tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/joseph-kabila-26275/articlesJoseph Kabila – The Conversation2023-11-14T09:00:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170012023-11-14T09:00:26Z2023-11-14T09:00:26ZDRC elections: the Kabila family legacy looms large over the country’s polls<p><em>The Democratic Republic of Congo is expected to hold elections on 20 December 2023. The country’s electoral commission has announced President Felix Tshisekedi will be seeking reelection <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/twenty-four-candidates-sign-up-congolese-presidential-race-december-2023-10-08/">alongside 23 other candidates</a>. They include Nobel Peace Prize winner <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231003-nobel-prize-winner-denis-mukwege-unveils-dr-congo-presidential-bid">Denis Mukwege</a> and the runner-up in the 2018 presidential election, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230930-dr-congo-opposition-figure-martin-fayulu-to-stand-in-presidential-election">Martin Fayulu</a>. The courts will confirm the final list of candidates. One key political figure has yet to make his intentions known: Joseph Kabila. He was president for 18 years until Tshisekedi took over in 2019. The DRC’s constitution allows <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/circumvention-of-term-limits-weakens-governance-in-africa/">two five-year terms</a>, but he remained in power by <a href="https://www.africanmedias.com/dr-congo-sets-elections-for-december-2018/?lang=en">delaying elections</a>. He holds substantial political, military and business sway. Jonathan R. Beloff is a <a href="https://jonathanrbeloff.com/publications/">political scholar</a> who researches the politics and security of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. We asked him some questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is the Kabila family’s place in the DRC’s politics?</h2>
<p>Joseph Kabila was the country’s fourth president. He took office after the assassination of his father, Laurent Kabila, who was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/feb/11/theobserver">killed</a> by his bodyguard in 2001. Joseph later won presidential elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/16/congo.chrismcgreal1">2006</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/17/congo-joseph-kabila-election-victory">2011</a>. </p>
<p>The surprise <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">2018 election</a> of Felix Tshisekedi, who took power in January 2019, as president interrupted more than two decades of the Kabila family’s rule. At the time, Joseph was constitutionally barred from running for president – and he had already <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/12/12/will-kabila-go?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e">overshot</a> his second term by more than three years.</p>
<p>The Kabila family became a political powerhouse after gaining control in 1996. With the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3bc5a95e8.pdf">assistance</a> of other countries – such as neighbours Uganda, Angola and Rwanda – the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6ce20.html">overthrew</a> the long-standing Zairian dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. This was during the First Congo War (1996-1997).</p>
<p>Laurent’s tenure was riddled with <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004407824/BP000014.xml?alreadyAuthRedirecting">ineffectiveness and corruption</a>. In less than two years, he had <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship">dismissed</a> his minister of defence, the Rwandan James Kabarebe, and <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Africa_s_World_War.html?id=kp93kUfdhC0C&redir_esc=y">begun arming</a> anti-Rwandan forces. These forces contained actors who participated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. </p>
<p>Laurent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/how-kabila-lost-his-way-performance-laurent-d%C3%A9sir%C3%A9-kabilas-government">claimed</a> his government only backed these forces after Rwanda attempted to overthrow his regime. </p>
<p>The bloody <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Second Congo War (1998-2003)</a> led to at least two million deaths, many of them from disease and extreme poverty rather than warfare itself. While <a href="https://archive.ph/20190515011819/https://mobile.monitor.co.ug/Rwanda-s-Gen-Kabareebe-remembered-Operation-Kitona-/691260-4834546-format-xhtml-ry3w3x/index.html">Kabarebe’s invasion attempt on the capital Kinshasa in 1998 failed</a>, the vast DRC was divided into spheres of influence for different nations and their aligned rebel groups. This status quo only began to break after Laurent’s assassination, which led to the rise of his son Joseph. </p>
<p>Joseph learned military strategy, tactics and politics under Kabarebe. The two worked together after the Second Congo War <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2014/06/rwandan-ponders-own-security-while-fdlr-remains-a-strategic-threat-by-jonathan-beloff/">to flush out many anti-Rwandan forces</a>. This included the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. They also <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2011-11-28/joseph-kabila-and-where-election-congo-went-wrong">campaigned</a> together during the 2011 presidential elections, which Joseph won. </p>
<p>Joseph initially cast himself as a reformer who would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/27/world/kabila-preaches-peace-congo-rebels-skeptical.html">end the Second Congo War</a> and pursue policies to spur political and economic development. However, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/12/jospeh-kabila-kivu-crisis-congo">instability in eastern Congo</a> persisted under his rule, with accusations of <a href="https://jgbc.scholasticahq.com/article/72664-cobalt-and-corruption-the-influence-of-multinational-firms-and-foreign-states-on-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo">massive corruption that undermined the nation’s development</a>. </p>
<h2>How much sway does Joseph Kabila hold today?</h2>
<p>Joseph Kabila remains a <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/kabila-congo/">strong presence</a> within Congo’s political, economic and military institutions. He has strong networks developed over <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/25/drc-what-is-joseph-kabilas-legacy-after-18-years-in-power">18 years in power</a>. He could use this influence to sway the vote towards any of the candidates.</p>
<p>His influence <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/drcs-shady-political-alliance-unravels">stems</a> from favourable business and political alliances he created when he was president. Like Mobutu, Kabila used his vast financial resources to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/11/19/document-leak-shows-kabila-family-associates-looted-drc-funds">secure favourable relationships</a> with Congolese and foreign business leaders. A <a href="https://www.pplaaf.org/2021/11/19/congo-holdup-leak.html">document leak</a> in 2021 revealed that Kabila received over US$138 million from corruption and bribes. </p>
<p>There were claims that the former president originally <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1065149/politique/consultations-nationales-en-rdc-comment-joseph-kabila-prepare-loffensive/">convinced</a> Tshisekedi to accept a power-sharing agreement. Under it, Tshisekedi would be president, while Kabila would control political decisions behind the scenes. The near <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/16/in-protests-hit-drc-a-fierce-power-struggle-deepens">appointment</a> of Ronsard Malonda as the president of the electoral body illustrated Kabila’s political influence. Malonda held senior positions during the country’s 2006, 2011 and 2018 elections. He has been accused of rigging results in favour of Kabila.</p>
<p>Such accusations have benefited <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181123-dr-congo-opposition-elections-tshisekedi-kamerhe-ramazani-kabila">Tshisekedi’s election campaign</a>. He is depicting himself as a candidate not tied to the corruption within DRC. </p>
<p>If Kabila does decide to campaign, political dynamics within much of Congo’s civil society, military and economy will be divided. Government ministers and officials will be forced to choose to support either the incumbent or Kabila’s preferred candidate.</p>
<h2>What was Tshisekedi expected to change after he routed Joseph Kabila?</h2>
<p>There was <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">initial</a> hope that Tshisekedi’s government would foster peace in eastern Congo, establish greater national unity and help solve the nation’s economic woes after decades of corruption and conflict. However, these problems have persisted.</p>
<p>Initially, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/drc-one-year-since-tshisekedi-took-office-insecurity-and-impunity-still-imperil-human-rights/">Amnesty International praised</a> Tshisekedi for pardoning political prisoners and allowing greater public space for criticisms of the Congolese government. He also began <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-28/congo-reviews-6-2-billion-china-mining-deal-as-criticism-grows">investigations</a> on past mineral deals during the Kabila governments. As the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2021/new-au-chair-drc-president-felix-tshisekedi-sets-ambitious-agenda-2021">African Union chair</a> from 2021 to 2022, he pushed for greater attention to the COVID-19 pandemic and promoted the African Continental Free Trade Area. </p>
<p>Despite initial attempts to foster more significant relations with Rwanda, relations <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/2/analysis-why-are-rwanda-and-drc-having-another-diplomatic-spat">soured</a> in 2022. This was after the Congolese government accused Rwanda of supporting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">resurrected M23 rebels</a>. </p>
<p>Rwanda <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/31/rwanda-denies-supporting-m23-rebel-group-in-eastern-drc//">denied</a> the allegations. It has also accused Tshisekedi’s government of being <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">hostile to the Congolese Tutsi population</a> – the Banyamulenge – who are historically related to Rwandans. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">US Department of State has expressed concern</a> about Tshisekedi’s anti-Banyamulenge rhetoric, as well as democratic transparency in the upcoming election. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s campaign strategy seems to focus on promoting security in eastern DRC by not only defeating the M23, but also attacking Rwanda for interfering in Congolese affairs. The <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/">securitisation</a> of the Banyamulenge and Rwanda – the political manipulation to stir public fear – has helped deflect internal criticisms of the Tshisekedi regime.</p>
<p>Whether the elections take place is another area of concern. There are concerns that Tshisekedi will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-president-says-unrest-east-could-disrupt-elections-2023-02-27/">delay or cancel the election</a> by citing security concerns. If this happens, it might be perceived by domestic and international partners as political interference by the ruling regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217001/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/W001217/1). </span></em></p>Laurent Kabila and his son Joseph were the Democratic Republic of Congo’s third and fourth presidents.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010992023-03-13T12:24:32Z2023-03-13T12:24:32ZThe Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513396/original/file-20230303-18-fisnxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Banyamulenge community members at the funeral of one of their own in eastern DRC.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Banyamulenge are a minority ethnic group in South Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In December 2022, the UN adviser on the prevention of genocide raised concerns about attacks against the community based on “<a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">ethnicity or perceived allegiance with neighbouring countries</a>”. The Banyamulenge have <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">long been viewed</a> as not being Congolese. The government, however, has often dismissed claims that the community is facing targeted attacks <a href="https://www.politico.cd/encontinu/2022/11/24/pretendus-discours-de-haine-en-rdc-une-fiction-qui-ressemble-aux-discours-segregationnistes-portes-par-le-rwanda-patrick-muyaya.html/121636/">as fiction</a>. Delphin R Ntanyoma, who has <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">extensively researched</a> the Banyamulenge, explains why they are facing persecution.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Banyamulenge and how has their status changed over time?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge live in eastern DRC in South Kivu province. They are mostly seen as affiliated to the Tutsi of the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">African Great Lakes region</a>, and they speak a language close to Kirundi (Burundi) and Kinyarwanda (Rwanda). The Banyamulenge settled in South Kivu between the 16th and 18th centuries, having come from what are today Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. They are largely cattle keepers. </p>
<p>They mostly occupy the southern part of South Kivu province: the Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira territories. In the 1960s and 1970s, some Banyamulenge moved to Katanga in the DRC’s southern region. The region has rich pastures for cattle herding and is close to the large cities of Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi, providing business opportunities. However, in 1998, nearly 20,000 Banyamulenge were forced to flee Katanga after they were <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_10298.html">attacked for being “foreigners”</a>. </p>
<p>Since 1984, the DRC has not organised a <a href="https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/DRC-census-working-paper-fina-online.pdf">general census</a>. The historian <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/nl/title/banyamulenge-qui-sont-ils-dou-viennent-ils-quel-role-ont-ils-joue-et-pourquoi-dans-le-processus-de-la-liberation-du-zaire/oclc/42719868">Joseph Mutambo</a> estimated the group had around 400,000 people in 1997. There are no clear estimates today, but it’s safe to assume that they have grown in number. </p>
<p>Colonial history in the Great Lakes region has categorised local communities into <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">“native” and “immigrants”</a>. Farmers are seen as native, while cattle herders are largely perceived as immigrants, foreigners and invaders. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">Why history matters in understanding conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo</a>
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<p>Based on these assumptions, the Banyamulenge have been viewed as foreigners and were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Africa-04.htm">denied citizenship in the 1980s</a>. A decade later, the Congolese state <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/drc-banyamulenge-seeking-political-solution-tensions">sought to expel them</a> after a parliamentary resolution to send back all Rwandan and Burundian descendants. </p>
<p>This added to the perception that the Banyamulenge were “invaders”. I have researched the drivers of violence in South and North Kivu for six years, with a focus on the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">Banyamulenge situation</a>. It’s clear that much of the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/14687968211009895">violence targeting them</a> revolves around the misconception that they are <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">strangers in their own country</a>. </p>
<h2>Who’s who on the list of their political adversaries?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge’s political adversaries range from local politicians to armed groups and militias. Most of the politicians who rally their constituents against the Banyamulenge are from neighbouring ethnic communities. These include the Babembe, Bafuliro, Banyindu and Bavira. Members of these ethnic communities consider themselves “native”. Political figures outside South Kivu have also spread the idea that the Banyamulenge are outsiders. </p>
<p>Those who take issue with the Banyamulenge claim to be protecting their country from “invaders”. This has led to armed mobilisations and the use of local militias, like the MaiMai and Biloze-Bishambuke. These militias have vowed to <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-warning-the-vulnerability-of-banyamulenge-invaders">expel the Banyamulenge or eliminate them</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Since 2017, Burundian rebel groups like Red-Tabara and Forces Nationales de Liberation have joined local militias in attacks against the Banyamulenge. The Red-Tabara’s involvement raised questions about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-rwanda-un-idUSKCN0VD04K">Rwanda’s role</a> after UN reports claimed that the country had supported the rebel group with logistical and training skills. </p>
<h2>How are the Banyamulenge targeted?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge have been targeted by Congolese security services and local militias in major attacks <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_brf2287.html">in 1996</a>, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/27798/drc-belgium-pursues-case-against-ex-minister-icj">1998</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">2004</a>. </p>
<p>A new wave of violence against the group <a href="https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/province-sud-kivu-un-champ-de-bataille-multidimensionnel-meconnu">began in 2017</a>, and has since led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and the destruction of <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/rapport-sur-les-attaques-anti-banyamulenge-en-rd-congo">hundreds of villages</a>. That year was marked by <a href="https://theconversation.com/2017-the-year-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-would-like-to-forget-88170">intensifying conflict in the DRC</a> over election delays. </p>
<p>The looting of Banyamulenge-owned cattle has been a constant occurrence <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26309798">since the 1960s</a>. Cattle constitute a major source of income and livelihood, and looting has worked as a strategy to impoverish the community and jeopardise their future. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">Burundi's Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict</a>
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<p>Due to the widespread destruction of villages, the remaining Banyamulenge in South Kivu live in small localities like Minembwe, Murambya/Bijombo, Mikenge and Bibokoboko. They continue to face <a href="https://kivutimes.com/minembwe-attaque-des-mai-mai-biloze-bishambuke-ilunga-et-yakutumba-plusieurs-villages-sous-le-feu-la-societe-civile-alerte-les-autorites/">regular and coordinated attacks</a>, which have prevented the community from accessing pastures and farmland beyond a two-kilometre radius. </p>
<p>Armed militias in South Kivu have <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">prevented and constrained</a> humanitarian organisations from getting aid into Banyamulenge settlements. </p>
<p>Hate speech has played a major role in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">fuelling violence</a> against the community. Twitter, Facebook, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG2YPRq3Uqw">YouTube</a> and other social media platforms have thousands of posts and videos that claim the Banyamulenge are not Congolese citizens and shouldn’t be in the country. </p>
<p>Such dehumanising and hateful speech feeds the minds and hearts of young people, mainly men, who consider attacks against the Banyamulenge a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5253c0784.html">“noble” cause</a>. <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/democratic-republic-of-congo-rising-concern-banyamulenge">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/hate-speech-and-genocide-in-minembwe-d-r-congo">activists</a> have called for greater attention to be paid to these attacks.</p>
<h2>Who’s behind the attacks?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge are targeted because they are viewed as “foreigners”. For decades, local armed groups and militias have mobilised to get rid of those perceived as invaders. This ideology is transmitted across generations. </p>
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<p>In addition, the Congolese national army has played a role in enabling attacks against the Banyamulenge by <a href="https://twitter.com/KivuSecurity/status/1304083139334156289">providing ammunition to militias</a> or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXYdu8U7At0">opening breaches when rebels attack civilians</a>. Huge destruction has taken place in areas where the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/10/28/eastern-Congo-Kivu-conflict-regional-tensions">Congolese army is present</a> but didn’t intervene. </p>
<p>There are three possible reasons for the army’s general inaction. First, some military commanders and soldiers may believe the narrative that the Banyamulenge are not Congolese. Second, some military commanders create chaos and conflict pocket zones to serve one or more protagonists in the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">Great Lakes region</a>. Third, violence allows military commanders to access operational funds – and looted cattle can be turned into money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Banyamulenge have been viewed as strangers in their own country – the violence targeting them revolves around this misconception.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976412023-01-24T14:34:50Z2023-01-24T14:34:50ZFootball and politics in Kinshasa: how DRC’s elite use sport to build their reputations and hold on to power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504456/original/file-20230113-26-o6a4dx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people play football on a street in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Football in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – as in much of the world – is intertwined with politics. </p>
<p>In the central African country, football clubs have long been a way for the regime in power to build political capital. Many politicians involve themselves with clubs to bolster their image. On the other hand, football is also a space for political opposition. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our recent paper</a>, we show how politics and football come together in a number of ways in Kinshasa, the country’s capital city. </p>
<p>Football was particularly important for Joseph Kabila’s regime, from 2001 to 2019. His was a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/01/kabila-must-go-the-congolese-see-this-why-cant-the-west/">contested and repressive regime</a>. Throughout his tenure as president, Kabila and his party members looked for ways to improve their reputation to gain votes. One way was by financially supporting football clubs. This worked because these clubs don’t have structural or sufficient commercial or state support. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study finds</a> that football politics can also work against a regime. During the Kabila years, football stadiums and supporter crowds offered a relatively safe place to protest the repressive regime. Anti-Kabila songs, for example, were often heard at matches. </p>
<h2>Football and power</h2>
<p>Our interviews with supporters, regime figures and others found that during the Kabila years, supporters and club officials made a distinction between regime figures supporting the club, and the regime. A common statement we heard was: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>supporters still appreciated Kabila-associated politicians as long as they were able to provide financial support.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gabriel Amisi (commonly known as Tango Four), for example, was a close ally of Kabila’s and currently serves as an <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee/">army general and inspector general of the Congolese army</a>. Amisi has been accused of a wide range of human rights abuses during his time as a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/20/congo-war-crimes-kisangani">rebel commander</a> and an <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres">army commander</a>. One press article describes him as “<a href="https://afridesk.org/whos-who-le-general-amisi-tango-four-le-boucher-du-kivu-jj-wondo/">the butcher of Eastern Congo</a>”. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2020, Amisi was president of the AS Vita Club, one of the biggest clubs in Kinshasa. Before 2007, the team was performing poorly. Under Amisi’s leadership, the team won three national titles and excelled internationally. Players remember his leadership as providing financial stability, with regular and good salaries, and material supplies. </p>
<p>This made him very popular. When Amisi tried to resign in 2012 after AS Vita Club’s elimination from the national league, the team’s management and club supporters didn’t accept his submission. When protests began against the Kabila regime in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKBN14800C">2016</a> in Kinshasa, AS Vita supporters protected Amisi’s house. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">Human Rights Watch</a> has documented how Amisi (and other elite figures) used youth league members of football clubs to infiltrate protests against the Kabila regime “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">and incite protesters to loot and commit violence</a>”. </p>
<p>An association with regime figures gives football clubs advantages, such as protection from prosecution if supporters are caught up in stadium violence. This makes it unattractive for clubs to associate with opposition figures, who generally have less money to invest and less political power. </p>
<p>In this way, Congolese football isn’t very different from football elsewhere in the world. It has been shown how <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=VIlcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA463&lpg=PA463&dq=Armstrong,+G.,+%26+Mitchell,+J.+P.+(2001).+%E2%80%9CPlayers,+patrons,+and+politicians:+oppositional+cultures+in+Maltese+football.%E2%80%9D+Fear+and+loathing+in+world+football,+137-158.&source=bl&ots=6GcJZyJ7BE&sig=ACfU3U3YaJGbpHXEt6nnlRXMeLAYfrrpVw&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiorpSsspz8AhUROewKHQ0BDxAQ6AF6BAgHEAM#v=onepage&q&f=false">worldwide</a> – not only on the <a href="https://polaf.hypotheses.org/5030">African continent</a>, but in a variety of places such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2013.792482">Turkey, Indonesia</a> and <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10117/">Malta</a> – football helps regimes to reproduce their hegemony, particularly by creating political capital. </p>
<h2>Football and protest</h2>
<p>But the opposite has also been shown. Football has played an important role in contesting power. It has, for example, played a role in decolonising struggles in <a href="https://experts.arizona.edu/en/publications/visualizing-politics-in-african-sport-political-and-cultural-cons">Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/kickin-it-leisure-politics-and-football-in-colonial-zanzibar-1900s1950s/A97494FF2D4FEB7BFA1252B4A11A6309">Zanzibar</a> and <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=N65pbr2hC4wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP12&dq=Martin,+P.+(2002).+%E2%80%9CLeisure+and+society+in+colonial+Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D+Cambridge+University+Pr&ots=2MF69toPoN&sig=6yK6P7RbPAWkvnTOo0XuYu3Tp6U#v=onepage&q=Martin%2C%20P.%20(2002).%20%E2%80%9CLeisure%20and%20society%20in%20colonial%20Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D%20Cambridge%20University%20Pr&f=false">Congo-Brazzaville</a>; and in the <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24122012-pitched-battles-the-role-of-ultra-soccer-fans-in-the-arab-spring-analysis-2/">Arab spring</a> in the 2010s. </p>
<p>These dynamics also played out in Kinshasa, where football supporters participated in decolonisation struggles. On <a href="https://dialectik-football.info/16-juin-1957-lunion-saint-gilloise-au-congo-et-la-premiere-emeute-anti-coloniale/">16 June 1957</a>, a match between Kinshasa’s FC Leopoldville and Belgium’s Union Saint Gilloise de Bruxelles led to the first riots leading up to independence. A year and a half later, AS Vita Club supporters played <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=bF5Vx8cCnrMC&printsec=frontcover&hl=nl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">an important role</a> in decisive riots against colonial authorities. In 1960, the DRC got its independence from Belgium. </p>
<p>In the postcolonial period, football has also played a role in challenging power. During the Kabila regime, as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears">political repression escalated</a> in almost every other space, the football stadium became an important venue for political protest. </p>
<p>In the words of a soccer fan in <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since we’re in the stadium, we won’t be arrested. The police knows this: they won’t try anything because we’re way more numerous than them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lyrics of protest songs and slogans – referred to as “hymns of the oppressed” – included: “God is doing everything so that Kabila dies!” and “Eeeh, we refuse (to be) the voting machine”. </p>
<p>During <a href="https://qz.com/africa/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-to-a-third-term">the “slippage” period</a> from 2015 onwards – when Kabila went beyond the formal limits of his mandate – anti-Kabila slogans became even more popular. </p>
<p>The engagement of regime figures with soccer clubs didn’t overcome hostile feelings about the regime. </p>
<h2>Regime controls</h2>
<p>The impact of these confrontations of regime power was limited, though. </p>
