tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/faslane-11270/articlesFaslane – The Conversation2015-07-06T05:14:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/441022015-07-06T05:14:16Z2015-07-06T05:14:16ZWhy the military is divided over Britain’s nuclear deterrent<p>One thing was very striking at the recent Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) <a href="https://www.rusi.org/landwarfare">Land Warfare Conference</a>, where current British Army personnel including top brass and Ministry of Defence officials were heavily present. The issue of replacing Trident, the UK’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, was not discussed at all. </p>
<p>This conference was taking place a few months ahead of Conservative plans to renew the deterrent like for like. This was <a href="https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf">guaranteed by</a> the party’s victory at the general election in May, and has since <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150608/debtext/150608-0001.htm">been reaffirmed</a> by Michael Fallon, the defence secretary.</p>
<p>Yet when it comes to Trident, the British military are “split on this issue as never before”. That was the conclusion of a <a href="http://www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/Military%20attitudes%20to%20nuclear%20weapons%20-%20full%20report.pdf">report</a> by the Nuclear Education Trust and Nuclear Information Service that was published at the end of June. So why the difference in views?</p>
<h2>The need for UK nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>Admittedly the report tends to emphasise the minority views in the data, coming from one organisation whose fundamental goal is to “make nuclear issues accessible to all regardless of age and ability” (Nuclear Education Trust) and another that is dedicated to disarmament (Nuclear Information Service). It also represents a mere snapshot of the views of mainly ex-military personnel based on 35 in-depth interviews. That said, it undoubtedly offers an insight into the variety of views on Trident that exist within UK defence circles. </p>
<p>It will be no surprise that most interviewees favoured UK nuclear weapons and replacing Trident. And those who demonstrated concerns were not opposed per se, but raised issues of costs and effectiveness. What was interesting, and may shed light on the silence at the RUSI conference, is that the majority of military personnel interviewed had “little interest in Trident” at all. </p>
<p>The report noted that army personnel are the “least supportive” as they have the “least to gain” in contrast to the Royal Navy, which feels Trident justifies its claim as the senior service responsible for the strategic defence of the United Kingdom. These grievances (some may call it tribalism) should presumably be understood in terms of materials and priorities as the cost of Trident limits investment in the conventional capabilities of the army and RAF. </p>
<p>No single weapons system can protect against all threats, of course. Even with the continuous at-sea deterrent provided by Trident, the UK would still remain vulnerable to threats below the nuclear threshold <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9850192/Trident-is-no-longer-key-to-Britains-security.html">such as</a> climate change, cyber war and nuclear terrorism. Yet there may be greater threats above the nuclear threshold if the UK were to <a href="https://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A536CF6E4B14D9/#.VZROWu1Viko">unilaterally</a> reduce its nuclear capability. Russia’s recent <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/25/us-usa-nuclear-arms-idUSKBN0P52FC20150625">nuclear sabre-rattling</a> is a case in point. </p>
<p>Deterrence can fail, of course. It is also ill-suited to many of today’s security threats, and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/apr/27/nuclear-waste-scotland">accidents</a> can happen – as one <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-32908665">whistleblower</a> recently augured. Yet most realists will still tell you that the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons helps to decrease the probability for war between great powers.</p>
<h2>Costs and strategy</h2>
<p>A related issue is the balance of costs between nuclear and conventional defences. Although most interviewees in the report favoured “high-priority” government spending on the nuclear deterrent, they didn’t want this to undermine conventional capabilities and said the cost of replacing Trident should fall outside the Ministry of Defence budget. Yet this logic assumes that savings from either abandoning nuclear weapons or reducing our current deterrent would be reinvested in conventional forces. There is no guarantee of this.</p>
<p>The report demonstrated an increasingly common argument: <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a3592c2-e1c9-11e4-8d5b-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3ekp5YvYH">Trident is</a> useless as a military tool and frivolously wastes billions on a symbol of strength. The fact that it is arguably more of a political tool used to be reflected in the fact that the Treasury met the cost of the deterrent. In 2010, however, it was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825">moved over to</a> the defence budget. </p>
<p>It is <a href="https://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A536CF6E4B14D9/#.VZepCu1Vikp">estimated</a> that the cost of replacing the four Trident-equipped Vanguard-class submarines will consume 10%-12% of the defence budget during the procurement stage but will be reduced to 5%-6% once the next generation of submarines comes online in the late 2030s. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32236184">According to</a> the ministry, it will cost £17.5bn to £23.4bn at 2013-2014 prices to procure the replacement system. (Though it has been claimed by the likes of the Scottish Nationalists that the total costs of procurement and the running costs of the replacement deterrent “over its lifetime” <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-will-renewing-trident-cost-100-billion-39002">will reach</a> £100bn.)</p>
