tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/mosques-36163/articlesMosques – The Conversation2024-02-15T13:33:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212982024-02-15T13:33:03Z2024-02-15T13:33:03ZTurkey will stop sending imams to German mosques – here’s why this matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575397/original/file-20240213-24-p2rrrc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=80%2C17%2C5867%2C3932&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The imam of the Khadija Mosque, in the Pankow district of Berlin, talks to visitors.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/october-2022-berlin-said-arif-imam-of-the-khadija-mosque-news-photo/1243697775?adppopup=true">Fabian Sommer/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the Turkish government has sent imams to work in mosques across Germany. But the German Ministry of the Interior <a href="https://www.br.de/nachrichten/kultur/tuerkische-imame-sollen-bald-nicht-mehr-in-deutschland-predigen,TyQ3ynX">recently announced</a> that it had reached an agreement with the Turkish government to put an end to the practice. </p>
<p>These imams, approximately 1,000 at present, are Turkish civil servants. Imams are sent to Germany on four- to six-year rotations, based on a long-standing agreement between the two governments. They work with Germany’s <a href="https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/migrationshintergrund-2010220217004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">more than 2.8 million</a> residents with Turkish citizenship or heritage.</p>
<p>The practice had come under intense criticism in Germany in recent years. German politicians have accused Turkish imams of <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-turkey-use-spying-imams-to-assert-its-powers-abroad-75643">spying on their flocks</a> or <a href="https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/oezdemir-warnt-vor-instrumentalisierung-junger-menschen-in-deutschland-durch-tuerkische-imame-100.html">abusing their positions</a> to promote support for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party.</p>
<p>The German government described plans to replace “imported imams” with imams trained in Germany as an “<a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2023/12/imam-ausbildung.html#:%7E:text=Das%20Bundesinnenministerium%2C%20die%20t%C3%BCrkische%20Religionsbeh%C3%B6rde,der%20T%C3%BCrkei%20nach%20Deutschland%20geeinigt">important milestone for integration</a>.” On the other hand, <a href="https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/imame-tuerkei-ditib-100.html">some observers</a> have questioned whether it will change anything for Germany’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/the-growth-of-germanys-muslim-population-2/">5 million Muslims</a>.</p>
<p>As part of my ongoing research into the <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/brian-van-wyck/">history of migration</a> between <a href="https://migrantknowledge.org/2020/08/14/turkish-teachers/">Turkey</a> and <a href="https://zeithistorische-forschungen.de/sites/default/files/medien/material/2005-3/Wyck_2017.pdf">Germany</a>, I have investigated the origins of this exchange and the goals both governments pursued by bringing Turkish imams to Germany. </p>
<p>Efforts by both states to intervene in the religious lives of Muslims by selecting which imams can preach in German mosques have a long history – although such efforts might not always achieve the goals of governments.</p>
<h2>The ‘strategy’ of sending imams</h2>
<p>A 1961 agreement led to Turkish “guest workers” being sent to Germany to meet the labor demands of its booming postwar economy. Many recruited workers and their families chose to settle permanently in Germany. By 1974, a year after labor recruitment ended, at least <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/443877/pdf">1 million</a> Turkish citizens were residing in Germany.</p>
<p>It was only in the 1980s that the Turkish government began sending cohorts of imams abroad, after it had become evident that a large Turkish population was in Germany to stay. </p>
<p>This step was motivated by several goals. One was to use state imams to create <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.926233">an alternative to Islamic groups</a> active in Germany who opposed the secular Turkish state. Another was to use imams to <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315143842-16/governing-turkey-diaspora-limits-diaspora-diplomacy-1">foster continued ties to Turkey</a> among the Turkish diaspora in Germany, encouraging them to continue to invest in Turkey.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, conservative governments made increasing use of Islam to encourage national unity in Turkey by, for example, mandating religious education in schools and revising curricula to emphasize Turkey’s Islamic heritage. Sending imams abroad was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12184">an example of this strategy being exported to Turkey’s overseas diaspora</a>.</p>
<h2>Only Turkish imams for Germany</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An ivory-colored building with two tall minarets with a dome in their center, set against the backdrop of a clear, blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sehitlik Mosque in the Berlin district of Neukoelln.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-sehitlik-mosque-photographed-on-july-16-2009-in-the-news-photo/1513208364?adppopup=true">Kaveh Rostamkhani/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the early 1980s, German authorities, like their Turkish counterparts, had become concerned about Islamic institutions in the country. Historian <a href="https://dl.acm.org/profile/99659642849">Alexander Konrad</a> has demonstrated that <a href="https://www.wallstein-verlag.de/9783835352681-umdeutungen-des-islams.html">unsubstantiated reports about corporal punishment and political extremism</a> in courses devoted to learning the Quran achieved wide currency in Germany in the 1970s.</p>
