tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/gulf-states-20720/articlesGulf states – The Conversation2023-10-18T20:01:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156572023-10-18T20:01:17Z2023-10-18T20:01:17ZSaudi plans to ‘de-risk’ region have taken a hit with Gaza violence − but hitting pause on normalization with Israel will buy kingdom time<p>Saudi Arabia and Israel had <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/22/middleeast/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-cnn-interview-intl/index.html">seemingly been</a> <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/21/middleeast/saudi-arabia-mbs-interview-fox-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Saudi%20Arabia's%20Crown%20Prince%20Mohammed,has%20publicly%20acknowledged%20the%20process.">edging closer</a> to a landmark deal to normalize their diplomatic relations – and then the Hamas attack on <a href="https://time.com/6321849/israel-attack/">Oct. 7, 2023</a>, happened. </p>
<p>Since then, thousands have died in Gaza and in Israel. And <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israels-invasion-of-gaza-could-escalate-into-regional-conflict-experts-2023-10">fears of the conflict spreading</a> across the region form the backdrop to frenzied diplomacy across the region, including a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/18/politics/joe-biden-israel-trip/index.html">visit to Israel by U.S. President Joe Biden</a> on Oct. 18.</p>
<p>It also threatens to undermine a key pillar of Saudi Arabia’s foreign and domestic agenda: the “<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/saudi-israeli-normalization-and-the-hamas-attack/">de-risking” of the region</a>. With Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman set on implementing “<a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/">Vision 2030</a>” – an ambitious economic, social and cultural program – and developing the kingdom as a <a href="https://sponsored.bloomberg.com/article/business-reporter/why-saudi-arabias-tourism-sector-is-emerging-as-the-destination-of-choice-for-global-investors">destination for tourism and investment</a>, a renewal of regional instability is the last thing the crown prince needs.</p>
<h2>De-escalating tensions</h2>
<p>Certainly, the escalating violence in the Middle East presents a challenge to the shift toward de-escalation of tensions across much of the broader region in recent years.</p>
<p>This has included the signing of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/subjects/abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in 2020, which established diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco. But it goes further, including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/whats-behind-growing-ties-between-turkey-and-the-gulf-states/">multiple-state treaties</a> that have <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/gcc-rift-over-qatar-comes-end">healed rifts across the Gulf</a>, culminating in the signing of a deal in March 2023 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/11/changing-global-order-china-restores-ties-with-iran-and-saudi">to restore Saudi-Iranian</a> relations.</p>
<p>These diplomatic breakthroughs opened up a space for greater regional cooperation through initiatives such as the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-world-leaders-launch-a-landmark-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/">India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor</a> unveiled at the G20 meeting in India in September 2023.</p>
<p>The hope of officials across the region was that economic development could integrate the region and move discussion away from the failure to make progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue.</p>
<h2>The Palestinian question</h2>
<p>Violence in Israel and Gaza threatens to knock Gulf states off a delicate balancing act of supporting the Palestinian cause in front of their largely Muslim populations while also making overtures to Israel and the U.S.</p>
<p>Qatar, for example, has long <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">hosted</a> the political leaders of Hamas while remaining on <a href="https://qa.usembassy.gov/us-qatar-relations-a-model-for-global-partnership/#:%7E:text=Our%20security%20partnership%20has%20been,Qatar's%20security%20is%20our%20security">friendly terms with the U.S.</a>. It will now likely face significant Israeli and U.S. <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/10/13/2023/qatar-is-us-partner-potential-adversary-in-hamas-war">pressure to expel</a> Hamas leadership.</p>
<p>The UAE and Bahrain both normalized relations with Israel in 2020, along with Morocco. But public support for the Abraham Accords across the region <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/gulf-states-lukewarm-on-palestine-amid-mass-public-disapproval">was always lukewarm</a> at best and may now <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-arab-allies-navigate-israel-ties-pro-palestinian-public-opinion-as-war-erupts/">dwindle</a> away.</p>
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<p>Meanwhile, Dubai, the UAE’s largest city, is <a href="https://unfccc.int/cop28">gearing up to host COP28</a>, the international climate change conference, starting Nov. 30. The UAE will not want the event overshadowed or put at risk by a new regional war.</p>
<h2>Reaching out to Israel</h2>
<p>But nowhere is the tightrope more delicate than in Saudi Arabia. This is by virtue of the kingdom’s religious standing in the Islamic world – it is custodian of the faith’s two most holy sites, Mecca and Medina – and the ambitious raft of economic reforms the kingdom has rolled out <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/">as part of Vision 2030</a>.</p>
<p>The campaign for Palestinian statehood has long been a cause célèbre in the Muslim world, and the current king of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, has been a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/where-is-king-salman/">staunch supporter of Palestine</a> all his life.</p>
<p>But his son and heir, the crown prince, has increasingly shown an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/21/saudi-crown-prince-says-israel-diplomatic-normalization-closer-every-day.html">interest in dialogue</a> with Israel. This has culminated in the talks to “normalize” relations between the two countries – something that would represent a historic breakthrough in Israel’s acceptance within the Arab and Islamic world. As recently as Sept. 20, <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/bret-baier-interviews-saudi-prince-israel-peace-ties-iran-nuke-fears-cannot-see-another-hiroshima">Crown Prince Mohammed told</a> Fox News that “every day, we get closer” to a deal.</p>
<p>Indeed, a series of leaks to U.S. media in the days and weeks prior to the Hamas attack <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/saudi-israeli-normalization-and-the-hamas-attack/">suggested that the outlines</a> of an agreement were taking shape, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/04/saudi-mega-deal-biden-israel-normalization-palestinian-talks">driven</a> by the Biden administration.</p>
<h2>Public shows, private diplomacy</h2>
<p>But the Hamas attack and Israel’s response have punctured this momentum. Saudi sources briefed the media on Oct. 13 that talks on normalization had been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-13/saudis-put-israel-normalization-on-hold-in-blow-to-us-goals">paused</a> – but not abandoned.</p>
<p>Such messaging is in line with Saudi attempts to balance domestic and external interests. An <a href="https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1710629609757086172?s=20">initial Saudi Foreign Ministry statement</a> on Oct. 7 appealed to both the “Palestinian factions” and “Israeli occupation forces” to de-escalate. But at the first Friday prayer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca after the attacks, Saudi authorities were more forthcoming in taking sides, with the state-appointed cleric <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-hamas-israel-conflict-may-upend-saudi-and-u-s-calculations/">urging support</a> for “our brothers in Palestine.”</p>
<p>Behind the public shows of support for Palestinians, there is evidence that Saudis are trying to spearhead diplomatic efforts to prevent the war between Israel ad Hamas from developing into a wider conflagration that might bring in Lebanon, Iran and others.</p>
<p>On Oct. 12, Crown Prince Mohammed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/12/irans-raisi-saudi-arabias-mbs-discuss-israel-hamas-war">discussed the unfolding developments</a> in Israel and Gaza with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi – their first conversation since ties between the two countries were restored in March. </p>
<p>Three days later, the crown prince received U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh amid <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/15/blinken-saudi-egypt-israel-gaza/">media reports of differences</a> between the Saudi and U.S. positions on the conflict and the need for de-escalation.</p>
<h2>Oil and foreign investment</h2>
<p>Such diplomatic moves fall in line with the crown prince’s desire to “de-risk” the region. He is eager to see that nothing jeopardizes a series of “<a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2167321/saudi-arabia">giga-projects</a>” – such as Neom, the futuristic new city on the Red Sea coastline – that have become synonymous with Vision 2030.</p>
<p>The Saudi fear is that a prolonged or regional conflict will deter foreign investment in Vision 2030.</p>
<p>Foreign investment was seen as key to the project’s success. But levels of foreign investment plunged after the detention by the Saudi authorities of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/06/07/saudi-arabia-shock-collapse-investment/?sh=6bbf7adc6e60">dozens of senior Saudi business figures</a> at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in 2017 over allegations of corruption. Investors took fright at the prospect that their business partners might suddenly disappear or be shaken down. </p>
<p>As a result, the Saudis are having to shoulder a greater proportion of the costs of Vision 2030 themselves. This explains why Saudi officials have <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/05/what-s-driving-russia-s-opportunistic-inroads-with-saudi-arabia-and-gulf-arabs-pub-88099">cooperated</a> with their Russian counterparts in OPEC+ meetings to keep the price of oil at a level high enough to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/05/business/saudi-higher-oil-prices-grand-plans-mime-intl/index.html">generate</a> enough revenues to fund the projects.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A hand holds a newspaper with Arabic writing and a picture of three men, one wearing traditional Saudi dress." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia was big news.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-in-tehran-holds-a-local-newspaper-reporting-on-its-news-photo/1248021168?adppopup=true">Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Vision 2030 has become so bound up with Crown Prince Mohammed’s pledge to transform Saudi Arabia that he cannot afford for it to fail – hence his determination to reduce sources of regional tension, including with Iran.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1671831?IRAccessToken=Malath">Saudi officials also recently revised</a> their plans to attract 100 million visitors a year by 2030 <a href="https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/2034-fifa-world-cup-saudi-arabia-hosting-bid/?zephr_sso_ott=MIxnYt">upward to 150 million and launched</a> a bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup.</p>
<p>Underlying these initiatives is the Saudis’ desire to diversify the kingdom’s economy away from an overdependence on oil, turning the kingdom into a <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2023/09/21/crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-aims-to-change-us-perceptions-of-saudi-arabia/">destination for capital and people</a> alike. These ambitions would be endangered by another regional war in the Middle East – especially if it drew in Iran.</p>
<h2>Playing the ‘normalization’ card</h2>
<p>So where does the “normalization” of Saudi-Israeli relations go from here?</p>
<p>Putting the process on ice – for now – fits Crown Prince Mohammed’s careful balancing act. Proceeding at full speed would have risked blowback from other Arab and Middle Eastern states, undermining the process of “de-risking” of the region.</p>
<p>It also may provide Saudi Arabia with greater leverage – Israel and the U.S. will be keen that the current violence does not derail the process entirely. </p>
<p>So pausing the process, I argue, now makes tactical sense for Saudi Arabia, given the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/protests-erupt-middle-east-africa-gaza-hospital-explosion/story?id=104064903">outpouring of anger in the Islamic world</a> at developments in Gaza – and it provides the Saudi leadership with an opportunity to control the next phase of what remains an extremely delicate endeavor.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A decade of de-escalation among Gulf states could be at risk if Israel-Hamas violence spills across region. And that could threaten Saudi plans to transform the kingdom.Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089602023-07-24T10:34:51Z2023-07-24T10:34:51ZSyria’s attempts to rejoin the international fold are far from convincing – here’s why<p>In the carefully composed photograph released by their state news agencies at the beginning of May, Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad has his arms outstretched to welcome the Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi. The two men are beaming.</p>
<p>Raisi’s visit was a sign of Tehran’s essential support for Assad, more than 12 years after the Syrian leader’s bloody repression of a popular uprising that called for reform and guarantees of human rights. The meeting was also an attempt to portray that both leaderships are stable and in control amid Assad’s quest for normalisation and re-entry into the regional community of nations. </p>
<p>But it’s a facade. The template agreements for “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-iran-sign-strategic-cooperation-accord-including-oil-mou-news-agency-2023-05-03/">strategic cooperation</a>” and declaration of Iranian support for Assad via “sovereignty” cannot knit together a Syria that is fractured, perhaps for the long term. They cannot provide relief for Syrians facing inflation and shortages of food, fuel and utilities, let alone the 11 million — almost half of the pre-conflict population — who are <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/740233/major-syrian-refugee-hosting-countries-worldwide/">refugees</a> or <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138202">internally displaced</a>.</p>
<p>Nor can they sweep aside <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">ten months of Iran’s nationwide protests</a>, sparked by the death in police custody of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/mahsa-amini-127580">Mahsa Amini</a> after her detention and reporting beaten for “inappropriate attire”. They cannot end the standoff over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">Tehran’s nuclear programme</a> or lift US and European sanctions. And despite <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iranian-backed-attacks-on-us-forces-in-syria-caused-23-traumatic-brain-injuries-/7054091.html">Iran-backed attacks</a> on American personnel in the region, they cannot break US support for the Kurdish administration in northeast Syria.</p>
<p>Seven weeks after the Assad-Raisi photo in Damascus, another international meeting in mid-June testified to the illusions of an Iran-Syria “<a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-13-2023">Axis of Resistance</a>”.</p>
<p>In Kazakhstan’s capital, the Assad regime was joining the six and a half-year “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/kazakhstan-unexpectedly-proposes-ending-syria-talks-astana-2023-06-21/">Astana process</a>” – the <a href="https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4930&lid=1744">UN-sponsored agreement</a> between Iran, Russia, and Turkey to monitor its 2016 ceasefire for the first time in that part of Syria. This would be a sign of Damascus being actively involved in the supposed resolution of the March 2011 uprising.</p>
<p>But as soon as the session began, illusion met reality. The regime’s deputy foreign minister, Ayman Sousan, demanded Turkey withdraw its forces from opposition territory in northwest Syria. The Turks unsurprisingly refused. They wanted the gathering to put pressure on the Kurdish administration in northeast Syria, which Ankara sees as part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK.</p>
<p>But that raises the challenge of confronting the US, the backer of the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces, who had helped evict the Islamic State from the country in 2019. Russia, embroiled in Vladimir Putin’s failing invasion of Ukraine, showed no appetite for a showdown with Washington.</p>
<p>So everyone went home with nothing beyond Moscow’s declaration: “This is a very crucial process.”</p>
<h2>Moving pieces</h2>
<p>The two days in Astana highlighted the difficulty for both the Assad regime and Iran. In a Middle East kaleidoscope of many moving pieces, it is daunting for either to line up all of them.</p>
<p>Assad’s headline ploy has been the restoration of relations with Arab states, hoping to break political isolation and his economic bind. There has been success: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/1/8/why-did-the-uae-and-bahrain-re-open-their-embassies-in-syria">UAE and Bahrain reopening embassies</a>; Assad’s visits to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-assad-arrives-uae-official-visit-state-media-2023-03-19/">Emirates</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-assad-visits-oman-first-post-earthquake-trip-2023-02-20/">Oman</a>; and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/syria-and-arab-league">re-entry into the Arab League</a> in May, with Saudi Arabia — once the leading supporter of anti-Assad factions — <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/05/19/Saudi-Arabia-s-Crown-Prince-meets-Syria-s-al-Assad-in-Jeddah">welcoming Assad to the summit in Jeddah</a>.</p>
<p>However, that process runs head-on into Assad’s reliance on Iran to maintain control over even part of Syria, given the longtime rivalry between Tehran and some Arab states — notably Saudi Arabia — throughout the region.</p>
<h2>An Arabian pipedream?</h2>
<p>The solution to the conundrum is a grand reconciliation, in which Iran would also repair its position in the region. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">resumption of diplomatic ties</a> more than seven years after they were broken. </p>
<p>The China-brokered deal was accompanied by a high-level Iranian visit to the UAE. Tehran spoke loudly about the prospect of billions of dollars of Gulf investments in its battered economy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">Saudi-Iran deal won't bring peace to the Middle East but will enhance China's role as power broker</a>
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<p>The manoeuvres freed the Iranian leadership from an immediate crisis. Amid the nationwide protests, its currency had almost halved in value, sinking to 600,000:1 against the US dollar. The easing of tensions with the Arab states, as well as talk of an “interim deal” with the US over the nuclear programme, helped lift the rial to 500,000:1, relieving pressure on an official inflation rate of 50%, with increases for food about 75% per year.</p>
<p>But this is a tentative respite. Saudi Arabia and Iran remain on opposite sides in the Yemen civil war. They back different factions in Lebanon’s long-running political and economic turmoil. Gulf States are wary about the renewal of Iran-backed attacks on Iraqi bases which host US personnel, as well as any further moves by Tehran towards the capacity for a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/normalising-relations-syria-how-significant">International Crisis Group</a> has highlighted the unending instability in the Assad-held part of Syria. No Gulf country is likely to want to spend significant sums in support of his regime. Syria is far from their top priority, and it offers poor returns on investment. They cannot realistically hope to compete with the influence that Tehran has built through years of military engagement. </p>
<p>Western sanctions limit potential economic gains – and <a href="https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/">US sanctions in particular</a> impose major legal barriers and political costs. Also, investing large amounts in Syria with a devastated infrastructure, an impoverished population with little purchasing power, a predatory regime and dismal security in the areas it nominally controls would be like pouring money into a bottomless pit. </p>
<p>Assad can still pose before the cameras to claim legitimacy. But his Iranian backers are entangled in domestic difficulties, his Russian backers are being sapped of strength by Putin’s deadly folly in Ukraine, and his would-be Arab escape route is far from assured.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite initiatives which appear to be normalising Suria’s relations with Arab states, Damascus remains isolated and insecure.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2022112023-03-27T12:24:50Z2023-03-27T12:24:50ZAs longterm partnership with US fades, Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its diplomacy – and recent deals with China, Iran and Russia fit this strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517425/original/file-20230324-20-qkpubf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Arabia, to the surprise of many, chose China to broker its deal with Iran in March 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/irans-top-security-official-ali-shamkhani-chinese-foreign-news-photo/1247994038">Chinese Foreign Ministry/Anadolu Agency via Getty Image</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fact that Saudi Arabia entered a <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2023-03/11/content_85160365.htm">rapprochement deal</a> with Iran and chose China to broker it came as a <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2023-03-10/saudi-arabia-iran-restore-relations-in-surprise-agreement-brokered-by-china">surprise to many international observers</a>. </p>
<p>The agreement, officially called the Joint Trilateral Statement, was signed in Beijing on March 11 and begins the process of restoring diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran. Those ties were severed in January 2016 after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-executes-47-sheikh-nimr-shiite-cleric.html">protesters stormed</a> the Saudi Embassy in Iran in the aftermath of the execution of Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric who had criticized Saudi treatment of its Shiite minority. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/expert/kristian-coates-ulrichsen">analyst of Saudi foreign policy</a>, I’ve seen how the kingdom’s decision to engage in this way with Iran and China is part of a broader diversification of the kingdom’s international relationships that has unfolded over the past decade. To close observers of geopolitical trends in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the China-brokered deal fits into a pattern. </p>
<p>From being firmly a part of the anti-communist camp during the Cold War and closely tied into U.S.-led regional security networks in the Persian Gulf, Saudi foreign policy is now taking a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-crown-prince-test-drives-nonaligned-foreign-policy-450ddefb">nonaligned stance</a> that has become increasingly consequential for how Saudi Arabia pursues its interests.</p>
<h2>Saudis question US partnership</h2>
<p>The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is often said to revolve around an <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/after-oil-security-blueprint-resetting-us-saudi-security-relations">oil-for-security</a> dynamic in which the Saudis provide the former and the U.S. the latter. </p>
<p>In reality, ties have spanned a far wider spectrum than that and have been more complicated, with periods of high tension – stemming from events such as Saudi participation in the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/23/business/ahmed-zaki-yamani-saudi-oil/index.html">Arab oil embargo in 1973</a>, or the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/saudi-arabia-faces-the-missing-28-pages">involvement of Saudi citizens</a> in the Sept. 11 terrorism attacks in 2001.</p>
<p>But since the Arab Spring protests in the early 2010s, U.S.-Saudi relations have frayed, both in Riyadh and in Washington. The perception among Gulf leaders that the Obama administration <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/02/09/133614346/Egypt-Arab-Leaders">abandoned former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak</a> during the Egyptian revolution in 2011 left them deeply rattled. They feared that the U.S. could abandon them just as it had done Mubarak, a longtime partner of 30 years.</p>
<p>This was compounded by the Gulf states’ exclusion from U.S. negotiations with Iran, initially in secret bilateral talks in 2013 and subsequently as part of the P5+1 framework of the U.N. Security Council permanent members, plus Germany, which culminated in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">Iran nuclear deal</a> in 2015.</p>
<p>And then in 2019, a missile and drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure temporarily <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-fire/attacks-on-saudi-oil-facilities-knock-out-half-the-kingdoms-supply-idUSKCN1VZ01N">knocked out half the kingdom’s production</a>. The attacks were linked, but never formally attributed, to Iran. President Donald Trump responded by declaring it had been an attack on Saudi Arabia, not on the U.S., drawing a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco/trump-says-he-does-not-want-war-after-attack-on-saudi-oil-facilities-idUSKBN1W10X8">distinction between their interests</a>. Trump’s remarks, and subsequent inaction, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/30/decades-gulf-leaders-counted-us-protection-heres-what-changed/">caused shockwaves</a> in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals as leaders began to question U.S. credibility as a reliable regional partner.</p>
<p>Finally, in 2021, the chaotic nature of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/us-left-78000-afghan-allies-ngo-report-rcna18119">U.S. withdrawal from Kabul, Afghanistan,</a> served to reinforce deeply-rooted <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/85367">perceptions about U.S. disengagement</a> from the Middle East, irrespective of the situation in reality.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Saudi men walk down hallway past an exhibition with digital screens" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517426/original/file-20230324-18-rc7aa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Saudi Vision 2030 program aims to build large-scale tourism, infrastructure, recreation and other projects to diversify the kingdom’s economy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/saudi-men-arrive-to-attend-the-quality-of-life-program-2020-news-photo/954313020">Fayez Nureldine/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Pivot to booming China</h2>
<p>It is against this backdrop of pragmatic acknowledgment of its own vulnerabilities to regional and global tensions – and entrenched uncertainty about the role of the U.S. as a long-term partner – that Saudi Arabia began to broaden its international relationships, with particular attention on China. </p>
<p>Officials across the Gulf <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f82b560-4744-4c53-bf4b-7a37d3afeb13">believe China will replace</a> the U.S. as the dominant economic and energy superpower in the 21st century. For more than a decade, a majority of oil and gas from the six Gulf monarchies <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/21/the-gulf-states-are-turning-to-asia-in-a-big-way-heres-why-it-matters/">has flowed east to Asia</a> in quantities that far exceed the cargoes heading west to Europe and North America. </p>
<p>In a further sign of deepening bilateral ties, in December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia to <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2022/12/08/Saudi-and-China-sign-34-investment-agreements-during-Xi-s-visit">sign investment agreements</a> across 34 sectors, ranging from green energy and information technology to construction and logistics. </p>