<p>For example, during the Kabila regime, radio and TV stations would cut their broadcasting when political songs were sung during games involving the national team. And in late 2016, the minister of sports <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">temporarily suspended</a> the national football competition. The official reason for this was “<a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">excessive violence in the stadiums</a>”. But it was widely understood as a political measure by the regime, fearing protests by supporters in reaction to the end of Kabila’s official mandate during this period. The former minister confirmed this to us during interviews. </p>
<p>In sum, football in Kinshasa is politics – but primarily regime politics. Even though political opposition can be expressed through football, it is questionable how much potential for change this carries. </p>
<p>During the authoritarian Kabila regime, the protest role of football was confined. It’s similar under the current Felix Tshisekedi regime, which uses football as a political tool. Kinshasa’s main clubs (Daring Club Motema Pembe and AS Vita), for example, have club presidents who are close allies of Tshisekedi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Football provides a way for unpopular elites to build political capital – but also creates space for citizens to voice dissent.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpAlbert Malukisa Nkuku, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768612022-03-10T15:01:23Z2022-03-10T15:01:23ZRwanda has reopened the border with Uganda but distrust could close it again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445494/original/file-20220209-1970-10db1fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda has fully re-opened the Gatatuna-Katuna border with Uganda, ending a three-year impasse. Cyril Ndegeya/Anadolu Agency via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-cross-the-katuna-border-crossing-between-uganda-news-photo/1238095524?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Rwanda has now fully <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/gatuna-border-fully-reopens-ordinary-passengers-after-3-years">reopened</a> the Gatuna border with Uganda, ending a three-year impasse on the <a href="http://www.ttcanc.org/page.php?id=11">Northern Corridor</a>, one of East Africa’s key transport arteries that funnels goods from the Indian Ocean seaport of Mombasa to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47495476">abruptly closed</a> the border in February 2019 after it accused Uganda of abducting its citizens and supporting rebels seeking to topple President Paul Kagame. Legal scholar Filip Reyntjens takes us through the nature of Rwanda-Uganda relations.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the brief history of Uganda-Rwanda relations?</h2>
<p>The presidents of Uganda and Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, were close allies during the civil wars of <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4386/5071">Uganda</a> (1981 to 1986) and <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/civil-war-erupts-in-rwanda">Rwanda</a> (1990 to 1994). They were also on <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1640692.stm">the same side</a> in the first (Democratic Republic of Congo) war that removed <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0782891/bio">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>, between 1996 and 1997. </p>
<p>But the two leaders <a href="https://eyalama.com/part-1how-six-day-kisangani-war-pushed-museveni-and-kagame-from-friends-to-nemesis/">fell out</a> during the second Congo war (between 1998 and 2003). Uganda and Rwanda clashed over the exploitation of Congolese resources and the management of the rebellion against <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240208704645">Laurent Kabila</a>, whose forces had deposed Mobutu Sese Seko. Rwandan and Ugandan armies fought each other in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 and 2000.</p>
<p>A semblance of peace was restored between the two leaders in the early 2000s but trust never returned. A new <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/12/frenemies-for-life-has-the-love-gone-between-uganda-and-rwanda/">round</a> of hostile verbal exchanges erupted in 2017, and they escalated considerably in early 2019. This time, Rwanda accused Uganda of harbouring armed dissidents and victimising Rwandans. </p>
<p>A 2018 UN <a href="https://www.undocs.org/S/2018/1133">report</a> found Uganda had provided support to Rwandan dissidents. Uganda too claimed that Rwanda was engaging in acts of espionage and attempts to destabilise Uganda. </p>
<p>Other issues included air traffic rights, the construction of a standard gauge railway, and energy projects. </p>
<p>In March 2019, Rwanda’s closure of the Gatuna/Katuna border crossing sealed the rupture. Influential opinion makers close to both countries’ regimes didn’t rule out the possibility of direct war. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-africa-should-intervene-to-defuse-rwanda-uganda-war-of-words-114202">East Africa should intervene to defuse Rwanda-Uganda war of words</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Later that year, the two leaders signed an agreement brokered by the Angolan and Congolese presidents. The <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/422686492/Memorandum-of-Understanding-of-Luanda">Luanda Memorandum of Understanding</a> called on both countries to desist from “acts such as the financing, training and infiltration of destabilising forces”. It also <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-rwanda-leaders-sign-pact-aimed-at-ending-tensions-1425494">called</a> for respect of rights, freeing of each other’s nationals and resumption of cross-border activities. </p>
<p>But there was very little progress. The two leaders continued to trade accusations. It seemed unlikely that, as long as Museveni and Kagame were at the helm, bilateral relations would ever improve. </p>
<h2>How important is the Gatuna border crossing?</h2>
<p>Gatuna is one of the most important borders in East Africa as it connects Kenya’s Mombasa port to various cities in the region. On <a href="https://www.ssatp.org/sites/ssatp/files/publications/SSATPWP96-border-crossing_1.pdf">average</a>, 2,518 trucks pass through the Gatuna border every month (84 trucks per day) into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The East African Community has since <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/works-gatuna-one-stop-border-post-near-completion">upgraded</a> it into a one-stop border post.</p>
<p>Its closure had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-re-opens-border-with-uganda-says-grievances-remain-2022-01-31/">choked off commerce</a> in East Africa. Its re-opening is set to spark <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2354-eac-applauds-the-re-opening-of-the-gatuna-katuna-border-post-by-the-republics-of-rwanda-and-uganda">social and economic activities</a> and also benefit the informal cross-border traders.</p>
<h2>What’s fuelling the border conflict now?</h2>
<p>The border stalemate is about two presidents who know each other well, and their mutual dislike and distrust is deeply ingrained. </p>
<p>On 22 January, Kagame met Lt. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s senior presidential advisor on special operations and commander of the Uganda People Defence Forces. Kainerugaba has no official function in Uganda’s foreign affairs apparatus, but he is Museveni’s son. </p>
<p>Three days after the visit, in a gesture of goodwill, Museveni replaced intelligence chief Major General Abel Kandiho, who is considered in Kigali as “anti-Rwanda”. Three days later, Rwanda announced a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/crossing-at-reopened-border-as-rwanda-uganda-3700576">partial reopening</a> of the Gatuna/Katuna border crossing.</p>
<p>But on 31 January, Rwandan deputy government spokesman Alain Mukuralinda told Rwanda TV that Uganda had not yet addressed all of Kigali’s grievances. </p>
<h2>Has the East African region seen the last of this conflict?</h2>
<p>The border issue is not a settled matter. The initial border reopening, which took place on 1 February, was made subject to COVID-19 protocols. Even with full reopening on 7 March, the situation at the border remains confused over the conflicting handling of the COVID-19 protocols by national agencies. </p>
<p>Ominously, on 8 February, Kagame told Parliament that Rwanda was ready to respond to any external <a href="https://chimpreports.com/why-museveni-cancelled-ex-cmi-boss-abel-kandihos-transfer-to-south-sudan/">threat</a>. He said: “We wish everybody in the region peace, but anyone who wishes us war, we give it to him”. </p>
<p>Kagame referred to rebel forces in the DRC, but the Ugandan army has been deployed there cooperating with the Congolese army against the Allied Democratic Forces, and a Rwandan intervention would carry the risk of a new confrontation with the Ugandan troops. </p>
<p>The next day, Museveni <a href="https://www.watchdoguganda.com/news/20220208/129901/gen-kandiho-bounces-back-as-polices-chief-of-joint-staff.html">appointed</a> Kandiho as Chief of the Joint Staff of the Uganda Police Force. </p>
<h2>How can this dispute be resolved?</h2>
<p>The mutual aversion between Museveni and Kagame is so deep that it has become hard to expect a long lasting solution to a conflict that has poisoned relations for over 20 years. </p>
<p>After the 2015 constitutional amendment Kagame can potentially stay in power until 2034. Although Museveni is not bound by term limits, he will be 82 years old at the time of the 2026 presidential election. Kainerugaba is often mooted as the <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/muhoozis-2026-presidential-bid-is-impossible/">anointed successor</a> and he appears to want to make peace with Rwanda. </p>
<p>In the absence of initiatives by regional leaders, change will have to come from inside Rwanda and Uganda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tension persists between the neighbours as Kampala is yet to address all of Kigali’s grievances.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1716682021-11-16T12:30:37Z2021-11-16T12:30:37ZTshisekedi a consolidé l'assise de son pouvoir en RDC: il lui faut maintenant passer à l’action<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431394/original/file-20211110-19-1c8nsfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C926%2C616&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Félix Tshisekedi, Président de la République démocratique du Congo</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/-Hayoung Jeon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Félix Tshisekedi, de l’Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social, est devenu le cinquième président de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) en <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/felix-tshisekedis-improbable-inauguration-leaves-congo-in-a-confused-daze/2019/01/24/36f51a84-1cf1-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html">janvier 2019</a> après l’une des élections les plus attendues de l’histoire du pays.</p>
<p>Les loyalistes du parti ont célébré l’événement. Mais beaucoup d’autres –- tant en RDC qu’à l’étranger –- ont déploré une nouvelle élection volée. Le Financial Times a trouvé des preuves irréfutables que l’élection avait fait l’objet d’une fraude <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">d’une ampleur inouïe</a>. Alors que Martin Fayulu devrait de droit être le président en exercice de la RDC, Tshisekedi occupe le palais présidentiel, ou la « Maison Blanche » comme on l’appelle parfois.</p>
<p>C’était un début peu prometteur. La fragilité de la position de Tshisekedi était aggravée par le fait qu’il avait formé avec l’ancien chef d’État <a href="https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-Fl-Ka/Kabila-Joseph.html">Joseph Kabila</a> une alliance précaire. Les deux n'ont pas fait bon ménage et ont engagé une lutte au coeur de la politique congolaise. </p>
<p>La coalition de Tshisekedi, Cap sur le changement, était minoritaire, tant à l’Assemblée nationale congolaise qu’au Sénat. Les deux branches du parlement congolais étaient dominées par la coalition Front commun pour le Congo, contrôlée par Kabila.</p>
<p>Faute de soutien parlementaire, Tshisekédi était, il faut le reconnaitre, en posision de faisblesse. Il a dû accepter le choix de Kabila pour le poste de premier ministre, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/29/dr-congo-s-prime-minister-sylvestre-ilunga-resigns-after-censure//">Sylvestre Ilunga</a>, en mai 2019. Il lui a fallu attendre cette année pour pouvoir enfin évincer Ilunga, un ancien professeur d’économie.</p>
<p>En avril, Tshisekedi a également <a href="https://chargedaffairs.org/felix-tshisekedis-newly-independent-agenda-for-the-drc-modernizer-or-strongman-2-0/">réussi à écarter du pouvoir de nombreux membres de la coalition Front commun pour le Congo</a>. Il a fermement établi son emprise sur le pouvoir politique à Kinshasa.</p>
<p>Bref, son gouvernement n'a plus l'excuse d'être entravé par l'emprise de l'ancien clan de son prédecesseur. Ayant renforcé sa mainmise sur la présidence, Tshisekedi doit s’atteler à la mise en œuvre d’un programme de changement au service du peuple congolais</p>
<h2>Ce qui a été fait</h2>
<p>En mars 2019, Tshisekedi a lancé un <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/23337/felix-tshisekedi-audits-his-emergency-program-troubles-partners/">programme d’urgence de 100 jours</a> pour donner le coup d'envoi à sa présidence. Le programme a été inauguré par la publication d’un <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">document de 78 pages </a> qui couvrait quelques-unes des priorités les plus importantes du gouvernement actuel à l’époque. Même si de nombreuses questions étaient abordées, comme la promotion de l’industrie et l’énergie, une grande partie de l’argent était réservée aux infrastructures: <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">183,2 millions de dollars</a>. Pourtant, bon nombre de ces projets sont inachevés.</p>
<p>Malgré la nécessité de prendre des mesures supplémentaires en ce qui concerne les projets de construction de routes, le président pourrait inscrire à son actif - fut-il partiellement - la fin de l'épidémie d'Ebola de 2018-2020 dans l’est du Congo. </p>
<p>Bien que les communautés locales et les <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/Ebola-2019-drc-">ONG aient été au cœur</a> des activités de secours, cela s’est produit pendant le mandat de Tshisekedi et il le presentera sans doute comme l'un de ses succès. </p>
<p>Dans le même temps, certains <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51220974">prisonniers politiques</a> ont été libérés, une décision qui permet de distinguer sa présidence de celle de Joseph Kabila.</p>
<p>Même s'il y a eu quelques changements, peu de Congolais ont constaté des améliorations majeures. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drcs-felix-tshisekedi-still-a-president-without-a-cabinet/a-48588554">Il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour améliorer</a> la vie des citoyens de la RDC, et cela est particulièrement vrai en dehors de la capitale.</p>
<h2>Ce qu’il reste à faire</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25506">Tout d’abord, de graves violences se poursuivent</a> dans la province de l’Ituri, dans le nord-est du pays. Après une décennie de paix relative de 2007 à 2017, les violences intercommunautaires entre Lendu et Hema <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/ituri-resurgence-conflict-and-failure-peacebuilding-policy">ont repris ces dernières années</a>. La récente campagne de terreur menée par les <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-allied-democratic-forces">Forces Démocratiques Alliées islamistes </a>a également contribué à accroître la violence dans la région nord-est du pays.</p>
<p>Alors que la violence se poursuit dans l’est de la RDC, la marge de progrès est encore énorme dans le secteur, situé en grande partie dans <a href="https://african.business/2014/01/economy/the-drc-s-katanga-province-return-of-the-copper-king/">la province du Haut-Katanga</a>, où la violence a diminué considérablement. Le gouvernement de Tshisekedi s'est engagé dans un long processus de négociations avec un consortium d’investisseurs miniers chinois basé dans le sud-est du pays.</p>
<p>Ces négociations, quoique lentes, présente quelques avantages pour l’État congolais. Les discussions portent sur <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/14/controversy-over-the-location-of-amazon-african-headquarters-in-cape-town-south-africa//">le montant que les investisseurs chinois donneront à l’État</a> en contrepartie des minéraux qu’ils exploitent.</p>
<p>En mai, le président a déclaré qu’il pensait que les contrats miniers précédents <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">pourraient être revus</a>. Globalement, il a cherché à renégocier le tristement célèbre accord <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2013.762167">« minerais contre infrastructures » </a> de Sicomines, conclu entre un groupe d’investisseurs chinois et le gouvernement congolais en 2008. En août, il a créé une <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">commission chargée d’examiner</a> les contrats miniers en vue d'obtenir des contrats plus avantageux.</p>
<h2>Perspectives</h2>
<p>Si un bon accord minier peut être conclu, la prospérité relative de ce secteur pourrait servir à propulser les plans de Tshisekedi au-delà du vieux programme d’urgence de 100 jours.
Premièrement, cela pourrait aider le secteur des infrastructures en difficulté, qui a connu peu de développement. La plupart des infrastructures sont <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">dans un état de délabrement</a>. Un réseau routier décent aiderait à propulser les entreprises et notamment celles du <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">secteur agricole</a>, si important pour la RDC.</p>
<p>Deuxièmement, des fonds publics plus importants pourraient aider le président à s’attaquer aux problèmes du système éducatif. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/school-children-storm-congo-parliament-over-teacher-strike-2021-10-21/">Une grève très inquiétante des enseignants</a> est en cours en RDC, le manque de salaire étant l’une des raisons de l’arrêt de travail. Voilà un problème qui nécessite une solution urgente.</p>
<p>Troisièmement, <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m2879">le secteur de la santé en RDC a également besoin d’un coup de pouce en termes d’investissements </a>, notamment en raison de la pandémie.</p>
<p>En bref, le gouvernement de Tshisekedi dispose désormais d’un capital politique durement acquis, qui lui permettrait d’opérer quelques-uns des changements qu’il a promis pendant sa campagne. Certains de ces changements pourraient être mis en œuvre par la négociation d’un accord minier décent, et à condition que cet argent soit distribué judicieusement.</p>
<p>Le secteur minier, aussi controversé soit-il, a connu une croissance soutenue depuis <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">le boom des matières premières en 2007</a>. Par ailleurs, la transparence au sein du secteur minier est apparemment <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">en train de</a> s'améliorer. Il est donc temps pour Tshisekedi de conclure un accord avantageux et de résoudre quelques-uns des nombreux problèmes auxquels ses citoyens sont confrontés.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171668/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman a reçu des financements de Arts and Humanities Research Council, de Economic and Social Research Council, de la British Academy, du Spalding Trust et de la Presbyterian Historical Society. Il est affilié au Parti travailliste britannique. </span></em></p>Le gouvernement du président Tshisekedi n’a plus l’excuse d’être entravé par l'emprise du clan de son prédécesseur Joseph Kabila.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1702822021-10-27T13:19:06Z2021-10-27T13:19:06ZDRC’s Tshisekedi has secured his power base: now it’s time to deliver<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428042/original/file-20211022-9474-2jop7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/-Hayoung Jeon </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Félix Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress became the fifth president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/felix-tshisekedis-improbable-inauguration-leaves-congo-in-a-confused-daze/2019/01/24/36f51a84-1cf1-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html">January 2019</a> after one of the most anticipated elections in the country’s history.</p>
<p>Party loyalists celebrated. But many others – both in the DRC and abroad – lamented another stolen election. The Financial Times found incontrovertible proof that the election had been the subject of a fraud on an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">eye-watering scale</a>. While <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/11/runner-up-in-congo-election-says-he-beat-official-winner-by-wide-margin">Martin Fayulu</a> should by rights be the sitting president of the DRC, Tshisekedi is occupying the presidential palace, or the “White House” as it is sometimes called.</p>
<p>It was an inauspicious start. The fragility of Tshisekedi’s position was compounded by the fact that he and the former head of state <a href="https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-Fl-Ka/Kabila-Joseph.html">Joseph Kabila</a> had formed an uneasy alliance. But they made unhappy bedfellows, which meant that a power struggle soon ensued in the very heart of Congolese politics.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s coalition, Heading for Change, was a minority – both in the Congolese National Assembly and in the Senate. The two branches of the Congolese parliament were dominated by the Common Front for Congo coalition that was controlled by Kabila.</p>
<p>With a lack of parliamentary support, Tshisekedi was admittedly in a weak position. He had to accept Kabila’s choice for prime minister, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/29/dr-congo-s-prime-minister-sylvestre-ilunga-resigns-after-censure//">Sylvestre Ilunga</a>, in May 2019. It took him until this year to finally be able to <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/29/dr-congo-s-prime-minister-sylvestre-ilunga-resigns-after-censure//">oust Ilunga</a>, a former economics professor.</p>
<p>In April Tshisekedi also <a href="https://chargedaffairs.org/felix-tshisekedis-newly-independent-agenda-for-the-drc-modernizer-or-strongman-2-0/">succeeded in removing many members of the Common Front for Congo coalition from power</a>. He firmly established his grasp on political power in Kinshasa.</p>
<p>In short, his government no longer has the excuse that it is being hampered by the dead hand of the old Kabila cabal. Having reinforced his grip on the presidency, Tshisekedi needs to set about enacting a programme of change that delivers for the Congolese people. </p>
<h2>What’s been done</h2>
<p>In March 2019, Tshisekedi started a <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/23337/felix-tshisekedi-audits-his-emergency-program-troubles-partners/">100 day emergency programme</a> to kickstart his presidency. The programme was launched by the publication of a <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">78 page document</a> that covered some of the most important priorities of the present government at the time. While many issues were covered, such as industry promotion and energy, much of the money was reserved for infrastructure: <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">$183.2 million</a>. Yet, many of these projects are incomplete. </p>
<p>Despite the need for more action with regard to the road-building projects, the president could take some – albeit very limited – credit for the ending of the 2018-2020 Ebola outbreak in eastern Congo. While <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/Ebola-2019-drc-">local communities and NGOs were at the heart of this relief effort</a>, it happened under Tshisekedi’s watch and he will doubtless point to it as an achievement. At the same time, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51220974">some political prisoners have been freed</a> in a move that distinguishes this presidency from that of Joseph Kabila. </p>
<p>While some change has been forthcoming, few Congolese have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drcs-felix-tshisekedi-still-a-president-without-a-cabinet/a-48588554">seen major improvements</a>. There is still much more to be done to make life in the DRC better for its citizens, and this is particularly true outside the capital.</p>
<h2>What’s still to be done</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25506">First, serious violence continues</a> in the Ituri province in the north-east. After a decade of relative peace from 2007 to 2017, inter-communal violence between the Lendu and Hema has <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/ituri-resurgence-conflict-and-failure-peacebuilding-policy">reignited in recent years</a>. The recent campaign of terror by the Islamist <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-allied-democratic-forces">Allied Democratic Forces</a> has also served to increase violence in the country’s north-eastern region.</p>
<p>While violence continues in eastern DRC, there is potentially more progress in the hugely important mining sector located largely in the <a href="https://african.business/2014/01/economy/the-drc-s-katanga-province-return-of-the-copper-king/">Upper Katanga province</a>, where there has been much less violence. Tshisekedi’s government is involved in a long process of negotiations with a consortium of Chinese mining investors based in the south-east of the country.</p>
<p>These negotiations, while slow, may yet yield some benefits for the Congolese state. The talks centre on <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/14/controversy-over-the-location-of-amazon-african-headquarters-in-cape-town-south-africa//">how much money Chinese investors will give the state</a> in return for the minerals they mine. </p>
<p>In May, the president stated that he believed previous mining contracts <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">could be reviewed</a>. In general, he sought to renegotiate the infamous Sicomines “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2013.762167">minerals-for-infrastructure</a>” deal that was struck between a group of Chinese investors and the Congolese government in 2008. In August, he formed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">commission to examine</a> mining deals with a view to getting better terms in general.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>If a good mining deal can be arrived at, the relative prosperity of this sector could serve to propel Tshisekedi’s plans beyond the old 100 day emergency programme. </p>
<p>First, it could help the ailing infrastructure sector, which has seen little development. Much of it <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">is in a state of disrepair</a>. A decent road network would help to propel business and not least those in the <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">agricultural sector</a>, which is so important for the DRC. </p>
<p>Secondly, more state funds could help the president tackle the problems in the education system. There is currently a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/school-children-storm-congo-parliament-over-teacher-strike-2021-10-21/">serious teacher strike in the DRC</a>, with lack of pay being one of the reasons for the stoppage. This is a problem in need of an urgent solution. </p>
<p>Third, the DRC’s <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m2879">health sector could also do with a boost in investment</a>, not least because of the pandemic.</p>
<p>In short, Tshisekedi’s government now has some hard-won political capital with which to enact some of the changes that he promised during his campaign. Some of these changes could be delivered if a decent mining deal can be negotiated, and if that money finds its way to the right places. </p>
<p>The mining sector – controversial as it is – has seen sustained growth since the <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">commodity boom in 2007</a>. Transparency within the mining sector is also reportedly <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">improving</a>. It is, therefore, time for Tshisekedi to secure a good deal and resolve some of the many problems his citizens are experiencing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Economic and Social Research Council, the British Academy, the Spalding Trust and the Presbyterian Historical Society. He is affiliated with Labour Party. </span></em></p>President Tshisekedi’s government no longer has the excuse that it’s being hampered by the dead hand of his predecessor Joseph Kabila’s cabal.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1622572021-07-08T14:57:01Z2021-07-08T14:57:01ZWhy payroll fraud in the DRC’s education sector will be hard to fix<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407644/original/file-20210622-28-9b31dg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pupils wear face masks in their classroom while a teacher writes on the board at a school in Kinshasa on August 10, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The primary and secondary education sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faces massive challenges. These include insufficient budgets, payroll fraud, a lack of infrastructure and teaching material, and poor opportunities for teacher professional development. Educational officials aren’t being held accountable for policy failures.</p>
<p>One of the biggest hurdles has to do with the teacher payroll. In general, the country’s teachers – more than 500,000 – work under dire conditions. In particular, a significant number of school teachers in the DRC have gone <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/teachers-observe-strike-in-dr-congo/2011572">without</a> government pay for several years. Since the early 1990s, parents have been <a href="https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/drc-students-drop-parents-struggle-pay-rising-required-teachers-bonuses/">called upon</a> to step in to support teachers and schools financially by paying substantial school fees. Providing quality education <a href="https://educationanddevelopment.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/cyril-owen-brandt-masterthesis-teachers-struggle-for-income-in-drc1.pdf">isn’t always</a> at the top of teacher priorities as they struggle to supplement their income with other activities. </p>
