tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/jomo-kenyatta-35984/articlesJomo Kenyatta – The Conversation2023-10-30T16:14:06Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165992023-10-30T16:14:06Z2023-10-30T16:14:06ZKing Charles in Kenya: despite past tensions, the visit is a sign of a strong relationship with Britain<p>King Charles’ <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">visit to Kenya this week</a> is the British monarch’s first to a <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/about-us">Commonwealth nation</a> since his coronation in September 2022. The visit comes during the country’s 60th anniversary of <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/kenya-declares-independence-from-britain">independence from Britain</a>.</p>
<p>By choosing Kenya, the British government and monarchy seek to highlight the importance they attribute to the east African nation. It also shows other Commonwealth members that it’s possible for a republic to have a positive relationship with Britain. Some Commonwealth states like <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/jamaicas-transition-republic-process-matters">Jamaica</a> are contemplating removing the king as head of state.</p>
<p>King Charles’ visit is meant to celebrate <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">the warm relationship</a> between the two countries. It will also <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">acknowledge the more painful aspects</a> of the UK and Kenya’s shared history. </p>
<p>The relationship with Kenya remains one of Britain’s more positive post-colonial relationships. However, there have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/calls-for-king-charles-to-apologise-for-colonial-era-atrocities-on-kenya-visit-4398116">calls for Britain to apologise and make reparations</a> for its brutal suppression of freedom fighters. People in Kenya, Britain and other former colonies will be watching closely to see what the king has to say.</p>
<p>I’m a historian who has <a href="https://www.lboro.ac.uk/subjects/politics-international-studies/staff/poppy-cullen/#tab2">studied and written</a> about the political relationship between Britain and Kenya in the decades after independence. In my view, the relationship has taken a positive tilt since independence for three reasons. These are: the choices of Kenya’s first independent president; diplomatic, economic and ideological alignments; and military ties. </p>
<h2>Kenya and Britain’s history</h2>
<p>Kenya became a British colony in the late 19th century. A small minority of white British settlers held almost all of the <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-56276-6">political and economic power</a>. The British government planned to make Kenya a “multi-racial” state. The small white European and Asian populations of 55,700 and 176,600 people, respectively, would have equal or more power than the black majority of 8.3 million. Only in 1960 did the British government accept that Kenya should have majority rule and independence. </p>
<p>Independence celebrations in 1963 were preceded by a difficult period of negotiation and violence. A state of emergency was declared in 1952 in response to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mau-Mau">Mau Mau uprising</a>. This was an armed rebellion among one of Kenya’s major tribes, the Kikuyu, fighting for land and freedom. </p>
<p>The emergency lasted until 1960. Over this period, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/18/uncovering-truth-british-empire-caroline-elkins-mau-mau">thousands of Kenyans were killed</a>, and tens of thousands were detained in camps without trial. The camps became sites of violence and abuse. </p>
<p>With this past, a close post-colonial relationship between Kenya and Britain can appear surprising. It was expected that Kenya would turn away from Britain and towards other international partners, such as the US or the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union">Soviet Union</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, the relationship has largely been close and friendly, with trade benefits, alignment on significant issues and strong military ties.</p>
<h2>Positive relations</h2>
<p>Kenya’s first president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jomo-Kenyatta/Return-to-Kenya">Jomo Kenyatta</a>, had been imprisoned by Britain as a leader of the Mau Mau. But once he took leadership, he opted to work primarily with Britain. </p>
<p>Kenyatta saw the benefits he could get from this relationship. These included financial and military backing during the Cold War, and personal backing. In 1965, Britain made plans to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2016.1261917">protect</a> Kenyatta if a coup was attempted.</p>
<p>British officials were surprised but pleased by Kenyatta’s position. They had many interests in Kenya, ranging from trade to diplomacy. One key interest was Kenya’s white European and Asian populations who held British passports. To help achieve their security, the British government financed the purchase of their land, which could then be sold to Kenyans. Before independence, many in Kenya had hoped for land redistribution. Instead, European settlers got financial benefits.</p>
<p>For decades after independence, Britain was Kenya’s primary economic partner. Currently, Britain is the <a href="https://www.kenyahighcom.org.uk/kenya-uk-relations">largest European investor in Kenya and Kenya’s second-largest export destination</a>. There are <a href="https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/locations/british-chamber-of-commerce-kenya/#:%7E:text=As%20it%20stands%2C%20there%20are,139%20billion%20in%20value.">more than 200</a> British businesses operating in Kenya. </p>
<p>The British and Kenyan governments have <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-kenya-strategic-partnership-2020-2025">broadly aligned on international diplomatic issues</a> like the Cold War, and later the “war on terror”. There were some exceptions, and the Kenyan government did criticise British policies towards white rule in Rhodesia and apartheid in South Africa. But in private the relationship remained cordial. </p>
<h2>Military connections</h2>
<p>Military ties have been especially close. Britain remains a training partner. The royal visit includes <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">meeting Kenyan marines trained by British marines</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2016.1261917">Britain has also sold arms to Kenya</a> and provided support to set up a navy and air force after independence. </p>
<p>After independence, many African countries expelled their British military commanders to replace them with Africans. Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta chose to keep British commanders. The Kenyan army was led by a British officer until 1966, the navy until 1972 and the air force until 1973. </p>
<p>Most important for Britain is that its military is allowed to <a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/africa/">train in Kenya</a>. This allows them to practise in different and difficult terrains.</p>
<h2>Closeness despite challenges</h2>
<p>The relationship between the two nations since independence has not always been smooth, however. </p>
<p>In 1967-68, Kenya increased policies that <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/4/newsid_2738000/2738629.stm">discriminated against Kenyan Asians</a>. The 1967 Immigration Act and 1968 Trade Licensing Act, for instance, meant non-citizens (including many Asians) needed work permits. This led to the immigration to Britain of <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1968-02-15/debates/e5e33ebe-b72f-4bae-82b4-1125bab0f265/AsianImmigrantsFromKenya">13,600 east African Asians</a> in 1967.</p>
<p>The British government then <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/9/pdfs/ukpga_19680009_en.pdf#page=4">passed legislation</a> to limit their right to enter the UK despite their holding British passports. </p>
<p>After Ugandan president Idi Amin <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/ugandan-asians-50-years-since-their-expulsion-from-uganda/">expelled the Asian population</a> in 1972 – about 40,000 Asian Ugandans moved to the UK – Britain offered aid to Kenya to ensure it didn’t follow a similar policy. </p>
<p>In 1982, after the Kenya Air Force <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/08/09/how-kenyas-rebels-botched-their-coup/ca1fdf2f-3961-476f-a682-45be109e583f/">attempted a coup</a>, many in Kenya’s elite became suspicious of Britain’s aims in the country. </p>
<p>Since independence, some in Kenya have <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/calls-for-king-charles-to-apologise-for-colonial-era-atrocities-on-kenya-visit-4398116">questioned</a> why British troops still train in the country. The killing in 2012 of a Kenyan woman, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10931549/British-soldier-accused-fatally-stabbing-Kenyan-prostitute-Agnes-Wanjiru-21-England.html">Agnes Wanjiru</a>, seemingly by British soldiers, exacerbated these grumblings.</p>
<p>The issue of the Mau Mau has also been a source of recent tension. </p>
<p>Kenya has repeatedly asked for archive files related to the Mau Mau, which the British government denied having. These files were only <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a824499e5274a2e87dc2089/cary-report-release-colonial-administration-files.pdf">acknowledged and released after 2011</a>. </p>
<p>In 2013, the British government finally acknowledged that the government had known about and been complicit in torture and violence during the emergency, and victims would be paid compensation of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/uk-compensate-kenya-mau-mau-torture">£19.9 million</a>. The then foreign secretary William Hague <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims">stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The British government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Pushing forward</h2>
<p>Despite moments of tension, the two governments have always sought to dispel difficulties. The king’s visit, for instance, is on the invitation of Kenya’s president William Ruto. Ruto made his first overseas visit as president to the UK for <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/ruto-attention-british-monarchs-funeral-150476/">Queen Elizabeth’s funeral</a> in September 2022. </p>
<p>Over six decades, the challenges that have arisen have not been enough to derail the relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216599/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Poppy Cullen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The visit will acknowledge the more painful aspects of the UK and Kenya’s colonial history.Poppy Cullen, Lecturer in International History, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082422023-07-09T11:35:15Z2023-07-09T11:35:15ZKenya at 60: six key moments that shaped post-colonial politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533521/original/file-20230622-8708-1flywg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta waves at a crowd. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harry Benson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya celebrates 60 years of independence this year. As a political scientist who has <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">studied</a> Kenya for the past 20 years, I consider a turning point from each decade that helped to shape the east African country’s post-colonial politics. I haven’t selected elections, assassinations or other moments that have enjoyed much coverage over the years. Instead, I turn to often-forgotten moments that shed light on the country’s key steps forward – and backwards – and the role of agency and institutions.</em></p>
<h2>1964: The Lanet mutiny</h2>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, governments across <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808104534id_/http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/mcgowan_2003jmas_-_african_military_coups_1956-2001-_frequency_trends_and_distribution.pdf">Africa fell</a> to military coups and countercoups. These nations suffered the arbitrary and authoritarian rule of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/ethnic-inequalities-in-kenya/EAFC4455E840815B624147EE930C1C34">military leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya managed to avoid this fate. A regiment based at Lanet in Nakuru did stage an unsuccessful mutiny in 1964. In response, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta – as Kenyan political scholar <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">Musambayi Katumanga</a> has detailed – opted to keep the military small. He relied instead on various police units. </p>
<p>Kenyatta also “gradually altered the military’s ethnic composition”, which, at that time, was disproportionately composed of officers from Kalenjin, Kamba, Samburu and Somali communities. He increased the number of co-ethnic Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest and most economically dominant ethnic group. </p>
<p>These measures helped to ensure the military’s loyalty to the regime. But at a cost. The multiplication of security units undermined control and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">accountabiliy</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy of ethnic recruitment and promotion reinforced a sense of an ethnically biased state. It was a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">strategy copied</a> by Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, after a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/nation-prime/how-ochuka-coup-attempt-changed-kenya-1910656">coup attempt in 1982</a>. Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki, also adopted it after the country’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007/8 post-election crisis</a>.</p>
<h2>1976: The Change the Constitution Movement</h2>
<p>By the mid-1970s, Kenyatta was unwell. To prevent the automatic succession of his vice-president, Moi, a group of prominent Kikuyu politicians attempted to <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress">change the constitution</a>. Their efforts were unsuccessful. Power transferred peacefully to Moi upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the attempt had three important legacies:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the military had once again been kept out of national politics </p></li>
<li><p>the new president was made acutely aware of the insecurity of his position</p></li>
<li><p>a popular sense grew of how a Kikuyu elite felt entitled to rule.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>1980: The crackdown begins</h2>
<p>For the first year or so, Moi largely followed in Kenyatta’s footsteps, or “nyayo” in Kiswahili. He blocked any real opposition but left space for broader political debate. </p>
<p>However, in 1980, Moi’s more authoritarian streak began to show. He banned the Nairobi University Students’ Organisation and deregistered the University Academic Staff Union and Kenya Civil Servants Union. He also ordered ethnicity-based associations to wind up their affairs in the interest of “national unity”. </p>
<p>Authoritarianism came to characterise the 1980s as people were required to follow in Moi’s footsteps. </p>
<h2>1990: Timothy Njoya’s new year speech</h2>
<p>In November 1991, the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/">Paris Club of donors</a>, an informal group of western creditors, suspended US$350 million in aid to Kenya until political reforms were initiated. The following month, a constitutional amendment was rushed through parliament, paving the way for a return to multi-party elections. </p>
<p>This timeline could mistakenly be taken to suggest that it was donor pressure that forced constitutional reform. But there was already substantive pressure for multi-party politics from within Kenya. </p>
<p>A tidal change occurred at the dawn of 1990 when, in a new year speech, theologian Timothy Njoya <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tmmTQgt0iXQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=i+say+to+you+ethnic+politics+kenya+lynch+&ots=u7HbNNpU6Q&sig=Fc0hDJagdL31LFjKxkRkf8E4qkc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=i%20say%20to%20you%20ethnic%20politics%20kenya%20lynch&f=false">speculated</a> on how much longer Kenya would be a one-party state. Opposition elements –- most notably, religious and civil society leaders, and politicians marginalised from the political centre –- became increasingly vocal in their demands for multi-party politics.</p>
<p>It was these domestic demands – together with the threat of suspended aid – that forced Moi’s hand and prompted a return to multi-party politics in the early 1990s. Still, Moi <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">sought to control</a> the transition. </p>
<h2>2005: The constitutional referendum</h2>
<p>In 2002, Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition ousted independence party Kanu in a landslide victory. This prompted a moment of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518447">great optimism</a> in Kenya. </p>
<p>However, divisions soon wracked the coalition as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2005.9627591">reports emerged</a> of corruption scandals and ethnic bias. Promises of constitutional reform were watered down. Popular frustration showed when Kenyans rejected the draft constitution in the 2005 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00020180601035674">referendum</a>.</p>
<p>The referendum and general elections that followed meant that Kenya was in intense campaign period for over two years. This elongated campaign drew attention to frustrated hopes. It also presented the government as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020180601035674">from and for the Kikuyu</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum also increased confidence in the electoral commission. This meant that people paid relatively little attention to developments like Kibaki’s unilateral <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2019.1592326">judicial appointments</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, the referendum fostered a sense that the opposition would win the 2007 election unless it was rigged. Together with a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67654/elections-ke-2007.pdf">problematic election</a> and history of unpunished election-related violence, these factors fuelled Kenya’s greatest post-colonial crisis. More than 1,000 people were killed and almost <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056240903346194">700,000 displaced</a> in violence after the 2007 election.</p>
<h2>2011: A new chief justice</h2>
<p>The 2007/8 crisis paved the way for a new <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2023-03/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_2010.pdf">constitution</a> in 2010. Among other things, it devolved power to 47 new county governments. It also established a new bill of rights and created the supreme court. The latter has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine presidential election petitions, and determine appeals from the court of appeal. It also determines cases that involve interpretation or application of the constitution. </p>
