tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/lords-resistance-army-8085/articles
Lord's Resistance Army – The Conversation
2024-03-18T13:42:37Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/224750
2024-03-18T13:42:37Z
2024-03-18T13:42:37Z
Press freedom in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda: what journalists have to say about doing their jobs
<p>A majority of the world’s population has experienced a decline in press freedom in recent years, according to <a href="https://www.unesco.org/reports/world-media-trends/2021/en">a UN report</a>. In east Africa, the results are mixed and debatable. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">Rwanda</a>, both international press freedom rankings and journalists on the ground say press freedom has increased over the past 10 years. In neighbouring <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">Uganda</a>, both international rankings and local journalists say media freedom has declined. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">Kenya</a>, rankings reflect declining freedom over the past decade, but reporters acknowledge they have more freedom than their counterparts in Uganda and Rwanda.</p>
<p>In our roles as associate professors in journalism and mass communication, we interviewed and surveyed more than 500 journalists in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. We learned that the evolution and current state of press freedom in the region is complex. In our book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">Press Freedom and the (Crooked) Path Toward Democracy: Lessons from Journalists in East Africa</a>, we provide an updated state of press freedom in these three countries. </p>
<p>We argue that much of the academic research that classifies global media systems has overlooked the world’s most developing nations, and those that have included developing nations have failed to consider their historical contexts. They have worked from a misguided premise that nations develop in a linear fashion – from non-democracy to democracy – and from a restricted press to a free press. In reality, press freedom and democracy ebb and flow. </p>
<p>We examine the impact of social, political, legal and economic factors on media in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya to help with understanding media systems outside the western world. </p>
<p>We chose to study these three countries because they represent varying stages of development and democracy building. Rwanda, which experienced a genocide in 1994, is in relatively early (though fast paced) stages of reconstruction. Uganda, which experienced a civil war in the 1980s and unrest in the 1990s but arguably not to the extent of Rwanda’s genocide, can be considered in a middle stage of development. Kenya, which has remained largely peaceful, can be understood as being in a more advanced stage of development.</p>
<h2>Rwanda</h2>
<p>In Rwanda, despite 30 years of economic, social and media progress and development, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">lingering impacts</a> from the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi permeate the country’s media. <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/legacy-of-rwanda-genocide-includes-media-restricti/">Multiple laws</a> limit free expression in the name of genocide prevention, and international press freedom rankings indicate the nation is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">not free</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we found</a> that many Rwandan journalists believe that they have a great deal of freedom and that outsiders don’t consider the country’s history when evaluating the media. Outsiders, for example, hear that Rwandan journalists cannot criticise the president or high-ranking government officials and immediately think there is no press freedom. But local journalists say they don’t feel oppressed. They feel relatively free to choose their story topics. They don’t want to publish critical stories because they want to foster peace. </p>
<p>Journalists believe their role is to act as unifiers and right the wrongs of their predecessors who exacerbated the genocide. Public trust in the media <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/49408/chapter-abstract/418504465?redirectedFrom=fulltext">remains high</a>, according to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077699021998647">focus groups</a> conducted with members of the general public. In Rwanda, there appears to be a relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict. That is, the more time that passes since the country experienced war, the more press freedom it has. </p>
<p>Prioritising social good over media rights has helped the country unify and develop, but over the long term <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we see signs</a> that Rwanda’s linear path towards increasing democracy and press freedom may not continue. Rather, prioritising peace at the cost of press freedom could limit development and reinforce existing <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-a-dictator-who-clings-to-power-but-its-not-just-for-his-own-gain-204834">authoritarian power structures</a>.</p>
<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>In Uganda, the relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict has been less linear. Some media restrictions have lessened and others have worsened. </p>
<p>Despite a sustained period of peace after conflict with the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-lords-resistance-army-violence-in-the-name-of-god/a-18136620">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> in the northern part of the country that began in the 1980s, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">press freedom is not increasing</a> as time passes. Overall, journalists in the country largely agree with the international perception that they’re restricted and that the situation is worsening the longer President Yoweri Museveni remains in power. Journalists in Uganda perceive their press freedom to be lower than journalists in neighbouring countries. They also have a more pessimistic outlook. </p>
<p>Government interference, some of which stems from the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/02/media-minefield/increased-threats-freedom-expression-uganda">conflict</a> and some that’s <a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/eron-kiiza-defends-the-press-uganda.php">new</a>, remains pervasive. Worn down by government intimidation and repressive laws, coupled with low pay and lack of necessary equipment, some journalists <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1852097">told us</a> they had turned to unethical behaviour, such as acting as spies in the newsroom. </p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya is home to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">freest media environment</a>. It’s also the only one in our study that has seen changes in presidential leadership in recent years. But just because a nation regularly holds elections doesn’t mean the path to democratisation and media freedom is smooth. </p>
<p>External measures indicate that Kenya has more press freedom than Uganda and Rwanda, and journalists in the country perceive this to be true. However, data show ups and downs of media freedom that have mirrored varying political administrations and events, including spurts of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These ebbs and flows are largely due to politicians or powerful members of society who share ideological goals or have financial interests like <a href="https://kenyamedia.reboot.org/">owning major media houses</a> and influencing coverage. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges, journalists attribute Kenya’s state of press freedom to the vast international connections the country and its leaders have. An empowered civil society – which stems from both a space for dissent given by public officials, and the culture and spirit of Kenyans – has promoted the growth of human rights, including media freedoms.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>After a nuanced examination of the factors that affect the media in each of these countries, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">our book lists</a> a set of factors that affect press freedom and democracy building. </p>
<p>Specifically, we believe each country’s distance from conflict, political benchmarks, international linkages and civil society strength are central to understanding its degree of press freedom, development and democratisation. </p>
<p>While these factors are not the only elements that influence media landscapes, they are a starting point for better understanding and theorising about press freedom environments. </p>
<p>A free and independent press allows the public to hold leaders accountable, make informed decisions and access a diversity of opinions. This makes it important to accurately understand how free varying media landscapes are, and why.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Important factors, such as conflict, are central to understanding a country’s degree of press freedom, development and democratisation.