<h2>Moving toward reconciliation with Iran</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the Saudi outreach to Iran has been more than three years in the making. </p>
<p>It began after the 2019 oil attacks and focused initially on de-escalating regional tensions. Saudi and Iranian officials held <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/explainer-how-iraq-planted-seeds-chinas-saudi-iran-deal">five rounds of dialogue</a> in Iraq between 2020 and 2022 to try to bridge the issues that divided them. These meetings formed the backdrop to the China-brokered deal in Beijing.</p>
<p>Reports have suggested that Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/19/irans-raisi-welcomes-invitation-by-saudi-king-official">King Salman has invited</a> Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to the kingdom, possibly during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month that began on March 22. Any such visit would indicate a political will on both sides to move beyond the two decades of rancor and acrimony that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and doomed an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/04/17/saudi-pact-with-iran-is-sign-of-growing-trust/fbdde133-8ef9-48d2-9deb-5393b7f314d4/">earlier phase of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement</a> at the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/clarifying-status-previous-iran-saudi-agreements">turn of the century</a>.</p>
<p>A Saudi reconciliation with Iran would undermine attempts by the U.S. and Israel to increase Iran’s international isolation and is consistent with a <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/0000017b-a7dd-de4c-a17b-e7df27540001">Saudi desire to de-escalate regional tensions</a>. This is particularly the case as <a href="https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/Pages/Homepage.aspx?gclid=Cj0KCQjwlPWgBhDHARIsAH2xdNfpXiJEOHaiuj6_mP0Hl1MaRKd323wotJ_UVbT1sB5klFcbdo2B3QYaAp6_EALw_wcB">Vision 2030</a>, a plan to diversify the Saudi economy beyond oil revenue, reaches its halfway stage and begins to implement the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2167321/saudi-arabia">infrastructure and tourism giga-projects</a> associated with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Launched in 2016, Vision 2030 has struggled to attract international buy-in, in part due to <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/video/oil-back-120-jeddah-attack-124321349.html">investor concerns about regional insecurity</a> and its spillover into Saudi Arabia. </p>
<h2>Balancing act on Ukraine</h2>
<p>Saudia Arabia’s unwillingness to take sides in great power competition is also evident in policy responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates, has resisted pressure to take sides in an era of strategic rivalries. One manifestation of this <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/opec-phenomenon-saudi-russian-cooperation-and-implications-us-saudi-relations">balancing act</a> has been the Saudi decision to work with Russia within the framework of the oil producers group OPEC+ – and at the same time <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/05/25/biden-officials-saudi-arabia-talks-oil-visit-israel-egypt">engage with U.S. officials</a> over issues of oil output and prices. </p>
<p>The Saudi deal with Iran and choice of China as an intermediary is consistent with a deeper shift in Saudi foreign policy, which has been evident for some time. By adapting to changing circumstances, Mohammed bin Salman is looking to Saudi Arabia’s future and trying to strike a wider balance of power in what he sees as an eventual “post-American” Gulf.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202211/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saudi Arabia’s choice of China to broker its deal with Iran surprised many, but is consistent with its foreign policy agenda.Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Baker Institute Fellow for Kuwait, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965182022-12-22T06:55:58Z2022-12-22T06:55:58ZChina’s increasing economic ties with the Gulf states are reducing the west’s sway in the Middle East<p>At the end of November 2022, UK prime minister Rishi Sunak announced that the “golden era” between Great Britain and China <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-63787877">was over</a>. China may not have been too bothered by this news however, and has been busy making influential friends elsewhere. </p>
<p>In early December, Chinese president Xi Jinping <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/chinas-xi-jinping-promises-security-energy-cooperation-at-saudi-summits-1.92596830">met</a> with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – a group made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – to discuss trade and investment. Also on the agenda were talks on forging closer political ties and a deeper security relationship. </p>
<p>This summit in Saudi Arabia was the latest step in what <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13368">our research</a> shows is an increasingly close relationship between China and the Gulf states. Economic ties have been growing consistently for several decades (largely at the expense of trade with the US and the EU) and are specifically suited to their respective needs. </p>
<p>Simply put, China needs oil, while the Gulf needs to import manufactured goods including household items, textiles, electrical products and cars. </p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0031/002/article-A005-en.xml">pronounced growth</a> in recent decades has been especially significant for the oil rich Gulf state economies. Between 1980 and 2019, their exports to China grew at an annual rate of 17.1%. In 2021, <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN">40%</a> of China’s crude oil imports came from the Gulf – more than any other country or regional group, with <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN">17%</a> from Saudi Arabia alone. </p>
<p>And the oil will likely continue to flow in China’s direction. In 2009, <a href="https://www.ief.org/_resources/files/events/bp-statistical-review/bp-statistical-review-2009-presentation.pdf">it was predicted</a> that China would require 14 million barrels of oil per day by 2025. In fact, China reached that figure in <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf">2019</a> and is expected to need at least <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/chinas-oil-demand-in-the-wake-of-covid-19/">17 million barrels per day by 2040</a>. At the same time, the US became a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9cbba7b0-12dd-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a">net oil exporter in 2019</a> and thus achieved a longstanding foreign policy goal: to overcome its <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/1754198.Addicted_to_Oil">dependence on Middle Eastern fossil fuels</a>.</p>
<p>China has benefited from increasing demand for its manufactured products, with exports to the Gulf growing at an <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/twec.13368">annual rate of 11.7%</a> over the last decade. It overtook the US in 2008 and then the EU in 2020 to become the Gulf’s most <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2041191/business-economy">important source of imports</a>.</p>
<p>These are good customers for China to have. The Gulf economies are expected to grow by around <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/05/23/-gcc-economies-to-expand-by-5-9-in-2022">5.9% in 2022</a> (compared with a lacklustre <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/07/stagflation-risk-rises-amid-sharp-slowdown-in-growth-energy-markets">2.5% predicted growth in the US and EU</a>) and offer attractive opportunities for China’s export-orientated economy. It is likely that the fast-tracking of a free trade agreement was high on the summit’s agenda in early December.</p>
<h2>Strong ties</h2>
<p>The Gulf’s increased reliance on trade with China has been accompanied by a reduction in its appetite to follow the west’s political and cultural lead.</p>
<p>As a group, it was supportive of the west’s military action in Iraq for example, and the broader fight against Islamic State. But more recently, the Gulf notably <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5e3b0998-705f-46c4-8010-9972b3c8a847">refused to support the west</a> in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It also threatened Netflix with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee0c877a-733a-4fc7-9041-6a6ca0644e49">legal action</a> for “promoting homosexuality”, while <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/63785482">Qatar</a> has been actively banning rainbow flags supporting sexual diversity at the Fifa men’s World Cup.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Oil barrel stacked up." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502331/original/file-20221221-22-d4epl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China has been using over 14 million barrels of oil a day since 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/photo-oil-barrels-background-texture-281016335">Nate Samui/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia was well timed to illustrate a strengthening of this important partnership. And to the extent that anything can be forecast, a deepening of the Gulf-China trade relationship seems likely. On the political front, however, developments are less easy to predict. </p>
<p>China is seeking to safeguard its interests in the Middle East in light of the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-brief">Belt and Road initiative</a>, its ambitious transcontinental infrastructure and investment project.</p>
<p>But how much further might the Gulf states be prepared to sacrifice their longstanding security pacts with western powers (forged in the aftermath of the second world war) in order to seek new ones with the likes of Beijing? Currently, America has military bases (or stations) <a href="https://apnews.com/article/e676e805b77347108068afc160313e2d">in all six</a> Gulf countries, but it is well documented that the GCC is seeking ways to diversify its self-perceived over-reliance on the US as its primary guarantor of security (a sentiment within the bloc that was <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15r56r3">pronounced while Obama was president</a>, less so with <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/less-privileged-personal-how-u-s-saudi-ties-may-soon-n1247439">Trump</a>, but on the rise again with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/18c2395e-1599-404d-86f6-210a35686a68">Biden</a>).</p>
<p>In the coming period, the GCC will need to decide which socioeconomic path to pursue in the <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/10767110-insecure-gulf">post-oil era</a> where AI-augmented, knowledge-based economies will set the pace. In choosing strategic ties beyond trade alone, the Gulf states must ask whether the creativity and innovative potential of their populations will be best served by allegiances to governments which are authoritarian, or accountable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emilie Rutledge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The region is well placed to satisfy China’s huge oil needs.Emilie Rutledge, Lecturer in Economics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572362021-04-07T06:55:18Z2021-04-07T06:55:18Z4 key areas of cooperation for growing Indonesia and Gulf countries partnership<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391880/original/file-20210326-23-2ql1aq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C40%2C1280%2C797&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The ongoing tension between the US and China should encourage Indonesia to strengthen ties with nontraditional partners, like the Gulf states.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesia-lends-support-for-saudi-arabias-vision-2030/">Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ongoing tension between the United States and China should encourage Indonesia to find ways to reduce reliance on the two great powers. It can start by looking to strengthen political and security ties with non-traditional partners. </p>
<p>Tensions with the US have led to China growing increasingly assertive in Southeast Asia and distrust of the US as a security partner is on the rise. Economic ties between the Chinese and American economies may be in decline, which could mean higher US tariffs on China, and vice versa. </p>
<p>As some have argued, growing protectionism in the two countries would also disrupt broader Southeast Asian access to the US market.</p>
<p>A decoupling of China and US relations could also lead to different trading blocs; one led by China and another led by the US.</p>
<p>This prospect could complicate life for Indonesian companies when conducting business with or investing in China and the US. They will need to take political factors into consideration.</p>
<p>The Gulf could serve as a gateway for Indonesia to move away from the orbits of China and the US. It also provides a potentially lucrative market and investment partner.</p>
<p>In this relationship, the Gulf is represented by the <a href="https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/MemberStates/pages/Home.aspx">Gulf Cooperation Council</a> (GCC) — an intergovernmental political and economic union made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>Here are four areas that can support cooperation between Indonesia and the GCC.</p>
<h2>1. Trade and investment is good — but can be better</h2>
<p>The GCC and Indonesia already have quite a good investment relationship, and it’s improved further in recent years. </p>
<p>Trade between Indonesia and the Gulf States <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1033326/indonesia-perkuat-kerja-sama-ekonomi-dengan-negara-negara-teluk">increased by 40%</a> from US$ 8.68 billion in 2016 to $12.15 billion in 2018. Indonesian imports from the Gulf countries are worth more than $7.6 million per year, with Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c360%7c%7c%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1">ranked</a> 12th among Indonesia’s global trading partners.</p>
<p>Investment has also grown — <a href="https://mediaindonesia.com/internasional/255992/indonesia-perkuat-kerja-sama-ekonomi-dengan-negara-teluk">by 26%</a> from $60.3 million in 2016 to $76.1 million in 2018. Although the number remains small, the two countries have increased their two-way investments.</p>
<p>Increasing cooperation in the economic sector, however, is not enough.</p>
<p>The Gulf is rich in <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20200207105459-85-472523/gara-gara-minyak-imf-ramal-kekayaan-negara-teluk-habis-2034">oil and gas</a>; Indonesia, too, has a <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/market/20190626094429-17-80665/indonesia-kaya-sumber-daya-berkah-atau-musibah">wealth of natural resources</a>. </p>
<p>There is an opportunity for both of parties to cooperate further when it comes to natural resource development, especially in the oil and gas sector. </p>
<p>In 2019, Indonesia’s imports of fossil fuels from the GCC <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c360%7c%7c%7c38%7c2710%7c%7c%7c4%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c%7c1">reached</a> $2.4 million. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar were among the ten biggest sources of oil imports for Indonesia.</p>
<p>In the same year, imports of coal from Indonesia to the GCC <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c%7c38%7c360%7c%7c2701%7c%7c%7c4%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c%7c1">was worth</a> $18,922, making Indonesia the fifth <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c%7c38%7c%7c%7c2701%7c%7c%7c4%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c4%7c1%7c1%7c1">largest</a> exporter of coal to the Gulf.</p>
<h2>2. Multilateralism presents opportunities</h2>
<p>Multilateralism, which is more coordinated interaction between states, can help increase efficiency and produce more coordinated global networks. </p>
<p>By working together, both parties contribute to strengthening the world trading system and multilateralism in general. </p>
<p>In this case, Indonesia and the Gulf are already eyeing cooperation. Indonesia encouraged the formation of the GCC <a href="https://www.kemendag.go.id/en/newsroom/press-release/bertemu-mendag-arab-saudi-mendag-ri-dorong-percepatan-indonesia-gcc-cepa">Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)</a>, which will help facilitate better outcomes for both economies, especially for Saudi Arabia, which a key partner for Indonesia. </p>
<p>Indonesia supported and welcomed the 2020 <a href="https://www.kemendag.go.id/en/newsroom/press-release/bertemu-mendag-arab-saudi-mendag-ri-dorong-percepatan-indonesia-gcc-cepa">presidency of Saudi Arabia</a> at the G20 — an international forum for the governments and central bank governors of 19 countries and the European Union. </p>
<p>At the same time, it has supported Saudi Arabia’s efforts to encourage key G20 member countries to discuss global economic challenges and opportunities.</p>
<h2>3. Solidarity in and after the pandemic</h2>
<p>On the pandemic mitigation front, the UAE wants to give Indonesia <a href="https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20200822/15/1281915/indonesia-akan-dapat-10-juta-dosis-vaksin-covid-19-dari-uea">10 million doses COVID-19 vaccine</a> (other sources say it’s <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1723681/world">30 million doses</a>). </p>
<p>The vaccines are from China, and this kind of pandemic mitigation effort forms a <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1723681/world">new front in the cooperative relationship between Indonesia, the UAE and China</a>.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s desire to work with Saudi Arabia to <a href="https://sehatnegeriku.kemkes.go.id/baca/rilis-media/20190304/1129635/indonesia-arab-saudi-sepakati-2-bentuk-kerja-bidang-kesehatan/">deepen cooperation on health issues</a> can help tackle COVID-19.</p>
<p>Indonesia also wants to send health workers, equipment and medicines to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Indonesia and the UAE are also <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/08/23/06201651/indonesia-dan-uea-bahas-kerja-sama-terkait-covid-19-hingga-energi-dan-pangan">collaborating</a> to manufacture laser-based and artificial intelligence-based COVID-19 detectors.</p>
<p>Indonesia last year <a href="https://pressrelease.kontan.co.id/release/bertemu-mendag-arab-saudi-mendag-ri-dorong-percepatan-indonesia-gcc-cepa?page=all">sought</a> to expedite internal processes in the GGC to accelerate economic partnership agreements with the Gulf countries. </p>
<p>The CEPA could support two-way trade and investment, improve market access, and promote inclusive economic growth in Indonesia and the GCC for the mutual benefit of both countries.</p>
<p>Although this effort might be affected by the pandemic, it will certainly continue in future and help return economic activity to normal.</p>
<h2>4. Cultural and people-to-people contacts</h2>
<p>Mutually beneficial socio-cultural cooperation can encourage better economic and political relations.</p>
<p>As Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia and the Gulf states share a <a href="https://www.beritasatu.com/archive/417068/indonesiaarab-perkuat-kerja-sama-kebudayaan">similar religious background</a> which can help facilitate communication and cooperation. </p>
<p>Education can be place to start, with young generation exchanging knowledge and deepening <a href="https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/pendidikan/pr-01275464/begini-kesepakatan-indonesia-arab-saudi-di-bidang-pendidikan-394995">connections</a>. </p>
<p>Such cooperation could help overcome linguistic-cultural barriers and increase the number of professionals who are acquainted with each other’s societal norms, customs, methods of performing business, as well as national and institutional interests.</p>
<p>Tourism is another area to develop. This sector could set an example of how cultural and people-to-people connection can be a driver for economic development between the two parties.</p>
<p><em>Fuad Tingai, a Universitas Islam Indonesia student, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Key areas for cooperation between Indonesia and the Gulf countries are trade and investment, multilateralism, pandemic mitigation, and cultural exchange.Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1535532021-01-21T14:36:00Z2021-01-21T14:36:00ZGulf blockade: Qatar hugs and makes up with its warring neighbours – but will it last?<p>Shortly after four Arab countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt – imposed an embargo on Qatar in 2017, I flew into the country’s capital Doha. Hamad airport – usually buzzing with visitors from the Gulf countries (<a href="https://qatar-tourism.com/large-influx-saudi-visitors-to-qatar-drives-recent-surge-in-tourism/">one of every four visitors</a> to Qatar in 2015 came from Saudi Arabia) – was eerily quiet.</p>
<p>The four countries <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55538792">severed ties with Qatar</a> in June 2017 after they accused Doha of supporting terrorism. They demanded the shutdown of Qatari news network Al Jazeera as well as calling on the country to downgrade its relations with Iran. Doha defiantly rejected the accusations and agreed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/04/breakthrough-in-qatar-dispute-after-fruitful-talks-to-end-conflict">mediation from Kuwait and the US</a> to end the standoff.</p>
<p>Qatar has estimated its losses from the blockade in the billions of dollars – citing factors such as “industrial-scale <a href="https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/bein-sports-lays-off-300-jobs-qatar-piracy-beoutq-arabsat">theft of content</a> from its sports broadcaster BeIN by rival Saudi network BeoutQ and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/4/8/qatar-sues-uae-saudi-luxembourg-banks-over-riyal-manipulation">manipulation of its currency</a> by the four countries. So, when they agreed on January 5 to lift the embargo and restore diplomatic relations with Qatar, all sides were keenly anticipating any economic benefits the restored detente might bring.</p>
<p>Qatar may be the smallest of the Gulf states – but it’s the richest. So when, hours after the agreement, foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ea1e7058-960d-416c-93dc-f4f8c7945c12">talked about</a> the possibility of the country’s sovereign wealth fund investing in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, his hint would have been well received in Riyadh.</p>
<p>Dangling the carrot of investment is a good way of appeasing Saudi Arabia, which is keen to attract foreign investment to back Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s grandiose modernisation projects as well as respond to the country’s long-term need to secure new export markets and diversify its oil-dependent economy.</p>
<h2>Fraternal relations</h2>
<p>But the biggest sign of the new detente has so far been in the tone of Qatar’s news media. Top of the list of the 13 demands placed on Qatar by the four countries was shutting down Al Jazeera. </p>
<p>Qatar didn’t shut the network down – but watching the network in the days after the blockade ended, one could feel the difference. Bulletins no longer include regular news on "violations” by the Saudi regime. The channel even rebranded the Saudi Crown Prince, who it had vociferously <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6zcRatILiP0">attacked</a> just a few weeks ago for “tarnishing the image of the Saudi state”. Now Bin Salman is represented as a rising peacemaker engaged in relations of “fraternity”. This was symbolically reflected in the way he hugged Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani when the Qatari emir arrived in Riyadh for their meeting on the sidelines of the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting in Saudi Arabia on January 5.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1346394765651275777"}"></div></p>
<p>Coverage of Qatar by Saudi network Al Arabiya has also softened considerably, something picked up on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/arabic/media-55593393">by the BBC</a>, which even hosted analysts to comment of the repeatedly screened scene of the hugging between the two leaders. “It was a hot hugging”, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FHlXl_VfKc">commented</a> one analyst, of the enthusiastic way the two leaders embraced when meeting at the airport in Riyadh.</p>
<p>The reconciliation has brought a sense of relief in all four countries. Ordinary people paid a deep humanitarian price – many are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/6/9/saudi-led-blockade-on-qatar-breaking-up-families">linked by close tribal ties</a> and there are thousands of cases of cross-border intermarriage (to give you an idea of how close the Saudi Arabia and Qatar are, consider that it takes just an hour to drive from Doha to Saudi territory).</p>
<p>In Qatar, I heard many stories of families split apart when Qatari nationals were ordered to leave their three Gulf neighbours within 14 days. More than 12,000 residents in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE were also ordered to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/6/9/saudi-led-blockade-on-qatar-breaking-up-families">leave Qatar</a>. Social media is now full of videos of families jubilantly crossing “Abu Samra”, the land border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar within hours of the agreement.</p>
<h2>Happy talk</h2>
<p>This may all sound like a return to normality, but sceptics pointed to the fact that, while the two feuding leaders talked of “brotherly unity” and desires for “Gulf unity”, neither mentioned an agreement on any of the issues that caused the crisis. On the one hand, everyone’s a winner – but, on the other, we don’t know how or why. The situation has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/05/qatar-and-saudi-arabia-breakthrough-is-more-exhaustion-than-compromise">been described as</a> a “detente borne more of exhaustion than compromise”. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40378221">13 demands</a> made by the other Gulf states of Qatar remain unmet. For example, the Qatari foreign minister <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ea1e7058-960d-416c-93dc-f4f8c7945c12">has already scotched</a> a demand for Qatar to reduce its ties with Iran by shutting down diplomatic posts in Iran or expelling members of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard, saying a couple of days after the agreement that his country would not alter relations with Tehran.</p>
<p>So this dispute is far from ended and there is a lot of tension brewing under the surface. Saudi Arabia, for its part, sees Iran as an “<a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bup/gd/2016/00000006/00000004/art00013;jsessionid=9ruht0p5u9dqp.x-ic-live-02">existential threat</a>” and is unlikely to take no change as a negative answer.</p>
<p>Others believe that for Bin Salman, temporarily easing the tension with Qatar is “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dbc2e3f9-80f8-447f-9bc1-00188e696dc4">low-hanging fruit</a>” – something achieved with relative ease ahead of the inauguration of Joe Biden as the 46th US president. Biden is known for his critical attitude towards Riyadh’s approach to human rights.</p>
<p>There is no sign that Qatar is also heeding the other demands, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-turkey-military-idUSKCN0XP2IT">closing Turkey’s military base</a> outside Doha. Turkey is popular among Qataris. You’ll see cars with number plate stickers featuring the Turkish flag – or even with the image of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>With so few issues apparently actually resolved, it’s little wonder that it took just days for new signs of tension to reappear after the agreement. The UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, said following the GCC summit that Doha still has questions to answer, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ea1e7058-960d-416c-93dc-f4f8c7945c12">including</a>: “How is Qatar going to deal vis-à-vis interfering in our affairs through support of political Islam? Is Turkey’s presence in the Gulf going to be permanent?”</p>
