tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/malawi-10751/articlesMalawi – The Conversation2024-03-05T20:11:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210882024-03-05T20:11:23Z2024-03-05T20:11:23ZPlight of migrant laborers killed, held hostage in Middle East exposes Israel’s reliance on overseas workforce<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579960/original/file-20240305-21577-9fmlrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C143%2C7961%2C4984&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Thai foreign worker tends to an agriculture field in Beersheba, Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/nachrichtenfoto/thai-foreign-worker-tends-to-an-agriculture-field-near-nachrichtenfoto/1231752520?adppopup=true">Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An Indian laborer in Israel was killed and several other migrant workers injured on March 4, 2024, in <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indian-killed-injured-anti-tank-missile-attack-israel-north-9195933/">a missile attack launched from Lebanon</a> by Hamas-aligned Hezbollah.</p>
<p>They are not the first migrant workers in Israel to get caught up in the monthslong fighting. Dozens of other farmworkers, agricultural apprentices and caregivers from countries including Thailand, Nepal, Tanzania, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Moldova were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jpeua8qUHmY&ab_channel=DWNews">murdered or taken hostage</a> during the Hamas attack of Oct. 7.</p>
<p>The sizable number of non-Israeli workers affected by the current war has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-so-many-thai-workers-became-hamas-victims/a-67266701">surprised some onlookers</a> while shining a light on Israel’s reliance on temporary migrant workers.</p>
<p>But as researchers who study the <a href="https://cas.uoregon.edu/directory/global/all/jweise">proliferation of migrant workers</a> around the world, we know how labor migration programs have transformed nearly all societies, including <a href="https://hu-berlin.academia.edu/SShoham">Israel’s</a>. The long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shaped Israel’s migrant worker history – and has contributed to the globalization of the workforce in the Middle East.</p>
<h2>A global story</h2>
<p>The initial recruitment of overseas workers to Israel, which began as early as the 1970s, followed a <a href="https://www.law.uchicago.edu/bilateral-labor-agreements-dataset">post-World War II trend</a> that saw higher-income countries – such as the U.S., France and West Germany – sign labor migration recruitment agreements with poorer nations. These poorer countries, which at the time included Mexico, Spain and Turkey, among others, overcame an initial reluctance to lose part of their populace and began to see emigration as a strategy for modernization. The idea was that emigrants could learn modern farming or industrial skills overseas, while sending money back to boost development in their home communities.</p>
<p>In the 1970s and 1980s, <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/migrants-for-export">many South and Southeast Asian countries</a> began to promote the export of migrant workers as a key piece of their economic development strategies. At the same time, receiving countries <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1080/0023656032000057010">became hooked</a> on the idea of a flexible, temporary labor force that would not inflame anti-immigrant sentiment as much as more settled migrants seemingly did.</p>
<p>Israel’s relationship with Thai workers came initially by way of the United States’ support for the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The U.S. government <a href="https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll4/id/353">recruited Thai workers</a> who had once worked on Vietnam War-era U.S. military bases in northeastern Thailand to help build a new air force base in Israel.</p>
<p>The arrival of the Thai migrant workers, along with Portuguese workers, prompted public controversy among Israeli lawmakers, trade unionists and the media about the creation of a split labor market, as research done by <a href="https://hu-berlin.academia.edu/SShoham">one of us</a> has shown. Meanwhile, others worried that the workers’ presence cut against Zionist imperatives to guarantee a Jewish majority.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a hat handles crates being loaded onto the back of a tractor." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C391%2C7241%2C4436&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Thai worker labors in the field adjacent to the Gaza Strip.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/october-2023-israel-sde-nitzan-a-thai-worker-continues-to-news-photo/1719823925?adppopup=true">Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Attempting to resolve these contradictions, the Israeli government <a href="https://www.trafflab.org/shahar-shoham">started to experiment</a> with migration policies designed for a new category of workers – neither Jewish nor Palestinian – who were intended to remain separate from Israeli society.</p>
<p>A decade later, in a different political moment, these policy ideas would become concrete in a new category of person in Israel: the “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imre.12109">foreign worker</a>.”</p>
<h2>Growing recruitment</h2>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict drove the “foreign worker” policy forward. Though Israel was founded on the ideology of “avoda ivrit,” or Hebrew labor, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 has led to the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian workers, who became an attractive <a href="https://cris.tau.ac.il/en/publications/power-breaking-or-power-entrenching-law-the-regulation-of-palesti">low-wage labor force</a>.</p>
<p>They soon came to <a href="https://cris.tau.ac.il/en/publications/power-breaking-or-power-entrenching-law-the-regulation-of-palesti">compose 7% of the workers</a> in the Israeli labor market as a whole, 24% of workers in the agricultural sector and 60% in the construction sector.</p>
<p>The non-citizen Palestinian workers commuted daily from the West Bank and Gaza, controlled by a <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25698">regime of permits</a> and regulations.</p>
<p>When the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, began in 1987, some members of the Israeli public came to see such workers as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2547185">security risk</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/oslo-accords-30-years-on-the-dream-of-a-two-state-solution-seems-further-away-than-ever-213003">1993 Oslo Accords</a>, which sought to foment “separation” between Israelis and Palestinians, further pushed Israel to minimize the dependency on non-citizen Palestinian workers.</p>
<p>To make up for the shortfall, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362022418_On_the_Establishment_of_Agricultural_Migration_Industry_in_Israel%27s_Countryside">Israeli employers</a> convinced the government to vastly expand the recruitment of temporary workers to take their place. In addition to Thailand, countries including China, India, Nepal, the Philippines, Romania and Turkey spotted an opportunity and allowed Israeli employers to recruit within their borders. By 2003, migrant workers <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/remi/2691">made up 10% of the labor force</a> in Israel.</p>
<h2>Creating marginal workers</h2>
<p>Migrant workers in Israel, like their counterparts the world over, have long since been <a href="https://www.trafflab.org/_files/ugd/11e1f0_861945c9ea904d57a359c89d44424869.pdf">vulnerable to exploitation</a>.</p>
<p>Many of their origin countries did not demand a commitment to secure their citizens’ rights in the form of a <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4168983">bilateral labor recruitment agreement</a>. And workers migrating via <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1350463042000227380">private recruitment</a> channels had to pay thousands of dollars in illegal “sign-up” fees, causing them to begin their journeys deep in debt. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Israeli government policies have attempted to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jols.12366">keep migrants outside of society by confining</a> them to specific industries, obligating them to leave the country upon completion of their labor contract, excluding them from the <a href="https://www.kavlaoved.org.il/en/a-land-devouring-its-workers-neglect-and-violations-of-migrant-agricultural-workers-right-to-health-in-israel/">public health system</a> and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article-abstract/63/3/373/2468875?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false">prohibiting</a> them from marrying or engaging in romantic relations while in Israel.</p>
<p>And authorities have paid little attention to labor standards, leaving farmworkers, for example, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/raw-deal/abuse-thai-workers-israels-agricultural-sector">vulnerable</a> to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/42386415/Giving_them_the_slip_Israeli_employers_strategic_falsification_of_pay_slips_to_disguise_the_violation_of_Thai_farmworkers_right_to_the_minimum_wage">wage theft</a>, terrible housing and exposure to pesticides without proper protection. </p>
<p>Under pressure from the U.S. government and Israeli civil society, over the past decade Israel began to sign <a href="https://www.cimi-eng.org/_files/ugd/5d35de_16d441738d06413184ba6dfa94cb0135.pdf">bilateral agreements</a> with countries sending migrants. These eliminated exorbitant recruitment fees, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4167016">even if they failed</a> to meaningfully improve labor conditions. </p>
<p>Even so, the number of migrant workers has <a href="https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/zarim2022.pdf">grown slowly</a> but steadily. In 2022, a total of 73,000 migrants in Israel worked as caregivers, in addition to nearly 50,000 in the construction and agriculture sectors combined. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man stands in a bombs shelter." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Thai worker takes shelter in an underground bunker in Metula, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/thai-workers-take-shelter-in-an-underground-bunker-after-news-photo/1720607203?adppopup=true">Marcus Yam/ LA Times via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet these migrants did not obviate the need to also have <a href="https://kavlaoved.org.il/en/areasofactivity/palestinian-workers/">Palestinian labor</a> in the mix. By Oct. 7, 2023, about 100,000 Palestinian workers crossed the border daily from Gaza and the West Bank.</p>
<h2>In harm’s way</h2>
<p>Since Oct. 7, Israeli authorities have ended those Palestinians’ work permits and tried to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-plans-bring-more-foreign-workers-construction-sector-report-2024-01-01/">recruit thousands of new workers</a> to the fields and construction sites to make up for the shortfall. </p>
<p>Malawi, a country that <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8987110/Independent_Africans_Migration_from_Colonial_Malawi_to_South_Africa_c_1935_1961">came to depend</a> on migrants’ economic remittances decades before Thailand did, has sent 700 farmworkers and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-parliament-allows-labor-export-to-israel-/7490863.html">promises</a> another 9,000 on the way – notwithstanding <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLjNqFY4_Dk">criticism</a> from voices within the African nation itself. </p>
<p>In India, which had long sent caregivers to Israel, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi <a href="https://www.bwint.org/cms/india-unions-denounce-govt-plan-to-send-migrant-construction-workers-to-israel-3017">ignored internal criticism</a> and sent Israel more workers in the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, including <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/india/who-was-pat-nibin-maxwell-indian-from-kerala-killed-as-hezbollah-launches-airstrikes-in-israel-11709631189269.html">Pat Nibin Maxwell</a>, the man killed in the March 4 Hezbollah attack.</p>
<p>Workers like Maxwell are now being sent to work near the borders of Lebanon and Gaza, laboring in agricultural communities vulnerable to Hamas and Hezbollah attacks that have been <a href="https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2024-03-04/ty-article/0000018e-09d0-d6be-afff-4dd174310000">depleted by the evacuation</a> of Israeli residents.</p>
<p>Though foreign governments are able to guarantee their citizens few protections in Israel, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/17/1229525320/india-israel-hamas-war-jobs-migrant-workers">thousands have queued up</a> in their home countries in search of a contract. </p>
<p>Once in Israel, they join the vast majority of migrant workers who have elected to remain in the country despite the Oct. 7 attack and its aftermath.</p>
<p>Like millions of migrant workers the world over in search of economic progress or survival, they have calculated, for now, that earning higher wages abroad is worth taking significant personal risks. </p>
<p>While helping keep the Israeli economy running during wartime, these migrant workers remain in the path of rockets – as the death of Pat Nibin Maxwell has illustrated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shahar Shoham previously worked at Physicians for Human Rights-Israel </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie Weise does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The contours of the Middle East conflict have long influenced Israel’s migrant worker policy.Julie Weise, Associate Professor of History, University of OregonShahar Shoham, Doctoral Candidate in Global and Area Studies at the Institute for Asian and African Studies, Humboldt University of BerlinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219982024-02-02T10:59:15Z2024-02-02T10:59:15ZSouth Africa needs to manage migrants better. That requires cleaning up the Department of Home Affairs<p>Legal grievances against the South African Department of Home Affairs, including contempt of court cases, are depressingly common. Too frequently the minister has to apologise to a court, or to ask for more time, on behalf of the department. Most of the court cases involve the operations of the department regarding visas and permits for foreign visitors, immigrants and prospective refugees.</p>
<p>Just a few months ago home affairs minister Aaron Motsoaledi said, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-15-minister-motsoaledi-apologises-to-south-africa-for-the-mess-created-by-his-department/">in legal papers</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would like to take this opportunity to extend my sincere apology to the Chief Justice, all judges of the high court and Constitutional Court, the President of South Africa, Minister of Finance, Lawyers for Human Rights and its legal representatives and the people of South Africa for the mess created by officials of the Department of Home Affairs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This particular mess was triggered by the minister’s failure to amend an unconstitutional law which allowed for the detention of irregular migrants for 120 days. </p>
<p>The rotten state of the department is widely known. Two reports released in the last three years, commissioned by the minister and the presidency and led by senior and seasoned individuals, set out the problems in detail. One, released <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Review-Issuance_of_visas_permits.pdf">in 2022</a>, chronicled a backlog of visa, permit and status applications, evidence of fraudulent applications being first rejected, then accepted, and the system being used illegally. The other found multiple failures in the provision of visas to senior business managers and experts.</p>
<p>The issue of migration policy and its implementation has never been more pressing for South Africa. Immigration has grown relatively rapidly in the past 20 years. The proportion of migrants to local people more than doubled from a relatively low level of 2.1% in 2000 to a moderate level of 4.8% in 2020, according to a <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">study</a> drawing on UN data.</p>
<p>The global average immigrant population is around 3.5% but countries like the US (nearly 16% in 2019), Australia and New Zealand are much higher. Côte d'Ivoire is the only country on the continent with a considerably higher percentage of immigrants than South Africa.</p>
<p>Migration policy is likely to be a key issue in South Africa’s forthcoming elections. A <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2023-11-16-is-south-africa-heading-for-an-immigration-election/">leading journalist</a> has argued that 2024 will be an “immigration election”. Populist parties are expected to mobilise around people’s fears, while the government will continue to use immigration as an excuse for poor service delivery and joblessness.</p>
<p>The reality is that the impact of migrants on the circumstances of poor South Africans is marginal, and far less important than the very poor performance of the economy and many governmental institutions. </p>
<p>In a paper <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/south-africa-migration-study-nsi-report/">just published</a> I examine the recent history of immigration policy in South Africa. I argue that the challenges would best be addressed by improvement in the operations of the Department of Home Affairs. This should be accompanied by some modernisation of migration law to encourage the use of regular migration channels and discourage irregularity. </p>
<h2>The problems</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Review-Issuance_of_visas_permits.pdf">first</a> of the two investigations initiated by the minister was headed by Cassius Lubisi, former secretary of the cabinet. The <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/images/PDFs/Report-of-the-Work-Visa-Review-2023.pdf">second</a> was headed by anti-apartheid struggle stalwart Mavuso Msimang. </p>
<p>Their main findings were as follows.</p>
<p>Fraudulent documentation was used in 36,647 applications for visas, permits or status over a 16-year period. Of these, 880 were approved and 288 were pending. 4,160 of the fraudulent applications were first rejected, and then accepted after reconsideration.</p>
<p>Systems that had been replaced were still being used illegally from time to time. The outcomes of such activities were suspicious. In some cases applications were processed in zero days. The investigation found visa expiry dates issued beyond the legal limit.</p>
<p>The department’s databases for naturalisation and population registration didn’t correlate with each other.</p>
<p>The list identifying undesirable immigrants was “fatally flawed due to incomplete and missing crucial data”. </p>
<p>In some cases, files had been inserted illegally into the information system. This process would require “a highly skilled IT user with administrator rights to execute”. </p>
<p>There were multiple cases of “forum-shopping” by applicants. This is when an applicant applies for a range of unrelated permits in the hope that one of them will get through.</p>
<p>The department did not have systems that could identify multiple applications by the same person.</p>
<h2>Possible fixes</h2>
<p>The Department of Home Affairs <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202311/49690gon4061.pdf">recently issued</a> a draft white paper which it said was aimed at addressing the problems that had been identified.</p>
<p>It proposed severely curtailing the rights of prospective refugees, restricting paths to citizenship, and strengthening the Border Management Authority and supportive institutions. </p>
<p>But, based on my findings, it is clear that these changes won’t solve the problems. Experts <a href="https://www.guilford.com/books/The-Age-of-Migration/Haas-Castles-Miller/9781462542895">show</a> that tighter restrictions lead to greater illegality, not less migration.</p>
<p>The most disappointing element of the draft white paper is that it makes no reference to recommendations made in the two reports on the problems at the department. </p>
<p>Recommendations of the reports included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>major investment in and reorganisation of information systems </p></li>
<li><p>the integration of the various population databases </p></li>
<li><p>further forensic investigations to root out corruption </p></li>
<li><p>hiring and training staff with skills and integrity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The draft white paper also does not mention the need to modernise the colonial-style bilateral labour agreements which South Africa maintains with five regional neighbours – Mozambique, Lesotho, Eswatini, Malawi and Botswana. These countries, and Zimbabwe, are the greatest source of regular and irregular migration.</p>
<p>These agreements are no longer fit for purpose. Firstly, they impose tight restrictions on the rights of contracted migrants from other countries. Secondly, they are based on patterns of migrant labour developed during the colonial period to support farming and mining. Thirdly, they’re written up on the basis of an unequal relationship between countries of the southern African region.</p>
<p>Modern bilateral labour agreements have been developed. An example <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_837529.pdf">is the Canadian system</a>. It provides for long term arrangements with full labour and social rights for the duration of the multiyear contract, but no right to permanent residence for the workers or their families. </p>
<p>Modern Canadian-style migrant labour agreements would encourage more migrants to choose regular migration routes and fewer would try to evade or abuse the law.</p>
<p>The draft white paper gives the impression that the challenge of migration policy can be solved with tighter laws on refugees and citizenship. In fact the fundamental problem is the corruption and inefficiency in the permits and visa section of the department, which the white paper hardly mentions.</p>
<p>The unfortunate conclusion that can be drawn from a reading of the draft white paper is that it was designed primarily to give the ruling party a narrative for the upcoming election, rather than to reform the migration governance regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute under whose auspices he researched and wrote this article.</span></em></p>Problems identified include a backlog of visa, permit and status applications, fraudulent applications being first rejected, then accepted, and the system being used illegally.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158202023-10-31T15:29:03Z2023-10-31T15:29:03ZKenya’s courts were under political pressure: how a constitutional reform empowered judges<p>Changes to Kenya’s constitution in <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398">2010</a> on the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/134-chapter-ten-judiciary/part-1-judicial-authority-and-legal-system/329-160-independence-of-the-judiciary">independence of the judiciary</a> created room for judges to act as guardians of the electoral process. </p>
<p>Before this, the law gave Kenya’s presidents considerable influence over courts’ actions. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379423000756">Historically</a>, the judiciary was not an independent branch. It was categorised as a governmental department working under the authority of the attorney general. The president was responsible for appointing judges. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Daniel-arap-Moi">Daniel Moi</a>, who was president from 1978 to 2002, <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/former-top-judge-blows-lid-off-moi-regime-dirty-bench-antics-61768/">systematically appointed loyalists</a>. The close links between the government and the judiciary made it pointless to go to court to challenge electoral disputes. </p>
<p>The 2010 constitution changed this. And in 2017, the Kenyan supreme court, the highest court in the country, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenyan-court-scraps-presidential-vote-kenyatta-calls-for-calm-idUSKCN1BC4A5">annulled the re-election of the presidential incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta</a>. The ruling asked the electoral commission to organise a rerun of the presidential election. This was despite the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/140716/">threats and pressure</a> the judges faced. </p>
<p>As a political scientist and former lawyer researching judicial politics in non-democratic settings, I found this change in behaviour puzzling. In <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379423000756">a recent paper</a>, I sought to understand why a court would take such a risk. Where judges face retaliation and pressure from political actors, why – and when – would courts take the risk of nullifying the elections of ruling party candidates? </p>
<p>I found that courts take such risks when there has been institutional reform. But to have this effect, the reform must meet two conditions. </p>
<p>First, a legal framework must shield the judiciary from political interference. It must create distance between the executive and the judiciary branch. Second, legal reforms must also mobilise judicial activists, lawyers and scholars to train and monitor courts on electoral issues. The Kenyan case illustrates how this works.</p>
<h2>The legal framework</h2>
<p>Kenya’s 2010 constitution put in place mechanisms to shield the judiciary from executive branch interference. First, the judiciary stopped operating under the leadership of the attorney general, an executive office. This made the separation between the two branches of power official. Second, the constitution <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/134-chapter-ten-judiciary/part-1-judicial-authority-and-legal-system/329-160-independence-of-the-judiciary">removed</a> the president’s prerogative to appoint judges. </p>
<p>My study found that constitutional reforms should not give the executive branch any decision-making power over the functioning and organisation of the judiciary. </p>
<p>In Kenya, the <a href="https://judiciary.go.ke/judicial-service-commission/">Judicial Service Commission</a>, an independent body established under the constitution in 2010, is responsible for all appointments. Judges go through a rigorous process where their legal skills and personal ethics are questioned before they are appointed. This process prevents the president from appointing regime supporters. </p>
<p>Kenya’s reforms also modified the structure of the judiciary by creating the <a href="https://supremecourt.judiciary.go.ke/">supreme court</a> and diluting the <a href="https://ocj.judiciary.go.ke/cj-roles/">authority of the chief justice</a>. A new <a href="https://www.judiciary.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Public-Hearing-2023-1.pdf#page=4">special fund</a> gave the judiciary financial autonomy. </p>
<p>The constitution also contains specific provisions regulating how the judiciary settles electoral disputes. Before 2010, it took years to settle them. The constitution established a <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/308-140-questions-as-to-validity-of-presidential-election">mandatory timeline</a>. Courts have six months to deal with electoral disputes and 14 days to rule on presidential elections. </p>
<h2>Strong judicial networks</h2>
<p>These legal mechanisms are not sufficient on their own. They must create the space for civil society groups to interact with the judiciary, and encourage collaboration between activists, lawyers and scholars. By teaming up, these groups bring together more resources, expertise and experience. </p>
<p>They can help courts to resist government pressures. In Kenya, I found that these networks of lawyers, activists and scholars used three strategies to empower courts.</p>
<p><strong>1. Strategic petitions</strong></p>
<p>Lawyers, activists and scholars in Kenya have engaged in strategic litigation to improve the quality of election petitions, pushing courts to depart from the old English precedent, <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/morgan-v-simpson-793009613">Morgan v Simpson</a>. The 1974 ruling requires plaintiffs to show that electoral fraud occurred, and that the fraudulent behaviour affected an election’s outcome. These Kenyan networks have given courts the opportunity to change their electoral jurisprudence. </p>
<p>In the 2017 <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/140716/">presidential election petition</a> filed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/raila-odinga-should-be-thanked-his-election-losses-helped-deepen-kenyas-democracy-190044">Raila Odinga</a>, the supreme court changed its jurisprudence. It established that petitioners had to prove either that electoral fraud took place, or that these irregularities affected election outcomes. This means plaintiffs don’t need to meet the two conditions at the same time, making it easier for opposition candidates to win a case. </p>
