tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/missiles-5794/articles
Missiles – The Conversation
2024-03-14T15:25:28Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/225451
2024-03-14T15:25:28Z
2024-03-14T15:25:28Z
Both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war are using new and old technologies for warfare
<p>When it comes to technology, the war in Ukraine is a war of juxtapositions. On the one hand, this is the first major war in which a variety of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/unmanned-aerial-vehicle">unmanned aerial vehicles</a> (UAVs) — or drones — have played such a prominent role. On the other hand, this new technology has played a major part in forcing infantry to dig lines of trenches reminiscent of the First and Second World Wars.</p>
<p>Some of the technology in the war in Ukraine, <a href="https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2023/10/russias-war-in-ukraine-ballistic-and-cruise-trajectories/">such as the guided missiles being used by both sides</a>, isn’t fundamentally all that new. Modern guided missiles trace their origin back to early developments during the <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/hitlers-precision-guided-bombs-fritz-x-hs-293">latter part of the Second World War</a>. </p>
<p>Modern precision-guided weapons may be increasingly accurate in hitting their targets, but there is <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2022/03/04/americas-last-drone-strike-in-afghanistan-and-the-necropolitical-language-of-drone-warfare/">all too often considerable human error in allocating targets for them</a>.</p>
<p>What is new in the war in Ukraine is that it isn’t like many of the “<a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/what-is-a-small-war">small wars</a>” of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, in which one side had an almost overwhelming technological advantage. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Taliban">Taliban in Afghanistan</a> didn’t have access to satellite imaging, large drones and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11353">precision-guided munitions</a>, or even weapons to counter these, so they had to fight an <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/asymmetrical-warfare">“unconventional” or “asymmetrical” war</a>. </p>
<p>In the war in Ukraine, both sides have access to and are developing new and not-so-new technologies, with neither side having an overall technological edge.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a plane-shaped drone flies over forested hills" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581757/original/file-20240313-30-r82ze1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian Shahed kamikaze drone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Drones and warfare</h2>
<p>Large drones have been in use in war for a number of years now. The United States in particular made heavy use of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/15/mq-9-reaper-what-is-the-us-drone-that-collided-with-a-russian-jet-and-how-is-it-used">large drones such as the Reaper</a> in Afghanistan, both for reconnaissance and targeted killings. Russia made use of large drones for <a href="http://cast.ru/eng/products/articles/russian-uavs-in-syria.html">reconnaissance in Syria</a> when its forces were supporting the Assad government there.</p>
<p>What is different in the war in Ukraine is the sheer number and range of drones being used. Large drones are still being used — including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/02/deadly-cheap-and-widespread-how-iran-supplied-drones-are-changing-the-nature-of-warfare">Iranian-developed “suicide” or “kamikaze” drones like the Shahed</a> being used by Russia — that can strike targets deep inside enemy territory. However, smaller drones are being used by both sides — often nearer to the frontline — for reconnaissance, artillery spotting and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-62225830">as kamikaze drones</a>.</p>
<p>At the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian side had an advantage in drone warfare — that advantage <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/some-ukraine-drone-pilots-fear-early-advantage-over-russia-now-lost-2023-11-09/">has now arguably passed to Russia</a>. Russia has been able to produce and import huge numbers of drones and develop some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-fighting-cat-mouse-battles-behind-russian-front-lines-ukraine-2023-11-01/">effective local countermeasures against Ukrainian drones</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraines-drones-sinking-russian-warships-1876608">Ukrainian naval drones</a> have, however, been a particular problem for the Russian navy. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2jeCwHViFGw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Footage appearing to show the sinking of the Russian warship Sergei Kotov.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent sinking of the large patrol ship Sergei Kotov with naval drones is a case in point. Modern warships are <a href="https://defencyclopedia.com/2016/05/02/analysis-importance-of-naval-guns-on-a-modern-warship/">not bristling with the sort of anti-aircraft guns</a> that their Second World War counterparts had to stop <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2020/october/countering-kamikaze">kamikaze pilots</a> for example. </p>
<p>But quite possibly they will soon be bristling again, because such guns are ideal for dealing with drones at close range. Even the <a href="http://www.gwpda.org/naval/nets.htm">humble torpedo net</a> from the late 19th century may make a return to try to stop drones reaching ships at anchor.</p>
<h2>Missile technology</h2>
<p>While in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. and other western powers made heavy use of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/missile">guided missiles</a>. What is different in Ukraine is that both sides have access to them. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.militarytoday.com/missiles/iskander.htm">Russian Iskander</a> and <a href="https://www.militarytoday.com/missiles/storm_shadow.htm">Anglo-French Storm Shadow missiles</a> have proven highly effective at striking targets deep in the enemy rear. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/03/09/a-russian-drone-spotted-a-ukrainian-patriot-air-defense-crew-convoying-near-the-front-line-soon-a-russian-hypersonic-missile-streaked-down/">Often targets for such missiles have been located using drones</a>.</p>
<p>Many tanks are being destroyed not only by or with the help of drones, but with anti-tank missiles such as the <a href="https://www.militarytoday.com/missiles/kornet.htm">Russian Kornet</a>, or much vaunted <a href="https://www.militarytoday.com/missiles/javelin.htm">U.S.-supplied Javelin</a> on the Ukrainian side. </p>
<p>Anti-tank missiles are not new — the Egyptian armed forces for example made good use of recently developed <a href="https://www.militarytoday.com/missiles/malyutka.htm">Soviet anti-tank missiles</a> during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War">Yom Kippur War</a> in 1973.</p>
<p>The anti-tank missiles being used in Ukraine today are however much more sophisticated. Back in 1973, anti-tank missiles often had to be connected to the operator through a <a href="https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Wire-guided_missile">fine wire that was reeled out by the missile as it flew</a>! Today’s missiles typically have more sophisticated and reliable targeting.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="black and white photograph of a man in military uniform crouching beside a missile." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581675/original/file-20240313-24-3e8rfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli Defense Forces soldier with an anti-tank guided missile, captured from Egyptian forces during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nli.org.il/en/images/NNL_ARCHIVE_AL990040053080205171/NLI#$FL45740532">(Dan Hadani Collection, The Pritzker Family National Photography Collection, The National Library of Israel)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New and old technologies</h2>
<p>A lot of drone use is for reconnaissance to help both sides carry out much lower technology tasks, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-are-transforming-the-battlefield-in-ukraine-but-in-an-evolutionary-fashion/">such as targeting conventional artillery</a> or guiding infantry.</p>
<p>While new technology has transformed the fighting in Ukraine, there are still many elements that would be easily understood by soldiers in the First World War. </p>
<p>Firstly, regardless of all the technology, ultimately the “<a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100336987">poor bloody infantry</a>” has to move in and occupy territory — and fight for it at close quarters. Soldiers still often have to kill other soldiers while in close proximity to each other.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="black and white photograph of a balloon." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=737&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=737&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=737&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581756/original/file-20240313-20-h207ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A British observation balloon from 1908.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Imperial War Museum)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Typically, the technology of today may be new, but the function isn’t. We could, for example, see drones playing a role like the <a href="https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-articles/roasting-a-sausage-balloons-their-crews-and-those-who-shot-them-down/">observation balloons of the First World War</a>. These were used in particular for directing artillery fire. </p>
<p>Balloons stopped being used in war because of the development of weapons that could easily shoot them down, from aircraft to high-powered anti-aircraft guns.</p>
<p>When a new technology comes along, the race begins to counter it. The Russian armed forces have already had some success in <a href="https://ca.yahoo.com/news/jamming-electronic-warfare-reshaping-ukraine-173948128.html">jamming the link between drone operators and their drones</a>. </p>
<p>In the constant technological battle, what is next? <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/us/politics/ai-drones-war-law.html">Autonomous drones using AI</a> are in many ways a nightmare idea, but they are being worked on. Autonomous anti-drone drones would no doubt follow. </p>
<p>One thing is certain — <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2023/10/18/the-challenges-of-counter-drone-technology-as-seen-in-recent-conflicts/?sh=286b45ee7013">new technologies will be developed, to be followed by countermeasures</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/oct/15/dangerous-rise-of-military-ai-drone-swarm-autonomous-weapons">New hi-tech ways</a> of killing or facilitating it will continue to serve alongside the old methods.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225451/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Russia-Ukraine war highlights developments in modern warfare, which uses new weaponry alongside traditional methods of fighting.
Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/215512
2023-10-13T12:32:58Z
2023-10-13T12:32:58Z
Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system works well – here’s how Hamas got around it
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553348/original/file-20231011-19-nefrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C4%2C3000%2C1989&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israel's Iron Dome air defense system launches interceptor missiles to shoot down incoming missiles and rockets.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-iron-dome-air-defense-system-fires-to-intercept-a-news-photo/451830880">Ilia Yefimovich/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Because of its unique national security challenges, Israel has a long history of developing highly effective, state-of-the-art defense technologies and capabilities. A prime example of Israeli military strength is the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/08/02/us-army-completes-second-iron-dome-interceptor-test/">Iron Dome air defense system</a>, which has been widely touted as the world’s <a href="https://nation.time.com/2012/11/19/iron-dome-a-missile-shield-that-works/">best defense against missiles and rockets</a>.</p>
<p>However, on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel was caught off guard by a very large-scale missile attack by the Gaza-based Palestinian militant group Hamas. The group fired <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006">several thousand missiles</a> at a number of targets across Israel, according to reports. While exact details are not available, it is clear that a significant number of the Hamas missiles penetrated the Israeli defenses, inflicting extensive damage and casualties.</p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&hl=en">aerospace engineer</a> who studies space and defense systems. There is a simple reason the Israeli defense strategy was not fully effective against the Hamas attack. To understand why, you first need to understand the basics of air defense systems.</p>
<h2>Air defense: detect, decide, disable</h2>
<p>An air defense system consists of three key components. First, there are radars to detect, identify and track incoming missiles. The range of these radars varies. Iron Dome’s radar is <a href="https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-missile-defense/irondome">effective over distances of 2.5 to 43.5 miles (4 to 70 km)</a>, according to its manufacturer Raytheon. Once an object has been detected by the radar, it must be assessed to determine whether it is a threat. Information such as direction and speed are used to make this determination. </p>
<p>If an object is confirmed as a threat, Iron Dome operators continue to track the object by radar. Missile speeds vary considerably, but assuming a representative speed of 3,280 feet per second (1 km/s), the defense system has at most one minute to respond to an attack.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a diagram showing the trajectory of a missile along with a radar system tracking the missile and a defensive missile intercepting the attacking missile" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The fundamental elements of a missile defense system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328689008_Analysis_of_the_Optimal_Frequency_Band_for_a_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_Radar_System/download">Nguyen, Dang-An et al.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second major element of an air defense system is the battle control center. This component determines the appropriate way to engage a confirmed threat. It uses the continually updating radar information to determine the optimal response in terms of from where to fire interceptor missiles and how many to launch against an incoming missile.</p>
<p>The third major component is the interceptor missile itself. For Iron Dome, it is a supersonic missile with heat-seeking sensors. These sensors provide in-flight updates to the interceptor, allowing it to steer toward and close in on the threat. The interceptor uses a proximity fuse activated by a small radar to explode close to the incoming missile so that it does not have to hit it directly to disable it.</p>
<h2>Limits of missile defenses like the Iron Dome</h2>
<p>Israel has at least <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/09/world/iron-dome-israel-defense-explained-intl-dg/index.html">10 Iron Dome batteries in operation</a>, each containing 60 to 80 interceptor missiles. Each of those missiles costs about US$60,000. In previous attacks involving smaller numbers of missiles and rockets, Iron Dome was 90% effective against a range of threats.</p>
<p>So, why was the system less effective against the recent Hamas attacks?</p>
<p>It is a simple question of numbers. Hamas fired several thousand missiles, and Israel had less than a thousand interceptors in the field ready to counter them. Even if Iron Dome was 100% effective against the incoming threats, the very large number of the Hamas missiles meant some were going to get through. </p>
<p>The Hamas attacks illustrate very clearly that even the best air defense systems can be overwhelmed if they are overmatched by the number of threats they have to counter.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/gTKb7Ffcv2I?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How Iron Dome works.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Israeli missile defense has been built up over many years, with high levels of financial investment. How could Hamas afford to overwhelm it? Again, it all comes down to numbers. The missiles fired by Hamas cost about $600 each, and so they are about 100 times less expensive than the Iron Dome interceptors. The total cost to Israel of firing all of its interceptors is around $48 million. If Hamas fired 5,000 missiles, the cost would be only $3 million. </p>
<p>Thus, in a carefully planned and executed strategy, Hamas accumulated over time a large number of relatively inexpensive missiles that it knew would overwhelm the Iron Dome defensive capabilities. Unfortunately for Israel, the Hamas attack represents a very clear example of military asymmetry: a low-cost, less-capable approach was able to defeat a more expensive, high-technology system.</p>
<h2>Future air defense systems, including high-energy lasers</h2>
<p>The Hamas attack will have repercussions for all of the world’s major military powers. It clearly illustrates the need for air defense systems that are much more effective in two important ways. First, there is the need for a much deeper arsenal of defensive weapons that can address very large numbers of missile threats. Second, the cost per defensive weapon needs to be reduced significantly. </p>
<p>This episode is likely to accelerate the development and deployment of <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11882">directed energy air defense systems</a> based on high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves. These devices are sometimes described as having an “<a href="https://www.militaryaerospace.com/home/article/14280611/highenergy-laser-weapons-ready-for-the-front-lines">infinite magazine</a>,” because they have a relatively low cost per shot fired and can keep firing as long as they are supplied with electrical power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense and Lockheed-Martin Corporation. </span></em></p>
If Israel’s Iron Dome is the best air defense system in the world, how did so many Hamas missiles get through? An aerospace engineer explains it’s a game of numbers.
Iain Boyd, Director, Center for National Security Initiatives, and Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/215241
2023-10-09T00:35:35Z
2023-10-09T00:35:35Z
The unprecedented attack against Israel by Hamas included precise armed drones and thousands of rockets
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<p>Last Friday, Israeli newspapers were filled with stories about the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, also called the October War. In 1973, the country had nearly been defeated by co-ordinated surprise attacks from its Arab neighbors. Never again, people thought.</p>
<p>So, Israelis were especially shocked to be awakened Saturday morning by rocket barrages and gunfire in the streets. Hamas militants from Gaza had launched a smaller but equally <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-765254">co-ordinated surprise attack</a>. It came by land, air <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/navy-says-it-killed-dozens-of-terrorists-attempting-to-infiltrate-from-sea/">and sea</a>.</p>
<p>The fighting <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/what-happened-in-israel-a-breakdown-of-how-the-hamas-attack-unfolded">began around 6:30 that morning</a>, when Hamas started firing rockets. But unlike many previous conflicts, this time it also attacked on the ground.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-enhanced-rocket-technology-challenges-israels-defences-160853">Gaza's enhanced rocket technology challenges Israel's defences</a>
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<h2>Gunfights and airstrikes</h2>
<p>While the rocketry was still underway, Hamas blasted numerous holes in the security fences between Israel and Gaza. That let hundreds of armed militants pour across the border and quickly spread out across southern Israel.</p>
<p>These forces were small by military standards, but quickly overwhelmed the local border guards and police forces. The militants overran an army base, captured a police station and attacked several dozen communities.</p>
<p>The results were bloody. By Sunday, Israel had reported more than <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/death-toll-from-hamas-onslaught-passes-600-over-100-kidnapped-as-israel-strikes-gaza/">700 deaths and 2,200 injuries</a>, mostly civilians. Another 100 people were taken back to Gaza as hostages. Some of the victims were reportedly citizens of other countries, including Germany, Thailand, <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/global-affairs-says-it-is-aware-of-reports-of-canadian-killed-amid-attack-on-israel-1.6594141">Canada</a> and the United States.</p>
<p>Israel’s army seemed largely absent from these initial fights. But its air force started bombing Gaza within hours, in Operation “Swords of Iron.” A day after the conflict started, the Palestinians reported <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/10/8/intense-battles-as-israel-declares-state-of-war">370 deaths and thousands of injuries</a> from the airstrikes.</p>
<p>The bloody ground attacks shocked Israel. But there were also surprises overhead.</p>
<h2>Massed rockets</h2>
<p>Militants in Gaza have been firing rockets toward Israel every year since 2005. I’ve <a href="https://brocku.ca/goodman/faculty-research/faculty-directory/michael-armstrong/">researched rocket defences and missile combat</a> for years, but the intensity of the Hamas attack this time was astounding. Israel counted more than 2,200 incoming rockets on Saturday morning alone; the total exceeded 2,500 by the day’s end.</p>
<p>That’s nearly quadruple the previous single-day record of 670 rockets. That was the number fired during the most intense day of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-enhanced-rocket-technology-challenges-israels-defences-160853">2021’s Guardian of the Walls</a> operation.</p>
<p>The barrage wasn’t restricted to border areas. It reached across southern and central Israel, including the suburbs of Tel Aviv. A hospital and several other buildings were hit. And about a dozen people died, including <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/always-the-first-to-defend-the-israelis-slain-in-hamass-surprise-onslaught/">several at a Bedouin village</a> that had no defences.</p>
<p>The toll was relatively low partly because the rockets are inaccurate: most land in empty fields. And <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-missiles-fly-a-look-at-israels-iron-dome-interceptor-94959">Iron Dome interceptor systems</a> typically shoot down most of the rest. Failing that, many homes and communities have <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-rocket-experience-shows-bomb-shelters-matter-as-much-as-interceptors-96402">bomb shelters</a> where civilians can take cover.</p>
<p>Because the Iron Dome systems are so effective, they would be valuable for Hamas to destroy. But <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1309">rockets are too inaccurate</a> to hit such small targets.</p>
<p>However, if the militants roaming southern Israel on Saturday had found a system deployed there, they could easily have destroyed it. For example, there is often a system stationed near Sderot, one of the towns that was attacked.</p>
<p>There is another way to destroy small, high value targets: attack them with drones.</p>
<h2>Drones in Israel and Ukraine</h2>
<p>This seems to be the first conflict where Hamas has successfully used armed drones. Some are quadcopters that operators fly via remote control. They can precisely drop explosives onto small targets — like an Iron Dome system. Videos online show them attacking people, a watchtower and <a href="https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1710725094723469428">a tank</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine has effectively used similar quadcopters against Russian military targets. They sometimes drop explosives right down an armoured vehicle’s open hatch.</p>
<p>Other Gazan drones resemble toy airplanes. They can fly considerable distances and then explode wherever they land.</p>
<p>Those drones are much like the ones Russia uses to attack Ukrainian cities. And both the Gazan and Russian drones resemble those made by Iran. That might not be co-incidental. <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-flexes-its-missile-muscle-with-terrible-consequences-129669">Iran</a> is known to have supported Gaza militants in the past. And it has admitted selling some drones to Russia.</p>
<p>There’s another interesting connection between the Ukrainian and Israeli conflicts. Israel has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but no weapons. Most notably, it has refused <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-small-missiles-are-challenging-a-big-invader-178718">Ukraine’s repeated requests for an Iron Dome system</a>.</p>
<p>Hamas also sent several dozen militants across the border <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-765254">on powered hang-gliders</a>. Their lightweight construction apparently let them avoid radar detection.</p>
<h2>Widening conflict?</h2>
<p>On Sunday, the Israeli army gradually regained control of most of its territory, while the air force kept bombing Gaza. Meanwhile, the rocket fire from Gaza slowed to a trickle.</p>
<p>However, a different rocket threat also appeared. Hezbollah militants in Lebanon <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-fires-mortars-at-israel-idf-strike-hits-tent-on-lebanon-border-in-response/">fired several missiles or shells at an Israeli military post</a> in the Golan Heights, on Israel’s northern border. It seemed to be a warning: if Israel retaliated against Gaza, Hezbollah might fire thousands of rockets and missiles into northern Israel.</p>
<p>But the Israeli government, not surprisingly, seems intent on retaliation. It officially declared war and called up its military reserves. A massive invasion of Gaza seems imminent.</p>
<p>So, while civilians in both Israel and Gaza are already mourning the deaths of hundreds, there is likely more bloodshed to come.</p>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The bloody ground attacks by Hamas in Israel caused the biggest shock. But the unprecedented scale of rocketry and successful use of armed drones contributed to the surprise.
Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/208466
2023-08-18T03:23:21Z
2023-08-18T03:23:21Z
The US navy is still more powerful than China’s: more so than the Australian government is letting on
<p>The federal Labor government today used the ALP national conference to address <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2023/aug/18/alp-national-conference-2023-day-2-aukus-unions-australian-labor-party-anthony-albanese-brisbane-politics-live">internal dissent</a> over the controversial AUKUS security pact and its plan for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.</p>
<p>Taxpayers have been asked to fund these subs at an extreme cost, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/14/aukus-nuclear-submarines-australia-commits-substantial-funds-into-expanding-us-shipbuilding-capacity">up to A$368 billion</a>, and with many risks in the procurement cycle. This decision, and the price tag, can only be justified by the consideration that Australia would likely join the US in a war against China to protect Taiwan.</p>
<p>But the government hasn’t specifically acknowledged that. Its public rationale for going ahead with the subs is to counter China’s growing military influence in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the maritime domain.</p>
<p>“China’s military buildup is now the largest and most ambitious we have seen by any country since the end of the second world war,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/jun/11/australian-defence-minister-warns-china-risks-sparking-arms-race">according</a> to Defence Minister Richard Marles.</p>
<p>But how great is China’s naval capability?</p>
<p>The truth is the US navy, alongside its allied navies, especially Japan, remains much more powerful compared with China’s navy – and that’s likely to continue. </p>
<p>The Australian government isn’t being fully open about the cost-benefit analysis. It hasn’t publicly laid out its case for why its pursuit of such extremely expensive subs in relatively small numbers would help redress negative implications of the Chinese military buildup for Australian security.</p>
<p>What’s more, the AUKUS arrangements add little to the security commitment the US and Australia already have. We already have the closest possible alliance with the US, and even the government has said to our Asian neighbours that AUKUS doesn’t upgrade the security guarantees of the US to Australia.</p>
<p>So how do we assess the naval balance of power between China and the US, and do the AUKUS submarines arriving in the 2030s figure in those assessments?</p>
<h2>Comparing their navies: the old way</h2>
<p>A traditional way of assessing the balance of naval power is to count and compare the number of warships operated by each country. Even on that metric, the US isn’t outgunned by China, based on recent data.</p>
<p>China is frequently described as the world’s largest navy. But the US has <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/267">more of the most important types of major warships</a>, which are suitable for maritime warfare. The count only shifts in China’s favour for lighter and less heavily armed ships, such as frigates and coastal patrol vessels.</p>
<p>China’s advantage in lighter classes of warships could be particularly important in a conflict contained largely within the Taiwan Strait and other coastal areas near China.</p>
<p>On the other hand, even though the US doesn’t normally deploy all its naval force to the Western Pacific, it could deliver overwhelming naval power in the region in most circumstances if war was imminent.</p>
<h2>The ‘missile age’</h2>
<p>In today’s world, the ability of a country to carry out missile strikes is a far more important consideration than simply the number of warships. </p>
<p>The US can readily compensate for China’s numerical advantage in light warship numbers with “stand-off” missiles, which can be launched from long distances (more than 1,500km).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-much-anticipated-defence-review-is-here-so-what-does-it-say-and-what-does-it-mean-for-australia-204267">The much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?</a>
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<p>In modern war, the count of “weapons platforms” (any structure from which weapons can be deployed, including ships) is far less important than the number of missiles that can be fired from a variety of platforms against enemy targets.</p>
<p>A US think tank <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ">has estimated</a> that in the event of China starting a war with Taiwan, the US could fire more than 5,000 anti-ship missiles over the first 3-4 weeks.</p>
<p>The simulation was pessimistic about whether this number would be adequate to hold the Chinese attack at bay or defeat it in the first weeks, but it still saw China suffer significant ship losses. The simulation didn’t include US attacks on Chinese naval bases, which could significantly alter the missile advantage in favour of the US.</p>
<p>In a war between the US and China, we could expect the US would be prepared to undertake crippling cruise missile strikes on naval bases and other targets inside China. Even on short warning, the US navy could, for example, launch more than 1,000 cruise missiles against the Chinese mainland in an initial engagement over several days if it chose to do so.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/267">US Congressional Research Service</a>, the US navy has 9,000 missile vertical launch tubes to deliver long-range cruise missiles, compared with China’s 1,000.</p>
<p>The Australian public need not be so spooked about China’s naval buildup, given the US’s supremacy in the “missile age”. </p>
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<h2>The US also has the cyber advantage</h2>
<p>The US navy also has superior cyber capabilities compared with the Chinese navy.</p>
<p>Its cyber resources are concentrated in its “Tenth Fleet”, with <a href="https://www.fcc.navy.mil/About-Us/">more than 19,000 active and reserve personnel</a>. It has 26 active commands, 40 cyber mission force units, and 29 reserve commands around the world, which could be available to strike China in the event of war. Such missions would likely aim to disable, disrupt or destroy the command and control and fighting effectiveness of the Chinese navy.</p>
<p>For example, it was US navy cyber personnel, alongside Ukrainian counterparts, who <a href="https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3229136/before-the-invasion-hunt-forward-operations-in-ukraine/">successfully blocked</a> what could have been <a href="https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3256645/us-cyber-command-2022-year-in-review/">crippling cyber attacks</a> by Russia ahead of its invasion in early 2022.</p>
<p>In contrast, China doesn’t appear to have a dedicated naval cyber command, corresponding forces, or such a substantial global footprint.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/deterring-china-isnt-all-about-submarines-australias-cyber-offence-might-be-its-most-potent-weapon-204749">Deterring China isn't all about submarines. Australia's 'cyber offence' might be its most potent weapon</a>
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<p>The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) <a href="https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/cyber-power-report/cyber-capabilities-and-national-power---net-assessment.pdf">has assessed</a> that China is at least ten years behind the US in its cyber power.</p>
<p>This judgement is based on the US’s industrial and technological supremacy, and its much longer history of integrating cyber operations into military planning.</p>
<p>In a war with China, the US could count on the active support of key allies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, through remote cyber military attacks against China. </p>
<p>The AUKUS pact enhances the strength of this cyber alliance. Australia having nuclear-powered submarines doesn’t hugely change the US/China balance of power. </p>
<p>The allied cyber capabilities together far outweigh those of China. China has no strong cyber allies and has <a href="https://www.iiss.org/research-paper//2021/06/cyber-capabilities-national-power">weak cyber defences compared with the US</a>.</p>
<h2>What about the long term?</h2>
<p>The Congressional Research Service’s <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/267">May 2023 report</a> assesses that the naval balance remains in favour of the US, especially in submarine capability.</p>
<p>It finds China would have to maintain its robust naval buildup and modernisation for quite some time if that were to change (though it doesn’t estimate a timeline for this). If that transpires, the report concludes China “might eventually draw even with or surpass the United States in overall naval capability”, though in my view this outcome is far from certain.</p>
<p>I estimate the US advantage in naval power over China will likely remain in place for at least the next decade, and probably longer. The government owes the Australian public a granular accounting of the military balance for the longer term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Austin consults for the International Institute for Strategic Studies whose work is cited in this article. </span></em></p>
Part of the rationale for acquiring nuclear-powered subs is to counter China’s growing military influence. But the US navy still remains much more powerful than China’s.
Greg Austin, Adjunct Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/206271
2023-05-24T20:22:19Z
2023-05-24T20:22:19Z
China’s hypersonic missiles threaten US power in the Pacific – an aerospace engineer explains how the weapons work and the unique threats they pose
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528043/original/file-20230524-24-c1ddtf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4546%2C3028&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Military vehicles carry an earlier version of China's hypersonic missile during a 2019 parade.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/China70Years/6cb5c67b8adf4d3b8d4a090bd6f5d1ff/photo">AP Photo/Ng Han Guan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s newest hypersonic missile, the <a href="https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/china/df-27/">DF-27</a>, can fly as far as Hawaii, penetrate U.S. missile defenses and pose a <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-aka-carrier-killers-are-holy-st-moment-us-military-1462794">particular threat to U.S. aircraft carriers</a>, according to news reports of an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/13/china-hypersonic-missile-intelligence-leak/">assessment from the Pentagon</a>.</p>
<p>Chinese researchers claimed in a May 2023 research journal report that the country’s hypersonic missiles <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3221495/chinese-scientists-war-game-hypersonic-strike-us-carrier-group-south-china-sea">could destroy a U.S. carrier group “with certainty</a>.” This capability threatens to sideline U.S. aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-aka-carrier-killers-are-holy-st-moment-us-military-1462794">potentially shifting the strategic balance of power</a> and leaving the U.S. with limited options for assisting Taiwan in the event China invades.</p>
<p>This shift in the balance of power highlights how the next-generation hypersonic missiles that China, Russia and the U.S. are developing pose a significant threat to global security. I am an <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&hl=en">aerospace engineer</a> who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, defending against these missiles requires tracking them throughout their flight.</p>
<p>A second important challenge stems from the fact that they operate in a different region of the atmosphere from other existing threats. The new hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. and its allies do not have good tracking coverage for this in-between region, nor do Russia or China.</p>
<h2>Destabilizing effect</h2>
<p>Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">How hypersonic missiles threaten to upend the relative stability of the current era of nuclear weapons.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In the case of the U.S., if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the U.S. would consider this a first strike attack and respond by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability">unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia</a>. The hypersonic speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced.</p>
<p>It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the U.S. and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons.</p>
<h2>What is hypersonic?</h2>
<p>Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher.</p>
<p>Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/feature/60-years-ago-john-glenn-the-first-american-to-orbit-the-earth-aboard-friendship-7">first U.S. crewed flight around the Earth</a>, his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-work-infographic.html">Intercontinental ballistic missiles</a> are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a diagram showing earth, the atmosphere and space overlaid by three missile trajectories of different altitudes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Hypersonic missiles are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles but are able to vary their trajectories.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/faster-speed-sound-u.s.-efforts-develop-hypersonic-weapons">U.S. Government Accounting Office</a></span>
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<h2>Three types of hypersonic missiles</h2>
<p>There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces have been using to attack Ukraine, the <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/">Kinzhal</a>, is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">China and the U.S. are investing heavily in developing hypersonic missiles.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way. Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/">Dongfeng-17</a>, Russia’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/">Avangard</a> and the U.S. Navy’s <a href="https://www.ssp.navy.mil/six_lines_of_business/cps.html">Conventional Prompt Strike</a> system. U.S. officials have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a127f6de-f7b1-459e-b7ae-c14ed6a9198c">expressed concern</a> that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the U.S. system.</p>
<p>A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a <a href="https://hyperlab.nd.edu/research/scramjet-aerodynamics/">scramjet</a> to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places. Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the U.S. The U.S. reportedly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html">conducted a test flight</a> of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020.</p>
<p><iframe id="PYZON" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PYZON/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Defensive measures</h2>
<p>The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The U.S. is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">close cooperation with key allies</a></p>
<p>With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict. </p>
<p>However, hypersonic missiles are expensive and therefore not likely to be produced in large quantities. As seen in the recent use by Russia, hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a silver bullet that ends a conflict.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hypersonic-missiles-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-180836">an article</a> that was originally published on April 15, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, and Lockheed-Martin. </span></em></p>
China’s newest hypersonic missile, the DF-27, could sideline US aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific, while missiles in the works in China, Russia and the US threaten global security.
Iain Boyd, Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/204267
2023-04-24T06:52:22Z
2023-04-24T06:52:22Z
The much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?
<p>The Albanese government on Monday released a declassified version of the much-anticipated <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">defence strategic review</a>, authored by former defence chief Angus Houston and former defence minister Stephen Smith.</p>
<p>The report looks at Australia’s defence equipment and resourcing, but it also looks beyond just acquisitions.</p>
<p>So what’s in the report? What were some of the political drivers of the decisions taken, and what does it tell us about Australian defence strategy in the mid-2020s?</p>
<h2>Increasing risks</h2>
<p>The review builds on the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update">Defence Strategic Update of 2020</a>, which stressed the time we’d have to prepare for a potential conflict is reducing.</p>
<p>It highlights a shift from describing the defence of Australia in narrow, conventional military terms to a broader approach that requires a “whole-of-nation effort”.</p>
<p>It describes Australia’s strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific as one that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels – economic, military, strategic and diplomatic – all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.</p>
<p>A large-scale conventional and non-conventional military build-up without strategic reassurance is contributing to the most challenging circumstances in our region for decades.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It adds that “the risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising”.</p>
<p>It mentions that climate change complicates our challenges further. It also notes that “economic coercion” and “other actions that fall short of kinetic conflict” are impinging upon the ability of “countries to exercise their own agency and decide their own destinies”. </p>
<p>In response, the paper declares “we must sharpen our focus on what our interests are, and how to uphold them”. It focuses on the need for Australia to develop long-range strike capabilities, notably with longer-range missiles (it says we’re in the “missile age”) and advanced nuclear-powered submarines.</p>
<p>The ADF has long focused on maintaining a “balanced force” for three concentric circles: defending the continent, regional engagement, and contributions further afield as a “good global citizen”. </p>
<p>But the focus in this review shifts. It emphasises what it calls a “focused force”, with five tasks: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>defence of the nation</p></li>
<li><p>deterrence through denial (that is, deterring adversaries by reducing any possible benefits of engaging in an attack)</p></li>
<li><p>protection of economic connections</p></li>
<li><p>working with regional partners </p></li>
<li><p>and supporting the so-called rules based global order.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Four of these five tasks involve acting well beyond Australia’s shores. That’s a significant shift. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1635758223511699458"}"></div></p>
<h2>6 priorities going forward</h2>
<p>The report lists six priorities, and 62 recommendations, for defence acquisitions. </p>
<p>The first priority is acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, of which Australia already has a plan following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS announcement in March</a>. The government recognises conventional diesel-electric submarines are now vulnerable to detection, due to advances in surveillance. Nuclear-powered subs are less likely to be spotted as they don’t have to come up for a “snort” to refuel.</p>
<p>Second is improving our precision strike capability. Guided weapons and explosives are in short supply, in part thanks to the war in Ukraine, but also because we’ve tended not to develop large stockpiles. The government also plans to invest in developing the ability to manufacture advanced munitions onshore, especially long-range guided weapons. Officials privately advise that they expect we will produce licensed versions of United States’-sourced weapons systems to equip the ADF.</p>
<p>The third priority is about supporting the second pillar of the AUKUS (the first pillar is the submarines). This focuses on acceleration of technology such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and longer-range precision guided munitions.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1638301318161870848"}"></div></p>
<p>Fourth is the redevelopment of Australia’s northern bases, from Cocos (Keeling) Islands ranging to the air bases and other defence infrastructure across northern Australia.</p>
<p>Fifth is investment in recruitment and retention of ADF personnel. The previous federal government <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-10/defence-workforce-growing-2040-national-security/100896902">projected a nearly 20,000 increase in uniformed defence personnel</a>. The current government committed to follow through on that, with an increase of 5% per year, but there was little to show for any further surge.</p>
<p>Sixth is an emphasis on improving relations with the region, with a particular focus on Pacific Island nations.</p>
<h2>Significant adjustments</h2>
<p>The review does not abandon the army. But it significantly cuts back its planned acquisition of infantry fighting vehicles intended to replace its Vietnam War-era armoured personnel carriers. It reduces the planned acquisition from 450 to 129 vehicles.</p>
<p>What’s more, the review says Australia must cancel the planned acquisition of addition mobile (or “self-propelled”) artillery. It advocates for weapons with a longer range instead, such as “HIMARS” (high mobility artillery rocket systems), which is currently being used by Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. </p>
<p>So the army will need to make some significant adjustments.</p>
<p>The report also calls for a review into the navy surface combat fleet. Australia has been planning to construct 12 offshore patrol vessels and nine Hunter-class frigates for the coming years, but there’s expectations both numbers will be rejigged. The challenge is to get this smaller naval review done quickly. Australia’s naval shipbuilding capability atrophies quickly if left dormant and delays have already seen the naval shipbuilding industry under stress.</p>
<p>The thinking now is not just about air, land and sea forces, but also cyber and space. The report emphasises a robust cyber capability. The Australian Signals Directorate’s cyber program, called REDSPICE, is part of the mix.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-lashes-albanese-government-over-aukus-calling-it-labors-biggest-failure-since-ww1-201866">Paul Keating lashes Albanese government over AUKUS, calling it Labor's biggest failure since WW1</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The review is largely internally coherent, but there’s a dissonance between the rhetoric and the substance – noting the absence of substantial additional resource allocation. Perhaps this reflects the political headwinds faced by the Albanese government.</p>
<p>With the left wing of the ALP spooked by former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s aggressive teardown of AUKUS and defence policy writ large, coupled with calls for great expenditure on health, education and welfare, the government is reluctant to spell out how the increases in budget forecast in the review will come to fruition.</p>
<p>But it seems clear the Albanese cabinet has an acute appreciation of the security challenges butting up against the mood of a more sanguine political base.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
‘The risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising’, according to the long-awaited report.
John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/202123
2023-03-21T19:12:28Z
2023-03-21T19:12:28Z
Why is Australia buying hundreds of missiles?
<p>Flying under the radar of last week’s AUKUS submarine announcement was the revelation that the United States had agreed to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/tomahawk-guided-missile-us-sale-to-australia-approved/102109084">sell Australia up to 220 Tomahawk cruise missiles</a>.</p>
<p>This follows Australia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jan/05/australian-defence-force-to-spend-1bn-acquiring-naval-strike-missiles-and-army-rocket-systems">purchase in January</a> of “high mobility artillery rocket systems”, known as HIMARS, which have been used by Ukraine on the battlefield in response to Russia’s invasion.</p>
<p>And in 2020, the US approved the sale of <a href="https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-long-range-anti-ship-missiles-lrasms#:%7E:text=This%20is%20Australia's%20first%20purchase,Lockheed%20Martin%2C%20Orlando%2C%20Florida.">up to 200 long-range anti-shipping missiles</a> (LRASM) to Australia.</p>
<p>But what are these missiles, and what purpose do they serve?</p>
<p>Do they contribute to an evolving arms race within the Indo-Pacific?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What are these missiles?</h2>
<p><strong>Tomahawks</strong></p>
<p>Tomahawks are long range, subsonic (that is, slower than the speed of sound) cruise missiles. They’re designed to strike targets on land at long-range, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/14/the-us-navy-has-an-upgraded-tomahawk-heres-5-things-you-should-know/">around 1,600km</a>.</p>
<p>Newer Tomahawk variants, such as those being purchased by Australia, can also <a href="https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/naval-warfare/advanced-strike-weapons/tomahawk-cruise-missile">strike moving targets at sea</a>. These missiles have been used in combat over <a href="https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/naval-warfare/advanced-strike-weapons/tomahawk-cruise-missile">2,300 times</a>.</p>
<p>They will be deployed on three Australian warships, known as <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australia-cleared-to-gain-tomahawk-cruise-missile-capability">Hobart class destroyers</a>. These ships are primarily designed to defend the navy from aerial threats such as aircraft and missiles, but adding Tomahawks would allow them to strike targets on land or sea.</p>
<p>What’s more, the Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines Australia is purchasing from the US under the AUKUS agreement are also capable of launching Tomahawks. It’s safe to assume Australia’s future AUKUS class nuclear-powered submarines will also be able to deploy Tomahawks.</p>
<p>This would provide Australia with a potent deterrent. It would mean Australia could conduct long-range precision strikes against potential adversaries, using a stealthy platform that would be extremely difficult to detect.</p>
<p><strong>LRASM</strong></p>
<p>Australia’s purchase of long range anti-shipping missiles (LRASM) is intended to increase the strike range of two types of Australia’s fighter jets. This would allow Australia to accurately strike hostile shipping at long range.</p>
<p>They will replace Australia’s ageing Harpoon anti-shipping missile. They have a range of about 560km, which is approximately <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/10/05/lockheed-anti-ship-missile-himars/">four times greater than the Harpoon</a>.</p>
<p>This capability is highly desirable given that, in the event of a regional conflict, the greatest threat to Australia is a blockade of its key trade routes.</p>
<p><strong>HIMARS</strong></p>
<p>Unlike the two missiles discussed above, high-mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS) are artillery systems for battlefield use. They use rockets instead of shells.</p>
<p>The advantage of rocket artillery such as HIMARS is threefold:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>It can provide greater range than “conventional” artillery, which generally speaking maxes out around <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/16/new-army-artillery-doubles-attack-range-outguns-russian-equivalent.html">20-30km</a>. It can strike targets ranging from 70km-300km away from the launch point, depending on the munition used.</p></li>
<li><p>It’s precise, minimising collateral damage.</p></li>
<li><p>It’s highly mobile. Troops can quickly fire its munitions, and then promptly relocate, which decreases an opponent’s ability to hit it with counterfire.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Why does Australia need them?</h2>
<p>Australia has had a gap in long-range strike capabilities, arguably since it retired the F-111 long range strike aircraft in 2010.</p>
<p>The F-111 could fly <a href="https://www.boeing.com.au/resources/en-au/pdf/RAAF-100-Years/F-111-PC.pdf">up to about 6,000km</a>, but the aircraft brought in to replace the F-111 have significantly lower ranges. The F/A-18F has a range of <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/aircraft/18f-super-hornet">2,700km</a>, while the F-35A is even worse off, with a range of only <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/projecting-power-with-the-f-35-part-1-how-far-can-it-go/">2,200km</a>.</p>
<p>What’s more, these are the ranges aircraft can fly in a non-combat environment (for example, cruising in a straight line). Their range is far lower in a combat scenario.</p>
<p>So the addition of long range, precision strike missiles allow these platforms to pack greater punch at longer distances.</p>
<p>In particular, the Tomahawks and LRASM allow aircraft and warships to launch the missiles further from potential danger. This is particularly important as countries such as China are heavily investing in military systems <a href="https://www.thedefencehorizon.org/post/china-a2ad-strategy">designed to prevent access</a> and freedom of operation in contested waters such as the South China Sea, a strategy referred to as Anti-Access/Area Denial, or “A2AD”.</p>
<p>Crucially, these missiles (within the broader context of other defence procurements) offer Australia two things. Firstly, they provide an increased deterrent in an increasingly turbulent region.</p>
<p>If Australia can hold key targets under threat, then a potential adversary is less likely to undertake a hostile action, or at the very least think more carefully before doing so.</p>
<p>It also facilitates what’s called “interoperability” with key allies such as the US, so Australian and US forces can operate more easily in a joint manner if need be.</p>
<p>Secondly, these platforms allow Australia to have our own “A2AD” capabilities. While an invasion of Australia is extraordinarily unlikely, it’s possible an adversary may try to block shipping routes to prevent our people and/or goods from free navigation (a naval blockade). Or, they may attempt to close strategic chokepoints and navigation routes to Australia’s north, such as the Malacca Strait.</p>
<p>Having the ability to strike targets at long range holds those undertaking such actions under threat, increasing the difficulty in sustaining a blockade, or making it unappealing to attempt to do so due to high potential costs.</p>
<p>Of course, these systems also come with significant costs. The purchase of approximately 220 Tomahawks will cost <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/tomahawk-guided-missile-us-sale-to-australia-approved/102109084">A$1.3 billion</a>, while 20 HIMARS launchers and missiles attracts a bill of <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/joint/australia-purchases-himars">$558 million</a>. About 200 LRASMs costs a further <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/strike-air-combat/5557-us-approves-multi-million-australian-lrasm-acquisition-request">$1.47 billion</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-military-might-is-much-closer-to-the-us-than-you-probably-think-124487">China's military might is much closer to the US than you probably think</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Contributing to an arms race?</h2>
<p>There is a question about whether these purchases contribute to a regional arms race. There’s no doubt China is rapidly building its military capabilities, and this is making other countries in the region apprehensive about the long-term purpose of such an arms build-up.</p>
<p>Even if China held no hostile intentions within the region, it’s prudent for states such as Australia to be able to defend themselves and their interests, just in case.</p>
<p>While many are decrying the enormous outlay for submarine procurement under AUKUS, and others are criticising Australia for being subservient to US interests or “warmongering”, the reality is that all states maintain offensive and defensive capabilities just in case the worst happens. In other words, we hope for the best, but plan for the worst. </p>
<p>Deterrence is a foundational concept of international relations, and these purchases are Australia maintaining its ability to deter potential adversaries. It’s not about warmongering, but about being ready just in case the worst occurs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
One key reason is to provide an increased deterrent in an increasingly turbulent region.