Karen McIntyre, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Director of Graduate Studies, Richard T. Robertson School of Media and Culture, Virginia Commonwealth University
Meghan Sobel Cohen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and the Master of Development Practice, Regis University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/177578
2022-02-28T14:37:16Z
2022-02-28T14:37:16Z
Ugandan rebel Joseph Kony: the latest US arrest bid raises questions
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447535/original/file-20220221-22-4twk5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joseph Kony, head of the Lord's Resistance Army (Centre) arrives for a past peace talks at a jungle in Southern Sudan. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/joseph-kony-head-of-the-lords-resistance-army-arrives-at-a-news-photo/71584145?adppopup=true">Adam Pletts/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The US, through its embassy in the Central African Republic, <a href="https://cf.usembassy.gov/united-states-announces-5-million-reward-for-joseph-kony/">recently published</a> a warrant offering up to US$5 million for information leading to the capture of Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony. The US had <a href="https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-verdict-in-the-case-against-dominic-ongwen-for-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/">previously announced</a> the bounty in early 2013. It has been on the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/22/joseph-kony-is-still-at-large-heres-why-the-u-s-and-uganda-were-willing-to-give-up-the-hunt/">trail</a> of the Lord’s Resistance Army leader since the early 2000s, spending at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/africa/joseph-kony-mission-ends.html#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20spent%20almost,fighting%20the%20Lord's%20Resistance%20Army.">US$800 million</a> on efforts to bring him to book. We asked international justice experts Tonny Kirabira and Leïla Choukroune to unpack the renewed interest in the Ugandan fugitive.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the history of the Lord’s Resistance Army?</h2>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group led by Joseph Kony, launched a <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351271929-27/uganda-omona-andrew-david-samuel-baba-ayegba">war</a> in northern Uganda in 1987. For over two decades, the group engaged the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, while also targeting civilians. Besides massacres and destruction of property, the group systematically targeted and abducted children to become its soldiers and sex slaves. </p>
<p>It is <a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-how-to-bring-justice-for-thousands-of-children-born-of-war-151121">infamous</a> for having pushed 66,000 children into war, and driven about 2 million people into camps. Over the years, various military campaigns by the Ugandan Army weakened the group and pushed its members into neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. </p>
<p>The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and four of his top commanders – Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen – in 2005. </p>
<p>The group took part in a two-year peace negotiation with the Ugandan government. The negotiation, brokered by South Sudan, collapsed in 2008. Kony <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1195413/govt-rejects-lra-demand-icc">pulled out</a> after Uganda’s government failed to urge the International Criminal Court to lift the indictment against him and the other top commanders.</p>
<p>In 2008, the Ugandan forces and troops from neighbouring countries launched <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1224614/lightning-thunder-milestone">Operation Lightning Thunder</a>, which drove the militants further into the Central African Republic. That’s where Joseph Kony is believed to be stationed.</p>
<h2>What has kept this group together?</h2>
<p>Besides its push for governance based on the <a href="https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/4997/12458">Ten Commandments</a>, the Lord’s Resistance Army’s <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/revisiting-lra-war-10-years-later-1658118?view=htmlamp">primary objective</a> was to overthrow the government of <a href="https://www.statehouse.go.ug/people/h-e-yoweri-k-museveni">President Yoweri Museveni</a>. They perceived Museveni’s government as hostile towards Kony’s Acholi ethnic group in northern Uganda. </p>
<p>In the early stages of the war, it was <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/-sudan-government-has-evidence-that-uganda-still-supports-rebels-in-darfur-region--1515786?view=htmlamp">believed</a> that the Sudanese government provided logistical support to the group. At the time, Sudan had accused the Uganda government of supporting rebels in its Darfur region. </p>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army also <a href="http://enoughproject.org/reports/konys-ivory-how-elephant-poaching-congo-helps-support-lords-resitance-army">engaged</a> in elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to fund its war.</p>
<h2>What’s known about the group’s activities today?</h2>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army is believed to have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-lord-resistance-army-final-days/a-60535944">fewer than 1,000 fighters</a>, all scattered in splinter groups. There are reports of <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/08/11/Kony-LRA-Uganda-Congo-CAR">its atrocities</a> in South Sudan and Central African Republic. The group’s actions include violent attacks on civilian populations and abduction of children. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/photographs-reveal-the-personal-lives-of-the-lords-resistance-army-127843">Photographs reveal the personal lives of the Lord's Resistance Army</a>
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<p>Significant reduction in the number of fighters, and deaths of commanders like Otti, Okot and Lukwiya, dismantled the group’s top leadership. In addition, its commander, Ongwen, <a href="https://theconversation.com/dominic-ongwen-surrenders-but-justice-for-lords-resistance-army-victims-will-be-hard-to-find-35966">surrendered</a> to US forces in the Central African Republic in 2015. In 2021, Ongwen was <a href="https://theconversation.com/dominic-ongwen-icc-conviction-of-former-child-soldier-establishes-forced-pregnancy-as-a-war-crime-154671">convicted</a> for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/child-victim-soldier-war-criminal-unpacking-dominic-ongwens-journey-154850">Child victim, soldier, war criminal: unpacking Dominic Ongwen’s journey</a>
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<h2>Why is the US going for Joseph Kony now?</h2>
<p>The US has always maintained a strategic role and responsibility in the efforts to counter Kony’s group. But its recent action – issuing a warrant and providing a WhatsApp number for relaying the information – poses more questions than it offers solutions. </p>
<p>Previously, the US put <a href="http://enoughproject.org/files/lra_strategy_paper_051209.pdf">political pressure</a> on the Democratic Republic of Congo to counter the rebel group. The <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/cabinet.html">George W. Bush administration</a> provided logistical and intelligence <a href="http://enoughproject.org/files/lra_strategy_paper_051209.pdf">support for the Operation Lightning Thunder</a> in 2008 and 2009. </p>
<p>US civil society has also been active in the efforts to neuter Kony’s group. As a result, President Obama <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-northern-uganda-r">signed</a> the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 in 2010. </p>
<p>In 2011, Obama <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore">deployed</a> 100 military advisors in Central African Republic to “enhance regional efforts against the Lord’s Resistance Army”. Succinctly, the deployment was premised on both national security and foreign policy interests of the US. While the foreign policy is magnified in the growth of US presence and influence in the region, supporting counterinsurgency operations could be critical to national security interests. </p>
<p>But with the reduction in the group’s capacity and threat, the renewed US interest is not clear. Does the move aim to support the International Criminal Court’s mandate, or is it simply a humanitarian intervention for civilians? </p>
<p>Following the conviction of Ongwen in 2021, the US Department of State issued a <a href="https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-verdict-in-the-case-against-dominic-ongwen-for-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/">statement</a> in support of the International Criminal Court’s verdict. The statement noted: “While we continue to believe the court is in need of significant reform, we are pleased to see Ongwen brought to justice”. </p>
<p>It is in this same statement that the US emphasised its goal of hunting down Kony. The US$5 million prize for information leading to “the arrest, transfer, or conviction” of Kony was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/4/4/us-offers-reward-for-uganda-warlord-kony">first announced by the Obama administration in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>Different interpretations can be made from this explicit US interest. The US$5m prize could demonstrate a tacit support of institutions like the International Criminal Court, as alternative avenues for peace and justice. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hunt-may-be-off-but-a-5-million-pledge-might-bring-kony-to-justice-13234">The hunt may be off, but a $5 million pledge might bring Kony to justice</a>
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<p>Prior to the Donald Trump administration, the US <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/14/the-darfur-crisis-the-role-of-the-usa-and-the-implications-for-the-icc/">supported</a> the International Criminal Court’s interventions in Darfur and Libya. It is important to note that the US is not a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It has had a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/74302/u-s-icc-relations-under-a-biden-administration-room-to-be-bold/">fractious relationship</a> with The Hague based court in previous years. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the Biden administration could be viewed as a new chapter in the US - International Criminal Court relationship, albeit under “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/5/biden-and-the-icc-partial-cooperation-selective-justice">partial and conditional</a> cooperation”. In essence, such cooperation is only limited to situations where US interests are at stake. In this case, the intervention in the fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa Republic. </p>
<p>Therefore, by placing a prize on Kony’s arrest, the Biden administration could be demonstrating a willingness to assist in the enforcement of an International Criminal Court-sanctioned warrant, in the process offering support to the Court.</p>
<p>But it could be argued that searching for Kony is a US entry point back into the Central African Republic. This is amid the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic">growing influence</a> of Russia in the country. France, the UK and the US accuse <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/28/russia-denies-its-personnel-involved-in-car-killings">Russian paramilitary forces of committing atrocities</a> in the Central African Republic. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-it-will-take-to-end-civil-war-in-the-central-african-republic-166041">What it will take to end civil war in the Central African Republic</a>
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<p>From a humanitarian perspective, the US intervention can be founded on a moral imperative to protect civilian victims of the Lord’s Resistance Army. And an external intervention would attain more legitimacy if received as a humanitarian intervention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Fresh efforts to capture Kony comes amid growing influence of Russia in the Central African Republic.
