tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/michel-barnier-31741/articlesMichel Barnier – The Conversation2023-08-08T15:20:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110552023-08-08T15:20:18Z2023-08-08T15:20:18ZThe EU is making overtures for a post-Brexit defence collaboration with the UK – but London isn’t listening<p>Michel Barnier, the EU’s former chief Brexit negotiator, has suggested that <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-uk-defense-brexit-michel-barnier-foreign-policy-treaty/">the time is now right</a> for the UK and EU to sign a treaty on defence and foreign policy cooperation. </p>
<p>This is the clearest indication yet that the EU is interested in cultivating a new and improved foreign affairs relationship with the UK after Brexit. The bad news, however, is that the smoke signals from Brussels are unlikely to be positively received by the present UK government. Britain simply isn’t willing to consider a formal collaboration in these areas. </p>
<p>As will be remembered, the governments of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49906702">Boris Johnson</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/liz-truss-eu-good-cop-bad-cop-brexit-team-northern-ireland/">Liz Truss</a> took an unhelpfully combative approach towards Brussels, making talk of cooperation difficult. </p>
<p>Relations have certainly warmed between London and Brussels under Rishi Sunak, particularly after his signing of the the Windsor framework to simplify the labyrinth of trading rules between the EU, mainland Britain and Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>Strong showings at bilateral and multilateral get-togethers with European leaders followed. This arguably refreshed diplomatic energy between both sides, opening the door to new forms of UK-EU cooperation, and even partnership.</p>
<p>But handshakes alone won’t cut it in a world where major security threats are global, from war to cybersecurity and terrorism. </p>
<p>The problem is that the UK government is simply not in listening mode. Despite an early inclusion of foreign policy and defence cooperation in the initial <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration">October 2019 political declaration</a> on the future UK-EU relationship, the UK government subsequently changed its mind. It then hardened its attitude to any form of official dialogue, tool or forum permitting overarching UK-EU foreign affairs to be discussed. </p>
<p>Indeed, throughout the entire period of Brexit negotiations, it remained so steadfastly uninterested that it deliberately constructed the landmark post-Brexit EU-UK trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) in a way that would shut out any form of foreign, security and defence cooperation. The agreement explicitly states that <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9117/">“formal foreign and defence policy”</a> is not part of the deal. </p>
<p>Rather than an institutional framework, or an agreement built into a treaty – like the TCA – the UK government opted for an intrinsically case-by-case, ad-hoc approach to foreign policy, security and defence cooperation between London and Brussels. </p>
<p>This decision reduced at a stroke any ability from 2020 onwards for Britain to realign formally with Brussels in any of these areas post-Brexit. And so it has remained. </p>
<p>Some shifting of deckchairs has left the Conservative party more towards the centre than the hard right in reappraising relations with Brussels but the government still remains cool to any such overtures. And opportunities have arisen in various forums, including the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/uk-europe-relations-finally-head-right-direction">European Political Community</a>, and suggestions made by EU leaders including European Council president <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/uk/2022/10/24/eu-and-britain-need-to-work-together-says-european-council-president/">Charles Michel</a> that close collaboration is vital. </p>
<p>But the UK had rebuffed such advances. Party politics still loom large, it seems, with the result that “domestic political concerns in the ruling Conservative party about being seen to move too close to Brussels” are still paramount, as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1147fc63-59f9-45c3-aee2-a15ee570bb84">one UK official put it</a>. That forecloses any suggestion of a treaty and even a loose dialogue on defence. </p>
<h2>A changing picture</h2>
<p>As with so much in international affairs however, broader events have a habit of disrupting plans. In a bittersweet turn of fate, the illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has transcended the UK’s preferred arms-length approach to foreign policy relations with the EU.</p>
<p>The war demands resolute diplomatic, security and defence cooperation between the UK and European partners, both in and beyond the traditional forum of Nato. From cooperating with the EU on sanctions against Russia, providing lethal and non-lethal aid to Ukraine, to supporting broader European war aims in other forums including the G7, the Ukraine war has helped “put the wiring back in” between London, Brussels, and other European capitals. A treaty may not be forthcoming but, in practice, security relations have deepened. </p>
<p>The UK has even felt involved enough to commit to <a href="https://www.pesco.europa.eu/">Pesco</a> (permanent structured cooperation). This long-standing EU project is geared towards simplifying the logistics of cross-Europe troop and hardware transport. The UK’s decision to join in late 2022 is indicative of closer defence cooperation via specific projects if not via institutionalised agreements.</p>
<p>Can the exigencies of Ukraine, combined with the wider regional and global security demands, and the first steps towards defence cooperation with the EU combine to prompt a change of heart by the UK government? Barnier certainly seems to think so. In his view, both the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-uk-defense-brexit-michel-barnier-foreign-policy-treaty/">circumstances and time are right</a>:</p>
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<p>Looking at the situation in Africa, looking at the war in Ukraine, looking at the new challenges for our security and the stability of the Continent — I think it would be in our common interest to negotiate a new treaty on defence, external policy, foreign policy and cooperation between the UK and the EU.</p>
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<p>Certainly cross-Channel cooperation has reached satisfyingly cooperative new heights in the past few months. But the TCA – essentially the sole foundation of post-Brexit UK-EU relations – remains a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/38/1/68/6514747">complex</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821574">imperfect</a> instrument. </p>
<p>It excludes much by way of police and judicial cooperation, with scope for ongoing rifts and spats on everything from fisheries to trade. And at this point, the UK government appears to have little appetite to establish a wholly new dialogue beyond the TCA to discuss any forms of bilateralism. The TCA’s scheduled review in 2025 may provide the next opportunity, but world events may simply not wait that long.</p>
<p>Upcoming elections in the UK (and indeed the EU), however, may prove catalytic in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-labour-british-german-military-cooperation-treaty-defense-keir-starmer/">reappraising</a> both need, and urgency, for a more formal and practical UK-EU foreign and security policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Amelia Hadfield is the founder of the Centre for Britain and Europe, and Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, which receives funding from a variety of external research funders, both UK and EU-based. </span></em></p>The reality is that cooperation has deepened, but one side seems reluctant to acknowledge that with a formal deal.Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254462019-10-17T12:51:15Z2019-10-17T12:51:15ZBoris Johnson’s Brexit deal: what’s in it and how is it different to Theresa May’s version?<p>Against seemingly all the odds, we have a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/revised_withdrawal_agreement_including_protocol_on_ireland_and_nothern_ireland.pdf">new Brexit deal</a>. As an apparent vindication of UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s strategy to ramp up the threat of a no-deal departure from the EU and to force concessions from Brussels, one would imagine that Number 10 is rather happy right now. But that happiness will be tempered with caution, because some major issues lie ahead.</p>
<p>Negotiations in Brussels have produced legal texts on arrangements for Northern Ireland and on the political declaration, which outlines the broad outline of what the two sides want from their future relationship. These are the product of months of planning by the British government, so it’s reasonable to ask what has actually changed since former prime minister Theresa May struck her original deal.</p>
<p>Reading the text, the first impression is that there’s much more that hasn’t changed than has.</p>
<h2>Northern Ireland</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-protocol-on-irelandnorthern-ireland-and-political-declaration">protocol on Northern Ireland and Ireland</a> has long been in the firing line. It proposes a backstop arrangement that would keep Northern Ireland in close alignment with the EU unless and until both UK and EU agreed to change that.</p>
<p>On that front, the introduction of a section on “democratic consent” is an important shift on the EU side. This provides a mechanism for the Northern Ireland Assembly to vote on whether to maintain the provisions of the protocol, with a requirement to have cross-community support. That means the UK is now no longer subject to the EU’s approval if it wants to end the backstop arrangement. </p>
<p>That said, a voting requirement to have majorities from both unionist and nationalist groupings makes it very hard to achieve – especially since the Northern Ireland Executive broke down several years ago and is still not in operation. While the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) might control unionist voting, it can only do the same with nationalists if it creates a much more benign and cooperative environment. And even if that does happen and arrangements are voted down by Stormont, there is still a long phasing-out period, so things cannot move too quickly.</p>
<p>From the EU’s perspective, this arrangement provides a degree of security, mainly because any decision to overturn the system is not solely in the hands of the UK – which has not been the most reliable partner of late.</p>
<h2>Customs arrangements</h2>
<p>The other big change is on customs arrangements. Instead of creating a temporary customs area for the whole of the UK, the revised Protocol makes Northern Ireland a part of the UK’s customs territory. Because that would imply border controls, a rather convoluted system of custom duty collection is set out.</p>
<p>In essence, the system collects duties from businesses, dependent upon where goods are coming from and going to, with the possibility of various exemptions that will be agreed down the line. </p>
<p>It’s a much more complex system than before, but it does allow Johnson to argue that the entire UK is leaving the EU’s customs union, allowing it to benefit from any new trade deals that might be concluded.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the political declaration, the main change is that the UK now suggests it is looking for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-the-difference-between-hard-and-soft-brexit-66524">much looser future relationship</a>, based on a free trade agreement, rather than anything that might include participation in the EU’s single market or customs union.</p>
<h2>Less is more?</h2>
<p>While these are all noteworthy, they do represent only a very small part of the totality of the withdrawal agreement, as agreed by May last November. The Protocol still kicks into effect at the end of a transition period and the effect is still that Northern Ireland is kept very close to EU’s regulatory standards for many years. The future relationship remains as aspirational as May’s plans – until such a document is negotiated and ratified, by some future British government, no one can be sure what it will look like.</p>
<p>Nor did this negotiation touch on <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnsons-dramatic-immigration-u-turn-leaves-2-5m-uncertain-of-their-future-122166">citizens’ rights</a>, <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8039">financial liabilities</a>, the power of the EU’s courts to issue <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/brexit-and-european-court-justice">definitive rulings</a> on matters of dispute (an important matter for hard Brexit supporters in the Conservative Party) or the institutional arrangements for managing all of this. Even as Number 10 goes into its selling mode, those continuities from last year’s text will be present in many people’s minds.</p>
<p>The plan still seems to be for the government to present this deal to the UK parliament in a special Saturday sitting on October 19. We already know that the DUP has <a href="https://twitter.com/duponline/status/1184707245478678533/photo/1">issues</a> with the revised text because it places Northern Ireland in a different legal position to the rest of the UK, so winning that vote looks even harder than it already did. The government will hope that it can present the deal to MPs as the last, best hope for a Brexit settlement – but, with wobbles from the DUP, Johnson will struggle to get close to a majority.</p>
<p>Even if he does, the potential to keep that majority together for the subsequent passage of the Withdrawal Agreement Bill looks even less likely. And remember that, as things stand today, this text isn’t even signed off by the 27 EU member states – there’s now not really enough time for them to digest and approve something that moves them off their previous position.</p>
<p>In short, this might still fall apart for Johnson, just as it did for May.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125446/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as Deputy Director of the "UK in a Changing Europe" programme. He sits on the academic advisory board of Modern Europe. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the research councils.</span></em></p>The prime minister has come to a new agreement with Brussels. But the question is whether he can get it through the UK parliament.Simon Usherwood, Professor in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1099702019-01-16T17:39:42Z2019-01-16T17:39:42ZEU reaction to Brexit vote defeat – regret, calls for clarity and no-deal preparations<p>The European Union has <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-442_en.htm">expressed its regret</a> at the rejection of the Brexit withdrawal agreement by the UK parliament. It also recognises there is not a sufficient majority in the UK parliament for a Brexit solution. As Guy Verhofstadt, Brexit coordinator for the European parliament, <a href="https://twitter.com/guyverhofstadt/status/1085261295056756741">put it</a>: </p>
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<p>The UK parliament has said what it doesn’t want. Now is the time to find out what UK parliamentarians want.</p>
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<p>While the outcome of the vote is no surprise to the EU, one might be able to hear a slight exasperation in the voice of Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, in his <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-442_en.htm">speech to the European parliament</a> on the morning after the vote: </p>
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<p>The EU feels that it has done all it can to deliver a Brexit agreement within the constraints of the British government’s red lines and the fact that a departing member state cannot retain the benefits of EU membership. Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-19-432_en.htm">stressed that</a> the EU had invested “enormous time and effort to negotiate” the deal and had “shown creativity and flexibility throughout”.</p>