James Dwyer, Associate Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/197965
2023-01-18T15:43:24Z
2023-01-18T15:43:24Z
Ukraine war: why Poland is piling pressure on allies to increase military support for Kyiv
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505110/original/file-20230118-13-kokk6q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Poland's president Andrzej Duda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Alamy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Polish president Andrzej Duda has been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/davos-world-economic-forum-poland-lithuania-pressure-germany-tanks-ukraine-war-russia-andrzej-duda-gitanas-nauseda/">putting pressure on</a> Nato allies to support Ukraine with more tanks at the World Economic Forum in Davos.
This is the latest attempt by Duda to rally other countries, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/davos2023/card/poland-s-duda-appeals-to-germany-to-support-leopard-tank-export-to-ukraine-oDp18n82PnQNMVo7XTcM">particularly Germany</a>, to support Ukraine with heavy armaments.</p>
<p>Duda had already announced that Poland intends to send a company of 14 German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, but needed permission from Germany to re-export them. German vice-chancellor Robert Habeck confirmed he would support such a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-leopard-tank-ukraine-war-germany-vice-chancellor-robert-habeck/">request</a>. Britain has also agreed to provide 14 Challenger II tanks.</p>
<p>This is a decisive shift in policy, because up to this point Nato countries had refused to provide armoured vehicles or tanks. Ukrainian authorities have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/092b8894-4441-4747-bfd4-5b21a0c68709">stated</a> they need 300 western battle tanks to enable them to free the occupied territory.</p>
<p>Ever since Russia began to mass troops near the Ukrainian border in preparation for the invasion, Poland as a frontline state has played a pivotal <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/11/poland-democracy-illiberalism-europe-ukraine-russia-war-eu-nato/">role</a>. Due to its geographical position, bordering both Ukraine and Belarus, Poland has become a major route for western supplies to Ukraine as well as a safe haven for Ukrainian refugees. </p>
<p>Poland and Ukraine have interlinked histories. Both emerged as Slavic successor states from parts of the Russian empire and parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The countries had a turbulent <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25778367">history</a>, with ethnic, political and cultural differences and territorial issues giving rise to armed conflict in <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/polish-ukrainian_conflict_over_eastern_galicia">1918-19</a>.</p>
<p>The interwar period saw the integration of Ukraine in the Soviet Union, while Poland became an independent state. The territorial boundaries between them have shifted over time, and some parts of western Ukraine have traditionally been part of Poland. <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2021/10/10/more-than-one-ukrainian-in-four-speaks-polish-new-survey-finds/">Polish</a> is still <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CP%5CO%5CPolishlanguageinUkraine.htm">widely understood in Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Since the end of the Soviet period, Poland has been a strong supporter of Ukrainian independence and democracy. Polish national security strategy includes support for Ukraine’s further involvement in European security arrangements (and its membership of Nato). This is important for Poland to counterbalance the influence of the Russian Federation.</p>
<h2>Poland’s risks</h2>
<p>Poland is a Nato state in an exposed position within the Ukraine war, which partly explains why it is so proactive in providing military support for Ukraine, and is pushing other allies to do more. On November 15 2022, after a large number of Russian missile attacks on Ukraine and its energy infrastructure, a missile hit an area in the south-east of Poland, killing two men. It was most likely caused by a stray Ukrainian air defence missile, but the event illustrated the potential risks Poland is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">facing</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of Ukraine and its neighbours." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In response to this incident, the German government offered to supply Patriot air defence systems to Poland, but the Polish defence minister Mariusz Blaszczak suggested that these systems should be provided for Ukraine instead. The German government agreed to consult within the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-poland-patriot-delivery-ukraine/32148907.html">alliance</a>.</p>
<p>Several hundred German soldiers will be stationed in Poland, accompanying the arrival of Patriot systems for Poland and Ukraine. Around 90-100 Ukrainian soldiers are expected to be trained by Germans based in Poland to operate one Patriot <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/poland-to-host-german-troops-receive-patriot-anti-aircraft-systems/">battery</a>. As Poland’s foreign minister Zbigniew Rau stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Every Pole is an expert on understanding what fighting for freedom, democracy and existential survival means. This is the case since, in our part of the world, the notion of independence means freedom from <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">Russia</a>.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the Polish perspective, the best way to prevent escalation is to provide Ukraine with the means to defeat Russian aggression. Unlike the rather restrained language of the US administration, the Polish government is quite clear in stating: “Imperialism must be stopped and defeated. Otherwise, it will be a constant threat to the free <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">world</a>.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-and-poland-why-the-countries-fell-out-in-the-past-and-are-now-closely-allied-184906">Ukraine and Poland: why the countries fell out in the past, and are now closely allied</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In January 2022, Poland announced that it would provide Ukraine with weapons, ammunition and humanitarian aid, and since then has provided US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) worth of aid (including US$1.8 billion of military <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">assistance</a>). On February 17 2022, a Polish-British-Ukraine trilateral pact was announced to improve cybersecurity and collaborate on energy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-60173211">security</a>.</p>
<h2>Poland’s supplies for Ukraine</h2>
<p>As the military conflict unfolded, Poland became the second-largest supplier of weapons – sending missiles, drones, tanks and other military <a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland-plays-a-key-role-in-aiding-ukraine#:%7E:text=Poland%20remains%20one%20of%20the,estimated%20at%201.7%20billion%20USD.">supplies</a> to Ukraine, as well as being a key route for the supply of weapons from the US and other Nato countries. Poland was even prepared to send MiG-29 fighter planes, although this was not approved by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polands-failed-deal-to-supply-mig-29s-shows-natos-fear-of-escalation-178860">US</a>. </p>
<p>However, Ukraine now needs more capable air defences due to the large-scale missile and drone attacks against infrastructure and civilians. </p>
<p>The US is gradually changing its policy, and has signalled that it will permit Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russian <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-drone-warfare-russia-732jsshpx">territory</a>. It also decided to provide Patriot systems to Ukraine, according to announcements in late December <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/patriot-ukraine-what-does-it-mean">2022</a>. The training period to operate these systems has been reduced to three months. </p>
<p>Military analyst at the Brookings Institution Michael O’Hanlon explained: “Going step by step has helped Ukraine patch up vulnerabilities, to be sure. But it hasn’t furthered the goal of formulating a strategy to end the war, or defining the capacity that will be ultimately <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/16/biden-ukraine-weapons-russia-tanks/">needed to do so</a>.” </p>
<p>A new phase of the conflict is beginning. For Poland, it is crucial that Ukraine defeats Russian aggression. Otherwise the security of Europe as a whole, and Poland in particular, would be at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Nuclear History Program, a NATO Research Fellowship, the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Leverhulme Trust</span></em></p>
Poland’s robust arguments for more weapons for Ukraine is partly sparked by its own vulnerable position.
Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of Bradford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/180836
2022-04-15T12:12:31Z
2022-04-15T12:12:31Z
How hypersonic missiles work and the unique threats they pose – an aerospace engineer explains
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457785/original/file-20220412-19-d9u5nq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2100%2C1760&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hypersonic missiles can change course to avoid detection and anti-missile defenses.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104467/x-51a-waverider/">U.S. Air Force graphic</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An updated version of this article was published on May 24, 2023. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-threaten-us-power-in-the-pacific-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-how-the-weapons-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-206271">Read it here</a>.</em></p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-19-22/h_e258f4d62704c278417a897db16cac80">used a hypersonic missile</a> against a Ukrainian arms depot in the western part of the country on March 18, 2022. That might sound scary, but the technology the Russians used is not particularly advanced. However, next-generation hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the U.S. are developing do pose a significant threat to national and global security.</p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&hl=en">aerospace engineer</a> who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, these missiles must be tracked throughout their flight. </p>
<p>A second important challenge stems from the fact that they operate in a different region of the atmosphere from other existing threats. The new hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. and its allies do not have good tracking coverage for this in-between region, nor does Russia or China.</p>
<h2>Destabilizing effect</h2>
<p>Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/FyUTNRIuAqc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How hypersonic missiles threaten to upend the relative stability of the current era of nuclear weapons.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the case of the U.S., if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the U.S. would consider this a first strike attack and respond by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability">unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia</a>. The hypersonic speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced.</p>
<p>It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the U.S. and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons.</p>
<h2>What is hypersonic?</h2>
<p>Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher.</p>
<p>Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/feature/60-years-ago-john-glenn-the-first-american-to-orbit-the-earth-aboard-friendship-7">first U.S. crewed flight around the Earth</a>, his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-work-infographic.html">ICBMs</a> are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a diagram showing earth, the atmosphere and space overlaid by three missile trajectories of different altitudes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hypersonic missiles are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles but are able to vary their trajectories.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/faster-speed-sound-u.s.-efforts-develop-hypersonic-weapons">U.S. Government Accounting Office</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three types of hypersonic missiles</h2>
<p>There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces used to attack Ukraine, the <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/">Kinzhal</a>, is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="men in military uniforms watch technicians work on a missile beneath a military jet plane on a tarmac" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The type of hypersonic missile Russia has used in Ukraine, the Kinzhal aero-ballistic missile, is essentially a ballistic missile launched from aircraft. It is not as advanced as other types of hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the U.S. are developing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaSyriaDrills/54c5b8e204184c24ae9694660b561aa3/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way. Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/">Dongfeng-17</a>, Russia’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/">Avangard</a> and the U.S. Navy’s <a href="https://www.ssp.navy.mil/six_lines_of_business/cps.html">Conventional Prompt Strike</a> system. U.S. officials have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a127f6de-f7b1-459e-b7ae-c14ed6a9198c">expressed concern</a> that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the U.S. system.</p>
<p>A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a <a href="https://hyperlab.nd.edu/research/scramjet-aerodynamics/">scramjet</a> to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places. Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the U.S. The U.S. reportedly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html">conducted a test flight</a> of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020.</p>
<p><iframe id="PYZON" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PYZON/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Difficult to defend against</h2>
<p>The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The U.S. is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">close cooperation with key allies</a>. This approach is likely to be very expensive and take many years to implement.</p>
<p>With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict. </p>
<p>However, hypersonic missiles are expensive and therefore not likely to be produced in large quantities. As seen in the recent use by Russia, hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a silver bullet that ends a conflict.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters?nl=science&source=inline-science-corona-important">Get The Conversation’s most important coronavirus headlines, weekly in a science newsletter</a></em>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, Lockheed-Martin, and L3-Harris. </span></em></p>
Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles in Ukraine has put the weapons in the news. Next-generation versions under development could dramatically alter national and global security.
Iain Boyd, Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/179334
2022-04-06T13:31:06Z
2022-04-06T13:31:06Z
Ukraine war shows grim conventions on ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways to kill — and what makes a war crime
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453991/original/file-20220323-23-6w8zej.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8426%2C5335&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Royal Canadian Air Force personnel load non-lethal and lethal aid at CFB Trenton, Ont., on March 7, 2022. The cargo was bound for Ukraine via Poland. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/ukraine-war-shows-grim-conventions-on--right--and--wrong--ways-to-kill-—-and-what-makes-a-war-crime" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>With the war in Ukraine in its second month, casualties are mounting. The full toll of civilian death is not yet clear, but the catastrophic impact of the sustained siege of cities <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/18/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-siege-survivor">like Mariupol</a> by Russian forces is not difficult to imagine. </p>
<p>On the Russian side, losses have also been significant, estimated to be <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russian-losses-cause-result-impact-1.6400495">as high as 15,000</a> deaths. </p>
<p>War is devastating. It is distinctive for its loss of life on a massive scale. It is equally distinctive for the means and methods — the weapons — that cause such death. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/23/russia-ukraine-weapons-missiles-nukes-drones/">Media coverage</a> of the war has featured stories on the weapons being used by both Russian invaders and Ukrainian defenders.</p>
<p>The media has introduced the general public to Russia’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/22/europe/biden-russia-hypersonic-missiles-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html">Kalibr, Iskander and Kinzhal</a> missiles. There have also been stories about the delivery of lethal aid — deadly weapons and military equipment — by countries <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/a-lot-more-people-are-going-to-die-canada-sending-more-lethal-weapons-to-ukraine-1.5804357">that include Canada</a> to help Ukraine defend against Russian troops and protect its citizens. </p>
<p>In addition to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/javelins-stingers-nlaws-help-ukraine-destroy-russian-tanks-aircraft-2022-3">Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-aircraft</a> missiles and millions of rounds of ammunition, the United States recently announced it will send <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/30/us-sends-100-killer-drones-called-switchblades-to-ukraine.html">Switchblades</a>, otherwise known as “killer drones.” </p>
<h2>Why are some weapons acceptable?</h2>
<p>Russian’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal. There’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/04/03/world/ukraine-russia-war">mounting evidence</a> it’s committed war crimes in Ukraine that must be prosecuted and punished. <a href="https://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/papers/associative-duties-and-the-ethics-of-killing-in-war/">But in war killing is permitted</a>. Deadly or lethal force is used on all sides. </p>
<p>But how do we distinguish between different kinds of weapons and their lethal effects? Why are some forms of death and destruction permitted while others are not? How, in war — when wounding and killing are objectives on all sides — can we even make such distinctions? </p>
<p>War is horrifying because of how many people die but equally troubling is that there are rules about <em>how</em> their killings should be accomplished.</p>
<p>Lethal weapons should be easy to define — weapons that cause mortal injury or wounds that are severely debilitating. But not all weapons are considered acceptable, even if they effectively have the same result.</p>
<p>Russia’s use of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/16/russia-military-ukraine-cluster-munitions-civilian-casualties/">cluster munitions</a> and its potential to use chemical weapons, both of which <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons">are prohibited</a> by international law, constitute war crimes. Even <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-rules-of-war-Geneva-Conventions">war has rules</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men, women and children huddle in a basement under a single light bulb." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456395/original/file-20220405-3023-oax6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People hide in a basement of a church in the town of Bashtanka used as a bomb shelter after they fled nearby villages under attack by the Russian army on March 31, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because the small bomblets dispersed by cluster munitions cover a wide area, they’ve been <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700902969687">outlawed for violating protections</a> enshrined in the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a> that protect civilians and civilian spaces (schools, buildings, residences) from being intentionally attacked.</p>
<p>Chemical weapons — toxic substances intended to cause death or permanent harm — <a href="https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention">also contravene a principle preventing unnecessary suffering</a>. Tactical nuclear weapons have wide-ranging <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-catastrophic/">devastating effects</a> for civilians and militaries, though there’s nothing prohibiting them. But their use would cross a moral <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/vladmir-putin-nato-red-line-1.6394192">“red line.”</a> </p>
<p>These rules prohibit certain weapons, but many others are permitted, seen as more legitimate, more legal and even more humane.</p>
<p>Weapons, especially lethal ones, present a paradox at the heart of the laws of war. Although attempting to minimize violence, laws of war don’t prevent war. Instead they allow war by outlining how it should and should not be done. </p>
<h2>Legitimate lethality</h2>
<p>Most weapons used in war are lethal. But their specific type of lethality has to meet standards of legitimacy according to the laws of war — something that those who design weapons must keep in mind.</p>
<p>There is a very specific process for designing weapons to be legitimately lethal.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383116000436">Improving the range and accuracy of missiles or the explosive radius of bombs</a> is a priority. Weapons design also involves experiments with materials that simulate human flesh, such as soap and gelatin blocks and live and dead animals. These experiments are used to simulate how bullets or explosives might penetrate human bodies, how they “disrupt” (tear, cut and pulverize) tissue — and how to optimize their abilities to do so. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A diagram/sketch shows the wound profile of a bullet and the damage done by military rifles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456224/original/file-20220404-13680-l6slxf.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A graphic shows the wound profile of a M193 (M161A) bullet, circa 1989, and the damage done by military rifles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">International Defense Review</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even in the language of technical expertise, devastating physical damage is described in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01369906">weapons testing reports</a>. </p>
<p>Information on how the body will be wounded is matched up with data from active battle to determine on which parts of the body wounds are more likely to occur, and on which parts of the body these wounds are likely to be most damaging (or deadly) by “disabling” enemy combatants. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/health/parkland-shooting-victims-ar15.html">contexts other than war</a>, these details would be regarded as abhorrent. But in war, being abhorrent is not always illegal. </p>
<h2>Killing the ‘right way’</h2>
<p>Ensuring the lethality of weapons does not occur in a legal or ethical vacuum. Laws of war aim to outlaw abhorrent acts: weapons that cause cruel wounds are illegal. But how can those wounds be distinguished from others, especially if they cause death? </p>
<p>The determination is made through a detailed study of a weapon’s mechanisms of wounding: <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docindex/v2_rul_rule77">a bullet that expands on impact is prohibited, for example, but a bullet that fragments is permitted</a>. </p>
<p>Scientists, diplomats and military officials review weapons within the existing laws of war and determine which ones are inhumane. In effect, the line between criminal weapons and conventional ones is based on <em>how</em> they kill, not whether they do kill. </p>
<p>As we witness the death and destruction being caused by the war in Ukraine, it’s easy to assume that the rules must have been broken. Surely, any violence on this scale must be a crime?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An elderly woman wearing a blue kerchief cries as she sits on a bus." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454001/original/file-20220323-23-445njx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A refugee cries on a bus while waiting for Ukrainian police to check papers and belongings in Brovary, Ukraine, on March 20, 2022, after 1,600 people were evacuated from the village of Bobrik.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But wartime violence often isn’t considered criminal, because war itself is not a crime. If the laws of war contend that the right to kill is limited, determining these limits is not just a question of how many are killed or even who is killed — it’s about how the killing is done. That suggests there’s a right and wrong way to kill. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely any of the victims of war or the families of dead civilians and soldiers would appreciate the distinction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nisha Shah has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p>
The laws of war and what is considered acceptable and unacceptable weaponry suggest there’s a right and wrong way to kill. It’s unlikely any of the victims of war would appreciate the distinction.