<p>Later this year, the government <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/policy/2015/06/08/uk-fallon-strategic-defense-and-security-review-2015/28691491/">will conduct</a> its strategic defence and security review. We are told it will be a full-scale review of all the threats and the capabilities facing the UK. But given the commitment to like-for-like replacement that I mentioned earlier, it is unlikely that this review will see Trident as no longer key to Britain’s security. </p>
<p>This is at a time when the UK’s defence budget <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article4454545.ece">is facing</a> another 5% or £1bn cut. Couple that with the sizeable cost of Trident renewal and it can only have an effect on the UK’s conventional forces. </p>
<p>As one young army officer so eloquently put it at the RUSI conference, we may have the manpower and the equipment but will we have the money left to do anything with them? A pan-military conference might feel understandably awkward about airing its divisions in public, but the rest of us must not. How much faith we put in nuclear weapons as a traditional deterrent in an age of fluctuating threats is a public debate that needs to take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform.</span></em></p>Splits over Trident can create stalemate between the UK’s forces, but the public needs to debate renewing the deterrent before time runs out.Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/370192015-02-02T16:18:53Z2015-02-02T16:18:53ZWhy our political classes won’t have any real debate on Trident until after the election<p>In the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum, the UK government refused to admit to any contingency plans for relocating Trident, the four Vanguard-class submarines mounted with nuclear warheads that are stationed at the Faslane naval base some 25 miles from Glasgow. </p>
<p>Though the Scottish National Party (SNP) had long made clear that an independent Scotland would not want Trident within its territory, it made no political sense for the UK government to show weakness by contemplating anything less than a No victory in the referendum. </p>
<p>Labour is in a similar position over questions of a potential power-sharing deal with the Scottish nationalists should it become the biggest party in a <a href="http://thedailyheckle.net/chances-hung-parliament-2015/">hung parliament</a> after the May general election. Hence it has been playing coy and keeping <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-31029492">quiet</a> about whether it would do a deal with the SNP, should predictions come to pass <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/21/poll-snp-labour-scottish-seats-election">that they will</a> “wipe out Labour in Scotland”. </p>
<p>On the Trident issue, Labour’s latest gambit has been for the shadow foreign secretary, Douglas Alexander, to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11382571/Douglas-Alexander-rejects-Trident-deal-with-SNP.html">say that</a> the party would exclude the nuclear deterrent from any coalition discussions. </p>
<h2>Trident’s three prongs</h2>
<p>Time will tell if Alexander’s comments leave any room for manoeuvre, but it is a reminder that there are three issues to consider in the context of Trident. First there is the short-term election struggle, of course. This is tangled up with the second strand, which is the UK government and the MoD’s reluctance to ever be held hostage again over control of Trident. The current arrangement meant that the SNP could have used it as a significant bargaining chip had Scotland voted Yes last September. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1179&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1179&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1179&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70827/original/image-20150202-25825-1997xlh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prong, prong, prong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/citizens-initiative-recall-photos/cnd-protests-outside-awe-aldermaston-photos-02032900">Jiripravda</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Finally, there is the debate over the long-term strategic viability and expense of replacing the deterrent in its current configuration. It is currently due to be decided by a parliamentary vote next year. </p>
<p>The Tory-led coalition <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/19/david-cameron-delay-trident-replacement">came out</a> in favour of like-for-like renewal of the current deterrent in 2010, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/dec/04/nuclear.liberaldemocrats">echoing</a> the position of Labour since 2006. Yet Labour leader Ed Miliband <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/11325940/Ed-Miliband-hints-he-may-back-replacing-Trident-with-cheaper-system.html">has hinted</a> that he would favour a “least-cost nuclear deterrent”. </p>
<p>It is the recent combination of these three issues that is creating such uncertainty over the future of the deterrent. Although the political posturing makes for great headlines in the run-up to the general election, it is the last narrative on efficiency and utility that is in the most need of attention. But it is also the least likely to take centre stage until after May.</p>
<h2>Wales watching</h2>
<p>The fact that Labour is both unclear about its Trident plans and could potentially do a deal with the SNP is contributing to the uncertainty. It is no surprise that national newspapers are replete with stories on the potential ramifications of a hung parliament – and one would expect them to reach saturation point the closer we inch towards the election.</p>
<p>For instance, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2929226/Trident-quit-Scotland-Wales-Secret-plan-nuclear-subs-triggered-rise-SNP.html">recent statements</a> that “work has now begun on the practicalities of shifting Britain’s nuclear defence systems to Pembrokeshire” in Wales have all the hallmarks of the sort of political white noise that the film maker Adam Curtis <a href="http://www.e-flux.com/program/adam-curtis-the-desperate-edge-of-now/">frequently observes</a>. </p>