<p>For the EU, the ball is firmly in the British government’s court. In the immediate aftermath of the vote, the EU is not willing to engage in any early guessing games as to what might happen next. It cannot act until the dust settles on the other side of the channel and the UK political process yields some kind of consensus as to what the British negotiating position may be moving forward. As the Irish government said in a <a href="https://twitter.com/simoncoveney/status/1085286263694024711">statement</a>: </p>
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<p>The government urges the UK to set out how it proposes to move forward. We will then consider what steps to take in consultation with our EU partners.</p>
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<p>This is a view echoed by <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-442_en.htm">Barnier</a>: </p>
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<p>As long as we do not have a way out of this current British political impasse, which has the support of a parliamentary majority, we cannot advance. That is why the next steps need to be clearly set out by the British government.</p>
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<h2>The EU gets ready for any scenarios</h2>
<p>For the EU, the withdrawal agreement is the best possible compromise to reduce the uncertainty and damage caused by Brexit and to ensure the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU. It delivers on all the objectives of the negotiation process and, together with the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759021/25_November_Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom__.pdf">political declaration</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/01/14/joint-letter-of-president-tusk-and-president-juncker-to-theresa-may-prime-minister-of-the-united-kingdom/">assurances</a> from Juncker and Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, on the Irish border, it sets the framework for the negotiation of the future UK-EU relationship.</p>
<p>The Brexit clock is ticking. The UK parliament’s rejection of the withdrawal agreement increases the risk of a no-deal Brexit. While this is the worst possible outcome for the UK and the EU, the European Commission and EU governments are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/16/eu-nations-no-deal-preparations-may-brexit-defeat">stepping up their preparations</a> for a no-deal Brexit to ensure that all contingency measures are in place. </p>
<p>The EU is also not ruling out an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/13/eu-preparing-to-delay-brexit-until-at-least-july">extension of the article 50 process</a>. But this requires a request by the British government and the unanimous support of all remaining 27 member states.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-how-article-50-could-be-extended-to-delay-uks-departure-from-the-eu-109966">Brexit: how article 50 could be extended to delay UK's departure from the EU</a>
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<p>The outcome of this stage of the negotiation process will set the tone for forging a future relationship. Barnier has <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-442_en.htm">made it clear</a> that the ratification of the withdrawal agreement: “Is a requirement to create mutual trust between us, in view of our second negotiation”. The implication is that without an agreement to ensure a no-deal Brexit, the negotiation of a future relationship may take place in a less constructive atmosphere.</p>
<h2>Red lines</h2>
<p>The current withdrawal agreement and political declaration on the future relationship between the UK and the EU reflect the red lines of the British prime minister, Theresa May. The EU is willing to accommodate shifts in these. As <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/slide-presented-michel-barnier-european-commission-chief-negotiator-heads-state-and-government-european-council-article-50-15-december-2017_en">Barnier’s Brexit staircase shows</a>, the current British red lines lead to only two possible outcomes: a free trade agreement along the same lines as Canada, or a no-deal Brexit.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254156/original/file-20190116-163274-s16817.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Barnier’s Brexit outcome staircase.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/slide_presented_by_barnier_at_euco_15-12-2017.pdf">European Commission</a></span>
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<p>But, following the deal’s defeat in parliament, the expectation is that, despite the <a href="https://twitter.com/GuardianHeather">prime minister’s reluctance</a>, the British government’s red lines will have to change in order to achieve some kind of domestic consensus that can be turned into a workable negotiating position. </p>
<p>For the EU27, the Brexit negotiation has been a process of damage limitation. The EU respects but does not welcome Brexit. Some see <a href="https://twitter.com/eucopresident/status/1085260488903090176">Tusk’s reaction</a> to the government’s parliamentary defeat as a door left ajar for the UK to remain in the EU. But, faced with a weakened British government that is <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu/search-on-for-brexit-consensus-after-mays-crushing-defeat-idUKKCN1PA0LU">unable to command parliamentary support</a> for the withdrawal agreement, there is very little that the EU can do. </p>
<p>As Barnier <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c9ee16d2-4f8a-11e7-bfb8-997009366969">put it</a> during the interim between the Brexit referendum and the triggering of article 50: “I cannot negotiate on my own.” Ironically, with Brexit edging closer, Barnier finds himself in the same position – waiting for a reactive negotiating partner that wants to leave the EU but does not have sufficient domestic support coalescing around a unified solution to achieve this goal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109970/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nieves Perez-Solorzano has received funding from the ESRC, the British Academy, the European Commission </span></em></p>There is little the EU can do while the UK is in disarray.Nieves Perez-Solorzano, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1087012018-12-13T12:09:23Z2018-12-13T12:09:23ZTheresa May’s mission to secure more Brexit guarantees from the EU is meaningless<p>After a dramatic day of watching the Conservative Party tear itself apart and try to put itself back together again, Theresa May’s immediate political future appears to be safe. The leadership challenge was only a <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-defeats-brexit-plotters-heres-what-happens-now-108729">partial victory</a> for the prime minister – with 200 votes of MPs in favour of her and 117 against – but she remains in post.</p>
<p>Brexit was the only issue on the table and May has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46547832">promised</a> to continue to seek “legally binding” assurances about the Irish backstop from the EU.</p>
<p>May’s bigger problems with Brexit remain intact. While it’s now known exactly how many of her MPs have no confidence in her, this only matters insofar as the likelihood of getting the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement_0.pdf">withdrawal agreement</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf">political declaration</a> on the future EU-UK relationship through parliament. And we already know that this was going to be almost impossible. Her lack of overall majority in the House of Commons continues to be her main domestic weakness.</p>
<p>It seems that her only hope of seeing her deal through parliament is that enough of her MPs will be swayed by any assurances she obtains from the EU as she heads to the European Council in Brussels. Yet key EU figures, including Michel Barnier, Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Guy Verhofstadt and the leaders of numerous member states have all lined up to repeat the message that the withdrawal agreement is not open for renegotiation. </p>
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<p>The prime minister and her supporters are clearly banking on the EU’s fear of a no-deal Brexit to force open the issue again. But the clock continues to tick. The UK will leave on March 29, 2019 as an automatic consequence of triggering Article 50 and there is simply no time to start unpicking the texts on the table. The UK could request an extension to Article 50 – something the prime minister has previously ruled out – but this would require the unanimous approval of the 27 other member states. </p>
<p>EU negotiations do often go to the wire, and last minute snags are always a possibility. The EU’s free trade agreement with Canada, for example, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-walloons-and-why-are-they-blocking-europes-free-trade-deal-with-canada-67718">held up by a vote</a> in a regional Belgian parliament. But the time-limit means that Brexit is different, and the EU side has demonstrated during the past two years that it has been more united on this issue than on almost any other confronting Europe.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-why-the-eu-doesnt-want-the-uk-to-remain-in-the-backstop-indefinitely-108451">Brexit: why the EU doesn't want the UK to remain in the backstop indefinitely</a>
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<h2>No more exceptions</h2>
<p>What May needs to try to win back the support of the DUP and her own backbenchers is to remove the Irish backstop, render it close to meaningless or change it substantially. This is not going to happen, for the simple reason that the EU would need to effectively ditch the concerns of Ireland, a member state, to appease the UK, a departing member state. May’s desire to gain a “legally binding” guarantee from the EU on the backstop is a similarly meaningless concept.</p>
<p>Aside from the substantive nature of the backstop, the EU does not want to risk reopening negotiations about the finely balanced details contained within the withdrawal agreement. It would not be logical to risk destabilising the process, especially with so little time left before March 2019. And it seems to be forgotten in the middle of debates at Westminster that any reopening of negotiations would mean the involvement of all the member states – most of whom have pressing domestic issues to deal with.</p>
<p>The recent turn of events in the tortuous Brexit process have revealed a continuous belief in the UK of a right to exceptionalism. Having always succeeded in gaining opt-outs to the EU treaties alongside its <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uks-eu-rebate-explained-58019">budget rebate</a>, there remains a prevailing view that the UK can demand special treatment. May – if she is not already aware of it – is about to find out that this exceptionalism only exists while you are a member of the club, and not outside it.</p>
<h2>In search of a fragment</h2>
<p>Even if May were to gain concessions from the EU, it is by no means certain that this would be enough in Westminster. Although the Irish backstop is the main issue of concern among her most vocal opponents, it is not merely a question of clarifying it but removing it, or ensuring that the UK can withdraw unilaterally. This is a non-starter as far as the EU is concerned. And since many of her most pro-Brexit MPs want the UK to leave without any deal at all, nothing she might hope to achieve is going to bear fruit. </p>
<p>Alternatively, she could seek the support of the opposition parties in Westminster. But this is equally unlikely to happen. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/brexit/theresa-mays-victory-does-not-change-anything-says-dups-foster-37621833.html">made clear</a> its lack of support for the current deal, and all the opposition parties are poised to submit a motion of no confidence in the government, which could happen at any time. </p>
<p>May heads to Brussels, not to engage in “handbagging” as <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/theresa-may-to-handbag-brussels-in-frantic-bid-to-save-brexit-deal-bbcq7n5kl">some reports suggested</a>, but rather in the hope of securing a fragment that might unite her party behind her. The only chance of this being a success is that a form of words are issued by the two sides which attempt to pacify the Brexit hardliners. But with no authority, and trust in the UK as a partner replaced by exasperation on the EU side, there seems to be almost no chance this will come to anything. The Brexit nightmare before Christmas will continue into the New Year and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul James Cardwell has received research funding from the UK in a Changing Europe and the James Madison Charitable Trust.</span></em></p>The prime minister may have won a vote of no confidence in her leadership, but Theresa May will struggle to get what she needs from Brussels.Paul James Cardwell, Professor of Law, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1035782018-09-24T12:14:33Z2018-09-24T12:14:33ZBrexit: fears in Dublin that time is running out to solve Irish border impasse<p>Despite the hype from some in the UK, very few observers expected a Brexit breakthrough at the EU’s Salzburg summit on September 20. Still, EU and Irish officials were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/20/macron-puts-the-boot-in-after-mays-brexit-breakfast-blunder">surprised</a> when the UK prime minister, Theresa May, told her Irish counterpart Leo Varadkar that her government would not have a detailed legal text on the Irish border issue ready by the next meeting of EU leaders in October. </p>
<p>Although the UK government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-temporary-customs-arrangement">had put forward proposals</a> for a legal “backstop” to avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland back in June, the EU and the Irish government had requested – and expected – more detail. </p>
<p>This apparently led the French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/20/macron-puts-the-boot-in-after-mays-brexit-breakfast-blunder">to tear up his conciliatory speech</a> to May and deliver a more hardline one. This speech, and the <a href="http://theconversation.com/chequers-plan-why-theresa-mays-brexit-blueprint-is-not-quite-dead-103642">forthright rejection</a> by European Council President Donald Tusk of May’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aeb53c82-82ac-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929">Chequers plan</a> for the EU-UK relationship after Brexit, resulted in an equally <a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/09/21/theresa-may-faces-the-nation-after-her-salzburg-humiliation">hardline statement</a> from May upon her return to London in which she asked the EU to spell out its alternative. Varadkar commented that negotiations <a href="https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/taoiseach-brexit-talks-hit-rocky-patch-870734.html">had entered</a> a “rocky patch”. </p>
<p>The core issues have changed little since the UK voted to leave the EU in June 2016. The EU continues to prioritise protecting a soft border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and it holds firm to the condition that the UK must agree the text of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-44615404%22%22">a legal backstop</a> that would prevent a hard border in Ireland in all circumstances. </p>
<p>Ireland and the EU also hold firm that the four freedoms of the single market – freedom of movement of people capital, goods and services – must not be undermined by a withdrawal agreement. However, they argue that single market rules could apply to Northern Ireland only, not the whole of the UK, because of Northern Ireland’s special situation as a post-conflict area and because of the primacy of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/good-friday-agreement-37019">Good Friday Agreement</a> in maintaining peace.</p>
<p>For the UK government, <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservatives-strike-deal-with-the-dup-experts-react-80101">propped up in Westminster</a> by the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), maintaining single market membership for the island of Ireland, but not for the UK as a whole, would undermine the constitutional integrity of the UK.</p>
<h2>Looking for solutions</h2>