Nisha Shah, Associate Professor, International Relations, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/178886
2022-03-09T03:17:01Z
2022-03-09T03:17:01Z
How do anti-tank missiles work – and how helpful might they be for Ukraine’s soldiers?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450841/original/file-20220309-27-1e0fk0q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=74%2C434%2C4902%2C3046&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pavlo Palamarchuk/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ukraine’s allies have sent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/politics/us-ukraine-weapons.html">some 17,000</a> anti-tank weapons into the battlefield, in a bid to help fighters bog down the Russian offensive.</p>
<p>The stockpile includes at least <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2022/01/25/the-uk-airmailed-2000-nlaw-missiles-to-ukraine-are-they-useful/?sh=56d3e5c64170">2,000 NLAW</a> (Next Generation Light Antitank Weapon) missiles from the United Kingdom, 100 NLAWs from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/luxembourg-send-anti-tank-weapons-jeeps-ukraine-defence-minister-says-2022-02-28/">Luxembourg</a>, and several hundred Javelin missiles from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/estonia-sends-javelin-anti-tank-weapons-ukraine-2022-02-18/">United States and Estonia</a>. The NLAW and Javelin are some of the most advanced man-portable anti-tank missiles available.</p>
<p>Both are relatively lightweight, shoulder-fired missiles which – although they won’t completely turn the tide of the war – have so far proven valuable in what is otherwise a highly asymmetrical conflict.</p>
<p>So how do the missiles work? And what makes them so helpful for Ukraine’s defence?</p>
<h2>What are anti-tank missiles?</h2>
<p>Portable anti-tank missiles are specifically designed to destroy main battle tanks, which are more heavily armoured than other types of armoured vehicles (such as armoured personnel carriers, for instance).</p>
<p>Main battle tanks, which Russia has deployed in large numbers, use modern and highly advanced armour technology, including “explosive reactive armour” (or ERA). In other words, the tank’s armour explodes outwards when impacted by a warhead. This is intended to divert the blast and minimise the damage caused.</p>
<p>However, explosive reactive armour actually isn’t much of an advantage against the modern anti-tank missiles being used by Ukrainian fighters. The NLAW and Javelin missiles are designed to hit a tank from above in a “top attack” – striking at the top of the tank’s turret where the armour is thinnest. This will either completely destroy the tank, or incapacitate the crew inside.</p>
<p>The missiles can also be used in “direct fire” mode against less well-armoured vehicles, such as armoured personnel carriers, buildings or even low-flying helicopters – with devastating results. This makes them a highly flexible and dangerous weapon for opposing forces.</p>
<p>Perhaps the greatest advantage of anti-tank missiles is their range and ease of use. They are relatively lightweight (between 10-25kg depending on the model), can be used by a single soldier and require (relatively) minimal training to handle. They are also extremely difficult to detect, due to their size and mobility.</p>
<h2>Fire and forget</h2>
<p>These modern missiles are fully guided “fire-and-forget” weapons, which means a soldier can immediately hide or relocate after firing. The projectile locks-on to the target and guides itself once fired. </p>
<p>In the case of a Javelin this is achieved using infrared technology, wherein the missile locks onto any heat signature present in the tanks. </p>
<p>NLAW missiles use “predictive line of sight” technology. The guidance package calculates both the distance to the target and the target’s speed (if its mobile), and guides itself to the predicted location. With this, a single soldier can snipe a tank at range. </p>
<p>NLAWs have a range of up to 1km, while the Javelin has a maximum effective range of up to 4.5km. Javelins are therefore much more expensive than NLAWs, with a single missile costing about <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/18922/it-looks-like-javelin-anti-tank-missiles-are-headed-to-battlefield-ukraine">US$80,000 (or A$110,000)</a>.</p>
<p>In the case of both the NLAW and Javelin, the warhead detonates upon impact with a hard object. A direct hit can be enough to wipe out a single tank if it impacts an area with thinner armour, such as the tanks turret – but it generally won’t have much impact on tanks nearby. </p>
<p>Even a glancing blow from one of these weapons may well be enough to incapacitate a tank, if not fully destroy it. Thus, anti-tank missiles pose a significant and, crucially, difficult-to-detect threat to Russian armoured columns.</p>
<h2>A seemingly effective strategy</h2>
<p>Russia does not appear to be relying on man-portable anti-tank weaponry to the same extent as Ukraine. </p>
<p>At this stage it’s drawing on a vast arsenal of tanks and aviation assets, such as attack helicopters, for its anti-tank capability. This may be due to Ukraine carefully husbanding and protecting its limited tank arsenal.</p>
<p>This could change at short notice, however, as Russia does possess its own anti-tank missiles. </p>
<p>Reports indicate Russians have suffered heavy losses against anti-tank weaponry, to the point where we’ve seen images and videos online showing Russian soldiers putting up makeshift mesh screens and cages over their tanks, in a (futile) effort to protect themselves. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1501204377398304769"}"></div></p>
<p>These are colloquially termed “cope cages” by various communities on the internet. Of course, they will do little to minimise the impact from a missile, but they do demonstrate that Russian soldiers are fearful of the threat the missiles present. </p>
<p>Unverified <a href="https://www.audacy.com/connectingvets/news/inside-the-deadly-javelin-anti-tank-program-in-ukraine">reports</a> indicate there have potentially been 280 armoured vehicles destroyed by Javelin’s in Ukraine, out of 300 fired. If the reports are true, this is a remarkable strike rate.</p>
<p>It appears these weapons have, in part, allowed the Ukraine army to bog down and stall the Russian advance, at a significant cost to Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The missiles, which can be fired by a single person, seem to be effective against Russia’s fleet of invading main battle tanks.
James Dwyer, Associate Lecturer and PhD Candidate, School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/172016
2021-11-16T23:58:54Z
2021-11-16T23:58:54Z
Russian anti-satellite weapon test: What happened and what are the risks?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432281/original/file-20211116-25-1uty5z7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=120%2C0%2C1796%2C948&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If a satellite is destroyed, the debris fans out in orbit and poses serious threats to other satellites or crewed spacecraft. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Satellite_break-up_ESA375611.tiff#/media/File:Satellite_break-up_ESA375611.tiff">ESA/ID&Sense/ONiRiXEL via WikimediaCommons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>On Nov. 15, 2021, U.S. officials announced that they had detected a dangerous new debris field in orbit near Earth. Later in the day, it was confirmed that Russia had destroyed one of its old satellites in a test of an anti-satellite weapon. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=PxIOz7cAAAAJ">Wendy Whitman Cobb is a space security researcher</a>. She explains what these weapons are and why the debris they create is a problem now – and in the future.</em></p>
<h2>What do we know?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.spacecom.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2842957/russian-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-test-creates-significant-long-last/">Russia launched an anti-satellite test</a> that destroyed one of its older satellites. The satellite broke up and created thousands of pieces of debris in orbit, ranging in size from tiny specks up to pieces a few feet across. This space junk will linger in orbit for years, potentially colliding with other satellites as well as the International Space Station. The <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-administrator-statement-on-russian-asat-test/">space station crew has already had to shelter</a> in place as they passed near the debris cloud.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A long white and red missile on display." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432283/original/file-20211116-19-enwd7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many anti-satellite weapons are missiles launched from the ground, like this U.S. ASM-135 ASAT.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Asat_missile_20040710_150339_1.4.jpg#/media/File:Asat_missile_20040710_150339_1.4.jpg">Lorax via WikimediaCommons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s an anti-satellite weapon?</h2>
<p><a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210331_Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment2021.pdf?gVYhCn79enGCOZtcQnA6MLkeKlcwqqks">Anti-satellite weapons</a>, commonly referred to as ASATs, are any weapon that can temporarily impair or permanently destroy an orbiting satellite. The one that Russia just tested is known as a <a href="https://www.spacecom.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2842957/russian-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-test-creates-significant-long-last/">direct ascent kinetic anti-satellite weapon</a>. These are usually launched from the ground or from the wings of an airplane and destroy satellites by running into them at high speeds.</p>
<p>A similar weapon type, called <a href="https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101/">co-orbital anti-satellite weapons</a>, are first launched into orbit and then change direction to collide with the targeted satellite from space. </p>
<p>A third type, <a href="https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101/">non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons</a>, use technology like lasers to disrupt satellites without physically colliding with them.</p>
<p>Space agencies have been <a href="https://swfound.org/counterspace/">developing and testing anti-satellite weapons</a> since the 1960s. To date, the <a href="https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4198/1">U.S.</a>, <a href="https://www.spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-test/">Russia</a>, <a href="https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf">China</a> and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/news/indian-asat-test-raises-space-risks">India</a> have demonstrated the ability to attack satellites in orbit that support services like GPS, communications and weather forecasting.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of the Earth with many red lines surrounding it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432284/original/file-20211116-23-1bg1lxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Debris from a single destroyed satellite can spread out rapidly, as seen in this image showing the orbits of debris from a Chinese satellite one month after it was destroyed in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fengyun-1C_debris.jpg">NASA Orbital Debris Program Office via WikimediaCommons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why is debris a problem?</h2>
<p>Regardless of the cause, space debris is a serious problem. </p>
<p>Larger pieces are easier to track and avoid but it’s difficult to track pieces smaller than 4 inches (10 centimeters). Even small debris can still pose a major threat though. Space debris <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html">is often traveling faster than 17,000 mph</a> around the Earth. At that speed, pieces of debris could destroy any spacecraft or satellite it collided with. In the 1980s, <a href="https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2520/1">a Soviet satellite broke up</a> as a result of a suspected debris strike. </p>
<p>More worrisome is the danger debris poses to crewed space missions. In July 2021, one of the International Space Station’s <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/space-junk-damages-international-space-stations-robotic-arm-rcna1067">robotic arms was struck</a> by a piece of debris that put a 0.2-inch (0.5 cm) hole clean through a part of the arm. While the damage did not need to be fixed, officials characterized it as a lucky strike – if it had struck a different part of the station, the situation could have been a lot worse.</p>
<p>Space debris is also a significant threat to people on Earth. Satellites play a vital role in the global economy through GPS, communications and weather data. If services such as these were disrupted, there would be <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Privatizing-Peace-How-Commerce-Can-Reduce-Conflict-in-Space/Cobb/p/book/9780367337834">significant economic cost</a>. One study found that a GPS outage could <a href="https://www.space.commerce.gov/doc-study-on-economic-benefits-of-gps/">cost the U.S. up to $1 billion a day</a>.</p>
<p>There are currently <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html">thousands of pieces of space junk</a> circling the Earth, with sources as varied as old rocket bodies, dead satellites, debris from previous collisions and tests, and lost items from astronauts. The problem – like with the environment – is that there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-satellite-falls-on-your-house-space-law-protects-you-but-there-are-no-legal-penalties-for-leaving-junk-in-orbit-160757">little incentive for individual countries</a> to avoid generating debris or clean it up.</p>
<p>The amount of space debris has only increased over time. For years, scientists have been warning about the possibility of a collision cascade. <a href="https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris">As the amount of debris increases</a>, the chance of collisions between it and other satellites and debris also goes up. More collisions might then leave certain orbits completely unusable. While this could take decades to play out, events like the Russian test will only make such an outcome more likely.</p>
<p>[<em>Too busy to read another daily email?</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-toobusy">Get one of The Conversation’s curated weekly newsletters</a>.]</p>
<h2>What to do now?</h2>
<p>In the short term, little can be done to mitigate this new cloud of space debris, but anyone with anything in space is on high alert to avoid it.</p>
<p>The U.S. government and commercial companies are tracking the new debris, and the crew on the International Space Station have been <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/satellite-debris-space-station-crew-take-shelter/">ordered to keep certain modules closed off</a> as they continue to pass through the debris cloud. As the new debris spreads out and the pieces are tracked, station controllers will have a better understanding of the danger posed to the crew.</p>
<p>In the long run, <a href="https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Global_experts_agree_action_needed_on_space_debris">experts recommend</a> working on global solutions to remove debris. This includes taking measures to prevent debris in the first place and removing debris that is already in space. Several governmental and international organizations have <a href="https://spacenews.com/u-s-interagency-panel-to-update-rd-strategy-to-tackle-orbital-debris/">proposed ways to prevent new debris</a>, but these are informal and not legally binding.</p>
<p>Remediation is a tougher challenge. Technology to remove debris has not yet been fully developed, but even still, its <a href="https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2019/07/analysis-of-the-potential-misuse-of-commercial-dual-use-technologies-for-satellite-servicing/">deployment is a sensitive subject</a>. The same technology that might be used to remove a piece of space junk could also be used for attacking a satellite. This dual-use technology poses challenges, as it can raise suspicions that <a href="https://www.space.com/china-launches-military-space-junk-satellite">countries are testing</a> anti-satellite weapons under the cover of debris removal. </p>
<p>Despite the difficulties, there is growing international recognition that space debris is a dangerous problem. A consortium of private companies recently created the <a href="https://spacenews.com/space-companies-forge-alliance-to-reduce-in-orbit-debris-by-2030/">Net Zero Space charter</a> to reduce debris, and the <a href="https://spacenews.com/space-force-launches-orbital-prime-program-to-spur-market-for-on-orbit-services/">U.S. Space Force is looking for ways</a> to combat the problem as well. While the world still does not yet have a full understanding of Russia’s actions, this event is a wake-up call on the importance of efforts to reduce pollution in Earth’s orbit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172016/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Whitman Cobb is affiliated with the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Her views are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its components.</span></em></p>
Russia destroyed one of its old satellites during a successful test of an anti-satellite weapon. A space security expert explains what this weapon was and the dangers of the expanding debris field.
Wendy Whitman Cobb, Professor of Strategy and Security Studies, Air University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/160853
2021-05-17T16:58:48Z
2021-05-17T16:58:48Z
Gaza’s enhanced rocket technology challenges Israel’s defences
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400886/original/file-20210516-19-y98z8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=52%2C824%2C5858%2C3043&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli Iron Dome air defense system launches to intercept rockets fired from Gaza Strip, near Sderot, Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ariel Schalit)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gaza militants have launched their <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-airstrikes.html">“Sword of Jerusalem” rocket war</a> with Israel by firing a symbolic salvo at Jerusalem and bigger ones elsewhere. Israel’s <a href="https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Operation-Guardian-of-the-Walls-10-May-2021.aspx">“Guardian of the Walls” operation</a> responded with Iron Dome interceptors at home and airstrikes in Gaza.</p>
<p>As someone who’s researched Israeli missile defence systems for several years, the situation initially seemed to me like a repeat of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33223365">their 2014 conflict</a>, which showcased Israel’s advanced defences. But militants in Gaza have enhanced their rocket technology and tactics. <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20181227-remembering-israels-2008-war-on-gaza/">That’s reminiscent of 2008</a>, when Israel was more vulnerable to rockets and waged a three-week military offensive against Gaza.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A ruined building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401051/original/file-20210517-13-1u7m0tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinians inspect damaged houses that were hit in early morning Israeli airstrikes in Gaza City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>According to the Israel Defense Forces, <a href="https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1393992449979260928">roughly 3,100 rockets</a> have been fired from Gaza. That’s about as many as during the seven-week battle in 2014. (All rocket numbers in this article were reported by the Israel Defense Forces or Israel Security Agency. There is no way to independently verify most of them.) </p>
<p>Israeli news reports say they’ve caused <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/homes-in-southern-israel-sustain-direct-hits-as-rockets-rain-down-668232">10 civilian deaths and more than 564 injuries</a>, while <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/16/more-deaths-gaza-israel-launches-most-intense-raids-yet">Israeli countermeasures have killed almost 200 Palestinians</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/16/middleeast/israel-palestinian-conflict-intl/index.html">resulted in scenes of carnage and devastation.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bar chart showing number of rockets fired per year from 2005 to 16 May 2021." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400900/original/file-20210516-23-w97sfx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rockets fired per year from Gaza toward Israel, from 2005 to 16 May 2021, according to Israel Defence Forces/Israel Security Agency.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Created by Michael Armstrong from published Israeli data.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The counts have risen so quickly because Gaza militants have <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/iran-reveals-its-strategy-advising-hamas-on-war-against-israel-668265">improved their rockets and their usage of them</a>.</p>
<h2>Improved rocketry</h2>
<p>The most noticeable change this year is larger quantities. Gaza militants fired 470 rockets during the first 24 hours and have averaged 408 per day. Those numbers easily beat the one-day maximums of 316 in 2012 and 192 in 2014.</p>
<p>The firing is also better co-ordinated. Rather than launching many small attacks spread across the day, they’ve unleashed larger salvos of up to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/2-killed-by-rockets-in-ashkelon-amid-massive-barrages-from-gaza/">137 rockets within five minutes</a>. That’s much improved, though still far slower than <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-SN9Cxao5M">regular army</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0vZKXGRpf5c">artillery units</a>.</p>
<p>Accuracy has improved, too. About 50 per cent of the rockets arriving over Israel have threatened populated areas. That’s up from 22 per cent in 2012 and 18 per cent in 2014. Fewer rockets land in empty fields after missing their targets.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1393069600137531392"}"></div></p>
<p>Larger, longer-range rockets are also more common now. During previous conflicts, Israel’s southern cities endured most of the fire. This time, <a href="https://goo.gl/maps/HHA716t1JF3Qmuxw7">Tel Aviv</a>, in central Israel more than 55 kilometres from Gaza’s border, is routinely targeted.</p>
<p>Rocket reliability, however, has dropped. About 15 per cent have failed at launch, versus under 10 per cent during previous conflicts.</p>
<h2>Destructive impact</h2>
<p>The improved technology and tactics make barrages more destructive. My calculations suggest at least 134 rockets have hit populated areas.</p>
<p>During the first four days of this conflict, one Israeli died for every 206 rockets reaching the country. That approaches the one-per-204 rate of 2008, when Israel’s defences were weaker. By comparison, it took 270 rockets to kill a civilian in 2012 and 1,429 in 2014. </p>
<p>The injury rate, about one for every three rockets arriving overhead, also resembles 2008. And many buildings have been damaged.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Rocket destruction, including decimated palm trees and cars covered in rubble and debris." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400895/original/file-20210516-17-owsize.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli firefighters works at the site where a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip hit the central Israeli town of Holon, near Tel Aviv.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Heidi Levine)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These results imply that shock-and-awe destruction is the 2021 strategy of Gaza militants. By comparison, the 2014 operation mostly featured economic attrition. Israel suffered relatively few civilian casualties <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/af80d236-74c6-11e4-a418-00144feabdc0">but heavy financial costs</a> from the prolonged disruption.</p>
<p>Both then and now, Israel has responded with <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-crisis-echoes-israels-anti-rocket-strategy-82415">several countermeasures</a>.</p>
<h2>Blocking (many) rockets</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/as-missiles-fly-a-look-at-israels-iron-dome-interceptor-94959">Iron Dome interceptors</a> provide the best-known defence. Israel claims the systems <a href="https://twitter.com/sfrantzman/status/1393995143582298113">intercepted 1,210 rockets</a> last week, or 90 per cent of the rockets they engaged. That’s about the percentage they achieved in 2014, too, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx028">though perhaps not in 2012</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Iron Dome air defence system fires to intercept a rocket" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400897/original/file-20210516-23-1q55dfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this July 2014 photo, an Iron Dome air defence system fires to intercept a rocket from Gaza Strip in the costal city of Ashkelon, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tsafrir Abayov)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Are they always achieving it now? </p>
<p>With bigger barrages and greater accuracy, more rockets are arriving together above each target. That means there’s more risk the interceptors will become overloaded and let some rockets through.</p>
<p>Suppose the systems sometimes block “only” 80 per cent of rockets. That’s still impressive. But it means the portion penetrating then doubles from 10 to 20 per cent, causing twice the destruction.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1309">My research seven years ago</a> analyzed this tactic. It showed that high-performing interceptors can seem “fragile” — once their capacity is exceeded, damage on the ground soars.</p>
<p>That research also studied the idea of firing directly at interceptor systems to disable them. Sure enough, one barrage <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-says-hamas-is-targeting-iron-dome-sites-airports-668194">recently made such an attempt</a>. That was likely a waste of ammo, as their rockets aren’t accurate enough yet for such small targets.</p>
<p>Ironically, one Iron Dome system was briefly disabled two days earlier by an equipment malfunction. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/1-killed-3-injured-as-hamas-fires-anti-tank-missile-at-israeli-jeep/">That let some extra rockets through</a>.</p>
<p>Israel also has <a href="https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/home-front-command/">extensive warning systems and bomb shelters</a>. Those prevent as many casualties as interceptors do, but don’t stop property damage.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-rocket-experience-shows-bomb-shelters-matter-as-much-as-interceptors-96402">Israeli rocket experience shows bomb shelters matter as much as interceptors</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Airstrikes are another Israeli countermeasure. Its aircraft began bombing <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/rocket-volleys-target-south-at-dawn-as-idf-hits-key-hamas-positions/">rocket stockpiles and launchers</a> last week, followed by production sites and other targets.</p>
<p>But while its bombers can destroy rocket stockpiles and workshops, they don’t have much immediate effect on firing rates. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx028">My analysis of previous operations</a> found that airstrikes didn’t decrease daily fire rates; only ground assaults did that</p>
<p>Collateral damage is another problem. Bombs have damaged <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-west-bank-gaza-middle-east-israel-palestinian-conflict-7974cc0c03897b8b21e5fc2f8c7d8a79">or completely destroyed</a> many buildings. And almost <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/16/more-deaths-gaza-israel-launches-most-intense-raids-yet">200 Palestinian militants and civilians</a> have died so far.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman cries standing near the rubble of a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400893/original/file-20210516-17-7wwkj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman reacts while standing near the rubble of a building that was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike on Saturday that housed The Associated Press, broadcaster Al-Jazeera and other media outlets in Gaza City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Adel Hana)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Gaza’s <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/what-do-hamas-and-pij-have-in-their-rocket-arsenals-analysis-667856">14,000-rocket arsenal</a> could support short-range barrages <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/idf-military-intelligence-knew-hamas-would-fire-on-jerusalem-668192">for months</a>. </p>
<p>But it will likely run out of long-range rockets sooner, making a truce look more attractive. Israel might favour a truce soon, too, as it runs out of meaningful airstrike targets.</p>
<p>Let’s hope that truce happens soon. The alternatives are a prolonged war of aerial attrition, or a costly ground battle in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Improved rocket technology and tactics have made the ongoing Gaza-Israel conflict different from the one in 2014. Israel’s defences have been stressed.