<p>These are the same questions asked of Qatar long before the four countries issued their ultimatum in 2017. It’s tension that is likely to outlive the warmth engendered by those televised hugs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mustafa Menshawy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Underlying issues which led to the three-year dispute have not been resolved.Mustafa Menshawy, Postdoctoral Researcher in Middle East Politics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1466212020-09-23T10:51:51Z2020-09-23T10:51:51ZBahrain v Israel: how sport could help cement peace accords in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359329/original/file-20200922-16-9s5rb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=87%2C58%2C6398%2C3053&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sporting events and initiatives could help strengthen ties between the Gulf states and Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/goal-post-3d-rendering-739805059"> EFKS/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Back in 2016, I was excited for the Bahrain Women’s National team to compete in the <a href="https://www.womenssoccerunited.com/aphrodite-womens-cup-2016-match-fixtures/">Aphrodite Cup</a>, an international football tournament held in Cyprus. Bahrain’s team, of which I was in charge, had previously participated in an earlier edition of the tournament. The competition would have offered great exposure for Arab women’s football by giving them an opportunity to play against European teams. Unfortunately, that excitement was short-lived when it fell on me to ultimately decline the invitation when it became clear that Israel would be fielding a team this time around. </p>
<p>The decision to pull out was taken jointly between Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), despite all of the organisers’ efforts to accommodate us by making suggestions to ensure the teams played in separate groups and stayed in different hotels. Such was the tension between the Arab states and Israel that participation in the same tournament was not even an option.</p>
<p>Now, in a historic move, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/world/middleeast/bahrain-israel-trump.html">Bahrain</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html">UAE</a> have <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/15/politics/israel-uae-bahrain-white-house-analysis-intl/index.html">signed peace accords</a> with Israel. </p>
<p>For the Gulf, a region that has traditionally refused to recognise the existence of the Jewish state, the news has generated <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/bahrain-move-toward-israel-risks-domestic-reaction2">mixed reactions among experts and public</a>. However, with more Arab countries <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/08/20/the-arab-countries-most-likely-to-recognise-israel">expected to follow suit and take diplomatic steps</a> to normalise relations, sport can help the transition and strengthen ties. </p>
<h2>Football diplomacy?</h2>
<p>Sport has long been used as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bob_Heere/publication/327680234_Sport_Diplomacy_A_Review_of_How_Sports_Can_be_Used_to_Improve_International_Relations/links/5c7d4c42299bf1268d390167/Sport-Diplomacy-A-Review-of-How-Sports-Can-be-Used-to-Improve-International-Relations.pdf?origin=publication_detail">a tool for nurturing international relations</a> between states. A prime example is <a href="https://www.history.com/news/ping-pong-diplomacy">ping-pong diplomacy</a>, which softened relations between the United States and China during the Cold War with the aid of table tennis. There is now an opportunity for sport to play a similar role when it comes to the newly formed Arab-Israeli agreements. </p>
<p>While the use of sport for community reconciliation between Israel and Palestine has been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1012690206075422">studied</a> in the past, its application to other Arab countries has never been explored. Indeed, the mere thought of such a thing has been so unlikely that the Israeli Football Association was <a href="https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/member-associations/isr/">forced to switch continental affiliations</a> from Asia to Europe in 1974 due to the refusal of many Muslim nations to play against them. </p>
<p>So could treaties between Gulf States be enhanced through sport? It’s possible, but not likely to be an easy task.</p>
<p>Today, Bahrain and Israel could participate together in the Aphrodite Cup, for example, but marketing such an endeavour would require an effective strategy to emphasise the positives and dispel criticism. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Red and gold logo for Bahrain women's national football team." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359395/original/file-20200922-14-mc0oxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bahrain women’s national football team was first formed in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain_women%27s_national_football_team">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Gulf region has hosted <a href="https://gulfbusiness.com/rise-sports-tourism-middle-east/">many international sporting events</a> in recent years where teams from different countries participate at the youth and national levels in diverse sports. One way to reinforce ties with Israel could be by inviting Israeli teams and delegations to such events. In fact, the three football associations of Bahrain, Israel and the UAE have already begun marketing such an idea on their social media with a shared post displaying the countries’ football emblems under a banner that reads, “<a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CFKtq9fgMuM/">Football can unite us. Let’s play!</a>”</p>
<p>Sporting events can also be used as a platform for brand promotion. Much in the same way as we see adverts for companies around the pitch in the Premier League, as well as shirt sponsorship, there is an opportunity for recognised Gulf brands (for example, Fly Emirates) to enter the Israeli market through sport and vice versa. It may seem surprising initially to see Visit Israel advertisements at a Gulf-based sporting event, but over time this could become the norm and as trade relations improve, businesses will be less hesitant to get involved in Arab-Israeli marketing.</p>
<h2>Sport for development and peace</h2>
<p>Sporting events can also be used to educate visiting delegations about the host countries and build positive experiences on the sidelines of competitions. Team excursions and sightseeing trips can help them learn more about the local culture. Again, this would need to be closely managed given the potential escalation that can come from sporting matches and animosities between teams. Take, as an example, the infamous <a href="https://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/research-projects/the-soccer-war/">soccer war</a> that erupted between El Salvador and Honduras as a result of geopolitical tensions that were compounded by incidents during football matches. </p>
<p>Another, safer, strategy that could be used as an alternative to hosting entire team events would be to implement a coach and player exchange program in a similar way to the one the <a href="https://exchanges.state.gov/non-us/subject/sports">US</a> uses in its sport diplomacy programs. Exchange programs are a great way to widen the network of athletes and <a href="https://jsfd.org/2018/06/01/immediate-outcomes-and-implementation-of-a-sport-for-development-coach-education-programme-in-belize/">coaching staff</a> in a country and allow them to broaden their horizons through learning from international experts. </p>
<p>Inter-community programs aimed at integrating the young people of Israel and the Gulf states could also take place in third locations such as the US. Such programs could be used to bridge cultural and religious differences through the commonality of sport to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2018.1506334">build social bonds and linkages</a>. Unlike coaches’ exchanges, the focus of this type of program would be on youth and community as opposed to the professional athletes and their coaching staff. They would include sporting events and team-building activities as well as skill development and leisure activities away from sport.</p>
<p>The historic announcement between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE offers an important opportunity to strengthen relations and bring the Middle Eastern states together. While sport may not offer the ultimate solution to solve the Middle East conflicts, it offers a complementary tool to develop ties between communities that have been separated by years of hostility. It could help them to come together towards a <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/mena/bahrain-israel-normalisation-heralds-new-era-of-peace-netanyahu">new era of peace</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussa Khalid is affiliated with the Bahrain Football Association as the Head of Women's Football. </span></em></p>Sports diplomacy has eased relationships between nations before – here’s how it could help Israel, Bahrain and the UAE as they enter into new peace accords.Hussa Khalid, PhD researcher in Sport for Development and Peace Initiatives, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1444802020-08-17T19:15:10Z2020-08-17T19:15:10Z‘Historic’ Israel deal won’t likely bring peace to the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353202/original/file-20200817-22-1u65vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C3278&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">These Palestinians aren't happy with Trump's Israel deal, which required Israel to make no territorial concessions. Gaza, Aug. 16, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-the-palestinian-democratic-front-hold-news-photo/1228069922?adppopup=true">Mahmoud Issa/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The heralded recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">agreement to normalize relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates</a> may not be the grand achievement it was made out to be. </p>
<p>The White House-brokered deal, which was announced with <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-state-israel-united-arab-emirates/">much fanfare</a> on Aug. 13, is undoubtedly a diplomatic win for U.S. President Donald Trump and for Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who declared its signing a “<a href="https://twitter.com/netanyahu/status/866741286270849024?lang=en">historic day</a>.”</p>
<p>But the United Arab Emirates and Israel have never been at war, so the new agreement between them is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/israel-peace-deal-united-arab-emirates-transforms-the-middle-east">not really a peace treaty</a>, as <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/kushner-hails-israel-uae-peace-deal-as-paradigm-shift-for-middle-east">some White House officials</a> and press accounts suggested. It is an agreement to begin officially upgrading relations that have been quietly improving for some time, a process that will probably unfold slowly and tentatively. </p>
<p>Nor is it a deal that helps resolve the long-running conflict between Israel and the Palestinians – the subject of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-9780190625337?cc=us&lang=en&">my academic research and recent book</a>. For Palestinians, in fact, the Israeli-Emirati agreement is seen as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/world/middleeast/palestinians-israel-uae-annexation-peace.html">major setback</a>, weakening their bargaining position with Israel. </p>
<h2>Winners of the Abraham Accords</h2>
<p>Until now, the <a href="https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/Moran_Zaga_-_Israel-UAE_-_Opportunities_on_Hold_-_December_2018-1.pdf">growing Israeli-Emirati relationship</a> has been conducted informally and secretly. It was largely focused on <a href="https://www.axios.com/israel-uae-white-house-meeting-iran-trump-kushner-ec81aa24-02db-4920-b4f2-88eec301222c.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twsocialshare&utm_campaign=organic">sharing intelligence to counter their mutual enemy, Iran</a>. The new deal, dubbed the Abraham Accords, will bolster this <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order">de facto alliance against Iran</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A photo of newspapers heralding the Israel-UAE 'peace deal'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=36%2C24%2C4031%2C2655&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Look beyond the headlines to understand what the Israel-United Arab Emirates agreement really does – and what it doesn’t.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-august-14-2020-in-dubai-shows-the-news-photo/1228036588?adppopup=true">Guiseppe Cacace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It will also accelerate commercial ties between the two nations, which have already <a href="https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2012/01/27/Emirates-has-security-links-with-Israel/73471327687767/?ur3=1">begun to develop in recent years</a>. Economic and technological cooperation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates – an important economic center in the Gulf region – can now take place publicly and expand into more areas. </p>
<p>Scientific cooperation, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/uae-israeli-companies-sign-coronavirus-research-agreement-1.9075573">especially around the COVID-19 pandemic</a>, will also commence, as will tourism. Both Israel and the Emirates will undoubtedly benefit from their growing relationship. </p>
<p>White House and Israeli officials hope that the agreement will also encourage other Arab states in the Gulf to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-israel-uae-deal-kushner-indicates-more-arab-countries-will-follow/">upgrade their own relations with Israel</a>, with <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-israeli-officials-reportedly-say-bahrain-next-in-line-for-normalization/">Bahrain and Oman the most likely to follow the Emirates’ lead</a>. Both countries have <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-15/bahrain-joins-egypt-oman-in-supporting-uae-israel-deal">expressed their support for the agreement</a>. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, the most important Gulf Arab state, however, has been conspicuously quiet about the deal. Due to their desire to lead the Sunni Muslim world and their typically cautious foreign policy, the Saudis seem unlikely to normalize their relationship with Israel <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-foreign-minister-relations-israel-peace-deal">unless major progress is made towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a>. </p>
<p>The agreement relates to that conflict by preventing Israel from implementing its <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">pledge to unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank</a>, an Israeli-occupied territory that the Palestinians claim as their land. </p>
<h2>Losers of the Abraham Accords</h2>
<p>The Emiratis demanded that concession from Israel in return for normalizing relations. But it’s far from clear that the Israeli-Emirati agreement will help the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. </p>
<p>For one, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-in-uae-deal-netanyahu-trades-imaginary-annexation-for-real-life-diplomacy-win-1.9071474">Israel analysts question</a> whether Prime Minister Netanyahu really intended to carry out his <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-west-bank-annexation-netanyahu-explanation-reactions-history-2020-7">election campaign promises</a> to annex some of the West Bank, especially in the midst of an economic and health crisis. Israel is now confronting its <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/22/israel-coronavirus-second-wave-netanyahu/">second wave of the coronavirus</a>. Annexation, which would be illegal under international law, also faced domestic, American and international opposition. </p>
<p>President Trump has declared annexation “off the table” as a result of the United Arab Emirates deal. But <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/after-netanyahu-says-still-committed-to-annexation-trump-says-it-s-off-the-table-1.9071859">Netanyahu claims</a> it is postponed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Trump sits next to his standing advisors in the Oval Office" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump and his advisers, including his Mideast czar, Jared Kushner, announcing the Israel deal on Aug. 13, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-speaks-during-a-meeting-with-leaders-news-photo/1228029060?adppopup=true">Doug Mills-Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Palestinians say it makes little difference to them whether Israel has called off or merely paused its official annexation of West Bank territory. Either way, some 2.8 million Palestinians in the West Bank will continue to live under <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/12/17/born-without-civil-rights/israels-use-draconian-military-orders-repress">Israeli military rule</a> alongside <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">an ever-growing population of Jewish settlers</a>, now numbering more than 430,000. </p>
<p>Israel has been <a href="https://wonitor.com/World/2020/0318/Why-Israeli-settlements-keep-growing-with-Trump-support">building its settlements in the West Bank</a> since it conquered the territory in the 1967 war. Palestinians and many observers see the relentless expansion of Jewish settlements as amounting to Israel’s “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/israels-creeping-annexation/6C18D4A2686DBFDBD54FC0F5EC5FD12A/core-reader">creeping annexation</a>” of West Bank land. </p>
<p>This process will continue despite the deal. It could even accelerate if Netanyahu tries to appease Jewish settlers, who <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/right-decries-annexations-downfall-as-most-politicians-laud-uae-deal/">feel betrayed by his suspension of annexation</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Sold out by your friends’</h2>
<p>The divided, fractious leadership of the Palestinians has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/palestinians-unanimously-reject-uae-israel-deal-200814115311669.html">unanimously denounced the agreement</a>. They describe it as a “stab in the back” for the United Arab Emirates to break from the Arab <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7">consensus not to normalize relations with Israel until it makes peace with the Palestinians</a>. In practice, that would mean withdrawing from the West Bank and allowing a Palestinian state to be established. </p>
<p>Now, Israel has achieved normalization with an important Arab state without making any territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Palestinians fear that gives Israel <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/upending-traditional-views-on-peacemaking-israel-uae-deal-truly-heralds-new-era/">less incentive to ever leave the West Bank</a>. That’s especially true if other Arab allies tire of supporting the Palestinian cause, and opt to forge relations with Israel based upon their own interests, as the Emiratis have done. </p>
<p>“May you never be sold out by your ‘friends,’” Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian politician, <a href="https://de.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-emirates-analysts-factbox/factbox-triple-win-or-double-cross-analysts-react-to-israel-uae-deal-idUKKCN259314">tweeted in reaction to the agreement</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel and the United Arab Emirates weren’t at war, so their new deal is not really a peace accord. Nor does it satisfy the Palestinians, who need Arab nations to support their drive for statehood.Dov Waxman, Director of the UCLA Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies and The Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Chair in Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1421872020-07-07T15:41:33Z2020-07-07T15:41:33ZAusterity in the Gulf states: why it’s alarming for women’s progress<p>Citizens of Saudi Arabia are having to get used to something that has long been an unpleasant fact of life in most parts of the world. On July 1, the kingdom <a href="https://www.natlawreview.com/article/vat-and-customs-duty-increases-saudi-arabia-implications-investment-kingdom">tripled the VAT</a> levied on consumer goods and services from 5% to 15%. There were <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/02/saudi-spending-soared-ahead-of-vat-but-triple-whammy-awaits-economy.html">reports of frantic stockpiling</a> ahead of the change as consumers put coronavirus fears to one side to buy while prices were low. </p>
<p>Besides VAT, the Saudis are implementing <a href="https://www.okaz.com.sa/english/na/1599241">an austerity package</a> that includes cuts to people’s living allowances and to national spending plans to develop the country. The kingdom is partly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52612785">attributing these measures</a> to the <a href="https://www.arabianbusiness.com/video/447007-business-impact-saudi-arabias-new-15-vat-explained">COVID-19 effect</a> on oil prices, <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-american-shale-oil-go-bust-136988">which crashed</a> below zero in April. The oil price has since recovered somewhat, though <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cmjpj223708t/oil">at circa US$40</a> (£32) per barrel, is still well below what the kingdom is used to.</p>
<p>Together with the economic effects of coronavirus restrictions, this has been putting severe pressure on the Saudis and their petroleum-rich neighbours in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The IMF <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-economy-imf/gulf-economies-to-shrink-by-7-6-this-year-imf-says-idUSKBN2411RS">recently predicted</a> that the GCC economies would contract nearly 8% in 2020 – a steep downgrade from the 3% decline it forecast in April. </p>
<p>All the same, there is more to the Saudi belt-tightening than the pandemic. On VAT, for instance, the whole GCC bloc <a href="https://blog.taxamo.com/insights/gcc-vat-update2">reached an agreement</a> in 2016 to <a href="https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/services/tax/me-tax-legal-news/2017/unified-agreement-vat-across-gcc-region-published-official-ksa-gazette.html">introduce VAT</a> for the first time at 5% across the board. The Saudis and UAE <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b1742920-efd0-11e7-b220-857e26d1aca4">duly did so</a> in 2018, followed <a href="https://www.unitedcashback.com/blog/bahrain-introduces-vat/">by Bahrain</a> a year later. Oman, Kuwait and Qatar have yet to impose this tax on their populations, but <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1673046/business-economy">the question is “when”</a> rather than “whether” they will follow suit. </p>
<h2>Visions from the desert</h2>
<p>It has long been obvious to the GCC nations that their existence as <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/df77a3f0/krane-subsidies-pomeps.pdf">“rentier” states</a> that rely on massive natural resources to subsidise goods and services for their populations cannot continue. Petroleum prices are low and unstable, and renewable technologies are reducing global demand for fossil-fuel products. </p>
<p>For years, these countries have been trying to increase their tax revenue and cut public expenditure while <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/a4c7078d/CES-pub-QLC_GCC-061317.pdf">diversifying away</a> <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55252/?from_serp=1">from petroleum</a> into everything from alternative energy to petrochemicals to construction. They do this through national “vision” plans such as <a href="https://vision2030.gov.sa/en">Saudi Vision 2030</a>, which <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2020/05/13/the-new-saudi-arabia-where-taxes-triple-and-benefits-get-cut/">put the emphasis</a> on private-sector growth and developing the country’s people. </p>
<p>Diversification is supposed to help improve the public finances, yet it has been a victim of the Saudi cutbacks. The kingdom has made a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-12/saudi-arabia-vision-2030-plan-cut-by-8-billion-okaz-reports?sref=Q77DYrNe">US$8 billion budget cut</a> to Vision 2030, which will involve scaling back plans such as a futuristic city <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/neom-what-we-know-saudi-arabia-500bn-mega-city-2019-9?r=US&IR=T#:%7E:text=It's%20called%20Neom%2C%20a%20planned,phase%20one%20is%20nearing%20completion.">known as Neom</a> and a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimdobson/2018/12/26/saudi-arabia-unveils-plans-to-create-massive-red-sea-wellness-destinations/#1d5d46d35dfb">massive tourism development</a> on the Red Sea. </p>
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<p>This will jeopardise the success of the whole Saudi policy of economic diversification, and risks being repeated with cuts to “vision” plans across the region. Economic stimulus packages <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/oil-production-cut-deepens-gcc-fiscal-deficit-hinders-growth-12-05-2020">were announced</a> in every GCC country in light of the fall in oil prices, but cuts in public spending will probably outweigh them. Compared to a projected Saudi budget cut of 12%, Oman is for instance cutting 10%, while Bahrain is seeking 30% in cuts. </p>
<h2>Gulf countries and women</h2>
<p>Not only is this bad news for long-term economic prospects, it raises serious development concerns with respect to women. I <a href="https://www.academia.edu/38556059/EMPOWERING_WOMEN_HOW_SHOULD_THE_OMANI_STATE_CONTINUE_SUPPORTING_WOMEN_WORKING_IN_ITS_HANDICRAFTS_INDUSTRIES">did a study</a> of Omani women in the context of Oman’s <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/About-Deloitte/mepovdocuments/mepov12/dtme_mepov12_Oman2020vision.pdf">Vision 2020</a> (since superseded by <a href="https://www.2040.om/en/">Vision 2040</a>). It was clear that these visions are part of a social contract, in which the sultanate retains power in exchange for providing the population of nearly 5 million with various kinds of support. </p>
<p>Particularly for women of low-income and minimal-education backgrounds, the state has been a major catalyst for their personal and professional development. It has provided them with education, training and employment programmes aimed at helping them to participate in the economy. </p>
<p>Likewise, there have been numerous initiatives to help women across the region in recent years. In UAE and Saudi Arabia, <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/private-sector-must-do-more-to-increase-gender-equality-in-the-uae-says-sheikha-manal-bint-mohammed-1.979872#3">legislation was introduced</a> in 2018 and 2019 aiming to remove gender-based discrimination in the workplace. The Saudis’ decision to lift the ban on women driving in 2018 was not only a win for women’s rights but also improved women’s access to workplaces among other gains. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346089/original/file-20200707-30-12teov3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The paradox continues.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/arabic-woman-typing-on-computer-searching-695113861">Kdonmuang</a></span>
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<p>Nonetheless, the Gulf continues to suffer from an “education and employment paradox”, where women are very well educated but <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/530451467995640868/main-report">play a very limited role</a> in the workforce. The daily reality for women is that they still have to navigate entrenched structures of patriarchy and discrimination that devalue their work. More progressive laws do not guarantee better outcomes for women on their own. The Gulf economies are in fact <a href="https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Young_Womens-Labor_ONLINE-2.pdf">more undermined</a> by low female participation in the workplace than any other region in the world. </p>
<p>The World Bank has pressed these nations to keep improving in this regard, for instance <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/09/29/why-supporting-womens-economic-inclusion-is-vital-for-the-gcc">calling on them</a> to make it easier for women to launch businesses. As shown in my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/38556059/EMPOWERING_WOMEN_HOW_SHOULD_THE_OMANI_STATE_CONTINUE_SUPPORTING_WOMEN_WORKING_IN_ITS_HANDICRAFTS_INDUSTRIES">Oman study</a>, barriers can be financial, such as not having enough money to get a business off the ground; and social, such as not having adequate social networks to spread the word and build professional contacts. </p>
<p>In sum, opportunities for women <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/women-gulf-countries-perceptions-and-reality">have been rapidly expanding</a> in the Gulf countries in recent years as their rights increase and these economies diversify beyond petroleum to create a wider range of jobs for both men and women. This has been an exciting shift and raises much hope for the future, but it is under threat as the region’s petroleum wealth declines and governments reduce spending. </p>