<p>For the EU and the Irish government, the only way to protect a soft border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, which preserves the integrity of the EU’s single market is to have customs controls between Northern Ireland and Britain – essentially a border within the Irish sea. This could ensure that goods originating from Britain do not seep into EU markets, via Northern Ireland and Ireland, undercutting EU prices and bypassing EU regulations.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/backstop-option-for-irish-border-after-brexit-the-difference-between-eu-and-uk-proposals-explained-97963">'Backstop' option for Irish border after Brexit – the difference between EU and UK proposals explained</a>
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<p>The head of the EU Commission’s Brexit task force, Michel Barnier, signalled his intention of “de-dramatising” the border issue. In the week before the Salzburg summit, <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/2018/0918/994437-brexit_coveney/">he proposed</a> that customs checks could take place at designated places in Britain of certain goods and that technical solutions could be found that would minimise explicit border controls at UK ports. In addition, the EU emphasised that there were already controls between Northern Ireland and Britain in areas of animal health and agri-food.</p>
<p>The EU’s proposal reflects the Irish government’s position that a soft border must be preserved and that Northern Ireland is already treated differently from other parts of the UK. The EU and the Irish government think the DUP is most definitely over-dramatising the significance of a sea border. Simon Coveney, Ireland’s minister for foreign affairs, said the DUP should <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2018/0922/995368-brexit/">not have a veto</a> on the backstop agreement. If the UK provides a draft detailed text on the Irish border, the Irish government and the EU have indicated that they could provide a flexible approach. </p>
<h2>The Irish response</h2>
<p>The imminent problem with achieving flexible, bespoke solutions is that the extent of bad feeling shown in Salzburg makes it hard for any compromises to be reached quickly in time for the next EU summit on October 19. </p>
<p>Some in Dublin still hold out hope that after the Conservative Party conference in late September, May will deliver a compromise. But the Irish government is deeply concerned that time is running out and there are serious fears that no agreement will be reached. </p>
<p>In the wake of the Salzburg summit, there were immediate efforts from the Irish government to ameliorate tensions. Coveney told <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/brexit-dup-cannot-be-allowed-to-veto-deal-says-coveney-1.3638494">RTE radio</a> that May had promised to produce a new legal text on the backstop and that he still felt progress could be made for the October summit. </p>
<p>Ireland’s opposition Fianna Fail party – which is in a confidence and supply arrangement with the governing Fine Gael party – argued that the EU should have been <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/2018/0923/995574-ireland-brexit-politics/">more positive about the Chequers proposal</a> so as to give May some bargaining space. The EU’s approach, Fianna Fail argued, made it harder for May to compromise given the divisions within her party.</p>
<p>The view from Dublin has become more pessimistic. Diplomats and politicians will seek to limit the damage from the Salzburg summit, but there is a keen awareness that time is running out and that May must deliver a text on the backstop. Hopefully, the EU will extend a symbolic olive branch to May and avoid any more hardline rhetoric during this fragile period. Hopefully, she will reciprocate after the Conservative Party conference. If so, a deal could still be possible, if not fully finalised by October 19 – though it’s by no means certain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Etain Tannam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The question of the Irish border remains at the centre of Brexit negotiations after an informal summit of EU leaders in Salzburg.Etain Tannam, Lecturer, International Peace Studies, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994292018-07-11T09:03:45Z2018-07-11T09:03:45ZThe EU wants to avoid a ‘no deal’ Brexit – here’s how it could achieve that<p>Before the Brexit negotiations had officially started, back in June 2017, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c9ee16d2-4f8a-11e7-bfb8-997009366969">told journalists</a> what he needed on the other side of the table: </p>
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<p>A head of the British delegation that is stable, accountable and that has a mandate. </p>
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<p>Less than a year before Brexit day, scheduled for March 29, 2019, Barnier may feel he is still waiting for those conditions to be met, especially as the EU now finds itself with a new head of the British delegation, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c9ee16d2-4f8a-11e7-bfb8-997009366969">Dominic Raab</a>. Raab’s negotiating position for the next round of talks, starting on July 16, results from Theresa May’s attempt to <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexiteers-outmanoeuvred-at-chequers-after-theresa-may-corrals-cabinet-before-brexit-secretary-resigns-99405">hold her cabinet</a> and the Conservative Party together at a meeting at Chequers. In doing so, <a href="https://theconversation.com/whos-to-blame-for-theresa-mays-meltdown-and-where-will-it-end-99613">the prime minister provoked</a> yet another domestic Brexit crisis with a spate of resignations, including those of the Brexit secretary, David Davis – who Raab has replaced – and foreign secretary, Boris Johnson.</p>
<p>In the face of such uncertainty, the reaction of the 27 remaining EU member states (EU27) to the UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-statement-following-cabinet-away-day-at-chequers">new vision</a> for a future UK-EU relationship has been cautious but unenthusiastic. European leaders from Barnier to German chancellor <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44719576">Angela Merkel</a>, and from <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44753265">Irish premier Leo Varadkar</a> to Sebastian Kurz, the Austrian chancellor whose country holds the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/austrian-chancellor-sebastian-kurz-the-eus-new-power-broker/a-44466137">EU Council presidency</a>, have spoken with one voice. They have all welcomed the British government’s attempt to define a negotiating position on the framework for the future UK-EU relationship, but have asked for further detail. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-brexit-plan-that-could-bring-down-the-british-government-explained-99607">The Brexit plan that could bring down the British government – explained</a>
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<p>As one <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/07/eu-diplomats-theresa-may-brexit-compromise">EU diplomat</a> recently put it: “We will try to receive it as well as possible but from what we understand it is still a carve-out of the single market.” The diplomat added that May’s proposed single market for goods is, “A lot of fudge with a cherry on top.”</p>
<h2>The final stretch</h2>
<p>European leaders are also concerned that time is running out for a deal to be finalised – even as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2018/jul/10/theresa-may-new-cabinet-boris-johnson-resignation-brexit-live">Barnier indicated</a>: “After 12 months of negotiations we have agreed on 80% of the negotiations.” This may be read as a reminder to the UK government not to divert too much from what has been achieved at the negotiating table so far – and an expectation of more clarity, soon. </p>
<p>Some have seen a recent <a href="https://twitter.com/eucopresident/status/1016327348919193601">tweet</a> from Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, in the wake of the UK cabinet resignations, as an opportunity to reverse Brexit altogether. </p>
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<p>The EU’s reaction to the detail of the British position will be shaped by the challenge of having to negotiate with an increasingly unstable British government while trying to avoid a “no deal” scenario. Even though European Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, has confirmed that the EU has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/21/eu-is-getting-ready-for-no-deal-brexit-says-jean-claude-juncker">started preparations</a> for this eventuality, the EU is committed to an orderly British withdrawal that avoids uncertainty and protects citizens and businesses. </p>
<p>And while the EU27 will not do this at any price, it’s in this commitment to a final Withdrawal Agreement that the member states may find the political will to work constructively with the UK’s current vision for a future relationship even if there are fears that May’s government could fall at any point. </p>
<h2>Extend the Article 50 deadline</h2>
<p>So how might the EU do this? First, it can agree to extend the Brexit negotiation process. This might not have been a preferred outcome at the start of the negotiations, but if extending the negotiation period ensures that there is an agreed solution that avoids a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and thus UK agreement on the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf">Withdrawal Agreement</a>, the EU27 are perfectly justified in drawing on this flexibility tool. The terms of <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html">Article 50</a>, which govern the procedural requirements for a member state to be able to exercise its right to leave the EU, allow for the deadline to be extended beyond the initial two years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">What is Article 50 – the law that governs exiting the EU – and how does it work?</a>
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<p>The UK and all EU member states must agree to the extension. Given its internal crisis, the UK government might welcome a softening of the ticking Brexit clock pressure. Even though Brexit day is enshrined in the <a href="https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html">EU Withdrawal Act</a>, ministers can change it if necessary. May <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42424997">confirmed</a> that this would only happen in “exceptional circumstances” and “for the shortest possible time”. </p>
<p>For their part, the EU27 need to unanimously agree to the extension. The experience of other highly politicised negotiations such as the accession of new countries, has shown that the member states are able to leave aside their egoistic national preferences to pursue the collective EU interest – namely avoiding a disorderly Brexit.</p>
<h2>Softening red lines</h2>
<p>Second, the EU may decide to soften some of its red lines for the purpose of finalising a Withdrawal Agreement. Barnier hinted at this in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/06/michel-barnier-eu-willing-to-compromise-if-uk-softens-brexit-red-lines">a speech on July 6</a>, stating “I am ready to adapt our offer should the UK red lines change”, but making it clear that the integrity of the single market had to be protected.</p>
<p>If the forthcoming white paper can offer sufficient detail and some realistic substance for the EU negotiating team to work with, and if the UK and EU can find sufficient common ground on such detail, this might afford some leeway to get the negotiations over the hurdle of completing a Withdrawal Agreement. As Franklin Dehousse, a former judge at the EU General Court <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chaotic-deal-brexit-threatening-why-european-union-must-dehousse">has put it</a>: </p>
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<p>There are no serious legal reasons to exclude a Brexit deal with single market on goods and partial free movement of people (but with the proper institutional guarantees). Obstacles are political, and if people want to create them, they should justify them as such. </p>
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<p>The Brexit challenge is no longer an existential threat to the EU but rather to the Conservative government. However, the future of the EU depends on the success of the Brexit process and this requires a degree of ingenuity and political will that allows it to consider Brexit scenarios that protect the integrity of the bloc and its member states, without marginalising the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nieves Perez-Solorzano has received funding from the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council and the European Commission. </span></em></p>Despite the problems that lie ahead with the Brexit plan Theresa May hammered out at Chequers, the EU prefers a Brexit deal rather than a ‘no deal’.Nieves Perez-Solorzano, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/979632018-06-08T14:23:27Z2018-06-08T14:23:27Z‘Backstop’ option for Irish border after Brexit – the difference between EU and UK proposals explained<p>As Brexit negotiations near their end point, Theresa May’s government has been trying to find the balance between two seemingly irreconcilable goals. The UK aims to leave the single market and the customs union, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/article-50-letter-read-full-brexit-theresa-may-takes-uk-out-of-eu-statement-a7655566.html">without returning to a hard border</a> on the island of Ireland. </p>
<p>The text of the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf">political agreement</a>, known as the Joint Report, reached between the UK and the EU in December 2017 included a formula to “square the circle”. It stated that the aim of the future trade negotiations would be to address the challenge of the Irish border through the overall EU-UK relationship. </p>
<p>If the future trade agreement finds it impossible to provide for a frictionless invisible border, then, “specific (technological) solutions” will apply to Northern Ireland. If the UK and the EU cannot agree on those “specific solutions”, then either the UK as a whole, or Northern Ireland, will remain aligned to the single market and the customs union after Brexit takes place. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-technology-and-max-fac-solve-the-irish-border-question-expert-explains-96735">Can technology and 'max fac' solve the Irish border question? Expert explains</a>
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<h2>The EU backstop option</h2>
<p>That third “backstop option” was legally codified in a protocol contained in the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement.pdf">Draft Withdrawal Treaty</a> in late February. It says that – should no specific solution be found – a common regulatory area comprising the European Union and Northern Ireland will be established and Northern Ireland will remain in the EU customs territory.</p>
<p>May vehemently <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43224785">rejected the plan</a> and <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/theresa-may-rejects-draft-brexit-withdrawal-agreement-1.3409215">said</a> that “no UK prime minister could agree to it”. She also <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-to-present-new-brexit-backstop-plan-on-ireland/">pledged to</a> “explore workable solutions on the Ireland question”. </p>
<p>As time went by, Dublin and other EU capitals <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ireland-border-brexit-same-view-progress-leo-varadkar-simon-coveney-a8322441.html">underlined</a> the need to see sufficient progress on this issue by the next European Council meeting of EU leaders on June 28 and 29. </p>
<h2>The UK’s backstop option</h2>
<p>Although, the cabinet is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-44077847">still split</a> over how to manage customs arrangements with the EU in the future, on June 7 the British government published its <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-temporary-customs-arrangement">counter-proposal</a> for a “backstop” arrangement to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. </p>
<p>The biggest difference between the two “backstop” proposals is that the UK one applies to the whole country and not just to Northern Ireland. It proposes that the entire territory of the UK and the Channel Islands will remain part of the customs territory of the EU even after the end of the Brexit transition period in December 2020. </p>
