tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/joko-widodo-13023/articlesJoko Widodo – The Conversation2024-02-15T01:33:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236372024-02-15T01:33:04Z2024-02-15T01:33:04ZPrabowo Subianto is poised to succeed in lifelong quest to become Indonesia’s president. This is why it’s so worrying<p>Controversial former general Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of long-time authoritarian leader Soeharto, looks set to be Indonesia’s next leader after securing what appears to be a convincing victory in this week’s election. </p>
<p>It may be a month before official results are confirmed, but exit poll “quick counts” from Indonesia’s well-regarded polling companies show Prabowo <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-voting-dd732adb2d0f3b674fc92aee4f547c6a">winning close to 60% of the vote</a>, which would be a landslide victory. There will likely be no need for a run-off election in June. </p>
<p>The runner-up, Anies Baswedan, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-elections-2024-unofficial-count-prabowo-lead-4122556">appears</a> to have secured around 24 to 25% of the vote, while Ganjar Pranowo is sitting on just 17%.</p>
<p>Prabowo is therefore the clear choice of Indonesia’s voters, even though he was rejected three times in previous bids for the presidency or vice presidency; there are claims of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-voting-dd732adb2d0f3b674fc92aee4f547c6a">human rights abuses</a> against him (including alleged kidnappings, forced disappearances and war crimes by troops under his command); and his campaign was marred by accusations of <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/02/12/dirty-vote-documentary-claims-jokowi-improperly-backed-election-frontrunner.html">unethical conduct and collusion</a>. </p>
<p>How did he achieve this remarkable turnaround, and what kind of leader will he be for the country?</p>
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<h2>Prabowo’s winning alliance with Jokowi</h2>
<p>A key reason for Prabowo’s convincing victory is the fact he was not running against the immensely popular incumbent Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who had defeated him in two previous elections and still enjoys approval ratings of well over 70%. </p>
<p>Jokowi was barred by a two-term limit from running again. So, this time – to the surprise of many – he decided to throw his very considerable electoral weight behind his former rival, Prabowo.</p>
<p>Although Jokowi claimed to be neutral in the campaign and never explicitly endorsed any candidate, his position became clear when it was announced that Prabowo’s vice-presidential running mate was Jokowi’s oldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka.</p>
<p>Their bid was controversial from the start due to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">heavily criticised Constitutional Court decision</a> that made Gibran eligible to run and allegations that Jokowi had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/13/indonesia-election-2024-president-joko-widodo-prabowo-subianto-interference-allegation">encouraged improper campaign support</a> for Prabowo and Gibran from government agencies. This led to many protests against the Prabowo-Gibran ticket in civil society, and even the release of a viral documentary called <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/02/12/dirty-vote-documentary-claims-jokowi-improperly-backed-election-frontrunner.html">Dirty Vote</a>.</p>
<p>However, it appears much of the electorate was unmoved by these scandals. After all, misbehaviour by the political elite is nothing new in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Moreover, most of Indonesia’s voters are too young to remember Prabowo’s dark past. Instead, they seemed captivated by the images of Prabowo as a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68028295">cute grandpa</a> and Gibran as cool, which had saturated the campaign.</p>
<p>Most importantly, many saw a vote for the pair as a vote for the continuance of Jokowi’s policies and even his political influence – the next best thing for them to a third term for Jokowi.</p>
<h2>A major political shake-up</h2>
<p>This meant a large block of votes that had previously gone to Jokowi shifted to Prabowo, ensuring his victory. </p>
<p>Because Jokowi is a member of former president Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI-P party, his supporters would normally have backed PDI-P’s presidential candidate, Ganjar. But Jokowi sabotaged Ganjar’s campaign by implicitly supporting his rival, leaving Ganjar to run a distant third.</p>
<p>Early indications suggest that while PDI-P will remain the largest party in the national legislature, its share of the vote may slide from <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/14/20084391/quick-count-pileg-2024-litbang-kompas-data-40-persen-pdi-p-golkar-gerindra#google_vignette">20% to 18%</a>. This matters because the next-biggest parties look to be two that backed Prabowo – Golkar and Gerindra. Both received around 14% of the vote in the “quick count”, up from the last election in 2019.</p>
<p>In short, Jokowi has delivered a humiliating blow to Megawati and her party, which many will see as pay-back for Megawati’s arrogant treatment of Jokowi as a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-SEAB-5976">mere “party functionary” during his time in office</a>.</p>
<p>It is a particularly galling outcome for Megawati, as Prabowo was her running mate when she lost the presidential election in 2009.</p>
<p>Given the controversies behind the Prabowo campaign, the losers are likely to challenge the result in the Constitutional Court. This is common after elections in Indonesia, and sometimes leads to recounts and even re-voting in some electorates.</p>
<p>However, Prabowo’s huge lead means an upset is unlikely. And, of course, Jokowi’s bother-in-law remains one of the nine judges on the Constitutional Court.</p>
<h2>So, what’s next?</h2>
<p>What can we expect from the new president? First, Prabowo will not take over immediately. Under the Indonesian system, he must wait until October to be sworn in. In the meantime, Jokowi will remain in office.</p>
<p>This means the next eight months will be a time of intense horse-trading, pay-offs and political deals, as the political and business elite – including Jokowi – manoeuvre to build a new regime and secure their places in it. </p>
<p>Oligarchs who backed Prabowo’s campaigns can expect to have cabinet seats and lucrative appointments given to them or their supporters, while Prabowo’s rivals will have to be placated or isolated. </p>
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<p>These negotiations will take some time, not least because Megawati and her PDI-P will still be a force to be reckoned with. Prabowo will probably work with Jokowi to try to recreate the sort of grand alliance of parties that Jokowi constructed to control the national legislature. However, this time, PDI-P may choose to go into opposition. This would force Prabowo to make a major political recalibration.</p>
<p>Second, the democratic regression that marked Jokowi’s decade in office is only likely to increase under Prabowo. Under Jokowi, core democratic institutions like the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-s-popular-president-accused-of-undermining-democracy-/7482068.html">Constitutional Court</a> and the <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/16/indonesias-corruption-eradication-commission-in-dire-straits/">Anti-Corruption Commission</a> (KPK) were undermined, restrictions on freedom of speech were <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/19/1144064811/indonesia-has-updated-its-criminal-code-with-a-raft-of-free-speech-restrictions">strengthened</a>, and critics of the government were <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/indonesia-is-one-of-the-worlds-largest-democracies-but-its-weaponising-defamation-laws-to-smother-dissent/">targeted for prosecution</a>. </p>
<p>Although he was reticent during the campaign, Prabowo has been <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-presidential-election-prabowo-democracy-term-limits-opposition-4085111">very clear</a> in the past that he thinks the democratic reforms that followed the fall of Soeharto in 1998, should be wound back. He is unlikely to do this immediately, but as he settles into office, a further gradual dismantling of democratic checks and balances, institutions and individual freedoms is very likely. Critics of Prabowo have good reason to be concerned.</p>
<p>Third, while the alliance with Jokowi was central to Prabowo’s victory, Prabowo has waited a very long time to finally claim the office he has sought for decades. He is 72 and a proud man in a hurry, meaning he is unlikely to be willing to be anyone’s puppet – or even partner – for long. </p>
<p>If he eventually breaks with Jokowi, it could force another major – and turbulent – reconfiguration of Indonesia’s political elite.</p>
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<h2>Implications for the West</h2>
<p>Dealing with all this will create challenges for the West, but there are other problems that diplomats will have to confront. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/prabowo-subianto-profile-new-president-02142024141502.html">human rights abuses</a> Prabowo is alleged to be responsible for as a former Special Forces commander – including in East Timor and Papua – are serious. They meant he was denied a visa to the US for many years, and could lead to protests if he visits Western countries as president. </p>
<p>Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. He has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-voting-dd732adb2d0f3b674fc92aee4f547c6a">denied</a> any wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Prabowo’s carefully styled “cute grandpa” image will probably not last long, and Western democracies may find his more usual military-style strongman style much more difficult to deal with. He is a politician who is happy to take hardline, even fiery, nationalist positions when it suits him. He is also notoriously temperamental and quick to anger.</p>
<p>However, Prabowo spent time overseas as a child and during his army career and is more at ease internationally than many of his colleagues. And he is clever, strategic and often pragmatic, as his decision to ally with Jokowi demonstrates.</p>
<p>Many democratic countries managed to work effectively with Prabowo as Jokowi’s defence minister for the last five years. These leaders will likely take a deep breath, remember the strategic importance of Indonesia, and continue to do so for the next five, far more difficult, years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223637/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>As the former general settles into office, a further gradual dismantling of democratic checks and balances, institutions and individual freedoms is very likely.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234682024-02-14T16:06:29Z2024-02-14T16:06:29ZPrabowo’s likely victory: Jokowi’s effect and a test for Indonesia’s democracy<p>Voters in the world’s third-largest democracy, Indonesia, have elected former army general Prabowo Subianto as its eighth president, despite his campaign being dogged by accusations of human rights violations and electoral fraud. According to the <a href="https://pemilu.antaranews.com/berita/3964449/kedaikopi-prediksi-pilpres-2024-satu-putaran">latest reliable polling</a>, Prabowo – Indonesia’s defence minister – secured almost 60% of the votes in what is considered as the largest and most complex single-day election in the world. This will likely mean that there will be no second round. </p>
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<p>More than 200 million eligible voters in more than 17,000 islands cast their votes at more than 820,000 polling stations. The one-day voting process involved 5.7 million election workers, almost the size of Singapore’s population</p>
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<p>Given the complexity of the election, General Elections Commission will announce the official result <a href="https://www.kompas.tv/lifestyle/485104/kapan-pengumuman-hasil-pilpres-dan-pileg-pemilu-2024-ini-jadwalnya-dari-kpu?page=all">on March 20</a>. But since its first direct presidential election in 2004, Indonesia has relied on quick counts to know their new president on the election day.</p>
<p>According to these preliminary results Prabowo defeated other candidates – former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, who is backed by Muslim conservatives, and former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo, who is supported by the country’s largest political party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP).</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C374%2C249&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Workers pass a poster featuring three presidential candidates in the 2024 election.</span>
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<p>Prabowo’s victory is a long time in the making. This is his fourth attempt to run for the country’s top jobs. He first ran as the vice presidential candidate for Megawati Sukarnoputri, PDIP chairwoman, in the 2009 presidential election. The pair lost to the Democrat Party’s chairman, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In the 2014 and 2019 elections, Prabowo ran against the incumbent president, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. He lost in close elections on both occasions as Jokowi had the backing of Megawati’s party.</p>
<p>It was after his 2019 election defeat that Prabowo <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230912225853-617-998201/cerita-prabowo-terima-tawaran-jokowi-jadi-menhan-tak-lebih-dari-1-jam">accepted the offer</a> of a job as Jokowi’s defence minister. </p>
<p>In this year’s election Prabowo teamed up with Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, after a <a href="https://www.liputan6.com/regional/read/5267482/jokowi-tinggalkan-rumah-di-solo-jelang-deklarasi-ganjar-pranowo-capres-pdip?page=2">dispute between Jokowi and Megawati</a> over their choice of candidates. It’s an example of how unpredictable the manoeuvres by politicians in Indonesia can be to stay in power and retain their dignity.</p>
<h2>Jokowi’s factor</h2>
<p>It is amazing to see how Jokowi rose from an unknown politician back in 2005 when he <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2723501/begini-perjalanan-politik-jokowi-si-capres-kerempeng">ran as a mayor</a> of a small city of Solo in Central Java province, to become a kingmaker in the current election.</p>
<p>The Prabowo-Gibran ticket was organised with substantial involvement from Jokowi throughout. Gibran was ruled eligible to stand as a vice-presidential candidate after the constitutional court, led by Jokowi’s brother-in-law Anwar Usman, overturned a requirement that the candidates must be at least 40 so that his 36-year-old son could run. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Joko Widodo.</span>
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<p>Not surprisingly, the opposition cried foul. Many declared that the election was no longer about continuing Jokowi’s legacy but about <a href="https://twitter.com/msaid_didu/status/1756987736316322005/photo/1">saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Three days before the election, a film exposing alleged electoral fraud involving Jokowi went viral. The film alleged that Jokowi painstakingly rigged the election so Prabowo and his son could win. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Dirty Vote by activist Dandhy Dwi Laksono.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Three leading academics – Bivitri Susanti, Zainal Arifin Mochtar and Feri Amsari – who were interviewed for the movie revealed what they said were Jokowi’s various strategies. These ranged from distributing government funds to potential voters before the election to planting supporters in numerous key provinces. The film’s director, Dandhy Dwi Laksono, and the three academics <a href="https://www.liputan6.com/pemilu/read/5527648/sutradara-dan-3-pemeran-di-film-dirty-vote-dipolisikan-mahfud-paling-untuk-imbangi-situasi">have been reported to the police</a>. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for Indonesia’s democracy?</h2>
<p>Many critics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/14/indonesia-elections-democracy-backsliding-prabowo-widodo/">are saying</a> that Prabowo’s likely victory is proof of Indonesia’s democratic backsliding. But it remains too early to make any judgements about any real democratic threat from the election. </p>
<p>But Prabowo’s chequered past has been widely discussed. He is the son-in-law of Indonesia long-term autocratic leader Suharto and has been accused of complicity in the <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20231213135152-4-496927/disinggung-ganjar-ini-13-aktivis-yang-hilang-tahun-1997-1998">disappearances</a> of 13 activists during Suharto’s presidency.</p>
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<p>Democratic safeguards introduced after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in the late 1990s and the onset of what became known as the reform era are thought likely to prevent Prabowo from becoming an autocratic ruler of Indonesia.</p>
<p>First, Prabowo is not as popular as Jokowi. </p>
<p>Unlike Jokowi, whose <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-enters-final-year-in-presidency-with-80-job-approval-poll">stratospheric approval rating of 80%</a> gave him a lot of leeway to test the limit of his power, Prabowo is not that popular. Until Jokowi gave him tacit support, Prabowo consistently placed second behind Ganjar at around 20% of the vote. It’s unlikely that Prabowo could have even achieved the runner’s up position had the election been held a year ago. Prabowo’s political party, Gerindra, sits in third place, according to the quick count, behind the PDIP and Golkar. </p>
<p>Further, Prabowo’s reputation as a strongman may have attracted many people to support him – but is has simultaneously meant that many voters are wary of him. Regardless of how <a href="https://www.globalasia.org/v18no4/feature/jokowis-complex-legacy-and-the-future-of-democracy-in-indonesia_yohanes-sulaiman">corruptible political parties are</a>, it is difficult to see that they will be willingly giving up the hard-won power that they gained in the aftermath of Suharto’s dictatorship to Prabowo.</p>
<p>And, importantly, the military does not necessarily support Prabowo. As an institution, the military has always prided itself on following the rule of law and constitution, especially after the reform era. It is difficult to see that the military may want to risk its hard-won reputation and public trust to support any moves Prabowo might make if elected to undermine democracy. </p>
<p>And the experience of Myanmar next door should give them a pause:<a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2021-Myanmar-coup-d-etat"> the 2021 military coup in Myanmar</a> has ended up plunging the entire country into a civil war. Myanmar’s powerful military, the Tatmadaw, is losing ground steadily to armed ethnic and opposition groups. </p>
<p>The other factor to bear in mind is Jokowi’s enduring popularity. There are those who think that he might be tempted by the extent of his popular support to continue to interfere in politics via his son Gibran’s vice-presidency. There are those who feel he used non-democratic means to influence the election and secure Gibran a place on the ticket. </p>
<p>Weeks before the election, civil society organisations as well as <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/04/08381211/gelombang-kritik-para-guru-besar-soal-pemilu-2024-dan-tanda-tanya-sikap?page=all">academics</a> and activists spoke out against Jokowi for what they saw as his his political manoeuvring to retain political influence. </p>
<p>Perhaps Prabowo’s victory is a blessing in disguise for Indonesian democracy if it means people will start seriously agitating for democracy – and no longer take it for granted.</p>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohanes Sulaiman tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Based on quick counts, Prabowo Subianto and his pair Gibran Rakabuming Raka won the majority of votes at almost 60%Yohanes Sulaiman, Associate Lecturer, School of Government, Universitas Jendral Achmad YaniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226042024-02-13T10:48:22Z2024-02-13T10:48:22Z200 million voters, 820,000 polling stations and 10,000 candidates: Indonesia’s massive election, by the numbers<p>Indonesians are going to the polls to elect a new president on Wednesday. There are three candidates running, alongside their vice presidential candidates.</p>
<p>According to opinion polls, the favourite is <a href="https://theconversation.com/cute-grandpa-or-authoritarian-in-waiting-who-is-prabowo-subianto-the-favourite-to-win-indonesias-presidential-election-221858">Prabowo Subianto</a>, leader of the Greater Indonesia Party (Gerindra), a populist and nationalist party he founded in 2008. A former army general, Prabowo has already stood unsuccessfully for president twice before. He is also the defence minister in the cabinet of the current president, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. </p>
<p>The other contenders are Ganjar Pranowo, a former governor of the large province of Central Java and a member of Indonesia’s biggest party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and Anies Basweden, an independent candidate who was governor of the city of Jakarta.</p>
<p>Prabowo is the frontrunner, but it’s unclear whether he will win an absolute majority of votes in the first round. If he fails to win 50.1% of the vote, there will be a runoff election between the two leading candidates in June.</p>
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<hr>
<h2>By the numbers</h2>
<p>Voters are also casting votes in parliamentary elections, <a href="https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/2024_Elections_FAQ_Final.pdf">which include</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>580 seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), with more than 9,900 candidates </p></li>
<li><p>152 seats in the Regional Representative Council (DPD), designed to represent the regions, with around 670 candidates</p></li>
<li><p>and local parliaments in each of the 38 provinces and 416 districts.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In total, there are over 2,700 separate electoral contests being held for around 20,500 seats. All are the responsibility of Indonesia’s independent election commission (the Komisi Pemilihan Umum, or simply KPU) to administer impartially and efficiently.</p>
<hr>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation, KPU, Perludem</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<h2>Logistical nightmare</h2>
<p>Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy after India and the United States – and all three are holding elections this year. But since Indonesia is holding five separate polls on one day, it is often touted as the largest and most complex <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-will-hold-the-worlds-biggest-single-day-election-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-208673">single-day election</a> in the world.</p>
<p>Indonesia is an archipelago with about 6,000 inhabited islands, some of them remote and with limited infrastructure. The distance from Aceh in the west to Papua in the east is some 5,100 kilometres (3,200 miles), wider than the continental US. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cute-grandpa-or-authoritarian-in-waiting-who-is-prabowo-subianto-the-favourite-to-win-indonesias-presidential-election-221858">Cute grandpa or authoritarian in waiting: who is Prabowo Subianto, the favourite to win Indonesia's presidential election?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It is a massive undertaking to organise an election of this size, from procuring polling station equipment to managing a huge election staff to ensuring the public trusts the integrity and fairness of the vote. The election commission does a remarkable job making sure the vote happens on time and the ballot counting occurs quickly and without tampering.</p>
<p>To get an idea of the size of the task facing the KPU, let’s look at the presidential election first.</p>
<p>There are 204 million registered voters in Indonesia, so the KPU has to print and distribute this many ballots across the country for the presidential vote alone, with a few million extra in case polling stations run short.</p>
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<p>The commission is then required to deliver, count and return the ballots to over <a href="https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/2024_Elections_FAQ_Final.pdf">820,000 domestic polling stations</a>, in addition to more than 3,000 stations overseas. Since there may be a second-round, runoff election, the KPU must be ready to repeat the whole exercise in a few months. This time it would need a different set of ballot papers showing the two final candidates.</p>
<p>But things get really complicated when it comes to the contests for Indonesia’s various national and regional parliaments, even though these get relatively little attention compared to the presidential poll.</p>
<p>The presidential election involves a simple majority count of three candidates. But the national and regional parliaments are conducted through a proportional representation system, the same used in countries like Germany and New Zealand, and for the Australian Senate. Under this system, parties win seats in proportion to the votes they receive. For example, a party winning 20% of the votes will take up around 20% of the seats in the chamber. </p>
<p>Adding to the complexity, voters in Indonesia are not compelled to vote just for a party, but can choose an individual candidate within a party’s list. So, when voters arrive at the polling station, they are presented with a huge ballot paper for the national parliament alone, which lists, on average, 118 candidates. </p>
<p>And they must also make choices for three other chambers – in addition to the presidential vote.</p>
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<h2>An unglamorous, but remarkable democratic achievement</h2>
<p>So, how well has Indonesia done in this massive task of making democratic elections work? </p>
<p>After languishing under a dictatorship and rigged elections for four decades under the rule of Soeharto, the country has done remarkably well since embracing democracy in the late 1990s.</p>
<p>In fact, Indonesia rarely receives recognition for this transformation. In a world where democracy seems increasingly under pressure, Indonesia has managed five peaceful and democratic transfers of power. In comparison to neighbouring states in Southeast Asia, where <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/civil-society-and-southeast-asias-authoritarian-turn/">one-party dominance</a> is widespread or democratic progress has been crushed under <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya">military coups</a>, Indonesia stands out as a bastion of democratic politics.</p>
<p>None of this is to say that Indonesia’s system is flawless. In fact, domestic and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918?casa_token=UxIulMCigoYAAAAA:6CZA0rTwlhWHlfUU6Y_sxAW1P3-ClmyKNUOlPfArJjAjAddU4jwBgltG41xOeLBi44jbLeISJ6m46B4">international observers</a> have increasingly noted the reemergence of authoritarian instincts among the country’s leaders and the rise of <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/10/26/jokowi-is-building-a-political-dynasty">dynastic politics</a> in which incumbents engineer the elections of family members. </p>
<p>And this not only applies to prominent figures from the Soeharto days, such as the leading presidential contender Prabowo. Jokowi has also been <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-joko-widodo-paving-the-way-for-a-political-dynasty-in-indonesia-219499">accused</a> of paving the way for a political dynasty by using his son’s candidacy to ensure he’ll have influence in a Prabowo presidential administration.</p>
<p>But when it comes to the electoral contest itself, Indonesia’s election commission, while not perfect, has delivered reliable and trustworthy outcomes. </p>
<p>The administration of free and fair elections is an unglamorous job, but it is crucial for maintaining public trust in the political system. It also ensures that candidates and parties accept the results and are not tempted to launch coups or deliberately obstruct the post-election process. </p>
<p>Given the strains placed on the United States’ long-established democracy in recent years, Indonesia’s achievement in making elections work should not go unnoticed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-with-a-30-quota-in-place-indonesian-women-face-an-uphill-battle-running-for-office-222387">Even with a 30% quota in place, Indonesian women face an uphill battle running for office</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Sherlock does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This is what it takes to organise the largest and most complex single-day election on the planet.Stephen Sherlock, Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218582024-02-11T19:05:52Z2024-02-11T19:05:52ZCute grandpa or authoritarian in waiting: who is Prabowo Subianto, the favourite to win Indonesia’s presidential election?<p>Ambitious and mercurial, with a dark past, former army general Prabowo Subianto has spent a lifetime vying for the ultimate prize in Indonesian politics. Now, with a <a href="https://www.roymorgan.com/findings/9414-indonesian-voting-intention-january-2024">large lead in the latest polls</a> ahead of this week’s election, it looks as though the <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-presidential-election-may-go-to-run-off-despite-what-the-polls-say-222380">presidency is finally within his grasp</a>.</p>