<p><strong>2. Judicial training</strong></p>
<p>These networks hold training and professionalisation workshops with the <a href="https://judiciary.go.ke/judiciary-committee-on-elections-jce/">Judiciary Committee on Elections</a>. The sessions help judges to deal with issues such as tight constitutional timelines. They also aim to build a more coherent approach to electoral petitions and discourage arbitrary decisions. </p>
<p><strong>3. Increased scrutiny</strong></p>
<p>The mobilisation of these networks has put the judiciary under intense scrutiny. They can detect inconsistencies or flawed legal reasoning in courts’ decisions. This scrutiny has direct effects on courts’ behaviour.</p>
<p>Most of the judges I interviewed for <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379423000756">my paper</a> remember the atrocities committed following Kenya’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007 election</a>. For many, the judiciary’s inability to settle the electoral dispute effectively plunged the country into violence. More than 1,100 people died. The conflict almost put the future of judicial institutions into jeopardy. </p>
<p>The supreme court knows that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">any future misstep</a> could threaten the institution’s survival and the country’s political stability. </p>
<h2>The lessons</h2>
<p>Policymakers can draw important lessons from the Kenyan case. </p>
<p>First, to prevent political actors from using courts for their own political gain, policymakers must design judicial institutions that cannot be influenced by the government’s agenda. They should identify all pathways through which governments could influence courts – not only through appointments. </p>
<p>Second, by funding and supporting civil society’s judicial activities, donors can help courts uphold electoral integrity and put states on the path to democratisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215820/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thalia Gerzso received funding from the United States Institute of Peace, the American Political Science Association, the Cornell Graduate School, and the Qualitative and Interpretive Research Institute. </span></em></p>Two conditions enable courts to take the risk of nullifying the elections of ruling party candidates.Thalia Gerzso, Postdoctoral Fellow, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130222023-10-11T13:42:31Z2023-10-11T13:42:31ZMale domestic workers in South Africa – study sheds light on the experiences of Malawian and Zimbabwean migrants<p>An estimated <a href="https://journals.uj.ac.za/index.php/The_Thinker/article/view/2672/1644">800,000 people work as domestic workers</a> in South Africa. Most are black women from marginalised backgrounds. It’s therefore not surprising that the bulk of the literature about domestic work focuses on females performing cleaning, cooking and care work. What’s missing in debates about domestic workers’ job-related experiences and relationships with their employers is the experiences of men performing domestic work, a job traditionally linked to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24713312">femininity</a>. </p>
<p>However, paid domestic work in South Africa hasn’t always been dominated by women. In the 1880s when the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/New_Babylon_New_Nineveh.html?id=DiDtAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">mining industry</a> was being established in Johannesburg, black men, rather than women, were the preferred servants in white households. Known as <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/From_Servants_to_Workers.html?id=ha_3GUYK6FwC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=houseboy&f=false">houseboys</a>, they cooked, cleaned, nursed and cared for white colonial families.</p>
<p>But over the next decade the landscape of domestic work underwent significant changes. This was due to a few factors, among them:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a scarcity of labour in the mines, which drew black men away from domestic roles to join the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/brief-history-domestic-service-south-africa">mining sector</a> </p></li>
<li><p>the increasing <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/brief-history-domestic-service-south-africa">urbanisation of black women</a> </p></li>
<li><p>racial stereotypes about black men as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637313">sexually aggressive or promiscuous</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A small proportion of men still work as domestic workers, however. Some are <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-pretoria/documents/vacancynotice/wcms_789648.pdf">migrants</a>. Due to South Africa’s relative stability and economic opportunities, there has been <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-africa-immigration-destination-history">an increase in migration</a> from countries like Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique since apartheid ended in 1994. The migrants come seeking education, employment and improved livelihoods. They rely on friends and family already in South Africa <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9_2">to find jobs</a>. </p>
<p>While African migrant women from poor backgrounds often find work in <a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edar2018_BP1_en.pdf">domestic service or the hospitality sectors</a>, most migrant men work as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/2019-05/20767_mangezvo_xenophobic_2015.pdf">gardeners, painters or security guards</a>. Some Malawian and Zimbabwean male migrants work as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/2019-05/20767_mangezvo_xenophobic_2015.pdf">waiters or domestic workers</a>, jobs that are traditionally associated with women. </p>
<h2>Exploring unfamiliar territory</h2>
<p>As a researcher of domestic work in South Africa, I noticed that few studies had focused on male migrants performing domestic work in South Africa. Consequently, such work is commonly viewed as an employment arrangement involving affluent female employers and black female domestic workers from marginalised backgrounds. The intersections of race, class and gender between employers and domestic workers often lead to <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/74795/Masterson_Domestic_2019.pdf?sequence=1">unequal power relations and economic exploitation</a> entrenched within the employment relationship. </p>
<p>In my study, I examined <a href="https://journals.uj.ac.za/index.php/The_Thinker/article/view/2677">the experiences of migrant male domestic workers in Johannesburg</a>, with the aim of shedding some light on their duties and working conditions. </p>
<p>A male Malawian domestic worker employed by an acquaintance referred me to other male domestic workers in Johannesburg. Interviews were conducted with six male Malawian and four male Zimbabwean domestic workers employed by affluent white employers in Johannesburg. All had been employed for more than five years. </p>
<p>Migrant men’s experiences add a new layer of complexity to the study of domestic work, where complex intersections of class, race and gender occur. </p>
<h2>Migrant male domestic workers in South Africa</h2>
<p>My study showed that domestic work offered a viable employment path for men. </p>
<p>They faced similar challenges to their <a href="https://www.academia.edu/13215366/_Help_somebody_who_help_you_The_Effect_of_the_Domestic_Labour_Relationship_on_South_African_Domestic_Workers_Ability_to_Exercise_their_Rights">female counterparts</a>. These included long working hours, a paternalistic employer-employee dynamic, and a marginalised job status.</p>
<p>The respondents said they had an array of indoor and outdoor responsibilities. Indoors, their tasks encompassed cleaning and tidying their employers’ residences. They also handled laundry and ironing, alongside duties such as grocery shopping and meal preparation.</p>
<p>Outdoors, their responsibilities extended to garden maintenance, swimming pool upkeep, pet waste disposal, cleaning outdoor grilling areas (braais), and sweeping driveways. They were also entrusted with securing the homes and taking care of pets when their employers were away. </p>
<p>The daily life of male live-in domestic workers was much the same as <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_230837.pdf">live-in female domestic workers</a>. The working day started at 06:30, preparing breakfast for employers. Once employers had left for work, they cleaned the house, prepared lunch, did laundry and attended to the garden.</p>
<p>The long working day often ended at 20:00 after dinner was prepared for employers. Most weekends were spent on additional piece jobs, working as gardeners or painters for others.</p>
<p>While the homes of employers were opulent, male domestic workers, just like their female counterparts, lived in small rooms in the back yard, hidden away from the employers’ gaze, as other researchers have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3514408?seq=1">also found</a>. The one-room accommodation was often equipped with basic furniture, differing little from the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=c89wfLEahEIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=living+quarters+of+domestic+workers+apartheid&ots=oumA3GgaGq&sig=Cjco7oSLcK6vGAgKpM_kgF0HTzQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=living%20quarters&f=false">squalid living quarters of domestic workers during apartheid</a>.</p>
<p>The men said they considered their wages reasonable. They earned on average between R5,000 (US$260) and R8,000 (US$416) a month. This was much higher than <a href="https://personal.nedbank.co.za/learn/blog/domestic-workers-minimum-wage.html#:%7E:text=The%20minimum%20wage%20for%20domestic%20workers%20in%202023&text=Employing%20someone%20for%20more%20than,with%20the%20Department%20of%20Labour.">the minimum wage of R4,067</a> (US$216) for a domestic worker working eight hours a day, five days a week in South Africa. Most said they could engage in wage negotiations, which enabled them to improve their wellbeing and that of their families.</p>
<p>None of the male domestic workers in this study had written employment contracts with their employers, or were members of a trade union, such as the <a href="http://www.sadsawu.com/">South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union</a>. Work contracts need to be renewed every few years, which is costly and time consuming. Job security is precarious. </p>
<h2>The recurring issues of domestic work</h2>
<p>In South Africa, domestic work continues to be associated with <a href="https://journals.uj.ac.za/index.php/The_Thinker/article/view/2672/1644">marginalised black individuals</a>, perpetuating a historical and societal imbalance. </p>
<p>Paid domestic work continues to occupy a low-status position. No formal qualifications and little specialised expertise are required. Domestic workers’ contributions to the functioning of households are essential but frequently taken for granted, as other studies have <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42905/">also confirmed</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/edited-collections/exploited-undervalued-and-essential-domestic-workers-and-the-realisation-of-their-rights">legislation</a>, domestic workers work long hours and perform physically demanding work. While male domestic workers in this study could negotiate better working conditions and pay, others might not be successful, and might remain in a precarious working environment. </p>
<p>Job security is not assured, a vulnerability most <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_535598.pdf">migrant domestic workers</a> experience. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-pretoria/documents/vacancynotice/wcms_789648.pdf">Practical protection remains constrained</a>. For instance, migrant domestic workers often encounter difficulties when seeking healthcare.</p>
<p>To safeguard this group from exploitation and elevate their overall livelihoods, regulators, enforcement agencies and trade unions must protect and recognise all domestic workers, including migrants, in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David du Toit does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Paid domestic work has a low status in South Africa. The labour of domestic workers is often undervalued and unrecognised.David du Toit, Sociology Lecturer, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130852023-09-24T12:02:25Z2023-09-24T12:02:25ZYoung people with sexual or gender diversity are at higher risk of stopping their HIV treatment because of stigma and harsh laws<p>Ending the AIDS pandemic – particularly in eastern and southern Africa – cannot be achieved unless more resources are channelled to meet the needs of key vulnerable populations.</p>
<p>This is one of the themes that emerged during an <a href="https://www.samrc.ac.za/event/11th-sa-aids-conference-2023-20-23-june-2023-durban">AIDS conference in June</a> in South Africa. Prejudice against particular groups – such as men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender communities – interferes with treatment regimes and people’s adherence to treatment. These groups are also at higher risk from HIV due to increased levels of stigma, discrimination, violence and criminalisation. </p>
<p>Our research is part of a three-year <a href="https://www.heard.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/SADC-Symposium-Report_final.pdf">project</a> on HIV-related stigma linked to young people with sexual or gender diversity. The research, conducted in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, involved 156 participants.</p>
<p>The research identified three main findings:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Criminal laws and strongly negative socio-cultural and religious beliefs produced deeply rooted intolerance around sexual or gender diversity. </p></li>
<li><p>Participants spoke about repeated experiences of verbal harassment, being gossiped about and physical violence.</p></li>
<li><p>Other population groups with HIV said their lives had become more tolerable as social awareness and acceptance of HIV had increased over time. However HIV-related stigma regained its potency when linked to sexual or gender diversity, with adverse effects for adherence to antiretroviral treatment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our research provided novel evidence on the deeply rooted fears and anxieties around multiple forms of stigma among young MSM and transgender women in southern Africa. </p>
<h2>Criminalising sex</h2>
<p>Across 13 countries in east and southern Africa, laws and policies criminalise same-sex sexual relations and facilitate the process of stigmatising gay and transgender individuals.</p>
<p>Recently, Uganda passed the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2023, which punishes same-sex conduct with life imprisonment. Several acts considered as “aggravated homosexuality” are liable to the death penalty. </p>
<p>Our study also noted that young people had developed various strategies to manage their lives. For example choosing when to disclose or identify as a person living with HIV or as a member of the sexual minority community in others, but rarely being both at once. </p>
<p>The constant worry and stress of living with HIV, and the fear of being stigmatised, could have a significant impact on health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>The burden of concealing their identities resulted in a range of mental, emotional and physical vulnerabilities. Signs of depression as well as frequent alcohol use were evident.</p>
<p>Overall 42% of participants had contemplated suicide at least once. According to one participant, an 18-year-old:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I feel like I am nothing, I am useless. In the community, looking at HIV, I am a gay, people they isolate me. So, I don’t feel comfortable, even failing to go to work and finding some money, whatever. And, sometimes, I decide if I can die today, I can rest. So, a lot of things come into my mind when I am disturbed … Sometimes my parents try to comfort me but, internally, I am really disturbed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As well as signs of depression, frequent alcohol use was evident. </p>
<p>There were few services available to assist in coping with these multiple stigmas, with those that came closest being provided by “sexual minority friendly” organisations or led by sexual minority peers themselves.</p>
<h2>Fear of being found out</h2>
<p>Being seen taking antiretroviral therapy or having it found in one’s possession signalled that one was living with HIV. Some individuals preferred to miss doses, occasionally or over more prolonged periods, rather than endure actual or feared stigma linked to being “found out” as someone living with HIV.</p>
<p>A 24-year-old told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What made me to delay taking medication is when my partner wants me to visit his home because he stays in Zomba, and I haven’t disclosed my HIV status to my partner yet, and I can’t take the ARVs with me there. As a result, I go there without the ARVs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A 19-year-old said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It affects me sometimes because, if people reject you, you feel like stopping to take the medication. ‘Maybe am just wasting my time, let me just die.’ It affects me a lot.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other findings we made were that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Many participants had had their status disclosed by LGBTIQ+ peers without their consent. HIV-related stigma is still highly prevalent within the LGBTIQ+ community and has many negative impacts. </p></li>
<li><p>Participants continued to experience or fear stigma related to their sexual orientation at health facilities, which also affected their access to healthcare and retention in care.</p></li>
<li><p>Tailored HIV services for key populations, including young MSM and transgender women, were not reaching everyone; rural areas were the least included.</p></li>
<li><p>Through their experiences, gay young men and transgender women were familiar with the harmful consequences of stigma and yet they were often ostracised from planning and decision-making roles. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Key populations in our study faced inequalities in three main areas: access to HIV services; justice and human rights; and investments in programmes geared towards them.</p>
<p>There were few services available to assist in coping with these multiple stigmas. Those that came closest were provided by “sexual minority friendly” organisations or led by sexual minority peers themselves.</p>
<p>There need to be more community-based organisations that are run by members of these key populations. In Cameroon, for example, the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/cameroon/health/hiv-aids">CHAMP</a> programme supports grassroots advocacy to mitigate stigma and violence and trains peers to offer counselling, </p>
<p>We can only achieve progress if we treat everyone as equal partners in fighting this pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaymarlin Govender receives funding from the National Research Foundation and Sida</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Nyamaruze receives funding from HIV/AIDS Special Fund Round III initiative of the Southern African Development Community. </span></em></p>Stigmatised people living with HIV often suffer from fear, depression and abuse. It’s sometimes easier to stop a treatment regime than risk being ostracised or assaulted by the community.Kaymarlin Govender, Research Director at The Health Economics and HIV and AIDS Research Division (HEARD), University of KwaZulu-NatalPatrick Nyamaruze, Post-doctoral research fellow, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071502023-06-25T11:11:29Z2023-06-25T11:11:29ZChildren’s movement affects health and development but research is lacking in Africa: here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531373/original/file-20230612-220077-jzsxfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children’s health and development depend on how much time they spend doing physical activity, being sedentary and sleeping.</p>
<p>Research on movement behaviours in children is essential. It helps us to understand what influences these behaviours, and their contribution to health and development. </p>
<p>Most <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/10/e049267">evidence</a> on movement behaviours comes from high-income countries. Here children have different lifestyles, environments and cultures from those in low- and middle-income countries. For example, children in African countries face different challenges in achieving healthy levels of physical activity and sleep. Safety, transport, infrastructure, culture, climate, nutrition, and different levels and types of screen time exposure may all present challenges. </p>
<p>Africa, as a continent, contributes less than <a href="https://www.elsevier.com/connect/africa-generates-less-than-1-of-the-worlds-research-data-analytics-can-change-that">1% of research</a> worldwide. This means over <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/">16%</a> of the world’s population has been excluded from the research. </p>
<p>The international <a href="https://sunrise-study.com/#about">SUNRISE study</a>, which we are part of, aims to bridge this gap. It conducts studies on movement behaviour in collaboration with researchers in several African countries, including Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, where we are based. We bring a collective expertise across disciplines such as public health, physiotherapy and child development. </p>
<p>SUNRISE findings so far show that the proportion of children in low- and middle-income countries meeting recommendations for movement behaviours is low, compared to high-income countries. This highlights the need for research and intervention in Africa. </p>
<p>But since the beginning of this study we have faced a wide range of challenges. In each country, the target number of children for the study is around 1,000. Researching their movement behaviour requires technology.</p>
<p>The challenges include access to devices to track movement, the lack of awareness of such tools and what they do, difficulty in securing funds, and institutional challenges. </p>
<p>Solutions include local collaboration, reducing financial barriers, developing new low-cost devices, and using contextually relevant methods. The following sections describe the challenges and possible solutions in detail.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p><strong>Access to devices</strong></p>
<p>Accelerometers are a type of digital wearable device, similar to Fitbits and smart watches. But they measure movement more accurately than commercially available devices. This is why they are more commonly used in research. These devices are generally more expensive because they are “research-grade”, and upwards of US$250 each (before software and delivery). This is a major challenge for those of us working in African countries, as at least 50 devices would be needed to conduct large scale studies like SUNRISE. There is no local manufacturer or distributor of accelerometer devices. Researchers need a legal licence to import or export them. </p>
<p>The SUNRISE study is able to loan devices. But exorbitant customs and shipping charges for moving this equipment to and between African countries makes sharing difficult – even when it’s only for research. This leads to unnecessary costs and delays, which means Africa gets left behind in this scientific field. </p>
<p><strong>Lack of awareness about the benefits of accelerometers</strong></p>
<p>These devices are often novel in African settings. Some parents and caregivers in our study areas have been sceptical about using them. For example, caregivers have asked whether the devices attract lightning, or whether they have some physical effect on the body. This may lead to another challenge in recruiting sufficient participants for the study. And data collection can take a long time when the shortage of devices is added to the time to get local buy-in. </p>
<p><strong>Difficulty in securing funds</strong></p>
<p>SUNRISE study researchers in Africa battle to get funding. They rely on highly competitive international funding, which seldom prioritises movement behaviour research in young children. It costs a lot to attend conferences internationally and to publish research in reputable academic journals. Open access journal fees can even exceed the monthly salary of a research assistant in an African country. </p>
<p><strong>Institutional challenges</strong></p>
<p>Within African research institutions, another challenge is how to build capacity. Few research institutes focus on movement behaviours in Africa. Accelerometer data is often complex to manage, and needs trained staff. High-income countries typically have access to support staff and students who can assist with this. This is not the case in many African countries. So it is difficult to conduct high-quality research and translate it into policy and practice. </p>
<h2>Possible solutions</h2>
<p>A possible solution is to collaborate with local partners and stakeholders to identify the most appropriate devices for each context and population. </p>
<p>All stakeholders, including local government and non-government organisations, ought to remove barriers so that the researchers can focus on the quality of evidence to inform policy and practice that is anchored to the local context. </p>
<p>Establishing some type of research equipment hub in Africa would go some way to help. But even moving equipment within Africa is not easy. Governments should consider waiving import and export charges for research equipment. The development of low-cost devices that can be produced and used efficiently in Africa is the best way forward. </p>
<p>Researchers in Africa could also examine other new data collection methods that are customised to the local context. Qualitative research (interviews and focus groups) can provide valuable insights into the factors that influence movement behaviours in different contexts. These insights are vital for the development of measurement tools and interventions that are culturally appropriate and effective. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>There are many other pressing needs in Africa. But the contribution of movement behaviours to population health and development is significant, particularly as there is growing evidence of the global economic costs of physical <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2822%2900482-X">inactivity</a>. We need local research on these behaviours, starting in the early years, when patterns of behaviour are established. </p>
<p>Without addressing barriers to robust research, researchers in this region will continue to lag behind in this field. </p>
<p>This means that we lose opportunities to learn how to promote movement behaviours that support health and development, thus setting children on the best path for life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Draper receives or has received funding from the British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the South African Medical Research Council, the Jacobs Foundation, and the European Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Okely receives funding from NHMRC, Research Council of Norway, World Health Organization, and UNICEF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoko Oluwayomi receives funding from ISBNPA-PIONEER PROGRAM SCHOLARSHIP 2022</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chalchisa Abdeta receives funding through HDR Scholarship from the University of Wollongong, Australia.</span></em></p>Africa contributes less than 1% of research worldwide on movement behaviours in children. This means that research on movement behaviours has largely excluded over 16% of the world’s population.Catherine Draper, Associate Professor at MRC/Wits Developmental Pathways for Health Research Unit, University of the WitwatersrandAnthony Okely, Distinguished Professor of Public Health, University of WollongongAoko Oluwayomi, PhD Candidate (Exercise Physiology), University of LagosChalchisa Abdeta, PhD candidate, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049242023-05-31T13:26:44Z2023-05-31T13:26:44ZFree secondary education in African countries is on the rise - but is it the best policy? What the evidence says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525851/original/file-20230512-29-k330gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa's secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those of other world regions'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Dorey/Contributor/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When President Salva Kiir <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/south-sudan-expands-access-free-education">announced the abolition of secondary school fees</a> in South Sudan in February 2023, he was following several fellow African leaders. </p>