<p>Such an arrangement <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf">respects the promise</a> of the UK government “to ensure that no regulatory barriers will develop between Northern Ireland” and the rest of the UK. It also eases the concerns of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland, on whose support the Conservatives rely for a majority in the House of Commons. The DUP leader, Arlene Foster, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/dup-would-not-back-may-if-ni-treated-differently-post-brexit-1.3518259">said in early June</a> that she would withdraw her support to May’s government “if Northern Ireland was treated differently from the rest of the UK” after Brexit.</p>
<p>Although Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, initially <a href="https://twitter.com/MichelBarnier/status/1004706411874541568">welcomed</a> the publication of the UK’s paper, in a press conference on June 8 he seriously <a href="https://twitter.com/MichelBarnier/status/1005077429621350400">doubted</a> whether the backstop proposal could apply to the whole of the UK, rather than just to Northern Ireland. He argued that such solution raises questions of an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2018/jun/08/anti-brexit-group-launches-second-referendum-campaign-with-roadmap-showing-how-it-can-happen-politics-live">à la carte access to the single market</a>, services, goods or people that is unacceptable to the EU. </p>
<h2>Beyond customs</h2>
<p>The EU backstop option has been <a href="http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/island-of-ireland-brexit-draft-withdrawal-agreement/">rightly criticised</a> for reducing the single market “access of Northern Ireland to … goods, including agricultural and electricity”. Regrettably, the UK proposal is even more <a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DfGOAuzW0AEP4SH.jpg">limited</a> as it explicitly only deals with customs processes and does not engage with issues such as regulatory alignment, agriculture, fisheries and environment that the EU “backstop option” covers.</p>
<p>The UK government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-temporary-customs-arrangement">concedes</a>, however, that to uphold its commitments with regard to the Irish border “an approach on regulatory standards … will also need to be addressed”. This is because, if there is no regulatory alignment between the two sides of the border, there must be, for example, regulatory checks on sanitary and phytosanitary rules of the various agricultural products that will be crossing to ensure the integrity of the single market. However, the paper contains no indication as to when to expect the UK proposals on regulatory alignment.</p>
<h2>An end date</h2>
<p>One of the key questions <a href="https://twitter.com/MichelBarnier/status/1004706411874541568">raised by Barnier</a> relates to whether the backstop has a time limit on it. Leading up to the publication of the UK document, there had been <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/theresa-may-averts-brexit-crisis-after-david-davis-resignation-talk-11397395">speculation</a> that the UK Brexit negotiator, David Davis, was ready to quit unless the UK backstop proposal was truly time limited.</p>
<p>The document published by the UK states that the backstop option “will be only in place until the future customs arrangement can be introduced” and that “the UK expects” this to happen by the end of December 2021. Notwithstanding the actual <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/theresa-may-averts-brexit-crisis-after-david-davis-resignation-talk-11397395">feasibility</a> of this deadline, the ambiguity of that formulation raises two possible scenarios. </p>
<p>If the UK insists on legally entrenching the deadline of the backstop option, the EU will reject such a suggestion not least because the Irish taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44396436">has made clear</a> that a Brexit backstop “cannot be time limited”. Alternatively, the EU may ask for a second backstop option without any time limitations specific to Northern Ireland. This will allow both the UK and the EU to comply with the political commitments undertaken in the December Joint Report. </p>
<p>If the UK accepts that a backstop option is an insurance policy that cannot have a time limitation and the EU does not reject the possibility of a common customs territory with the UK even after the end of the transition, there will be negotiations about the exact obligations that the UK will have to undertake during the period of the backstop. Those may concern the UK contribution to the new EU budget and the supervision of the arrangement by the Court of Justice of the European Union. </p>
<p>In any case, the Irish border might prove the pulling factor that keeps the UK in a close relationship with the EU for the next few years at least. For a region that became famous for its divisions, such a role is almost a historical irony.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97963/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nikos Skoutaris consults the GUE/NGL parliamentary group of the European Parliament for Brexit-related issues. He has received funding from UACES and UEA's HEIF Impact Fund for the organisation of a conference on the 'De-Europeanisation of Border Conflicts: The Brexit Effect on Territorial Borders</span></em></p>A tale of two ‘backstop options’ for Northern Ireland after Brexit.Nikos Skoutaris, Lecturer in European Union Law, School of Law, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/944332018-04-11T20:04:01Z2018-04-11T20:04:01Z‘Hang on a minute lads, I’ve got a great idea!’ Brexit, crisis management and sensemaking<p>March 30 officially marked [<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/1-year-to-brexit-so-much-to-do-so-little-time-for-both/2018/03/29/55049a8e-3306-11e8-b6bd-0084a1666987_story.html?utm_term=.bb84d0114240">one year to go</a>] before the Brexit clock strikes – with or without an agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union. At this point, nobody in the UK, even the Brexiteers themselves, are any clearer about how the British will actually find their way to the exit ramp off the European project. </p>
<p>The phase-one negotiations were eventually <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-42368096">agreed upon</a> in December 2017 and the transition period was confirmed in early March 2018. But for the final break-up, the British government has yet to define in sufficient detail its future relationship with Europe, how it will achieve agreement on the details and how a host of remaining messy points will get settled in the final “divorce”.</p>
<p>Viewed from the other side of the channel, the pro-Brexit politicians seem to have <a href="https://euobserver.com/opinion/141024">unrealistic expectations</a>, and hold, like their followers on social media, an emotional relationship to the entire project. Yet the British public, at least those who voted for Brexit, still seem to follow their leaders. Terms such as <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/theresa-mays-dogs-brexit-repeal-11153035">“dog’s Brexit”</a>, “deluded”, and “regrettable” have been used to describe the collective state of mind of those leading the “leave” camp. </p>
<p>How can we make sense of this confusing and increasingly ambiguous scenario? One possible way is through a careful study of the final scenes of a classic British film, enlightened with a bit of management science.</p>
<h2>Brexit the movie</h2>
<p>Not long after the vote that signalled the UK’s impending departure from the EU, the commentator Anne McElvoy highlighted how the 1969 heist film <em>The Italian Job</em> was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/21/italian-job-brexit-vote">prescient parody of the Brexit melodrama</a>. Released in France as <em>L'Or se barre</em> (“The gold takes off”), the film starred Michael Caine in an iconic role, heading up a team of British criminals out to steal 4 million pounds (5 million euros) of gold in Turin, Italy. </p>
<p>The team’s secret weapon was a trio of Minis in red, white and blue, not coincidentally the colours of the Union Jack. Backed up by great music from Quincy Jones, the Minis raced through gorgeous scenery, narrow streets and even sewer pipes to hold on to the gold. The film inspired scenes in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ypt3XtV6od4"><em>Bourne Identity</em></a>, among others, and even survived a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Eyw-Qiwpj0">Hollywood remake</a> in 2003.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/FEltJsIwSvE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption"><em>The Italian Job</em> trailer (1969).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In her article, McElvoy teased out how the film revealed British insecurities around its place in Europe, and the parallels between post-Brexit UK and the Britain of 1969. With everything that’s happened since the vote, and with just one year to go now, the film’s famous final scene provides us with another view of how the upbeat, pro-Brexit narrative is unravelling.</p>
<p>The closing scenes in <em>The Italian Job</em> find our fugitive heroes, now in a van laden with gold bullion, making their escape through the Italian Alps toward Switzerland (and its welcoming banks). All the carefully laid plans go terribly awry, however, and they end up stranded, balanced over a cliff edge with their gold teetering over the abyss. If one man takes even a step toward it, they all go down. Their ringleader, Caine, is panicked and yet attempts to reassure his men that he is in control and has a plan – in a situation from which there is visibly no escape. “Hang on a minute lads, I’ve got a great idea!” he cries out. The others look utterly petrified and unconvinced, but they have no alternative other than to believe him.</p>
<h2>Follow the leaders</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=794&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=794&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=794&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=997&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=997&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213133/original/file-20180404-189827-1xe16oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=997&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boris Johnson in 2012, back in the simple days before the Brexit vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/53797600@N04/6996040919/in/photolist-bEdxea-bEdoeF-brisME-8g57uJ-bk5bPo-bEdhNV-xsijq-bEdzdz-4AUUDT-22q9wK-fLQJUY-apYeYc-6djunX-6Ypvrs-4SAhAa-dG5Gm9-bw74Yd-ankp26-55ZcWe-7sP8Vs-jxPxM7-22u97A-brim9j-MqKv3U-8jHH5e-fddKbA-britm3-mEFjhP-britL3-d9QzFu-bEdpKT-briudb-bEdst6-AAsou-joejVr-5raQqw-eQHzV8-bEdoLk-e4Yfwu-dKDWsb-jxQAL3-d81j23-8nVeUM-cpKpdu-bo5fQJ-6iA8ZM-dquMUj-akPSLE-ph3ycV-52Lo3Z">Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This scenario can be viewed as a classic case of what <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40926-016-0040-z">organisational scholar Karl Weick</a> called “sensemaking” under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Weick developed this concept to demonstrate how leaders make sense of the unknown in order to reassure and reduce anxiety among followers. Studying organizations’ traumatic work events and crisis scenarios, Weick uncovered key moments of meaning in teams and the ensuing impact on members.</p>
<p>By providing a way forward through the unknown, leaders can provide structure, which is particularly useful when that future appears unintelligible to many. In this way, followers can move forward in a complex environment and trust their leaders, even when in doubt. Sensemaking can also be a useful approach to coping with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14697017.2017.1279824">unexpected changes</a> in political contexts.</p>
<p>Weick also contributed to better understanding organisations and leadership through the analogy of a map as a key tool of sensemaking. Sensemaking can act as a cartographic aide to navigate uncertain conditions and environments caused by the unexpected. Perhaps the surprising part of Weick’s work is that <em>any map</em> can help make sense of a situation, even the wrong one.</p>
<p>In one well-known anecdote about World War II soldiers lost in the Alps, he pointed out that “when you’re tired, cold, hungry, and scared, any old map will do”. The soldiers apparently survived a major blizzard thanks to an old and tattered map which, they later discovered when back at the base camp, was a map of the Pyrénées, hundreds of kilometers away.</p>
<p>In a sensemaking context, the map’s rational use as a location instrument – an aid to help situate where we are and where we are going – is less important than its value as a visualization tool, a practical heuristic – a means to find a “quick and dirty” solution to a pressing problem. Better problem-solving emerges from the sense one makes of a given situation, using whatever means available.</p>
<h2>Managing through Brexit</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213129/original/file-20180404-189810-c8e7qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">UK prime minister Theresa May in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/eu2017ee/37388975951/in/photolist-YXWgWp-W6fjvE-QG5wfm-4L7gAU-dQEged-S1h6uu-dQEgtL-VZLyLb-22EqYcS-TmX9a5-S7okdF-ezS939-6oEPcb-H3ie26-rayVfF-2q338-V3ADSb-VSZhg4-Wos8t6-4L7gXm-8MXREt-8N1VYL-8N1UrJ-Vh7nxb-8MXQ7M-8MXQAt-UUcCgE-dQEgg5-TQnN9u-8MXRSD-egNER-qThRZM-8MXMpV-8N1SWb-UqrsWD-dSK7Wn-WEwvhh-rayVUr-r8qqjs-T9EHsS-KmdVRV-TU42QS-VFD7rM-XcAciy-VPujAb-QBc16Q-JpNku8-qT9TsA-Vh7oAo-21jqzNq">Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>When organisations are navigating through uncharted territory, they and their members are presented with prime opportunities to learn and to construct their future. We seem to learn more from adversity than from happier, more carefree periods. So, how we deal with the ambiguity of the present can help us in the future.</p>
<p>Since the impact of present decisions is vague at best, how can leaders and organisations develop greater ambiguity tolerance? With Brexit coming in less than a year, British citizens need to cope with ambiguity while still exercising the right to public debate and discussion as they try to educate themselves. They will also need to learn in the “post-truth” news and media environment online, and continually make sense of <em>what is</em> without too much anxiety of <em>what will be</em>.</p>
<p>Perhaps some answers lie in discovering, or rediscovering, works of popular culture which capture the heart and soul of a given group of people in a given context. Nations, like organisations, collectively experience catharsis, or the release of tension and stress, through films and stories that reflect their values and current anxieties. <em>The Italian Job</em> is one such work.</p>
<p>Michael Caine, observing his followers hanging on for their lives (and their gold), declares that he’s “got a great idea”. But before his team and the audience can hear it, the credits roll. Unfortunately, there was never a sequel to shed light on whether or not his map led the team to safety in Switzerland. For leaders in the United Kingdom, there is an urgent need to make sense of what the future holds and show their followers a map. To paraphrase Weick: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Any old map will do – even a bad Brexit map may be better than none. Just get us the heck out of here!”</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213130/original/file-20180404-189801-6a4lp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Michael Caine in <em>The Italian Job</em> (1969). So how’s he going to get his team out of this one? Viewers of the film never find out.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/21/italian-job-brexit-vote">TheGuardian.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94433/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>March 30 officially marked one year to go before the Brexit clock strikes. How can the “leave” camp get out of this one? The classic 1969 heist movie ‘The Italian Job’ provides clues.Mark Smith, Dean of Faculty & Professor of Human Resource Management, Grenoble École de Management (GEM)Michelle Mielly, Associate Professor in People, Organizations, Society, Grenoble École de Management (GEM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/938312018-03-24T09:19:47Z2018-03-24T09:19:47ZAs the Brexit negotiations enter a decisive stage the EU is not home and dry<p>Now that the European Council has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43509309">confirmed</a> the draft terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the new Article 50 negotiating <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/33458/23-euco-art50-guidelines.pdf">guidelines</a>, its chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, can open negotiations on an overall framework for a future relationship between the EU and the UK. </p>
