tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/eu-elections-10114/articlesEU elections – The Conversation2024-01-14T19:05:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2208372024-01-14T19:05:32Z2024-01-14T19:05:32ZMore than 4 billion people are eligible to vote in an election in 2024. Is this democracy’s biggest test?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568754/original/file-20240110-23-1z2jwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C107%2C3000%2C2887&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/voting-positive-person-pigeon-vote-valid-2311529719">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>2024 is going to be democracy’s biggest year ever. In a remarkable milestone in human history, over four billion people – more than half of the world’s population across more than 40 countries – will <a href="https://www.ndi.org/elections-calendar">go to the polls</a>.</p>
<p>National elections will be held in the United States, India, Indonesia, Russia, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Mexico, and South Africa to name just a few. The European Union will also go to the polls. This busy calendar of elections is as extraordinary for the diversity of nations and peoples participating as it is for its huge scale.</p>
<p>It’s tempting to see this record as a triumph for democracy as the dominant organising principle for governing people in the modern world.<br>
But a closer examination shows democracy is at risk on many fronts. While these challenges take different forms in different jurisdictions, some clear patterns emerge. 2024 is going to be a rugged year for democracy, but there is still cause for cautious optimism about its future.</p>
<p>Here’s a rundown of just some of the significant elections that will shape the world in 2024.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/there-will-be-more-elections-in-2024-than-ever-before-heres-how-it-could-affect-financial-markets-220682">There will be more elections in 2024 than ever before – here's how it could affect financial markets</a>
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<h2>United States</h2>
<p>The most high-stakes election of 2024 will be the US general election for the president, house of representatives and senate in November. For decades America has stood as the world’s most powerful democracy and a guarantor (if a flawed one) of democratic governments the world over. </p>
<p>Donald Trump is the likely Republican nominee. In his previous term as President he did more than any previous chief executive to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/29/trump-democracy-abnormal-ratings/">undermine democracy</a> according to a Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) analysis. </p>
<p>Now he is promising to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/22/trump-revenge-game-plan-alarm">punish his political opponents</a>, override the independence of the Department of Justice and extend presidential power into non-political areas of government administration. </p>
<p>This prompted President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/biden-casts-trump-threat-to-democracy-as-central-to-2024-race/ar-AA1mwvvC">to warn</a> that “Democracy is on the ballot” in the 2024 Presidential vote.</p>
<p>At this stage, US voters do not seem to care too much, with Trump ahead in many <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">key opinion polls</a>. </p>
<h2>India and Indonesia</h2>
<p>The rise of democracy in India and Indonesia, the world’s second and fourth most populous nations, has been a game changer for the global advancement of human freedoms. The sheer scale of the elections in these developing nations, with a combined population of 1.7 billion, is also a miracle in modern administration. </p>
<p>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/31/bjp-modi-india-general-election-2024">almost certain</a> to be returned for a third term in an election to be likely held between April and May.</p>
<p>While Indonesian Defence Minister, Prabowo Subianto, is the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/from-populist-pariah-to-jokowis-man-analyzing-prabowo-subiantos-political-transformation/">clear frontrunner</a> to become the next president of the world’s largest Muslim nation in February.</p>
<p>In both cases, there is the risk these “strongman” leaders will win power in free and fair elections but then <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/02/india-elections-modi-bjp-congress-nda-lok-sabha-brics/">oversee illiberal policies</a> that put democratic institutions under strain.</p>
<h2>United Kingdom and Europe</h2>
<p>The UK is likely to go to a general election in the second half of 2024. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/">Current polling suggests</a> it will result in the first change of government in 14 years with victory for the Labour Party led by Keir Starmer. </p>
<p>If that happens, it will be a reminder of democracy’s ability to enable the transfer of political power between opposing interests without widespread bloodshed – something humankind has failed at for most of history. </p>
<p>Other elections in Europe will be a barometer of the standing of the populist far right. </p>
<p>The success of anti-Islam extremist Geert Wilders in elections in the Netherlands in November means many analysts are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/14/hard-right-europe-2024-ukraine-climate-election-us">now predicting</a> the far right will enjoy a surge in support in European parliament elections in June, as well as national elections in Austria, Belgium, Croatia and Finland. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-2024-election-cycle-could-result-in-more-threats-to-us-democracy-200704">Why the 2024 election cycle could result in more threats to US democracy</a>
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<h2>Africa</h2>
<p>National elections are occurring in a dozen countries in Africa this year including Rwanda, Ghana, Tunisia, South Sudan and Algeria. But most attention will be on the mid-year election in South Africa which will be the most important since the end of apartheid in 1994. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/332191/south-africas-all-to-play-for-election-in-2024/">Current polls suggest</a> that after three decades in power the African National Congress (ANC) will not be able to garner the necessary 50% of votes needed to govern in its own right, bringing to an end 30 years of one-party rule. </p>
<h2>Bogus elections</h2>
<p>Special mention must be made of the 2024 elections which will not be free and will not be fair. </p>
<p>Russia, Rwanda and Belarus are governed by tyrannical rulers who <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf">jail opponents</a> and run bogus elections that deliver 90% majorities or higher. </p>
<p>Then there is the charade elections occurring in Bangladesh, Iran and Tunisia where leaders allow the opposition to compete, but <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/free-and-fair-elections-index">not to win</a>.</p>
<h2>Will democracy pass these tests?</h2>
<p>Elections are taking place against a backdrop of spreading illiberalism around the world, the weakening of independent institutions in some of the big democracies, and a creeping disillusionment in advanced democracies, especially among younger people, about the benefits of a democratic system.</p>
<p>But there is also reason for cautious optimism that the long arc of history continues to steer determinedly towards a more democratic world. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-religion-and-politics-will-mix-in-2024-three-trends-to-track-219386">How religion and politics will mix in 2024 – three trends to track</a>
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<p>Democracy remains the model that most developing nations strive for. According to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%2C%20FIW%201989-2014.pdf">Freedom House</a>, there were 69 electoral democracies in 1990 rising to 122 by 2014. It is telling that even dictators and despots feel the need to give themselves the appearance of a democratic mandate. And <a href="https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/global-public-opinion-on-democracy-while-most-still-embrace-democratic-ideals-there-s-discontent-with-how-political-systems-are-functioning">surveys of citizens</a> in advanced democracies continue to show high levels of support for the ideals of democratic government.</p>
<p>“Government of the people, for the people, by the people” still holds significant advantages over all the other alternatives currently being tried. But in 2024 it will be tested mightily.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220837/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Reece does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In 2024, more than 40% of the world’s population is eligible to vote in an election. The scale is unprecedented, but not all elections are made equal. What will it mean for democracy?Nicholas Reece, Principal Fellow, Melbourne School of Government, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1969982023-12-11T14:18:15Z2023-12-11T14:18:15ZEU issues increasingly shaping national elections, research reveals, though left-right divide remains crucial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510094/original/file-20230214-26-o5vnke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">europawahl</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Treaty of Lisbon celebrates its 15th anniversary on 13 December. Looking back, <a href="https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2019/sieps-antologi-2019_2op-eng-web.pdf">experts agree that it played a big part in structuring the EU as we know it</a>. It reinforced the role of Commission President, to be elected by the European Parliament and share power with a newly created President of the European Council, the body that brings together EU heads of government. </p>
<p>So, the treaty strengthened both the Commission and the Council, effectively creating a dual executive for the EU. Following the treaty changes, the EU faced a succession of crises, including the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, the COVID pandemic, and the invasion of Ukraine. These have reinforced the centrality of both institutions for EU decision-making. </p>
<p>This dual nature of the EU executive is a reminder that <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044157">EU accountability vis-a-vis its citizens is <em>also</em> dual. </a>. The Commission, now elected by the Parliament signals the importance of the latter body for citizens’ ability determine EU policy. The renewed importance of the Council, as the intergovernmental executive body of the EU, underpins the role national elections play in holding the EU accountable. </p>
<p>Yet, when debates on the degree of democracy in the EU are held, or when institutional innovations are considered to increase the proximity between citizens and the EU, the focus tends to lie exclusively on the European Parliament (EP) elections, while national channels of accountability as a source of EU democratization tend to be disregarded. In order to counter that trend, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6">our book</a> examines the EU’s national accountability channels, providing a detailed analysis of how the EU is debated in national media and parliaments. </p>
<h2>North and south under the microscope</h2>
<p>The research focuses on six countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain from 2002-2021. Combining founding members of the EU with more recent entrants, these countries also differ in economic performance both before and after the Eurozone crisis.</p>
<p>The book notes an increasing importance of EU in the media and parliamentary debates. In terms of how they engage with the EU, these two arenas have inherently different logics. The media has a negativity bias. Therefore, as the media coverage of the EU issues grows, so does the negative tone toward it. In parliaments, the larger parties control debates, and they tend to act strategically. So, in countries such as Spain and Ireland with no eurosceptic party in Parliament, the EU is discussed to a greater extent by the larger parties. On the contrary, in countries where there is an eurosceptic party in parliament, the larger parties tend to discuss the EU less. This is probably to prevent the eurosceptic parties from gaining more visibility.</p>
<p>Both media and parliaments tend to focus on EU policies rather than notions of European belonging and identity. These findings are common to all countries, and suggest that both arenas are contributing to enable citizens to form opinions on EU policies rather than questioning EU membership. </p>
<p>Yet, differences do emerge between countries on how EU policies are debated. Namely, in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, EU policies are mostly discussed in the context of their effect on national policies. But in Germany, EU policies are discussed in a broader context.</p>
<p>So, the EU is being discussed mostly in terms of its policies. Citizens are therefore being provided with information about the EU which can then be used when making vote choices in legislative elections. </p>
<p>But is this occurring? Does Europe really matter in national elections? Our research, using different methods <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6_5">(experiments</a> and observational data), finds that this is indeed the case. If the EU matters, how does it compare to other factors which tend to explain vote choice? <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6_6">Despite the increasing importance of European factors, we found that traditional national left-right issues remain more significant defining factors of vote choice</a>. </p>
<p>But we found that the more EU policies were mentioned in the media, the more they impact how people vote. Regarding parliamentary debates, we find that the more eurosceptic parties discuss the EU in parliaments, the greater the importance that EU attitudes will have among these parties’ voters choice. </p>
<p>Therefore, our book establishes firmly the degree to which national governments are now selected across Europe partly on the basis of their stances on the EU. The national media environments, national parliamentary debates and legislative elections are not only important to legitimise governments at the national level, but also at the EU level. </p>
<p>The role that heads of government play in the European Council is not disconnected from voters choices back home when legislative elections are held. When discussing the quality of democracy with the EU and how it can be improved, it is necessary to take into account not only the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, but also the quality of the national media, national parliaments and legislative elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Costa Lobo est Directrice et Professeure de Sciences Politiques à l'Institut de Sciences Sociales de l'Université de Lisbonne. Elle a reçu des financements de European Research Council, Consolidator Grant no.682125.</span></em></p>The Treaty of Lisbon celebrates its 15th anniversary on 13 December. Looking back, experts agree that it played a big part in structuring the EU as we know it. It reinforced the role of Commission President…Marina Costa Lobo, Professor in political science , Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (FMSH)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818432022-04-24T21:21:18Z2022-04-24T21:21:18ZFrench president Emmanuel Macron wins re-election: a victory with deep challenges<p>Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/24/macron-wins-french-presidential-election_5981506_5.html">decisive victory</a> over Marine Le Pen in the second round of France’s presidential election on 24 April 2022 is no surprise. For more than a year, opinion polls had been predicting it. As early as April 2021, the leading polling institutes (Elabe, Harris interactive, Ifop, Ipsos) estimated the final score of the outgoing president in a range of 54 to 57% of the vote. And when it came down to the final night, Macron made it through all the campaign’s twists and came out unscathed, with 58.8% of the vote.</p>
<p>The success continues the theme of the first round, when Macron finished 4.5 points and 1.6 million votes ahead of Le Pen, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon just barely being eliminated for the second round – he won nearly <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/11/french-presidential-election-the-winners-and-the-losers-of-the-first-round_5980244_5.html">22% of the vote</a>, just a single percentage point behind the far-right candidate.</p>
<p>With the first round behind him, Macron knew that he could count on the support of a larger number of candidates (Valerie Pécresse, Les Républicains; Yannick Jadot, Europe Ecologie–Les Verts; Fabien Roussel, Parti Communiste; and Anne Hidalgo, Parti Socialiste) than Le Pen, who was endorsed only by the two other far-right candidates (Eric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan). </p>
<p>While Mélenchon did not call for his supporters to cast votes for Macron, he proclaimed that <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220410-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-jean-luc-m%C3%A9lenchon-appelle-%C3%A0-ne-pas-donner-une-seule-voix-%C3%A0-marine-le-pen">“not a single vote”</a> should go to Marine Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Re-election without shared power</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron thus escapes the curse of the <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-billet-politique/emmanuel-macron-face-a-la-malediction-du-sortant">“punishment vote”</a> against the incumbent president that led to the defeats of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 and Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012, and also contributed to François Hollande’s decision not to stand for re-election in 2017. Macron also becomes the first president of France’s Fifth Republic to be reelected without having to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">share power</a>. François Mitterrand went into the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44484352">1988 elections</a> with the centre-right Jacques Chirac as prime minister. The situation was reversed from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42843396">1997 to 2002</a>, after then-president Chirac made the error of calling elections early and ended up with Lionel Jospin of the Parti Socialiste as his prime minister.</p>
<p>Macron’s win appears to vindicate his 2017 strategy in which he cast himself as the “progressive” champion of pro-European liberals of the right and the left against the “nationalist populists” gathered around Marine Le Pen. In the past five years, Macron’s words and actions have sought to consolidate the bipolarisation that had ensured his success in the second round of the 2017 presidential election and appeared to be the key to a second term.</p>
<h2>An imperfect strategy</h2>
<p>The strategy worked, but only imperfectly. Indeed, the French political landscape is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">structured around three poles</a> rather than two. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s score was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">first round’s biggest surprise</a>, as was his capacity to bring together left-wing voters hostile to Macron’s liberalism. This was most overlooked by Macron himself, who concentrated on capturing the electorate of the traditional right. </p>
<p>During the two-week period between the two rounds, the question of what left-wing voters would – or wouldn’t – do was crucial, with the two finalists both seeking to attract those who voted for Mélenchon. Marine Le Pen pushed her <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">“social-populist strategy”</a> while seeking to minimise her party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649">deep ties to Russia</a>. Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, declared that he would <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/17/macron-unveils-plan-to-address-climate-change-ahead-of-french-election_5980777_5.html">make the environment the top priority</a> of his goverment. Neither succeeded in fully convincing voters nor did the balance of power really shift.</p>
<p>The results of the second round seem to indicate that left-wing voters did not behave in a mechanical and uniform way. A significant proportion opted for Marine Le Pen, particularly in rural areas and in the <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/guadeloupe/marine-le-pen-plebiscitee-par-les-guadeloupeens-les-saint-martinois-et-les-saint-barths-1276256.html">overseas departments and territories</a>. In the latter, she attracted many who had voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round: she obtained almost 70% of the vote in Guadeloupe, where he had won 56% of the vote a fortnight earlier. Still, a slightly larger fraction voted for Emmanuel Macron, especially in the big cities where Mélenchon’s supporters have a sociological profile fairly close to that of the incumbent president. </p>
<h2>Refusing to choose</h2>
<p>Even more numerous are those who refused to choose. More than 12% of voters cast a blank or invalid ballot, compared to 2.2% for the first round. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-cause-cachee-de-la-montee-de-labstention-180152">abstention rate</a> was also significantly higher than that of the first round of 2022 (28% versus 26.3%), and was also higher than that of 2017’s second round (25.4%). </p>
<p>The electorate’s three-way split does not sit well with the two-round majority vote. In 1969, the low proportion of votes cast in relation to the number of registered voters (63%) was already proof of this. 2022 serves as an even bolder example, with turnout sinking below 60% – a record for a French presidential election. Emmanuel Macron is therefore both one of the “best elected” presidents of the Fifth Republic (behind Jacques Chirac in 2002 and himself in 2017) if we compare his score to the votes cast, and “worst elected” if we look at the percentage of registered voters (barely 35%, against 38% for Georges Pompidou in 1969 and 43.5% for himself in 2017).</p>
<p>The scattering of left-wing, and to a lesser extent, of traditional right-wing votes, has caused Macron to fall back by more than 8 points and nearly 4 million voters compared to the second round of 2017. This drop is unprecedented in the history of presidential elections: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in 1981, and Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2012, had respectively lost 3 and 5 points compared to the previous election.</p>
<h2>A crumbling “Republican front”</h2>
<p>This has less to do with a punishment vote than the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2021/06/25/de-la-sfio-aux-regionales-de-2021-la-lente-erosion-du-front-republicain-dans-le-monde_6085704_4500055.html">erosion</a> of the “Republican front” – or the French political tradition consisting in setting aside political differences to prevent the far right’s rise to power. It had a huge impact in 2002, was less effective in 2017 and only worked partially in 2022. Hence although Le Pen has lost again, voting for a far right candidate is no longer seen as unacceptable in France.</p>
