tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/fethullah-gulen-28324/articlesFethullah Gulen – The Conversation2020-04-23T12:09:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1364662020-04-23T12:09:58Z2020-04-23T12:09:58ZTurkey releasing murderers – but not political opponents – from prison amid coronavirus pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329270/original/file-20200420-152591-1m88gyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Released prisoners sit in a bus outside Ankara, Turkey -- while government critics remain behind bars due to Turkey's sweeping terror laws.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Virus-Outbreak-Turkey-Prisons/e5c80285419b44eca27fe42a7e5d05f9/3/0">AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey has begun to release about <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/penal-reform/war-words-between-turkish-mafia-leaders-escalates-following-legal-reform-bill">90,000 prison inmates</a>, half of them temporarily and the other <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-coronavirus/turkeys-coronavirus-death-toll-reaches-1518-prisoner-releases-begin-live-blog">half permanently</a>, to prevent COVID-19’s spread and to ease overcrowding. </p>
<p>President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his AK Party and their ruling coalition partner have excluded those who are charged with terrorism from the law allowing the releases.</p>
<p>In other words, the Erdogan regime is determined to keep in prison tens of thousands of academics, journalists, politicians, civil servants and others who did not commit any crime other than being affiliated with groups the regime sees as political threats. </p>
<p>Out of the total of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/turkey-should-protect-all-prisoners-pandemic">300,000 prisoners in the country</a>, around <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-prisoners/turkish-parliament-passes-bill-to-release-thousands-from-prison-amid-coronavirus-idUSKCN21V241">50,000</a> are charged with terrorism. </p>
<p>Terrorism charges have been used to suppress the opposition in Turkey, particularly since the 2016 failed coup attempt against Erdogan and <a href="https://hrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Turkey-ECtHR-Report_April-2019.pdf">his subsequent purge</a> against perceived political enemies. </p>
<p>Among those imprisoned on terrorism charges are <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/coronavirus-turkey-law-release-thousands-prisoners-pandemic">Selahattin Demirtas</a>, the previous leader of Turkey’s pro-Kurdish political party; <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/12/outrage-after-turkish-journalist-re-arrested-a-week-after-his-release">Ahmet Altan</a>, a world-renowned journalist and author; and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/world/middleeast/osman-kavala-turkey.html">Osman Kavala</a>, a philanthropist and businessperson. </p>
<p>Some of those charged with terrorism have indeed perpetrated violent acts as members of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html">the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</a> (often called ISIS), the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">Kurdish militant group PKK</a> or the junta who attempted the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/world/asia/turkey-mass-trials-coup.html">2016 coup</a>. </p>
<p>But most of those imprisoned for terrorism are not even charged with a single violent act; they are accused of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/05/turkey-academics-trial-signing-petition">enabling the PKK</a>, or being <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-two-islamic-groups-fell-from-power-to-persecution-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-and-turkeys-gulenists-120800">Gulenists</a>, followers of the U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom Erdogan blames for masterminding the 2016 coup attempt.</p>
<p>The initial draft of the law would have released <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-52011385">rapists and drug dealers</a>. They were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-52113167">later excluded</a> from release after public criticism surfaced. But the regime’s critics charged with terrorism were never considered for release, even in the drafts.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C5%2C3946%2C2461&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-speaks-during-a-news-photo/1207621179?adppopup=true">Getty/Adem Altan/AFP</a></span>
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<h2>The state versus individuals</h2>
<p>This policy is based on a historically <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2020/01/25/polat-alpman-turkiyede-tek-ideoloji-var-o-da-devletcilik/">consistent ideology</a>, which has been embraced by most governments and even a <a href="https://www.maviyorum.com/turk-ilahiyatina-giris-devlet-dinimdir-millet-mezhebimdir-gokhan-bacik/">large segment of society</a> – that the Turkish state is much more important than individuals.</p>
<p>Using the risk of COVID-19 as an opportunity, the Turkish state with this move underlines the main purpose of prisons: They are meant to primarily punish the designated enemies of the state. Those who violate rights of individuals (by murdering or robbing them) can be regarded as less dangerous and even pardoned.</p>
<p>My 2019 book, “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>,” traces the origins of this state-centric ideology in the history of the Seljuk (1040-1194), Mamluk (1250-1517) and Ottoman (1299-1922) states, which left an ideological legacy to contemporary Turkey and most Arab countries.</p>
<p>Even late Ottoman reformists, who tried to import Western European ideas, did not challenge state-centricism and restrictions over individual liberties. The famous <a href="http://kitaptarih.com/tanzimat-fermani-pdf.html">Reorganization Edict</a> of 1839, issued by the Ottoman sultan and bureaucrats, guaranteed the protection of their subjects’ life, honor and property. But it did not even refer to their liberty.</p>
<p>The laws of modern Turkey have generally guaranteed individual liberties. Yet, its governments have constantly violated the citizens’ freedoms, especially those of religious (<a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=P7qKDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Turkey+Wealth+Tax&ots=H_YjGG3-6V&sig=KCes4ULaTPhhGtasSj-Yoff_BiM#v=onepage&q=Wealth%20Tax&f=false">non-Muslim</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/europe/alevi-minority-turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan.html">Alevi</a>) minorities and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkey#8e519f">Kurds</a>.</p>
<h2>Erdogan and his changing allies</h2>
<p>President Erdogan has dominated Turkish politics for the last 17 years. Since 2011, he has been powerful enough to define the citizens of his country as either friends or enemies of the state. </p>
<p>During the early part of his rule, Erdogan cooperated with followers of Gulen, certain Kurds and various intellectuals against secularist forces in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32136809">military</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23581891">judiciary</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Erdogan had his signature put on the coronavirus care packages distributed to 1.15 million people aged 65 and over, containing five masks and some cologne.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-poses-for-a-photo-with-a-gift-package-containing-news-photo/1209451691?adppopup=true">Getty/Elif Ozturk/Anadolu Agency</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Erdogan-Gulen alliance, prosecutors launched investigations against hundreds of this alliance’s political targets. And the courts played along with these probes, stretching the definition of terrorism so far that they even declared Turkey’s retired armed forces chief of staff, <a href="https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2012/03/10/basbugu-terleten-sorular">Ilker Basbug</a>, a terrorist.</p>
<p>In the last six years, Erdogan gradually changed his allies because of his tug-of-war with Gulen and the popularity of being tougher against Kurds. Erdogan embraced <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/why-turkey-torn-between-united-states-and-russia/">ultranationalist secularists</a> as political partners – the very group he had targeted earlier. This new partnership labeled all Gulenists, many Kurdish nationalists and numerous intellectuals as terrorists.</p>
<p>After the 2016 failed coup against Erdogan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/30/despite-odds-turkeys-academic-activists-keep-defying-erdogan/">500,000 citizens</a> were investigated for being members of terrorist organizations. Most of these investigations aimed to sentence Gulenists. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkey#8e519f">Tens of thousands</a> were imprisoned with such evidence as downloading a smartphone application used by Gulenists and having an account in a bank affiliated with Gulen. In <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/hundreds-of-young-turkish-children-jailed-alongside-their-moms-as-part-of-a-post-coup-crackdown">650 cases</a>, imprisoned women are parents of children under 6 years old, so they live in jail together.</p>
<p>Turkey was particularly unprepared for COVID-19 due to the post-coup purge of about <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/08/the-coronavirus-will-destroy-turkeys-economy/">150,000 civil servants</a>, and specifically, <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-coronavirus/turkeys-most-knowledgeable-coronavirus-expert-sidelined">15,000 health care professionals</a>. One of Turkey’s rare coronavirus experts, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=r6fD_noAAAAJ&hl=en">Dr. Mustafa Ulasli</a>, was among those who were purged with the accusation of being a Gulenist. <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/purged-coronavirus-expert-sidelined-in-turkey-1.997333">He lost his job</a> and remains unemployed, despite <a href="https://tr.euronews.com/2020/03/21/docent-mustafa-ulasli-koronavirus-covid-tavsiye-asi-turkiye-bulabilir-khk-goreve-hazirim">his offers to help</a> the Health Ministry with the crisis.</p>
<h2>COVID-19 and authoritarians</h2>
<p>Globally, analysts have tried to explain possible political <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/coronavirus-effect-economy-life-society-analysis-covid-135579">effects of COVID-19</a>. One of the main questions is: Will it weaken or empower autocrats? The case of Turkey shows the complexity of COVID-19’s political consequences.</p>
<p>On the one hand, COVID-19 has deepened the Erdogan regime’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/15/coronavirus-in-turkey-economy-in-trouble-as-case-numbers-shoot-up.html">financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkish-lira/turkish-lira-plumbs-2018-crisis-lows-virus-hits-budget-finances">Turkish lira</a> has been losing its value against the U.S. dollar since 2018, and that trend continues. </p>
<p>Erdogan declared a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-18/turkey-announces-15-4-billion-plan-to-counter-virus-outbreak">US$15 billion stimulus plan</a> on March 18. Because <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/08/the-coronavirus-will-destroy-turkeys-economy/">this was insufficient</a>, he asked citizens to donate to <a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/meral-aksener-bilim-kurulu-tam-karantina-istedi-erdogan-reddetti,871842">a state-run aid campaign</a>, which will financially help those who are affected by the measures against the pandemic, <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-coronavirus-offers-money-companies-donations-for-poor.html">especially daily wage workers</a>.</p>
<p>An important pillar of Erdogan’s regime is Diyanet – the government agency that controls all of the country’s 85,000 mosques and pay salaries to their imams. COVID-19 is further weakening the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/26/turkey-political-islam-is-getting-way-rational-health-policy/">public reputation of the Diyanet</a>, reflected in discussions on social media about why taxpayers’ money is still going to imams’ salaries though the mosques are closed.</p>
<p>On the other hand, a <a href="https://twitter.com/metropoll/status/1248290597930242048?s=20">recent survey</a> indicated that Erdogan’s approval rate has lately increased. During the COVID-19 crisis, many people may want to rally around <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/approval-rating/erdogans-approval-rating-bolstered-coronavirus-pandemic-metropoll">the leader</a> – in Turkey and across the globe.</p>
<p>In fact, Erdogan has tried to unify the nation around <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-coronavirus-meets-authoritarianism-in-turkey">his personality</a> during the crisis. He put his <a href="https://tr.euronews.com/2020/04/08/erdogan-65-yas-ustu-vatandaslara-mektup-yazd-sizlere-koruyucu-maske-ve-kolonya-hediye-ediy">personal signature</a> on the Turkish state’s COVID-19 care packages distributed nationwide. He also declared that only the central government was authorized to collect money for COVID-19 aid purposes; the interior ministry blocked the charity drives of <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-opposition/erdogan-says-opposition-aid-drives-attempt-create-parallel-state">opposition-run municipalities</a>.</p>
<p>During the COVID-19 crisis, it is crucial for Erdogan to control the media in order to minimize criticisms of his policies. Otherwise, his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/world/middleeast/coronavirus-turkey-deaths.html">ineffective responses to the crisis</a> may lead to a growing opposition. Hence, Erdogan wants to keep many journalists and other critics in prison. </p>
<p>When faced with COVID-19, the Turkish state repeats what it knows best – the state is more important than individuals. Erdogan and his allies have even created new ways to demonstrate this: For them, the regime’s critics are more dangerous than violent criminals.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To stem the spread of COVID-19, Turkey is releasing 90,000 prison inmates. Not on the list for release: tens of thousands of academics, journalists and others the regime sees as political threats.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1208002019-08-20T11:22:00Z2019-08-20T11:22:00ZHow two Islamic groups fell from power to persecution: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s Gulenists<p>Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first-ever democratically elected president, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/mohamed-morsi-and-end-egyptian-democracy/591982/">died unexpectedly during a trial</a> in June 2019. He was a member of the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Hc7iAAAAQBAJ&q=Tarek+Masoud#v=onepage&q=%22Chapter%2031%22&f=false">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, an almost century-old Islamist group that rose to power after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. </p>
<p>Its political tenure was short. Morsi was deposed by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution">coup in 2013</a>, on the one-year anniversary of his election. Egypt’s new military regime declared the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political coalition received 38% of the votes in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/voting-in-historic-egyptian-elections-enters-second-day.html">2011 parliamentary elections</a>, a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285">terrorist organization</a>. Its members have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1202532019ENGLISH.pdf">arrested, jailed</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/we-do-unreasonable-things-here/torture-and-national-security-al-sisis-egypt">tortured</a>. Morsi was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/opinion/morsi-death-egypt.html">sentenced to death</a>, though the sentence was overturned on appeal.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood’s fall recalls the sudden decline of another once-powerful Islamic group: Turkey’s Gulen movement.</p>
<p>In July, Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan marked the third anniversary of a failed coup accusing Fethullah Gulen – a former <a href="http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-Democracy-In-Turkey.php">ally</a> and leader of an influential Islamic movement – of <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/failed-coup-attempt/turkey-commemorate-3rd-anniversary-coup-attempt">masterminding the attempted overthrow</a> of his government.</p>