<p>We can’t assume that women will continue to enjoy greater economic inclusion in the years to come. They will continue to rely on support from the state to drive this agenda forward, at least for a while. This must be protected from austerity programmes, and instead needs more investment both in the private and public sector to enable women – in expanding their capabilities and building their experience, knowledge and skills – to participate effectively alongside men in the economy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Humaira Hansrod has received funding from a United States Fulbright Research fellowship grant to conduct research in Oman.</span></em></p>Gulf states have given women great education, but they are still very limited participants in the workplace.Humaira Hansrod, Researcher in International Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1366312020-04-21T13:11:44Z2020-04-21T13:11:44ZGulf states use coronavirus threat to tighten authoritarian controls and surveillance<p>Governments across the Middle East have moved to upgrade their surveillance capabilities under the banner of combatting COVID-19, the disease linked to the new coronavirus.</p>
<p>Overtly <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Political_Military_Relations_and_the_Sta.html?id=Ac3cAAAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">repressive policies</a> have been commonplace across the Middle East for years, notably in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, where violent measures have been taken to control populations. </p>
<p>As a result of technological advances, an increase in political engagement and changes of leadership, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – have also <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arabworld.pdf">upgraded their form of authoritarianism</a> in recent years. This has seen policies of partial economic liberalisation and market-based reforms used to obscure an increase in repression and surveillance, for example by containing the work of civil society groups. </p>
<p>Following the pattern in which authoritarian states tend to exploit common threats, some of the GCC states are now manipulating the current pandemic to enhance their social power and control – as I’ve explored in a recent <a href="https://pomeps.org/authoritarian-exploitation-of-covid-19-in-the-gcc">article</a> as part of a contribution for the Project on Middle East Political Science at George Washington University. </p>
<h2>New controls</h2>
<p>In Dubai, nationwide curfews have been put in place and enforced by the <a href="http://www.dxbpermit.gov.ae/">security services</a> and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/16/countries-in-the-middle-east-are-using-ai-to-fight-coronavirus.html">surveillance</a>. Authorities in the UAE have also introduced criminal <a href="https://gulfnews.com/uae/crime/covid-19-temporary-imprisonment-for-spreading-rumours-in-uae-1.1585722668466">penalties</a> for the dissemination of information about the virus deemed to be false. Meanwhile, Bahrain introduced <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/coronavirus-bahrain-to-use-electronic-tags-for-people-in-quarantine-1.1001903">electronic tags</a> for patients who had tested positive for COVID-19. In Saudi Arabia, people have been arrested for <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/covid-19-34-curfew-violators-nabbed-in-saudi-arabia-1.1587299810053">violating strict curfew laws</a>. </p>
<p>Beijing’s recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52321529">admission</a> that more people had died than originally reported in Wuhan, the original epicentre of the pandemic, shows the fragile nature of information and truth within authoritarian states. Likewise, it’s difficult to assess the scale of who has been affected so far across the GCC. According to official government statistics as <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">of April 21</a>, there were 10,484 reported cases in Saudi Arabia and 103 deaths from COVID-19. The UAE had reported 7,265 cases and 43 deaths, Qatar 6,105 ases and nine deaths and Kuwait 2,080 cases and 11 deaths.</p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-coronavirus-cover-up-how-censorship-and-propaganda-obstructed-the-truth-133095">handling of its own early COVID-19 whistleblowers</a> showed how authoritarian states often react promptly to the dissemination of news which could undermine their authority. Of course, the curtailing of “fake news” during this time is important to prevent hysteria and panic. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/matthew-hedges-uae-held-me-spy-west-complicit/581200/">from my own experience</a> of being forcibly detained for six months and falsely accused of spying charges in the UAE, I know full well how these laws can be abused and twisted for ulterior purposes. The real test will be to see if all of these preventative laws are relaxed once the pandemic is under control.</p>
<p>The inherent weaknesses of GCC states are also being further exposed through this pandemic. GCC citizens only inadvertently hold the power of accountability over their monarchies, due to the lack of formal political mechanisms that generate and provide legitimacy in democracies. In essence, the monarchs hold power until they don’t.</p>
<p>In response, Middle Eastern states have introduced programmes in recent years that emphasise cultural traditions in an attempt to further centralise power using key figures within their regime. A recent anti-corruption drive in Saudi Arabia, which climaxed with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/how-saudi-elite-became-five-star-prisoners-at-the-riyadh-ritz-carlton">Ritz-Carlton incident</a> in which more than 30 elite figures were detained in a luxury hotel, highlighted the ascendancy of Mohammed Bin Salman, the crown prince. </p>
<p>In the UAE, the security state has been intensified through the creation of <a href="https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/social-affairs/preserving-the-emirati-national-identity/initiatives-to-preserve-the-national-identity-of-the-uae/the-uae-national-service-law">conscription</a> programmes which emphasise national identity under the patronage of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. </p>
<h2>Biopolitics</h2>
<p>Central to the current messaging around COVID-19 is the heightened value of “purity” within the nation. This notion has been promoted through the prism of the family, with the region’s rulers extending the meaning to include the nation in an attempt to retain cohesiveness. In the current context, for example, only one member of a family is allowed to pick up food during the lockdown in some Gulf states, and there have been greater protections imposed for nationals than non-nationals, many of whom <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4f3c258-7ec9-477c-92f7-5607203f77fc">have been deported</a>.</p>
<p>But this comes at a moment when the so-called purity of the family unit is under threat as dowry costs, marriages to foreigners and divorce rates are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331436638_Tribe_and_Tribalism_The_Trojan_Horse_of_GCC_States_The_Anatomy_of_a_Crisis">all increasing across the GCC</a>. This has helped maintain a heightened significance of the family within GCC politics. As a result, issues such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-women/saudi-promo-video-labels-feminism-atheism-homosexuality-as-extremist-ideas-idUSKBN1XL29Z">homosexuality</a>, marriage to foreigners and now even COVID-19 are seen as a threat which has the potential to dilute the national gene pool. </p>
<p>The GCC states are also capitalising on a new vein of conservative nationalism across the region that is highly personalised and driven by security concerns. An era of assertive foreign policy from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha is now playing out as a matter of principle and survival. As a result, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fortified their political and military engagements. Their closer ties with regional players such as Libya’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/suspected-military-supplies-libya-un-cargo">General Khalifa Haftar</a> and pro-government Yemeni <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/25/yemen-saudi-forces-torture-disappear-yemenis">forces</a> have helped keep these conflicts alive within a reduced footprint. </p>
<p>Back home, the GCC states have exploited the underlying threats of the virus to bolster their own survival strategies. In the past, authoritarian states such as the former Soviet Union often relied on crude illustrations of force alongside state propaganda. But the modern authoritarians in the GCC take a more co-optive route to manage their populations. They have been able to enact policies which undermine civil liberties, perpetuating their current political designs and generating no protest from their populations. So it’s crucial to understand how these practices are maintained, why they have the population’s consent, and upon what basis they will continue to be applied.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Hedges does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have exploited the underlying threats of the virus to bolster their own survival strategies.Matthew Hedges, Doctoral Research Candidate in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1304602020-02-11T13:54:30Z2020-02-11T13:54:30ZWomen in Arab countries find themselves torn between opportunity and tradition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314580/original/file-20200210-109916-1bwnb7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4928%2C3275&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In an effort to increase tourism, Saudi Arabia recently eased its strict dress code for foreign women, allowing them to go without the body-shrouding abaya robe still mandatory for Saudi women. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participants-attend-the-launch-of-the-new-tourism-visa-in-news-photo/1171500442?adppopup=true">FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life. </p>
<p>All countries of the Arab Gulf now have <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2825910">workforce “nationalization policies”</a> that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labor by getting more women into the workforce. <a href="https://vision2030.gov.sa/en">Saudi Arabia set a goal</a> of 30% female labor participation by 2030. In <a href="https://lmis.csb.gov.kw/En/default.aspx">Kuwait</a>, female citizens outnumber male citizens in the workforce. And across the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16121/degrees-of-difficulty-women-and-higher-education-in-the-persian-gulf">Gulf</a>, women outnumber men in higher education enrollment. </p>
<p>Women are making political inroads in the region, too. In <a href="https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/history-of-qatar/qatari-women">Qatar</a>, four women have been <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/231456">appointed</a> to ministerial positions since 2003. Eleven women have held cabinet positions in <a href="https://www.albawaba.com/news/kuwaits-new-cabinet-has-three-women-ministers-1327658">Kuwait</a> since 2005, including health minister, transportation minister and <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/gulf-s-first-female-finance-minister-named-in-new-kuwait-government-1.952640">finance minister</a>. </p>
<p>Even Saudi Arabia, which notoriously restricts women’s rights, <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2019/8/3/20752864/saudi-arabia-guardianship-laws-women-travel-employment-mbs">reformed the guardianship system</a> that grants authority over women to their male relatives. Since August 2019, women may obtain passports, travel abroad and register marriages and births on their own. </p>
<p>These changes have real world benefits for Arab women, giving them greater economic independence and a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/04/lolwah-al-khater-qatar-foreign-policy-interview-074959">voice in domestic and international affairs</a>.</p>
<p>But Arab Muslim women in the Middle East still face substantial <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-personal-is-political-gender-identity-in-the-personal-status-laws-of-the-gulf-arab-states/">social and legal inequalities</a>. Even as governments in the region tout female advancement abroad, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=7dMcuN0AAAAJ&hl=en">my research on women in the Arab Gulf</a> finds, at home they still enforce traditional gender roles. </p>
<h2>Women as symbols of Islam</h2>
<p>The discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/06/21/how-oil-transformed-the-gulf">turned these Islamic monarchies into global players</a>. One result of this globalization was that Western leaders put <a href="https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91831/CME-pub-PoliticalEconomy-050815.pdf?sequence=1">pressure on the region</a> to “modernize” their laws and customs. </p>
<p>Championing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gulf-women-long-190308131344342.html">women’s advancement</a> is one way Gulf rulers can present a positive international image. This helps maintain good political, military and trade relationships with Europe and the United States and allays <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/12/human-rights-in-the-gulf-under-renewed-scrutiny-ahead-of-gcc-summit/">criticisms</a> of human rights violations.</p>
<p>In recent years, Arab Gulf women have also <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-women-are-going-to-college-running-for-office-and-changing-the-conservative-country-109938">fought hard for their rights</a>. Saudi women successfully campaigned for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/world/middleeast/saudi-driving-ban-anniversary.html">right to drive</a>, which was granted in 2018. In Kuwait, activists are now pushing for <a href="http://abolish153.org/">better protections</a> against domestic violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314584/original/file-20200210-109935-1fgjarm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lolwah Rashid Al-Khater, of the Qatar’s foreign affairs ministry, is one of several Qatari women in high-profile political posts, Sept. 24, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/lolwah-rashid-al-khater-spokesperson-of-the-ministry-of-news-photo/1176806473?adppopup=true">Leigh Vogel/Getty Images for Concordia Summit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But Gulf rulers still need the support of conservative citizens and influential religious leaders, too. And these sectors of the population have repeatedly raised <a href="https://mepc.org/political-costs-qatars-western-orientation">fears of Westernization</a> threatening local language, dress styles, food and cultural traditions.</p>
<p>One way Gulf rulers manage this tension, I’ve found, is by promoting <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/A_Most_Masculine_State/JmafWmVNJAAC?hl=en&gbpv=0">Quranic interpretations</a> that relegate women to traditional roles like <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6040123">bearing and raising children and caring for their families</a>. Celebrating women’s domesticity is an easy way to signal their government’s commitment to what they consider Islamic values.</p>
<p>In Qatar, for example, the <a href="https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/">National Vision 2030</a> – an economic and social development blueprint – states that “Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of society.” </p>
<p>And the Qataris propping up this pillar are women. </p>
<p>“Through their nurturing of language, codes of ethics, behavioural patterns, value systems and religious beliefs, women play an indispensable role in upholding traditional familial and cultural values,” reads a <a href="https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/pages/default.aspx">government document building on the proposals laid out in the National Vision 2030</a>.</p>
<h2>Religion and gender</h2>
<p>There are, of course, <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rise-islamic-feminists/">more gender-equal interpretations of the Quran</a>. Islam itself does not require repressing women. </p>
<p>But throughout history <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Women_and_Gender_in_Islam.html?id=U0Grq2BzaUgC&source=kp_book_description">male leaders in the Gulf</a> have associated patriarchal gender roles with religious purity. And clerics, who have significant <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/516a1378/bi-report-092319-cme-mbs-saudi.pdf">social and political influence</a> in the region, enforce <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mwz6.5?refreqid=excelsior%3A73695d320b89c549f2d264978e14cf5b&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">conservative readings of Islamic law</a> that subordinate women. </p>
<p>For example, women in all of the <a href="https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Aldosari_ONLINE_updated.pdf">Gulf states</a> must receive the approval of a male guardian to marry. In <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2019/08/04/Qatar-remains-only-GCC-country-restricting-travel-for-women.html">Qatar</a>, single women under 25 require permission to travel abroad, and Qatari men can argue in court to stop their wives from traveling. In Saudi Arabia, men can file a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/loopholes-riddle-saudi-reforms-guardianship-women-report-191023062306285.html">“disobedience” complaint</a> against female relatives for leaving the house without permission. </p>
<p>In Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, a man can <a href="https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Aldosari_ONLINE_updated.pdf">stop his wife from working</a> if he feels her employment interferes with her domestic responsibilities or religious conduct.</p>
<p>As a result, women in Gulf countries find themselves <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/02/saudi-arabia-women-travel-consent-rights-feminist-movement">caught between two contradictory agendas</a> for the 21st century.</p>
<h2>What women want</h2>
<p>Many Qatari women I’ve interviewed say they struggle to balance the <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/jmews/article/15/3/344/140633/Gender-and-Nation-Building-in-QatarQatari-Women?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Gender%20and%20Nation%20Building%20in%20Qatar%3A%20Qatari%20Women%20Negotiate%20Modernity&utm_campaign=j-MEW_Top5of2019_Jan2020">conflicting expectations between domestic responsibilities and emerging professional opportunities</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4087%2C2990&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4087%2C2990&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314574/original/file-20200210-109887-x1p1vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ice cream selfies in Doha, Qatar, Dec. 19, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/local-women-take-pictures-of-their-ice-creams-in-doha-qatar-news-photo/1189635066?adppopup=true">Adam Davy/PA Images via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Sheikha, an unmarried Qatari in her late 20s who works as an academic adviser, told me she often wonders: “I have a job and future plans. Why should I marry?”</p>
<p>“I don’t want to say that marriage erases the dreams,” she said, “but sometimes with the family commitment you can’t do it.”</p>
<p>Qatari women like Sheikha tend to face significant <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/06_bdc_essay_winner.pdf">social pressure</a> to settle down and have children by a certain age and to make sure their education and career goals do not get in the way of domestic responsibilities. </p>
<p>Not all the pressure is external. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11199-016-0708-9">Many women</a> I met hold conservative views on marriage and the family, too.</p>
<p>“I started work when my last daughter got married,” Amina Al-Ansari, an associate professor at Qatar University, told me. “Before that, I took care of the house and kids.” </p>
<p>Al-Ansari, like all 15 Qatari women I interviewed, believes caring for the family is a woman’s religious duty.</p>
<h2>Still can’t have it all</h2>
<p>Conservative Qataris also view women working or <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780333638125">studying in a gender-mixed</a> environment as a violation of Islamic values and a sign of <a href="https://mepc.org/political-costs-qatars-western-orientation">Westernization</a>.</p>
<p>That’s why Amal Al-Shammari, a 32-year-old Qatari who now runs a cultural association for expatriates and tourists called <a href="http://www.embracedoha.net/">Embrace Doha</a>, attended Qatar University – the country’s only gender-segregated university. </p>
<p>“My parents wanted me to go there to keep a good reputation. Guys assume you have lots of relationships if you go to gender-mixed universities,” she told me. “My parents wanted me to stay with the conservative way.”</p>
<p>As political and religious leaders in the Gulf push their national agendas, women must find their own ways to balance newfound freedoms with existing social and religious pressures. </p>
<p>“There is always development, improvement, but always tradition, religion, and culture,” the professor, Al-Ansari, told me, summing up these tensions. </p>
<p>“We are living under the umbrella of religion.” </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alainna Liloia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain, it’s now official policy that women should go to college and work outside the home. But cultural pressure to marry and have kids remains strong.Alainna Liloia, Ph.D. Student, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281552019-12-05T10:48:14Z2019-12-05T10:48:14ZManchester City v Manchester United: a battle for ideological dominance<p>The Manchester derby is <a href="https://theconversation.com/manchester-a-city-united-by-sport-76186">always a key clash in the Premier League calendar</a> and all eyes will be on the Etihad Stadium when City take on United, as the two footballing giants face-off for the first time this season. Yet the confrontation will be significant for reasons that go way beyond goals and titles. </p>
<p>So far this season, City have fallen some way short of the exacting standards they have set themselves over recent years under Pep Guardiola’s tutelage. Meanwhile, United is still immersed in post-Ferguson angst as Ole Gunnar Solskjaer grapples with his team’s continuing underachievement.</p>
<p>Adding some spice, each of the clubs’ off-field struggles are no less troubling. City has seen a Court for Arbitration in Sport ruling go against it as the club deals with charges that it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/50435304">breached UEFA’s Financial Fair Play</a> (FFP) regulations. Over at United, fans remain concerned about the club’s owners and their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2019/oct/08/manchester-united-problems-ole-gunnar-solskjaer">failure to deliver the levels of success</a> they have previously enjoyed.</p>
<p>Yet despite the tensions associated with the head-to-head and the perpetual financial waltz of trying to work within the constraints of FFP, a bigger battle is being fought out in Manchester – one that is largely anonymous though profoundly more important than anything that a single Premier League game can manifest.</p>
<p>In 2005, Manchester United was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2005/may/16/newsstory.manchesterunited">acquired by the Glazers</a>, a family of American sports entrepreneurs and owners of National Football League franchise the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. The Glazers are steeped in the traditions of a US domestic sports economy that remains the largest in the world, possibly accounting for 40% of the total <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjt0-eu8ZbmAhUhQEEAHZ9IBEMQFjAAegQIBBAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pwc.com%2Fgx%2Fen%2Fhospitality-leisure%2Fpdf%2Fchanging-the-game-outlook-for-the-global-sports-market-to-2015.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1JZkn_P_4hYpirGY-cbS6B">global sports industry</a>.</p>
<p>The growth and dominance of the US sports industry remains striking, as it has been governed largely by the free market. Unlike most countries in the world, America effectively has no government sports ministry. Instead, sport in the US is driven by commercial principles, where profit rules and financial returns are generated by and for private investors.</p>
<p>In many ways, Manchester United has become the embodiment of this western, capitalist model of sport. While costs are carefully controlled, revenue growth is pursued with gusto. This has constantly reaffirmed United’s position as being one of the most <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49808790">commercially valuable football clubs in the world</a>, even though the club has been struggling on the pitch. </p>
<p>It also sees the organisation locked into a perpetual cycle of rights sales. The club now makes money on deals with anything from <a href="http://www.sportspromedia.com/news/manchester_united_agree_deal_with_japans_kansai">Japanese paint brands</a> to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgekoutsakis/2018/10/01/first-50-year-old-chivas-whisky-celebrates-manchester-uniteds-1968-cup-victory/#19f7c5bdb411">Scottish whisky distillers</a>.</p>
<p>United needs a win this weekend, not just for the club but also for the capitalist ideology that it represents. The club <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/773f17be-1320-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e">goes to great lengths</a> in its pursuit of revenues, though its <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/07/football/manchester-united-ole-gunnar-solskjaer-spt-intl/index.html">recent travails</a> have taken some of the lustre off the brand. Victory at the Etihad will say just as much about the best way to run a football club as it does the team’s capabilities. </p>
<h2>The ‘rentier state’ owners</h2>
<p>A cursory glance at the list of Manchester City’s commercial partners might lead one to conclude that the club is of the same ilk as United. However, City is a very different proposition. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2008/sep/01/manchestercity.premierleague">In 2008</a>, the east Manchester outfit was acquired by the <a href="https://www.cityfootballgroup.com/our-business/ownership/">Abu Dhabi United Group</a> for Development and Investment, a state investment vehicle.</p>
<p>Hence, City is owned and run by a petrodollar-fuelled Gulf state, which exhibits the characteristics of a <a href="http://www.ejinsight.com/20191125-the-rentier-states-ruling-football/">“rentier state”</a>. As was discussed in a <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sport-politics-and-society-in-the-middle-east/">recently published book chapter</a> that I wrote, among their characteristics rentier states are typically dependent upon natural resource deposits for revenues which are, in turn, used to invest in overseas rent-generating assets. </p>
<p>These rents are then utilised domestically as a substitute for taxation and spending, which mitigates the need for democratic structures and processes. Manchester City-generated revenues therefore play their part in keeping Abu Dhabi’s population happy.</p>
<p>The importance of Asian state ownership at City is further illustrated by the way in which its owners use the club as an <a href="http://www.ejinsight.com/20190225-manchester-city-chengdu-deal-a-matter-of-business-or-politics/">instrument of state policy</a>, notably in international relations and diplomacy. For instance, the City Football Group (CFG, of which Manchester City is a constituent element) is part-owned by Chinese investors, a stake that was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/01/manchester-city-265m-deal-chinese-investment-group">publicly announced</a> to coincide with Chinese president Xi’s Jinping’s visit to Britain in 2015. </p>
<p>Utilising City as a policy instrument has enabled all manner of deals between Abu Dhabi and Beijing to be agreed. Earlier this year, as the football world responded to CFG’s announcement that it will set up a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/feb/20/manchester-city-football-group-buy-chinese-club">franchise club in Chengdu</a> (China), few people noticed the simultaneous announcement that Abu Dhabi’s state airline Etihad (the main shirt sponsor of Manchester City) <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/etihad-airways-to-deploy-new-787-dreamliners-to-china">will establish new links with …. Chengdu</a>.</p>