<p>As the highest court in the land, the leadership of the supreme court is critical. It marked a turning point when Willy Mutunga –- a highly respected human rights advocate –- was appointed as the court’s first chief justice. Some criticise Mutunga for having <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2015.1029296">validated</a> Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s election in 2013. However, he also presided over <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/SPECJU/2015/6.html">decisions</a> that protected the devolution of power and the bill of rights. And he oversaw <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/kenyas-democracy-hinges-strong-chief-justice">reforms and judicial learnings</a> that helped to establish a more independent court. Reforms that – together with his successor’s brave leadership – made the supreme court’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenyan-court-scraps-presidential-vote-kenyatta-calls-for-calm-idUSKCN1BC4A5">annulment of the August 2017 election</a> possible.</p>
<p>The lesson from these moments: individuals can make a difference for good or bad, particularly when they help to reshape the institutions that will outlive them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In recent years Gabrielle Lynch has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and University of Warwick. </span></em></p>Jomo Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap Moi set the tone for ethnic and authoritarian politics which Kenya has wrestled to free itself from in recent decades.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063502023-06-15T14:00:34Z2023-06-15T14:00:34ZMama Ngina Kenyatta at 90: the quiet power behind Kenya’s famous political family<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529907/original/file-20230603-15-pe3jy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mama Ngina Kenyatta</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Kenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few witnessed the building of the young Kenyan state from within as did Ngina Kenyatta, the widow of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Mama Ngina, as she is known, will mark her 90th birthday on 24 June 2023. She was by her husband’s side when Kenya won independence 60 years ago and for many turbulent years thereafter. Although Kenyatta was polygamous, it was the younger Mama Ngina who took on the roles of first lady. </p>
<p>Ngina married Jomo Kenyatta in 1952 at the age of 19. That year, Kenyatta was arrested and subsequently <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2012/04/kenya-jomo-kenyatta-sentenced-hard-labor/">jailed</a> on charges of masterminding the anti-colonial Mau Mau uprising. By then, he had spent years abroad (mainly in England), where he embraced anti-colonialist and Pan-African ideas. Back home he was elected president of Kenya African Union, before becoming the front figure of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party that would go on to lead Kenya to independence. </p>
<p>Kenyatta’s marriage to Ngina was his fourth. He had married Grace Wahu in 1920, Edna Clark in 1942 and Grace Wanjiku in 1946. The last marriage had political significance because Ngina was the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/queen-mother-mama-ngina-the-power-behind-uhuru-kenyatta-s-throne-3937204">daughter of a senior chief</a>, Muhoho wa Gatheca, who held an administrative position of great influence. By then, Kenyatta was expanding his political base, so this marriage secured an alliance with an important clan.</p>
<p>Mama Ngina is to be seen in many official photographs of the early days, protectively herding their young children in State House. The first-born was Christine Wambui-Pratt, who is today an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001450285/ku-to-award-uhurus-sister-doctorate">advocate</a> for people living with disability. The second was Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, who became Kenya’s fourth president (2013-2022). The third was Nyokabi Muthama, now a businesswoman and <a href="https://www.thekenyattatrust.org">philanthropist</a>. Muhoho Kenyatta, the reclusive last-born, is reputedly the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/muhoho-the-man-behind-kenyatta-family-business-empire-132182">engine</a> of the Kenyatta family business empire. </p>
<p>Away from family, Mama Ngina was often involved in supporting various <a href="https://theconversation.com/active-citizens-for-better-schooling-what-kenyas-history-can-teach-south-africa-92534">Harambee</a> (community development) projects. Yet very little was known about her and in particular her political influence during this period. </p>
<p>She was, and still is, certainly not uninterested in politics. Though not a frequent public political speaker, she has spoken out in defence of her family. In 2022, she <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/03/mama-ngina-supports-raila-for-the-presidency/">publicly campaigned</a> for Uhuru Kenyatta’s preferred presidential candidate, Raila Odinga. She also sought to <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/04/11/mama-ngina-and-field-marshall-muthonis-locs-sanitising-the-kenyattas/">associate</a> herself with the Mau Mau independence struggle in an apparent attempt to counter popular <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/48250-controversial-mt-kenya-musician-blasts-uhuru-new-hit-song">sentiment</a> against the Kenyattas among the Kikuyu. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mama Ngina Kenyatta (second left) and Jomo Kenyatta (right) host Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, during a visit to Kenya in 1972. (Photo by William Lovelace/Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Kenyatta’s death and after</h2>
<p>The way she handled the news of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/-end-of-an-era-as-mzee-jomo-kenyatta-dies-892138">Kenyatta’s death on 21 August 1978</a> suggests she was preparing her political survival. At that time, jockeying for succession was fierce and the Kenyan political elite was profoundly divided over it. So as the Mzee (“old man”) – as he was called – died, Mama Ngina and his stepsons Peter Magana and Peter Muigai informed their political allies with great discretion.</p>
<p>According to a report by the authoritative Weekly Review news magazine, one of the first to be informed was <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel Arap Moi</a>, then vice-president and constitutionally next in line to act as president. This placed Moi in the lead of the succession battle at a time when some were <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.id=&brand=ucpress">opposed</a> to his automatic succession. Only thereafter was <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mbiyu-koinange-the-politician-british-aptly-nicknamed-newt--466712">Peter Mbiyu Koinange</a>, Kenyatta’s long-time comrade and a prominent minister, informed, along with Kenyatta’s other children.</p>
<p>Mama Ngina took a low profile after the succession. She was <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kenyatta-business-empire-goes-into-expansion-drive-2045420">inheriting</a> a huge <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/rise-and-rise-of-the-kenyatta-family-business-empire-139094">business empire</a> which continued to expand. Today, the holdings include <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/political-families-own-half-of-private-wealth-952330">land</a> as well as shares in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/mama-ngina-listed-top-investor-at-kenya-power-with-2-2-million-shares-864034">companies</a> in banking, real estate, hospitality, mining, insurance, airlines, education, energy, dairy farming, transport and telecommunications. </p>
<p>Her role during the political transition was rewarded with political support by President Moi, according to news reports. </p>
<h2>Protecting “our son”</h2>
<p>In 2013, the matriarch bounced back to the centre of Kenyan politics, the first woman to have been spouse and now mother of a sitting president. That would not have seemed likely when Uhuru Kenyatta was indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/23/kenya-trial-international-criminal-court">crimes against humanity</a>. The charges stemmed from the 2007-2008 post-election violence, in which Uhuru and William Ruto were on opposite sides. With Mama Ngina’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/queen-mother-mama-ngina-the-power-behind-uhuru-kenyatta-s-throne-3944964">financial muscle behind them</a>, the two formed the unlikely alliance that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/3/10/kenyatta-wins-kenyas-presidential-election">swept to power in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>Planning began in April 2011, when Mama Ngina appeared at <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000137547/pre-icc-confirmation-prayer-rallies-united-uhuru-kenyatta-and-william-ruto">rallies</a> where prayers were said for the indicted duo. According to the Daily Nation, Mama Ngina brokered the coalition between the two. She also bankrolled the promotion of “our son” for president in Mount Kenya region, inhabited by her co-ethnics and related tribes.</p>
<p>Uhuru’s ICC case was dropped in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019">2014</a> and Ruto’s in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35965760">2016</a>. They soon fell out. Ngina blamed Ruto for the rift. This in her eyes meant Uhuru was not to blame for breaking his <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/01/16/fear-and-loathing-why-kikuyus-may-end-up-voting-for-ruto-in-2022/">2013 campaign promise</a> to back Ruto after his own term.</p>
<p>Now, for the first time, Mama Ngina has little or no influence over proceedings in State House. What’s more, the Kenyattas are seen as <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2023/01/section-of-kenya-kwanza-senators-accuse-kenyatta-of-sponsoring-azimio-rallies/">anti-government</a> for the first time since independence. </p>
<h2>Mau Mau uneasy legacy</h2>
<p>Mama Ngina recently came to the defence of the Kenyattas, who are <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/gachagua-criticises-kenyattas-over-mau-mau-neglect-land-troubles-4207716">accused</a> of sidelining freedom fighters and their families. The historical <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/217022">grievance</a> is that they did not benefit from post-independence allocations. </p>
<p>Ngina has sought to <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/04/11/mama-ngina-and-field-marshall-muthonis-locs-sanitising-the-kenyattas/">realign herself</a> with the Mau Mau. She has claimed that <a href="https://hardtalkkenyan.wordpress.com/2023/04/21/field-marshal-muthoni-wa-kirima-and-i-were-the-true-mau-mau-freedom-fighters-founding-first-lady-mama-ngina-kenyatta/">she was among the Mau Mau women fighters</a>. There is no archival evidence to support this, and her husband denounced the movement before independence. The group remained banned under his and the next presidency. It was finally <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2003-09-01-kenya-lifts-ban-on-mau/">lifted</a> in 2003.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that in an election campaign heavy with economic empowerment promises, this claim was her way of identifying with the marginalised, on behalf of the Kenyattas’ candidate. She can be counted on to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-02-04-ive-paid-all-taxes-stop-tarnishing-my-family-name-mama-ngina-tells-ruto-allies/">defend</a> the family name, in good times and bad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Angelo receives funding from the Austrian Science Fund. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catheline Bosibori consults to Africa politicum. she has previously received funding from KAAD . She is affiliated with The Adam smith Fellowship, Mercatus centre USA.</span></em></p>You can count on Mama Ngina Kenyattta to defend the family name, in good times and bad.Anaïs Angelo, Elise Richter Fellow, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Universität WienCatheline Bosibori N, Adam Smith Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050052023-05-16T10:59:38Z2023-05-16T10:59:38ZKenya’s political elites switch parties with every election – how this fuels violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524923/original/file-20230508-173480-qsf6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters at the launch of the Jubilee Party manifesto in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jubilee-party-supporters-of-kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-news-photo/801424352?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Barely seven months after leaving office, Kenya’s former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kanini-kega-led-jubilee-faction-kicks-out-uhuru-as-party-leader--4220148">is battling</a> to keep together the party that won him a second term and a majority in parliament in 2017. His <a href="https://web.facebook.com/TheJubileeParty/?_rdc=1&_rdr">Jubilee Party</a> performed dismally in the 2022 election. Only 27 out of 290 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/mps">members of the national assembly</a>, four out of 47 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-senate/senators">senators</a> and one county governor out of 47 were elected on its ticket. This isn’t surprising in Kenya where political elites switch parties and coalitions with every election. No political party or coalition has ruled for more than one term since the opposition deposed the independence movement, KANU, in 2002. Gilbert Khadiagala, a political scientist who has researched <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364268431_Coalition_politics_in_Kenya_Superficial_assemblages_and_momentary_vehicles_to_attain_power">the fluidity of Kenya’s political coalitions</a>, explains the impact of this.</em></p>
<h2>What is the background of Kenya’s fluid political landscape?</h2>
<p>The onset of the multiparty era in the early 1990s <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Multi-Party+Politics+in+Kenya">brought</a> a new phase of complex political coalitions and alliances. They were competing against the previously dominant political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Typical of Africa’s post-colonial dominant parties, KANU governed for more than two decades through authoritarian methods. Under presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002), KANU co-opted opposition figures into an elaborate system of patronage and coerced critics who didn’t toe the party line. </p>
<p>The coalitions that emerged were based primarily on ethnic and regional affiliations – they were overwhelmingly elite-based. The first was the Forum for the Restoration Democracy (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Forum-for-the-Restoration-of-Democracy">FORD</a>). However, barely a year into its existence, FORD broke into two major factions – FORD Kenya and FORD Asili – in August 1992. Further splits followed. </p>
<p>The dominant coalitions that participated in the August 2022 elections – the Kenya Kwanza alliance (led by William Ruto) and the Azimio alliance (led by Raila Odinga) – comprise many smaller parties. They are products of previous failed attempts at alliance building.</p>
<p>In 30 years of competitive politics, coalitions were expected to gradually stabilise into coherent political parties with national reach and resonance. Instead, political coalitions in Kenya have not advanced beyond their narrow bases. They remain fundamentally ethnic and regional machines that are frequently scrambled together on the eve of elections to win power. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3497247/Political_movements_and_coalition_politics_in_Kenya_entrenching_ethnicity">studied</a> Kenya’s politics for 30 years. It’s my view that Kenyan coalitions that rise and fall with every election do not provide the foundation for steady and enduring party systems. These coalitions postpone the evolution of national parties that would lend some predictability and stability to political competition.</p>
<p>Parties should broadly reflect – and manage – societal differences. In Germany, for instance, parties have come together to overcome certain historical differences by calling on shared interests. Germany’s coalition governments are largely based on well-established political parties, not conglomerations concocted before elections as in Kenya. And <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/nejo.12310">political parties negotiate</a> these governing coalitions after elections, not before.</p>
<p>Throughout Africa, where ethnic and regional divisions are paramount, political mobilisations deepen societal differences. Electoral violence occurs because winning coalitions control all the national resources. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/victors-go-spoils-how-winner-takes-all-politics-undermine-democracy-sierra-leone">winner-takes-all</a> political systems of countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone face a related problem: they have very small independent private sectors. So winners are tempted to use political power to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-08_Issue-2/nsia-pepra_e.pdf">grab</a> national resources. </p>
<h2>What are the main weaknesses of fluid political coalitions?</h2>
<p>They cause instability in the country. Unstable coalitions contribute to electoral violence as losing coalitions vent their grievances. Following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/12/kenyan-protests-against-kenyatta-election-victory-turn-deadly">violent aftermath</a> of the 2017 Kenyan elections, Odinga’s coalition at the time, the National Super Alliance (NASA), threatened to agitate for the secession of his support base from Kenya. </p>
<p>In 2002, there was a brief phase of optimism for an enduring coalition. The National Rainbow Alliance (NARC), led by Mwai Kibaki, was a grouping of the leading ethnic groups ranged against Moi’s chosen successor, Kenyatta. But it ended in <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">civil conflict</a> in 2007-2008 after Kibaki marginalised key allies largely on ethnic and regional lines. </p>
<p>The Government of National Unity <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/LS_Kenya_Powersharing_FINAL.pdf">crafted</a> by international actors in 2008 became an uneasy and unwieldy coalition. Its members decamped to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-government-of-national-unity-about-to-collapse">new coalitions</a> in the next elections. </p>
<p>Subsequent political alliances have reproduced the conditions for anxiety and chaos after every election. Despite the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a> giving more power to Kenya’s 47 counties, political elites remain fixated on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14662043.2015.1089006?needAccess=true&role=button">winning presidential elections</a> to gain power at the centre. </p>
<p>The unstable coalitions also account for widespread corruption. Winning coalitions <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-run-for-office-in-kenya-heres-how-much-itll-cost-you-183683">expend enormous resources</a> to fortify their power. To do this they have to loot state resources. </p>
<h2>What are the strengths of these loose coalitions?</h2>
<p>In societies where ethnic groups coincide with regions, coalitions are one of the means of organising competitive politics. The loose coalitions enable leaders who neither share policies nor vision to temporarily accommodate each other. This creates a semblance of national unity. The fluid coalitions are, therefore, essential in such political landscapes until national cohesion and coherence are achieved. </p>
<p>When the search for presidential power ceases to be politically relevant and salient, Kenya’s politics will be normalised. Transforming coalitions into solid parties may take time. But it’s the only way out of the prevailing political stalemate. </p>
<h2>What adjustments should be made?</h2>