<p><a href="https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/news-style2/364-president-akufo-addo-launches-free-shs-policy">Ghana</a>, <a href="https://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Gratuite-des-inscriptions-dans-les-etablissements-scolaires-publics.html">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-abolishessecondary-school-tuition-fees-full-free-education-by-jan-2019/">Malawi</a>, <a href="https://statehouse.gov.sl/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-andteachers-to-support-the-initiative/">Sierra Leone</a>, <a href="https://togobreakingnews.info/togo-gratuite-frais-de-scolarite-secondaire/">Togo</a>, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202202030616.html">Zambia</a> have all announced free secondary education policies in the last five years. Rwanda, Kenya and South Africa were early trendsetters in this regard.</p>
<p>Despite its popularity with policymakers, parents and other stakeholders, the abolition of secondary school fees in resource-constrained contexts is still a subject of debate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://southafrica.un.org/en/191051-african-leaders-launch-education-plus-initiative#:%7E:text=Education%20Plus%20calls%20for%20free,to%2Dwork%20transitions%2C%20and%20economic">African Union</a>, global NGOs like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/31/millions-children-denied-free-secondary-education">Human Rights Watch</a> and various United Nations agencies are in favour. </p>
<p>Others are sceptical. They highlight financial sustainability and equity implications, especially at the upper secondary level. A report by the Malala Fund, a global education NGO, <a href="https://r4d.org/resources/financing-upper-secondary-education-unlocking-12-years-education/">argued</a> that free upper secondary education “would be regressive in nature” and might not be affordable for low-income countries. </p>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/8fa2c.html">systematic review</a> to take stock of the evidence. We conclude that free secondary education can be costly and inequitable in the short run, especially if it diverts resources from primary education. Based on these findings, we recommend a policy of “progressive universalism”: free education should be introduced gradually, starting with the lowest levels. </p>
<h2>Setting the scene</h2>
<p>Many African countries abolished primary school fees in the 1990s and early 2000s. This led to a <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a55bc38c-5d2b-5932-83e4-debc56e30da9">major rise in enrolment</a>. But secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those in other world regions. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS?locations=ZG">Less than half</a> of children in sub-Saharan Africa complete lower secondary education, compared to around 80% in South Asia and Latin America. High fees and related costs are a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a5b40f0b6497400056a/School-fees-2012-Morgan-report.pdf">major impediment</a>, particularly for children from low-income backgrounds.</p>
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<img alt="A map of Africa, marked with various shades of red to indicate which countries have free secondary education" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Free secondary education policies in sub-Saharan Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors supplied</span></span>
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<p>The number of sub-Saharan Africa countries with free secondary education policies in place has increased rapidly over the last two decades. Almost half of all African countries now offer fee-free education at the lower secondary level. Almost one in three does so at the upper secondary level. The aim of the recent wave of free secondary education policies is to raise overall education levels – and, ultimately, countries’ <a href="https://cocorioko.net/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-and-teachers-to-support-the-initiative/">broader prosperity and social conditions</a>. </p>
<p>Abolishing school fees is also <a href="https://www.ghgossip.com/ghana-election-2020-free-shs-alone-can-boost-500k-votes-to-npps-win-franklin-cudjoe/">popular with voters</a>. This may have been on the minds of politicians seeking to win or maintain power.</p>
<h2>The cost of free education</h2>
<p>There are two major problems with secondary school fee abolition in resource-constrained states. The first is that, in most African countries, the majority of children from poor households would be ineligible for free secondary education. In Somalia, Niger and Mozambique, less than one in five of the poorest children <a href="https://www.education-inequalities.org/indicators/comp_prim_v2#maxYear=2019&minYear=2014&ageGroup=%22comp_prim_v2%22&dimension=%7B%22id%22%3A%22wealth_quintile%22%2C%22filters%22%3A%5B%22Quintile+1%22%2C%22Quintile+5%22%5D%7D&countries=%5B%22BDI%22%2C%22BEN%22%2C%22BFA%22%2C%22CAF%22%2C%22CIV%22%2C%22CMR%22%2C%22COD%22%2C%22COG%22%2C%22COM%22%2C%22ETH%22%2C%22GAB%22%2C%22GHA%22%2C%22GIN%22%2C%22GMB%22%2C%22GNB%22%2C%22KEN%22%2C%22LBR%22%2C%22LSO%22%2C%22MDG%22%2C%22MLI%22%2C%22MOZ%22%2C%22MRT%22%2C%22MWI%22%2C%22NAM%22%2C%22NER%22%2C%22NGA%22%2C%22RWA%22%2C%22SEN%22%2C%22SLE%22%2C%22SOM%22%2C%22SSD%22%2C%22STP%22%2C%22SWZ%22%2C%22TCD%22%2C%22TGO%22%2C%22TZA%22%2C%22UGA%22%2C%22ZAF%22%2C%22ZMB%22%2C%22ZWE%22%5D">complete primary school</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/only-1-in-3-girls-makes-it-to-secondary-school-in-senegal-heres-why-and-how-to-fix-it-200294">Only 1 in 3 girls makes it to secondary school in Senegal: here's why and how to fix it</a>
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<p>Moreover, even those eligible for free secondary education are often unable to attend. School fees constitute <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/facing-forward-schooling-for-learning-in-africa">less than half</a> of households’ education spending in most African countries. Most free secondary education policies do not cover the cost of essential non-fee expenses such as textbooks, school uniforms, meals and transport. Nominally “free” secondary education can therefore be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059311000101">unaffordable for low-income households</a>. This means the benefits of fee abolition would mainly accrue to children from relatively privileged households and not help those who needed it most.</p>
<p>The second problem is that enacting these policies is very expensive. Empirical evidence from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305764X.2020.1789066">Ghana</a>, The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/33/1/185/2420643?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Gambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775721000467">Kenya</a> and other countries shows that free secondary education policies can substantially increase secondary school enrolment and completion rates in the short run. But they do so at a very high cost: the average expense per senior secondary student is <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/node/819#:%7E:text=2015-,Pricing%20the%20right%20to%20education%3A%20The%20cost,reaching%20new%20targets%20by%202030&text=This%20paper%20shows%20there%20is,and%20lower%20middle%20income%20countries">equivalent to that of five primary school pupils</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277051/africa-sovereigns-left-exposed-to-looming-debt-crisis-afdb/">precarious financial position</a> of many African states, providing free secondary schooling to the entire population is likely to be fiscally unsustainable. </p>
<p>It may also divert scarce resources away from basic education, which is already chronically underfunded. In Malawi for example, which recently abolished secondary school fees, there are <a href="https://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/packed-classrooms-reality-educational-planners-malawi-13351">more than 70 students</a> per primary school teacher.</p>
<h2>What is to be done?</h2>
<p>Access to education is <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/human-rights/universal-declaration/translations/english">a human right</a>. In an ideal world, the global community would ensure that all children could enjoy a full cycle of free, high-quality education. </p>
<p>Most African countries are far removed from this scenario, however. Policymakers must balance the potential benefits of abolishing secondary school fees against the urgent need for investment in basic education. </p>
<p>In many cases, this would suggest a phased approach to introducing free education, which prioritises public spending on basic education in the short run, while asking wealthier households to contribute to the cost of higher levels of education. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/662580">A good example</a> is South Africa’s fee-free schools policy, which was designed to increase enrolment in the poorest districts.</p>
<p><em>Mohammed Alhassan Abango and Leslie Casely-Hayford of Associates for Change, Ghana co-authored this article and the research it is based upon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research project on which this article is based was funded by the British Academy.</span></em></p>The introduction of free education should follow a gradual process, starting with the lowest levels.Rob Gruijters, Associate Professor in Education & International Development, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050832023-05-17T13:24:05Z2023-05-17T13:24:05ZTeen mothers and depression: lack of support from partners and violence are big drivers in Malawi and Burkina Faso<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526211/original/file-20230515-15365-5il9n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ann Rodchua/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Up to <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/adolescent-health/">one in four</a> African girls have their first child before the age of 18. Becoming a mother at such a young age can lead to mental health problems like depression. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3876179/">Research</a> suggests that pregnant and parenting teenagers have poorer mental health than adult mothers. </p>
<p>Several factors make teenage mothers vulnerable to mental illness. For example, in conservative societies pregnant, unmarried adolescent girls are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441692.2020.1751230">shamed</a> and excluded. Parenting is stressful. Early and unintended pregnancy can add to the pressure. Moreover the loss of childhood can overwhelm and distress adolescent girls. </p>
<p>Adolescent mothers from poor homes and communities are at even <a href="https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC3876179&blobtype=pdf">higher risk</a> of depression. These girls experience social inequality, chronic stress, violence and food insecurity. When teenagers become mothers, their adversities are compounded. </p>
<p>Several studies have looked at <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0890856718319063">drivers of depression</a> among adolescents in general. But there is scant attention to the mental wellbeing of pregnant and parenting adolescent girls in Africa. Scant research means limited programme or intervention focus. Limited attention means there is a missed opportunity to address poor mental health in this group. Pregnant and parenting adolescents face different challenges from their peers who are not pregnant or parenting.</p>
<p>Our recent <a href="https://reproductive-health-journal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12978-023-01588-x">study</a> estimates the level of probable depression among pregnant and parenting girls in Burkina Faso in West Africa and Malawi in southern Africa. We chose these countries because they showed potential for policy change around adolescent sexual and reproductive health. </p>
<p>We used the <a href="https://www.hiv.uw.edu/page/mental-health-screening/phq-9">Patient Health Questionnaire-9</a>, the tool used in diagnosing depression. But only a clinician can ultimately decide if an individual has depression. We thus classify those in this study who met the clinical criteria for depression as probably depressed. </p>
<p>We explored the factors associated with a higher likelihood of depression. We found that depression was highest among girls who experienced sexual, emotional and physical violence from their partners; whose partners denied paternity or refused to provide any support; who received no support from their community; who described their neighbourhood as unsafe. </p>
<p>Our study showed that the prevalence of probable depression in Burkina Faso was 18.8%. In Malawi it was 14.5%. But cases of depression were undiagnosed and untreated. This could have dire implications for the health and wellness of the girls and their babies. </p>
<h2>Our study</h2>
<p>We interviewed 980 adolescent girls in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and 669 girls in Blantyre, Malawi in 2021. We asked them how often they had faced the following problems over the last two weeks: having little interest or pleasure in doing things; feeling down or hopeless; having insomnia or oversleeping; fatigue; loss of appetite or over-eating; having low self-esteem; trouble concentrating; restlessness or slowness; and negative self-thoughts, including self-harm. </p>
<p>We also collected information on the girls’ families, partners and neighbourhoods. </p>
<p><strong>Burkina Faso:</strong></p>
<p>Birth status was the only individual factor associated with probable depression in Burkina Faso. Girls who had already given birth were 35% less likely to report depression compared to girls currently pregnant. This group of girls might have had time to develop coping mechanisms after experiencing the disappointment of early and unintended pregnancy. </p>
<p>Girls exposed to intimate partner violence were twice as likely to report depression compared to those who were not. </p>
<p>One key result of our study in Burkina Faso was that paternity denial was a major risk factor for depression among young girls. Paternity denial brings shame to the girl. It also means she receives no support from her partner in taking care of the child, unlike her married counterparts. Acceptance of paternity can help girls deal with the disappointment of becoming pregnant too early and the fear of facing shame and child upbringing alone. Girls whose partners denied paternity were blamed for sleeping around and their children were deemed illegitimate. The pressure from parents on the girls to identify the person responsible for their pregnancy could result in girls’ prolonged sadness and loss of interest in living.</p>
<p>Consistent with previous <a href="https://bmcwomenshealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12905-018-0581-5">research</a>, we found that girls who got support from their parents and partners were shielded from depression. Having access to support within the community was related to a lower likelihood of depression. Also, having goodwill from neighbours and the community was linked to a lower likelihood of depression.</p>
<p><strong>Malawi:</strong> </p>
<p>Having secondary education level was substantially linked to a lower likelihood of reporting depression in Malawi. The explanation for this is likely that girls with some secondary education may be more optimistic about future job prospects than girls with no or simply elementary education. Other research done in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2156869314564399">Malawi</a> has shown education as having a protective effect against depression. Generally, higher education in Malawi is associated with more favourable employment possibilities than having no schooling or only primary schooling. </p>
<p>Exposure to intimate partner violence was associated with a higher risk of depression. </p>
<p>Here, too, we found that girls who got support from their parents and partners were shielded from depression. Young mothers need a lot of support to navigate their new role as parents. Childcare can be tedious even for adults, and requires a lot of money, which these girls lack. Having access to adequate support from parents and partners can lessen the burden of childcare and help girls build their resilience, determination and self-esteem. Girls who considered their neighbourhood to be safe were less likely to report depression. </p>
<h2>Thinking ahead</h2>
<p>Depression is common among pregnant or parenting adolescent girls. </p>
<p>Because depression can harm a girl’s health, routine depression screenings at prenatal and postpartum visits are crucial. </p>
<p>Health systems should be strengthened by governments and developmental partners to develop and provide therapy that addresses all areas of vulnerabilities linked to depression in pregnant and parenting girls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Idowu Ajayi receives funding from SIDA and IDRC. He is affiliated with African Population and Health Research Center. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elita Chamdimba is affiliated with Centre for Social Research, UNIMA and University of Strathclyde. </span></em></p>In addition to motherhood these girls experience social inequality, chronic stress, violence, and food insecurity. When teenagers become mothers, their adversities are compounded.Anthony Idowu Ajayi, Associate research scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterElita Chamdimba, Research fellow, Centre for Social Research, University of MalawiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002892023-02-23T07:11:06Z2023-02-23T07:11:06ZElection observers are important for democracy – but few voters know what they do<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511364/original/file-20230221-14-2b9goz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of a European Union election observation team speak to voters in Zimbabwe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election observers keep watch over polls throughout the world. Their job is to support efforts to improve electoral quality and to provide transparency. In African countries, both local citizen and international observers have been deployed regularly since the 1990s. </p>
<p>During several recent elections across the continent, however, questions have arisen about the competence and impartiality of observation missions. This has led to concerns about the future of observation, both in Africa and elsewhere.</p>
<p>In 2023, <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2023/02/africa-elections-all-upcoming-votes/">more than 20 African countries</a> are scheduled to go to the polls. It will be a busy year for observers who’ll <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/uhuru-to-head-au-polls-mission-in-nigeria-4124542">be present</a> at the majority of these elections. </p>
<p>When done well, election observation <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414008325571">detects</a> ballot-box stuffing, voter suppression and political violence. Observers’ presence at polling stations <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/electoral-fraud-or-violence-the-effect-of-observers-on-party-manipulation-strategies/C1EC14B4C4BBB2156A9A17A24F6A90DF">deters election-day fraud</a>.</p>
<p>Observers also provide public statements about election quality and offer recommendations on how electoral processes could be improved. </p>
<p>Yet some observers have been criticised for a reluctance to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/abs/valid-electoral-exercise-ugandas-1980-elections-and-the-observers-dilemma/300FE5D9472423B0C1F19813688EA87D">point out flawed processes</a>, for holding <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/election-observers-and-their-biases/">biases</a> and for weaknesses in their methodologies. </p>
<p>The perception that observation missions’ verdicts were “proved wrong” by court judgements in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1657277">Kenya (2017)</a> and <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/news/malawi-courts-landmark-ruling-puts-spotlight-on-foreign-observers/">Malawi (2019)</a> has been particularly damaging. In both cases, many commentators (mis)interpreted international observers’ statements as endorsements of electoral processes that the courts later annulled.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
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<p>It’s not clear how widely held these critical views are. The perspectives of the broader public in countries holding elections are often missing from discussions on observation. So we set out to get a sense of what voters in three African countries thought.</p>
<p>We found that people wanted to know more about election observers, but couldn’t easily get the information. Both the media and observers need to do more to provide it. Knowledge of observers’ goals and statements is essential if they are to play the role of public arbiters of election quality. </p>
<h2>What citizens think</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/lmeo">research</a> into citizen perceptions and media representations of election observation took place in Zambia, The Gambia and Kenya. These three countries have had varying experiences of election observation. </p>
<p>We interviewed 520 citizens about topics relating to their perceptions of election observation. In each country, we conducted in-depth interviews in both urban and rural areas, and in constituencies that supported the opposition and the incumbent. </p>
<p>Ordinary citizens in our case study countries rarely offered criticisms of election observation. </p>
<p>For example, we asked 120 Kenyans to evaluate the past performance of election observers during the run-up to the country’s 2022 election. Only one person referred to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/future-election-observation-after-kenyas-supreme-court-judgement">the controversy</a> surrounding observation in 2017 and the supreme court’s annulment of the presidential election.</p>
<p>Instead, we found <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/pdf/Local%20Perceptions%20of%20Election%20Observation__Jan23.pdf#page=2">strong support</a> for election observation among citizens. This was the case in all three of our case study countries, which cover east, southern and west Africa. </p>
<p>Our respondents tended to have concerns about the electoral process in their own country. They spoke favourably about the potential of observation to improve overall electoral quality and transparency. They also felt that observers contributed to reducing the potentially destabilising effects of elections, such as violence. </p>
<p>In both Zambia and Kenya, support for the presence of international observers was higher than support for citizen observers. Respondents in The Gambia, however, tended to prefer citizen observers.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-rest-of-africa-can-learn-from-the-gambias-transition-to-democracy-71822">What the rest of Africa can learn from The Gambia's transition to democracy</a>
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<p>The explanations from those who chose international observers highlighted a perception that they were more impartial than citizen observers, who were often viewed as being biased or corruptible. </p>
<p>Perceptions in Zambia and Kenya may be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2173177">influenced</a> by:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>political polarisation</p></li>
<li><p>a perception that political corruption is high</p></li>
<li><p>the prominence of ethnicity in politics. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These factors appear to reduce confidence in citizen observers. </p>
<p>Despite the popularity of election observers in our case study countries, we found that citizens knew little about their roles. Few could name any specific observation missions. Citizens often confused observers with other electoral actors like polling station staff, the electoral management body and party agents. </p>
<p>It’s common for citizens to believe observers can and should intervene in the electoral process. Yet, non-interference should be a key principle for both <a href="https://gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles/">citizen</a> and <a href="https://www.ndi.org/DoP">international election observers</a>. </p>
<h2>The information gap</h2>
<p>Our interviews made it clear that citizens – especially those in rural areas – found it difficult to get information about the activities and statements of election observers. Few of the respondents heard this information when missions issued their preliminary statements.</p>
<p>The media can bridge this information gap by providing more coverage of election observation. </p>
<p>The quality of this coverage could also be improved, as observers’ preliminary statements are <a href="https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/en/publications/re-evaluating-international-observation-of-kenyas-2017-elections">often mischaracterised</a>. </p>
<p>Observers’ statements tend to be complex and nuanced because they are commenting on numerous aspects of an ongoing process. In media coverage, these statements are often reduced to simple either/or judgements (such as “free and fair”). </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Our project has drawn upon interviews with African journalists and editors to create a short <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/doc/Tips%20for%20Journalists%20and%20Editors%20who%20Cover%20Election%20Observation_.pdf">list of tips</a> on covering election observation. These are designed to improve the circulation of accurate information. The tips include getting a range of perspectives from observer missions and reaching out to them early.</p>
<p>Observer missions could also be more active in raising the profile of their work. We created a <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/doc/Media%20Representations%20of%20Election%20Observation_Jan23.pdf#page=6">list of suggestions</a> from the media in our three case study countries to help them do this. One of the tips is to interact with the media in local languages.</p>
<p>Citizens are more likely to criticise observers for the poor flow of information than for anything else. This doesn’t invalidate other criticisms of observers. In fact, if citizens begin to get more information, these criticisms may become more common. Our research suggests the media and observers need to provide it anyway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Molony receives funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for the ‘Local Perceptions and Media Representations of Election Observation in Africa’ research project, under grant reference ES/T015624/1.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Macdonald receives funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for the ‘Local Perceptions and Media Representations of Election Observation in Africa’ research project, under grant reference ES/T015624/1.</span></em></p>Voters speak favourably about the potential of observation to improve overall electoral quality and transparency.Thomas Molony, Senior Lecturer in African Studies, The University of EdinburghRobert Macdonald, Research Fellow in African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2003712023-02-21T11:56:45Z2023-02-21T11:56:45ZCyclones in southern Africa: five essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511392/original/file-20230221-18-r3odu7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The fishing village of Mahebourg, Mauritius, is among the places in the path of cyclone Freddy.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Morosoli/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Tropical cyclone Freddy was, on 21 February 2023, bearing down on Mauritius and Madagascar. Mauritius grounded flights and, news agency Reuters <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-20-mauritius-halts-flights-madagascar-braces-for-floods-as-cyclone-freddy-nears/">reported</a>, emergency teams in four regions of Madagascar were braced for “heavy rains, floods and landslides”.</em></p>
<p><em>A day earlier the Mauritius Meteorological Services <a href="http://metservice.intnet.mu/current-cyclone.php">issued</a> a Class 3 cyclone warning, saying estimated gusts in the centre of Cyclone Freddy could reach around 280 kilometres an hour.</em></p>
<p><em>Both island nations are located in the Indian Ocean and are no strangers to tropical cyclones. But, as the global climate shifts, such storms will become ever more common, endangering millions of people in Madagascar, Mauritius and other countries in the southern African region like Mozambique and Malawi.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa has published a number of articles explaining the science of tropical cyclones and the role climate change is playing in their increasing frequency and force. Here are five essential reads.</em></p>