<p>Gulen, a Turkish scholar and cleric who has lived in the United States for 20 years, has consistently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/fethullah-gulen-turkey-coup-attempt.html">denied involvement</a> in the coup. He founded an Islamic community in the 1970s. By 2013, his movement had millions of supporters worldwide, as well as media institutions and schools in over <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1969290,00.html">100 countries</a>, including <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/gulen-movements-charter-schools-may-be-caught-up-in-turkey-u-s-standoff-1468967536">some 150 charter schools</a> in the United States. </p>
<p>The New York Times once presented the movement as promoting “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/world/asia/04islam.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=D2E054B31541981F4179434CC8A6F7C4&gwt=pay">a gentler vision of Islam</a>.” In 2014, the BBC called Gulen “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25885817">Turkey’s second most powerful man</a>,” after then Prime Minister Erdogan. </p>
<p>Now, Erdogan has declared the Gulenists to be terrorists. Those who are affiliated with the movement have been systematically <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2018-01-29/remarkable-scale-turkeys-global-purge">purged and jailed</a>. </p>
<p>How did the Muslim Brothers and the Gulenists fall so far, so fast? </p>
<h2>The authoritarian state</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">research on Islam and authoritarianism</a> indicates that both groups were victims of the same dangerous combination: an authoritarian state, Utopian ideas about Islam and unreliable friends.</p>
<p>Both in Egypt and Turkey, Islamic movements have struggled to survive in authoritarian regimes that exert strong control over religious practice.</p>
<p>Egypt’s autocratic presidents keep <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/conflict-and-cooperation-between-the-state-and-religious-institutions-in-contemporary-egypt/88682BFE96041526E0E4FFB0EC3B892E">mosques and Al-Azhar</a>, a leading educational institute of Sunni Islam, under their thumb. </p>
<p>In Turkey, a government agency called the <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/gulen-movement/secret-diyanet-report-gauges-threat-posed-turkeys-islamists">Diyanet</a> oversees religious affairs and defines for the Turkish people what “correct Islam” is. Under the strongman regime Erdogan has built since 2013, which combines <a href="https://theconversation.com/nationalism-and-piety-dominate-turkeys-election-98609">religious conservatism, nationalism and authoritarianism</a>, the Dinayet has been a crucial instrument of social control.</p>
<p>Given these political conditions, both the Muslim Brothers and the Gulenists have since their founding had a well-founded fear of persecution. Their leaders, several of whom I <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/29/egypts-transition-two-years-later-a-turkish-perspective/">interviewed</a> in 2013 during my book research, assumed that these groups could not survive unless they became powerful enough to control state institutions entirely. </p>
<p>That fear has proven to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. </p>
<p>Their efforts to capture the state institutions were initially so successful that they created a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=gR9KTPUCUkk">backlash</a>. Political elites in Turkey and Egypt turned against these powerful groups, designating them enemies of the state.</p>
<h2>Utopian Islam</h2>
<p>The comparison I’m developing here will be unacceptable for most Gulenists. </p>
<p>Gulen’s followers see themselves as nonpolitical, a <a href="https://fgulen.com/en/press/interview-by-foreign-policy/26368-meet-fethullah-gulen-the-worlds-top-public-intellectual">civil society organization</a> – sharply different from the Muslim Brothers, an Islamist political organization with an explicitly <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/muslim_bros_participation.pdf">political agenda</a>.</p>
<p>And it is true that the Gulenists never established a political party. But their initial alliance with Erdogan – and, later, their <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_government%E2%80%93G%C3%BClen_movement_conflict">conflict</a> with him – demonstrates that Gulenists are a deeply political force in Turkey.</p>
<p>Like the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/20/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-faces-a-dilemma-religion-or-politics/?utm_term=.ad667bd681e2">Muslim Brothers</a>, the <a href="https://kitalararasi.com/2018/11/26/hepimiz-islamciyiz-ozgur-koca/">Gulenists</a> have a certain Utopian vision of their religion. Both groups see Islam – albeit different versions of it – as the solution to all society’s ills. </p>
<p>Religion is, for these organizations, a blueprint that should guide Muslims in every detail of their life, from restroom manners to governance. The judiciary, military and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/turkish-police-fethullah-gulen-network">police</a>, too, should be “Islamic.”</p>
<p>In their quest to control everyday life in Turkey and Egypt, the <a href="http://rusencakir.com/Tanidigim-Fethullah-Gulen/7057">Gulenists</a> and the <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/egypt-at-a-crossroads-after-morsi-grants-himself-sweeping-powers-a-869291.html">Muslim Brothers</a> made enemies. They alienated secular citizens, who rejected the “Islamization” of their country. They also angered <a href="http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-Democracy-In-Turkey.php">other Islamic groups</a>, who felt themselves being <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/01/egypt-s-pragmatic-salafis-politics-of-hizb-al-nour-pub-64902">edged out of power</a>.</p>
<h2>Wrong partners</h2>
<p>Even one-time allies have turned against these groups. </p>
<p>This is a sign of the third feature that, I found, contributed to the downfall of the Gulenists and the Muslim Brotherhood: Neither is very good at choosing their friends.</p>
<p>Within a month of winning the Egyptian presidency, Morsi promoted to defense minister and head of the armed forces <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/egypts-failed-revolution">General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi</a>, a young general. Morsi thought al-Sisi had strong enough Islamist leanings that he would be friendlier to the Muslim Brotherhood than other high-ranking officials in the Egyptian military. </p>
<p>A year later, al-Sisi staged the coup that overthrew Morsi. Once in power, he designated the Muslim Brothers a terrorist organization.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brothers have made this mistake before. In the 1950s, they believed <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11081.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a> – the military mastermind of Egypt’s 1952 revolution – was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. But after using the group to seize power, President Nasser persecuted his former partners.</p>
<p>The Gulenists have made similarly disastrous partnerships. </p>
<p>Between 2006 and 2011, they <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/gulen-movement/how-has-gulen-movement-ended-where-it">allied with Erdogan</a>, helping him eliminate Turkey’s secular political establishment. But once Erdogan consolidated his <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/politics/turkeys-one-man-rule-will-end-end-man-ahmet-kuru">personal power</a>, he turned against all his former allies – the Gulenists included. </p>
<p>Concerned about Erdogan’s persecution of their movement, some Gulenists came to see General Hulusi Akar, then the head of Turkey’s armed forces, as the man to check the Turkish president’s dictatorial tendencies. Arguably, they expected some sort of <a href="https://twitter.com/farukmercan/status/755646527129935876?lang=en">military intervention against Erdogan</a>. </p>
<p>Whether Akar actually played a role in the 2016 coup attempt is still a mystery in Turkey. He insists he had <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/army-failed-to-spot-all-gulenists-chief-of-general-staff-129234">nothing to do</a> with the effort to overthrow Erdogan. </p>
<p>In 2018, Erdogan <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4e273880-8823-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543">promoted Akar to defense minister</a>. With Akar’s support, more than <a href="https://twitter.com/t24comtr/status/1124236467499425793?s=20">16,000 military officers have been fired</a> for allegedly being Gulenists.</p>
<h2>Lessons to be learned</h2>
<p>Just a few years ago, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gulenists were powerful enough to imagine that their Utopian goal of remaking society in their image was within reach.</p>
<p>Today their leaders are exiled, dead and jailed. Their <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/egypt-approved-law-seizing-assets-funds-muslim-brotherhood.html">properties</a> have been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fed595d0-631e-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1">seized</a>, their <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/gulen-movement/intellectual-crisis-gulen-movement">reputations tarnished</a>.</p>
<p>The downfall of these two Islamic organizations is a cautionary tale for other religious groups with political ambitions in the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Trying to run a country based on a single Utopian vision of what an ideal Islamic society looks like is risky business. Add authoritarianism to the mix, and the chances of failure grow. Choose the wrong allies, and the result can be deadly. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru is the author of Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2019).</span></em></p>A few years ago, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s Gulenists were running the show. Now both religious movements face political repression. How did they fall so far, so fast?Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1109572019-02-06T11:42:59Z2019-02-06T11:42:59ZAutocracies that look like democracies are a threat across the globe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256887/original/file-20190201-103164-to7fhl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A rally celebrating the second anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea, March 18, 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Russia-Crimea/d572a67ffa844324a14d389cbbaa6ac5/27/0">AP/Ivan Sekretarev</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html">Russia’s successful interference</a> in the 2016 U.S. presidential election may inspire other countries to do the same. </p>
<p>These other countries don’t look threatening. They look like democracies. But they’re not. </p>
<p>They’re a special kind of autocratic regime that masquerades as a democracy. And what looks like benevolent conduct by these countries can quickly change into aggressive, politically charged behavior. </p>
<p>Autocracies, often known as “authoritarian regimes,” maintain power through centralized control over information and resources. Political opposition is either forbidden or strongly curtailed and individual freedom is limited by the state.</p>
<p>Autocracies that look like democracies are different because their leaders permit political opponents to run for election – even though they rarely win.</p>
<p>These countries’ capitalist systems have some of the trappings of liberal democracies in the West. But these regimes use capitalism to further their authoritarian rule.</p>
<p>These so-called “dominant party authoritarian regimes” have surged in number from around 13 percent of all countries before the end of the Cold War to around <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108186797">33 percent today</a>. </p>
<p>Most are located in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. They are also present in Eastern Europe and in the Americas. Russia is one of them; so are Turkey, Malaysia, Singapore and Venezuela. </p>
<p>These regimes often engage in the same kinds of bad behavior as other autocracies. But their behavior is critically different in both the motivations and methods used to further authoritarian ends, as detailed in my new book “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108186797">Authoritarian Capitalism</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256890/original/file-20190201-108334-dhuupg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian military intelligence service building; 12 of its officers hacked into the Clinton presidential campaign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Russia-US-Trump-Probe/39c1c0cf812c4522b3152d7b348c664d/1/0">AP/Pavel Golovkin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Political control</h2>
<p>Part of the danger with dominant party authoritarian regimes is that their veneer of democracy permits political opponents to run for election. But when incumbent rulers face a threat to their power, the autocrats often respond by targeting political dissidents and taking aggressive actions toward foreign enemies to bolster popular support.</p>
<p>For example, Russian leader Vladimir Putin faced an unprecedented challenge from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011%E2%80%932013_Russian_protests">citizen protests during the 2012 presidential election</a>. The protests continued into 2013.</p>
<p>Putin punished the protesters. New York Times correspondent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/world/europe/in-russia-a-trendy-activism-against-putin-loses-its-moment.html">Ellen Barry reported in 2013</a> that “new laws prescribe draconian punishments for acts of dissent. … Mr. Putin … embraced a new, sharply conservative rhetoric, dismissing the urban protesters as traitors and blasphemers, enemies of Russia.”</p>
<p>Shortly afterward, Russia’s foreign activities became even more <a href="https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McFaul%20Testimony%209-6-18.pdf">belligerent than during the Soviet period</a>. This accomplished just what Putin wanted: Following his annexation of Crimea in 2014, his approval ratings <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/24/putins-approval-ratings-hit-89-percent-the-highest-theyve-ever-been/?utm_term=.cdbd4c686102">skyrocketed</a>. </p>
<p>Another recent example is Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s repression of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/05/erdogan-cumhuriyet-turkey-journalists-arrested-detained-dissent">domestic political dissidents</a> following the failed July 2016 coup against him. According to The Guardian, the regime arrested or suspended “more than 110,000 officials, including judges, teachers, police and civil servants.”</p>
<p>Erdogan went after foreign-based dissidents too, allegedly orchestrating a plot to kidnap opposition leader <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/mueller-investigating-michael-flynn-plot-kidnap-turkish-opposition-leader-708053">Fetullah Gulen</a> from Pennsylvania.</p>
<p>And while he won the presidential election in June 2018, Erdogan’s foreign-based critics remain concerned about his threats. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/sports/kanter-knicks-erdogan-turkey.html">Enes Kanter</a>, a Turkish NBA star, declined to travel to London in January 2019 out of fear that Turkish spies might kill him.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=808&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=808&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=808&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1016&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1016&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/256888/original/file-20190201-127151-199bf61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1016&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish NBA star Enes Kanter curtails foreign travel for fear of kidnapping by the Turkish government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mavericks-Knicks-Basketball/627009ce8b004df39b8c836df302337b/10/0">AP/Kathy Willens</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Information control</h2>
<p>Another distinction that characterizes dominant party authoritarian regimes is how they exploit Western legal and financial systems against Western media outlets critical of the regime.</p>
<p>Normally, <a href="http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-3">autocrats control information and resources</a> to retain power. But rather than relying on the typical autocrat’s crude hostile attacks or outright censorship, dominant party authoritarian regimes use legal or financial methods regarded as legitimate by the West.</p>
<p>In other words, they sue the media or they buy them.</p>
<p>A slew of foreign news organizations – including <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/opinion/global/24iht-opednote.html">The New York Times</a>, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122791989311765753">Wall Street Journal</a>, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/opinion/04pubed.html">Bloomberg</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/opinion/04pubed.html">The Economist</a> – were sued by the Lee family, autocratic rulers of Singapore, for political and financial reporting after the 2008 global financial crisis. </p>