<p>Kenyans do share basic bread-and-butter interests. When those interests are highlighted – instead of ethnic and regional affiliations – political parties with national outreach could emerge. </p>
<p>It’s elites who emphasise cultural and ethnic differences between regions. They have a large stake in the stalemate continuing, instead of building institutionalised parties. The puzzle for Kenya is how to transform ethnic diversities and identities into the foundations for predictable and organised politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fluidity of the country’s short-lived coalitions is a major cause of instability in Kenya.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2029792023-04-03T13:57:28Z2023-04-03T13:57:28ZMass protests in Kenya have a long and rich history – but have been hijacked by the elites<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518491/original/file-20230330-20-zjju3k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters face off with an anti-riot police officer in Nairobi, Kenya, in March 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga and his coalition party, Azimio la Umoja-One Kenya, recently called for <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/292123/kenya-raila-announces-anti-ruto-protests-with-major-demo-in-nairobi/">mass protests across the country</a>. Odinga and his team have questioned the legitimacy of President William Ruto’s win in the country’s August 2022 election, and taken issue with the rising cost of living. The Conversation Africa’s Kagure Gacheche spoke with Westen K Shilaho, a senior researcher on African politics, who explores the evolution of political protests in Kenya.</em></p>
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<h2>What does the law say about political protest?</h2>
<p>The right to protest is enshrined in the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/203-37-assembly-demonstration-picketing-and-petition#:%7E:text=Assembly%2C%20demonstration%2C%20picketing%20and%20petition,-Chapter%20Four%20%2D%20The&text=Every%20person%20has%20the%20right,present%20petitions%20to%20public%20authorities.">constitution of Kenya under Article 37</a>. It states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person has the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to present petitions to public authorities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The right to protest is also affirmed by international instruments to which Kenya is a signatory. These include the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human and People’s Rights</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>. </p>
<p>However, successive Kenyan governments have repeatedly criminalised the right to protest. As a result, the police consistently react with <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/au-calls-for-calm-restraint-in-kenya-4175774">brute force against protesters</a>. </p>
<h2>What led to the latest wave of protests in Kenya?</h2>
<p>Kenya held general elections on 9 August 2022, and <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/nJbSsSKxMj.pdf">William Ruto was declared president</a>. The opposition contested the election results and <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/raila-contests-presidential-election-results-supreme-court-3922660">filed a petition</a> before the supreme court, which <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenyan-court-to-rule-on-disputed-presidential-election-/6731434.html">unanimously dismissed the petition</a> for lack of evidence. </p>
<p>Raila Odinga, the losing presidential contestant, rejected this ruling and has refused to recognise Ruto’s win. He has taken the dispute to the court of public opinion – the streets. He has made three main demands: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>that the electoral agency’s servers be opened to prove that he won the 2022 election</p></li>
<li><p>that Ruto halts <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/25-kenyans-seek-to-replace-chebukati-as-iebc-chair-895-eye-commissioner-jobs-4177314">reconstitution of Kenya’s electoral body</a> </p></li>
<li><p>that the government lowers the cost of living.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Protests began on 15 August 2022 when the presidential election results were declared. <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/national/article/2001453334/bitter-end-chebukati-attacked-as-chaos-mar-bomas-briefing">Hoodlums assaulted</a> the electoral agency’s chairperson and other officials. They are yet to be held to account for these attacks.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-body-choosing-kenyas-election-commission-is-being-overhauled-how-this-could-strengthen-democracy-198798">The body choosing Kenya's election commission is being overhauled – how this could strengthen democracy</a>
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<p>After a six-month lull, these protests recently spilled over onto the streets. The opposition called for demonstrations <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/raila-odinga-calls-for-boycott-of-safaricom-kcb-4167328">twice a week</a> from 20 March until the government accedes to its demands. </p>
<p>Ruto and his supporters <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2023/03/president-ruto-dismisses-raila-call-for-resignation-halt-of-iebc-recruitment/">have been scornful</a> of the opposition’s demands, saying they have no basis in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/president-ruto-dismisses-raila-s-azimio-protests-as-sabotage--4103666">law, morality or logic</a>. Ruto dismissed the protests as <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-03-19-i-will-not-allow-you-to-terrorise-kenyans-ruto-tells-raila/">acts of economic terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>After two weeks of <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/30/violent-clashes-as-kenya-opposition-stages-third-day-of-protests/">violence</a> – where at least three people died, several others injured and property vandalised – Ruto extended an olive branch to the opposition and asked them to <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/eyes-on-raila-as-ruto-asks-opposition-to-call-off-protests-4182346">call off the protests</a>. He suggested that the issue of the reconstitution of the electoral body could be revisited. </p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-04-02-my-door-is-open-for-talks-call-off-protests-ruto-tells-raila/">the opposition suspended the protests</a>. </p>
<p>Ruto has previously said he would not be <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/anxiety-as-ruto-raila-harden-stance-over-protests-4172706">blackmailed into a power-sharing arrangement</a> with the opposition. If not checked, power-sharing arrangements – or “<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyatta-raila-pact-will-only-herald-real-change-if-promises-are-followed-by-action-96148">handshake</a>” in Kenya’s political parlance – could become the country’s default arrangement after elections. This would be to the detriment of democratic tenets. </p>
<h2>What is the history of political protests in Kenya?</h2>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenyas-constitutional-duels-are-all-about-power-struggles-among-the-elite-147471">political history</a> is marked by mass protests that date back to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/180739">colonial period</a> and continued into independence. </p>
<p>Amid police crackdowns, Kenyans protested against <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000096439/witness-recalls-the-1969-kisumu-massacre-that-marked-jomo-kenyatta-s-visit">political assassinations</a> and autocracy during the tenures of the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, and his successor, Daniel Moi. </p>
<p>Through a <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Constitution/HistoryoftheConstitutionofKenya/Acts/1982/ActNo.7of1982.pdf">constitutional amendment</a>, Moi turned Kenya into a one-party state in 1982, which heightened political tensions. Later that year, Kenyans protested in Nairobi in support of an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001380803/inside-secret-coup-attempt-that-killed-240-in-city-crossfire">attempted coup against Moi</a> as opposition politicians and civil society sought a return to political pluralism. </p>
<p>Countrywide protests were held in <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/07/07/saba-saba-and-the-evolution-of-citizen-power">1990</a>. This agitation, coupled with pressure from civil society, religious groups and western donors, forced Moi to accede to <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1204/04041.html">multiparty politics in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>In 1992, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/news/article/2001261426/bare-breasted-crusade-when-mothers-of-political-prisoners-stripped-at-uhuru-park">mothers of political prisoners</a> held an 11-month hunger strike in Nairobi to demand the release of their sons. </p>
<p>Protests against presidential results in 2007 led to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">horrific crackdown</a>. More than 1,100 people were killed, <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov">several of them extrajudicially</a> by the police. Odinga had disputed Mwai Kibaki’s win. Protests and summary executions also followed the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/17/kenya-riot-police-election-protest">2013</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">2017</a> announcements of presidential election results.</p>
<p>Protests are important. They can influence a government or a body of authority to respond to popular interests and injustice. Through protests, a government can be forced to address service delivery concerns, corruption, labour disputes, extrajudicial and summary executions and education matters, and to abandon dictatorial tendencies. In some countries, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring">Tunisia, Egypt and Libya</a>, protests collapsed regimes. </p>
<p>As I discuss in my book, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322174201_Political_Power_and_Tribalism_in_Kenya">Political Power and Tribalism in Kenya</a>, political protests in the country have become insular, sectarian, tribal, unashamedly personality driven and elitist. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">Kenya’s history of political violence: colonialism, vigilantes and militias</a>
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<hr>
<p>My research found that the political elite have used protests for self-preservation and to pursue their interests. Protests have become about getting opposing political personalities to come to an agreement so that election losers don’t lose all the benefits of being in power – but such agreements stifle healthy debate.</p>
<p>Elections must produce winners and losers among the contestants. The citizenry should be the only constant winners. Their concerns must be met regardless of who ascends to power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Political protests in Kenya have become insular, sectarian, tribal and unashamedly personality driven.Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000922023-03-09T14:29:56Z2023-03-09T14:29:56ZKenya’s first skyscraper closes – and leaves a complicated legacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510534/original/file-20230216-16-44jtkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hilton Hotel towers over Nairobi’s vibrant, if declining, central business district. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Georgina Goodwin/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Hilton Hotel was Nairobi’s first skyscraper. The iconic cylindrical tower was opened in 1969 by President Jomo Kenyatta, six years after Kenya’s independence from Britain. </p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-01-02-nairobi-hilton-hotel-closes-doors-after-53-years/">closure</a> of the hotel after more than 50 years of operation comes at a time of vertical transformation in the city’s skyline. As Nairobi grows ever taller, and as newer suburbs take over from the central business district as the city’s commercial centres, the Hilton is a landmark from a different era of urban life. </p>
<p>The Hilton’s modernist shape was part of a post-independence shift away from colonial hotel architecture in Nairobi. As seen in the exclusive Norfolk and Fairview hotels, the colonial style had mimicked the English country house. </p>
<p>Across the continent, a new African modernism emerged in the 1960s. Like the Hotel Independence in Dakar, Senegal, or the soaring Hotel Ivoire in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, the vertical reach of the Hilton was symbolic of a new era of ambition and a means to express an emerging national identity. As the anthropologist Filip de Boeck has <a href="https://www.anthropocene-curriculum.org/contribution/the-tower-a-concrete-utopia">said</a>, by </p>
<blockquote>
<p>pointing towards the sky, it also pointed towards the future.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Hilton helped to shape the character of central Nairobi. It quickly became an urban landmark and a meeting place of the new elite. It also gained notoriety for what went on behind closed doors. More recently, it has symbolised the declining fortunes of the city centre. As my <a href="https://www.highriselandscapes.org/publications">research</a> has examined, Nairobi’s high-rise transformation is closely linked to the politics of urban change.</p>
<h2>Upwardly mobile lifestyles</h2>
<p>In the Hilton’s early years of the 1970s, hotels in Nairobi were an important part of the upwardly mobile lifestyles of aspirant families. Something like the Kenyan equivalent of the country club, hotels were where you went to see and be seen. Business and political elites took their families for lunch and a day by the pool, knowing that others would be doing the same. </p>
<p>Hotels were places where alliances were made and deals were struck in a more informal atmosphere. Different hotels had different personalities and were associated with different social sets. Some were more exclusive; others were associated with certain political allegiances. </p>
<p>This was a deliberately exclusive and exclusionary scene. A world where you had to dress a certain way to get in, where you were judged on what car dropped you or on where you’d bought your dress. It was part of how new forms of socio-economic difference were established and experienced in the aftermath of colonialism. In downtown Nairobi, spaces of racial exclusion began to be overwritten by distinctions based on class and wealth.</p>
<h2>High-end sleaze</h2>
<p>Whereas the nearby Intercontinental or Panafric hotels were regarded as family-friendly, the Hilton was more closely associated with government and politics. It was known as a place for government-funded conferences and “trainings” that were held in its huge salon; extravagant functions that were another indication of the way power and finance circulated in the 1980s and 1990s. </p>
<p>Over time, however, the Hilton also gained a reputation for high-end sleaze. It was a place where the predominantly male politicians of the time would go to pick up women, where notorious parties were held, and rooms could be booked for “a short time.” </p>
<h2>Urban landmark</h2>
<p>The future of the building is uncertain. The Kenyan government still holds a <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/real-estate/article/2001459123/state-in-search-of-new-hilton-tower-tenant-as-hotel-exits-cbd">controlling stake</a> in it through the Kenya Development Corporation, with a decision still to be made. </p>
<p>As an exclusive hotel, the Hilton was perhaps irrelevant to most Kenyans’ lives: most have never been inside, and now likely never will. Yet many city residents still speak of it fondly, using it as a landmark to find one’s way around the city. </p>
<p>Despite its inaccessibility, it is a familiar and even comforting part of the urban landscape. ‘You see it every day almost without noticing’, as one friend put it. ‘We grew up with it. We’d miss it if it wasn’t there’. It is like a tree in the compound that you build everything else around: an orientating feature that gives the landscape character. </p>
<h2>Urban influence</h2>
<p>In recent years, the declining fortunes of central Nairobi have been mirrored by the waning prestige and financial viability of the Hilton. Westlands and Upper Hill have become the new commercial and political heartlands, and downtown Nairobi is often bypassed by both visitors and residents alike. </p>
<p>Yet the early ambition of high-rise buildings like the Hilton can still be seen as influential in contemporary Nairobi. Since the turn of this century, the city has been experiencing a high-rise boom. Neighbourhoods like Kileleshwa and Kilimani have gone from single dwelling plots to multi-storey apartment blocks. This transformation is part of Nairobi’s increasing presence on a world stage, as it becomes known for its digital and tech economies, and its middle-class status. </p>
<h2>The dark side of the high-rise</h2>
<p>High-rise buildings are reshaping other parts of Nairobi too, with estates like Pipeline, Zimmerman or Tassia known for their densely packed blocks of rental units. Although aimed at a different type of tenant, these high-rise buildings, known as <em>maghorofa</em> in Kiswahili, often imitate more high-end tower blocks. Reflective glass, bright paint colours, pretty balconies and fancy names – Lifestyle Plaza, Jazzy Heights, Muthaiga View – indicate new aspirations, even when the interior of the building might not live up to its surface claims.</p>
<p>This high-rise boom has a darker side too. Just as the modernist ambition of the Hilton hid less salubrious activity, so is Nairobi’s glossy vertical transformation awash with rumours of property speculation, cut-throat deals and a murky real estate sector.</p>
<p>The recent spate of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenyan-building-collapses-spark-alarm-cities-swell-2022-11-23/">building collapses</a> has tragically killed scores of Nairobians and has destroyed the homes of many more. </p>
<p>These collapses speak to the suspect economies of the construction industry, where shortcuts are taken with little regard for safety, as well as the challenges of exerting regulatory control over a sector that is so entangled with political and business elites. </p>
<p>In a city like Nairobi, where urban inequality is getting ever wider, the surface promise of high-rise futures can be hollow, covering a much more uncertain reality within.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Research for this article was funded as part of a UK Research and Innovation Future Leaders Fellowship, grant number MR/S015558/1</span></em></p>As Nairobi grows ever taller, and as newer suburbs take over from the central business district as the city’s commercial centres, the Hilton stands as a landmark to a different era.Constance Smith, Lecturer, Social Anthropology, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1838502022-05-30T14:13:26Z2022-05-30T14:13:26ZKenya’s ‘patriotic’ choral music has been used to embed a skewed version of history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465751/original/file-20220527-23-mveqt7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A choir performs during independence day celebrations in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Choral music – patriotic choral music in particular – is a significant genre in Kenya’s political history. </p>
<p>Patriotic music is defined by how it engages citizen to praise and express sentiments of national affiliation. In the Kenyan context patriotic choral music has been used to influence behaviour and the forming of a national identity. </p>