<p>The rentier state game plan in football is already <a href="http://www.ejinsight.com/20191125-the-rentier-states-ruling-football/">well established</a>, has been playing out <a href="https://theconversation.com/english-football-a-proxy-battleground-for-feuding-gulf-states-117812">for most of this year</a> and, indeed, looks <a href="https://www.policyforum.net/a-different-kind-of-sporting-contest/">set to intensify</a> as we head into 2020. A City victory in this weekend’s Manchester derby will add impetus to an increasingly powerful influence on the sport.</p>
<h2>Not just a football match</h2>
<p>City versus United is therefore no longer just a football match, it is a front line in what has fast become an <a href="http://www.ejinsight.com/20171122-europe-s-flat-footed-response-to-the-rise-of-asian-sports/">ideological war between the West and the East</a>. Sure, the war doesn’t solely involve a battle for the heart and soul of football. Similar skirmishes are also being played out in various sports and across other industrial sectors such as real estate, financial technologies and leisure. </p>
<p>Two decades ago, <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/international-sports_b_1246775">western capitalism ruled</a> and United dominated. But the world order is now changing with Asian states in the ascendancy. Perhaps no surprise, then, that City is now dominant. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, as with many conflicts, there is collateral damage which, in this case, seems to be the football fans of Manchester. City supporters from Openshaw and West Gorton no doubt remain nostalgic for the good old days of Francis Lee and Colin Bell. Over in Stretford and Gorse Hill, United fans will often hark back to the days of the <a href="https://www.manutd.com/en/history/munich-remembered/the-busby-babes">Busby Babes</a> and <a href="https://www.manutd.com/en/players-and-staff/detail/EricCantona">King Eric</a>.</p>
<p>But these once locally embedded social institutions, which were a tangible manifestation of peoples’ geographic identity and community, have now simply become instruments in a global ideological war. </p>
<p>However fans might reminisce, the reality is that the clubs are no longer “theirs”. Instead, the avaricious corporate appetites of western capitalism and the rent hungry sheikhs of the Gulf are now engaged in playing the biggest derby game of them all – the battle for ideological dominance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chadwick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The clubs no longer ‘belong’ to the fans - they have become instruments in an ideological war between Western capitalism and the rent hungry sheikhs of the Gulf states.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sports Enterprise, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179152019-05-28T11:34:42Z2019-05-28T11:34:42ZCelestial Bodies: Booker International Prize highlights rich literary tradition among Arab women<p>It says something that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/may/21/man-booker-international-prize-jokha-alharthi-wins-celestial-bodies-oman">winner of the 2019 Man Booker International prize for Literature</a>, Jokha Alharthi, is the first woman from her country to have a novel translated into English. Alharthi – from the Arabian Gulf state of Oman – who won for her novel Celestial Bodies, shares the £50,000 prize with her <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/apr/06/its-a-silent-conversation-authors-and-translators-on-their-unique-relationship">translator</a> Marilyn Booth. The book has the distinction of also being the first novel translated from Arabic to win the award.</p>
<p>“I am thrilled that a window has been opened to the rich Arabic culture,” Alharthi <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-48363022">told journalists</a> after the ceremony in London in May. “Oman inspired me but I think international readers can relate to the human values in the book – freedom and love.”</p>
<p>Celestial Bodies revolves around three sisters from a middle-class background in the small Omani village of al-Awafi. The novel is a fragmented collection of past and present events in Oman as they pertain to particular characters in this small village. These intricate storylines come together to shape the broader narrative of the novel, of a village going through remarkable change.</p>
<p>Celestial Bodies gives the reader a glimpse into a society that isn’t often spoken about in terms of its literature, culture and traditions. And a woman’s perspective is particularly rare – Arab Gulf women <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15m7j94">only really began publishing</a> their writings in the second half of the 20th century. It’s a trend that is intimately connected to the introduction of girls’ education – spanning half a century between 1928 and 1970 in different Gulf states.</p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean that Arab Gulf women weren’t producing literature before then – they were particularly well known for the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15m7j94">tradition of oral storytelling</a> and were especially esteemed for their poetry – the works of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Suad-al-Sabah">Kuwaiti poet Suad al-Sabah</a> and <a href="http://thepoeticheart.com/poets/mrs-hamda-khamis-ahmad/">Bahraini poet Hamda Khamis</a> are particularly worth checking out.</p>
<p>But it was the explosion of oil wealth, which forced the Arabian Gulf out of isolation and into the international arena – leading to the establishment of schools and newspapers and media outlets that allowed for literary creativity. Since the 1970s, <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/7200227">Arab Gulf women’s writing has evolved</a> – now Arab Gulf women write in a whole range of genres that reflect different themes and issues through their storylines, especially those issues which pertain to the specific experience of women in Arab Gulf society. But the novel is still something of a recent genre for Gulf women.</p>
<h2>Modernity and nostalgia</h2>
<p>One common theme in Arab Gulf writings is nostalgia for a simpler past, which is often used in contrast to the remarkably fast growth these countries have undergone with the discovery of oil. The narrative of Celestial Bodies draws a connection between the slave trade in Oman – the backdrop of the story – with the way Omani society started to change with the introduction of oil wealth into the region. </p>
<p>Although Alharthi positions her story within this narrative of tradition versus social change, she does so in a way that offers an objective outlook to the practices and history portrayed in the novel. She does this by portraying neither a romanticising of the past nor an overly optimistic focus on the positive aspects of oil revenue in the present. Instead, Celestial Bodies presents an honest portrayal of change and how it has affected different members of the village she is writing about.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276774/original/file-20190528-42600-4ke2ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The first novel by an Omani woman to be translated into English.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sandstone Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A defining feature of Omani literature is that Oman, in particular out of the Arab Gulf, has remained a traditional society in many aspects, which is oftentimes reflected in the <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/7200227">writings produced in the region</a>. The novel makes use of specific cultural and religious features of Oman and the Arab Gulf region, such as references to supernatural spirits – or <em>jinn</em> – as well as the all-important date harvest – as well as allusions to classical Middle Eastern literature and poetry such as Iraqi poets <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Mutanabbi">al-Mutanabbi</a> (915-965AD) and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ibn-al-Rumi">Ibn al-Rumi</a> (836-396AD).</p>
<p>You don’t need to be intimately familiar with Arab Gulf customs, literature and traditions to appreciate Celestial Bodies – but to fully grasp the impact of these references and the beauty they add to the text, it’s worth doing some background reading. This literary technique invites the reader to become immersed into Omani culture – and, in turn, play a role in the interpretation of the text itself.</p>
<h2>Rich literary tradition</h2>
<p>Celestial Bodies is emblematic of the fact that Arab Gulf women are actively producing remarkable works of literature that are very much worth exploring. Worthwhile, not only to offer a glimpse into this society, but also in order to discover a rich literary tradition that has not been accessible to a wider audience beforehand. </p>
<p>In an interview published on the <a href="https://themanbookerprize.com/international/news/celestial-bodies-interview">Man Booker International Prize website</a> Alharthi says this about her book:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I hope this helps international readers discover that Oman has an active and talented writing community who live and work for their art … They take on sacrifices and struggles and find joy in writing, or in art, much the same way as anywhere else. This is something the whole world has in common.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Alharthi’s novel offers a glimpse of the world being experienced by women in the Arabian Gulf. I hope that Celestial Bodies will encourage more translations of works from the region, encouraging readers to experience for themselves the cultural riches on offer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shadya Radhi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jokha Alharthi is the first woman from Oman to have a book translated into English.Shadya Radhi, PhD Researcher, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158342019-04-30T14:43:04Z2019-04-30T14:43:04ZWhy the new ‘solar superpowers’ will probably be petro-states in the Gulf<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271762/original/file-20190430-136794-45bqac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">capitanoproductions / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every now and then, the idea of powering Europe using the <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-we-turn-the-sahara-desert-into-a-huge-solar-farm-114450">vast solar resources of the Sahara Desert</a> comes up. Were this to actually happen, we may witness the rise of new energy superpowers in Northern Africa. But a look at the economic and political energy system suggests what’s more likely is the oil-rich countries of the Arabian (or Persian) Gulf will continue to dominate energy trade even in the post-fossil era.</p>
<p>Renewable energy, of course, is very location dependent – the sunnier a place is, the more energy you get out of photovoltaic panels. Over the course of a year, southern Algeria, for example, gets <a href="https://globalsolaratlas.info/">more than twice</a> as much solar energy as southern England. The graph below, which I put together as part of my PhD, shows that some of the best solar resources in the world are indeed found in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Niger, Chad and Sudan. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271757/original/file-20190430-136794-c8dt63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia and Canada have lots of low-solar land, but the most sunny areas are elsewhere.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://openei.org/datasets/dataset/solar-resources-by-class-and-country">Denes Csala / NREL</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So, one could build <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-we-turn-the-sahara-desert-into-a-huge-solar-farm-114450">large Saharan solar farms</a> and then transmit the power back to densely populated areas of Europe. Such a project would need to overcome various technical challenges, but we can say that in theory it is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0038092X12003763">possible</a>, even if not practical.</p>
<p>Yet plans to actually set up mass Saharan solar have floundered. The most notable project, <a href="https://www.desertec.org">Desertec</a>, was fairly active until the mid 2010s, when a collapse in the price of oil and natural gas made its business case more difficult. At that time, the major technology considered was <a href="https://www.solarpaces.org/csp-technologies/csp-projects-around-the-world/">concentrated solar power</a>, where you use the heat from the sun to run a steam turbine. Energy can be stored as heat overnight, therefore enabling uninterrupted energy supply and making it preferred to then expensive batteries. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271779/original/file-20190430-136790-umz2y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Solar is getting cheaper and cheaper.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-018-0256-3/figures/1">Nature</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since then, however, the cost of both solar panels and battery storage have dropped <a href="https://data.bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/14/2017/07/BNEF-Lithium-ion-battery-costs-and-market.pdf">drastically</a>. But, while conditions might look favourable for Saharan solar, it is unlikely that new solar energy kingpins will arise in North Africa. Instead, we should look one desert further to the East – the Rub al Khali on the Arabian peninsula, the home of the reigning energy powers.</p>
<h2>Sun shines on the Gulf</h2>
<p>The economies of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the other Gulf nations are built around energy exports. And as climate change imposes pressure on the extraction of fossil fuels, these countries will have to look for alternative energy (and income) sources in order to keep their economies afloat. The <a href="https://www.irena.org/">International Renewable Energy Agency</a> set up its headquarters in Abu Dhabi, and the region has no shortage of <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-018-0256-3">ambitious solar projects</a> promising <a href="https://www.natureasia.com/en/nmiddleeast/article/10.1038/nmiddleeast.2018.127">extremely cheap electricity</a>. However only a <a href="https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Jan/IRENA_Market_Analysis_GCC_2019.pdf">small</a> amount of capacity has actually been deployed so far. Low oil revenues <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-16/why-saudi-arabia-isn-t-meeting-its-ambitious-solar-energy-targets">have not helped</a> with the megaprojects.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1123074468434337792"}"></div></p>
<p>Countries in the Sahara also have little history of trading fossil fuels, outside of Libya and Algeria, while things are rather different for the petro-states of the Gulf. And this matters because, in the energy business, worries over longer-term <a href="https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/energy-security-energy-risk-management/">security of supply</a> mean countries <a href="http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2009026">tend to</a> trade with the same partners. </p>
<p>This would be the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511002151">Achilles’ heel</a> of a Northern African energy project: the connections to Europe would likely be the continent’s single most important critical infrastructure and, considering the stability of the region, it is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009458">unlikely</a> that European countries would take on such a risk. </p>
<p>Which brings us to an alternative way to transmit energy: hydrogen. A process called electrolysis can use renewable electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen, and the resulting hydrogen can store lots of energy. Soon it will become <a href="https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlehtml/2015/ee/c4ee04041d">feasible</a> to move energy around the world in this form, using <a href="https://www.wilhelmsen.com/media-news-and-events/press-releases/2019/new-design-makes-liquefied-hydrogen-bunker-vessels-a-reality/">shipping infrastructure</a> similar to that already in use today for liquefied natural gas.</p>
<p>Sure, there are disadvantages compared to batteries. It would mean introducing two more conversion stages and thus reduced efficiency (<a href="http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/technologies/hydrogen-energy-storage">30% roundtrip efficiency</a> compared to <a href="https://batteryuniversity.com/index.php/learn/article/bu_808c_coulombic_and_energy_efficiency_with_the_battery">80%</a> for batteries), but it would overcome the distance barrier. And perhaps just as importantly: shipping energy by hydrogen would mean no significant change to the existing maritime trade infrastructure, which will hand an advantage to established energy exporters. </p>
<p>If this means the Sahara is unlikely to develop renewable energy superpowers, then perhaps this is for the better. With the booming populations of Sub-Saharan Africa in dire <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178711000774">need</a> of electrification, clean solar power might be better used to alleviate the energy crisis in somewhere like <a href="https://www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=53">Nigeria</a> rather than sent to Europe. While these countries may eventually be able to shake off any <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/21790">solar resource curse</a>, in the short term, exports like these could just look like <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/138982/Competition%20Over%20Resources%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20the%20Global%20South%20FINAL%20pdf.pdf">yet another</a> European attempt to extract natural resources <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20421338.2014.947200?casa_token=3QNEK2PVBKYAAAAA%3AMkd9g2GKtceCT3OHHk8YTujEEHBMbx4YXfYkp5WJz-6c_WcWVzaBeFFb84tNMNnxqGgDTuea9v3h&am">from Africans</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/imagine-newsletter-researchers-think-of-a-world-with-climate-action-113443?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=Imagineheader1115834">Click here to subscribe to our climate action newsletter. Climate change is inevitable. Our response to it isn’t.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dénes Csala receives funding from the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Faraday Institution. </span></em></p>A legacy in fossil fuels is likely to help even in the era of renewable energy.Dénes Csala, Lecturer in Energy Storage Systems Dynamics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1050642018-10-17T10:51:36Z2018-10-17T10:51:36ZJamal Khashoggi disappearance a defining moment for Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West<p>On October 2, Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi entered his country’s consulate in Istanbul to obtain the documents he needed to marry his fiancée. She was waiting outside. He <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/12/how-jamal-khashoggi-disappeared-visual-guide">never came out</a>.</p>
<p>Following days of reports of what might have happened to Khashoggi, who was an outspoken critic of the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish authorities are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/world/middleeast/khashoggi-saudi-prince.html">investigating</a> whether he was killed inside the Saudi consulate. </p>
<p>Since bin Salman’s coming to power, Saudi Arabia has been pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy – through the seemingly unwinnable war in Yemen, the overreaction to a critical tweet by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-major-trade-implications-of-the-canada-saudi-arabia-spat-101306">Canadian foreign minister</a>, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/06/qatar-blockade-unexpected-new-vision-isolation">blockade of Qatar</a>, to name a few examples. Domestically, bin Salman has pushed for social reform such as allowing <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-reason-saudi-arabia-lifted-its-ban-on-women-driving-economic-necessity-97267">women to drive</a> and opening cinemas, as well as attracting more foreign direct investment into the country. Yet in the meantime, Saudi Arabia has continued to <a href="https://cpj.org/blog/2018/09/new-saudi-arabia-ushers-in-even-more-repressive-cl.php">suppress any form</a> of criticism or dissonance, and has jailed those who speak out against the authorities. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-end-it-was-khashoggis-friends-who-silenced-him-104890">In the end, it was Khashoggi's 'friends' who silenced him</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<h2>Alliances under pressure</h2>
<p>These latest accusations, coupled with past behaviour, raise questions for Saudi Arabia’s key allies, such as the UK, the US and France, at a time when their association with the Gulf kingdom is becoming increasingly controversial. In the UK, MPs from across the political spectrum have been rallying the government to take action. Conservative chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, the MP Tom Tugendhat, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/13/uk-saudi-relations-khashoggi-tom-tugendhat">called for the UK</a> to reconsider its relationship with Saudi Arabia if the allegations are proven to be true. </p>
<p>In the US, a bipartisan group of senators <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-corker-leahy-graham-letter-triggers-global-magnitsky-investigation-into-disappearance-of-jamal-khashoggi">triggered</a> the Magnitsky Act on October 10, which <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/magnitsky-act-apply-khashoggi-case-181011184312416.html">forces</a> the US president to investigate the allegations, report back to Congress within 120 days and potentially trigger sanctions against those implicated. </p>
<p>The UK was one of the first countries – albeit a week after Khashoggi’s disappearance – to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-call-with-saudi-foreign-minister">demand answers</a> from the Saudis. In a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-disappearance-of-jamal-khashoggi-by-foreign-ministers-from-the-uk-france-and-germany">joint statement</a> with France and Germany’s foreign ministers issued on October 15, the British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, demanded a “credible investigation”. In the past, these three countries have often competed for defence contracts with Saudi Arabia. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2018/10/15/eu-s-top-diplomat-says-a-full-investigation-needed-into-khashoggi-s-disappearance">said</a> that she expected a “full investigation” in the disappearance. </p>
<p>Yet US President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-latest-trump-talks-to-saudi-king-dispatches-pompeo/2018/10/15/8dadc74a-d07a-11e8-a4db-184311d27129_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c89c7a2e0580">comment</a> following a phone call with King Salman, that “rogue killers” may have conducted an operation which killed Khashoggi, has given the Crown Prince and King a window of opportunity big enough to avoid accountability all together. If the murder is blamed on “rogue killers”, it would absolve the Saudi government of responsibility for the murder – although questions about the credibility of this statement remain. For the US, concerns remain over Iran’s influence in the region, and it views Saudi Arabia as an important ally to contain Iran. </p>
<p>In previous comments Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/15/donald-trumps-60-minutes-interview-eight-takeaways">seemed reluctant</a> to suspend arms deals with Saudi Arabia were the allegations about Khashoggi proven to be true. This would suggest Trump views the US-Saudi relationship as purely transactional, although he did <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pompeo-says-saudis-promise-to-punish-wrongdoers-in-khashoggi-case/2018/10/17/34bab87e-4f56-4fd6-be3f-0faf03e3439c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bddbdd511704">send his secretary of state</a>, Mike Pompeo, to Riyadh to meet with King Salman and ask for explanations.</p>
<h2>A test for ‘Global Britain’</h2>
<p>The Khashoggi case highlights a deeply problematic issue for the UK in particular. As part of the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy agenda, dubbed “Global Britain”, the UK government has said it will seek to become the defender and upholder of the international rules-based order. At the UN General Assembly, British Prime Minister Theresa May <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-un-general-assembly-26-september-2018">said</a>: “We must stand up for our values by protecting those who may suffer when it is violated.” </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s relationship with its Western allies, such as the UK and US is crucial for security and trade relations. Yet, our recent <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/research-analysis/the-uk-saudi-arabia-security-relationship.aspx">research</a> suggests that there are more limited benefits – whether economic, political or strategic – to the UK from its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Instead, the UK’s international reputation is being damaged by association with the Gulf state’s aggressive foreign policy, particularly its actions in the conflict in Yemen, which has been <a href="https://news.un.org/en/focus/yemen">dubbed</a> the “world’s worst man-made disaster” by the head of the UN.</p>
<p>Silence from 10 Downing Street over the Khashoggi case will only diminish the UK’s reputation further, at a time when it is desperate for friends outside of the EU. Leading the international response and building a coalition with its European and transatlantic allies to advocate for accountability and justice, would, however, boost the country’s credibility on the world stage – aside from being the right thing to do. If the UK government is serious about holding states to account, and defending the international order as we know it, now is the time to show it. </p>
<p>Just as the Khashoggi case, if the allegations are true, has in a dramatic way shown Saudi Arabia’s disregard for human life, norms and international law – again, the UK government’s actions once it becomes clear what happened to Khashoggi will speak volumes about its foreign policy red lines and its commitment to an international rules-based order. To maintain its credibility on the global stage, the UK needs to demonstrate that those rules apply to everyone in the same way, foes or friends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105064/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Armida L. M. van Rij received funding from the Oxford Research Group's Remote Warfare Programme for this study. She is a member of the Women in International Security (WIIS) UK Leadership Team.</span></em></p>UK and US relations with Saudi Arabia were already under serious scrutiny – even before the disappearance of a prominent Saudi journalist.Armida v., Research Associate in Security and Defence Policy at the Policy Institute at King's, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794802017-06-16T00:42:10Z2017-06-16T00:42:10ZCan tiny Qatar keep defying its powerful neighbors? It may be up to Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174096/original/file-20170615-24943-1sjg23z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nearly all of Qatar's residents live in its capital, Doha.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Doha skyline via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent decision by half the nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a few other countries to isolate fellow member Qatar came <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-05/saudi-led-alliance-cuts-qatar-ties-as-gulf-crisis-escalates">as a surprise to many</a> – though perhaps it shouldn’t have.</p>
<p>Essentially, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-other-gulf-states-cut-ties-with-qatar-78906">severed all ties</a> over <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">Qatar’s positive opinion</a> about Iran and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ap-explains-qatars-ties-with-iran-and-islamist-groups/2017/06/11/d8294df0-4ec9-11e7-b74e-0d2785d3083d_story.html?utm_term=.3678e572241f">support</a> for Islamist groups like Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Besides cutting those ties, <a href="http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-issues-qatar-list-10-demands-must-meet/">one of their demands</a> also included putting curbs on the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, which is based in Qatar’s capital of Doha and is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by its ruling family.</p>