<p>The family maintained the coverage defamed them. As the Wall Street Journal’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122791989311765753">editors wrote in 2008</a>, “We know of no foreign publication that has ever won in a Singapore court of law. Virtually every Western publication that circulates in the city-state has faced a lawsuit, or the threat of one.”</p>
<p>Malaysian political authorities deployed similar tactics when their rulers felt threatened.</p>
<p>Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and in the months leading up to the November 1999 general election, wealthy ruling party supporters in Malaysia filed a flurry of <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/1999/05/rights-malaysia-on-a-media-suing-spree/">defamation lawsuits</a> against foreign journalists and media organizations, such as the Asian Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones.</p>
<p>Russia’s means of pressuring foreign media are slightly different, but they also involve taking advantage of Western legal-financial systems.</p>
<p>Russia has engaged in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook">disinformation campaigns</a> that exploit weaknesses in the West’s freedom of speech protections, as documented by experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and at the Center for the Study of Democracy. </p>
<p>And Russian companies have acquired sufficiently large <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook">ownership stakes</a> in foreign media companies to influence their operations. </p>
<p>This has involved both the manipulation of their coverage and a reduction in media freedoms of the country in which they are located. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook">Delyan Peevski</a> is a controversial member of the Bulgarian Parliament who advocated for pro-Russian policies. Peevski built and sustained a media empire that controls around 40 percent of Bulgaria’s print sector and 80 percent of the newspaper distribution with loans from a partially Russian-owned bank.</p>
<h2>Resource control</h2>
<p>In contrast to firms located in other types of autocracies, state-controlled businesses in dominant party authoritarian regimes often comply with international financial regulations. This helps them gain access to Western countries’ corporate and financial systems.</p>
<p>Under cover of legitimate business operations, their autocratic leaders can pursue political objectives with less scrutiny. </p>
<p>Malaysia’s state-owned investment fund, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1mdb">1MDB</a>, engaged in <a href="http://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/why-malaysians-should-be-worried-about-1mdb%E2%80%99s-debts">aggressive investment tactics</a> with corrupt practices – including “abnormally high payback” for investment bankers – that extended across the globe. </p>
<p>The U.S. accuses former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/1mdb-inside-story-worlds-biggest-financial-scandal-malaysia">family friend</a> of masterminding the theft of US$2 billion from the fund. And its capital was also <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/28/wsj-reports-malaysia-pm-najib-razak-used-700m-donation-to-win-2013-elections.html">channeled to politicians and projects</a> to help the ruling party win the 2013 elections.</p>
<p>Russia has also used <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook">state-linked companies</a> to gain influence over Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria’s crucial energy sectors via purchases of ownership stakes in listed companies.</p>
<p>This granted the Russian state access to other key sectors of these economies, such as finance and telecommunications. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook">Russia then was able to influence government policies</a>. </p>
<p>In one case, the Serbian government <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ac12dd62-c881-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e">chose not to enforce the European Union’s sanctions against Russia</a>. That was a risk for Serbia, because it has wanted to qualify for European Union membership by 2025.</p>
<p>Even bolder actions occurred with Russia’s interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential election.</p>
<p>Michael McFaul, the former U.S. ambassador to Russia, told the Senate in September 2018 that never before had the Kremlin violated American sovereignty so <a href="https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McFaul%20Testimony%209-6-18.pdf">“illegally, aggressively and audaciously”</a> – even during the high-stakes rivalry of the Cold War.</p>
<p>It is now common knowledge that <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-russian-individuals-and-three-russian-companies-scheme-interfere">Russian-controlled agencies and businesses</a> played a strategically vital role in the election interference.</p>
<h2>Resisting influence</h2>
<p>Can democracies defend themselves against such aggressive regimes?</p>
<p>The “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook">Kremlin Playbook</a>,” written by Heather A. Conley, James Mina, Ruslan Stefanov and Martin Vladimirov, is an extensive study of Russian influence in Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Serbia. It provides a detailed list of policy recommendations to resist Russian influence that can be applied to other dominant party authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>They include strengthening intelligence gathering and cooperation between the U.S. and its allies; increasing U.S. and allied governments’ assistance to vulnerable countries; and stronger protections for and enforcement of transparency measures.</p>
<p>But I believe an important addition to this list is the need to monitor the strength of the ruling party’s hold on power. That’s because aggressive, politically charged activities are most likely to occur when incumbent rulers face an elevated threat. </p>
<p>With its attack on the U.S. 2016 election, Russia showed that it’s possible to interfere destructively in the most powerful Western democracy. I expect that other autocracies that look like democracies will follow suit – across the globe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110957/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Carney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Almost one-third of countries around the world are authoritarian regimes with the trappings of democracy. Their bad behavior poses a threat to real democracies, as the United States recently learned.Richard Carney, Professor, China Europe International Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/758242017-04-17T19:56:06Z2017-04-17T19:56:06ZTurkish referendum grants more power to Erdogan: Democracy no more?<p>Turkey’s April 16 referendum will be long remembered as a turning point in the country’s political history. </p>
<p>Turks were asked to grant additional executive powers to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, bringing an end to the separation of powers. The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1fc620a6-2121-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9">18 proposed constitutional amendments</a> grant the Turkish president sweeping authority over the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, including power to dismiss the Turkish Grand National Assembly and autonomy in drawing the state budget with minimal parliamentary oversight and directly appointing 12 members of the 15-member Constitutional Court. The post of prime minister will also be eliminated to make way for an executive president. </p>
<p>The meager <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en">51.4 percent “yes” vote</a> shows a divided Turkey. In main urban centers and western Turkey, people overwhelmingly voted against the executive presidency, while rural and poorer segments of the Turkish society mostly voted in favor of strong-man rule. </p>
<p>The “no” campaign has called for <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/erdogan-is-defiant-as-opponents-contest-referendum-result-1.3051163">the cancellation of the vote</a> due to fraud. They argue that the High Electoral Board unlawfully <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/384943-turkey-referendum-ballot-count/">allowed for the count of 1.3 million unofficiated “yes” ballots</a> halfway through the count, tilting the result in favor of Erdogan. <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/311721?download=true">A group of international observers has also voiced concerns</a> over the legality of the referendum.</p>
<p>Let’s take a look at how a once trustworthy NATO ally, an aspiring EU candidate and an emerging power came to the brink of autocracy. </p>
<h2>A short tragic history</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s AKP, the Justice and Development Party, has been running the country since 2002. This 15-year-long journey started <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629390701622382?journalCode=fmed20">with a series of democratization reforms</a> supported with steady economic growth.</p>
<p>Ever since his days as the mayor of Istanbul during the 1990s, Erdogan has built his political career as a crafty politician willing and capable of making temporary deals with <a href="http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/04/erdogans-paradox/">nonconventional partners</a> against common enemies. For example, Erdogan’s persistent struggle against the Turkish military’s influence over the regime helped him gain the alliance of <a href="https://theconversation.com/fethullah-gulen-public-intellectual-or-public-enemy-62887">the secretive Fetullah Gulen network</a>.</p>
<p>I’d argue that liberals in Washington, D.C. and in European capitals misread Erdogan’s ambitions. They saw him as an open-minded reformer who could bring Islam and democracy together at home and abroad. Barack Obama visited Turkey on his first major foreign trip in April 2009 to underline Turkey’s unique role in the Middle East. <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780739193631/Turkey-as-a-Mediator-Stories-of-Success-and-Failure">I myself recently edited a volume</a> that examines a period (2007-2011) when Turkish diplomats and businesspeople served as mediators in different parts of the world from the Western Balkans to Somalia, from Golan Heights to Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>The Arab uprisings</h2>
<p>But that period was short-lived. The turning point in Turkey’s slide toward authoritarianism came as the result of a major miscalculation in international politics. </p>
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<p>In 2011, in the wake of the revolutionary uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria, Turkey’s former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu saw a great opportunity for Erdogan and his AKP to leverage <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-the-new-model/">Turkey’s liberal Islam model elsewhere in the Middle East</a>.</p>
<p>Erdogan unconditionally supported <a href="http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/">Islamist groups across the region</a> under the disguise of supporting democratization against dictatorships. Even after the revolution in Egypt failed, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170217-turkeys-erdogan-muslim-brotherhood-is-ideological-not-terrorist-organisation/">Erdogan persisted in pursuing pro-Muslim Brotherhood</a> policies across the Middle East. As the Syrian civil war raged on, Turkey allowed jihadist fighters to cross from Turkey into Syria to fight against the Assad regime. </p>
<p>With time, Turkey’s sizable democratic and liberal-minded population began to react against the growing government intervention in their way of life. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Efe_Guercan/publication/271706066_Turkey's_Gezi_Park_Demonstrations_of_2013_A_Marxian_Analysis_of_the_Political_Moment/links/566e10d908ae1a797e405eb3.pdf">The Gezi Park protests in summer of 2013</a> started against the demolishing of a central city park in Istanbul to build a shopping mall. However, it quickly turned into a widespread pro-democracy show of force against Erdogan and his brand of Islamist politics. This drove Erdogan to relinquish his ties with his former liberal allies. </p>
<h2>Kurds and Gulenists</h2>
<p>Another thorny issue for Erdogan has been <a href="http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_11.pdf">making peace with the country’s 14 million Kurds</a>. Kurds have been demanding political and cultural autonomy from the central government in Ankara. Clashes between the the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Turkish military have cost lives of more than 40,000 people over the last four decades. </p>
<p>When official peace talks began between Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, and President Erdogan, a sense of optimism prevailed in the Kurdish towns of Turkey. But the peace process lacked parliamentary oversight, and it collapsed when Ankara refused to help the Kurdish fighters surrounded in September 2014 by the Islamic State in Kobane, Syria – just a few hundred yards from the Turkish border.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/07/turkey-election-preliminary-results-erdogan-akp-party">The following summer</a>, the AKP lost its majority in parliament when a pro-Kurdish party won a record number of seats. As a result, Erdogan unilaterally ended the peace process with the PKK. He built a new alliance with ultra nationalists that carried out retaliatory attacks in Kurdish population centers, further alienating the Kurds from the country’s political mainstream. Many elected <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/world/europe/turkey-kurdish-mayors-expect-arrests.html">Kurdish MPs and mayors have been imprisoned</a> since the failed coup attempt in July. </p>
<p>Erdogan’s last and most formidable enemy turned out to be his former ally, the U.S.-based cleric Fetullah Gulen and his secretive and extensive network. Erdogan believes the Gulen network was behind the <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12239/full">failed coup attempt of July 2016</a>. He alleges the Gulenists wanted to retaliate against Erdogan’s punitive measures against their education, business and media networks in Turkey which began after <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-all-corruption-scandals-refuses-to-go-away/">corruption allegations against Erdogan and his family</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey has been living in a state of emergency since July 2016. Erdogan claims that the new executive powers granted him in the referendum will allow him to single-handedly cleanse the enemies of the nation from the judiciary, military and media. Already, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/magazine/inside-turkeys-purge.html?action=click&contentCollection=Europe&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article">thousands of people</a> have been forced out of their government jobs and put in high-security state prisons due to allegations of being a member of the Gulen network. </p>
<p>Is democracy dead in Turkey? </p>
<p>The 51.4 percent “yes” vote certainly seems to mark the beginning of the end for Turkey’s fragile democracy. However, Erdogan’s clear defeat in Turkey’s urban centers and in the western part of the country suggests that a self-confident pro-democracy movement could make life much more difficult than Erdogan expected in the coming months and years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75824/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doga Ulas Eralp does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How a once trustworthy NATO ally, an aspiring EU candidate and an emerging power came to be ruled by one strong man.Doga Ulas Eralp, Professorial Lecturer, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641812016-08-22T13:29:32Z2016-08-22T13:29:32ZTurkey isn’t a failed state, but maybe it should act like one<p>As Turkey recovers from an attempted coup, it has an opportunity to move in a new direction. And while it is neither a failed state nor emerging from a civil war, it might be useful to see itself as such in the transformation process. The state needs to be rebuilt as though part of a post-conflict reconstruction effort. </p>
<p>Turkey is not Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia. On the contrary, it is one of the strongest countries in its region in terms of its economy, military power and governance. However, the attempted coup against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on July 15 exposed a number of significant problems on all three fronts. They are of such a scale and depth that Turkey could, and in fact should, learn from how other countries rebuild after conflict – imperative if it is to avoid future coup attempts and even a possible civil war.</p>
<h2>Cleaning up the government</h2>