Tonny Raymond Kirabira, PhD Candidate in Law, University of Portsmouth
Leïla Choukroune, Professor of International Law and Director of the University Research and Innovation Theme in Democratic Citizenship, University of Portsmouth
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/127843
2019-12-12T07:34:51Z
2019-12-12T07:34:51Z
Photographs reveal the personal lives of the Lord’s Resistance Army
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306303/original/file-20191211-95138-10lmfpl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">© ARLPI</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A great deal has been written about the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army. Under their commander, Joseph Kony, the group became notorious for its brutal violence and use of child soldiers. But few images of the group are available. Those that are were mostly taken during <a href="http://www.justiceandreconciliation.org/tag/juba-peace-talks/">peace negotiations</a> between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Juba, Sudan, in 2006.</p>
<p>My newly published book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rebel-Lives-Photographs-within-Resistance/dp/9492677989">Rebel Lives. Photographs from inside the Lord’s Resistance Army</a>, aims to change this. It consists of photographs taken by Lord’s Resistance Army commanders themselves. It gives an unprecedented view into the lives of those involved in the rebel movement. </p>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army emerged in opposition to President Yoweri Museveni’s newly formed government in the late 1980s. But the group turned <a href="http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2004/02/25/focus-lra-attack-barlonyo-idps-camp">against the people they claimed</a> to protect, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s. They abducted civilians – mostly children – on a <a href="https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/723/">large scale</a>. Boys and men were used as fighters, whereas girls were given as “wives” to commanders. </p>
<p>The photographs were mainly taken in 2002 and 2003, when the Ugandan army <a href="http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/46151/uganda-operation-iron-fist-agreement-renewed-amid-tensions">chased</a> the rebels from their bases in southern Sudan. Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, supported the rebels and allowed them to launch attacks into Uganda from bases in southern Sudan. The Lord’s Resistance Army re-entered northern Uganda, <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/118335/99%20FULL.pdf">expanded their territory</a>, established new bases and looked for potential new allies. </p>
<p>The photos are testimony to this period. Most were taken by two of the highest commanders – Charles Tabuley and Vincent Otti – who were in charge of this mission. </p>
<p>The photos have a profound ambiguity. They illustrate the tension between extreme violence and the everyday lives of the rebels. They show abducted young men and women who have been exposed to large degrees of violence – and who have been committing these acts themselves. At the same time, they also show how, within this context of extreme violence, life continues to be surprisingly ordinary. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306305/original/file-20191211-95120-1r6vj5s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© ARLPI</span></span>
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<h2>Collecting photographs</h2>
<p>I collected the photographs during many years of research in the region. They came from various people including former rebels, traditional and religious leaders and journalists. </p>
<p>For the past three years, I have worked with a local research team (led by a former rebel) to trace the former soldiers in the photographs: to ask for their permission to use the photographs and understand their meanings. We found a great deal of information from female ex-LRA members, who usually stayed longer in the rebel group. As “wives”, most of them spent less time on the frontlines, which offered them less opportunity to escape but also made their situation relatively safer. </p>
<p>Many of the photographs are of a striking normality: they depict scenes of families posing during celebrations, young men trying to look cool, young women showing off their nicest dresses and couples in love. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1211&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1211&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306309/original/file-20191211-95149-rna1n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1211&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© ARLPI</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They make for uncomfortable viewing. These ordinary scenes were being photographed against a backdrop of great violence. The Lord’s Resistance Army brought <a href="https://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/joseph-kony-lra">suffering and pain</a> to civilians in northern Uganda, and beyond. They <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160303214220/http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/JRP/JRP-FN4-2007.pdf">slaughtered</a>, looted, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/uganda/">abducted,</a> burned, raped and disfigured people. Moreover, the rebels themselves had been exposed to extreme violence within the LRA, as most of them were abducted.</p>
<p>The normality of their photographs isn’t unsurprising. War reporting and analysis often focuses on the spectacular: on violence, suffering, and horror. But in between these moments, there’s an “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Culture-Chaos-Anthropology-Social-Condition/dp/0226496422">everyday</a>”, in which people live ordinary lives. </p>
<p>Conflicts also constitute a time of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14733285.2012.726075?casa_token=yFuy6eKy3ioAAAAA%3A_4z0JhCW_L3kqF5FCa1aNKBs4eWyCCe6zt8CU0s-dTNEpla-JbEBmKUFgxXSdqnPsxVbb6xsME41">intense bonding</a> between members of armed groups, as dangers and sorrows are shared, protection is sought, and friendships are made.</p>
<h2>Memories</h2>
<p>When discussing the photographs with the former rebels, I would often get surprising reactions: some of the former rebels spoke of their time in the army with a certain melancholy. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1258&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1258&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306310/original/file-20191211-95165-1xul1da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1258&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Photographer unknown</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They spoke about friendships they nourished, spiritual miracles they witnessed and the power they felt. They would speak of the nice clothes they had, and the celebrations they organised. </p>
<p>At first sight, the photographs mirror <a href="https://www.academia.edu/31778430/On_The_Ultimate_Patronage_Machine_Photography_and_Substantial_Relations_in_Rural_South-western_Uganda">practices</a> in wider Ugandan society, and are not very different from ordinary family photos. They show people posing as friends, in pairs, suggesting a familial bond. </p>
<p>They show people dressed at their best, posing for a photo on a “big day”. In the words of a former rebel:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We particularly put these clothes on special days like Christmas and Juma Oris (one of Kony’s spirits, named after a Ugandan military officer) day – the 7th of April, which is the day when Kony has gone to the bush. That day is a good day: you eat well, and you look smart. We put our nice clothes on, and we have our photo snapped. The bigger commanders, some of them would dress very nicely!</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Photographs and coercion</h2>
<p>Yet, at the same time, the photographs reflect the violence and coercion of which they are part. For example, the photographs show the pleasure of certain individuals, but not of everyone: not all fighters had nice clothes to pose in, or the opportunity of posing in front of a camera. </p>
<p>The clothes worn show the inequality, particularly among the women: the clothes were looted by the men, and not equally distributed among the women. The better their rank, or the higher the rank of their “husband”, the better their access to the nicer clothes.</p>
<p>In the words of a former (female) rebel: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the bush, we had very nice clothes. A nice dress means that the husband loves you. They come to Uganda, and they get all these clothes, and they take it to the bush. The choice to do so is out of love. Sometimes a man has eight wives; he only gives to his favourites. This often provokes jealousy: the other wives could not get any of the nice clothes, and they also could not pose for the photo. It only were the favourites who were able to do so!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Given the fact that clothes were often the result of looting, they themselves are a testimony to the violence both outside and within the army.</p>
<p>For some, the act of being photographed was outright negative: not everyone felt happy posing in front of the camera. For them, it was not a choice, but a reflection of the forced circumstances of which they were part.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306312/original/file-20191211-95115-u66rak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Unknown</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The photographs force us to further think beyond binary terms such as victims or perpetrators. It has been <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/complex-political-perpetrators-reflections-on-dominic-ongwen/505CC493324F01B19B6C475B82A9510C">widely discussed how these categories are difficult to maintain</a> for combatants of the Lord’s Resistance Army, who can be considered both a victim (of abduction), and a perpetrator (having participated in the violence). </p>
<p>Within the coercive and violent limits of their existence, combatants still have a number of identities and encounter a multitude of experiences. They are confronted with the most brutal violence, suffer a range of mistreatment, but in a number of cases also fall in love, argue, and look for ways to relax or find pleasure. </p>
<p>The photographs are very much witness to these multiple experiences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Photographs give unprecedented insight into the lives and humanity of those involved in the Ugandan rebel movement.