<p>The diplomatic and security ramifications have so far taken center stage, with most Western nations, including the U.S., and countries in the region calling for a negotiated resolution to avoid further escalation. Yet the dispute that led to the recent outburst has been lingering for years – and erupted in a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">similar if smaller kerfuffle in 2014</a> – which begs the following questions: </p>
<p>What exactly has allowed Qatar to defy its more powerful GCC neighbors for so long? And what (or who) could possibly change that? </p>
<h2>Flouting its neighbors’ demands</h2>
<p>Qatar is the second-smallest country in the GCC with a national population of just 243,000. That swells to almost 2.4 million when you include expatriates, yet it’s still <a href="http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total-population-percentage-nationals-foreign-nationals-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2010-2016-numbers/">just a fraction</a> of Saudi Arabia’s 31 million total population or the UAE’s 8 million. </p>
<p>It also has the smallest military, at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_Armed_Forces">just 12,000 soldiers</a>, <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/03/26/saudi-arabia-gulfs-best-equipped-military/70494532/">compared with</a> Saudi Arabia’s 227,000. </p>
<p>Despite this large gap in population and military power, Qatar <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/timeline-qatar-gcc-disputes-170605110356982.html">has long ignored</a> the complaints of its stronger neighbors over its foreign policy positions that on some issues are diametrically opposed to theirs. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Al-Jazeera, which is based in Doha and partially supported by the government, is one of the sticking points between Qatar and its neighbors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/ Hamid Jalaudin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There’s essentially one reason Qatar can afford to do this: the American security umbrella, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">which includes basing</a> some 11,000 U.S. military personnel in Doha – the largest deployment in the region – as well as hosting the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center, which oversees air power in 20 countries. </p>
<p>Like the other GCC countries, Qatar has a <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/qatar-forrel-us.htm">bilateral security arrangement</a> with the U.S., and it hosts the United States’ largest military base in the region. The U.S. military protection not only shields Qatar against military threats from outside the region but empowers it to stand up to its larger GCC allies when it chooses to do so. </p>
<p>Qatar is not the only GCC member that takes advantage of U.S. military protection in this manner. Bahrain has also defied other GCC members on occasions. In 2005, this tiny island of one million and home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet upset Saudi Arabia when it signed a <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/archives/2004/may/us-and-bahrain-conclude-free-trade-agreement">bilateral free trade agreement</a> with the U.S., which violated the GCC common tariff <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200841012520998396.html">regulations</a>. In a sign of America’s pull in such disputes, it was Saudi Arabia that <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/economic-integration-can-ease-regional-tensions">ultimately backed down</a>. </p>
<p>Consequently, as long as Qatar remains under U.S. military protection, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can not resort to military options and have to limit their campaign to diplomatic and economic pressure. In other words, bilateral security relations with the U.S. serves as an equalizer in interactions among GCC countries regardless of their size. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defense Secretary James Mattis, second from right, greets an airman during a recent visit to the U.S. military base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pool Photo via AP/Jonathan Ernst</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How long can Qatar hold out?</h2>
<p>A secure and protected Qatar can afford to remain defiant in the face of economic isolation from its neighbors as long as it can tolerate the economic and financial costs. While these costs are hardly trivial, Qatar, as the <a href="https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/richest-countries-in-the-world?page=12">richest country in the world</a> on a per capita basis, can probably afford to ride them out for some time. </p>
<p>In terms of imports, Qatar’s reliance on other GCC countries and Egypt is relatively modest and easily substitutable. The main immediate impact of the severing of ties was a disruption of food imports <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/qatar-residents-rush-to-stock-up-food-supplies-as-border-closes">from Saudi Arabia</a>, but Qatar managed to quickly switch to air shipments from Iran and Turkey – notably more expensive than ground shipments via Saudi border. </p>
<p>Qatar’s dependence on these neighbors for exports is even less. In 2015, only 4.6 percent of Qatar’s US$80 billion worth of exports <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/qat/are/show/2015/">went to the UAE</a>, while just 1 percent <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/qat/sau/show/2015/">flowed to Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>A key reason for so little <a href="http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=F&Country=QA">trade</a> between countries in the GCC is that their primary exports (oil and gas products) and imports (food and industrial products) are very similar. </p>
<p>So all in all, economic disengagement from the UAE and Saudi Arabia will disrupt about 13 percent of Qatar’s commodity imports and 5.6 percent of its exports (trade with Bahrain and Egypt is insigificant). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, left, meets with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Doha in hopes of helping mediate an end to the crisis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KUNA via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Qatar also has financial and commercial investment links with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. By one account, 300 Saudi businesses are active in Qatar with <a href="https://english.mubasher.info/news/3120439/Qatar-could-lose-SAR50bn-of-Saudi-investments">investments worth $13.3 billion</a>, as well as <a href="http://qatarchamber.com/6030">1,075 UAE companies</a>. The same report estimated 4,200 Qatari businesses were engaged in the UAE in 2016. </p>
<p>While disruption of these business activities will also be costly for Qatar, the value of these investments is only a small share of its financial and commercial capital. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-11/qatar-sovereign-wealth-fund-s-335-global-empire">Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund</a>, for example, is estimated at $335 billion. </p>
<p>Beyond U.S. protection, the relatively small size of trade and investment links with Saudi Arabia and the UAE is what gives Qatar little immediate incentive to concede to <a href="http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-issues-qatar-list-10-demands-must-meet/">their demands</a>, even as it hopes <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/06/12/qatar-says-gulf-citizens-can-stay-despite-crisis">to avoid escalation</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Qatar recently agreed to buy up to 36 F-15 fighters from the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Amir Cohen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US still holds the key</h2>
<p>So while Qatar’s economy is under some stress, its substantial financial resources as well as diplomatic and economic <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/66128/irans-4th-food-shipment-sent-to-qatar">support from</a> several countries including Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Oman give it quite a bit of breathing room.</p>
<p>But in the end, it all comes down to its security patron, the U.S., and President Donald Trump, who <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872062159789985792">in a tweet praised and even seemed to claim credit for</a> the move by Saudi Arabia and the other countries. </p>
<p></p><blockquote><p>During my recent trip to the Middle East, I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar - look!</p>— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872062159789985792">June 6, 2017</a></blockquote> <p></p>
<p>Afterwards, officials at the <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/06/09/532294710/in-an-afternoon-trump-and-tillerson-appear-to-contradict-each-other-on-qatar">State</a> and Defense departments <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/donald-trump-qatar-tweets-us-diplomatic-damage">expressed a more neutral position toward this dispute</a> and called for a negotiated resolution, as some diplomats acknowledged Qatar’s efforts to prevent financial support for terror groups. </p>
<p>So if Qatar ends up making any major concessions, it will most likely be a response to demands from the United States, on whom Qatar depends for its security. A few years ago, Qatar’s former ruler Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/qatar-crisis-economy-diplomatic-links-torn-middle-east-russia-hacking-real-story-robert-fisk-a7778616.html">put that dependence this way</a>: Without the Americans, “my Arab brothers would invade me.”</p>
<p>And in a sign that the U.S. commitment to Qatar remains solid, the Pentagon <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-14/qatar-said-to-sign-deal-for-u-s-f-15s-as-gulf-crisis-continues">just announced a $12 billion deal</a> to sell as many as 36 F-15 jets to its ally. </p>
<p>In other words, apart from President Trump’s tweet burst, the U.S. government has given diplomatic breathing room to Qatar. But if the United States calls for significant concessions, it is unlikely that Qatar will risk its military protection by saying no.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saudi Arabia and the UAE led a group of countries that have severed all ties to fellow American ally Qatar over its foreign policy. The US will play a key role in whether it accedes to their demands.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788942017-06-07T04:57:28Z2017-06-07T04:57:28ZSaudi rift with Qatar exposes growing division in the anti-Iran alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172537/original/file-20170606-3698-136fk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US and Gulf Cooperation Council forces conduct field training, in Kuwait in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/39955793@N07/33131071574/in/photolist-StFpiY-TaJyBQ-Tpyypp-RYxJPC-Rjgwfx-Sn1BaV-RjgiET-RY9DTY-PXYYYd-PMygpt-PMyfUR-PJRm55-PXMyMH-PJRkL9-S6B4uZ-RPLiss-SzgxmF-RHmSJ2-RiWDCj-PPRwpw-NwwcJB-Pz1yRt-PvkzgT-Ns71gt-PvkyKH-Ns711P-NqSjDA-Ns6ZKD-Ns6YHZ-NqSiE1-NqSiFJ-Ns6Yzn-Ns6Yxi-NqSiBL-NqSizw-Ns6YuT-Ns6YsD-NqSiwW-Ns6Ygr-PvkuXT-Ns6XQB-Pvkuwc-Pvkuui-Pvkusp-Ns6XNx-Pvkuj8-PFvqE8-PvkueZ-PFvqBn-P1zbzF">U.S. Army, Francis O'Brien/</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is the worst diplomatic crisis in the Gulf region in decades. </p>
<p>On June 5, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt decided to <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/24/media/al-jazeera-blocked-saudi-arabia-uae/">break off ties</a> with Qatar, accusing the Gulf state of supporting terrorism and of destabilising the whole region. </p>
<p>Qatar had fired the opening shot by what seemed to be open criticism of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-donald-trump.html?mcubz=1">the Saudi-led and US-assisted anti-Iran alliance </a> pushed by Donald Trump after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-donald-trump.html?mcubz=1">his visit</a> to Riyadh on May 21. </p>
<p>On May 24, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the ruler of Qatar, allegedly criticised the US-Saudi move and described Iran as an “Islamic power”. The Qatar News Agency <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/24/media/al-jazeera-blocked-saudi-arabia-uae/">quoted the emir</a> as saying, “There is no wisdom in harbouring hostility towards Iran”. This infuriated Saudi Arabia and the UAE. </p>
<p>Qatar then questioned the veracity of the comments and said <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/qatar-cyber-idUSL8N1IQ02O">its news agency was hacked</a>. Nevertheless, the diplomatic rift been deepening, culminating in the current crisis. </p>
<h2>Not the first diplomatic imbroglio</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that Qatar, a thumb-shaped emirate of the size of the US state of Connecticut, has become embroiled a diplomatic imbroglio with its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. </p>
<p>These three Gulf Arab states withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar’s capital Doha in early 2014, on the pretext that the country had <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-idUSKBN18W0DQ">links </a> to the Muslim Brotherhood and gave refuge to its leaders after the fall of Egypt’s first democratically elected <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">government in July 2013</a>. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood, which it views as an alternative source of authority that’s opposed to hereditary monarchical rule, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092">a terrorist organisation</a> in early March 2014.</p>
<p>But the current crisis is much more serious than the 2014 diplomatic spat, which was resolved after eight months, with Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors returning to Doha in November of the same year on <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gulf-summit-ambassadors-idUKKCN0J00Y220141116">the condition</a> that Qatar would never allow the Muslim Brotherhood to operate from its territory. </p>
<h2>Iran in the centre</h2>
<p>Unlike the 2014 crisis, the current Qatari–Saudi rift is not just an intra-GCC falling out, as it involves Saudi Arabia’s regional rival Iran. </p>
<p>Qatar is seen by the Saudi government and its Emirati and Bahraini counterparts as a spoiler of efforts to forge a unified Arab–Muslim position, undergirded by the Trump administration, against Iran’s so-called “<a href="https://www.unwatch.org/iran-state-sponsor-terrorism-11-arab-countries-tell-un/">terrorist agenda</a>” in Arab countries. </p>
<p>A week before US President Donald Trump visited Riyadh to consolidate the anti-Iran alliance, the Saudi arabic-language daily newspaper Okaz reported a <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/secret-qatari-iranian-meeting-held-in-baghdad-report-1.2033141">secret meeting</a> between the Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, who was officially visiting Baghdad at the time, and the Iranian Quds Force Commander Qasim Sulaimani. </p>
<p>The newspaper accused Qatar of exiting “early from the Arab-Islamic consensus” on Iran, adding “its defence of the Iranian terrorist regime shows the secret Doha-Tehran alliance intends to strike at Arab and Islamic solidarity.” </p>
<p>All of this while Qatar signed the anti-Iran <a href="http://www.blog.sami-aldeeb.com/2017/05/22/arab-islamic-american-summit-the-riyadh-declaration-may-2017/">Riyadh Declaration</a> issued after the Arab-Islamic-America summit on May 21 2017. </p>
<p>But why would Qatar, a country that hosts <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/5/al-udeid-air-base-open-to-us-despite-qatars-rift-w/">the largest US air force base</a> in the Middle East (Al-Udeid), veer off the Saudi-led GCC military and diplomatic track? </p>
<p>Gulf watchers know that Qatar is suspicious of Saudi goals under the GCC umbrella, and it wants an independent foreign policy, free from Saudi or Iranian influence.</p>
<p>Qatar hardly sees Saudi Arabia as a harmless neighbour. Tensions in Saudi-Qatar relations started right after the former emir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khaifa Al Thani (1995 – 2013) came to power <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html">via a bloodless coup in 1995</a> by overthrowing his father Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani. Sheikh Khalifa was visiting Saudi Arabia at the time, which embarrassed the Saudi government. </p>
<p>Sheikh Hamad’s takeover in 1995 was preceded by a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17550912.2015.1024034">Saudi attack</a> on a Qatari border security post in September 1992, in violation of a mutual defence treaty the two states had signed in 1982. </p>
<p>Riyadh also <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00318.x/full">thwarted Qatari initiatives</a> to export liquefied gas to other GCC member states in the 1990s. Emir Sheikh Hamad began to pull Qatar out of the Saudi shadow, a policy that Emir Sheikh Tamim is also pursuing.</p>
<p>Qatari satellite news channel Al Jazeera occasionally broadcasts programs criticising Saudi Arabia and, much to the anger of Riyadh, it <a href="http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2002/nov/021111.seelye.html">hosted Saudi dissidents</a> in a popular talk show in June 2002.</p>
<p>The incident led to Saudi Arabia recalling its ambassador from Doha in September 2002. Full diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored five years later, in September 2007, on <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/world/africa/04iht-04jazeera.9019066.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.">Qatari assurance</a> that Al Jazeera would refrain from broadcasting anti-Saudi programs.</p>
<h2>A big push in the region</h2>
<p>At the same time, Qatar, <a href="https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/market-share-matters-despite-global-price-volatility-country-remains-leading-player-oil-and-gas">with the massive amount </a> of oil and gas-generated income in its coffers (US$191 billion GDP in 2012), has been pushing for a bigger foreign policy and diplomatic profile in the region. </p>
<p>Doha successfully <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17550912.2015.1078073?journalCode=rcaa20">mediated a series of conflicts</a> in the 2000s. It broke the political impasse in Lebanon by persuading the Sunni-led Lebanese government and the opposition Hezbollah to sign the May 2008 Doha Agreement; it mediated the conflict between the Yemeni government and Houthis in February 2008 (though it failed subsequently to find a permanent solution to the conflict); and, in February 2010, it facilitated a ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government and the opposition Justice and Equality Movement. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dhg5iQ2az94?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese parties sign Darfur truce deal.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These successful mediations brought the tiny country enviable diplomatic plaudits from home and abroad.</p>
<p>In 2011, to the surprise of many regional states, the Qatar military participated in the NATO-led intervention to dislodge the Gaddafi government in Libya. It wanted to achieve a similar goal in Syria – to topple the Bashar Al-Assad government – but did not succeed primarily due to Iranian and Russian opposition. </p>
<p>Despite being <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=uXIlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=autocracy+qatar&source=bl&ots=UG4vLlvGvY&sig=vMvO9u-YTLbgBsEcTTkwpu02iJE&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=autocracy%20qatar&f=false">an autocracy</a>, Qatar presented itself as a frontline Arab state for politically transforming the Arab world, under the rubric of the Arab Spring movements. </p>
<p>Its objective was to strengthen Qatari national security and foreign policy autonomy in the Gulf region, a neighbourhood dominated by giants such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, the diplomatic spat with Saudi Arabia does not bode well for Qatar. The Saudi-led diplomatic offensive has isolated it from the rest of GCC and the Middle East region by cutting off air, land and sea routes to Doha. </p>
<p>Doha has been <a href="https://apnews.com/8257ce650e224188a1884e34eabb5e90/4-nations-cut-diplomatic-ties-to-Qatar-as-Gulf-rift-deepens?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP">accused again of supporting</a> regional terror groups – al-Qaeda and ISIL in Iraq and Syria - and cooperating with Iran. </p>
<p>Qatar has always denied funding extremist groups, but the small country has been accused in the last few years of allowing <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/us-ally-qatar-shelters-jihadi-moneymen">terrorist financiers </a> to operate within its territory with impunity. </p>
<p>The Qatari government has also <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-hosting-hamas-whitewashing-terror-606750">pledged support</a> for Hamas, the Palestinian group regarded as a liberation force against Israeli occupation by most Muslim countries, but as a terrorist organisation by the United States, Israel, Egypt and Canada.</p>
<p>Qatar can expect no serious help from Iran either, as any possible Iranian political or diplomatic help runs the risk of further embittering Saudi-Qatar relations and permanently subject Doha to Saudi wrath.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872105875422445568"}"></div></p>
<p>The Trump administration is definitely not on Qatar’s side, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, speaking in Australia, indirectly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism">hoped to resolve</a> the intra-GCC irritants and put Qatar back in the Saudi-driven GCC orbit. </p>
<p>Cracks in the Saudi-Qatar relationship would undercut the joint Arab-US fight against regional terror and extremist groups. It’s difficult to say how long Qatar would be in the position to resist the Saudi diplomatic offensive. </p>
<p>But backing down from the fight with Riyadh looks set to produce two outcomes. First, Doha would be obliged to downgrade its support to rebel groups in Syria, linked to either Muslim Brotherhood or al-Qaeda. And second, it must be willing to shed some degree of its foreign policy autonomy to participate in the Saudi-led offensive against Iran. </p>
<p>In either case, Qatar has undermined the anti-Iran alliance, giving Tehran more time to reassess the situation and consider its options.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78894/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Nuruzzaman previously received funding from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences. </span></em></p>The ongoing diplomatic spat with Saudi Arabia has isolated Qatar from the rest of the Middle East while also undermining the anti-Iran alliance among the Gulf countries.Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Associate Professor of International Relations, Gulf University for Science and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789062017-06-07T01:33:08Z2017-06-07T01:33:08ZWhy have other Gulf states cut ties with Qatar?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172568/original/file-20170606-3677-1533bvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The skyline of Doha, Qatar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWest_Bay_Skyline%2C_Doha%2C_State_of_Qatar.jpg">Gregory Hawken Kramer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gulf Arab countries summon images of oil-fueled wealth, luxurious malls and strong Muslim identity. Nasty regional rivalry, diplomatic ruptures and panicked citizens <a href="https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Qatar_residents_stockpile_food_as_Saudi_plans_to_close_land_border-ZAWYA20170605103702/">stockpiling groceries</a> don’t usually figure.</p>
<p>So why have Gulf states Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, as well as non-Gulf Egypt, dramatically ruptured relations with tiny Qatar? What will this international crisis mean for the Middle East and the broader world?</p>
<h2>What is the dispute about?</h2>
<p>The Arab Gulf spans diverse countries. On one end of the scale is <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview">fractured, war-torn Yemen</a>. Then come the tourist destination and politically unassertive Oman, the small oil kingdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>As the largest country in the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia has long championed common regional policies under its leadership. However, in the past few decades, the rapid growth of massive oil wealth in smaller countries like Qatar and the UAE has allowed them excess capital to establish their own global influence.</p>
<p>The UAE has largely aligned its foreign policy with its larger neighbor. But Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies different from, and sometimes rivaling, Saudi Arabia’s. Qatari positions have been propelled through the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, based in Qatar’s capital, Doha, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by Qatar’s ruling family, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/al-jazeera-the-most-feared-news-network/">popular throughout the Middle East.</a></p>
<p>The Saudis have not appreciated Qatar’s foreign policy assertions, particularly its warmer relations with their archrival Iran. In Syria’s civil war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both oppose ruler Bashar al Assad, but have supported competing Sunni militias. Qatar also had <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/qatar/inside-doha-at-the-heart-of-a-gcc-dispute">good relations with the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt</a> and other anti-establishment Islamist organizations, again in contrast to Saudi positions.</p>
<p>The 2013 removal by the military of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government under President Mohamed Morsi spearheaded a broader move among Arab governments to crack down on Sunni Islamist organizations that could threaten their authority. Some of these organizations <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">had received Qatari support</a>. </p>
<p>In 2014, to pressure Qatar to fall in line with Saudi-led policies, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE suspended diplomatic ties with their neighbor. In response Qatar pulled back somewhat from open support for militant Sunni political groups and cooperation with Iran. It continued nonetheless to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">assert a right to its own foreign policy.</a> </p>
<h2>What prompted the current crisis?</h2>
<p>Relations improved modestly since 2014. But Saudi and other commentators still complained that Qatar was <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/qatar-cannot-be-allowed-to-sabotage-the-region">“sabotaging the region</a>.”</p>
<p>And then came President Donald Trump’s May 21 visit to Riyadh, bolstering U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and promoting a common front against Iran and <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1103136/saudi-arabia">Islamist “extremism,”</a> a vague term which for the Saudis can include political opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On his recent trip to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump, right, met with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Middle-East/5912b74b0fe3474d845b0ccb60dd1200/2/0">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Soon after, on May 24, Qatari news sites were blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE after alleged remarks by Qatar’s ruler <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/saudi-arabia-and-uae-block-qatari-media-over-incendiary-statements-iran-israel">that openly acknowledged Iran’s regional political role and Qatari ties to Israel.</a> Arab Gulf leaders would not normally take such positions publicly. Qatari sources insisted that the remarks were inaccurate, and that <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-23/qatar-says-its-official-state-news-agency-was-hacked">Doha’s media had been hacked</a>.</p>
<p>But Saudi Arabian and Emirati sources played up the alleged comments. They portrayed them as a renewed sign that Qatari policies remain deviant, despite the 2014 efforts to make Doha fall in line. The Trump administration’s <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/20/us-saudi-arabia-seal-weapons-deal-worth-nearly-110-billion-as-trump-begins-visit.html">announcement of a large military sale to Saudi Arabia</a> suggests new assurance in Riyadh that Washington will back confrontation against Iran. This likely bolstered Saudi confidence that it could move to rein in Qatar.</p>