<p>Had the coup been successful we would, today, have been witnessing the “Syrianisation” of Turkey. The pro and anti-coup elements in the military, and the coup organisers and the police, would have probably ended up waging a <a href="http://setadc.org/coup-attempt-successful/">civil war</a> against each other. The way in which the public went out into the streets to stand against the coup also indicated that a successful coup regime would have been fighting <a href="http://scroll.in/article/813417/what-if-the-attempted-coup-in-turkey-had-succeeded">opposition from the public</a> too. In short, society would be divided along numerous political, ethnic and sectarian fronts and a bloody civil war might even have ensued.</p>
<p>Consider the huge international security ramifications that the crisis in Syria has already caused. It has turned the country into a centre of global jihadism and driven millions out, sparking a continent-wide <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/migrant-crisis-16372">refugee crisis</a>. A civil war in Turkey – a much more significant country internationally – could have meant even greater upheaval. The failure of the coup was therefore a narrow escape, not only for Turkey, but also for Europe and the world beyond.</p>
<p>As it is, since July 15, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/02/world/europe/turkey-purge-erdogan-scale.html">tens of thousands</a> of staff in the military, judiciary, police, intelligence service, academia, schools and various ministries and national authorities have been dismissed or suspended. Nearly <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/1992119/turkey-fires-25000-teachers-professors-and-others-huge-purge-coup">25,000 people</a> have been detained or arrested and these numbers increase on a daily basis.</p>
<p>This is aimed at weeding out supporters of <a href="https://theconversation.com/fethullah-gulen-public-intellectual-or-public-enemy-62887">Fethullah Gülen</a>, who is accused of masterminding the coup attempt. President <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/recep-tayyip-erdogan-5905">Erdoğan claims</a> that a “parallel state” system had been established by Gulenists who had infiltrated the Turkish government, private sector, media and education system. </p>
<p>However, if these people had been able to infiltrate the state to such a dangerous degree, how they were able to do it? <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/real-and-imagined-threats-the-shared-past-of-akp-and-the-g%C3%BClen-movement/a-19429199">Revelations</a> over the past few weeks point to nepotism, corruption and short-termist political manoeuvring. It is <a href="http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition">claimed</a> that the Gulenists placed their supporters in key public sectors using various tactics, including stealing questions at national exams for civil servants and blocking promotions for their rivals.</p>
<p>It would follow from Erdoğan’s argument, then, that the Turkish state has been failing to implement the number one rule of good governance: employing public workers on their merits. This should be the most important factor to bear in mind during the post-coup statebuilding process. In replacing thousands of public workers the only criteria that will really matter should be applicants CVs, otherwise many other religious brotherhoods might now see an opportunity to infiltrate the state system.</p>
<p>If the government fails to establish a transparent, accountable and merit-based recruitment and promotion system as the norm in public life, Turkey may not be so lucky in repelling a next coup attempt, be it civilian or military.</p>
<h2>Democratic values</h2>
<p>Turkey also needs to rebuild itself as a state in which legislative, executive and judicial powers are clearly and effectively separated. Otherwise it will continue to be plagued by security threats, including those that target its very existence as a country. </p>
<p>The concentration of power in Erdoğan’s presidency was one of the most controversial issues before the failed coup attempt. If nothing else, Turkey must have now learned that democratic checks and balances and rule of law are a must for the survival of the state. </p>
<p>The accumulation of power in a single office is a sure recipe for societal polarisation. It breeds damaging levels of mistrust between society and the state. There is now an opportunity for Turkey to restructure itself as an accountable and transparent state for all of its citizens. </p>
<p>The failed coup also underlined the importance of secularism for Turkey and why Turkey’s founder, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml">Mustafa Kemal Atatürk</a>, made it the main cornerstone of the Turkish Republic. There should now be no ifs and buts with these principles. The country needs to re-establish, protect and maintain this.</p>
<p>Turkey must become a country where freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity are clearly ensured and protected. This is the only way to deal with wider peace and security problems, from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/kurdistan-12557">Kurdish insurgency</a> to other terrorism risks. In other words, Turkey needs to stop thinking about security through guns and weapons, and come to the realisation that, as Gandhi once said, “peace is the only way”.</p>
<p>After its collapse in 2015, the peace process in Turkey needs to be re-initiated. The Kurdish PKK is killing indiscriminately and the resolution of the Kurdish issue can no longer be postponed, particularly when the country is facing a major security risk posed by Islamic State. </p>
<p>To help with all this, Turkey should use some of the well-known tools for post-conflict statebuilding, such as truth and reconciliation commissions. It might not be possible to identify the full scale of any Gülenist infiltration through purely punitive means. A commission in which everyone is open and honest might be a most effective long-term approach. Similarly, the state needs to investigate itself and its role in the creation of possible security threats. </p>
<p>The way the public and all political parties reacted to the failed coup should be considered a great opportunity to initiate such a reconciliation process. The Kurdish political party, HDP (which expressed clear opposition to the coup attempt), should be brought into the fold in the rebuilding of a new Turkey.</p>
<p>After the IS <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/injured-blast-hits-wedding-hall-gaziantep-160820204150494.html">suicide attack on August 20</a> at a wedding in Gaziantep, Selahattin Demirtas, the leader of HDP, called all political parties to mourn for the dead side-by-side. Such opportunities to make peace and reconcile are rare, and therefore, should be seized upon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey is recovering from a failed coup, not a war, but it could learn from the practice of post-conflict reconstruction.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/624842016-08-16T03:09:10Z2016-08-16T03:09:10ZTurkey’s post-coup commitment to democracy offers chance to resolve Kurdish crisis<p>Turkey’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-turkeys-failed-coup-and-massive-purge-affect-its-economic-future-62947">failed military coup</a> last month rocked the foundations of its political system, yet in some ways the country has emerged stronger and more resilient. </p>
<p>And that’s precisely what Turkey needs to deal with one of its biggest and oldest challenges: the Kurdish minority and the PKK separatists who took up arms against the Turkish military 32 years ago this week. </p>
<p>The popular protests that brought the July 15 coup to an end less than 12 hours after it started evolved into a collective affirmation of Turkey’s commitment to political democracy, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN10I0CZ">culminating in a rally of more than a million people</a> earlier this month. </p>
<p>Although the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-turkeys-failed-coup-and-massive-purge-affect-its-economic-future-62947">government’s crackdown</a> on perceived supporters of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen has raised <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">some concerns</a> in Western capitals about that commitment, it nonetheless provides an opening to reexamine the current cultural and political status of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. </p>
<p>President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) has emerged <a href="http://community.bowdoin.edu/news/2016/08/prof-robert-morrison-on-turkey-attempted-coup-leaves-erdogan-in-much-stronger-position/">stronger than before</a>, so he can afford to take a bold step to address the Kurdish crisis, which <a href="http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/07/20/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-the-rising-toll/">has cost Turkey</a> thousands of lives, millions of internal migrants and billions of dollars in property damage. </p>
<p>But how to do that with both sides so embittered and entrenched after years of fighting? </p>
<p>As an observer of Turkey’s social and political developments for more than two decades, I suggest a fresh approach to the problem that should ease Turkish fears of Kurdish separatism as well as Kurdish fears that they have few rights. It depends on whether Turkey is ready to honor its ideals and fulfill the promise that its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, <a href="http://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/A-History-of-the-Turkish-Kurdish-Conflict-20150728-0042.html">made to the Kurds in return</a> for their support for his war of independence. </p>
<h2>From the ashes of the empire</h2>
<p>That’s when the trouble began, as Turkey emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire – known for its <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/SHR/5-1/text/rodrigue.html">multiethnic diversity</a> – in 1923. </p>
<p>After the empire’s collapse, Ataturk sought to build a modern republic on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atat%C3%BCrk%27s_Reforms">two cultural policies</a>. First, he suppressed Islamic and traditional cultures in favor of a Western and modern lifestyle for all citizens. Second, he suppressed ethnic identities and tried to create a unified Turkish identity. </p>
<p>The group most affected was the Kurds. Ataturk <a href="http://www.ssu.edu.tr/uploads/vol_13-no_1-arakon_DLG1DRl5.pdf">had promised</a> to let them preserve their language and cultural identity in exchange for their support in ousting the Allies after World War I but later broke his word and initiated more than eight decades of cultural and linguistic homogenization. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, Turkey’s military <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/opinion/the-kurdish-challenge.html?_r=0">engaged in a costly war</a> with the PKK, founded in 1978 and regarded as a terrorist organization by several other countries including the U.S. </p>
<h2>A new policy, negotiations and collapse</h2>
<p>When he came to power in 2002, Erdogan began to gradually reverse these policies. A decade later, he initiated peace negotiations and a ceasefire with PKK leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdullah-Ocalan">Abdullah Ocalan</a>. </p>
<p>Ocalan agreed to abandon his separatist demands and cease paramilitary operations in exchange for political and social rights for the Kurds. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the negotiations and ceasefire collapsed after a suicide bombing targeting Kurdish activists prompted a new round of <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/turkey-syria-explosion-suruc-150720093632908.html">PKK violence</a> in July 2015. <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/only-solution-is-to-destroy-pkk-erdogan.aspx?PageID=238&NID=98037&NewsCatID=338">Erdogan later pledged to destroy the PKK</a> and all Kurdish resistance groups that resort to violence. </p>
<p>This policy of fighting without negotiations and imposing severe restrictions on the Kurds – such as <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/international-state-crime-initiative/death-of-peace-process-martial-law-returns-to-turkey">long daily curfews and martial law</a> – in my view is not enough to defeat the uprising.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-co-chair-calls-for-return-to-peace-talks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102114&NewsCatID=338">Some have been calling on Erdogan</a> to back up his post-coup talk of democracy by resuming peace negotiations. Though renewed fighting has created an environment of distrust, a new strategy to end the crisis is desperately needed. </p>
<h2>A fresh approach</h2>
<p>That brings me to what I call my “max-min proposal” as a step toward resolving this decades-old conflict. A key point is that it would be a unilateral initiative by the Turkish government, without the need for negotiation or coordination with the PKK. </p>
<p>The policy has two parts: the max and the min. </p>
<p>The min refers to a minimum level of tolerance (read zero) for separatism by any ethnic group. It’s a policy already in place and necessary because there is unanimous agreement among Turks on preserving Turkey’s <a href="https://dspace.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/16734/Territorial%20Integrity%20of%20Turkey%20and%20the%20PKK%20Peace%20Process.pdf?sequence=2">territorial integrity</a>. Any policy package by the AKP must start with this commitment. </p>
<p>Max stands for maximum respect for political, cultural and linguistic rights of Kurds as an ethnic minority in Turkey. The cultural dimension of this policy recognizes the right of Kurds to preserve their ethnic language and culture identity – while keeping Turkish as the official language. </p>
<p>Providing Kurds with the right to teach and consume media in their own language – as well as equal democratic political rights – would create an environment of fairness and justice in which Kurds would feel confident as equal citizens. </p>
<p>Since taking power, the AKP has initiated several partial steps toward recognition of these rights. These steps, <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080410">which were mostly introduced in 2009</a>, included a Kurdish language television station and permission to offer Kurdish language classes in universities and private institutions. They were undertaken <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080410">in an effort</a> to meet the human and minority rights requirements for joining the European Union and to increase the popularity of the AKP in the Kurdish regions. Yet these rights have been only partially implemented. </p>
<p>Successful implementation of these rights, however, would require a change in public opinion. At the moment, expressions of Kurdish culture <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080410">are perceived as a threat</a> to national unity among a sizable segment of the Turkish population. Success will depend on changing minds. On this note, there’s some reason to be optimistic because there was <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/04/19/turkeys-kurdish-peace-process-parsing-the-polls/">little significant opposition</a> to the progress of the peace talks with the PKK.</p>
<p>As for the Kurds, several public opinion surveys indicate that a <a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/Ups/dosya/8504.pdf">large majority would welcome</a> such a unilateral offering of rights. This support would come from moderate Kurdish political leaders such as Leyla Zana, a member of the Turkish parliament who <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/06/prominent-kurdish-leaders-statem.html">has rejected</a> the PKK’s separatist goals. Full cultural and linguistic rights would likely empower the moderates and isolate the separatists.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c116413a-5cdb-11e6-a72a-bd4bf1198c63.html#axzz4Ggwwpzmw">political unity that Turkey is currently enjoying</a> in the aftermath of the failed coup creates a unique opportunity for Erdogan to initiate negotiations with other Turkish political parties to gain a strong majority and political consensus for these reforms. </p>
<h2>Bountiful benefits</h2>
<p>Many of the benefits of this proposal are fairly obvious, while others may be more obscure, but they add up to a powerful argument for choosing a unilateral path of cultural accommodation rather than one of war or <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-turkey-pkk-peace-talks-an-inevitability-postponed.aspx?pageID=238&nID=96978&NewsCatID=39">endless negotiation</a>.</p>
<p>Besides likely reducing support for the separatists, it’s also a just policy that would earn Turkey international respect at a time <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/world/europe/russia-putin-turkey-erdogan-syria.html?_r=0">when it’s feeling isolated</a> after its <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b82ef35a-4cc3-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a.html">post-coup crackdown</a>. </p>