<p>So, who is Prabowo and how will he change Indonesia if he wins?</p>
<h2>A rapid rise through the military ranks – and fall</h2>
<p>Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo is a true Indonesian blueblood. His family claims to be descended from national hero <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Diponegoro">Diponegoro</a>, a prince of the Mataram sultanate who led the Java War rebellion against Dutch colonial forces in the 19th century. </p>
<p>Prabowo’s grandfather was the founder of Indonesia’s first state bank and a prominent member of Indonesia’s independence movement. His father was a leading economist who served as minister of finance, minister of trade and minister for research in the government. His brother is a wealthy tycoon.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prabowo (standing right) with his siblings and grandparents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Prabowo, too, has long sought national prominence. An ambitious military officer serving mostly in the Special Forces (Kopassus), his marriage to a daughter of the authoritarian former president, Soeharto, fast-tracked his career. Prabowo rose to the rank of lieutenant general and, finally, the key position of commander of the powerful Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) in the capital, Jakarta.</p>
<p>As Soeharto’s regime began to falter amid the financial crisis of 1997, Prabowo become involved in covert operations to defend Soeharto’s army-backed and repressive <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/asian-studies/soehartos-new-order-and-its-legacy">New Order</a> regime against its critics. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Soeharto: the giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Under his leadership, the Special Forces’ “Rose Brigade” was accused of abducting and torturing more than 20 student protesters, 13 of whom are still missing, presumed dead. Prabowo has admitted to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/7/18/indonesia-candidate-admits-role-in-abductions">abductions</a>, but denies being involved in any killings. </p>
<p>Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. The allegations against him meant he was, for years, denied a visa to enter the US.</p>
<p>Prabowo also denies a wide range of earlier accusations relating to human rights abuses committed by Special Forces under his command in East Timor and Papua, including alleged torture and killings. </p>
<p>He also denies accusations he was involved in engineering the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120310123501/http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/05/13/six-years-after-may-1998-tragedy-still-unresolved.html">violent rioting</a> in the capital in 1998 that contributed to the collapse of his father-in-law’s regime, likely the result of an <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/1998/08/25/indonesia-army-ousts-suhartos-son-in-law/">internal military struggle to become Soeharto’s successor</a>. It seems Prabowo hoped to climb high amid the chaos at the time. </p>
<p>After Soeharto resigned in May 1998, his newly installed successor, B.J. Habibie, refused Prabowo’s request to be made head of the army, instead effectively demoting him. Prabowo is said to have responded by arming himself with a pistol and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/98/0724/cs6.html">driving to the palace with truckloads of soldiers</a>, but was stopped outside the president’s office.</p>
<p>Soon after, Prabowo was <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/1998/08/25/indonesia-army-ousts-suhartos-son-in-law/">cashiered</a> for “misinterpreting orders”, although the precise details of his dismissal still remain mysterious. He went into voluntary exile in Jordan for some years and it seemed his career was over.</p>
<h2>Three unsuccessful bids for higher office</h2>
<p>But Prabowo remained an ambitious man. By 2009, he was a wealthy business figure and had co-founded his own political party, Gerindra. He had also rehabilitated himself enough to make a formal bid for power, running for vice president in the 2009 elections on a ticket with former president Megawati Soekarnoputri. They lost in a landslide.</p>
<p>In 2014, Prabowo tried again. This time he ran as a presidential candidate against Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Prabowo campaigned as a nationalist “strongman”, riding his horse around stadiums of cheering uniformed supporters and promising a return to the authoritarian model of the New Order. He lost both the election and a challenge to the results in the Constitutional Court.</p>
<p>In 2019, he tried once again against Jokowi, this time turning to conservative Islamists to support him. He was a strange choice as their figurehead, given he had a Christian mother and brother and, although a Muslim himself, had previously shown little public piety. In his 2014 campaign, he had even promised to protect religious minorities against Islamists.</p>
<p>Prabowo’s use of identity politics proved deeply polarising, strengthening the hand of hardline Islamist groups in Indonesia and deepening tensions between religious communities for years to come.</p>
<p>But Prabowo lost this election, too. He accused Jokowi of cheating, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/24/indonesias-prabowo-challenges-election-result-in-court">sparking rioting</a> in Jakarta in which eight people died. He again contested the results in a highly publicised Constitutional Court challenge, which he also lost.</p>
<p>Prabowo then made the extraordinary decision to reinvent himself again. Dumping his supporters, he took the position of defence minister in the cabinet of his rival, Jokowi. The two former foes were photographed shaking hands and sharing jokes to seal their extraordinary deal.</p>
<p>For the next four years, Prabowo dutifully performed the role of loyal minister – even when Jokowi’s government moved against some of the Islamist organisations that had backed him in his last bid for the top job.</p>
<h2>Controversial political moves</h2>
<p>Now 72, Prabowo’s ambitions are undiminished, but his tactics have, once again, changed dramatically. </p>
<p>In his current run for president, Prabowo has selected Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his vice-presidential running mate. And Jokowi himself now backs him. (Although Jokowi has never explicitly endorsed Prabowo, Gibran’s candidacy makes Jokowi’s preferences crystal clear.)</p>
<p>Jokowi’s decision to join forces with Prabowo and his Gerindra party was driven by the fact he was prevented from running himself by the two-term presidential limit in the constitution. He therefore needed to find another way to maintain influence. Having his son as vice president would certainly suffice.</p>
<p>Jokowi is hugely popular, with approval rates still well over 70%. This means his decision to back Prabowo may – at last – deliver the presidency to the former general.</p>
<p>But building a new alliance with Prabowo has proved to be a seismic event in Indonesian politics, for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, according to the country’s election law, candidates for president and vice president must be at least 40 years old. The 36-year-old Gibran didn’t qualify.</p>
<p>Helpfully, the chief justice of the Constitutional Court was Gibran’s uncle and had been appointed by Jokowi. The court duly delivered a ruling that younger candidates could run if they had held elected office as a regional head. Gibran just happens to be mayor of the city of Solo (a position his father once held), so he was now eligible.</p>
<p>Uproar ensued, and the chief justice was demoted for his obvious conflict of interest. But, incredibly, the decision stood, and Gibran is running.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1755398254924308598"}"></div></p>
<p>Second, Jokowi is a member of the PDI-P party, which had twice nominated him for president. The party has its own candidate running for president, Ganjar Pranowo. </p>
<p>So, by backing Prabowo, Jokowi has effectively turned his back on his own party and may help defeat its candidate for the presidency.</p>
<p>His actions also pose a major threat to PDI-P’s prospects in the legislative elections (held at the same time as the presidential vote). To the PDI-P leader, former president Megawati, and many of her supporters, Jokowi is now a traitor and enemy who may inflict huge damage on their political prospects.</p>
<h2>Why this election matters</h2>
<p>Prabowo’s big lead in the polls is partly thanks to Jokowi’s support and the many government officials now openly backing him. However, Prabowo has undergone (yet another) spectacular reinvention in recent months that has helped as well. </p>
<p>His campaign team has heavily promoted him as a baby-faced <em>gemoy</em> (cute) grandpa, using viral memes, video clips and even huge screens with anime avatars of Prabowo and Gibran smiling and winking at passers-by.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@aku_chandkelvin/video/7311218296395713797?q=prabowo%20gemoy\u0026t=1707360432315"}"></div></p>
<p>But Prabowo is not cute. In fact, he has repeatedly said Indonesia’s democratic system is <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-presidential-election-prabowo-democracy-term-limits-opposition-4085111">not working</a> and the country should return to its original 1945 constitution. This would mean unravelling most of the reforms introduced since Soeharto fell, which are largely based on constitutional amendments. </p>
<p>Among other things, Indonesia’s charter of human rights would go, as would the Constitutional Court. The courts would no longer be independent, direct presidential elections would end, the two-term presidential limit would go and the president could again control the legislature.</p>
<p>Of course, these changes might not be easily done, but it is a chilling prospect if Prabowo wins. And that may happen because much of the electorate doesn’t seem to care all that much about the consequences of picking him.</p>
<p>The average age of Indonesia’s 205 million eligible voters voters is just 30, and more than half are millennials or Gen Z. This means many have no memory of Soeharto’s oppressive and abusive New Order that Prabowo seems to want to revive.</p>
<p>Young voters also seem untroubled by Prabowo’s dark past and the credible allegations of violence and human rights abuses made against him. Instead, they seem captivated by the cute Prabowo and cool Gibran imagery saturating social media, backed by the charisma of Indonesia’s most popular public figure, Jokowi.</p>
<p>If Prabowo does become president, as many now expect, Indonesia’s fragile democratic system may be the next thing he reinvents – or, more likely, dismantles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p>The general has repeatedly said Indonesia’s democratic system is not working and the country should return to its original 1945 constitution, which could unravel many democratic reforms.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210672024-02-07T13:10:59Z2024-02-07T13:10:59ZIndonesians head to polls amid concerns over declining democracy, election integrity and vote buying<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572044/original/file-20240129-28-cofmi2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C603%2C5498%2C3050&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gearing up for the election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaElection/058ccdda469046b4a05ab184f9fe9154/photo?Query=indonesia%20election&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1572&currentItemNo=3">Achmad Ibrahim/Associated Press</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a record year for <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-4-billion-people-are-eligible-to-vote-in-an-election-in-2024-is-this-democracys-biggest-test-220837">elections around the world</a>, Indonesia’s Feb. 14, 2024, vote is set to be one of the largest – and it will be one of the sternest tests for democracy’s progress.</p>
<p>Voters are expected to turn out in record numbers to choose between some 20,000 national, provincial and district parliamentary representatives in what will be the world’s largest single-day election – unlike, say, in the U.S., Indonesia does not allow votes to be cast in advance.</p>
<p>While the scale of the election might seem to suggest a vibrant state of democracy in Indonesia, multiple factors – including a voting system susceptible to money politics and vote buying, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-election-campaign-violation-gibran-prabowo-mahfud-muhaimin-4024331">alleged violations of election rules</a>, the sheer number of down-ballot candidates, and a cacophony of political messages on social media – make it difficult for voters to know what they are voting for and to effectively express their preferences. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s General Elections Commission reports that as many as <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1743779/over-204-million-voters-in-2024-general-elections-electoral-roll-kpu-declares">204 million voters</a> are enrolled for the election, with about 114 million of them under 40 years of age. Polls say the <a href="https://s3-csis-web.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/doc/Final_Rilis_Survei_CSIS_26_September_2022.pdf?download=1">top issues for younger voters</a> include unaffordable basic goods, lack of employment opportunities, high poverty rates, expensive health services and poor education quality and service.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there are concerns among many observers that Indonesia’s democracy has been <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/03/23/is-indonesias-democracy-really-backsliding.html">backsliding in recent years</a>.</p>
<h2>Southeast Asia’s largest economy</h2>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=JhojdBgAAAAJ&hl=en">As an expert</a> on Indonesia’s international relations, I see how the election has implications far beyond the sprawling archipelago’s borders and comes at a crucial time. Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s largest economy but faces getting caught in what economists call the <a href="https://www.adb.org/publications/escaping-middle-income-trap-innovate-or-perish#:%7E:text=The%20middle%2Dincome%20trap%20captures,productivity%20is%20relatively%20too%20low">middle-income trap</a>, where its wages are too high but productivity too low to be competitive. Indonesia also plays a crucial geopolitical role in the Indo-Pacific. Its growing <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/05/13/why-and-how-indonesia-must-reduce-its-economic-dependence-on-china/">economic dependence on China</a> and regional tensions over <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">territorial disputes in the South China Sea</a> have <a href="https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/when-goods-cross-borders/indonesia-should-be-at-the-heart-of-us-indo-pacific-policy">foreign policy observers and investors</a> watching the election closely.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men stand smiling and waving." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential candidates. from left, Anies Baswedan and running mate Muhaimin Iskandar; Prabowo Subianto and running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka; and Ganjar Pranowo with running mate Mahfud Mahmodin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaElection/0fcba3a1931049e0a72438f9745f3994/photo?Query=President%20Widodo%27s%20son,%20Gibran%20Rakabuming,&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=50&currentItemNo=21">Tatan Syuflana/Associated Press</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. government sees Indonesia’s democracy as critical to regional stability, and at least for the last two decades, <a href="https://id.usembassy.gov/president-joseph-r-biden-and-president-joko-widodo-announce-the-u-s-indonesia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/">U.S.-Indonesia relations</a> have been built on shared values of democracy. Yet the election takes place against a backdrop of increasing democratic fragility.</p>
<p>Telltale signs include government attempts <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1253615/higher-education-ministry-contacts-rectors-over-student-protests">to restrict critics and dissent</a> in a show of executive overreach, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/11/08/chief-justice-demoted-over-gibran-ruling.html">changes in election laws</a> to tilt the playing field toward favored candidates and so-called “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/23/indonesian-leaders-son-brushes-off-nepo-baby-tag-in-solid-debate-showing">nepo babies</a>,” and voter <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3886224/tpd-amin-beberkan-potensi-intimidasi-jelang-pemilu">intimidation</a>.</p>
<p>Voters will cast their ballots for one of <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-election-anies-baswedan-ganjar-pranowo-prabowo-subianto-4031946">the three presidential candidates</a> vying to be the next president: <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/01/30/the-economist-revises-down-prabowos-electability-to-47.html">Prabowo Subianto</a>, a former military officer and politician who is running for president for the third time; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesian-presidential-hopeful-ganjar-projects-grassroots-appeal-popularity-2023-12-13/">Ganjar Pranowo</a>, a former governor of Central Java; and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-presidential-hopeful-promises-change-end-patronage-politics-2024-01-05/">Anies Baswedan</a>, an academic, and former culture and education minister and governor of Jakarta. </p>
<p>The three candidates <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/tech/20231026141749-37-483935/visi-misi-ganjar-mahfud-anies-imin-download-link-pdf">all promise</a> to improve living standards, accelerate economic growth and infrastructure development, protect Indonesia’s resources against foreign exploitation and territorial sovereignty, promote environmental sustainability, advance human rights and democracy, and eliminate corruption.</p>
<p>Despite their similar campaign talking points, there are some differences. On trade, for example, Subianto favors protectionism. Baswedan and Pranowo support a market-based approach and a balanced approach between protecting national industries and fostering foreign investment.</p>
<p>On one of the main issues of the day, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/28/indonesia-to-move-capital-from-jakarta-to-nusantara-but-it-wont-be-easy.html">relocation of the capital city of Indonesia</a>, Baswedan is the most critical of the candidates. He has <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/election-willdetermine-new-capital-fate-01262024140057.html">vowed to review the project</a>, but is unlikely to stop the move even if he wins, as the plan is already formalized into law.</p>
<h2>Massive spending and vote buying</h2>
<p>While the presence of many candidates – for example, there are 300 in <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/01/11/jakarta-sees-tight-competition-for-2024-legislative-race.html">Jakarta</a> alone, including celebrities and cabinet ministers from 17 parties, vying for 21 seats in the House of Representatives – could suggest a vibrant democracy, the <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/12/07/en-biaya-politik-caleg-hadapi-pemilu-2024-membengkak">massive spending</a> among them increases the risk of vote buying. Furthermore, due to the current <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/269187/kpu-committed-to-open-list-proportional-representation-system-dpr">open-list</a> proportional voting systems, candidates must compete against their party peers to win a seat. This system creates a fierce competition among candidates and increases the chance of vote buying. Political scientist <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/rof2024/burhanuddin-muhtadi/">Burhanuddin Muhtadi</a> argues that the problem affects 10% of voters and may be enough of an issue to sway the outcome of elections. In addition, celebrity candidates and those with a large social media following and deep pockets will have an easier time gaining support.</p>
<p>A glut of campaign messaging does not lead to a more informed citizenry. Instead, citizens are heavily targeted by <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/multimedia/graphics/2024/01/indonesia-election/index.html?shell">social media with populist overtones</a>. And despite the digital bombardment, there is actually little information about party platforms, candidate track records or policy details – a problem when the sheer number of candidates is so large.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Political candidates shake hands in Jakarta, Indonesia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, left, with running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of Indonesian President Joko Widodo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaElection/91f8aacec6cd40e981f597776e81744f/photo?Query=indonesia%20joko%20and%20son&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=95&currentItemNo=2">Tatan Syuflana/Associated Press</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Financial irregularities tied to election funding have also dogged parties across the political spectrum, leading the <a href="https://www.idea.int/node/683">Association for Election and Democracy</a> to cite a worrisome trend of citizens coming to see money politics as acceptable within a competitive democracy. The other challenge during the election campaign is the <a href="https://kemitraan.or.id/press-release/buruknya-akuntabilitas-laporan-dana-kampanye-problem-serius-pengaturan-penegakan-aturan-dan-komitmen-para-capres-cawapres/">lack of accountability and transparency</a> for campaign funding.</p>
<h2>A slide toward autocracy</h2>
<p>The decline in the quality of Indonesia’s democracy has been years in the making. A 2023 report by <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">V-Dem Democracy Institute</a> highlights several factors in its slide toward autocracy. Limited freedom to publicly criticize the government is one reason, and numerous examples of intimidation and <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/16/students-continue-to-protest-jobs-law-alleged-police-brutality.html">attacks on students</a>, academics and <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1818020/stop-intimidation-against-activists">activists</a> who are critical of the administration have been documented.</p>
<p><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/607612">Strategic election manipulation</a> is another form of backsliding, encompassing a range of activity geared toward tilting the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents. In a notable case, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/jokowi-indonesias-kingmaker-works-keep-influence-after-election-2023-10-14/">President Joko Widodo’s</a> 36-year-old son, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3249354/indonesia-election-2024-gibran-resorts-gotcha-questions-jargon-vp-debate-bid-trip-rivals">Gibran Rakabuming Raka</a>, mayor of Solo, was cleared by a constitutional court ruling to run for vice president. The ruling, issued by a court led by the president’s brother, stated that the age restriction for presidential candidates that they should be at least 40 years old does not apply to those who have served as mayors, regents or governors. While Widodo claims not to have intervened in the ruling, there is a clear benefit to his family.</p>
<p>Electoral intimidation is a problem disproportionately affecting civil servants and people in poor neighborhoods. <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3886224/tpd-amin-beberkan-potensi-intimidasi-jelang-pemilu">Power brokers</a> have reportedly told some civil servants to vote for particular candidates, intimating that refusal will mean being asked to serve in some remote places in Indonesia. People in areas with high poverty rates <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3886224/tpd-amin-beberkan-potensi-intimidasi-jelang-pemilu">have allegedly</a> received threats that cash transfer programs that would benefit the community will be revoked unless they vote for certain candidates. </p>
<p>All of this takes place as younger Indonesians <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/10/10/analysis-csis-survey-shows-young-voters-want-change-not-prabowo.html">look for change and better lives</a>. Their hopes for a democratic future where issues important to them can be solved, as well as securing Indonesia’s role on the global stage as a democratic partner ensuring regional stability, ride on the outcome of the election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angguntari Ceria Sari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As many as 204 million Indonesians are registered to vote in what will be the world’s largest single-day election in 2024.Angguntari Ceria Sari, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Katolik ParahyanganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223802024-02-06T05:21:58Z2024-02-06T05:21:58ZIndonesia’s presidential election may go to run-off, despite what the polls say<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573264/original/file-20240204-29-8abu5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C374%2C210&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>In less than two weeks, Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, will simultaneously hold presidential and general elections. Held on Valentine’s Day, it is being touted as the world’s biggest single-day election.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-will-hold-the-worlds-biggest-single-day-election-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-208673">Indonesia will hold the world's biggest single day election: here is what you need to know</a>
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<p>With three presidential candidates running, the current electoral rules <a href="https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/ini-skenario-bila-pilpres-2024-digelar-dua-putaran-lt659d67651a12f/">require</a> a candidate to win at least 50% of the national vote and at least 20% of the vote in each province to avoid a runoff.</p>
<p>The country’s various polling institutions <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20240129132122-4-509823/18-hasil-survei-terbaru-pilpres-2024-anies-vs-prabowo-vs-ganjar">have forecast</a> that the frontrunner, former general Prabowo Subianto, and his vice-presidential candidate, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, will likely win the first round. But whether they will get enough votes to win the election outright or be forced into a runoff is still unclear. </p>
<p>They are competing against two other pairs of candidates – Anies Baswedan, the former Jakarta governor, and his running mate, Muhaimin Iskandar; and Ganjar Pranowo, the former Central Java governor, and his running mate Mahfud MD. </p>
<p>A credible polling institute, Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI), <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/01/31/08364751/survei-lsi-denny-ja-anies-muhaimin-22-persen-prabowo-gibran-507-persen">predicts</a> Prabowo could squeak out an outright victory in the first round with 50.7% of the vote. This was based on a survey of
1,200 respondents.</p>
<p>Another well-respected pollster, Indikator, shows Prabowo <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240201161340-617-1057271/survei-indikator-politik-prabowo-gibran-unggul-562-persen-di-jatim">garnering 56.2% of the votes in East Java</a>, the electorate with the second-highest number of voters in the country. </p>
<p>Indikator’s latest projection has also slightly revised an earlier national poll showing that Prabowo is <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240121164034-617-1052398/8-hasil-survei-terbaru-elektabilitas-anies-prabowo-ganjar-januari">very close to winning the election outright</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573265/original/file-20240204-23-au9rhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman casts her vote in an election in Pekalongan, Central Java.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the major pollsters’ predictions, it is still too early to declare he will definitely win the presidency in the first round for at least two reasons.</p>
<p><strong>First</strong>, a poll is simply a poll – a sampling of a tiny number of people to predict the entire population’s preferences. </p>
<p>Based on their performances so far, it is doubtful that credible polling institutes like Indikator and LSI have gotten their methods wrong. Far from it, they have done everything possible to get the most accurate results. </p>
<p>But they may fail to accurately capture the bigger picture simply due to the variable nature of voters. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-third-of-indonesian-voters-bribed-during-election-how-and-why-100166">A third of Indonesian voters bribed during election – how and why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>In contrast to what <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230607141641-617-958782/rocky-gerung-sentil-survei-tipu-tipu-bos-smrc-indikator-buka-suara">conspiracy theorists</a> may insinuate about the credibility of polling institutes in Indonesia, a national survey is merely a representative snapshot based on a sampling of a limited number of voters. This is why there is a margin of error. </p>