<p>The victory of Emmanuel Macron, while anticipated, should not mask the election’s two main lessons. First, the far right obtained a level never before reached in France, thanks to its ability to bring together a heterogeneous, predominantly working-class electorate. Second, the country’s political landscape, now structured around three poles, is out of step with a voting system adapted to two dominant parties. These two issues make the outcome of France’s upcoming legislative elections, which take place in June, all the more uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>Emmanuel Macron’s success validates a strategy aimed at making him appear as the champion of the “progressives”, but it has only partially worked.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1175792019-06-03T21:13:39Z2019-06-03T21:13:39ZHow youth influenced the EU election – and could do the same in Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276621/original/file-20190527-193540-17php9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5649%2C3760&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstrator holds a sign outside the Portuguese parliament in Lisbon during a climate strike of school students as part of the Fridays for Future movements on Friday, May 24, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Armando Franca)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With major votes occurring within the span of five months this year, the European Union and Canadian federal elections are critical in deciding our planet’s future.</p>
<p>The results of the EU election — in which each European country elects an allotted number of representatives to the EU parliament — have already resulted in big changes, largely due to youth getting involved in politics.</p>
<p>Young people around the world are demonstrating a thorough understanding of the larger economic and environmental threats that are endangering not only individual freedom, but the very survival of our own species and more than <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/canada-biodiversity-1.5125108">a million others</a>.</p>
<p>Around the world, youth protest movements like #FridaysForFuture have been growing steadily. Student protesters recently turned out in <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2019/05/24/student-protesters-hope-bay-st-march-will-wake-up-government-and-corporations-to-climate-crisis.html">120 countries and 1,700 cities</a> to demand action on climate change just days before the EU elections on May 26. The next global student strike has already been announced for Sept. 20 and is expected to draw even bigger numbers.</p>
<p>It’s clear that young voters are bringing critical issues to the fore.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276617/original/file-20190527-193544-upar1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Young people protest ahead of the European elections during a climate strike of school students as part of the Fridays for Future movement in front of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Boris Roessler/dpa via AP)</span></span>
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<p>As Europeans headed to the polls to elect a new European Parliament, the notion of a European “Green New Deal” was a big campaign issue. The German Green Party made history by coming in second place with <a href="https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/europawahl-2019/35_19_vorlaeufiges-ergebnis.html">20.5 per cent thanks in part to the increased voter turnout in Germany (61.4 per cent)</a>.</p>
<p>The shift was due mostly to many first-time voters casting their ballots for the Greens, who won <a href="https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-05/europawahlergebnis-klimapolitik-fridays-for-future-protestwahl-gruene">the highest support in the 18-to-24 cohort — 34 per cent — and 27 per cent in the 25-to-35 age group.</a>.</p>
<h2>European Green New Deal</h2>
<p>There was a renewed brawl pitting democratic eco-socialists and liberals against conservatives and far-right parties, as Europeans witnessed most strikingly in the <a href="https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/the-maastricht-debate-insight-into-candidates-for-european-commission">first debate</a> of the lead candidates of the pan-European parties.</p>
<p>The debate focused on “digital Europe,” “sustainable Europe” and the future of Europe. </p>
<p>The prospect of a European Green New Deal — popular among young voters — has been increasingly paired with renewed discussions about democratizing the European Union not just politically, but also economically. </p>
<p>Yanis Varoufakis’s transnational party <a href="https://europeanspring.net/">European Spring</a> included a Green New Deal in its platform, with the following pledges: <a href="https://diem25.org/manifesto-long/">“To dismantle the habitual domination of corporate power over the will of citizens; to re-politicize the rules that govern our single market and common currency.”</a> </p>
<p>The party only marginally missed the threshold for securing seats in Germany and Greece, <a href="https://diem25.org/green-new-deal-gathers-more-than-1-4-million-votes-across-europe/">but more than 1.4 millions Europeans</a> voted for a Green New Deal. In Spain, the Socialist Party (PSOE) won <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-green-new-deal-is-going-global-115961">on a Green New Deal platform</a>.</p>
<p>As World Economic Forum writer <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/this-is-what-a-green-new-deal-for-europe-could-look-like/">Katie Whiting explained, a European Green New Deal would</a> invest “at least five per cent of Europe’s GDP in emissions-free transportation infrastructure, renewable energies and innovative technologies, while creating jobs and transitioning Europe to zero-emissions — all without raising taxes.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-green-new-deal-is-going-global-115961">The Green New Deal is going global</a>
</strong>
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<p>The European Greens, with <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20190523STO52402/elections-2019-highest-turnout-in-20-years">69 projected MEPs</a> in the European Parliament, will certainly need to respond to calls from the Left Bloc (38 seats) and the Socialists and Democrats (153 seats) to work together on making Europe environmentally green and socially just.</p>
<p>They’ll have to do so while dealing with MEPs from pan-European parties like Volt Europa who want to <a href="https://www.volteuropa.org/vision">democratize the European Union</a> as far-right parties like <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groe-but-heres-what-they-all-have-in-common-101919">Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)</a> embrace increasingly nationalist and isolationist views.</p>
<p>The EU environmental agenda is also being shaped by particular national New Green debates. For example, in Germany, there is talk of reappropriating apartment units and car manufacturers to alleviate inequality and establish a <a href="http://www.taz.de/Debatte-Kevin-Kuehnert-zu-Enteignung/!5590059/">more sustainable Europe.</a> </p>
<h2>Nationalize BMW?</h2>
<p>Soon after discussions about nationalizing real estate properties emerged in the state of Berlin, Kevin Kühnert, the head of the 80,000-member-strong youth movement of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), was recently in the news for <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/05/02/german-politician-calls-bmw-put-collective-ownership/">public remarks</a> calling for the nationalization of corporations like BMW as well. </p>
<p>BMW is in the spotlight due to allegations it “breached EU antitrust rules from 2006 to 2014,” according to the <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2008_en.htm">European Commission</a>. It’s being investigated for allegedly using illegal defeat devices to cheat regulatory emissions tests.</p>
<p>It’s not just young people making the case for abolishing private ownership of some entities. These daring remarks by young people, sometimes considered taboo, have inspired older generations too. As Germany celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Federal Republic and its German Basic Law, even Baby Boomers are reminding the public about the law’s Article 15 that allows the <a href="https://www.vorwaerts.de/artikel/enteignungen-steht-grundgesetz">nationalization of private property</a>. </p>
<p>Demands for action on climate change are growing louder every day. British parliament recently declared a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/01/declare-formal-climate-emergency-before-its-too-late-corbyn-warns">climate emergency</a> due in part to ongoing protests organized by the Extinction Rebellion movement, which has also been supported by #FridaysForFuture student activist <a href="https://twitter.com/GretaThunberg">Greta Thunberg</a>.</p>
<h2>Growing movement?</h2>
<p>The strong representation of Democratic Socialists federally in Germany, including young socialists up to the age of 35, is beginning to take hold across the Atlantic, where the Democratic Socialists of America, whose membership stands at 60,000, have also amassed more than 200,000 followers on <a href="https://twitter.com/DemSocialists?ref_src=twsrc%5Egogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Twitter</a>.</p>
<p>While Canada seems to be lagging behind when compared to the European youth activism, voter turnout for those aged 18-24 <a href="https://bdp.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/2016104E#a6">increased by 18 percentage points from the 2011 federal election to 57.1 per cent in 2015</a></p>
<p>And although provincial elections in Alberta and Prince Edward Island resulted in Progressive Conservative governments, the Green Party of P.E.I. are the first Greens in Canada to become the official opposition. </p>
<p>The progress is happening as many young Europeans and Canadians look up to young leaders like Germany’s Kühnert and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the United States as they advocate Green New Deals. It’s time for young people in Canada to get more involved politically if they want to have a shot at saving the planet. For now, #FridaysForFuture may be a good way to start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117579/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tobias Wilczek receives funding for his doctoral research from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).</span></em></p>It’s clear that young voters are bringing critical issues to the fore as they did in the recent EU elections. Will they do so in Canada too?Tobias Wilczek, University Instructor in German Studies, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179982019-06-03T08:26:43Z2019-06-03T08:26:43ZSNP surge in European elections has major implications for a second independence referendum<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276991/original/file-20190529-192361-1t9wk9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Jane Barlow</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fallout from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/european-elections-6507">European elections</a> in Scotland is of interest not just to voters north of the border but also for its potential wider ramifications.</p>
<p>Unlike most of the rest of the UK, where the upstart Brexit Party topped the poll, in Scotland the SNP finished first yet again. The party took more than <a href="https://www.snp.org/snp-victory-in-european-elections/">38% of the vote</a>, picking up half of Scotland’s six seats in the European Parliament.</p>
<p>This is quite a remarkable success for a party that has been in power in Scotland since 2007 and has finished top in every election since 2011.</p>
<h2>The surge</h2>
<p>The party had a clear and unambiguous message going into this election. It wants to stop Brexit. This allowed it to rally support from pro-Remain voters.</p>
<p>However, the SNP also had an anti-Westminster message: Westminster is ignoring the wishes of Scots and the best way to respond is to vote SNP.</p>
<p>All this matters because overshadowing everything in Scottish politics is the constitutional divide between unionists and nationalists and whether Scotland should become independent as the parties position themselves for a possible second independence referendum.</p>
<p>For the SNP, Scotland voting differently from the rest of the UK feeds into the narrative that Scotland is just politically different and should make its own decisions.</p>
<p>The SNP vote is also mainly pro-EU, but some of its voters who want to leave the EU may also want to leave the UK even more. Such voters will support the SNP anyway, viewing it as the best vehicle to deliver independence.</p>
<p>On the unionist side, the result looks initially quite poor for the Conservatives. Nevertheless, their percentage share of the vote was still higher than the party received in England and Wales.</p>
<p>The Conservative anti-independence message to an extent prevented the party from having an even worse election. They are likely to remain the main unionist party, particular as their leader Ruth Davidson has a very high profile, rivalling only the SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon, and is also relatively popular too.</p>
<p>Davidson, though, will want to distance herself somewhat from the UK Conservative Party leadership, given its <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-resigns-how-the-leadership-race-could-play-out-from-here-117762">current turmoil</a>. Before the elections, Boris Johnson, now the main contender to replace Theresa May, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ruth-davidson-bars-boris-johnson-from-party-conference-after-dismal-poll-results-ss9bhz80k">was blocked from attending</a> the Scottish Conservative and Unionist conference.</p>
<h2>Labour losses</h2>
<p>The big losers in Scotland were the other unionist party – Labour. The party lost both of its MEPs and a huge number of voters. It once took one in four votes in European elections but was reduced, this time around, to less than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-48424055">10% of the vote</a>. </p>
<p>Clearly the 2014 and 2016 referendums have taken their toll on the party but this is a particularly poor result for Richard Leonard, the Scottish Labour leader and an ally of Jeremy Corbyn. Leonard has made no real impact despite repositioning the party to the left.</p>
<p>If Leonard has to stand down as leader it is unlikely he will be replaced by a candidate on the left. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/labour-euro-campaigns-chief-neil-findlay-to-quit-holyrood-amid-internal-battles-1-4936243">Neil Findlay</a>, the other key Corbyn ally in Scotland, has already announced he will be standing down at the next election to pursue other interests.</p>
<p>As the Scottish party leader sits on Labour’s ruling national executive this could be problematic for Corbyn. And while Corbyn is under pressure to support a second EU referendum, his Scottish party is under even greater scrutiny. Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain in 2016 and the remain parties won more than 60% again in the European elections. The pressure on Scottish Labour is likely to intensify.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Brexit Party did finish a distant second with around 14% in Scotland but this does not place them to do well in the next Holyrood election. UKIP won a seat at the 2014 EU elections in Scotland and gained less than 2% two years later at the Holyrood elections.</p>
<p>The Brexit Party, if it fights other elections in Scotland, is likely to attract mainly unionist voters, fragmenting the vote even further. This would only help the SNP. A Liberal Democrat recovery in Scotland could do likewise.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The SNP is already seeking to capitalise on the European election result, immediately introducing legislation in the Scottish parliament to allow for a possible referendum on independence to be held.</p>
<p>The Conservative Party candidates for prime minister all agree so far that they will not be another referendum on Scottish independence. However, Scottish Conservatives will be hoping that they temper and moderate their language somewhat.</p>
<p>Conservative home secretary Sajid David’s comment that Scotland will not be <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/home-secretary-sajid-javid-mocked-on-twitter-for-scottish-independence-allow-comment-1-4937765">“allowed”</a> to hold another referendum is likely to grate even with unionists, who would rather the line that “Scots don’t want one” was used instead.</p>
<p>Unionists are aware that the SNP will seek to portray the constitutional issue as Scotland versus Westminster and will hope to avoid this. For the SNP it is a waiting game. The ideal situation may be perhaps a no-deal Brexit imposed by Westminster with Johnston as the new prime minister. This might just strain the 300-year-old union to breaking point.</p>
<p>The EU elections are over but both the SNP and Conservatives know that the real battle for Scotland in the run up to the 2021 Scottish elections and the push for indyref2.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ruling party took three of six seats in the European Parliament.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179972019-05-31T10:00:10Z2019-05-31T10:00:10ZBack in business – but are the Liberal Democrats back for good?<p>The Liberal Democrats must currently be tempted to quote Mark Twain’s quip that “the report of my death was an exaggeration.”</p>
<p>Only four years ago it was fashionable to argue that the Liberal Democrats <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/12/strange-death-of-liberal-democrats-leadership-vote">were finished</a>. After five years in coalition government with the Conservatives, they lost 49 parliamentary seats in the 2015 election, ending up with just eight MPs. The party’s representation in local government was halved, and in Europe almost obliterated.</p>
<p>But in the European elections of 2019, the party came second in a national election for the first time ever. It won representation in every region of England, coming top of the poll in London. In the local elections they doubled their representation and the number of councils they control in the areas contested. Finally a <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/05/30/lib-dems-lead-polls-they-start-become-party-48">YouGov poll</a> put the Lib Dems ahead of all other parties for the first time since 2010. What has returned the Liberal Democrats to health, and will it last?</p>
<h2>Time to forgive?</h2>
<p>There is something to be said for the reconciliation factor when it comes to the Lib Dems. It is possible that the portion of the public that voted Liberal Democrat in 2010, but abandoned it in revulsion <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KUDjRZ30SNo">at the experience of coalition</a> has forgiven the party.</p>
<p>The party’s share of the vote – 19% in the local elections and 20% in the European elections – is suggestively close to the 23% secured in 2010. Lib Dem victories in councils it held before its losses under the coalition like North Devon, Winchester and North Norfolk, and topping the poll in Stockport in the European elections, suggest it is building on historic strengths.</p>
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<p>If true, though, this is remarkable. Reputational damage – as Labour found after the <a href="https://www.historyextra.com/period/modern/the-winter-of-discontent-what-can-we-learn-from-history/">Winter of Discontent</a> in the late 1970s and the Tories after the <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/chequers-deal-brexit-more-unpopular-poll-tax/">Poll Tax</a> in 1990 – usually affects parties for a decade or more, and is used by their opponents for at least as long. Labour supporters are particularly indignant that the coalition effect seemed to lose its impact so quickly – look at the embittered responses among some party members about party member Alistair Campbell’s decision to <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/labour-should-review-spiteful-expulsion-of-alastair-campbell-kcsx36h6c">vote Lib Dem</a> in the 2019 elections for an example. </p>
<p>Perhaps the coalition question was obscured for these elections by a second factor: Brexit. The Lib Dems’ success in London and York at the European elections, and winning seats on councils like Warwick, indicate that their clarity in rejecting the referendum result – summed up in the slogan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/09/liberal-democrats-bollocks-to-brexit-party-slogan">“Bollocks to Brexit”</a> – was decisive in recruiting defectors from other parties. The potential for this was first demonstrated when the Lib Dems took the parliamentary seat of Richmond in a 2016 by-election, but failed at the 2017 general election while the public reserved judgement on the Brexit process.</p>
<p>The Brexit factor is a double-edged sword. It has restored the credibility of the Lib Dems as an electoral alternative but it is a benefit shared with the Greens in England and the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, all of whom are staunchly anti-Brexit as well. It is also a factor vulnerable to changing circumstances and election agendas. The two Lib Dem <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48468251">leadership contenders</a> have already identified the need to give thought to what the party stands for beyond Brexit.</p>
<h2>Beyond the protest vote</h2>
<p>The Liberal Democrats’ increased vote has been dismissed by opponents as a familiar “protest” phenomenon. European elections are generally seen as a vehicle for public frustration and this time it was ever more so. Anger at the inertia and perceived incompetence of the government and official opposition drove voters <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48402593">to smaller parties</a> on both the Leave and Remain side of the Brexit debate. This would be a fragile basis for growth as it depends heavily on the leaderships and conduct of the main parties.</p>
<p>Liberal surges in past by-elections have often been based on protest votes. The party then generally failed to capitalise on the swing at the next general election. However, the 2019 Lib Dem surge doesn’t mainly look like protest voting. The local government areas in which the Lib Dems topped the poll for either the council elections or the European poll either had previous Lib Dem representation or voted “Remain” in the 2016 referendum. To that extent, the Lib Dems’ success seems to have a positive basis.</p>
<p>There are lessons in all this for the Lib Dems and their opponents. Labour and the Conservatives cannot take even their base vote for granted these days. They urgently need unity and clarity if they are to prevent repeats of May 2019.</p>