<p>We <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/epdf/10.10520/EJC-f184b6256">traced the history</a> of the music to explore how it has been used in this way in the country. We found that songs that were composed and performed in the immediate aftermath of Kenya’s struggle for independence urged the public to forget colonial injustices to build the new country. </p>
<p>This music was used to create political heroes out of individuals at the expense of the hosts of people who contributed to the country’s independence. It continues to be used as a political tool. This is primarily done through a distribution network that involves airplay on both private and state broadcasters, and during national holidays. </p>
<h2>A long tradition</h2>
<p>Choral music was used to amplify former President Jomo Kenyatta’s widely publicised rhetoric of “forgive and forget”. </p>
<p>Kenya’s first president introduced the idea in his speech to the nation at the first celebration of Kenyatta Day – later renamed Mashujaa (Heroes) Day – on 20 October 1964. He <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279155301_Jomo_Kenyatta's_Speeches_and_the_Construction_of_the_Identities_of_a_Nationalist_Leader_in_Kenya">proclaimed that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the foundation of our future must lie in the theme: forgive and forget.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It would later become a motto closely linked to his presidency. His policies inaugurated a national culture of selective socio-political amnesia.</p>
<p>This persists in contemporary Kenya. </p>
<p>Most of the choral music composed and performed in Kenya as ‘patriotic music’ has been embraced and influenced by the government through the Permanent Presidential Music Commission (PPMC). </p>
<p>The commission was established in 1988 under President Daniel arap Moi, Kenya’s second president. The government agency deals with the entertainment functions of the state, among others. </p>
<p>Music researchers <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319249">Hellen Agak and Kakston Mindoti</a> observe that the commission scrutinises all Kenyan patriotic choral music to ensure that it conforms to the social and political ideals of the government. The commission also examines the quality of music and messages communicated.</p>
<p>Over different government regimes, patriotic choral music has been presented to the public through the national broadcaster and during state celebrations of national days. The music presented is curated through the commission. </p>
<p>During these celebrations, a few selected canonical choral pieces have continued to dominate through different governments and political regimes. </p>
<h2>The telling of history</h2>
<p>Our research focused mainly on the music of Enock Ondego, one of Kenya’s pioneer composers. Ondego’s ‘Huu ni Wimbo wa Historia’ (This is a Song of History) is perhaps the main choral composition that has persisted through different regimes.</p>
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</figure>
<p>‘Huu ni Wimbo wa Historia’ was composed in May 1964. It was <a href="https://www.kwani.org/publication/kwanini-series/7/the_life_of_mzee_ondego.html">first performed</a> before President Kenyatta by the children of Samburu Primary School. </p>
<p>The song foregrounds the importance of the anti-colonial struggle in Kenya’s history. It opens with a plea to the audience to pay attention to the message. </p>
<p>It is a narrative of the experiences of different victims during the <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/british-kenya-1920-1963/#:%7E:text=British%20Government%20Evelyn%20Baring%20declared,militants%20on%20October%2022%2C%201952.">1952 emergency period</a>. The lyrics suggest that the struggle for Kenya’s independence was a collective moral phenomenon. Lines 7 and 8 – “there was sorrow in the country Kenya” and “all the people were very sad” – capture this reality. </p>
<p>In lines 14 and 15, the song further explains that there was “matata” (trouble) and that “many people died because of freedom”. </p>
<p>Yet, the history documented in the choral song is a selective one.</p>
<p>Despite the promise of its title, ‘Huu ni Wimbo wa Historia’ foregrounds only Kenyatta’s involvement in the freedom struggle. It does this by focusing on the supposed physical and emotional violence he faced as an individual. This erases the contribution of everyone else in the country’s struggle for independence. </p>
<p>The song initially mentions that Kenyatta was arrested together with other freedom fighters. But the others remain unnamed and unacknowledged (lines 4, 5 and 6). </p>
<p>Lines 20, 21, 22 and 23 invoke the memory of how Kenyatta and other representatives travelled to Britain to negotiate for Kenya’s constitution. Again, the lyrics foreground Kenyatta only. The promise of a collective identified by the idea of ‘representatives’ suddenly collapses into the singular. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>When he reached there … he was beaten with rotten eggs … The father of the nation did not mind … he won and came back with a constitution for our country, Kenya. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rather than recognising that Kenya’s constitutional victory was the result of collective endeavour, the song suggests that it was produced by the individual efforts of Kenyatta. </p>
<p>This silencing takes on added significance when considering the original naming of the commemorative day upon which this song reflects: Kenyatta Day. </p>
<p>The individuality cult of Kenyatta is central in understanding how music became a site where heroes were purged from Kenyan history, or where their role in the making of the nation was undermined. </p>
<p>Such narratives risk promoting socio-political, historical and even economic exclusion in the process of nation formation. </p>
<p>To echo literary professor Pumla Dineo Gqola’s work on <a href="https://witspress.co.za/catalogue/what-is-slavery-to-me/">postcolonial slave memory in South Africa</a>, forgetting and remembering are framed within power hierarchies, where “unremembering is a calculated act of exclusion and erasure”. </p>
<p>In the current government, songs such as ‘Huu ni Wimbo wa Historia’ continue to get significant airplay, especially on national holidays. </p>
<h2>Influencing memory and history</h2>
<p>By relying on such music for entertainment during state commemorative events, the presidential music commission plays a crucial function in statecraft, especially in the context of influencing memory and history. </p>
<p>But the musical and performance component of the songs also reveals that it is multi-layered. </p>
<p>The emotive tone and mood of ‘Huu ni Wimbo wa Historia’ demonstrate the immensity of the pain endured in the anti-colonial struggle. Feelings of despair and sorrow are painted through repetition and by onomatopoeic sounds, such as ‘woooi woooi’ (line 11). </p>
<p>Such sounds capture the general mourning response of the public not only to Kenyatta’s arrest, but also to the deaths and torture witnessed after the state of emergency was declared. </p>
<p>Hence, the song’s text seems to call for a celebratory turn towards the future, while simultaneously ruminating in the pain of the past through non-linguistic verbal signifiers that reach their full effect only in performance. </p>
<p>This shows that patriotic choral music in Kenya, although repeatedly used as a political tool, also shares the potential for contesting meaning and drawing listeners’ attention to different layers of significance embedded in musical texts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Music has often been used as a political tool to urge Kenyans to forget the sins of colonial and post-colonial regimes.Doseline Kiguru, Research associate, University of BristolPatrick Ernest Monte, Lecturer of Music, Kabarak UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1547562021-02-08T08:18:58Z2021-02-08T08:18:58ZSimeon Nyachae: the larger-than-life civil servant who made his mark on Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382869/original/file-20210207-15-z743ze.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Simeon Nyachae (right) welcomes President Uhuru Kenyatta to his alma mater, Kisii School in western Kenya, during the institution's 80th anniversary in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/120898464@N04/14995103431/in/photolist-8dfzcw-oR4PQ4/lightbox/">State House Kenya/Courtesy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Simeon Nyachae, who <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-02-02-nyachae-wealthy-politician-who-controlled-gusii-politics/">passed away</a> in early February at the age of 88, was among the men who shaped Kenya and made it one of Africa’s leading economies. For Kenya’s first 40 years of independence he was highly visible in government and helped to craft an economy oriented to the private sector that also was favourable to both large and small-scale agriculture.</p>
<p>Nyachae held senior leadership positions under all three of Kenya’s first presidents – Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki – from 1963 to 2007. </p>
<p>Nyachae was among the favourite sons of <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/biography-of-chief-musa-nyandusi/oclc/32825246&referer=brief_results">Musa Nyandusi</a>, who was the senior chief in Kisii District in western Kenya and supervisor of its other chiefs. This was the highest government post an African could hold in the colonial government. As independence approached Nyandusi was able to influence an appointment for Nyachae as district assistant (or officer) – which had been the entry grade for British colonial officers – in Kisii. He then moved to Machakos district bordering the capital Nairobi. </p>
<p>After independence President Kenyatta made Nyachae district commissioner for Nyandarua. He was then promoted to provincial commissioner for the Rift Valley, the largest of the country’s eight provinces. Subsequently, he was moved to Central Province, the president’s home province outside Nairobi. </p>
<p>As Kenyatta was a strong centraliser and ruled through the civil service, these positions were equivalent to a governor or prefect. He was effectively in charge of the local activities of other government officials. The places where Nyachae served gave him considerable authority over the transformation of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1792632?seq=1">“White Highlands”</a> estates from European hands into African-held small and large farms. This meant that his position was highly political. </p>
<p>Under President arap Moi, Nyachae rose in 1979 to the office of chief secretary and cabinet secretary, from which he retired in 1987. </p>
<p>Moi was much less of a centraliser than Kenyatta had been. He was interested in seeing a better distribution of resources among Kenya’s ethnic (or tribal) regions. To this end, Nyachae formed an alliance with Harris Mule, then the permanent secretary in the ministry of planning, and together they shepherded the “<a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/9018">District Focus for Rural Development</a>” into policy in the mid-1980s. </p>
<p>This involved devolving significant financial authority and responsibility to district county councils. In turn this presaged the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/138-chapter-eleven-devolved-government">decentralised structure</a> provided by the current Kenyan constitution promulgated in 2010. </p>
<p>The purpose of both changes was to give Kenya’s multiple “tribes” greater control over the local distribution of government resources. In this way Kenya sought to mitigate the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-divided-pasts-to-cohesive-futures/kenyas-four-ages-of-ethnicity/47BB799B6C95D3E2659C1EE1B8B148BE">intensity of “tribal” competition</a> for national political office which had been building up over the years. Indeed, it boiled over into considerable violence after the 2007 elections. </p>
<p>After retirement from the civil service, in 1992, Nyachae was elected a member of parliament from his home in Kisii and was re-elected in 1997. As an MP, Nyachae served in Moi’s cabinet, first as agriculture minister from 1992, and then as water minister. After the 1997 election, he served in finance before moving to industry. </p>
<p>He broke with Moi and <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/ken2002results.htm">contested</a> the presidency in 2002, but lost to Mwai Kibaki. Nonetheless, President Kibaki appointed Nyachae as minister of energy in a government of national unity. In 2005 Nyachae chose to retire from public life for health reasons.</p>
<h2>Wealth and interests</h2>
<p>With financial support from his father, Nyachae had begun a very small bakery even before he joined the civil service. At Kenya’s independence, most African leaders of the independence generation were given opportunities by Kenyatta to take over previously European parts of the economy. </p>
<p>They had <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft8p3008fh;query=;brand=ucpress">privileged access</a> to farms in the ‘White Highlands’, loans, government permits, contracts, and the like and became instantly wealthy. Nyachae was no exception. His bakery expanded, he acquired at least two large farms, and other businesses he established did well.</p>
<p>As was true for other members of the new African elite, the agricultural commodities they produced were largely the same as those of small farmers. By pursuing public policies that profited their farms, they were helping a large number of poorer Kenyan farmers as well. This Kenyan coincidence of large and small-holder agricultural interests was very unusual in Africa and a part of the key to its economic success. </p>
<p>Nyachae shared those interests and thus joined in promoting business, agricultural and rural development policies with long-term, broad benefits that reached widely in the economy. Furthermore, unlike many others he was a <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft8p3008fh;query=;brand=ucpress">‘nationalist’</a>, in that he was concerned with the welfare of all parts of the country and much less focused on immediate personal gain or in advancing sectional (that is, ‘tribal’) advantage.</p>
<p>Nyachae’s wealth also gave him the economic independence to risk government displeasure when he wanted to quietly oppose political measures he found unwise. He believed strongly in supporting the interests of the presidents he served, but when others with political influence tried to gain unseemly advantage at government expense, Nyachae was willing to interfere. Several times he <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110527054529/http://mvuleafricapublishers.com/walking-through-the-corridor-of-services-hard-cover/">blocked conspiracies</a> to remove dedicated civil servants who were in the way.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110527054529/http://mvuleafricapublishers.com/walking-through-the-corridor-of-services-hard-cover/">believed</a> the efforts he made to stop corruption were behind Moi’s decisions to transfer him to minor cabinet portfolios from being minister of agriculture and later of finance. </p>
<p>Ultimately, particularly around the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf">Goldenberg corruption scandal</a> in which senior government officials were implicated, he lost influence with President Moi and broke with him in 1999. </p>
<h2>Round the clock manager</h2>
<p>Nyachae always served at the intersection of politics and administration. Nevertheless, he was more of a firm manager than a politician. In addition to being a ‘nationalist’ he was known for his exceptional drive, long hours, self-discipline and the speed with which he wrote memos. </p>
<p>More important, his success as a manager came from the support he provided gifted civil service professionals in gaining links to presidential support and in his willingness to take risks in opposing misguided endeavours of lesser politicians.</p>
<p>Nyachae is survived by numerous children and their offspring, but he insisted when I last spoke to him that it was contrary to Gusii tradition to enumerate them. He had four wives and was very proud of the effort he put into keeping their children united under his leadership. In this he was successful, as witnessed by the many occasions until the very end in which they were there to support him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154756/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David K. Leonard received funding from the US National Science Foundation and the US Fulbright programme in the mid-1980s. to research a 1990 book on Nyachae and others.</span></em></p>Nyachae always served at the intersection of politics and administration. Nevertheless, he was more of a firm manager than a politician.David K. Leonard, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, BerkeleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1445502020-08-18T14:23:40Z2020-08-18T14:23:40ZAfrica’s presidents have been wrongly stereotyped: what we can learn from Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353350/original/file-20200818-18-79gpne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's founding president Jomo Kenyatta attends a ceremony in 1964 in Nairobi.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Anwar Hussein/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>All-powerful presidents are an essential part of a <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/tare/46/2/article-p275_1.xml?language=en">stereotypical representation</a> of African politics controlled by a few individuals, rather than by institutions. This view has been reinforced by a literary tradition sanctifying the biographies of “great men” while demonising more troubled political figures.</p>
<p>The academic discourse has for a long time reproduced these stereotypical biases. To paraphrase the political scientists <a href="https://books.google.at/books?id=GNSDSgQijaQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=roseber+black+africa+prince&hl=de&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj8_9O6zL_qAhWF1aYKHQHzDucQ6AEwAHoECAAQAg#v=onepage&q&f=false">Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Roseberg</a>, African politics is interpreted as the playground of a few prophets, tyrants and princes. </p>
<p>Yet, the important question remains: why did, on independence, almost all African states (with the notable exception of Ethiopia for example) adopt a presidential system of rule? Put differently: what are the historical origins of presidential power in postcolonial African countries? This is the question my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-and-the-presidency-in-kenya/05E72D9730B9ECD45175F416108E51B7#fndtn-information"><em>Power and the Presidency in Kenya: The Jomo Kenyatta Years (1958-1978)</em></a>, sought to answer.</p>
<p>Since the 1990s, <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-institutionalization-of-political-power-in-africa/">the role and importance of African state institutions has grown beyond question</a>. But caricatures of African presidents have persisted in popular culture. The success of the British film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0455590/"><em>The Last King of Scotland</em></a> (2006) about Idi Amin Dada, Uganda’s dictator from 1970 to 1979, shows a fascination with the African dictator. He’s pictured as a dangerous and eccentric figure, yet never as a serious political actor. </p>
<p>More recently, however, scholars have emphasised that African presidents’ purportedly excessive personalities must be considered as serious political strategies. Alicia Decker, <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/In+Idi+Amin%E2%80%99s+Shadow">author</a> of <em>In Idi Amin’s Shadow</em>, has shown, for example, that Amin’s hyper-masculinity was a political strategy. Others have found that behind this show, <a href="https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/authoritarian-africa-9780190279653?cc=at&lang=en&">autocrats strategically use the power of ideas to legitimise their rule</a>. </p>