<p>Although the county’s deep-sea port of Milford Haven has been recognised as one potential alternative to Faslane since the 1960s, it was rejected at that time because of its dangerous proximity to two liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in the area. The new claims seem to have more to do with local <a href="http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/five-reasons-moving-trident-milford-8530796">Welsh politics</a> than they do with any serious plan for any UK government to relocate Trident there. </p>
<p>If contingency plans are underway, Milford Haven would be just one of the options being considered. The most suitable site (but by no means without problems) is <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/devonport">HMNB Devonport</a> at Plymouth, which is, crucially, also in England. It would seem to make little sense to move Trident from one region of the UK with separatist tendencies to another, no matter how undeveloped they are in Wales as compared to Scotland. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70828/original/image-20150202-13708-7gyi2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lock gates at Milford Haven, through which Trident is unlikely to sail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Construction_of_additional_Lock_Gates_at_Milford_Haven_DSC_1778_-2.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Construction_of_additional_Lock_Gates_at_Milford_Haven_DSC_1778_-2.jpg">Talsarnau Times</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Scottish possibilities</h2>
<p>There certainly is a need for a commissioned study to scrutinise possible relocation options as Professor Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute defence think tank <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201408_OP_Relocation_Relocation_Relocation.pdf">proposed</a> before the Scottish referendum. It is also worth considering where Labour/SNP discussions might lead, notwithstanding Alexander’s intervention. </p>
<p>On the Labour side, Miliband’s hints about a reduced deterrent leaves the door open for a limited deal. And the SNP’s position is not quite as hard-line as during the Scottish referendum. They are no longer asking for the removal of Trident from Scotland. In exchange for their support in Westminster, they want a commitment to “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-30479621">no Trident renewal</a>”. </p>
<p>The idea of Labour accepting a deal that would essentially disarm the UK of its deterrent overnight is not credible, but agreement to delay the 2016 decision on replacement could be in the party’s interest. This could allow a proper debate on the real utility of Trident while extending the SNP some political cover. It is also worth bearing in mind that the relocation options might widen if Trident were replaced by a smaller deterrent. </p>
<h2>The big question</h2>
<p>But more importantly, we need a serious debate that gives serious public reflection to Trident’s practicality and effectiveness as a deterrent. For one thing there is the economic debate. Can a top-shelf replacement of Trident be justified in an age of austerity and shrinking defence budgets? If it is a given that the UK will continue to think of itself as a premier security provider, will it best achieve this by spending diminishing resources on additional conventional forces or on another Rolls-Royce version of Trident?</p>
<p>Or does the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trident-alternatives-review">Government’s Trident Alternatives Review</a> suggest a third way between a £20bn replacement and complete abandonment? These issues are even more acute since the capital costs for replacement will now be paid through the MoD budget and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825">not the UK Treasury</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70830/original/image-20150202-8997-fjkk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trident: still fit for purpose?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine-launched_ballistic_missile#mediaviewer/File:Trident_missile_launch.jpg">Unknown</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An equally crucial question is whether Trident is strategically viable in the 21st century. Does it deter the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trident-time-to-rethink-britains-nuclear-future-13762">extremely challenging and modern threats</a> in our current interdependent security environment – global warming, transnational terrorism, pandemics? Or does the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war between states still override these concerns? </p>
<p>We may also want to ask to what extent the like-for-like replacement is really about overlaps in US and UK submarine procurement contracts. Then there is the question of the ramifications for nuclear proliferation if the UK demonstrates to the world that retaining a cheaper version of the deterrent is a viable option. </p>
<p>These are the issues that should really be preoccupying the electorate and our political leaders. Yet political horse-trading and speculative proposals for Trident relocation and termination will remain the dominant headlines until the election. Once it is out of the way, hopefully a more rigorous and meaningful debate on Trident can finally take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>In the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum, the UK government refused to admit to any contingency plans for relocating Trident, the four Vanguard-class submarines mounted with nuclear warheads…Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/352882014-12-10T06:21:22Z2014-12-10T06:21:22ZTrident prods Scottish Labour leadership contenders all the way to finishing line<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/66771/original/image-20141209-32165-xbib3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Since Scots can't make up their minds on Trident, why all the politicking?