<p>The Lib Dems need to develop a profile wider than opposition to Brexit, and to practise their well-established skills for digging in where they have won new support. The party was never likely to die, but what it does with its life is less inevitable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Cole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How the resurgent party can learn from the mistakes of the past to keep growing.Matthew Cole, Teaching Fellow, Department of History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1180682019-05-30T12:25:16Z2019-05-30T12:25:16ZAn anti-Brexit party just made an extraordinary breakthrough in Northern Ireland<p>In Britain, the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/48420324?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cwmmd8e4433t/brexit-party&link_location=live-reporting-story">big story</a> of the 2019 European elections was the breakthrough of a group that formed just weeks before the poll – Nigel Farage’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigel-farage-triumphs-survey-reveals-what-drove-voters-to-the-brexit-party-in-the-european-elections-117865">Brexit Party</a>. But in Northern Ireland, there was another shock success – for a party that has been around for half a century without making a major electoral impact. </p>
<p>Since it was founded in 1970, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland has usually been in fifth place behind the main unionist and nationalist parties. But in the 2019 European elections, it ended up, after the final round of counting, with the <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/eu-elections-2019/eu-election-results-diane-dodds-naomi-long-and-martina-anderson-are-northern-irelands-meps-amid-alliance-vote-surge-38151787.html">highest number of votes overall</a>. This surprise result came just three weeks after it secured <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/local-elections-2019/northern-ireland-local-government-elections-2019-results-alliance-surge-dup-and-sinn-fein-still-top-two-38073953.html">11.5% of the vote</a> in the local government elections – almost double its share five years ago and its largest since 1977.</p>
<p>It’s being called the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/alliance-surge-continues-with-long-taking-seat-in-european-parliament-1.3906264">“Alliance surge”</a>. Everyone is talking about a party which, for decades, was widely, if unfairly, regarded as too boring to talk about.</p>
<h2>What is going on?</h2>
<p>Alliance’s success is down to a combination of factors: events, leadership, and ideas.</p>
<p>The events are the unique circumstances surrounding the European poll. It appears that some <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-48370936">Sinn Féin voters put Alliance as their first preference</a> in the belief that Sinn Féin’s Martina Anderson would be elected anyway, and that Alliance was the most likely Remain party to take the third of Northern Ireland’s European Parliament seats (the DUP’s pro-Brexit Diane Dodds being virtually guaranteed the other one). Alliance also mobilised its own constituency, gained support from pro-Remain unionists abandoning the equivocating Ulster Unionist Party, and received thousands of lower preference votes from the SDLP and Greens.</p>
<p>Then there’s the candidate who took that European seat, Naomi Long. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-37617253">“Ginger Ninja”</a> (a description she herself embraced in a previous campaign) has been leader of the party since 2016. Predecessors have been statesmanlike but cerebral. Northern Irish politicians can be dour, evasive, or crassly hostile. Long has the ability to translate Alliance’s policies into compelling common sense. Her tone of perpetual exasperation has clearly captured the mood of a public which has much to be exasperated about: no power-sharing government between unionism and nationalists; not much reconciliation since the Troubles; and Brexit, which a majority do not want.</p>
<p>What Alliance actually stands for is also crucial. First and foremost is reconciliation. It’s the largest and oldest party to draw support from both Catholics and Protestants. It also has a progressive social and environmental agenda, an important selling point for many young voters. And on the border question, it’s pragmatic. For Alliance (and this is incredible to many unionists and nationalists), the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is secondary to how social and political life is arranged for the good of citizens in the region.</p>
<h2>Why now?</h2>
<p>Alliance, along with the SDLP and other moderates, were decades ahead of their time in calling for a Good Friday Agreement-type solution to the violent conflict. Yet an electoral breakthrough for the self-styled “radical centre” never came. For cynics, this suggested that the non-aligned “third tradition” of which Alliance spoke was mythical – a fantasy of the conflict-insulated middle class.</p>
<p>What appears to have happened now is that Alliance’s vision has finally been amplified by an attractive leadership, and a specific electoral opportunity has arisen for this vision to be endorsed by the public in a manner that actually converts into seats won.</p>
<p>In the past, Alliance has been derided for supposedly being on the fence about Northern Ireland’s national question. But Brexit has given the party the chance to take a crystal clear stand on the major issue of the day. Indeed, there are likely few other parties in Europe so ideologically suited to making a case for the European Union. Alliance’s belief in sharing and diversity, suspicion of nationalism, and longstanding support for immigration, all translate seamlessly into a principled pro-EU argument.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>There are several implications of the Alliance surge. It strengthens the anti-Brexit, pro-backstop voice of Northern Ireland. It raises major questions for the two main unionist parties which have become cold houses for voters who care about rights, reconciliation and the impact of Brexit. It further challenges the “two communities” architecture of the (suspended) Northern Ireland institutions – which <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537113.2018.1489574">Alliance has long-criticised</a> as divisive.</p>
<p>And it proves, along with the growth of the Greens, that there is a section of society which does not fit into the unionist and nationalist blocs, and which wants to be heard. If there is a referendum on Irish unity in the coming years, it may well be the followers of Long’s Alliance Party who decide the outcome. After 50 years, the future really could be in their hands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mitchell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For 50 years, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland has lagged behind the main unionist and nationalist parties. But it left them standing in the European elections.David Mitchell, Assistant Professor in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179272019-05-29T12:43:19Z2019-05-29T12:43:19ZHow Germany’s Green party took on the far right to become a major political force<p>A green wave has flooded Europe in the 2019 European elections. The big winners of the night were the German Greens, who took <a href="https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/index.html">20.5%.</a> of the national vote, almost doubling their 10.7% share from 2014. This best ever result is even more significant given the exceptionally high turnout in Germany of <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/previous-elections">61.4%</a>. </p>
<p>The German Greens will now be represented by 21 MEPs – ten more than in the last parliament. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats (SPD) suffered a historic defeat, losing 12 of their MEPs. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) lost five. </p>
<p>These staggering pro-Green results in the European elections have firmly put environmentalism on the political agenda within both Germany and Europe. The once dominant European Parliament party groups of the centre right and the centre left have lost their majority, which means the Green bloc could become kingmakers. Both sides will need support from the Greens to create broad pro-EU majorities, giving the group a strengthened hand to push for real, European, ecological change. </p>
<h2>A real alternative</h2>
<p>In eight months of PhD fieldwork on the Greens in Berlin, Kiel and Stuttgart, I have some observations about how the party has transformed to become the main political challenger in Germany – a country known best for its economy and car manufacturers. </p>
<p>The German Greens have no doubt benefited from their perceived competence on climate change and increased awareness of the need for proactive environmental protection. But they are also deliberately repositioning themselves as a real alternative to the parties of government. And the approach seems to be working. The party welcomed more than <a href="https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-02/mitgliederzahlen-gruene-rekord-zuwachs-partei-ostdeutschland">10,000 new members in 2018</a> alone, a figure that continues to rise.</p>
<p>The Greens have further cemented their status by taking strong positions on issues beyond the environment. They are emphatically pro-Europe, and anti-racism and the far right. </p>
<p>During my fieldwork, I found that this issue has been just as important as climate change for those joining the party. Membership numbers started to rapidly increase, for instance, as the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the national parliament. Rather than pander to the AfD’s anti-immigration rhetoric, as other political parties have done, the Greens have taken a very adversarial approach to the newcomers. </p>
<p>When the AfD made a formal complaint to parliament in February 2018 about a speech by National Green MP Cem Özdemir <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/oezdemirs-bundestagsrede-zur-afd-deutschland-ist-staerker-als-es-ihr-hass-jemals-sein-wird/21003244.html">accusing the AfD of racism and censorship</a>, Green politicians hit back. Green MEP Sven Giegold collected instances of AfD politicians being racist and Islamophobic so that the party could put forward its own complaint to the same all-party parliamentary committee and <a href="https://sven-giegold.de/nehmt-der-afd-die-maske-runter-schickt-uns-belege-fuer-den-rassismus-der-afd-fuer-den-aeltestenrat-des-bundestags/">then published them on his website</a>.</p>
<h2>Groundswell</h2>
<p>This positioning of the party as an alternative happens on the streets as much as in institutions. The German Greens unapologetically mobilise within movements that oppose the AfD and racism, such as the “Europe for All” march that campaigned for a Europe free from the far right. They also support groundbreaking ecological movements, from campaigns to phase out coal to the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/school-climate-strikes-69510">#FridaysForFuture</a> school strikes for climate, inspired by environmental activist Greta Thunberg.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the CDU and SPD – the two traditionally catch-all parties of Germany – are perceived to have taken little action on climate change during their time in a grand coalition government. They appear to have been punished for this at the polls, with both parties losing vote share to the Greens in the EU elections in comparison with the vote shares achieved during the last <a href="https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2019-05-26-EP-DE/index.shtml">German general election</a>. </p>
<p>The German Greens also seem to be the only party to have successfully undertaken reform strategies since the general election of 2017. Party members elected new party co-leaders Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock in January 2018, who appear to have stopped infighting between leftist and reformist party wings.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, infighting continues unabated in the CDU and SPD. The CDU is plagued by those calling for a shift to the right after Angela Merkel’s tenure as chancellor comes to an end. And the leader of the SPD youth wing, Kevin Kühnert, has made his name by openly criticising his own party’s role in the grand coalition. </p>
<h2>A Green chancellor?</h2>
<p>The European elections saw the Greens perform overwhelmingly well in cities and in western states. The affluent state of Baden-Württemberg is run by a majority Green coalition, headed by prime minister Winfried Kretschmann, and the state capital, Stuttgart, has a Green mayor, Fritz Kuhn. Despite the controversial introduction of a <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/in-stuttgart-demonstrierten-700-buerger-gegen-dieselfahrverbote-15998025.html">one-year provisional diesel ban</a> in Stuttgart at the start of this year, the Greens managed to increase their vote share in the municipal elections held alongside the EU elections. The Greens are now the largest party in Stuttgart, ahead of the former leaders, the CDU. This increased trust of green politics in the affluent west could be seen in the party’s similarly strong showing in the state elections in wealthy Hesse and Bavaria last October.</p>
<p>However, in eastern states, where economic deprivation and political dissatisfaction are much higher, the Greens struggle to break through in the same way. Despite coming second only to the CDU overall in the European elections, the Greens have scored much lower vote shares in areas of Germany that used to belong to East Germany, with only a <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europawahl-ergebnisse-deutschland-1.4464207">few, metropolitan exceptions</a>.</p>
<p>With some of these eastern states due to have state elections later this year, this will be an interesting test for the #GreenWave. Whether they prove successful or not in these regional votes, this European electoral success could lead to the Greens playing a big role in the next national government coalition negotiations. We could see the return of the Greens as a junior coalition partner after 16 years in opposition, this time with the CDU, or as the leading party in a left-coalition with the SPD and The Left Party.</p>
<p>If the Greens maintain their position as Germany’s second party ahead of the SPD, this coalition could even mean that Germany could have a Green chancellor in the not too distant future. Not bad for a supposedly “one-issue” party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chantal Sullivan-Thomsett receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council competition of the White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities. </span></em></p>Germany’s Green Party were the big story on the night of the European elections. Their strategy has been to expand beyond climate policies to become a true alternative to establishment parties.Chantal Sullivan-Thomsett, PhD Candidate in German and Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1178652019-05-27T15:36:27Z2019-05-27T15:36:27ZNigel Farage triumphs: survey reveals what drove voters to the Brexit Party in the European elections<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/european-elections-6507">European elections</a> in England were a triumph for Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party, which took 32% of the vote. There was real success for the Liberal Democrats and Greens as well, <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-labours-dismal-european-election-performance-is-it-too-late-for-jeremy-corbyn-to-back-a-second-referendum-117845">deep disappointment for Labour</a> and the new Change UK party and disaster for the Conservatives.</p>
<p>Survey research we conducted just before the vote shows where the Brexit Party votes came from, offering some vital insight into what the main parties need to do to recover from their losses ahead of any future general election.</p>
<p>In the survey, conducted just before the European elections, we found that the Brexit Party benefited most from disaffected Conservative voters. However, it also took votes from Labour and even the Liberal Democrats as well as soaking up the UK Independence Party (UKIP) vote.</p>
<p>However, the our survey results also show that voters are locked in a dead heat on the question of how they would vote in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/peoples-vote-59512">second referendum</a>; we found 43% said they’d vote to remain and 43% said they’d vote to leave. Another 6% said they would not vote, while 8% said they didn’t know which way they’d go.</p>
<h2>Tory exodus</h2>
<p>We worked all this out using an internet survey commissioned from Deltapoll conducted between the May 18 and 22, 2019. This survey is part of a wider project to study the Brexit process and it involved interviewing just over 2,500 people, making it more than twice as large as a standard opinion poll.</p>
<p>We asked respondents which party they voted for in the 2017 general election and then compared their answers to their vote intention in the European elections. The survey showed that 64% of the Brexit Party vote came from Conservatives, 22% came from Labour, 11% from Liberal Democrats, and 3% from other parties, largely UKIP. </p>
<p>Put simply, the Brexit Party took three times as many votes from the Conservatives as it did from Labour and six times as many as it took from the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<h2>Bad news for Corbyn and Johnson – but Farage too</h2>
<p>We also asked if respondents felt satisfied or dissatisfied with <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-resigns-as-british-prime-minister-heres-where-it-all-went-wrong-117763">Theresa May</a> as prime minister and only 22% said they were satisfied. A massive 74% were dissatisfied. That said, the public evaluates leaders using a variety of characteristics such as their competence, honesty, caring quality and other attributes. It turns out that these are all summarised rather well by asking people if they like or dislike a particular leader. If the public like a leader they are very likely to think that they are competent, honest and so on.</p>
<p>We measured the likeability of leaders using an 11 point scale, where zero means they dislike them a lot and ten means that they like them a lot. The chart below shows the average scores on this leadership scale for <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/jeremy-corbyn-18860">Jeremy Corbyn</a>, Nigel Farage, Theresa May and Vince Cable. Boris Johnson is also included since he is currently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/24/uk/may-resigns-what-next-merrick-gbr-intl/index.html">the frontrunner</a> in the Conservative leadership race.</p>
<p>Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn did worst, with a likeability score of only 3.8 and Vince Cable did best with a score of 5.9. These scores, in part, may explain why Labour’s performance was poor and the Liberal Democrats did so well in the election. </p>
<p>Interestingly though, Nigel Farage had the same score as May, indicating that there is more to the success of the Brexit Party than his popularity. Among the public as a whole the Brexit leader is not that popular. What’s more, Johnson was only marginally ahead of Theresa May on 4.4. This suggests that if he does succeed her as party leader he is not going to give the Conservatives much of a boost.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An unpopular bunch.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Only 9% of the public think the Conservatives have done well in handling the negotiations with the EU compared with 71% who thought they had done badly. This goes a long way to explaining why they received only 9% of the vote in the elections.</p>
<h2>The next election</h2>
<p>It is nevertheless clear that while the two major parties performed badly in these elections, they both have a reservoir of identifiers or loyalists, many of whom are likely to stick with them when times are difficult. That’s not true for the Liberal Democrats or the Brexit Party. These two parties have only a limited brand loyalty which means that if things go wrong, as they did with UKIP following the 2016 referendum, they could rapidly lose support.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can party loyalty prevail?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So the two major parties have the potential to bounce back in a general election in the future. Needless to say, these results show that Labour is in a much better position to do this than the Conservatives. A new Tory leader is going to have their work cut out to change the perception that the party has really messed up the Brexit negotiations and is therefore unfit to govern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council</span></em></p>Newcomers took most support from the Conservatives. But survey shows Nigel Farage is not as popular as he likes to think.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1178452019-05-27T12:28:03Z2019-05-27T12:28:03ZAfter Labour’s dismal European election performance, is it too late for Jeremy Corbyn to back a second referendum?<p>Labour’s performance in the European elections was appalling. For a party aspiring to form the next government, winning just <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2019/may/26/european-election-latest-results-2019-uk-england-scotland-wales-ni-eu-parliament">14% of the vote</a> and coming third behind the Liberal Democrats would normally set the alarm bells clanging.</p>
<p>But these are not normal times. The elections were not even supposed to happen: Britain should already be out of the EU. And it’s not unusual for European elections to produce idiosyncratic results: turn out is invariably low – it was 37% this year – and with many uncertain about the function of the European Parliament, voters have often used them to give a kick to whoever is in government.</p>
<p>Yet, even though European elections produce a distorted picture of public opinion, they have influenced Westminster politics. UKIP topped the poll in 2014, encouraging then prime minister David Cameron to support an EU referendum. And this year they have already <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-to-resign-june-conservatives-trump-tory-uk/">cost Theresa May her job</a> as prime minister and cast a dark shadow over the contest to succeed her with leading candidates effectively repeating <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/brexit-party-69483">Brexit Party</a> lines.</p>
<p>Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership will also be shaken by the election’s aftershocks, although it will likely take time for them to work their way through the party.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/uk-election-2017-37907">2017 general election</a>, Corbyn’s position has been secure because many members believed Labour’s unexpectedly strong showing was due to him and the radical policies he advanced. Even critics like deputy leader Tom Watson conceded that thanks to Corbyn, <a href="https://labourlist.org/2017/09/tom-watson-love-wins-and-so-will-labour/">“something magical happened”</a> in June 2017. But there were other reasons why Labour did well. An <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-conservatives-media-strategy-collapsed-during-the-election-campaign-79291">ill-judged Conservative campaign</a> headed by a leader with strikingly poor communication skills meant that instead of just being about securing a big majority for May’s Brexit plans, the election also became about the inequities of austerity. This allowed Corbyn to talk about the issues he wanted – like the very popular pledge to abolish tuition fees – and to discuss Brexit as little as possible.</p>