<p>Given the British <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-our-future-economic-partnership-with-the-european-union">government’s commitment</a> to leave the customs union and the single market, the European Council recognised that a future economic relationship is likely to take the form of a balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging free trade agreement.</p>
<p>Surprisingly, the remaining 27 EU member states, known as the EU27, have managed to maintain a unified voice during the Brexit negotiation. The European Commission who negotiates on behalf of the EU, remains firmly in the driving seat as the effective drafting of the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community-0_en">Withdrawal Agreement</a> shows. Meanwhile, the British government has become weaker and more divided as the Brexit negotiations have progressed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-transition-three-misunderstandings-about-the-deal-explained-93784">Brexit transition: three misunderstandings about the deal explained</a>
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<p>Although the Withdrawal Agreement largely reflects the EU’s preferences, and, because “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, the EU faces three key challenges in the months ahead to ensure that the negotiations make it to the home stretch: avoiding a no deal, managing the ticking negotiation clock and ensuring unity.</p>
<h2>Avoiding a no-deal scenario</h2>
<p>Both the Article 50 process, which governs the UK’s withdrawal negotiation, and the EU’s Brexit strategy are geared towards ensuring the UK’s orderly departure – and this can only be achieved if the draft Withdrawal Agreement is ratified by both the UK and the EU. The most difficult challenge for the EU is to ensure that the British government ratifies the agreement. This is exacerbated by domestic factors that are largely beyond the EU’s control. </p>
<p>The British government is struggling to assuage different and at times overlapping factions at home. It has prioritised the accommodation of a broad church of pro and anti-Brexit voices, to the detriment of making hard and substantial political choices about the future EU-UK relationship, or the Irish border. </p>
<p>But the time for political choices has arrived. For the Withdrawal Agreement to be finalised, the government must put on the table robust proposals for the Irish border and contribute to the political declaration – accompanying the agreement – that will set out the framework for the future relationship. In its <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/09/26/tusk-remarks-may-london/">damage limitation mode</a>, the EU has offered suggestions to these issues, namely, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/28/eu-publishes-plan-to-keep-northern-ireland-in-customs-union">a “common regulatory area” for Ireland</a>, and an <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33458/23-euco-art50-guidelines.pdf">ambitious free trade agreement after Brexit</a>. But there is nothing more the EU can do unless the government <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/Correspondence-2017-19/20-03-18-draft-withdrawal-agreement-letter-to-Rt-Hon-David-Davis.pdf">sets out its stall</a>. </p>
<p>Once made, these choices will not be broadly supported and if the prime minister, Theresa May, is faced with a Brexiteer rebellion in her party or a withdrawal of support from the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland, a no-deal scenario may prove attractive. If her Conservative government was to fall, the prospect of a Labour-led government may not be a significantly better scenario – given the party’s own internal divisions and <a href="https://theconversation.com/jeremy-corbyns-brexit-plan-proves-he-likes-having-his-cake-and-eating-it-even-more-than-boris-johnson-92622">lack of clear strategy</a> on Brexit beyond a loose commitment to a future customs union.</p>
<p>The EU has two assets in its bid to avoid a no-deal scenario. First, the European Commission, a seasoned negotiator, with a wealth of policy and technical expertise that has shown its ability to successfully remain in the driver’s seat and push the negotiations ahead despite the UK’s hesitance. Second, <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/46/46.pdf">the overwhelming evidence</a> of the negative effect of no deal for the UK and the EU. No Withdrawal Agreement would mean the abrupt departure of the UK, the adoption of World Trade Organisation norms for trade, and the end to UK-EU cooperation on key areas such as, nuclear safeguards, data exchange, counter-terrorism or aviation. </p>
<h2>Managing the ticking negotiation clock</h2>
<p>The final text of the Brexit agreement must be ready by the European Council meeting in October. This deadline is necessary to ensure that the text can be ratified by the UK, and on the EU side, by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in time for Brexit day, set for March 29, 2019. The <a href="https://interactive.news.sky.com/2017/brexit-countdown/">ticking Brexit clock</a> is as loud as ever until the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified and implemented. </p>
<p>After the end of March 2019, the ticking becomes quieter for the EU because the transition period – <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-and-uk-reach-brexit-transition-deal/">until December 2020</a> – affords 21 additional months <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/21/eu-to-agree-brexit-transition-period-says-donald-tusk">to prepare for</a> the negative impact of Brexit.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-transition-deal-conceding-on-the-possible-in-hope-of-the-hypothetical-93673">Brexit transition deal: conceding on the possible in hope of the hypothetical</a>
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<p>It is unlikely that the negotiation of the future relationship between the UK and the EU will be completed during the transition. It’s not far fetched to envisage the EU asking for an extension of the transition period to further negotiate the UK-EU future relationship. There will be no constraints of a hard deadline, and the UK will have become a <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/is-a-cliff-edge-still-a-possibility/">“vassal state”</a> with diminished influence at the EU top table. In any case, the British government is keen on a longer transition. There is nothing in the Withdrawal Agreement that limits this option.</p>
<h2>A unified voice</h2>
<p>As the negotiation of a framework for a future relationship with the UK starts, individual member states may be more vocal about their specific national preferences. While the Withdrawal Agreement only requires a qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers, a future trade agreement will require a unanimity vote. Depending on the type of agreement, it could even require the support of regional parliaments – which would increase the number of possible veto players. </p>
<p>However, the EU27 are committed to protect the single market and to avoid a Brexit contagion – so the UK will not be afforded the same benefits as those of a member state. With European elections looming in 2019 and member states occupied with other joint and domestic concerns, it is likely that the EU27 will focus on what unites them rather than on what divides them to ensure both, an orderly Brexit but also an advantageous trade agreement afterwards. Still, a united front may not be sufficient to ensure that the Withdrawal Agreement is concluded and ratified.</p>
<p>Nine months into the negotiation process and considering what has been achieved, the leaders of the EU27 may indulge in a sigh of relief as the March European Council meeting draws to a close. However, as the Brexit negotiations enter another crucial phase, the EU’s Brexit success is dependent on avoiding a no-deal scenario, retaining a unified voice and ensuring that the Withdrawal Agreement makes it to the home stretch.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93831/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nieves Perez-Solorzano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The EU faces three key challenges over Brexit: avoiding a no-deal scenario, managing the ticking negotiation clock and ensuring its own unity.Nieves Perez-Solorzano, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/936732018-03-20T16:06:51Z2018-03-20T16:06:51ZBrexit transition deal: conceding on the possible in hope of the hypothetical<p>Politics is very much a game of timing. And time is definitely of the essence in the negotiations between London and Brussels over how the UK should leave the EU. In the latest instalment of the talks, both sides have agreed to buy time to delay the moment the UK loses a host of rights and obligations stemming from EU membership. The withdrawal agreement – if completed successfully prior to the moment the UK officially leaves the EU at 11pm (GMT) on March 29 2019 – will now incorporate a 21-month <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-and-uk-reach-brexit-transition-deal/">transitional period</a>. This entails extending the applicability of EU policies and associated law, which includes free movement of people alongside that of goods, services and capital, until the end of 2020.</p>
<p>The UK’s official departure date is regulated by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, unless there is a <em>deus ex machina</em> in the form of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b47aa32-c629-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656">government requesting to cancel Brexit</a>. But Prime Minister Theresa May has sought to postpone when Brexit really takes effect by up to two years. The official message is that this hiatus allows businesses and individuals on both sides to adjust to the changed rules that will follow from an eventual free trade deal.</p>
<p>In reality, transition is an admission that the UK government is not prepared for the consequences of Brexit, politically or economically. There is no replacement arrangement for trade or immigration rules, among many other issues. The cabinet still does not have a common position on what the future EU-UK relationship should look like. This explains <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5449824/angela-merkel-mocks-theresa-may-at-davos-reception-brexit/">Angela Merkel’s joke</a> that the UK acts like a bad mafia boss saying “make me an offer” when in fact the offer needs to come from London.</p>
<h2>The original wishlist</h2>
<p>Time has effectively run out for negotiating the outline of a free trade agreement within the framework of the Article 50 talks. The EU made it clear that to ensure ratification the final withdrawal treaty needs to be done and dusted by October 2018. That’s unrealistic given that finalising the legal text for the issues already concluded in theory in December is proving problematic because the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b15f357c-2ab0-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381">UK has not resolved how it wants to prevent a hard border in Ireland</a>.</p>
<p>Playing with time is convenient for the EU too. The next European parliament elections are due in May 2019, so it’s essential for the formal Brexit to take place beforehand. There is no desire on either side of the Channel to prolong UK participation in EU decision-making institutions.</p>
<p>Negotiating a mutually desirable standstill arrangement was nonetheless quite fraught. The UK initially argued that it should be allowed to diverge from EU rules during transition. In January the government articulated a set of <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/brexit-transition-explained">wide-ranging demands</a> to cushion the initial economic impact of Brexit and render this halfway house politically more palatable by limiting restrictions on British sovereignty. The UK wanted to distinguish between the rights of European citizens arriving before and during transition, along with the ability to influence new laws adopted during transition. It also wanted flexibility to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries at the same time as wishing to remain bound by existing EU FTAs. Fish also entered the picture after environment secretary Michael Gove called for leaving the EU fish quota system <a href="http://fishingnews.co.uk/news/gove-shorter-brexit-transition-period-for-fishing/">sooner rather than later</a>.</p>
<h2>Key concessions</h2>
<p>What became of these demands? The text covering the transition period includes a clause confirming that the UK can negotiate and ratify trade deals with other countries. However, they must not enter into force prior to 2021. There is also a footnote enshrining EU support for the UK policy of “rolling over” existing EU trade deals with countries such as South Korea or Canada so that these continue to apply to British goods and services.</p>
<p>Fish allocations decided in Brussels will apply for the duration of transition, although the UK will be consulted when these are renewed again in 2019. EU citizens will be treated equally regardless of whether they arrived before or after Brexit day, just as UK citizens who move to the EU prior to the end of transition.</p>
<p>Thus the deal reflects a number of compromises made under time pressure. It is important to remember that transition is the possible in the hope of the hypothetical. That is, the 21-month standstill is not automatic – it will only apply if both sides ratify a more comprehensive withdrawal treaty by October. Equally, both sides have bought time for a hypothetical FTA that can settle the more thorny and detailed issues of trade. That extra time will count for nothing if issues of how far the UK is to diverge from the EU cannot be resolved within the cabinet and parliament at large. So the politics of Brexit will continue to drag on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93673/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Glencross receives funding from the EU's Erasmus+ scheme.</span></em></p>The UK will continue to abide by several important EU rules during a 21-month Brexit transition period.Andrew Glencross, Senior lecturer, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/858612017-10-19T11:16:04Z2017-10-19T11:16:04ZTo break Brexit talks deadlock the EU must agree ‘sufficient progress’ has been made – what does that mean?<p>The next stage of the Brexit negotiations hinges upon two words: “sufficient progress”. </p>
<p>At the European Council meeting on October 19 and 20, leaders of the EU27 will review developments in the Brexit negotiations and establish whether they believe enough progress has been made in the first phase of talks to move on to the second phase. That would allow discussions to begin on the future relationship between the UK and the EU.</p>
<p>The term “sufficient progress” is <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/">embedded</a> within the European Council’s negotiating guidelines for <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html">Article 50</a> – the part of the EU treaty which governs how a state leaves the bloc. It is born out of the EU’s phased approach to the Brexit negotiations, which was later <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/620409/Terms_of_reference_for_the_Article_50_negotiations_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf">confirmed</a> by both the EU and the UK in June 2017. </p>
<p>The ongoing first phase of Brexit negotiations is focused on finding solutions to three key issues: the status of UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK, the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and the settlement of the UK’s financial obligations. </p>