<p>These arguments are necessary to challenge the stereotypical representation of African presidents. Writing a different narrative on African presidential history first required the deconstruction of a notion that has been increasingly <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine-2013-4-page-156.htm">criticised: that of the “father of the nation”</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353022/original/file-20200815-14-1yffdyb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Father of the nation</h2>
<p>Why, when and how did Kenyatta become the “father” of the Kenyan nation? By the time the independence negotiations started in the early 1960s, Kenyatta was <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/specials/1952-1978-925598">living under restriction</a>. He had been (falsely) convicted by British colonial authorities for being the leader of the Mau Mau. The movement emerged in the early 1950s in protest over colonial land alienation, economic inequalities and political oppression. The Mau Mau was crushed in a brutal counter-insurgency war. </p>
<p>Though the sentence turned Kenyatta into a (Mau Mau) martyr, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenyas-mau-mau-gave-up-their-fight-131222">his relationship to the movement was much more ambiguous</a>. He had always publicly denounced Mau Mau fighters as “terrorists” and the movement as a “disease”. </p>
<p>There was, however, little consensus among the Kenyan political elite as to whether he should become ‘father of the nation’. As a moderate politician and defendant of a centralised state, his leadership aroused much opposition. Yet no other leader could claim to be both a friend and an enemy of the Mau Mau. Kenyatta was the only politician who could embody reconciliation in a country torn apart by colonial rule and the Mau Mau war.</p>
<p>Until Kenya became formally independent in 1963, the negotiations focused on land decolonisation and whether the future state apparatus should be centralised or decentralised. As Kenyatta and his party, the Kenya National African Union, formally took over the government, the debate took an unexpected turn: what would the limit of executive powers be within a centralised government? </p>
<p>Only a few wanted Kenyatta to become president and fewer wanted him to be granted extensive executive powers. The question created a great deal of tension among the Kenyan elite, to the point that Kenya’s transition to becoming a republic was delayed by one year. Parliamentarians specifically contested the provisions made by the draft independence constitutions that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the President has power to make any appointment or make any order <strong>or do any other thing</strong> (my emphasis). </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet these debates had come too late in the independence period to negotiate. The British government saw Kenyatta as politically indispensable to hold a divided country together. And so, indeed, he was. He had no stake in compromising his political plans, or softening his ambitions. No one could resist the extended (almost limitless) and ill-defined executive powers he was granted.</p>
<h2>Shrewd politician</h2>
<p>Upon independence, Kenyatta knew he was surrounded by a deeply divided political elite. He was a shrewd politician and understood how to keep his enemies not only close to him, but also close to state resources by nominating them to important political positions. Besides, he had no other choice but to remain a discreet and distant president, to remain aloof from political tensions. </p>
<p>Kenyatta’s political rise, one made of unpredictability – and isolation – set the tone for future presidential power in Kenya. It showed that far from the myth of the omnipotent father of the nation, big man or dictator, the strength of the Kenyan presidential system was built on divisions and uncertainty. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenyas-mau-mau-gave-up-their-fight-131222">Why Kenya's Mau Mau gave up their fight</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This shows that presidential power has a more complex history than popular stereotypes would have us believe. It requires political intelligence, rather than irrationality or uncontrolled passions, for the president to understand and hold both his allies and enemies together. </p>
<p>Until today, the presidency in Kenya remains the sole institution that strongly resists attempts to <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/devolution-has-changed-kenyan-politics-but-not-in-ways-envisaged-by-its-proponents-16020">decentralise the political system</a>. Nevertheless, presidential rule is also evolving. While Kenyatta became an increasingly imperial leader, his successors – and his son and current President Uhuru Kenyatta in particular – further turned the presidency into an increasingly authoritarian and dynastic institution.</p>
<p>But one things remains: no matter how strong the presidential institution is, it was and is still built on <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyatta-and-odingas-pact-has-led-to-a-new-elite-alliance-why-it-wont-last-141207">profoundly fragile alliances</a>. </p>
<h2>Like father, like son</h2>
<p>With the 2022 presidential contest approaching, the president’s party is <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/06/26/the-battle-within-uhurus-war-against-his-deputy/?print=print">profoundly divided</a> between Uhuru’s camp and that of his former ally, Deputy President William Ruto. Uhuru’s <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/politics/uhuru-raila-deal-stage-set-for-referendum-258354">new ally</a> is his longtime adversary Raila Odinga. This signals not only that Uhuru is, <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/11/01/man-in-the-mirror-echoes-of-jomo-in-uhuru/">just like his father</a>, using his presidential privileges to turn his <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/politics/uhuru-raila-tighten-grip-on-house-with-key-committee-positions-1900908">enemies into allies, temporarily at least, so as to remain in power in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>In a context of political and economic insecurity created by the COVID-19 pandemic and continuous weakening of <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2020/07/10/saba-saba-at-30-the-struggle-for-progressive-alternative-political-leadership-in-kenya-continues/">civil society</a>, it might well be that Uhuru’s presidential powers will be stronger than ever.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article was recently published by <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/bookclub-power-presidency-kenya/">Democracy in Africa</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144550/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Angelo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Far from the myth of the omnipotent father of the nation, big man or dictator, the Kenyan presidential system was built on divisions and uncertainty.Anaïs Angelo, Postdoctoral research fellow, Universität WienLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1312222020-02-12T14:12:13Z2020-02-12T14:12:13ZWhy Kenya’s Mau Mau gave up their fight<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313680/original/file-20200205-149796-1m32hke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A statue of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, who was killed in 1957. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">K. Gituma/Wikimedia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 40 years, successive Kenyan governments turned their back on the Mau Mau. The armed movement sprang up in the early 1950s in protest over colonial land alienation, economic inequalities and political oppression under British rule. Outlawed in 1952, it was crushed in a brutal campaign in which more than <a href="https://www.weidenfeldandnicolson.co.uk/titles/david-anderson/histories-of-the-hanged/9781780222882/">10,000 Mau Mau fighters were killed</a>. Its leader, Dedan Kimathi, was killed in 1957. </p>
<p>A few years later, in 1963, Kenya became independent with Jomo Kenyatta as founding leader. <a href="https://books.google.at/books?id=AmFVjigwkxwC&printsec=frontcover&hl=de&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">The new government</a> was made up of so-called “moderates”, rather than the “radicals” who had supported Mau Mau claims.</p>
<p>Kenyatta’s relationship to the movement was ambiguous. The British arrested him in 1952 on suspicion of being one of its leaders. But after independence his pleas to <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/9781526111890/9781526111890.00021.xml">“forgive and forget the past”</a> were often accompanied by a clear dissociation from the Mau Mau. He continued to describe them as a <a href="https://books.google.at/books/about/Suffering_Without_Bitterness.html?id=ce33ngEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">“disease”</a> and they remained banned under Kenyatta and his successor <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel arap Moi</a>.</p>
<p>In 2003 Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki, lifted the ban on the movement. For many, the 40-year clampdown meant its contribution to Kenyan independence had been <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/mau-mau-and-nationhood-pb.html">actively erased from national memory</a> since independence. </p>
<p>Though the reasons why the successive Kenyan governments did not want to talk about Mau Mau history <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/cea_0008-0055_1995_num_35_137_2026">are no longer a mystery</a>, one question remains: why did the resilient Mau Mau freedom fighters fail to maintain revolutionary action after independence? </p>
<p>The research I conducted for my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-and-the-presidency-in-kenya/05E72D9730B9ECD45175F416108E51B7#fndtn-information">Power and the Presidency in Kenya: the Jomo Kenyatta Years, 1958-1978</a>, suggests some reasons.</p>
<h2>Mau Mau resilience</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2017.1354521?scroll=top&needAccess=true">attention</a> to Mau Mau post-colonial history was first caught by an archival file held in the <a href="http://www.archives.go.ke/">Kenyan National Archives</a>. In it were various intelligence reports received by the provincial commissioner of the (then) Eastern Province, <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Powerful-Coast-PC-who-used-connections-to-mint-millions/440808-2907916-ms78i9z/index.html">Eliud Mahihu</a>, around the years 1964 and 1965. </p>
<p>Based on these reports, Meru district stood out as a particularly sensitive area. There, Mau Mau fighters holed up in the forests refused to surrender. Whereas virtually all Mau Mau leaders had either been killed or coopted in what was then Central Province, fighters in Meru held firm. Field Marshal Mwariama, Field Marshal Baimungi Marete and General Chui (originally from Central Province) were among them. </p>
<p>Their actions and movements were closely monitored by security officers and informers. The government’s fear was that if not dispersed from their forest camp, the remaining fighters and recently released Mau Mau detainees would form a separate movement. The revival of Mau Mau was a threat to the new political order. </p>
<p>Archival files document how the Kenyan government was trying to neutralise resilient Mau Mau fighters. Ministers and government officials repeatedly toured Meru district offering amnesty for those who would surrender. Police action to clear the forest risked being highly unpopular and even unproductive.</p>
<p>In the end the government chose to coopt remaining leaders, or target them. Mwariama finally surrendered early in 1964. The government hoped to use him as an intermediary to negotiate with Baimungi and Chui – in vain.</p>
<p>This resilience risked strengthening the voice of the populist opposition, whose main demand was that land alienated by colonisers be redistributed for free. The government, on the other hand, was driving its land policy of <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-473158-knv82wz/index.html">“willing buyer, willing seller”</a>. </p>
<p>On 26 January 1965 Baimungi and Chui were both killed by police. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Baimungi and Mwariama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ambiguous relationship</h2>
<p>The story did not end in 1965. Silencing the Mau Mau movement was also about sending subtle but powerful messages to the restive Meru population. A member of their tribe, <a href="https://mambo.hypotheses.org/963">Jackson Angaine</a>, held the powerful position of Minister for Lands.</p>
<p>As the archives reveal, Angaine was in close contact with both provincial commissioner Mahihu and President Kenyatta about the situation in Meru. But the archives did not reveal much about the relationship between Angaine and the Mau Mau, so I decided to find out more through field work. Meru politicians who had been active in the 1960s and Mau Mau veterans filled out the picture. They helped me to situate Angaine within Meru politics.</p>
<p>In 1954, Angaine was arrested and briefly detained by the colonial authorities. It remains unclear whether this was primarily because he was suspected of belonging to the Mau Mau movement, or because he was accused of the murder of his wife. He was acquitted for lack of proof. </p>
<p>Still, his detention helped to establish him as a follower of the movement. Kenyatta certainly knew that, just like himself, Angaine had an ambiguous relationship to the Mau Mau movement. Appointing him as Minister for Lands would send a positive message to the Meru people. They would believe that the minister in charge of land redistribution was a local follower of the movement. </p>
<p>And so the “willing buyer, willing seller” land policy could quietly go on. The British government was relieved that there would no radical land redistribution that could undermine its interests in Kenya. The new Kenyan government officials could get British loans to buy colonial land and strengthen their control over the country’s main economic resource. Left out of the equation were the <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498506991/Mau-Mau-Crucible-of-War-Statehood-National-Identity-and-Politics-of-Postcolonial-Kenya">landless poor people who would have to wait</a> longer for the promise of land to be fulfilled.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on the research I conducted for my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-and-the-presidency-in-kenya/05E72D9730B9ECD45175F416108E51B7#fndtn-information">Power and the Presidency in Kenya: the Jomo Kenyatta Years, 1958-1978</a> (Cambridge University Press, 2020).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Angelo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resilient Mau Mau freedom fighters failed to maintain revolutionary action after independence.Anaïs Angelo, Postdoctoral research fellow, Universität WienLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1306022020-01-29T13:19:55Z2020-01-29T13:19:55ZCrisis at Nairobi University has its roots in decades of political interference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312036/original/file-20200127-81362-15y2o5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jomo Kenyatta, wearing a gold and scarlet robe and leopard cap, is installed as Chancellor of the University of Nairobi in December 1970.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The University of Nairobi, Kenya’s oldest institution of higher learning, is steeped in a crisis after the education secretary <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001356950/magoha-dissolves-uon-council-revokes-prof-kiama-appointment-as-vc">revoked</a> the appointment of a new vice-chancellor. The university council has also been disbanded. </p>
<p>Far from being unusual, however, the crisis falls within an established pattern of government intervention in universities going back decades. </p>
<p>Successive Kenyan governments have sought to control universities. This has been with varying degrees of success. One of the earliest attempts to assert executive control dates back to 1969 when the east African countries <a href="https://www.iucea.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1:overview-of-the-iucea&catid=81&Itemid=529">resolved to dissolve</a> the regional University of East Africa. Each country was to elevate constituent colleges to national universities. </p>
<p>The Kenyan government appointed a committee to develop a plan for a new university. The committee was made up of two academics, Professor Arthur Potter, Principal of the University College, Nairobi and his deputy Professor Bethwell Ogot, as well as civil servants. But it was <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=z-UUUIZ5wTYC&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=university+college+nairobi+committee+njonjo&source=bl&ots=GsQTFArfD1&sig=ACfU3U1eapgcmxhfWfF_eDILzi_DsDuAJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjazqv64aPnAhWDlFwKHXw2B-0Q6AEwBXoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=university%20college%20nairobi%20committee%20njonjo&f=false">dominated by civil servants</a>, including the permanent secretary for education, permanent secretary for finance, and the comptroller of State House. </p>
<p>An unusual addition to the committee was a junior official in the Ministry of Education, who was also the sister of the powerful Attorney General of Kenya, Charles Njonjo. Her involvement indicated that the government considered the establishment of a national university a sensitive matter that needed close monitoring by trusted insiders.</p>
<p>The committee convened against a tense backdrop. By the late 1960s the government of Jomo Kenyatta had started viewing the University College, Nairobi – the forerunner of the University of Nairobi – with disdain because of frequent student protests against the state. As I observed in my recent <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/State-University-Experience-East-Africa/dp/1868888274">book</a>, the government even banned the members of faculty from using certain publications because it considered them subversive and likely to inculcate radical ideas among students. These included the Political Thoughts of Mao, Quotations from Chairman Mao, and the Communist Manifesto.</p>
<p>The suspicions of the government became even more clear in 1970 after the elevation of the institution to a national university. The government appointed Dr Josphat Karanja, a career civil servant as its vice-chancellor. Until his appointment he had served as Kenya’s high commissioner in the UK.</p>
<p>The appointment came as a shock to the university fraternity. The expectation had been that Professor Ogot would be appointed vice chancellor. He had served as deputy principal of the college. The irregular appointment became a trendsetter. </p>
<p>When President Moi came into office after Kenyatta in the late 1970s, he made sure that he filled the vice-chancellor positions with those he deemed loyal. The consequence of this executive interference in the appointment of university heads was twofold. The practice disregarded skills, credentials, and competencies which meant that the best qualified people were not appointed. Secondly, the practice resulted in the erosion of academic freedom and university autonomy.</p>
<h2>A chequered history</h2>