<p>Two years ago, the government decided to abolish primary school fees. The idea was that the government would pay all teachers. However, drawing on our long engagement with the DRC’s education sector and political system, we believe that this will be a challenge because of political, budgetary and administrative issues. </p>
<p>In April this year, Tony Mwaba, one of the most ferocious critics of corruption in the education sector, was appointed the new minister of education. This followed the <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2021/04/30/actualite/justice/rdc-willy-bakonga-condamne-3-ans-de-servitude-penale">conviction</a> of former education officials, including the former minister of education, for corruption and money laundering. </p>
<p>Is this the start of a serious reform of the battered education sector? </p>
<p>We believe that sustainable change in this system would require a thorough restructuring of the mechanisms of political accountability. In the meantime, we can only expect a realignment of existing patronage networks to the political agenda of the current president.</p>
<h2>Patronage networks</h2>
<p>In November 2020, the DRC’s auditor general published a <a href="https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-79332_secope_l_enquete_de_l_igf_revele_la_dilapidation_de_62_milliards_cdf.htm">report</a> which revealed the depths of the payroll crisis. Masses of teachers remained unpaid while new ones were being added to the payroll. There was also an influx of administrative staff, diverting resources from teacher salaries. The report revealed the embezzlement of 62 billion Congolese francs (about US$30 million) and other forms of payroll fraud.</p>
<p>Payroll fraud <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20210324-la-rdc-recense-ses-fonctionnaires-pour-lutter-contre-les-cumulards-et-emplois-fictifs">permeates</a> the public sector, and this has been a persistent problem in the DRC. The report <a href="https://actualite.cd/2020/11/18/rdc-ligf-decouvert-lexistence-de-faux-arretes-de-recrutement-des-agents-et-de-creation">implicated</a> senior civil servants and staff from the ministries of budget and finance, education and the teachers’ payroll agency. The issue reverberated in the provinces as well. Several officials were <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/02/09/lomami-le-directeur-provincial-du-secope-aux-arrets">placed under</a> arrest.</p>
<p>The boundary between “state” and “society” has become a twilight area in the DRC, whose dynamics are governed by specific social pressures, economic rents and political considerations. For example, relationships with politicians, due to party affiliation or origin, increase a school’s chances of being added to the payroll. Another example is the attempted removal of 1,179 schools from the payroll. As <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2021/04/15/actualite/education/rdc-600-ecoles-conventionnees-catholiques-desactivees-de-la-liste-de">reactions</a> by educational leaders suggest, some of these schools have properly functioned for decades. In the past, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1367920?journalCode=crea20">masses</a> of other schools have obtained their decree via informal processes, void of any educational planning. What is the difference between schools functioning on “false” decrees, and schools functioning on decrees based purely on patronage without any technical preparation and monitoring?</p>
<p>Government actors who benefit from the current structures have few incentives to clean up the payroll. However, teacher union politics also partially explains these continued dynamics. There’s a <a href="https://www.ei-ie.org/fr/item/25128:an-online-union-academy-made-in-dr-congo">lack</a> of strong, independent unions and a lack of trust between teachers and unions. Also the political co-option of union leaders, for example by mobilising them as consultants or by inviting them into party politics, has weakened the unions’ impact. Out of 40 unions, only a handful can be considered to be functioning properly. With a dozen pseudo-unions and a high number of unions which hardly function, Congolese teacher unions have been effectively silenced.</p>
<h2>Possibility of reform?</h2>
<p>Trying to reform human resource and payroll management means taking away a massive resource of patronage and electoral politics from hundreds of bureaucrats and politicians.</p>
<p>Public statements to fight against payroll fraud seem to materialise at strategic moments. In 1979, the former president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Mobutu Sese Seko, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/22/archives/mobutu-says-imf-will-give-zaire-aid-asserts-in-paris-after-talks.html">stated</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We’re going to wipe out the imaginary schools and the fake teachers who exist only on paper. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Mobutu, it was a way to attract World Bank funding. </p>
<p>So, what was the reason for the most recent announcement? The investigations, and Mwaba’s appointment, are nested within Congolese political dynamics, and it is necessary to look beyond the education sector. </p>
<p>For 15 years, according to our sources, the education ministry functioned as a cash cow for long-term ruler Joseph Kabila’s party. When Félix Tshisekedi was elected president in 2019, in what is seen as a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/10/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">rigged election</a>, he formed a coalition with Kabila. The investigations and sentences of high-level educational officials sit within Tshisekedi’s much wider use of “<a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/making-sense-of-dr-congos-stunning-political-turnaround/">judicial harassment</a>” against key persons from Kabila’s camp. </p>
<p>Given that Tshisekedi’s coalition remains unstable and based on members of parliament who will “<a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/making-sense-of-dr-congos-stunning-political-turnaround/">condition their support upon payments or extractive opportunities</a>”, he will need all possible sources to gather funds. This is all the more the case as the DRC looks forward to a new round of elections in 2023.</p>
<p>So this is the situation in which the president finds himself: while the judicial investigations and new appointment indicate that using the payroll for patronage purposes is being addressed, now that he’s completely in power himself, Tshisekedi might be tempted to deviate from the norms through which he won his position. </p>
<p>With an education sector struggling to cope through patronage politics and informal arrangements, and with all of the high level dynamics at play, can the new education minister bring much needed change? We truly hope so, but he would have to swim against a strong tide. </p>
<p><em>For a longer French version of this article, please see <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/blog-invite-fraude-dans-leducation-en-rdc-le-nouveau-ministre-peut-il-changer-la-donne/?lang=fr">here</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stylianos Moshonas receives funding from the FWO (Research Foundation Flanders), through a fundamental research project entitled 'Understanding the political economy of Congo's civil service recruitment and remunerations system', in which he works as a postdoctoral researcher.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cyril Owen Brandt, Gauthier Marchais, Jacques Taty Mwakupemba, and Tom De Herdt do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Public statements against payroll fraud seem to materialise at strategic moments.Cyril Owen Brandt, Associate Researcher, Institute of Development Policy, University of AntwerpGauthier Marchais, Research Fellow, Institute of Development StudiesJacques Taty Mwakupemba, PhD candidate, Université catholique de BukavuStylianos Moshonas, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpTom De Herdt, Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1490062020-11-16T14:59:52Z2020-11-16T14:59:52ZGrowing turbulence in DRC’s ruling coalition points to an early divorce<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369276/original/file-20201113-23-1f96hpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former DRC President Joseph Kabila, left, congratulates his succesor, Felix Tshisekedi, on his inauguration in January 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kinsela Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rickety coalition that has governed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for 20 months, forged by President Félix Tshisekedi and his predecessor Joseph Kabila, appears to be falling apart. </p>
<p>In 2019, for lack of a parliamentary majority, Tshisekedi chose to share power with his former rival, Kabila, in a coalition of their respective political platforms – the Cape for Change and the Common Front for the Congo. The Cape for Change is led by Tshisekedi and opposition figure <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/drc-opposition-figures-tshisekedi-and-kamerhe-form-joint-ticket-20181123">Vital Kamerhe</a>.</p>
<p>Rather than put the country on the path of economic and social recovery as intended, this alliance turned out to be a centre of conflict from early on. The alliance partners have fought over the sharing of ministerial posts. They have also clashed over the control of other state agencies, including the judiciary and the national electoral commission.</p>
<p>The tensions have become more pronounced in the last six months, as shown by, for example, the ousting of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/30182/drc-tshisekedi-loses-an-asset-in-parlia">Jean-Marc Kabund a Kabund</a>, the interim president of Tshisekedi’s party, Union for Democracy and Social Progress, from his post as vice president of the National Assembly. This was at the instigation of Kabila’s platform. The members of the platform in the government have also been refusing to execute orders from Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>In addition, the parliament, which is dominated by Kabila’s platform, has accused Tshisekedi of violating the constitution. He appointed three new judges to the constitutional court <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2020/07/18/actualite/justice/justice-felix-tshisekedi-nomme-trois-nouveaux-membres-la-cour">in July</a> and the Kabila camp considers the appointment to be <a href="https://in.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics/congo-leader-boosts-influence-with-new-constitutional-court-judges-idUSKBN27629F">flawed</a>. They also accuse the president of wanting to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46712/drc-constitutional-court-fight-reveals-kabila-tshisekedi-struggle/">control the country’s judicial institutions</a>.</p>
<p>Members of parliament aligned to Kabila have been boycotting initiatives by Tshisekedi, in both the government and parliament. They refused to take part in the swearing-in of the three recently appointed judges.</p>
<h2>Unworkable marriage</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi became president 20 months ago. Before then, his political party had been the main opposition party for more than 35 years, to the successive regimes of <a href="https://www.lesinrocks.com/2017/04/16/livres/actualite/lascension-et-la-chute-de-mobutu-lhomme-leopard-qui-ravage-le-congo/">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Laurent-Kabila">Laurent Désiré Kabila</a> and his son <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/25/drc-what-is-joseph-kabilas-legacy-after-18-years-in-power">Joseph Kabila</a>. </p>
<p>As his party didn’t get enough MPs to form a government, he got into a coalition with Kabila’s Common Front for Congo, which had more than the required number of MPs. This enabled him to lead the war-weary, unstable country, promising to rebuild it.</p>
<p>But being a president without a loyal parliament made his position precarious.
From early on, the governance of the country was like a vehicle driven by two people at the same time, without any prospect of positive economic outlook.</p>
<p>It didn’t take long for a breakdown to happen.</p>
<p>Major disagreements arose between the coalition partners. They differed over how to share ministerial posts, management of the state-owned companies, diplomacy, the <a href="https://actualite.cd/2020/08/03/rdc-elections-les-trois-principales-reformes-proposees-par-les-12-personnalites">electoral process</a>, appointments of the head of the electoral commission as well as judges of the constitutional court, to mention but a few.</p>
<p>From the onset, many observers dismissed the coalition between Tshisekedi and Kabila as an <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/44907/opinion-la-coalition-tshisekedi-kabila-duo-ou-duel-au-sommet-de-letat-en-rd-congo/">unholy alliance</a> doomed to fail. The experience of the last 20 months supports the sceptics’ view that the coalition was never sincere about working together for the benefit of the Congolese people. </p>
<p>For Kabila, the motivation seems to be the desire to retain power behind the scenes. His platform used its parliamentary majority to get cabinet positions and other positions in stated-owned companies (such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15859686">national railway of the Democratic Republic of Congo</a> and <a href="https://www.gecamines.cd/">Gécamines, the Congolese commodity trading and mining company</a>).</p>
<p>For Tshisekedi, the main goal appears to have been to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the coalition to destroy the system of cronyism and corruption that had become entrenched under Kabila. He relied on popular support and political gamesmanship to tighten his grip on power. </p>
<h2>Looming divorce</h2>
<p>After endless, futile negotiations with the Kabila camp, Tshisekedi appears to have finally recognised the limits of the coalition government, and has lost patience. In a brief address to the nation <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=0ZptIKGTDe0">on 23 October</a>, he denounced the Kabila camp’s obstructive actions. It was thinly veiled rebuke of his coalition partner. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These disagreements between parties involved in this Agreement are hindering the economic take-off of the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He announced a consultation with social, religious and political leaders with a view to bringing about reforms. His aim is to gain a majority in parliament and establish a new government loyal to him. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would not let any political commitment of any kind take precedence over my constitutional prerogatives and over the best interests of Congolese people. I will never compromise the best interests of the nation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The statement underlines the primacy of constitutional order over all kinds of political arrangements, including the governing coalition. The president promised to report back to the nation on the outcome of his consultations. Undoubtedly, this statement spells the end of the ruling coalition. </p>
<p>The Kabila camp was caught by surprise. It came soon after they failed to make good on their threats to impeach the president. This is even more unlikely since he appointed new judges to the constitutional court. </p>
<p>The constitutional court is the institution empowered to proclaim the results of both the presidential and legislative ballots, and to judge the head of state and the prime minister if necessary. Its verdicts are final.
It is, therefore, a strategic institution in the control of power. In this context, the frustration of the Kabila camp is understandable. They suspect the newly appointed judges <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46712/drc-constitutional-court-fight-reveals-kabila-tshisekedi-struggle/">belong to Tshisekedi’s movement</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>If successful, the president’s consultation process would end the Kabila faction’s stranglehold on his government. He will be free to set up a new government – through a new parliamentary majority – in line with his own political agenda.</p>
<p>Now, the question is how to get this new parliamentary majority. In the labyrinth of Congolese politics, two possibilities seem to open to Tshisekedi: either to dissolve the parliament and call early parliamentary elections, or to create a new coalition with the participation of new partners from the current parliament. </p>
<p>Calling early elections seems unlikely for want of time and funding. The second option sounds more plausible as Tshisekedi is more likely to be supported by dissidents from the Kabila platform and other opposition leaders, including for example, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9tvaP9Upkc">Bahati Lukwebo</a>, <a href="https://www.financialafrik.com/2020/11/08/moise-katumbi-peu-bavard-apres-avoir-rencontre-felix-tshisekedi/">Moise Katumbi</a> and <a href="https://www.financialafrik.com/2020/11/04/jean-pierre-bemba-a-felix-tshisekedi-je-soutiens-ce-dialogue-entre-congolais/">Jean-Pierre Bemba</a>. The consequence would be that Kabila and his remaining supporters would be a minority in the parliament, and subsequently join the opposition. </p>
<p>If Tshisekedi wins this battle for a new parliamentary majority, he will have achieved a masterstroke. Meanwhile, the Congolese people are holding their collective breath.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Albert Kasanda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After endless, futile negotiations with the Kabila camp, Tshisekedi appears to have finally recognised the limits of the coalition government and has lost patience.Albert Kasanda, Researcher in Political Philosophy and social sciences, Center of Global studies, Institutes of Philosophy, Czech Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1277292019-11-28T12:39:53Z2019-11-28T12:39:53ZIs the Democratic Republic of Congo ready for peacekeepers to leave by 2022?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303711/original/file-20191126-112539-uva5nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Peacekeeper with the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An independent United Nations (UN) strategic review <a href="https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/11/consultations-on-the-independent-strategic-review-of-monusco.php">has recommended</a> that the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) complete a phased withdrawal by 2022. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Mats Berdal to give his insights into why this is happening and what the implications could be.</em></p>
<p><strong>Why is the peacekeeping operation coming to an end?</strong> </p>
<p>The UN Organisation Mission in the DRC started off as a small observer force in 1999. It was deployed by the UN Security Council to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in August 1999. At the time the hope was that this would mark the end of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/africa/drc.html">Second Congo War</a>. It did not. The war was also known as Africa’s World War because, at one stage, it pitted the government of President Laurent Kabila and allied troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia against the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, fronting for forces supported by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The war officially ended in 2003. </p>
<p>War and profound insecurity in the eastern part of DRC continued to be the norm after 1999, at a horrific cost to civilian populations. By one estimate, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2223004/">more than</a> 5 million people had died as a result of war and violence by 2008. </p>
<p>Continuing instability and violence led to a deepening of the UN’s involvement. The initial observer force grew in size. It’s now the UN’s largest field operation with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-massacre-idUSKBN0F828I20140703">overall strength</a> of about 20 000, including civilian staff. </p>
<p>Over time, it also came to assume a much more ambitious mandate. Changing its name to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC in 2010, the principal mandate of the mission became <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">two-fold</a>: the protection of civilians and the strengthening of state institutions in the DRC.</p>
<p>The Security Council first called for the withdrawal of the mission – or rather a transfer of responsibilities to the government and the UN country team – in 2015. Since then, every mandate renewal (every nine months) has involved calls for plans to be developed for its withdrawal. In March this year, the Security Council ordered an independent review of how exactly a phased, progressive and comprehensive exit strategy could happen. This <a href="https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/11/consultations-on-the-independent-strategic-review-of-monusco.php">was presented</a> to the Council in October.</p>
<p>The argument in favour of a progressive withdrawal has long been that the Congolese government, after years of UN involvement and three presidential elections, must now assume full “national ownership” of the peace and stabilisation process. </p>
<p>But this isn’t the only reason. At US$1.1 billion <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/after-strategic-review-what-should-be-done-monusco">per year</a>, the mission is an expensive peacekeeping operation, and member states have been anxious to cut costs. </p>
<p><strong>After 20 years on the ground, what did the UN mission achieve?</strong></p>
<p>The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission’s record of achievement in the DRC is mixed. </p>
<p>The independent strategic review <a href="https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/11/consultations-on-the-independent-strategic-review-of-monusco.php">noted</a> “significant peace gains” and that after 20 years of UN peacekeeping some two thirds of the country was “stable”. Presidential elections were also finally held in December 2018. After 18 years as president, Joseph Kabila stepped down and Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/23/congos-new-president-felix-tshisekedi-does-not-call-the-shots">was voted in</a> as President. This could mean a new political direction that would allow the country to move forward. </p>
<p>But, while a measure of stability has been brought to parts of country, intercommunal violence and internal displacement <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2019/776">are widespread</a> in Eastern DRC, connected in part to the struggle over control of natural resources. The number of armed groups in North and South Kivu is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-roadblocks-not-just-minerals-fund-rebels-and-conflict-in-the-congo-101124">well over</a> 100. </p>
<p>Human rights violations perpetrated by the Congolese Army also <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-un-reports-hundreds-human-rights-violations-security-situation">continue to be</a> a major problem. This reflects a larger failure, after numerous unsuccessful attempts, on the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC’s watch, to undertake meaningful reforms of the security sector. </p>
<p>The mission’s <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11513.doc.htm">programmes</a> in support of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups and the reform of rule of law institutions have fared little better. Critically, the drivers of conflict – specifically those related to issues of land tenure and the management of mining and natural resources – remain unaddressed. </p>
<p>Finally, although the recent presidential elections were relatively smooth, Tshisekedi’s position is weak. Loyalists of Kabila’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drc-is-president-tshisekedi-a-puppet-of-kabila/a-50171782">are firmly</a> ensconced in networks and positions of power, notably within the security sector.</p>
<p><strong>What could the implications of a withdrawal be?</strong></p>
<p>This all depends on the manner in which the withdrawal is organised and implemented. If it is rushed and doesn’t include a clear political strategy and regional diplomatic engagement, it will result in further instability and a recurring protection crises. </p>
<p>The independent strategic review, now before the Security Council, recognises many of the challenges ahead. But it appears overly sanguine about what can be achieved within a three-year period. Given the profound weakness of the Congolese State, especially the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/security-sector-reform-congo">failure to reform</a> the security sector, this timetable is likely to become an operational straitjacket and a potential source of instability. </p>
<p>While the political pressure with regard to timelines is understandable, transitions must be based on meeting realistic targets, not on calendar dates. Particular account must be taken of the indisputable risks to civilians of a precipitate withdrawal. This will likely increase insecurity and violence, especially in Eastern Congo. </p>
<p>Above all, the UN must intensify, rather than scale down, efforts to engage with the politics of post-election DRC. It should help the government build legitimate political institutions while harnessing regional, donor and diplomatic support for the consolidation of peace. All of this is likely to take more than three years. </p>
<p>Even if the UN peacekeeping presence is substantially reduced by 2022, it will be vital for the UN and the international community to remain engaged, in some form, in helping consolidate peace after the formal closing down of the mission.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127729/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mats Berdal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The independent strategic review, now before the Security Council, recognises many of the challenges ahead. But it appears overly sanguine about what can be achieved within a three-year period.Mats Berdal, Professor and Director of Conflict, Security and Development Research Group, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130982019-03-26T10:37:54Z2019-03-26T10:37:54ZDynasties still run the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265365/original/file-20190322-36252-1jpexuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Worldwide, 1 in 10 presidents and prime ministers has relatives who were already in politics. Europe and Latin America, both democratic regions, have the highest proportion of leaders who come from political families.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/three-characters-crowns-royal-ermine-mantles-1202595091">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Want to get into politics? It helps if you come from the right family.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/37977325/Blood_is_Thicker_than_Water_Family_Ties_to_Political_Power_Worldwide">Our study</a>, published in the journal <a href="https://www.jstor.org/journal/histsocres">Historical Social Research</a> in December 2018, shows that, on average, one in 10 world leaders comes from households with political ties. </p>
<p>We examined the backgrounds of 1,029 political executives – that is, presidents and prime ministers – in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America from 2000 to 2017. We found that 119, or 12 percent, of all world leaders <a href="https://www.gesis.org/hsr/abstr/43-4/03jalalzai-rincker/">belonged to a political family</a>. </p>
<p>Our study defined “political family” as having either a blood or marital tie to someone already involved in politics, whether as a judge, party official, bureaucrat, lawmaker, president or activist. </p>
<p>Notable examples include former U.S. President <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-12846098">George W. Bush</a>, Canadian Prime Minister <a href="https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ywj3kg/a-canadian-political-dynasty-emerges-as-justin-trudeau-ascends-to-power">Justin Trudeau</a> and the former Argentine President <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2007/07/ignore-the-press-cristina-kirchner-isn-t-argentina-s-hillary.html">Cristina Fernández de Kirchner</a>.</p>
<h2>Family connections matter worldwide</h2>
<p>Family political connections mattered in all the regions we studied, in monarchies and democracies, and in rich countries and poor ones. </p>
<p>Power is by nature inherited in monarchies. But even in democracies – where citizens may choose their leaders in <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019">free and fair elections</a> – belonging to a political family is a meaningful advantage. It gives candidates name recognition, some political experience and better access to allies and resources when running for office.</p>
<p>Bush and Trudeau, for example, were democratically elected executives who also had direct ties to that office, given that their fathers had previously served in the same role.</p>
<p>Technically, North America actually had the highest rate of leaders with family ties. Two of the eight presidents and prime ministers who served during the period of our study were related to past heads of state. However, since by our definition the region consists of only two countries – the U.S. and Canada – we set it aside during data analysis because it would skew overall results. </p>
<hr>
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<hr>
<p>With North America excluded, Europe topped the list of leaders from political families. In this region of <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/democracy">robust democracies</a>, 13 percent of European presidents and prime ministers between 2000 and 2017 came from political families – the same proportion as in Latin America. </p>
<p>Relatively few European leaders, however – just six of 54 – had ties to a previous president or prime minister. </p>
<p>Fully 11 of the 88 Latin American leaders who held office from 2000 to 2017 were related to other presidents. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Batlle-Jorge">Jorge Luís Batlle of Uruguay</a> had three different relatives who held the presidency before him.</p>
<p>Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest percentage of executives with family ties of any region we studied – just 9 percent. </p>