Michael J. Armstrong, Associate professor of operations research, Goodman School of Business, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/129749
2020-01-11T03:09:42Z
2020-01-11T03:09:42Z
Flight PS752: A deadly combination of Iran’s recklessness and incompetence
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309521/original/file-20200111-97130-2uxxiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C3976%2C2497&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Jan. 8, 2020 photo, rescue workers search the scene where a Ukrainian plane crashed in Shahedshahr, southwest of the capital Tehran, Iran. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/AP-Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crash of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-ukraine-plane-crash-flight-752-timeline-unfolded-events-allegations-2020-1">with the loss of all 176 people on board</a>, including 15 children and 57 Canadians, was a horrific tragedy. It’s also deeply revelatory regarding several seminal issues involving Iran.</p>
<p>Flight PS752 went down shortly after it took off from the Tehran airport, just hours after Iran fired some 15 ballistic missiles at two large bases in Iraq that housed American and allied forces, as retaliation for the U.S. drone strike that killed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/03/asia/soleimani-profile-intl-hnk/index.html">Qassem Soleimani</a>.</p>
<p>The coincidence of the airline crash and the Iranian retaliation resulted in speculation and suspicion. The Iranian regime immediately and implausibly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/08/iran-plane-crash-170-passengers-feared-dead-ukraine-boeing-737/">claimed mechanical problems</a> as the crash cause. As telling evidence emerged that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51055219">the aircraft was brought down by Iran’s own anti-aircraft missiles</a>, Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization chief, Ali Abedzadeh, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-plane-crash-iranians-deny-us-claims-missile-shot-down-ukrainian-plane-today-2020-01-10-live-updates/">adamantly denied that the crash was caused by missiles</a>. And then the story changed again: <a href="https://apnews.com/21f4a92a2dfbc38581719664bdf6f38e">Iran finally admitted that it “unintentionally” shot down the airliner</a> and blamed “human error.”</p>
<h2>No weapons of mass destruction</h2>
<p>Certainly, initial claims by Western intelligence that the airliner was brought down by Iranian missiles deserved careful scrutiny. “Intelligence-based” assertions by George W. Bush and Dick Cheney that there <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/07/usa.iraq1">were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, after all, proved to be starkly wrong</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, it seemed a reasonable conclusion when extremely cautious leaders like Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau asserted that on the basis of strong evidence, including from Canadian intelligence services, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/is-iran-ukraine-plane/index.html">it was highly likely that Iranian missiles shot down the airliner</a> – an assertion backed by the British prime minister. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau attends a candlelight vigil for victims of the Ukraine International Airlines crash in Tehran, in Ottawa, on Jan. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/video/iran-plane-missile.html">There was also a video</a> verified by the <em>New York Times</em> that appeared to show an Iranian missile hitting a plane in the air near Tehran’s airport, and by a video trending on Iranian social media showed the same.</p>
<p>Further, there were reports that Iran <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-bulldozers-ukrainian-jet-crash-site-complicate-investigation-2020-1">has been bulldozing part of the crash site</a>, that it did not secure the site as protocol would require, that much of the ground evidence is now gone and that Tehran is refusing to hand over the black boxes as normal procedure would demand. </p>
<p>It all strongly reinforced the impression that the Iranian regime was dissembling about the cause of the crash.</p>
<h2>Larger picture of Iranian regime</h2>
<p>But what’s likely to be most disturbing to the Iranian people is the larger picture of the behaviour of the Iranian regime and its long-term implications. </p>
<p>The theocratic regime has efficiently and violently suppressed all domestic dissent, and carefully but brutally fostered an image of regional and internal invincibility. It’s moved relentlessly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/16/from-tehran-to-beirut-shia-militias-aim-to-firm-up-irans-arc-of-influence">to create a Shia arc controlled from Tehran, stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean</a>. There was an aura of invulnerability around Soleimani, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-are-iran-s-secretive-quds-forces-n1110156">who led the Quds Force</a>, representing the tip of the spear of Iranian imperial regional ambitions, domestic repression and world support for terrorism. </p>
<p>Soleimani seemed untouchable. Yet the Americans managed to so effectively reach him and remove him.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters demonstrate in Tehran, Iran, on Jan. 4, 2020, against the U.S. airstrike in Iraq that killed Iranian Revolutionary Guard Gen. Qassem Soleimani.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Iranian regime, which <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/iran-attack-us-troops-at-iraqi-base-in-revenge-operation-000247595.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAALUPVt_kihc07j8nx_6J3tQOpZGfmV1Urj0XuizXzUh3oPYBRPZk8tjzT3PGGhpr5vU5cTx6zs01AZPtsnBsWng8qW75p9uimzea55SJmoui_-7k9lIFsY0GRplfWk4VP--P9IJQUaoKJxblUoKhP1jgY2HHSRL6rkATxtSx7hIu">threatened “hard revenge”</a> for his targeted killing, settled for symbolic and feckless face-saving. Some of its ballistic missiles malfunctioned and others, either by design or prudent allied defence measures, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51042156">failed to inflict any casualties when fired at U.S. bases in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>The response revealed something more than just fecklessness. The efficiency that the Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated in repressing any internal dissent seems to have evaporated when faced with an unpredictable, narcissistic and vindictive opponent like U.S. President Donald Trump, who chose not to play the game by the old rules. </p>
<p>The Iranian response was not only uncharacteristically weak but it reflected the fear of an all-out confrontation. Iranian overreach met Trumpian unpredictability.</p>
<h2>Reckless and incompetent</h2>
<p>The admission by Iran that its missiles brought down the flight is more than just a terrible tragedy.</p>
<p>It’s also revealed a deadly combination of the regime’s breathtaking recklessness and monumental incompetence. That the Iranian regime did not shut down air traffic when it was firing missiles at Iraqi bases, as any normal procedure requires, was nothing short of gross negligence. </p>
<p>The deaths of so many civilians, mostly Iranians, demonstrates the regime’s weakness, incompetence and callous disregard for the safety of its own citizens. </p>
<p>To be sure, the regime in the future may well engage in asymmetrical warfare. Iranian military leaders are bloviating and making dire threats against the United States and the West, but the image of the regime’s invulnerability has been forever punctured by its corruption, melded with its carelessness and incompetence.</p>
<p>For now, the U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/politics/us-sanctions-iran-mnuchin/index.html">is imposing additional sanctions</a> on top of the already devastating ones, and Soleimani is gone. </p>
<p>The people of Iran <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/iran-anti-government-protests-us-support/">have been demonstrating en masse for months</a>, making it clear they don’t want to die fighting for Iraq, Syria or Lebanon or spend scarce resources that are so desperately needed at home. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-iran-could-spell-trouble-for-the-middle-east-at-large-89588">Protests in Iran could spell trouble for the Middle East at large</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>They may now more openly begin to blame the regime and become more emboldened.</p>
<p>Perhaps the tragedy of Flight PS752 may also finally convince the Iranian theocratic dictatorship that it’s time to stop pursuing dangerous foreign adventures.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurel Braun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Flight PS752 is more than just a terrible tragedy. It’s also revealed the potential future costs of Iran’s irresponsibility.
Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of Toronto
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/114694
2019-05-01T10:41:53Z
2019-05-01T10:41:53Z
US, Russia, China race to develop hypersonic weapons
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271583/original/file-20190429-194627-1fzvvu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=71%2C402%2C2661%2C1219&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A new-generation weapon, in white, launches from an older one, the B-52 bomber.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104467/x-51a-waverider/">Mike Cassidy/U.S. Air Force</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/2178620/nothing-matches-our-new-hypersonic-weapons-and-they">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a26015499/china-hypersonic-missiles-sink-us-aircraft-carriers/">China</a> have touted their progress in developing hypersonic vehicles, which fly much faster than the speed of sound, which is 767 mph. Hypersonic missiles are rocket-boosted to high altitude and may be launched from land, sea or air. They fly far faster than any other weapons – more than 3,000 mph and potentially <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-the-global-race-to-develop-hypersonic-weapons/">up to 10,000 mph</a> – which makes them difficult to identify, avoid or shoot down. After leading the development of this technology area for decades, the U.S. finds itself behind and investing heavily in the technology to try to keep up.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://aero.engin.umich.edu/people/iain-d-boyd/">professor of aerospace engineering</a> at the University of Michigan, and one of my primary research areas is in the development of computational models to help design hypersonic vehicles. The research is funded by the government and private industry. I have led studies on hypersonics for the government.</p>
<p>Over the past 60 years, U.S. interest in hypersonic vehicles has waxed and waned. An early success was the <a href="https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/north-american-x-15">X-15, a hypersonic test aircraft</a> with a maximum speed of 4,500 mph that was flown from 1959 to 1968. The X-15 flew 199 times and only experienced two failures, of which one resulted in the death of the pilot. It set the stage for the development of the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/main/index.html">space shuttle</a>, which flew from 1981 to 2011. The next ramp-up in hypersonic activity was the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-88-122">National Aero-Space Plane</a> Program, from 1986 to 1993, which never built a prototype. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271582/original/file-20190429-194637-1azpce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An earlier generation of hypersonic weapon: the X-51A WaveRider in 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.wpafb.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/400162/new-scramjet-has-promising-future/">U.S. Air Force</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A recent success was the X-51A, from 2005 to 2013, which set <a href="https://www.space.com/20967-air-force-x-51a-hypersonic-scramjet.html">a world endurance record</a> for sustained flight of a hypersonic vehicle powered by a high-speed propulsion engine called a <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/factsheets/X43A_2006_5.html">scramjet</a>. However, there were only four flights, of which flights <a href="https://newatlas.com/x-51a-waverider-second-flight/18942/">two</a> and <a href="https://spacenews.com/future-x-51a-test-program-uncertain-after-another-failure/">three</a> were not fully successful. In addition, there were no plans in place for any follow-on at the end of the X-51A program.</p>
<p>Now it seems the U.S. is back in the hypersonic effort in a serious way. The Pentagon has declared hypersonics to be its <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/03/06/hypersonics-highest-technical-priority-for-pentagon-rd-head/">number one research and development technical priority</a>. The president’s recent budget request proposes allocating <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/10/pentagon-eyes-windfall-as-trump-seeks-750-billion-defense-budget-military/">almost US$3 billion</a> to develop hypersonic weapons and defense systems against potential adversaries’ hypersonic weapons.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ir6eh9HUgUY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. and Russia are working to develop hypersonic weapons.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The race for hypersonic supremacy</h2>
<p>China and Russia have become increasingly interested in hypersonic weapons in recent years. Since 2005, <a href="https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/hypersonic-weapons-race/">China has published more research papers</a> at a key hypersonics conference than any other country or international group. The Chinese have invested in a number of new and impressive <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120072/china-builds-worlds-fastest-wind-tunnel-test-weapons">hypersonic test facilities</a>. And, China has conducted more <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-hails-successful-test-of-a-new-hypersonic-weapon-2018-8">hypersonic flight tests</a> recently than the U.S. </p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that his country’s military will begin deploying a <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/12/26/putin-oversees-hypersonic-weapon-test-says-its-invulnerable/">hypersonic weapon called the Avangard</a> sometime in 2019.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/SgzeS7-jgSY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Russia launches a test of its Avangard hypersonic weapon.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s not yet clear when those countries will be able to deploy hypersonic weapons in any significant numbers, which is why the U.S. has seized upon this moment to step up its efforts. The recent presidential <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA%20RDTE_PB20_Justification_Book.pdf">funding requests</a> for weapons development signal efforts to figure out how to deploy hypersonic weapons from air, sea and land.</p>
<h2>Need for a good defense</h2>
<p>Most of the U.S. spending appears to be aimed at developing new weapons – but that risks ignoring the key priority of defense. To counter Chinese and Russian development efforts, the Pentagon will need to invest in ways to detect, track and disable or destroy incoming hypersonic weapons.</p>
<p>It is not clear if the types of interceptors that have been developed for defense against slower weapons will be effective against hypersonic missiles. Entirely novel approaches may be needed to defeat this new threat. Examples include <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/12/03/high-energy_laser_systems_and_the_future_of_warfare_113998.html">high-power lasers</a> and beams of electromagnetic energy.</p>
<p>I believe that to avoid an important gap in U.S. defensive capabilities, American efforts in defense must at least keep up with the progress of other nations in developing hypersonic weapons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the American Physical Society, and the Royal Aeronautical Society. His research on hypersonics is funded by the Air Force, the Navy, and NASA. He is a paid consultant for several organizations, both non-profit and for-profit.</span></em></p>
Missiles that fly 3,000 mph or faster – much faster than the speed of sound – are the next generation of high-technology weapons.
Iain Boyd, Professor of Aerospace Engineering, University of Michigan
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/111251
2019-02-06T23:26:51Z
2019-02-06T23:26:51Z
The collapse of the US-Russia INF Treaty makes arms control a global priority
<p><em>UPDATE: The cold war-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired today, August 2, 2019.</em></p>
<p>On October 20 2018, US President Donald <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia">Trump announced he intends to withdraw</a> from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) – an arms control treaty with Russia that contributed to the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p>Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/us-russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-pompeo/index.html">confirmed this decision</a>, while Trump reiterated his <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/02/06/trump-state-of-the-union-2019-russia-inf-nuclear-treaty-sot-vpx.cnn">commitment to withdrawing</a> from the treaty in his State of the Union address. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.rt.com/news/450395-russia-suspends-inf-treaty/">Russia followed suit</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47134028">reports say</a> it is aiming to create new land-based missiles within the next two years. Reports also say the US is allocating funds for the research and development of such missiles. </p>
<p>So, what is the INF Treaty? And will its collapse lead to an increase of global nuclear tensions that marked the Cold War?</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/B9Ck_qri4H0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<h2>What is the INF?</h2>
<p>The INF Treaty took seven years to negotiate, contributed to the end of the Cold War and ushered in three decades of strategic stability. </p>
<p>US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the treaty on December 8, 1987 to give effect to their declaration that “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/12/11/joint-statement-by-reagan-gorbachev/cd990a8d-87a1-4d74-88f8-704f93c80cd3/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d53d121d75e8">a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought</a>”.</p>
<p>The treaty prohibited the development, testing and possession of ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with a range of 500km to 5,500km, whether armed with nuclear or conventional warheads.</p>
<p>A joint statement from Reagan and Gorbachev <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/12/11/joint-statement-by-reagan-gorbachev/cd990a8d-87a1-4d74-88f8-704f93c80cd3/?amp;utm_term=.d53d121d75e8&noredirect=on&utm_term=.56d20493420e">noted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This treaty is historic both for its objective – the complete elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear arms – and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It entered into force on June 1 1988. By its implementation deadline of June 1 1991, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">859 US and 1,752 Soviet</a> missiles had been destroyed.</p>
<p>Reflecting the dominant Cold War architecture of nuclear arms control, the INF Treaty was bilateral. US National Security Adviser <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903918104576500273389091098">John Bolton</a>, writing in 2011 as a private citizen, conceded the treaty had successfully “addressed a significant threat to US interests”. The threat was a surprise Soviet/Russian nuclear attack in Europe using missiles in the 500-5,500km range. </p>
<p>But the arms control architecture began fraying when US President George W. Bush <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html">pulled out of</a> the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001. Signed in 1972, the ABM controlled systems designed to counter “strategic” ballistic missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).</p>
<p>With the INF Treaty now dead and another arms control treaty, <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/">New Start</a>, set to expire in 2021, the world will be left without any limits on the two major nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. </p>
<h2>What now, for Europe?</h2>
<p>Since 2014, under the Obama administration, Washington has accused Russia of deploying nuclear-capable ground-launched missiles with a 2,000km range (the SSC-8) in Europe that are <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf">non-compliant with INF Treaty obligations</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/obamas-nobel-winning-vision-of-world-without-nuclear-weapons-is-still-distant-67566">Obama's Nobel-winning vision of 'world without nuclear weapons' is still distant</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The US decision to pull out of the treaty will deepen the strains in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Baltic countries insist Russia’s violations of the INF Treaty demand robust diplomatic and military counter-measures. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/21/uk-backs-trumps-nuclear-treaty-withdrawal-blames-russia-for-breakdown">UK has lined up firmly behind Washington</a>, blaming Russia for the breakdown. </p>
<p>But Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas, urged Washington to consider the consequences of withdrawal for Europe and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45931231">future of nuclear disarmament</a>. And the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/eu-us-nuclear-arms-race-inf-treaty-bolton-moscow">EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini</a>, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The INF contributed to the end of the Cold War and constitutes a pillar of European security architecture.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>NATO stands to lose more from the INF Treaty collapse than Russia. Russia will be able to move ahead rapidly with the development and deployment of short and medium-range ground-launched nuclear-capable missiles. But, unlike in the 1980s, the US would face difficulty in finding allies in Europe prepared to station such missiles on their territory. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1091354782999166982"}"></div></p>
<p>Also, would the host countries have a voice or veto on launching them and in choosing targets?</p>
<h2>What about the Asia-Pacific?</h2>
<p>In addition to alleged Russian violations, the US exit is motivated by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-trump-administration.html">China’s growing challenge</a> to US dominance in the Pacific. China and North Korea have been developing missile-delivery capabilities.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-may-not-yet-have-a-long-range-missile-but-its-progress-is-worrying-73115">North Korea may not yet have a long-range missile, but its progress is worrying</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>“To reduce the threat from INF-range missiles,” Bolton <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903918104576500273389091098">concluded</a> back in 2011, “we must either expand the INF Treaty’s membership or abrogate it entirely so that we can rebuild our own deterrent capabilities.” Trump has done the latter.</p>
<p>As a non-signatory, China is unconstrained by INF Treaty limits. About <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf">95% of its missiles</a> are in the prohibited range. This enables it to target US ships and bases from the mainland by relatively inexpensive conventional means. </p>
<p>Without INF restrictions, the US could develop and station ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles across the Asia–Pacific, which would force Beijing to divert significant military resources to defend its homeland.</p>
<p>China’s nuclear stockpile has remained relatively stable over many years despite the fluctuations in the Russian and US numbers. It is below 300, compared to nearly 7,000 and 6,500 <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">Russian and US warheads</a>, respectively. </p>
<p>This signifies a policy of deliberate restraint in China despite substantial growth in economic and technological capability since its first nuclear test 55 years ago.</p>
<p>The collapse of the INF Treaty and deployment of China-specific US missiles could compel China to institute counter-measures – such as rapidly expanding its warhead numbers and missile-delivery systems – to protect vital security interests, including nuclear assets deep in its interior. </p>
<p>China’s response in turn may trigger re-adjustments to India’s doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and could produce matching re-adjustments by Pakistan. The <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pakistan-has-more-nuclear-warheads-india-credible-deterrence/articleshow/64641056.cms">nuclear arsenals of both these countries</a> is presently limited to under 150 each. </p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, China, India and Pakistan could engage in a sprint to parity with the US with a rapid expansion of warhead numbers and missile-delivery capabilities, and perhaps even move to keeping a stock of nuclear weapons on high alert just like Russia and the US. </p>
<p>However, economic and technological limitations will constrain India and Pakistan’s ability to engage in an open-ended nuclear arms race.</p>
<h2>Expanding arms control</h2>
<p>The sensible alternative would be to begin urgently multilateralising the Cold War bilateral structure of nuclear arms control regimes. This means involving more countries than just Russia and the US in arms control treaties, and in particular involving China. Chinese nuclear expert <a href="https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/11/07/why-china-is-worried-about-end-of-inf-treaty-pub-77669?">Tong Zhao’s conclusion</a> holds for the whole world, not just China: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the era of relying on the US-Russia bilateral arms control structure is at its end. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Multilateralising the arms control negotiating process and resulting structure will avoid a free-for-all nuclear arms race and instead anchor strategic stability in arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, thanks to Donald Trump and John Bolton, we shall continue to live in interesting times.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111251/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ramesh Thakur is affiliated with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (<a href="http://www.a-pln.org">www.a-pln.org</a>), a nuclear policy advocacy group of which he is the co-convenor. </span></em></p>
The US has withdrawn from a major arms control treaty with Russia, and Russia followed suit. So, what was the treaty, and what happens now?