<p>Agreeing whether there has been been sufficient progress means solving these three key problems. What the agreed solution ought to look like, however, is more elusive.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-post-brexit-border-in-the-irish-sea-was-never-really-on-the-table-but-a-political-solution-must-be-81767">A post-Brexit border in the Irish sea was never really on the table – but a political solution must be</a>
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<p>After a meeting with the British prime minister, Theresa May, on September 26, Donald Tusk, president of the European Council <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-41389498">said</a> there is no “sufficient progress yet. But we will work on it”. The European Parliament, which will have to agree to the final Brexit deal, <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171002IPR85121/brexit-tangible-progress-still-needed-on-withdrawal-terms">approved</a> a resolution on October 3 confirming that sufficient progress had not yet been made on the negotiations. On October 12, at the end of five rounds of Brexit negotiations, Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-41585430">said</a> he was not in a position to recommend that the European Council open discussions on the future relationship between the UK and the EU27. </p>
<p>From the EU’s perspective, the Brexit clock is ticking and <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-in-the-eus-interest-to-press-ahead-with-brexit-negotiations-79289">delaying the process</a> is not to its advantage. The earliest the UK can expect the EU27’s green light to move to the second phase of the negotiations is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41650246">December 2017</a>, after the next European Council meeting.</p>
<p>Some reports <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-makes-pledge-to-eu-citizens-in-bid-to-unlock-brexit-talks/">suggest</a> that at the end of the October Brussels summit, the EU27 may conclude that while sufficient progress has not yet been made, work can nevertheless start on the EU side to prepare for the second phase. Under this scenario, the EU27 would begin talks among themselves about a transition period and future trade agreement, but not start talks with the UK about it yet. </p>
<h2>Finding a way through</h2>
<p>The challenge for the EU is how and when to agree that there has been sufficient progress without crossing its own red lines on citizens rights, the island of Ireland and the UK’s financial obligations. This means not offering too many concessions to the UK government but enough to avoid weakening May’s position further. The goal is an orderly British withdrawal on March 30, 2019. </p>
<p>The challenge for the UK is how to convincingly show the EU27 that sufficient progress has been achieved on the three key issues in order to start negotiating a post-Brexit trade deal with the EU – but without alienating Brexit supporters at home. </p>
<p>For the EU, the phased approach stems from a desire to avoid uncertainty and build trust so that any unresolved issues from phase one are not used as bargaining chips in phase two and a final agreement is achieved at the end of the process. The EU’s <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/">commitment</a> to the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” leaves the door open to that possibility. </p>
<p>There is not a clear-cut definition of what sufficient progress ought to look like. This absence of a defined template affords the EU some flexibility in moving forward, as long as the deadlock on the UK’s financial settlement and Ireland can be overcome and the solutions are built on clarity and trust.</p>
<h2>Clock ticking on a trade deal</h2>
<p>For the UK government, the phased approach is an obstacle to its key priority: negotiating its future trade relationship with the EU. It sees the EU’s refusal to agree that sufficient progress has been made as a delaying tactic. </p>
<p>The decision to agree that sufficient progress has been reached is the EU27’s prerogative, which illustrates the asymmetry of power built into the Article 50 process. The article was designed not to facilitate a country’s exit from the EU. </p>
<p>May’s conciliatory <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu">Florence speech</a> on September 22 and her latest <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/foreign-affairs/brexit/news/89833/theresa-may-launches-diplomatic-offensive-bid-break-brexit">diplomatic offensive</a> – which included a dinner with Tusk, Barnier and Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU Commission’s
president – illustrate the UK’s current predicament. </p>
<p>Some progress has been achieved in citizens’ rights and Northern Ireland, but the financial settlement is at a deadlock and the EU27 are united in ensuring that the UK meets its financial obligations. This means that clarity and detail on the British financial liabilities, continued progress on citizens’ rights and Northern Ireland and trust upon which to build a post-Brexit relationship, is what sufficient progress probably means at the moment. This is the hurdle that the UK government must successfully jump. </p>
<p>With domestic public opinion more open to compromise and <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-public-open-to-compromise-on-brexit-deal-new-research-finds-80985">less willing</a> to accept a “no deal scenario”, the British government has a window of opportunity to justify why meeting the requirements of sufficient progress is a more reasonable exercise than jumping off a Brexit cliff. Whether the prime minister’s own <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/of-new-dynamics-and-insufficient-progress/">divided party</a> would follow this narrative is difficult to predict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nieves Perez-Solorzano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is up to the EU to decide when Brexit negotiations can move on to the next phase.Nieves Perez-Solorzano, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841892017-09-21T08:48:48Z2017-09-21T08:48:48ZBrexit negotiations: here’s where we’re at so far<p>While many have enjoyed a summer break, the Brexit negotiating teams in Brussels and London have been busy. But has there been any progress? In terms of substance, the answer is short: not really.</p>
<p>There have been three negotiating rounds so far – in June, July and August – and a fourth one is due to take place in the last week of September. Some common ground has been found on citizens’ rights and the <a href="http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7661">Common Travel Area</a> for Northern Ireland but major disagreements remain. A particular point of contention continues to be what the role of the Court of Justice of the EU will have in guaranteeing the rights of EU citizens living in the UK. Another is the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-brexit-divorce-bill-explained-74466">divorce bill</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, while little progress has been made on substance, there have been developments on the structure, the negotiating approach, and the likelihood of a transition agreement.</p>
<h2>Negotiating structure</h2>
<p>The parties have agreed on a two-phase approach for the talks. Phase one involves the negotiations of the the withdrawal agreement – focusing in particular on citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, and the border issue between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Phase two will see the two sides discussing their future relationship. </p>
<p>The EU had originally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/dec/06/uk-wants-as-much-flexibility-as-possible-in-brexit-negotiating-position-says-hammond-politics-live?page=with:block-5846a144e4b049350cc96739#block-5846a144e4b049350cc96739">insisted</a> that phase two could only begin once a final deal had been reached on phase one issues but has since moderated its stance. Now phase two can begin once “sufficient progress” has been made on the withdrawal negotiations. The UK, which was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/dec/01/labour-condemns-may-for-floating-plan-to-make-schools-deprioritise-illegal-migrant-pupils-politics-live?page=with:block-5840023be4b056d3d56ac26a#block-5840023be4b056d3d56ac26a">keen to start the two negotiations in parallel</a>, welcomed this change.</p>
<p>For the first phase, the two negotiating teams have agreed to meet for week-long negotiation rounds every month. Each round starts with an introductory meeting between the chief negotiators, David Davis and Michel Barnier. Then come meetings between the coordinators, Oliver Robbins (previously permanent secretary at the Department for Exiting the EU, and now the prime minister’s EU adviser in the Cabinet Office) and Sabine Weyand (deputy chief negotiator of the European Commission’s Article 50 taskforce), and the respective negotiating groups.</p>
<p>So far, three negotiating groups have been established: on citizens’ rights, financial settlement, and other separation issues (including <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexatom-the-uk-will-now-leave-europes-nuclear-energy-authority-72136">Euratom</a>). The issue of the Irish border is under the responsibility of the coordinators. The rounds are concluded with a plenary session and a joint press conference.</p>
<h2>Negotiating approaches</h2>
<p>This is the first time a country has left the EU so Brexit negotiations are unprecedented. Given the significant consequences of Brexit, the European Commission committed early on to providing maximum transparency on the negotiations. It publishes all EU position papers, text proposals and negotiation mandates on its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en?field_core_tags_tid_i18n=351&page=1">website</a>.</p>
<p>UK officials, on the other hand, initially stressed the importance of playing their cards close to the chest. They provided little information about the UK’s goals and red lines, arguing that to make that information public would <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-explained-vote-negotiation-david-davis-eu-theresa-may-parliament-a7238971.html">undermine their negotiating position</a>.</p>
<p>However, these negotiations are different to traditional value-claiming or win-lose negotiations, in which each party starts off with clear positions and makes concessions and trade-offs along the way, trying to gain advantages at the other party’s expense and never disclosing their own bottom line. On issues such as the Irish border and citizens’ rights it’s difficult to see how trade-offs can be made. Creative solutions must be found to minimise the disruption caused when disentangling the UK from the EU after 44 years of membership. That means both sides need to be open.</p>
<p>The UK now seems to have accepted this and has adopted a more open approach. Over the summer, it published a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%255B%255D=department-for-exiting-the-european-union">number of position papers</a> on issues such as the Northern Irish border and the customs union. This allows the negotiators on both sides to take a problem-solving approach, identifying areas of convergence and divergence, and move forward in the coming crucial months.</p>
<h2>A transition deal</h2>
<p>Even if a working structure is in place and the two parties are engaging in more open discussions, it is clear that these negotiations are anything but <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f1f9fe02-c5e5-32dc-8431-23d099170625">simple and easy</a>, and that the negotiations on the future agreement might not start in October as initially predicted.</p>
<p>If the European Council, which is meeting on October 19 and 20, decides that sufficient progress has not been achieved on the withdrawal issues, the negotiations will most likely not proceed to the second phase until after the next European Council on December 14 and 15. That’s because the Commission cannot engage in negotiations on the future relationship without a new negotiation mandate from the member states.</p>
<p>Either way, it’s now apparent to all parties involved that it will be impossible to negotiate an agreement on the future relationship within the two-year window provided by Article 50. That window closes on March 29, 2019 and given that most EU trade agreements take more than five years to negotiate (the EU-Canada agreement took over ten years in total), a consensus is emerging that a time limited transition agreement is needed. </p>
<p>During that period, the two parties can negotiate the terms of a comprehensive agreement for their future relationship. But there is still disagreement about what such a transition agreement will look like, adding further complexity to an already complicated process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84189/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After three rounds of talks, what has been agreed and what are the big sticking points?Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, Lecturer in Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/836842017-09-08T12:34:59Z2017-09-08T12:34:59ZRemarkable flexibility on Northern Ireland from the EU – the UK government should take note<p>The European Commission has announced the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/guiding-principles-dialogue-ei-ni_en.pdf">guiding principles</a> for its position regarding the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland after Brexit.</p>
<p>The main message is that, when all is said and done, the solutions to this knotty problem lie in the hands of the UK government. As Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar wryly <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/834254/Brexit-leo-varadkar-ireland-border-design-brexiteers-leave-eu">remarked</a>, “it’s Britain that has decided to leave”, and so it must manage the consequences of this decision.</p>
<p>At the same time, the commission is concerned that <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northern-ireland-and-ireland-a-position-paper">the UK government’s approach</a> to the Irish border has so far centred fairly narrowly on preserving its “invisibility”, on the Common Travel Area, on the rights of Irish citizens, and on funding for peace programmes. Chief negotiator Michel Barnier has also called out the UK government for attempting to use the EU’s flexibility for the Irish border as a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e05b1903-2cb1-3c02-b78c-c4497a59bbde">test case</a> for the future UK-EU trading relationship. </p>
<p>In its own guidelines, the EU is attempting to move the discussion forward by outlining a framework for solutions that are unique to Northern Ireland.</p>
<h2>A unique situation</h2>
<p>The EU is in an extraordinary position here, and, reflecting that, uses one word in particular numerous times in its guidelines: “Specific”. Barnier <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I143268">states</a> that, in the case of Northern Ireland and the Irish border, “the specific situation is a specific responsibility” for both the UK and EU. </p>
<p>The emphasis upon the particularity of this case is important for two reasons. First, the commission is keen to emphasise that what happens in Northern Ireland will not set a precedent for elsewhere in the EU or on its borders. </p>
<p>Second, it wants to draw clear water between what is arranged for Northern Ireland and what pertains to the rest of the UK. A level of flexibility is on offer in this case that cannot be expected for other elements of the Brexit negotiations. </p>
<p>The commission is also clear that this flexibility will only work if it comes from both sides. It claims to have seen little of this so far from the UK. This is despite the fact that the British government legally cannot treat Northern Ireland and its future as of purely domestic concern. The Irish government has a legitimate role and interest in the affairs of Northern Ireland. As the DUP is well aware, Margaret Thatcher herself conceded this in the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/15/newsid_2539000/2539849.stm">1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement</a>.</p>
<h2>The EU, peace and cross-border co-operation</h2>
<p>In light of this, the EU recognises that the peace process is not merely about symbolism or visibility of borders. The agreement has a “practical application” across its three strands – unionist/nationalist, north/south and British/Irish. Co-operation along these three lines must be protected in order to shore up peace. The commission is concerned that, because European Union law and policy underpins so much of this cooperation, it is put at very real risk by Brexit.</p>