<p>Mwai Kibaki, who succeeded Moi, set about reducing the level of executive interference at universities. The most important step he took was to discontinue the practice of having the president serve as the chancellor of all public universities. </p>
<p>But the legal framework that Kibaki inherited stayed in place until the University Act was passed in 2012. It introduced some fundamental reforms. These included giving the senate and alumni associations the powers of appointing the chancellor. </p>
<p>It also provided for the competitive appointment of vice-chancellors. Interviews were to be done by university councils which would make a recommendation to the Cabinet Secretary. </p>
<p>The new law seemed to create a fair process of appointing the vice-chancellor. But there were still deep flaws. One was that the councils consisted mostly of bureaucrats and members appointed by the cabinet secretary. This allowed powerful politicians to continue influencing appointment.</p>
<p>The flaw of the 2012 law was highlighted in 2018 when Isaac Kosgey was <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/education/Prof-Isaac-Kosgey-takes-over-Moi-University-vice-chancellor/2643604-4351108-70r1kt/index.html">appointed</a> as the vice-chancellor of Moi University. There were claims that some panellists <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Interview-ranking-for-Moi-University-VC-post-released/539546-4208402-14n3wjs/index.html">deliberately down-graded</a> Laban Ayiro who was considered a stronger candidate for the position. The intrigues surrounding the interview process prompted Margaret Kobia, chair of the Public Service Commission to <a href="https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Tribalism-in-public-institutions-worrying-/1950946-4212024-format-xhtml-mrmb1r/nation.co.ke">lament</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is worrying trend where some council members award scores that are outliers. It makes one wonder if the panel members are measuring agreed competencies or had a predetermined candidate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2018, the 2012 law underwent major amendments following the enactment of the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/AmendmentActs/2018/StatuteLawMischellaneousNo18of2018.pdf">Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2018</a>. This stripped university councils of the right to conduct interviews. Instead, this was transferred to the public service commission. </p>
<p>The appointment of Nairobi university’s new chancellor was done under this new regime. But cabinet secretary George Magoha revoked the appointment barely two weeks later. These actions have been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-01-23-uon-wars-court-stops-magoha-from-appointing-new-council/">challenged</a> in court. </p>
<p>It’s now clear that the 2018 law was deeply flawed.</p>
<p>Firstly, the idea of making the public service commission the fair arbiter in the recruitment of university administers has backfired. Secondly, it gave government enormous new powers. It was given the role of appointing the chancellor and vice-chancellor as well as other administrative positions. These included deputy vice chancellors, principals and deputy principals of constituent colleges. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The 2018 law therefore effectively eroded university autonomy and granted the state the ultimate powers in university governance.</p>
<p>It is time to bring sanity to universities by taking away the role of appointing university administrators from the state. This only serves to enable corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Instead, constitute appointment panels consisting of the university senate and alumni associations.</p>
<p>_Professor Kithinji is the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/State-University-Experience-East-Africa/dp/1868888274">“The State and the University Experience in East Africa: Colonial Foundations and Postcolonial
Transformations in Kenya”</a></p>
<p>Twitter: @MikeMwendaK</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Mwenda Kithinji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The crisis at Nairobi University falls within an established pattern of government intervention in universities going back decadesMichael Mwenda Kithinji, Associate Professor, University of Central ArkansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1022052018-08-30T14:03:34Z2018-08-30T14:03:34ZKenya’s struggle to modernise traditional medicine is far from won<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234230/original/file-20180830-195307-5cpfcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Traditional medicines on sale in Kibera slum in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/620571468285024188/The-contribution-of-traditional-herbal-medicine-practitioners-to-Kenyan-health-care-delivery-results-from-community-health-seeking-behavior-vignettes-and-a-traditional-herbal-medicine-practitioner-survey">70% of Kenyans rely on traditional healers</a> as their primary source of health care. This number is high because healers respond to diverse needs – they work as herbalists, birth attendants and spiritualists and they’re within reach of ordinary citizens. </p>
<p>Some estimates suggest that there is <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/620571468285024188/The-contribution-of-traditional-herbal-medicine-practitioners-to-Kenyan-health-care-delivery-results-from-community-health-seeking-behavior-vignettes-and-a-traditional-herbal-medicine-practitioner-survey">one healer for every 950 patients</a>, compared with one doctor for every 33,000 in Kenya. Traditional healers work in both rural and urban settings. And their treatments fill gaps in the official health system. </p>
<p>Healers also enjoy <a href="http://pubs.iied.org/14590IIED/?a=D+Mutta">legitimacy and authority</a>, particularly in villages. They are also custodians of precious biodiversity and the bearers of traditional knowledge.</p>
<p>For decades little attention was paid to traditional medicine. The colonial power tolerated it as long as healers stuck to their own ethnic group and used traditional methods exclusively. But since independence traditional medicine has increasingly drawn the attention of law makers, regulators and international agencies. </p>
<p>Today, in the larger towns and cities, healers complement or compete with biomedicine, rather than substitute it. Some operate commercial clinics with their own staff, production systems and internet presence. Others retail remedies on the kerbside or advertise in newspapers and on lampposts offering cures for physical, sexual and emotional complaints. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020184.2018.1452856">recently published paper</a>, I look at the steps that have been taken in Kenya to integrate traditional medicine into the country’s healthcare system and to protect community and national interests in traditional medical knowledge. I identify the shortcomings in policies that have been put in place and what’s missing, particularly when it comes to regulating practitioners and intellectual property.</p>
<h2>Evolving approach</h2>
<p>Early independence governments <a href="http://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/GeisslerEvidence">prioritised western biomedicine</a>, as pointed out by historian Kenneth Ombongi in his chapter in The Anthropology and History of Medical Research in Africa. </p>
<p>In 1969 Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta dismissed healers as charlatans, while health officials called for them to be outlawed, wrote historian John Iliffe in his book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/East-African-Doctors-History-Profession/dp/0521632722">East African Doctors: a History of the Modern Profession.
</a></p>
<p>This <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=Tv8ewg0mMu0C&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25&dq=%E2%80%98Governing+the+Traditional+Health+Care+Sector+in+Kenya:+Strategies+and+Setbacks%E2%80%99&source=bl&ots=r5cNvDr1e6&sig=vYnHxEs3onZBoOtZlvxEuoORtf8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiJmcLjpZTdAhXGZ1AKHQFcDNIQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%98Governing%20the%20Traditional%20Health%20Care%20Sector%20in%20Kenya%3A%20Strategies%20and%20Setbacks%E2%80%99&f=false">changed in the mid-1970s</a>. The shift was influenced by the World Health Organisation’s drive to promote accessible primary care by integrating traditional medicine into the state system. This had already been done in China, Vietnam and Korea. </p>
<p>In Kenya <a href="https://www.kemri.org/index.php/ctmdr-collborations">a dedicated traditional medical research unit</a> was opened at the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI). But, unlike other African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, plans to professionalise traditional medicine came to nothing.</p>
<p>In the last two decades this neglect has been replaced by renewed focus and a raft of policies and legislative changes. In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020184.2018.1452856">paper</a>, I argue that these changes have focused on two aspects of traditional medicine: practice and knowledge. While the renewed attention is welcome, the outcome on neither front has been totally satisfactory.</p>
<h2>The problem with policies</h2>
<p>Recent health policies have been geared to meeting the state’s constitutional obligation to ensure adequate and safe healthcare. Officials recognised that access could be improved, in part, by harnessing healers, <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=Tv8ewg0mMu0C&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25&dq=%E2%80%98Governing+the+Traditional+Health+Care+Sector+in+Kenya:+Strategies+and+Setbacks%E2%80%99&source=bl&ots=r5cNvDr1e6&sig=vYnHxEs3onZBoOtZlvxEuoORtf8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiJmcLjpZTdAhXGZ1AKHQFcDNIQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%98Governing%20the%20Traditional%20Health%20Care%20Sector%20in%20Kenya%3A%20Strategies%20and%20Setbacks%E2%80%99&f=false">but only where quality can be assured</a>.</p>
<p>The problem is that there’s insufficient regulation. The <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwib54zH3ZLdAhWwsKQKHWq1AeEQFjAJegQIARAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncpd.go.ke%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2016%2F11%2FPolicy-Brief-1-Seeking-Solutions-to-Traditional-Herbal-Medicine-Kenya-Develops-a-Policy-1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0631VfqpAk-tu-Mj5XKYz2">National Policy on Traditional Medicine and Medicinal Plants</a> has noted that the optimal dosage of herbal remedies is often unclear because they’re usually stored badly. In addition, many healers treat patients in parallel with ongoing biomedical procedures. This increases the risk of complications setting in. And finally, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/1144030185/yes-we-must-lock-quacks-out-of-herbal-medicine-industry">so-called quacks</a> mislead vulnerable and desperate patients. </p>
<p>The agreed response is greater legal involvement by enforcing detailed standards and controls and applying the framework for licensing and disciplining healers included in the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/HealthActNo.21of2017.pdf">Health Act passed in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>The results so far may have been patchy. But the long-term ambition is clear: to standardise and modernise traditional practice.</p>
<h2>Intellectual property</h2>
<p>Kenya, like many other developing countries, has suffered from the appropriation of valuable medical know-how and materials by foreign companies. Documented <a href="https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2190-widespread-biopiracy-in-africa">cases of biopiracy</a>, in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, are attributed to weaknesses and asymmetries in standard intellectual property law, now enforced by the World Trade Organisation. These tend to favour countries of the global north and companies based there.</p>
<p>Groups at KEMRI and the ministry of culture are <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000129725/group-roots-for-policy-to-protect-natural-products">working</a> on how Kenya can develop an export-focused natural products industry. </p>
<p>Having the proper laws in place is also important. Progress has already been made on this front. In 2016 the <a href="https://ipkenya.wordpress.com/2016/09/23/kenyas-protection-of-traditional-knowledge-and-cultural-expressions-act-no-33-of-2016-comes-into-force/">Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions Act</a> was passed. The first of its kind in the world, it created a new type of intellectual property right that allows communities to control access to their resources and to profit from them. </p>
<p>These are early days for the Act which also gives the government significant powers that could trump those of communities. So it’s not clear yet whether national or local development will have priority in the use of these resources.</p>
<h2>New challenges</h2>
<p>Traditional medicine in Kenya has proved resilient. It has withstood state neglect as well as the hostility of medical professionals. It has survived the loss of essential forest resources as well as the incursion of foreign interests. It has adapted and extended its popularity in an urbanising Kenya. </p>
<p>But the recent turn to recognition and regulation presents new challenges. Problems of patient safety and bogus practitioners, of vulnerable and unexploited indigenous medical knowledge, all have a ring of truth about them. </p>
<p>The push towards health-for-all and respect for indigenous culture are the popular inheritance of anti-colonial struggles. But the realisation of these values, by addressing the problems, requires deliberation and sensitivity, an acceptance that there will be trade-offs, and a willingness to revise in the light of experience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Harrington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the last two decades, neglect of traditional medicine has been replaced by renewed focus and a raft of policies and new laws.John Harrington, Professor of Global Health Law, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/962832018-05-09T14:11:05Z2018-05-09T14:11:05ZRapprochement between two leaders isn’t enough to fix Kenya’s deep divisions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218243/original/file-20180509-185500-1g2gjj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) with opposition leader Raila Odinga in March.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his latest <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-full-state-of-the-nation-address/1064-4541100-gqbp50z/index.html">state of the nation address</a> Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta called for opening a new chapter of national unity and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/kenyatta-and-odinga-call-reconciliation-kenya">reconciliation</a>.</p>
<p>This was Kenyatta’s first state of the nation address after last year’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2017/08/kenya-elections-bitterly-contested-170810154141394.html">disputed national elections</a> which went into a re-run. Kenyatta reemerged victorious. But it was a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-5010873/Uhuru-Kenyatta-president-facing-Pyrrhic-election-victory.html">pyrrhic victory</a> as his main challenger Raila Odinga had boycotted the rerun.</p>
<p>With both men at the head of their <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicity-factor-170806081143385.html">ethnically aligned</a> coalitions, Jubilee and National Super Alliance, the 2017 electoral season was highly charged and polarising. Odinga refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s victory and threatened disruption. One of his actions was being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/kenya-tv-networks-gagged-odinga-inauguration-180130081747894.html">sworn in as the people’s president</a>. The mock swearing-in ceremony escalated tensions, culminating in threats of arrests, arraignment and deportation of opposition leaders. The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/08/government-crackdown-threatens-rights-kenya">press and civil society</a> were also targeted.</p>
<p>Kenya’s politics has <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyatta-or-odinga-why-dynastic-politics-is-alive-and-well-in-kenya-80732">broadly been dominated by two families</a>, the Kenyattas from the Kikuyu and the Odingas from the Luo ethic groups. Uhuru, son of the founding president Jomo Kenyatta, has gone head to head with Raila for the presidential vote twice – in 2013 and 2017. Both elections were marked by ethnic coalition building in which Kenyatta led the most demographically dominant coalition, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/kenya-jubilee-party-uniting-or-dividing-kenyans/a-19540503">Jubilee</a>. </p>
<p>On both occasions, the outcome was a kind of ethnic census because <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-elections-ethnicity/kenyan-politicians-struggle-to-break-ethnic-voting-patterns-idUSKBN1AL049">Kenyan politics</a> is highly charged along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>Since last year’s tensions, there’s been a visible rapprochement between the two men. Does this signal a broader bottom-up reconciliation process? </p>
<p>Perhaps the reality is that the momentum has started from the top but will take time to get to the bottom. Kenyan politics is notoriously <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicity-factor-170806081143385.html">tribal</a>, in part because the system is built for zero sum gains in that it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/books/review/Hammer-t.html">creates winners and losers</a>. As long as this remains the case, Kenya will always remain susceptible to ethnic entrepreneurs as politicians seek to play the ethnic tramp card.</p>
<h2>The rapprochement</h2>
<p>The first sign of rapprochement between the two men took the country by some surprise. A staged <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/opposition-alliance-in-kenya-seen-dead-as-odinga-breaks-ranks">handshake</a> in March 2018 signalled a dramatic change of tone and de-escalation of tensions. </p>
<p>Government immediately mellowed its tone towards the opposition, signalling a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. Within days, Odinga was serving as <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Raila-attended-Winnie-Mandela-funeral-as--official-Kenyan-envoy-/1056-4394164-1205di2/index.html">official</a> government emissary to South Africa to attend Winnie Mandela’s funeral. And a joint team to oversee dialogue was announced.</p>
<p>But what does all this rapprochement mean? The <a href="http://www.president.go.ke/2018/03/09/building-bridges-to-a-new-kenyan-nation/">joint statement</a> following the first meeting sought to strike a new political tone. On the surface, it signalled the willingness of both men to draw a line under the acrimony that had emerged from the electoral crisis. </p>
<p>This perhaps points to Kenya’s politics as not only complex but also unpredictable. The country has been here before – after the 2008 elections of Mwai Kibaki thousands died <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html">in inter communal post electoral violence</a>. Undertakings were given and efforts were made to build national unity. Yet a decade later, Kenyans are witness to more of the same, albeit on a lesser scale. </p>
<p>Questions are therefore being asked if there is any depth to the Kenyatta-Raila “handshake” beyond portraying both leaders as magnanimous and willing to compromise for the national interests. Their joint statement sought to heal divisions and open a new chapter of inclusiveness and security for all. </p>