<p>Take, for example, Indikator’s prediction of the support for the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the 2019 legislative election. A few weeks before the election, Indikator predicted the PKS <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/03/26/09451171/elektabilitas-parpol-menurut-survei-terbaru-tiga-lembaga#google_vignette">would receive</a> 6% of the vote nationally. In reality, <a href="https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/18852/kpu-tetapkan-rekapitulasi-perolehan-suara-nasional-pilpres-2019/0/berita">the party received 8.21%</a>. </p>
<p>Indikator’s prediction was still within the margin of error of 2.9%, meaning the the model worked as it should. </p>
<p>In this year’s election, PKS is supporting Anies. With PKS’s voters concentrated in several areas, Anies’ share of the votes may actually be higher than what is reflected in the polls. Thus, the total votes received by Prabowo may vary enough to prevent him from winning the election outright.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573266/original/file-20240204-19-utn1on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Anies Baswedan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Furthermore, even at this point, there are still a significant number of voters (<a href="https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/RILIS-INDIKATOR-JAWA-TIMUR-01-FEBRUARI-2024.pdf">about 5.78% nationally</a> and <a href="https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/RILIS-INDIKATOR-18-JANUARI-2024.pdf">12.1% of voters in East Java</a>) whose preferences remain unclear.</p>
<p><strong>Second,</strong> it’s still too early to declare Prabowo the winner is the fact that candidates may still make blunders in the final two weeks, which could impact their chances.</p>
<p><a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/12/23/16020291/debat-cawapres-kuatnya-mahfud-asertifnya-gibran-dan-muhaimin-tak-meyakinkan?page=all">In the latest vice-presidential debate</a>, for instance, Gibran faced a significant backlash from the public after disrespecting Mahfud MD, a seasoned professor much older than him. Being disrespectful towards older people is still frowned upon in conservative Indonesia. </p>
<p>While it is unclear how many votes Prabowo may have lost due to this show of disrespect, <a href="https://m.jpnn.com/news/spanduk-penolakan-terhadap-gibran-ramai-di-jatim-madura-ternyata-ini-penyebabnya?page=2">anecdotal evidence</a> suggests there is a growing dislike of Gibran among some voters – especially ethnic Maduranese, Mahfud MD’s ethnic group.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/12/18/prabowo-in-hot-water-for-mocking-anies-at-gerindra-gathering.html">The question of ethics</a> surrounding the Prabowo-Gibran pairing also continues to dog their reputation among the public. </p>
<p>Gibran, the 36-year-old son of current President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, secured his candidacy following a controversial decision by the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/10/16/breaking-constitutional-court-opens-door-for-jokowis-son-to-run-in-presidential-poll.html">Indonesian Constitutional Court</a> to lower the age limits for both presidential and vice-presidential candidates to below 40. The court was led at the time by Jokowi’s in-law, Anwar Usman, who was demoted over the controversial ruling following a public protest. </p>
<p>There are also <a href="https://twitter.com/faridgaban/status/1753594174144966978?s=20">growing concerns that Jokowi is abusing his powers</a> to support his son. For example, Jokowi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cy7wvegjydvo">increased</a> the salaries of civil servants and military officers in late January in what some believe to be an attempt to sway their votes. The military officers cannot vote, but their families can. </p>
<p>Some analysts have also questioned <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918">Jokowi’s apparent authoritarian turn</a> in recent weeks, prompting Prabowo’s opponents to see this election as an important choice between democracy and authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Anies <a href="https://www.viva.co.id/berita/politik/1667046-prabowo-ke-anies-kalau-jokowi-otoriter-anda-tak-mungkin-jadi-gubernur">even brought this issue up in the first debate</a> as a way to frame this election – obviously to his benefit. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ypBgjIL_nP4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Universitas Islam Indonesia rector Fathul Wahid shares his concerns on President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s latest stunts to support his son running as a vice presidential candidate. Fathul’s protest was followed by other universities across the archipelago.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Professors at universities across Indonesia <a href="https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20240203/15/1738013/deretan-perguruan-tinggi-tuntut-jokowi-netral-jelang-pilpres-2024">have also conveyed</a> their grave concerns on these recent political moves by Jokowi. </p>
<p>Considering none of the latest polls are strongly indicating an outright Prabowo victory, a runoff in the presidential election is still likely. This would be even more likely if Prabowo or Gibran commit another blunder in the coming days. </p>
<p>With an election this close, Prabowo and his team should be far more concerned about winning the election in round one than being overly confident and perhaps losing in a runoff months down the road.</p>
<p><em>The article has been updated to add details about the voting rights of Indonesian military personnel and their families.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222380/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohanes Sulaiman tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Pollsters are pointing to a Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming victory in round one, but it remains to be seen whether they have enough votes to avoid a second round.Yohanes Sulaiman, Associate Lecturer, School of Government, Universitas Jendral Achmad YaniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194992023-12-20T00:56:50Z2023-12-20T00:56:50ZIs Joko Widodo paving the way for a political dynasty in Indonesia?<p>Joko Widodo, popularly known as “Jokowi”, has served as Indonesia’s president for almost a decade. He is hugely popular, garnering around <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/10/27/can-jokowi-influence-indonesias-presidential-election/">80% in some polls</a>. But the constitution bars him from serving a third term in office.</p>
<p>Repeated proposals in recent years years to amend the constitution to allow Jokowi to run again have gained little public or political traction. This leaves him unable to contest the next presidential election in February.</p>
<p>Key powerbrokers, however, have been keen to make the most of the tens of millions of votes that Jokowi commands – and maintain his inner circle’s influence after he leaves the palace next year. </p>
<p>Perhaps their most conspicuous strategy to do this has been to install Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as vice presidential running mate for Prabowo Subianto, now ahead in the polls with a huge lead of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/prabowo-subianto-opens-up-significant-lead-in-latest-indonesian-polls/">20 points</a>.</p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-professor-the-general-and-the-populist-meet-the-three-candidates-running-for-president-in-indonesia-217811">The professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia</a>
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<h2>Concerning legal moves</h2>
<p>Getting Gibran into that position required the co-option of one of Indonesia’s most respected judicial institutions – the Constitutional Court. </p>
<p>The main roadblock for Gibran (and Jokowi) was that the election law imposed a minimum age of 40 for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">case</a> challenging that age limit, Chief Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle, intervened to ensure a majority of judges would reverse the court’s position in three previous decisions. </p>
<p>As a result, the election law was altered to permit younger candidates to stand if they had previously held office as head of a sub-national government. Gibran, 36, just happens to have served as mayor of Solo in central Java, a job his father once held, and so the decision meant he could now run for vice president. </p>
<p>The decision has trashed of the reputation of the Constitutional Court, raising questions about its continuing credibility and future, with witty hackers changing its <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20231024105551-192-1015126/viral-mahkamah-keluarga-di-google-maps-cek-sikap-mk-dan-google">name on Google Maps to the “family court”</a>.</p>
<p>However, not all judges agreed with the decision. Three judges dissented, with some raising questions about Anwar’s behaviour and his obvious conflict of interest. Public outrage over the decision led to the court’s ethics tribunal <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowis-brotherinlaw-removed-as-constitutional-court-chief-justice">removing</a> him from his position as chief justice last month.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">A twist in Indonesia's presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Yet, Anwar remains one of the nine judges on the court, the decision he is accused of “fixing” stands, and Gibran’s nomination as a vice presidential candidate can probably not be reversed.</p>
<p>Worse, the national legislature has been debating amendments to the Constitutional Court statute that could enable the removal of the dissenting judges. Ironically, this might be through the imposition of a minimum age requirement on Constitutional Court judges. One of the court’s most respected judges, Saldi Isra, is under the proposed age, and appears to be a target.</p>
<h2>Jokowi picks a side</h2>
<p>From the outside, it may seem like Gibran and Prabowo are strange bedfellows. Prabowo is a former son-in-law of the dictatorial former president Soeharto. He is a cashiered former general who has long been accused of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-new-cabinet-its-human-rights-implications">serious human rights abuses</a>, including alleged killings in East Timor, Papua and even the capital, Jakarta. </p>
<p>Prabowo has never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. He has denied the allegations against him.</p>
<p>Ironically, he was also Jokowi’s bitter opponent in the past two elections, which polarised Indonesia. Prabowo’s refusal to accept his electoral defeats in 2014 and 2019 led to dramatic <a href="https://asiafoundation.org/2014/09/03/elections-boost-trust-in-indonesias-constitutional-court/">challenges in the Constitutional Court</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-presidential-election-dispute-prabowos-plan-to-challenge-election-result-may-be-in-vain-117663">Indonesia's presidential election dispute: Prabowo's plan to challenge election result may be in vain</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But the enmity between Jokowi and Prabowo seemed to evaporate almost immediately after the court challenges failed, with Prabowo pragmatically accepting the job of defence minister in Jokowi’s cabinet. </p>
<p>Now, Jokowi appears to have decided that Prabowo, of all people, offers the best chance to build a dynasty to keep some sort of hold on power. Certainly few see Gibran – largely silent or inarticulate in public appearances – as serious leadership material. He is widely assumed to be a proxy for Jokowi. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/27/the-widodo-family-indonesias-newest-political-dynasty/">dynasty-building exercise</a> has involved a massive and expensive campaign that many complain has co-opted government agencies and programs to <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1796080/prabowo-gibrans-campaign-team-responds-to-abuse-of-power-allegations">promote Prabowo and Gibran</a>.</p>
<p>It has also involved reinventing Prabowo, a one-time special forces general, as a <em>gemoy</em> <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/12/06/will-the-gemoy-tactic-be-effective-in-wooing-gen-z-voters.html">(cute) grandpa</a>, with viral video clips showing him dancing and playing with kittens. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@rumahindonesiamaju/video/7293110875060292870?q=prabowo%20gemoy\u0026t=1702612100643"}"></div></p>
<p>Jokowi’s alignment with Prabowo (through his son) is all the more surprising given Jokowi was a longtime member of PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party – Struggle). PDI-P is Indonesia’s largest political party. It twice successfully nominated Jokowi for the presidency, and it has its own candidate, Ganjar Pranowo, in February’s election. Party rules require Jokowi to support him.</p>
<p>By abandoning Ganjar for Prabowo (who has his own party, Gerindra), Jokowi will effectively be stealing votes from PDI-P and declaring war on its boss, the formidable – and vengeful – former president, Megawati Soekarnoputeri, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president. She will fight hard to maintain her party’s power and influence.</p>
<h2>Is Indonesia’s democracy under threat?</h2>
<p>Despite the political chaos these moves have sparked, Jokowi’s bet that his loyalists and the general public don’t really care about constitutional crises or claims of dynasty building seems to be paying off. </p>
<p>Of course, votes could still shift in the next month and a half. However, there is a sense the momentum created by Jokowi’s support for Prabowo may make his victory inevitable. Some former critics are already quietly changing sides to ensure a share of the spoils.</p>
<p>Jokowi has previously <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/hrw-slams-jokowis-democracy-has-gone-too-far-comments-ahead-of-australia-visit/ykdprpqs0">said</a> “our democracy has gone too far”. And Prabowo has openly called for a return to the model of Suharto’s authoritarian <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070980">New Order</a>. </p>
<p>So, a Prabowo-Gibran victory may be good news for the elites now in power, but it will likely be bad news for Indonesian democracy. It will confirm – and probably accelerate – the regression that most observers, including <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia">Freedom House</a>, agree is already advanced under Jokowi.</p>
<p>Many voters seem untroubled by this. Indonesia’s post-Soeharto <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-21/activists-look-back-on-20-years-of-reform-in-indonesia/9783462">“Reformasi” wave</a> of democratisation is mere history for Indonesia’s Gen Z, who appear to have limited interest in all that was achieved two decades ago and no experience of living under authoritarianism.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1733972585908498556"}"></div></p>
<p>But the activist legal NGOs that form Indonesia’s policy “brains trust” are depressed and anxious. Certainly, some are protesting, and a few are even challenging the court decision that allowed Gibran to run. </p>
<p>However, many are intimidated by <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/are-indonesia-s-rubber-laws-limiting-freedom-speech">criminal charges that members of Jokowi’s administration have brought against critics</a> with increasing frequency in recent years. From the perspective of civil society, Jokowi’s strategists seem to have a fix in place and dark and difficult times lie ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Butt receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Jokowi’s bet the general public doesn’t really care about constitutional crises or claims of dynasty building seems to be paying off.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneSimon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178112023-11-24T08:41:46Z2023-11-24T08:41:46ZThe professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia<p>In just over two months, Indonesia will hold one of the biggest one-day elections anywhere on Earth. More than 200 million eligible voters will take part across Indonesia’s 6,000 inhabited islands – along with 1.75 million people in the diaspora – to elect a new president, vice president and members of the People’s Consultative Assembly at both the national and regional levels.</p>
<p>The Election Commission <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-candidates-457845138892d5de371bcc8ee95c7bc6">has announced three pairs of candidates</a> for president and vice president who will contest the election on February 14. The campaign period kicks off Tuesday. </p>
<p><a href="https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/576423/demokrasi-indonesia-bakal-lebih-sehat-dengan-3-capres">A number of political observers</a> have said the presence of three presidential candidates, instead of the usual two, would be good for Indonesia’s political stability as it could prevent <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26920.8.pdf">deepening polarisation among the main parties’ supporters</a>. </p>
<p>In the 2014 and 2019 elections, which featured only two candidates, Indonesia witnessed <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26920.8.pdf">great polarisation</a> between the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672400">two camps</a>. Next year, the voters will have more alternatives.</p>
<p>On the other hand, some scholars have warned the 2024 presidential election will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/4-alasan-mengapa-pilpres-2024-bisa-jadi-ancaman-bagi-demokrasi-indonesia-216437">a test for the country’s democracy</a> because the contenders have either all run for office before or are backed by established power players. As a result, Indonesians do not really have many new candidates with fresh ideas to choose from.</p>
<p>Here is a brief rundown of the current field of candidates, and who backs them.</p>
<h2>1. Anies Baswedan, the professor</h2>
<p>Anies is the only presidential hopeful who does not represent a single political party. However, his candidacy has been endorsed by the National Democratic Party, Indonesia’s fifth-largest party, the Islamist-based National Awakening Party (PKB) and the conservative Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).</p>
<p>Prior to his political career, Anies was a well-known, US-educated scholar with a doctorate in political science. He was <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/2024-elections-the-third-candidate-anies-baswedan/">born into an academic family</a> – both of his parents are professors. He then became a lecturer himself, as well as a rector. After President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was elected in 2014, he was appointed minister of education.</p>
<p>In 2017, Anies won the Jakarta governor election with the support of hardline Islamist groups. Anies <a href="https://theconversation.com/manuver-koalisi-anies-baswedan-apa-untungnya-memilih-cak-imin-dan-akan-kemana-ahy-212697">is known</a> for <a href="http://www.ejurnal.ubk.ac.id/index.php/communitarian/article/view/316">using religious identity issues</a> to attract support from conservative Muslim groups.</p>
<p>In an attempt to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XN6TusC1E9Y">shed</a> the label of “identity politician”, though, Anies has chosen Muhaimin Iskandar as his running mate in next year’s election.</p>
<p>Muhaimin is the chairman of PKB, which has strong affiliations with Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. This group has <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3233481/indonesia-presidential-poll-can-anies-baswedan-and-running-mate-win-total-opposite-ideals">a decades-long reputation</a> as a moderate Islamic entity that promotes pluralism and tolerance.</p>
<p>A study has shown a majority of Indonesians view Anies positively, thanks to sympathetic <a href="https://ijmmu.com/index.php/ijmmu/article/view/3460">media coverage</a>. He is framed as intelligent, polite, firm and, of course, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_3">religious</a>.</p>
<h2>2. Prabowo Subianto, the military man</h2>
<p>Prabowo, a former army general, is the current chairman of the Gerindra Party, the second-largest in parliament. He is also the minister of defence.</p>
<p>Prabowo <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohamad-Rosyidin/publication/316164742_Democracy_without_justice_transitional_justice_in_Indonesia_after_the_fall_of_Suharto/links/58f44daf0f7e9b6f82e7d054/Democracy-without-justice-transitional-justice-in-Indonesia-after-the-fall-of-Suharto">has long been linked</a> to the <a href="https://griffithlawjournal.org/index.php/gjlhd/article/view/663">kidnapping</a> and <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora102&div=18&id=&page=">disappearance</a> of students and activists who opposed former <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jrnatila14&div=7&id=&page=">dictator Suharto’s authoritarian regime</a> in the late 1990s, as well as other <a href="https://repository.um-surabaya.ac.id/1741/">alleged human rights abuses</a>, including in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2019.1584636">East Timor</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xtWSDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA213&dq=prabowo+human+rights+abuse+papua&ots=jAIExEyK-3&sig=9sQKyGq3izuy28k8FznmJAtjwPw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Papua</a>. At that time, he was the commander of the Indonesian Army special forces.</p>
<p>Prabowo, the former son-in-law of <a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Suharto</a>, has repeatedly denied all of the allegations.</p>
<p>The 2024 race will be Prabowo’s third attempt at winning the presidency; he previously lost twice to Jokowi. He also lost in the 2009 vice presidential race as the running mate of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who won the presidency.</p>
<p>Prabowo was once Jokowi’s rival; now he is <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">his ally</a>. In a surprise, he has picked Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi’s eldest son and the mayor of Surakarta, as his running mate. </p>
<p>The decision followed a controversial Constitutional Court <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">ruling</a> in October on the 2017 Election Law. The law says candidates for presidential or vice presidential office must be at least 40 years old, but the court ruled there could be an exception if the candidate has previously held elected office as a regional head. </p>
<p>This ruling paved the way for Gibran, who is just 36 years old, to run for vice president. He has been a mayor for nearly three years.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/indonesia-elections-frontrunners-pick-of-presidents-son-as-running-mate?utm_referrer=https://www.google.com">Analysts argue</a> this is part of an agenda by Jokowi to establish a political dynasty. The Constitutional Court is led by Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi’s brother-in-law, and Gibran’s uncle. Since the ruling, he has been <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/11/08/en-anwar-usman-dicopot-syarat-batas-usia-diuji-lagi">dismissed dishonorably</a> for breaching the court’s ethics.</p>
<p><a href="https://katadata.co.id/ameidyonasution/berita/653e61b745907/rangkuman-hasil-survei-terbaru-capres-cawapres-siapa-unggul?page=all">Prabowo has risen in the polls</a> since picking the president’s son as his running mate.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">A twist in Indonesia's presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy</a>
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<h2>3. Ganjar Pranowo, the populist</h2>
<p>Ganjar Pranowo is a former governor of Central Java, Indonesia’s third most-populous province. He is a member of the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the country’s largest political party. </p>
<p>He will be contesting next year’s election with <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/10/18/breaking-mahfud-md-tapped-as-ganjars-running-mate.html#google_vignette">Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin</a> (commonly known as Mahfud MD), who is currently a minister in Jokowi’s government and the former chief justice of the Constitutional Court.</p>
<p>Months ago, many predicted Jokowi would throw his support to Ganjar as his successor. This is because Jokowi and Ganjar are from the same political party, come from the same hometown and have both embraced Javanese culture. <a href="https://sr.sgpp.ac.id/post/widodo-and-indonesias-changing-political-culture">In Indonesian politics</a>, the elites are usually strong defenders of their culture, and Javanese have dominated the country’s politics since colonial times.</p>
<p>Political communication scholars have also noted the populist Ganjar is the only political figure with <a href="https://news.republika.co.id/berita/rav2um384/rajin-blusukan-ganjar-dinilai-mirip-jokowi">a similar</a> “<a href="https://eudl.eu/pdf/10.4108/eai.21-10-2020.2311832">down-to-earth</a>” leadership style as Jokowi.</p>
<p>However, there’s been a twist in the plot. With his son now running with Prabowo, Jokowi is widely believed to back the former general.</p>
<p>Ganjar has consistently <a href="https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1626254/capres-2024-simak-peringkat-ganjar-pranowo-dalam-3-survei">polled</a> among the top candidates running for president in recent years, but has never been a clear favourite.</p>
<p>In March, Ganjar sparked a public outcry after <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/03/23/ganjar-calls-for-ban-on-israel-soccer-team-for-upcoming-fifa-u-20-cup.html#google_vignette">strongly opposing</a> the participation of the Israeli soccer team in the FIFA U-20 World Cup that was supposed to be held in Indonesia, citing his support for Palestinian statehood. This caused <a href="https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/media-releases/fifa-removes-indonesia-as-host-of-fifa-u-20-world-cup-2023-tm">FIFA to strip</a> the tournament hosting rights from Indonesia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217811/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesians will go to the polls on February 14 to elect a new leader. Here are the three leading candidates and their running mates.Dadang I K Mujiono, Faculty member of International Relations Department, Universitas MulawarmanTriesanto Romulo Simanjuntak, Dosen, Universitas Kristen Satya WacanaWawan Kurniawan, Peneliti di Laboratorium Psikologi Politik Universitas Indonesia, Universitas IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160072023-10-24T04:56:49Z2023-10-24T04:56:49ZA twist in Indonesia’s presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy<p>On Valentine’s Day next year, Indonesia will go to the polls for its most important election in ten years.</p>
<p>The incumbent president, Joko Widodo (known as “Jokowi”), has built a broad supporting coalition of political parties and oligarchs, which has delivered stability but also power and wealth for a small elite. He has also presided over a period of increasing <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/talking-indonesia-democracy-under-threat/">democratic regression</a>, marked by an erosion of the independence of institutions like the <a href="https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/indonesias-anti-corruption-commission-the-kpk">anti-corruption commission</a>, inaction on claims of human rights violations, and litigation to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa21/6013/2022/en/">silence critics</a> of the government.</p>
<p>Despite this, Jokowi remains immensely popular, with some opinion polls indicating that 80% of citizens support him. He would likely win again if he ran. However, after two five-year terms, he is constitutionally barred from a third, and proposals to change the rules to keep him in the palace have failed. </p>
<p>This is of deep concern to his political allies, who are reluctant to lose their privileged positions. So, for many months, politicians and oligarchs have been manoeuvring to find a way to keep their grip on power.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-indonesias-presidential-election-be-delayed-and-could-jokowi-stay-in-power-longer-202609">Will Indonesia's presidential election be delayed? And could Jokowi stay in power longer?</a>
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<h2>A former rival turned ally</h2>
<p>Their solution now seems to be aligning behind the minister for defence, Prabowo Subianto. </p>
<p>At first glance, he is an unlikely choice: a cashiered general and former son-in-law of the authoritarian <a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Soeharto</a>, who ruled Indonesia for more than three decades. Prabowo has been accused of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/14/world/asia/indonesia-prabowo-subianto-us-visit.html">human rights abuses</a>, including in Timor and Papua, and alleged <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-constitutional-court-age-limit-election-subianto-e4d5da4882b32e4e4b8c28c1cc138d9c">involvement</a> in the abduction and murders of activists around the time of the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. </p>
<p>Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. The allegations against him meant he was, for years, denied a visa <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/indonesia-defence-minister-prabowo-to-make-historic-visit-to-us-20201008-p56390">to enter the US</a>. He has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-12/jokowi-rival-prabowo-to-stand-for-indonesian-president/9645650">denied</a> the allegations against him.</p>
<p>More recently, Prabowo ran against Jokowi in two bitterly fought election campaigns (2014 and 2019), which polarised Indonesia.</p>
<p>However, Prabowo is a member of an elite family, and, despite his previous election losses, can be expected to poll well. After he lost in 2019, Jokowi effectively co-opted him by offering him a seat in cabinet. He has been a compliant member of the administration ever since. Now he is Jokowi’s preferred candidate.</p>