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<h2>Warming oceans</h2>
<p>Tropical cyclones are huge. They can span more than 1,000km in diameter and they draw their energy from the ocean heat – ocean surface temperatures of at least 26⁰C are required for tropical cyclones to form. Over the past 30 years, as the world’s oceans have become warmer, the locations of where tropical cyclones form and intensify have been shifting.</p>
<p>Climate scientists Micheal Pillay and Jennifer Fitchett unpacked these shifts.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tropical-cyclones-in-the-south-west-indian-ocean-new-insights-125579">Tropical cyclones in the South West Indian Ocean: new insights</a>
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<h2>Devastation</h2>
<p>The most damaging tropical cyclones of the past few years were tropical cyclones Idai and Kenneth, which hit Mozambique especially hard in March and April of 2019. Idai alone killed more than 1,500 people in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. In an article first published in 2019 soon after the devastation and updated in 2022 as more powerful storms battered Mozambique, Professor Fitchett explained why tropical cyclones from the Indian Ocean were becoming ever more powerful.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-indian-ocean-is-spawning-strong-and-deadly-tropical-cyclones-116559">Why the Indian Ocean is spawning strong and deadly tropical cyclones</a>
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<h2>Countries must pull together</h2>
<p>In the wake of tropical storms Idai and Kenneth, researcher Chris Changwe Nshimbi argued that the Southern African Development Community had once again proved that it wasn’t ready to deal with environmental disasters as a collective. He traced the reasons for these shortcomings and suggested ways forward – more critical than ever as tropical storms and other climate-related crises hammer southern Africa.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-african-countries-wont-manage-disasters-unless-they-work-together-114541">Southern African countries won't manage disasters unless they work together</a>
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<h2>More to come</h2>
<p>Nshimbi is right: there is far more to come. Professor Fitchett – who has dedicated much of her research to the phenomenon – explained what drives extreme weather events.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africa-must-brace-itself-for-more-tropical-cyclones-in-future-103641">Southern Africa must brace itself for more tropical cyclones in future</a>
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<h2>The bigger picture</h2>
<p>Tropical cyclones are only one part of the African continent’s climate crisis. Meteorologist Victor Ongoma explained what climate change experts were predicting for the continent and how different regions would be affected.</p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-for-african-countries-from-the-latest-climate-change-projections-165944">Insights for African countries from the latest climate change projections</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Tropical cyclones are becoming more frequent in the Indian Ocean. Here’s why and what that means.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996562023-02-16T14:35:57Z2023-02-16T14:35:57ZIlemi Triangle spat: how resources fuel East Africa’s border conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509768/original/file-20230213-19-nq08wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan fishermen demand a say in the country's border conflict with Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyan-coastal-fishermen-carry-placards-during-a-news-photo/1231734423?phrase=Geographical%20Border%20east%20africa&adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peacebuilding</p>
<p>For decades, African states have grappled with numerous interstate <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/44264/edit">border disputes</a>, especially in resource-rich regions. In east Africa, most of these conflicts are as old as independence. The disputes flare up every so often despite interventions by agencies of the African Union and the United Nations. A <a href="https://nation.africa/africa/news/kenya-south-sudan-locked-in-border-dispute-4117296">fresh war of words</a> has erupted between Kenya and South Sudan over the water- and oil-rich Ilemi Triangle border, which was first drawn up in 1914. We asked Al Chukwuma Okoli, a defence strategy scholar, four key questions._</p>
<h2>Why do boundaries matter for nation states?</h2>
<p>The term “boundary” refers to a cartographic (mapped out) line that marks and defines the confines of a state, distinguishing its <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/international-internal-boundaries-definition-function.html">sovereign territory from that of others</a>. It is mutually agreed upon and jointly owned by the countries involved. </p>
<p>Boundaries matter because they determine the area that a country rules. They also assign national identity. </p>
<p>Boundaries are both a bridge and a barrier to international peace and stability. As a bridge, international boundaries have a role in legitimate activities, especially in trade and migration. But as a barrier, they can be a site for criminality and violence. More importantly, boundaries provide a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/boundary-dispute">“fault-line” for international conflicts</a>.</p>
<h2>Which are some of east Africa’s boundary conflicts?</h2>
<p>I took part in a <a href="https://cejiss.org/borderlines-natural-resources-and-conflicts-towards-a-territorial-materialism-of-boundary-disputes-in-east-africa">recent study</a> of several instances of boundary conflicts in east Africa. These include the conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia (ongoing since 1960); Kenya and South Sudan (ongoing since 1963); and Kenya and Somalia (1963-1981). Others are Ethiopia and Sudan (from 1966 to 2002), Tanzania and Malawi (ongoing since 1967) and Uganda-Tanzania (1974–1979). </p>
<p>The various boundary conflicts in the region originated and evolved in different historical and political contexts. But they have been complicated by the changing dictates of international politics. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts have been protracted and intractable. A case in point is the Kenya–South Sudan conflict, which seems to have become more complicated in recent years. It began in 1963 when Kenya claimed the Ilemi Triangle. Ilemi is a region rich in oil and water, lying to the north of a straight border that was drawn in 1914. Kenya’s claim, and de facto control, extends beyond the limit marked in 1938. </p>
<p>Several bilateral and multilateral measures have been taken over the years to resolve the conflict. These include continental initiatives anchored by the African Union. In 2019 Kenya and South Sudan agreed to talks. They have demonstrated commitment to finding a solution by creating a joint boundary commission. But flare-ups and skirmishes still erupt on the disputed borderlines.</p>
<h2>What generally fuels Africa’s boundary disputes?</h2>
<p>A dominant view by scholars holds that boundary disputes are inevitable creations of colonialism. Via the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467">Berlin Conference diplomacy</a> of 1884 to 1885, European imperial powers took control of African territories and carved them up. European maps defined African state boundaries. </p>
<p>This perspective suggests that the imperialist scramble for Africa was a sort of crude territorial grabbing, leading to arbitrary and artificial partitioning of Africa into slices of colonial spheres of interest. By slicing up similar cultural groups and lumping together culturally divergent groups, colonialism created long-lasting disputes.</p>
<p>Other scholars have questioned this view. They say colonial interference cannot fully explain the nature and dynamics of the current boundary conflicts in Africa. These “realist” scholars believe that states fight for <a href="https://cejiss.org/borderlines-natural-resources-and-conflicts-towards-a-territorial-materialism-of-boundary-disputes-in-east-africa">territory for material advantage</a>. The fight is largely about the ownership, access or control of natural resources like oil and water. This implies that the motive behind most present-day boundary conflicts is states’ pursuit of material advantages along their common territorial frontiers. </p>
<p>My view is that what is crucially at issue in most current border-related disputes in Africa is the quest for resources.</p>
<p>Apart from the Ilemi Triangle spat, South Sudan is currently feuding with Sudan over the oil-rich Abiyei region. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are locked in a dispute over the ownership of parts of Lake Albert. The disputed spot has potential for crude oil alongside minerals like diamonds, gold and coltan.</p>
<p>Similarly, Tanzania and Malawi are at loggerheads over the oil-rich area around Lake Malawi (Nyasaland), while Kenya and Uganda have been quarrelling over the waters, fish and possible crude oil of Lake Victoria’s Migingo Island.</p>
<h2>How can these border conflicts be resolved?</h2>
<p>Modern boundary disputes in east Africa have often been largely driven by declared or disguised claims, stakes, motives and interests that are material or economic in essence. Understanding boundary disputes in Africa should go beyond the idea of “colonial causation” and come to terms with strategic and material interests.</p>
<p>Solutions to such conflicts depend on a diplomatic approach that recognises the colonially inherited boundary system and also mediates the interests of affected states.</p>
<p>It is necessary to evolve a regional border management mechanism that can proactively and multilaterally address border-related issues to find an enduring resolution. The joint border commission between Kenya and South Sudan is a step in the right direction.</p>
<p>The spate of boundary conflicts in east Africa poses a huge challenge to regional politics and diplomacy. Apart from creating diplomatic tension among states, the situation has resulted in a loss of lives and livelihoods. It has also destabilised the region – a setback to regional integration. A lasting solution is needed to sustain peace and stability of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Al Chukwuma Okoli teaches Political Science at Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. He has consulted for the UN-Women, African Union, Centre for Democracy and Development, and Open University of Nigeria. He has received funding from the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, Nigeria. He is a Member of Amnesty international and CORN West Africa. </span></em></p>The joint border commission between Kenya and South Sudan is a step in the right direction.Al Chukwuma Okoli, Reader (Associate Professor), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria, Federal University LafiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1977992023-01-14T09:53:17Z2023-01-14T09:53:17ZWhy cholera continues to threaten many African countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504431/original/file-20230113-17-bb62ey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Key to preventing cholera is a good supply of water.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Many African countries are periodically affected by outbreaks of cholera. For instance, Malawi’s current outbreak, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-12/worst-cholera-outbreak-in-decades-kills-750-people-in-malawi">worst</a> in two decades, has claimed <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/cholera-outbreak-kills-620-in-malawi-4073880#:%7E:text=Malawi%20has%20recorded%2018%2C222%20cholera,Health%20Minister%20Khumbize%20Chiponda%20announced">hundreds</a> of lives and forced the closure of schools and many businesses. Cholera deaths have now been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-22/south-african-capital-hit-by-cholera-outbreak-with-10-dead">reported</a> in South Africa too.</em></p>
<p><em>Microbiologist Sam Kariuki, the director of Kenya’s Medical Research Institute, explains what cholera is and why it’s so hard to control in Africa.</em></p>
<h2>Why is cholera still such a big issue for African countries?</h2>
<p>Cholera is a disease <a href="https://www.gtfcc.org/research/cholera-prevention-preparedness-and-control-in-kenya-through-hotspot-mapping-genotyping-exposure-assessment-and-wash-oral-cholera-vaccine-interventions/">caused and spread by</a> bacteria – specifically <em>Vibrio cholerae</em> – which you can get by eating or drinking contaminated food or water. </p>
<p>It’s an <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=qpjshPr7HVcC&pg=PA197&lpg=PA197&dq=cholera+and+bangal&source=bl&ots=4htxUE4c61&sig=S52TKJb0YKHttBcyNZt2jJRtLcY&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=cholera%20and%20bangal&f=false">old disease</a> which has mostly <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2857326">affected</a> developing countries, many of which are in Africa. Between 2014 and 2021 Africa <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/who-and-partners-revamp-war-against-cholera-africa">accounted for</a> 21% of cholera cases and 80% of deaths reported globally.</p>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/why-cholera-continues-to-threaten-many-african-countries-197799&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>In several African countries, cholera is the leading cause of severe diarrhoea. In 2021, the World Health Organization <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/who-and-partners-revamp-war-against-cholera-africa">reported</a> that Africa experienced its highest ever reported numbers – more than 137,000 cases and 4,062 deaths in 19 countries.</p>
<p>It has persisted in Africa partly because of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/28/is-africa-losing-ground-battle-water-sanitation/">worsening</a> sanitation, poor and unreliable water supplies and worsening socioeconomic conditions. For instance, when people’s incomes can’t keep up with inflation they’ll move to more affordable housing – often this is in congested, unsanitary settings where water and other hygiene services are already stretched to the limit.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-urban-poor-are-being-exploited-by-informal-water-markets-144582">Kenya's urban poor are being exploited by informal water markets</a>
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<p>In addition, in the last decade, many African countries have witnessed an <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africas-urbanisation-dynamics-2022-economic-power-africas-cities">upsurge in population migration</a> to urban areas in search of livelihoods. Many of these people end up in poor urban slums where water and sanitation infrastructure remains a challenge. </p>
<p>Displaced populations – a major concern in several African countries – are also very vulnerable to water and food contamination. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504400/original/file-20230113-17-rju7ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sadiki Sabimana, an internally displaced person, holds water he believes is contaminated with cholera, in the DRC’s Masisi area.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP</span></span>
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<p>It’s important to control cholera because it can cause severe illness and death. In mild cases cholera can be managed through oral rehydration salts to replace lost fluids and electrolytes. Severe cases may require antibiotic treatment. It’s vital to diagnose and treat cases quickly – cholera can <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/">kill within hours</a> if untreated. </p>
<p>In 2015, it was <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/3/e044615">estimated that</a> over one million cases in 44 African countries resulted in an economic burden of US$130 million from cholera-related illness and its treatment. </p>
<h2>What’s missing in the response?</h2>
<p>African governments must acknowledge that the burden of cholera is huge. In my opinion, governments in endemic areas don’t recognise cholera as a major issue until there’s a big outbreak, when it’s out of control. They treat it as a once off. </p>
<p>The burden of cholera could get worse unless governments put measures in place to control and prevent outbreaks. They need to address water and hygiene infrastructure. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cholera-how-african-countries-are-failing-to-do-even-the-basics-74445">Cholera: how African countries are failing to do even the basics</a>
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<p>There must also be community engagement. For instance, widespread messaging that encourages hand washing, boiling water and other preventive measures. Community health <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6503a7.htm">extension workers</a> are key in getting these messages across and distributing supplies during an outbreak.</p>
<p>For the most vulnerable populations we must apply oral cholera vaccines. Data on cholera hotspots from surveillance studies will be vital to ensure critical populations are targeted first. </p>
<p>There are various brands and variation of the oral cholera vaccine, and they are all easy to administer because they are taken orally. They have an effectiveness rate of <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/vaccines.html#:%7E:text=The%20vaccine%20manufacturer%20reports%20Vaxchora,3%E2%80%936%20months%20after%20vaccination.">between</a> 60% to 80% but require a yearly booster. There’s not been a concerted vaccination campaign in many countries, however, because governments are not taking the prevention and control of the disease seriously. </p>
<p>Finally, the issue of drug resistance needs to be addressed. Drug resistance has made it possible for these cholera strains to stay longer in the environment. </p>
<p>I was part of a team that conducted a <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0074829">study</a> in Kenya which found that bacteria that causes cholera has become resistant to some antibiotics. Some types of drug resistance are caused by a natural interaction of the <em>Vibrio cholerae</em> bacteria with other drug resistant bacteria in the environment. </p>
<p>The overuse of antibiotics also contributes to drug resistance. Government agencies should develop ways to monitor the use of antibiotics and restrict their prescription. Regulation of antibiotic use in animals should also be improved. Healthcare workers also need to be trained in the proper use of antibiotics.</p>
<h2>Have there been any recent advances?</h2>
<p>One important one has been the development of rapid diagnostic tests that can be used by health workers in the field. These kits are available at costs far lower than lab culture costs. Using them makes it possible to confirm outbreaks promptly so treatment can be initiated. </p>
<p>In addition, more countries are now adopting the oral cholera vaccine for prevention and control. </p>
<p>What is lacking is a concerted effort for all endemic countries – which I consider to be all countries in sub-Saharan Africa – to have joint measures to tackle cross-border transmission and persistence of cholera outbreaks. </p>
<p>Some countries are still in denial about outbreaks. This is partly due to fears about repercussions on trade and tourism. But in an interconnected world this attitude isn’t helpful. </p>
<p>I am optimistic that we can control cholera in African settings. In the short term this could be done through raising awareness among vulnerable populations and interventions like the oral cholera vaccine.</p>
<p>In the long term African countries need improved water hygiene infrastructure, housing and enhanced socioeconomic conditions. But there must be a strong will by relevant government ministries to work together to realise these goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Kariuki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cholera has persisted longer in Africa largely due to worsening hygiene and sanitation situations in urban areas.Samuel Kariuki, Chief Research Scientist and Director, Centre for Microbiology Research, Kenya Medical Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916242022-10-09T07:43:00Z2022-10-09T07:43:00ZCannabis corporates should be taxed to fund mental health programmes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488015/original/file-20221004-25-g3cnay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mental health is the state of mental well-being that contributes to individual and population health. This state of mental well-being sustains national output and labour force <a href="https://www.psychreg.org/mental-health-employees-productivity/">productivity</a>. But governments around the world haven’t been investing resources into addressing mental ill-health. This is despite acknowledging that economics and mental health are <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102717/">intertwined</a>. </p>
<p>It’s documented that cannabis consumption erodes <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpsy/article/PIIS2215-0366(19)30048-3/fulltext">mental well-being</a>. It has adverse effects on school, work, and social life. The consumption of cannabis has also been linked to increases in <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/5/1578">domestic violence</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://newfrontierdata.com/product/africa-regional-hemp-and-cannabis-report-2019-industry-outlook/">2019 Africa Regional Hemp and Cannabis report</a> indicates that Africa contributed US$37 billion to the cannabis global market. This figure demonstrates the potential in targeting the cannabis sector for special excise taxes to fund African mental health prevention programmes.</p>
<p>Some developing countries have opted to legalise the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46374191">use of cannabis</a>. These include Jamaica, Colombia, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, Rwanda, South Africa, Lesotho, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All of these governments could benefit from implementing special excise taxes. </p>
<p>Mental ill-health costs the world economy <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30432-0/fulltext">US$1 trillion</a> annually. The 2020 Mental Health Atlas <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/345946">estimates</a> the global spending on mental health per capita is US$7.49. These figures highlight the underinvestment in averting mental ill-health. Without a drastic increase in investment, this cost is projected to rise to US$6 trillion by 2030. </p>
<p>Bold political commitment is needed to improve the financing of mental health programmes. In a recently <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535222000908">published paper</a>, my colleagues and I argue that imposing excise taxes on cannabis corporations is a feasible option. Excise taxes have rarely been imposed on the cannabis sector despite the wealth amassed by this industry. <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220203005879/en/Global-Cannabis-Market-Size-Forecast-Report-2021-A-176-Billion-by-2030---Growing-Legalization-of-Medical-Cannabis-in-Various-Countries-Driving-Growth---ResearchAndMarkets.com.">Current estimates</a> show that the global formal cannabis sector is valued at US$25 billion in 2021 and is projected to reach US$176 billion by 2030. </p>
<p>The growth projection demonstrates the risk of poor mental health as well as the viability of targeting the cannabis sector for special excise taxes. These can be used to finance prevention and promote mental health programmes that have remained neglected in developing countries. </p>
<h2>Cannabis tax and legislation</h2>
<p>Take Tanzania as an example. The country has criminalised cannabis possession, despite being one of the largest consumers of cannabis in East Africa. It is among the countries with the highest prevalence of domestic violence and assault cases worldwide. According to World Bank estimates, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/publication/tanzania-can-do-more-to-protect-women-and-girls-by-urgently-addressing-gaps-in-efforts-to-combat-gender-based-violence">40% of all women aged 15-49 years in Tanzania have experienced physical violence</a>. The prevalence of spousal violence is highest in rural areas, averaging 52%. Such gender-based violence and assaults are linked with cannabis consumption. </p>
<p>In the East African region, Tanzanians are the largest consumers of cannabis. Up to <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201905270878.html">3.6 million Tanzanians</a> used the drug in 2018, according to New Frontier Data.</p>
<p>Based on this reality, there appears to be room to legalise and allocate excise taxes on cannabis corporations for investments in mental health programmes in Tanzania. Taxing cannabis aggressively may reduce consumption. Tanzania collected about <a href="https://www.tra.go.tz/index.php/tax-collection-statistics">US$9 billion in tax</a> in 2020, according to government statistics. </p>
<p>This amount covers only about half of the government’s expenses. Hence, it would be impossible for Tanzania to fund mental health programmes sustainably. The growing population needs other essential services too. So Tanzania would have to collect more taxes to fund mental health programmes.</p>
<p>The Tanzanian government can learn much from the US and other high-income countries that opted to legalise and tax cannabis corporations aggressively. The criminalisation of cannabis is regressive. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, it costs <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/id/100791442">US$3.6 billion per year</a> to enforce laws on cannabis possession alone. Police officers must invest many hours and resources in arresting and booking suspects for cannabis possession. </p>
<p>Cannabis suspects spend a night or more in jail and are subjected to multiple court visits to resolve the case. Those detained by the justice system are subjected to poor treatment, inducing poor mental health outcomes. The public health payoff for all cannabis criminalisation is small.</p>
<p>In 2020, the US excise tax revenue from cannabis was estimated to be <a href="https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2790754">US$1.6 billion</a> from nine states. This is projected to grow to US$12 billion by 2030. The revenue was ring-fenced and used to finance substance abuse prevention programmes. So far, the legalisation and taxation of cannabis have reduced domestic assaults by <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0886260520961876">18%</a> in the US. Furthermore, cannabis legalisation and taxation reduced mental health prescription drug use among Medicaid enrolees – saving the US government on expensive <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hec.4519">drug costs</a>.</p>
<p>Canada legalised the use of cannabis in 2018 and has already collected US$15 billion of tax revenue in 2021 from <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/ca/en/pages/consumer-business/articles/an-industry-makes-its-mark.html?id=ca:2el:3dp:eng_FY22_ConsumerCannabis_AnnualReport:External_OCS__GKWAB76A">cannabis companies</a>. Like the US, Canada has invested a significant portion of the tax revenue in programmes for youth mental health. Post-legalisation, there is no marked increase in the prevalence of cannabis use in the young Canadian population.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The first hurdle to clear is that <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835498">all countries</a> need to strengthen their tax collection systems. The rich countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development collect 35% of their GDP in taxes. Low-income economies collect only 11%. Such modest tax collection and lack of cannabis legalisation and taxation is a risk to optimum mental health financing.</p>
<p>They then need to respond to three critical areas to improve mental <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535222000908?via%3Dihub">health financing</a>. </p>
<p>Firstly, tax systems must be fair and progressively advance accountability – with undertaxed cannabis corporates paying their reasonable contribution. </p>
<p>Secondly, governments need to reduce the transaction costs of paying taxes by investing in efficient technologies for tax collection. </p>