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/8950656444/in/photolist-eCWsjQ-a7Amu5-rcuNZ-9MeTse-a7mJSi-9aWxRg-9eA46e-9aZFR7-9aZG8Q-a7mJYp-9cPkSF-rUXif-9eD9U7-kr5w5z-rUSFx-9oNtW6-9eA4JH-hMfwc-9mSHEh-4mGP5h-nP6hTs-eK1K2S-6kGnyH-e7dKsb-5tTBts-9eD9FL-6qR3p8-o8vzAo-dEkMHx-a7pALC-8FTyzt-gSJXr2-dEr1Qb-a7Bnom-7Gi5Zt-5ot79N-a6YTZ5-o6yrC9-34UZfu-eeGrDM-7YvvxZ-7RaPou-6UipAH-Cpnvc-cySsbW-a7mJTH-iT6N7k-k4qE4x-oG4VVg-k4t6M1">UK Ministry of Defence</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Polling is shortly to close in the battle to become the next Scottish Labour leader, the result of which will be announced on December 13. Given the party’s position <a href="https://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2014/dec/osbornes-performance-sees-approval-rating-fall">in the polls</a>, whoever takes on this role has a mountain to climb – be it Jim Murphy (<a href="http://sports.ladbrokes.com/en-gb/Politics/Scottish-Labour-Party-LeaderPolitics/Scottish-Labour-Party-Leader-t210004319">odds 1-4</a>), Neil Findlay (3-1) or Sarah Boyack (25-1). According to the <a href="http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Scottish-Attitudes-November-Tables_1_46.pdf">latest poll</a>, conducted by Survation, only 24% of people in Scotland intend to vote for Labour in the UK general election next May – a statistic that could yet impede Ed Miliband’s route to Downing Street. </p>
<p>As many as 46% intend to vote for the Scottish National Party (SNP), while 17% currently back the Conservatives and 6% the Liberal Democrats. Contrast this with the 2010 UK general election, where 42% voted Labour while just 19% backed the SNP. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/election2011/overview/html/scotland.stm">Even in the last Scottish parliament election</a> in 2011, when the SNP won an overall majority, Labour still secured 32% of the constituency vote. </p>
<h2>Personality paradox</h2>
<p>How might Labour recover? Does it need to elect a popular individual? Or do its prospects depend on the policies the new leader brings to the table? The same Survation poll suggested that policies not personalities will be key. Nearly half of voters (49%) said that having “better policies for Scotland” would make them more likely to vote Labour. Only 37% said that having a better Scottish leader would do so.</p>
<p>This fits the evidence of current UK-wide polls. The <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/12/07/other-lead-2/">latest YouGov poll</a> of UK-wide voting intentions puts Labour on 33%, one point ahead of the Conservatives, even though Miliband’s ratings are much lower than those for David Cameron. Only 17% <a href="http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/n965i9mzb8/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-311014.pdf">say that</a> Miliband is doing well as leader of the Labour party, compared with 40% who think Cameron is doing well as prime minister. </p>
<p>It might also explain the relative closeness of the Scottish race. Although Murphy is still the favourite, Findlay is giving him a good run for his money. Of the three voting blocs, the unions are expected to swing behind Findlay and the politicians behind Murphy. That leaves the party membership holding the balance of power, and <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/top-stories/jack-mcconnell-warns-labour-against-lurch-to-left-1-3627909">Findlay’s people</a> insisting he has the edge. </p>
<h2>The Trident tango</h2>
<p>So if policies are the more important factor in persuading people to vote for a party, then the policies put forward by the new Scottish Labour party leader could be vital to their efforts to restore the Labour vote. So how are the three potential new leaders of the Scottish Labour party attempting to differentiate themselves on policies? </p>
<p>Two of the key issues that have emerged during the campaigning have been income tax and nuclear weapons. Murphy supported the full devolution of income tax to the Scottish parliament, whereas Findlay and Boyack both expressed reservations. But events have overtaken these declarations with the publication on November 27 of the <a href="http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf">Smith Commission report</a> into new Scottish powers, which recommended that full control over income-tax rates and bands should be devolved. </p>
<p>On the contentious issue of Trident, which is headquartered at the mouth of the River Clyde in the west of Scotland, Findlay stands out as the anti-nuclear-weapons candidate. His stance goes beyond even the SNP’s promise in the referendum that an independent Scotland would require the UK to remove Trident from Scottish soil. </p>
<p>If elected, he <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/11234327/Scottish-Labour-leadership-candidate-promises-to-oppose-Trident.html">has promised</a> to lobby Miliband to scrap Britain’s nuclear weapons capability entirely, arguing that the savings could be better spent on tackling poverty and youth unemployment and on improving social care and social housing. Both Murphy and the SNP <a href="http://www.snpcnd.org/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1416157020&archive=&start_from=&ucat=&">counter that</a> whatever Findlay would like to happen, this is not a decision that Scottish Labour will ultimately make, and that Labour in London will reject this position.</p>
<h2>What the voters think</h2>
<p>But how popular is an anti-nuclear-weapons stance with the general public in Scotland? Evidence from the <a href="http://www.natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/scottish-social-attitudes/">Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) survey</a> suggests that people in Scotland are in fact fairly evenly divided on the issue. On the one hand, the 2013 survey found that more people (46%) were against Britain having nuclear weapons than were in favour (37%). </p>
<p>But asked whether Britain should be required to remove its nuclear weapons from an independent Scotland, slightly fewer (37%) reckoned it should than said it should not (42%). And when the latter question was repeated in 2014, the two proportions were again almost the same, at 42% and 37% respectively.</p>