<p>When a sub-Saharan African president or prime minister did have family ties to politics, however, they were powerful and direct. Of the 29 African executives with family ties to politics, 18 – including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/world/africa/congo-kabila-tshisekedi-election.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FKabila%2C%20Joseph&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=collection">Joseph Kabila of Democratic Republic of the Congo</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21544245">Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta</a> – were related to former presidents or prime ministers. </p>
<p>Asian presidents and prime ministers were in the middle of the pack regarding political families, according to our study. Twenty-three of 204 Asian leaders covered by our study had family connections to politics. Over 75 percent were in nondemocracies like Bhutan, Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka.</p>
<h2>Women in political dynasties</h2>
<p>Our study also offers some interesting insights into how women worldwide get a foothold in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-no-such-thing-as-gender-equality-if-youre-a-woman-in-politics-71209">male-dominated business of politics</a>.</p>
<p>First off, very few do. Of the 1,029 political executives included in this study, just 66 were women. They included Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the late <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/obituaries/archives/benazir-bhutto">Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto</a>, Liberia’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2011/johnson_sirleaf/facts/">Ellen Johnson Sirleaf</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36028247">President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil</a>.</p>
<p>Women who do attain highest office are much more likely to belong to political families than their male counterparts. </p>
<p>Nineteen of the 66 female executives in our sample had familial connections to politics – 29 percent. One hundred of the 963 men we studied – just over 10 percent – had family ties.</p>
<p>This suggests that family ties are particularly important for women to get into politics. </p>
<p>In our analysis, the endorsement of a powerful male relative – himself preferably a former president or prime minister – meaningfully helps female politicians establish their credibility with voters and political insiders. </p>
<p>Family ties are helpful for men, too. But there are other well-trod paths to power.</p>
<h2>Political family ties start with men</h2>
<p>The female presidents and prime ministers who came from political families were, without exception, the first woman in their family to hold office. Their link to power was invariably a male relative, usually a father or husband.</p>
<p>Bhutto, who was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/world/asia/28bhuttocnd.html">assassinated in 2007</a>, came to power 14 years after her father, former President Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto, was assassinated. </p>
<p>Argentina’s Cristina Fernández <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2007/07/ignore-the-press-cristina-kirchner-isn-t-argentina-s-hillary.html">succeeded her husband</a>, Nestor Kirchner, as president of Argentina in 2007.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/26/world/from-a-symbol-to-a-leader-the-rise-of-corazon-aquino.html">Corazon Aquino</a>, who governed the Philippines from 1986 to 1992, won election after the ouster of the Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos, who was implicated in the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/assassination-of-benigno-aquino-jr-video">assassination of her husband</a>, Senator Benigno Aquino – also one of Marcos’ loudest critics.</p>
<p>Corazon’s power then benefited her son, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who was <a href="https://progressive.org/dispatches/oreign-correspondent-the-legacy-of-Ninoy-Aquino-Jr.-181005/">president of the Philippines from 2010 to 2016</a>.</p>
<p>This study certainly calls into question the notion that politics is only a meritocracy. </p>
<p>But consider this: 71 percent of all the female world leaders in our study attained highest office without any family connections to politics. That includes Croatia’s <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/kolinda-grabar-kitarovic/#5e3eba8b3843">Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic</a>, who is the daughter of butchers. She is the first woman ever to govern Croatia, which has been around since A.D. 879.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To reach the highest rungs of power, a new study shows, it really helps if your dad was president.Farida Jalalzai, Professor and Hannah Atkins Endowed Chair of Political Science, Oklahoma State UniversityMeg Rincker, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University NorthwestLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1138772019-03-24T09:34:08Z2019-03-24T09:34:08ZCollaboration or coalition? Tshisekedi’s tough choices as leader of the DRC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264900/original/file-20190320-93054-pq07lu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former DRC President Joseph Kabila congratulates President Felix Tshisekedi at his inauguration.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Hugh Kinsella Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been a little over a month since Felix Tshisekedi became the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) <a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedis-victory-in-the-drc-is-historic-but-controversial-109673">head of state</a>. </p>
<p>Protests that followed the presidential election seem to be dwindling. And internationally the African Union and Western countries, including France and Belgium, have <a href="https://africandailyvoice.com/en/2019/01/23/african-union-and-european-union-accepts-tshisekedi-presidency/">recognised his</a> takeover.</p>
<p>But Tshisekedi faces an uphill struggle to establish his legitimacy. The poll was contested by the platform that supported <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/martin-fayulu-drc-opposition-candidate-pick-181111204554772.html">Martin Fayulu</a> in the presidential election. The coalition, called <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/11/12/drc-opposition-coalition-picks-united-candidate-martin-fayulu/">Lamuka</a>, seems to have come round to accepting that it failed to win power. Fayulu is seeking to fit into the current political scheme. But it’s clear that he’s called on his supporters to remain vigilant to make sure Tshisekedi doesn’t renege on promises he’s made.</p>
<p>Other aspirant presidential candidates have also fallen into line. The political parties associated with Fayulu in the <a href="https://africatimes.com/tag/lamuka/">coalition</a> have made it clear that they recognise the current authority of the country. This includes the National Union of Federalists of the Congo party under the leadership of <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2019/03/11/actualite/politique/gabriel-kyungu-candidat-president-de-lassemblee-provinciale-du-haut">Gabriel Kyungu</a>, Mouvement social pour le renouveau under <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/4062/Pierre_Lumbi">Pierre Lumbi</a> and a wide range of members of Ensemble under <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/3488/Moise_Katumbi">Moïse Katumbi</a>. </p>
<p>The Catholic Church, which was first to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/10/drc-opposition-chief-wins-vote-as-rival-church-cry-foul">contest the result</a> of the poll, has also <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/six-drc-bishops-recognize-election-of-tshisekedi-as-president-69414">recognised</a> the new head of state.</p>
<p>All this suggests that the race for the presidential chair is over. The question now is to identify where the real power lies. And what capacity the new president has to run the country. The hard truth is that Tshisekedi can’t set up a government to fulfil his political project unless he takes one of two options - cohabitation or forming a coalition. </p>
<h2>A difficult and complex beginning</h2>
<p>For the first time, a peaceful and civilised handover of power took place in the country, between Joseph Kabila and Tshisekedi. But these stories are quiet about one fact: that the old regime remains firmly in place. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s power is being undermined by the outgoing regime in a number of ways. Firstly, Kabila loyalists were put in key positions to run essential state services. Examples include the army, police and intelligence services.</p>
<p>Secondly, Kabila’s cabal has made sure that it retains power through institutions like the national assembly and provincial governments. This is clear from the fact Tshisekedi has lower representation in the national assembly. </p>
<p>There are already signs of tension. One was Tshisekedi’s recent decision to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics/congo-suspends-seating-of-new-senators-following-disputed-election-idUSKCN1QZ20I?utm_source=Media+Review+for+March+19%2C+2019&utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+March+19%2C+2019&utm_medium=email">suspend</a> the process of installing senators and electing provincial governors, amid allegations of procedural irregularities and corruption. </p>
<p>Kabila’s camp considers these decisions a violation of the country’s laws, while Tshisekedi’s supporters view his decision as part of the president’s duty as the guarantor of the constitution and stability of the republic.</p>
<h2>Difficult choices</h2>
<p>The option of cohabitation would see him poach members of the <a href="https://7sur7.cd/tout-savoir-sur-le-front-commun-pour-le-congo-fcc-ses-membres-et-ses-objectifs/">Common Front for Congo</a>, which has the largest number of parliamentarians.</p>
<p>This approach would be interesting because it would allow him to infiltrate the majority parliamentary group and get it to support his political project as head of state. </p>
<p>If that doesn’t work, he’d be forced to form a coalition with other minority parties to counterbalance the weight of Common Front for Congo. This option is rather complicated because he would have a weak hold on both the parliament and the government. He would be a president without power. In other words a puppet.</p>
<p>Yet another option is to form an alliance with Common Front for Congo. If this happens, some thorny questions will be raised about the control of the parliamentary leadership. For example, who would lead such a coalition – Kabila, who holds the the moral authority of the Front Commun pour le Congo, or Tshisekedi? </p>
<p>Another tricky question would be which political programmes or projects should be given precedence. </p>
<p>And lastly, will it be possible to take the country in a new direction while there’s a continued reliance on people who for almost 18 years plundered the country?</p>
<h2>To eat with the devil, you need a long fork</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi doesn’t seem to have many options to set up his first government as head of state. Initially, he will probably have to deal with the current parliamentary majority which is held by Kabila’s supporters, the Common Front for Congo. </p>
<p>Hopefully, he can reshape it during his term in power. In the meantime, he should not lose sight of the popular wisdom that eating with the devil requires a long fork. Despite the apparent cordiality between himself and Kabila, he should not forget that the former head of state remains a political opponent. </p>
<p>If, following Nelson Mandela’s example after his release from prison, Tshisekedi calls all Congolese to reconcile and to work together for the good of the nation, he must not lose sight of the need for justice (for all) as the basis of the rule of law. </p>
<p>Only then will he be able to claim an alternative rule and new perspectives for the Congolese people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Albert Kasanda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Democratic Republic of Congo’s new leader Felix Tshisekedi is being undermined by the outgoing regime of Joseph Kabila.Albert Kasanda, Researcher in Political Philosophy and social sciences, Czech Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101222019-01-28T13:33:56Z2019-01-28T13:33:56ZDRC musicians, patronage networks and the possibility of change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255105/original/file-20190123-135148-glbkmy.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lexxus Legal is a hip-hop artist and at the forefront of the activist movement in the DRC.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/lexxuslegal/photos/a.10152059106112445/10156225003507445/?type=3&theater">Facebook</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Popular musicians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), like many of their compatriots, have often been forced to depend on political patronage networks for their livelihoods. It dates back to colonial times, but has lived on through the country’s nearly six decades of independence.</p>
<p>The nature of the networks may not change after <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/felix-tshisekedi-is-sworn-in-as-congolese-president-11548356987">the inauguration</a> of Félix Tshisekedi as president. That question depends largely on whether or not Tshisekedi is able to take control of the most strategic appointments in the federal bureaucracy and security services. If he does – and it’s a big if – musicians will be faced with a rare moment in their history: a substantial change in the shape of the DRC’s patronage networks. </p>
<p>There have only been three such changes. The first, from the colonial era under the Belgians to the short period of instability after independence in 1960 marked by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassination</a> of Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Next was to the long period of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ll2z5">Mobutu Sese Seko’s</a> dictatorship from 1965 to 1997. This was followed by the establishment of new networks of patronage by the Kabila family until today.</p>
<p>These latest networks may yet endure if the Kabila family remains in <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/10/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">effective control</a> through a cohabitation arrangement with a Tshisekedi presidency. Either way Congolese musicians are likely to be faced with the same invidious choice: accept the patronage of the powers that be, or face the consequences. </p>
<p>Under the Belgians and Mobutu the choice was stark: toe the line if you want to make a living as a professional musician. Conformity determined access to government controlled media and public space. As Congolese soukous musician <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/kanda-bongo-man-mn0000303409/biography">Kanda Bongo Man</a> told me, in Nigeria <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/fela-kuti-mn0000138833">Fela Kuti</a> might openly protest and survive, but under Mobutu he and his family would be tortured, murdered and thrown from a helicopter into the Congo river. </p>
<p>That control has loosened under the Kabilas. But it has by <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-12-10-anti-govt-rapper-abducted-as-dr-congo-vote-tensions-rise/">no means disappeared</a>.</p>
<h2>The colonial period</h2>
<p>After the Second World War Greek and Jewish entrepreneurs, who were outsiders to the Belgium political establishment, were the first to invest in music. They imported rudimentary recording facilities, public address systems, guitars, drums and brass instruments. </p>
<p>They also used their family networks of shops across Africa to sell records elsewhere on the continent. This partly explains how the beautiful and popular music of Leopoldville (the capital of the Belgian colony of Congo, before it was renamed Kinshasa in 1966) and Brazzaville across the Congo River, spread through the colony as well as the continent.</p>
<p>Tanzanian musician <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/remmy-ongala-mn0000190008">Remmy Ongala</a>, who has been part of the Congolese soukous scene since the 1980s, told me in a 2002 interview that he first heard the popular music of the Congolese capital performed in the third largest city Kisangani during colonial times. </p>
<p>It was the Belgian government that paid the transport and provided the public space for the Greek owned company Ngoma to promote their young stars Wendo and Bowane.</p>
<h2>Mobutu’s way of doing things</h2>
<p>Mobutu introduced the cultural policy of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10464883.2014.937235?mobileUi=0"><em>authenticité</em></a>, which was aimed at combating a colonial mentality denigrating African culture and language and casting it as inferior to Europes. In practice, however, it was harnessed to building Mobutu’s personality cult.</p>
<p>The dominance in cultural life of the <em>Mouvement Populaire de La Révolution</em> the political party <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Political-process#ref467764">he founded</a>, was implemented in ways that mimicked the kind of imposition formerly associated with the colonial authorities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/congolese-musicians-rarely-provide-a-critique-but-continue-to-provide-solace-80201">Congolese musicians rarely provide a critique, but continue to provide solace</a>
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<p>His favoured bands, especially <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/tpok-jazz-mn0000955002">TPOK Jazz</a>, benefited the most, and were given both direct patronage and control of the nationalised record plant as part of “Zaireanisation”. The band’s leader Franco Luambo Makiadi was a member of Mobutu’s party. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_k349KCe0qY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Franco’s song ‘Tailleur’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8300170.stm">King of Rumba</a>, as Franco was known, is also famous for composing metaphorically ambiguous songs. One of the most celebrated is <em>Tailleur</em> that’s about an unnamed tailor and an unnamed owner of his needle that captures the nature of patronage networks:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>How is the tailor going to operate if the owner of the needle takes it away?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>During the Mobutu era Congolese musicians created a musical genre that came to known as Rumba. Very little, if any, “resistance” Rumba was composed. As part of <em>authenticité</em>, Mobutu demanded that popular music turn to indigenous influences and languages for inspiration. </p>
<p>Franco responded enthusiastically deepening his relationship with those sources and composing songs in KiKongo. But Lingala, the language of the capital and of the <em>force publique</em> under the Belgians remained the national language of power, government and the army under Mobutu. Despite the “authenticity” policy Lingala remained the predominant language of popular song even for Franco. </p>
<p>This may help explain why the most outspoken musical critics of the corruption and violence in Congolese politics has still not come from the Lingala speaking capital , with some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/28/political-soundtrack-drc-uneasy-mix-of-music-and-power-elections-congo">notable exceptions</a> such as Lexxus Legal, but from the east of the vast country, and is expressed in Swahili rather than Lingala.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drcs-flawed-election-means-for-emerging-democratic-culture-in-africa-109410">DRC protest music</a> , is mainly expressed in East African <a href="http://afropop.org/audio-programs/congo-goma-music-conflict-and-ngos">versions</a> hip-hop, particularly from Goma. Musically it is more derivative than Rumba, being heavily indebted to US hip-hop. The protest is not against the power of the US culture industries but against violence, and the lies that foster violence.</p>
<h2>Dependent musicians</h2>
<p>The 1990s was a decade of change. Late in the decade there was a general weakening of state institutions in the post-Mobutu era with no sign of a return to secure government sponsorship for musicians or of regular salaries for public servants.</p>
<p>Another dramatic shift was that musicians became more dependent on live performance and transient commercial and political sponsorship with the advent of cheap cassette tapes and even cheaper digital recording technology.</p>
<p>This intertwining of the market, state and society has continued to see itself expressed through music in the DRC. A well-loved dance of 2005, <em>Kisanola</em>, (literally meaning a comb) is associated with the moment when one of the country’s best-known stars, Werrason, shifted commercial allegiance from one beer brand, Skol, to its popular rival Primus, with lucrative consequences for Werrason. </p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Werrason’s dancers doing the ‘Kisanola’ dance.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Werrason’s election poster.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the <em>Kisanola</em> dance, also involves a movement representing the shaving of one’s hair to the bone – a metaphor for how people in the DRC have had everything taken from them. </p>
<p>In the past commercial imperatives and political censoring have not entirely prevented challenging songs slipping through the net. Remmy Ongala told me how even Wendo in the 1950s, under the patronage of the Belgian colonists, sang songs he and his Congolese audience understood as a call for independence and as a challenge to the colonial regime:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>one fine day this country will change, you will see it yourselves. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is a call that remains tragically resonant today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Salter received funding from the ESRC for his PhD on the spread of Congolese popular music in Africa</span></em></p>The intertwining of the market, state and society has continued to see itself expressed through music in the DRC.Thomas Salter, Musician, Academic, Consultant, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101022019-01-19T08:10:10Z2019-01-19T08:10:10ZMaking sense of the DRC’s struggle for democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254572/original/file-20190119-100295-nkyqg9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Citizens movements are now more powerful than conventional political parties in the DRC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Hugh KinsellaI Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On January 10, amid much controversy, the national electoral commission announced that Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/congo-riot-police-deploy-at-electoral-commission-ahead-of-vote-result-idUSKCN1P30RO?il=0">had won</a> the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) presidential poll. Prior to this, unofficial voting results leaked to diplomats and the press suggested Martin Fayulu had won. </p>
<p>Days later, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">compelling evidence</a> emerged that Fayulu had won by a sound majority. The evidence was based on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">rigorous analysis of voting results</a> provided by the Catholic church’s network of observers and by voter tallies in the electoral commission’s database. This was followed by the country’s Constitutional Court ruling that Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drc-calm-after-court-upholds-election-win-of-tshisekedi-20190120">had won</a>. Fayulu immediately rejected the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/20/fayulu-rejects-court-ruling-declaring-tshisekedi-as-drc-president">court’s judgment</a>.</p>
<p>In our view, confidence in democracy in the country will be built through incremental steps. Understanding the complicated dynamics at work now will solidify the foundation in the future.</p>
<p>One important factor to bear in mind is that <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/in-democratic-republic-of-congo-activists-face-uphill-struggle-1.803860">citizens’ movements</a> in the DRC are now more powerful than conventional political parties. They anticipated political and strategic issues and assisted political parties in raising public awareness in the run up to the elections. </p>
<p>Also, the fact that during the 18-year struggle against outgoing leader Joseph Kabila several opposition leaders were bought by the regime further weakened political parties. Organisations in civil society didn’t fall into this trap. The revival of <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180708-rdc-comite-laic-coordination-actions-mois-aout-ceni-joseph-kabila">civic engagement by the Comité laïc de coordination</a>, a secular structure led by Catholic activists to demand Kabila respect the constitution and organise elections, was a lifeline for struggling political parties.</p>
<p>Civic engagement during the past decade has cultivated a demanding citizenry in the country. This is evident in the extent of the collective rage against any manipulation of the election’s results. This represents a qualitative shift from previous elections. The fact that voting was closely observed, and results reported, represents considerable courage in the face of violence and intimidation.</p>
<h2>Pre-election deal making</h2>
<p>Months before the election, the political opposition was divided and without a clear consensus or strategy. In November 2018 seven opposition members agreed to attend a meeting in Geneva <a href="https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/mediation-and-crisis-resolution/meeting-of-congolese-drc-opposition-leaders-in-geneva-faq/">hosted by the Kofi Annan Foundation</a> to discuss backing a single candidate. They hoped this would ensure the defeat of Kabila’s chosen successor, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3900/Emmanuel_Ramazani_Shadary">Emmanuel Shadary</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">DRC President Joseph Kabila’s chosen successor Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stefan Kleinowitz</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Several rounds of voting were necessary <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/665388/politique/rdc-comment-lopposition-a-saborde-laccord-de-geneve-pour-un-candidat-commun/">to reach a fragile agreement</a> over days of fraught deliberations. The agreement was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vl81X1kygCY">contingent</a> on the promise of holding free and fair elections, with a full field of candidates, within two years. Whoever became president under such circumstances would be in debt to the coalition that put him in power and seen as a transitional figure. </p>
<p>The fact that Fayulu, a businessman-turned-politician, was chosen – rather than leaders of the two largest political parties – sowed division among the opposition. Tshisekedi, who leads the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, and Kamerhe, leader of the Union for the Congolese Nation, later withdrew their pledge to support Fayulu. </p>
<p>This was <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/27434/katumbi-bemba-muzito-matungulu-tout-pour-fayulu/">seen by some as a betrayal</a> and by others as a means of escaping from what the local press referred to as <a href="https://congosynthese.com/laccord-mort-ne-de-geneve-un-marche-de-dupes/laccord-mort-ne-de-geneve-un-marche-de-dupes-2/">“un marché de dupes”</a>, or a trap.</p>
<p>Understanding why Fayulu was chosen must include considering who <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/27434/katumbi-bemba-muzito-matungulu-tout-pour-fayulu/">stands to benefit</a> if he does indeed take office. </p>
<p>There are visible business interests and political actors supporting him. But given the complex coalition-building that made him into a national candidate it’s difficult to discern what role other interests may be playing. </p>
<p>The Congolese people and citizens groups are committed to creating the necessary conditions for unfettered democracy, so that Congolese people can benefit from their country’s wealth. This means electing leaders who aren’t beholden to corrupt businessmen, inside or outside the country.</p>
<h2>The top three</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/martin-fayulu-drc-opposition-candidate-pick-181111204554772.html">Fayulu</a> studied in France and the US. He worked for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/martin-fayulu-drc-opposition-candidate-pick-181111204554772.html">ExxonMobil from 1984 to 2003 before becoming a member of parliament</a>. </p>
<p>It’s possible to see Fayulu as a political and strategic place-holder, more than a viable stand-alone candidate for president. He was active in the anti-Kabila opposition movement and a member of parliament. But before Geneva, few would’ve bet on him becoming president. He was an outsider without national popularity or many followers. </p>
<p>In practical terms, he’s the national face of <a href="https://africatimes.com/2018/11/11/congolese-opposition-names-fayulu-as-coalition-candidate/">Lamuka (“wake up” in Lingala and Swahili), the opposition coalition supporting him</a>. This coalition formed a strategic alliance and campaigned across the country.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1017&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1017&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1017&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Felix Tshisekedi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stefan Kleinowitz</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3970/F%C3%A9lix_Antoine_Tshisekedi">Tshisekedi</a> is a completely different political persona. The son of <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3522/%C3%89tienne_Tshisekedi_wa_Mulumba">Étienne Tshisekedi, the popular opposition leader</a>, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-tshisekedi-newsmaker/congos-president-elect-steps-out-of-fathers-shadow-but-doubts-persist-idUSKCN1P42AO">took over the leadership of his father’s party</a> the Union for Democracy and Social Progress in 2018 <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180331-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-elu-tete-udps-candidat-presidentielle">after Étienne passed away</a>. </p>
<p>The son was considered a favourite in the presidential election from the outset due to both his party’s struggle for democracy since 1982 and its popularity. But some members of the opposition are disappointed with him and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-tshisekedi-newsmaker/congos-president-elect-steps-out-of-fathers-shadow-but-doubts-persist-idUSKCN1P42AO">feel he doesn’t compare favourably to his father</a>. </p>