Kristof Titeca, Senior Lecturer in International Development, University of Antwerp
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/74210
2017-03-14T18:59:03Z
2017-03-14T18:59:03Z
The ICC can’t live with Africa, but it can’t live without it either
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160597/original/image-20170313-9641-aseeng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ICC's Former Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo looks at a video of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Gonzalo Fuentes </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the first of February, 2017, the African Union issued a resolution <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/african-union-resolution-urges-states-to-leave-icc">encouraging</a> member states to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Whatever comes of it, the <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/quietly-au-encourages-withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court/3701428.html">reported plan</a> is the culmination of a highly publicised <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-criminal-court-must-not-ignore-threats-of-an-african-mass-withdrawal-67257">pushback</a> by African states, which have accused the court of political bias, interference in African affairs and even racism. </p>
<p>Today’s African opposition represents a crisis for the 15-year-old court. But it’s also a symptom of a deeper dilemma faced by the ICC: how to enforce international criminal law impartially in a world of vast inequalities of power?</p>
<p>As I argue in a recent <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijw027/2919404/Dominic-Ongwen-on-Trial-The-ICC-s-African-Dilemmas">article</a>, the ICC sought to escape this dilemma by focusing exclusively on Africa. At first, African states went along with it because cooperation entailed significant benefits. When the ICC shifted gears, however, and began to prosecute African heads of state instead of siding with them, the relationship went sour.</p>
<p>Africa’s push back is thus a result of the ICC’s own strategy for the continent. But it also needs to be seen in the context of Africa’s long experience of damaging foreign intervention within a highly inequitable international order.</p>
<h2>The ICC’s Africa strategy</h2>
<p>Without Africa to turn to, the ICC may not have survived in the post-9/11 world. The Middle East was ablaze with <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/9-11-and-america-s-war-on-terrorism/24975">US wars</a>, and the US <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf">actively threatened</a> the court’s survival. The ICC was without enforcement power and depended on state cooperation to conduct investigations and arrest suspects. So it had to <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/us-opposition-to-the-icc.html">avoid US opposition</a>, while finding support for its prosecutions. </p>
<p>Africa seemed the perfect target for the ICC’s first cases. The continent was politically marginal enough that intervention there wouldn’t interfere with US interests. In addition, Africa was politically weak enough that those subject to intervention were considered unlikely to challenge the court. </p>
<p>Involvement was made easier by a history of Africa being represented as a terrain of barbaric violence, of <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525547">savages</a> committing atrocities against victims in need of a Western saviour. This humanitarian image fit squarely with the international court’s stark moral narrative of inhuman criminals and helpless innocents.</p>
<p>In 2003, Luis Moreno-Ocampo was <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/01/interview-with-luis-moreno-ocampo-chief-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court/">elected</a> as the ICC’s first Chief Prosecutor. Once he embarked on his Africa adventure, another advantage became clear. African heads of state could be encouraged to refer situations in their own countries to the ICC in a tacit bargain: African leaders provided assistance in arresting suspects, and the ICC gave those leaders effective immunity in return.</p>
<p>Uganda, for instance, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2007.00069.x/abstract">called in</a> the ICC to investigate the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The ICC eagerly undertook the case with <a href="https://justicehub.org/article/why-icc-wont-prosecute-museveni">close assistance</a> from the Ugandan military, for all purposes taking Uganda’s side in its <a href="https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/uganda/conflict-profile/">long-running</a> civil war. </p>
<p>While no one disputes the LRA’s brutality, the ICC’s selective approach raised deep concerns. The Ugandan government was also <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502970801988057">accused</a> of war crimes and crimes against humanity as part of its counterinsurgency. Despite demands for equal justice for both sides, the ICC has <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda">failed to issue</a> any arrest warrants for Ugandan government officials. </p>
<p>In the ICC’s early years, Africa thus came to the court’s rescue. It could avoid US censure while claiming that it was ending global impunity by pursuing a few minor Congolese or Ugandan rebels. Meanwhile, African leaders obtained a new tool in their arsenal of external support to use against internal opposition.</p>
<h2>A shift</h2>
<p>This cosy relationship changed when the ICC started going after African state elites. </p>
<p>The ICC thought it could depend on Western support to trump African sovereignty. While it was proven correct in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-libya-became-the-international-criminal-courts-latest-failure-45389">Libya</a>, it was wrong in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/10/sudan-fm-icc-court-built-indict-africans-161027112211288.html">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/44012/1/Kendall-AJLS.pdf">Kenya</a>. For their part, while many African states were happy to cooperate with the ICC when it served their interests, when the court turned against them, accusations of neocolonialism were soon heard.</p>
<p>The ICC made gestures to appease its critics. It appointed an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/jun/05/fatou-bensouda-international-criminal-court-tyrants">African Chief Prosecutor</a> and opened the first formal investigation <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35422437">outside Africa</a>. But these efforts failed, and African states stepped up their opposition. First Burundi, and then The Gambia and South Africa, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/africa/africa-international-criminal-court.html">declared their intention</a> to exit the Rome Statute. Then came last month’s AU resolution. </p>
<p>The ICC and its supporters have taken an uncompromising stance on African moves to withdraw. Moreno-Ocampo <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/gambia-withdraws-international-criminal-court-161026041436188.html">denounced</a> uncooperative African heads of state as being complicit with genocide and abandoning African victims. </p>
<p>Of course, the declared intention by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html">The Gambia</a> or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/burundi-icc-withdrawal-major-loss-victims">Burundi</a> to withdraw from the ICC can be seen, in part, as defensive moves by authoritarian leaders looking to shield themselves from prosecution. </p>
<p>However, to reduce all African opposition against the ICC to the self-interest of African elites ignores the context of Africa’s response. It fails to see that African states and people are justified in having very real concerns about the way the ICC has intervened in the continent, given Africa’s historical experience with destructive international interference. </p>
<h2>A decade of criticisms</h2>
<p>For one thing, for African actors to reject the ICC’s current involvement in the continent is not to reject international law. Africa has its own <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNDAULawRw/2010/6.pdf">histories and traditions of international law</a>, in which international law has been used in the struggle for self-determination, dignity, and sovereign equality within the international community. An ICC that can interfere arbitrarily with fundamental internal political processes, or undermine regional efforts at peace and security, has no place within these African traditions of law.</p>
<p>Africa’s opposition has a specific material foundation - specifically, the ongoing commodity boom, fuelled by heightened demand from rising global powers. For instance, in Kenya, the backlash against the ICC has been couched in an <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/?articleID=2000095433&story_title=Speech-by-President-Uhuru-Kenyatta-at-the-Extraordinary-Session-of-the-African-Union">anti-imperialist narrative</a> of a declining West and a future of growth for Africa. </p>
<p>While the pushback by African states has gained the most attention, and poses the greatest threat to the court, it had been foreshadowed by over a decade of <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201369851918549.html">intense</a> criticism by African civil societies, peace activists, and academics. They have accused the ICC of taking sides in conflict, being a tool of Western powers, of manipulating victims, and of undermining African ideals of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/travis-rejman/send-dominic-ongwen-of-the_b_9032270.html">reconciliation</a>.</p>
<p>Today, it’s becoming clear that the ICC cannot live with Africa, given that it faces opposition both for its alliances with African state elites as well as for its efforts to prosecute those elites. </p>
<p>But it’s equally doubtful that the ICC can live without Africa, since intervening anywhere else looks increasingly far fetched. The ICC seems unable to prosecute anyone except minor African rebels who have fallen out with their state sponsors and former African heads of state who have been overthrown by Western military intervention. </p>
<p>The ICC can try to dump the blame for its current problems on the continent, but this dilemma is one that the court looks to have little chance of escaping.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74210/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Branch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The African pushback is as a result of the ICC’s own Africa strategy.