<p>It would legitimize Turkey’s advocacy for the cultural and political rights of Turkish minorities in other countries. How can Turkey campaign for the rights of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34910389">Turkmen</a> in Iraq, Chechens and <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/turkey-russia-crimea-ukraine.html">Tatars</a> in Russia and the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/world/asia/ethnic-tensions-in-xinjiang-complicate-china-turkey-ties.html?_r=0">Uighurs</a> in China if it’s suppressing Kurds at home?</p>
<p>As for those who prefer a military solution, public opinion surveys indicate that majority of Turkey’s citizens <a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/Ups/dosya/8504.pdf">believe that the crisis can’t be resolved</a> this way. The Turkish military may enjoy complete supremacy, yet peace will remain elusive as long as the underlying grievances persist.</p>
<p>Resolving this crisis is also of regional geopolitical importance. The U.S. relies on Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria in its battle to take back ground from the Islamic State. Turkey’s conflict with its own Kurdish population has complicated the war against IS.</p>
<p>And finally, it would be a major step toward fulfilling <a href="http://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-nationalism/">Ataturk’s original promise to the Kurds</a>. </p>
<h2>Crucial next steps</h2>
<p>As a final note, it must be acknowledged that enhancing the cultural and political rights of Kurds is likely to reduce their desire for separatism but it is unlikely to end the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/kurdish-autonomy-turkey-risks-consequences.html">Kurdish desire for regional autonomy</a>.</p>
<p>These demands cannot be resolved unilaterally by the Turkish government and would require political negotiations between the government and a representative body of Kurdish political leaders. </p>
<p>Such a negotiation, however, will take place in a more positive and cooperative atmosphere if Kurds already feel confident about the protection of their cultural and political rights in a democratic and tolerant Turkey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The protests that helped end the attempted coup turned into an affirmation of Turkish democracy. Can it help resolve the Kurdish crisis?Nader Habibi, Professor of the Economics of the Middle East at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/628872016-08-08T00:03:36Z2016-08-08T00:03:36ZFethullah Gülen: public intellectual or public enemy?<p>On July 15, 2016, the Turkish Republic survived an attempted military coup d’état that killed nearly 300 people and cost more than an estimated <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/08/02/The-cost-of-Turkeys-failed-coup-100-billion/1211470140887/">US$100 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Immediately following the coup, Turkey’s government began a massive purge of state, military, business and civil society institutions in an attempt to remove alleged plotters from the ranks of social power. To date, approximately <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/02/world/europe/turkey-purge-erdogan-scale.html">75,000 people</a> have been detained or forced to resign.</p>
<p>Human rights groups <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/">allege</a> that arbitrary arrest and torture are becoming routine. Turkey’s leaders strongly refute such claims. They argue that security forces are doing what is necessary to protect the nation from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-slams-amnesty-over-report-alleging-torture/2016/08/02/cbcbe49a-58bc-11e6-8b48-0cb344221131_story.html">a clearly defined enemy</a>. The <a href="http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2016/07/after-turkish-coup-democracy.html">implications</a> of the failed coup are deeply concerning for Turkey, the region and the world.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-survey-idUSKCN1060P1">What unites the purged</a> are alleged connections to Turkey’s most famous religious personality, Fethullah Gülen. </p>
<p>Presented by his followers as a learned scholar and orator, Gülen leads a transnational social and economic network that participants call Hizmet, from the Turkish word for “service,” and outsiders call the Gülen movement. The Turkish government insists Fethullah Gülen orchestrated the coup, and are demanding both <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/state-of-emergency-enables-turkish-govt-to-rule-by-decree-without-control-mechanisms.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102029&NewsCatID=341">domestic</a> and <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-warns-kyrgyzstan-over-possible-gulenist-coup-attempt-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102091&NewsCatID=510">international</a> <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/4f8d6d3e-55a3-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60">cooperation</a> to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/live/turkey-coup-erdogan/erdogan-calls-on-u-s-to-arrest-or-extradite-fethullah-gulen">bring him</a> and his alleged co-conspirators to justice.</p>
<p>What do we know about this man and his movement?</p>
<h2>The Gülen movement</h2>
<p>Anchored in private education, the GM began in the late 1960s. That’s when Gülen established a following of mostly young men attracted to his emotional call for religious Turks to participate in secular education and the market economy.</p>
<p>Gülen discouraged participation in Turkey’s primary Islamic political movement. Instead, he encouraged a patient and calculated accumulation of economic and institutional influence. As a form of “<a href="http://nyupress.org/books/9780814770986/">market Islam</a>,” members of the GM moved beyond education to succeed in news and entertainment media, information technologies, manufacturing, finance and other sectors. By the early 2000s, the GM operated schools and businesses in well over 100 countries.</p>
<p>I first met associates of the Gülen movement in 2005 in the United States. At the time, I was aware that Gülen lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and I knew of several <a href="http://pacificainstitute.org/#">interfaith institutions</a> that <a href="http://www.turkishculturalcenter.org">designated Gülen</a> as their <a href="http://rumiforum.org">honorary president</a>. I chose to do my dissertation research on the GM. I was intrigued by his brand of Islamic activist thinking, and by his followers’ focus on participation over confrontation, and on market competition over political insurrection. </p>
<p>In Turkey and most of the world, GM schools are private, for-profit institutions that required startup capital to be secured from within the GM community. Access to charter funding in the U.S., however, provided GM affiliates with an opportunity to secure public dollars for their education ventures. My research revealed that GM affiliates operated approximately <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/gulen-movements-charter-schools-may-be-caught-up-in-turkey-u-s-standoff-1468967536">150 publicly funded</a>, privately managed, charter schools throughout the United States – more GM institutions than anywhere outside Turkey. </p>
<p>As public schools, the GM’s school’s curriculum adhered to state-defined standards. Despite criticism that they were laboratories of “<a href="http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/12/18/book-release-the-gulen-movement-turkeys-islamic-supremacist-cult-and-its-contributions-to-the-civilization-jihad/">education jihad</a>,” GM schools were <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2010/09/27/what-drives-high-achievement-at-harmony-charters-/">widely lauded</a> for offering a <a href="http://gacharters.org/press-releases/fulton-science-academy-middle-school-going-from-great-to-greater/">high-quality</a> <a href="http://mycsp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Charter_Schools_2011_Annual_Report.pdf">science- and math-based education. </a></p>
<p>Parallel to moving into U.S. education was a widespread effort to promote Fethullah Gülen as an antidote to global jihadism. Followers presented his teachings as exemplifying what non-Muslims term “liberal” or “moderate” Islam. To this end, loyalists organized <a href="http://gulenconferences.com/category/conferences/">conferences</a>, <a href="http://rumiforum.org/ambassadors-speaking/">lobbied</a> political officials and sponsored thousands of <a href="http://toronto.interculturaldialog.com/upload/Essays/Essay04.pdf">trips to Turkey</a> for <a href="https://prieststurkey.wordpress.com/testimonials-and-reflections/">American academics</a>, activists, journalists, politicians and religious leaders. The GM was presented as a collective advocate for peace and democracy. </p>
<p>Time and again, GM activists denied any and all political aspirations. In interviews I conducted in the U.S., directors of these activities insisted that their aim was simply to cultivate dialogue with different social groups. When I pointed out that they were clearly targeting people of influence to support GM initiatives, I was told that I was not taking into account the religious sincerity of those involved. </p>
<p>I spent more than a year in Turkey conducting field research. From dozens of interviews, I learned that the GM network provided social mobility for thousands of Turks in a variety of sectors. A quality education, gainful employment, social rank and prestige, and world travel were all rewards of participation. I frequently asked why Gülen was a subject of distrust and conspiracy in Turkey. GM followers dismissed such suspicions as fear-mongering. They explained that so-called secularists in Turkey were fearful of pious Muslims. Organizational opaqueness, they argued, was necessary to protect themselves from secular state repression. </p>
<p>As I argued in <a href="http://nyupress.org/books/9781479800469/">my book</a>, when and where an organization labeled itself as “inspired” by Fethullah Gülen, and when and where affiliation was denied, depended upon context. Despite such ambiguity, GM loyalists insisted their aims were solely focused on creating the conditions for <a href="https://www.fgulen.com/en/">peace and prosperity</a>.</p>
<p>A high point in this effort was reached in 2008 when GM affiliates managed to <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/howglentriumphed">manipulate the results</a> of a popular online poll conducted by Prospect and Foreign Policy magazines to name Gülen <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/07/the-worlds-top-20-public-intellectuals/">the world’s most influential public intellectual</a>. </p>
<h2>The new Turkey</h2>
<p>The GM’s maturation coincided with the 2002 rise of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, to single-party power. Gülen had long avoided participation in Turkish political Islam, but the AKP’s effort to rebrand Turkish Islamism in favor of market liberalization and global cooperation led the two social forces toward cooperation. </p>
<p>As partners, the GM and the AKP led a period of extensive political and economic reform in Turkey, and oversaw a massive, albeit <a href="http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/plot-against-the-generals.pdf">fraudulent</a>, legal effort to dismantle entrenched state and military elites. It was thus under the AKP’s authority that the GM accumulated influence in Turkey’s police forces, the judiciary, the military and in the Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Trade and elsewhere.</p>
<p>In 2011, the AKP returned to power for a third term. Shortly thereafter, the AKP and the GM each attempted to consolidate power, leading to a period of increasing enmity. A GM-linked prosecutor subpoenaed the AKP-appointed head of Turkey’s National Intelligence to account for alleged illegal government negotiations with Kurdish insurrectionists. This, together with a surveillance effort targeting the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/originals/2014/06/kutahyali-espionage-bodyguards-erdogan-gulenists-bugs.html">highest levels of government</a>, was viewed by the AKP as overreach. </p>
<p>For its part, the AKP moved to <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/gulen-akp-conflict-prep-schools.html">close down</a> GM-affiliated schools, media outlets and companies. In so doing, however, the AKP earned infamy for curbing press freedoms and for seizing private businesses. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s international reputation shifted from that of a reformer to an <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/turkey-authoritarian-drift-undermines-rights">authoritarian</a> trying to silence <a href="https://cpj.org/blog/2015/07/erdogan-vs-the-press-president-uses-insult-law-to-.php">critics</a>. Between <a href="http://www.wrldrels.org/profiles/FethullahGulen.htm">2012 and 2016</a>, a behind-the-scenes struggle for power devolved from squabble to nonviolent <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-gulen-movement">warfare</a>. </p>
<h2>Peace island or civil war monger?</h2>
<p>So what happens now? Should the U.S. extradite Fethullah Gülen? Should schools, businesses and interfaith organizations operated by GM affiliates in the U.S. be investigated to see if they played a part in an attempt to overthrow a foreign government? What about the thousands of recruited sympathizers in the U.S. and elsewhere who have previously supported, promoted or defended the GM and its leader? How will they respond to the accumulation of <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-indeed-seems-gulen.html">evidence</a> pointing to the GM’s culpability on July 15? </p>
<p>Like me, most are likely waiting for a transparent investigation that can withstand legal scrutiny. Considering Gülen’s rights as a permanent resident in the U.S., Turkey must provide such evidence in accordance with <a href="https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf">international extradition law</a>. This slow process will inevitably stir tensions between the two allies. </p>
<p>Turkish intellectuals claim the West is reluctant to accept Gülen’s <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-coup-attempt-who-difficult-to-decipher-gulenists.html">true colors</a>. <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thinking-gulen-is-a-peaceful-scholar-is-a-huge-mischaracterization.aspx?pageID=449&nID=102173&NewsCatID=548">Many</a> <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-western-response-to-the-coup-attempt-is-scary-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=102311&NewsCatID=406">are incensed</a>. <a href="http://observer.com/2016/07/erdogans-self-serving-purge-has-gone-too-far/">Skeptical</a> U.S. opinion-makers, however, point to alleged <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/03/erdogans-purge-is-a-sectarian-war-turkey-gulen/">human rights atrocities</a> following the coup, and to Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies before the coup as cause for <a href="http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-update-erdogans-outlook-consequences-failed-coup/p38145">pause</a>. </p>
<p>Regardless of this debate, Gülen has not been able to deny the mass of circumstantial evidence linking his affiliates to the coup plot. His argument, however, is that this should <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/opinion/fethullah-gulen-i-condemn-all-threats-to-turkeys-democracy.html?_r=0">implicate neither himself</a>, nor the GM as a whole. </p>
<p>Sincere or not, it must be underscored that the GM is organizationally defined both by obfuscation and hierarchy. That is, it is entirely plausible that if “Gülenists” in Turkey’s military played a leading role in the events of July 15, “Gülenists” in other sectors could have had no knowledge of it, or of any aspect of the GM’s alleged “<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-indeed-seems-gulen.html">dark side</a>.” As the world observes the collapse of “the new Turkey,” confusion should be expected. </p>
<p>If it can be proven that the events of July 15 were orchestrated by GM, however, longtime critics will be vindicated and longtime sympathizers will be at an impasse. These actions killed hundreds and propelled Turkey into a state of chaos. They are completely antithetical to what the GM has collectively claimed to stand for – peace and democracy.</p>
<p>If Gülen helped orchestrate the coup, tens of thousands of affiliates and sympathizers, as well as those of us who have tried to more objectively study this man and his movement, will need to come to terms with one of the most fantastic frauds in modern history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua D. Hendrick has previously received research funding from the US Fulbright program, the Institute for Turkish Studies, The American Research Institute in Turkey, Loyola University Maryland, and the University of California, Santa Cruz. All observations and analyses are entirely his own. </span></em></p>It may sound farfetched that a scholar living in Pennsylvania planned the overthrow of the Turkish government. But Turkey is demanding the U.S. extradite the Hizmet leader.Joshua D. Hendrick, Assistant Professor of Sociology and Global Studies, Loyola University MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/629472016-07-27T18:03:35Z2016-07-27T18:03:35ZHow will Turkey’s failed coup and massive purge affect its economic future?<p>The failed July 15 coup in Turkey has prompted a tsunami of responses by the government that is likely to have a lasting impact on all aspects of politics and society, including the economy. </p>