<p>Others feel that he belongs to a new generation and has learned from his father’s mistakes. Although he hadn’t collaborated with Kabila’s regime in the past, it has been reported that he likely <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-congos-election-is-headed-for-a-chaotic-outcome/2019/01/10/77014fca-14c3-11e9-ab79-30cd4f7926f2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c1c3b8ca4fff">made a deal with Kabila</a> to assume power. The two key concessions he’s reported to have made were assuring Kabila immunity from prosecution and allowing him to retain extensive power <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12538/Data_leak_exposes_plot_to_steal_presidential_vote">over mining and security</a>.</p>
<p>For his part, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3252/Vital_Kamerhe">Kamerhe</a> isn’t an exception in the Congo. He behaves like many politicians do: an informed opportunist who is always ready to help when needed for some profit in return. </p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The opposition must avoid a stand-off framed as Tshisekedi against Fayulu. This would simply open the way for Kabila to step forward as the steady hand that stays in power to make peace.</p>
<p>Those who support democracy in the DRC should insist the true outcome of the election, regardless of who won, be respected. This includes Tshisekedi and Kamerhe who, in theory, have nothing to hide.</p>
<p><em>Professor Albert Kasanda contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phyllis Taoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Confidence in democracy in the DRC will be built through incremental steps.Phyllis Taoua, Professor of Francophone Studies (Africa, Caribbean), Faculty Affiliate with Africana Studies, World Literature Program and Human Rights Pracice, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1094422019-01-08T12:45:29Z2019-01-08T12:45:29ZThe DRC’s election was flawed. But it still offers signs of hope<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252817/original/file-20190108-32124-cvialf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the DRC's opposition candidate, Felix Tshisekedi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stefan Kleinnowitz</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent presidential election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been over two years in the making. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46639103">Postponed twice</a> by the ruling coalition, the Common Front for the Congo, problems persisted even after a date was set. Nevertheless, the presidential elections finally went ahead in late December.</p>
<p>There were a number of candidates vying to become the president of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country. The three most important were Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, from the governing Common Front for the Congo. He represented <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46447089">continuity with the Kabila regime</a>. Martin Fayulu was also a very important opposition figure. He was chosen by the major opposition candidates after a meeting in Geneva in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181111-drc-congo-opposition-picks-presidential-candidate-martin-fayalu">early November 2018</a>. </p>
<p>Lastly there was Félix Tshisekedi, leader of one of the Congo’s oldest opposition parties, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, who had reneged on the Geneva agreement. He claimed that his supporters wanted him to run <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46507814">for president on his own</a>.</p>
<p>In a brave and unforeseen move, the Episcopal Centre of the Congo – a mainly Catholic Church based organisation – has claimed that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/dr-congo-election-results-delayed-ballots-trickle-190103054329276.html">Martin Fayulu has won the poll</a>. Should Fayulu be announced the winner, it will mean a seismic shift in Congolese politics.</p>
<p>But the final results have yet to be declared. The electoral commission had provisionally said it would <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2019/01/06/actualite/politique/elections-2018-la-ceni-annonce-officiellement-le-report-de-la">publish the results on January 6</a>. But, it didn’t, <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/contenu/ticker/elections-rdc-pas-publication-resultats-provisoires-avant-semaine-prochaine-ceni?ref=tw_i">citing technical difficulties</a>. The Episcopal centre has also said that it would challenge the governing Common Front for the Congo and the electoral commission if the commission gets the result wrong. Based on rumours circulating in the capital Kinshasha, this presumably means if Fayulu is not declared the winner.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the government has shut down the internet to stop the opposition mobilising.</p>
<p>Aside from the self-evident problems that have plagued the election so far, there are signs of hope. First, it will not be easy for the ruling Common Front for the Congo to distort the results in its favour. And the fact that Episcopal Centre of the Congo was able to monitor the poll with such precision – as the close eye the international community has kept on it – has weakened the regime. </p>
<p>In Burundi the President Pierre Nkurunziza, was able <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/world/africa/burundi-president-surviving-coup-warns-of-a-threat-from-shabab.html">to purge those who opposed his seeking of an unconstitutional third term in 2015</a>. The Common Front for the Congo didn’t have the resources to prosecute repression to this extent. </p>
<p>Secondly, if Fayulu has won the election, then the opposition have done very well indeed. Few believed the opposition would be able to unite coherently against the ruling party. But it seems to have done so, despite Tshisekedi splitting off late last year. </p>
<p>While future splits and disagreements will almost certainly occur, the DRC has proved the exception to the rule in a year in which opposition <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/editorial/East-Africa-stunted-political-culture/434752-4783260-u7b4lv/index.html">parties have fared badly across East and Central Africa</a>. </p>
<h2>Problems with the polling</h2>
<p>The presidential polls were marred by a number of problems and irregularities.</p>
<p>First, around 17% of the voting machines that had been imported from South Korea <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/s-korean-voting-machines-at-center-of-drc-election-dispute/4636556.html">failed to up and running on time</a> for the voting.</p>
<p>The machines were brought in with a view to making the voting more accurate. But many of them ended up disenfranchising a large proportion of the Congolese people.</p>
<p>The elections were also hit by <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2018-12-30/voters-go-to-polls-in-dr-congo-presidential-election/">the bad weather</a>. Large parts of Kinshasa were under several feet of water, thanks to the heavy rain. The flooding meant that turnout in many polling stations, even if the voting machines were on, was poor.</p>
<p>Thirdly, while reports of voter intimidation were relatively rare, they were still a factor in the elections. Voters in North Kivu, for example, complained about militias being present in the polling stations and getting them to vote for <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">specific candidates</a>. In Mutongo, for example, Congolese army soldiers were dispatched to force people to vote for Shadary, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">governing Common Front for the Congo candidate</a>.</p>
<p>Fifthly, many polling stations did not open on time, meaning a significant number of voters had to wait hours to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">cast their ballot</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, many of the voters - who had battled through floods, braved militia and waited patiently for the voter machines to work - found that their names were not on the voter rolls. The reasons why they were not actually able to vote, despite registering at the appropriate time, remains unclear.</p>
<h2>Debated results</h2>
<p>There were a number of institutions monitoring the election. These included the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and CENCO.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/topics/province-de-leglise-anglicane-du-congo">Episcopal Centre of the Congo</a> was viewed as one of the more impartial observers of the elections. It had enough staff, around 40,000, to monitor most of the polling booths in the country.</p>
<p>The centre made sure to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46747352">highlight many of the problems with the elections</a>.</p>
<p>Bizarrely, the governing Common Front for the Congo were taking their own tally of the votes, alongside that of the electoral commission, the <a href="https://www.ceni.cd/">Independent National Electoral Commission (DRC)</a>. While election tallies are often counted by state institutions, it is very unusual for parties within states to run a parallel count of elections. </p>
<h2>Big job ahead</h2>
<p>The Kabila family, including the present President, Joseph Kabila, and his father, Laurent Kabila, have ruled the DRC since 1997. It remains to be seen if they will voluntarily relinquish power despite what looks certain to be electoral defeat. </p>
<p>The DRC operates by way of a semi-presidential system in which the president choses the Prime Minister. As the highest ranking politician, the constitution confers a great deal of power on the President not least in their rule over internal security, the armed forces and foreign policy. A lot of power is therefore invested in the DRC’s central executive branch. </p>
<p>But whoever takes over once the election is finally decided will inherit a country that still contains large enclaves of unrest, poverty and underdevelopment. The tasks facing any future president of the DRC is enormous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy. He is affiliated with the Labour Party. </span></em></p>The DRC could be the exception after a year in which opposition parties fared badly across East and Central Africa.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1094102019-01-07T08:04:54Z2019-01-07T08:04:54ZWhat DRC’s flawed election means for emerging democratic culture in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252573/original/file-20190106-32121-t0q79n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some in the DRC identify opposition leader Martin Fayulu as the winner but official results have yet to be released.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/ STEFAN KLEINOWITZ</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On December 30, 2018, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/drc-election-polls-open-long-delayed-vote-181230055430093.html">46 million citizens cast their votes</a> in a historic election in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There hasn’t been a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">peaceful transition of power</a> in this country since the end of Belgian rule in 1960. If this election produces a result that’s widely viewed as credible, it will cement a new era of representative government in Africa. </p>
<p>The deferral of representative government in the DRC has a long history. After the Berlin Conference (1884-85), Belgium acquired the Congo as a colonial territory and, from Léopold II to King Baudoin I, Belgian administrators oversaw one of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/21/arts/belgium-confronts-its-heart-darkness-unsavory-colonial-behavior-congo-will-be.html">most brutal regimes</a> on the continent. In 1960, Patrice Lumumba became the first prime minister, sharing power with Joseph Kasa-Vubu as president. A confluence of internal and external factors unleashed a crisis that led to <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/792-the-assassination-of-lumumba">Lumumba’s assassination</a> in 1961 and Mobutu Sese Seko’s rise to power in 1965. With the support of Western nations, Mobutu <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/legacy-of-corrupt-and-ruthless-dictator-who-built-versailles-in-the-jungle-1259907.html">presided over the looting</a> of his country’s natural wealth as one of the most tenacious gatekeeping dictators of the 20th century. He clung to power for more than 30 years.</p>
<p>In 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Laurent-Kabila">took over as president</a> in the midst of conflict that spilled over from the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Assassinated by his bodyguard in 2001, Kabila was succeeded by his son Joseph who has been in office ever since. Violent protests followed rigged elections in 2006 and 2011.</p>
<p>The quiet work of pro-democracy activism has been ongoing in the Congo since 2012 and the process of cultivating a demanding citizenry is visibly yielding results. A recent example was when <a href="https://www.politico.cd/encontinu/2019/01/04/rdc-21-organisations-appellent-la-population-a-se-tenir-pret-a-defendre-sa-victoire.html?fbclid=IwAR3zEWDfhiX-rUzuwE8td2WZpy6IukVSJ7jxnRyc9bmjjJDyIMAtOsc1YwE">21 civic organisations mobilised</a>, vowing to use non-violent protest to defend the outcome of the election. </p>
<p>There can be little doubt that a paradigm shift of historic importance is underway.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/05/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">Widespread irregularities have been documented</a> in the recent election despite the presence of 40,000 observers. Nonetheless, preliminary reports by the powerful Catholic church with direct knowledge of the process, claim that one presidential candidate has clearly won. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/world/africa/fayulu-congo-presidential-vote-catholic.html">Diplomatic sources</a> identify the winner as Martin Fayulu.</p>
<p>Once results started to come in on December 31, confirming Fayulu’s overwhelming victory, the government <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/drc-state-says-it-cut-internet-avoid-uprising-after-vote">shut down</a> the Internet, Radio France Internationale’s FM broadcasting signal, and cell phone service across the country. Many believe Kabila’s attempt to fix the election in favour of his handpicked successor, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, didn’t work. They interpret the information blackout as stalling and censorship, rather than a means of avoiding false news as alleged.</p>
<p>As the world waits amid growing international pressure for the national electoral commission to make official the results, it’s already possible to see that significant change has come to the Congo.</p>
<p>Massive voter turnout under very difficult circumstances is compelling evidence of the people’s commitment to a democratic transition, even though the process was far from perfect. </p>
<h2>Wave of progressive political change</h2>
<p>Recent civic engagement in the DRC has emerged as part of a pan-African trend. In 2012, students in Goma founded La <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/lucha-youth-movement-congo-demands-social-justice">LUCHA, shorthand for “struggle for change.”</a> La LUCHA is a non-partisan citizen movement with as many as 3,000 activists who engage in non-violent campaigns to raise awareness of human rights and cultivate a demanding citizenry.</p>
<p>Another citizen’s movement is <a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/democratic-republic-congo-heavy-repression-pro-democracy-youth-civil-society">Filimbi</a>, which means “blow of the whistle” in Swahili.</p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.unric.org/en/right-to-participation/28099-the-movement-yen-a-marre-weve-had-enough">rappers and journalists in Senegal founded Y’en a marre (“We are fed up”)</a>. They protested against unreliable electricity and corruption, registered young voters and <a href="https://theconversation.com/senegals-rappers-continue-to-cry-from-the-heart-for-a-more-just-society-91263">ousted Abdoulaye Wade</a>. In 2013, hip-hop artist, Smockey Bambara, and reggae artist, Sams’K le Jah, joined forces in Burkina Faso to create <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2014/10/the-citizens-of-burkina-faso/">Balai Citoyen (“Citizen’s Broom”)</a>. They led an uprising that evicted Blaise Compaoré after 27 years and then swept the streets as a symbolic gesture of civic engagement <a href="http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2014/12/09/citizens-revolt-in-burkina-faso/">inspired by Thomas Sankara</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015 and 2016, massive mobilisation in the DRC, supported by activists from Senegal and Burkina Faso, put pressure on Kabila, <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/05/31/lucha-continua-the-youth-movement-striking-fear-into-congos-elite/">who ultimately decided not to cling to power</a>. A coalition in the DRC formed the <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151220-rdc-front-citoyen-2016-barrer-route-kabila-mandat-constitution">“2016 Citizen’s Front,”</a> including Filimbi, la LUCHA, Katumbi, Fayulu calling for Kabila to respect the Constitution.</p>
<p>In 2016, la LUCHA <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/05/musician-angelique-kidjo-and-african-youth-activists-honoured-with-amnesty-international-award/">shared</a> Amnesty International’s Ambassadors of Conscience Award with Angelique Kidjio, Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen.</p>
<h2>Breaking a cycle of violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/drc-opposition-picks-martin-fayulu-presidential-candidate-181111173349147.html">Fayulu</a> is an anti-corruption reform candidate. He ran on a platform promising to restore dignity, to invest in education and to enforce the rule of law. Educated in France and the US, he was an executive at Exxon Mobile before being elected to Parliament in 2006.</p>
<p>Fayulu has said he’ll create jobs in agriculture, tourism and develop local expertise to add value to the Congo’s natural resources. He was backed by an opposition coalition and supported by two powerful figures: Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former warlord, and Moïse Katumbi, a wealthy businessman from Katanga.</p>
<p>If Fayulu becomes president, the cycles of violence that brought dictators to power will have finally come to an end. There’s no disputing that Kabila’s regime did use violence to intimidate citizens during the election process. But it doesn’t appear to have completely undermined the process.</p>
<p>To be sure, some observers will dismiss the election as late, flawed and a chaotic mess. Doubtless more remains to be done to guarantee the integrity of future elections. And whoever wins will have much to do to recover from decades of corrosive violence and autocratic rule.</p>
<p>Yet it’s also possible to look at this election as evidence of the people’s commitment to democracy, even when the process is messy. The fact is that this election – and its promise for the future – adds to a wave of progressive political change across Africa led by students, musicians, journalists and activist citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phyllis Taoua was a Tucson Public Voices Fellow with the Op-Ed Project. She is the author of African Freedom: How Africa Responded to Independence (Cambridge University Press, 2018).</span></em></p>The recent poll in the DRC was messy. Nevertheless, it showed that significant change is underway in the country.Phyllis Taoua, Professor of Francophone Studies (Africa, Caribbean), Faculty Affiliate with Africana Studies, World Literature Program and Human Rights Pracice, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/992202018-07-03T15:20:59Z2018-07-03T15:20:59ZDRC faces upsurge of violence unless a deal is done with Kabila<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225890/original/file-20180703-116152-zmz6ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Kabila’s time in government has shown an inability to bring together the various ethnic groups. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Kappeler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears">fresh wave of civil unrest</a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the international community must question its confidence in President Joseph Kabila to achieve stability in a turbulent region. He has been at the helm since he took over as president in 2001 after his father, Laurent, was assassinated. The young Kabila ruled for a transitional period until 2006, before winning two elections. </p>
<p>He is now in his seventh year of what should have been just five years of his second term and is constitutionally barred from standing again. But he has remained in office after his mandate ended in late 2016. This, as the country awaits a long-delayed election. The delay has sparked deadly protests. </p>
<p>While Kabila cannot legally stand for a third term, the <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/06/05/drc-opposition-enraged-as-pro-kabila-campaign-clip-appears-on-social-media//">opposition is concerned that he might</a>. Fears among opposition and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-20/court-shakeup-fuels-fears-that-congo-s-leader-plans-another-term">church leaders</a> have been further fuelled by Kabila’s appointment of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-20/court-shakeup-fuels-fears-that-congo-s-leader-plans-another-term">three new judges</a> to the constitutional court. Two are well-known allies. </p>
<p>But Kabila has no legitimacy and his authority is disintegrating. If the elections are delayed again there’s a real possibility that central Africa will slide into violent conflict once again. The armed violence is likely to be bloodier than in the past due to the number of fragmented localised groups aiming to grab their slice in one of the world’s most resource-rich countries.</p>
<p>If the international community wants to avoid another major armed conflict on the African content – in addition to the outstanding conflicts in Libya, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan – urgent action is needed to negotiate with Kabila for his own peaceful exit before the country slides back into full-scale armed conflict. </p>
<h2>Deteriorating situation</h2>
<p>In the wake of Kabila’s refusal to cede power, the security situation has deteriorated. At least 10 of Congo’s 26 provinces are in the grip of armed <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/15/congos-war-was-bloody.-it-may-be-about-to-start-again">conflict</a>. This has forced over two million people to flee their homes, 800,000 of them children. The total number of internally displaced people is <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/unicef-drc-humanitarian-situation-report-april-2018">estimated to be 4.5 million</a> while refugees are flocking into Uganda, Tanzania, Angola and Zambia. </p>
<p>The security situation in the DRC is dire. As the violence in Kasai and eastern parts of the <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/07/31/briefing-conflict-kasai-drc">country intensifies</a>, escalating conflict in south eastern Congo looks set to continue. </p>
<p>More than <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Landscape-of-Armed-Groups-in-Eastern-Congo1.pdf">70 rebel groups</a> are estimated to be <a href="http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory">operating</a> in the country. They are all variously involved in skirmishes with the army or, more commonly, prey on civilians. This in turn creates a tangle of ethnic and tribal grievances for warlords to exploit.</p>
<p>In 2012, the M23 rebel <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739">movement</a> briefly took the city of Goma. They were eventually thrown out by the Congolese army, supported by the UN. But the current violence in Kasai is threatening to overshadow even that disaster. In August 2017, for example, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drc-opposition-mounts-dead-city-protest-against-kabila-20170808">“dead city” movements</a> ensured that significant parts of the country’s urban population went on strike.</p>
<p>Some reports have suggested that more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/keeping-watch-kasai-congo">3,000 people</a> have been killed since the start of 2017. More than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/over-33000-refugees-fled-violence-dr-congo-angola-people-need-helps-water-sanitation">33,000</a> Kasai residents have fled <a href="http://www.msf.org/en/article/angola-people-camp-had-one-goal-stay-alive">into Angola</a>. It has been suggested that the <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/kamwina-nsapu-rebels-drc-un-investigators-589469">Bana Mura</a> - a government sponsored militia - was behind the violence. </p>
<p>Last year major fighting <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/10/59eefe3e4/unhcr-warns-worsening-displacement-democratic-republic-congo.html">occurred</a> between Twa and Bantu populations in Tanganyika province. And as the year entered its last quarter, Uvira, on the outskirts of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence/congo-naval-boats-battle-rebels-on-lake-tanganyika-idUSKCN1C31DJ">Lake Tanganyika</a>, was the site for fighting between the rebel Yakutumba militia and government forces. Government forces fled and the rebels would have taken the city had they not been <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/15/congos-war-was-bloody.-it-may-be-about-to-start-again">repulsed by Pakistani peacekeepers</a>.</p>
<p>Despite a failure by the Yakutumba militia to take Uvira, it was a reminder of the level of dissatisfaction rising in the east, since the end of the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/dr-congo-5-questions-understand-africas-world-war-1524722">Second Congo War</a> in 2003. The rise of rebels operating in the east means violence could potentially spread to Kivu and beyond.</p>
<h2>Uncertain times ahead</h2>
<p>In 2017, presidential and legislative elections were delayed despite the Catholic Church <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">reaching a deal</a> with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">Kabila</a>. The political crisis was further complicated by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/africa/etienne-tshisekedi-dead-congo-opposition.html">death</a> of long-standing opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi later in the year.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-primeminister-exclusive/congo-election-remains-on-track-for-december-says-prime-minister-idUSKCN1GK1F9">election</a> planned for December this year is unlikely to bring together the various groups or solve the outbreak of violence in the country. The most likely candidate with the perceived ability to bring together the different groups is Moïse Katumbi. He has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/congo-opposition-forms-coalition-before-presidential-elections">succeeded</a> in rallying together opposition parties into a coalition backing his candidacy – an impressive feat in a country as fragmented as the Congo. </p>
<p>He also has by far the best broad plan to reconcile the country, which is what the country needs if the fragile peace is going to hold. But the country’s attorney general announced recently that Katumbi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/04/drc-opposition-leader-may-be-barred-from-elections-over-italian-citizenship">may not be eligible to stand</a> in presidential elections because he held Italian citizenship from October 2000 until January 2017. </p>
<p>Under Congo’s constitution, its nationals cannot hold <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-congo-politics/congo-opposition-leader-held-italian-citizenship-for-16-years-town-says-idUKKCN1HB18B">dual citizenship</a> and have to petition the government to regain their citizenship if they take up a foreign nationality. But the provision, however, is loosely enforced and many prominent politicians are believed to have second citizenships.</p>
<p>Kabila’s time in government has shown an inability to bring together the various ethnic groups and to control the growth of dissatisfied rebel groups. This is despite the fact that the DRC has the world’s largest UN peacekeeping force, numbering <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">18,000 blue helmets</a>, who try to enforce a measure of calm in the east of the country. </p>
<p>Botswana’s President Mokgweetsi Masisi has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bL6WXCr9DAU">said</a> that he hopes to see a commitment from Kabila to <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2018-41aa/april-6332/peace-and-stability-in-africa-botswanas-perspective-da7f">leave office at year’s end</a>. More African leaders need to acknowledge the gravity of the crisis and apply pressure on Kabila through existing African Union mechanisms.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew E. Yaw Tchie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African leaders need to acknowledge the gravity of the Congo crisis and apply pressure on Kabila.Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Conflict and Policy Advisor on Syria, Senior Visiting Research Follow Kings College London Centre for Conflict and Health, Visiting Researcher at PRIO, and PhD Candidate at University of Essex., University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/941962018-04-16T13:56:19Z2018-04-16T13:56:19ZWeaning African leaders off addiction to power is an ongoing struggle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215044/original/file-20180416-540-1cwprob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni refuses to relinquish power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some African countries have recorded democratic victories in the past 12 months. Ethiopia has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">new leader</a> whose ascent holds great promise for change, despite the country’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/ethiopia-100-election">problematic 2015 election</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/liberia-george-weah-salary-change-constitution-racism">Liberia</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/sierra-leones-new-leader-bio-starts-work-as-president-20180405">Sierra Leone</a> have new leaders.</p>