<h2>On the fence</h2>
<p>Corbyn’s immediate response to the 2016 referendum was to accept the result but to transcend the Leave-Remain divide by being evasive as to what precise version of Brexit he supported. Initially this appeared a cunning ploy. For however well Labour did in 2017 Corbyn still failed to win a Commons majority. In order to do that the party needed to win largely manual working-class seats in which Leave voters predominate while holding on to more affluent constituencies where Remain voters are in the majority.</p>
<p>Corbyn hoped he could accomplish this difficult task by sidestepping Brexit in favour of talking up issues which united Britons, specifically the injustices of austerity, which he argued were more pressing than Britain’s membership of the EU. But as May’s inability to deliver a deal became ever more obvious <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters/">voters began to identify ever more strongly as Leave or Remain</a>. </p>
<p>This polarisation <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/02/most-labour-members-believe-corbyn-should-back-second-brexit-vote">was also true of nearly 90% of Labour members</a> and 75% of party supporters who backed another referendum in which most of them intended to vote Remain. For a man who said he wanted Labour to be a member-led party, Corbyn’s refusal to embrace these positions was paradoxical.</p>
<p>Corbyn’s implacability was not just due to electoral pragmatism. That was arguably a convenient cover for more basic – and ideological – thinking. The Labour leader has always been hostile to the EU. He voted for Britain to leave what was then the EEC in the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/11859648/Jeremy-Corbyn-admits-he-voted-for-Britain-to-leave-Europe-in-1975.html">1975 referendum</a> and, like many of his generation on the left, always saw the institution as a “capitalist club”.</p>
<p>If this meant Corbyn stood at odds with the majority of Labour members, many trusted in his intentions – especially as some prominent Remainers could be painted as Blairites exploiting the issue to undermine his leadership, one that appeared so close to power. But in the past few months pressure from prominent Corbyn supporters has intensified. The <a href="https://www.lovesocialismhatebrexit.org/">Love Socialism Hate Brexit</a> group, which sees Brexit as “a Tory project and a massive assault on working class people”, has been particularly influential.</p>
<h2>Too late to the party?</h2>
<p>Labour’s performance in the European elections has seen loyalists like Emily Thornberry call for Corbyn to <a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/05/emily-thornberry-we-should-have-backed-a-second-referendum/">embrace a referendum</a> and abandon a Brexit policy so vague few in the public understood it – and it appears to have lost both Leave and Remain supporters. But even if he is inclined to jump off the fence, the electoral damage might already have been done. Some voters lost this time to the Liberal Democrats and other enthusiastic Remain parties might return to Labour in a general election: this kind of thing has happened after previous European contests. But with <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters-110311">Leave/Remain identities</a> now often trumping those of Labour/Conservative, Corbyn might have missed the bus.</p>
<p>This is not the end of Corbyn. But it might now be the beginning of the end. Many members still believe a Corbyn-led government is the greatest prize of all, even though the aura of 2017 has dimmed. If, in the wake of these results, he is challenged by a long-established critic such as Tom Watson, Corbyn will survive. But, before long, an ardent Remainer with more credibility among members – a Keir Starmer perhaps – may eventually mount a challenge. By then, however, Britain might be out of the EU: thanks to a prime minister in Boris Johnson or Dominic Raab, Corbyn will probably get his Brexit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Fielding is a member of the Labour Party and a Progressive Centre UK Policy Fellow.</span></em></p>European vote sees electorate again dividing into Leave and Remain, as the Labour leader remained on the fence.Steven Fielding, Professor of Political History, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1176272019-05-24T13:24:15Z2019-05-24T13:24:15ZIs throwing a milkshake an act of political violence? What political theory tells us<p>That the word “violence” is a powerful piece of political rhetoric has been brought home by the welter of opinion pieces, editorials and tweets that have emerged about a recent spate of “milkshakings” – in which prominent right-wing figures have been doused with dairy-based beverages. Those who have sought to condemn these actions have labelled them “political violence”, taking them to be unjustifiable. Those who have sought to defend and justify these actions have rejected the term “political violence”. It is worth asking two questions: as political violence, could “milkshaking” be justified? And is milkshaking even violence in the first place?</p>
<p>At the outset, it’s worth dealing with the objection that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/31b6c7b0-7be8-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560">political violence is always wrong</a>. This is almost certainly incorrect. It’s useful to think of a distinction <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1969/02/27/a-special-supplement-reflections-on-violence/">Hannah Arendt</a> made between legitimacy and justification. Violence can never be legitimate – it cannot be <em>intrinsically</em> right – but it can be justified. If we are committed to a present state of affairs – such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09kxq2p">enfranchisement of women</a> – then we cannot completely dismiss the way that that state of affairs was brought about. The difficulty is in determining the “ends” that justify violence and whether those ends can be attained. It’s a near impossible task to weigh the consequences of violence after the fact, let alone beforehand and, as Arendt added, the further the ends recede into the future, the less justified violence becomes.</p>
<p>Are these milkshakings actually violence? Hardly. These are disruptive actions, no doubt, and they sit somewhere on the spectrum between the peaceful and the violent, but, by nearly all accounts, political violence entails intentionally inflicting harm. So far, if their own accounts of their intentions are to be believed, the “milkshakers” have wanted, at most, to inflict humiliation.</p>
<p>Even if we were to accept a more permissive definition of violence as only the infliction of harm (whether intentional or not) it’s still difficult to see how, of all things, a milkshake could be construed as harmful. The instruments of violence really are important here. We associate things like knives, guns and bombs with violence precisely because of what they can do to somebody – both physically and psychologically. That said, public ignominy may be more of a harm to some than to others, particularly when we consider relative positions of privilege, power, and vulnerability, and particularly if want to include a psychological element to our understanding of “violence”.</p>
<p>In the early 1960s, at a time of radical protest in the US, the political theorist <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1939-0025.1963.tb00355.x">Sheldon Wolin</a> claimed that violence should be understood as an “intensification of what we ‘normally’ expect”. Something is “violent” when it exceeds a normal level of controversy.</p>
<p>Such an understanding might be problematic in that we wouldn’t want to say something had ceased being “violent” because we had simply become inured to it, and it raises the broader question of what is “normal”. But this tells us something useful. In the context of political campaigning in Britain, vigorous debate has often been accompanied, <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/05/we-shouldnt-cheer-milkshaking-right-wingers-heres-why-0">not coarsened</a>, by a certain level of theatrics. Small and harmless projectiles like eggs have often been thrown, and just as often met with a good deal of sangfroid. After being egged on the campaign trail in 1970, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/21/far-right-milkshake-nigel-farage-tommy-robinson?fbclid=IwAR2dkhNxsmLD2Is1mytRosFsnLOuUKGRWH04541ZnGgYp7DEGMYeW1VEMX4">Harold Wilson</a> quipped that if the Conservatives got into power, nobody would be able to afford eggs to throw. It’s hard to see how “milkshaking” exceeds a typical level of controversy.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1130471629732155392"}"></div></p>
<p>The idea of “relative severity” here allows us to recast initially poor justifications for violence in a new light. One does not justify an act by claiming that the far right have already undertaken violence, or that politics has already become imbued with violence – as though two wrongs had ever made a right. Rather, it’s as though commentators on the left are arguing that, if the right, or public opinion more widely, is prepared to call milkshaking “violence”, then it must be prepared to call things like <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/05/no-throwing-milkshake-someone-not-act-political-violence">hate speech</a> “violence” too.</p>
<p>The point here is that whether we choose to call something “violence” or not is not a dry philosophical question. The word “violence” has a strong emotive force and is used, when applied to actions, to uphold or denounce a certain moral vision of the world. Those who choose to call this or that act “violence” have already, in a sense, made up their mind about the fact of that action being wrong. In applying that term it paints one’s opponent in a certain light and puts them on the back foot. But in applying the word “violence” to a given action one is also saying that that action should be treated with all the seriousness and gravity that the word “violence” demands. That is something that should not be done without thought.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Blanchard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How dangerous is dairy? Hannah Arendt can help us understand.Alexander Blanchard, Researcher on Political Violence, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1177062019-05-23T15:45:21Z2019-05-23T15:45:21ZEuropean elections – government was warned voters could be turned away at polling stations<p>As polling got underway in the European elections in the UK, stories began to emerge about EU nationals being turned away from polling stations because they were not properly registered. As the day went on, more and more claims were being made. #DeniedMyVote began trending, with well over 20,000 tweets being sent out by lunchtime.</p>
<p>But their troubles could have been predicted. The UK’s system of electoral administration has been creaking for some time. The government has long known about a range of issues that need improvement.</p>
<p>These European elections were particularly important to EU citizens in the UK, because the franchise for the 2016 Brexit referendum had excluded them from voting on something that clearly had a major impact upon them. Many saw this as their first real opportunity to express their views on Brexit at the polls. </p>
<p>The problem with EU citizens in the UK arose because they were required to submit an additional form along with their electoral registration form before they could be fully registered. This additional form certified that they would only vote once – in the UK rather than the country where they hold citizenship.</p>
<p>Amid fears that this additional requirement would disenfranchise EU citizens, campaign groups for EU citizens, such as <a href="https://www.the3million.org.uk/let-us-vote-campaign">The 3 Million</a>, had complained that this requirement was not well publicised. They made considerable efforts to communicate this more widely. They made representations to the Electoral Commission and to local authorities. Questions were also asked in <a href="https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2019-05-09.252485.h&s=european+elections+citizens#g252485.r0">parliament</a> around this issue to attempt to get government to resolve it, to little effect.</p>
<p>There were also reports of British citizens registered as overseas voters having similar problems. Some said they <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48351281">had not received their postal votes</a> in time to return them. The legal timetables for sending out such ballots were inevitably tight. And, when coupled with the vagaries of domestic and international postal systems, it was almost inevitable that some ballot papers would arrive too late.</p>
<h2>Why did this happen?</h2>
<p>Lots of voters inevitably feel disenfranchised. Many are calling it a scandal. In reality, issues of this sort had been brewing for a long time, and had largely been ignored by government. My <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/identifying-the-determinants-of-electoral-integrity-and-administration-in-advanced-democracies-the-case-of-britain/4B51C001A3133DD2E7C81DF9DAE4E914">own research</a> into election administration sheds some light into how such difficulties arose.</p>
<p>Election administrators are the unsung heroes of the electoral process. Most of the people who work in polling stations and at counts are volunteers, employed only for the duration of the election itself. They are not experts. Professional election services and registration teams are very small – with as few as three people working on them in some local authorities. The speed and uncertainty of events in recent years has put them under immense pressure. The Association of Electoral Administrators has been very publicly offering members support to help them cope in the run-up to these European elections.</p>
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<p>Electoral administration has been underfunded in the UK for some time. Austerity has taken its toll on budgets. And, in 2014, individual voter registration was introduced. This was intended to tidy up the register and ensure accuracy but, instead, many people have fallen off registers. People have no easy way of checking whether they are registered, which not only means that some people are no longer on the register but also has the perverse affect of driving people who are already registered to try to register again every time a vote comes up. Such duplicate registrations inevitably increase the workload of small electoral registration teams. </p>
<p>Spending on election administration is vital <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0192512118824787">if elections are to run smoothly</a>. In <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/214991/A-Clark-and-T-S-James,-Electoral-Administration-at-the-EU-Referendum-September-2016.pdf">research</a> done for the Electoral Commission on the 2016 EU Referendum, we found 43% of our respondents saying that they had <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/214991/A-Clark-and-T-S-James,-Electoral-Administration-at-the-EU-Referendum-September-2016.pdf">insufficient funds to maintain their register</a>. The short notice with which the European elections were called has inevitably driven up costs for both registration and administration.</p>
<p>Research I have carried out into polling station workers (with Toby James from the University of East Anglia) has shown that the most regular problem faced in polling stations is not electoral fraud – as is often claimed – but people being <a href="https://theconversation.com/voter-id-our-first-results-suggest-local-election-pilot-was-unnecessary-and-ineffective-100859">turned away because they are not on the register</a> for whatever reason. The Electoral Commission has started collecting data on this and is asking election observers for more feedback to help understand the issue.</p>
<p>Nor are problems with overseas voting a new problem. We identified this as something to be addressed in research we did for the <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/214991/A-Clark-and-T-S-James,-Electoral-Administration-at-the-EU-Referendum-September-2016.pdf">Electoral Commission</a> on the 2016 EU Referendum.</p>
<h2>Wrong priorities</h2>
<p>The government is thinking about asking voters to show ID at polling stations, after running pilots in local elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/13/second-voter-id-trial-sees-800-people-unable-to-vote-in-local-elections">2018 and 2019</a> – a move that many fear will lead to people being disenfranchised. There are may be problems in electoral administration in the UK, but impersonation fraud is not one of them.</p>
<p>Electoral Commission data show that, while there were 266 allegations of electoral fraud in the 2018 local elections, there had been only one conviction and two cautions – and none for impersonating another voter. That’s from an eligible electorate of around 21.5 million voters.</p>
<p>These European elections are a stark reminder that more pressing problems are at hand.</p>
<p>Responsibility for running elections in the UK is confused. The Electoral Commission has no powers of direction over local returning officers or registration, except in specific circumstances around running referendums. It can advise, but not direct. Meanwhile, returning officers run the elections in their locality, with support from their local authorities, but are not responsible for the national picture.</p>
<p>The Cabinet Office has a role in delivering electoral administration, but this has not been an obvious priority given other competing demands. Uncertainty around Brexit and the short notice for of these European elections will surely have played a part in voters being turned away on polling day.</p>
<p>The UK’s electoral administration is clearly creaking at the seams. Administrators achieve a lot, under very difficult circumstances. But there is only so much they can do. #DeniedMyVote should not have happened. It did so as much by government omission as anything more sinister. But the government has been warned about this problem – again and again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alistair Clark has I the past received research funding from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust for research into polling station workers, and from the Electoral Commission for research and evaluation into electoral administration in the 2016 EU Referendum (both with Toby S. James). </span></em></p>Chronic underfunding has made elections difficult to run in the UK. Yet the government continues to obsess over voter ID.Alistair Clark, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1175312019-05-22T09:32:56Z2019-05-22T09:32:56ZFive things to look out for in the European elections<p>Voters across Europe are about to head to the polls to elect 751 members to the European Parliament from across 28 separate member states, representing more than 512m people. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-elections-a-beginners-guide-to-the-vote-114473">2019 elections</a> are a mammoth democratic exercise with profound consequences for European citizens and the global role of the EU. Here are five things to look out for that could shape the future of Europe, and the world.</p>
<h2>Will populists gain ground?</h2>
<p>Populist upswings are part of the political cycle the world over. Europe has moved from pro-integrationist parties to populist backlashes many times in its recent history, as have states in North America, Asia and Africa. Current European populist movements tend to be national in type (protesting against key government decisions, like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/gilets-jaunes-63133">Gilets Jaunes</a> movement in France) or international (focused against the EU itself, or specific trends like migration and globalisation).</p>
<p>The 2019 election is an opportunity for populist movements in Europe to gain ground internationally. Among the most likely populist parties to win seats are Nigel Farage’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-elections-guide-how-to-vote-if-you-support-brexit-117111">Brexit party</a> in the UK, Marine le Pen’s rebranded National Rally from France, and Matteo Salvini’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-european-elections-could-lead-to-collapse-of-yet-another-italian-government-116198">League</a> from Italy.</p>
<p>The far-right Alternative for Germany is now the largest national opposition party, but it’s not expected to be a major European contender, nor is Austria’s Freedom Party. Hungary, however, could win seats for the centre-right Fidesz party (despite serious questions over the validity of its last election). Poland will also witness a clash between pro-EU groups like the European Coalition and the ruling Law and Justice party, which is promoting a conservative vision of a “Christian” Europe of sovereign states.</p>
<h2>How will the parliament regroup?</h2>
<p>Once elected to the European Parliament, populist parties (right- or left-leaning) will need to decide which of the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups">eight party groups</a> they want to join – or whether to remain unaffiliated. This could have a big impact on how the parliament operates. </p>
<p>Essentially, they can then play along, or dig their heels in. Working in coalition, they can promote a key policy (for example, opposing the euro, enhanced migration options, foreign affairs), building consensus with other parties, left and right. Equally, they can refuse to engage and stonewall legislation that comes before the European Parliament, producing procedural inertia. As populist parties have very specific demands on key EU issues (including those with international implications), the size of their possible gains will be key. </p>
<p>A boost in centre-right seats would see the parliament’s largest group – the <a href="https://www.eppgroup.eu/">European People’s Party (EPP)</a> – strengthen its ability to dictate the next legislative term of the parliament, and bolster its influence over EU posts and policies. But if centre-right and populist votes simply aren’t there, then the democrats and socialists will get a boost as the second and third largest parties, making things tough for the dominant centre-right EPP grouping.</p>
<h2>Could green parties be about to set the agenda?</h2>
<p>Centrist parties are important, but recognising the greens is crucial. In Britain, and in Europe, green parties are aiming to mop up votes from people who are uneasy with simplistic far-left or far-right messaging. Their strength is to sidestep much of binary “us vs. them” dynamic by simply platforming an issue that generates near-universal consensus: tackling climate change.</p>