<p>This division is mirrored by Labour supporters. While 48% oppose the principle of Britain having nuclear weapons, 36% are in favour, almost exactly in line with the figures for Scots as a whole. They are also almost exactly evenly divided between those who think an independent Scotland should require Britain to remove its nuclear weapons and those who do not. </p>
<p>In truth whatever stance he or she takes on the issue, the next Scottish leader will run the risk of contradicting the views of a significant body of the party’s current supporters. Policies may matter to voters, but on this issue at least the new leader may well discover that the best strategy is not to say very much at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan receives funding from the ESRC</span></em></p>Polling is shortly to close in the battle to become the next Scottish Labour leader, the result of which will be announced on December 13. Given the party’s position in the polls, whoever takes on this…Susan Reid, Research Director, ScotCen Social ResearchLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/315822014-09-15T05:21:54Z2014-09-15T05:21:54ZAn independent Scotland might have to agree a deal on Trident to get into NATO<p>As Scotland teeters on the brink of independence these next few days, the question of Trident is one issue in particular that is bound to cause a few sleepless nights in Edinburgh, London and Washington DC. </p>
<p>Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde is home to the four Vanguard-class Trident-equipped submarines (at Faslane). Nearby is the storage depot for the nuclear warheads (at Coulport). The Scottish government is at present <a href="http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/293639/0090721.pdf">“unable to decide whether or not nuclear weapons are based”</a> in Scotland, a position which the SNP would seek to overturn with independence. As most people following the debate will know, the desire to rid Scotland of Trident is fundamental to the SNP campaign and, according to deputy first minister Nicola Sturgeon, <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/uc643-iv/uc643.pdf">“not negotiable”</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58931/original/ssdq2dbv-1410542696.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Of course, the position of the UK government is the exact opposite. Worse, according to a former <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/676/676.pdf">minister of state</a> for the armed forces, “the UK government are not making plans for independence… and hence we are not making plans to move the nuclear deterrent or indeed the submarines from HM Naval Base Clyde.”</p>
<h2>Timescale differences</h2>
<p>The Scottish government’s white paper on independence, <a href="http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439021.pdf">“Scotland’s Future,”</a> calls for “the removal of Trident within the first term of the Scottish parliament following independence.” Given their ambition to see Scotland become fully independent on March 24, 2016, this would mean removal by 2020. </p>
<p>There <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/676/676.pdf">is a view</a> that everything could be removed from Scotland within 24 months, but there is a major problem. The chances are quite slim that two replacement facilities (one to base the submarines and another to store the nuclear warheads) could be agreed and – more importantly – deemed safe enough to be operational in that narrow time period. In other words, the weapons could be removed in that period but without a suitable replacement. This would mean that the UK could be effectively disarmed of its deterrent – some may say this is no bad thing, of course. This aspect is therefore likely to dominate negotiations.</p>
<p>And what chance that a replacement could be found in the UK at all? According to a recent <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201408_OP_Relocation_Relocation_Relocation.pdf">report published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)</a>, the two most suitable locations (in England) to replace Faslane and Coulport are HMNB Devonport at Plymouth and a facility that would need to be generated near Falmouth in Cornwall. </p>
<p>Although these sites are geographically superior to some of the other locations that have been suggested, they are still located near sizable population centres. Milford Haven has been ruled out due to its proximity to natural gas terminals and Barrow-in-Furness due to the lack of a suitable location for storing the warheads in the vicinity. It is important to remember that this is not the 1960s, when the ministry of defence could get away with much more, so getting the local populations to acquiesce could also prove rather tricky. And after all that, what if Cornwall decided it wanted to go independent sometime down the road as well?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58929/original/3yd6x6t5-1410541194.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Suitable replacement sites at Falmouth and Davenport/Plymouth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Joking aside, the estimated cost for preparing any future facilities for Trident, according to the <a href="https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201408_OP_Relocation_Relocation_Relocation.pdf">same RUSI report</a>, would be between “£2.5bn and £3.5bn in 2012/13 prices,” not including the cost of acquiring any additional land. But if the procurement process for the two (or one) UK aircraft carriers is anything to go by, expect long delays and dramatically higher cost overruns to those first estimated. </p>
<h2>Overseas options?</h2>
<p>Other options have been proposed including “sharing facilities” in either the United States or France. However the UK government is <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/861/86104.htm">on record as saying</a> that, “operations from any base in the US or France would greatly compromise the independence of the deterrent and there would be significant political and legal obstacles.”</p>