Adam Branch, Lecturer, University of Cambridge
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/70087
2017-01-11T20:14:34Z
2017-01-11T20:14:34Z
Child victim or brutal warlord? ICC weighs the fate of Dominic Ongwen
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149207/original/image-20161208-31352-gey470.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dominic Ongwen, a senior commander in the Lord's Resistance Army, in a court room in The Hague. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Peter Dejong</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The trial of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen">Dominic Ongwen</a> before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague is like none other springing from the killing fields of the Great Lakes of Africa. These include the prosecution of the first person ever to be convicted by the ICC, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga">Thomas Lubanga</a>. He was accused of mass human rights violations as a rebel leader in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also ongoing is the trial of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ntaganda">Bosco Ntaganda</a>, another Congolese.</p>
<p>Ongwen is a former commander of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/katine/2007/oct/20/about.uganda">Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)</a>, a particularly brutal rebel group in Uganda. Its ruthless campaigns in Uganda and in neighbouring countries since the late 1980s encompassed <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda">murder, rape and torture</a>. The organisation also recruited child soldiers and engaged in sexual slavery, including forcibly abducting young girls to act as “bush wives” for LRA fighters. </p>
<p>The LRA started as a rebellion in northern Uganda against Yoweri Museveni who overthrew Tito Okello, a northerner, to become president in 1986. Nearly two million people were displaced at the height of the insurgency and more than 10,000 killed in rural massacres. </p>
<p>Led by Joseph Kony, the highly mobile group later moved to South Sudan, eastern Congo and as far afield as Central African Republic. A UNICEF <a href="https://www.unicef.org/har07/files/Uganda.pdf">report</a> estimated that tens of thousands of children and youth had been abducted by the LRA between 1986 and 2005. </p>
<p>Ongwen, who is in his early 40s, is charged with the greatest number of crimes ever faced by an accused person before the international court. In March, the court <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02331.PDF">confirmed</a> 70 charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes against him. </p>
<p>Aside from the scale of the case, one aspect that makes it unique is that Ongwen himself is a former child soldier. He was forcibly abducted by the LRA as a child walking home from school. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXoT2I27oMU">Some accounts</a> suggest he was so small and frail at the time of his abduction that he had to be carried by other recruits. </p>
<p>But he went on to climb through the ranks of the LRA command. The ICC case concerns crimes allegedly committed by Ongwen himself, and by his subordinates, from 2002-2005.</p>
<h2>Past victimisation is no excuse</h2>
<p>In her <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=2016-12-06-otp-stat-ongwen">opening statement</a> in the Ongwen trial the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, noted that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The evidence of many of the child victims in this case could be, in other circumstances, the story of the accused himself… But having suffered victimisation in the past is not a justification, nor an excuse to victimise others.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The shift of narrative here from the court’s first judgment in <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga">Lubanga</a> is <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/04/20/shifting-narratives-ongwen-and-lubanga-on-the-effects-of-child-soldiering/">notable</a>. In that case, Lubanga was tried and convicted of the crime of recruiting and using child soldiers. The court <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1438370">focused</a> on the trauma suffered by former child soldiers and the lasting impact of that suffering. </p>
<p>By contrast, in Ongwen, the prosecutor emphasised </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the choice that he made; the choice to embrace the murderous violence used by the LRA and to make it the hallmark of operations carried out by his soldiers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/04/11/the-dominic-ongwen-trial-and-the-prosecution-of-child-soldiers-a-jic-symposium/">Some authors</a> have argued that Ongwen’s status as a former victim should act as a partial defence to his later actions or should, at a minimum, be treated as a mitigating factor in sentencing if he is convicted. But this would assume that victims are devoid of choice over their actions by reason of their victimhood. The picture is, of course, much more nuanced than that, as Alcinda Honwana has pointed out in her <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14183.html">pioneering study</a> of child soldiers. </p>
<p>Criminal law is concerned with an individual’s actions and whether they possessed the intent to commit criminal acts, and not the factors that may have led them to commit the actions. This is why in domestic criminal trials perpetrators of sexual abuse who are themselves former victims of such abuse are still found culpable for their actions. </p>
<p>Criminal responsibility is a question of <a href="http://www.bloomsbury.com/au/answering-for-crime-9781841137537/">answerability</a>; it declares certain actions to be wrong and calls those who are accused of having perpetrated such wrongs to answer for their actions.</p>
<h2>Dismissing the sympathy plea</h2>
<p>While the prosecutor will no doubt have a challenge in overcoming the victim-perpetrator narrative that is likely to cast a shadow over the case, it seems unlikely that Ongwen’s status as a former child soldier can be successfully raised as a defence to the charges against him. </p>
<p>There is a defence of duress included in the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf">ICC Statute</a>. But this is limited to situations of imminent threat where the harm caused is not greater than the harm avoided. It would be difficult for Ongwen to argue that his alleged orders as an adult were made under duress. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the prosecutor was right in pointing out in her opening statement that the court will not decide on whether Ongwen deserves sympathy, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>but whether he is guilty of the serious crimes committed as an adult, with which he stands charged.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvonne McDermott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Criminal responsibility is a question of answerability; it declares certain actions to be wrong and calls those who are accused of having perpetrated such wrongs to answer for their actions.