<p>The European Parliament has not one but two green groups, and both are likely to increase their seats. Should they choose to work together, as well as pulling others into their orbit on key issues, the outcome could strengthen the European Parliament’s hand as a purveyor of climate change activism, as well as deepen the instituiton’s ability to work with the European Commission in legislating on the EU’s approach to climate change. This, in turn, would enhance the EU’s role as a green pioneer on the world stage in the face of climate-sceptic states like the US and Brazil.</p>
<p>If the Greens wind up as the issue-based “glue” of the parliament, brokering agreements between other, less unified groups, this could certainly help bring climate issues to the fore internationally.</p>
<h2>Will the UK vote for Brexit again?</h2>
<p>In the years since the UK’s vote for Brexit, the UK government still hasn’t produced a deal that everyone can agree on, and the deadlock seems interminable. Into this vacuum comes an opportunity to issue a satisfying smack to the establishment. For some, the Brexit party provides a cathartic release with a simple message: You want to get on with leaving – vote our way and we’ll ensure the message is heard. That may be the case, but MEPs can’t actually enforce Brexit from the European Parliament.</p>
<p>Pro-Remain parties are more fragmented but are still neck-and-neck collectively with the combined Brexit coalition. </p>
<h2>Who will the parliament choose to lead the EU?</h2>
<p>The European Parliament has gained power, visibility and an enhanced reputation since the first election in 1979. It is a force to be reckoned with. It co-legislates with the European Commission and scrutinises legislation in trade and foreign policy and climate change, to name but a few. It also controls the EU budget. </p>
<p>The parliament also plays a major role in choosing the top jobs in the European Commission. The largest European Parliament party gets to propose its preferred candidate for the European Commission president (among others) for the Council to consider, and accept. There are currently six lead candidates (or Spitzenkandidaten) from among the eight groups in parliament.</p>
<p>The individuals appointed to these positions will doubtless become key players in current and future Brexit talks. They and MEPs will also have to promote the new 2020 European vision that will be unveiled as part of the changing of the guard. This vision will dictate specific bilateral relations, like Franco-German cooperation, and regional balances, from the Baltics to the Balkans. It will also involve kick-starting relations with new partners like Canada and China, or restarting work with the US on ticklish issues like trade, state aid and competition.</p>
<p>Whether this vision will balance integrationist and populist strains remains to be seen. The outcome of the European elections will give us our first clue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117531/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amelia Hadfield has in her previous role at Canterbury Christ Church University, and other HEIs received Jean Monnet funding from the EU for excellence in teaching, learning, research and outreach on aspects of EU integration and EU foreign affairs. She has not however received funding since taking up her post as Head of Politics at the University of Surrey.</span></em></p>There’s a lot to play for in this sprawling democratic exercise, so here are the most important matters at hand.Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1170522019-05-21T19:55:36Z2019-05-21T19:55:36ZIs there such thing as a ‘European identity’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275431/original/file-20190520-69192-18csgul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=42%2C39%2C2002%2C1306&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is there such a thing as an European identity?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://foto.wuestenigel.com/screwed-up-european-union-flag-on-black-background/?utm_source=47318179001&utm_campaign=FlickrDescription&utm_medium=link">Marco Verch/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The outcome of the UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership has sent shockwaves across Europe. Among other impacts, it has prompted debates around the issues whether a <a href="http://euroacademia.eu/presentation/european-culture-as-a-mirage/">“European culture”</a> or a “European identity” actually exist or whether national identities still dominate.</p>
<p>It would be wrong, in my opinion, to write off the identification of various people with “Europe”. This identification has been the outcome of a long process, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, involving both the policies of the European Economic Community (EEC) and EU institutions and grassroots initiatives. Cross-border youth mobility since 1945 is a key example of the former: it was often developed by groups that were not formally linked to the EEC/EU. They still helped develop <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/B/bo25400340.html">an attachment to “Europe”</a> in several countries of the continent.</p>
<p>As political scientist Ronald Inglehart <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1971.tb00641.x">showed in the 1960s</a>, the younger people were, and the more they travelled, the more likely they were to support an ever-closer political union in Europe. More recently, <a href="https://www.esn.org/erasmus">Erasmus exchange programmes</a> have also helped develop forms of identification with Europe.</p>
<h2>Feeling “European”</h2>
<p>Simultaneously, feeling “European” and subscribing to a national identity have been far from mutually exclusive. Numerous West Germans in the 1980s were passionate about a reunified Germany being part of a <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/in-europes-name-germany-and-the-divided-continent/oclc/28375767">politically united Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Attachment to “Europe” has also been a key component of regional nationalism in several European countries in the last three decades, such as the Scottish or the Catalan nationalism. A rallying cry for Scottish nationalists from the 1980s on has been <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-modern-snp.html">“independence in Europe”</a>, and it continues to be the case today. Indeed, for the 2019 European Parliament elections, the primary slogan of the centre-left Scottish National Party (SNP), currently in power, is <a href="https://www.snp.org/eu/">“Scotland’s future belongs in Europe”</a>.</p>
<h2>Diverse agendas</h2>
<p>What requires further attention is the significance attached to the notion of European identity. Diverse social and political groups have used it, ranging from the far left to the far right, and the meaning they attach varies. For the SNP, it is compatible with the EU membership of Scotland. The party combines the latter with an inclusive understanding of the Scottish nation, which is open to people who have been born elsewhere in the globe, but live in Scotland.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Speech by SNP leader and first minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, on July 2, 2016.</span></figcaption>
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<p>By contrast, Germany’s far-right AfD party (<em>Alternative für Deutschland</em>, Alternative for Germany) is critical of the EU, yet identifies with “Europe”, which it explicitly contrasts with Islam. A clear example is a one of the <a href="https://www.apnews.com/e4a3dca3c7464ca3925e4fe67afda5a6">party’s posters for the upcoming elections</a> that asks “Europeans” to vote for AfD so that the EU doesn’t become “Eurabia”.</p>
<p>Identification with Europe does exist, but it is a complex phenomenon, framed in several ways. and does not necessarily imply support for the EU. Similarly, European identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive with national identities. Finally, both the former and the latter identities may rest upon stereotypes against people regarded as “non-European”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nikolaos Papadogiannis ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Does an “European culture” or a “European identity” actually exist?Nikolaos Papadogiannis, Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary History, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1171112019-05-17T12:35:29Z2019-05-17T12:35:29ZEuropean elections guide: how to vote if you support Brexit<p>The European Elections weren’t supposed to involve the UK. But the UK is still a member of the EU, having failed to agree a Brexit deal, so it is obliged to hold elections for the European Parliament. Excluding the possibility of a vote to remain in a confirmatory referendum, any MEPs sent to the European Parliament by the UK will have very little time, if any, to influence European policy. </p>
<p>As a result, much of this vote will be based on sending messages to Westminster and for many it has become a proxy for a second referendum. Those who still want to leave the European Union have lots of options on May 23 but many will find it a difficult choice. The perceived failures of the Conservative Party are forcing Brexit supporters to consider fringe, populist parties over the established ones.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/european-elections-guide-how-should-remainers-use-their-vote-117108">European elections guide: how should Remainers use their vote?</a>
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<h2>The Brexit Party</h2>
<p>Despite only being formally established at the beginning of the year, the Brexit Party is predicted to be the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/nigel-farages-brexit-party-polling-higher-than-labour-and-tories-combined-before-eu-elections-11717553">big winner</a> at the European elections. Founded by Nigel Farage and other breakaway UKIP MEPs, the party supports leaving the European Union without a deal and trading with the EU on WTO terms until a suitable deal can be struck. The party has <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/brexit-party-has-no-policies-1-6011379">no manifesto</a>. The leadership says it will publish one after the vote.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> Rather than championing specific policies, the Brexit Party’s main function is to serve a as protest option. If your main goal is to send a strong message to the major political parties and you aren’t too concerned what the specifics of that message are, then the Brexit Party may well be a valid vote choice for you. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> If you are concerned about a specific aspect of Brexit, such as the backstop or freedom of movement, and want to send more than a blunt statement, the lack of a manifesto means that you don’t really know what you are voting for policywise. And, without a manifesto, the party will have limited accountability to you after the election. There are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-deal-seven-reasons-why-a-wto-only-brexit-would-be-bad-for-britain-102009">serious doubts</a> about the viability of trading on WTO terms. </p>
<h2>UKIP</h2>
<p>Having won the most votes in the 2014 European elections in the UK, the outlook doesn’t look as bright for the party this time around. Since the 2016 referendum, UKIP seems to have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cff64e3c-ff84-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5">lost its identity</a>. A series of internal disputes, notably between current leader Gerard Batten and Nigel Farage, have dogged the party. However, as long as the UK remains in the EU, UKIP arguably still has a purpose. </p>
<p>UKIP’s central policy for Brexit is not all that dissimilar from the Brexit Party’s, although it is more fleshed out and actually written down in a manifesto. UKIP argues that the UK should leave without a deal and then either offer to trade with the EU on a tariff-free basis or on WTO terms, with reciprocal rights for citizens. </p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you don’t want to support one of the major parties with your vote, but you also want to send more than just a blunt protest message, UKIP’s more clearly defined policies regarding Brexit may be a better option for you than the Brexit Party, especially if you want some accountability for policies after the election. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> UKIP has been dogged by infighting for some time now and the party has lost its momentum as of late. Accusations of it lurching further to the right and associations with former English Defence League leader Tommy Robinson may be off-putting for some voters. And, much as with the Brexit Party’s proposed Brexit solutions, there are serious doubts about their viability. </p>
<h2>The Conservatives</h2>
<p>Much like the local elections just a few weeks ago, the Conservatives are expected to take a beating at the European elections. Even its own party members and elected representatives have claimed they will not be <a href="https://inews.co.uk/opinion/brexit-b-party-candidates-european-elections-conservative/">campaigning</a> for the party – or even <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1124136/brexit-party-latest-news-theresa-may-nigel-farage-conservative-leave-EU-elections-2019">voting</a> for it. Party leader Theresa May had hoped to avoid holding these elections altogether so there is <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1124819/EU-elections-latest-polls-tory-election-labour-lib-dem-european-elections-2019-brexit">no manifesto</a>. Instead, the Conservatives have sent an election leaflet to most households claiming that a vote for the party will send a message that you want the UK to leave with a deal and you want it to leave with it now.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you want the UK to leave the EU with a deal and you have had enough of the lack of progress being made in Westminster, then a vote for the Conservatives would send a strong message to this effect. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> If you don’t like the proposed withdrawal deal then the Conservatives aren’t really offering you anything aside from that. Moreover, given how unpopular the deal is in Westminster, even by sending this message, there is still no guarantee parliament will accept it. </p>
<h2>Labour</h2>
<p>Although many Labour supporters have been calling for a second referendum, the party leadership itself has remained committed to leaving the EU and has been hesitant to support a confirmatory referendum, to the disappointment of many. The party has a much broader and more <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/whats-labours-eu-election-manifesto-15020979">ambitious manifesto</a> for the European campaign than the other parties and it effectively reads like a draft for their next general election manifesto. </p>
<p>Labour continues to promote its own <a href="https://labour.org.uk/issues/labours-plan-brexit/">alternative plan</a> for Brexit – a comprehensive customs union with the EU. This is a much closer relationship than that being proposed by the Conservative leadership. There are provisions for a second referendum, but only if the government tries to leave without a deal and it can’t secure support for its plan or a general election.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you support leaving the EU with a deal, but don’t much care for the one currently on offer or can’t bring yourself to vote Conservative, then Labour’s alternative plan may be worth your support. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> Many within the Labour Party want to see a second referendum, and although there are a few caveats that need to be met first, it is still a possibility that Labour could possibly support this in the future. Additionally, while Labour’s Brexit plan is ambitious, there is no real consensus that it is achievable.</p>
<h2>The DUP</h2>
<p>If you live in Northern Ireland and are pro-Brexit there is another option. Despite its agreement to prop up the Conservative government, the DUP has repeatedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-47736913">refused</a> to support the prime minister’s proposed Brexit deal.</p>
<p>The DUP wants to ensure that all of the UK leaves on the same terms, thus protecting the union. Party leaders have warned that if Northern Ireland doesn’t support the DUP in the European elections, Westminster will interpret the vote as a <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/eu-elections-2019/weak-dup-vote-will-be-seen-as-a-rejection-of-brexit-says-foster-38108896.html">rejection of Brexit</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> For those voters in Northern Ireland who are concerned about the backstop and the stability of the union, a vote for the DUP will send a message to that effect.</p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> While it is fairly clear what the DUP is opposed to, it doesn’t really present a clear and viable alternative. So while a vote for the DUP may signal what you don’t want, it won’t provide an endorsement for any alternatives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117111/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Stafford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are lots of options for Brexit supporters, but that won’t make it an easy choice.Chris Stafford, Doctoral Researcher, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1169752019-05-17T11:48:27Z2019-05-17T11:48:27ZEuropean elections guide: what’s actually on the ballot paper?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273958/original/file-20190512-183103-ttlyuc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=46%2C0%2C5157%2C2992&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite plans to go ahead with Brexit, the UK will now participate in elections to the European Parliament on May 23. </p>
<p>Voting in this election will take place across Europe between May 23 and May 26, with different countries holding votes on different days. The <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/623556/EPRS_ATA(2018)623556_EN.pdf">majority of member states</a> vote on Sunday May 26.</p>
<p>Here is what you need to know about voting in the UK. </p>
<h2>Voting in a region rather than a constituency</h2>
<p>The way the country is carved up into voting areas is different to a general election. Rather than hundreds of constituencies, the UK is divided into 12 parts. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are represented as whole nations while England is divided up into nine regions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273951/original/file-20190512-183080-1fmp4z5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">European election voting areas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">European Parliament</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Different regions and nations get different numbers of seats. In England, for example, the North-West gets eight and the South-East gets ten. Scotland gets six. Wales gets four. Northern Ireland gets three.</p>
<h2>What’s on the ballot paper</h2>
<p>Since 1999, MEPs from the UK have been chosen using a closed list system (except in Northern Ireland). That means the ballot paper will show a list of parties in boxes. Within each party box there will be a list of candidates.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273956/original/file-20190512-183083-fnknv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2014 ballot paper shows how candidates are listed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a region which gets three MEPs, parties will usually list three candidates, if ten, ten candidates. They can’t list more but would be allowed to list fewer. Independent candidates are also listed on the ballot paper separately.</p>
<p>But voters don’t pick and choose between individual MEP candidates. They get one vote and use it to choose one party, or one independent, marking the box with an X. </p>
<h2>How the counting works</h2>
<p>The way votes are counted in a European election is different to a general election too. A system called <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27187434">d’Hondt</a> is used, which is meant to produce a broadly proportional allocation of seats.</p>
<p>The total number of votes for each party in each region are counted and then put in order. The party at the top gets seat number one. That is allocated to the candidate at the top of its list. </p>
<p>The winning party’s vote total is then halved and the whole list is looked at again. Whichever party is on top of this reordered list gets the next seat. That may well be the same party that won the first seat, if it has secured enough support, or it may be another party. </p>
<p>The party at the top of the second list (if it is a different party) then gets its vote total divided in half and the process is repeated. (If the same party has just won twice, the division is by three). This goes on until all the seats in the region are filled. Parties with less support may never reach the top and won’t win a seat. Chances vary depending on the size of the region.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275385/original/file-20190520-69209-4pm15o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How voting might work in a region electing four MEPs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Northern Ireland, the election is carried out by <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/single-transferable-vote/">single transferable vote</a>, a system in which voters do have more than one choice. Citizens are used to this as it is the method for local elections and the Northern Ireland Assembly. They show their preferences by voting 1,2,3 and so on. In an STV system there is no real chance of a “wasted vote”.</p>
<h2>Moving down the list</h2>
<p>So, why is there a list of candidates if you only get to vote for a party? It’s because when each party chooses its representatives, it puts them in priority order. The candidate at the top of the list is the one the party most wants to get elected.</p>
<p>Candidates on the lower rungs of the ladder have no realistic chance of being elected – I say this as someone who has previously been number nine of ten.</p>
<p>But if an MEP resigns or dies during their term in parliament, their place is filled by the next person down the list (rather than in a by-election). This has actually happened. When Diana Wallis, Liberal Democrat MEP for Yorkshire and the Humber <a href="https://www.libdemvoice.org/diana-wallis-mep-resigns-26683.html">resigned in 2012</a>, she was replaced by Rebecca Taylor. For these purposes, defecting out of a party does not count as a vacancy.</p>
<h2>How Brexit changes the game</h2>
<p>Voters may feel the ballot papers for this election are longer than usual. That’s because they are. They feature several new parties, such as Change UK and the Brexit Party, as well as some other less familiar ones, such as The Yorkshire Party.</p>