<p>Finally, tax systems in developing countries need to be transparent to increase public trust. Taxes collected to improve mental health conditions must be ring-fenced and used for mental health prevention programmes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cyprian M. Mostert does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cannabis consumption erodes mental well-being and has adverse effects on school, work, and social life.Cyprian M. Mostert, Assistant Professor, Global Health Economics & Lead Mental Health Economist, Brain & Mind Institute, Aga Khan University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909242022-09-27T13:12:02Z2022-09-27T13:12:02ZChild marriage comes with a heavy cost for young girls in Africa – but there’s one clear way out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485643/original/file-20220920-11061-sp09wv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Early marriage has a number of negative effects on the lives of girls and their own children.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Riccardo Mayer/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>650 million women and girls alive today were married before their 18th birthday. That’s one of the startling figures contained in a <a href="https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Towards-Ending-Child-Marriage-report-2021.pdf">2021 UNICEF report</a> about child marriage. Africa’s sub-Saharan region is home to <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-marriage/">nine of the ten countries</a> with the highest rates of child marriage in the world. </p>
<p>Ingrained traditions and cultural practices typically entrench such early marriages. State or customary laws in <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/MarryingTooYoung.pdf#page=12">146 countries</a> allow girls younger than 18 to marry with the consent of their parents or other authorities. In <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/MarryingTooYoung.pdf#page=12">52 nations</a>, girls under 15 can marry with parental consent. </p>
<p>Early marriage among boys is <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/115-million-boys-and-men-around-world-married-children-unicef">also widespread</a>, though the numbers are far lower than they are for girls and young women. </p>
<p>And it is girls and young women who pay the heaviest costs for early marriage. Girls who marry before 18 are <a href="https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Towards-Ending-Child-Marriage-report-2021.pdf">more likely</a> to be subjected to domestic violence and less likely to continue schooling than their peers. They have worse economic and health outcomes, a burden they almost inevitably pass on to their children. </p>
<p>Early marriage has been linked to poorer <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Events/PDF/Slides/1_khatoon.pdf">cognitive development</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953617303283">stunting</a> among the children of such women. </p>
<p>Today, the practice is declining thanks to national and international policies, global treaties and, since 2016, the UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage. But gains have been slow in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>What is it that drives the practice in the region? That’s what we examined in a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0021909620966778">recent study</a>. Using statistical analysis, we looked at the socio-economic and demographic determinants of early marriage among young women the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mali and Niger. Each of the four countries has sought to introduce measures to discourage early marriage, but their challenges remain formidable.</p>
<p>We explored several possible explanations and variables: age at first intercourse, education and literacy, women’s current age, region and type of place of residence, family wealth index, ethnicity, employment status, and even mass media exposure.</p>
<p>One factor stands out across the four countries in our study: education. Women without formal education are more likely to marry early than those who completed secondary or higher education. </p>
<h2>Four study countries</h2>
<p>The four countries have a great deal in common, including high poverty levels and substantial under-15 and rural populations. </p>
<p>In each country, around 50% of people are younger than 15, and around half of the countries’ respective populations live in rural areas (a full 84% in the case of <a href="https://malawi.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/2018%20Malawi%20Population%20and%20Housing%20Census%20Main%20Report%20%281%29.pdf#page=23">Malawi</a>).</p>
<p>Among the four countries in our study, Niger has the highest child marriage prevalence worldwide – 76% of girls are married before the age of 18. The rates stand at 52% in Mali, 42% in Malawi, and 37% in the DRC. </p>
<p>For our analysis, we turned to the most recently available demographic and health surveys from each of the four countries. We then applied a framework that seeks to describe the important social-cultural and cognitive variables and their interrelationships that underlie behaviours and decisions around reproductive health. </p>
<h2>Statistical variables</h2>
<p>The answers we found as to why early marriage is so commonplace in these countries were not always clear-cut. What’s more, there were lots of statistical variations across the four countries and contradictions, as was to be expected.</p>
<p>For example, the average age of first marriage ranged from 15.3 in Niger to 17.1 in Malawi. There was also a range in the percentage of women from the poorest wealth category in the countries who had been married by 18: Niger (90.9%), Mali (80%), DRC (70.3%), Malawi (63.1%).</p>
<p>Rates of early marriage dropped among women from richer categories, but were still high: Niger (72.7%), Mali (65.4%), DRC (60.3%) and Malawi (42.5%).</p>
<p>The study also showed that young women living in rural areas were likely to marry earlier than those from urban areas.</p>
<p>These variations’ social, economic, and cultural underpinnings are likely complex and would need some unpacking. In some cultures, for example, girls are married off young as they are considered to be more likely to be virgins still and can thus fetch a higher payment of what’s known as the <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/child-marriage-brides-india-niger-syria/">bride price</a>. </p>
<p>Amid the many statistical variables that emerged, we were especially struck by the relationship between educational levels and average age at first marriage.</p>
<h2>The role of education</h2>
<p>We found that the average age at first marriage in Niger, Mali, DRC, and Malawi increased from young people with no education (15.1, 15.4, 16.2, and 16.4, respectively) to those with secondary and higher education (17.0, 16.6, 17.1 and 18.5 in that order). </p>
<p>In addition, we saw that the highest prevalence of early marriage (by 18 years) was found among young women with no education (90.6%, 80.3%, 70.9%, and 70.3%). It was lowest among women with secondary and higher education (64.2%, 62.9%, 58.9%, and 30.2%).</p>
<p>Malawi is the only one of the four countries where school education is universal, accessible and compulsory.</p>
<p>Education offers young women opportunities in life. In some African cultures, however, allowing girls to finish or even attend school <a href="https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-and-education/">is discouraged</a> as it is feared that an educated girl is less likely to get a husband or be a good wife.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-atlas/atlas/malawi/">In Malawi</a>, less than 15% of women have any secondary school education, and 42% of girls are married before the age of 18 – the twelfth highest rate of child marriage in the world. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>There is an urgent need for governments in these countries to introduce programmes that promote delaying the age at which girls first have sex and to equip adolescents with knowledge about responsible and safer sex. </p>
<p>Policymakers should also work to promote prolonged enrolment in school for adolescent girls. And, crucially, laws are needed – and must be enforced – that criminalise child marriages.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sathiya Susuman Appunni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Though child marriage rates are declining globally, the practice remains worryingly common in some African countries.Sathiya Susuman Appunni, Professor of Demography, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1850142022-06-20T14:28:41Z2022-06-20T14:28:41ZAfrica’s smaller cities are usually overlooked: they shouldn’t be<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469181/original/file-20220616-24-ilh27c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Long prices in Ghana's Cape Coast have been soaring.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Cristina Aldehuela / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Often when one thinks or writes about urbanisation in Africa, mega-cities or primary cities like Lagos, Nairobi, Addis Ababa or Kampala, come to mind. Little, however, is written about places like Gabés in Tunisia, Touba-Mbacké in Senegal, or Ibadan in Nigeria. Yet these are just three of an <a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/book/dynamics-systems-secondary-cities-africa">estimated 885 secondary</a>, or intermediary, cities in Africa that already account for over <a href="https://www.oecd.org/development/africa-s-urbanisation-dynamics-2020-b6bccb81-en.htm">40% of the continent’s urban population</a>. Their share is very likely to grow over time.</p>
<p>These cities have a critical role to play in Africa’s overall urbanisation trajectory. They have a number of advantages.</p>
<p>Firstly, they’re located closer to rural populations, they provide an important market for agricultural goods. This means that they provide a crucial link to ensuring more balanced economic growth for a country. </p>
<p>Secondly, their location also enables people to make the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural work more easily. And more generally they make the move from living in the countryside to a more urban existence easier. </p>
<p>There is in fact <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeewdevel/v_3a63_3ay_3a2014_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a43-58.htm">global evidence from developing countries</a>, that demonstrates that for a given level of urban population growth, these intermediary cities are in fact overall better in driving poverty reduction than the primary cities are.</p>
<p>A further major advantage that intermediary cities have, is that many still have most of their growth trajectory to come. And, unlike many primary cities struggling under the weight of large populations, investment in infrastructure in intermediary cities can happen in advance of settlement. </p>
<p>If this is done, it helps avoid the substantial financial, political, and social costs of retrofitting. But this requires substantial upfront financing. Yet raising this upfront finance together with the revenue to repay it, is a challenge. </p>
<h2>Where the money is going to come from</h2>
<p>Many of the options available to intermediary cities when it comes to generating local revenues, are the same as available to all cities. </p>
<p>The first is administrative reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the collection of taxes and fees.</p>
<p>Such reforms include updating taxpayer rolls or streamlining payment systems. The benefit of these types of reforms is that they usually lie squarely in the city’s remit. And a city doesn’t necessarily need to get approvals from other levels of government. </p>
<p>In addition, the reforms can result in substantial increases in revenue for cites far off from achieving optimal efficiency. </p>
<p>But there’s a major drawback. Increasing revenue from these types of administrative reforms is finite based on efficiency being achieved.</p>
<p>Cities can also focus on reforms to change the composition of what they can collect. This includes the types of taxes and fees, their rates and from whom they should be collecting them. Reforms like this usually require changes to laws and regulations. This makes them longer and more onerous to implement.</p>
<p>Both administrative and policy reforms can be supported by improvements in technology. For example, to improve tax collection several secondary cities in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329937685_Practices_in_Institutionalizing_GIS_for_Revenue_Mobilization_The_Case_of_Secondary_Cities_in_Tanzania">Tanzania introduced GIS mapping</a> to help identify and map all the properties in their remit. Despite some challenges in implementation, <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/223/Working%20Papers/ict-and-revenue-collection-in-tanzania.-mccluskey-et-al.zp166260.pdf">cities like Arusha</a>, still managed to increase their annual revenue from property tax collection accordingly. </p>
<p><a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2021/06/Case%20Studies_web_0.pdf">Mzuzu, in Malawi</a>, also used technology to support a policy reform for their property tax valuation system. This change required various characteristics of the property to be captured. This was done digitally. The result was a 7-fold increase in revenue in the space of five years. </p>
<p>This showed that technology can have an important role to play to support reform processes when the availability and integration of data are improved. </p>
<p>But technology can’t replace the need for the underpinning reforms to happen.</p>
<h2>Opportunities</h2>
<p>There are also some opportunities particularly pertinent for intermediary cities. This is particularly true around land value capture.</p>
<p>One of the most important assets for all cities is the land that they are located on. For some cities, land can make up <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FINAL-Asset-and-Debt-Management-for-Cities_Working-Paper-062118.pdf">90% of their total asset base</a> The urbanisation process results in an increasing scarcity of land as people and businesses begin to locate in cities. </p>
<p>Together with the public investments made on the land to improve productivity and liveability, these two forces drive up its value. <a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/book/dynamics-systems-secondary-cities-africa">Cape Coast in Ghana</a>, for example, has land values of up to US$200,000 per hectare, with prices rising over 50% per annum. This is not uncommon for many intermediary cities.</p>
<p>This means that intermediary cities, particularly those still at the relative outset of their urbanisation process, should put in place mechanisms that can capture this increased value and then use the revenues from this to reinvest into the cities. </p>
<p>One way for these cities to capture the value of land, is through proper planning of urban expansion. Changing or adopting new land-use management plans, and the resultant impact on land values, can provide a major source of revenue for a city. </p>
<p>In four Ethiopian intermediary cities where this has been done – <a href="https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/programs/urban-expansion">Adama Bahir Dar, Hawassa and Mekelle</a> – an estimated US$77 million of leases have already been sold. This is money that can then be reinvested to service the land, as well as provide for further infrastructure in the expansion areas.</p>
<p>Another major opportunity is to harness the potential of remittance payments. Research of the impact of remittances on secondary cities in Africa, is still scarce. Nevertheless <a href="http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/iadbremit/orozco04.pdf">evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean</a> shows that the majority of these flow into secondary cities and towns. </p>
<p>A study looking at remittance flows to eight secondary cities in Latin America and the Caribbean showed that certain cities with large numbers of international migrants could receive up to as <a href="http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/iadbremit/orozco04.pdf">much as 20%</a> of the total remittance flows for that country. </p>
<p>The same study shows that most of these remittances are spent by households on education, health, housing and insurance.</p>
<p>A similar, smaller study conducted in <a href="https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/106785/2/02whole.pdf">Gondar, Ethiopia</a> shows that about one third of households received remittances monthly, usually reflecting their sole source of income. In these cases, remittances were overwhelmingly used to support housing investments, businesses, and education. </p>
<p>To tap into remittances as a source finance, cities must have structures in place that allow for the absorption of the funds, as well as their utilisation in the overall economy</p>
<p>In the near term, intergovernmental fiscal flows will remain a significant portion of intermediary city budgets. This means that finding ways to support national governments to improve and stabilise these flows will be key in supporting investments to happen in advance of settlement.</p>
<p>At the same time, it is critical that the dependence on these intergovernmental fiscal flows is reduced by looking at ways to increase intermediary cities own revenue generation. This is key to ensuring the overall longer-term sustainability for these intermediary cities and in particular their infrastructure and public services, and as such unlocking the urban dividend for the whole country from the urbanisation process.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on the chapter “Funding and and Financing Secondary Cities” from the Cities Alliance book “<a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/book/dynamics-systems-secondary-cities-africa">The Dynamics of Systems of Secondary Cities in Africa: Urbanisation, Migration and Development</a>”.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Intermediary cities have a vital role to play in the economies of African countries.Astrid R.N. Haas, Fellow, Infrastructure Institute, School of Cities, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844662022-06-06T15:07:04Z2022-06-06T15:07:04ZQueen Elizabeth II: a reign that saw the end of the British empire in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467177/original/file-20220606-22-vdmb9p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Queen Elizabeth II waves from the balcony of Buckingham Palace during the Platinum Jubilee Pageant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the UK the Queen’s official title is: <a href="https://royalcentral.co.uk/uk/what-are-elizabeth-iis-titles-172181/">Elizabeth the Second</a>, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.</p>
<p>There has been a lot of political and social change during her <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-a-look-back-at-the-evolution-of-sport-during-queen-elizabeths-platinum-jubilee-184119">70 years on the throne</a>. None less than in what was once her African empire. </p>
<p>Famously, she was in Kenya (then pronounced by the British as “Keenya”), at the luxury Tree Tops game lodge, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-16904171">when her father died in 1952</a>. She returned hastily to Britain to accede to the throne <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-a-look-back-at-the-evolution-of-sport-during-queen-elizabeths-platinum-jubilee-184119">that year</a>.</p>
<p>This was her second trip to Africa. She had accompanied her parents to South Africa <a href="https://britishheritage.com/the-royal-family-in-south-africa#:%7E:text=In%201947%20the%20Royal%20Family,Swaziland%2C%20Basutoland%20and%20the%20Bechuanaland">in 1947</a>, the monarchy’s “last hurrah” in the country before the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a>, which formalised apartheid, displaced General Jan Smuts’ United Party the following year. </p>
<p>At its height, the British Empire extended over something like a third of the world, but was already in recession when the Queen came to the throne. India had been the “Jewel in the Crown”, but had proceeded to a violently partitioned independence involving the creation of predominantly Muslim Pakistan <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Independence-Day-Indian-holiday">in 1947</a>. Burma (now Myanmar) went <a href="https://www.au.edu/news/myanmar-national-day.html">in 1948</a>. There were still other territories in Asia, notably Malaya, odd outposts in Latin America and various islands in Oceania. And there was still Africa. </p>
<p>There Britain’s territories included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>four territories in west Africa</p></li>
<li><p>four in east Africa (inclusive of Zanzibar, then still separate from Tanganyika), </p></li>
<li><p>the two Rhodesias (Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi)</p></li>
<li><p>the three High Commission Territories in southern Africa (Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland), </p></li>
<li><p>the island of Mauritius, and </p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Empire/Dominance-and-dominions">Dominion of South Africa</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>All are now independent, and have become republics, although all (Zimbabwe being the exception) belong to what used to be known as – but is no longer known as – the “British” <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries">Commonwealth</a>.</p>
<p>It was not realised at the time, nor intended, that the Empire would begin to dissolve as fast as it did after the Queen had come to the throne. However, by the early 1970s a bulk of the Empire had gone. </p>
<p>Britain effectively scuttled in the face of early nationalist stirrings (Ghana); the expense in blood, money and prestige of confronting armed struggle and violence (Malaya and Kenya); the increasing cost of demands for “development” in the colonies; the foreign policy disaster of Suez; and London’s developing sense that it should reorient its trade to a uniting Europe. </p>
<p>In fact, the decolonisation process had started half-a-century before. Ironically, it was South Africa which provided the constitutional precedent for the decolonisation process which was to take place so rapidly during the reign of Elizabeth II.</p>
<h2>The story of the dominions</h2>
<p>The rot (if that is the right word) started at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10314616608595335?journalCode=rahs18">1911 Imperial Conference </a>, the first of several meetings of the British Prime Minister and his counterparts in the four <a href="https://www.britannica.com/summary/Decline-of-the-British-Empire">“dominions”</a> (Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand). These were all countries of white settlement, territories to which Britain had exported population since the end of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Napoleonic-Wars">Napoleonic wars</a>. </p>
<p>Some went as “explorers”, more as traders, and some (notoriously to Australia) were <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/australia-day">dispatched as convicts</a>. The majority went to make a new life, many escaping hunger and misery at home.</p>
<p>Fearful of a repeat of the loss of their American empire, the British governments of the day conceded “self-government” to British settlers, albeit in fits and starts. An early marker was laid down with by the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-empire/collections1/parliament-and-canada/british-north-america-act-1867/">North America Act of 1867</a> which created confederation in Canada. </p>
<p>As dominions, such settler states enjoyed “self-government” over their internal affairs. But, they lacked total independence as Britain continued to control their foreign affairs, and notably, the right to take them into a war. </p>
<p>South Africa had become a “dominion” at <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-south-africa-1910">Union in 1910</a>, and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Botha">Prime Minister Louis Botha</a> attended the imperial conference of the following year. In response to the growing assertiveness of the four dominions, the British government made a significant concession. </p>
<p>It retained the right to declare that the dominions would join it in declaring war against an enemy state. But it conceded that they would have the right to decide their level of support for the war effort. The British were wholly confident that Australia, Canada and New Zealand would display their loyalty for “the mother country” in any European conflict. </p>
<p>However, a question hung over South Africa. Its government headed by Botha and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jan-Smuts">Jan Smuts</a>, two former Boer generals who had recently been fighting against the British. This was answered in 1914. When it came to the crunch, Botha and Smuts <a href="https://en.unesco.org/courier/news-views-online/first-world-war-and-its-consequences-africa">threw South African troops into the First World War</a> without any hesitation. </p>
<p>They subsequently took to the field in uniform to crush an Afrikaner Nationalist rebellion against fighting “Britain’s war”. Yet when the war was over, a Nationalist government led by another former Boer general,<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/james-barry-munnik-hertzog"> Barry Hertzog</a>, led the way in securing a further concession from the British at the <a href="https://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/imperial-conference">Imperial Conference in 1926</a>. </p>
<p>This time round, the dominions gained the right to run their own foreign policies, to have separate diplomatic representation in countries around the world, and importantly, to decide for themselves whether to side with Britain in the event of another war. </p>
<p>All this was confirmed by the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf">Statute of Westminster of 1931</a>. Come 1939, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Africa/World-War-II">Smuts won a critical vote</a> in the Union Parliament to lead South Africa into the Second World War against Nationalist opposition. But, they took their revenge by defeating him <a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-south-africas-catastrophe-the-1948-poll-that-heralded-apartheid-96928">in the 1948 election</a>. </p>
<p>Although Nationalist desire for South Africa to cut ties with Britain and become a republic ran deep, caution initially prevailed, and formally, the Queen remained head of state, represented by a governor-general as her viceroy. But when faced with hostility to apartheid by African states, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-africa-withdraws-commonwealth">led South Africa out of the Commonwealth</a>. </p>
<p>By 1961 it was also <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-south-africa-movement-towards-republic">a republic</a>.</p>
<h2>Decolonisation</h2>
<p>This began with the Gold Coast, which achieved “self-government” in 1951 before moving rapidly to independence as Ghana <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/gold-coast-ghana-gains-independence">in 1957</a>. Government was now firmly in African hands. But, the imperial legacy remained in the form of a governor-general, who represented the Queen as the country’s formal head of state and sovereign. But this was not to last long. </p>
<p>The time of the Great White Queen sitting at the heart of Empire had long gone, and Ghana transitioned to the status of a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ghana/Independence">republic in 1960</a> with <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/nkrumah-kwame">Kwame Nkrumah</a> becoming its first president and head of state. Albeit with local variations, this was the route followed in virtually every other British African territory over the course of following two decades.</p>
<p>By the late 1970s, every formerly British African state, bar <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/lesotho">Lesotho</a> and Swaziland (now <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/kingdom-eswatini">Eswatini</a>) whose own monarchs replaced the Queen as head of state, had become a republic. </p>
<p>The exception which proved the rule was Rhodesia. White Rhodesians, a tiny proportion of the territory’s population, had obtained self-government <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/zimoverview2.htm">in 1923</a>, yet Britain had retained nominal sovereignty. As one African government after another swept to freedom, the Rhodesians wanted to follow suit to retain white rule, but fearing African reaction, Britain had declined to grant full independence unless an incoming government had a democratic mandate. </p>
<p>Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party rebelled and unilaterally declared independence <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe/Rhodesia-and-the-UDI">in 1965</a> and although the white settlers famously thought themselves more British than the British themselves, declared in 1970 that they no longer recognised the Queen as head of state and declared Rhodesia a republic. This never gained international recognition, and a conservative politician, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137318299_7">Christopher Soames</a> returned briefly as governor and the Queen’s representative in 1980. </p>