<p>And what about the US view? Many there would be none too pleased if they suddenly found that their only other nuclear ally in NATO was suddenly disarmed of its deterrent; although they do not seem to be doing much <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/09/scotland-independence-vote-us-headache">contingency planning</a> either. </p>
<p>On a recent visit to Washington one think-tanker there put it to me this way: “If the Scots go, than you can kiss-off keeping the two key strategic bases. From our point of view (USA), it will really mean you (UK) are finished as a major power. You are done!”</p>
<p>The truth is many in the US will argue, <em>sotto voce</em>, that the UK does not really need a Rolls Royce version of the deterrent, especially if it comes at the price of a bonsai conventional force. But that does not mean that they want the UK to give up the capability altogether.</p>
<h2>Temp Trident?</h2>
<p>There is also the possibility of a temporary leasing agreement between Scotland and the UK. This would keep Trident in Scotland past the 2020 deadline but potentially see new facilities ready in time for 2028, when the current Vanguard-class submarines are due to start being replaceed at an estimated total cost of £20bn (assuming the electorate do not take the opportunity to scupper those plans as well). </p>
<p>One must assume that when it comes to nuclear weapons, cool heads would prevail in post-independence negotiations but nothing is certain. Delaying a permanent removal until satisfactory alternatives are arranged would help to avoid the prospect of what could be a major deterioration in relations with London. UK officials have made clear that a forced removal of Trident from Scotland would affect discussions “across the whole piece” of pan-governmental negotiation. After all, the reputation of the UK as a state that punches above its weight would be at stake.</p>
<p>A temporary leasing arrangement, if it could be negotiated, would also have benefits for Scotland. If London and Edinburgh could see eye to eye on this thorny issue, the likelihood of garnering UK support for Scotland membership in NATO would be much enhanced. The chances of obtaining the share of the UK’s current conventional assets that the Scottish government seeks would also be strengthened. </p>
<p>Purging Scotland (and the world) of nuclear weapons is a noble historical ambition for a would be fledgling state, but an independent Scotland may want to think twice about alienating a multitude of its potential allies in the process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon is a member of the Scotland Institute think tank.</span></em></p>As Scotland teeters on the brink of independence these next few days, the question of Trident is one issue in particular that is bound to cause a few sleepless nights in Edinburgh, London and Washington…Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/287522014-07-03T05:01:31Z2014-07-03T05:01:31ZScotland Decides ’14: could Salmond shift on retaining nuclear weapons?<p>One long-running sore in the Scottish independence referendum campaign concerns the future UK’s nuclear deterrent. Scottish Nationalists say an independent Scotland <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28113133">will no longer house</a> any of the UK’s nuclear arsenal at Faslane and Coulport. The party <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/referendum-news/scottish-constitution-would-ban-nuclear-weapons.19078977">even wants</a> the anti-nuclear stance written into the proposed Scottish constitution. </p>
<p>Recently the party’s position on nuclear was called into question when the <a href="http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.heraldscotland.com%2Fpolitics%2Freferendum-news%2Fblow-for-snp-after-new-poll-reveals-support-for-trident.24514174&ei=0jK0U_aKGeiK7Ab35IFI&usg=AFQjCNEOEPkoUt1UwYvQG2JvV44fN3SeSw&bvm=bv.70138588,d.ZGU">latest British Social Attitudes survey indicated</a> that the Scottish public possibly had a more pro-nuclear stance. With the UK Trident Commission <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-28098583">this week proposing</a> that the country should maintain its nuclear capability, we asked our panel where this issue was heading. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Trevor Salmon, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen</strong></p>
<p>It is all very well for the SNP to argue that an independent Scotland would join NATO because of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19993694">their conference decision</a>, but the nuclear issue will actually be the key. You could argue that only three of NATO’s members possess nuclear weapons; that Norway and Denmark have national legislation that does not allow nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime; and that about 20 neither possess or host nuclear weapons. But that misses the point. </p>
<p>Norway, Denmark and many of those other nuclear-free countries joined NATO in a different era. The Danes and Norwegians both joined in 1949, at a time when the cold war had just begun and the priority for the allies was to assemble a broad defence base. The Americans may not have liked their positions, but they were willing to tolerate them at the time. That wouldn’t necessarily be the case now. </p>
<p>When you join NATO you undertake a formal obligation to respect and meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments, and to accept all of its principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by members. This means that every member accepts the alliance’s nuclear first-strike capability, if NATO is losing a conventional war.</p>
<p>One question that Alex Salmond has never answered is whether if NATO tried to use nuclear weapons, would he attempt to veto it. Of course in reality everyone knows that although the veto may be implied by the fact that NATO is supposed to act by consensus, there would be no veto in practice. The US and Iceland are not equal. All the same, NATO will not allow a state that is philosophically against nuclear weapons to join. If the answer to the Salmond question is yes, NATO would never let him in. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/lord-robertson-of-port-ellen/672">Lord Robertson</a> has said, other states that have applied to join NATO since 1989, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, were told to resolve territorial and other disputes so that they did not import problems with their neighbours into NATO