<p>After months of uncertainty, Jokowi and his circle have come out strongly in support for Prabowo, with Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, announced as his vice presidential running mate in recent days. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Soeharto: the giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption</a>
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<h2>A controversial court decision</h2>
<p>This has sparked enormous controversy, for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, Jokowi is a member of former President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI-P party, which backs another candidate, Ganjar Pranowo. Prabowo and Ganjar are running almost neck and neck, with Ganjar sometimes slightly ahead. If Jokowi’s supporters now give their votes to Prabowo, this might be enough to beat Ganjar. </p>
<p>Megawati is sure to see this as a massive betrayal by Jokowi, and she and her party will do whatever they can to stop Prabowo and Gibran.</p>
<p>Second, the 2017 Election Law says candidates for presidential or vice presidential office must be at least 40 years old. Gibran is only 36. Last week, this obstacle was conveniently overcome when the Constitutional Court ruled there was an exception to this age limit if the candidate had previously held elected office as a regional head. Gibran happens to be the mayor of Solo and so is now eligible.</p>
<p>Knocking out a statutory age limit for candidates might not seem a big issue, but this case has caused a <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-court-upholds-minimum-age-requirement-for-president-vp-candidates">huge scandal in Indonesia</a>.</p>
<p>The problem is the court’s chief justice, Anwar Usman, also happens to be Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle. The conflict of interest is obvious. But Anwar refused to recuse himself. </p>
<p>This was significant because the case was decided by five judges to four. Anwar had cast the deciding vote.</p>
<h2>Reversal of three similar cases</h2>
<p>Legally, the most controversial part of the decision is its reversal of three decisions the court read out earlier on the same day about precisely the same minimum age requirement. In those cases, the court had maintained the minimum age limit for presidential and vice presidential candidates. </p>
<p>As one of the dissenting judges in Gibran’s case pointed out, Anwar did not attend a meeting of judges last month to decide the three other cases. In that meeting, the judges voted by a majority of six to two to maintain the minimum age limit.</p>
<p>However, two days later, Anwar did attend a meeting to decide the Gibran case, during which the judges voted to remove the requirement. As dissenting judge Arief Hidayat wrote in his judgment, Anwar claimed he had not attended the first meeting to discuss the three other cases because of “health reasons”, not out of a conflict of interest. </p>
<p>The court’s decisions in all four cases were read out the same day, and, to the surprise of many, the final decision overruled the others. </p>
<p>The implication here is clear. When the chief justice did not attend the judges’ meeting on the initial three cases, the court was clearly in favour of maintaining the minimum age (and thus blocking Gibran). But when he did attend the final meeting, a number of judges switched sides and changed their decisions. </p>
<p>This reeks of political manipulation and interference. Professor Saldi Isra, perhaps the most-respected judge on the Constitutional Court for his expertise and integrity, expressed it this way in his dissenting judgment:</p>
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<p>I am confused, I am really confused how to start my dissenting opinion. Because since setting foot in the Constitutional Court building as a Constitutional Court judge on 11 April 2017 […] this is the first time I have experienced an event so ‘extraordinarily strange’ and which can be said to defy reasonable expectation: The court changing its position and attitude in a flash.</p>
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<p>The court has now paved the way for Gibran to run in the election. Critics joke the court’s name should be changed to “Mahkamah Keluarga” (the “Family Court”). </p>
<h2>Undermining the court’s independence</h2>
<p>The Constitutional Court is Indonesia’s first and only court with the power to review statutes. It was a key institution that emerged from the reforms after Soeharto’s fall. But many now see this decision as marking the end of the court’s independence. This is because it comes against a background of other obvious attempts to undermine its independence.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, the court’s serving deputy chief justice, Aswanto, was <a href="https://asianews.network/jokowi-gives-nod-to-controversial-removal-of-constitutional-justice/">removed</a> by the national legislature for <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/the-dpr-attacks-the-constitutional-court-and-judicial-independence/">perceived disloyalty</a>. In fact, all he did – along with other judges – was raise questions about the constitutionality of a law that was enacted without adequate public participation. This just happened to be Jokowi’s signature <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/whats-stake-with-indonesias-controversial-jobs-creation-law-2022-06-09/">Job Creation “Omnibus” Law</a>. </p>
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<p>Aswanto’s removal put the court’s other judges on notice that they could share his fate if they went against the government, particularly in big cases. Many suspect Aswanto’s removal was front of mind for the judges in Gibran’s minimum age case.</p>
<p>While there have yet to be any polls conducted since Gibran’s entry into the race, many expect the court’s decision means Prabowo will emerge as the favourite. And if he and Gibran win, Jokowi and the elite group around him may well expect to extend their influence and privilege for years to come.</p>
<p>However, the decision may also spell the end of Constitutional Court as an independent check and balance on Indonesia’s increasingly powerful rulers. That does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216007/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from The Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Butt receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>A court ruling has paved the way for current president Joko Widodo’s son to run as a vice presidential candidate, even though he doesn’t meet the minimum age requirement.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneSimon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2026092023-03-29T23:53:18Z2023-03-29T23:53:18ZWill Indonesia’s presidential election be delayed? And could Jokowi stay in power longer?<p>A decade ago, Joko (Jokowi) Widodo was an outsider candidate whose carefully cultivated “everyman” persona swept him into Indonesia’s presidential office. To get there, he had to overcome opposition from many rich and powerful figures.</p>
<p>However, he soon built a formidable political coalition, and he and his family are now firmly part of the oligarchic ruling elite. So much so, that many members of that elite fear their access to political and economic power could be disrupted if he leaves office.</p>
<p>By law, Jokowi’s time in office is limited. In 1998, Indonesia’s longest-serving president, Soeharto, was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/21/world/fall-suharto-overview-suharto-besieged-steps-down-after-32-year-rule-indonesia.html">forced to step down</a> after 32 years in power. One of the constitutional priorities after his fall was to prevent a repeat of his long rule, which had become associated with military repression and corruption. </p>
<p>In 1999, the Constitution was amended to prevent presidents serving more than two five-year terms. This was seen as a non-negotiable part of the reforms that delivered Indonesia’s transition to democracy.</p>
<p>Elections for the presidency and legislature are now due on February 14, 2024, and, because Jokowi has already been elected twice, he cannot run again.</p>
<p>But in reality, things are not so simple. For some years, powerful politicians, including Luhut Panjaitan (Jokowi’s close adviser and so-called “minister for everything”), have been <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220311145544-32-769948/luhut-soal-penundaan-pemilu-sah-sah-saja-jika-dpr-mpr-berproses">proposing ways</a> to keep Jokowi in the palace. These range from <a href="https://fulcrum.sg/a-third-term-for-jokowi-weighing-the-risks-of-constitutional-change/">amending the Constitution</a> to remove the two-term limit to “postponing” the elections because of the COVID pandemic.</p>
<p>These proposals have received little public support and have been roundly rejected by most civil society groups, which are important drivers of public opinion and policy-making in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Jokowi himself has been inconsistent. At times, he has rejected calls for him to stay in office. Other times, his statements <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/03/06/08200511/3-pernyataan-jokowi-terkait-wacana-perpanjangan-masa-jabatan-presiden?page=all">have been more ambivalent</a>. Rumours of his involvement in plans to keep him from losing the presidency continue to abound.</p>
<h2>Court decision causing election uncertainty</h2>
<p>The idea of Jokowi staying in power just won’t go away. </p>
<p>In fact, it is dominating headlines again after the Central Jakarta District Court <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/indonesian-judicial-body-to-review-controversial-election-ruling/">issued a shock decision</a> in early March ordering the General Election Commission to postpone the 2024 elections. </p>
<p>The court ruled in favour of Partai Rakyat Adil dan Makmur (PRIMA), a very small party that claimed the commission had unfairly disqualified it from running in the elections. The court awarded PRIMA compensation and ordered the elections be postponed for two years, four months and seven days. It gave no clear explanation for this very specific time period.</p>
<p>As it stands, this decision could force the election commission to postpone the elections, and, presumably, leave Jokowi and the current legislators in office as “placeholders” until new elections can be held. </p>
<p>But, in our view, there is no legal basis for the court’s ruling. </p>
<p>For a start, the court should have refused to hear the case because it lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has clearly determined that in cases where a plaintiff wishes to sue the government for performing an unlawful act, it can only do so in the administrative courts. </p>
<p>In fact, before suing in the district court, PRIMA had appealed to the Jakarta Administrative Court, but that court dismissed the claim, saying it lacked jurisdiction. That should have been the end of the matter. </p>
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<p>More problematic still, the district court issued a judicial remedy that does not exist in the law. The 2017 Law on General Elections allows the election commission to hold “further elections” (pemilu lanjutan) or “follow-up elections” (pemilu susulan) in extreme circumstances, such as natural disasters or unrest. The commission may postpone an election in such circumstances, but it can only do this for specified locales – not nationally. </p>
<p>In other words, only the election commission can postpone an election, not a district court. And not even the commission can postpone a national election.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-battles-a-push-to-postpone-elections-and-undermine-its-fragile-democracy-180410">Indonesia battles a push to postpone elections - and undermine its fragile democracy</a>
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<p>This case also exposes major gaps in Indonesia’s judicial system. For one, the district court ruling, if enforced, leads to a clearly unconstitutional result. </p>
<p>The Constitution says elections must be held every five years, but the court’s decision could delay things until <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/03/06/calls-mount-for-jokowi-to-address-election-delay-ruling.html">2025</a> or 2026, meaning six or seven years would pass between elections.</p>
<p>Only the Constitutional Court has clear authority to make decisions about the implications of the Constitution, but it cannot review lower court decisions. This means it cannot step in and fix the problem created by the district court. </p>
<p>There are even fears the district court decision might prompt the government to attempt to amend the Constitution to provide a basis to delay the election, or even remove the two-term limit on presidents.</p>
<p>In any case, the PRIMA case has now been appealed to the Jakarta High Court. A decision could take some time and is likely to be appealed to the Indonesian Supreme Court.</p>
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<h2>The potential fallout from a postponement</h2>
<p>The run-up to elections is always a time of intense political manoeuvring in Indonesia. Presidential and parliamentary candidates for next year’s elections have also not yet been finalised. </p>
<p>This means the PRIMA case – and the uncertainty it has created – is generating a lot of heat. With little public enthusiasm for postponing the elections, and fears the higher courts may make the situation worse, there is now intense pressure on the election commission to allow PRIMA to run, thereby defusing the issue. </p>
<p>At first, the commission had said it would push ahead with preparations for elections next February, as scheduled, but there are now reports of negotiations between PRIMA and the commission.</p>
<p>Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and a rising politician himself, <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/03/14/pidato-politik-ahy-dari-isu-ekonomi-hingga-penundaan-pemilu">gave a fiery speech earlier this month</a> in which he warned that postponing the elections would result in “chaos” and make the “world view Indonesia as a banana republic”. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-indonesia-retreating-from-democracy-99211">Is Indonesia retreating from democracy?</a>
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<p>It’s a fair point. Many observers already believe Jokowi’s time in office has led to <a href="https://www.merdeka.com/politik/demokrat-tingkat-demokrasi-di-era-jokowi-jauh-di-bawah-masa-sby.html">democratic regression</a>, with <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2023">Indonesia slipping in the Freedom House rankings</a>. Jokowi himself has publicly said he thinks Indonesian democracy has “<a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/02/22/12031291/jokowi.demokrasi.kita.sudah.kebablasan">gone too far</a>”. </p>
<p>A delay in elections or a constitutional change to allow Jokowi to run for a third term would only confirm this trend.</p>
<p>But that won’t stop the powerful figures who have benefited politically and financially from Jokowi’s presidency from trying to find ways to keep him there if the PRIMA case fails to do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He has previously received funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Butt has received funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Joko Widodo is prevented from running again for president. But a court ruling has thrown next year’s elections in doubt and rumours abound of efforts to keep him in power longer.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneSimon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1845472022-06-07T05:53:35Z2022-06-07T05:53:35ZBeyond boats, beef and Bali: Albanese’s unfinished business with Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467340/original/file-20220607-14-2z3iaq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">original</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia may be the world’s fourth most populous nation – with more than 270 million people – but Australian news coverage of it typically involves three things: beef, boats and Bali. </p>
<p>Anthony Albanese’s visit to Indonesia in his third week as prime minister is an important sign the relationship can’t be defined by domestic concerns about asylum seekers, live cattle exports and drug smuggling.</p>
<p>Accompanied by Foreign Minister Penny Wong (who speaks Bahasa) and Science and Innovation Minister Ed Husic (whose Muslim faith was of interest to the Indonesian press), Albanese has made it clear Indonesia is of utmost diplomatic importance to Australia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mutual-respect-and-genuine-partnership-how-a-labor-government-could-revamp-our-relationship-with-indonesia-183116">'Mutual respect and genuine partnership': how a Labor government could revamp our relationship with Indonesia</a>
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<h2>Calling on Jakarta first</h2>
<p>Albanese has followed a recent tradition of Australian prime ministers heading to Jakarta early, before London or Washington. His predecessor, Scott Morrison, visited Indonesia in September 2018 as his first port of call. So too did Malcolm Turnbull and Paul Keating.</p>
<p>Indonesia is perhaps the Australian continent’s first trading partner. </p>
<p>Evidence from the 1600s shows the indigenous fishers of Arnhem land traded sea cucumber and other goods with counterparts from Makassar – on the island now known as Sulawesi – which the Makassarese then sold to Chinese merchants. Makassar remains an important port, which Albanese visited after meeting Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo at his presidential palace.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/long-before-europeans-traders-came-here-from-the-north-and-art-tells-the-story-69032">Long before Europeans, traders came here from the north and art tells the story</a>
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<h2>Supportive from the beginning</h2>
<p>Australia’s interest in close ties with Indonesia were established immediately after the second world war.</p>
<p>Future President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta issued their Proclamation of Indonesian Independence on August 17 1945, six weeks after the surrender of the occupying Japanese. </p>
<p>By November 1945, an Australian diplomatic mission headed by William MacMahon Ball was in Jakarta (then still called Batavia) to meet with them and other independence officials.</p>
<p>Economist Joe Isaac, who would go on to become deputy president of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and deputy chancellor of Monash University, was part of the delegation. He later recalled the meetings with Sukarno:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Mac [MacMahon Ball] outlined the purpose of his mission […] and that Australia was sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Indonesians; and he canvassed Sukarno’s reaction to the despatch by the Australian Government of a boat load of medical supplies. No doubt thinking of the action of the Australian waterside workers (who refused to load Dutch ships hostile to Indonesian independence) Sukarno expressed gratitude for the support of the Australian people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This support was a big deal at the time (the Netherlands only gave up attempts to reassert its colonial control in 1949). According to Isaac, the action of the waterside workers against Dutch ships as well as Australia’s support for Indonesian independence in the UN Security Council were instrumental in shaping a positive view of Australia in Indonesia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A newspaper report from September 29 1945 about a rally in Sydney in support of Indonesian independence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newspaper report from September 29 1945 about a rally in Sydney in support of Indonesian independence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://img.jakpost.net/c/2020/09/09/2020_09_09_103946_1599629997._medium.jpg">Daily Telegraph/ivens.nl</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Recent economic assistance</h2>
<p>Australia’s desire for close relations with Indonesia has been challenging – in particular over Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua in 1969 and of East Timor in 1975.</p>
<p>But in recent decades there have been some great occasions of economic co-operation.</p>
<p>During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, Australia went into bat for Indonesia against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Clinton administration, which both wanted to impose severe fiscal austerity measures. </p>
<p>Australia favoured more expansionary policies – partly informed by Reserve Bank deputy governor Stephen Grenville, who had been a diplomat in Indonesia and understood the Indonesian economy. </p>
<p>The Australian view prevailed, and the Indonesian economy fared much better as a result, avoiding the pitfalls of the developing economies subject to the IMF prescription.</p>
<h2>Room to grow</h2>
<p>As of 2020, Indonesia is Australia’s <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement#:%7E:text=Indonesia%20has%20been%20a%20growing,our%2013th%20largest%20trading%20partner.">13th biggest trading partner</a>, worth A$17.8 billion in two-way trade.</p>
<p>Almost <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/characteristics-australian-exporters/latest-release">2,500 Australian businesses</a> export goods to Indonesia.</p>
<p>But in many ways Indonesia is still underdone as an economic partner – not just when compared with China and India, and our longstanding partners in Japan and South Korea, but also with southeast Asian neighbours Singapore and Thailand.</p>
<p>More Australian small and medium sized companies export goods to Fiji than Indonesia. And despite Indonesia’s massive population, just <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/characteristics-australian-exporters/latest-release">250 Australian companies</a> have a presence in Indonesia. This compares to more than 3,000 in China. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-great-albanese-is-in-indonesia-but-australia-needs-to-do-a-lot-more-to-reset-relations-here-are-5-ways-to-start-184446">It's great Albanese is in Indonesia, but Australia needs to do a lot more to reset relations. Here are 5 ways to start</a>
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<p>Indonesia hasn’t attracted manufacturers looking for low-cost opportunities like China, Vietnam and Bangladesh. Foreign companies have mainly gone there for its massive domestic consumer market, especially the urban middle class in cities like Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. </p>
<p>So, there’s still a great potential for Australian trade and foreign investment to help build capacity way beyond boats, beef and Bali.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Harcourt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s new prime minister has made it clear Indonesia is of utmost diplomatic importance to Australia.Tim Harcourt, Industry Professor and Chief Economist, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811342022-04-14T09:57:28Z2022-04-14T09:57:28ZA tale of two cities: why Indonesia is planning a new capital on Borneo – and abandoning Jakarta. Podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457879/original/file-20220413-28-tk7tav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C799%2C489&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An artistic impression of Indonesia's new presidential palace, designed by the artist Nyoman Nuarta. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CYSve2zpoHk/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=">nyoman_nuarta via Instagram</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia plans to move its capital city from Jakarta on the island of Java to a new forest city on the island of Borneo called Nusantara. In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, we talk to three experts in urban planning and ecology to find out why – and what the environmental impacts of the project could be. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/6257d218bd9ef5001212c4aa" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Jakarta is a city struggling to keep its head above water. “It’s been attacked from both sides – from the river and from the land,” says Eka Permanasari, associate professor in urban design at Monash University, Australia.</p>
<p>The city experiences <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/26/climate-change-behind-2020-floods-that-displaced-thousands-in-jakarta-agency-says.html">extreme amounts of rainfall, worsened by climate change</a>, which regularly causes severe flooding. Coupled with this, massive extraction of ground water from aquifers underneath the city is causing the Jakarta to sink. “If you go to the northern part of Jakarta, you may see the road is higher than the houses next to it. In some other areas, it’s actually sinking more than 15cm per year,” says Permanasari.</p>
<p>Due to the problems facing Jakarta, plans to relocate Indonesia’s capital have a long history. During the colonial era, the Dutch considered abandoning the city, then called Batavia, due to flooding, high temperatures and disease linked to stagnant water. Since Indonesian independence in 1945, successive administrations have also floated plans to relocate the capital, but these never came to fruition. </p>
<p>Now, the government of President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, is forging ahead with a new project, estimated to cost around US$35 billion. In January, Indonesia’s parliament <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-passes-law-relocate-capital-remote-borneo-2022-01-18/">passed a bill</a> to relocate the country’s capital city from Jakarta on the island of Java to the East Kalimantan province of Borneo. The government then announced the city’s name: <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3163853/indonesia-names-its-new-us34-billion-capital-nusantara">Nusantara</a>, which loosely translates as archipelago in sanskrit. </p>
<p>Hendricus Andy Simamarta is a lecturer in urban planning at the University of Indonesia and president of the Indonesian Association of Urban and Regional Planners. He says a big reason for relocating the capital is to shift Indonesia’s centre of gravity away from Java. “We are very dependent on Java economically, more than 50% of our economy is located in Java,” he says. Simamarta is sceptical that moving the capital to East Kalimantan will re-balance the economy, but he says at least it can start to “re-orientate our mindset of development”. </p>
<p>The dream for Nusantara is for a new high-tech, smart city, surrounded by forest. Borneo is an island with rainforests home to an abundance of different species, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-surveyed-borneos-orangutans-and-found-100-000-had-disappeared-91944">orangutan</a> and Asian elephants. However, Alex Lechner, an associate professor in landscape ecology at Monash University, Indonesia, who is based in Jakarta, says the area planned for Nusantara’s construction is currently covered by eucalyptus plantations – monocultures with less biodiversity than intact rainforest. </p>
<p>Lechner is impressed with eight principles set out for Nusantara’s development, including on carbon neutrality and circular economy approaches. “If it all looks like it’s looking like on paper, there’s potential for this city to be this shining example for southeast Asia of what green and sustainable development should look like,” he says. </p>
<p>But he’s also concerned about what might happen on Borneo outside Nusantara’s footprint. “What happens to all the development which this city encourages outside of the city boundaries? Is this going to be developed sustainably?” Lechner says if more roads are built to connect Nusantara to other parts of Borneo, this could produce a “fish-bone effect” with small roads leading off into the forest, which could have a “whole raft of cascading spillover effects on the environment and especially on diversity”.</p>
<p>Listen to the full episode to hear more about the challenges facing Jakarta and the plans – and politics – behind Nusantara. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-not-to-build-a-capital-what-indonesia-can-learn-from-other-master-planned-cities-mistakes-175318">How not to build a capital: what Indonesia can learn from other master-planned cities' mistakes</a>
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<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also sign up to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>Newsclips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0W6DiFps9U">CNA</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHQnz1UuYOM">News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-aHJJUA3P-s">Aljazeera</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GP6JlmI4eik">English</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-aHJJUA3P-s">France24 </a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sJUIWCfwYo">The Jakarta Post</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHA35syvg7I">Media dan Informasi Sekretariat Presiden</a>.
You can watch a video showing a digital rendering of the presidential palace, designed by the artist Nyoman Nuarta, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/CYX1HzYFgCE/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=">here</a>. </p>
<p>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eka Permanasari has received funding from the Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs Research Grant, Drake University, the Humboldt Research Linkage Program and the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology.