<p>But elsewhere on the continent, leaders continue to disregard their countries’ own constitutions and laws governing presidential tenure. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Joseph Kabila has been in power <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/joseph-kabila-will-not-stand-in-next-drc-elections-aide-says">since 2001</a>. He refuses to go even though he was meant to step down in December 2016. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has clung to power since <a href="http://www.africareview.com/news/UG-lawmakers-pave-the-way-for-Museveni-stay-in-power/979180-4093204-ug1sqi/index.html">1986</a>. Denis Sassou Nguesso has ruled Congo for <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14121193">almost 30 years</a>. </p>
<p>Their refusal to step down at the appointed time flies in the face of several governance blueprints adopted as African countries shifted away from liberation politics to the new post independence <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-africa-the-ebbs-and-flows-over-six-decades-42011">struggle for democracy</a> in the early 2000s.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/organisation-african-unity-formed-and-africa-day-declared">Organisation of African Unity</a> was transformed into the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> in 2001 with this shift in mind. The continent adopted progressive governance tools like the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. This was spearheaded by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki as a tool for African countries to review one another’s performance. </p>
<p>Numerous African countries adopted and agreed to uphold the terms of the African Union Charter on Democracy, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-treaty-0034_-_african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance_e.pdf">Elections and Governance</a>. It came into force in 2012 and was designed to guard against undemocratic governance.</p>
<p>These plans promised a great deal. They were designed to usher in good governance, democracy and security. It was hoped Africa’s image as a continent of ignorance, poverty, disease, misrule and corruption could be erased.</p>
<p>The rhetoric pointed in the right direction. But not all African leaders were willing to be swept by this wave of democratic reforms. Some are quite simply addicted to power, as shown by their reluctance – if not outright resistance – to leave at the end of their legal terms.</p>
<p>Leaders continuing to overstay their welcome undermines Africa’s attempts at overhauling its leadership and negates the noble intentions of the AU’s founders.</p>
<h2>Term limits</h2>
<p>Term limits regulate leadership succession. They are meant to counteract leaders’ temptation to overstay their welcome. This helps to consolidate and legitimise democratically elected leadership. </p>
<p>Of course, they’re not enough. Regular transfer of power as seen in countries like Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana and Zambia, among others, cannot guarantee political and socio-economic stability. Other ingredients such as accountable, legitimate leadership are critical. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Botswana president Ian Khama recently stepped down.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Felipe Trueba</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But regular transfers of power give citizens hope that new policies, programmes and approaches will be adopted by the new leadership. In turn, this could overturn numerous political, social, economic impacts of uninterrupted strangleholds on power in Africa. </p>
<p>The benefits of frequent power transfers are evident in African countries that have them, such as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/electoral-commission-confirms-senegal-ruling-coalition-landslide-20170805-2">Senegal</a>; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-botswana-politics/botswanas-khama-steps-down-as-president-after-a-decade-at-helm-idUSKBN1H70DO">Botswana</a> and <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/mauritius-gets-new-pm-opposition-demands-new-election/">Mauritius</a>. Incumbents are kept on their toes because there’s a real chance they can be removed from power if they fail to govern properly. </p>
<p>Term limits have recently become controversial and divisive. Some leaders have used dubious constitutional amendments to extend their stay in power. Usually, governing parties and their leaders almost exclusively pass such amendments with minimal or no opposition participation. That’s what happened in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Congo Republic. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite constitutional provisions and regular elections, countries such as Angola, Togo, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea are virtually de facto one party or one leader repressive states wherein resignation, retirement and term limits are meaningless.</p>
<p>Leaders have different reasons for refusing to leave office. In some countries, the answer lies in a lack of succession planning to transfer power. In others, leaders blatantly refuse to resign because of their despotic and kleptocratic tendencies. They abuse their states’ minerals, oil and money with their <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-leaders-take-the-blame-for-the-continents-resource-curse">families and friends</a>. Stepping aside would cost them these “benefits”.</p>
<p>For instance, the eventual departure of Angola’s Eduardo Dos Santos from office after decades in power has <a href="https://theconversation.com/stability-in-southern-africa-hinges-on-how-leaders-gain-and-lose-power-89980">left his family exposed</a>. His children stand accused of amassing billions during their father’s many terms. </p>
<p>Without strong constitutional safeguards and a democratic culture to counter the negative consequences of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-13-anc-must-renew-itself-and-root-out-sins-of-incumbency">“sins of incumbency”</a> – as corruption associated with state power is often described by South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress – can be menacing. It breeds <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Big-Men-Little-People-Leaders/dp/081477542X">“Big Men, Little People”</a>, to borrow a phrase from the title of a book by journalist Alec Russel.</p>
<h2>Weaning leaders off power addiction</h2>
<p>Perceptive leaders know when to leave office, whether through resignation or <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/botswana-president-ian-khama-steps-down-after-end-of-tenure//">retirement</a>. Botswana’s past and current presidents have established this practice despite the country’s continued <a href="http://www.thepatriot.co.bw/analysis-opinions/item/3585-single-party-dominance-not-good-for-democracy.html">one-party domination</a>.</p>
<p>With the emergence of a strong democratic culture, South Africa has experienced the opposite of such presidential power mongering. Two presidents were recalled by their political party the ANC, albeit for different reasons. Thabo Mbeki readily <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-21-mbeki-resigns-before-the-nation">accepted his fate</a> when he was told to pack up and go, although he was not accused of any specific wrong doing. Jacob Zuma remained defiant and only stepped aside when faced with the very real prospect of a vote of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-13-anc-want-motion-of-no-confidence-against-zuma">no-confidence</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/nana-akufo-addo-sworn-ghana-president-170107124239549.html">Ghana</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">Zambia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibia-grown-up-after-a-generation-into-independence-but-not-yet-mature-74571">Namibia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/buharis-victory-in-nigerian-election-has-global-significance-39416">Nigeria</a>, <a href="https://www.constitutionnet.org/news/presidential-elections-malawi-towards-majoritarian-501-electoral-system">Malawi</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/magufuli-has-been-president-for-two-years-how-hes-changing-tanzania-86777">Tanzania</a> are other African states where regular transfer of power has occurred.</p>
<p>African voters are not blameless. They habitually relax their vigilance on leaders and fail to hold them to account after elections. This, coupled with winner-take-all election systems, renders some African countries vulnerable to autocratic, despotic and non-accountable leaders who would rather die in office than leave.</p>
<p>What, then, is the solution? It may be time for ordinary voters across the continent to begin to collaborate through non-governmental organisations and other cross-border institutional mechanisms to share experiences and begin to enforce durable continental democracy. Africa needs democracy from below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye receives funding from National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, NIHSS, South Africa. </span></em></p>Not all African leaders are willing to be swept by the democratic reforms of the early 2000s.Kealeboga J Maphunye, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916902018-02-13T13:16:18Z2018-02-13T13:16:18ZWith a busy election schedule, Africa needs a reversal of the old order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206165/original/file-20180213-44660-yvjtjz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Democratic Republic of Congo's President Joseph Kabila. Time to step aside.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kenny Katombe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The winds of change may blow in several directions across Africa this year as a host of countries prepare for elections. But a change in power isn’t always synonymous with change in governance. In Africa, very often, a new face in power doesn’t signal change of the system of governance.</p>
<p>The continent is set for a busy 2018 electoral year. In the past presidential, legislative, or local elections, or a combination, have had a destabilising if not devastating effect due to pre and post-election transparency issues and accompanying protests, violence and political instability. But when conducted well, elections have also brought hope for a better future. Ghana and Benin are good examples. </p>
<p>The year ahead won’t be any different. On the one hand the expected end of Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might bring momentous change to the country. On the other it’s more difficult to foresee better days for South Sudan. Others might also depart before elections. </p>
<h2>Early departures?</h2>
<p>In Pretoria President Jacob Zuma <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-finally-falls-on-his-sword-but-not-before-threatening-to-take-the-house-down-with-him-91910">resigned</a> on February 14. He had come under increasing pressure to do so following the December election of Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f727f130-e3e7-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da">as president of the African National Congress</a>, and the future president of the country. </p>
<p>And seven years after the Jasmine Revolution that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html">ousted the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a>, Tunisians are back on the streets. The wave that took away Ben Ali now threatens to sweep the government of Beji Caid Essebsi.</p>
<h2>Presidential seats at stake</h2>
<p>The DRC has added more instability to its already complex situation. The country has been embroiled in a political and institutional crisis since Joseph Kabila extended his term in office, after failing to amend the constitution <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/dr-congo-president-can-remain-in-office-without-a-vote-court">to remove the disposition preventing him from running for a third term</a>. He has twice postponed presidential elections, despite signing the December 2016 agreement whose main clause was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">to have presidential and legislative elections held by December 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Kabila’s failure to hold elections by the December 2017 deadline has led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/31/congo-security-forces-shoot-two-dead-during-protest-against-president">mounting national protests</a>, which <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/drc-protesters-killed-anti-kabila-protests-180121105558348.html">the regime has crushed</a>. Increasing national and international pressure might see Kabila out in 2018 unless he amends the constitution.</p>
<p>In Cameroon, Paul Biya, 85, in power since 1982, should be up for <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">reelection in October</a>. Although there is no indication that he will relinquish power, he has <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171003-eye-africa-cameroon-anglophone-unrest-kenya-election-protest-oromo-festival-ethiopia">faced dissensions and separatist claims from so-called anglophone Cameroon</a> and is believed to have ill-health. The current lack of succession plans if Biya does not run, <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/Reviews%20&%20Outlooks/Cameroon---Risks-Will-Rise-On-Upcoming-Election/36227">leaves room for speculation and uncertainty</a>. </p>
<p>In Madagascar, concern reigns in the run-up to the presidential <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">election at the end of this year</a>, which should see incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina face up his two predecessors Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina. The island, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13861843">with a tumultuous history, has been prey to institutional instability since 2001</a>. There are fears this will happen again.</p>
<p>Three countries, South Sudan, Libya and Mali, plagued by instability for some years, <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">are expected to hold presidential elections this year</a>. Strong uncertainties prevail in South Sudan and Libya where negotiations for peaceful settlements have yielded little tangible results. In Mali the government doesn’t control large parts of its territory and <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170928_sg_report_on_mali_september_eng.pdf">is not immune to terrorist attacks</a>.</p>
<p>No surprise will come from Cairo where, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/24/egypt-heading-towards-elections-president-sisis-name-ballot/">will certainly be reelected president of a country</a> he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/former-egyptian-general-arrested-by-military-after-announcing-presidential-bid-sami-anan">now controls unchallenged</a>.</p>
<h2>Longevity and power sharing dilemmas</h2>
<p>In West Africa, Togolese Faure Gnassingbé appears as a poor student in the field of democracy. He came to power in 2005 in a quasi-dynastic political ‘transition’, replacing his father, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">who had been in power for 38 years</a>. Reelected in 2015, he has, since August 2017, faced massive and sustained popular <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">protests</a> demanding institutional reforms and the end of his family’s 50-year rule.</p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States is trying, through negotiations, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/nigerias-president-warns-togo-about-political-instability-20180208">to restore calm</a>. An uneasy situation is emerging given that Faure is the current chairman of <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/04/togolese-president-faure-gnassingbe-is-new-ecowas-chairperson/">the organization until June 2018</a>. But if he completely loses the support of his peers, he might be on his way out. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by July.</p>
<p>Like Togo, Gabon experienced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">similar ‘transition’</a> from father Omar Bongo, who died in power in 2009 after 42 years of rule, to his son Ali Bongo, who replaced him that year. Once a haven of peace in an unstable Central African region, Gabon has tumbled into a serious crisis since the highly contested presidential election in 2016 which was <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-mulls-amnesty-for-post-election-violence-20170914">marred by widespread fraud and deadly repression</a>. Jean Ping, leader of the opposition and former chairperson of the African Union Commission, continues to claim victory.</p>
<p>The hardening of the Libreville regime has recently resulted in a constitutional amendment that the opposition characterises as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-president-defends-constitutional-change-after-parliament-gives-okay-20180111">‘monarchisation’ of power</a>. Legislative elections planned this year will certainly be a turning point for the country.</p>
<p>In Guinea Bissau, the power of José Mario Vaz is in troubled waters, with the appointment of a seventh prime minister <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/guinea-bissau-president-names-new-prime-minister-0">since 2014</a>. The opposition has decried the president for overstepping his constitutional prerogatives by monopolising power, in violation of the Conakry agreement signed in 2016, <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-mission-to-guinea-bissau-to-assess-the-implementation-of-conakry-and-bissau-agreements/">under the aegis of the regional west African body</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ecowas-threatens-guinea-bissau-sanctions-as-crisis-drags-20171217">Vaz runs the risk of sanctions</a>, in which case he would definitively lose the support of the organisation and the protection of <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/ecomib.htm">the regional troop deployment</a>. This would precipitate his departure and could plunge the country into chaos, in a state that has <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/2012414125957785808.html">mostly known military coups and instability</a>. Legislative elections are expected to take place this year.</p>
<p>In Chad, the crisis that has affected resource-dependent countries has <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/08/chad-suspends-10-parties-for-disturbing-public-order/">plagued the economy</a>. This is coupled with Idris Deby’s stronghold on power and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr20/7045/2017/en/">his repressive methods</a>. Despite facing civil unrest, he is unlikely to be shaken even though the country <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/civil-unrest-chad-idriss-deby/">is expected to hold legislative elections this year</a>.</p>
<h2>Ghana setting the pace</h2>
<p>Over the past 20 years, since the John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor presidency, Ghana has epitomised democracy south of the Sahara (aside from South Africa). Its institutional stability and peaceful transitions of power are commendable.</p>
<p>What the continent <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/world/africa/12prexy.html">needs most are strong institutions</a>, which will only come about with a regeneration of its leadership as well as its political class. This renewal must be rooted in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTNk4q6zRw8">paradigm shift</a> as embodied with determination, class and panache by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PNJjpw-Qb4">Ghanaian president Nana Akufo Addo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed M Diatta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa needs strong institutions. But they can only be built if there’s a change in leadership.Mohamed M Diatta, Ph.D. Candidate & Lecturer in Political Science-International Relations, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899802018-01-22T15:43:51Z2018-01-22T15:43:51ZStability in southern Africa hinges on how leaders gain and lose power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202402/original/file-20180118-29900-1tmlu4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand Congolese President Joseph Kabila step down.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While each country in Southern Africa has its own politics, recent developments involving presidents provide interesting contrasts across the region. Which presidents gain and lose power in 2018 – and how they do so – will have significance for the region as a whole, not least in helping determine its continued stability.</p>
<p>As 2018 begins, Joseph Kabila is clinging to the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), claiming that there is insufficient funding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">hold an election</a>, amid <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/53-protesters-killed-over-six-months-in-drc-report-20171121">growing protests</a> against him in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It remains to be seen if he will fulfil the undertaking he has made that elections will be held in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-at-un-pledges-drc-elections-but-still-no-date-20170923">December this year</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries in the region start 2018 on a much more promising footing. In Botswana, President Ian Khama, approaching the end of his two presidential terms, is expected to step down in an <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/09/botswana-president-says-he-will-step-down-at-the-end-of-his-term-in-april//">orderly succession</a> in April and will be suceeded by the vice-president.</p>
<p>In both Zimbabwe and Angola autocratic presidents who had been in power for almost four decades lost power in 2017 in very different ways.</p>
<h2>Military intervention in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe the country’s army intervened in November 2017 to force Robert Mugabe to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">give up power</a>. This came after he had, under the influence of his wife Grace, sacked Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">as vice-president</a>. The Southern African Development Community did not need to intervene, and even the mediation mission it planned wasn’t required.</p>
<p>Instead, the Zimbabwe military acted, with the ruling party, Zanu-PF, to replace Mugabe with Mnangagwa. It did so peacefully, denying during the entire process that a coup was underway. The 93-year-old Mugabe, in office since 1980, initially refused to step down, but was finally removed both as president of the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-21-breaking--zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned/">country and of the ruling party</a>.</p>
<p>The country will go to the polls in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/earliest-election-date-july-23-2018/">mid-2018</a>, and Mnangagwa, who was confirmed in December 2017 as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate, has said that the election will be credible, <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/12/16/mnangagwa-promises-free-fair-elections/">free and fair</a>, but he has yet to confirm that he will allow international and other observers.</p>
<p>With the military more obviously involved in government than anywhere else in the region, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties divided, and with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11532872">seriously ill</a>, there is little likelihood that Zanu-PF or Mnangagwa will lose power.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>In Angola José Eduardo dos Santos, suffering from ill-health, agreed in early 2017 to step down as president of the country. He nominated a man he thought would be a trusted successor, hoping to continue to wield influence as president of the ruling MPLA.</p>
<p>After elections for the National Assembly in August, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angolas-ruling-party-regains-power-but-faces-legitimacy-questions-83983">João Lourenço duly succeeded Dos Santos</a> as president. To widespread surprise, he began sacking the heads of some of the country’s key institutions. These included Dos Santos’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, who was <a href="https://qz.com/1130420/africas-richest-woman-has-been-fired-from-angolas-state-oil-firm-by-the-new-president/">CEO of the state oil company Sonangol</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, left, and his successor Joao Lourenco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And in early 2018 her brother José Filomeno dos Santos, was removed as head of Angola’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42638761">sovereign wealth fund</a>. Their father’s influence was rapidly slipping away.</p>
<p>In Angola, as in Zimbabwe, a change of leader to one with a more reformist approach probably means that the ruling party has consolidated itself in power.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa in December 2017 the leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) passed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1762486/breaking-cyril-ramaphosa-is-the-new-anc-president/">from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who thus became heir apparent to the presidency of the country. While there is no two-term limit for ANC presidents, Zuma had brought the ANC into discredit and Ramaphosa, despite having worked closely with Zuma as deputy president, was seen as the one who would curtail the corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>For now, Zuma remains president of the country until general elections due to be held by June 2019. The country waits to see whether, how and when Ramaphosa can <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-should-end-the-presidential-merry-go-round-in-south-africa-90116">arrange to take over</a> as president of the country as well as of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>A presidential challenge defeated</h2>
<p>In Namibia, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">Hage Geingob</a> had to meet a challenge to his continuing as leader of Swapo, the governing party, in <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/07/10/swapo-elders-endorse-geingob-as-swapo-presidential-candidate/">November last year</a>. He was, however, confirmed in his position and will therefore be Swapo’s presidential candidate for the election scheduled to take place in November 2019.</p>
<p>Geingob supporters now fill all the key posts in his government, enabling him to make policy as he wishes. This is very different from South Africa, where the new ANC leadership remains divided and where Ramaphosa, when he becomes president of the country, will find it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/when-will-zuma-go-its-a-matter-of-time-20171224-3">adopt new policies</a>.</p>
<h2>Malawi and Zambia</h2>
<p>Malawi must hold elections <a href="http://www.mec.org.mw/category/Steps_towards_2019.html">in 2019</a> and the contest for the presidency then has already begun. It is not known whether Joyce Banda, the former president and leader of one of the country’s leading political parties, will <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/">return from self-imposed exile</a> abroad to stand again. In 2017 she was formally charged with having been involved in the massive <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/malawi-issues-warrant-of-arrest-for-former-president-banda-20170731">“Cashgate’ corruption scandal”</a> that was uncovered while she was president.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Zambia, by contrast, where the next election is not due until 2021, the question is how Edgar Lungu, who took over the presidency after narrowly winning the presidential election in August 2016, will try to consolidate his power. </p>
<p>In 2017 Lungu became <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">more authoritarian</a>. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the main opposition United Party for National Development, was arrested on what were clearly trumped-up charges. These were only <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/08/16/knew-hhs-treason-charge-trumped-antonio-mwanza/">dropped in August</a> after interventions by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and inside Zambia by the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/20/real-reasons-hh-released-jail/">local Catholic Archbishop</a>.</p>
<p>Lungu wants to serve a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/05/no-third-term-president-lungu-gbm/">third term as president</a>, and the country’s Constitutional Court has been asked to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2017-11-10-is-zambia-headed-for-a-constitutional-crisis/">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional perspective</h2>
<p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation from similar ones elsewhere. Given that South Africa is the most important country in the region, how the Ramaphosa-Zuma poser is resolved will be significant for the region. Elsewhere, how presidents gain and lose, and try to consolidate their power, will help shape the continued stability of the region. </p>
<p>Will political tensions be managed internally, as in Zimbabwe in late 2017? Or will they require some kind of intervention by the Southern Africa Development Community, in the DRC and perhaps elsewhere, to prevent them from escalating? Throughout the region, contests for presidential power are likely to keep political passions on the boil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation. In southern Africa events in one affect others in the region.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/856172017-10-16T13:12:55Z2017-10-16T13:12:55ZElections in Africa: democratic rituals matter even though the outlook is bleak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189998/original/file-20171012-31381-thdt34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An elderly woman displays her inked finger after casting her vote during the 2016 presidential elections in Uganda. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/James Akena</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multi-party systems established in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in the early 1990s have endured despite electoral violence. But democratic hopes have been dashed or perverted throughout the rest of the region. The governments built on the ruins of the civil wars in Angola, Burundi, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda and Rwanda have all relied on armed political groups to stay in power. </p>