<p>The implication is that sustaining the peace process in Northern Ireland will require continuity in policy areas most relevant to cross-border cooperation. To make that happen, the EU is suggesting adding specific provisions in the Brexit withdrawal agreement for the continued application of EU law in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>It hints (from a position grounded in the 1998 agreement) that this may be done across a wide range of policy areas, including health, social security and the environment. Here the EU is setting out a broad field of possibilities for the UK to seize upon, including continued application of EU law and policy in a region of the UK after Brexit.</p>
<h2>Flexibility now required of the UK</h2>
<p>The unique situation of Northern Ireland within the UK again needs to be stressed. Core to this is the birthright of people born there to identity as British, Irish or both. These EU guidelines go further than ever before in stating that Brexit should come “without prejudice” to the “rights, opportunities and identities” that come with EU citizenship for Irish citizens in Northern Ireland. What is more, as co-guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement, the UK will have to ensure that there is no diminution of those rights in Northern Ireland after Brexit. </p>
<p>If the UK government seizes this opportunity to soften the fallout of Brexit on the peace process, it will need to be prepared to make the case for unique post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. This would have to be sold to its own supporters, including the ten pro-Brexit DUP Westminster MPs on whose vote it currently relies. The EU is making an exceptional offer for peace; to seize it will require new levels of flexibility and nerve from the UK government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83684/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katy Hayward receives funding from the ESRC and the SSHRC (Canada). She is a Board Member of the Centre for Cross Border Studies.</span></em></p>The European Commission has published its guidelines for talks on this thorny issue.Katy Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/800152017-06-26T15:59:59Z2017-06-26T15:59:59ZSummits, uphill struggles … and what a murky tale of mountaineering derring-do can teach us about Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175651/original/file-20170626-326-1q08l4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Brexit, like Annapurna, could be a long and dangerous slog.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/655126330?src=iJYKDtm8k9TXEZqdWTsrkQ-1-0&size=medium_jpg">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the start of the recent Brexit negotiations, UK Brexit secretary David Davis and EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/david-davis-michelbarnier-kick-brexit-talks-exchange-hiking/">exchanged “mountaineering gifts”</a>. Barnier gave Davis a carved wooden walking stick from his native <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haute-Savoie">Savoie</a> while Davis presented Barnier with a French version of the classic mountaineering book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Regards-lAnnapurna-Maurice-Marcel-Herzog/dp/B0026VJJQC">Regards vers l'Annapurna</a>, by Maurice Herzog and Marcel Ichac. </p>
<p>But beyond a shared love of the outdoors, what do these gifts signify? Barnier had already discussed his passion for hiking and hill-walking with Britain’s prime minister, Theresa May, at a previous meeting and his walking stick gift may well end up in her holiday luggage this summer. But such exchanges aren’t only about largesse – they have a powerful symbolic element, too.</p>
<p>Barnier, for example, was at pains to draw on the power of mountains as a metaphor for the arduous task of undertaking the Brexit negotiations, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/david-davis-michelbarnier-kick-brexit-talks-exchange-hiking/">reportedly saying that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you like walking in the mountains, you have to learn a certain number of rules. You have to be very careful to keep your breath, you have to have stamina because it could be a lengthy path. And you have to keep looking at the summit, the outcome. That’s what I learnt when mountain walking.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This thinly veiled warning of the dangers ahead forms part of a long Western tradition of using mountain symbolism. During the Enlightenment, for example, “the summit position” was seen as emblematic of human self-mastery and sovereignty over nature. </p>
<p>The moral philosopher <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/23/mary-midgley-philosopher-soul-human-consciousness">Mary Midgely</a>, meanwhile, has drawn attention to the fact that the grammar of ascent informs our whole system of values, and that <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=cYZ-YdmteG4C&pg=PA174&lpg=PA174&dq=strong+natural+imagery+that+links+up-down+dimensions+with+difference+of+value+...+light+and+upward+direction+always+tend+to+stand+for+greater+nobility&source=bl&ots=iwF3eJzS4x&sig=5NiqWYqrTGenghePQjQLzjWtFc8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjN15bA09vUAhUFXBQKHSFfDPgQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&q=strong%20natural%20imagery%20that%20links%20up-down%20dimensions%20with%20difference%20of%20value%20...%20light%20and%20upward%20direction%20always%20tend%20to%20stand%20for%20greater%20nobility&f=false">language itself employs</a> “strong natural imagery that links the up-down dimension with difference of value. Earth is ‘lower’ than us, the sky is ‘higher’. The Earth is, of course, also darker, while the sky is the source of light. Light and the upward direction always tend to stand for greater nobility”. </p>
<p>Political and business leaders, when they gather together, also dignify their endeavours with the term <a href="https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/photographs/gorby.html">“summit”</a>, frequently choosing mountain locations such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/21/-sp-davos-guide-world-economic-forum">Davos</a>, in the Swiss Alps, to drive home the message. Mountains, it seems, convey complex and potent messages.</p>
<h2>Into thin air</h2>
<p>Davis’s gift of a French first edition of Herzog’s and Ichac’s book (1951) may well be a symbolic gesture of respect for France’s post-war mountaineering glory. But in the complex language of diplomatic gift-giving another subtext suggests itself. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=219&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=219&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=219&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175645/original/file-20170626-32751-invqq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Annapurna.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?src=iJYKDtm8k9TXEZqdWTsrkQ-1-8">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>French post-war mountaineering endeavour was a form of heroic reconstruction after the humiliations of World War II. Like the creation of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Coal-and-Steel-Community">European Coal and Steel Community</a>, the precursor of the European Union, in May 1950, the ascent of <a href="http://www.himalayamasala.com/himalayan-climbs/annapurna-i-northeast-face-1950">Annapurna</a> by Herzog in June 1950 reestablished France as a global player. </p>
<p>Annapurna, in Nepal, was the first 8,000 metre peak in the world to be climbed, an extraordinary achievement for France, a nation with no real tradition of Himalayan mountaineering. Against a backdrop of emerging post-colonial anxiety and economic uncertainty, a grateful France had raised 14m francs for the expedition through fund-raising and a national subscription campaign. As the historian <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IplubV3tjZEC&pg=PA32&lpg=PA32&dq=Annapurna+was+a+campaign+of+national+honour+david+roberts&source=bl&ots=8j9eC5mBiF&sig=QgrS8P790ukq9N8kWrEGrlezIZ4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiftPaA19vUAhUBVBQKHdndA4cQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=Annapurna%20was%20a%20campaign%20of%20national%20honour%20david%20roberts&f=false">David Roberts noted</a>: “Annapurna was a campaign of national honour.” </p>
<p>Herzog burnished that national honour with his narrative of the expedition, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annapurna_(book)">Annapurna: Premier 8,000 (1951)</a>, dictated from his hospital bed as he recovered from the amputation of his toes and fingers lost to frostbite. A lyrical account of “loyalty, teamwork, courage, and perseverance” for a greater cause, Herzog’s Annapurna expresses a transcendental optimism and unity of purpose that transfixed post-war readers around the world. It remains one of the canonical works of mountaineering literature and the bestselling mountaineering book of all time.</p>
<p>But in the decades that followed, Herzog’s official account of the expedition was called into <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/sports/1996/11/25/annapurna-premier-8000-et-sommet-de-desinformationl-epopee-officielle-racontait-un-maurice-herzog-tr_187550">question by other expedition members</a>. It transpired that Herzog and France’s mountaineering bureaucrats had enforced on all the other expedition members an oath of loyalty to Herzog, forcing them to sign a contract forbidding them from publishing anything about the expedition for five years. The Chamonix guide Gaston Rébuffat, for example, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=RI4xKkS9ngMC&lpg=PT25&dq=david%20roberts%20true%20summit%20depersonalization%20a%20certain%20nazification&pg=PT25#v=onepage&q=david%20roberts%20true%20summit%20depersonalization%20a%20certain%20nazification&f=false">wrote</a> in his journal that this represented “Depersonalisation … a certain Nazification”.</p>
<h2>Murky summits</h2>
<p>It was not a happy expedition. Precious pre-monsoon time was wasted due to inaccurate maps and the absence of previous reconnaissance. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhaulagiri">Dhaulagiri</a> (the seventh highest mountain in the world) was the expedition’s original objective, but had to be abandoned, and the attempt on Annapurna was a last desperate attempt to salvage national honour. Indeed, the summit party of Herzog and Louis Lachenal were lucky to survive the descent from the summit. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=989&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=989&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175646/original/file-20170626-326-176au27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=989&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A gift with a message.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the passage of time, Herzog maintained a tight grip on the representation of the expedition, publishing a heavily edited version of Lachenal’s diary after <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnets_du_vertige">Lachenal’s death in 1956</a>. Only in the 1990s, did France become aware of competing expedition narratives as a steady stream of revelations challenged the almost mythopoeic verities of the official account. </p>
<p>An unexpurgated edition of Lachenal’s notebooks was <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Carnets-du-vertige-Louis-Lachenal/dp/2911755014">published in 1997</a>, closely followed by Yves Ballu’s <a href="https://www.babelio.com/livres/Ballu-Gaston-Rebuffat-Une-vie-pour-la-montagne/99165">biography of Rébuffat in 1999</a> and David Roberts’ <a href="http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/True-Summit/David-Roberts/9781476737874">True Summit: What really happened on Maurice Herzog’s legendary ascent of Annapurna</a> (2000). Some even began to question the veracity of Herzog’s summit account.</p>
<p>Against this historical backdrop, Barnier and Davis’s attempt to use the shared language of mountains as a form of symbolic exchange belies a deeper rift. Davis’s gift suggests that perhaps mountains, like political unions, are boundary objects that can only be approached from widely different perspectives – and that in the long run the attempt to sustain a master narrative is doomed, ultimately, to failure. </p>
<p>Post-war structures and strategies, like mountains, are subject to the gradual erosion of time. Perhaps the lesson of looking towards Annapurna is that all unifying narratives are subject to revision.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80015/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Westaway does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The story of the first ascent of Annapurna offers a remarkable insight into today’s European relations.Jonathan Westaway, Research Fellow in History, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792892017-06-16T08:59:51Z2017-06-16T08:59:51ZIt’s in the EU’s interest to press ahead with Brexit negotiations<p>The extraordinary outcome of the UK general election and the uncertain domestic political climate has led to calls by Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/12/nicola-sturgeon-calls-for-may-to-pause-brexit-negotiations">“short pause” in the Brexit process</a>. Despite this, Brexit negotiations are now <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-talks-to-start-monday-eu-sources/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=1dd6e9ffd6-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_15&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-1dd6e9ffd6-189987201">scheduled</a> to begin on June 19. </p>
<p>There are no advantages for the EU in delaying or pausing Brexit negotiations. It is ready and waiting to negotiate an orderly British withdrawal – and keen to press ahead to limit the uncertainty caused by Brexit. </p>
<p>Delaying the negotiation process would only prolong uncertainty about the direction of Brexit. Meanwhile, the EU is eager to address other challenges such as the refugee crisis or an increasingly unpredictable international environment. A pause would also increase legal uncertainty: there is no agreement on whether <a href="https://theconversation.com/once-the-uk-triggers-article-50-to-start-brexit-can-it-turn-back-61727">it is legally possible to stop the Article 50 process</a>, so the Court of Justice of the EU <a href="https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/29/stijn-smismans-about-the-revocability-of-withdrawal-why-the-eu-law-interpretation-of-article-50-matters/">might have to intervene</a>.</p>
<p>The UK’s negotiating position <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper">outlined before the election</a> appears under pressure as the prime minister, Theresa May, no longer has a parliamentary majority to sustain it. The outcome of the election has increased the influence of those within the Conservative Party, such as leader of the Conservatives in Scotland, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40249433">Ruth Davidson</a>, who favour membership of the single market, continuation of free movement and building cross-party consensus over the direction of Brexit.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-the-dup-will-want-in-return-for-rescuing-a-conservative-government-79222">expected</a> controversial “supply and confidence” agreement with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has knocked May’s “no deal is better than a bad deal” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/17/prime-minister-vows-to-put-final-brexit-deal-before-parliament">mantra</a> on the head. A solution to the Irish border issue – which requires a deal – has moved top of the agenda. </p>
<p>But until the UK government sits at the table and outlines its negotiating position, the EU is hostage to the partisan interests of the Conservative government. As Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator put it, talks should start when the “UK is ready”, but <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c9ee16d2-4f8a-11e7-bfb8-997009366969?mhq5j=e3">that</a>: “I can’t negotiate with myself”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"873090975999983617"}"></div></p>