. </p>
<p>The whole question of nuclear weapons in Scotland would require long and complex negotiations. It would be unrealistic to suppose that the British PM and government would easily give up Faslane’s nuclear facilities. There may be a proposal for a constitutional legally binding guarantee to close down the nuclear facilities under an SNP government by 2020, but there is no political mileage for the British PM to agree to this – not if they wish to win the British election after 2015!</p>
<p>As well as the theological and philosophical arguments about having nuclear weapons, there are also political arguments. Sweden has long argued that its decision not to go down the nuclear route added to its status in the world and gave it leverage. But it must be said that Norway has played a key role in the Middle East rather than Sweden.</p>
<p><strong>Michael Keating, Professor of Politics, University of Aberdeen</strong></p>
<p>The most recent British Social Attitudes survey didn’t show that the Scots wanted to keep Trident, contrary to how it was reported in <a href="http://www.jackiebaillie.co.uk/new-poll-shows-more-scots-want-to-keep-trident">some quarters</a>. A majority were opposed to Britain having nuclear weapons, which is also what previous surveys have shown.</p>
<p>When they were asked whether nuclear weapons should stay in Scotland after independence, a slightly higher proportion agreed than disagreed. But I would not put too much weight on this. It just means that most voters are relaxed about compromises with the UK after independence. The SNP are not out of line with Scottish opinion here. If the unionists are going to make that an argument, it’s probably not going to be a winning argument.</p>
<p>It’s hard to imagine the SNP abandoning its commitment to remove Trident as it is a core issue for many in the party. The Labour party is divided on nuclear weapons. The Conservatives could talk about it, but of course they don’t have a lot of credibility in Scotland.</p>
<p>Perhaps for these reasons, the unionists have been a little bit quiet on this subject. When they talk about Trident, the focus is usually on jobs rather than arguing it’s necessary because we are going to use it or because it’s essential for British defence. The argument about defence in general also rapidly becomes one about jobs.</p>
<p>I don’t think anybody thinks that the weapons would go by 2020. There would probably be some sort of transitional arrangement. During that time, the UK might have changed its mind about Trident altogether.</p>
<p>I still have difficulty in believing that the UK is going to spend up to £100bn on a weapons system it’s never going to use. It begs credibility, particularly when most the armed forces don’t want it, and are being deprived of resources for basic kit. It seems a gigantic national prestige project.</p>
<p>That’s probably why there’s quite a lot of scepticism about the whole thing. At some point, a British government will likely say this is going to be a waste of money. Scottish independence might provoke it, or it may not. The whole debate seems slightly unreal to me.</p>
<p>As far as NATO is concerned, nobody is really paying attention to what the two sides are saying. If people think about it at all, they assume Scotland would get in since nobody has an interest in creating a hole in NATO coverage.</p>
<p>This debate does tell us something about the wider referendum campaign. If you look at public opinion in Scotland, there’s not a lot of support for independence in a hard sense. People want control of domestic policy, of welfare and taxation. They are not that interested in getting control of defence policy, which is perhaps one reason why this does not look like a make-or-break issue for the electorate.</p>
<p><em>To read other editions of Scotland Decides ‘14, click <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/scotland-decides-14">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael receives funding from the economic and social research council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trevor Salmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One long-running sore in the Scottish independence referendum campaign concerns the future UK’s nuclear deterrent. Scottish Nationalists say an independent Scotland will no longer house any of the UK’s…Michael Keating, Chair in Scottish Politics, University of AberdeenTrevor Salmon, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/286212014-06-30T13:42:14Z2014-06-30T13:42:14ZWise up England, you’d be better off without Scotland<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/52642/original/jctfgbp7-1404126842.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Time to say adieu, England!</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-197880722/stock-photo-europe-maps-with-flags.html?src=v5lveTPUreSZR-WaLYtZ_g-1-43">d100</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>To date, the debate on the Scottish independence referendum has focused on why the Scots should or shouldn’t back independence. There has also been some <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/?sf1=id_product&st1=761207">recent academic research</a> on why the Scots have arrived at a referendum in the first place. </p>
<p>But very little has been written or said about why the English should back Scotland’s exit from the union. I know many people in England would like to have a say on Scottish independence, and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/mar/01/english-welsh-majority-against-scots-independence">if the polls are any indication</a> the vast majority of English voters would cast a no vote. But I would argue there are several powerful reasons why the English should accept or even be enthusiastic about the Scots going it alone when they vote at the end of the summer. </p>