<p>From June 2015 to August 2017 an uninterrupted series of general elections took place in Central and East Africa. Those in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/burundi-president-nkurunziza-wins-disputed-election-150724140417364.html">Burundi (2015)</a> and the DRC (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-election/congo-presidential-election-set-for-november-27-2016-commission-idUSKBN0LG28M20150212">initially set for 2016</a>) were expected to be the most problematic. In both the incumbent presidents were seeking to extend their mandates beyond a second term. In the <a href="http://time.com/4080835/africa-republic-of-congo-protest-sassou-nguesso-violence/">Congo</a>, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/uganda-opposition-leader-arrested-days-elections-160215132155444.html">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">Kenya</a>, the risk of violent clashes was palpable.</p>
<p>The ruling regimes were not only dated, but worse for wear. At the time of the elections, the presidents of Angola (José Eduardo Dos Santos), the Congo (Denis Sassou N'Guesso) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), all members of the revolutionary or progressive <a href="http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/02/bill-clintons-new-generation-of-african"><em>New Generation</em></a> of African leaders, were all in their seventies and had been in power for 30 or more years. The Presidents of Rwanda (Paul Kagamé), the DRC (Joseph Kabila) and Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza), having served terms of 21, 14 and 10 years respectively, took steps to change their countries’ constitution to seek a third term.</p>
<p>Despite the bleak regional outlook and contagious scepticism among voters, these pious “democratic” rituals have become critical events over the past 20 years. This is true even in the most authoritarian countries where so much is predetermined. From the parties in the running to the authorised candidates and even the results.</p>
<p>As artificial as they may be, these rites still represent a risk for those in power. Rulers need expert skill to ensure both maximum control over their institutions and demonstrations of love from their people. Consequently, the outcome of the race – between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression – is never entirely certain.</p>
<p>From Kinshasa to Kampala, from Brazzaville to Luanda and Bujumbura, courageous dissenters have organised numerous protests, usually with the approval – and sometimes active support – of the general population. These protests express the frustrations and expectations of a generation fed up with regimes clinging to power and responding to growing disillusion with increasing authoritarianism.</p>
<p>The ruling parties have, on the whole, proved themselves highly resourceful and resilient against the desire for change. Their victory has been comprehensive. Only Kenya is the exception: a second vote is set for October 26 following the Supreme Court’s surprise <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenya-supreme-court-criticizes-election-board-in-verdict-on-polls-idUSKCN1BV0QB">decision</a> to invalidate the election results. In the DRC, Joseph Kabila’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/no-congo-election-until-mid-2019-vote-commission-says-angering-opposition-idUSKBN1CG1KW">delaying tactics</a> have so far allowed him to remain in power. And while Dos Santos eventually withdrew his candidature due to illness, the election of his chosen successor has ensured power in Angola <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">remains in his faction’s hands</a>.</p>
<h2>In power until 2034</h2>
<p>The string of Central and East African elections got off to a bad start. In April 2015, the president of Burundi <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">controversially</a> sought a third term in office. Although devastated by 10 years of internal strife, Burundi had become a <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7748.doc.htm">symbol of peaceful transition</a> in the region. Three months of tactical manoeuvring and brutal repression were required to bring victory to the incumbent president. This pushed the country back to the brink of civil war and further plunged it down the ranks of the world’s poorest countries. </p>
<p>The resulting crisis and the violent response by this relatively inexperienced president threw discredit on other outgoing presidents in the region, all flagrant repeat offenders. They were forced to up their game.</p>
<p>In February 2016, Museveni took office for the fifth time in Uganda amid relative calm. In March, in a tenser national atmosphere, Congolese president Denis Sassou-Nguesso started on the first of the three extra terms allowed by the recent constitutional reform. He could still be in power in 2031, at nearly 90 years of age.</p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Rwandan President Paul Kagame presided over a constitutional referendum in 2015 enabling him to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">remain in power until 2034</a>. The reform was approved by 98% of voters, with a voter turnout of more than 98%.</p>
<p>Overall, pending the outcomes in Kenya and DRC, each of the self-proclaimed candidates who won the recent bout of electoral contests can boast enviable popular mandates, and even landslide victories.</p>
<h2>Every leader for themselves</h2>
<p>In the eyes of these leaders their longevity, and that of their counterparts in the region, constitutes in and of itself a justification for remaining power.</p>
<p>Their relations, alliances and conflicts were carved out in a shared past, marked by civil wars and fiercely violent regional clashes. Widespread structural insecurity <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-and-rwanda-a-rivalry-that-lies-at-the-heart-of-great-lakes-crises-63795">plagues the entire region</a> as a result. The insecurity is fuelled by governments’ failure to lay down formal, mutually beneficial, political frameworks for cooperation and regional integration. Yet such frameworks would allow them to develop the human resources and agricultural and mining potential of the region in an equitable manner.</p>
<p>In 2013, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game-congo">African Intervention Brigades</a> were authorised to take offensive measures to neutralise the main militia groups in the country’s Eastern region. The Brigades’ main target was the M23, a movement supported by Rwanda and Uganda, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/drc_5.pdf">intelligence</a> later submitted to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The return to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo">low-scale warfare</a> is a sign of a regulated joint governance of the instability.</p>
<p>Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, numerous political and criminal armed groups still control vast, lawless zones. In their own ways, these groups secure the exploitation of natural resources. They supply a lucrative cross-border trade run at the highest levels of government. These activities bring in significant profits for the ruling classes. They also allow countries in the sub-region to export goods they do not produce themselves. And they ensure the continued viability of the various regional and international trade routes towards the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>At every stage of wealth creation, profits are essentially redistributed according to private interests. It is therefore easy to understand why each head of state believes themselves best placed to serve both national and personal interests, and the interests of the political-ethnic groups they represent.</p>
<h2>The price of longevity</h2>
<p>When they came to power, the <em>new generation</em> of leaders from the Great Horn of Africa embodied the new ideal of “good governance”. They were “strong men” at the head of “strong and sustainable democracies”, ensuring the order and security necessary for development.</p>
<p>During the course of these elections, none of these so-called democrats, so regularly and resoundingly “elected” by their citizens, had any thoughts of retirement. Setting aside Kabila, whose fate is still undecided, at least two of them, in Burundi and Uganda, had no qualms about changing their country’s constitution to ensure their own reelection.</p>
<p>But in a region of considerable wealth, it’s by no means certain that government can indefinitely be determined by the life expectancy of leaders who are still incapable of developing the regional cooperative frameworks that would ensure peace, security and prosperity for their citizens.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The outcome of the race between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression is never entirely certain.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/802012017-06-29T10:41:16Z2017-06-29T10:41:16ZCongolese musicians rarely provide a critique, but continue to provide solace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176182/original/file-20170629-16061-1fk4of0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Authenticité survives in the present generation of Congolese musicians like Fally Ipupa (with the red vest).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T4KNVT2w0mU">From YouTube</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The “Indépendance Cha-Cha” is one of the best-known songs in the Congolese cannon. It was composed and first performed by the father of modern popular Congolese music, <a href="http://www.allmusic.com/artist/joseph-kabasele-mn0001901870">Joseph Kabasele</a>, and his band African Jazz in Brussels in January 1960 during the negotiations for Congolese independence. It proved a huge hit all over Africa in the years to come and is performed to this day.</p>
<p>The song was done in anticipation of June 30 1960 when the Belgian Congo became the independent Republic of the Congo.</p>
<p>“Indépendance cha-cha” is firmly part of a tradition in which a list of names of important parties and people are included in the song (it’s a tradition that nowadays involves substantial payment for the honour).</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/0y6BjNJD0ZM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Indépendance cha-cha’ by Joseph Kabesele and his band African Jazz.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the “Indépendance cha-cha” the list was of pro-independence parties and the main actors in the drama unfurling in Brussels including <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/patrice-lumumba">Patrice Lumumba</a> and <a href="http://www.blackpast.org/gah/tshombe-moise-kapenda-1919-1969">Moise Tshombe</a>.</p>
<p>The early dreams of independence gradually disappeared as the years passed and this beloved song became ripe for a reworking. In 2010 the rap artist <a href="http://www.allmusic.com/artist/baloji-mn0000555019/biography">Baloji</a> produced a wonderful video of the song renamed “Le jour d'après”. In the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2011/dec/04/baloji-rapper-congo-sorcerer-interview">video</a> he tells the ironic story of life since independence.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/C4vc25TcIe0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Congolese-Belgian rapper Baloyi with a modern update on ‘Indépendance Cha Cha’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Old gentlemen musicians, who could still remember the heady days leading to independence, play and dance beside the younger generation. They’re all attired with the dapper dandy <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/09/world/africa/congo-sapeur-fashion/index.html">style</a> for which the Congolese are rightfully famous. </p>
<h2>The era of mass rallies</h2>
<p>After independence, throwing off the formal shackles of political colonialism proved far easier than removing the bonds of economic imperialism. The covert involvement of the former Belgian colonists and the CIA in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassination of Lumumba</a> in 1961 was followed by years of turmoil as the independence movement fractured. </p>
<p>Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu assumed the presidency after seizing power in a coup in 1965. In 1971 he renamed the country Zaire.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176076/original/file-20170628-31318-1sdtmrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mobutu Sese Seko in Kinshasa, back in September 1960.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>His programme to nationalise Congolese industries, dubbed <a href="http://dictionary.education/english/dictionary/Zaireanization">Zaireanization</a>, followed visits to China and Korea in the early 1970s. Industries were taken over and assigned to his clients, often without the skills to manage the businesses, or the motivation to reinvest any profits Mobutu didn’t take for himself. Taxes weren’t invested in education and health or maintaining the energy, road and rail networks necessary for the long-term health of the economy.</p>
<p>But the visits to China had another influence on Mobutu. They provided him with a model for mass performances for party and nation. These included mass gatherings during which huge numbers of party members performed choreographed songs and dances in praise of the president and his party. </p>
<p>The gatherings were clearly performances of nationhood. But they were also linked to Mobutu’s policies of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10464883.2014.937235?mobileUi=0">authenticité</a> – an idea borrowed from the president of Guinea, Sékou Touré. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/21495">idea</a> was first mooted in the Manifesto of N'Sele in 1967, alongside <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=R5pJxgosjIIC&pg=PA216&lpg=PA216&dq=Mobutism&source=bl&ots=t48MVCgraP&sig=FZWciwMLKOb_S6jmNWyuq2AVL0s&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjjuLreouDUAhVjAcAKHbyxCscQ6AEIYTAN#v=onepage&q=Mobutism&f=false">Mobutism</a> and nationalism, and presented as a rejection of both capitalism and communism. It was foremost a cultural policy aimed at combating a colonial mentality denigrating African culture and language as inferior to that of Europe.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=645&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=645&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=645&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176186/original/file-20170629-16061-1i79r32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mobutu on a Zairean banknote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In practice it was harnessed to building Mobutu’s personality cult. He ordered the building of one of the first state run television studios and broadcasting facilities in Africa. Named the Cité de la Voix de la Peuple it had 18 radio and six television studios. Television broadcasting began in 1966 and the broadcasting centre was completed in 1970. The building is now a sad and dilapidated testament to Mobutu’s glory days. </p>
<p>The dominance in cultural life of the Mouvement Populaire de La Révolution (MPR) was implemented in ways that mimicked the kind of imposition formerly associated with the colonial authorities. </p>
<p>For the sartorially expressive Kinois this was not something to be accepted without a challenge. In time it led to the rise of the rebellious movement of satorial dandies, the <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2013/05/07/181704510/the-surprising-sartorial-culture-of-congolese-sapeurs">Sapeurs</a>. </p>
<p>Authenticité also involved the changing of colonial Christian names to African ones. Mobutu <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1997/sep/08/news/mn-30058">changed</a> his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa za Banga. </p>
<p>And like Nyerere in Tanzania, Mobutu demanded that popular music should be exclusively in a national language – which in practice meant primarily Lingala – the language of the capital.</p>
<h2>Personality cult</h2>
<p>For many of the musicians I interviewed, whether or not they had any sympathy for Mobutu, the idea of authenticité was almost universally seen as a positive one at a certain level. This was despite the fact that Mobutu abused Congo culture to build his own personality cult.</p>
<p>Independence may not have led to genuine political and economic autonomy for the former Belgian Congo. But at least in areas of life that were not a source a mineral wealth and not an obvious political threat to the president, a new kind of freedom of cultural expression and self confidence in the worth of Congo’s cultural heritage could bloom. It found expression in a glorious period of musical creativity.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176188/original/file-20170629-11766-wuzgmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sleeve of Franco and Sam Mangwana’s collaborative album, Coopération.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This included adopting modernity into Congolese music. For some, like <a href="http://likembe.blogspot.co.za/2011/05/congo-memories-with-bumba-massa.html">Bumba Massa</a> and <a href="http://www.allmusic.com/artist/sam-mangwana-mn0000287320/biography">Sam Mangwana</a>, it took the form of modernity from diverse diaspora influences from across the Atlantic, especially Latin America. For others, like <a href="http://africanmusic.org/artists/kanda.html">Kanda Bongo Man</a>, it was in the mastering and use of modern technology to express Congolese culture. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20407211.2011.10530761">Malcot Lowiso</a>, a Congolese musician working in South Africa, made it clear that authenticité was not about a return to the past:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is possible to modernise with authenticity. We have modernised our authenticity without copying others, without copying the French or the Belgians.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Love of a huge fan base</h2>
<p>The man most closely identified with the cultural movement of authenticité was the leader of the giant band TPOK Jazz, the Congo colossus <a href="http://www.allmusic.com/artist/franco-luambo-makiadi-mn0001615589">Luambo Franco Makiadi</a>. Franco was inspired to create wonderful music by integrating the Congolese musical heritage with African and European influences and the world of the diaspora. He benefited both from Mobutu’s patronage and the love of a huge fan base all over the continent. Franco embraced the principle of authenticité, and sang songs in praise both of the principle and the party espousing it.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Franco wholeheartedly embraced the principle of authenticité in his music.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Maybe the idea of authenticité survives as part of the dream of a meaningful cultural independence in the present generation of Congolese musicians, in the work of singers such as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/music/artists/455a23c4-ec18-4e87-893d-db79514eb50b">Fally Ipupa</a> and <a href="http://www.musiques-afrique.com/frames/art_ferre-gola.html">Ferré Gola</a>, who continue to create a distinctively Congolese sound.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HqtC3hxVLMo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Congolese singers like Fally Ipupa keep it authentically Congolese.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unfortunately politically things look far less hopeful. President <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/people/joseph-kabila.html">Joseph Kabila</a> is looking increasingly like the inheritor of the political tradition of his father Laurent’s former enemy, Mobutu, and the dictatorial colonists who preceded him. </p>
<p>Scheduled elections slip into an indeterminate future, accompanied by worsening <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39587896">human rights abuses</a> in the Kasai region and attempts to divide and weaken the opposition. </p>
<p>As has been the case for so much of the DRC’s history since independence, musicians rarely provide a critique, but continue to provide solace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Salter works as an independent consultant in the Great Lakes Region. </span></em></p>For many of contemporary Congolese musicians the idea of authenticité was seen as a positive one at a certain level, even though Mobutu abused Congo culture to build his own personality cult.Thomas Salter, Musician, Academic, Consultant, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788472017-06-05T16:39:08Z2017-06-05T16:39:08ZDemocracy is looking sickly across southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172262/original/file-20170605-16869-1kz7k3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in Zambia. Beyond multi-party systems and regular elections, many countries resemble very little of true democracies.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GovernmentZA/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Politics are in shambles across the world. Populism and political gambles are making headlines from London to Washington. Southern Africa is no exception. If it’s any comfort, this suggests that there’s nothing genuinely typical about African versions of <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/populism-common-southern-africa-where-former-liberation-movements-have-become-dominant">political populism</a>. Nor are the flaws in democracy typically African. </p>
<p>This might put some events into wider perspective. But it’s nonetheless worrying to follow the current political turmoil in some southern Africa countries.</p>
<p>The regional hegemon, South Africa, is embroiled in domestic policy tensions of unprecedented proportions since it became a democracy. And the situation in the sub-region is not much better. </p>
<p>The state of opposition politics and democracy is in a shambles too. The fragile political climate and the mentality of most opposition politicians hardly offer meaningful alternatives. This is possibly an explanation – but no excuse – for the undemocratic practices permeating almost every one of the region’s democracies. </p>
<p>Beyond multi-party systems with regular elections, they resemble very little of true democracies.</p>
<h2>South African hiccups</h2>
<p>At the end of May the dimensions of “state capture” in South Africa were set out in a report published by an <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/26/FULL-REPORT-%E2%80%98How-South-Africa-is-Being-Stolen%E2%80%99-a-report-on-state-capture">academic team</a>. </p>
<p>It shows how deeply the personalised systematic plundering of state assets is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-26-betrayal-of-the-promise-the-anatomy-of-state-capture/">entrenched</a>. Additional explosive evidence was presented only days later through thousands of leaked e-mails. Dubbed the “Gupta Leaks”, they document a mafia-like network among Zuma-loyalists and the Indian Gupta family. </p>
<p>The evidence points to massive influence, if not control, over political appointments, the hijacking of higher public administration and embezzlement of <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2017/05/28/Here-they-are-The-emails-that-prove-the-Guptas-run-South-Africa">enormous proportions</a>.</p>
<p>Some 65% of South Africans want Zuma to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/65-of-south-africans-want-zuma-to-resign--ipsos">resign</a>. An all-time low approval rating of 20% makes him less popular among the electorate than even <a href="http://time.com/4785127/michael-temer-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump/">US President Donald Trump</a>. Despite this – combined with growing demands from within the party that he steps down – the ANC still backs its president. </p>
<p>But divisions within the party are deepening, with some in its leadership demanding an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/88337066-4797-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996">investigation</a> into the Gupta patronage network. </p>
<p>For his part, Zuma is focused on pulling strings to secure Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/dispatches/2017/03/10/zuma-succession-the-businessman-vs-the-ex-wife-or-is-it-all-smoke-and-mirrors/">his successor</a> as president of the party. The other front-runner candidate is Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>Zuma’s assumption appears to be that, once in office, his former wife would not endorse any legal prosecution of the father of her children. </p>
<p>But the country’s official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), isn’t reaping the benefits of the ANC’s blunders. It has its own problems, which are constraining the gains it might otherwise be making from the ANC’s mess. </p>
<p>The party is divided over what to do about its former leader and Premier of the Western Cape province, Helen Zille following a tweet in which she defended the legacy of colonialism. The comment whipped up a storm of protest and for weeks the party had been at pains on how to deal with the scandal. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"842260539644497921"}"></div></p>
<p>DA leader Mmusi Maimane finally announced that Zille had been suspended from the party and that a disciplinary hearing would decide what further <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40143710?ocid=socialflow_twitter">political consequences</a> she might face. But a resilient Zille immediately challenged <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/das-u-turn-on-zille-suspension-20170603">the decision</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever the outcome, the DA’s image is damaged. Its aspirations to be the country’s new majority party has been dealt a major blow. </p>
<h2>Regional woes</h2>
<p>In Angola, 74-year-old Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979, has decided to select a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3995176/Angolas-President-Dos-Santos-stand-2017-state-radio.html">successor</a>. The scenario will secure that the family “oiligarchy” will remain in control of politics and the country’s economy, while the governing People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) uses the state apparatus to ruthlessly suppress any meaningful <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-mercury/20170221/281706909446949">social protests</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast Robert Mugabe – reigning in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 - shows no intention of retiring. He was nominated again as the Zimbabwe African Nation Union/Patriotic Front’s (ZANU/PF) candidate for the 2018 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-30365706/mugabe-confirmed-as-zanu-pf-candidate-for-2018-election">presidential elections</a>. But everyone is anxiously following the party’s internal power struggles over the ailing autocrat’s <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/04/zimbabwes-make-break-moment/">replacement</a>. Fears are that the vacuum created by his departure might create a worse situation. </p>
<p>While the regime’s constant violation of human rights is – as in Angola – geared towards preventing any form of meaningful opposition, there are concerns that the unresolved succession might add another violent dimension to local politics.</p>
<p>Zambia’s democracy also looks sad. The country’s main opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) is on trial for high treason. Hichilema has been embroiled in a personal feud with President Edgar Lungu of the governing Patriotic Front (PF) for years. He was arrested in early April after obstructing the president’s motor cavalcade. The charge of high treason is based on the accusation that he <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/09/hichilema-willfully-put-pres-lungus-life-danger-state-house/">wilfully put President Lungu’s life in danger</a>. </p>
<p>The trial is feeding growing concerns over an increasingly autocratic regime. The once praised democracy, which allowed for several <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/05/15/its-time-to-start-talking-about-zambia-says-cheeseman/">relatively peaceful transfers</a> of political power since the turn of the century, is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/05/16/birmingham-university-professor-cheesemans-ignorance-democracy-shocking-regrettable/">now in decline</a>.</p>
<p>Lesotho is also in a mess. It provides a timely reminder that competing parties seeking to obtain political control over governments are by no means a guarantee for better governance. Aptly described as a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-02-00-lesothos-groundhog-day-election">“Groundhog Day election”</a>, citizens in the crisis-ridden country went to the polls for the third time since 2012 with no new <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/02/lesothos-night-before-the-elections-photo-of-the-weekexplainer/">alternatives or options</a>. </p>
<p>Their limited choice is between two former prime ministers aged 77 (Tom Thabane) and 72 (Pakalitha Mosisili). The likely election result is another fragile coalition government – provided the military accepts the result. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the biggest challenge for relative political stability in the region might still be in the making: President Joseph Kabila, whose second term in office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ended in December 2016, is still hanging on with the promise that he’ll vacate the post by end of this year. </p>
<p>Despite a constitutional two-term limit, his plans remain a matter of speculation. In a recent interview, he was characteristically <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-lage-am-samstag-aggressiver-nationalismus-plus-atomraketen-a-1150544.html">evasive</a>. He refused to give a straight answer on whether he’s still considering <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-says-he-never-promised-to-hold-elections-in-drc-20170603">another term</a> and flatly denied that he had promised anything, including elections. </p>
<p>Kabila’s <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/21/Up-to-20-dead-as-Congo-police-protesters-clash-over-president/6411482288306/">extended stay in office</a> threatens to exacerbate an already explosive and violent situation, with potentially devastating consequences.</p>