<p>The last British governor in Africa, he waved goodbye when Rhodesia transitioned to independence as the Republic of Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe">in 1980</a>.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Britain’s relationships with its former African colonies are now those of trade, aid and diplomacy. The Queen herself remains highly respected, and acknowledged as head of the Commonwealth. Yet once she has gone, and that cannot be long, even that status for the British monarch may go. </p>
<p>At that moment, the rout of the British monarchy in Africa will be complete.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decolonisation process was to take place rapidly during the reign of Elizabeth II.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1828792022-06-01T15:07:43Z2022-06-01T15:07:43ZEnforcing competition would ease food price hikes in east and southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465021/original/file-20220524-20-96j83c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman selling produce at the Manzini Wholesale Produce and Craft Market in Swaziland.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Edwin Remsberg/VWPics/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Small and medium-scale farmers and agri-businesses in east and southern Africa are getting a raw deal. To succeed they need fair and integrated regional markets. Research <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/">by the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development</a> has highlighted the need for better integration of regional economies as a step towards food security in the region.</p>
<p>Powerful commercial interests, high transport costs and poor access to facilities such as for storage mean that small and medium-scale farmers are often not getting fair prices for the food they grow. Fair prices are those that meet demand and cover reasonable costs of supply including transport across borders.</p>
<p>During the course of <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/africanmarketobservatory-amo-resources">our research</a> we came across examples of how the odds are stacked against most small and medium-scale farmers. Take the experience of Endrina Maxwell, a small producer in Malawi. In April 2021, she sold her soybean crop in central Malawi and realised the returns from investing in commercial agriculture as a female agribusiness owner and farmer. She got prices around Malawi kwacha 350/kg, about $450/t (see Figure 1). At the same time, the prices in the main markets in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were over a $1000/t.</p>
<p>A number of hurdles stood in Endrina’s way to take advantage of the high prices in neighbouring countries. First, specific price information was not readily available for someone in Endrina’s position to be aware of the gains from exporting. Second, transport costs are very high for smaller producers. Third, to hold-off from selling at the harvest and to bargain for better offers, producers like Endrina need to have storage options. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466667/original/file-20220601-48284-2mohnq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This situation does benefit some. These include the main traders and processors in Malawi and across the region. These companies bought up much of the crop at the time of harvest at low prices, for local use and for export, taking advantage of their storage facilities and private information. Prices in Malawi then increased to peak at $1350/t in January 2022, as if there was a severe scarcity. </p>
<p>The trebling of soybean prices affected another cohort of small-scale farmers. Soybeans are a key component of poultry feed. Small-scale poultry farmers saw their animal feed prices increase by similar amounts, squeezing them severely. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/africanmarketobservatory-amo-resources">research</a> identifies a lack of effective regional competition and indicates the need to inquire into transport, storage and logistics issues. The differences in prices between locations on transport corridors translate into rents to transporters and arbitrage margins being made by large traders. It also points to supplies being bought-up by intermediaries at low prices at the harvest and held back to drive prices up.</p>
<p>The fragile food systems in the region, combined with increasing concentration at multiple levels of key value chains, calls for a regional competition policy for resilient and sustainable regional value chains. </p>
<p>A stronger regional market referee to monitor and enforce competition rules would level the playing field for fairer food markets.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.comesacompetition.org/">The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Competition Commission</a> working together with national competition authorities, has the central role to play. </p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/africanmarketobservatory">African Market Observatory</a> was created to fill the gap of reliable market information for key food products at the wholesale and producer levels. The observatory tracks and compiles prices monthly. The first 12 months of data gathering by the observatory underlined the benefits to smaller market participants of <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/africanmarketobservatory-amo-price-tracker">market data</a>.</p>
<p>This year, with the African Market Observatory, it has been possible to track markets through crowd-sourcing prices from smaller market participants. Access to this data has allowed Endrina to anticipate what she should get for her soybean harvest. It has also enabled her to plan her other business – oil production – more efficiently.</p>
<p>The pricing patterns have highlighted the crucial role that access to competitive transport services as well as storage facilities play in accessing markets and fairer prices. This has informed Endrina’s decision to invest in storage facilities on her farm as a result of discovering that there is value in spreading her grain sales throughout the year as opposed to selling only at the harvest.</p>
<p>To strengthen the region’s fragile food security – made worse by climate change –it’s essential that produce can be sourced from across the region, which is the most cost effective way to meet the needs of customers and to reward producers for expanding supply. </p>
<p>This is most evident in Kenya where food prices have risen <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/drought-pushing-food-prices-sharply-east-africa">exponentially</a>. The country is experiencing the most severe drought in 40 years. In addition, the war in Ukraine is compounding international pricing <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/627bb0acc075915489bb7d4d/1652273327133/AMO_Price+tracker+12_11052022.pdf">pressures</a>. </p>
<p>This means that Kenya needs to source imports from the region where weather has been good at fair competitive prices. Yet, despite growing production in countries such as Malawi and Zambia, cross-border trade is not happening effectively.</p>
<h2>Unfair trade</h2>
<p>By considering the market clearing sources of supply for the main centres of demand in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi we can see that soybean prices have been way above the fair import prices. This implies that producers received too little and end users paid way too much, with intermediaries capturing the difference.</p>
<p>Dar es Salaam could have sourced soybeans from Malawi, Zambia or Uganda – all neighbouring countries – to add to domestic supplies. Prices at over US$1200/t in some months, such as October to December 2021, were US$200-400/t above what it should have cost to land goods from Uganda and US$400-750/t above what it should have cost to land from Zambia. This includes an efficient transport rate, calculated at US$0.04/t/km from various sources. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466668/original/file-20220601-49499-i2vpfu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<p>Regional trade and competitive markets are also impeded by governments. Zambia had an export restriction on soybeans from August to November 2021. Removing the restriction brought lower prices to buyers in Dar and higher prices to sellers in Zambia, benefiting both sides through trade.</p>
<p>Where the region is unable to take advantage of good supply in some locations to meet demand in others at competitive prices, this places great pressure on downstream industries. For example, animal feed producers in Kenya who are buyers have been hit hard. </p>
<p>A package of interventions to ensure regional markets work better is urgently required.</p>
<h2>Making regional markets work</h2>
<p>We propose the strengthening of three priority areas: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>policy and advocacy,</p></li>
<li><p>enforcement, including against cartels; and </p></li>
<li><p>regional merger evaluation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Competition advocacy and policy is essential, as many of the factors undermining effective regional competitive markets include policy aspects. Regulatory barriers, for example, undermine trade and reinforce the market power of companies within countries. </p>
<p>The Comesa Competition Commission and national authorities in the region need to urgently act together in these areas to tackle poorly working regional food markets.</p>
<p>The African Market Observatory is a starting point for data collection where analyses can be deepened, collaboration can be strengthened, and access to pricing information improved for market participants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182879/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development at the University of Johannesburg in which Simon Roberts is lead researcher has received funding for the African Market Observatory from the COMESA Competition Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grace Nsomba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Monitoring and enforcing competition rules is essential to level the playing field for fairer food markets.Grace Nsomba, Researcher at Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of JohannesburgSimon Roberts, Professor of Economics and Lead Researcher, Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, UJ, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1757402022-02-01T14:22:23Z2022-02-01T14:22:23ZThe science of weather forecasting: what it takes and why it’s so hard to get right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442675/original/file-20220126-17-1i0g402.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IgorZh/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Weather forecasting is an important science. Accurate forecasting can help to <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/new-study-shows-socio-economic-benefits-of-weather-observations">save lives</a> and minimise property damage. It’s also crucial for agriculture, allowing farmers to track when it’s best to plant or helping them protect their crops. </p>
<p>And it will only become more vital in the coming years. Severe weather events are becoming <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/weather-related-disasters-increase-over-past-50-years-causing-more-damage-fewer">more frequent and more intense</a> because of climate change and variability.</p>
<p>I am <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=gsHLQ2gAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">a meteorologist</a> with specialities in forecasting weather and climate change – who wants to improve the quality of weather products and their applications to spur socioeconomic development across Africa. Doing so matters: the World Bank has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/09/12/improving-weather-forecasts-can-reduce-losses-to-development-in-africa">pointed out</a> that better weather forecasts can bolster the continent’s development. </p>
<p>So, how does forecasting work? What does it take to produce accurate, reliable and timely forecasts? And how can African countries do better on this front?</p>
<h2>A complex process</h2>
<p>Weather forecasting is complex and challenging. The process entails <a href="https://www.weather.gov/car/weatherforecasting">three steps</a>: observation, analysis and communication. </p>
<p>For observation, forecasters work with atmospheric models. These are sets of equations that depict the state of the atmosphere. The models use information on the initial state (observations) of the atmosphere, land and ocean to forecast weather. Data from the models is combined with information drawn from weather stations which are set up at key points across a region or country to give the actual state of the atmosphere. This <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-0029-1_2">data assimilation</a> produces a better forecast since it optimises forecasters’ understanding of the evolving weather system. </p>
<p>It’s easier to be accurate when giving a short-range forecast – one that covers hours to days – than it is when interpreting long-range (months or seasons) data. The atmospheric system is dynamic; the more time that passes, the less certain forecasters can be of its state.</p>
<p>Technological advances have greatly improved the general quality of weather forecasting. For instance, more observations are possible because of <a href="https://www.earthnetworks.com/resources/weather-facts/automated-weather-stations/">automated weather stations</a>. There’s also been an increase in the use of <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/advanced-research-computing/what-high-performance-computing#:%7E:text=High%20Performance%20Computing%20most%20generally,science%2C%20engineering%2C%20or%20business">high performance computing</a>. This allows for more data storage, faster processing, analysis, and visualisation of incoming data.</p>
<p>These datasets are key in diagnosing past and current weather to create a forecast. Unfortunately, the data observation network (both manual and automated stations) is still poor, especially in developing countries. That’s the result of limited investment into the sector. Forecasters in these countries are forced to use alternative datasets that are not very accurate. </p>
<p>One such alternative dataset is <a href="https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/products/weather-climate-models/numerical-weather-prediction">Numerical Weather Prediction</a>. It uses global deterministic models that are normally not detailed enough to realistically represent <a href="https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/learn-about/weather/how-weather-works/what-is-convection">convection</a> at a local or regional level; forecasters using this data often can’t accurately predict rainfall, especially heavy rain. A lack of access to better historical data also means forecasters struggle to identify when an area’s seasonal rainfall will start and end because they can’t examine trends over years or decades.</p>
<p>It’s these variations in access to data and technology that mean some forecasts are more accurate than others. </p>
<p>Once forecasts have been collated, they are released in various forms. The way that weather products – apps, TV and radio bulletins or website updates – are packaged will differ depending on end users’ needs. Some people, like farmers, may be especially interested in seasonal forecasts and will seek these out. Athletes, for example, are more likely to use portals or services that focus on hourly and daily forecasts. </p>
<p>I would recommend that, whoever you are, you consider seasonal forecasts general information for broad planning purposes. But this should be interpreted together with monthly, weekly and daily forecasts for accuracy’s sake.</p>
<h2>Indigenous knowledge</h2>
<p>Some African countries also use another kind of data for their forecasts: <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/priority-areas/links/related-information/what-is-local-and-indigenous-knowledge">indigenous ecological knowledge</a>. This entails drawing from communities’ long held knowledge about their environments, and especially about long-term trends and shifts. Such knowledge can be blended with scientific processes during forecasting.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-satellites-are-helping-africa-improve-weather-forecasts-45548">How satellites are helping Africa improve weather forecasts</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/seeds-of-gold/weatherman-rainmakers-team-up-to-offer-crop-farmers-accurate-forecast-1178750?view=htmlamp">“rainmakers”</a> from the Nganyi community in western Kenya are a good example. These residents have deep historical knowledge about the area’s climate and weather patterns. They use plants and animals to understand what the weather is doing. They now work with meteorologists from <a href="https://meteo.go.ke/">Kenya’s Meteorological Department</a> to produce seasonal weather forecasts.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A trailer for a documentary about the “rainmakers” of Nganyi.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Indigenous knowledge is under threat as the elders who are its custodians are perishing. Vital plants and animals used in their processes are going extinct, too. It would be a great pity if this resource were lost to forecasters. This knowledge plays an important role in local livelihoods and it supports efforts to forecast and make sense of seasonal climate state at local scale.</p>
<h2>Changes coming</h2>
<p>Some of the ways that weather is forecast today may change in the coming years. The <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en">World Meteorological Organisation</a> is encouraging national meteorological services to move from what the weather will <em>be</em> (forecasting weather) to what the weather will <em>do</em> – <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/resources/bulletin/impact-based-forecasting-and-warning-weather-ready-nations">impact based forecasting-and-warning</a>. </p>
<p>There’s also a push to ensure forecasts reach the people who need them. A number of African countries, among them <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-61160-6_5">Malawi</a> and <a href="https://www.climate-chance.org/en/best-pratices/participatory-scenario-planning-psp-an-approach-to-translate-seasonal-climate-predictions-into-information-adapted-to-the-local-context/">Chad</a>, have adopted what’s known as Participatory Scenario Planning. This collaborative approach designs and delivers user focused climate information services by taking the co-production process down to the sub-national level. It brings together producers and users of weather and climate information – meteorologists, indigenous knowledge experts, researchers, various sectors of local government, farmers, as well as NGOs and journalists.</p>
<p>Private firms that provide global weather forecasts are also emerging. This is commendable given that they supplement the services of countries with limited resources. But my advice is that, where the national meteorological and hydrological centres have capacity to produce weather forecasts, theirs should be considered first, ahead of those generated by private firms. This is because national bodies’ forecasts are based on the observed historical and observed data which they are custodians of rather than private institutions that rely mainly on model data.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victor Ongoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Weather forecasting is complex and challenging. The process entails three steps: observation, analysis and communication.Victor Ongoma, Assistant Professor, Université Mohammed VI PolytechniqueLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1710502021-11-07T08:43:12Z2021-11-07T08:43:12ZHow granular climate information can help tea growers in Malawi and Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430164/original/file-20211104-21-1zk76u.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pickers at work on a tea estate in Western Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Neha Mittal</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change is touching every aspect of our lives – including our daily cups of tea. Kenya and Malawi are the African continent’s largest tea producers and exporters, together accounting <a href="https://resourcetrade.earth/?year=2019&exporter=ssf&category=115&units=weight&autozoom=1">for about 27%</a> of global tea trade. </p>
<p>Tea producers in the two countries have already seen what damage climatic shifts can do, as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tea-prices/drop-in-india-kenya-tea-output-brews-price-rises-idUSL3N1IV1KZ">damaging droughts</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/climate-change-bites-kenyan-tea-farmers/a-18830268">frost</a> and <a href="https://www.worldteanews.com/Features/malawi-heatwaves-threaten-tea-yields-and-livelihoods">high temperatures</a> are already becoming more common. This threatens tea yields and the <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/tea/reporter/ken#:%7E:text=Exports%20In%202019%2C%20Kenya%20exported,most%20exported%20product%20in%20Kenya">countries’</a> <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/tea/reporter/mwi">economies</a>. It also affects people whose livelihoods are dependent on tea estates and farms, and the wider value chain.</p>
<p>African tea producers have typically not found generic climate projections useful. That’s because these projections focus on changes in average conditions. But tea crop production is at the greatest risk of temperature extremes. Tea growers need information that is specific to the tea variety they grow and where they grow it compared to average temperature and rainfall over a large region. </p>
<p>Knowing what future conditions will be like is particularly important for tea growers, because the tea plant has a long lifespan, of more than 80 years. That means it is critical to take decisions now that will continue to be sound in the future, like replanting with better and resilient cultivars, planting shade trees and crop diversification.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212096321000966#!">We have developed</a> novel, site-specific climate information for Kenya and Malawi’s tea-growing regions. This, we hope, can better inform tea producers about the range of climate conditions they can expect in the future – specifically, the 2050s and 2080s.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212096321000966#!">Our research</a> shows that the nine locations we studied will see more heatwave days. This will create heat stress for the tea plants and affect yield. At the same time, tea quality could be adversely affected by the fact there is also likely to be a significant decrease in the number of cold nights by the 2050s. The specific impacts will vary dramatically from location to location, depending on the site-specific projected conditions. Some sites will see only small rises and others might see increases of more than 100 heatwave days per year.</p>
<p>The significant difference in future projected conditions underlines why such tailored climate information is important. It enables tea farmers and managers to select adaptations that are appropriate for the conditions and the desired outcome. These adaptation options can be selected according to the tea variety that is grown and the scale.</p>
<h2>Modelling projections</h2>
<p>We partnered with tea growers in Malawi and Kenya so we could understand the particular climate information that would be useful to them in managing and planning their farming practices to maximise yield and quality.</p>
<p>The tea plant is sensitive to heat; it can only withstand a short period of time above certain temperatures before it is damaged. This temperature threshold is specific to different locations and tea varieties. For example, in Kenya tea growers want to know about consecutive days with temperatures exceeding 27°C. In Malawi, tea growers asked for 35°C as the threshold beyond which their tea bushes face heat stress.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429934/original/file-20211103-23-4mw8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Mulching for newly planted tea bushes in Mulanje, Malawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Neha Mittal</span></span>
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<p>We then combined two sources of information. The first is hidden weather data – observations of temperature and rainfall held in tea estate weather station records. The second is future projections for the 2050s and 2080s from the latest high resolution climate models, including a new convection-permitting model vital for predicting climates in mountainous regions. These models better represent small-scale atmospheric processes responsible for extreme weather events in such regions.</p>
<p>Projections from a suite of 29 global climate models were used to explore uncertainties in future temperature and rainfall changes. These projections were combined with a novel high resolution climate model (4.5 km), <a href="https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/clim/31/9/jcli-d-17-0503.1.xml">CP4A</a>, the first high resolution model for Africa. It can capture the local, small scale atmospheric processes that give rise to micro-climates. </p>
<p>These micro-climates are essential to tea growth, but are typically not discernible in the resolution of standard global climate models. As a result, the average conditions projected by global climate models over large areas aren’t of much use to tea farmers.</p>
<p>We integrated these model projections with the local historical evidence of past weather conditions to map out climate risk several decades into the future.</p>
<h2>Adaptations</h2>
<p>We have shared the projections with tea growers. They say that these, together with other feasibility criteria including social and environmental benefits, and economic viability, helped them identify emerging risks and potentially suitable adaptation strategies.</p>
<p>The tea growers also pointed out that having more detailed information about what might happen to the local climate means they’re better able to garner government support for preferred adaptation options including afforestation and crop diversification. </p>
<p>Continuing such discussions to identify and prioritise adaptation investments is vital to ensuring that risks to tea production and quality are minimised, and the sector remains vibrant. Hidden weather data and new climate models will help to sustain our daily cup of tea – and, more importantly, support economic growth and livelihoods in both Kenya and Malawi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neha Mittal received funding from the UK Government NERC/FCDO Future Climate for Africa (FCFA) programme for the 'Climate Information for Resilient Tea Production' project - a joint UMFULA and HyCRISTAL project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dougill received funding from the UK Government NERC/FCDO Future Climate for Africa (FCFA) programme for the 'Climate Information for Resilient Tea Production' project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katharine Vincent received funding from the UK government NERC/FCDO Future Climate for Africa (FCFA) programme 'UMFULA' project.</span></em></p>Tea growers in Malawi and Kenya wanted site-specific climate information to help them manage and plan their farming practices to maximise yield and quality.Neha Mittal, Research Fellow, University of LeedsAndrew Dougill, Professor of Environmental Sustainability, University of LeedsKatharine Vincent, Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1698422021-10-20T07:16:23Z2021-10-20T07:16:23ZWe unpack what some African countries are doing about tobacco control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426410/original/file-20211014-16-smwk9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The growth in tobacco use in Africa is a potential public health catastrophe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rapid <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-population-boom-burden-or-opportunity">population growth</a>, increased <a href="https://tobaccotactics.org/wiki/bat-africa-history-double-standards/">advertising</a> by the tobacco industry, and growing <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/samj/article/view/175692">tobacco consumption</a> among young people in Africa all contribute to a projected massive tobacco-related burden of disease. The World Health Organisation (WHO) <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/tobacco-control">estimates</a> that one in five African adolescents use tobacco. The WHO also forecast <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/tobacco-control">a doubling</a> of deaths related to tobacco use in low- and middle-income countries between 2002 and 2030.</p>
<p>There are many efforts being made to prevent these unnecessary deaths. One of these is the establishment of the <a href="https://actd.africa/">Africa Conference on Tobacco Control and Development</a> (26-28 October 2021). The aim of the conference is to connect researchers, policymakers, advocates, students and members of the public who are interested in tobacco control on the continent. It’s a platform to share information on some of the tobacco control work conducted in Africa, reflect on lessons learned and identify what needs attention.</p>