<p>After meeting British negotiators Olly Robbins and Tim Barrow on June 12, <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/06/12/michel-barnier-je-ne-vois-pas-l-utilite-ni-l-interet-d-un-report-des-discussions-sur-le-brexit_5143347_3214.html">Barnier told journalists</a> he needs a British delegation that “is stable, accountable and that has a mandate”.</p>
<h2>Momentum with the EU</h2>
<p>Once the UK triggered Article 50 in March, beginning a two-year countdown to leaving the bloc, the balance of power tilted in favour of the EU, putting pressure on the UK. </p>
<p>Despite the legal disagreement on whether Article 50 can be withdrawn once triggered, Article 50 and the Council’s negotiating guidelines do afford the EU flexibility tools to adapt to changes during the process. These include the possibility to extend the formal two-year negotiation period and to agree <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/four-principles-for-the-uks-brexit-trade-negotiations/">transitional arrangements</a>. </p>
<p>The calculated deployment of these tools could help the EU limit future uncertainty. But it is not currently in the EU’s interest to either use this ability to extend the talks – or to press pause. Doing so would give the momentum back to the UK, and allow it to switch on and off the Article 50 process at will – <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-article-50-lord-kerr-john-kerr/">which goes against the spirit of the article itself</a>. </p>
<p>The pressure of the two-year time frame on the British government is evident in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/11/eu-threatens-year-long-delay-in-brexit-talks-over-uks-negotiating-stance">reports</a> of an EU threat to delay Brexit negotiations for a year if the UK insists on negotiating the terms of a new trade deal at the same time as its divorce proceedings from the bloc. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/negotiating-directives-article-50-negotiations_en">Barnier’s mandate</a> is to negotiate the UK’s withdrawal from the EU – not a future trade agreement. If the UK insists on negotiating an exit and a trade agreement in parallel, Barnier would need a new mandate from the European Council – and agreeing this might take a year. All the while, the Brexit clock continues ticking, and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/df0c9a20-4f76-11e7-bfb8-997009366969">the time frame to negotiate a deal shortens.</a></p>
<p>Politically, the EU is in a strong position. The 27 EU member states have presented a solid, unified voice over Brexit. The eurosceptic threat has weakened after pro-European Emmanuel Macron’s electoral success in France and Angela Merkel’s <a href="https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/874658812061523969">expected</a> re-election in September. The Eurozone’s economic performance <a href="http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-forecast-summary-euro-area-oecd-economic-outlook-june-2017.pdf">has also recently improved</a>. So it is to the EU’s advantage to harness this political capital and press on with the Brexit negotiations while it is in a strong position, rather than accommodating the needs of a weakened British government.</p>
<p>Under the current time frame, the deadline to reach a divorce deal is the end of March 2019. If there were to be a delay, European Parliament elections, scheduled for May or June 2019, could potentially limit the length of any extension to just over two months so that the Brexit process would not overlap with the campaign and vote. </p>
<p>If a delay did mean negotiations overlapped or went beyond the 2019 elections, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=baCdEAJRrek&list=PL40D9235B3A23C882&index=3">these are typically fought on national issues</a> and the status of Brexit negotiations may well have some impact on voters’ choices. Of course, British MEPs standing in the election would be contesting an election to serve a shorter term. </p>
<p>There is no need for the EU to delay or press pause before the Brexit negotiations start. The EU has tools at its disposal to adapt to a changing environment now that the Article 50 process has been set in motion. In the meantime, the Brexit clock is ticking and the pressure to get talking is felt more strongly in London than in Brussels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nieves Perez-Solorzano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The balance of power in Brexit talks is firmly with the EU.Nieves Perez-Solorzano, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655762016-09-29T12:26:54Z2016-09-29T12:26:54ZFour men who will shape the way the EU negotiates Brexit<p>Although the UK has yet to announce when it will trigger the all-important <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">Article 50</a>, which will start the process of it leaving the European Union, diplomats on the continent are getting ready for kick-off. Here we profile four people – two Germans, a Frenchman and a Belgian – who are likely to play a part in shaping the way Brexit negotiations will play out. </p>
<h2>Michel Barnier</h2>
<p><strong>Chief Negotiator for the European Commission on Article 50</strong> </p>
<p>The <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2652_en.htm">nomination of Michel Barnier</a> in July to head European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s task force on Brexit negotiations raised eyebrows and a few hackles in Britain. The right-wing press depicted the Brussels insider as an “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/27/who-is-michelbarnier-the-frenchman-in-charge-of-the-eus-brexit-n/">arch federalist</a>”. He has been an EU commissioner twice, most recently in charge of the single market from 2010 to 2014, and is known in the UK as the architect of banking union. </p>
<p>But Barnier has been at pains in his recent writing to distinguish himself from both what he sees as a British-style narrow agenda for the EU and a federalist expansive view of it. Instead, he has sought to promote a strong European economy and industry in a world of regional economic blocs: as he put it in his 2014 <a href="http://www.gallimard.fr/Catalogue/GALLIMARD/Hors-serie-Connaissance/Se-reposer-ou-etre-libre">book</a>, “less regulation and more policy”. Commentators agree that his task force, which will start work on October 1, shows that Juncker’s commission <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/barnier-battler-of-british-bankers-is-commissions-new-brexit-boss/">means business</a>. </p>
<p>Two things are of note here: first, Barnier’s team shows a strong Franco-German political leadership, with the appointment of current trade commissioner <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/14/german-trade-expert-appointed-to-eus-brexit-taskforce">Sabine Weyand</a> as his deputy, and experienced commission official, Stéphanie Riso <a href="https://twitter.com/MichelBarnier/status/775999000344485888">as his chief advisor</a>. Second, all concerned have strong links with the single market, intra-EU trade and external trade negotiations. The level of specialist knowledge, experience and networks they have to hand will be difficult to match on the British side.</p>
<p>Barnier also has strong links with the French political establishment, maintained over a long career in politics (he was the youngest MP in parliament at the age of 27 in 1978). This means that he will have a close working relationship with any of the likely presidential candidates of France’s right-wing party Les Republicans who <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-conservatives-idUSKCN11Y2FC">currently look best-placed</a> to beat the Front National in next year’s executive elections. </p>
<p>At the moment, France’s relationship with the UK is mired in acrimony over the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/27/who-is-michelbarnier-the-frenchman-in-charge-of-the-eus-brexit-n/">Calais migrant crisis</a> which will intensify as the elections loom, creating another headache for Brexit negotiators. Any incoming French president is likely to push for a tough line on allowing Britain to retain access to the single market. </p>
<p><em>by Susan Milner, Reader in European Politics, University of Bath</em> </p>
<h2>Martin Selmayr</h2>
<p><strong>Head of Cabinet for Jean-Claude Juncker</strong></p>
<p>EU president Jean-Claude Juncker’s right-hand man, Martin Selmayr, is well-placed to set the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-negotiators-david-davis-didier-seeuws-cecilia-malmstroem-martin-schulz-eu-a7149806.html">parameters</a> of the Brexit negotiations. A professor of European law, Selmayr was appointed Juncker’s head of cabinet in 2014. There his responsibilities include overall management of the cabinet and legal and communications strategy. Fiercely competent, ruthless and abrasive, Selmayr is a staunch European federalist who believes that the UK has long obstructed European integration and that Brexit will promote European unity. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139624/original/image-20160928-27058-sicb12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Martin Selmayr: uncompromising.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/Martin_Selmayr_2014-11-28.jpg">Saeima via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Selmayr is best known in Britain for his comment that the prospect of Boris Johnson as UK prime minister would be a “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/26/boris-johnson-british-people-unreal-stories-eu-juncker">horror scenario</a>”. Selmayr enjoys links to the German media and to Angela Merkel’s chief of staff <a href="https://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/EN/FederalGovernment/Cabinet/PeterAltmaier/_node.html">Peter Altmaier</a>, but some believe he may be taking too much of a <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/insane-aide-to-ailing-juncker-dictates-brexit-l5wrrcx2q">political risk</a> in confounding Germany’s leadership role in EU internal matters. Certainly, Germany has been <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-germany-insight-idUKKCN1012AN">keen to avoid</a> the Commission dominating the Brexit process for fear that hardliners Juncker and Selmayr would adopt a confrontational and uncompromising stance against the UK. </p>
<p>EU member-state governments were quick to <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-power-struggle-over-brexit-negotiations/">block</a> an attempt by Selmayr to appoint himself as the coordinator of Brexit negotiations for the European Council – a job that council president Donald Tusk <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/26/belgian-diplomat-to-head-eus-brexit-taskforce">gave to the Belgian Didier Seeuws</a>. But Selmayr remains in an ideal position to shape the commission task-force once the exit clause is triggered by the UK.</p>
<p><em>by Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of Westminster</em></p>
<h2>Guy Verhofstadt</h2>
<p><strong>European Parliament’s chief Brexit negotiator</strong></p>
<p>A spearhead of the federalist movement within the European Parliament, Belgian’s former prime minister Guy Verhofstadt enjoys great popularity both in Belgium and the EU and substantial experience in negotiating both at the national and EU levels. But his appointment as the parliament’s chief negotiator on Brexit, sparked criticism from UK eurosceptics, with the former UKIP leader Nigel Farage <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/14/nigel-farage-says-eus-top-brexit-negotiator-guy-verhofstadt-is-a/">branding him a “fanatic”</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139628/original/image-20160928-27051-x56jai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former Belgian PM, Guy Verhofstadt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/aldegroup/10082707345/sizes/l">ALDEGroup/flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>At the age of just 29 he became president of the Flemish liberal party of Belgium and quickly became a major political player. As prime minister between 1999 and 2008 he was already looking towards Europe – and in 2006 wrote a book called the <a href="https://euobserver.com/institutional/20465">United States of Europe</a>. But in 2004, the then UK prime minister Tony Blair <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/2812292">refused to back him</a> as a candidate to succeed Romano Prodi as European Commission President, despite the fact that he had had early support from French president Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder.</p>
<p>Five years later, he entered the European Parliament as an MEP, where he’s been holding the chairmanship of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group ever since. He has built up a reputation as a fierce partisan of a federal Europe. Popular among his peers, he co-founded the <a href="http://www.spinelligroup.eu/about-us">Spinelli Group</a> in 2010 – a network of organisations working for greater federalism in Europe – and in 2014 was the <a href="https://www.aldeparty.eu/en/guy-verhofstadt-nominee-alde-party-candidate-european-commission-presidency">ALDE party nominee</a> for the European Commission presidency. </p>
<p>In the UK, Verhofstadt is known for his arguments within the European Parliament with eurosceptics and nationalists over the future of Europe. Since his appointment, he has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/734494b2-849e-11e6-a29c-6e7d9515ad15?ftcamp=crm/email//nbe/WorldNews/product">frank</a> about his negotiating position, in particular, insisting the parliament would refuse a deal which would allow the UK to enjoy access to the single market while opting out of the free movement of people. </p>
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<p>No doubt that over the forthcoming discussions, Verhofstadt will be a tough and experienced negotiator. </p>
<p><em>by Clément Jadot, PhD candidate, Université Libre de Bruxelles</em></p>
<h2>Michael Roth</h2>
<p><strong>Germany’s de facto Brexit negotiator</strong></p>
<p>As soon as the EU referendum result became known, it was clear that Germany would play a key role in the Brexit negotiations. In Germany, an issue exists only when it has legal status. This means that there will be no formal designation of a Brexit negotiating team until the UK triggers <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html">Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty</a>, formally launching the exit process. In the meantime, Germany’s de facto spokesperson on Brexit is <a href="http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Leitung/StMRoth_node.html">Michael Roth</a>. </p>
<p>A committed protestant and member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Roth has been an MP since 1998. He was made European affairs minister in 2013, aged 43. As a secretary of state or junior minister, to the public Roth is little known outside his home region of Hessen, but is recognised in political circles as one of the <a href="https://beta.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article123448742/Dies-sind-Merkels-einflussreichste-Neben-Minister.html?wtrid=crossdevice.welt.desktop.vwo.article-spliturl&betaredirect=true">most influential</a> upcoming politicians in chancellor Angela Merkel’s cabinet. </p>
<p>Young, dynamic and confident, Roth claims to be “<a href="http://www.fr-online.de/rhein-main/spd-in-hessen--michael-roth-wird-staatsminister-fuer-europa,1472796,25636918.html">heart and guts</a>” for Europe. On Brexit, Roth is a moderate, conceding that the EU will need to work out a “<a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-germany-idUKKCN10R1AK">special status</a>” for the UK after Brexit on account of the country’s size, its economic weight and the length of its membership of the EU. At the same time, though, he has stressed that a close relationship would not allow UK “cherry picking” and there would be no access to the EU free market without the free movement of people. He insists that the UK needs to be ready to negotiate at the start of 2017.</p>
<p><em>by Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of Westminster</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two Germans, a Frenchman and a Belgian: who to watch as negotiations with the UK begin.Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of WestminsterClément Jadot, PhD candidate, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Susan Milner, Reader in European Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.