Hendricus Andy Simarmata is president of the Indonesian Association of Urban and Regional Planners. He is a co-founder of NUA Advisory, a small planning firm. He is a member of the scientific committee of ISOCARP, a non-profit professional organization; and an urban reader at Thamrin School of Climate Change and Sustainability. He also volunteers on the steering committee of the Urban Land Institute Indonesia, a membership-based non-profit research and education organization. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Lechner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why is Indonesia planning to build a new capital called Nusantara? Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationDaniel Merino, Assistant Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1748662022-01-19T23:49:40Z2022-01-19T23:49:40ZIndonesia will take a big step on the global stage this year – are Australians paying enough attention?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441441/original/file-20220119-27-w1awo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=340%2C235%2C2913%2C2163&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tracey Nearmy/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many Australians are probably unaware that neighbouring <a href="https://g20.org/g20-presidency-of-indonesia/">Indonesia has assumed the G20 presidency</a> and will host the crucial meeting of the world’s largest economies for the first time in October. </p>
<p>The theme for the summit in Bali will be “Recover Together, Recover Stronger”. We can all hope this will more closely match global realities by then. </p>
<p>Indonesia is well-positioned to ensure the world focuses on the gap in the global pandemic response between developed and lower-income countries, which threatens to prolong the crisis. Its overall growth trajectory has earned it international respect, and it has made solid efforts to <a href="https://www.unodc.org/indonesia/en/issues/terrorism-prevention.html">combat extremism</a> and <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/indonesia/democracy-human-rights-and-governance">maintain a vibrant democracy at home</a>. </p>
<p>Jakarta has also showed diplomatic skill on the international stage, for example, in mustering <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-rcep-can-tell-us-about-geopolitics-asia">ASEAN support for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a> – a free-trade agreement among more than a dozen countries in the Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>And it has carved out a potentially influential role in the region by maintaining constructive relations with both China and the United States.</p>
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<h2>Public disengagement</h2>
<p>But this isn’t the way Australians tend to think about their next-door neighbour. Australians seem little engaged in what is generally considered a very important relationship for the country. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/about">Lowy Institute’s poll of Australian attitudes</a> to the world reveals limited knowledge about Indonesia’s system of government and national experience. <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/views-of-indonesia/">Recent annual surveys</a> indicate only 39% of Australians agree that Indonesia is a democracy, and just 37% believe its government has worked hard to fight terrorism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jokowis-visit-shows-the-australia-indonesia-relationship-is-strong-but-faultlines-remain-131463">Jokowi’s visit shows the Australia-Indonesia relationship is strong, but faultlines remain</a>
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<p>Another sign of this disengagement is the <a href="https://asaa.asn.au/the-state-of-indonesian-language-in-australian-universities-the-past-20-years/">steady decline in Indonesian language enrolments in Australian universities</a>. Only 178 university students were undertaking Indonesian language studies in 2019, down 63% from a peak of 503 in 1992. </p>
<p>Australian businesses also lack interest or capability when it comes to Indonesia. There has been little evidence of change since an Asialink business report in 2017 <a href="https://asialinkbusiness.com.au/research-resources/match-fit-shaping-asia-capable-leaders">found</a> 90% of the top Australian public companies were not adequately equipped to do business in Asia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/survey-reveals-what-indonesians-really-think-of-australia/">Australia isn’t front of mind for many Indonesians</a>, either. They are naturally more focused on the pressing challenges and opportunities in the rest of Asia, specifically Southeast Asia and China. </p>
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<h2>Bipartisan efforts to prioritise the relationship</h2>
<p>It wasn’t always like this. Enthusiasm for Bahasa Indonesia <a href="https://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/languages/indonesian/context-statement/">grew rapidly in the early 1990s</a> when it became the third-most studied language in Australian schools. </p>
<p>Its <a href="https://asaa.asn.au/the-state-of-indonesian-language-in-australian-universities-the-past-20-years/">rise was spurred by a national languages policy</a> introduced by the Hawke government, which highlighted the importance of Indonesian. The establishment of the <a href="https://www.deakin.edu.au/about-deakin/news-and-media-releases/articles/new-colombo-plan-helps-australians-engage-with-the-indo-pacific">New Colombo Plan</a> by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop provided fresh momentum after 2013, supporting significant numbers of Australians to study Indonesian and other regional languages while extending their studies abroad. </p>
<p>Governments can clearly play a role in stimulating public interest. </p>
<p>Successive Australian administrations have certainly prioritised the official relationship between the countries, with both the Keating and Howard governments signing security agreements with Indonesia in <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9596/96rp25">1995</a> and <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/agreement-between-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-australia-on-the-framework-for-security-cooperation">2006</a>, respectively. </p>
<p>The Morrison government has joined its predecessors in prioritising Jakarta as a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-09/australia-indonesia-boost-defence-ties-meeting-jakarta/100448662">destination for ministerial travel</a>. During a <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7424287/payne-dutton-in-jakarta-security-talks/">recent visit</a> by Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton to Jakarta last September, the two countries agreed to collaborate more closely on defence training and efforts to combat terrorism and cybercrime.</p>
<p>And a new trade agreement, called the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement">Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement</a>, came into force in mid-2020, which built on a range of important economic and security arrangements between the countries. </p>
<p>By reducing barriers to trade, this agreement provides the framework to boost bilateral trading links – if business is willing.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-more-than-a-free-trade-agreement-but-what-exactly-have-australia-and-indonesia-signed-112853">It's more than a free trade agreement. But what exactly have Australia and Indonesia signed?</a>
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<h2>Fresh opportunities for trade</h2>
<p>Despite these efforts, the two countries are still “<a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/strangers-next-door-9781509918171/">strangers next door</a>.” Australians stand to lose most if the two countries remain this way.</p>
<p>Indonesia is <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability">projected</a> by some to be the world’s fifth-largest economy by 2030, and fourth-largest soon after that. It is already host to many mega-cities and a thriving digital economy. In fact, a number of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanburgos/2021/12/14/indonesias-tech-unicorns-are-leading-the-countrys-ipo-rush/?sh=2a2d3e11f3d4">tech “unicorn” companies</a> are developing relationships with the largest global tech platforms. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1456453146117492744"}"></div></p>
<p>There are other areas <a href="https://australiaindonesiacentre.org/trade/a-closer-look-at-australia-indonesia-trade-potential/">of growth potential in the trade relationship</a>, including textiles, fashion, food processing, healthcare services and infrastructure development. </p>
<p>But, overall, bilateral trade remains too skewed towards “traditional” items, such as petroleum, minerals and live animals. The economic relationship is under-performing as a result. </p>
<p>In fact, trade between the two countries has declined to the point where <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias-goods-and-services-by-top-15-partners-2020.pdf">Indonesia is now Australia’s 14th largest trading partner</a>, behind Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia. This cannot be fully explained by the pandemic’s impact on the tourism and education markets. </p>
<p>Indonesia should be factored into any Australian strategy to diversify its trading links away from China. But Australians will be poorly positioned to take advantage of these opportunities unless something is done to address the lack of knowledge about Indonesia’s language, culture and governance.</p>
<h2>Greater public awareness is what’s needed</h2>
<p>A truly mature relationship requires high levels of public participation and awareness, and this needs work. </p>
<p>The challenge is for Australians to stay informed about what Indonesia is becoming. This involves understanding the effort it has made to put its security challenges in the past, while also recognising there are some areas where we may differ. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesians-support-for-the-death-penalty-declines-with-more-rigorous-survey-methods-167123">death penalty</a> is an obvious case in point, and a really strong relationship should allow for frank discussion on this and other human rights concerns.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesians-support-for-the-death-penalty-declines-with-more-rigorous-survey-methods-167123">Indonesians' support for the death penalty declines with more rigorous survey methods</a>
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<p>While there’s a lot of ground to make up, there are some positive ingredients to work with. The <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/trust-in-global-powers">2021 Lowy Institute poll</a> indicates Australian trust in Indonesia as a nation has lifted recently, even if Australian knowledge of the country and trust in its leaders remain low. </p>
<p>Science and technology ties remain strong, with some exciting joint research projects by Australian and Indonesian universities underway through the <a href="https://pair.australiaindonesiacentre.org/">Partnership for Australia-Indonesia Research</a>. And programs such as the <a href="https://aiya.org.au/">Australia-Indonesia Youth Association</a> indicate growing interest by young people in both countries to learn more about each other. </p>
<p>Before the last Australian federal election in 2019, there were <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-indonesia-towards-a-durable-partnership/">calls for any incoming government to stimulate fresh community understanding and awareness</a> of this important relationship. This case remains strong. Indonesia is changing, and Australians need to keep up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Kemish is a director of the Australia-Indonesia Centre and a senior adviser with Bower Group Asia. He is also a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute and an adjunct professor at the University of Queensland. He is a former Australian diplomat who served as Head of DFAT's Southeast Asia Division, as Head of the Prime Minister's International Division, and as an Ambassador in both the Asia Pacific and Europe. After leaving government service he worked for several years as a member of the leadership team at Newcrest Mining Limited, which had operational interests in eastern Indonesia.</span></em></p>A truly mature relationship requires high levels of public participation and awareness, and this is what needs work with our northern neighbour.Ian Kemish AM, Former Ambassador and Adjunct Professor, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1630802021-06-23T09:24:46Z2021-06-23T09:24:46ZWhat is Indonesia’s US$125 billion arms procurement budget plan about and what does it need to do?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407629/original/file-20210622-15-azdawx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1921%2C1245&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto (foreground, left) and Indonesian President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo (right).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wahyu Putro A/Antara Foto</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Indonesian Defence Ministry’s plan to seek up to <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/06/02/government-seeks-up-to-125-billion-in-loans-to-modernize-military.html">US$125 billion</a> in loans to modernise the country’s military was leaked to the public earlier this month.</p>
<p>The news created a stir. The number translates to around Rp 1.7 quadrillion (it’s a 16-digit number). By comparison, the Indonesian government planned to spend a total of <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/01/govt-house-pass-indonesias-2021-state-budget-what-you-need-to-know.html">Rp 2.75 quadrillion</a> ($185.19 billion) in its 2021 budget.</p>
<p>The ministry said that since the procurement would be financed by foreign debt it would not <a href="https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/kemhan-alpalhankam-rp-1-760-t-dibiayai-utang-luar-negeri-agar-tak-bebani-apbn-1vqtQyginUk/full">burden the state budget</a>. That statement has also raised more than a few eyebrows.</p>
<p>So, does the number make sense? </p>
<h2>A long-term plan</h2>
<p>The plan – drafted in a presidential regulation – outlines an overall defence procurement budget intended for a 25-year-period of 2020–2044.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s defence planning is usually done in a five-year medium term and is called the strategic plan (“rencana strategies” or renstra). </p>
<p>Longer-term planning is usually done by combining several renstra. </p>
<p>For example, the Minimum Essential Force (<a href="https://www.kemhan.go.id/ppid/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/Permenhan-Nomor-19-Tahun-2012-Lampiran-1.pdf">MEF</a>) arms modernisation policy planned for 2010–2024, or 15 years. It is divided into three renstra, covering 2010–2014, 2015–2019 and 2020–2024.</p>
<p>The leaked draft combines the third renstra of the MEF (2020–2024) with four new renstra up to 2044, which are still being finalised. </p>
<p>The Indonesia Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces will then discuss which weapon systems are to be procured within each renstra.</p>
<p>According to an <a href="https://www.lab45.id/detail/83/tilik-data-dinamika-senjata-rp1-7-kuadriliun">analysis</a> by Andi Widjajanto and colleagues of Lab 45 research institute, the planned number makes sense. Their analysis is based on a technocratic budget planning approach, using conservative macroeconomic assumptions in calculating an economic growth projection.</p>
<p>The budget shows the Defence Ministry is not planning a sharp increase in the budget for weapon systems procurement.</p>
<p>Allocating a big enough budget for weapon systems procurement is crucial to improve the military’s capability to ensure Indonesia’s national security. </p>
<p>It is even more essential considering the long list of accidents involving Indonesia’s ageing weapon systems, including the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-indonesia-must-learn-from-the-nanggala-submarine-tragedy-160572">Nanggala submarine tragedy</a>.</p>
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<strong>
Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-indonesia-must-learn-from-the-nanggala-submarine-tragedy-160572">Lessons Indonesia must learn from the Nanggala submarine tragedy</a>
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<h2>Guns <em>versus</em> butter, or guns <em>and</em> butter?</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, arguments against the budget persist, citing the guns versus butter trade-off.</p>
<p>The term “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111564">guns versus butter</a>” refers to the macroeconomics model based on the idea that a country must choose between guns (defence/military) or butter (civilian goods) when deciding how to spend its finite resources. </p>
<p>The more it spends on defence, the less it can spend on civilian production, which would improve economic growth, and vice versa.</p>
<p>Proponents of the guns versus butter model see military spending as having adverse effects on economic growth. Therefore, they propose the government limits its defence budget to maximise its spending on goods that increase social welfare.</p>
<p>Others have argued that military spending can have positive effects on the economy. This proposition is known as “<a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/guns-and-butter">guns and butter</a>”.</p>
<p>Proponents of this argument see military spending as important to guard national security, which is vital to support economic activities. </p>
<p>They also believe military spending can boost aggregate demand in the economy, create employment, lead to spin-offs of military technology to civilian goods, support human capital development and stimulate the economy.</p>
<p>Which model is more relevant in the Indonesian context? </p>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v1i2.63">study</a> I did with my colleagues in 2013 found Indonesia’s military spending positively affects the country’s economic growth. It was most possibly due to human capital development as an effect of military expenditure. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="http://www.kho.edu.tr/akademIk/enstItu/Alp_SAVBEN_dergi/151/3.pdf">another study in 2016</a> found Indonesia’s defence spending correlates positively with its economic growth.</p>
<p>The findings that Indonesia’s military spending has positive effects on the economy have led the government to focus on a strategy of defence investment. </p>
<p>President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo first raised the term during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/experts-respond-to-indonesias-4th-round-of-presidential-debate-jokowi-defeats-prabowo-114559">fourth round of presidential debates</a> against Prabowo Subianto in March 2019. After Jokowi was elected president for the second time in October 2019, he named Prabowo as his defence minister.</p>
<p><a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/11/11/18204461/prabowo-dengan-biaya-berapa-pun-pertahanan-indonesia-harus-kuat">Defence investment</a> has since been the central policy of the Defence Ministry. Weapon systems procurement is part of the defence investment strategy.</p>
<p>Overall, Indonesia’s arms procurement aims to fulfil the nation’s defence needs and establish a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-self-reliant-defence-industry-a-mission-impossible-for-indonesia-98934">self-reliant defence industry</a>. To this end, Indonesia has required offset and technology transfer in foreign purchases.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407648/original/file-20210622-27-1ufs4kh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An Indonesian military weapons system exhibition in Surabaya, East Java, in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">M Risyal Hidayat/Antara Foto</span></span>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesian-defence-minister-prabowo-in-the-us-what-lies-ahead-for-defence-cooperation-148732">Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo in the US: what lies ahead for defence cooperation</a>
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<h2>Good governance and accountability</h2>
<p>Regardless of how big a budget number it involves, one thing is for sure: weapon systems procurement needs to observe principles of good governance, accountability and legislative oversight.</p>
<p>This might be the public’s most relevant concern about the recent weapon systems procurement budget plan. After all, Indonesia’s past arms purchases have often been riddled with irregularities.</p>
<p>Transparency International placed Indonesia in Band D of its <a href="http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/indonesia/">2015 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index</a>, meaning Indonesia’s defence sector had high risk of corruption. </p>
<p>According to the index, Indonesia has problems in scrutiny and active enforcement of military-owned businesses, scrutiny of off-budget expenditures, and in procurement systems.</p>
<p>An example was the procurement of an Italian-made <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/02/09/revisiting-military-and-industrial-relations.html">AW101 helicopter</a> in 2017. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.kemhan.go.id/itjen/2013/01/02/undangundang-republik-indonesia-nomor-16-tahun-2012-tentang-industri-pertahanan.html">Indonesian Defence Industry Law</a> obliges the Armed Forces to prioritise purchase from the domestic defence industry if it could produce similar products. In this case, state-owned aircraft maker PT Dirgantara Indonesia could produce helicopters with equal capabilities.</p>
<p>The procurement had been vetoed by <a href="https://nasional.tempo.co/read/724621/jokowi-batalkan-pembelian-heli-presiden-aw-101">Jokowi</a>, then <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3382312/panglima-tni-saya-batalkan-kontrak-pembelian-heli-aw-101-tak-jadi">Armed Forces Commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo</a>, and then <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/01/19/07075901/menhan.sebut.pembelian.heli.agustawestland.aw101.batal">Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu</a>. </p>
<p>Still, the helicopter arrived in Indonesia in <a href="https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2849194/heli-aw-101-tiba-di-indonesia-ini-penjelasan-ksau">February 2017</a>. How come? Four years later now, it is still a mystery. An investigation by the Corruption Eradication Commission has <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5513270/jejak-kasus-dugaan-korupsi-heli-aw-101-mangkrak-di-kpk-digugat-ke-pn-jaksel">stalled</a> since 2019.</p>
<p>These irregularities can also be very deadly and costly. Some of Indonesia’s weapon systems accidents have involved secondhand systems received from problematic procurement. </p>
<p>For example, on March 10 2018, the Army’s <a href="https://jateng.tribunnews.com/2018/03/11/cerita-guru-tk-melihat-tenggelamnya-tank-m113-tergelincir-lalu-tenggelam-seorang-siswa-hanyut">M113 armoured vehicle</a> sank in a river in Purworejo, Central Java, while carrying preschoolers, killing two people. It was a secondhand vehicle from the Belgian Armed Forces.</p>
<p>To prevent future irregularities, especially with a budget number so huge, civil society organisations have proposed that weapon systems procurement needs to be made publicly accountable. Its financing should be transparent. Military court reform is also urgently needed. </p>
<p>I could not agree more. </p>
<p>Accountability in arms procurement is essential to avoid another deadly, costly incident – as well as ensure Indonesia gets its money’s worth in terms of the performance, operability and serviceability of its weapon systems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163080/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tangguh Chairil tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>The budget number, slated to cover a 25-year-period, is not peculiar. Nevertheless, weapon systems procurement needs to involve good governance, accountability and legislative oversight.Tangguh Chairil, Lecturer in International Relations, Binus UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1589552021-06-02T20:09:23Z2021-06-02T20:09:23ZIndonesia may be on the cusp of a major COVID spike. Unlike its neighbours, though, there is no lockdown yet<p>No one really knows the true state of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, and that means it is unpredictable. But there are good reasons to worry about what will happen next.</p>
<p>Fifteen months after Indonesia reported its first case of COVID-19, testing for the coronavirus remains among the lowest in Asia. Perhaps because it is not free, testing has reached only around <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/full-list-cumulative-total-tests-per-thousand-map">40 per 1,000 people</a>, compared with 115 in the Philippines, 373 in Malaysia, and more than 2,000 in Singapore. </p>
<p>Testing is better even in Myanmar, where a military coup has triggered daily protests and an increasingly fraught security situation.</p>
<p>And Indonesia’s test results are not reliable. The country is still excessively reliant on <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/04/false-security-who-advises-against-using-covid-19-rapid-test-as-travel-requirement.html">rapid antigen tests</a>, which are less accurate than PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests.</p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesian-made-covid-19-breathalyser-sensitivity-comparable-to-rt-pcr-155497">Indonesian-made COVID-19 breathalyser sensitivity comparable to RT-PCR</a>
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<p>Indonesia’s official death reports are questionable too. <a href="https://laporcovid19.org">LaporCovid-19</a>, an independent website established to provide accurate information about the pandemic, noted a discrepancy between the 48,477 COVID-related deaths reported by the government in May and its own total of 50,729. It reached its tally by simply adding the death tolls of <a href="https://laporcovid19.org/post/data-warga-diduga-bocor-data-covid-19-disembunyikan">each province</a> – and that was with out-of-date data from six provinces and none from Papua.</p>
<p>In fact, researchers and journalists have long pointed to significant “<a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/excess_deaths.htm">excess deaths</a>” as evidence of significant under-reporting of COVID fatalities in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Excess deaths refer to the number of deaths occurring beyond what would be expected in a normal year. One <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.12.14.20248159v1">study</a> found a 61% increase in excess deaths in Indonesia in 2020 compared with the previous five years, which was not reflected in the official data.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Indonesia's COVID deaths surged in January" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403968/original/file-20210602-27-l6czjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesia’s COVID deaths surged in late January, but may be on the rise again.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Achmad Ibrahim/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Concerns of a super-spreader event</h2>
<p>But even on the clearly inadequate official data available, COVID case numbers are now on the rise. Indonesia <a href="https://covid19.who.int/region/searo/country/id">reported</a> 2,385 new cases on May 15. Two weeks later, daily cases had more than doubled to 6,565.</p>
<p>If numbers keep growing at this rate, Indonesia’s health system will not be able to cope. When daily cases peaked earlier this year at 10,000-14,000 new cases per day (officially), Jakarta’s hospitals were overwhelmed and COVID patients were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/26/covid-patients-turned-away-as-hospitals-in-indonesia-face-collapse">turned away</a>.</p>
<p>And there is a real possibility the numbers will get this high again — maybe even worse. </p>
<p>Countries in the region that had managed the pandemic well through 2020, such as Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia are now experiencing deadly third and fourth waves. In early May, Indonesian authorities also reported cases of the UK variant (B.1.1.7), South African variant (B.1.351) and Indian variant (B.1.617.2), which are more contagious than the original strain. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-is-forcing-millions-of-girls-out-of-school-in-south-east-asia-and-the-pacific-157230">COVID is forcing millions of girls out of school in South-east Asia and the Pacific</a>
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<p>To make matters worse, Indonesia just experienced a national super-spreader event: Eid al-Fitr, the most important Islamic holiday. </p>
<p>Traditionally, millions of Muslims <a href="https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNGEGN/docs/11th-uncsgn-docs/The%20Role%20of%20Toponymy_Indonesia.pdf">return to their home villages</a> to see family and friends during this time — a mass event known as <em>mudik</em>. Fearing a repeat of last year, when daily cases <a href="https://setkab.go.id/en/press-statement-of-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-on-the-ban-of-this-years-mudik-friday-16-april-2021/">shot up by 93%</a> after <em>mudik</em>, the government banned travel this year — the second time it has tried to halt <em>mudik</em>. </p>
<p>But, as is so often the case in Indonesia, enforcement was badly lacking, and <em>mudik</em> rolled on, even if numbers were down. WhatsApp groups were ablaze with <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2021/05/06/bribes-lies-and-black-sticky-rice-indonesians-outsmart-mudik-ban.html">ways to avoid</a> police checkpoints.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1390651083580755971"}"></div></p>
<p>Over the past fortnight, Indonesians have been gradually returning to the cities, fuelling concerns of a major outbreak. </p>
<p>This is happening in next-door Malaysia, where the government has announced a post-Eid <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/covid-19-malaysia-third-lockdown-more-cases-empty-streets-malls-14927082">total lockdown</a> of the entire country as consecutive days of record infections catapulted its total caseload above 550,000.</p>
<p>In Vietnam, as well, the government has just <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/31/vietnam-hybrid-coronavirus-variant-ho-chi-minh-city-restrictions/">imposed</a> a two-week lockdown on the largest city, Ho Chi Minh City, with plans to test all 9 million residents.</p>
<p>But in Indonesia, with more than eight times the population of Malaysia and a far weaker health care system, it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-new-normal-might-fail-in-indonesia-and-how-to-fix-it-140798">business as usual, or what the government calls the “new normal”</a>. </p>
<p>The government recently expanded its <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/482656/indonesia-officials-expand-and-extend-covid-19-restrictions-nationwide-through-june-14-update-73">social restrictions</a> nationwide through June 14, requiring schools to shut, shops and restaurants to close by a certain time each night, and limits on employees allowed in offices. However, a more robust lockdown still appears only a remote possibility.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-new-normal-might-fail-in-indonesia-and-how-to-fix-it-140798">Why a 'new normal' might fail in Indonesia and how to fix it</a>