Yvonne McDermott, Associate Professor of Law, Swansea University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/70027
2016-12-23T07:25:23Z
2016-12-23T07:25:23Z
In one of 2016’s best books, a former Lord’s Resistance Army child soldier reveals the reason behind the mayhem
<p>Rather than review the year gone by, I wanted in this column to look at a particularly haunting book, Ledio Cakaj’s <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/W/bo25073317.html">When the Walking Defeats You</a>. It’s narrated by a young Ugandan student, pseudonym “George”, who was expelled from school and sent by his own family to join and fight with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). He became a bodyguard to the group’s infamous leader, Joseph Kony, who admired him for his learning.</p>
<p>It haunts me in particular as back in 1982, I wandered through many of the parts of Uganda that George describes. I was there as part of a desultory international effort to rehabilitate the country after the hellish reign of Idi Amin. I found almost everything, everywhere I went, from Kampala to Kasese, to Gulu, to Jinja, in ruins. Sometimes, I navigated by compass, as the roads had become so overgrown by vegetation that nothing on the maps was left. </p>
<p>When the still-reigning <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-clinging-on-ugandas-president-has-hollowed-out-his-countrys-politics-55520">Yoweri Museveni</a> won power in 1986, it briefly seemed as if Uganda had a chance at a new beginning – but when religious radical <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6274313.stm">Alice Lakwena</a> rose up violently against the government soon afterwards, it was clear that Uganda was doomed to many years of division and conflict. </p>
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</figure>
<p>Kony claims to be Lakwena’s successor. The West knows him simply for atrocities, among them the kidnapping of children – the boys forced to serve as child soldiers, the girls to be “wives” and concubines. </p>
<p>I used to imagine this motley crew walking around the wilds of northeastern Uganda and through the places I myself passed. Those memories drew me to Cakaj’s book, which chimes well with Christian Ryan’s 2012 book <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Children_of_War.html?id=UkJLfxwXoh8C&redir_esc=y">Children of War: Child Soldiers as Victims and Participants in the Sudan Civil War</a>, based on her PhD thesis, which I supervised. </p>
<p>Before Christine went to South Sudan for a year of fieldwork, during which she essentially lived among the former child soldiers of a terrible conflict, the received wisdom, certainly among the aid agencies, was that they had all been victims. Christine talked to them often, and one day one of them broke down and began to cry. “Thank you for asking why we fought. No one has asked us before.” Many of them, though young, didn’t see themselves as only victims: they had had their own reasons for picking up guns. </p>
<p>The story George tells in Cakaj’s book confirms something similar: that as a very young soldier in Uganda, he also had his reasons and reflections, fears and hopes, pride and premonitions.</p>
<p>I have followed the conflict between Kony and Museveni for many years. I discussed it with the Ugandan officer who led the hunt for Kony, and asked: “Why? For what reasons?” To ascribe no reasons, no rationality, no belief, no principles for rebellion is a return to the old notion that Africans are mere savages – a racist device of dismissal and non-enquiry.</p>
<p>I myself wrote a fictional account of Kony’s rebellion in my 2012 novel, Joseph Kony and the Titans of Zagreb, in which I tried to demonstrate how the political machinations of a European capital city can be made to look just as atrociously ridiculous as a horrible rebellion in Africa. All you need to do is assume that the participants have put no reasoned thought into what they’re doing.</p>
<h2>Hostage to the Holy Spirit</h2>
<p>Very early on in Cakaj’s book, George explains that what often defeats the LRA’s young soldiers is the endless walking. A stationary army is a target, and the only way for the LRA to stay on the move is to walk for mile after mile every day. </p>
<p>George relates the killings along the way. He is anxious he is not asked to kill people by hand – that is, with a machete. To kill with a rifle, with a gap that reduces a terrible intimacy, is one thing. To butcher someone up close is harrowing precisely because it is not only atrocious, but atrociously intimate.</p>
<p>In the book’s most riveting moment, George gets the chance to talk with Kony himself. George is thankful he has been asked to cook; he serves alcohol with the meal, and it’s one of the very rare moments when Kony accepts a drink. The leader’s tongue loosens a little, and he relates his trust in the Holy Spirit, who always warns him when Museveni’s forces are near. He shows his battle scars. He talks politics, and laments how Museveni has ruined Uganda. </p>
<p>When the other officers leave him and George alone, Kony asks after George’s uncle. He praises George’s love of books, and congratulates him on the good grades he had been receiving in school – and then he makes two confessions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You need to know that if I had a choice I would not be doing this, this life in the forest like animals. I wish I could be a schooled man like you. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He also wishes aloud that his children could go to school, saying: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is too late for me. I have all the wisdom in the world, thanks to the spirits who tell me everything. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But then Kony tells George he’s a hostage to these same spirits, bound to act on their instruction and instigation. Above all, he is captive to the Holy Spirit, who calls him to keep his army and his rebellion going – fighting, killing, and walking to their deaths.</p>
<p>Kony is to this day a hero to many of Uganda’s Acholi people, who feel marginalised under Museveni’s rule. Looked at in a particular way, he is perhaps not so unlike Joan of Arc, who also heard the voices of spirits; the English demonised her before finally capturing and burning her alive. Wanted worldwide for his heinous crimes, long since driven from Uganda and isolated with his greatly diminished forces, Kony is more likely to fade away.</p>
<p>George’s telling is very much a narration of an encounter, not a psychological or intellectual inquiry. But it isn’t cheap or glib, and the book as a whole raises profund questions. Perhaps there are reasons why children fight – and perhaps even why madmen fight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Even ‘madmen’ have their motives for fighting.
Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/66889
2016-10-20T15:29:14Z
2016-10-20T15:29:14Z
How decent data can help African girls overcome second class status
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141805/original/image-20161014-30272-cq83xx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Participants in the Finote Hiwot project to end child, early and forced marriage in Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/14684737026/in/album-72157645407207489/">Department for International Development/Jessica Lea</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations has made the gathering of data on girls across the world the coming year’s focus. Marking the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/girlchild/">International Day of the Girl Child</a>, it issued a call for action for increased investment in collecting and analysing data that’s focused on and relevant to girls.</p>
<p>Robust and reliable data collected on a regular basis is essential for policy making. According to the UN, improving data on girls is critical to fulfilling the <a href="http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/08/120815_outcome-document-of-Summit-for-adoption-of-the-post-2015-development-agenda.pdf">new global 2030 roadmap and the Sustainable Development Goals</a>. </p>
<p>For Africa, girl-focused and girl-relevant data is a critical tool for identifying the challenges that continue to disadvantage girls. This will enable African politicians, lawmakers and civil society to better understand the barriers that confront girls and design policies and services to respond to their specific needs.</p>
<p>Africa still has a long way to go for girls to fully realise their rights. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-37614798">report from Save the Children</a> ranked Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia as the hardest places in the world to be a girl. <a href="http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/mdg-report-2015_eng_summary_rev2sept15.pdf">Research</a> indicates that the rates of enrolment for school aged girls in primary education in sub-Sahran Africa are below 1990’s levels.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/02/beijing-synthesis-report">2015 UN Women Beijing +20 Report</a> points to Africa as having the highest prevalence of physical or sexual violence in world. According to the UN, 4 in 10 girls marry <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/girl-child">before age 18</a> and UNICEF has warned that the number of child brides across Africa is expected to triple by <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/12017537/Africas-child-brides-to-reach-310-million-as-continents-population-grows.html">2050</a>. </p>
<p>The question that needs to be answered is: why do sexual violence and forced marriage continue to be pervasive vehicles for injustice against girls in Africa, even though there are various laws and regulations that African governments can use to protect girl children?</p>
<p>The answer is twofold. </p>
<p>First, there is a limit to the ability of the law to change ingrained social and cultural attitudes that suppress girls and discriminate against them. </p>
<p>Second, a top down approach (such as structural changes in law and policy) must be integrated with a bottom up approach that targets the hearts and minds of local communities. </p>
<p>The shared goal is clear: to enhance and amplify Africa’s girl power. </p>
<h2>Legal instruments</h2>