<p>The initial arrest of military personnel who were involved or suspected of participating in the coup <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/07/16/at-least-60-killed-more-than-700-detained-as-turkish-military-attempts-coup.html">did not come as a shock</a>. The next phase did, however, as massive waves of arrests and suspensions in the judiciary and government bureaucracy followed, as well as a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkeys-president-erdogan-uses-emergency-powers-to-close-around-two-thousand-gulen-connected-a7152471.html">declaration of emergency presidential powers</a>. As of July 23, nearly 45,000 government employees <a href="http://aa.com.tr/tr/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimi/kamuda-45-bin-484-calisan-gorevden-uzaklastirildi/613958">have been suspended</a> and close to 10,000 people <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/">have been detained</a>. According to Deputy Prime Minister Nurettin Canikly, thousands more are <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36868230">likely to be purged</a> in the coming weeks.</p>
<p>While most analysts have focused on the political and security consequences of the attempted takeover and the Erdogan government’s reaction, it is equally important to examine their impact on Turkey’s troubled economy. And that will depend most on how widespread the purge will be and whether any economic policies will change significantly. </p>
<p>In order to assess the economic impact and identify the key risks, first we must consider the backdrop: How did the coup transpire, what led to it, who is being purged and what was the state of the economy?</p>
<h2>A coup and response</h2>
<p>It is now clear that the coup was planned and carried out <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-failed-coup-explainer/">by only a small group of military officers</a>. Officers not involved <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/19/how-fighter-jets-almost-killed-a-president.html">played a key role</a> in its failure, as did Erdogan’s ability to get Turkish citizens into the streets. </p>
<p>Thus, within hours of its start, the coup was over, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-tragedy-of-turkish-democracy-in-five-acts-62678">citizens</a> and police overpowered those who participated in it, and the government regained full control over the military. <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/world/turkey-military-coup-what-we-know/">Media reported casualties</a> at 300, with several thousand injured.</p>
<p>Immediately, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) claimed that the coup was orchestrated by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/europe/fethullah-gulen-erdogan-extradition.html?_r=0">supporters of Islamist intellectual Fethullah Gulen</a>, a U.S. resident who has denied any involvement. Besides jailing the officers and soldiers involved in the coup, the government began the mass arrest of military personnel perceived as loyal to Gulen. Erdogan then initiated a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-turkey-wants-to-silence-its-academics-62885">purge of Gulenists</a> in ministries and <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-education-ministry-to-shut-down-936-private-schools-over-alleged-gulen-links.aspx?pageID=238&nID=101951&NewsCatID=509">shut down more than 1,600 private educational institutions</a> due to such affiliations. More than 27,000 of their employees have also lost their work permits. </p>
<h2>AKP and Gulen: from friends to foes</h2>
<p>Since the coup itself failed, its harm to the economy was limited to increased political risks for investors. It is the large-scale purge of Gulenists – once allies of the president – that will have a deeper and longer-lasting effect.</p>
<p>When AKP won the 2002 election and formed a government for the first time, the party leadership <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/24/turkey-s-g-len-movement-between-social-activism-and-politics-pub-53397">had close relations with the Gulen movement</a>. </p>
<p>Up until 2013, the AKP actively supported the social activities of the <a href="http://www.guleninstitute.org">Gulen Institute</a> and welcomed its adherents into all ranks of the government. </p>
<p>So who is this mysterious man who supposedly orchestrated the coup?</p>
<p>Gulen can best be <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/24/turkey-s-g-len-movement-between-social-activism-and-politics-pub-53397">described as an advocate</a> of tolerant and democratic Islam and moral capitalism.</p>
<p>Gulen believes that Muslims have <a href="http://fgulen.com/en/gulen-movement/fethullah-gulen-and-the-gulen-movement-in-100-questions/48357-what-is-fethullah-gulens-view-of-the-market-economy-where-would-he-place-the-state-and-private-enterprise-in-the-economy">a duty to engage in business</a>, work hard and acquire wealth so that they can serve their society by offering charity and helping others. These views have attracted millions of civil servants, intellectuals and religious businessmen to the Gulen movement in Turkey in the past two decades. </p>
<p>Until the feud between Erdogan and Gulen began in 2013, large numbers of Gulenists were employed in military and civil servant positions. They had no reason to hide their affiliation with the Gulen movement. In the past three years, the tensions between AKP government and Gulenists escalated. As a result the government was gradually and sporadically removing Gulen supporters from both military and civilian positions even before the coup. </p>
<p>Indeed some analysts believe that coup supporters <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45646&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=d952a371aaf32bf71ebbe7cb1a4d5093#.V5fROY543Dw">were motivated by a growing fear</a> that they were going to be arrested or expelled from the military within days under such accusations. </p>
<h2>Before the coup, a deteriorating economy</h2>
<p>Until 2014, Erdogan and his party had steered the Turkish economy impressively for more than a decade. Even during the global financial crisis, Turkey was one of the few G-20 countries <a href="http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/11/turkey-erdogan-inflation-lira-opinions-contributors-g20.html">that did not plunge</a> into a severe recession.</p>
<p>But since then, <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-economy-terrorism-russian-sanctions/3147900.html">economic growth has slowed.</a> This is thanks, in part, to a sharp decline in tourist arrivals because of fears of terrorism. It is also due to disruption in trade with Russia, one of Turkey’s key partners until tensions over Syria emerged. The collapse of peace talks with Kurdish separatists that led to renewed fighting in some provinces, further disrupted economic activity. </p>
<p>The economy was just beginning to recover this year after slowing to 2.9 percent in 2014, with <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/anadolu-post/turkeys-economic-growth-soars-in-first-quarter-of-2016/587472">growth pegged at a better-than-expected 4.8 percent</a> in the first quarter. Concern about economic hardship was a major motivation behind <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkey-russia-israel-relations_us_57716029e4b017b379f6b5cd">Erdogan’s move to ease tensions</a> with Russia, Egypt and Israel in June. He has even <a href="http://en.news-4-u.ru/turkey-after-reconciliation-with-russia-ready-to-compromise-on-syria-learned-media.html">hinted at backing down</a> from his demand that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must go as a precondition for peace. </p>
<p>While the quick suppression of the coup meant economic policy hasn’t shifted, the attempted takeover and the harsh response have hurt investor confidence. </p>
<p><a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/idINFit968095">Fitch</a> and <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/s-p-cuts-turkeys-ratings-deeper-into-junk-territory-1469032326">Standard & Poor’s</a> – two of the leading credit-rating agencies – downgraded their views of the Turkish economy, while <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-to-review-turkeys-credit-rating-for-downgrade-1468878090">Moody’s</a> has left its rating unchanged so far. The Turkish lira plunged as much as six percent in the days after the coup but has since recovered.</p>
<h2>Key risks for the economy</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1404436924&Country=Turkey&topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Policy+trends">investors remain cautious</a> and have adopted a wait-and-see attitude to get a better idea of how far the political purges will go and how they will affect the business community. </p>
<p>Here are a few of the key risks they’ll be following closely to see how Erdogan’s response will affect the economy’s long-term outlook. </p>
<p>First, a widespread purge that reaches into the hundreds of thousands might cause a political backlash and social instability. The remarkable support of opposition parties for the AKP government after the coup might come to an end, while the forced resignation of a large number of university presidents and deans could lead to student unrest.</p>
<p>Second, the removal of thousands of civil servants and their eventual replacement with new employees could affect the quality of government services, which are crucial for a well-functioning economy. Normal operations in some ministries might be affected during this purge and replacement period. </p>
<p>Third, there are signs that the government is going after private businesses affiliated with Gulen, which could adversely affect the economy if it spreads. Some experts <a href="http://www.city-journal.org/html/who-fethullah-g%C3%BClen-13504.html">estimate the followers</a> of Gulen in Turkey at three to five million, many of whom are active in the private sector. The <a href="http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/is-yasam/haber/1269385-naksan-holdingten-taner-nakiboglu-yakalandi">first arrest of a businessman</a> with alleged links to the Gulen movement took place in Gaziantep on July 20. </p>
<p>It also appears that some companies <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hundreds-fired-by-turkish-companies-after-attempted-coup.aspx?PageID=238&NID=102048&NewsCatID=345">are proactively firing</a> staff who might have had any affiliation with the movement. Even before the coup, the <a href="https://www.turkishminute.com/2016/04/18/businessmen-among-88-detained-new-witch-hunt-operation-targeting-gulen-movement/">government was selectively targeting</a> some of these private businesspeople. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen how far the anti-Gulen purge of the private sector will go. A Gulen-affiliated financial institution, Bank Asya, which was seized by AKP government in May, was officially <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-bank-asyas-banking-license-cancelled/613864">shut down a few days</a> after the failed coup. </p>
<p>Fourth, the economy will also be harmed by any tensions that emerge with the U.S. or the European Union. With the U.S., the main source of potential tension is over Turkey’s demand for extradition of Gulen, who lives in Pennsylvania’s Poconos region. Turkey <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/7287c982-4da2-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a">has submitted</a> the evidence against Gulen, and a diplomatic team is likely to visit soon to <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/americas/2016/07/23/graham-fuller-former-vice-cia-chairman-whitewashes-gulen-man-behind-turkeys-failed-coup">press for his extradition</a>. Meanwhile, the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36861154">EU is growing concerned</a> over Turkey’s post-coup violation of human rights.</p>
<p>Fifth, while the AKP government so far has remained committed to respecting the lifestyle and cultural values of secular citizens, after the failed coup it might come under increasing pressure (from its conservative base) to impose restrictions on secular lifestyle or favor pious AKP supporters in allocation of public sector jobs and business opportunities. If the government succumbs to such demands, it risks alienating a very valuable class of secular professionals and industrialists who have many options for migration. This could accelerate a brain drain that <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/11/turkey-secular-immigration-exodus.html">has been observed</a> in recent years.</p>
<h2>Sound economic policy is not enough</h2>
<p>The AKP owes its electoral success in the past decade to its ability to improve Turkey’s economy, particularly in the Asian region. Erdogan’s cabinet <a href="http://atimes.com/2016/07/turkey-seeks-damage-control-for-economy-after-failed-coup-attempt/">is very concerned about</a> the adverse impact of the coup and its aftermath on Turkish economy. It is expected to give top priority to economic issues in coming months. </p>
<p>This priority has already been demonstrated by the quick and effective measures in the first three days after the coup, which <a href="http://atimes.com/2016/07/turkey-seeks-damage-control-for-economy-after-failed-coup-attempt/">prevented a financial collapse</a> and calmed the capital markets without imposing any capital controls.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-economy-idUSKCN0YG0NW">government is preparing</a> a major economic reform package to further improve the business environment. Also, after two years of diplomatic tensions with former economic partners (such as Russia and Egypt), Turkey is returning to a business-oriented foreign policy. </p>
<p>These are positive steps that will benefit Turkish economy in the long run although the terrorism risks to tourism and investor confidence that existed before the coup are likely to continue in the new environment as well. However, the government must also be very mindful of how its cultural, political and security decisions in response to the coup will affect the economy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Quick measures by the central bank prevented a financial crisis, but investors are worried. Longer-term economic effects will depend on how long Erdogan’s purge goes on.Nader Habibi, Professor of the Economics of the Middle East at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/628972016-07-22T06:58:21Z2016-07-22T06:58:21ZTurkey’s almost coup and the need for perspective<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was quick to quell the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/turkey-coup">attempted military coup</a> on July 15 and to accuse the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846">Gülen movement</a> of being responsible. This accusation has since dominated the news on the coup. </p>
<p>Even Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said it was <a href="http://www.juliebishop.com.au/category/transcripts/">speculated that “Gülenists” were behind the attempt</a>. This simple and uncritical reiteration of Erdoğan’s accusations is problematic because Turkey is a land fond of conspiracy theories and Erdoğan’s labelling of people as “Gülenists” may simply be code for anyone who opposes his <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-coup-erdogans-tightening-grip-will-test-relations-with-the-west-62706">autocratic rule</a>.</p>
<h2>What is the Gülen movement?</h2>
<p>So what do we know about the Gülen movement? Founded in the 1960s in Izmir, the movement is led by former Turkish imam <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/fethullah-gulen-who-is-the-man-blamed-by-turkeys-president-for-coup-attempt">Fethullah Gülen</a>, who seeks to blend modern secular education with religious values. In 1999, he went to America shortly before being charged for treason. He was tried in absentia and has been living in exile in Pennsylvania, United States, ever since. </p>
<p>Like its reclusive leader, the Gülen movement is a large opaque organisation with operations in around 160 countries and an estimated worth of US$25 billion. It is speculated that the movement may have as many as 8-10 million followers and until 2013 it was closely aligned with Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party. Given its size and assets, one can understand how such an organisation could make Erdoğan uneasy. </p>
<p>But the Gülen movement preaches neither hate nor violence and explicitly values the democratic process. At its core it is a transnational educational movement with more than 1,000 secular schools around the world. It prizes the combination of science and religious values, and interfaith dialogue, with a view to creating pious yet modern Muslims who can actively participate in and shape the modern world. </p>