<p>We are also seeing the rise of so-called “celebrity candidates” such as Boris Johnson’s sister <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rachel-johnson-and-her-father-to-stand-as-meps-w82wkg3xz">Rachel Johnson</a> for Change UK and former Conservative minister <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48034732">Ann Widdecombe</a> for the Brexit Party. But it’s worth remembering that these celebrity candidates are there to raise profile more than anything. Because the contest is between parties, no aspiring MEP can really call on a “personal vote”. </p>
<p>Of course the UK MEPs may not take their seats, or may take them only for a short period of time. Assuming the UK leaves the EU, some other countries are electing “shadow MEPs” who will effectively take up the empty seats in the parliament on the UK’s departure.</p>
<p>European elections in the UK are rarely about Europe. They are generally seen, by journalists, campaigners and public alike, as massive opinion polls. In fact I have seen some campaign leaflets in the past which fail to mention the parliament at all.</p>
<p>This time however, the elections are about Europe, although they are generally about decisions MEPs have no power to take. So a vote for the Brexit party, for example, won’t give its MEPs the power to speed up Brexit (the European Parliament can’t do this). However people vote though, will act as a signal to the UK government and House of Commons about what they think of the current state of play with Brexit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Keaveney is a member of, and former candidate for, the Liberal Democrats</span></em></p>Confused about how this vote works? D'Hondt worry, we’ve got you covered.Paula Keaveney, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Edge Hill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1171402019-05-16T11:55:54Z2019-05-16T11:55:54ZWhy Labour’s Remainer MPs have less to fear from Brexit voters than they think<p>The Labour Party is frequently criticised for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/13/jeremy-corbyn-labour-brexit-nigel-farage-european-elections">sitting on the fence</a> over Brexit. The party leadership has, most notably, avoided making a definite commitment to a second referendum, which might deliver a Remain vote.</p>
<p>This stance can in part be attributed to the fact that 60% of the seats the party won in the 2017 election had Leave majorities in the 2016 referendum. At the same time, there is strong pressure from Labour’s supporters both in the party membership and among the voters for the party to advocate remaining in the EU. This is particularly true of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/20/labour-youth-tell-corbyn-come-off-fence-brexit">young supporters</a>. As long as the Brexit turmoil continues, then Labour is going to face this dilemma.</p>
<p>As a result, it is often said that Labour MPs who represent Leave voting constituencies – such as Caroline Flint in Don Valley – are afraid to speak out against Brexit for fear that they will lose their seat in the next election.</p>
<p>But the evidence actually suggests that they shouldn’t be so worried that their chances of re-election will be jeapordised if Labour comes out as a Remain party. The political consequences of being a Remain MP in a Leave voting constituency have been overblown. In fact, the issue is likely to have little or no effect on the vote in the next general election. This can be seen by looking at the relationship between the referendum vote in 2016 and the Labour vote in the general election of 2017.</p>
<p>To put this in context, if we compare the Labour vote share in the 632 constituencies in Britain in 2017 with the vote share in the previous election in 2015, the relationship between the two is extremely strong. The figure below demonstrates this. Each dot in the figure is a constituency. The vertical axis measures the Labour vote share in 2017 and the horizontal axis the 2015 vote share. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274597/original/file-20190515-60554-2rccbu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">2015 and 2017 compared.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The relationship between voting in 2015 and in 2017 is very close because the vast majority of the dots cluster closely around the summary line, which identifies the average relationship at each point. It shows that, by and large, constituencies with weak Labour support in 2015 remained that way in 2017, as did constituencies with strong Labour support. The correlation between the vote shares in the figure is 0.96, which is near perfect and means that the 2015 vote share is a very powerful predictor of the 2017 vote share.</p>
<p>The relationship occurs because there is a lot of inertia in electoral politics. Changes do occur between successive elections but these are relatively small in comparison with the strong continuities found in voting over longer periods of time.</p>
<p>The Brexit issue was important in the 2017 election but if it had been so important that Remain supporting Labour MPs in Leave voting constituencies were punished by the voters, we would observe this in the data. It would mean that the Labour vote share would decline, or increase less, in constituencies that strongly supported Leave in the referendum compared with constituencies which supported Remain.</p>
<p>In fact, as the second figure shows, there is no relationship at all between the change in the Labour vote in the successive elections and voting to leave the EU in the referendum. The correlation between these two is -0.04, which is negligible. </p>
<p>This means that the summary line linking the two measures is flat, so that Labour MPs in Remain voting constituencies were treated in much the same way by the voters as Labour MPs in Leave voting constituencies. Given that the 2017 general election took place about a year after the referendum, if the Brexit vote was influential, it would have affected the change in Labour’s share of the vote.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274940/original/file-20190516-69199-tg390t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Comparing the referendum and elections.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is worth remembering that UKIP won the 2014 European elections in Britain, but three years after that victory the party was almost wiped out in the general election. We are three years away from the official date of the next general election in 2022, suggesting that this pattern is likely to be repeated as memories fade. Labour Remainers have nothing to worry about, despite the current popularity of Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117140/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the ESRC and the British Academy. </span></em></p>The political consequences of speaking out about Brexit have been overblown, data from the most recent elections suggest.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1159642019-05-14T09:50:08Z2019-05-14T09:50:08ZRussia will target the European elections – this radical idea could turn a threat into opportunity<p>Over the past three years, Russia has been repeatedly accused of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/nov/08/further-reading-books-russian-influence-luke-harding">infiltrating democratic elections in the West</a>. It is suspected of supporting anti-establishment movements on both the left and right through a mixture of financial support, intelligence sharing, and, perhaps, even through the use of cyber weapons.</p>
<p>Russia has undergone a staggering transformation in this time. It was once something of an <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/05/russia-is-finished/302220/">afterthought in international affairs</a> with seemingly no <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/">credible public diplomacy capabilities</a>. Now, it is the perceived source of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-plot-against-the-west-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-europe/">existential crisis</a> gripping the West. The truth, of course, is somewhere in the middle. Russia was never as weak as many in the West thought but, in turn, is not as strong as many currently believe.</p>
<p>Rather than using some kind of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/">magic weapon</a>, Russia has mainly exploited a major weak spot in Western democracies – the corruptibility of elections. </p>
<p>Elections are not meritocratic – they favour candidates with power, status, and money. And usually, candidates require significant external support to fund their campaigns, meaning that interest groups - <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/fara">including foreign powers</a> - can often wield significant influence.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2019/apr/18/mueller-report-trump-russia-key-takeaways">Mueller Report</a> in the US, for instance, found that Russia’s lobbying tactics “consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the campaign, invitations for candidate Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin to meet in person, invitations for campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved US-Russian relations.” </p>
<p>In addition to lobbying, Russia has arguably also sought to promote anti-establishment sentiments in the West by positioning itself as a <a href="https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201810201069040138-russia-eu-us-conservatism/">traditional and conservative power</a>. Through its RT news network, Russia has seemingly had some success in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-messaging-machine-propaganda-russia-today-media-war/">fanning the flames of discontent in Europe</a>, especially with regards to topics like the EU, the refugee crisis, and Islamic terrorism.</p>
<p>The problem here is that elections naturally encourage populism and demagoguery as winning the majority of votes is the aim of the game. If Russia is able to find fertile ground for its anti-establishment message among Western publics, it can then indirectly influence a state through its own democracy.</p>
<p>All of this has existed for some time, however, and it certainly isn’t uniquely a Russian tactic. Powerful states – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/05/americans-spot-election-meddling-doing-years-vladimir-putin-donald-trump">including powerful democracies</a> – have promoted their regime preferences in foreign countries for centuries. One early instance was when the French interfered with the <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-election-interference-founding-era">1796 US presidential election</a> to help its favoured candidate, Thomas Jefferson. </p>
<h2>Vulnerable Brussels</h2>
<p>The upcoming European Parliament elections are particularly vulnerable to potential Russian influence because, frankly, the European Parliament is an institution with scant public credibility at a time when Europe’s divisions are high.</p>
<p>Despite the EU’s conscious efforts to address its purported democratic deficit over the years – including giving the parliament powers such as budgetary authorisation and the power to select the Commission president – <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html">popular perceptions continue to trend downwards</a>.</p>
<p>In the 2014 European elections, roughly a third of voters held <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2017/european-parliament-malcontents-and-antieuropean-union-parties-by-seats-infographic-30310294.html">“malcontented” views of the EU</a>. Given many of the same crises that dominated the 2014 election have not dissipated, it is fair to believe that a similar result – if not worse – will occur <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/the_2019_European_election">this time</a>.</p>
<p>Russia may well, therefore, seek to capitalise on this <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-trying-to-meddle-in-eu-elections-report/a-48318678">discontent</a> to undermine the European Union further by supporting parties and candidates that are openly anti-establishment, such as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord. This support could be both <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153">financial</a> and <a href="https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eu-elections-update-the-long-game/">discursive</a>. </p>
<h2>Power to the people</h2>
<p>However, the EU needs to be wise and see Russia as a symptom, not a cause of its democratic failings. Improving its democratic mechanisms is one way the EU can insulate itself from external interference.</p>
<p>Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has taken up this challenge with his <a href="https://diem25.org">DiEM25 movement</a>. DiEM25 <a href="https://diem25.org/manifesto-long/">aims to</a> “transform Europe (by 2025) into a full-fledged democracy with a sovereign parliament”. However, for all its lofty goals (which are commendable), the DiEM25 movement fails to consciously detach itself from a reliance on elections as the main mechanism of democracy.</p>
<p>The answer might nevertheless still be found in Greece. Not from Varoufakis and his ideas but from Classical Athens. The Athenians were well aware of the negative effect of elections - <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2016/03/sortition-ancient-greece-democracy/">which they saw as a conduit to oligarchy</a> – and rather emphasised the role of citizens in the everyday running of the state.</p>
<p>To maximise citizen input, the Athenians used a <a href="http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/article_democracy_overview?page=all">lottery system called sortition</a> to randomly select citizens from the Ekklesia (an assembly open to all citizens) to sit on the Boule (the council) and the Heliaea (the court). Elections were used only to select magistrates who presided over military, economic and societal affairs, and these positions were strongly scrutinised by the Boule and Heliaea.</p>
<p>There are significant democratic advantages of a system based on the deliberation and decision making of ordinary citizens randomly selected by lotteries. It is fairer than voting because it removes the privilege of those with power, status, and money and produces an unbiased cross-section of society (it does not discriminate against gender, ethnicity or sexuality). And with no specific candidates to target, interest groups and foreign governments would lose some influence.</p>
<p>The European Parliament is an ideal institution to try such a radical idea because it cannot sink any lower in terms of popular legitimacy.</p>
<p>After all, one of the key roles the European Parliament is designed to perform is <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/powers-and-procedures/supervisory-powers">the democratic oversight</a> of the other institutions of the EU. So, what better way of doing that than using a random selection of ordinary citizens from the EU’s member states?</p>
<p>Something as seemingly crazy as selecting the European Parliament via sortition would not only offer a radical solution that could have real positive democratic effects but it would help safeguard from any potential external interference (not to mention internal interference). It could also turn the EU from a punchline to an inspiration; a force for reinvigorating democracy on the European continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Ross Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The European Parliament is particularly vulnerable to meddling. So let’s change the way it works.Nicholas Ross Smith, Assistant Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1169152019-05-10T14:59:41Z2019-05-10T14:59:41ZEuropean elections: how vote could help predict the outcome of a second Brexit referendum<p>The last time European elections were fought in the UK, Nigel Farage was buoyant. UKIP became the first party other than Labour and the Conservatives to top a national poll in a UK-wide election in 98 years. Farage proclaimed that “the UKIP fox is in the Westminster hen house”.</p>
<p>This time, Farage, as well as parties on the Remain wing of British politics, are promising to blow the whole house down. Interpretations of the results of <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-European-elections-and-Brexit.pdf">these elections</a> are likely to rest on the degree to which the bubble of two-party politics – perhaps the key political fact of the 2017 general election – has burst.</p>
<p>These elections are the only UK-wide political contests fought under a proportional system, and potentially the last for the foreseeable future. This is vital to understanding how they have worked in the past, and why they are important to British politics now.</p>
<p>Since they became proportional contests in 1999, European elections have always led to a small decline in support for the big two parties. These dips sustain themselves for a brief period, before the majority of voters drift back to their existing tribes. This time, these elections are seen as a tool and an opportunity to entrench a sharp decline already underway and due, in no small part, to the Brexit process.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=193&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=193&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=193&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=243&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=243&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/273855/original/file-20190510-183093-vr2ia8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=243&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Decline of the big two.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Each party has their eyes on their own interests and, specifically, on the prospect of a further general election in 2019. This has coloured the behaviour of the Remain parties in particular. Electoral rules have made it difficult – although not impossible – to establish a genuine “Remain alliance”. Yet, the fact is, there were good reasons for pro-Remain parties to avoid any formal coalition. After all, when it comes to normal elections, they would be in competition.</p>
<p>Nor is it necessarily the case that remain-orientated parties will damage the cause if they work in competition against each other – despite what those who have criticised the absence of a Remain alliance have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/15/remain-parties-eu-elections">claimed</a>.</p>
<p>While not necessarily pursuing the optimal strategy to win seats, by providing a slew of different anti-Brexit options, they could be maximising their chances of a high vote share. It is far from clear, for example, that a Lib Dem-Green-Change UK joint ticket would be more successful at attracting Conservative, Remain-inclined voters than these parties acting independently. And in an election whose significance lies as much in what it tells us about the state of opinion on Brexit as anything else, that matters.</p>
<h2>Mapping the vote</h2>
<p>These elections will be written up not just as an electoral test for party politics, but also as a proxy for a second referendum. The ability to test which areas of the country currently have the highest levels of relative enthusiasm – measured in turnout – will provide a useful indication of which voters would show up in another national poll on EU membership.</p>
<p>Significantly, five of the ten local counting areas which saw the biggest increase in turnout between the 2015 local elections and the 2016 referendum – Boston, South Holland, Mansfield, Fenland and Bolsover – were also in the top ten areas that voted most heavily for Leave. If, in these elections, the biggest jumps in voter turnout between 2014 and 2019 are in areas that voted disproportionately Remain, that would suggest the opposite effect: a relative enthusiasm among Remain voters. This is important, not least as the drift to Remain in opinion polling is largely predicated on <a href="https://whatukthinks.org/eu/has-there-been-a-shift-in-support-for-brexit/">voters who did not turn out in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>The European election might serve as a warning shot to incumbent MPs. Success for the Brexit Party in leave-voting Labour marginal areas might prompt some soul searching as to whether backing the PM’s deal might be the lesser of two evils, should the alternative be losing a seat due to the impact of Farage. Higher than expected losses to insurgent Remain parties will have the opposite effect.</p>
<p>As always with these elections, expectation management will be key. This time, it won’t just be the political parties massaging the figures to claim voters have delivered a particular message – it will also be the groups campaigning on either side of the Brexit debate. </p>
<p>So there is much to play for, albeit that the actual point of the elections – sending MEPs to Brussels – might be somewhat lost from sight.</p>
<p><em>This article was published in partnership with The <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/">UK in a Changing Europe</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anand Menon receives funding from The ESRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Wager does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turnout on May 23 could prove revealing when it comes to public opinion about Brexit.Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King's College LondonAlan Wager, Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1132132019-03-21T13:59:24Z2019-03-21T13:59:24ZFacebook’s plan to protect the European elections comes up short<p>Intentionally false news stories were shared more than <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.2.211">35m times</a> during the 2016 US presidential election, with Facebook playing a significant role in their spread. Shortly after, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election">Cambridge Analytica scandal</a> revealed that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election">50m Facebook profiles</a> had been harvested without authorisation and used to target political ads and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-43472347/cambridge-analytica-planted-fake-news">fake news</a> for the election and later during the UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum. </p>
<p>Though the social network admitted it had been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9e973ba4-3903-11e8-8eee-e06bde01c544">slow to react</a> to the issue, it developed tools for the 2018 US midterm elections that enabled Facebook users to see who was behind the political ads they were shown. Facebook defines ads as any form of financially sponsored content. This can be traditional product adverts or fake news articles that are targeted at certain demographics for maximum impact. </p>
<p>Now the focus is shifting to the 2019 European parliament elections, which will take place from May 23, and the company <a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/european-parliament-elections/">has introduced</a> a public record of all political ads and sweeping new transparency rules designed to stop them being placed anonymously. This move follows Facebook’s expansion of its fact-checking operations, for example by teaming up with British fact-checking charity <a href="https://fullfact.org/blog/2019/jan/full-fact-start-checking-facebook-content-third-party-factchecking-initiative-reaches-uk/">FullFact</a>. </p>