<p>Our own contribution to the conference is <a href="http://www.reep.uct.ac.za/etcp/projects/economics-tobacco-control-project">work on the economic impacts of tobacco use</a> on the continent and beyond. </p>
<h2>Progressive developments</h2>
<p>Many African countries have indicated that they want to adopt tobacco control policies. Of the 54 countries in Africa, 51 have ratified the <a href="https://fctc.who.int/who-fctc/overview/parties">WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control</a> – Malawi, South Sudan and Eritrea have not. By ratifying the convention, countries commit to adopting effective and evidence-based measures to curb tobacco consumption.</p>
<p>One of the key interventions is to ban smoking in public spaces. The WHO suggests that, globally, between <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco">1 million and 1.2 million deaths annually</a> are related to exposure to second-hand smoke. Thirteen African countries have <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095">smoke-free bans</a>, joining more than 50 other countries around the world.</p>
<p>Sixteen African countries <a href="https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/en/WL_country_size.pdf">require</a> cigarette manufacturers to print graphic health warnings on cigarette packs. Studies have <a href="https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13643-018-0933-0">shown</a> that pictures of risks, like diseased lungs, reduce the attractiveness of the pack and the appeal of smoking.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ghana-is-using-graphic-pictures-to-cut-tobacco-use-116845">How Ghana is using graphic pictures to cut tobacco use</a>
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<p>In 2018 the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products came into force. Countries that ratify the protocol commit themselves to adopting a variety of measures, such as using track and trace systems to prevent and counter illicit trade. Currently, 27 African countries have <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IX-4-a&chapter=9&clang=_en">ratified the protocol</a>, the highest proportion of any continent. A number of countries have already implemented some of the measures suggested in the protocol.</p>
<p>Raising excise taxes is the most effective measure to <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1341465/retrieve">reduce smoking</a>. Studies around the world show that excise taxes that effectively raise the price of tobacco products almost always result in a <a href="https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/m21_complete.pdf">decline in smoking</a>. The structure of the excise tax is important. In general, a specific tax (an amount of tax per cigarette, irrespective of value) is better than an ad valorem tax (a percentage of the product’s value). Simpler tax systems are better than complex ones.</p>
<h2>Safeguarding the gains</h2>
<p>Despite the progress made in many countries, many challenges remain. One is the slow adoption of recommended tobacco tax policies.</p>
<p>Most African countries have excise tax systems that are <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095">generally regarded</a> as sub-optimal. This is because the tax systems are usually ad valorem, tiered, or both. These factors dampen the influence of excise taxes on the price of cigarettes. It is thus unsurprising that cigarettes are relatively cheap in most African countries. In fact, the excise tax, expressed as a percentage of the average retail price, is lower in Africa than on any other continent in the world. On average, this figure stands at 28.6% in Africa, 35.4% in South America and 37.3% in Asia. </p>
<p>The excise tax systems in some countries have actually regressed. A classic example is Kenya. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Kenya had one of the most complex tax systems in Africa. This complexity allowed the tobacco industry to profit at the expense of the fiscus and of public health. Targeted campaigns by tobacco-control advocates culminated in the implementation of the WHO-recommended uniform specific excise tax in 2015. This achievement, however, was short-lived. In 2019, under pressure from the tobacco industry, the Kenyan government reintroduced a <a href="https://www.kra.go.ke/en/media-center/blog/823-sin-tax">two-tier system</a>. The two-tier system allows tobacco companies to differentiate their products just enough to maximise profits on high-end brands, while keeping low-end brands cheap enough that large numbers of people continue smoking.</p>
<p>South Africa’s tax system has also regressed. Between 1994 and 2009, South Africa’s tobacco control efforts, anchored by sharp increases in the excise tax, were praised globally. Strong administrative controls by the South African Revenue Service prevented illicit trade from increasing. Since 2010, there has been a rapid increase in illicit trade, even though excise tax increases in the past decade have been negligible. Since 2015, illicit trade in South Africa has increased substantially, and now accounts for at least <a href="https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/29/Suppl_4/s234.full.pdf">35% of the total market</a>. The primary reason for this increase is the decline in the South African Revenue Service’s capacity to ensure tax compliance among tobacco manufacturers. The tobacco industry has been at the forefront of <a href="http://www.inqcomm.co.za/Docs/media/SARS%20Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf">undermining the revenue authority</a>. Efforts to implement a track and trace system have been unsuccessful.</p>
<p>The ethical practices of the tobacco industry have been called into question for decades. Recently, the BBC’s programme <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m000zpd5/panorama-dirty-secrets-of-the-cigarette-business">Panorama</a> presented a documentary on the tobacco industry. The documentary was the culmination of <a href="https://tobaccotactics.org/wiki/the-bat-files/">years of research</a> conducted by investigative journalists and researchers at the University of Bath. It <a href="https://bat-uncovered.exposetobacco.org/">details</a> the ways in which British American Tobacco (BAT) acted unethically in various <a href="https://tobaccotactics.org/wiki/bat-africa-dirty-deeds/">African countries</a> to maintain its high profits, to block or weaken tobacco control legislation, and to maintain its market dominance. </p>
<p>This is not the first time British American Tobacco has been accused of these practices and, sadly, it is unlikely to be the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Corné van Walbeek is the Director of the Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products (REEP) at the University of Cape Town. The unit is soft-funded and receives funding from a number of donor organisations, the most important of which are the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the African Capacity Building Foundation, the International Development Research Centre and Cancer Research UK. His salary is paid by UCT, but he receives a modest supplement from these funding agencies. He is not affiliated to the tobacco industry. He is a non-remunerated board member of the Tobacco, Alcohol and Gambling Advisory, Advocacy and Action Group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zunda Chisha is a research officer with the Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products (REEP). He is also a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Cape Town. His thesis is focused on how tobacco use and alcohol abuse affect development in South Africa. Zunda's PhD studies are funded through a scholarship provided for by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) with a grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. He is not affiliated to the tobacco industry. </span></em></p>Globally, about 1 million deaths annually are related to exposure to second-hand smoke. Thirteen African countries have implemented comprehensive smoke-free bans.Corne van Walbeek, Professor at the School of Economics and Principal Investigator of the Economics of Tobacco Control Project, University of Cape TownZunda Chisha, Research officer, Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659872021-09-14T16:11:11Z2021-09-14T16:11:11ZAfrican farmers and agribusinesses need fair access to markets in face of climate change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420049/original/file-20210908-13-16jx5l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Agricultural commodity prices spiked after cyclone Kenneth had hit northern Mozambique in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Southern and Eastern Africa face the twin challenges of growing agricultural production to meet food demand while adapting to extreme weather. And climate change makes addressing these challenges extremely urgent.</p>
<p>Southern Africa is <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-latest-assessment-on-global-warming-means-for-southern-africa-104644">a climate change hotspot</a>. Eastern Africa is projected to still have good average rainfall, although temperatures will increase and floodings become more frequent.</p>
<p>There is huge potential for meeting these twin challenges across Eastern and Southern Africa, where there are in fact <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/5f43657bf186f763e265c86b/1598252427643/CCRED+WP+2_2020+Southern+African+Market+Observatory.pdf">good soils and water availability</a> in many countries. </p>
<p>However, markets are not working well, especially for small and medium-scale farmers and agri-businesses which are at the heart of inclusive food value chains. These participants are often not receiving fair prices for their produce due to the way markets have been working, including powerful interests, high transport costs and poor facilities such as those for storage. </p>
<p>Analysing market failures requires information. Yet, poor market information has made the ability to monitor market prices in close to real time difficult across much of the region. Up-to-date information on food prices is critical to understanding agricultural food systems in the region and for collectively planning responses. Information on food prices should be accompanied by other market information relating to production and market structures.</p>
<p>To address this, the University of Johannesburg’s <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/">Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development</a> has launched a <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/marketobservatory">market observatory</a>. This is one part of supporting smaller producers in negotiating fair prices and in identifying measures to make markets work better across the region. </p>
<h2>Markets not working well</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.fao.org/3/i3907e/i3907e.pdf">Volatility over time</a>, and very <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/i3907e/i3907e.pdf">large price differentials</a> between areas in Eastern and Southern Africa for key crops such as soybeans and maize, reflect markets that are not working well for producers or buyers such as agro-processors. </p>
<p>The price differentials point to potential local market power being exploited and big profit margins being earned by large traders. The spread of larger traders across the region is meant to have heralded more efficient markets. However, market outcomes and high levels of concentration at various levels of supply chains indicate that there are also major concerns about market power.</p>
<p>For example, over the past 12 months, the patchy data supported by anecdotal information indicate that <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/5f43657bf186f763e265c86b/1598252427643/CCRED+WP+2_2020+Southern+African+Market+Observatory.pdf">soybean prices</a> have been extremely high in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi (above US$900 per tonne). This while there is great potential to supply from areas within Tanzania as well as from Uganda, Malawi and Zambia. </p>
<p>Prices in areas such as <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/5f43657bf186f763e265c86b/1598252427643/CCRED+WP+2_2020+Southern+African+Market+Observatory.pdf">Zambia and southwest Tanzania</a> were below $400/t in May after the harvest and around $500 in Malawi. The difference between the producing areas and the cities is consistent with farmers getting offered unfairly low prices by large buyers. Large buyers are taking advantage of the poor storage and the lack of other market options available for the farmers. Farmers have to accept the low prices being offered.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415647/original/file-20210811-19-1ncuon1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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</figure>
<p>The transport costs to the main urban markets should not account for more than $100/t of the difference between $400 or $500 and $900, meaning that massive profits have been made by the “middle-men” or traders. In competitive markets, trading margins would reflect reasonable costs and not super profits.</p>
<p>These profit margins are at the expense of farmers, who receive low prices, while high prices are charged to agribusinesses and consumers in urban areas. This undermines production in the region. It also contributes to high food prices and compounds reliance on imports.</p>
<p>This especially affects smaller market participants. Large and integrated processors and traders have their own transporters and infrastructure, and better market information. </p>
<p>Smaller market participants are charged massively inflated transport costs where they look to bypass traders and organise their own sales. This undermines effective market integration across the region. In <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/611504af8d2b162b32f8637e/1628767408243/Price+tracker+4+DRAFT_Final.pdf">our research</a>, market participants in Malawi indicated that those looking to export from Malawi were being charged as much as three times what were reasonable rates. </p>
<p>There are also high rates being set by local transporters within some countries. This suggests market power in transport and trading, including on the part of influential large trucking companies in some countries. Some market participants in Tanzania have resorted to placing loads on buses in recent months, incurring very high costs and yet still receiving the product at much lower than the prevailing prices in Dar es Salaam.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Smaller producers and agribusinesses are integral in growing production and ensuring the fairer and more competitive markets required for the benefits to be widely shared and sustainable. Small to medium sized farms and agribusinesses have been growing strongly in many countries yet face many disadvantages in markets, especially relative to large multinational trading groups. </p>
<p>Action, including market monitoring, effective competition enforcement and investment in the necessary infrastructure and support, is required to shape markets to work better. </p>
<p>Steps to support smaller producers are important in any event. However, the climate emergency means they are imperative and that the time to act is running out fast. The extreme weather currently in the Americas is a warning not to be complacent. </p>
<p>The El Niño state brings drought in southern Africa while inducing heavy rainfall and floods in Eastern Africa. The 2015/16 period saw the worst drought in Southern Africa for around 30 years. This led to maize shortages and prices jumping in countries such as <a href="https://meetingorganizer.copernicus.org/EGU2018/EGU2018-6979.pdf">South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi</a>. Extreme weather patterns also contributed to price volatility in subsequent years with, for example, <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/ca7638en/ca7638en.pdf">cyclones in Mozambique</a>, poor rainfall and drought concerns in 2019 seeing prices spike again.</p>
<p>Adaptation to the effects of climate change means supporting increased production, such as through irrigation, coupled with intra-regional trade across Eastern and Southern Africa. According to the latest <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#SPM">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessment</a>, while Southern Africa will experience less rainfall and more droughts, Central to Eastern Africa is projected to maintain precipitation levels, on average. When extreme weather hits one part of the region there will likely still be good harvests from other areas.</p>
<p>Urgent measures are required to support agricultural practices for farmers to adapt to climate change and increase production while ensuring markets work effectively across the region. The good news is that the region has the potential to substantially improve its resilience and increase earnings for farmers and jobs in the related value chains. This requires fair market prices and support for investments in areas including irrigation, production, storage and processing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grace Nsomba is affiliated with the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development at the University of Johannesburg.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Roberts is affiliated with the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development at the University of Johannesburg and the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose at University College London</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ntombifuthi Tshabalala is affiliated with the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development at the University of Johannesburg.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Namhla Landani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Small and medium-scale farmers and agri-businesses in Southern and Eastern Africa, which are at the heart of inclusive food value chains, are not receiving fair prices for their produce.Grace Nsomba, Associate Researcher at Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of JohannesburgSimon Roberts, Professor of Economics and Lead Researcher, Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, UJ, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1660562021-08-17T14:37:56Z2021-08-17T14:37:56ZWhat women in Malawi told us about infertility and seeking help<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416043/original/file-20210813-28-l2brv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In Malawi, childbearing remains an important and expected part of married adult life. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeffrey Davis/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Malawi, about <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23271957/">2%</a> of childless women experience infertility – difficulty conceiving or carrying a pregnancy to term. Another 10.5% experience infertility after the birth of at least one child. </p>
<p>Both men and women can be infertile, but the responsibility for infertility and childbearing often falls more heavily on women. Those who aren’t able to reproduce can face stigmatisation, mental distress, marital instability, and even exposure to domestic violence.</p>
<p>Childbearing remains an important and expected part of married adult life in a country where the total fertility rate – the average number of children expected per woman over a lifetime – is around <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=MW">4.12</a>. </p>
<p>The World Health Organisation says <a href="https://www.who.int/westernpacific/health-topics/reproductive-health">reproductive health</a> includes the ability to decide if, when and how often to reproduce. Infertility, however, limits this ability. </p>
<p>Despite the substantial negative impacts of infertility on health and well-being, it’s a neglected public health issue throughout much of the Global South, including Malawi.</p>
<p>To understand women’s own perceptions of their ability to become pregnant, and carry a pregnancy to term, I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441692.2021.1965179">analysed</a> survey data collected in 2010 for Malawian women aged between 16 and 26 living within 7km of Balaka township in the country’s southern region. </p>
<p>The survey remains a rare and valuable source because it asked for women’s own perceptions of their ability to conceive and carry a pregnancy. There is little reason to expect that the incidence of perceived fertility impairments has changed dramatically in the last decade. </p>
<p>Women in the study were asked questions about their health and social lives. I focused on data relating to perceived fertility impairments for the 915 women in the survey who had ever tried to conceive. Among the 117 women who reported fertility impairments, I also looked at what they did to seek help. </p>
<p>I found that a large minority of women reported fertility impairments. Most sought some kind of help for their fertility impairments. Some looked for help from multiple sources.</p>
<p>These findings highlight the need to reduce stigma and scale up public health support for infertility.</p>
<h2>Perceived fertility impairments</h2>
<p>Some existing <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/29/2/285/758134?login=true">large-scale</a> studies of infertility in the Global South use <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441692.2021.1965179">survey data</a>. They often <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15820788/#:%7E:text=Conclusion(s)%3A%20The%20infertility,and%20research%20among%20different%20disciplines.">measure infertility</a> by examining whether <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/1478-7954-10-17">sexually active women</a> who are not using contraceptives have children within in a given timeframe. This ‘objective’ measurement is useful for estimating the prevalence of infertility. </p>
<p>However, it is sometimes poorly aligned with women’s own perceptions of their ability to conceive and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-biosocial-science/article/abs/impaired-fertility-and-perceived-difficulties-conceiving-in-ghana-measurement-problems-and-prospects/0B45F2EBA0F7162DEB41738E453F54F2">carry a pregnancy to term</a>. </p>
<p>Women’s views of their own bodies are worth investigating, and people act based on their perceptions. That is why, in this study, I looked instead at women’s own reports of whether they had ever experienced a fertility impairment. Women were asked whether they had ever experienced difficulties conceiving a pregnancy or difficulties carrying a pregnancy to term.</p>
<p>I found that 117 women (12.8% of the sample) reported experiencing at least one fertility impairment. Breaking this figure down, 7.4% of women reported difficulties conceiving and 7.3% reported difficulties carrying a pregnancy to term. (These add up to more than 12.8% because 15 women experienced both kinds of impairment.)</p>
<p>Next, I wanted to understand who was most at risk. Older women were more likely to report a fertility impairment. This is a young sample and biologically, infertility increases with age. Nonetheless, some women as young as 16 reported fertility impairments. This could reflect in part the significant social pressure women are under to conceive early. </p>
<h2>Seeking help</h2>
<p>I also wanted to understand what actions women take to seek help. Based on what was asked in the survey, I considered five kinds of help-seeking: visiting a hospital or clinic; visiting a traditional healer; visiting a church or mosque, or praying; finding a new partner; and starting a secret sexual partnership outside one’s relationship to try to conceive.</p>
<p>Most women (85.5%) who reported a fertility impairment sought help. More than a quarter (27.4%) used multiple strategies. However, none of the women who reported a fertility impairment said they found a new partner or started a secret relationship to conceive.</p>
<p>Going to a hospital or clinic was the most common way of seeking help. Almost one-third (29.9%) chose this option only. Visiting a traditional healer only was the choice of 22.2%, and 5.9% looked for religious help only. The remainder of women used multiple strategies. Just 4.3% tried all three options.</p>
<p>Importantly, women with different kinds of fertility impairments used different help-seeking strategies. Over one-fifth (22.6%) who reported difficulties conceiving did not take any action. Only around one-tenth (10.2%) who reported difficulties carrying to term did not take action. Everyone who reported both difficulties sought some form of help, and these women were more likely to use multiple strategies.</p>
<p>Women reporting difficulties conceiving more commonly visited a traditional healer. Visiting a hospital was most common for difficulties carrying to term. These differences could, in part, reflect the urgency of addressing some impairments. Some pregnancy complications require immediate medical care, which may prompt urgent care at a hospital. Difficulties conceiving are less likely to require emergency medical care. </p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>The study shows that it’s important to consider women’s perceptions of their own bodies, and to recognise that even young women may report fertility impairments. Also, studies which focus on hospitals and clinics may miss experiences that occur outside these spaces. Less privileged women may be especially likely to be left out of these spaces.</p>
<p>It is quite possible that help-seeking strategies may have changed, both in terms of overall uptake and specific combinations of help-seeking.</p>
<p>It is not clear yet whether or how the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the availability and accessibility of different help-seeking options. This is why it’s vital to continue monitoring infertility as a pressing public health issue, taking women’s own views into account.</p>
<p>Many family planning programmes throughout sub-Saharan Africa do not offer infertility services. If the aim is indeed to help women plan their families, rather than just reduce fertility and prevent unwanted pregnancy, then infertility support (such as screening and treatment) should be part of existing programmes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasmine Fledderjohann receives funding from UKRI in the form of a Future Leaders Fellowship. </span></em></p>Despite the substantial negative impacts of infertility on health and well-being, it’s a neglected public health issue throughout much of the Global South, including Malawi.Jasmine Fledderjohann, Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Social Work, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640102021-07-11T09:47:01Z2021-07-11T09:47:01ZAfricans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410288/original/file-20210708-15-yitatg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Mswati III of eSwatini, Africa's last absolute monarch, is facing growing demands for democracy and rule of law. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has become common to argue that most Africans are not that committed to democracy. Commentators often suggest that Africans care more about development than democracy, and that voters – especially those in <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/trouble-democracy-africa/">rural areas</a> – don’t really <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/western-style-democracy-in-africa-is-just-a-way-of-pushing-the-neoliberal-agenda/">understand democracy</a>. They would thus happily trade away their political rights for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/11/africa-strongmen-angola-dos-santos-zimbabwe-mugabe-uganda-sudan">“strong man”</a> who can get things done.</p>
<p>This narrative has proved to be durable despite being wrong. </p>
<p>In our new <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/african-studies-keyword-democracy/31A98158F9749E17ADFA5DEC518CD757">journal article</a> for the <a href="https://africanstudies.org/annual-meetings-asa/2019-call-for-panelists/keywords-in-african-studies-african-studies-review-sponsored-panels/">Keywords</a> series of the <em>African Studies Review</em>, we investigated three issues. First, is there support for democracy in Africa? Second, what kind of democracy do people want? Third, why are the desires of African citizens so often silenced?</p>
<p>Drawing on survey data collected by the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> between 2016 and 2018, we show that strong majorities think that democracy is the best political system for their country. </p>
<p>Contrary to claims that “Western style” democracy is “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0ec9dc4e-8976-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7">unAfrican</a>”, we find widespread support for a form of consensual democracy, which combines a strong commitment to political accountability and civil liberties with a concern for unity and stability.</p>
<h2>Support for democracy remains strong</h2>