<p>African states have a number of regional and international instruments that they can rely on to help tackle sexual violence and forced marriage. These include the:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/">African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1986</a>, </p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://pages.au.int/acerwc/documents/african-charter-rights-and-welfare-child-acrwc">African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1999</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf">Protocol on the Rights of Women 2005</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>International law has given girls’ rights some visibility and sets out the duties of states in respect of these rights. For example, the <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm">Convention</a> on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 and the Convention on the <a href="https://www.unicef-irc.org/portfolios/general_comments/CRC.C.GC.13_en.doc.html">Rights of the Child</a>
have been used to emphasise that culture and tradition do not justify the failure of states to intervene and prevent traditional practices that foster discrimination and violence against women and girls.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142188/original/image-20161018-15115-1l7x3l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Closing panel at the African Girls’ Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GNB/Sophie Drouet</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are signs that a number of African states are taking positive steps to combat violence against girls. For instance The Gambia and Tanzania have banned <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36746174">child marriage</a>, with tough sanctions for those who breach the law. Other countries are under pressure to <a href="https://theconversation.com/banning-child-and-forced-marriages-is-gaining-traction-in-africa-53507">follow suit</a>. In Malawi the Ministry of Gender, Children and Community Development is <a href="http://www.gender.gov.mw/">mandated </a> to tackle violence against women, including child marriages. </p>
<p>This top-down approach seeks to provide a legal infrastructure that national authorities can use to prevent and respond to forced marriage and sexual violence. </p>
<p>But social and cultural barriers can nullify national laws and strategies. </p>
<h2>Societal and cultural barriers</h2>
<p>Sexual violence and forced marriage thrive in a climate of gender inequality and discrimination. This is true for girls living in conflict as well as non-conflict situations. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/resources/online-library/every-last-girl">report</a> on child marriage by Save the Children notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… in many contexts, it is sustained as a result of harmful social norms and practices associated with the roles and expectations assigned to girls, and the negative consequences of poverty and deprivation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Patriarchy is present in many societies in Africa and is perpetuated through social, cultural and religious norms and practices. These reinforce the subordinated position of women and girls in both public and private spheres. </p>
<p>Females who are victimised also have to cope with negative responses from their families and communities. This serves to shift fault or blame away from the perpetrators to the victims.</p>
<p>Many of those who escaped from the jihadist group Boko Haram face taunts of being called <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/world/middle-east-africa/the-trauma-stigma-of-the-boko-haram-wives/">“Boko Haram wives”</a>. And girls who fall pregnant and bear children are ostracised. </p>
<p>In northern Uganda <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/magazine-girls-lord-resistance-army-150527110756222.html">former girl soldiers</a> – girls who were abducted and drafted by the Lord’s Resistance Army – and were sexually exploited as “bush wives” live with significant physical and mental trauma. Their trauma is compounded by physical and verbal abuse from their communities.</p>
<p>The perceived inferiority of girls is reinforced by ideologies around chastity, virginity and the perceived roles girls should adopt in their families and societies. </p>
<p>This means that addressing the victimisation of girls also demands tackling the stigmatisation they face. </p>
<p>Such a bottom-up approach, combined with top-down implementation, can strengthen and sustain initiatives for promoting girls’ empowerment. </p>
<h2>Africa’s girl power</h2>
<p>Girls must be allowed to decide, free of coercion or violence, about their futures. Many girls across the continent are asserting their rights and raising their voices. Social media campaigns such as <a href="https://plan-international.org/because-i-am-a-girl/girls-takeover">#GirlsTakeover</a> and <a href="https://plan-international.org/because-i-am-a-girl">#BecauseiamaGirl </a> convey a global message of awareness and action. They have drawn attention to the challenges girls face and have amplified stories of resilience, survival and empowerment. </p>
<p>Girls must be provided with the information, education and services they need to enable them to take their lives into their own hands. </p>
<p>For Africa, girl-focused and girl-relevant data provides a gateway for telling the stories of girls across the continent, the challenges that stifle their full potential and the best means to overcome them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yassin Brunger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A number of African states are taking positive steps to combat violence against girls and child marriage. But social and cultural barriers can nullify national laws and strategies.
Yassin Brunger, Lecturer in Human Rights Law, Queen's University Belfast
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/35966
2015-01-07T12:49:27Z
2015-01-07T12:49:27Z
Dominic Ongwen surrenders – but justice for Lord’s Resistance Army victims will be hard to find
<p>On January 6 2014, the US State Department reported that a Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander had <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30705649">handed himself in</a> at an American base in the Central African Republic. The man identified himself as Dominic Ongwen, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and war crimes for murder, attacks on civilians, and enslavement in Northern Uganda in 2004. </p>
<p>Ongwen is the first of the ICC’s Lord’s Resistance Army indictees to be apprehended. Three other LRA indictees have been killed, with only leader <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17299084">Joseph Kony</a> still at large. Interestingly, it has been suggested that Ongwen was abducted as a child on his way to school, and as <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5556588">Erin Baines</a> noted, the first known person then to be charged with the same war crimes of which he is also a victim.</p>
<p>The conflict between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army raged in Northern Uganda for 20 years from 1986 to 2006. More than 200,000 civilians were killed, and tens of thousands abducted. They were used as soldiers or porters by the LRA, or in the case of women and girls, as sex slaves. Most of the 2m population of Northern Ugandan were forcibly displaced from their homes. </p>
<p>While a peace deal in Juba in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5179284.stm">2006</a> saw the LRA leave Uganda, the group set up a base in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. Peace talks collapsed in 2008, with the LRA citing fears of arrest warrants issued by the ICC and Kony’s unwillingness to surrender. Soon afterwards, the LRA began attacking civilians in the DRC and Central African Republic. Since then, Uganda, the US and other central African states have all been involved in hunting down the LRA in the vast central African jungle.</p>
<p>Ongwen’s capture is a rare advance in that effort – but the question of how to proceed is fraught with confusion and risk.</p>
<h2>Victim and perpetrator</h2>
<p>If Ongwen is transferred to the custody of the ICC, the court can hold the trial in Gulu, Northern Uganda under Article 62 of the Rome Statute. </p>
<p>In the trial, Ongwen may argue that as a former child soldier, he was under duress to commit atrocities. However, as an adult commander this defence is unlikely to work, since to prove crimes were committed under duress, a defendant has to demonstrate they were a “proportionate response” to that duress. Crimes against humanity of mass killings and enslavement are unlikely to meet this standard.</p>
<p>What Ongwen might hope for is to have his sentence reduced, due to his past victimisation – but the ICC may also seek further charges against him for crimes committed since 2005 in the DRC and Central African Republic, including the notorious <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/01/17/dr-congo-lra-slaughters-620-christmas-massacres">2008 Christmas massacres</a> in which the LRA killed more than 600 Congolese. This would only add to the enormous weight against him.</p>
<p>But as <a href="http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/01/07/an-icc-indicted-lra-commander-is-in-us-custody-so-what-now/">Mark Kersten</a> pointed out, Uganda may itself be able to prosecute Ongwen. The Ugandan government handed the case over to the ICC in 2003 because of its inability to apprehend LRA commanders, not a lack of willingness or ability to prosecute them. And the Ugandan government has established an <a href="http://www.judicature.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International_Crimes_Division.html">International Crimes Division</a> to investigate and prosecute international crimes. </p>
<p>Holding the trial in Northern Uganda would allow victims and the affected community to “see justice done” and participate more easily. Northern Uganda has been relatively peaceful since the LRA left the country in 2006, and should not pose any serious concerns for ICC proceedings.</p>
<p>Uganda still has an <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/95476/uganda-amnesty-or-prosecution-for-war-criminals">amnesty law</a> in place, however, which allows any rebel to obtain immunity from prosecution if they so choose. It will be in effect until May 2015. This means that if Ongwen is transferred back to Uganda before then, he can apply for an amnesty to avoid prosecution. </p>
<p>There’s precedent for this: the first and only LRA trial to take place at Uganda’s International Crimes Division in 2011 was that of commander <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/thomas-kwoyelos-troubling-trial">Thomas Kwoyelo</a>, never indicted by the ICC. That trial collapsed after his prosecution was challenged in the Constitutional Court, citing his application for an amnesty. </p>
<h2>Seeing justice done</h2>