<p>Facebook told us that it has taken an industry-leading position on political ad transparency in the UK, with new tools that go beyond what the law currently requires and that it has invested significantly to prevent the spread of disinformation and bolster high-quality journalism and news literacy. The transparency tools show exactly which page is running ads, and all the ads that they are running. It then houses those ads in its “ad library” for seven years. It claims it doesn’t want misleading content on its site and is cracking down on it using a combination of technology and human review.</p>
<p>While these measures will go some way towards addressing the problem, several flaws have already emerged. And it remains difficult to see how Facebook can tackle fake news in particular with its existing measures.</p>
<p>In 2018, journalists at <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-approved-political-ads-paid-for-by-cambridge-analytica-2018-10?r=UK">Business Insider</a> successfully placed fake ads they listed as paid for by the now-defunct company Cambridge Analytica. It is this kind of fraud that Facebook is aiming to stamp out with its news transparency rules, which require political advertisers to prove their identity. However, it’s worth noting that none of Business Insider’s “test adverts” appear to be listed in Facebook’s new ad library, raising questions about its effectiveness as a full public record.</p>
<p>The problem is that listing which person or organisation paid the bill for an ad isn’t the same as revealing the ultimate source of its funding. For example, it was <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexspence/mysterious-facebook-brexit-group-britains-future-tim-dawson">recently reported</a> that Britain’s biggest political spender on Facebook was Britain’s Future, a group that has spent almost £350,000 on ads. The group can be <a href="https://britainsfuture.co.uk/about-us/">traced back</a> to a single individual: 30-year-old freelance writer Tim Dawson. But exactly who funds the group is unclear. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1105818519432847360"}"></div></p>
<p>While the group does allow donations, it is not a registered company, nor does it appear in the database of the UK’s Electoral Commission or the Information Commissioner. This highlights a key flaw in the UK’s political advertising regime that isn’t addressed by Facebook’s measures, and shows that transparency at the ad-buying level isn’t enough to reveal potential improper influence.</p>
<p>The new measures also rely on advertisers classifying their ads as political, or using overtly political language. This means advertisers could still send coded messages that Facebook’s algorithms may not detect.</p>
<p>Facebook recently had more success when it <a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/removing-cib-uk-and-romania/?">identified and removed</a> its first UK-based fake news network, which comprised 137 groups spreading “divisive comments on both sides of the political debate in the UK”. But the discovery came as part of an investigation into hate speech towards the home secretary, Sajid Javid. This suggests that Facebook’s dedicated methods for tackling fake news aren’t working as effectively as they could.</p>
<p>Facebook has had plenty of time to get to grips with the modern issue of fake news being used for political purposes. <a href="https://ria.ru/20080912/151227362.html">As early as 2008</a>, Russia began disseminating online misinformation to influence proceedings in Ukraine, which became a <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/">testing ground</a> for the Kremlin’s tactics of cyberwarfare and online disinformation. Isolated fake news stories then began to surface in the US in the early 2010s, targeting <a href="https://dailycaller.com/2012/07/11/nancy-pelosi-made-between-1-5-million-on-asian-investments-in-2011/#ixzz20L8laF1E">politicians</a> and divisive topics such as <a href="https://www.thecommonsenseshow.com/back-to-the-future-what-history-teaches-about-gun-confiscations/">gun control</a>. These then evolved into sophisticated fake news networks operating at a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/02/fake-news-facebook-us-election-around-the-world">global level</a>.</p>
<p>But the way Facebook works means it has played a key role in helping fake news become so powerful and effective. The burden of proof for a news story has been lowered to one aspect: popularity. With enough likes, shares and comments – no matter whether they come from real users, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-many-click-farm-jobs-should-be-understood-as-digital-slavery-83530">click farms</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artificial-intelligence-conquered-democracy-77675">bots</a> – a story gains legitimacy no matter the source.</p>
<h2>Safeguarding democracy</h2>
<p>As a result, some countries have already decided that Facebook’s self-regulation isn’t enough. In 2018, in a bid to “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42560688">safeguard democracy</a>”, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, introduced a controversial law banning online fake news during elections that gives judges the power to remove and obtain information about who published the content. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Germany has introduced fines of up to €50m on social networks that host illegal content, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-42510868">including fake news and hate speech</a>. Incidentally, while Germans make up only 2% of Facebook users, Germans now comprise <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/facebook-germany-online-hate-censorship-social-media-a8374351.html">more than 15%</a> of Facebook’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/what-facebook-told-insiders-about-how-it-moderates-posts/552632/">global moderator workforce</a>. In a similar move in late December 2018, Irish lawmakers introduced <a href="https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/five-years-in-jail-for-spreading-fake-news-under-ff-proposal-36375745.html">a bill</a> to criminalise political adverts on Facebook and Twitter that contain intentionally false information.</p>
<p>The real-life impact these policies have is unclear. Fake news still appears on Facebook in these countries, while the laws give politicians the ability to restrict freedom of speech and the press, something that has sparked a mass of criticism in both <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/07/france-macron-fake-news-law-criticised-parliament">France</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, there remains a considerable mismatch between Facebook’s promises to make protecting elections a top priority, and its ability to actually do the job. If unresolved, it will leave the European parliament and many other democratic bodies vulnerable to vast and damaging attempts to influence them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113213/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Dance receives funding from Research Councils UK and consults with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).</span></em></p>Several flaws have already emerged in Facebook’s new measures to stop improper political influence.William Dance, Associate Lecturer in Linguistics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1125762019-03-01T15:37:12Z2019-03-01T15:37:12ZBrexit delay: what it would take for the EU to agree article 50 extension<p>For the first time – 23 months after the UK triggered the article 50 negotiations to begin the process of leaving the European Union – Theresa May acknowledged that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47373246/brexit-may-statement-on-future-votes-and-article-50-extension">it might be necessary</a> to delay Brexit day. Reportedly under pressure from a number of the Remainers in her cabinet, keen to emphasise her own opposition to a delay, but also hoping to push hard-line Brexiteers towards support of her deal, the prime minister conceded that an extension of the two-year article 50 period beyond March 29 might be necessary.</p>
<p>Missing from the discussion in the House of Commons was any reference to what say the other member states – the EU27 – would have in the matter. Such an omission is typical of what has gone on in the UK in the past few years. Much of the debate about the negotiations and the UK’s future relationship with the EU has proceeded without any reference to the position of the EU27, still less recognition of their interests, aims or strategy.</p>
<p>An extension to article 50 could, however, disrupt the UK’s solipsism. If it looks like the UK is heading down this course, loose talk about the desirability of extending the negotiations will confront a hard reality: the UK cannot unilaterally decide on an extension to the negotiations. London would have to make a proposal, to which the EU27 would have to agree – with unanimous consent.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-how-article-50-could-be-extended-to-delay-uks-departure-from-the-eu-109966">Brexit: how article 50 could be extended to delay UK's departure from the EU</a>
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<h2>Not yes to every request</h2>
<p>Let’s assume that May fails again to get her deal through the UK parliament and that MPs vote “no deal” off the table in mid-March when given the option. She then decides to ask the EU for an extension. This would already be a difficult move for the prime minister, who has reiterated – <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/bill-cash-and-peter-bone-on-theresa-may-brexit-betrayal-1-5907600">reportedly 108 times</a> – that the UK will leave the EU on 29 March. </p>
<p>The EU27’s response to such a request would depend on the circumstances. Generally positive comments on the issue have come from the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, who said he now regarded an extension as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/feb/25/donald-tusk-article-50-extension-rational-solution-brexit-video">“rational solution”</a>, and president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who said a request from the UK <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-juncker/no-one-in-europe-would-oppose-extension-to-brexit-talks-juncker-idUKKCN1Q71RF">would be welcomed</a>.</p>
<p>But as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, said on February 27, the reason would <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-article-50-extend-macron-merkel-theresa-may-france-germany-eu-talks-a8799506.html">need to be “clear”</a>. It’s unlikely, for example, that the EU27 would agree to an extension in order to renegotiate the EU-UK withdrawal agreement, or the complicated issue of the Irirhs backstop. They consider both issues closed. They would also want to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/28/extension-article-50-must-be-one-off-brussels-eu27-uk-brexit-delay">avoid repeated requests</a> from the UK.</p>
<p>The EU’s first preference since the referendum has for been for a change of mind in the UK and for the country to remain in the EU. If that isn’t possible, the EU wants an orderly departure. It regards “no deal” as a disaster, even if the EU27 stand to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-no-deal-brexit-would-be-less-costly-for-the-eu-than-the-uk-110407">less badly hit</a> than the UK. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely, however, that the EU27 would give their consent to just any request from London. They see no evidence that May has been able to make any progress since the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration">withdrawal agreement</a> was agreed in late November 2018, and they have little confidence in her ability to secure a majority for her deal at Westminster.</p>
<h2>Two, three or six months</h2>
<p>The prime minister told MPs that any extension would <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47373246/brexit-may-statement-on-future-votes-and-article-50-extension">have to be short</a>. She would be subject to intense political pressures from Brexiteers in her party, sections of the press, and public opinion, which polls suggest would favour no more than three months. May would also want to avoid UK participation in elections to the European parliament. She said that people would find it strange for a country that is about to leave the EU to vote in the elections. </p>
<p>Since the elections are <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/elections">scheduled for 23-26 May</a>, that would allow an extension of just under two months. Or, if the aim is for any extension to finish before the members of the European parliament (MEPs) take up their seats on July 1, that could allow for an extension of three months. Though since hearings to select a new commission president – one of the new parliament’s first major tasks – will not begin until the autumn, six months might be a possibility.</p>
<p>On the EU side, however, there is scepticism about what a short extension would achieve. Although the timing of the European elections does complicate the situation, the problem they present is not insurmountable. Even the fact that seats have been re-allocated in anticipation of the UK’s departure <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/the-european-council-establishes-the-composition-of-the-european-parliament/">could be dealt with</a>. </p>
<p>From an EU perspective, the obligation to contribute to the EU budget beyond March 29 on the part of the UK would not be overly problematic. As part of the arrangements for the transition period built into the withdrawal agreement, the UK has already agreed that it would maintain its contributions in 2019 and 2020. Problems would arise only if an extension period went beyond 2020, since that’s when the current EU budget period ends and the EU is currently negotiating the EU budget for the seven-year period that follows.</p>
<p>In the event, if the alternative is a no-deal Brexit with the disruption that such an outcome would entail, the EU27 may reluctantly agree to a short extension. However, it’s unlikely to do so without imposing conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Kassim receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. He is an Associate Fellow of 'The UK in a Changing Europe'.</span></em></p>Even if parliament votes to delay Brexit beyond March 29, the EU27 would have to unanimously agree. Would they?Hussein Kassim, Professor of Politics, Political, Social and International Studies, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1114582019-02-08T17:28:11Z2019-02-08T17:28:11ZFrance and Italy: a deeper rift over Europe lies behind the current crisis<p>France and Italy are in a diplomatic crisis, provoked by a recent meeting between Italy’s deputy prime minister, Luigi Di Maio, and representatives of the French <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/06/italys-deputy-pm-luigi-di-maio-meets-senior-gilets-jaunes-figure">Gilets Jaunes protest movement</a>.</p>
<p>Di Maio has expressed his support for the Gilets Jaunes as they prepare to stand candidates in the European Parliament elections this year. This has caused so much trouble for the French president, Emmanuel Macron, that the French government has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/07/france-italy-ambassador-macron-di-maio-salvini-second-world-war">pulled its ambassador out of Rome</a>, accusing the Italian government of making verbal attacks “without precedent since World War II”.</p>
<p>Di Maio’s gesture was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Tensions between the two governments – over corporate takeovers, policy towards Libya, and an exhibition Leonardo Da Vinci’s works – have been mounting since a new populist “government of change” came to power in Italy last June. This latest conflict has soured relations to an unprecedented point. It’s difficult to see how they can improve in the near term.</p>
<h2>Two visions of Europe</h2>
<p>It is exceptional for two of the founding members of the European Union to have such an open conflict. But it is also exceptional for Italy to have a government that is so openly hostile to the EU. This reveals that behind this crisis lies a deeper rift over Europe.</p>
<p>Macron’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/en-marche-36127">La Republique En Marche</a> movement is a newcomer on the French political scene, but it nevertheless represents the mainstream, pro-European liberal centre. Macron poached people from across the moderate left and right to form his new government. In France, the forces of the populist left (the France Insoumise movement) and right (the far-right party Rassemblement National) are in opposition. But in Italy, the equivalent forces – the Five Star movement and the League – are in government. There, it is the mainstream pro-European centre that is in opposition.</p>
<p>So the French and Italian governments now have very different visions for the EU. Macron has <a href="http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html">ambitions</a> for deeper cooperation in foreign, military and economic affairs. In contrast, the League and the Five Star movement have been aligning themselves with fellow populist governments in Austria, Poland and Hungary, all of which are either promoting eurosceptic views or are in open conflict with Brussels.</p>
<h2>Elections on the horizon</h2>
<p>These two parvenus governments need to give some credibility to their contrasting visions because elections to the European Parliament are now in sight.</p>
<p>They have given voters a flavour of the forthcoming campaign, which will highlight the divisions that exist across Europe about the basic nature, purpose and architecture of the EU. The frequent attacks levelled against the French government by the Italian government are thus indirect attacks against the former’s pro-EU integration agenda and against the EU itself.</p>
<p>The populist parties in the Italian government will be running against each other on separate platforms during the European Parliamentary elections. So they are also cultivating potential allies in the European Parliament. The League is already a member of the right-wing <a href="https://www.enfgroup-ep.eu/">Europe of Nations and Freedom</a> parliamentary group that also comprises the Rassemblement National. But the Five Star movement has yet to find a suitable political home. It is therefore seeking to embolden movements elsewhere, such as the Gilets Jaunes, that contain populist elements of both left and right. </p>
<h2>Macron’s reforms</h2>
<p>These contrasting relationships to the EU have a direct bearing on domestic politics too. The French president’s attempt to bolster Europe has created conflict with the Gilets Jaunes, whereas the Italian government’s efforts to satisfy its electoral base has created conflict with Europe.</p>
<p>Macron is trying to implement a very ambitious programme of economic reforms. This is a feat that has felled more than one government in recent decades. Most of the changes are consistent with a liberal programme of structural adjustment that is meant to solve unemployment problems and improve the competitiveness of the French economy while maintaining sound fiscal balances. </p>
<p>Brussels has applauded the reforms, but they are controversial at home. Macron has been successful in making changes to education, labour markets and pensions – but on those issues where opposition to reform maps onto a newly emerging cleavage between liberalism and populism, between the cosmopolitan-liberal-urban so-called “elite” and the national-conservative-rural “populace”, he has struggled. </p>
<p>The Gilets Jaunes movement was born initially out of opposition to a tax on fuel – principally among people in the rural hinterlands that depend on their cars for their livelihoods. But it has now morphed into a protest <a href="https://theconversation.com/gilets-jaunes-why-the-french-working-poor-are-demanding-emmanuel-macrons-resignation-107742">movement</a> comprising different strands of French society on the left and right. To appease their demands for an improvement of living standards, Macron has promised handouts and tax breaks for pensioners and low-income workers, jeopardising the government’s finances.</p>
<h2>Rome against Brussels</h2>
<p>In contrast, the Italian government – especially the Five Star movement – is taking an opposite approach to economic policy. It is promising greater social protection: the preservation of pension entitlements, a citizen’s income for the unemployed and greater spending on social services. It is doing this even though the Italian government has, for decades, been confronted by economic stagnation and high levels of budgetary deficits and debt. Both have become anathema in the EU since the Eurozone crisis. As a result, the Italian government has been at loggerheads with the EU over its proposed budget, which it had to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-commission-budget-waves-white-flag-rome-brussels/">revise several times</a> to meet the EU’s fiscal sustainability criteria.</p>
<p>Or take the case of immigration policy, which has been particularly salient in Italy – mainly because of the sheer number of illegal immigrants arriving on its shores. The Italians feel, justifiably, that they have been left to deal with the rush alone. The EU, because it is a large, cumbersome organisation, has been too slow to develop a common approach and to provide Italy with the support it needs. This is something that the Italians – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/matteo-salvini-who-is-the-firebrand-politician-shaking-up-italian-politics-99063">especially the League</a> – have long been angry about. Along with the disillusionment that Italians feel about membership of the Euro, it now effectively forms the basis of popular resentment toward the EU. So the Italian government has refused entry to ships carrying immigrants in Italian ports, shifting the problem to the neighbouring French. </p>
<p>The French government, facing its own populist opposition to migration, was also reluctant to step up. On this issue, Macron’s pro-EU credentials are being tested.</p>
<h2>Pragmatism vs Populism</h2>
<p>The French-Italian crisis may abate somewhat after the European elections. But it will only be genuinely resolved if there is a change in the ideological complexion of the government in Italy (or France), or if the EU is able to offer what the Italian government is seeking: greater flexibility in the domain of economic policy and greater effectiveness in the domain of immigration. Neither are likely any time soon. </p>