Ramesh Thakur, Professor of International Relations, Australian National University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/96402
2018-05-10T16:04:03Z
2018-05-10T16:04:03Z
Israeli rocket experience shows bomb shelters matter as much as interceptors
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218456/original/file-20180510-34021-1hrbdnr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This photo, provided May 10, 2018, by the government-controlled Syrian Central Military Media, shows Israeli missiles in the sky as others hit air defence positions and other military bases in Damascus, Syria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Syrian Central Military Media, via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict between Israel and Iran emerged from the shadows early Thursday morning. Forces allegedly backed by Iran <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Israel-strikes-dozens-of-Iranian-targets-in-Syria-556034">fired 20 rockets</a> from Syria into Israel’s <a href="https://www.google.ca/maps/@33.1613579,35.7181865,10z">Golan Heights</a> positions. Israel replied with 50 airstrikes against <a href="https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN1IA3GF-OCATP">Iran’s military infrastructure in Syria</a>.</p>
<p>Israel is worried about Iranian-backed forces like Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon. It claims they have <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/alleged-israeli-strike-in-syria-shows-readiness-to-pay-to-remove-seismic-threats/">100,000 to 150,000 rockets</a>. To keep them from getting more advanced missiles, Israel periodically launches airstrikes there. </p>
<p>The latest happened Tuesday, striking <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel/syrian-state-media-says-israel-attacked-just-after-us-quit-iran-deal-idUSKBN1I92MI">a weapons base in Syria</a>. One in April <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/alleged-israeli-strike-in-syria-shows-readiness-to-pay-to-remove-seismic-threats/">triggered an earthquake-scale explosion</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries face rocket and missile threats too. On Wednesday, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security/saudi-arabia-says-it-intercepts-houthi-missiles-over-riyadh-idUSKBN1IA100">Houthi rebels fired ballistic missiles</a> (allegedly Iranian-supplied) at Saudi Arabia. Iran’s growing missile arsenal alarms its Arab neighbours. Half a world away, the U.S. worries about North Korean ICBMs.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-crisis-echoes-israels-anti-rocket-strategy-82415">North Korea missile crisis echoes Israel's anti-rocket strategy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It’s not surprising then that missile interceptors are in fashion. Israel credited its <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-missiles-fly-a-look-at-israels-iron-dome-interceptor-94959">Iron Dome</a> system with intercepting four rockets on Thursday. Saudi Arabia employs American-made Patriots, though their <a href="https://www.apnews.com/b606a2b8e0024b508dd0dc374b7f3bf3/Videos-raise-questions-over-Saudi-missile-intercept-claims">effectiveness has been questioned</a>. In March, U.S. Congress approved an <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/22/congress-provides-33-billion-boost-for-missile-defense-in-fy18-spending-bill/">US$11.5 billion missile</a> defence budget. Some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/bipartisan-house-letter-seeks-iron-dome-use-for-us-army/">U.S. lawmakers want Iron Dome</a> too.</p>
<h2>Civil defences deserve attention</h2>
<p>By contrast, civil defences like warning sirens and bomb shelters receive less press coverage. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsrEY3YZqsI">Spectacular interceptor launches</a> are more photogenic than concrete block houses.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218458/original/file-20180510-34021-1scuj2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Israeli walks past bomb shelters in the southern Israeli town of Sdero.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dan Balilty)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But Israel’s own experience shows civil defences deserve at least as much attention as interceptors. That’s why it <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-08/israel-readies-bomb-shelters-in-north-fearing-iranian-attack">reopened public bomb shelters</a> near its northern border earlier this week.</p>
<p>That’s also why, from 2005 to 2014, Israel <a href="http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/2014-Gaza-Conflict-Factual-and-Legal-Aspects.aspx">spent US$384 million to reinforce buildings</a>. By 2014, more than <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/IDF-expands-missile-fortification-of-strategic-sites-442664">70 per cent of homes</a> had shelters. More shelters have been built since then, especially in the south. The northern region is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-northern-israel-unprepared-for-war-needs-huge-budget-increase/">less well-equipped</a>.</p>
<p>The country simultaneously invested another US$140 million in rocket warning systems. Loud speakers and cellphone apps give increasingly precise alerts. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/TwjEvR12C4c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">CNN.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Israel was divided into only 25 warning zones in 2006. <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Security-and-Defense-Revolutionizing-rocket-warnings-390900">That grew</a> to 127 in 2012 and 200 in 2014. The count hit 248 in 2015, and may soon reach <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.742305">3,000 zones</a>.</p>
<p>Even interceptor advocates agree civil defences save lives and prevent injuries. An <a href="https://besacenter.org/mideast-security-and-policy-studies/the-rocket-campaign-against-israel-during-the-2006-lebanon-war-2-2/">analysis of the 2006 Second Lebanon War</a> between Israel and Hezbollah noted that most rocket deaths involved people out in the open. Rocket fatality rates declined once warning systems were fine-tuned and residents learned to take shelter.</p>
<p>The benefits of civil defences have also been observed for rocket fire from Gaza. For example, they <a href="https://besacenter.org/mideast-security-and-policy-studies/the-missile-threat-from-gaza-from-nuisance-to-strategic-threat-3-2/">helped reduce casualties</a> during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Hamas militants there in 2008-2009. Some 617 rockets landed in Israel during the conflict. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.872024">One study</a> estimated that southern Israel’s defences reduced rocket casualties by at least a factor of three from 2000 to 2010. For example, suppose residents had not received warnings and taken shelter during Cast Lead. There could have been more than 423 rocket injuries instead of 141.</p>
<h2>Interceptors or shelters?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx028">My own research</a> indicates that losses on a per-rocket basis continued to drop after Cast Lead. That was despite rising rocket sizes and ranges.</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/05/iron-domes-success-in-israel-is-ironclad/">Interceptor advocates credit Iron Dome</a> for those decreases. But the data suggest civil defence enhancements were at least as effective as the interceptor deployments.</p>
<p>How much can be attributed to civil defence improvements? Consider <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pillar_of_Defense">Operation Pillar of Defense</a>. During eight days in 2012, Israeli airstrikes pounded Gaza while Hamas militants fired 1,506 rockets at Israel.</p>
<p>According to my calculations, death and injury rates per rocket in that conflict fell 36 per cent relative to Cast Lead. The improvements therefore prevented roughly three extra deaths and 135 extra injuries. That’s on top of the pre-existing protection provided by Cast Lead-era shelters.</p>
<p>The benefits were bigger during <a href="https://theconversation.com/problems-ahead-for-israel-after-pyrrhic-victory-in-gaza-30575">Operation Protective Edge</a> in 2014, which involved more than 3,000 rockets. My study suggests civil defence enhancements cut fatalities 71 per cent and casualties 75 per cent compared to Cast Lead. That avoided about five deaths and 250 injuries, again on top of the benefits from previously built defences.</p>
<h2>Other advantages</h2>
<p>Civil defences also offer advantages over interceptors. One is price. Iron Dome ammunition reportedly costs over $100,000 per shot. Other interceptors are even pricier. By contrast, shelters and warning systems involve minimal usage costs.</p>
<p>Civil defences also tolerate large salvos almost as well as individual rockets. By contrast, too many rockets arriving at once could <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1309">overwhelm an Iron Dome battery</a>.</p>
<p>That risk hasn’t mattered against Hamas’ relatively small salvos. But it could be a problem against Hezbollah forces potentially firing 1,000 rockets daily, or against attackers using decoys to distract interceptors. (<a href="http://www.israelhayom.com/2018/03/27/idf-official-we-dont-take-chances-when-it-comes-to-intercepting-gaza-fire/">Machine gun bullets</a> apparently will do the trick.)</p>
<p>Of course, interceptors offer advantages too. Successful interceptions protect people and property. Shelters, on the other hand, only protect people, and only if they’re inside.</p>
<p>The best approach combines interceptors and civil defences in mutual support. Unfortunately, even that can’t completely prevent missile deaths and injuries. It also doesn’t prevent their disruptions to daily life and economic activity — all factors that leaders in Israel and elsewhere should consider carefully as they navigate these tense times.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Flashy interceptor systems attract media and government attention. But bomb shelters and warning systems are at least as important in the midst of missile strikes.
Michael J. Armstrong, Associate professor of operations research, Goodman School of Business, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/95473
2018-05-10T15:21:41Z
2018-05-10T15:21:41Z
I go undercover into arms fairs – and secretly draw caricatures of the ‘hell’ I find there
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218081/original/file-20180508-34015-wl9r39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=202%2C155%2C2946%2C2142&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The arms multinational BAE Systems is in the final stages of a deal to sell <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-saudi-bae-systems/britain-to-finalize-typhoon-plane-order-talks-with-saudi-idUSKCN1GL26D">48 Typhoon fighter jets</a> to Saudi Arabia, despite mounting evidence of war crimes in Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks against civilians but the Saudi-led coalition has bombed Yemeni schools, markets and hospitals, <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/69215/">killing more than 10,000 people</a> including children, while survivors face disease and starvation with the collapse of infrastructure. </p>
<p>Fragments of bombs made in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/exposed-british-made-bombs-used-civilian-targets-yemen">Britain</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/yemen-evidence-indicates-us-made-bomb-was-used-in-attack-on-msf-hospital/">the US</a> have been found in the debris of some of these attacks, yet both countries <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-35898999/uk-made-bomb-destroyed-yemen-factory">continue to sell arms</a> to the Saudi regime.</p>
<p>Such deals take place in arms fairs, away from the public eye. I have drawn undercover in fairs in Europe and the Middle East for the past ten years, in an attempt to understand how international arms sales are normalised and legitimised. Access is restricted, but I get in by dressing up as a security consultant with a suit, heels, fake pearls, and a sham company. My performance is a metaphor for the charade of respectability in the industry.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sales rep.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Arms fairs emerged from the globalisation of the military industry in the late 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, defence budgets were cut. There was a brief opportunity to convert military production facilities into civil areas such as medical equipment, transport and renewable energy; instead, arms companies merged into multinationals, expanded into security, and focused on a global market. Arms fairs were set up to provide venues for these deals. </p>
<p>The largest, DSEI (the Defence Security Exhibition International) takes place every two years in London, with similar fairs in Paris, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. Here, weapons are displayed to an international clientele including countries at war, unstable states and repressive regimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/dsei/delegations">DSEI welcomes</a> 75% of the countries that the UK Foreign Office <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015">has listed</a> as “Human Rights Priorities”, where “the worst, or greatest number of, human rights violations take place”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A tank salesman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Inside a fair, missiles, bombs and bullets are arranged under spotlights; guns are available to try out for weight and size, and to aim at imaginary targets; mannequins pose in camouflage offering private military services and tear gas; tanks are open for viewing. “Lethality” is a sales slogan. Manufacturers boast of the precision of their products, as if war could be refined through science. </p>
<p>As with most advertising, such claims turn out to be exaggerated when the weapons are actually used. Bombing is <a href="http://www.comw.org/pda/0402rm9.html">inevitably inaccurate</a>, compromised by an inbuilt margin of error, malfunctions, mistaken intelligence and the weather. The difference between a combatant and civilian is also increasingly unclear, as Yemen shows. Yet such claims make war more likely.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">String quartet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many stalls hand out gifts as an alternative to business cards – stress-balls in the shape of bombs, grenades and tanks, branded sweets and pens. A gas mask manufacturer has condoms with the slogan, “The ultimate protection”. Waiting staff hover with trays of wine, beer and grapes, while a string quartet plays Handel and Mozart.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grenade stress relief.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are also promotions. The BAE subsidiary Bofors has a live satellite link to its weapons testing facility in Sweden where a military vehicle explodes in a cloud of light and metal. Alongside the video screens, bowls are filled with toffees in wrappers saying, “Welcome to hell”. Brochures explain that the Bofors test centre is “Hell for your product, heaven for your investment”. The impact on people of the weapons that pass through the test centre is oddly missing. In an arms fair, missiles are forever products.</p>
<p>How to draw this? My drawings veer between caricature and observational methods. Mainly, I focus on the etiquette that gives the industry an appearance of respectability – the handshakes, pinstriped suits, hospitality, and violins. I also draw cracks in the façade – a lewd advance, a rep slumped in a chair with his head in his hands, the continual, desperate drinking. Brecht used the Latin word <em>gestus</em> to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Brecht_On_Theatre.html?id=W1iCBAAAQBAJ&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">describe</a> an attitude that expresses a social role or condition. In his plays, gestures are frozen so they seem strange. Perhaps drawing can be used in a similar way.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Drinking.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Or, perhaps the gifts are sufficient in themselves to reveal the strange amorality of an industry that uses war as a sales opportunity. The BAE Bofors toffees might be intended to convey the impact of a test centre on weapons with the slogan “Welcome to hell” – but sweets are usually meant for children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jill Gibbon receives funding from the Independent Social Research Foundation. </span></em></p>
There’s a disturbing disconnect between the polite etiquette of arms fairs and the hell that their products create.
Jill Gibbon, Senior Lecturer in Graphic Arts, Leeds Beckett University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/94959
2018-04-15T19:58:12Z
2018-04-15T19:58:12Z
As missiles fly, a look at Israel’s Iron Dome interceptor
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214760/original/file-20180413-566-1l7tinx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Israeli soldier walks next to an Iron Dome rocket defense battery near the southern city of Sderot, Israel, in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tsafrir Abayov)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the American-led missile salvo against Syria comes a barrage of <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/15/602618667/debates-ensue-after-western-missiles-hit-syria">interception claims and counterclaims</a>. Russia says Syrian air defences <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-rockets/most-rockets-in-western-attacks-on-syria-were-intercepted-russia-idUSKBN1HL0AY">shot down most of the missiles</a>. But the U.S. says <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1493749/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/">all 105 cruise missiles reached their targets</a>. That’s despite some 40 Syrian interceptors being fired.</p>
<p>Given this new missile interception controversy, it’s worth looking at another ongoing one. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx028">Newly-published research</a> investigates the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome rocket interceptor systems.</p>
<h2>Iron Dome arrives</h2>
<p>Iron Dome began operating in Israel in 2011. The systems achieved international fame during the country’s 2012 and 2014 Gaza Strip conflicts. But they also triggered controversy about their true performance.</p>
<p>Each Iron Dome system includes a radar, computer and several launchers. The radar detects incoming rockets. The computer then estimates the impact points. If any rockets threaten valued targets, the launchers shoot them down.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-israels-iron-dome-anti-missile-system-29746">Explainer: Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile system</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The systems cost Israel billions to develop, build and reload. The United States contributed <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/14/fact-sheet-memorandum-understanding-reached-israel">$1.3 billion</a> of that, and recently budgeted <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/22/congress-provides-33-billion-boost-for-missile-defense-in-fy18-spending-bill/">several hundred millions more</a>.</p>
<p>Five Iron Dome systems served during Israel’s 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense against Gaza. They claimed <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.644042">421 rocket interceptions</a>. That’s 85 per cent of the rockets they engaged. Observers declared the technology a “<a href="http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Bankrupting-terrorism-one-interception-at-a-time">game-changer that heralds the end of rockets</a>.”</p>
<p>Nine systems participated in 2014’s Operation Protective Edge. They claimed <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/iron-dome-to-get-mysterious-upgrade/">735 rocket and mortar shell interceptions</a>. That’s 92 per cent of those engaged.</p>
<h2>Skepticism about missile interceptions</h2>
<p>However, missile interception is difficult and often doubted, as in the Syrian case. Analysts shot down American claims of <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-patriot-missile-the-ultimate-missile-shield-or-the-25137">intercepting Iraqi missiles</a> during the 1991 Gulf War. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-oil/saudi-says-it-shot-down-houthi-missiles-over-riyadh-and-southern-cities-idUSKBN1HI0SL">Saudi Arabia’s recent interceptions</a> of Houthi missiles <a href="https://www.apnews.com/b606a2b8e0024b508dd0dc374b7f3bf3/Videos-raise-questions-over-Saudi-missile-intercept-claims">are likewise under fire</a>.</p>
<p>For Iron Dome, videos of interception attempts lack enough detail to confirm the rockets’ warheads were destroyed. Critics therefore have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/israels-iron-dome-system-is-at-center-of-debate.html?mcubz=0">questioned Israel’s claims</a>. One U.S. analyst argued the effective interception rate might have been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-21/israels-iron-dome-weapons-expert-warns-of-major-flaws">30 to 40 per cent</a>. Another put it <a href="http://www.technologyreview.com/view/528991/an-explanation-of-the-evidence-of-weaknesses-in-the-iron-dome-defense-system/">below 10 per cent</a>. An Israeli critic called the system <a href="http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-defense-prize-winner-shefer-iron-dome-is-a-bluff-1000954085">a bluff</a>.</p>
<p>(The technology’s occasional missteps don’t help. In 2016, a system <a href="http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=36503">fired at mortar shells falling outside of Israel</a>. Last month, one <a href="http://www.israelhayom.com/2018/03/27/idf-official-we-dont-take-chances-when-it-comes-to-intercepting-gaza-fire/">launched interceptors at machine gun bullets</a>.)</p>
<p>In response, Iron Dome supporters have pointed to <a href="https://besacenter.org/mideast-security-and-policy-studies/israels-air-missile-defense-2014-gaza-war/">declining property damage rates</a>. Israel had no interceptors during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. In that conflict, the country suffered 6.7 property damage insurance claims per rocket. The rate dropped to 2.9 in 2012 and 1.2 in 2014. Supporters argued the steep decrease after Iron Dome’s arrival proved its “<a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/05/iron-domes-success-in-israel-is-ironclad/">ironclad success</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214763/original/file-20180413-105522-13vvw66.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Average property damage insurance claims per rocket during three Israeli conflicts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A closer look</h2>
<p>But that comparison overlooks some important details. The first is Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. That conflict had just 2.4 damage claims per rocket. With that included, Iron Dome’s 2011 debut coincides with slightly <em>increased</em> damage rates.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214619/original/file-20180412-570-10s58l8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Average property damage insurance claims per rocket during four Israeli conflicts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second oversight concerns rocket differences. In 2006, Hezbollah militants in Lebanon fired thousands of <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/images/hamas-rockets-2014.jpg%7C%7C%7Cartillery%20rockets">Grad artillery rockets</a> at Israel. Several hundred heavier missiles reinforced the barrage.</p>
<p>By contrast, Hamas militants in Gaza mixed Grads with smaller Qassam rockets. The average Gaza rocket warhead consequently was about half the size of those from Lebanon.</p>
<p>Scaling the damage rates relative to warhead weight can adjust for these differences. The damage claims per “standardized” rocket then become 4.4, 3.9, 4.3, and 1.5, respectively. The first three numbers’ closeness suggests Iron Dome had minimal influence in 2012. But the subsequent large drop implies it was very influential in 2014.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214622/original/file-20180412-543-kq6z5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Average property damage insurance claims per standardized rocket warhead during four Israeli conflicts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Estimating performance</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx028">My new research</a> investigates this topic in more detail. It suggests Iron Dome intercepted 59 to 75 per cent of all threatening rockets during Protective Edge four years ago. “Threatening” means the rockets struck populated areas or were intercepted beforehand. The interceptions likely avoided $42 to $86 million in property damage. They also prevented three to six deaths and 120 to 250 injuries.</p>
<p>Those percentages include rockets anywhere in Israel. Therefore, the claim of a 92 per cent interception rate for only the areas defended by Iron Dome seems plausible.</p>
<p>By contrast, the 2012 Pillar of Defense interceptions apparently blocked less than 32 per cent of threatening rockets. They prevented at most two deaths, 110 injuries and US$7 million in damage.</p>
<p>The data also imply the number of rocket hits on populated areas was understated. Conversely, the number of threatening rockets seems overstated. The effective interception rate for Pillar of Defense therefore may have been markedly less than the reported 85 per cent.</p>
<h2>Improved but not impenetrable</h2>
<p>These results suggest the Iron Dome debate has been too polarized. The system’s initial value may have been largely symbolic. But it later become very influential.</p>
<p>That’s good news for Israel and its American funder. It’s also reassuring for potential Iron Dome buyers facing <a href="https://theconversation.com/missile-interception-from-yemen-to-the-south-china-sea-84676">missile</a> threats in other parts of the world.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-crisis-echoes-israels-anti-rocket-strategy-82415">North Korea missile crisis echoes Israel's anti-rocket strategy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Only Azerbaijan has purchased any systems so far. But the U.S. Army may buy some for <a href="http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-us-army-to-test-iron-dome-for-use-in-europe-1001204453">short-range air defence</a>. (<a href="http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-canada-buys-iron-dome-radar-technology-from-israel-1001056948">Canada only bought the radar</a>.)</p>
<p>However, the system isn’t “the end of rockets.” Attackers can counter interceptors by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1309">firing rockets in large batches</a>. Indeed, Israel’s opponents keep acquiring more rockets. <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-nonviolent-protesters-exploited-by-hamas-but-feared-by-israel-94255">Hamas in strife-filled Gaza</a> reportedly has <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-official-Hamas-has-replenished-its-missile-capability-since-2014-war-480175">10,000</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hezbollah-matters-so-much-in-a-turbulent-middle-east-88111">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> has <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Home-Front-preparing-for-thousands-of-rockets-480096">120,000</a>. That latter arsenal would severely strain Israeli interceptors during any future “<a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/with-iran-operating-in-syria-israel-girds-itself-for-first-northern-war-1.4553594">Northern War</a>.”</p>
<p>Similarly, sophisticated attackers use technology to make their missiles hard to intercept. In their Syria strike, America and its allies used <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-tomahawk-cruise-missile-how-trump-could-strike-syria-25338?page=show">difficult-to-detect cruise missiles</a>. Defenders can’t intercept what their radars can’t see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Iron Dome rocket interceptors achieved international fame during Israel’s 2012 and 2014 Gaza conflicts. Research suggests the systems provided substantial protection in 2014, but not two years earlier.