<p>His continued reign would not only provoke further bloodshed at home. Any spill-over will challenge the Southern African Development Community’s willingness and ability to find solutions to regional conflicts in the interests of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">relative stability</a>. A stability which is at best fragile and indicative of the crisis of policy in most of the regional body’s member states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>Democracy is in a parlous state in many countries in southern Africa. Autocrats hold onto power, while electorates have little to choose from at the polls.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/737372017-03-08T10:07:05Z2017-03-08T10:07:05ZCongolese politicians scramble for control as violence ramps up again<p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is still struggling to bring an end to months of torrid political wrangling. Ever since the incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, began to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/drc-delays-election-2018-opposition-anger-161016135155845.html">delay and obstruct scheduled elections</a> that could eject him from office, the country has been stuck in political limbo. And while a peace deal to set a proper plan for the election has now been agreed, events are still moving at a dizzying pace. </p>
<p>First, <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/02/19/dr-congo-pope-francis-calls-for-peace//">the Pope and the church</a> dramatically intervened to broker the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/drc-delays-election-2018-opposition-anger-161016135155845.html">deal</a>, which (at least in theory) guarantees that Kabila will step down after the much-delayed election is held in 2018. </p>
<p>Then <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38835381">Etienne Tshisekedi</a>, leader of the opposition umbrella movement <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/drc-opposition-unites-against-president-kabila/3373403.html">Rassemblement</a> (the Rally), suddenly died. Soon afterwards, Moïse Katumbe, a presidential candidate who fled the DRC after being sentenced to three years in prison, said he would <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/02/10/drc-katumbi-confirms-his-return-to-attend-tshisekedi-s-funeral/">return to Kinshasa</a> for Tshisekedi’s funeral. Everyone is still guessing what his intentions really are.</p>
<p>As Congolese politics gets ever more complex and fraught, violence and oppression have become the norm in parts of the country. Regrettably, the movements and forces behind it are too numerous to survey in much detail – but a few stand out.</p>
<p>Central Congo is seeing <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/soldiers-kill-101-clashes-kamwina-nsapu-170214110027063.html">intense fighting</a> between the state and the followers of the late rebel leader Kamwina Nsapu; hundreds of people have been killed and many more displaced. The violence has been condemned by the country’s <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en">UN Stabilisation Mission</a>, but to little effect. It is more than matched in the east of the country, where various <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/battle-control-drc-who-are-mai-mai-groups-1526276">Maï-Maï rebel groups</a> are still furious with the Congolese army for <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/02/09/a-l-est-de-la-rdc-apparaissent-de-nouvelles-milices-inspirees-par-jesus-christ-le-foot-et-la-guerre_5077170_3212.html">arresting</a> their leader, David Maranata, at the start of 2017. They have been stepping up their attacks with a vengeance ever since.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, violent movements once thought nearly extinguished are suddenly back in the picture. The <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/dr-congo-who-are-adf-ugandan-rebels-hacking-civilians-death-399889?rm=eu">Alliance of Democratic Forces</a> (ADF) has gone from an obscure and rather marginal quasi-jihadist group to a serious threat, lately mounting a spate of violent attacks on civil society in the Kivu region, in the east of the country. It’s also unclear whether <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20438531">M23</a>, a dreaded militia movement that was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739">dealt a crippling blow</a> by the Congolese army and Maï-Maï rebels in November 2012, is now <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-rebels-idUSKBN14Z0WL">making a bloody return</a> and threatening to derail the already rickety election process. </p>
<p>With the DRC seemingly fragmenting once again and regional warfare ramping up, it’s only natural to wonder what hope there is for the country’s civil society at all. As long as Kabila remains in power, what little legitimacy the state still enjoys will steadily ebb away, and local warlords such as Maranata will inevitably seize the initiative. Politicians, not least Kabila himself, are running out of time. So what is to be done?</p>
<h2>Onward and upward?</h2>
<p>All politicians, national, local and regional, need to keep up the pressure on the president to resign. Power vacuums in the DRC are seldom filled by anything good; few could forget the fall of Mobutu and the onset of the <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars">first and second Congo Wars</a>, which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8471147.stm">some have estimated</a> killed more civilians than any other conflict since World War Two. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s death is a bitter blow to the Rally, and particularly its main constituent party, the <a href="http://udps-rdc.com/">UDPS</a>, which is in a very disorganised state. UDPS members need to remain steadfast and make it clear that their leaders should not accept payoffs from the Kabila government to remain silent. As such, UDPS chairperson Jean-Marc Kabunda needs to quickly unify the party and make it a force to be reckoned with once again. </p>
<p>A strong UDPS could spur some much-needed changes. It could finally seize the initiative to oust the Rally’s president, Pierre Lumbi, who has strong connections to the Kabila regime. He should step down; the list of potential replacements isn’t long, but there are at least some options. If his lawyers can keep him out of jail, Moïse Katumbe is the most obvious and electable presidential candidate. But for just those reasons, Kabila will work hard to lock him up. Clearly, reserve candidates to lead the Rally need to be found.</p>
<p>There are a few options, among them Etienne Tshisekedi’s son Felix; he’s not yet famous in his own right, but his father’s name will carry much weight. Then there’s veteran politician and former cabinet member <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/democratic-republic-congo-who-vital-kamerhe-congos-opposition-heavyweight-1540901">Vital Kamerhe</a>, whose time to lead may finally have come. If he put his heft behind the Rally and Lumbia moved down the hierarchy to make way for him, the movement might be considerably strengthened. </p>
<p>A viable and competent opposition wouldn’t suddenly solve all the DRC’s problems, but it could be the first step towards a secure peace. The international community must continue to show their support for the 2006 constitution and pressure Kabila to step down. His time in office needs to end – and as far as his country’s people are concerned, the sooner the better.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article originally stated that Moïse Katumbe had already returned to Kinshasa; at the time of writing he had only said he will return at some point. The error has been corrected.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Economics and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy (BA). </span></em></p>A deal to finally hold long-postponed elections has been reached, but parts of the country are still dealing with violence and chaos.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/733202017-02-22T14:34:26Z2017-02-22T14:34:26ZTrump is right on Congo’s minerals, but for all the wrong reasons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157711/original/image-20170221-18633-19k0nqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A prospector prepares to pan for gold in South Kivu in 2014. Many informal miners faced tough choices as US regulations turned life upside down.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kenny Katombe </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A few weeks ago a British newspaper <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/08/trump-administration-order-conflict-mineral-regulations">leaked</a> the draft of an executive order proposing the suspension of a US law that imposes tight controls over the trade in Congolese gold, tin, coltan and tungsten. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml">Section 1502</a> of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act requires US companies to carry out due diligence to ensure their products do not contain minerals sourced in conflict-affected areas in this central African country. Its main objective was to cut the financing of armed groups operating in the country.</p>
<p>But this objective was not entirely achieved. To be sure, armed group involvement decreased in some certified mines, but at the same time it shifted to gold which is not yet certified. Besides armed groups found other sources of revenue. </p>
<p>Dodd-Frank went into effect in July 2010 and immediately created a de facto <a href="http://www.swedwatch.org/sites/default/files/Conflictminerals_report.pdf">boycott</a> of mineral exports from the Congo and neighbouring countries. Companies found it easier to just stop sourcing from this region, instead of facing the high compliance costs for setting up and monitoring supply chain due diligence. </p>
<p>As such, the move by the Trump administration to repeal this section of the law sparked a wave of indignation and protest on social media and in the <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/02/08/leaked-memo-trump-conflict-minerals/">press</a>. <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/fr/press-releases/executive-order-suspending-us-conflict-minerals-law-would-be-gift-warlords-and-corrupt-businesses-says-global-witness/">Global Witness</a> called the decision </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a gift to predatory armed groups seeking to profit from Congo’s minerals as well as a gift to companies wanting to do business with the criminal and the corrupt.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But some have <a href="http://www.estellelevin.com/dodd-frank-1502-future-due-diligence/">downplayed</a> the gravity of the order. They have argued that a repeal will not have much effect since similar European law, soft law and corporate codes of conduct remain in place. Two online news sites <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/investigations/2017/02/14/who-pays-hidden-price-congo%E2%80%99s-conflict-free-minerals">IRIN</a> and <a href="http://www.mo.be/nieuws/trump-en-congo">Mo</a> are now reporting that Trump may have a point.</p>
<h2>Fact check</h2>
<p>The explanatory statement to the Trump draft executive order highlights the unintended consequences of Dodd-Frank. Top of these are job losses and lost livelihoods. On this point, Trump is right. In the age of “alternative facts”, this calls for evidence.</p>
<p>Research has documented the effects of Dodd-Frank in the eastern Congo, the area that was most affected by the policy. Here a virtual boycott on exports had a number of socioeconomic consequences, as well as an impact on the organisation of supply chains.</p>
<p>First, there was a negative effect on incomes. This can be attributed to the de facto ban itself, but also to the accompanying certification programmes that were rolled out. In South Kivu, a certification system set up by International Tin Research Initiative created a <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B57858126-EF65-E411-9403-005056AB4B80%7D.pdf">monopoly</a> for one export office and reduced prices on the local market. A similar <a href="http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/201011_Kivuhinterlands.pdf">monopoly</a> was created by Mining Mineral Resources in Katanga, resulting in falling prices and ultimately <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/investigations/2017/02/14/who-pays-hidden-price-congo%E2%80%99s-conflict-free-minerals">miners’ protests</a>.</p>
<p>Second, an indirect effect on health care and child mortality has been documented. Researchers from the United Nations University <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/unintended-consequences-economic-sanctions-human-rights">conclude</a> that the probability of infant deaths near the policy-targeted mines increased by at least 143%. This they attributed to mothers’ reduced access to infant health care. </p>
<p>As Congolese miners struggled to sell their minerals, not to mention receiving a good price, their household incomes dropped. This had knock-on effects on the incomes of petty traders, shop and restaurant owners, taxi drivers and others operating in and around the mines. All this has affected people’s ability to afford health care.</p>
<p>Third, the stricter regulations allowed non-Western companies to take more control over mineral exports from the region. In Bukavu, for example, two <a href="http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17767/S_2012_843-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y">export offices</a> trading with Chinese buyers remained active after the de facto ban.</p>
<p>Fourth, the creation of “islands” of certified mining sites has pushed more actors into illegality and smuggling. In eastern Congo, this means a move to <a href="http://sarageenen.net/?page_id=15">gold mining</a>. Thanks to its material characteristics – a small amount of gold is worth a lot of money – gold is easy to smuggle. On the other hand, the 3T minerals (tungsten, tin and coltan) are bulky and require more sophisticated processing. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, most policy efforts so far have focused on 3T, while gold has for now largely remained below the radar. But, it’s not just artisanal miners that have moved into gold, as documented by the <a href="http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/9/discover?rpp=10&filtertype_0=spatial&filtertype_1=contentType&filter_0=DEMOCRATIC+REPUBLIC+OF+THE+CONGO&filter_relational_operator_1=equals&filter_1=Reports&filter_relational_operator_0=equals&filtertype=agenda&filter_relational_operator=equals&filter=UN+ORGANIZATION+STABILIZATION+MISSION+IN+THE+DEMOCRATIC+REPUBLIC+OF+THE+CONGO">UN</a> and the Belgian research institute <a href="http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/20141031-Promines_analysis.pdf">International Peace Information Service (IPIS)</a> the same was true for armed groups. Dominic P. Parker and Bryan Vadheim, in a study under the title <a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/689865">“Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed?”</a> find that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the legislation increased looting of civilians and shifted militia battles toward unregulated gold-mining territories.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the positive side, the “regulated” 3T mines saw an <a href="http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Dodd-Frank1502ImpactUpdate022016.pdf">improvement</a> in health and safety standards, a <a href="http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Mapping-minerals-in-eastern-DR-Congo_v005.pdf">reduction</a> in armed group control, and increased security for civilians. Some observers have also applauded the increased international attention for living and working conditions in Congolese mines.</p>
<p>Although these consequences were unintended, they were anticipated by local stakeholders as well as by some researchers and academics working in the region. A six-month <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257125920_A_Dangerous_Bet_The_Challenges_of_Formalizing_Artisanal_Mining_in_the_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo">presidential ban</a> on artisanal mining activities issued by Joseph Kabila had already revealed some of the likely consequences. The ban was framed as an attempt to combat militarisation and “reinstall order” in the mines. </p>
<p>At the lifting of the presidential ban in March 2011, miners and traders in the Congo feared what a de facto ban created by Dodd-Frank would mean for them. They asked for more support in order for them to be able to comply with the requirements. Yet, in the campaign running up to Dodd-Frank the voices of local stakeholders were not heard. This case was well argued in an <a href="https://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/09092014-open-letter-final-and-list.pdf">open letter</a> signed by 70 (mainly) academics and researchers in 2014 and is persuasively demonstrated in the documentary <a href="http://www.wewillwinpeace.com/">We Will Win Peace</a>.</p>
<h2>All the wrong reasons</h2>
<p>So the ensuing question is: Would Trump have listened to the Congolese miners?</p>
<p>The answer is, very unlikely. Section 1502 is just a small part of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, which was passed after the 2008 financial crisis to tighten oversight of banks and protect consumers. Under the influence of powerful corporate lobbying groups, the Trump administration is now looking into repealing several sections, including a <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-sec-rule-foreign-governments-235013">disclosure rule</a> requiring US oil, gas and mining companies to be transparent on the payments they make to foreign governments.</p>
<p>So despite the rhetoric of Dodd-Frank’s unintended consequences on local livelihoods and the convenient use of – in this case – scientific evidence, concerns about Congolese stakeholders are not what motivates the Trump administration. Rather, as the explanatory statement explains, it is the fact that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Compliance costs are estimated at 3 to 4 billion USD upfront, and 200 million USD per year thereafter. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These are evidently the wrong reasons.</p>
<p>The explanatory statement does include something else of interest. It says that a more effective way of addressing the problems of the Congo and adjoining countries will be sought. Talking about artisanal mining sector reform specifically, here are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259505314_In_the_face_of_reform_What_future_for_ASM_in_the_eastern_DRC">some ideas</a> that emanate from the miners themselves:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>creating more and viable artisanal mining zones where they can legally work;</p></li>
<li><p>providing them with technical and material assistance so as to increase their productivity; </p></li>
<li><p>facilitating access to credit;</p></li>
<li><p>supporting the empowerment of bottom-up miners’ organisations instead of top-down <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/Publications/PolicyBriefs/APB/14-DeHaan-Geenen.pdf">cooperatives</a> captured by elites. </p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157675/original/image-20170221-18640-193ane7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Artisanal miner in eastern Congo.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But when it comes to addressing the problems of the Congo the more effective way is complex and politically messy. It involves more than just mining sector reform, but also <a href="http://www.mo.be/nieuws/trump-en-congo">political negotiations and peacebuilding efforts</a>.</p>
<p>A mineral trader in Bukavu put it this way to me: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are tired of all these decisions on our lives, being taken elsewhere. How can you refuse to buy the minerals that we export, but at the same time sell weapons to our armed groups? In both cases you are denying us a chance to live. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Will anyone listen to him now?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Geenen receives funding from FWO (Research Fund Flanders) and VLIR-UOS (Interuniversity Cooperation Flanders). She is affiliated with CREAC (Belgian Expertise Centre for Central Africa). She thanks Marijke Verpoorten and Mollie Gleiberman for editing this piece</span></em></p>The US wants to repeal controls imposed seven years ago on the trade of some Congolese minerals. The president’s reasons might be all wrong. But the law was badly put together in the first place.Sara Geenen, Lecturer in Globalisation, International Development and Poverty, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/717222017-01-23T18:07:46Z2017-01-23T18:07:46ZWhat southern Africa can learn from west Africa about dealing with despots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153866/original/image-20170123-8078-qsdy9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Muhammadu Buhari, Macky Sall and former Ghanian President John Mahama at a special meeting of Ecowas on The Gambia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Has the Economic Community of West African States <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">(Ecowas)</a> just taught the Southern African Development Community <a href="http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/">(SADC)</a> a lesson? The West African states effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/high-stakes-as-west-africa-prepares-military-action-against-gambias-jammeh-71481">took a dictator</a> to task after he refused to comply with the democratic will of the people to vacate office.</p>
<p>By using diplomacy in combination with the threat of military force they managed to convince the former Gambian president Yahya Jammeh to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/jammeh-arrives-banjul-airport-stepping-170121210246506.html">surrender power and leave the country</a>. This was after he was defeated in an election.</p>
<p>Why has the southern African regional body been, in comparison, so ineffectual? Will it learn from Ecowas and become more interventionist?</p>
<p>Many countries in southern Africa have not had free and fair elections; Zimbabwe is the most obvious example.</p>
<p>Where there have been cases of unconstitutional seizures of power, or leaders have stayed in office despite a lack of electoral support, there has been at best some form of SADC mediation, but not the threat of military intervention.</p>
<p>Such contrasting relative tolerance, if not outright passivity, can be explained by a number of factors. They relate in part to the sub-regional configuration, with former liberation movements governing the most influential member states. In addition, there appears to be a lack of common political will. This can be seen from the fact that there is no operational regional military force.</p>
<p>SADC’s credibility is at stake. At a time when the AU is increasingly promoting legitimate governance, the question arises: how much longer can SADC justify its inaction?</p>
<h2>The case for a regional military force</h2>
<p>The Anglophone member states of Ecowas formed a military force, called the <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4379/5057">Ecowas Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)</a>, already in 1990. It has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">intervened</a> in a number of civil wars and cases of instability in West Africa. </p>
<p>SADC, on the other hand, has for years been attempting to organise a <a href="http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/regional-peacekeeping/standby-force/">stand-by force</a> which would fall under the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">stand-by force of the African Union (AU)</a>.</p>
<p>But the SADC force isn’t operational and has not got beyond some basic training exercises. Units of the South African National Defence Force have been deployed for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africas-plans-to-militarise-humanitarian-work-are-misguided-53391">peace-making missions</a> on behalf of the AU and the United Nations (UN) in a number of African countries. A disastrous military engagement in the Central African Republic <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-28-sa-soldiers-died-in-car-while-generals-dithered">cost the lives of 13 South African soldiers</a> in March 2013. South African troops remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a SADC member state. Soldiers have been <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2016/12/19/south-african-soldier-killed-in-congo-firefight/">killed there</a>, too.</p>
<p>It cannot be said that southern Africa has not experienced the kind of civil wars that West Africa has had in recent decades, and that there has therefore not been the need for such a force in the region. </p>
<p>The war in the DRC has been far larger than those in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the East African regional force intervened. And there have been a number of other cases of instability where a SADC force might well have played a role in bringing about legitimate governance, including Madagascar and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The only case that somewhat resembled events around The Gambia was South Africa’s <a href="https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/south-africa-invades-lesotho">intervention in Lesotho in September 1998</a>. Nominally under SADC, that intervention’s goal was to ensure the incumbent ruler was not ousted by opposition forces. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153871/original/image-20170123-8057-h08ppl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of President Adama Barrow cheer Senegalese soldiers on patrol in Banjul, The Gambia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Legnan Koula</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Three SADC member states did intervene militarily in the DRC in August 1998. Troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe were deployed, nominally under the umbrella of SADC. The goal was to aid the then president, Laurent Desiré Kabila, against rebels who had invaded the eastern Congo. Kabila would not have been able to consolidate himself in power without the <a href="https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/%7Erwest/link-suggestion/wpcd_2008-09_augmented/wp/s/Second_Congo_War.htm">military support</a> of the three SADC states. </p>
<p>Both interventions were controversial within SADC, since they were not based on a common decision by the member states. These were at that time marred by the <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/12/13/masire-reveals-mugabe-mandela-rivalry/">rivalry</a> between Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela. This may help explain why there have not been any similar military interventions since.</p>
<h2>Different approaches</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe stands out as a case for intervention. Back in March 2002 Mugabe’s re-election as president was rigged and did <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241803/FULLTEXT01.pdf">not reflect the democratic will</a> of the people. </p>
<p>Then in March 2008 he lost presidential elections to his rival Morgan Tsvangirai. By all accounts Tsvangirai won the election, but Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/02/zimbabwe1">rigged the vote</a>. A second round of voting was deemed necessary. But the ruling party’s militia unleashed brutal state terror against the opposition and Tsvangirai pulled out of a second round to stop <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817057,00.html">further loss of lives</a>.</p>
<p>Instead of taking action against Mugabe, SADC engaged in mediation. This led to a coalition government being formed. </p>
<p>Why did Ecowas act firmly against Jammeh while SADC didn’t against Mugabe? There are a number of reasons. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is a much more important country in southern Africa than The Gambia is in West Africa. Despite all his human rights abuses and repressive rule, Mugabe remains a widely-respected liberation hero and popular among large parts of the population in the <a href="http://rense.com/general56/mugabevoted3rd.htm">sub-region and on the continent</a>. He has been able to project himself as having not only liberated his country from colonialism but also as remaining steadfast <a href="http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/president-mugabe-and-the-stubborn-ideological-consistency-of-zimbabwes-anti-colonial-project/">against colonial influences</a>. Above all, he managed to sell his fast track land reforms as a necessary and just act of appropriating land from white farmers and giving it to blacks. </p>
<p>Another key factor is that the most influential SADC countries are led by liberation-era leaders who continue to regard Mugabe as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">one of their own</a>.</p>
<p>Taking action against Mugabe would therefore always be controversial, and the consequences difficult to predict. In addition, Zimbabwe’s army has remained loyal to Mugabe and is a force to be reckoned with. The SADC leadership therefore played safe and did nothing effective. </p>
<h2>SADC and Kabila</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, there seems little chance of SADC following ECOWAS’s example and using the kind of intervention that led to Jammeh’s removal from office. </p>
<p>SADC faces just such a test in the DRC. President Joseph Kabila has finally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/31/drc-close-to-deal-for-president-joseph-kabila-to-step-down-after-2017-elections">agreed to leave office</a>. This should happen latest a year after he should have stepped down when his two terms came to an end. He made his decision after public protests against his continued term in office turned violent in December. Many people were killed during <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/21/Up-to-20-dead-as-Congo-police-protesters-clash-over-president/6411482288306/">two days of riots</a>.</p>
<p>If Kabila reneges on the agreement he has made, will SADC act to ensure he in fact leaves office? How long will it take before SADC has the means and the will to remove rulers who have either been defeated in an election or who refuse to accept that their terms of office have come to an end? Will what has happened in West Africa in the case of The Gambia help persuade SADC to move towards more effective interventions to remove dictators and other illegitimate rulers? </p>
<p>It seems unlikely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of SWAPO since 1974. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>SADC’s credibility is at stake. Its lack of political will in acting decisively against despots is at odds with the African Union’s goal of promoting legitimate governance on the continent.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownHenning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.