<p>This is one reason why Erdoğan’s accusation seems so unlikely. The second reason is that the movement is on its knees in Turkey. </p>
<h2>Sustained crackdown has sapped opposition</h2>
<p>Since 2013, there has been a spectacular falling out and the Gülen movement has been brought low by Erdoğan. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/rift-with-party-fuels-crisis-at-heart-of-turkeys-government-21665">corruption scandal</a> erupted in December 2013, which saw several ministers resign (and implicated both Erdoğan and his son Bilal in the embezzling of funds). This also resulted in the judiciary and the police force being purged. As with the recent coup attempt, Erdoğan alleged that the Gulenists were behind the corruption probe in an attempt to topple his government. </p>
<p>Following the 2013 scandal, about 500 so-called Gülenist police were sacked or reassigned. The prosecutors who presided over the case were later charged with terror offences and fled the country to Armenia. By early January 2014, at least 2,000 police and prosecutors had been dismissed or reassigned. </p>
<p>Alongside these purges Erdoğan has systematically stripped the Gülen movement of its bank, media holdings and flagship university. In 2015, the <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/10/why-did-turkey-seize-bank-asya">government seized Asyabank</a>, which was founded by movement followers, and placed it in a fund that answered directly to the prime minister. The movement’s TV channel Samanyolu (among others) was dropped in 2015 from the Turksat satellite-TV platform as part of a <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/14/world/europe/turkey-media-crackdown/">crackdown on media outlets</a> that were critical of the government.</p>
<p>Then, in 2016, the Gülen movement’s flagship newspaper, <a href="https://theconversation.com/takeover-of-opposition-newspaper-is-a-death-warrant-for-free-speech-in-turkey-55902">Zaman, was seized and shut down</a>. Hot on the heels of this closure, the movement’s premier university, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-university-take-over-trustees-gulen-movement.html">Fatih, was placed in the hands of trustees</a>.</p>
<h2>In no state to mount a coup</h2>
<p>This prompts the question: How could an organisation that had already been humbled so dramatically organise a military coup?</p>
<p>Such a notion becomes even more implausible when one considers that historically the military, a traditionally anti-religious institution in Turkey, has been hostile to the Gülen movement. Suspected Gulenists were systematically purged from both the military schools and the military itself during the 1980s and 90s. </p>
<p>This is not to say that such an alliance is impossible. But strong evidence is required to substantiate such an assertion, because history tends to suggest otherwise. This has been the line of US Secretary of State John Kerry, who has <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/kerry-turkey-send-us-evidence-allegations-gulen-40739179">asked for “evidence” rather than allegations</a> to support the Turkish government’s request to extradite Gülen. </p>
<p>One of the alleged coup plotters has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36835340">reportedly confessed to being a Gülenist</a>. However, there are also reports suggesting this confession may have been coerced. </p>
<p>Therefore, the need for reliable evidence is paramount. Otherwise it is simply grist for the mill for both Erdoğan and conspiracy theorists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62897/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Tittensor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Turkish government is accusing the Gülen movement of being behind the recent coup attempt, but there are reasons to doubt the claim.David Tittensor, Research Fellow, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/628392016-07-21T10:56:35Z2016-07-21T10:56:35ZPurge of teachers and academics bulldozes through Turkish education<p>As news of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">attempted military coup</a> in Turkey unfolded, I was in Pennsylvania. Travelling in the US, I had coincidentally found myself in the home state of Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has singled out as the mastermind of the uprising. Gülen, once a close Erdoğan associate until he fell out with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/17/fethullah-gulen-alleged-coup-mastermind-and-friendly-neighbour">has lived in exile</a> in Pennsylvania since 1999.</p>
<p>In what Erdoğan calls a “parallel state”, the Gülen movement <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/europe/fethullah-gulen-erdogan-extradition.html?_r=0">is said</a> to have “infiltrated” state institutions, most notoriously the judiciary and the police. The Turkish government reacted to the coup attempt by arresting tens of thousands of state officials including judges, civil servants, soldiers, and teachers. </p>
<p>In rhetoric reminiscent of the Stalinist purges, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36835340">Erdoğan promised</a> to “cleanse all state institutions”, rid Turkey’s judiciary of “cancer cells” and purge state bodies of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36818401">the “virus”</a> that has spread throughout Turkish state structures. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36835340">numbers of those arrested</a> is on a truly shocking scale. More than 7,000 soldiers have been detained, 8,000 police have been removed from their posts, 3,000 members of the judiciary suspended, and thousands of civil servants in diverse ministries dismissed, including over 15,000 in the education <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36835340">ministry alone</a>. All levels of education have been affected: 21,000 teachers have their licences withdrawn and more than 1,500 university deans have been told to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36843180">quit their jobs</a>. </p>
<p>These numbers make it hard to believe that the crackdown is not operating according to lists that had been ready already before the attempted coup.</p>
<p>On July 20, a three-month state of emergency <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36852080">was declared</a>. Academics currently on study missions abroad <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36843180">have been told</a> to return home while those in Turkey are banned from travelling <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSI7N1A3004">abroad until further notice</a>.</p>
<h2>Sustained attacks on academic freedom</h2>
<p>Turkish academics have been targeted before, most recently after a <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/171097-academics-for-peace-we-stand-by-our-signatures">petition of the Academicians for Peace Initiative</a> was circulated that spoke out against the government’s attacks in Kurdish provinces. The official state reaction <a href="http://www.nature.com/news/turkish-scientists-rocked-by-accusations-of-supporting-terrorism-1.19179">was to sack and persecute</a> academics for “spreading terrorist propaganda”. </p>
<p>The Turkish Higher Education Board (YÖK) and public prosecutors in several Turkish university cities subsequently launched investigations against academics who signed the petition. Signatories of peace petitions were <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-academics-pay-heavy-price-for-resisting-erdogans-militarised-politics-54088">accused by the government</a> of undermining national security and of “supporting Kurdish propaganda”. </p>
<p>The preemptive obedience on the part of university managements was a grim indicator of the state of freedom of speech in Turkey and the erosion of the independence of the higher education sector. Universities started to <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/171152-investigations-universities-reactions-against-academics">self-censor</a>, reacting with disciplinary measures including forced resignations, suspensions, and the launch of formal investigations.</p>
<h2>Crackdown on schools and students</h2>
<p>The arrest wave following the July 15 coup will only aggravate this clampdown on higher education. Gülen’s movement, also called <em>Hizmet</em>, operates a network of private schools and universities, both in Turkey and abroad. What worries Erdoğan is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361">Hizmet’s objective</a> of educating its followers “for the common good” and to “build schools instead of mosques”. Hizmet marries its emphasis on education with a moderate and pragmatic approach to Islam. It is accused of working to “infiltrate” Turkish state institutions and the AKP itself by taking up influential positions and undermining, in an almost Trotskyist analogy, state structures from within.</p>
<p>It is this paranoia that explains the Turkish government’s obsession with cracking down on student protests and anti-government rallies at universities. Repression followed the 2013 <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-gezi-turkey-in-media-and-campus-clampdown-18028">Gezi Park protests</a> and subsequent demonstrations at the Middle East Technical University <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-students-and-academics-treated-as-states-enemy-within-23952">in 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Erdoğan’s message is unequivocal, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-calls-protesters-atheists-leftists-terrorists.aspx?pageID=238&nid=63068&NewsCatID=338&utm_content=buffereb537&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">lumping</a> student protesters together as “atheists, leftists, terrorists”. Passing bills to shut down private prep-schools, many of which are run by the Hizmet movement, serves the same purpose <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26397755">of “cleansing”</a> Turkish schools of “unhealthy” elements.</p>
<h2>The world must speak up</h2>
<p>State pressure on students to remain depoliticised is matched by the Higher Education Board’s work to rein in the activities of academics and teachers. Following the coup attempt, the board <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36843180">asked university rectors</a> to “urgently examine the situation of all academic and administrative personnel” with links to what it calls the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation. </p>
<p>The recent clampdown on teachers and education ministry officials in the wake of the coup attempt adds to a depressing list of continued attempts to staunch dissent in Turkish society. Turkey must respect the freedom of speech to which it officially subscribed as a <a href="http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/turkey">member of the Council of Europe</a> and as signatory of UN conventions that enshrine such fundamental democratic rights as the right to freedom of opinion and expression.</p>
<p>Academic freedom of thought is at the heart of a healthy civil society. Restricting the free movement of academics and curtailing the independence of universities defeats the purpose of scholarship. The exceptional proportions of the recent arrests should be met with a resolute response worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62839/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moritz Pieper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkish higher education has got used to repression, but this is on another scale.Moritz Pieper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/627062016-07-19T10:58:55Z2016-07-19T10:58:55ZTurkey coup: Erdoğan’s tightening grip will test relations with the West<p>Turkish President <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/erdogan">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s</a> power grab at the expense of the country’s democratic principles predates the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">failed coup of July 16</a> by many years.</p>
<p>His creeping authoritarianism dates back at least to the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/08/20138512358195978.html">Ergenekon</a>, Balyoz and associated trials of members of the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-turkish-deep-state-and-why-is-it-in-the-frame-for-the-ankara-bombings-49038">“deep state”</a> in 2008. Since then detention of soldiers, but also businessmen, bureaucrats, journalists and the like has led inexorably to trials that have resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of military officers – many of them senior officials, including Ilker Basbug, the former chief of the general staff, who was sentenced to life imprisonment.</p>
<p>Lawyers and policemen allegedly loyal to the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen had provided the momentum behind the demolition of the “deep state” and the weakening of the military’s political power. This very much suited Erdoğan’s ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was fearful that the notoriously secular military might conduct a coup against its hold on office.</p>
<p>Fethullah Gülen lives in exile in Pennsylvania and presides over a vast network of businessmen, journalists, intellectuals, and professionals of all kinds. The tentacles of this network extend to commerce, education, charities and the media, as well as government.</p>
<p>In retrospect, we can see that Erdoğan’s previous alliance with the Gulenists was simply one of convenience. When a group of Erdoğan associates, including his own son, were investigated for corruption in December 2013, again by allegedly Gulenist law enforcement agencies, Erdoğan decided that the network – or hizmet as it calls itself – now constituted a major threat to his hold on and enjoyment of power. He has been relentlessly purging supposed Gulenists from public office ever since, accusing them of having established a “parallel structure”.</p>
<p>The police and judiciary had already lost tens of thousands of alleged sympathisers to the purges in the years preceding the attempted coup on July 16. The foreign, interior, and other ministries have also been extensively purged. In the wake of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/istanbul-protesters-violent-clashes-police">Gezi Park protests of 2013</a>, journalists and academics have been detained, intimidated or sacked. Turkey’s media is cowed where it is not directly under government control, and its intellectuals are frightened.</p>
<p>Erdoğan has also used his years in office to mould his party to his own image. He has ousted or marginalised possible challengers – most recently the prime minister, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-announces-resignation-after-falling-out-with-president-a7014801.html">Ahmet Davutoglu</a>. Erdoğan’s adoring supporters appear unfazed by such developments.</p>
<h2>A gift from God</h2>
<p>Earlier this year the sentences that had been imposed on military officers following the “deep state” trials were <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36099889">annulled</a>. Even so it is likely that the military remained the government institution that Erdoğan least trusted. This is why the failed coup attempt was described by Erdoğan himself as a <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-17/coup-was-a-gift-from-god-says-erdogan-who-plans-a-new-turkey">“gift from God”</a>.</p>
<p>In the wake of the coup more than 100 – almost a third – of the military’s most senior officers were detained, and 6,000 others taken into custody. But that is not all. Erdoğan is using the opportunity presented by the coup to detain or oust from office thousands of lawyers, policeman, interior and other ministry bureaucrats, regional governors, and is also now turning his attention to businessmen, journalists and academics who may have grumbled against him – or, according to Erdoğan, are part of the Gulenist “parallel structure”.</p>
<p>There is even talk of reintroducing the death penalty for the coup plotters. In short, the outcome of the coup attempt’s failure will not be democracy but rather Erdoğan’s ever more tightening grip over all levers of power. It looks like Turkey will find itself subjected to a civilian dictatorship hardly less repressive than a military one would have been – although again, his own supporters might not object.</p>
<p>The reintroduction of the death penalty alone will prove sufficient to put an end to Turkey’s (in any case implausible) EU membership bid. The erosion of liberties will cause problems for relationships with all Western allies. That Gülen lives in exile in the US, and that Ankara has demanded his extradition, will cause particular difficulties for the US-Turkey relationship.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Turkey’s Western allies have only expressed passing concern at the creeping coup started by Erdoğan over the past few years. They have remained silent in the face of the brutal crackdown in the country’s Kurdish south-east. Ankara’s murky relationship with jihadi groups in Syria, and its tardy commitment to the struggle against Islamic State, has shaken but not broken its Western alignments.</p>