<p>For now it is too early to deduce tangible evidence of political inclusivity though tensions have been greatly dialled down. Kenyatta’s <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/I-am-sorry--says-Uhuru-Kenyatta--in-new-unity-plea-/1064-4541806-xiq0ajz/index.html">public apology</a> to those he “offended” was meant to portray him as a conciliatory statesman. </p>
<p>On the other hand Odinga had more political capital to gain by seeking compromise as a way out of the impasse. His <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1de27bbf-5abc-3e53-ad33-6c56f38d295c">defiance campaign</a> was always deemed more disruptive and a political nuisance than strategically meaningful as the <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171120-kenya-supreme-court-upholds-kenyatta-election-win">Supreme Court</a> had validated the elections.</p>
<h2>Much more is needed</h2>
<p>What Kenya needs is transformative change, including constitutional reforms. This should include strengthening structures in which everyone feels represented. And the country needs to design a formula to provide a competitive but an embracing political framework that can deliver enduring peace and prosperity for all Kenyans.</p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/548e1080-7f88-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff">lives were lost</a> in the post electoral violence. The two leaders bear special responsibility and should therefore lead efforts to help heal and bridge communal divisions. The recent warming of relations between the two protagonists point to this effort. </p>
<p>But they are not the only players. Others that would be equally important in bringing their communities on board in the broader effort of reconciliation. they include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.kenya-today.com/politics/meet-ruto-the-king-maker">William Ruto</a>, current deputy president and an ethnic Kalenjin, </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kalonzo-Musyoka-Skips-Raila-Odinga-Oath-Event/1064-4285500-7pd502z/index.html">Kalonzo Musyoka</a>, former vice president, wider democratic movement leader, co-principle of NASA and an ethnic kamba, and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Musalia-differs-with-Raila-on-fresh-elections/1064-4316288-egr9n4/index.html">Musalia Mudavadi</a> a co-principal of NASA, former vice president and deputy prime minister, leader of Amani National congress and an ethnic Luhya would
The role of civil society and religious leaders is also indispensable as partners in reconciliation and rebuilding inter-communal and institutional trust. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In the short and medium term, it’s overly optimistic to expect ethnic politics to dissipate in Kenya. This requires institutional change as well as a shift in attitude, values and culture like belief in collective prosperity, non-violent settlement of disputes and inter communal trust. For this Kenyan communities and their political leaders still have a great deal to do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Questions are being raised about the Kenyatta and Odinga relationship.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/925342018-03-01T14:09:57Z2018-03-01T14:09:57ZActive citizens for better schooling: what Kenya’s history can teach South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208088/original/file-20180227-36683-15r4g0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=73%2C49%2C927%2C821&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The idea of "Harambee" - self-help - was central to Jomo Kenyatta's thinking and politics.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bootbearwdc/225535252/in/photolist-f65GKx-eELByD-eFaCHS-eF7DSL-eFkBoP-eESFJM-eEYYH2-eEW4fF-eEUpgK-eF7zvk-eEQZsM-RaPM1-eFc9mY-4dubcJ-ihgULH-7VcD9i-kVVLQ-zKf2BY-ihUSQz-ihkuAa-ii8x8o-ihp7kR-ihsmco-ihHsRY-ii5VcQ-ihBgqx-ihzaZz-ihE7zv-ihw6w2-9yNbNN-9prugd-DEHQaG-nQ4nAd-nQ5cFD-9DkaA-9DkBh-E5vf9m-9Dkfw-9DkkR-ihRJ3U-9DkvB-HVef6A-vb2PDf-uTXQ93-uU6b7X-uTXi7W-ueGiv2-nQ4GwY-8nthVT-RaL6q">bootbearwdc/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Weak governance” is a popular scapegoat for the <a href="http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/164/ZP_Files/pirls-literacy-2016-hl-report-3.zp136320.pdf">poor results</a> achieved by South Africa’s education system. And there is no doubt that many aspects of how the education bureaucracy operates are problematic. </p>
<p>But what about setting the scapegoats aside for a moment and seeking solutions? One way to do this is to look elsewhere for inspiration. So, in that spirit, consider Kenya. For much of the half-century since it became independent the East African nation had been an over-performer on the continent in its measured education outcomes.</p>
<p>To get a sense of Kenya’s historical overperformance, consider the 2007 results of <a href="http://www.sacmeq.org/sites/default/files/sacmeq/reports/sacmeq-iii/policy-brief/kenya_achievement_05_october_2011_final.pdf">standardised tests</a> for sixth graders conducted by the <a href="http://www.sacmeq.org/">Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality</a>. Kenya’s average score was 557 points. That’s well above South Africa’s average of 495 points. Kenyan children’s basic literacy and numeracy skills were stronger than South Africa’s. </p>
<p>Kenya has <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD">a much lower per capita income</a> than South Africa. In part as a result, its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=KE">public spending</a> on education per pupil is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=KE-ZA">only one-fifth</a> that of South Africa. Its educational bureaucracy is <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/801891468773756126/pdf/280640KE.pdf">relatively messy</a>.</p>
<p>Despite all this, as the graph in a more extended discussion <a href="https://workingwiththegrain.com/2018/02/28/better-education-kenyas-history-lesson-for-south-africa/">underscores</a>, it has historically been an over-performer in southern and eastern Africa, both relative to South Africa and more broadly. </p>
<p>How did this happen? The answer lies with active civic engagement. Kenya’s first president of the independence era, Jomo Kenyatta, championed this in the form of a self-help ethos known as “Harambee” as the pathway to development, including a strong focus on educating the country’s citizenry. For years after his tenure as head of state ended, the principle remained deeply embedded in Kenyan society – and the country’s <a href="http://africanphilanthropy.issuelab.org/resource/the-role-of-harambee-in-socio-economic-development-in-kenya-a-case-of-the-education-sector.html">education system</a>.</p>
<p>There could be valuable lessons here for South Africa. Kenyans believe that fixing education is not someone else’s task or someone else’s failure. It involves active citizenship and proactive engagement at all levels: public officials; principals, teachers and their unions; parents and communities. </p>
<p>Perhaps what South Africa needs now is not a top-down government policy of “education for all” – but rather, “all for education”.</p>
<h2>Kenya’s history of Harambee</h2>
<p>In an email exchange with me, Dr Ben Piper, a <a href="https://shared.rti.org/users/ben-piper">seasoned educational specialist</a> and long-term resident in Nairobi, identified some key things that he finds remarkable in Kenya:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…[I]n rural Kenya there is an expectation for kids to learn and be able to have basic skills … Exam results are far more readily available than in other countries in the region. The ‘mean scores’ for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) and its equivalent at secondary school are posted in every school and over time so that trends can be seen. Head teachers are held accountable; paraded around the community if they did well, or literally banned from school and kicked out if they did badly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This sort of accountability and community involvement forms part of the “softer” dimensions of school governance. And the roots of this approach run deep. They were part of the foundational ideas that shaped modern Kenya.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jomo-kenyatta">Jomo Kenyatta</a> was a powerful advocate for better quality education. His focus on education persisted during his activist days, through his years in the UK and in his role as director and principal of the Kenya African Teachers’ College, run by the independent schools movement.</p>
<p>He became independent Kenya’s first president in 1963 and immediately offered a vision of a nation imbued with Harambee (“let us pull together”). The country adopted the term as its official national motto. As numerous studies have <a href="http://www.researchkenya.or.ke/thesis/10994/the-contribution-of-harambee-(self-help)-to-the-development-of-post-primary-education-in-kenya-:-the-case-of-sosiot-girls-high-school,-1969-1979">underscored</a>, engagement <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12313234">with education</a> held pride of place within the Harambee movement.</p>
<h2>Harnessing existing structures</h2>
<p>The key to turning around South Africa’s education system may be to spend less time deciding who to blame and more seeking out renewed opportunities for engagement. </p>
<p>This wouldn’t involve reinventing the wheel. The country’s institutional framework for education, <a href="https://www.education.gov.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=aIolZ6UsZ5U%3D&tabid=185&mid=1828">promulgated in 1996</a>, creates multiple entry points for participation by a variety of stakeholders. </p>
<p>School governing bodies, which consist mostly of parents, can play a central role. These bodies are generally in the news for all <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/sgbs-receive-wake-up-call-on-school-fraud-2008568">the wrong reasons</a>; as tools for elites to keep control of their schools, and as sites of corruption. Indeed, the South African government’s recent Basic Education Laws Amendment proposal, following an investigation of ‘jobs for cash’ scandals in schools, proposed scaling back the authority of school governing bodies.</p>
<p>But, as I’ve <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-05-03-to-help-eastern-cape-schools-add-a-dose-of-active-citizenship/#.WpaKc66WbIU">written elsewhere</a>, research at school level also shows that school governing bodies can be a source of resilience, including in poor communities. </p>
<p>Perhaps the crucial lesson from Kenya’s history is that our current discourse has it backwards. Fixing education is not someone else’s task, and someone else’s failure. Active citizenship implies pro-active engagement at all levels – by public officials, by principals and teachers (and their unions), by parents and communities. </p>
<p>If South Africa is willing to learn from Kenya, what is called for now is not another top-down “education for all” target from government –- but rather “all for education”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Levy receives funding from the DfiD-funded Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research project, led by the University of Manchester; ESID funded the research on which this article is based. </span></em></p>Kenyans believe that fixing education is not someone else’s task or someone else’s failure.Brian Levy, Professor of the Practice of International Development, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/819572017-08-03T10:07:09Z2017-08-03T10:07:09ZKenya’s elections are much more than just a ruthless game of thrones<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180757/original/file-20170802-7625-af4xsv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Despite their scepticism, Kenyan voters come out in large numbers to cast their ballots. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Dai Kurokawa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The threat of controversy and unrest looms over Kenya’s elections, which will be held on 8 August. Incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta is ahead by a whisker in the <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/08/ipsos-survey-shows-uhuru-will-beat-raila-election/">most recent opinion poll</a>. His main challenger, Raila Odinga, has repeatedly alleged that Kenyatta plans to <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/247239-nasa-leader-raila-odinga-alleges-rigging-plot-by-jubilee.html">rig the elections</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya has an unhappy history of violence, and of alleged election rigging, and the recent gruesome <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001249957/slain-iebc-ict-manager-chris-msando-had-reported-death-threats-to-police">murder of a key official</a> at the electoral commission has heightened anxiety. Some fear that – whatever the electoral laws say – no holds are barred in Kenyan politics.</p>
<p>That history of electoral problems is interwoven with a <a href="http://theconversation.com/kenyatta-or-odinga-why-dynastic-politics-is-alive-and-well-in-kenya-80732">dynastic political drama</a> that goes back more than 50 years. Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga were political allies turned enemies in the 1960s; now their sons continue the rivalry. </p>
<h2>Dynasties</h2>
<p>Kenya’s most powerful politicians are a small group, many of whom know one another socially, and many of whom have served in government together over the years. Raila Odinga’s running mate was in office for years under the old ruling party. So too was Musalia Mudavadi, one of Odinga’s close allies in the opposition coalition, whose father was also a senior politician. </p>
<p>Kenya’s politics can sometimes look like long-running squabbles amongst a gang of cronies, and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiPhJG017jVAhVO62MKHcAdAXEQjRwIBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fafricacartoons.com%2Ftag%2Fgado%2F&psig=AFQjCNErG3ee8rx8w9LokjA6c4NAZGGksQ&ust=1501767833210948">newspaper cartoonists</a> like to portray the Kenyan voter – routinely personified as an oppressed but <a href="http://gadocartoons.com/tag/wanjiku/">doughty woman, Wanjiku</a> – as the victim of these scheming rivals.</p>
<p>All the more so because these dynasties are linked to ethnic rivalry. The muted background narrative of Kenyan politics is that access to the presidency has made some communities rich while others stay poor, and politicians stand accused of fostering that narrative, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/the-role-of-ethnicity-in-kenyan-politics/a-37442394">stirring up tribalism</a> to win office and pitching ordinary Kenyans into violent confrontations. </p>
<p>Politicians are blamed, too, for the widespread use of gifts, and cash handouts, in elections – <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001234650/vicious-circle-of-vote-buying-and-the-guilt-of-conscience">buying votes</a> for a few shillings and a bottle of fizzy drink, and then going on to abuse their elected office to enrich themselves through corruption.</p>
<p>Kenya’s elections then, appear as the ruthless game of leaders who pursue power at the expense of their people, not on their behalf. But talk to any candidate at a level below the presidency – for Kenya’s elections involve six separate ballots, for multiple positions in national and county government – and a slightly different picture appears. </p>
<h2>The moral economy of elections</h2>
<p>Candidates constantly complain of the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/impact-of-elections/">demands of voters</a>. </p>
<p>Need to meet women voters in a particular village? It can be arranged, but it often requires ‘facilitation’ to be provided – money to organise soft drinks, and hire chairs. And once you have spoken, you cannot leave your audience empty-handed. Each person must get at least a token gift, even if it is only fifty shillings (about half a dollar). </p>
<p>Need to reach a wider group of influential people? Easy – speak at the funeral of some well-known local elder. But if you are to do that, you must make a donation to the grieving family. </p>
<p>Or perhaps you are anxious about the youth vote? Here is a youth group, willing and ready to hear your message. But they might also expect that you will help them set up as motorcycle taxi riders. </p>
<p>And then there are the personal requests: the voter who cannot afford school fees for their children; the constituent who needs help with mounting hospital bills. </p>
<p>A commentator even recently suggested that the demand for “something small” was so high that the 2017 elections had made the 50-shilling note an “<a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/article/2000222164/is-2017-election-endangering-50-shilling-note">endangered species</a>”.</p>
<p>Faced with these multiple demands, candidates find little support from the party whose colours they wear. They <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/article/2001243180/are-kenyan-politicians-spending-too-much-on-campaigns">spend their savings</a>, or sell their assets. They borrow from family and friends. Some lose everything, impoverishing themselves and their families – and still lose the election. </p>
<p>Those who do win election take up office with multiple debts. The temptation to use office corruptly to repay those debts, and build up funds for the next campaign, is a strong one.</p>
<p>Yet many voters don’t consider their demands wrong; after all, they say, those elected often enrich themselves and ignore their constituents. Voters’ demands are <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/impact-of-elections/">a moral test</a>. </p>
<p>The overall message of elections in Kenya is a simple one: government exists to bring development, and those elected are delegates, sent by their constituents to secure at least a <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjoxcie3rjVAhVsJsAKHVVyA-g4ChAWCDMwAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.co.uk%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-39810869&usg=AFQjCNEv9DNbcJgmjJom9119LGCMdZDsuw">fair portion of development</a> - which may take any material form from youth training centres to tarred roads to a cabinet seat for a local. Voters need to be sure both that their representatives can deliver, and will respond to local demands. As a result, the campaign becomes a prolonged test of politicians’ virtue – will they meet constituents’ expectations?</p>
<p>Ethnicity plays into this. Bureaucratic accountability does not always work in Kenya: people don’t necessarily follow the rules. So having someone on the inside – a cousin, an in-law, a friend of a friend – is always useful. So too with politics: voters want representatives on whom they feel have some moral claim. That <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/cheeseman-why-mike-sonko-could-be-president/440808-4006894-mfgvj8/index.html">need not be ethnic</a> – but it may often coincide with ethnicity. </p>
<p>And, of course, voters want to feel that their representative, in turn, has similar claims on people further up in the hierarchy of power. Ordinary people do not need to be ‘tribalists’ to vote on ethnic lines; they just need to doubt the <a href="http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/03/13/what-is-democracy-and-what-is-it-for_c1523222">impartiality of the system</a>. </p>
<p>Once they do, they will begin to think that development may be denied them unless ‘their man’ wins office.</p>
<p>Which is not to say that Kenya’s politicians are not culpable, for their behaviour has encouraged ethnic politics, and lavish electoral spending. Nor is it to excuse the high-stakes games around the presidential election that currently threaten to generate political unrest. </p>