<h2>What good will devo max do?</h2>
<p>The first revolves around <a href="http://www.eveningtimes.co.uk/news/scots-are-in-favour-of-devo-max-152658n.23473601">the most popular</a> alternative to independence, “devo max”. If the Scots decide to vote against independence, David Cameron is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/02/scottish-independence-cameron-backs-holyrood-income-tax-power">already promising</a> that more powers will be devolved to the Scottish parliament. Many have interpreted these additional powers as equating to devo max. </p>
<p>But what would be the likely outcome of the Scots being granted devo max as a concession following a no vote? Some people are calling this bribery to keep the Scots in the union. Whatever you call it, it is nothing more than a short-term solution for maintaining the British state. Does anyone believe for a split second that a Scottish government run by the Scottish National Party devoted to extricating the Scots from the British state would be placated with devo max? </p>
<p>Once the Scots have it, what’s to stop them, just like any good negotiator, from continually asking for additional powers and threatening to separate if they don’t get them? Wouldn’t Scotland and England continue to grow further apart within the UK until all that would be left to say is that they are the two largest national components of one excessively decentralised state? What good does this do for England, Wales and Northern Ireland? The English must know that in the long term, offering devo max is a disastrous policy fraught with dire consequences for the union.</p>
<h2>Ditch Barnett, resolve West Lothian</h2>
<p>Another contentious issue <a href="http://www.opm.co.uk/blog/whatever-way-scotland-votes-this-september-the-current-status-quo-will-no-longer-be-tenable/">from an English point of view</a> is the Barnett formula, which provides extra subsidies from the British government to the people of Scotland for public services. If Scotland were to regain its independence after the referendum, this would free up additional taxpayer dollars to be invested elsewhere in what remained of the British state (albeit <a href="http://www.businessforscotland.co.uk/new-figures-confirm-that-scotland-would-have-been-8-3-billion-better-off-an-independent-country/">Scottish nationalists argue</a> that Scotland is a net contributor to the UK once North Sea petroleum revenues are taken into account). </p>
<p>Then there’s the <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/west-lothian-question/">West Lothian question</a>, which concerns the fact that MPs representing Scottish constituencies in the Westminster parliament are allowed to vote on legislation that does not affect their electorates. This would immediately disappear with the establishment of an independent Scotland, which English people ought to see as a benefit. After all, why should the Scots have a say on issues like English education when English MPs have absolutely no control over the Scottish equivalent? </p>
<p>One understandable anxiety from an English point of view is the fact Faslane in the west of Scotland is an important storage site for UK nuclear weapons. But there are other places to store them if an independent Scotland demands their removal. There <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/pro-union-campaign-in-crisis-after-minister-admits-currency-union-ban-was-a-bluff.23823233">has even been suggestion</a>, reportedly from within the British government, that these weapons could remain at Faslane in the west of Scotland in exchange for a currency union. </p>
<h2>Get real, England</h2>
<p>This all raises the question, how exactly is England hurt by Scottish independence? Wouldn’t England be better off financially and governmentally by seeing Scotland leave the union? </p>
<p>I understand the emotional connection to the historical union and the desire to keep the borders of the British state intact after more than 300 years. But the British state today is not the British state of 100 or even 50 years ago, when the the Scots and English were still both benefiting from the spoils of empire.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/52643/original/p7zygqcs-1404127357.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sometimes you have to know when to let go.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lewishamdreamer/8308042569/in/photolist-dE9TBg-dFFoqa-b64sL4-m5ndaQ-tLycc-6YZS7B-n97pZ-dFLPH5-ah93Y4-a2Vnku-bTUckT-dq241L-8ipZo7-6SSih9-dD2koC-794vB7-9PXKPg-7rZWPA-9uGpJA-4Dpyir-7NNyij-3wL3jT-4ZPCV4-aEDadn-aEH12w-aEDaDT-aEGZLs-3FS1H-6zVcWh-5WAX8j-6M8kFq-9mSCxd-4FHA6i-8H5s7-9PXyDx-aEDaJ2-6oyZS-3akLa-8H8dZ-dXqKkh-aj5HkG-4DSWGb-JMrzN-GQAKX-8kZwnt-4mgTBf-iRxye-5EbVm8-cSFKM-3GP3u2">Jason</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A Britain with a Scottish population constantly angry or depressed or demanding further authority is not conducive to the remaining UK being a productive global power. Internal conflicts at home undermine Britain’s power abroad as history has demonstrated time and time again. Numerous distractions for the English, and the rest of Britain, would be eliminated with a yes vote on September 18.</p>
<p><em>Dr Glass put forward these arguments at the <a href="http://www.cvhf.org.uk/programme/events/event-100-iq2-debate-history-teaches-us-that-scotland-and-england-are-better-off/">Chalke Valley history festival on Sunday June 29</a> in a debate with education secretary Michael Gove, former Lib Dem leader Menzies Campbell and journalist Simon Jenkins on whether Scotland should gain its independence following the referendum.</em> </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bryan Glass is General Editor of The British Scholar Society</span></em></p>To date, the debate on the Scottish independence referendum has focused on why the Scots should or shouldn’t back independence. There has also been some recent academic research on why the Scots have arrived…Bryan Glass, Lecturer in Modern British and British Imperial History, Texas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.