<p>The only hope lies in the pragmatism that the European Commission and Italian government put on display during their discussions over Italy’s 2019 budget. But that hope should be tempered by an appreciation that populism is just as much about style as it is about policy. That style is provocative, confrontational, abrasive, and … popular.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Toubeau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When two founding partners of the European Union are at loggerheads, something is very wrong.Simon Toubeau, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/618942016-12-20T01:58:16Z2016-12-20T01:58:16ZTrump is not a European-style populist. That’s our problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150390/original/image-20161215-26071-1mro1gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">America is, once again, exceptional.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photos/Christophe Ena and Evan Vucci</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two days after the U.S. presidential election, Marine Le Pen – the leader of the right wing French National Front – <a href="https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/796347586638659584">tweeted out</a> congratulations to Donald Trump.</p>
<p>During <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20161113-uk-france-usa-le-pen-lauds-trump-win-bbc-bashed-remembrance-sunday">a controversial BBC interview</a> that aired a few days later, <a href="https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/796439590236258308">Le Pen summed up</a> how she believes the American election will affect her own electoral chances. She said Trump’s victory “renders possible what had been presented as impossible – that what the people want, the people can have.”</p>
<p>Brexit and the election of Trump have given hope not only to Le Pen, but also to her European confrères, such as leader of the Dutch nationalist right Freedom Party Geert Wilders, as they look forward to their own elections in spring 2017. As savvy politicians, they are exploiting the American election for their own purposes.</p>
<p>Yet, despite the temporal coincidence and surface similarities, I believe the election of Trump in the U.S. is fundamentally different from what is occurring in Europe. The Trump phenomenon is not simply an American iteration of European populism. It’s also potentially more dangerous.</p>
<p>As I argue in my book <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/illiberal-politics-neoliberal-times-culture-security-and-populism-new-europe?format=HB&isbn=9780521839136">“Illiberal Politics in Neo-liberal Times</a>,”
populism – or extreme nationalism – began to gain ground in Europe during the 1990s as a reaction against the accelerated process of European integration. European populists sought to preserve their national institutions against encroaching Europeanization – a term they use sometimes interchangeably with globalization. Globalization is a force that has contributed to putting <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/">large numbers of people</a>, particularly young people, out of work and facing a bleak future on both sides of the Atlantic.</p>
<p>In contrast, Trump questions the legitimacy of political institutions and the reality of facts in a manner that European populists do not. </p>
<p>Let’s consider the important ways that America and Europe differ by first turning to the European example.</p>
<h2>An imperfect union</h2>
<p>Le Pen has been gaining ground since the 2012 French presidential election. <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/france-election-2017-latest-polls-odds-ahead-presidential-vote-le-pen-fillon-set-run-2455690">Recent polls</a> place her on track to move to the final round in the 2017 presidential elections, although <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/the-fear-of-marine-le-pen-will-the-next-political-earthquake-happen-in-france">most analysts</a> agree she’s unlikely to win the presidency.</p>
<p>For years, <a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/1618/">scholars have debated</a> whether the lack of direct popular participation in EU governance mattered. </p>
<p>They got their answer beginning in 2008 when economic crisis and austerity politics proved that democracy did matter. European citizens <a href="http://eed.nsd.uib.no/">began voting</a> in national parliamentary elections for parties that advocated economic protectionism. For example, in 2011 the True Finns scored 19 percent of the vote. In 2010, the Swedish Democrats had their first breakthrough. In 2012, the Greek left populist party Syriza polled at 16.8 percent and is currently the main party in Greece, and the Greek neo-Nazi Golden Dawn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/21/neo-fascist-greek-party-election-golden-dawn-third-place">broke through at 7 percent</a>. </p>
<p>The festering European economic crisis was joined by two additional crises in 2015 – the refugee crisis and the security crisis that public terrorist attacks generated. All of this was played out in mass media and provided the final push for nationalist parties across Europe to come close to achieving political power.</p>
<h2>An all-American election</h2>
<p>Donald Trump is more than an Atlantic Ocean away from Marine Le Pen. </p>
<p>As I see it, Trump’s electoral victory is a peculiarly American product of working-class unemployment, a deep distrust of and resentment of educated elites and a celebrity culture that valorizes street smarts.</p>
<p>We should not forget that Trump was elected at the margins – razor-thin layers of <a href="http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/education-not-income-predicted-who-would-vote-for-trump/">non-college-educated voters</a> living in rural Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania appear to have tipped the outcome of the election.</p>
<p>Trump tapped into what Richard Hofstadter identified in 1966 as <a href="https://openlibrary.org/works/OL2465582W/Anti-intellectualism_in_American_life">“anti-intellectualism”</a> in American life in a way that his Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton never could. </p>
<p>Trump’s 3 a.m. tweets exploited social media. His tweets and retweets generated many more millions of followers than traditional media. In a popular cultural world where “Dancing with the Stars” and “American Idol” tell their audience anyone can be a “star,” Trump reigned supreme. On his reality television show “Celebrity Apprentice,” he was the uber-successful billionaire and alpha male who lived in a golden tower – an image that is arguably more accessible to the average person than the closeted world of Hamptons cocktail parties that Clinton was portrayed as inhabiting.</p>
<p>Trump exploited the fears, feelings of neglect and fantasies of his voters. He deployed rhetoric that combined a cadence of danger with megadoses of emotional empathy. Trump’s <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974">acceptance speech</a> at the Republican National Convention invoked law and order and was replete with descriptions of violent acts that victimized ordinary Americans – particularly those who live in inner cities. Trump claimed that he was the “only one” who could save ordinary Americans. He would be their “champion.” He would “fight” for them. He would “win” for them. </p>
<h2>A different reality in Europe</h2>
<p>In contrast to Trump, European populists are committed conservative nationalists. They are responding to a crisis of management on many levels in EU governance – debt, migration and security. Many are experienced politicians who have held office and have thought out policy positions – no matter how one feels about those positions. </p>
<p>The media often emphasize the anti-immigrant positions of European populists. But these politicians are more than single-issue xenophobes. When European populists say they want to express the will of the people, they have some <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2016-10-17/france-s-next-revolution">specific issues</a> in mind. They want to exit the European Union and reestablish national governance. They want to return to the “social Europe” that began to crumble in the 1970s. </p>
<h2>An American rootlessness</h2>
<p>Trump has tapped into what sociologist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/anomie">Emile Durkheim identified as anomie</a> – a state of profound rootlessness and dislocation that occurs when institutions such as family and work break down. The salesman in Trump seemed to have grasped this instinctively. He was willing to say what perhaps others were thinking and to shatter verbal taboos. </p>
<p>Pundits <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/american-authoritarianism-under-donald-trump/495263/">have also compared Trump</a> to another European figure <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100724770">I’ve studied</a> – Benito Mussolini. Some see similarities in the men’s physical appearance, personal style and authoritarian ways. </p>
<p>This may be a more apt comparison. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/230411">The motto</a> of the Italian fascist party was “Believe, Obey, Fight!” – an injunction to action without a defined object – a command to do anything that the leader requires. In other words, style without content. </p>
<p>“Make America Great Again” is a similar slogan. It opens the door to virtually anything. So far it has encouraged white nationalists to justify <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/15/update-more-400-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-electionlink">public attacks on Americans of color</a> which have risen since the election. </p>
<p>It is a rare event when citizens turn their back on things that even basic civics teaches about good governance – such as the legitimacy of political institutions, the free press and the electoral system. This, to my mind, is the true American exceptionalism, and it is profoundly dangerous. Europeans have some idea what the populist script will be; Americans do not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61894/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mabel Berezin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Europe’s populists are taking advantage of Trump’s victory, but the comparison only goes so far.Mabel Berezin, Professor of Sociology, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/605292016-06-13T09:15:17Z2016-06-13T09:15:17ZFour ways to have your say in Europe<p>Taking back control from an anti-democratic EU is a central theme of the EU referendum leave campaign. But, in fact, stories about Brussels dictating our lives are overblown at best, and deeply misleading at worst.</p>
<p>Here are four ways that every citizen can influence the European Union.</p>
<h2>Voting at home</h2>
<p>The most obvious way in which UK citizens influence the EU is by voting in British elections. Over decades elected representatives have approved the EU’s current shape and powers by voting with solid majorities for each treaty change and giving effect to supranational law. </p>
<p>National ministers appointed through general elections wield significant power in the day-to-day running of the EU. They make up the Council of Ministers, which plays a major role in setting legislation. And national leaders are responsible for strategic direction via the <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-the-eu-a-beginners-guide-to-brussels-59553">European Council</a>.</p>
<p>Aside from this, the UK retains the power to make its own decision in the areas most sensitive to UK citizens. That includes taxation, pensions, health and defence. </p>
<p>It is true that the UK does not always have its way in Europe, but as my <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/02/does-the-uk-win-or-lose-in-the-council-of-ministers/">LSE colleagues have shown</a>, British governments have voted with the winning majority in 87% of the votes held between 2009 and 2015. So the idea that the UK is regularly being “dictated to” is misleading. </p>
<p>If citizens are unhappy about Brussels policies, they can make a big difference by electing a British government with different ideas for what it wants to do when wearing its EU-hat.</p>
<h2>European elections</h2>
<p>Then there are the elections to the European Parliament. These take place every five years, giving the British people – like all other EU citizens – the chance to directly choose their representatives in Brussels according to a system of proportional representation, benefiting smaller parties such as UKIP and the Greens.</p>
<p>The parliament has real power to block or change legislation in most areas. It also has increasing power over the European Commission as the regulator and proposer of new legislation. The parliament has used resolutions and its budgetary powers to influence policies even if it does not have the formal power to do so.</p>
<p>Even more significantly, the European Parliament has now significant power over who will be appointed president of the European Commission. In 2014, each of the major party groupings had a policy manifesto and ran a nomination process for candidates for commission president. When the European Peoples Party emerged as the winner, its candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, was duly elected president. </p>
<p>The fact that national governments, after initial hesitation, agreed to this, marked a significant improvement from previous practice when governments nominated commissioners and elected by consensus a president (and the parliament could only say yes or not to the whole commission).</p>
<p>So if citizens do not like the commission president or his/her team, they can participate through their national parties in the nomination process of the candidates and then vote at the next European Parliament election for the party grouping with the most convincing person and manifesto.</p>
<p>Moreover, the parliament takes its role seriously when it comes to holding the commission to account. In 1999, it <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/historic_moments/newsid_8207000/8207105.stm">forced the whole commission</a> to resign in the wake of a corruption scandal. It can do so again with the support of transnational investigative journalism that can expose wrong-doing as it does in a national arena.</p>
<h2>The power of the crowd</h2>
<p>The general public also has the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/basic-facts">Citizens Initiative</a> as a last avenue of influence. The European Commission is obliged to consider new legislation on a particular issue if it is backed by at least one million EU citizens, coming from at least seven of the 28 member states. Even though if it does not force the commission to actually legislate, it is a powerful tool to put issues on the agenda.</p>
<h2>Take an interest</h2>
<p>Finally, citizens, civil society actors as well as the media need to more closely scrutinise what happens in Brussels. This is how you prevent ministers from <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/boris_johnson_the_liberal_cosmopolitan_case_to_vote_leave">“saying one thing in Brussels, and another thing to the domestic audience”</a>, as Boris Johnson claims they do as if this was something that could not be challenged or changed.</p>
<p>It has been <a href="https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2015/pb_ag_westminster_27may15-11240.pdf">argued that the House of Commons’ scrutiny of European affairs has been weak</a> and many MPs have lacked the motivation to invest time in the job as they feel it wouldn’t attract much attention from the press and therefore would not be appreciated by the general public. This can be changed.</p>
<p>The media should also <a href="http://theconversation.com/eu-referendum-british-media-coverage-of-europe-is-letting-voters-down-57685">report more extensively and accurately</a> about who makes the decisions in Brussels and what the consequences are for the rest of Europe.</p>
<p>As we have seen, the European Union has evolved over the years to allow for more participation of citizens over who governs and for what purpose, sometimes against the initial resistance of some national governments who see democracy in Europe as a zero-sum game - if you win, I lose. However, as the current referendum debate shows, national politicians can suffer from blaming faceless “Brussels” rather than taking full responsibility for their decisions. </p>
<p>Building a more democratic Europe is a process that starts at the national level, but cannot stop there. As long as Britain is a member of the EU its citizens retain the opportunity to engage and shape this process. Choosing to leave would not automatically enhance democracy either, if Britain became like Norway to safeguard its access to the Single Market. In this case it would still be governed by the EU in many areas of the Single Market and participate in freedom of movement without having a formal say in the EU’s core institutions or influence its future direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60529/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Meyer is affiliated with the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS).</span></em></p>Here are four ways in which, you, the citizen, can decide what goes on in Brussels.Christoph Meyer, Professor of European and International Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/277592014-06-09T13:42:17Z2014-06-09T13:42:17ZCaptain Clegg is steering the good ship Lib Dem towards an electoral iceberg<p>It has now been a few weeks since the Liberal Democrats were, broadly speaking, humiliated at the local and European elections. This humiliation was repeated at the subsequent Newark by-election, although the majority of coverage has focused on congratulating the Tories on winning a safe seat and not enough on the fact that the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/06/newark-by-election-lib-dems-ukip_n_5457384.html">Lib Dem candidate lost his deposit</a>. </p>
<p>There were already grumblings of growing intensity from Lib Dem members about the leadership of Nick Clegg after the local and European elections. But after the botched coup attempt by Lord Oakeshott, ironically, his position feels more secure after his supporters circled the wagons and mounted attacks on those people calling for his head. And even after Newark there was a sense that the moment to replace him as leader had been missed.</p>
<p>So the Lib Dems are left with a lame-duck leader who has no connection with the public and no obvious strategy to develop one. Credibility and character are fundamental for any politician trying to build support in the community. David Cameron has successfully defined himself as a small “l” liberal Conservative in charge of a government that is successfully delivering an economic recovery. Miliband, meanwhile – who has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ed-miliband-is-damaged-goods-and-labour-needs-to-act-quickly-27202">leadership issues of his own</a> – draws upon his beliefs in social democracy and the intellectual credentials of Labour’s ideological renewal <em>vis-à-vis</em> his One Nation vision.</p>
<p>Clegg, meanwhile, has lost his narrative. His argument for joining the Coalition was that the Lib Dems would finally be a party of government. The Lib Dems would have hoped that some of the credit from the improving economic numbers would rub off on them. But this plan has been undermined by the way the Tories have managed to dominate the economic agenda, which has meant they’ve been able to take ownership of any positive narrative deriving from the economy.</p>
<h2>Credibility deficit</h2>
<p>The Lib Dems’ expectation and hope was to repeat the experience of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/election_01.shtml">Labour in Churchill’s government</a>, which demonstrated to the electorate that Labour was a credible governing force. Unfortunately they have failed because the electorate simply does not believe Clegg; they think he cannot be trusted because he <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/29/nick-clegg-changed-mind-cuts">changed his mind on economic strategy prior to the general election</a> yet continued making arguments which ran counter to this change. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-S8EqyjgvBI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Clegg’s sorry moment.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He lost credibility because he had promised to oppose any rise in tuition fees and gave way on that, too. He is also seen as detached from the agenda of the rest of society: styling the Lib dems as <a href="http://www.libdemvoice.org/lib-dems-party-of-in-clegg-stategy-38433.html">the party of “in”</a> and focusing on unsuccessful campaigns for AV and Lords reform – when what everyone really wanted was a sign the economy was on the mend, something he has failed to win any credit for.</p>
<p>On Europe, rightly or wrongly, the arguments of Cameron (who wants to remain in a radically reformed Europe) and Farage (who simply wants out) resonate far more with the electorate.</p>
<p>As a result of this and the various broken promises or ditched campaigns, Clegg – who rode high in 2010 on his promises to bring a “new style of politics” has simply confirmed a perception in the mind of the electorate that politicians can’t be trusted. Meanwhle Farage is winning ever-stronger support on the basis that his “straight talking” puts fresh air between him and the “professional politicians”.</p>
<h2>Lib Dems’ ostrich moment</h2>
<p>Clegg’s failure to fall on his sword after three poor election results in quick succession is now reinforcing the message that, far from being a party that listens, the leadership is now burying its head in the sand. There is no evidence that the are preparing to change the approach that brought about humiliation in the European elections, the local council election and, last week, at Newark. Maintaining confidence in this message speaks to Einstein’s definition of madness, that repeating the same action over and over in the hope of different results will produce a winning strategy. </p>
<p>Because Clegg has little remaining political currency left with the audience, convincing them of anything will be very difficult. Even if the argument he is advancing is intellectually or politically valid he will not be able to convince the electorate because he is, for lack of a better description, seriously damaged goods. This is compounded by a party membership which is increasingly disgruntled by his approach. That membership will be expected to show its support in the conference season and into the general election campaign when they will be expected to mobilise to knock on doors. At the moment it’s looking as if Clegg is fast approaching a position where he is incapable of firing up his party in the run up to the general election.</p>
<p>If the Lib Dems continue hemorrhage support, they can expect to lose more than half of their seats. This will inevitably be spun as not as bad as it could be. But it all looks a bit sick when you think that the reason they went into coalition with the Conservatives was to become a party of government and attract increased support, not lose it hand over fist.</p>
<p>So what can be done? The moment for change has come and gone, now all they can do is press on. The result may be devastating, but regardless of how bad it is, it could always have been worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew S. Roe-Crines does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has now been a few weeks since the Liberal Democrats were, broadly speaking, humiliated at the local and European elections. This humiliation was repeated at the subsequent Newark by-election, although…Andrew S. Roe-Crines, Teaching Fellow in Foreign Policy and British Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.