<p>But this <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/impact-of-elections/">moral economy of elections</a> does help to explain why Kenyan voters turn out in large numbers to cast their ballots. Kenya’s electoral politics are not just an elite game of thrones; they are driven by the demands and concerns of ordinary people, trying to navigate their way to the uncertain promised land of development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81957/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Research for this article was has been funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (under grant ES/L002345/1)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch and Nic Cheeseman do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s history of electoral problems is interwoven with a political drama which pits one dynasty against another in a rivalry that goes back more than 50 years.Justin Willis, Professor of History, Durham UniversityGabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickNic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/807322017-07-11T18:47:30Z2017-07-11T18:47:30ZKenyatta or Odinga? Why dynastic politics is alive and well in Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177493/original/file-20170710-29701-3mn9cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rivals in the Kenya election Uhuru Kenyatta (left) and Raila Odinga.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s general election will be contested by a large number of hopefuls, but in reality it’s a <a href="http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/11/30/2017-poll-a-two-horse-race-between-raila-and-uhuru-ipsos_c1251578">two-horse race</a> between Raila Odinga of the National Super Alliance and Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Party.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly in a country in which the executive continues to wield a dominant influence, coverage of the campaign has focused on the personalities and records of Odinga and Kenyatta. </p>
<p>What does their candidacy tell us about Kenyan politics in 2017?</p>
<p>The first and most obvious lesson from the 2017 election campaign is that dynastic politics is alive and well in Kenya. Despite all of the contestation, efforts and plotting of rival leaders hoping to push their own ambitions, 2017 will be fought between a Kenyatta and an Odinga, just like the elections of 2013 and the <a href="http://www.globalblackhistory.com/2016/10/political-history-kenyas-kanu-kadu-kdp-1960s.html">Little General Election of 1966</a>.</p>
<p>The second is that ethnicity only gets you so far. In 2013, Odinga outperformed rival presidential candidate Musalia Mudavadi within his own Luhya community. This was possible because while Odinga was seen to be a credible opposition leader, <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Who-should-lead-the-Kenyan-opposition/440808-3873434-hgdb5iz/index.html">Mudavadi’s dalliance with Kenyatta</a> – with whom he formed an extremely short-lived alliance – raised concerns that he was a State House puppet. Kenyatta’s recent rehabilitation as the dominant leader among the Kikuyu community following his electoral humiliation in 2002 also demonstrates this point well. </p>
<p>So who are the two leading contenders?</p>
<h2>Odinga, the opposition stalwart</h2>
<p>Raila Odinga is the son of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-oginga-odinga-1409463.html">Oginga Odinga</a>, a prominent independence leader and Kenya’s first vice president who never realised his dream of occupying State House. Like his father, Raila has campaigned tirelessly against considerable odds, and has so far been unsuccessful. He narrowly lost elections in 2007 – when many believe he was <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kibaki-stole-kenyan-election-through-vote-rigging-and-fraud-772349.html">rigged out</a> – and in 2013.</p>
<p>Odinga’s great ability is to be able to mobilise well beyond his own Luo community, and to sustain his political party – the Orange Democratic Movement for a decade. Given that most Kenyan parties collapse within a few years, this is some achievement.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Who-should-lead-the-Kenyan-opposition/440808-3873434-hgdb5iz/index.html">breadth of Odinga’s support base</a> is also impressive. In 2013 he performed well among Luhya voters in Western Kenya, Kamba voters in Eastern Kenya and also at the Coast.</p>
<p>Odinga’s capacity to mobilise support across ethnic lines has two sources. On the one hand, he receives some votes “second hand” as a result of the efforts of his allies from other regions and ethnic groups to direct rally their communities to his cause.</p>
<p>On the other hand, he’s built a strong reputation for <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050802058286">representing historically economically and politically marginalised communities</a>. Indeed, while he has never secured the presidency, he has contributed to political reform. Most notably, Odinga played an important role in bringing about constitutional reform in 2010 that introduced devolution and hence a <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4fa3b8e6-a934-4dfa-861d-e2c28952ec17/datastreams/binf275a4a2-62de-40e0-b277-f450256413cf">degree of self-government</a> for the groups in his coalition.</p>
<h2>Kenyatta, born to power</h2>
<p>In contrast to Odinga, <a href="http://presidential-power.com/?p=5881">Uhuru</a> was born into power as the son of the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, and secured the presidency in the 2013 general election having previously failed to do so in 2002.</p>
<p>Kenyatta’s supporters like to say that he was <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/173991-five-facts-not-know-state-house-nairobi.html">born in State House</a>, and hence born to power, although this is not actually true. But it is true that he has spent his life close to the machinery of government, and his family’s political influence and wealth give him a clear advantage in the elections. His gift is to be able to look and sound presidential when he has an important speech to make, despite his playboy lifestyle.</p>
<p>Although it’s tempting to see Kenyatta’s rise to power as inevitable, this is not the case. In 2002, he <a href="http://presidential-power.com/?p=5881">failed to mobilise support</a> among his own community because he had been selected by the outgoing Kalenjin President Daniel arap Moi to be his successor. He was then widely seen to be a proxy for Moi’s interests. At that point, his political career appeared to be over.</p>
<p>It was not until Kenyatta developed a reputation for defending Kikuyu interests by allegedly funding and organising militias in the violence that engulfed the 2007 elections that he emerged as the dominant figure within the Central Province. It is for this alleged role that he faced charges (that were subsequently dropped) of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta">crimes against humanity</a> at the International Criminal Court. This, and his <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2013.874105">electoral alliance with his co-accused</a> – the influential Kalenjin leader William Ruto – were critical factors in his victory in 2013.</p>
<h2>The 2017 race</h2>
<p>During the campaign Kenyatta and Odinga have been a study in contrasts.</p>
<p>While Odinga stresses his intention to shake things up, Kenyatta presents himself as a safe pair of hands who will protect the status quo.</p>
<p>While Odinga plays up his image as the representative of the excluded, promising to <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Nasa-launches-manifesto/1064-3989916-fb7nmtz/index.html">deepen devolution</a> and invest in poorer areas, Kenyatta emphasises <a href="http://ntv.nation.co.ke/news/national/2725528-3988772-f6it3tz/index.html">building a national infrastructure</a> and maintaining economic growth, arguing that the gains of the rich will trickle down to benefit all Kenyans in time.</p>
<p>These images are further entrenched by the criticisms that each leader makes of the other. Jubilee caricatures Odinga as an unprincipled thug who <a href="https://thenationalist2017.wordpress.com/2017/03/13/revealed-why-raila-odinga-will-never-be-president-of-kenya-even-in-2017/">cannot be trusted</a> with the fine art of government. For its part, the National Super Alliance charges that Kenyatta is out of touch and only interested in serving the interests of <a href="http://www.hivisasa.com/posts/0d450b7c-2741-4006-ad5d-315bbabe15f6">the wealthy within his own community</a>.</p>
<p>Some complain that these differences are more rhetorical than real, one thing is clear. In fact Kenyans have a real choice to make at the ballot box.</p>
<h2>Election outlook</h2>
<p>The greater resources available to Kenyatta, along with the more professional team around him, mean that the opposition faces an uphill battle. Moreover, government interference with the media – which is <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000214956/awards-against-media-in-kenya-akin-to-censorship">regularly intimidated</a> – means that while election reportage is vibrant some of the stories that would most hurt the government don’t make it on to the front pages.</p>
<p>It’s therefore not surprising that, at the time of writing, Kenyatta enjoys a <a href="http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/05/31/uhuru-raila-in-tight-race-ipsos-opinion-poll-shows_c1571200">small but significant lead in the polls</a>. A series of surveys conducted by different companies using different samples have put him on around <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/20535-infotrak-poll-reveals-5-margin-between-president-uhuru-kenyatta-and-raila-odinga">48% of the vote</a>, with Odinga on around 43%. These polls suggest that about 8% of Kenyans remain undecided. This suggests that Raila can still win, but to do so he will have to capture the vast majority of “floating voters” in the last month of campaigning.</p>
<p>However, if undecided voters divide equally between the two main candidates, Kenyatta looks set to end up on <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/12032/Opinion_polls_in_question">something like 52%</a> – surpassing the 50%+1 threshold for a first round win – with Odinga on 47%.</p>
<p>Given this, the record of no sitting Kenyan president ever having lost an election may survive for a while yet, despite the momentum behind the opposition. Although the country has made real democratic strides with its new constitution, the advantages of incumbency remain formidable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although some complain that the differences between Kenyatta and Odinga are more rhetorical than real, one thing is clear: Kenyans have a real choice to make at the ballot box.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/730752017-02-21T20:09:22Z2017-02-21T20:09:22ZIn tribute to Peter Abrahams: a champion of pan Africanism and anti-colonialism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157486/original/image-20170220-15931-4pqoql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Peter Abrahams.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">South African History Online</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African literary icon and Pan-Africanist, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/peter-henry-abrahams">Peter Henry Abrahams</a>, died in his adopted home of Jamaica on January 18 2017. He was 97. The author of some 12 novels, Abrahams was also a stalwart in the anti-colonial struggles dating back to the 1940s. Until the end he remained an acerbic and incisive commentator on global and Pan-African affairs.</p>
<p>He was born to an Ethiopian father and a mixed race South African mother in Vrededorp, a suburb in Johannesburg, South Africa. As a 20-year-old, Abrahams left his birthplace in 1939 after running into trouble with racist police and authorities in his deprived settlement. After an eventful journey by ship, troubled by hostilities during World War 2, he eventually arrived and settled in London, England. There he began a career of activism as a left wing journalist and Pan-Africanist in the 1940s.</p>
<p>Peter, with a natural storytelling talent, had learned writing skills from his mother and from religious mentors who rescued him from further trouble as a militant youth in Vrededorp. These skills and talents were to serve him well during his exile in London and later in Jamaica, where he settled in 1956 with his second wife Daphne.</p>
<h2>First novel</h2>
<p>While in London during his early literary pursuits his first novel, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40238962?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“Dark Testament”</a>, was published in 1942. His second book <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3819636?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“Song of the City”</a>, published three years later, confirmed him as being among the first successful black South African writers being published in Europe and the West. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157482/original/image-20170220-15882-1skaguk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The cover of ‘Mine Boy’.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>His already prolific writing career next saw the publication of the semi-autobiographical and seminal book <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20109544?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“Mine Boy”</a> in 1946. It charted the travails of a country youth seeking to survive in the frightening and oppressive environs of big city Johannesburg.</p>
<p>With “Mine Boy” Abrahams became the first author to bring the horrific reality of South Africa’s apartheid system of racial discrimination to international attention. Published two years before Alan Paton’s acclaimed <a href="http://paton.ukzn.ac.za/Collections/Crythebelovedcountry.aspx">“Cry, The Beloved Country”</a>, which also exposed the tragedy of apartheid, “Mine Boy” was also significant because it made Abrahams one of the first black South African authors to become financially successful. With over a dozen books and countless newspaper and magazine articles published, Abrahams has since become established as an authority on the problems of race not only in South Africa, but in the world.</p>
<p>Several other novels were to follow in London, even as Abrahams became more and more engaged in the anti-colonial struggles of the time. He interacted with other political activists such as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jomo-kenyatta">Jomo Kenyatta</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/president-seretse-khama">Seretse Khama</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/dr-kenneth-kaunda-former-president-zambia-born">Kenneth Kaunda</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> and <a href="http://www.blackhistoryheroes.com/2010/09/kwame-nkrumah.html">Kwame Nkrumah</a>. Those names now resonate as leaders of the legendary generation of anti-colonial, Pan-African activists who led their respective African countries to political independence. </p>
<p>At this time, his South African compatriots under the leadership of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/oliver-reginald-kaizana-tambo">Oliver Tambo</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/walter-ulyate-sisulu">Walter Sisulu</a> and others persevered politically (and in some cases militarily) in the struggle against apartheid. For his part, Abrahams waged a war by wielding a mighty pen. He brought the unfolding racist atrocities in South Africa to the attention of the wider world. This he did through an ever-expanding body of compelling political and literary works, as well as through his intellectual activism.</p>
<p>He played an important role, alongside journalist and Pan Africanist <a href="http://silvertorch.com/about-padmore.html">George Padmore</a> of Trinidad and Tobago, American intellectual and activist <a href="https://donate.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history-w.e.b.-dubois">WEB Du Bois</a> and others, in <a href="http://www.marxistsfr.org/archive/padmore/1947/pan-african-congress/index.htm">organising</a> the <a href="http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/058.html">Fifth Pan-African Congress</a>. Held in Manchester, England in October 1945, the congress was regarded as a unifying event in the multifaceted, disparate, colonial struggle of the time. Abrahams was among the representatives of the African National Congress (ANC). He was elected as chairperson of the movement’s publicity committee, alongside a young Nkrumah.</p>
<h2>Jamaican independence</h2>
<p>By 1956, he accepted an invitation from <a href="http://jis.gov.jm/heroes/norman-washington-manley/">Norman Manley</a>, Premier of Jamaica and leader of the Jamaican independence movement, to provide advice and editorial services in Jamaica and the Caribbean. He soon acquired a hilltop property overlooking the city of Kingston, a home he called Coyaba.</p>
<p>Abrahams became prominent as journalist and radio commentator in Jamaica. He also continued his career as a novelist. Acclaimed books penned in Jamaica were released globally. These included such widely respected works as <a href="http://caribbean-beat.com/issue-61/view-coyaba">“The View from Coyaba”</a> (1985) and his <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/994599.The_Coyaba_Chronicles">memoir</a> “The Coyaba Chronicles: Reflections on the Black Experience in the 20th Century” (2000).</p>
<p>Abrahams was to serve Manley’s younger son, Prime Minister <a href="http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Michael-Manley---the-visionary-who-will-never-be">Michael Manley</a>, in the historic social restructuring of the 1970s. This included the engagement of Abrahams as the principal advisor in the government takeover and reform of Jamaica’s leading radio network, Radio Jamaica, from the British Rediffusion Group.</p>
<p>Responding to question I posed to Abrahams in a July 2004 <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02560046.2011.639959">interview</a>, he defended a new model of media ownership he had developed. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>He (Michael Manley) wasn’t quite sure what the model was but he knew it had to be ‘people-based’. So he called me and we had a long session. What the Re-diffusion was saying to him was, ‘all right, you take it over but give us a management contract and so much per annum’. So they would be getting their money anyway. I said to him I don’t think you need to give them a management contract. I am convinced that there are enough Jamaicans who can run this thing without a management contract.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His model succeeded and is among the seminal achievements in Jamaica of this 5ft 6in (1.52m) <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-278276715/an-interview-with-peter-abrahams-custodian-and-conscience">giant</a> of an intellectual, activist and author. </p>
<p>His passing cannot erase the phenomenal contributions he made to the anti-colonial struggles in Africa and the Caribbean, his scholarly eminence and his seminal leadership of media reform and commentary in Jamaica.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73075/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hopeton Dunn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South African-Jamaican intellectual, activist and author Peter Abrahams died in January 2017. He will be revered for his contributions to the anti-colonial struggles in Africa and the Caribbean.Hopeton Dunn, Professor of Communications Policy and Digital Media, University of the West Indies, Mona CampusLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.