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<h2>Vaccine rollout offers some hope</h2>
<p>Indonesia’s vaccine rollout may offer a slim ray of hope. More than 27 million vaccine doses have <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/indonesia">now been delivered</a> and nearly 4% of Indonesia’s population (10 million of 270 million) has been fully vaccinated, compared with 3.6% in Malaysia, 2.7% in Japan and a woeful 2% in Australia.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s vaccine program began in January with a combination of AstraZeneca, procured through the World Health Organization’s COVAX scheme, and the Chinese-made Sinovac vaccines. But AstraZeneca shortages exacerbated by the recent COVID surge in India have led to <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-satisfied-with-effectiveness-of-chinese-covid-19-14608920">greater reliance on China</a>. </p>
<p>In April, the Indonesian government approved Sinopharm for <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1851441/world">emergency use</a>, and supplies of the China’s CanSino and the Russian Sputnik V vaccines are on the way. </p>
<p>There are concerns about the efficacy of these vaccines, but most Indonesians would agree they are better than nothing.</p>
<p>A two-track vaccination system has <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-vaccination-programme-rate-covid-19-challenges-gotong-14881924">now been developed</a>. The government is offering Sinovac or AstraZeneca vaccines free to health workers, senior citizens and public servants, and for a fee to anyone else. </p>
<p>At the same time, a program self-funded by companies is offering their employees Sinopharm vaccines supplied by the government.</p>
<p>This two-pronged approach will help increase vaccination numbers, but only a little. The corporate program is costly, and most medium-to-small enterprises — which represent <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_695134.pdf">99% of businesses</a> in Indonesia — simply can’t afford it. </p>
<p>And the young, poor and unemployed — a fast-growing group as the economy continues to slide – have little hope of getting a jab.</p>
<h2>Scandals and data leaks</h2>
<p>Price-gouging, corruption and other crimes are only make things worse. Several civil servants were <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3134658/chinese-vaccines-meant-indonesian-prison-stolen-and-sold-public">arrested</a> last month, for example, for allegedly stealing Sinovac vaccines intended for a prison, to sell to the public. </p>
<p>Worse still, former social affairs minister Juliari Batubara <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/6/indonesia-juliari-batubara-named-suspect-in-covid-19-graft-case">stands accused</a> of taking 17 billion rupiah (A$1.5 million) in bribes related to the distribution of COVID-19 aid for the poor. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-coronavirus-fatalities-are-the-highest-in-southeast-asia-so-why-is-jokowi-rushing-to-get-back-to-business-144059">Indonesia's coronavirus fatalities are the highest in Southeast Asia. So, why is Jokowi rushing to get back to business?</a>
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<p>And, most recently, the social security data of 279 million Indonesians — both alive and dead — is believed to have been <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/05/23/alleged-breach-of-bpjs-data-points-to-indonesias-weak-data-protection-experts.html">leaked</a> and sold on the dark web. </p>
<p>Pandemic fatigue has well and truly set in, and these high-profile scandals threaten to further deepen distrust between Indonesians and the government. The country will not fare well if predictions of an even bigger outbreak fuelled by new variants of the virus come true. </p>
<p>If this happens, the government will may well find itself facing a looming health catastrophe, rising social unrest and perhaps serious political tensions, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey has received funding from Australian Research Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Max Walden is a PhD Candidate under the Australian Research Council-funded project "Indonesia's refugee policies: responsibility, security and regionalism".</span></em></p>New cases have more than doubled in the past two weeks, sparking concerns that last month’s Eid holiday could have been a super-spreader event.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneMax Walden, PhD Candidate at Melbourne Law School, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600082021-04-30T07:02:52Z2021-04-30T07:02:52ZPoliticisation of Indonesia’s state research body shatters technocrat dream – time for scholars to stop being naive and anti-politics<p>The leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a member of the country’s ruling coalition, will <a href="https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/kepala-brin-megawati-jadi-ketua-dewan-pengarah-1ve5pWgWqvB">head the supervisory council</a> of the newly established <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/04/28/reshuffle-marks-new-era-of-research-innovation.html">National Research and Innovation Agency</a> (<em>Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional</em> or BRIN).</p>
<p>New BRIN chief Laksana Tri Handoko said that, according to a yet-to-be-published presidential regulation, the chair of the state ideology body, the Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education (BPIP), will head the BRIN supervisory council. That will be the matriarch of PDI-P (of which President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is a member), former president Megawati Soekarnoputri.</p>
<p>BRIN had been under the purview of the now-defunct Research and Technology Ministry. The agency will co-ordinate all research by government bodies and universities.</p>
<p>The new oversight of BRIN opens the door to <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1455880/the-danger-in-politicizing-research">politicisation of research</a> in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Not only could the research budget be misused for narrow political-economy interests, the research institution could be policitised for profit-gaining. This can be done, for example, by giving scientific support to huge projects that do not necessarily benefit the public.</p>
<p>Megawati has previously said BRIN was established as part of an effort to <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20210413124417-4-237461/brin-mimpi-megawati-yang-diwujudkan-jokowi">implement the state ideology of Pancasila</a>, instead of to mainstream research.</p>
<p>As such, BRIN is now placed as an instrument of state ideological indoctrination that serves the ruling interests.</p>
<p>This shatters the dream of technocrats who pushed BRIN as a vehicle to create a knowledge and innovation ecosystem that supports the making of quality research-based public policies. </p>
<p>The change in BRIN’s institutional design to be open to political intervention shows how the government is unwilling to prioritise research and technology. It is also evidence of the limitations of technocratic ideas.</p>
<h2>Technocratic limitations exposed</h2>
<p>The creation of BRIN, under the <a href="https://penelitian.ugm.ac.id/2019/08/21/undang-undang-no-11-tahun-2019-tentang-sistem-nasional-ilmu-pengetahuan-dan-teknologi/">2019 law on national system of science and technology</a>, was a technocratic effort to push research-based public policies.</p>
<p>Technocratic ideas rely on changes on an institutional level that underline actor and institution capacity and institutional management. The idea is that a problem happens due to weak actor and institutional capacity, or poor institutional design.</p>
<p>The technocratic solution is to strengthen the capacity of actors working in an institution through various forms of training. Promoting new regulations or bodies, like BRIN, to build a superior research ecosystem is also a form of change based on technocratic ideas.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ksi-indonesia.org/id/about">Knowledge Sector Initiative</a> (KSI), a partnership program between the Indonesian and Australian governments, is <a href="https://www.ksi-indonesia.org/id/wawasan/detail/1136-membangun-badan-riset-dan-inovasi-nasional-yang-efektif">one of the main proponents</a> of this approach. KSI is one of The Conversation Indonesia’s donors. </p>
<p>KSI positions itself as catalyst for change that brings together stakeholders to push research-based policymaking.</p>
<p>To realise these technocratic ideas, this partnership program has facilitated meetings between Indonesian ministries - especially between the Research and Technology Ministry, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), and the Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform Ministry - leading to the Science and Innovation (<em>Ekosistem Pengetahuan dan Inovasi</em> or EPI) <a href="https://lldikti5.kemdikbud.go.id/assets/thirdparty/filemanager/source/sistem_informasi/regulasi/FINAL%20-%20CETAK%20BIRU%20EKOSISTEM%20PENGETAHUAN%20%26%20INOVASI.pdf">blueprint</a>. This document aims to “synchronise policies and programs” and various legal regulations in creating this science ecosystem.</p>
<p>KSI also supports involvement by policy research institutions and the scientific community in drafting the law on a national system of science and technology.</p>
<p>However, the government’s manoeuvre in allowing political intervention in BRIN shows the technocratic approach is not enough to bring about meaningful change.</p>
<p>There are two problems with this approach. First, it tends to disregard aspects of power and considers public institutions in a vacuum.</p>
<p>Stanford University anthropologist James Ferguson consider this perspective as <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-anti-politics-machine">anti-politics</a> for disregarding political aspects in understanding realities.</p>
<p>An institution or a regulation can be made with noble intentions, but in the end power relations determine how the institution or regulation will work.</p>
<p>More often than not, technocratic ideas have legitimised power itself.</p>
<p>Second, because of its anti-politics characteristics, this approach tends to be optimistic but naive in looking at a problem. <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2021/04/15/riset-dan-inovasi-di-simpang-jalan/">Several articles by Indonesian technocrats</a> on the BRIN debate illustrate this optimism.</p>
<p>Despite political interests having more opportunity to intervene in BRIN, the technocrats still believe the state is <a href="https://theconversation.com/brin-cerai-dari-kementerian-riset-dan-teknologi-benarkah-akan-mengakhiri-ketidakpastian-status-dan-fungsinya-158947">on the side of research and innovation</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, the dissolution of the Research and Technology Ministry clearly shows the government does not see building a superior research ecosystem as a priority.</p>
<h2>Focus on rent seeking</h2>
<p>The politicisation of BRIN also shows research products are not considered important in Indonesian policymaking.</p>
<p>The government clearly prioritises economic development over other fields, including science and technology.</p>
<p>Even in COVID-19 pandemic management, <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/investment-at-all-costs-jokowi-fails-the-coronavirus-test/">economic concerns</a> took priority over public health matters that put human lives at risk. For example, vaccines were prioritised for working-age adults over vulnerable groups like the elderly. <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/covid-19-indonesia-vaccine-program-worker-mandiri-jokowi-sinovac-14341636">Economic recovery was a stronger motive in decision-making than pandemic mitigation</a>.</p>
<p>But, what kind of economy is the Indonesian government focusing on?</p>
<p>When efforts to build research and innovation ecosystem are marginalised, then rent-seeking economics will be the focus, especially activities that rely on non-renewable resources (extractive industries), which tend to destroy nature and dismiss local/indigenous communities.</p>
<p>It’s a simple logic: if rent-seeking economic activities can generate profit for politico-business alliances, why should they invest more in research that produces no clear profit for these industries?</p>
<p>In the meantime, political control over BRIN also creates opportunities to exploit research resources for profit. It also provides opportunities to make scientific justification for rent-seeking practices. </p>
<p>Rent-seeking economics has become dominant in Indonesia, marked by <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203155011-14/democracy-money-politics-case-indonesia-vedi-hadiz">endemic corruption</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/the-end-of-the-kpk-at-the-hands-of-the-good-president/">incapacitation</a> of the Corruption Eradication Commission has given more space to rent-seeking practices.</p>
<p>The dominance of rent-seeking economics dismisses not only liberal economic principles of clean and good governance, but also research- and innovation-based economics.</p>
<h2>Weak scientific communities</h2>
<p>The politicisation of BRIN also reveals the Indonesian scientific communities’ weakness in analysing political situation and organising effective strategy.</p>
<p>The technocratic approach is too optimistic and ignorant in identifying the strength of scientific communities in generating change. It’s too heavily reliant on documents like EPI blueprints and the establishment of new institutions to build a superior research ecosystem.</p>
<p>Such documents appear to assume the ruling elites have interest in advancing research and innovation. In fact, politicians and businesspeople have their own logics in which accumulating wealth and power is their main interest.</p>
<p>There needs to be either an incentive or threat to push politico-business alliances to put aside their political-economic interest. Blueprints and new institutions like BRIN not only fail to provide incentive or threat, but also pave the way for very different interests to prevail.</p>
<p>EPI blueprints even support problematic laws like the <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/omnibus-law-shows-how-democratic-process-has-been-corrupted/">Job Creation Law</a>, which threatens <a href="https://tirto.id/dampak-omnibus-law-uu-cipta-kerja-rugikan-buruh-hingga-abaikan-ham-f5Cs">labor rights</a> and the <a href="https://katadata.co.id/sortatobing/ekonomi-hijau/5f7c3f0e25cc1/bahaya-pasal-pasal-omnibus-law-uu-ciptaker-yang-ancam-lingkungan-hidup">environment</a>, and facilitate <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/10/05/20012551/diatur-uu-cipta-kerja-lembaga-pengelola-investasi-dinilai-berpotensi?page=all">rent-seeking practices</a>.</p>
<p>The technocratic approach with its anti-politics attitude needs to be abandoned.</p>
<p>Change, including efforts to build a scientific ecosystem, can only be achieved through political struggle; it is not born out of politicians’ charity and goodwill.</p>
<p>Pushing for change means entering the arena of political fights: between advancing research against wealth-accumulating interests, and between science-based economics versus rent-seeking economics.</p>
<p>But political struggle is not about lobbying or seeking positions within the power structure in the hope of achieving change from within. That would be equivalent to submitting to subjugation or purposely seeking profit for self.</p>
<p>What needs to be done is to transform the scientific communities together with other social groups concerned with justice and welfare into a political power able to subdue the predatory alliance of politicians and businesspeople.</p>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This article has been updated to reflect that the Knowledge Sector Initiative is one of The Conversation Indonesia’s donors.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir is a commissioner at the Indonesian Caucus for Academic Freedom.</span></em></p>The institutional design of BRIN allows for political intervention, showing how the Indonesian government is unwilling to prioritise research and technology.Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, State University of Jakarta and Honorary Research Fellow at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583052021-04-15T07:13:03Z2021-04-15T07:13:03ZMoney, jobs and power: how the presidential system fosters political party infighting in Indonesia<p>In early March this year, a retired Indonesian army general named Moeldoko was elected chairman of the Democratic Party (known locally as Partai Demokrat or PD) in a <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/03/06/moeldoko-splits-democratic-party-poses-threat-to-sbys-ascendancy.html">controversial</a> extraordinary congress. Moeldoko — who, like many Indonesians, goes by just one name — is also the chief of staff of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.</p>
<p>Moeldoko ousted Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of Jokowi’s predecessor, former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly referred to by his initials SBY). SBY led the Democratic Party throughout his presidency from 2004 to 2014.</p>
<p>In early April, the government <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/04/05/government-puts-foot-down-in-democrat-schism-deals-political-blow-to-moeldoko.html">refused</a> to recognise Moeldoko as chairman of PD on the grounds certain administrative requirements hadn’t been met by a government-set deadline. This ruling means Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono still holds chairmanship of PD.</p>
<p>The PD split, although it didn’t last long, was not the first party political schism in Indonesia’s political history. The United Development Party (<a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/19/govt-gives-nod-to-initial-ppp-leadership.html">PPP</a>) and the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/05/golkarsplitairlanggasetspartymeetinginvites-bambangssupporters.html">Golkar Party</a> have also split in the past.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2017.1413499?journalCode=ccpo20">studied</a> how Indonesian parties and its party system have changed since the fall of ex-president Soeharto (a dictator who ruled Indonesia from 1966 until his resignation in 1998) and the subsequent shift to democratic, direct presidential elections.</p>
<p>Presidentialism in Indonesia creates very specific political dynamics. It has fostered factionalism, where infighting is driven not by different policy ideas, but by the struggle for money, jobs, and power.</p>
<h2>Effects of presidentialism</h2>
<p>In general, presidentialism is marked by the executive branch’s dual origin and distinct survival strategies: the president and parliament are both directly elected, and the president can only be removed through impeachment.</p>
<p>Under his New Order regime, president Soeharto amassed enormous and almost unchecked power; the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) was the highest state organ on paper only.</p>
<p>Soeharto controlled Golkar — the regime party — and was able to subdue the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI) and the PPP, which were then, at best, two semi-oppositional parties.</p>
<p>After his fall in 1998, the lawmaking power of the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) was strengthened considerably.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the early reform period — known locally as Reformasi — was marked by uncertainty.</p>
<p>The impeachment of president Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid in 2001 was the result of a power struggle between the DPR, the MPR, and a president who strongly disagreed with parliament about the authority of his office.</p>
<p>As a reaction to the upheaval created by Gus Dur’s fall, direct presidential elections were held for the first time in the country’s history in 2004.</p>
<p>Presidentialism tends to entail particular forms of factionalism, especially on grounds of a dualism between the president and his/her party. As the president is directly elected, he/she is not as dependent on the support of parliament (and political parties) as a prime minister would be. </p>
<p>Factionalism in presidential systems is, of course, not only a question of electoral rules governing whether parties are well-organised or institutionalised. </p>
<p>Parties can be more <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/saaa/39/1">factionalised</a> if intra-party democracy is higher, if the political economy of parties does not benefit single financiers, if the party is rather decentralised, if organisational regulations (for example on party membership or the election of the executive board) are not well-defined, and so on.</p>
<p>If new parties, such as in Indonesia, do not have a realistic chance to succeed because of – among other things – a high electoral threshold, regulations demanding the establishment of a high number of branches, and the need to finance very expensive campaigns, the tensions between different groups cannot easily be solved by creating new parties.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, presidentialism has brought at least three effects. </p>
<p>First, it has resulted in the establishment of political parties for the purpose of fostering a presidential candidate (or a candidate for other important positions). </p>
<p>The PD, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/02/national-scene-wiranto-officially-runs-president.html">the People’s Conscience (Hanura) Party</a>, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/20/a-bumpy-road-prabowo-despite-gerindra-s-rise.html">Gerindra</a>, and <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/18/newly-established-nasdem-aims-high-general-election.html">NasDem Party</a> come to mind. </p>
<p>This is only possible in political systems within which rich people can build such vehicles from scratch. </p>
<p>Presidentialism here means the rise of more or less charismatic leaders with their own vehicles. </p>
<p>Factionalism in these parties is low if the party leader is very strong (like Gerindra party leader and presidential-hopeful, Prabowo Subianto). </p>
<p>But factionalism is strong when the party leader — such as former president and PD leader SBY — allows for some competition or is forced to live with it, for example when he leaves office. </p>
<p>Second, there are outsiders like the current president, Jokowi, who have made their careers substantially without their own parties, or at least without strong roots in one of the big parties. </p>
<p>Then, presidentialism can foster a dualism between the outsider and the party apparatus. This was apparent in the tension <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2015.1110684">between Jokowi and Megawati Soekarnoputri</a>, chief of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).</p>
<p>Third, over the years Jokowi has become a very powerful president and seems to be able to indirectly intervene in other parties’ internal infighting to manufacture the rise of factions supporting his presidency. Examples are the PPP, Golkar and, maybe, the PD. </p>
<p>The altercations in the PD are, arguably, characterised by a mixture of all these effects of presidentialism.</p>
<h2>Remedies</h2>
<p>Indonesian political parties collude and build grand coalitions; their platforms are not much different from each other. </p>
<p>The distinction between left and right-wing parties is almost meaningless. Parties have become part of a cartel and have been involved in numerous corruption cases at the national and sub-national levels. </p>
<p>Infighting often takes the form of factionalism marked by clientelism — in other words, the struggle about money, jobs, and power. </p>
<p>In contrast, policy-based factionalism, which is rare or nonexistent in Indonesia, is predominantly about political ideology. Different groups within the party fight over basic political ideas and connected strategies. </p>
<p>Indonesia needs parties with meaningful platforms representing the full spectrum of ideas from the political right to the political left. </p>
<p>To promote this, a strict regime of party and candidate financing combined with a selection of candidates based on binding rules on intra-party democratic procedures could be introduced. </p>
<p>Maybe then the groups within parties would not see their organisations merely as tools of power and patronage. Instead, debate could begin on how to craft complex policies on financial, economic, environmental, and health issues to serve the best interests of Indonesian voters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreas Ufen tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Presidentialism in Indonesia creates very specific political dynamics.Andreas Ufen, Adjunct professor, University of HamburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1509552020-12-08T07:51:28Z2020-12-08T07:51:28ZWith economic legacy in mind, Jokowi turns a political blind eye during the pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373528/original/file-20201208-19-2m7n1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1616%2C1076&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The pandemic has not been Indonesian President Joko Widodo's finest hour.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sigid Kurniawan/Antara Foto</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nine months into the pandemic, Indonesia is still in what has been dubbed an “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-indonesia-insight-idUSKCN25G02J">endless first wave</a>”. </p>
<p>As of mid-November, the spread of infection was still high. More than 13% of people tested were returning positive results. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), figures above 5% mean an outbreak is not under control.</p>
<p>In late November, the archipelagic nation passed a grim milestone, confirming a total of <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2020/11/23/indonesia-surpasses-half-million-covid-19-cases.html">more than half-a-million cases</a> since the first cases were announced in early March.</p>
<p>There is much blame to be shared over this dismal affair by the WHO and the government. </p>
<p>The WHO, by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/health/china-virus-who-emergency.html">minimising the severity of the spread of the virus</a> outside China at the start of the pandemic and <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/01/29/indonesia-well-prepared-to-handle-coronavirus-outbreak-who.html">overpraising the Indonesian government’s preparation</a>, contributed to complacency. </p>
<p>More damaging, however, is the Indonesian government’s own goal in dealing with the pandemic. The government’s attempts to play down the infectiousness and severity of the virus led people to underestimate the threat. </p>
<p>And the main driver of the government’s actions is its laser-like focus on economic growth.</p>
<h2>Economy first</h2>
<p>Even a month after the first COVID-19 cases were reported in Indonesia, the administration kept playing down the pandemic threat. It wrongly claimed the virus could not survive Indonesia’s <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4963524/saat-luhut-bicara-corona-tak-tahan-cuaca-panas-indonesia">high heat and humidity</a>. </p>
<p>As Jokowi admitted in an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-51382305">interview with BBC</a> in February, his administration’s main focus was on the economy. </p>
<p>When asked about the threat of a pandemic, he said his main concern was how it would jeopardise Indonesia’s image as a tourism destination, which would hurt incomes from tourism. </p>
<p>While nations all over the world were issuing travel warnings to prevent COVID-19 spreading into their territories, the administration instead pushed much-derided “Rp 72 billion influencer funds” to <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4915687/pemerintah-luruskan-soal-dana-influencer-rp-72-m-untuk-banyak-komponen">promote Indonesia as a tourist destination</a>.</p>
<p>This focus on the economy explained why Jokowi’s administration <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/03/13/we-dont-want-people-to-panic-jokowi-says-on-lack-of-transparency-about-covid-cases.html">kept mum</a> about the virus when it started to spread in Indonesia: to prevent people from panicking and, in turn, to prevent the economy from crashing.</p>
<p>And when there were calls for a national lockdown or a unilateral lockdown, especially from Anies Baswedan – the governor of Jakarta who is seen as a standard-bearer of the opposition – the administration attacked the proposal as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/indonesia-polarization-democratic-distress-and-coronavirus-pub-81641">dangerous and politically motivated</a>. </p>
<p>Home Minister Tito Karnavian rebuked such calls. He declared they <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200317145943-4-145527/temui-anies-tito-tegaskan-peringatan-jokowi-soal-lockdown">could damage the economy and cause public panic</a>, creating more problems. </p>
<p>Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Pandjaitan asked political elites to <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4962420/luhut-minta-para-elite-tak-politisasi-soal-corona-dewasalah-sekali-kali">“grow up” and stop politicising the pandemic</a>. Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security Mahfud MD said people should not panic since while COVID-19 was dangerous, <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5029287/mahfud-md-pemerintah-serius-atasi-corona-tapi-tak-takut-berlebihan">more people died from influenza, tuberculosis and dengue</a>.</p>
<p>Jokowi further justified his refusal to impose a total lockdown based on <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200321194208-4-146683/oh-ini-ternyata-kenapa-lockdown-tak-jadi-pilihan-jokowi">economic considerations</a>. He also pointed to <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200331085509-4-148631/maaf-pak-anies-permintaan-lockdown-dki-ditolak-jokowi">Italy and India as examples</a> of how a lockdown could cause social chaos. </p>
<p>And finally, after the pandemic started to spiral out of control, instead of pulling out all stops and imposing a strict national lockdown, Jokowi dithered. He <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28823/amid-lackluster-response-by-jokowi-indonesia-reels-from-covid-19">delegated the decision to impose lockdowns on regional heads</a>. Most likely he did this to shield himself from any political fallout from imposing lockdowns. </p>
<p>Instead, he promoted “<a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-says-mini-lockdowns-more-effective">mini lockdowns</a>,” localised lockdowns that would isolate small areas to prevent larger social disruption. </p>
<p>The problem, however, is that for this kind of lockdown to be effective, it needs to be combined with effective rapid testing and contact tracing, and these are lacking in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Prijo Sidipratomo, dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the National Veterans Development University in Jakarta, went so far as to say the government’s policy was effectively a strategy based on “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-indonesia-insight/endless-first-wave-how-indonesia-failed-to-control-coronavirus-idUSKCN25G02J">herd immunity</a>”. </p>