<p>Democracy in Africa has come under considerable pressure over the last decade. Satisfaction with the way that democracy is performing has fallen. This is in part due to a decline in public confidence in the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp84-quality-elections-satisfaction-democracy-and-political-trust-africa">quality of elections</a> – how free, fair and credible they are. </p>
<p>We argue that this has only had a modest impact on support for the principle of democratic government, in part because African citizens continue to view authoritarian rule as a worse option. Of the 35 countries surveyed, the proportion of citizens who suggested that non-democratic political systems might be preferable only exceeded 20% in eSwatini and Malawi.</p>
<p>This figure is now likely to have declined in both countries. Malawians faith in democracy was revived by a <a href="https://oxfamapps.org/fp2p/how-does-change-happen-lessons-from-malawi/">peaceful transfer of power in 2020</a>. And the people of eSwatini have been protesting against a failing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2021/7/1/will-eswatinis-king-respond-to-calls-for-democracy">authoritarian regime</a>.</p>
<p>Even in states in which the reintroduction of multiparty politics has been associated with political controversy and conflict, such as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334391635_The_Root_Causes_of_the_Conflict_in_Ivory_Coast">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tug-of-war-in-togo-over-term-limits-and-the-distribution-of-power-100731">Togo</a> and <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/how-museveni-mastered-violence-to-win-elections-in-uganda/">Uganda</a>, more than three quarters of citizens say that democracy is preferable.</p>
<h2>Consensual democracy</h2>
<p>It is, therefore, time to stop doubting that African citizens want democracy, and start asking what kind of democracy people want. We argue that there is widespread demand for a form of consensual democracy, in which a desire for elections and checks and balances on those in power goes hand in hand with a concern to maintain national unity.</p>
<p>Consensual democracy has four main features:</p>
<p><strong>Multiparty elections</strong></p>
<p>We show that the vast majority of Africans support selecting their government through multi-party elections. Three-quarters of those surveyed agreed that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Almost 65% also agreed that “many political parties are needed to make sure that (the people) have real choices in who governs them”. Most rejected the idea of one-party rule.</p>
<p><strong>Political accountability</strong></p>
<p>Our article also shows that most Africans want political accountability and the rule of law. Over three quarters of respondents agreed that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Only 34% agreed that the government getting things done was more important than being accountable to citizens.</p>
<p><strong>Civil liberties and political rights</strong></p>
<p>Respondents also wanted to be able to express their own opinions and engage in political activities. Over three quarters (76%) agreed that a citizen’s freedom to criticise the government was “important” or “essential” for a society to be called democratic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ugandans in Kenya demand freedom for opposition leader Bobi Wine in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Daniel Irungu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This extends to the right of association, with over 60% of individuals believing they “should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves”. </p>
<p><strong>Consensual politics</strong></p>
<p>Strong support for rights, elections and accountability goes hand-in-hand with a concern to prevent “excessive” freedom and competition, lest they lead to disunity and instability. Many citizens worry about violence around elections; they want parties to put aside their differences and work for the common good.</p>
<p>Most respondents were therefore against the use of street protests to settle disputes, even though they often sympathised with protesters’ aims.</p>
<h2>The exceptions that prove the rule</h2>
<p>There are of course variations in how people feel about these issues, both across the continent and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/moral-economy-of-elections-in-africa/DDAE0D88636E296400383CFFFA2D13DF">within countries</a>. </p>
<p>Respondents in eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique were less committed to elections, but only in Lesotho did this drop below 50%. </p>
<p>Namibians and South Africans were more willing to trade accountability off against efficiency – perhaps because of majority support for the ruling party.</p>
<p>Yet, what is striking is the consistency of support for the four pillars of consensual democracy across the continent. What does this mean for African politics? Why is this reality not more accepted? </p>
<p>Our article outlines three key episodes in which support for democratic government has been silenced. We also identify vulnerabilities that authoritarian leaders could exploit. </p>
<p>Leaders who can persuade citizens that their country <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/118/473/603/5536927">faces a grave risk of violence and instability</a> may be able to legitimise backsliding on democracy – whether or not the risk actually exists. This is a cause for concern because supporters of democracy in Africa don’t always reject <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo19.pdf">all authoritarian alternatives</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, as our <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/african-studies-keyword-democracy/31A98158F9749E17ADFA5DEC518CD757">study shows</a>, the overwhelming majority of Africans support consensual democracy.</p>
<h2>Lazy argument</h2>
<p>The argument that multi-party politics is incompatible with African ways of life stretches back to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/voting-nationhood-and-citizenship-in-latecolonial-africa/D6252CD6E0638A803F7086313BC703F1">racist colonial officials</a>. It was also used by nationalist leaders to justify creating one-party states after independence. But it is not true, and has become a lazy excuse for authoritarian regimes that are neither popular nor legitimate.</p>
<p>In a decade in which <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/10/23/book-review-africa-uprising-popular-protest-and-political-change-by-adam-branch-and-zachariah-mampilly/">activists have risked their lives</a> to advance democratic causes in Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, eSwatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, it is time to recognise that most Africans do not want authoritarian rule.</p>
<p>It is both misleading and patronising to suggest that democracy has somehow been imposed by the international community against the wishes of ordinary people. Instead, it has been demanded and fought for from below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman is a member of the International Advisory Council of the Afrobarometer. This article is written in his individual capacity.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sishuwa Sishuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is more support for democracy among African people than is often recognised. Yet this can be undermined by election rigging and is lower in countries like Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamSishuwa Sishuwa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow; Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1614322021-06-30T15:16:34Z2021-06-30T15:16:34ZThe fight against economic fraud: how African countries are tackling the challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404182/original/file-20210603-27-2nv14z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technology has been key in tackling fraud</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mpedigree</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has stifled many sectors of the global economy. But it has apparently <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/criminal-contagion/">boosted the business of fraudsters</a>. Experts <a href="https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/Fraud%20The%20Facts%202021-%20FINAL.pdf">note</a> that some fraudsters have taken advantage of the new opportunities of the <a href="https://www.teiss.co.uk/covid-19-phishing-scams-sophisticated/">pandemic economy</a> and that they seem to become ever <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/online-scams-go-viral-as-pandemic-gives-fraudsters-new-opportunities-1.4549085">more sophisticated in their methods</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time anti-fraud measures are becoming more sophisticated too, with technology <a href="https://www.unbs.go.ug/news-highlights.php?news=2&read">playing a big part</a>, and more increasingly <a href="https://www.expresscomputer.in/exclusives/neurotags-anti-counterfeiting-ai-solution-is-helping-crack-down-on-fake-products/71649/">artificial intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>In recent years many initiatives have been put forward in the name of fighting and reducing various forms of fraud and other crimes in the economy. But have these measures actually been effective in containing fraud? Will the typical package of anti-fraud measures stop the fraud pandemic? </p>
<p>We did <a href="https://roape.net/2015/12/07/researching-anti-fraud-measures-in-the-global-south/">research</a> into major characteristics of anti-fraud measures in several African countries. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2019.1660156">south</a> we looked at Malawi, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2020.1866524">east</a> we covered Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Madagascar and in the west Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.</p>
<p>We looked at the various fraud responses to identify major dynamics and themes. We used online data from news outlets and reports on websites of private companies and governmental agencies to analyse the characteristics of anti-fraud measures across 11 countries. </p>
<p>We found a diverse set of measures had been introduced. We were able to identify 10 particular characteristics. </p>
<h2>The landscape</h2>
<p>The first notable feature was a remarkable proliferation of anti-fraud agencies and cross-agency alliances and cooperation. This was between government agencies, the government and the private sector, and at times civil society actors such as <a href="https://twitter.com/ucc_official/status/1111564692500164608">consumer protection agencies</a> too.</p>
<p>Agreements, memorandums of understanding and partnerships had been signed to encourage data collection and sharing and knowledge exchange within and across borders as different actors were brought together <a href="https://www.sabric.co.za/media-and-news/press-releases/saps-and-sabric-recommit-to-intensify-fight-against-bank-robberies/">to fight the “common enemy”</a>. </p>
<p>At the state level, new anti-fraud agencies, taskforces, squads and networks were set up regularly. One example was the <a href="https://www.cid.go.ke/index.php/sections/investigationunits/insurance-fraud-investigations-unit-ifiu.html">Kenya Police Insurance Fraud Investigations Unit</a>. We also found that a number of regulatory agencies had been established. These included competition and consumer protection authorities <a href="https://www.ccpc.org.zm/">at</a> <a href="https://www.cak.go.ke/">national</a> and <a href="https://www.arcc-erca.org/">regional</a> <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/eac-competition-authority-to-start-operations-in-july--1351478">level</a>.</p>
<p>Second, outreach, engagement and “empowerment” of consumers played a major role. Here, education, sensitisation and awareness raising – also among business actors – <a href="https://www.genghis-capital.com/newsfeed/kba-launches-the-annual-kaa-chonjo-awareness-campaign-to-boost-security-of-payments-platforms/">emerged strongly</a> as a way to popularise <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=64659&dir=2016/november/16">the anti-fraud fight</a>. This was promoted by a range of actors. Among them were banks, insurance providers, private consultancies, international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and aid agencies, as well as NGOs. Regional organisations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa were also included. </p>
<p>Third, large-scale technology was used extensively in anti-fraud measures. This was particularly the case in financial services and banking. </p>
<p>Anti-fraud software in various forms featured strongly. One example was detecting fraudulent transactions. Additional technological solutions included PIN protection techniques, enhanced chip technology for payment cards and authentication technology. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.securingindustry.com/pharmaceuticals/nigeria-insists-on-mobile-authentication-of-medicines/s40/a2083/#.YJA9m2ZKj9E">Technology</a> was <a href="https://medium.com/innovate4health/mpedigree-battles-counterfeit-drugs-through-innovative-verification-system-50de6f4a4bea">also used</a> to uncover counterfeit or substandard products. </p>
<p>Fourth, anti-fraud measures regularly came with rhetoric and language that was strong in giving a sense of alarm and urgency. The vices of fraud (and corruption) were presented as “weeds” needing to be “rooted out”. They were also referred to as a virus or a disease that needed “eradication”. </p>
<p>At times, warfare-type language was used, that is, fraud needed to be “combated” like an enemy. </p>
<p>Fifth, anti-fraud measures were regularly political in nature. Pledges to counter fraud featured in election campaigns. The rising or falling of fraud was used as a metric to determine whether politicians and public servants were effective in their roles. At times, political or business opponents of the government were allegedly targeted by the measures. And some powerful business actors reportedly got around regulations. </p>
<p>Sixth, corruption, as well as in-fights, conflicts, tensions and power struggles within and between state agencies charged with anti-fraud measures, featured too. One example was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2001387385/kebs-staff-in-sh26m-fraud-case">Kenya Bureau of Standards</a>. In recent years, several managing directors of the bureau <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/news/article/2001377377/kebs-boss-arrested-over-graft-allegations">were accused of graft</a>. </p>
<p>The seventh feature was that many anti-fraud measures were carried out by specialised for-profit private actors. They were therefore arguably shaped by business interests, competition for anti-fraud measure contracts, and the dynamics of industries and markets.</p>
<p>We also found that international companies specialising in regulations and standards often played a role. Such commercially oriented actors were particularly active <a href="https://www.sgs.co.uk/en-gb/public-sector/product-conformity-assessment-pca/kenya-pvoc-program">in promoting the proliferation of anti-fraud measures</a>. </p>
<p>Eight, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-revenue-authority-arrests-8-businesspersons-over-vat-offences/">arrests</a>, <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/fake-goods-worth-r5m-seized-joburg">confiscation</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-corruption/kenya-authoritiesarrest-standards-bureau-head-over-fertilizer-imports-idUSKBN1JJ0AO">destruction of items</a> were widespread in reports about anti-fraud activity. </p>
<p>Ninth, we noticed a prevalence of anti-fraud measures in efforts to increase tax revenue and inhibit illicit financial flows. Various initiatives emphasised the need to increase compliance. At times we detected tensions in moves to create an “enabling” business environment to attract foreign investment – such as low taxes – and calls to protect the national tax bases.</p>
<p>We found there was international cooperation and the involvement of civil society actors in efforts to address tax evasion and transnational money laundering. One example was the <a href="https://www.taxjustice.net/">Tax Justice Network</a>. </p>
<p>Tenth, civil society actors seemed to have a limited role – or no role at all – in various anti-fraud measure coalitions. In some cases, however, they seemed to play a larger role. One example was consumer protection agencies.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>A challenge we identified was that anti-fraud measures could be launched and sustained for reasons that went beyond an interest in simply fighting fraud. This included commercial interests of specialised anti-fraud firms. These were often companies that operated globally. Other interests at play included governments that used anti-fraud platforms to seek legitimacy or state agencies that sought government funding as well as new areas of operations and streams of revenues. </p>
<p>We also came across criticisms in some cases of the measures’ design, costs, bureaucracy and impracticality. There were also concerns about the heavy handed way in which some <a href="http://www.psfuganda.org/new/images/downloads/Trade/position%20paper%20on%20pre-inspection.pdf">measures were implemented</a>. There were allegations about:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>bias (for example, against small-scale actors such as traders and against poor sections of costumers) in favour of foreign, large scale multinationals; </p></li>
<li><p>opaqueness and <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/kacita-calls-for-a-two-months-import-boycott-to-protest-pvoc">irregularities</a>; </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=31498:a-year-later-has-pvoc-locked-out-fake-goods">effectiveness problems</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Currently, anti-fraud measures seem largely an affair between state and corporates (including business associations), and consumers. Consumers are mostly on the “receiving” end of anti-fraud measures. They are regularly encouraged to play their role by, for example, calling an anti-fraud hotline, verifying the goods they buy and not contributing to the facilitation of fraud. Aid agencies played a decisive role in some anti-fraud measure cases too.</p>
<p>Anti-fraud measures are mostly initiated and shaped by powerful actors. This includes big business, particularly transnational companies, rather than grassroots or activist organisations. They are uneven across sectors (for example, the financial sector gets significant attention), and they seem to have become a business and revenue generation vehicle in itself. </p>
<p>It is important to acknowledge that some measures certainly <a href="https://www.unbs.go.ug/">make a positive impact</a> and that efforts are made by various agencies to address internal and other shortcomings, thereby improving the effectiveness of measures. But the question remains: how can countries substantially contain “irregularities” in situations where the irregular has become widespread, routine and institutionalised? And the dominant agendas and pressures of the day – such as economic growth, profit and commercialisation – are highly conducive to fraud. </p>
<p><em>Nataliya Mykhalchenko is serving as an intern at the United Nations Population Fund. The views expressed in the article are her own.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nataliya Mykhalchenko has received funding from the University of Leeds ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme, and the Review of African Political Economy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jörg Wiegratz has received funding from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust Fund, the University of Leeds ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme, and the Review of African Political Economy.</span></em></p>Countries have adopted a wide array of measures involving a proliferation of fraud agencies.Nataliya Mykhalchenko, Research Associate, University of LeedsJörg Wiegratz, Lecturer in Political Economy of Global Development, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1625222021-06-16T14:17:37Z2021-06-16T14:17:37ZMalawi abolishes death penalty: what it means for southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405885/original/file-20210611-13-bsdunc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal decision ends years of confusion over the status of prisoners on death row.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal <a href="https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment/supreme-court-appeal/2021/3">abolished the death penalty</a> in April, the most notable decision against capital punishment since the South African Constitutional Court found the penalty unconstitutional <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.html">in 1995</a>. The Malawian decision is significant because Malawi’s constitution <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-and-subject-groups/death-penalty-research-unit/blog/2021/05/malawi-and-puzzle">specifically provides for the death penalty</a> (in Article 16), unlike the unqualified right to life in the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">South African constitution</a>.</p>
<p>The Malawian decision <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-47307275">ended years of confusion</a> over the status of the <a href="https://www.newswise.com/articles/malawi-abolishes-death-penalty-historic-ruling-felt-far-and-wide">remaining 37 prisoners</a> on death row. Nearly 15 years ago, the Malawi High Court abolished the <a href="https://www.globalhealthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Kafantayeni-v.-Attorney-General.pdf">mandatory death penalty for murder</a>. It had found that an automatic death sentence did not sufficiently individualise sentencing and, therefore, was cruel and degrading punishment. </p>
<p>But, the ruling was not clearly retroactive. Many defendants were still appealing their mandatory death sentences or had them commuted to life imprisonment without ever having a sentencing hearing. This “grey area” led to the latest <a href="https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment/supreme-court-appeal/2021/3">court challenge</a> brought by <a href="https://reprieve.org/us/2021/05/06/malawi-just-abolished-the-death-penalty/">Charles Khoviwa</a>, a death row inmate and client of <a href="https://reprieve.org/us/">Reprieve</a>, a legal action non-profit organisation, and the <a href="http://legalaidbureau.org/">Malawi Legal Aid Bureau</a>, that resulted in the abolishment.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-death-penalty-is-losing-favour-in-sub-saharan-africa-43130">Why the death penalty is losing favour in sub-Saharan Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Malawi’s constitution</h2>
<p>Although the <em>Khoviwa</em> decision was particular to Malawi’s progressive constitution, the case has implications for other Southern African countries, most of which keep the death penalty on the books but do not use it in practice. </p>
<p>Malawi’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en">constitution</a> came out of a public consultative process, initiated after a one-party dictatorship that ended <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43101816?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">in 1994</a>. As a result, this newer constitution has some progressive elements. They include that Malawi must consider international law obligations and may look to foreign case law in deciding constitutional disputes. </p>
<p>This is important because <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx">international human rights law</a> disfavours the death penalty, and has placed increasingly strict standards on its use. Ever fewer countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-death-penalty-is-losing-favour-in-sub-saharan-africa-43130">carry out executions in practice </a>, which in turn has strengthened the human rights case against the death penalty.</p>
<p>Because Malawi’s constitution is a living document that evolves, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the global decline of capital punishment.</p>
<p>In the <em>Khoviwa</em> case, the court considered Article 16 of the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en">Malawian constitution</a>. The court explained that the wording of this provision created two separate rights: the right to life and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. This is clear in the text:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person has the right to life and no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, the wording of the second sentence of Article 16 was unusual compared to other <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth</a> and African constitutions. This said, in the relevant part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the execution of the death sentence … shall not be regarded as arbitrary deprivation of his or her right to life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The second sentence only stated that the death penalty could not be an arbitrary deprivation of life; it did not state that the death penalty could not violate the right to life (the other right contained in Article 16) or the right to be free from cruel and degrading punishment at Article 19. This gave the court an opening to find the death penalty unconstitutional even though Article 16 specifically provided for the death penalty.</p>
<h2>Wider implications</h2>
<p>The wording of Malawi’s constitution is peculiar. The constitutions of its southern African neighbours; <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2005.pdf?lang=en">Botswana</a>, <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sz/sz010en.pdf">eSwatini</a>, and <a href="https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en">Zambia </a> have a right to life provision that specifically provides for the death penalty. This, without setting out a separate right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. As a result, the reasoning of the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal in the <em>Khoviwa</em> case is not precisely applicable.</p>
<p>Of course, the constitutions of <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf">South Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en">Mozambique</a>, and <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2010.pdf">Namibia</a> have an unqualified right to life with no provision for the death penalty, which is why these countries are abolitionist. The <a href="https://www.aripo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Constitution-of-Lesotho.pdf">Lesotho</a> and <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/tz/tz008en.pdf">Tanzania</a> constitutions also have unqualified right to life provisions with no exclusion for the death penalty. However, the senior courts in these countries have not yet found the death penalty to violate the right to life.</p>
<p><a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe</a> have more complex constitutional “right to life” provisions. Zimbabwe’s 2013 constitution provides for the death penalty in an extremely narrow class of cases - adult men between the ages of 21 and 70 and only for the crime of aggravated murder.</p>
<p>In terms of Article 26 of Kenya’s constitution, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[one] shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except to the extent authorised by this Constitution or other written law".</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the constitution provides no authorisation except for abortion.</p>
<p>The Malawi court’s decision in <em>Khoviwa</em> could be especially useful in future human rights litigation in countries without clear constitutional support for the death penalty. This is so for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, the Malawian Supreme Court of Appeal validated the emerging global consensus that the death penalty violates the right to life, even where the constitution specifically authorises it. </p>
<p>Second, and even more importantly, the Malawian court used a more progressive interpretive method: if two interpretations of a constitutional provision are possible, the interpretation that expands human rights protections is preferred over an interpretation that restricts or limits human rights. </p>
<p>This is a roadmap for future challenges to the death penalty in other southern African countries.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article appeared as a <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-and-subject-groups/death-penalty-research-unit/blog/2021/05/malawi-and-puzzle">blog</a> for Oxford University</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Novak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Malawi court’s decision provides a roadmap for future challenges to the death penalty in other southern African countries.Andrew Novak, Term Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology Law and Society, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.