<h2>What is Qatar’s perspective?</h2>
<p>Qatar’s ambitious growth has included opening its society to global <a href="http://qatarphilharmonicorchestra.org/">cultural</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-qatars-education-city-us-colleges-are-building-an-academic-oasis/2015/12/06/6b538702-8e01-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html?utm_term=.0b78554f2a2a">educational</a> and business influences, as the country completes its plans to host <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/jun/05/2022-world-cup-qatar-under-threat-saudi-arabia-blockade-fifa-football">soccer’s 2022 World Cup</a>. As part of this ambition, Qatar has asserted its intention to <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf">work with a range of global partners</a>. </p>
<p>This foreign policy has included <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf">mediating between Islamist groups and Arab governments</a>, as well as <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-qatar-rapprochement-middle-east.html">between Iran and other countries</a>. Although <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/qatar-needs-to-do-its-part/">some have critiqued</a> such an approach as two-faced, Qatari officials could argue that it is a rational strategy to resolve conflict in places where repressing Islamic political opposition <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/10/14/islamism-the-arab-spring-and-the-failure-of-americas-do-nothing-policy-in-the-middle-east/">has not worked</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever actually happened to trigger the crisis, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4535914/Qatars-state-news-agency-hacked-unknown-entity.html">Qatar’s concerns about hacking</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/2017/06/06/Qatar-s-ambition.html">recent Saudi and other critiques of the country</a>, and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/leakers-share-new-email-dump-targeting-top-arab-diplomat-and-us-foreign-policy-elites_us_5934450be4b0c242ca252468">leaked emails from other Gulf governments</a> make Qataris feel victimized by what <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/whats-going-on-with-qatar/?utm_term=.4baf6d58fffe">could be a well-orchestrated campaign against them</a>. </p>
<h2>Why does this matter?</h2>
<p>Stability in the Arab Gulf region is <a href="https://gccstat.org/en/">critical to world trade</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_busiest_airports_by_international_passenger_traffic">global transportation</a> and regional military security. Dubai, for example, has been the world’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/united-arab-emirates/dubai/articles/The-incredible-rise-of-Dubai-as-the-worlds-air-travel-hub/">busiest airport by international passenger traffic for several years</a>, with Qatar’s Hamad Airport not far behind. And, with 11,000 U.S. troops on site, Qatar hosts the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">Middle East’s major American military base</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Al_Udeid_Air_Base.jpg">U.S. Government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The bottom line is that the dramatic escalation of tensions in the Arab Gulf threatens regional stability, and makes it much harder to resolve graver conflicts in Syria, Libya, Islamic State-controlled Iraq and Yemen. Indeed, Qatar’s isolation from other Arab states could lead it closer to Turkey or even Iran. </p>
<p>More generally, the move against Qatar is part of a broad regional shift since the Arab uprisings of 2011. Many Arab governments now feel justified in <a href="https://www.ifex.org/middle_east_north_africa/2017/06/04/repression-crush-dissent/">acting strong to quash dissent</a>. They are now more likely to condone <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170526-world-leaders-find-freedom-repress-era-trump">using force internally to maintain stability</a> and in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/20/if-trump-doubles-down-on-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-millions-could-starve/">external conflicts like Yemen</a>. The Trump administration appears <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/middleeast/-egypt-sisi-trump-white-house.html?_r=0">comfortable with this</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872077638042628096"}"></div></p>
<p>Indeed, the President has inserted himself directly into the growing conflict in several tweets, pointing a finger at Qatar as a funder of “radical ideology.” The U.S. may end up mediating the dispute out of its own interest in regional stability and its military base. At the same time, Trump has revealed his support for the Saudi position, and the trend to curb dissenting Arab voices around regional policy.</p>
<p>This trend goes against Qatar’s past autonomy and policies, leaving it little wiggle room. Qatar may have no choice but to conform its policies to Saudi ones, and to limit Al-Jazeera’s independence. Whether or not the crisis resolves soon, Riyadh’s new move against Doha has underscored its clear <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-may-have-pay-heavy-price-restore-links-its-gulf-neighbors-620948">determination to limit Qatari policy influence as much as possible</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated to include President Trump’s statements – via Twitter – on Qatar.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff received a Fulbright US-government fellowship to be a visiting professor in Qatar in 2006-7, a fellowship at Harvard University funded in part through the Dubai School of Government in the UAE, and a research grant from 2013-16 from the Qatar National Research Fund. He currently receives no external funding from any government or government-funded entity.</span></em></p>Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies sometimes rivaling Saudi Arabia’s. Think, for example, of the popular Al-Jazeera. Now the Saudis seem determined to limit Qatari influence as much as possible.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655092016-09-19T12:25:18Z2016-09-19T12:25:18ZGulf states are torn between economic sense and military ambition<p>There is a certain irony in the Arab Gulf states’ rising power across the Middle East and North Africa. International prestige, the ability to intervene militarily in regional conflict, and holding the same leverage as international financial institutions in aid and investment are what these states <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Transformation-of-the-Gulf-Politics-Economics-and-the-Global-Order/Held-Ulrichsen/p/book/9780415574525">have long coveted</a>. But now that they have the power – both economic and military – Gulf states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are faced with the dilemma of demonstrating their dominance without destroying the neighbourhood.</p>
<p>These Gulf states’ foreign policies are increasingly at odds with their economic interests. Twenty or 30 years ago, times of war and conflict in the wider Middle East usually meant <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf">marginally better economic times for the Gulf states</a>. Oil prices would rise, Dubai could host informal arms negotiations, and the relative calm of the backwater Gulf cities beckoned those in the Middle East (and further abroad) seeking a place to shelter investment, and sometimes to continue opposition politics. From the 1960s to the 1980s the Gulf states provided a welcome for many expatriate Arabs looking for jobs in education, healthcare and security services.</p>
<h2>Economic integration</h2>
<p>But no more. The economies of the Gulf states <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-Series/KarenYoungPaper.pdf">have changed dramatically</a> since the beginning of the second oil boom, between 2003 and 2014. Joined together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) trade bloc, they are more integrated into the regional and wider international economy in trade and investment flows. </p>
<p>Their labour markets are less reliant on Arab nationals, with the influx and preference for workers from Asia since the 1990s. Meanwhile, citizens living in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are more dependent on family members working in Gulf states, as a <a href="http://www.agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Young_Refugee-Crisis.pdf">source of remittances</a> (money sent to foreign nationals abroad). At the same time, the mega real estate projects that have propelled infrastructure development across the Gulf in the last decade have relied on wealthy expatriates as builders and buyers of these ventures. </p>
<p>The GCC’s outward investments in equity markets, especially towards Europe and the US, means it is also more integrated globally. And it has large amounts of foreign direct investment in infrastructure, agriculture and real estate across the MENA region.</p>
<p>The figures speak for themselves. Average annual inflows of foreign direct investment into the GCC have blossomed to more than US$30 billion in the decade since 2001. This is up from less than $1 billion during the 1990s and constitutes the bulk <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29875/1/The_GCC_and_Arab_economic_integration_(LSERO).pdf">of total foreign investment in the Arab world</a>. The GCC states are now more sensitive to the financial stability of their local markets, as well as to the performance of their investments regionally. </p>
<p>With the prolonged <a href="http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/september/global-energy-investment-down-8-in-2015-with-flows-signalling-move-towards-clean.html">decline in oil revenues</a>, the stakes for ensuring stability and continued financial flows both into the Gulf, and the profitability of ventures flowing out of the Gulf, are high. Gulf state investments are also in <a href="http://www.agsiw.org/the-korean-connection/">unlikely places</a>, including shared investments with deemed adversaries like Iran. In non-oil trade flows, the GCC states <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/GCCStudyweb.pdf">continue to lag</a> behind other regional organisations in promoting trade, though it has certainly been increasing in the last decade:</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137953/original/image-20160915-30575-jwm518.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Growth of GCC intra-regional trade.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/GCCStudyweb.pdf">World Bank</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The strength of their economic influence in the region lies in huge flows of capital – often a mixture of remittances, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment under the auspices of state-related bodies. This has enabled the Gulf states to usurp international institutions in shaping economic reform across the MENA region, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/gulf-states-pledge-additional-12-billion-in-aid-to-egypt-1426262660">especially in Egypt</a> and other oil importers.</p>
<h2>Political disorder</h2>
<p>Politically, however, the GCC is engaged in numerous interventions across the region that have caused significant disorder and pose a threat to their mutual economic prosperity. The Gulf states were <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/gcc-arab-spring-spoilers-201312251230835766.html">successful</a> in crushing the Arab Spring within their own countries and cementing their development agenda. By contrast, their <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-coalition-is-a-brazen-challenge-to-syria-iran-and-the-us-52455">interventions</a> in Libya, Syria, <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-yemen-offensive-is-bigger-than-anyone-expected-39706">Yemen</a> and Egypt have stoked the chaos there, putting the stability of the region at risk. </p>
<p>In the last year, the foreign economic policies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia have specifically targeted the political and economic stability of Egypt and Lebanon. In <a href="http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-long-game-egypt">Egypt</a>, the attempt has been to support the Sisi administration, while also creating opportunities for state-related entities to invest in Egypt’s housing and infrastructure development. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.agsiw.org/gulf-economic-statecraft-hits-lebanon/">Lebanon</a>, they have punished the political establishment for its perceived proximity to Iran by reneging on military aid transfers and discouraging economic links and travel there for Gulf citizens. Their foreign policies, in arms transfers or direct confrontation, have targeted Libya, Syria and Yemen. Iran remains a target of diplomatic confrontation. </p>
<p>In each of these interventions, there is an incumbent economic cost to the GCC states. The war in Yemen is probably the best example of a mounting <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-damages-idUSKCN10R2B7">military expenditure</a> that will only be dwarfed by the <a href="http://www.agsiw.org/the-economic-war-in-yemen-oil-revenue-and-debilitated-financial-institutions-weaken-recovery-hopes/">cost of re-building</a> Yemen, which surely the UAE and Saudi Arabia will have to help foot. The Gulf States would therefore be wise to start dovetailing their foreign policies with their economic interests by fostering stability instead of conflict. And sooner rather than later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65509/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen E. Young receives grant funding from the LSE Middle East Centre and Emirates Foundation. She works for the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington as a Senior Resident Scholar. </span></em></p>The interventionist foreign policy of the Gulf states is increasingly at odds with their economic security.Karen E. Young, Visiting Fellow, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521032015-12-31T09:53:24Z2015-12-31T09:53:24ZMeltdowns, crises and Islamic State: a terrible year in the Middle East<p>As we approach the fifth anniversary of the Arab Uprisings, it’s hard to remember the days of popular protests, of democratic revolutions and of dreams of a better future that rocked the Middle East in 2011. Nearly five years on, tensions between rulers and the ruled have exploded across the region – and the ensuing struggles for survival have continued to take all manner of ugly forms.</p>
<p>At the centre of things, the Syrian conflict has deepened – and while the brutality of Islamic State (IS) has been responsible for much of the recent chaos and tragedy across Syria, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been responsible for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/islamic-state-has-killed-many-syrians-but-assads-forces-have-killed-even-more/2015/09/05/b8150d0c-4d85-11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html">seven times as many Syrian deaths</a> as IS. Assad’s position was strengthened by continued support from <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-powerbrokers-gather-at-last-russia-races-against-time-to-save-assad-49910">Russia</a>, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/middleeast/syria-iran-reaffirms-a-role-for-assad.html">Iran</a> and Lebanon’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/assad-defends-presence-hezbollah-fighters-syria-150825203254106.html">Hezbollah</a>, antagonising powerful states in the West and the Gulf – particularly <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-saudi-arabia-is-having-such-trouble-with-its-syria-policy-47309">Saudi Arabia</a>. The Gulf states also faced domestic threats from IS, with the group carrying out a number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-islamic-state-attacked-a-kuwait-mosque-during-ramadan-43973">attacks on Shia sites and communities</a> across the region. </p>
<p>The Syrian conflict became ever more internationalised in 2015. The number of foreign fighters on the ground – on all sides – continued to grow, while on the diplomatic level, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-powerbrokers-gather-at-last-russia-races-against-time-to-save-assad-49910">Vienna talks</a> tried to resolve the seemingly intractable conflict – though they have yet to yield any decisive action. </p>
<p>The task of dealing with IS was further complicated by a batch of new <a href="http://intelcenter.com/maps/is-wilayats-map.html">wilayats</a>, groups who declared allegiance to IS. <a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-9268-wilayat-sinai-and-the-evolution-of-a-global-terror-threat-50140">Wilayat Sinai</a> in particular was purportedly responsible for a range of acts, allegedly including a <a href="https://theconversation.com/cairo-bomb-al-sisis-egpyt-is-less-secure-than-ever-46427">massive bomb attack in Cairo</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sinai-crash-what-do-we-really-know-50262">downing of a Russian passenger jet over Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula</a>. </p>
<p>All the while, Syria’s refugee emergency has now escalated to a point that United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-Moon, referred to it as the <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16634.doc.htm">worst humanitarian crisis</a> of our time. It has now killed <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/14/world/middleeast/syria-war-deaths.html">more than 200,000 people</a>, displacing 7m within the country and driving <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/">more than 4m</a> to flee abroad. </p>
<p>In neighbouring Lebanon, the state struggled to provide safe haven for the millions of refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria, a problem exacerbated by the Lebanese government’s <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugees/legal-status-refugees.php">long-term refusal</a> to ratify the 1951 Refugees Convention. Government paralysis brought rubbish collection services in Beirut to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanons-leaders-abandon-pragmatism-as-trash-fills-the-streets-46822">spectacular standstill</a> over the summer, giving birth to the #YouStink movement – which left Lebanese politicians in little doubt as to what their people think of them. </p>
<p>Other neighbouring states also absorbed large numbers – Turkey took in <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html">more than 2m</a> and Jordan a further <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-06/u-s-and-jordan-in-a-dispute-over-syrian-refugees">1.4m</a>. Almost 250,000 refugees fled Syria and <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/unhcr-s-protection-chief-visits-iraq-calls-more-support-protect-displaced-iraqis-and">crossed the border into Iraq</a>, where they face a precarious future.</p>
<p>Iraqi premier Haider al-Abadi, a year into his prime ministership, faced a welter of serious challenges which were all exacerbated by the fight against IS. While his government has tried to dilute the sectarian differences that so badly dogged Iraqi society under <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/19/how-maliki-ruined-iraq/">Nouri al-Maliki</a>, the country is still facing the same deep-seated grievances that created the conditions for militant groups to spring up in the first place. </p>
<h2>Hope extinguished</h2>
<p>Elsewhere, Benjamin Netanyahu <a href="https://theconversation.com/last-ditch-appeal-to-the-right-helps-netanyahu-pull-off-surprise-election-win-in-israel-38888">won yet another term as prime minister of Israel</a>, drawing support from an increasingly right-leaning electorate that was seduced by Netanyahu’s hawkish politics. Coupled with this victory was an increase in settlement building across Palestinian territories and, unsurprisingly, the freezing of the peace-process – leading to talk of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-israeli-palestinian-tension-running-high-a-third-intifada-is-just-a-spark-away-49472">third intifada</a> over the summer. While these pessimistic predictions have so far not come true, the intense frustration at the current situation is palpable.</p>
<p>Across the border, the Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, increasingly concerned with security across the state, continued the counter-revolution and finally all but extinguished the hopes that lit up Tahrir Square in early 2011. Key Muslim Brotherhood figures, among them the country’s deposed president, Mohammad Morsi, and the group’s leading cleric, Mohammad Badie, were <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsi-death-penalty-completes-military-takeover-of-egypt-41948">sentenced to death</a>, leading to widespread condemnation and protests. </p>
<p>Almost in the background but no less seriously, the proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran rumbled on, complicating events in Syria and Iraq and throwing up new crises of its own. In March, these tensions erupted into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-yemen-offensive-is-bigger-than-anyone-expected-39706">full-blown proxy conflict in Yemen</a> fought by a Saudi-led coalition of states against a coup mounted by Houthi separatists backed by Iran. </p>
<p>This made Yemen’s already tragic situation even worse, as socio-economic conditions rapidly deteriorated and the casualties rose beyond <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/world/middleeast/yemen-cease-fire.html?_r=0">40,000</a> in total – albeit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-2-800-people-are-dead-in-yemen-so-why-arent-we-outraged-43795">remarkably little international outcry</a>. In recent days, the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels have called a ceasefire and have agreed to participate in talks in Switzerland. In an effort to create a coordinated counter-terrorism strategy across the region, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of 34 countries, most of them Muslim states. While the intent should be commended, Iran was not a part of the coalition and some members were <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35114060">surprised to be included</a>, having not formally agreed to join, raising questions about the credibility of the coalition. </p>
<h2>Breaking point</h2>
<p>There was one rather remarkable ray of hope: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">nuclear deal</a> reached between the P5+1 powers and Iran. Probably the single biggest diplomatic success of the year, it was greeted with much chagrin by regimes in Israel and across the Gulf. The deal will lift economic sanctions on Iran, providing much needed injections of capital into the Iranian economy. The prospect of an increasingly influential Iran, galvanised by a growing economy, is a cause for concern for many in the Gulf – and there are fears that this could also strengthen the position of Iran’s allies, notably, Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad.</p>
<p>But ultimately, the Middle East will remember this year above all for the continued brutality of IS and the fraught, messy efforts to contain it, all at a tragic human cost. And as they enter 2016, people across the region still face an array of existential threats. </p>
<p>The imperative to ensure that basic human needs are met is paramount: many people are struggling to access food, shelter and security, while millions of refugees and displaced people desperately need access to health care (both physical and mental) as well as education and employment. </p>
<p>And even in some of the Middle East’s more stable countries, the political and human cost of providing support to refugee populations that number in the millions is becoming a terrible strain – turning the screws on societies already pushed almost to the point of collapse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Syria and IS may have dominated the news this year, but the Middle East has plenty of other problems on its hands.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/524552015-12-17T17:06:34Z2015-12-17T17:06:34ZSaudi Arabia’s ‘coalition’ is a brazen challenge to Syria, Iran, and the US<p>Deputy crown prince and minister of defense of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman’s <a href="http://www.spa.gov.sa/english/details.php?id=1429203">announcement</a> of a new Saudi-led counter-terrorism coalition surprised allies like the US, adversaries such as Iran, and other interested parties including Russia.</p>
<p><a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/12/15/Saudi-Arabia-forms-anti-terror-military-alliance.html">Prince Mohammed said</a> the Saudis had formed a 34-nation “Islamic military coalition” to fight Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups. A headquarters in Riyadh will provide military, intelligence, logistics, and other support to members as needed.</p>
<p>This was so surprising that countries in the new coalition said they were unaware they were founding members. Pakistan’s foreign secretary Aizaz Chaudhry said he had <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/1226723">only learned of the initiative</a> when he read the prince’s statement, and that he had asked Pakistan’s ambassador in Riyadh to get a clarification from Saudi officials.</p>
<p>The Indonesian Foreign Ministry <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35114060">was only slightly more diplomatic</a>, saying that “the government is still observing and waiting to see the modalities of the military coalition”. Malaysian defence minister Hishammuddin Hussein, while supporting the coalition, ruled out “<a href="http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/12/15/minister-no-military-obligation-in-saudi-anti-terror-coalition/">any military commitment</a>”.</p>
<p>So this was hardly the unveiling of a grand military initiative. Instead, it was a political message – not just to Russia and Iran, but to Riyadh’s nominal allies in Washington.</p>
<h2>From Syria to Yemen</h2>
<p>For starters, we must recognise that Riyadh’s announcement is more of a PR exercise, rather than a revelation of any military cooperation, amid the twin challenges of escalating Saudi involvement in Syria and Yemen.</p>
<p>Since 2012, Saudi Arabia has backed Syrian opposition and rebel groups in their attempt to overthrow the Assad regime, providing arms and money as well as political support.</p>
<p>However, that effort has always been constrained by the US and its indecision over intervention. The <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/04/syria-analysis-saudis-told-obama-3-point-guide/">Saudis were especially angered</a> by president Barack Obama’s sudden U-turn after the Assad regime’s chemical attacks near Damascus in August, as the president – with forces from Paris to Riyadh ready to respond – stepped away from what the Saudis had thought was the agreed plan for intervention. </p>
<p>Saudi-American relations continued to fray as US-led operations rooms in Turkey and Jordan put limits on military assistance to rebel groups.</p>
<p>The ailing King Abdullah was too cautious to break from Washington, but his death in January brought in <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/17549">a more assertive court</a> with King Salman, the crown prince and interior minister, Mohammed bin Nayef, and the 30-year-old deputy crown prince, who is also the king’s son.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia not only renewed aid to the rebels but mended fences with Qatar – which since 2012 had been vying with Riyadh over which factions to assist – to ensure a more effective effort. The decision had immediate significance, with <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2015/05/syria-special-3-reasons-why-assad-will-lose-the-war/">rebels capturing</a> much of north-west Syria and parts of the south.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Riyadh doubled its bet with the decision for military intervention in Yemen. Worried about the <a href="http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/9/21/yemens-year-of-destruction-the-houthi-takeover-of-sanaa">takeover of the capital Sana'a</a> by the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement and the group’s advance south towards the port city of Aden, where president <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012219133034774204.html">Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi</a> had fled, the Saudis announced a coalition and began bombing.</p>
<p>The aerial operations checked Ansar Allah’s expansion, but at a heavy cost. Counter-attacks have killed scores of troops from Saudi Arabia, its coalition partners, and mercenary units. Riyadh has been widely criticised for the destruction and deaths of civilians from its bombs. And with Hadi proving an ineffectual leader with no visible alternative, the likelihood of a political resolution is slim.</p>