Michael J. Armstrong, Associate professor of operations research, Goodman School of Business, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/91840
2018-03-06T03:38:31Z
2018-03-06T03:38:31Z
China’s quest for techno-military supremacy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209036/original/file-20180306-146700-1mczeha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's new J-20 stealth fighter was placed into combat service in February.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://photos.aap.com.au/search/j-20">AAP/EPA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese President Xi Jinping wants to transform China’s military into the world’s most powerful force <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/27/content_33756453.htm">by 2050</a>. And he could be on track to do it. </p>
<p>On the opening day of its National People’s Congress in Beijing yesterday, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/china-boosts-defence-spending--rattling-its-neighbours--nerves-10013490">China reported</a> a defence budget of ¥1.11 trillion ($A225 billion) for 2018. That represents an 8.1% increase in its defence budget, compared to a 7% increase last year.</p>
<p>China’s military has modernised rapidly in recent years. Since January alone it has demonstrated new capabilities in stealth fighter jets, drones, naval ships and advanced missiles.</p>
<p>Chinese scientists are also working to develop revolutionary technologies that would change the way wars are fought – and the way we live.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asia-is-set-for-a-difficult-year-in-2018-much-of-it-centred-around-china-89957">Asia is set for a difficult year in 2018 – much of it centred around China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Challenging US military might</h2>
<p>While China still lags the US in overall technological capability, it has narrowed the gap substantially. In the coming decades, it is poised to <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/2081771/be-afraid-china-path-global-technology-dominance">challenge</a> US technological supremacy in key fields such as artificial intelligence, supercomputing and quantum information science. </p>
<p>What explains China’s rise as a technological power? </p>
<p>First, it has leveraged the innovation of other countries via <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-formally-begins-probe-of-china-technology-transfer-1503091630">technology transfers</a>, and the <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2111230/chinas-plan-buy-foreign-technology-meets-increasing-resistance-us">acquisition of foreign companies</a> and talent. It has also been reverse-engineering Western technology, and conducting state-sponsored industrial espionage. </p>
<p>According to one <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units.html">security analysis</a>, between 2006 and 2013 the Chinese military stole confidential data from more than 140 organisations around the world. The problem was so serious that in May 2014, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor">US Department of Justice</a> indicted five Chinese military hackers for cyber-espionage activities against US companies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-beijing-the-greatest-threat-to-chinas-national-security-is-not-the-kim-regime-it-is-the-us-88271">For Beijing, the greatest threat to China's national security is not the Kim regime: it is the US</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Second, China has been able to mobilise resources for priority technology sectors and research and development (R&D) projects in a way that many democracies are simply unable to do because of the limits of government power or popular mandate. Large state subsidies, government R&D funding, tailored regulations, market barriers and lax individual rights (such as privacy) protection have given Chinese domestic companies an edge over their foreign competitors.</p>
<p>A good example of this is the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-china-s-tech-sector-making-internet-empire">rise of China’s internet sector</a> to global prominence, as represented by giants such as <a href="https://www.tencent.com/en-us/index.html">Tencent</a> and <a href="https://www.alibaba.com/">Alibaba</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, China has substantially increased its R&D expenditure in recent years. From 2012 to 2017, China’s annual <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-r-d/china-spends-279-bln-on-rd-in-2017-science-minister-idUSKCN1GB018">R&D spending rose 70.9% to ¥1.76 trillion</a> ($A356 billion). The <a href="https://www.nsf.gov/nsb/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=244465">US National Science Board</a> expects China to surpass the US in R&D investment, in purchasing power terms, by the end of this year.</p>
<h2>China’s new superweapons</h2>
<p>Here are a few examples of how China is making rapid progress in high-tech fields with military applications. </p>
<h3>Hypersonic technology</h3>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209006/original/file-20180306-146645-u4yo4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Chinese hypersonic gliding vehicle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Chinese_Hypersonic_Gliding_Vehicle.jpg">Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Hypersonic technology could one day allow us to travel from <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11433-017-9117-8.pdf">Beijing to New York</a> in about two hours, rather than the 13 hours it currently takes. China is developing a <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-worlds-leader-super-deadly-hypersonic-weapons-china-19437">hypersonic glide vehicle</a> known as DF-ZF to make its nuclear and non-nuclear missiles extremely fast, manoeuvrable and capable of defeating existing missile defence systems.</p>
<p>To support this effort, China is building the world’s most advanced <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120072/china-builds-worlds-fastest-wind-tunnel-test-weapons">hypersonic wind tunnel</a> for testing the extreme conditions of supersonic flight. While an operational hypersonic missile is still years away, once developed it would be a formidable weapon. It could also have a <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html">destabilising effect</a> on strategic relations between China and other powers by compressing the time window for decision-making in a conflict or crisis situation. </p>
<h3>Quantum technology</h3>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=968&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=968&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=968&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1216&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1216&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209009/original/file-20180306-146675-1s7z2gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1216&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A quantum computer.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/criminalintent/39660636671/in/photolist-23qF8wx-FKkLdU-RmgoS5-8Fpeo3-GGHbYc-242tG5U-Ga36mB-Eqbkme-pfqD13-DLP9MP-9ewuVC-22GXJmB-8FpbEU-aVPr3R-ST8rZN-o9cwnW-6c1ik6-RmgpA9-Eqbkev-BQdkR9-ahqS6j-4CLK2R-b5UZL-GsgM63-21PZKhw-Y3VJ3b-22gLCVp-4CR1oA-agJ3xP-Sp2BiY-33fGbC-CAC6Cu-Fw7aTN-GLnXhx-7gWkWU-8tVxvC-4BQ75w-CmGCCQ-dcwgMW-awGYmv-qiTLff-8ie1Gd-8ie1uA-eAB5A-hrxrQc-245mbsx-D1r1VN-215Fn2t-gymfZ-5JUN3F/">Flickr/Lars Plougmann</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another area of China’s focus is quantum technology, which uses subatomic mechanics to process and transmit information in a fraction of the time required by existing technology. </p>
<p>China is making rapid headway in quantum communication, computing and cryptography. In August 2016, China launched the world’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2017-06-16/chinese-satellite-breaks-quantum-entanglement-distance-record/8620240">first quantum satellite</a>. This enabled Chinese researchers to conduct cutting-edge experiments in quantum entanglement and teleportation. To win the quantum race, China announced last year that it will build the <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2110563/china-building-worlds-biggest-quantum-research-facility">world’s largest quantum research facility</a> at a cost of ¥76 billion ($A15.4 billion).</p>
<p>Quantum technology would enable the Chinese military to set up virtually unbreakable communication networks. It would also provide it with overwhelming computing power for information operations, such as the decryption of secret communications by adversaries.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-quantum-satellite-could-make-data-breaches-a-thing-of-the-past-66863">China's quantum satellite could make data breaches a thing of the past</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h3>Electromagnetic technology</h3>
<p>China is also in the advanced stages of developing an electromagnetic railgun. This supergun uses electromagnetic energy to shoot powerful projectiles over vast distances at incredible speed. These projectiles are aerodynamic and their power comes from the kinetic damage generated by the intense speed at which they travel.</p>
<p>Recent photos circulated on <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2132263/chinas-military-fires-world-first-revolutionary-rail">Chinese social media</a> show what is suspected to be an experimental electromagnetic railgun mounted on the bow of the Chinese navy ship. This indicates that China may soon be the first in world to test such a weapon at sea, where it could revolutionise naval combat. In contrast, the US Navy is <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/navy-electromagnetic-railgun-budget/">winding down</a> its railgun research program because of resource constraints and shifting priorities. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"959054896350703616"}"></div></p>
<p>The above examples are only a few among dozens of high-tech fields in which China is making rapid progress. Others include biotechnology, robotics, supercomputing, nanotechnology, advanced materials, space technology, and artificial intelligence. In fact, the Chinese government has identified <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242704112_China's_15-year_Science_and_Technology_Plan">17 engineering and science megaprojects</a> that are key to China’s economic and military strength. These include advanced satellites, large nuclear reactors, large aircraft and high-end electronic chips.</p>
<p>China’s continued rise as a technological giant will have profound implications for its military power as Beijing leverages civilian technology for its military. This effort is so important that President Xi considers it a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/12/c_134062403.htm">top priority</a>. To underscore this, Xi created a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/22/c_136004750.htm">powerful commission</a> under his direct leadership to provide high-level guidance and oversight.</p>
<p>Much hinges on how Beijing chooses to use its new-found military and technological might. Indeed, China’s extensive geopolitical ambitions and increasingly assertive foreign policy are <a href="http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/photos-reveal-chinas-south-china-sea-island-fortresses-are-complete/news-story/776e1a695fb41ccb7e47a436594c1530">ominous signs</a> that foreshadow the challenges ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Ni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
China has upped its defence spending and is investing heavily in revolutionary technologies that could transform its military into the world’s most powerful force by the middle of the century.
Adam Ni, Researcher, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/90273
2018-01-17T18:30:49Z
2018-01-17T18:30:49Z
Life, death and politics in Hawaii: 125 years of colonial rule
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202326/original/file-20180117-53295-100482p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The fear and distress caused by a false missile alarm last week on Jan. 13 in Hawaii is part of the 125 year legacy of American occupation. Here, cars drive past a highway sign: "Missile alert in error. There is no threat" on the H-1 Freeway in Honolulu. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Cory Lum/Civil Beat via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The effects of a political overthrow that happened 125 years ago in Hawaii could not have been felt more vividly this month. The fear and distress that cast a shadow over the Hawaiian islands on Saturday morning during a false missile alert is part of the legacy of American occupation. </p>
<p>No one should have received that abrupt notice that their lives would end in roughly 12 minutes, the time it takes a missile to travel from North Korea to the islands. Least of all the people whose land, food, culture, and traditions have been under siege for a century and a quarter.</p>
<p>Since moving to Honolulu five years ago to begin a position as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/milk-a-symbol-of-neo-nazi-hate-83292">professor at the University of Hawaii law school</a>, I have felt ambivalent at best about my place here. Outsiders meet this ambivalence with disbelief. They think I live in paradise. What they are missing is how it feels, and what it means, to know that my life here arises from and relies upon the oppression of the people whose land I live, work and play on.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202332/original/file-20180117-53307-1lcgalp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Jan. 17, 1893, Hawaii’s monarchy was overthrown when a group of businessmen and sugar planters forced Queen Liliuokalani to abdicate.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/jan-17-1893-hawaiian-monarchy-overthrown-by-america-backed-businessmen/">In 1893, American businessmen overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy</a> to avoid taxes on their sugar imports to the United States. In the name of profit, they worked tirelessly to eradicate Hawaiian culture and language — everything that could make Hawaiian resistance stronger. </p>
<p>Their efforts did not succeed. Resistance is as strong as ever. On the anniversary of Queen Liliukalani’s forced abdication, thousands march in peace to protest the illegal overthrow, honour the Hawaiian monarchs and celebrate Hawaiian culture and traditions.</p>
<p>Ongoing U.S. occupation and militarization of the islands puts Hawaiians in perpetual peril. Pearl Harbor brought this danger tragically to life. Saturday’s missile alert represented the culmination of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-north-korea-military-action-will-be-a-disaster-so-a-more-patient-thoughtful-solution-is-required-76318">chain of irresponsible exchanges between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un</a>, leader of the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK). </p>
<p>During the same time period, Trump has repeatedly <a href="https://theconversation.com/shithole-countries-trump-uses-the-rhetoric-of-dictators-89850">made his disdain for Black and brown people clear</a>. He is more than willing to sacrifice lives he does not value to prove he has a bigger button or to distract from disastrous domestic policies. He can tolerate the casualties of some whites and soldiers when the majority of the hurt will fall upon <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-lies-are-white-nationalist-gospel-90089">people historically subject to American policies of hatred and exclusion</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1338&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202324/original/file-20180117-53324-1nx6irh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1338&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The missile alarm was loud.</span>
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</figure>
<h2>A loud alarm</h2>
<p>On Saturday, I was talking and playing with my eight-year-old twins in bed when my phone gave off a loud alarm, the one that usually signals a flash flood. It was a clear, sunny day. I picked up the phone and read the message: “Ballistic missile threat incoming to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter.” Then the five words that made it real: “This is not a drill.” </p>
<p>In that split second, fears of nuclear devastation that I had harboured since I was a young child in Toronto flared up. I quickly pushed down the guilt I felt at moving my children to a military target. At not moving them away when the danger first arose, and as it built. </p>
<p>Only the day before, in the midst of talks of possible reconciliation, <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/trump-officials-mull-north-korea-strike-bloody-nose.html">Trump threatened to give North Korea a “bloody nose.”</a> Military analysts <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-for-using-military-force-against-north-korea-89747">wrote that a nuclear strike would be a logical response</a> to this threat, providing the only opportunity to take out the U.S. Pacific Command, located at Pearl Harbor. I had no reason not to take the warning seriously. And there was no time to think. I had to move.</p>
<p>I threw on clothes and told the kids to do the same. I told them why. I did not have the energy or forethought to lie. I did not have an emergency kit. I grabbed onto their hands and ran across the street to Safeway. </p>
<p>I thought it would have an enclosed, safe room. It didn’t. We went into the bathroom. One of my children was so brave. She stood close to me, silently. The other couldn’t stop crying because we were about to die. I held them both and told them to be positive, to think that everything would be alright. We waited. </p>
<p>Eventually, news of a false alert appeared on my phone, but I didn’t know what to believe. Someone knocked on the bathroom door. He confirmed the rumours of a false alert, but still there was no all-clear. It didn’t come until 10 minutes later. Then I could allow myself to feel again. But the feelings are too painful to hold for very long.</p>
<p>My mind understands that a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42677604">state employee made an error</a>, in the context of a flawed system, that created unnecessary panic. My heart stands ready for the next alert, when I may not be lucky enough to hold my kids in our last moments. It hurts now to let them out of my sight.</p>
<p>Some of my friends reacted completely differently. They had no desire to survive a nuclear blast. When the alert came, they went outside and looked to the west, where they would see the blast and die quickly and peacefully. </p>
<p>Some of my neighbours who, like me, came to this island to take jobs that should never have been theirs, for a university that has reneged time and again on its promise to be a Hawaiian place of learning, contemplated arming themselves. They want guns to protect themselves in case chaos erupts next time we get the alert. </p>
<p>The “peaceful” overthrow of the Hawaiian kingdom has been anything but, even 125 years later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Freeman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The fear and distress caused by a false missile alarm last week in Hawaii is part of the 125- year legacy of American occupation.
Andrea Freeman, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/84115
2017-09-18T00:09:30Z
2017-09-18T00:09:30Z
Will China do the right thing about North Korea?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186110/original/file-20170914-5772-1kaajx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3917%2C2597&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this April 15, 2017, file photo, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves during a military parade in Pyongyang, North Korea.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Wong Maye-E, File)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s master strategists are making sure the latest <a href="https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/un-security-council-unanimously-steps-up-sanctions-against-north-korea/article36225030/">United Nations sanctions</a> cannot extinguish the menace that North Korea poses to world peace. </p>
<p>Last week, Beijing again <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-calls-for-monday-vote-on-new-north-korea-sanctions/2017/09/11/4b9959f0-96a6-11e7-af6a-6555caaeb8dc_story.html">manipulated the UN into diluting sanctions</a> so they won’t seriously impede North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons capable of striking targets as far away as Europe and North America.</p>
<p>The problem with the “deter and contain” strategy represented by sanctions is that it won’t deter or contain anything. The minute North Korea demonstrates its ability to hit Los Angeles or Chicago with a nuclear bomb, the dynamic between Pyongyang and the rest of the world changes sharply.</p>
<p>In the meantime, China also knows that imposing truly harsh sanctions on North Korea could simply backfire. </p>
<p>If Beijing were to cut off oil and food supports to its isolationist neighbour, North Korea’s likely response would be to lash out militarily at China, putting Beijing into an extremely awkward dilemma.</p>
<h2>North Korea starved its own citizens</h2>
<p>Even if sanctions did inflict economic pain and harm on North Korea, that regime’s cold indifference to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/how-kim-jong-il-starved-north-korea/250244/">the horrendous famine</a> in the 1990s — when millions of its own citizens starved to death — suggests the nuclear program will continue unabated, domestic suffering be damned. </p>
<p>Many children in North Korea, after all, <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/09/18/Stunted-growth-acute-anemia-persists-in-North-Korean-children-says-report/4351442628108/">are stunted in growth</a> due to a lack of nourishing food, even as elites live in luxury with their German cars and French cognac.</p>
<p>North Korea and China actually share the same end game: Compel the U.S. to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-trump/532113/">abandon its defence</a> of South Korea. </p>
<p>Beijing would love nothing more than the withdrawal of American troops from regional bases in Korea and Japan. But while Pyongyang wants to achieve that through threats of nuclear apocalypse, everyone else — including China — knows that the only realistic path forward to some kind of new era is via political change in Pyongyang.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186108/original/file-20170914-22524-183v5w3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This image, taken from an August video by North Korea’s state television network, purportedly shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un receiving a briefing in Pyongyang about his military’s plans to launch missiles near Guam.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(KRT via AP Video)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For nearly 30 years, attempts to engage with North Korea have failed miserably; talks are simply a delaying tactic for Pyongyang. </p>
<p>The UN, of course, has a responsibility to protect Korean people trapped in a nightmare regime. But it needs full collaboration from China and Russia to make it happen.</p>
<p>Until the 1970s, North Korea — propped up by China and Warsaw Pact nations — was <a href="http://asiancenturyinstitute.com/development/650-poverty-and-prosperity-in-north-and-south-korea">relatively prosperous,</a> arguably providing more social justice for its people than did the U.S.-backed military dictatorships in the South. </p>
<h2>North Korea embraced Leninism</h2>
<p>But in the 1980s, ignoring warnings from China’s leadership at the time, <a href="http://www.scmp.com/article/727755/kim-il-sungs-secret-history">Kim Il Sung</a> decided to make North Korea the first Stalinist system where hereditary leadership would pass from father to son. </p>
<p>As China <a href="http://www.chinaorbit.com/china-economy/china-politics/china-economic-reform.html">abandoned its failing Maoist political economy</a> in favour of “opening and reform,” North Korea clung to the stagnant norms of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Leninism">Leninism,</a> with its disastrous “planned economy” and an ideological totalitarianism to sustain the Kim family’s grip on power.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a seismic shift was changing the balance on the Korean peninsula. South Korea’s political and economic transformations led to the free, democratic and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/24/south-korea-sees-high-growth-in-2017-pushes-consumption-and-jobs.html">economically robust</a> society it enjoys today.</p>
<p>As North Korea’s stubborn dysfunctionality deepens, China must be realizing that the time has come to act like a world leader and cooperate with the United States, Japan and South Korea to reunify the Korean Peninsula along the lines of Germany’s reunification 27 years ago. </p>
<p>Beijing already has highly productive political and economic relations with South Korea. North Korea, on the other hand, has become a strategic deadweight.</p>
<p>Pyongyang houses the most repressive, dangerous regime on the planet. It’s a place where entire families get sent <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/dprk-north-korea-south-prison-camp-guard-reveals-what-life-like-punishment-execution-a7710696.html">to brutal prisons</a> for the perceived sins of one member, where <a href="https://en.tjwg.org/TJWG_Report-Mapping_Crimes_Against_Humanity_in_North_Korea(July2017)-Eng_Final.pdf">suffering and executions are the common fate</a> of anyone who does not show complete devotion to the Kim family cult.</p>
<p>Beijing wouldn’t make any moves before next month’s <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/08/31/547544659/china-has-set-oct-18-for-its-communist-party-congress-heres-what-to-expect">19th Communist Party Congress,</a> but later this fall, China could win unprecedented global credibility by emerging as the champion of an international effort that fixes the North Korea problem once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
China could win unprecedented global credibility by emerging as the champion of an international effort that fixes the North Korea problem once and for all. Does it have the moxie?
Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/83480
2017-09-05T23:43:47Z
2017-09-05T23:43:47Z
As North Korean missiles fly, Canada faces a crisis of conscience
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184719/original/file-20170905-13726-12hnpug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Japanese man watches a TV news program on a public screen in Tokyo showing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un amid reports the North Korean leader has inspected a hydrogen bomb meant for a new intercontinental ballistic missile.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As if anyone needed convincing, it’s clearer than ever that Kim Jong Un’s one-man arms race is that of a madman with anger issues who needs to command unqualified fear and compliance. </p>
<p>In recent days it’s become difficult to keep up with developments as North Korea conducts a stream of menacing “tests.” </p>
<p>They started with an outrageous <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/29/asia/north-korea-missile-launch-guam-threat/index.html">missile launch over Japan</a> (described as a practice run for Guam) and escalated with claims about developing a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/12084087/North-Korea-hydrogen-bomb-Kim-Jong-un-earthquake-live.html">massively potent hydrogen bomb</a> and a long-range missile that can deliver it to the heart of North America.</p>
<p>Pyongyang’s dangerous game of “Korean roulette” makes responses like trade sanctions or joint naval exercises seem like kindergarten fare. As the world sputters in fury, North Korea — supported by China — keeps perfecting a nuclear capacity that threatens world peace. </p>
<p>The time for boilerplate statements by Canada — expressing regret, urging restraint on all sides — has passed. The next border a Korean missile crosses could very likely be ours. </p>
<h2>Korean reunification is paramount</h2>
<p>North Korea’s relentless flouting of international law demands a more serious, coordinated response by the international community, including Canada. </p>
<p>Increasingly, the only resolution is to <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/reunification-on-the-korean-peninsula-toward-a-peaceful-confederation/5589946">reunify the Korean peninsula</a> through United Nations action, and use South Korea’s considerable resources to reconstruct the North. </p>
<p>The biggest factor blocking Korean unification is China, where I worked as a counsellor at the Canadian embassy in Beijing for years. It is increasingly clear that <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship">Beijing’s enabling of the appalling North Korean regime</a> — through transfer of critical technology, food and energy aid — is part of China’s larger plan for East Asia. </p>
<p>The end game is for North Korea to bring about an implacable crisis. China can then exploit the crisis to negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea as part of its grand bargain to resolve Pyongyang’s nuclear threat. </p>
<p>This paves the way for China to retake Taiwan, and to bring all of East and Southeast Asia into its economic and strategic orbit. </p>
<p>This Chinese power gambit has too much potential for geopolitical calamity for us to stand idly by and watch it play out unanswered.</p>
<p>So where does Canada stand? </p>
<h2>Canada is trade-focused</h2>
<p>Ottawa is so focused on riches from <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-roaring-silence-around-trade-talks-with-china-82690">Canada-China free trade</a> that we have given tacit consent to China’s illegal regional expansion. This despite our <a href="http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/does-canadas-openness-for-chinese-business-silence-on-the-south-china-sea-signal-shift-away-from-u-s">faint lip-service support</a> of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that China’s building of military bases on reefs and outcrops in the South China Sea is a violation of international law. </p>
<p>Canada could show some moral spine and join the United States and other countries in what are known as <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-reacts-angrily-to-latest-us-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operation/">freedom-of-navigation naval exercises</a>, essentially Navy patrols throughout the disputed waters aimed at countering China’s maritime claims.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184723/original/file-20170905-13755-sfeel8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this March 2017 photo, a U.S. Navy F18 fighter jet lands on the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson following a freedom-of-navigation patrol off the disputed South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bullit Marquez, File)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But Ottawa is afraid China would punish Canada over such a move, possibly <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-beef-canola-1.3773980">reimposing restrictions</a> on our billion-dollar export of canola seeds into China. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184771/original/file-20170905-13703-103jhbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and China’s Ambassador to Canada Luo Zhaohui stand outside an enclosure as newly named panda cubs Jia Panpan and Jia Yueyue are exhibited to the media at the Toronto Zoo in March 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Chris Young</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Canada-China free-trade negotiations would be suspended, as would high-level official visits with panda bear photo ops and huge business contracts. And that’s just for starters.</p>
<p>After the missile launch, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland’s <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/08/canada_condemns_northkoreanprovocation.html">delayed statement</a> 24 hours later ended with our usual whimper: “We call on North Korea to cease these provocations, comply with its obligations and immediately and verifiably abandon its ballistic missile program. Canada supports international measures that encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and resume dialogue toward a political solution.” </p>
<h2>Kim dictatorship must come to an end</h2>
<p>If Canada is serious about playing a meaningful role in international relations, it’s time for us to join with our allies and form an action plan for North Korea that has more credibility than U.S. President Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric. </p>
<p>The inescapable fact is that the Kim dictatorship in North Korea has to be brought to an end. More China-mediated years of polite dialogue will not bring that about. </p>
<p>The South Koreans must become more focused on the end game of reunification — now, not later — and accept that the end of the Kim dynasty in North Korea will come <a href="http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/the_economic__costs_of_korean_reunification">at considerable cost to South Korea</a> in terms of the high price tag on reconstruction and poverty relief for Koreans.</p>
<p>The demise of China’s economic and political influence in the North can no longer be deferred, and meaningful measures must be taken to minimize the loss of civilian life before horror unfolds. </p>
<h2>China’s ‘sly backing of atrocious ally’</h2>
<p>Canada must reverse its position and start cooperating with the United States on North American missile defence. It should also ban Canadian businesses from collaborating with Chinese state banks or trading companies that support North Korea by way of UN sanctions violations.</p>
<p>It’s time for our government to state clearly that Canada condemns China’s continued sly backing of its atrocious North Korean ally. China is obstructing the deeply held aspirations of Korean people to reunite their broken country and to rebuild a peaceful, prosperous and democratic nation on the Korean peninsula. </p>
<p>Sixty-seven years ago, Canada <a href="http://lermuseum.org/index.php/1946-to-present/1946-1956/canadian-defence-at-kapyong-hill-677-24-25-apr-1951">made a military commitment to defend South Korea</a> against North Korean and Chinese military aggression, at a loss of over 500 Canadian lives. </p>
<p>If Canada is truly back in international diplomacy now, it must stand firm today against a much greater threat — North Korea, helmed by a madman and backed by mighty China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
As North Korea ups the missile ante, it’s time for Canada to take a meaningful stand against China’s continued sly backing of its atrocious ally.
Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/82415
2017-08-14T23:42:06Z
2017-08-14T23:42:06Z
North Korea missile crisis echoes Israel’s anti-rocket strategy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182004/original/file-20170814-28437-1blun8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A rocket is launched from Israel's Iron Dome, an anti-missile system, in order to intercept a rocket fired by Palestinian militants from the Gaza Strip in 2011.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dan Balilty, File)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s nuclear weapons and <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/north-korea-guam-us-nuclear-missile-trump-kim-jong-un-1.4242162">ballistic missiles</a> have been making headlines again. There’s also been serious controversy over how the United States and other countries should react to that threat. </p>
<p>To that end, it might help to examine Israel’s experience in dealing with actual rocket attacks. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1309">Some of my research</a> has explored the properties of its interceptor systems.</p>
<p>Israel is a leader in missile countermeasures because of its neighbours. It has experienced rocket fire for more than a decade from Hamas militants in Gaza and Hezbollah militants in Lebanon. The country hasn’t forgotten Iraq’s 1991 Scud missile strikes. It also worries about future attacks from Syria and <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-anyone-care-about-the-iranian-missile-strikes-21360">Iran</a>. </p>
<p>Israel has consequently developed a set of countermeasures that provide it with a layered defence:</p>
<h2>Blockade</h2>
<p>One way to guard against missiles is to prevent hostile countries from getting them. Trade sanctions and military blockades can assist this.</p>
<p>Israel restricts trade into Gaza for this reason. However, Hamas responds by <a href="http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=23485">smuggling rockets</a> inside other shipments. It also bypasses the blockade by producing Qassam rockets locally.</p>
<p>International sanctions against North Korea have likewise <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-didnt-sanctions-stop-north-koreas-missile-program-82365">had limited success</a>, partly due to its <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-the-key-to-avoiding-nuclear-fire-and-fury-in-north-korea-82257">relationship with China</a>. North Korea has also made domestic weapons development a national priority.</p>
<h2>Deterrence</h2>
<p>We can try to discourage the use of missiles by threatening to retaliate with our own weapons. But success depends on the opposing leader’s goals. Some might risk or even welcome retaliation.</p>
<p>For example, Israel has <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Analysis-Was-the-Second-Lebanon-War-a-success-460129">deterred Hezbollah</a> from firing rockets for 11 years. But Hamas has not been deterred, as it benefits politically from occasionally provoking Israel.</p>
<p>Deterrence is the default solution regarding North Korea, as it was during the Cold War. It may be what U.S. President Donald Trump meant by his “<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-of-fire-and-fury-is-a-gift-to-north-koreas-propaganda-machine-82275">fire and fury</a>” comments. If North Korea ever uses nuclear weapons, it will invite massive U.S. retaliation and likely end the regime’s rule.</p>
<h2>Pre-emptive strikes</h2>
<p>The direct military solution to missiles is to destroy them on the ground. This counterforce approach assumes the missiles can be located and effectively attacked. It also risks collateral damage against civilians and diplomatic repercussions with other countries.</p>
<p>Israel conducts clandestine <a href="http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=42007">airstrikes</a> against selected Hezbollah missile shipments for this reason. It destroys rockets on a larger scale during its operations against Hamas. One challenge is the large number of rockets. Israel has destroyed thousands, but thousands more remain. Another problem is rockets being stored in civilian areas like <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-condemns-placement-rockets-second-time-one-its-schools">schools</a>. Collateral damage there is unavoidable.</p>
<p>Donald Trump’s “military options” presumably include pre-emptive strikes. There are “only” <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-north-korea-military-operation-signs-1.4244579">about 60</a> North Korean nuclear warheads. But the U.S. would not want to miss even one. They may be hard to locate in that highly secretive country. They also may be well-sheltered and difficult to destroy without causing heavy civilian losses.</p>
<h2>Interception</h2>
<p>Once missiles have launched, defenders may try to shoot them down. Such interceptions are difficult to achieve, but make <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3qaGic-qGw">spectacular videos</a>.</p>
<p>Israel has developed <a href="http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=41211">several interceptor systems</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-israels-iron-dome-anti-missile-system-29746">Iron Dome</a> intercepts short range rockets, David’s Sling handles medium range missiles and Arrow targets long range missiles.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/b4a_ie0J0hU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Arrow <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/did-israels-arrow-really-shoot-down-syrian-rocket-19902">claimed</a> its first interception this year. Iron Dome has engaged hundreds of rockets since 2011, though with much <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/05/iron-domes-success-in-israel-is-ironclad/">debate</a> about its <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/528991/an-explanation-of-the-evidence-of-weaknesses-in-the-iron-dome-defense-system/">effectiveness</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. also has several <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-ballistic-missile-defence-and-would-it-stop-a-missile-from-north-korea-80601">interceptor systems</a>: Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Aegis (Standard) Ballistic Missile Defense and Patriot. Patriot has limited combat experience, while the others have none. Their effectiveness against North Korean missiles is uncertain.</p>
<p>Even good interceptors aren’t perfect. Iron Dome cannot engage every incoming rocket, and sometimes it misses those it engages. Fortunately, the rockets have small warheads. The U.S. would likely face only a handful of North Korean nuclear warheads. But missing even one could be devastating.</p>
<h2>How attackers try to avoid detection</h2>
<p>There are also ways for attackers to avoid interception. The simplest is to overload the interceptors by firing many missiles at once. Hamas has been unable to do this against Iron Dome but Hezbollah has enough launchers to try.</p>
<p>North Korea may have too few nuclear missiles to overload U.S. systems. But it could succeed with its numerous conventional missiles.</p>
<p>Attackers might also try fooling interceptors into chasing non-threatening missiles or ignoring threatening ones. The former wastes interceptors, while the latter lets missiles through. Possible methods include jamming, decoys or manoeuvrable warheads. This approach is probably not worthwhile for rockets fired at Israel. North Korea, however, could develop decoys to accompany its warheads.</p>
<p>An attacker could instead try shooting missiles at an interceptor system to destroy it. However, such counter-battery fire uses up valuable ammunition. Hamas artillery rockets are too inaccurate to make this trade-off profitable. Hezbollah could attempt it with <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Iran-is-placing-guided-warheads-on-Hezbollah-rockets-395679">guided missiles</a> or <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-the-front-lines-against-isiss-bomber-drones-18059">armed drones</a>. North Korea would not waste nuclear warheads against interceptor systems but might shoot conventional ones at them.</p>
<h2>Civil defences</h2>
<p>Finally, a country can reduce its missile casualties by preparing civil defences. These include warning systems, bomb shelters and emergency response units.</p>
<p>Israel’s warning system is called Red Color. Speakers, sirens and <a href="https://itunes.apple.com/ca/app/red-alert-israel/id873642097?mt=8">cell phone apps</a> alert civilians of incoming rockets. The country has built concrete shelters in locations like <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-arkus/sderot---bomb-shelter-cap_b_7252014.html">playgrounds and bus stops</a>, as well as in private homes. However, there is concern that attackers might someday use <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-worried-Syria-weapons-going-to-terrorists">poison gas</a> warheads to bypass these shelters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182002/original/file-20170814-27094-1e03s3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Israeli mother passes by a bus stop which also serves as a bomb shelter as she accompanies her daughter to school in the Israeli southern city of Sderot, which has been the target of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Anja Niedringhaus)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. could revive its civil defence program, starting in Guam and <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/hawaii-prepares-for-unlikely-north-korea-missile-threat-1.479149#.WY83OVWGOpo">Hawaii</a>. The priority should be the warning systems. Shelter needs depend on the warheads. Even ordinary basements or concrete buildings would help somewhat against conventional explosive warheads. More sophisticated shelters and decontamination gear would be needed against <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-think-clearly-about-north-koreas-weapons-of-mass-destruction-73627">nerve gas</a> or nuclear warheads.</p>
<h2>Complementary layers</h2>
<p>Israel’s countermeasures act together to complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Collectively they may have prevented <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Rockets-were-threats-not-toys-375252">thousands of casualties</a> and millions of dollars of damage.</p>
<p>To achieve that, the country has spent billions, including <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/14/fact-sheet-memorandum-understanding-reached-israel">over $3 billion</a> of U.S. aid. That’s a lot to protect a small territory containing fewer than nine million people. The cost to defend the U.S. or its allies would be far larger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Armstrong's research on short-range ballistic missile defense was funded by a grant from Fulbright Canada. Michael performed that study while he was the 2013-2014 Visiting Research Chair in War and Peace Studies at Norwich University.</span></em></p>
There is much debate over how to react to North Korean missile threats. What can we learn from Israel’s responses to actual rocket attacks?
Michael J. Armstrong, Associate professor of operations research, Brock University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/82365
2017-08-14T02:32:45Z
2017-08-14T02:32:45Z
Why didn’t sanctions stop North Korea’s missile program?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181827/original/file-20170811-12740-bacwqy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Images of Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are shown on a news program in Seoul, South Korea on Thursday, Aug. 10, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s long-range missile program has made significant technological advances in the past few months. </p>
<p>For most of the past 20 years, the international community has struggled to stop this kind of progress.</p>
<p>Kim Jong Un’s plan to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/world/asia/north-korea-guam-missiles-kim-trump.html">target four test missiles</a> approximately 20 miles off the coast of the U.S. territory of Guam shows just how destabilizing this rapidly advancing ballistic missile program can be. North Korea’s plan – which Kim claims will be finalized later this month – follows last month’s <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/north-koreas-second-icbm-test-introduced-new-features-to-the-missiles-second-stage/">two successful tests</a> of an intercontinental ballistic missile with the capability to hit the U.S.</p>
<p>My research on how states <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0096340213485948">illegally obtain missile technologies</a> and my experience conducting <a href="https://projectalpha.eu/outreach-workshop-in-dalian-china/">outreach related to U.N. sanctions</a> give me some insight into the methods North Korea used to make illicit procurements and the limitations in using technology-based sanctions to prevent them.</p>
<h2>Technology-based sanctions</h2>
<p>In 2006 – following North Korea’s first nuclear test – the U.N. Security Council <a href="https://undocs.org/S/RES/1718(2006)">prohibited</a> the “supply, sale or transfer” of “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology” that could contribute to the country’s missile program. </p>
<p>Efforts to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of missile technology by certain nations – notably the United States – had been <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron">underway since the 1990s</a>. However, the U.N. sanctions went further by placing standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.</p>
<p>These sanctions are “universal” – obligatory for all states around the world. Each nation is responsible for implementation within its borders. Missile, nuclear and military technologies are regulated through national export control systems. Exports of certain goods and technologies need to be granted an export license by the government. This allows governments to do a risk assessment on transactions and minimize the diversions to undesirable uses, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction programs or human rights abuses.</p>
<p>In theory, all countries should have the capacity to implement technology-based sanctions. Having an export control system has been mandatory for states since the passage of <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004)">U.N. Security Council resolution 1540</a> in 2004. However, more than a decade after this resolution was passed, many nations – particularly developing ones – are still struggling with <a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/1540-reporting-overview/">implemention</a>.</p>
<p>This has led to uneven execution of missile-related sanctions on North Korea. A recent report has described the U.N. sanctions regime as a “<a href="https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201706_whr_a_house_without_foundations_web.pdf">house without foundations</a>,” noting that not a single element of the sanctions regime “enjoys robust international implementation.” </p>
<h2>Sources of missile technology</h2>
<p>As <a href="http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/delivery-systems/">North Korea’s missile program</a> has advanced, its sources of missile technology have evolved. </p>
<p>North Korea began by importing full missile systems and seeking to reverse-engineer or replicate them. For example, after procuring short-range <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/63dc9c5369804d008171cae0d9922f58">Scud missiles</a> from Egypt in the late 1970s, North Korea “reverse-engineered” them by the mid-1980s. The 1990s saw North Korea develop the <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/74e8a504b63340e284da666629bac84e">Nodong</a>, a scaled-up Scud design. It also experimented with longer-range missiles in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. These Taepodong missiles drew together elements of the shorter-range systems such as their engines. The <a href="https://sketchfab.com/models/1d2f4783998146a0a574ae05c509c607">Taepodong-2</a> allegedly had an intercontinental range, although it was never successfully tested.</p>
<p><iframe id="r10BA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/r10BA/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Since taking power in 2011, Kim Jong Un has accelerated North Korea’s missile program. In the past year alone, <a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/">the country has tested</a> four seemingly new missiles for the first time – including a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN10Y2B0">submarine-launched ballistic missile</a> and an <a href="http://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/1182085/us-pacific-command-detects-tracks-north-korean-missile-launch/">intermediate range ballistic missile</a>, as well as the ICBMs tested last month. </p>
<p>The country has also sought to learn how to produce required parts and components at home. North Korea’s program is opaque, and the balance between reliance on external sources and homemade parts is unclear, but some episodes provide insights.</p>
<p>Rocket debris salvaged from the sea following a satellite launch in December 2012 suggested an ongoing reliance on the international market place for parts. A 2013 <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147">U.N. report</a> suggested the rocket had used modern components sourced from China, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S., as well as “cannibalized” Scud components and other 1980s vintage Soviet parts.</p>
<p>Since then, North Korea has continued to pursue more advanced manufacturing technologies. Footage from the leadership’s <a href="http://www.38north.org/2013/09/jlewis090413/">frequent factory visits</a> has shown that North Korea has acquired advanced computer numerically controlled machine tools which are of use in missile and nuclear programs. Photographs from a parade in April 2017 <a href="https://storify.com/ArmsControlWonk/ribbed-for-your-pleasure">suggest</a> that North Korea’s new submarine-launched ballistic missile was constructed with wound filament. This material is lighter and stronger than aluminum, and a significant step forward in capability.</p>
<h2>Evading sanctions</h2>
<p>To make these advances in their missile program, North Korea has had to evade sanctions and the broader scrutiny of the international community. Their illicit procurement techniques include using front companies, obscuring the end user, falsifying documentation and mislabeling cargo. A 2017 <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">U.N. report</a> notes that North Korea’s evasion techniques are “increasing in scale, scope and sophistication.”</p>
<p>North Korea’s military and WMD procurement networks are global in nature. <a href="http://projectalpha.eu/alpha-in-depth-north-koreas-proliferation-and-illicit-procurement-apparatus/">According to one study</a>, they have touched more than 60 countries. </p>
<p>Due to geographical proximity, historic relationship and broader trading links, China has played an unparalleled role in these networks. Many middlemen and procurement agents have operated in <a href="http://thebulletin.org/engaging-china-proliferation-prevention">China</a>, and increasingly – as the country’s private sector develops – its manufacturers have been a source of technology. A series of revelations in early 2017 demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers and Chinese-North Korean joint ventures are benefiting North Korea’s missile program – including with <a href="http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Shenyang_Machine_Tools_13Apr2017_Final.pdf">machine tools</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150">components</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-north-korean-venture-shows-how-much-sanctions-can-miss-1494191212?mod=djem10point">materials</a>.</p>
<h2>The effects of sanctions?</h2>
<p>Observers might rightfully ask: Have sanctions failed? </p>
<p>This question is complicated. It might be more useful to consider what the effects of sanctions have been.</p>
<p>The primary objectives of technology-based sanctions have been to slow and prevent North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The recent ICBM tests clearly prove these measures have not prevented North Korea’s missile development. Whether they slowed progress is debatable. </p>
<p>What is undeniable is that sanctions have had unforeseen consequences. <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462">Research suggests</a> that sanctions could have made North Korea’s procurement efforts more sophisticated as Chinese middlemen monetize the risk.</p>
<p>Americans tend to view North Korea as an inward-looking, economically isolated state cut off from the international community. However, the country’s illicit networks – including those supplying its missile program – are global and responsive. Ultimately, they will be difficult to counter.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-sanctions-against-north-koreas-missile-program-fail-80666">an article</a> originally published on July 7, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The international community has been trying to stop North Korea from developing long-range missiles for decades. So how did North Korea get them?
Daniel Salisbury, Postdoctoral Fellow, Middlebury
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.