<p>For Ongwen, the ICC could simply wait until June 2015 to transfer him to Uganda, when the amnesty law has lapsed. President Museveni has <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-12-00-museveni-rails-against-the-icc-during-kenyattas-inauguration">been a very vocal critic of the ICC</a> in light of the court’s failed case against Kenya’s President, <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-the-collapse-of-the-kenyatta-case-how-is-the-icc-supposed-to-help-victims-34991">Uhuru Kenyatta</a>. It is likely that Museveni will want Ongwen to be tried in Uganda to demonstrate that African states can deliver fair justice. </p>
<p>The prosecution benches and judges at the International Crimes Division are well trained in international law, but there’s an acute shortage of the sufficiently experienced defence lawyers needed to ensure a fair trial. Uganda’s drafted <a href="http://www.africanyouthinitiative.org/assets/victims-voices-on-transitional-justice--2014-report.pdf">witness protection law</a>, meanwhile, has yet to be adopted.</p>
<p>What the prosecution of Ongwen will not do is bring justice to the hundreds of thousands of victims of the Northern Ugandan conflict. </p>
<p>Many victims have themselves been abducted, killed, tortured or raped, or seen the same happen to family members. Many continue to live with physical scars, psychological trauma and in abject poverty as a result of the LRA’s atrocities. And given the overlap between victims and perpetrators and the huge numbers of both, many in Uganda have argued that prosecuting child soldiers is inappropriate and impractical.</p>
<p>The ICC case will allow victims to participate in proceedings with their own lawyers, and 41 victims have already been granted the right to participate in the Ongwen case and claim reparations; thousands of applications still remain unprocessed by the court. But if Uganda tries Ongwen in its International Crimes Division, victims will only be allowed to appear as witnesses, with no right to claim reparations.</p>
<h2>Beyond the courtroom</h2>
<p>While some may welcome the prosecution of Ongwen, many believe that the Ugandan government failed to protect them from either the LRA or its own forces, and that it is still neglecting them by not delivering reparations. The Ugandan government committed its own atrocities in its counter-insurgency campaign, including extrajudicial executions and forcibly displacing the Northern Ugandan population to “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jan/24/northern-uganda-displaced-people-out-in-cold">protected villages</a>”.</p>
<p>The Ugandan government has also been implicated in atrocities committed in DRC, including in the <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx">Lubanga case</a> at the ICC.</p>
<p>But what the ICC case against Ongwen could do is draw desperately needed attention to the plight of Northern Ugandan victims, putting international pressure on the Ugandan government to implement its long-mooted <a href="https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/uganda">Transitional Justice policy</a>. And as a senior commander, Ongwen could be the key to finding out what happened to many Northern Ugandans abducted by the LRA and never returned to their families. </p>
<p>What must be remembered above all is that justice for the victims of the Northern Ugandan conflict cannot be secured by criminal trials alone. They need a comprehensive approach including accountability, truth and reparations from all the parties at whose hands they suffered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Moffett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
On January 6 2014, the US State Department reported that a Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander had handed himself in at an American base in the Central African Republic. The man identified himself as…
Luke Moffett, Law Lecturer in international criminal justice, Queen's University Belfast
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/20662
2013-11-25T06:19:41Z
2013-11-25T06:19:41Z
Joseph Kony peace talks may be just another tactic
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/35914/original/rvk3d9g7-1385128727.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A former child soldier following his rescue from the LRA.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Inmediahk</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The government of the Central African Republic <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ugandan-warlord-joseph-kony-urged-surrender">claims</a> to be in talks with one of the world’s most enigmatic African guerrilla leaders, Joseph Kony. But Kony has entered talks before with no intention of backing down. This latest announcement follows all the same patterns and should be treated with scepticism.</p>
<p>This is the first official set of meetings with Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, since talks in Uganda were aborted in 2008. Those talks were ostensibly unsuccessful because Kony feared that he would be turned over to the International Criminal Court, which has a warrent out for his arrest. Since then, he has fled his homeland of Northern Uganda and has cut a bloody swathe across the Northern Democratic Republic of Congo, eventually settling in an area of dense forest straddling the DRC, Sudan and the CAR.</p>
<p>The current leader of the CAR, Michel Djotodia, himself the leader of a rebel group that seized power earlier this year, says Kony has asked for food supplies and support for his followers around the town of Nzako. The CAR itself is in no position to do anything about the hardened rebels of the LRA. The country has just 200 police officers for its population of around 4.6 million people. It is a relatively lawless country, which makes it a perfect sanctuary for a group that sets itself beyond the conventional rule of law.</p>
<h2>Mystical origins</h2>
<p>The LRA is a semi-mystical group that grew out of the ruins of the <a href="http://eprints.bham.ac.uk/974/1/Working_Paper_43_complete_for_web.pdf">Holy Spirit Movement</a> in Uganda, which was led by Alice Lakwena, a reputed witch. Lakwena, who died in Kenya in 2007, was said to be possessed by several spirits, including various dead Italians. Her violent millennial movement came in reaction to the end of Acholi power in Uganda when Yoweri Museveni became president in 1986.</p>
<p>Kony claimed kinship to Lakwena and adopted several mystical devices to manage the LRA. This includes citing the Ten Commandments in its plans, spirit possession and the adoption of different spirits into a very specific cosmology, including both Allah and Jesus.</p>
<p>The emphasis on cosmology has been an integral part of the violence and brainwashing that has been the hallmark of the LRA itself. The group operates a regime of kidnapping of children and is reported to have taken up to <a href="http://www.oxfam.org/en/emergencies/congo/rebuilding-lives-areas-affected-lra-attacks-drc">70,000</a> in its history. These children are then brutalised and become loyal followers. </p>
<p>The most common method of binding the children to the LRA cause is reportedly to wait until one child tries to escape and is captured. Former rebels report that the others are forced to kill the escapee, sometimes in extremely brutal ways, such as by biting them to death. These young children are then told that they cannot go back to their original homes and that the LRA is now their family.</p>
<p>Whilst the LRA itself was chased across the Nile in 2005 and effectively exiled from Uganda in 2008, they have continued to terrorise local communities in the DRC and Sudan and to poach elephants for ivory.</p>
<h2>Unusual tactics</h2>
<p>As well as being a somewhat bizarre entity itself, the LRA has also been subject to several unconventional attempts to end its existence. The hunt for Joseph Kony hit the mainstream last year as a result of a campaign by the NGO <a href="http://invisiblechildren.com/">Invisible Children</a> and the subsequent very public meltdown of its leader. The group used crowdsourcing to support its work and sought to recruit high-profile supporters for its cause.</p>
<p>But before the Kony 2012 campaign, a US millionaire funded a hunt for Kony organised by the former mercenary <a href="http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.co.uk/">Eeben Barlow</a>. More recently, African Union troops supported by around 100 US Special Forces have been <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/central_africa_lords_resistance_army">flying over the jungle</a> in helicopters broadcasting “go home” messages to the LRA rank and file.</p>
<h2>Why we should be sceptical</h2>
<p>The AU and US military intervention appears to have had a significant effect and Kony has been pushed into Nzako. And it is this success that casts doubt on the future of the latest peace talks. </p>
<p>Kony has form when it comes to using peace talks to buy time to regroup. The timing of these latest talks is very similar to the abortive talks in 2008 when the LRA had again been under military pressure. He is using the same tactics, notably greatly exaggerating the strength of the LRA, in order to increase <a href="http://enoughproject.org/publications/field-report-lra">supplies</a>. Whilst the CAR estimates the strength of the LRA given by Kony as around 2,000, a more realistic estimate is a few hundred.</p>
<p>On top of the pressure from outside forces, the LRA has reportedly been subject to an internal purge by the increasingly unstable Kony. He has a history of executing leadership rivals and an internal purge has reportedly led him to demote several LRA commanders and murder others. This has clearly contributed to the high desertion rate amongst LRA troops as many seek to go home.</p>
<p>Finally, the purported peace offer comes from an approach from one of Kony’s commanders, Otto Ladeere, who commands an LRA satellite group, rather than from Kony himself. It is possible that Ladeere is using Kony’s name to give himself legitimacy, but even if Kony is involved, the history of the LRA and particularly of Kony would emphasise that extreme caution is required whenever he talks about peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Jackson receives ESRC, EU and UK Government research funding on security, security sector reform and African poltical agency. He is a Senior Security and Justice Adviser to the UK Government Stabilisation Unit.</span></em></p>
The government of the Central African Republic claims to be in talks with one of the world’s most enigmatic African guerrilla leaders, Joseph Kony. But Kony has entered talks before with no intention of…
Paul Jackson, Professor of Politics, University of Birmingham
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.