<p>A further complication came in Syria with the start of Russia’s own bombing campaign on September 30. The Saudis had blocked a Russian-Iranian initiative for international talks to confirm president Assad in power, at least for the short term in a “transition”, but now <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-putin-gambled-on-airstrikes-in-syria-and-what-might-come-next-48414">Moscow was using its military operations</a> to convene a conference. Pressed by the US, Riyadh reluctantly agreed to attend and to accept Iran’s participation.</p>
<h2>The contest with Iran</h2>
<p>Given Saudi Arabia’s longtime rivalry with Iran for influence in the Middle East and the Islamic world, this latest announcement will simply be slotted into the storyline of their geopolitical competition.</p>
<p>Iran has spent years making grand declarations of its own. In 2011, the Supreme Leader tried to seize leadership of the “Arab Spring” across the Middle East and North Africa by renaming it the “Islamic Awakening”. That effort soon ran into trouble, as <a href="http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2012/8/31/iran-special-regime-show-collapses-as-morsi-gives-tehran-an.html">Egypt’s new leadership refused</a> to follow Tehran and the Islamic Republic faced economic crisis and pressure over its nuclear programme. </p>
<p>But in 2013, the new president, Hassan Rouhani, tried to regain the initiative with a proposed programme loftily entitled “<a href="http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/12/04/iran-to-present-updated-wave-version-to-un-official/">World Against Violence and Extremism</a>”. At the same time, Tehran maintained some of its regional alliances, such as the ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and tried to deal with strain on others, such as relations with Palestine’s Hamas. </p>
<p>At the nexus of the rhetoric and the confrontation is Syria. While Saudi Arabia has chosen the opposition and rebels, Iran has poured in billions of dollars in economic aid, hundreds of commanders and troops, and Iranian-led foreign militias to prop up Assad. Russia’s intervention in the autumn transformed this into an “anti-Islamic State coalition” – even as Moscow was devoting most of its bombs to rebel positions, opposition-held territory, infrastructure, and civilian sites.</p>
<p>Still, it’s far too easy to reduce Saudi Arabia’s own “coalition” to the latest ploy in a Saudi-Iranian game. It is, of course, much more. Riyadh’s step owes as much – and possibly more – to its positioning versus the US, Russia, and other Arab powers.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia is frustrated by Washington’s hesitancy over Syria and wary of the political aftermath of the July 14 <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1 powers</a>, including the US. From its point of view, president Obama and secretary of state John Kerry are moving ever closer to Russia in pursuit of a “settlement” in Syria – one which will be pursued as Moscow drops even more bombs on the opposition and rebels and which could accept Assad’s rule for a lengthy period.</p>
<p>Riyadh has tried to counter the moves with a <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2015/12/syria-daily-opposition-rebel-bloc-prepares-for-talks-but-assad-must-go/">conference</a> to forge a Syrian opposition rebel bloc, gaining leverage in any negotiations with the Assad regime, and now it’s added this rather strange declaration. It may be empty of immediate military significance, but the political message is loaded: this is a coalition to offset Iran’s own alliances – and this coalition, in contrast to others in the Middle East and against the Islamic State, is not “US-led”.</p>
<p><a href="http://eldorar.com/node/92275">Prince Mohammed drove home the point</a> on December 17, after president Putin said that Russia’s plan for Syria was “in line with that of the US” – support for the Syrian rebels, the prince said, would be “unstinting” whether or not Moscow or Washington got their desired outcome from an international conference.</p>
<p>For almost 50 years, Saudi Arabia has been a pillar of US policy in the Middle East. But just as the uprisings of recent years have swept away regimes that ruled for decades, so they – and the reactions to them – are unsettling alliances. A <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/04/syria-analysis-saudis-told-obama-3-point-guide/">summary from one analyst in October 2013</a> takes on added force this week:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Saudis are saying to the Americans: ‘You don’t want to work with us on Syria, fine. Let’s see who can flex their muscles in the region. Let’s see who can wield power. Let’s see what you’re made of.’</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When is a coalition not a coalition? When you don’t tell the founding members they’re in it.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/495602015-10-26T18:18:06Z2015-10-26T18:18:06ZHow to build a city fit for 50°C heatwaves<p>The Persian Gulf is already one of the hottest parts of the world, but by the end of the century increasing heat combined with intense humidity will make the region too hot for habitation, according to research published in <a href="http://nature.com/articles/doi:10.1038/nclimate2833">Nature Climate Change</a>.</p>
<p>Heating and air conditioning currently permit humans to live everywhere from Siberia to the Sahara. However the extreme heatwaves predicted for the Gulf, where temperatures will regularly hit 50°C or even 60°C, will reach the limits of the <a href="http://nceub.commoncense.info/uploads/04-01-05-Zhang.pdf">thermal adaptation</a> that buildings can provide. </p>
<p>Our ancestors lived without the sophisticated thermal control systems we typically use in modern buildings; they implicitly used <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-cope-with-soaring-temperatures-in-gulf-cities-traditional-architecture-might-help-49760">different “bioclimatic designs”</a>, such as natural ventilation or south-facing windows, and these skills are still valuable in many climates today. But the latest data suggest this will not be enough. </p>
<p>So is there a future for habitation in the hottest regions of the world? It seems mass migration is less likely than staying put and taking on the challenge. However figuring out how to live comfortably and sustainably while it’s hot enough to fry an egg on the sidewalk may provide a fillip for environmentally sensitive design and urban development throughout the world.</p>
<h2>Living with intense heat</h2>
<p>The climate is a problem but does offer some opportunities. The amount of sunshine available means there should be no shortage of solar electricity, though we need to develop efficient storage systems too. We could also take advantage of day-to-night ambient temperature variations using “thermal mass” techniques to even out temperature fluctuations.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99727/original/image-20151026-18426-1ic5z5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dino-architecture? Bahrain’s twin towers are covered in glass.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/allandonque/5298791735/">Allan Donque</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We will have to make significant changes to building design – highly glazed structures that <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-means-we-cant-keep-living-and-working-in-glass-houses-45006">soak up heat</a> will become architectural dinosaurs. Traditional ideas from hot regions of the world will resurface: thick walls giving thermal stability (but enhanced with smarter materials such as composites with layers of insulation or perhaps embedded “phase-change” materials), used together with small windows. Building surfaces will need to be coated with smart materials that reflect heat gain – these already exist and researchers have <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0038092X06002039">looked at their perfomance</a> in the hot summers of cities such as Athens. </p>
<p>We’ll need to optimise where and when we occupy buildings, to seek out the coolest spots and take advantage of less intense night time conditions. We may find ourselves living partly underground in order to benefit from lower and more stable temperatures to be found a few metres <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-30586983">below the Earth’s surface</a>. </p>
<p>In intense heat, finding some shade becomes essential. Buildings, streets, services and even entire transportation systems need to be entirely shaded or even fully underground. Some of these features are already showcased in the <a href="http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2013/12/features/reality-hits-masdar">Masdar City</a> development in Abu Dhabi, though the project (which had significant design input from Norman Foster and partners) is not yet <a href="http://www.masdar.ae/en/city/detail/one-of-the-worlds-most-sustainable-communities-masdar-city-is-an-emerging-g">fully operational</a>.</p>
<h2>Switch on the air con industry</h2>
<p>Expect an air conditioning boom. This will cost a lot both to build and to operate, and we’ll have to come up with systems specially designed for extreme temperatures. The thermodynamics of current designs which rely on temperature differences between heat absorption and heat rejection mean it would be very difficult to achieve sufficient and efficient heat removal as these change and narrow. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99718/original/image-20151026-18435-zf66bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Dubai even the bus stops are air conditioned.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jaygalvin/16923955145/">Jay Galvin</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One opportunity would be to use the Earth or the sea/rivers as “heat sinks”, rather than the external air, as these will be at lower temperatures and have the ability to absorb the heat, though perhaps with as yet unknown long term effects. It is also likely that air conditioning might most effectively be used during the night-time to pre-cool the building; night-time air temperatures will allow more efficient refrigeration.</p>
<p>Urban design and the ways in which cities are used at time of extreme heat will also need to be considered. Moving around outdoors without protection could become as unimaginable as walking unprotected from a <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-path-of-the-polar-bears-what-its-like-to-be-an-arctic-scientist-47060">polar research station in winter</a>. </p>
<p>This obviously causes significant problems for those who must work outside: places of refuge may need to be constructed and the very act of building may need to be restricted to the “winter” (or rather slightly cooler) months. Construction products will also be obliged to change in order to cope with more extreme thermal stresses and expansion effects.</p>
<h2>Heatwave cities</h2>
<p>The shape of cities and the massing of their major buildings will change so that groupings offer a degree of self-protection. Streets will be designed to optimise shading and, when available, cooling air ventilation. The spaces between buildings will need to be carefully designed and uses (such as what might happen underground) considered alongside services provided to citizens. Shopping malls could be submerged and used as links between areas, just as the underground streets found in northern latitude cities like Montreal are used in winter.</p>
<p>Cities themselves may shift away from coastal to inland zones due to the problematic combination of high temperatures with high humidities near to water masses. In drier atmospheres, technologies such as <a href="http://energy.gov/energysaver/evaporative-coolers">evaporative cooling</a> (in their simplest form fountains and water sprays) can be used to reduce temperature. </p>
<p>A technological alternative to this might be the use of moisture absorbing materials (regenerated desiccants) to dehumidify the atmosphere, but this would be a significant and complex task on the scale required. Moving whole cities can only be a long term plan but its something worth thinking about now, while there is time. </p>
<p><em>Read more: could turning to traditional techniques provide a solution? Amin Al-Habaibeh, professor of intelligent engineering systems at Nottingham Trent University, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-cope-with-soaring-temperatures-in-gulf-cities-traditional-architecture-might-help-49760">thinks so</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49560/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Pitts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We can live comfortably and sustainably in hot places – but we’ll have to ditch the glassy skyscrapers.Adrian Pitts, Professor of Sustainable Architecture, University of HuddersfieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/497602015-10-26T18:16:47Z2015-10-26T18:16:47ZCould traditional architecture offer relief from soaring temperatures in the Gulf?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99706/original/image-20151026-18411-48zjls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/erwinb/4159979618/">Erwin Bolwidt/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Temperatures in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran could soar to uninhabitable levels during the course of this century, according to a <a href="http://nature.com/articles/doi:10.1038/nclimate2833">new study</a>. </p>
<p>Already, places such as <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/environment/temperature-shoots-up-to-52-degree-celsius-in-al-ain-and-other-parts-of-uae-1.118206">Al Ain</a> and Kuwait <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/jul/22/where-world-hottest-city-kuwait-karachi-ahvaz">can experience</a> temperatures of up to 52°C. But the study predicts that the effects of global warming and the increase in greenhouse gases could push the average temperature up to the mid 50°Cs or lower 60°Cs. </p>
<p>Currently, many residents of the gulf can find refuge in air-conditioned homes, shopping centres and cars. But as temperatures increase, so does the need for cheaper, more sustainable, less energy-intensive ways of staying cool. Fortunately, the region’s past offers a rich source of architectural inspiration. </p>
<h2>A history of heat</h2>
<p>Historically, the inhabitants of the Gulf were either farmers living near oases in agricultural villages, Bedouins living in tents in the desert, or urban dwellers living in cities. Given <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects.html">the global trend</a> toward urbanisation, it makes sense to take a closer look at how the latter group coped with the heat. </p>
<p>Traditional buildings in the gulf’s cities and villages are designed to maximise shading, reduce thermal gain of the sun radiation, regulate building temperature and enhance air circulation. These effects are achieved through a clever combination of building materials, placement and design.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99725/original/image-20151026-18446-rbk4b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">All natural.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/erwinb/4158964098/sizes/l">Erwin Bolwidt</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Natural materials such as limestone and mud – in some cases mixed with local desert plants – provide a construction material with the capacity to regulate building temperatures. The material itself is capable of absorbing moisture in humid conditions, which can later evaporate during hot and sunny days to provide a slight cooling effect. And the sandy texture and colour of the buildings reduces both the absorption and emission of radiating heat. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99707/original/image-20151026-18458-192vxlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Built close, for comfort.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/felibrilu/5534583869/sizes/l">Felibrilu/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Traditional buildings are placed adjacent to one another, with narrow roads and alleyways in between. This means that the ratio of the area exposed to the sun relative to the building’s total volume is minimised, which in turn limits heat increases during the day time. </p>
<p>Many traditional structures feature an internal courtyard, often containing trees and a water well. The courtyard is typically surrounded by rooms or walls on all sides, maximising the area in shadow throughout the day and creating a space for socialising in the evenings. When the sun bears down at midday, the courtyard works as a chimney for the hot air to rise and be replaced by cooler air from the surroundings rooms – this promotes air circulation and creates a cooling effect.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99692/original/image-20151026-18446-1ksjh0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lattice windows.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/seier/2078287373/sizes/l">seier+seier/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Glass is not a common material in traditional buildings. A typical room has two external windows: one very small window, located high up the wall, which is kept open to allow air to circulate and let in natural light. The second is larger, and closed by wooden shutters, with grooves to allow the flow of air inside the room while maintaining privacy. Rooms also have windows towards the internal courtyard for improved cooling. Finally, a <em>mushrabiya</em> – a projecting window with carved wooden latticework, typically located on the upper stories of a building – allowed for better air circulation and a view. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=701&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=701&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=701&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99724/original/image-20151026-18443-j0ohjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A wind tower.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/felibrilu/5534589927/sizes/l">Felibrilu/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some buildings also have a wind tower, which creates natural ventilation by circulating cool air. The narrow streets allowed them to be covered in most cases by light material from date palm trees to avoid direct sun light. This allowed for better air circulation between streets and courtyards of buildings, via the rooms.</p>
<p>All of these features helped to keep traditional buildings cool. But the question remains, how can we apply them in today’s cities? </p>
<h2>Hot, modern buildings</h2>
<p>Modern buildings in the Gulf are built predominantly from reflective glass, concrete and asphalt, which means that temperatures really soar during day time, due to high reflection or high absorption and emission of radiated heat. </p>
<p>But with research and improvements in building and pavement materials, designs, urban planning, insulation and the use of renewable energy, cities in the Gulf could maintain a comfortable lifestyle, with a lower level of carbon emission and fossil fuel use. </p>
<p>For example, Masdar city in the United Arab Emirates has attempted to combine some of the lessons learned from the past with modern technologies by increasing shaded areas, creating narrow streets and constructing a wind tower. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/99736/original/image-20151026-18446-12j16d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The basic function of my patented heat sink.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The use of insulation would also reduce the need for air conditioning and lower electricity consumption. Meanwhile, natural or new materials which absorb moisture and increase thermal capacity (meaning the material can maintain lower temperatures in higher heats) could regulate heat gain and facilitate the natural cooling process. </p>
<p>I have developed a new patented technology to regulate building temperatures in extremely hot conditions using a heat sink in the ground. The heat sink will allow the ground to exchange heat with the envelope of the building, thereby reducing its thermal gain on hot days. </p>
<p>In recent years, the Gulf countries have sat up and paid attention to renewable energy and sustainability measures. Research and development is expected to progress further in this area if people are to live comfortably at the expected high levels of temperature, while reducing their dependency on fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions.</p>
<p><em>Read more: Adrian Pitts, professor of sustainable architecture at the University of Huddersfield, looks <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-build-a-city-fit-for-50-heatwaves-49560">at the impact on cities</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amin Al-Habaibeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Temperatures are set to rocket throughout the 21st century, but design lessons from history could help the gulf states stay cool.Amin Al-Habaibeh, Professor of Intelligent Engineering Systems, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/473942015-09-25T09:30:41Z2015-09-25T09:30:41ZWhy are the Gulf states so reluctant to take in refugees?<p>Europe’s reaction to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/migrant-crisis">refugee crisis</a> has hardly been a calm and considered one; with <a href="https://theconversation.com/fencing-off-the-east-how-the-refugee-crisis-is-dividing-the-european-union-47586">fences erected</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/open-and-shut-how-germany-plays-politics-with-its-borders-47520">border controls reinstated</a>, the continent’s governments are struggling to agree on a response.</p>
<p>But at least Europe’s governments are acting. In the Middle East, things are rather different. In particular, the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-crisis-wealthy-gulf-states-deny-famed-arab-hospitality-refugees-1518310">Arab Gulf States</a> are catching serious flack for their response to the crisis – or rather, their failure to respond.</p>
<p>One big question is reverberating in the minds of the general public, expert observers and policy-makers; why have the Gulf states, who are <a href="http://www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-named-world-s-richest-country-uae-also-in-top-10-599852.html#.VgFVZt9Viko">among the richest countries in the world</a>, not taken in any Syrian refugees? There’s no need to rewrite <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/09/438797627/gulf-states-taking-heat-for-not-resettling-syrian-refugees">the commentary</a> that’s already out there: many articles have provided useful <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3222405/How-six-wealthiest-Gulf-Nations-refused-single-Syrian-refugee.htm">statistics and background information</a> on the international conventions and treaties the Persian Gulf countries are signed up to, and their failure to honour them.</p>
<p>What all this misses, though, is the general lack of social justice and a social welfare ethos in the Persian Gulf and Middle East in general. This is a complex story about the mindset of a region in disunity and disarray. </p>
<h2>Precarious societies</h2>
<p>The absence of social consciousness particularly among governing bodies and ruling elites which sparked the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab uprisings in 2011</a> is still very much a problem across the Middle East. The Persian Gulf’s governments are resolutely parochial, and continue to insist on taking in migrant workers but not refugees. That is a sad measure of their political immaturity. These governments have long forgotten the ideals of social citizenship and political unity which animated the liberation movements of the decolonisation era. </p>
<p>The Gulf states have always been monarchies dominated by <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=U6REAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA78&lpg=PA78&dq=tribal+identities+in+the+persian+gulf&source=bl&ots=1RWPr_NURP&sig=XkJ1VVUj3vx2s1WZSaogTb6xmzw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAmoVChMIxPXA7OaKyAIVBNYUCh1G8QVN#v=onepage&q=tribal%20identities%20in%20the%20persian%20gulf&f=false">tribal lineages</a>, which <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2014-12-19/guzzling-gulf">the oil windfall</a> of half a century ago helped to protect through the mirage of modern consumerism. </p>
<p>This unhappy reality does not trump responsibility. For all their unpleasant rhetoric and sometimes dire performance in recent weeks and months, European countries are not any more responsible for the plight of the Syrians than the Gulf states are, even if they do have laws in place to protect refugees and asylum seekers.</p>
<p>There are many reasons why the Gulf states should take in Syrian refugees. These are rich nations with plenty of resources; they share similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds to many of the refugees; they are in part responsible for the turmoil in Syria (not least since some Arab Gulf countries have <a href="http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/saudi-qatari-convergence-and-divergence-on-iran-and-syria/">funded the factions</a> fighting against Bashar al-Assad’s regime); and they are formally responsible as members of various other Arab states’ groups to take in Arab refugees. </p>
<p>But the Gulf States apparently believe that they have been benevolent enough with the rest of their Arab neighbours – Egyptians, Syrians and Lebanese, for example, have all been granted work permits over the years and allowed to live in Gulf territories – that their generosity has been extended far enough. </p>
<p>Gulf countries have become increasingly preoccupied in the last decade with <a href="http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/labor-migration-united-arab-emirates-challenges-and-responses">migrant labour control</a> and nationalisation strategies. These strategies were aimed at protecting the rights and privileges of their indigenous populations, who are outnumbered by the huge swathes of Arabic and South Asian populations <a href="http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf">coming to work and settle in the Arab Gulf</a>. </p>
<p>This is a major social and demographic issue, and the Gulf countries do not want to further outnumber their indigenous populations by accepting yet more settlers.</p>
<p>But there is something else that commentators are missing: the Gulf region has built its modern reputation on being a pristine, <a href="http://www.timeout.com/travel/features/699/the-gulf-dubai-and-beyond">consumerist heaven</a>. This is the land of large spotless highways, sports cars, massive malls …..</p>
<p>Refugee camps would tarnish this perfect landscape, which must remain appealing to foreign investors and Western tourism. Besides, the argument goes, isn’t sending money to the refugees who’ve ended up in far-flung, less wealthy countries like Lebanon and Jordan enough?</p>
<h2>Lacklustre measures</h2>
<p>With the exception of Yemen, Iran and to a certain extent Oman (which has often tried to maintain a neutral political stance), the Persian Gulf states form a strong and high-profile clique, the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/4155001.stm">Gulf Cooperation Council</a>. They see themselves as a cut above the countries of the Levant and North Africa, the now largely derelict cradle of Arab civilisation.</p>
<p>But the idea of social responsibility for human beings, it seems, just doesn’t move these states to action. Instead, their sanitised response of giving work permits to migrants is a stark illustration of their misplaced generosity.</p>
<p>Of course, the Gulf does not have a monopoly on diplomatic hypocrisy; far from it. Were the Syrian refugees not primarily Muslim, would the rest of the world have reacted differently? Is Europe afraid of taking in more Muslims too? Why did we not hear such calls when the Iraqi Christians were fleeing their home country after IS arrived?</p>
<p>Still the challenge in the Gulf is very particular. Being politically relevant means getting your hands dirty. The Gulf states will not be able to maintain their sanitised approach to the ever-expanding quagmire engulfing the region. Inaction can only be understood as simply not caring about a humanitarian crisis on their doorstep.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rana Jawad receives funding from the ESRC. </span></em></p>By refusing to take in Syrian refugees, the Gulf States’ governments prove they don’t care much about the humanitarian crisis on their doorstep.Rana Jawad, Lecturer in social policy, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.