<p>By being indecisive, Indonesia ends up with the worst outcome: an uncontrolled domestic outbreak and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54819898">first economic recession in 22 years</a>. </p>
<p>It was only in September that Jokowi backtracked and said it was <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/09/07/10514071/jokowi-ingatkan-bahaya-jika-dahulukan-ekonomi-ketimbang-kesehatan">dangerous to put economic recovery</a> ahead of tackling the pandemic. </p>
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<strong>
Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nine-months-and-no-progress-what-went-wrong-in-indonesias-covid-19-responses-and-what-can-be-done-145850">'Nine months and no progress': what went wrong in Indonesia's COVID-19 responses and what can be done</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>Lack of political will</h2>
<p>Essentially, Jokowi administration’s inability to deal with the pandemic effectively boils down to a lack of political will to tackle the issue head-on for fear it could wreck the economy and, with it, his legacy. </p>
<p>Instead, the administration seemed to pin its hopes on the idea that perhaps the pandemic was not as severe as predicted due to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1868103420935561">tropical climate of Indonesia, ethnic Malays’ natural immunity to the virus, or the power of prayer</a>. </p>
<p>History is still being written on whether Indonesia’s haphazard approach may be a better choice in light of how Europe, which imposed strict lockdowns, could soon face a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-third-wave-europe-2021-world-health-organization-envoy/">third wave</a>. Still, at this point, the pandemic is not Jokowi’s finest hour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohanes Sulaiman tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Jokowi’s administration has been unable to deal with the pandemic effectively because it lacks political will and fears it could wreck the economy and, with it, his legacy.Yohanes Sulaiman, Associate Lecturer, School of Government, Universitas Jendral Achmad YaniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1317562020-02-13T05:30:42Z2020-02-13T05:30:42ZAustralia and Indonesia: how to collaborate like the Avengers<p>Can Australia and Indonesia collaborate like the Avengers? On Monday, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YnetrtC73M">President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>When the forces of good unite, the Avengers assemble, then the common enemy can be defeated. When Indonesia and Australia continue to collaborate then intolerance, protectionism, the fear of poverty and the threat of climate change can be overcome. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the last item might not get much traction in Australia, both national leaders seem confident about the collaboration between both countries and see a bright future ahead.</p>
<p>Partnership and collaboration are becoming more common approaches to some of our most pressing challenges; from <a href="https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/organization/crs/research-initiatives/team-science-field-guide">cancer research</a>, to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263786315000411">large infrastructure projects</a>, even to <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300">achieving the Sustainable Development Goals</a>.</p>
<p>However, you could say that in many instances collaboration itself turns out to be one of these big challenges. Even though Australians and Indonesians are both friendly and easy-going, systemic boundaries – lack of resources, institutional underpinnings, and inequitable collaborative processes – can slow down the process. </p>
<p>Through our work for the Australia-Indonesia Centre, we helped to link hundreds of researchers, government departments, business partners and other stakeholders in a variety of collaborative partnerships across both nations. </p>
<p>Through extensive evaluation of our work, we learned many valuable lessons on the key requirements to set up successful collaborative endeavours. </p>
<p>Here are some starting points that are often overlooked in dealing with systemic boundaries.</p>
<h2>Establish a level playing field</h2>
<p>Innovative partnerships and new collaborations typically generate a lot of energy and enthusiasm. </p>
<p>But systemic barriers can result in projects and ventures being delayed and people becoming demotivated and disengaged. For example, when there is a delay in data exchange between the countries people tend to blame their counterparts and get annoyed, rather than noticing the absence of an agreement that allows for the exchange of data. </p>
<p>This response relies on the “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=3aAwmlgC7YMC&lpg=PA191&ots=3Rg7W19nhE&dq=attribution%20in%20distributed%20work%20groups&lr&pg=PA191#v=onepage&q=attribution%20in%20distributed%20work%20groups&f=false">fundamental attribution error</a>” by which we attribute things that don’t go well to people’s personality, rather than considering the situational constraints. </p>
<p>That is a shame, as most people are very willing to collaborate and give it their best.</p>
<p>Contributions in terms of money, effort, time or ideas require careful consideration. They do not have to be equal in absolute terms but <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.001245">have to be equitable to fully engage everyone once they start collaborating</a>. </p>
<p>This sounds simple in theory. But differences in legal and bureaucratic environments can affect partners’ autonomy and timing of projects. </p>
<p>Both Indonesia and Australia are on different bureaucratic cycles. This means, for example, that budget decisions and allocations do often not align. </p>
<p>Because of the differences in bureaucratic decision-making, extra time might be required to get the desired result. The contracts and agreements that underpin the collaboration, therefore, require careful planning and consideration to prevent later misunderstandings and delays.</p>
<h2>Ensure equitable participation</h2>
<p>Once the playing field is established we should work on systemic barriers between people on the same team. </p>
<p>To get Australians and Indonesians on the same page and to ensure equitable participation, it is essential to have everyone participate straight from the very early stages. Shaping projects collaboratively drives equal representation of ideas and ownership, as well as achieving team commitment to outcomes. </p>
<p>Stimulating a “shared mental model” about who is on the team (and who is not), what the team will do, why, and how they will go about it <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2000-15247-010">can support collaboration</a>. </p>
<p>Having a shared understanding of these aspects of teamwork can overcome differences in national culture and create a culture that is unique to a team. A shared goal can anchor the collaboration and guide energy.</p>
<p><a href="https://cebp.aacrjournals.org/content/26/11/1581">Skilful facilitation</a> at these early stages can unite people who speak different languages (including jargon) and come from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343516300033">different cultures and fields of expertise</a>.</p>
<p>For example, at first instance, Indonesians often tend to talk less and listen more in meetings. Australians are happy to fill the gaps. As a result, the Australian voice can overpower the Indonesian. A facilitator can help here to accommodate these cultural differences and ensure equal input and influence.</p>
<h2>Avengers, assemble!</h2>
<p>Australia and Indonesia have had a working relationship <a href="http://guides.naa.gov.au/near-neighbours/chapter1/index.aspx">since the early days of Indonesian independence</a>. This relationship has had its fair share of challenges, as most strong relationships have. </p>
<p>President Jokowi voiced a strong intention for Australia and Indonesia to become partners in the development of the Pacific region. This vision would be a departure from the current strong bilateral relationship into multilateral collaboration. </p>
<p>As challenges become more complex, collaboration becomes more complex, but potentially also more interesting and rewarding. Whether it is combating bushfires, stimulating equality through trade, or supporting development of the Pacific region, we’ll need an epic team-up that ensures results.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=222&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=222&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=222&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>The Australia-Indonesia Centre supports The Conversation Indonesia as strategic partner.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131756/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martijn van der Kamp works with The Australia-Indonesia Centre as their Team Science Fellow.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugene Sebastian tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Even though Australians and Indonesians are both friendly and easy-going, systemic boundaries can slow down the process of collaboration.Martijn van der Kamp, Team Science Fellow, Australia-Indonesia CentreEugene Sebastian, Executive Director, Australia-Indonesia Centre, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314632020-02-10T10:59:48Z2020-02-10T10:59:48ZJokowi’s visit shows the Australia-Indonesia relationship is strong, but faultlines remain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314431/original/file-20200210-109891-9a8fqx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Rick Rycroft</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesian President Joko Widodo - Jokowi – has shown himself to be generally less interested in international affairs than his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). He has also been less committed to the Indonesia-Australia relationship. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, Australia’s invitation to Jokowi to address the parliament, and his acceptance of that invitation, suggests the bilateral relationship is strong, at least at the governmental level.</p>
<p>Both Morrison and Jokowi referred in their parliamentary addresses to the fact this year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and Indonesia. Morrison reflected backwards, noting Australia had been an early supporter of Indonesian independence, and had been chosen by Indonesia to represent its interests on a UN committee involved with the Indonesia-Dutch dispute then underway.</p>
<p>Jokowi chose to look forward, to 2050 and the 100th anniversary of the start of diplomatic relations. He identified four major steps he suggested the two countries should take together to strengthen their bilateral relationship, and to contribute to regional peace and security.</p>
<p>Two of these steps were fairly predictable recitations of established policy.</p>
<p>The first was cooperation in furthering democracy, respect for human rights, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation strategies. He spoke against identity politics, disputing the idea it was cultural clashes that divided the world. Implementation of these principles remains fraught with difficulties, but the parameters of the problems are well-known in Jakarta and Canberra.</p>
<p>Second, Jokowi argued for free and fair trade, both bilaterally and regionally, in the face of increasing protectionism. Here he welcomed the conclusion of the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">Indonesia Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement</a>, which he described as opening opportunities for economic growth in both countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-more-than-a-free-trade-agreement-but-what-exactly-have-australia-and-indonesia-signed-112853">It's more than a free trade agreement. But what exactly have Australia and Indonesia signed?</a>
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<p>But there were two other steps Jokowi wanted the two countries to take, which were perhaps different from what might have been expected.</p>
<p>First, he called for collaboration on protection of the environment. Some of his remarks were predictable, such as protection of forests and rivers. But he also argued for collaboration on lowering carbon emissions and handling climate change. </p>
<p>Jokowi did not explain what he had in mind with joint action to lower carbon emissions, or managing climate change. Indonesia is a major exporter of coal, and annual forest fires have substantially reduced forest cover. Its political and business leaders are even more divided than those in Australia on climate-related issues and how to deal with them.</p>
<p>What Australia and Indonesia seem to share, it might cynically be suggested, is internal disagreement over the nature of the problem being faced, and steps that might be taken to address it. </p>
<p>Second, Jokowi called for Australia and Indonesia to be “anchors for development programs” in the Pacific region.</p>
<p>Like Australia, Indonesia has recently been paying increased attention to the nations of the South Pacific. Last October, it established the <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-launches-212m-international-development-aid-fund">Indonesian Agency for International Development</a>, with a focus on the South Pacific. Speaking at the launch of the agency, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi noted assistance had already been provided to Tuvalu, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Fiji, as well as Myanmar and the Philippines.</p>
<p>Australia’s renewed interest in the South Pacific is linked to the increased Chinese presence in the region. But Indonesia’s concern is less with China than with the status of its easternmost provinces of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-world-failed-west-papua-in-its-campaign-for-independence-129623">West Papua</a> and Papua. The movement seeking the independence of this region from Indonesia has its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/03/indonesia-accuses-vanuatu-of-inexcusable-support-for-west-papua">greatest support in the south Pacific</a>, particularly in Vanuatu, though support has also come from Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-scott-morrison-deliver-on-climate-change-in-tuvalu-or-is-his-pacific-step-up-doomed-121501">Can Scott Morrison deliver on climate change in Tuvalu – or is his Pacific 'step up' doomed?</a>
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<p>Indonesia has <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-aid-agency-fund-pacific-nations-papua-independence-12023670">formally denied the establishment of the agency</a> was aimed at countering international criticism of Indonesia’s position in Papua. But the suspicion there is a link will be hard to shake off.</p>
<p>Australia’s formal position on the Papuan provinces is made clear in the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2008/3.html">2006 Lombok Treaty</a>, which committed each party to supporting the territorial integrity of the other, and not providing support to separatist movements. There is, though, considerable support for Papuan separatism in the Australian community, reflected in the parliament particularly by the Greens. The Greens’ new leader, Adam Bandt, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2020/feb/10/nationals-coalition-liberals-queensland-morrison-politics-live?page=with:block-5e40cc448f08e13324740425#block-5e40cc448f08e13324740425">is reported to have told Jokowi</a>, after his address: </p>
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<p>Thank you for your speech, thanks for your comments on climate change, now please get something done on West Papua.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is nothing new in the dilemma facing the Australian government on Papua, but the increased Indonesian focus on the Pacific region could well provide more opportunities for the two countries to differ than to work together effectively.</p>
<p>Finally, Jokowi’s speech was notable for what he did not say.</p>
<p>There was no mention of China’s increasingly activist foreign and defence policy position, especially in the South China Sea. However, given the issue was explicitly considered in the <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-0">joint statement</a> of the two leaders, the president may have deemed that sufficient.</p>
<p>The other significant omission was any mention of easing conditions for the issuing of visas to Indonesians to visit Australia. This had been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-08/indonesia-s-jokowi-to-urge-visa-rule-easing-on-australia-visit">widely discussed in Indonesia</a> before the president left for Australia. Scott Morrison <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-10/joko-widodo-indonesian-president-addresses-australian-parliament/11948604">did commit to reviewing the visa situation</a>, but Jokowi would be well advised not to hold his breath.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Brown is affiliated with the Australia Indonesia Business Council. This article does not reflect the views of the AIBC.</span></em></p>The Indonesian president outlined four major steps to improve the relationship, two of which were quite unexpected.Colin Brown, Adjunct Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1255532019-10-20T19:10:36Z2019-10-20T19:10:36ZMorrison says China knows ‘where Australia is coming from’, after meeting Chinese vice-president<p>Scott Morrison seized the opportunity of his Jakarta weekend visit for Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s inauguration to obtain a meeting with Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan.</p>
<p>Morrison told a news conference he had come out of the discussion “pleased that there is, I think, a very clear understanding of where Australia is coming from, our commitment to the relationship”.</p>
<p>“It was a chat that we had very much in the spirit of the partnership that we have, and very much inoculated from all of the assessments that are made about the relationship,” he said.</p>
<p>The meeting comes after Morrison’s description, while in the United States, of China as a “developed” economy, which China rejects. More generally, the relationship between the two countries has been very cool, with tensions on several fronts including Australia’s strong legislative stand against Chinese interference.</p>
<p>The discussion with Wang did not see an invitation for Morrison to visit China. The Prime Minister said Wang was an envoy of President Xi Jinping and not in a position to issue any invitation.</p>
<p>Wang, speaking at the start of their discussion, made it clear Australia had sought the meeting and Xi had given his approval for it. The discussion went for almost double the half hour scheduled.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/define-the-boundaries-in-new-phase-of-australia-china-relationship-wong-125210">Define the boundaries in new phase of Australia-China relationship: Wong</a>
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<p>Morrison told reporters he’d made the point “which was well received, that Australia is an independent, sovereign nation.</p>
<p>"Yes, we are very much proud of our Western liberal democratic tradition, our open economy and our engagement with the rest of the world and that gives us a set of eyes that look into the world very much from our perspective.”</p>
<p>But he had also stressed “that we will never feel corralled into any sort of binary assessment of these relationships” - assessments that said “pro-United States or pro-China”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile a Lowy Institute report, released Monday, warns that without an increase in its total aid budget Australia could be increasingly at a strategic disadvantage in the Pacific.</p>
<p>The research, which focuses on China’s expanding role there, concludes that so far “China has not been engaged in such problematic debt practices in the Pacific as to justify accusations of debt trap diplomacy”. But the scale of its lending and recipient countries’ lack of strong mechanisms to protect their debt sustainability mean there are clear risks, the paper says.</p>
<p>In contrast, Australia’s infrastructure lending plans contain rules to protect the sustainability of borrowing countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/vital-signs-why-cant-australia-be-friends-with-both-us-and-china-124261">Vital Signs: Why can't Australia be friends with both US and China?</a>
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<p>Making a strong call for a rethink of the overall Australian aid budget, the paper argues: “Today, Australia’s strategic goal of doing more in the Pacific is boxed in by a limited aid budget, the desire to avoid cutting back on other important development priorities (such as health and education, or aid to countries outside the Pacific), and the need to avoid causing debt sustainability problems by relying too heavily on non-concessional lending.</p>
<p>"If Australia wants to do more, one of these constraints needs to be relaxed. Increasing the overall aid budget would be the most desirable option,” the paper says.</p>
<p>Also, “China might itself begin providing substantially more grant financing in the Pacific. In that case, a stagnant aid budget would increasingly place Australia at a geostrategic disadvantage”.</p>
<p>The paper, titled “Ocean of debt? Belt and Road and debt diplomacy in the Pacific”, has been prepared by Roland Rajah, the head of the Institute’s international economy program, Alexandre Dayant, and Jonathan Pryke, the head of Lowy’s Pacific Islands program.</p>
<p>The work draws on data from the Institute’s Pacific Aid Map, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank to examine China’s development finance in the Pacific. </p>
<p>It says China is the single largest creditor in Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu, although only in Tonga does it account for more than half outstanding debt. “With the important exception of Tonga, China is currently not a dominant creditor in the Pacific.”</p>
<p>But the analysis finds: “there are significant risks of future debt sustainability problems under a business-as-usual scenario for bilateral Chinese lending”, pointing in particular to the situations of Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji and Papua New Guinea.</p>
<p>“China will therefore need to reconfigure its approach significantly if it wants to disprove the debt trap accusations made by its critics,” the paper says, while noting it has taken some steps in this direction.</p>
<p>“Protecting debt sustainability in Pacific countries will also require Australian loans to be as concessional as possible, given elevated debt risks and the often limited economic viability of many infrastructure projects in the Pacific,” the paper says.</p>
<p>The competition among major powers gives Pacific countries an opportunity to press for advantageous financing and better project management, it says.</p>
<p>For their part external players should avoid “geopolitically-driven” assistance aimed at “short-term wins” at the expense of the reforms and improved governance the countries need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Morrison stressed “that we will never feel corralled into any sort of binary assessment of these relationships” - assessments that said “pro-United States or pro-China”.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1154802019-04-25T10:05:49Z2019-04-25T10:05:49ZEither Jokowi or Prabowo: Indonesia’s foreign policy to remain the same under new president<p>The Indonesian public still needs to wait until May 22 to know the official tally of votes in the presidential election last week. But at least <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/pemilu2019/quickcount/pilpres">five credible survey agencies are forecasting</a> the re-election of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. </p>
<p>As the largest country in Southeast Asia, a region that’s facing growing security concern over the South China Sea as well as humanitarian issues in Myanmar with the persecution of ethnic Rohingya Muslims, whoever is elected as Indonesia’s president will determine how the country navigates its relations with regional neighbours and with the international community. </p>
<p>With the vast difference in style between Jokowi, a former furniture businessman turned politician, and his opponent, former military general Prabowo Subianto, one might think they would have very different foreign policy strategies. But that’s not the case. </p>
<p>Prabowo shares Jokowi’s ambition to boost “Indonesia’s active role in international affairs”, as shown in his <a href="https://www5.jetro.go.jp/newsletter/jkt/2018/VISI%20MISI%20ADIL%20MAKMUR%20BERSAMA%20PRABOWO%20SANDI.pdf">policy paper</a>. </p>
<p>Whoever wins the election, Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy, in which Indonesia does not align with any superpower and has an active role in contributing to world peace, will remain. </p>
<h2>Indonesia’s foreign policy remains intact</h2>
<p>The president is bound by the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174556.pdf">Indonesian Constitution</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwiQuI6I997hAhXSgeYKHbBqB6kQFjAAegQIABAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.track.unodc.org%2FLegalLibrary%2FLegalResources%2FIndonesia%2FLaws%2FAML%2520laws%2FIndonesia%2520Law%2520No.%252037%2520Concerning%2520Foreign%2520Relations%25201999.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0P83puPNcYGbakZ_i1i9RH">existing regulations</a> not to align the nation with any major powers. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, introduced this policy after Indonesia gained independence in 1945. At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union, the major superpowers, were fighting for influence around the world. </p>
<p>With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US became the world’s strongest power. But today power relations have shifted from the global “North” to the “South” with the rise of powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.</p>
<p>If the new president chooses to abandon this policy and take sides, this may disrupt the global order. </p>
<h2>Possible changes</h2>
<p>Despite the set-in-stone foreign policy, presidents still have room to modify how Indonesia implements its foreign policy. They can design a particular slogan to represent their strategies. </p>
<p>This slogan signals Indonesian foreign policy’s direction and priorities. </p>
<p>Sukarno’s foreign policy slogan was “<a href="https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/index.php/foreign-policy/">rowing between two reefs</a>”. It represented Indonesia’s position as a newly independent country that would not take sides between the United States and the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly called SBY, also introduced foreign policy slogans during his two terms from 2004 to 2014. The first was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704602?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">“Navigating in Turbulent Oceans”</a>, which was followed by <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/10/20/1308159/sby.million.friends.zero.enemy">“Zero Enemy, A Thousand Friends”</a>.</p>
<p>SBY’s slogans suggested Indonesia’s cautious steps amid growing uncertainty and a changing global order. At the same time, the slogans encouraged the country to befriend any country, which helped Indonesia advance its national interests. </p>
<p>Jokowi introduced <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html">“Global Maritime Fulcrum”</a> as a foreign policy slogan in 2014. The slogan sought to advance Indonesia’s strategic interests as an archipelagic state. </p>
<h2>Between Jokowi and Prabowo</h2>
<p>Both Jokowi and Prabowo hinted at the direction of their foreign policy strategies during the fourth presidential debate last March.</p>
<p>Jokowi pointed out Indonesia’s success as a mediator in conflicts involving Afghanistan and Rohingya in Myanmar. Learning from these successes, Jokowi wanted the country to capitalise on its status as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. </p>
<p>Jokowi’s <a href="https://www5.jetro.go.jp/newsletter/jkt/2018/VISI%20MISI%20FINAL%2022%20SEPT%202018.pdf">38-page policy paper</a> shows Indonesia would focus on “promoting total diplomacy, peace diplomacy, and human diplomacy” to strengthen Indonesia’s leadership in international forums under his administration. The paper was submitted to the General Election Commission, as required of presidential candidates. </p>
<p>On the other hand, Prabowo’s foreign relations standpoint is similar to SBY’s “Zero Enemy, A Thousand Friends” policy. However, during the debate, Prabowo emphasised the need to build a stronger military power to anticipate wars that might break out any time. </p>
<p>Prabowo’s inclination might be influenced by his military background. He was involved in a number of military operations in East Timor since the 1970s. </p>
<h2>What’s ahead for the new president</h2>
<p>In addition to the South China Sea dispute and the persecution of Rohingyas, Indonesia also has to consider other growing security concerns, including possible conflict on the <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/27/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-denuclearization/2936493002/">Korean Peninsula</a>. It must also tackle transnational crime, terrorism and violence extremism in the region.</p>
<p>When the new president is inaugurated in October, Indonesia will still have a non-permanent seat at the Security Council. The president will be responsible for <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/will-indonesia-bring-the-rohingya-issue-to-un-security-council-jakarta-post-contributor">representing the Asia-Pacific region in the UN’s most powerful body</a>. </p>
<p>The president will be expected to chair Security Council debates during Indonesia’s second year on the council. </p>
<p>Indonesia is also hoping to secure a seat on the UN Human Rights Council by fall 2019. Indonesia has been campaigning for this position since <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/17/indonesia-vies-for-spot-on-un-human-rights-body.html">earlier this year</a>. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s new president should not abandon the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its vehicle to become a regional powerhouse. As one of ASEAN’s founding nations, Indonesia is often considered its “natural leader”.</p>
<p>Indonesia is <a href="https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2019/mp_mr_190320a.aspx">leading</a> the drafting process of a strategy to enhance connectivity between countries in the Indian and Pacific oceans. If adopted, the strategy will make ASEAN central among countries from the shores of Africa to the Americas.</p>
<p>The new president might continue the already established foreign policy direction regionally and globally. While it might be too early to comment definitively on the foreign policy direction of either Jokowi or Prabowo, it will be too risky for both to retract from Indonesia’s current world standpoint.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dio Herdiawan Tobing tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Whoever wins the election, Indonesia’s foreign policy, in which the nation does not align with any superpower and has an active role in contributing to world peace, will remain.Dio Herdiawan Tobing, Senior Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center, Universitas Gadjah Mada Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1157122019-04-18T10:15:06Z2019-04-18T10:15:06ZJokowi wins Indonesia’s election, polls indicate – what does that mean for human rights?<p>Joko “Jokowi” Widodo will keep his position as Indonesia’s president for another term, now with a senior Islamic cleric Ma'ruf Amin as his vice president, according to early results from polling companies that surveyed the vote held on Wednesday April 17.</p>