<p>The West has preferred to repeat the mantra of Turkey’s strategic significance in the region and as a NATO member. The coming months and years will test whether there is any line that Turkey cannot cross if it wishes to hold onto its Western friendships. There will be tensions with Western capitals certainly; but should we expect more?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Park has received funding from the US Army War College and Leverhulme.</span></em></p>President Erdoğan has described the failed coup as a ‘gift from god’. And we can expect him to make the most of it.William Park, Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/625962016-07-16T11:28:10Z2016-07-16T11:28:10ZTurkey struggles to make sense of a surreal, failed coup d'état<p>After the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-airport-massacre-will-further-imperil-a-nation-on-the-verge-of-crisis-61836">Ataturk airport bombings</a>, I wrote that Turkey is “a country with serious deficiencies in democracy, governance, the judicial system, human rights, the rule of law and – more importantly – security. Some commentators have even warned of the possibility of a full-blown civil war. More terror attacks such as the massacre at Ataturk airport can only serve to hasten the country down this dark path”. </p>
<p>It seems the country may have reached that breaking point already. In a span of just few hours on the night of July 15-16, I, and everyone else in Turkey, watched as a horrendous and violent process almost too bizarre to believe unfolded. </p>
<p>Turkey last endured a coup d’etat on February 28 1997. That one is often described as a “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-army-coup-idUSBRE9810B220130902">postmodern</a>” coup, since it was carried out via a military statement on the Turkish Chief of Staff’s website. There were no tanks in the streets, as had been the case with the previous coups in the country in 1960, 1971 and 1980, but it nevertheless successfully overthrew the government of the time. </p>
<p>By contrast, this latest coup attempt was not so postmodern in the way it was carried out – tanks were indeed in the streets, and buildings bombed – but the way it played out was a spectacle unlike any Turkey has seen.</p>
<p>First, reports came through that the bridges over the Bosphorous in Istanbul had been <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-military-close-down-bridges-in-istanbul-and-low-flying-jets-seen-over-ankara-a7139606.html">blocked</a> by army units. State TV station TRT stopped its normal broadcasting and a statement from the coup’s leaders was <a href="http://theturkishsun.com/army-seized-state-broadcaster-trt-and-aired-its-coup-statement-21207/">read out</a>, announcing that their objective was to take the full control of the country. Ataturk airport was closed; tanks <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/live/turkey-coup-erdogan/chaos-creeps-into-ataturk-airport/">blocked its entrance</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, President Erdoğan, who had just flown from Marmaris to Istanbul, <a href="http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/coup-appears-to-falter-in-turkey-as-erdogan-greeted-by-crowds-at-istanbul-airport">addressed his people from the airport</a>, telling them to go out into the streets and resist the coup attempt. Large crowds responded to his call and filled the main squares of Istanbul, Izmir – where I was – and the capital city, Ankara. </p>
<p>The surprises kept coming. At first, most TV channels kept broadcasting; Erdoğan contacted the news channels via a feed from his mobile phone, answering questions and calling on Turks to defend their democracy. </p>
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<p>Soon afterwards, members of the public stormed the state TV studios in Ankara, and the same broadcaster who read out the coup statement only a few hours before announced that the state TV had been brought back under civilian control. </p>
<p>However, an army unit then stormed the studios of CNN Türk just after 3.30am, and the Turkish public were treated to the bizarre spectacle of a military coup taking over a TV broadcast <a href="http://www.unilad.co.uk/news/dramatic-footage-shows-turkish-journalists-and-police-fighting-military-takeover/">and journalists fighting back</a>. </p>
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<p>Half an hour later, the public stormed the CNN building too, chanting “Allah-u Ekber”. A man entered the studio itself from the fire escape and asked his fellow protesters to join him there, apparently without realising that all cameras in the studio were broadcasting live – instantly making him something of an unwitting national icon.</p>
<h2>Shock and disbelief</h2>
<p>The coup’s leaders declared that they had imposed nationwide martial law, but their grandiose announcement seemed to make no impact at all. Some people went out to buy food just in case the military really did take control, but cafes and restaurants remained open as usual in most parts of the country, and most of the public didn’t pay much attention to the order and continued with their normal Friday night out. </p>
<p>Instead of fear, the atmosphere was one of total disbelief; many people were contacting each other to check that what they were seeing on their TV screens was actually happening.</p>
<p>To make things even more unbelievable, while there were reports that the head of the armed forces had been <a href="http://bnonews.com/news/index.php/news/id4863">taken hostage</a>, a number of top generals contacted the TV channels and declared their opposition to the coup. It was becoming clear that the putsch had threadbare support among Turkey’s huge military forces.</p>
<p>As both the governing and opposition party leaders declaring their opposition against the coup, TV channels started to broadcast scenes of army helicopters <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/351425-ankara-parliament-bomb-dropped/">bombing</a> the Turkish Grand National Assembly building in Ankara. For a moment, this really started to look like a country on the brink of civil war. The Turkish people might be used to coups, but the national assembly had never been attacked in such a way.</p>
<p>Things got even more alarming with reports of clashes between the police and the coup’s army units in Ankara and Istanbul. Had this got out of hand, it could easily have thrown the country into a state of total chaos. But soon afterwards, the public saw something completely new: the sight of soldiers being arrested by police officers. Images of handcuffed army officers and soldiers were broadcast live on TV. </p>
<p>By 5am, it became clear that the coup attempt had failed. According <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-live-erdogan-dead-killed-istanbul-ankara-military-take-over-martial-law-latest-updates-a7140371.html">to reports</a> in Turkey, it claimed 161 lives, with more than 1,500 injuries. Nearly 3,000 people have already been arrested.</p>
<h2>Living on the edge</h2>
<p>A surreal, short-lived failure it may have been, but this incident was nonetheless one of the most significant challenges to Turkey’s civilian democracy in years. It’s also still unclear exactly who mounted this coup and why. </p>
<p>Erdoğan and the government representatives are already claiming that it was organised by the <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/gulen-movement-turkey-erdogan/3420811.html">Gulen movement</a>, a religious brotherhood in Turkey. Erdoğan’s ruling AK Party and the Gulen movement were very close until only a few years ago, but today, the state considers the Gulen movement a terrorist organisation, and its leader, Fethullah Gulen, is accused of trying to run a “parallel state” by infiltrating the justice system, the police and other apparatuses of the state. </p>
<p>The government has been purging staff from the supposedly infiltrated institutions for months, so it’s therefore not surprising that they have accused this coup attempt on the Gulen movement. The movement, whose leader is currently in exile in Pennsylvania, has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-gulen-group-idUSKCN0ZV2YW">denied his involvement</a> and said he was against the coup.</p>
<p>The thwarted coup has set Turkey on a strange political trajectory that’s very difficult to chart right now. But it’s not too difficult to guess that Erdoğan will emerge politically hugely strengthened. His long-held dream of becoming an executive president is now closer by the day to coming true. </p>
<p>The implications of all this for Turkey’s future are not all bad. Social media and TV channels played a hugely significant role in mobilising people to act against the coup attempt, and the strength of the public’s response is a clear indicator of their disdain for military regimes. This certainly augurs well for Turkey’s democracy, but what Erdoğan will do in response remains to be seen.</p>
<p>All the while, Turkey is still processing the night’s startlingly violent events – a classic tanks-and-bombs coup that played out in a postmodern spectacle of interrupted news broadcasts, martial law imposed in name only, and a president mobilising his people against a coup from a phone screen held up to a TV camera.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Alp Ozerdem reports from Turkey on a violent, thwarted attempt to take over the country by force. It was a bizarre night of botched announcements and presidential Facetime calls.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/604652016-06-20T14:30:50Z2016-06-20T14:30:50ZTurks living in Britain see it as their duty to integrate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126746/original/image-20160615-14048-1wncxz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C18%2C902%2C533&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Turkish festival in London's Clissold Park. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/54665539@N03/5850284370/in/photolist-9UYeHU-cJK3iU-9UYgqS-cJK253-dUmrKq-jzngwo-4Vansg-4wHBC5-dBLdMd-9SsD1J-9UXZ97-9UY1w3-9UXZKS-4M6Wqx-9UY2s3-9SsEks-9UVaTg-9UXPr5-9SpZvr-6FHKjn-9UXPEQ-9SpYR2-9SsY33-7dKS2T-2aUspQ-9Sq37z-cJK1hW-aUXvQr-cJJZRq-9UUXUt-cJK2nE-cJK3L9-9SsBzA-9UV4FV-B1Nf8-cJJZqh-9UXY3G-9UXQcL-9Sq1KV-59xh9c-9Sq19F-9UXQpS-9UXYhC-cJJTWJ-9Sqkux-4PiYPv-9UUXyT-9SsQaS-6zBRZV-6zBSfk">Ozan Huseyin/www.flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For a long time, Turks <a href="http://www.tariqmodood.com/uploads/1/2/3/9/12392325/young_turks.pdf">have been</a> a largely invisible minority group in Britain. But thanks to those campaigning for a British exit from the European Union <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/21/vote-leave-prejudice-turkey-eu-security-threat">who have argued</a> that Turks are a national security threat, and those warning <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/672563/Turkey-EU-Britain-exclusive-poll-crime-figures-Turks">that 12m Turks want to come</a> to Britain if Turkey becomes an EU member state, Turkish immigration is high on the national political agenda. This is despite the prospect of Turkey in the EU <a href="https://theconversation.com/never-mind-brexit-scaremongering-turkey-is-a-long-way-from-joining-the-eu-58958">being very remote</a>. </p>
<p>There are now more than <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/01/turkish-immigration-possibilities-assessed">half a million Turkish-speaking people</a> living in Britain, with different experiences of migration. As subjects of the crown, Turkish Cypriots were the first to come to Britain during the late 1930s. Turks followed them during the late 1970s as labour migrants, and Kurds came to Britain in large numbers as asylum seekers during the 1990s. Today, the 300,000 Turkish Cypriots make up the largest part of Britain’s Turkish-speaking community. </p>
<p>The Brexit campaign has shot itself in the foot by portraying these Turks as criminals and terrorists. Such hostile and racist arguments <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/europe/-racist-brexit-campaign-hurts-uk-s-turkish-community/579564">have offended</a> Turkish-speaking people in the UK and such xenophobia does little to help Turks develop a sense of attachment to Britain – reinforcing racial prejudices instead. </p>
<p>There are, however, strong mechanisms within the Turkish-speaking community in Britain that promote a sense of belonging towards, and integration into Britain. One is the <a href="http://www.dialoguesociety.org/">Dialogue Society</a>, a community organisation founded by second-generation Turkish-British Muslims and inspired by prominent Turkish Islamic scholar, Fethullah Gulen. It seeks to promote and work for an interconnected and cohesive society. It has 11 branches across the UK, though the number of its followers and volunteers is unknown. </p>
<p>Once an important ally of the governing Justice and Development Party, the Gulen movement both in Turkey and abroad has become the number one enemy of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party. The government’s <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=gulen&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b&gfe_rd=cr&ei=6rlaV4uiGM7N7AaS2IyYBQ#q=gulen&tbm=nws">allegations against it</a> – that it is infiltrating into state apparatus and forming a terrorist organisation – are serious, yet no significant evidence has been provided. The movement and its followers, especially business people, have been targeted by the government in Turkey and <a href="http://www.onebrickcourt.com/files/REPORT_ON_THE_RULE_OF_LAW_FINAL_FINAL_240815_27622.pdf">a 2015 report</a>, written by four prominent British lawyers, detailed various human rights violations against them. </p>
<p>Gulen’s followers have continued their activities abroad. Followers have organised hundreds of community outreach events across the UK, such as community engagement breakfasts, themed dinners, Ramadan fast-breaking dinners and many other <a href="http://www.dialoguesociety.org/events.html">civil society activities</a>. </p>
<p>At the end of 2015, I interviewed senior members of the the Dialogue Society in Britain. They believed that integration and the development of a sense of attachment towards the country of settlement is not just important and necessary, but also a “moral responsibility” placed on all Muslims.</p>
<p>The society does not represent all Turks in the UK, nor do the majority of Turks support it. But there is a trend of “young Turks” getting involved and leading community organisations. There is a strong youth wing in the Dialogue Society – also observed in other Turkish community organisations – who are also actively engaging with wider society, not just exclusively with the Turkish community. </p>
<h2>Be part of society</h2>
<p>Followers of the Dialogue Society believe that people have the responsibility to come out of their comfort zones to engage with and build bridges between people of different dispositions. They argue that people cannot be connected with their place of residence if they sit at home all the time or only socialise with people like them. Instead, they need to be proactive, come out of their ethnic enclaves and engage with people of different cultures and faiths. </p>
<p>In an interview as part of my PhD research, the chair of the Dialogue Society, Ozcan Keles, told me that the state “has the responsibility to facilitate and lubricate integration”. This responsibility, he added, should not be seen as merely encouragement: it must be “providing housing, welfare, jobs [and] safety, which will lead to a sense of belonging”. Crucially, he argued that the state needs to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Avoid inhibiting freedom and freedom of choice, it needs to avoid being prescriptive, it needs to do as much as it can without doing too much in terms of becoming an overbearing state, which is … problematic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of the senior members of the Gulen community I interviewed, 11 identified themselves as a “British Muslim of Turkish background”, and five as “British”. For them, identification with the identity of the country where they have settled is a sign of integration. </p>
<p>The movement’s teachings around dialogue and community engagement foster a sense of attachment towards the place of residence. Ilknur Kahraman, the co-director of the Dialogue Society, for instance, told me that she is still a “proud Turk … But I don’t think that’s the only thing that defines me”. She is among those who identify herself as British Muslim of Turkish background.</p>
<p>Britain’s Turkish community is a dynamic ethno-religious group – a significant number of whom are actively working to promote integration into British society. They should be encouraged and supported, not stigmatised and marginalised as criminals and a national security threat by some British politicians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erdem Dikici does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Followers of the Gulen movement are trying to foster community cohesion.Erdem Dikici, PhD candidate, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.