<p>The official tally from the General Election Commission is expected by May 22. But various survey institutions such as <a href="https://quickcount.tempo.co/">Indicator, Indobarometer, Charta Politika</a>, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/04/17/breaking-jokowi-wins-second-term-csis-cyrus-quick-count.html">CSIS-Cyrus</a>, <a href="https://pemilu.kompas.com/hitunglangsung">Kompas</a> took a sample of around 2000 polling stations (TPS). Their sampling showed that Jokowi-Ma'ruf led the vote in the range of 54-56%, while the opposition ticket of Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno was at 44-46%.</p>
<p>We asked political and human rights experts to analyse what Jokowi’s apparent victory means for civil liberties and the protection of human rights in Indonesia.</p>
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<h2>Jokowi’s debt to human rights protection</h2>
<p><strong>Asmin Fransiska, Lecturer in Human Rights Law, Universitas Katolik Indonesia Atma Jaya</strong> </p>
<p>In 2014, Jokowi won the presidential election by promising to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. For four and a half years the Jokowi government failed to keep this promise.</p>
<p>Jokowi should use his second victory to keep his promises. </p>
<p><a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/192/60/PDF/G1719260.pdf?OpenElement">Indonesia’s 2017 Universal Periodic Review by the UN </a>, shows that the government must address a number of human rights issues, for example, violence carried out by security forces, especially in remote areas, such as Papua, and cases of torture, and violence against women, children and minority groups.</p>
<p>In the first period of Jokowi’s administration, protection of minorities was weak. Also, <a href="http://en.safenetvoice.org/daftarkasus/">the state used the Electronic Information and Transaction Law</a> to ensnare minority groups, anti-corruption activists and environmental protection groups.</p>
<p>As a first step, Jokowi and his new vice president, Ma'ruf Amin, must evaluate the Attorney General’s performance who for four years failed to bring human rights criminals to justice as recommended by the National Human Rights Commission.</p>
<p>Jokowi must also ensure the mandate of the demands of the 1998 Reformation to revoke military involvement in civilian matters be upheld. If he appoints those who are affiliated with the military in civilian positions, especially in strategic positions to protect human rights, it will muddy the civilian-military boundaries and potentially harm attempts to resolve past human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Jokowi needs to balance the priorities of infrastructure development with environmental protection and corruption erradication. These two things are a prerequisite for development that values human rights. Indicators of human rights-friendly development include environmental preservation, protection of indigenous peoples and vulnerable communities, and high public participation in the development process from the beginning to the end.</p>
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<h2>Power constellation around Jokowi may threaten civilian liberties</h2>
<p><strong>Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of Melbourne, Lecturer in Sociology, Universitas Negeri Jakarta</strong></p>
<p>In my opinion not much will change in terms of civil liberties protection in Jokowi’s second term if the constellation of power supporting the Jokowi government remains the same. And it seems so. We can see this from the “status quo” parties in Jokowi’s coalition that survived the <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/12/13420961/ambang-batas-parlemen-4-persen-caleg-jadi-penentu-kemenangan-parpol">parliamentary threshold</a>. Jokowi and the leader of Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Megawati Sukarnoputri, may remain close with retired general Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, who has an interest in <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/02/27/luhut-admits-owning-6000-ha-coal-mine-in-east-kalimantan.html">the mining business</a> and energy, and with AM Hendropriyono, former head of the National Intelligence Agency, an organisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/solving-munirs-murder-case-a-test-for-indonesias-president-elect-31293">allegedly involved in the killing of human rights defenders Munir Said Thalib</a>.</p>
<p>The existence of retired generals allegedly involved in human rights violations as well as those connected with mining companies in Jokowi’s circle of power will hinder efforts to resolve not only past atrocities but also agrarian conflicts. The number of land conflict victims from agriculture, mining and infrastructure development activities will likely increase. State repression and civilian violence against discussions, film screenings and meetings that criticise the business relationships of people around Jokowi as well as those advocating for the interests of marginalised groups will continue. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, civil society efforts to prevent the military from intervening in civilian matters will continue to face challenges. The case of <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/03/08/09055501/7-fakta-kasus-yang-menimpa-robertus-robet">Robertus Robet</a>, an activist and academic who was recently arrested during a rally for singing a song that criticised the military, for example, is likely to be left unresolved but will serve as a warning. </p>
<p>The use of identity politics will still be dominant given that the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Gerindra seemed to gain significant votes and will remain in opposition. Moreover, they also have strong candidates, such as current Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, Sandiaga Uno or other PKS officials for the 2024 presidential election. </p>
<p>The two parties will likely continue using religious identity narratives that will reproduce and sharpen polarisation in society to consolidate their power. As before, Jokowi’s camp will also respond to the attacks using similar narratives, with minority groups taking the brunt. </p>
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<h2>‘The best of the worst’</h2>
<p><strong>Lailatul Fitriyah, PhD Candidate in Theology, University of Notre Dame</strong> </p>
<p>Jokowi-Ma'ruf’s victory will not mean anything to many segments of minority groups, including LGBTIQ, if they do not make any major improvement in the form of policies that protect the rights of individual minorities.</p>
<p>Jokowi’s first term has been widely criticised. Jokowi had ignored gross human right abuse cases and minority protection, even though he campaigned on a human rights platform.</p>
<p>In the face of his lack of achievement in human rights protection, his victory can be seen as a result of two things: <em>First</em>, his opponents have poor human rights records. <em>Second</em>, the public still trusts Jokowi more compared to Prabowo on human rights issues. </p>
<p>In other words, in the context of human rights, voters choose Jokowi on the principle of ‘the best of the worst’. Jokowi was elected because he did not have any record of human rights abuse, that’s all.</p>
<p>Another aspect of Jokowi 2.0 era, which human rights activists will closely monitor, is his running mate, Ma'ruf Amin.</p>
<p>Ma'ruf Amin’s popularity does not come from his commitment to inclusiveness, but his traditional support base as the senior cleric of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation. In the long term, Ma'ruf Amin must serve not only his Muslim base, but also other segments of Indonesian society, especially those from marginal groups.</p>
<p>Ma'ruf should change his perspective. In his role as an Islamic scholar, he has alienated minority groups, including, Syi'ah, Ahmadiyah and LGBTIQ. As Vice President, Ma'ruf must act as a public official with the obligation to protect the rights of all Indonesian people, irrespective of race, ethnicity, sexuality or religion/non-religion. </p>
<p>For Jokowi’s second term, the sacrificing of minority rights to gain popular votes will no longer be acceptable. Jokowi should protect minority groups who, although they had lived within the structure of systemic violence under his first term, have shown they still trusted him for a second term in office.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asmin Fransiska received a scholarship from Fulbright and The Catholic Academic Exchange Service (KAAD) - Germany. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir terafiliasi dengan Department of Sociology, Universitas Negeri Jakarta</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lailatul Fitriyah tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>We ask political and human rights experts to analyse what Jokowi’s victory means, based on this early quick count, for civil liberties and the protection of human rights in Indonesia.Asmin Fransiska, Lecturer in Human Rights, Universitas Katolik Indonesia Atma Jaya Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, PhD Candidate in politics at the Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLailatul Fitriyah, Ph.D Student, World Religions and World Church Program, Department of Theology, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1156262019-04-18T01:52:35Z2019-04-18T01:52:35ZJoko Widodo looks set to win the Indonesia election. Now, the real power struggle begins<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269895/original/file-20190418-139088-1xer4y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joko Widowo (centre, left) and his running mate, Ma'ruf Amin celebrate with supporters after the 'quick count' results showed him the likely winner of the presidential election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mast Irham/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo (known as “Jokowi”) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/17/indonesia-elections-president-joko-widodo-set-comfortable-win">looks poised to win</a> another five years in office by a convincing margin.</p>
<p>Official results from Wednesday’s election won’t be released by Indonesia’s General Elections Commission (KPU) until 22 May, but the usually reliable <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-election-2019-joko-widodo-ahead-of-rival-prabowo-in-early-quick-count-vote">“quick count” results</a> produced by six private polling groups suggest Jokowi may have won by as much as 10% of the vote (54% to 45%). This is hardly a surprise, as <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/polls-point-to-victory-for-jokowi-in-indonesian-election/">polling in the months leading up the vote</a> never had his lead lower than double digits.</p>
<p>This is the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/09/jokowi-declares-victory-prabowo-wont-concede-defeat.html">second election defeat</a> for former general Prabowo Subianto, who also ran against Jokowi in the last presidential race in 2014. It is also likely the end of Prabowo’s aspirations to follow his former father-in-law, Soeharto, the authoritarian ruler of Indonesia for three decades, to the Presidential Palace. But that doesn’t mean Prabowo will go quietly.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-presidential-election-is-jokowi-religious-enough-for-conservative-voters-114353">Indonesia's presidential election: Is Jokowi 'religious enough' for conservative voters?</a>
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<p>For weeks, he has <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/prabowo-campaign-alleges-millions-of-dodgy-voters-on-electoral-role-20190401-p519m5.html">claimed the elections were rigged</a>, alleging widespread fraud. He has called on his supporters to take action if he loses, saying they should be prepared to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/as-crowds-surge-prabowo-vows-fight-if-indonesia-vote-stolen">“come out onto the streets”</a> for a month if necessary.</p>
<p>It is certainly true that there have been problems with this election, but that was always going to be the case. </p>
<p>When the Constitutional Court ruled that Indonesia’s presidential election had to be held simultaneously with local, provincial and national legislative elections this year, it imposed a huge burden on the hardworking KPU. On Wednesday, <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-elections-why-do-they-matter-and-whats-at-stake-115464">193 million eligible voters were asked to choose</a> from over 300,000 candidates from 16 parties for 20,528 seats across 34 provinces and more than 17,000 islands.</p>
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<p>Under these circumstances, it would have been surprising if there were no irregularities. Among the allegations being levied by Prabowo’s campaign have been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-14/indonesian-election-likely-plagued-by-vote-buying/10826922">manipulation of the electoral rolls</a>, millions of <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesian-authorities-reject-prabowo-ghost-voters-claims-11449784">“ghost voters”</a>, <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/viral-video-alleging-vote-rigging-taints-indonesian-poll-20190412-p51dn5">ballot box stuffing</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3005362/indonesia-election-polling-day-nears-vote-buying-remains">widespread attempts to buy votes</a> with cash and gift handouts.</p>
<p>As in previous elections, many of these allegations will end up in the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/constitutional-courts-in-asia/indonesias-constitutional-court-and-indonesias-electoral-systems/2ECBF37B4403A4B33C4D22C1272C87B3">Constitutional Court</a>. This is where Prabowo is expected to file a challenge to reverse the result of the presidential ballot, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-22/indonesia27s-highest-court-unanimously-upholds-widodo-elect/5688344">just as he did, without success, in 2014</a>. The nine judges on the court will probably be overwhelmed by hundreds of cases, and the chief justice has warned they will not be decided until early August at best, with legislative disputes given priority over the presidential ballot.</p>
<p>But it is unlikely the court will end up sending Prabowo to the palace. The margin of victory looks too big to be overcome by challenging voting irregularities.</p>
<p>So why bother sending his supporters into the streets? The answer probably has lot to do with the real struggle for power that begins today.</p>
<h2>Jockeying for positions in the new administration</h2>
<p>Indonesia has a political system that loosely resembles America’s, in that the president appoints his cabinet from outside the legislature. But in Indonesia, the ministries have traditionally been treated as cash cows to be milked.</p>
<p>Jokowi, who has proved utterly pragmatic as a politician, will have no choice but to spend the next few months negotiating the allocation of ministries with the powerful oligarchs who wield great power and influence in Indonesia’s corrupt political system. These include hugely wealthy businessmen, some of whom “own” their own political parties, or control major media groups - or both. They will want to recoup their investments in the election campaigning, plus profits.</p>
<p>These negotiations will be complicated by the fact that, once again, no party looks likely to win an outright majority in the legislature. A governing coalition will somehow have to be pieced together, with political threats neutralised by offers of positions of power in the legislature or administration. A lot of minor parties have failed to meet the new higher threshold for seats in the legislature, so how all this will play out is unpredictable.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facing-bumps-but-on-the-right-track-indonesias-democratic-progress-61038">Facing bumps, but on the right track: Indonesia's democratic progress</a>
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<p>But Jokowi will likely end up brokering a broad legislative alliance. Just as <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-new-cabinet-built-on-political-transactions-63196">in his last administration</a>, and former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration before that, the Cabinet will probably be largely filled by proxies of oligarchs and powerful politicians. There will likely only be a few lonely technocrats to bear the burden of policy making.</p>
<p>Prabowo and his party, Gerindra, know the haggling has already begun, but they are in a difficult position. According to the “quick count” results, Prabowo looks certain to lose again, and although Gerindra is poised to come in second in the national legislature, <a href="https://pemilu.kompas.com/quickcount">it scored just under 13%</a>, well behind Jokowi’s party, the PDI-P, with 20%. </p>
<p>Prabowo and Gerindra’s campaigns have also drained vast sums from the personal fortunes of Prabowo’s family and his vice-presidential candidate, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/even-if-prabowo-loses-sandiaga-uno-will-win-indonesia-s-election">Sandiaga Uno</a>. Gerindra’s second place finish in the legislature is about the only political capital Prabowo has left – unless, of course, his die-hard supporters are marching in the streets protesting Jokowi’s victory.</p>
<p>This will be easy for Prabowo to arrange among <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3006054/indonesia-election-radical-islamist-groups-express-support">his core supporters of conservative Islamists</a>. The Islamists have strongly backed him largely because he is the only alternative to Jokowi, whom they despise as a major obstacle to their aspirations to push Indonesia in a more conservative Islamic direction. They will be all too eager to protest, giving Prabowo the leverage he wants to try to win places in the new administration for his party, inner circle and proxies.</p>
<p>Whether Prabowo succeeds in winning concessions from Jokowi will be another question, of course. If he does, he will eventually distance himself from the street protesters.</p>
<h2>Australia’s limited clout in Indonesia</h2>
<p>What does all this mean for Australia-Indonesia relations? In the final analysis, not much. </p>
<p>Jokowi is an inward-looking politician with <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/jokowi-defends-indonesias-foreign-policy-during-us-trip/">limited interest in international relations</a>. He has made it clear that it doesn’t see the relationship with Australia as “special” <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-strategic-outlook-the-view-from-indonesia/">in the way Yudhoyono did</a>; that is not likely to change now.</p>
<p>And Australia has limited clout in Indonesia. Despite our proximity, we have <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-a-40-cut-in-australian-aid-affect-indonesia-41753">slashed our aid to Indonesia</a>, are a low-ranked trading partner, and invest more in New Zealand, Luxembourg and smaller Southeast Asian nations than we do in Indonesia. We are not an important player in Indonesia’s political and economic decision-making.</p>
<p>Of course, the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australia-and-indonesia-sign-historic-free-trade-deal-after-months-of-uncertainty">recently signed</a> Indonesia-Australia free-trade agreement (IA-CEPA) is intended to change that by giving both countries greater access to each other’s markets. But don’t hold your breath. The <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-and-indonesia-trade-deal-not-quite-done">agreement has yet to be ratified</a>, and for all its rhetoric of deregulation, Indonesia remains heavily protectionist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-more-than-a-free-trade-agreement-but-what-exactly-have-australia-and-indonesia-signed-112853">It's more than a free trade agreement. But what exactly have Australia and Indonesia signed?</a>
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<p>Despite the fact that neither came close to winning a majority in the legislative elections, Jokowi and Prabowo’s parties will be important powers in the new legislature, and both are nationalist and often suspicious of foreign influence. It is by no means certain the free-trade agreement will be quickly ratified. It may well face major amendments or simply be put on hold, like a number of other international agreements inked by past administrations that still await ratification.</p>
<p>Like much else in Indonesia today, the outcome depends heavily on the intra-elite back-room horse-trading and deal-making that will be happening quietly behind closed doors for weeks to come, while court challenges and noisy protesters in the streets get all the attention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Jokowi’s challenger, Prabowo Subianto, has vowed to contest the result and urged his supporters to the streets – and that win him leverage in the new administration.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1143532019-04-16T04:45:20Z2019-04-16T04:45:20ZIndonesia’s presidential election: Is Jokowi ‘religious enough’ for conservative voters?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269433/original/file-20190416-147480-1oog42c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=114%2C21%2C4671%2C2325&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jokowi has maintained a double-digit lead in most recent polls, but some moderate supporters have indicated they may stay away from the polls. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bagus Indahono/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Indonesian presidential election on Wednesday will be a re-run of the 2014 poll, pitting the incumbent, Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi), against the same candidate, former major-general Prabowo Subianto. </p>
<p>Various polls over the past few months have consistently shown Jokowi with a sizeable lead. The last survey from the <a href="https://www.csis.or.id/events/paparan-survei-nasional-csis-menjelang-17-april-2019-pertarungan-antara-elektabilitas-dan-mobilisasi-pemilih">Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)</a>, for example, shows Jokowi with a lead of 51.4% among likely voters, compared to just 33.3% for Prabowo. (The rest are undecided.) The latest poll this week from <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4508944/survei-indo-barometer-jokowi-maruf-599-vs-prabowo-sandi-401">Indo Barometer</a>, meanwhile, gives Jokowi an even wider lead – 59.9% to 40.1%.</p>
<p>With a total of nearly 200 million registered voters expected to cast ballots at some 800,000 polling stations across the country, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/15/indonesia-193m-people-17000-islands-one-big-election-heres-what-you-need-to-know">the election is a massive undertaking</a>. Making things even more complex this year is the fact that legislative elections are being held at the same time as the presidential election, with some 250,000 candidates running for more than 20,000 legislative seats. However, the legislative elections have not received the same level of domestic or international attention as the contest between Jokowi and his old adversary, Prabowo.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266642/original/file-20190330-70982-hcmfm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">2019 presidential and vice-presidential candidates and political party coalitions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by authors</span></span>
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<h2>Islam and identity politics</h2>
<p>Jokowi has spent the past few months highlighting his achievements since entering office in 2014, especially with infrastructure development and the streamlining of bureaucracy for businesses and the general public. Prabowo, on the other hand, has tried to chip away at Jokowi’s lead with a fiery brand of nationalism and promises of change (for example, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/06/prabowos-campaign-pledge-to-stop-imports-sparks-debate.html">the halting the importation of food and fuel</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-08/prabowo-rejects-surveys-to-claim-big-lead-in-indonesia-election">lowering prices for staples and reducing inequality</a>) without offering any details on how to achieve them.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/experts-respond-to-indonesias-4th-round-of-presidential-debate-jokowi-defeats-prabowo-114559">Experts respond to Indonesia's 4th round of presidential debate: Jokowi defeats Prabowo</a>
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<p>Prabowo’s candidacy has made some in Indonesia nervous. He is the former son-in-law of the dictator Suharto, who ruled Indonesia for 32 years before being driven from power in 1998. Prabowo has <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1181538/prabowo-partly-praise-indonesias-authoritarian-new-order-regime">praised some elements</a> of Suharto’s “New Order” regime and has also been accused of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/world/asia/indonesia-presidential-election.html">committing human rights violations</a> during his military career. (Prabowo has never been tried for any human rights abuses and denies all the allegations against him.) </p>
<p>Prabowo’s leadership abilities are also unclear – he’s never held elected office.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269439/original/file-20190416-147508-1duimip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prabowo Subianto has played the nationalist card at rallies, railing against foreign interests in Indonesia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fully Handoko/EPA</span></span>
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<p>Even though Jokowi has a big lead in the polls, he has nonetheless faced questions about his religious credentials and specifically whether he is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-18/joko-widodo-picks-a-hardline-muslim-cleric-as-his-running-mate/10117820">“Muslim enough”</a> for the hard-line conservatives in his party. Just days before the election, he embarked on a quick trip to Mecca in Saudi Arabia – a move <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-14/jokowi-heads-to-mecca-for-pilgrimage-as-indonesia-vote-nears">many analysts believe</a> was intended to shore up support among religious voters.</p>
<p>Jokowi has also selected one of the most influential Muslim clerics in the country, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/03/14/maruf-amin-elderly-cleric-or-canny-political-operator-well-see-sunday.html">Ma'ruf Amin</a>, to be his running mate. Ma'ruf is head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), a top clerical body comprised of registered Muslim organisations across the country. </p>
<p>Jokowi’s decision to choose Ma'ruf as his running mate has not been popular with his more moderate supporters. His <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesian-president-picks-conservative-running-mate-for-poll-20180810-p4zwt8.html">initial preference</a> for running mate was Mahfud MD, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia and a former minister when Abdurrahman Wahid was president.</p>
<p>However, this move carried the risk of being perceived as not “Muslim enough” for religious voters, hence the selection of Ma'ruf.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/one-partys-lonely-battle-for-minority-voices-in-indonesia-115165">One party’s lonely battle for minority voices in Indonesia</a>
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<p>So far, this decision has seemed successful. <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190322165443-32-379836/survei-litbang-kompas-sandiaga-uno-kalahkan-maruf-amin">The results of surveys</a> indicate that although Ma'ruf’s overall popularity is not as high as Prabowo’s running mate – the former vice governor of Jakarta, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/even-if-prabowo-loses-sandiaga-uno-will-win-indonesia-s-election">Sandiaga “Sandi” Uno</a> – most prospective voters are only looking at the top of the ticket. The contest is squarely between Jokowi and Prabowo. </p>
<p>However, there are also <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/04/10/jokowis-ideological-shift-has-not-gone-unnoticed.html">concerns</a> that Jokowi’s more moderate supporters think he has not yet fulfilled some of his <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/10/20/after-four-years-jokowi-still-has-lots-to-do-for-human-rights-graft-fight.html">promises on human rights</a>, and they may abstain from the election in protest. There is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3005276/indonesia-election-unimpressed-both-jokowi-and-prabowo-32">a campaign on social media</a> urging people to abstain or cast blank ballots – known as <em>golput</em> in Bahasa.</p>
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<h2>What would a second Jokowi term mean for Indonesia?</h2>
<p>Should Jokowi win as expected, he is unlikely to bring sweeping changes to the country. The main challenge for him will be continuing <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowis-uphill-economic-challenges/a-17822920">Indonesia’s economic growth</a>. Further reforms are needed to reduce protectionism, encourage foreign investment and improve productivity. With the mining industry in decline, more attention should be focused on sectors with growth potential, such as agriculture, manufacturing and services, including tourism and hospitality. The government needs to do more to tackle corruption and cut red tape, too. </p>
<p>Infrastructure and mass transport development also remain key issues, as is boosting financial assistance to university students and expanding health insurance. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/either-jokowi-or-prabowo-indonesias-future-in-human-rights-enforcement-remains-bleak-110152">Either Jokowi or Prabowo, Indonesia's future in human rights enforcement remains bleak</a>
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<p>As for foreign policy, Jokowi’s focus will likely remain on economic diplomacy and market expansion. One priority will be implementing the just-signed <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">free-trade agreement between Indonesia and Australia</a>, which will eliminate many tariffs between the countries and increase the number of work visas for Indonesians in Australia. The deal is also <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesian-free-trade-pact-to-help-australian-universities-hospitals-20180831-p5010c.html">expected to allow</a> Australian hospitals to open and universities to set up campuses in Indonesia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Indonesian President Joko Widodo has been burnishing his religious credentials ahead of this week’s election. Will it be enough to beat an old rival, the firebrand populist Prabowo Subianto?Hadrian Geri Djajadikerta, Associate Dean Research, School of Business and Law, Edith Cowan UniversityElla S. Prihatini, Endeavour scholar, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.