<p>When German diplomats and Turkish officials began to discuss their shared concerns in meetings in Ankara in 1980, they quickly found common ground. As diplomatic cables in the archives of the German Federal Foreign Office reporting on these discussions reveal, Turkish and German officials agreed that having the right imams in German mosques would solve the social and political problems they believed were caused by extremist imams. And they believed that imams employed by the Turkish state were guaranteed to be well-trained and moderate.</p>
<p>Accordingly, as I learned from directives preserved in the State Archive of North Rhine-Westphalia, German policymakers had begun by 1982 to issue entry visas directly to the Turkish government to distribute to those imams it selected to serve in Germany. Already by the end of the 1980s, <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/muslim-identity-and-the-balkan-state/oclc/037261064">more than 500</a> Turkish state imams were active in Germany.</p>
<p>At the same time, entry visas for all other imams were more tightly controlled. This meant that imams from Turkey or anywhere else in the world who wanted to work in Germany but were not employed by the Turkish government faced new hurdles. I learned from legal judgments in the German Federal Archives that some imams who were already working in Germany were forced to leave the country as a result of the new policy.</p>
<h2>Limits to the influence of Turkish state imams</h2>
<p>Both governments assumed that Turkish state imams would be able to reshape German mosques, eliminate perceived extremism and ensure secular Islamic practice in Germany. However, this agreement did not achieve the results the Turkish or German government desired. </p>
<p>There were a few reasons for this. For one, imams often arrived with limited knowledge of German and Germany. Because of that, they relied on members of the local Turkish community, as the sociologist <a href="https://www.irp-cms.uni-osnabrueck.de/personal/professoren/prof_dr_dr_rauf_ceylan.html">Rauf Ceylan</a> has <a href="https://www.herder.de/geschichte-politik/shop/p4/58318-imame-in-deutschland-kartonierte-ausgabe/">argued</a>.</p>
<p>Contrary to what German and Turkish officials might have assumed, these imams could not simply assume control over the often long-established mosques to which they were assigned. And that meant that whatever control the Turkish government exercised over German mosques through them was partial and depended on local buy-in.</p>
<p>Furthermore, not all mosques in Germany received Turkish state imams. Turkish-origin migrants and their descendants created Islamic institutions and organized religious life for themselves for decades <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9783657782130/BP000007.xml">without Turkish state intervention</a>. Those institutions did not disappear when competition in the form of Turkish state imams arrived. Both now and then, many Muslims with Turkish roots choose to attend mosques with Turkish state imams, but many do not. </p>
<h2>Imams trained in Germany?</h2>
<p>Over the course of the more than 40 years in which Turkish state imams have been sent to Germany, the German and Turkish governments invested their work with high expectations. And now, as the end of these imam exchanges comes into sight, German officials continue to assume that changing who preaches in mosques will dramatically alter religious life for German Muslims.</p>
<p>In the coming years, imams trained in academies in Germany will replace more and more Turkish state imams as they end their rotations in Germany and return home. According to this plan, the eventual result will be that only domestically trained, German-speaking imams will work in German mosques at some point in the near future. German officials <a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2023/12/imam-ausbildung.html#:%7E:text=Das%20Bundesinnenministerium%2C%20die%20t%C3%BCrkische%20Religionsbeh%C3%B6rde,der%20T%C3%BCrkei%20nach%20Deutschland%20geeinigt">described the new model</a> as “an important milestone for the integration and participation of Muslim communities in Germany.”</p>
<p>Ultimately, as history demonstrates, it is German Muslims themselves, and not the imams who lead them in prayer, who will determine if this is the case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221298/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Van Wyck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Turkish government started sending imams to Germany in the 1980s, but under a new agreement, imams will be trained in Germany instead.Brian Van Wyck, Assistant Professor of History, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1895542023-05-08T04:35:21Z2023-05-08T04:35:21ZAustralia now has its own grand mosque: a brief history of how these buildings fold into the urban landscape<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519210/original/file-20230404-28-bgr4gy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C0%2C4937%2C6211&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, Abu Dhabi</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Olah/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A referee’s whistle pierces the air. A player dribbles a ball across a court; goal! Cheers erupt. </p>
<p>These are the familiar sounds of Australian life. Children squeal with laughter. The barbecue sizzles. The muezzin calls the faithful to prayer. </p>
<p>Opened in 2022, Melbourne’s Grand Mosque and the Werribee Islamic Centre offer a host of facilities that connect with the multicultural community of Tarneit, 25 kilometres west of Melbourne’s CBD. </p>
<p>Grand mosques mark the urban space of major historical cities such as Mecca, Medina, Cordoba and Tunis. More recently, these buildings have been built in cities like Algiers and Abu Dhabi. </p>
<p>The notion of a “grand mosque” has been shaped by the location of the mosque, its scale and its historical importance. </p>
<p>But what makes a grand mosque “grand”?</p>
<h2>Building the grand mosques</h2>
<p>Historically, ruling and social elites such as religious leaders, monarchs, princes and princesses financed and built mosques for their communities. </p>
<p>This charitable act was an important legacy, and mosques were also a reflection of the <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/The_Contemporary_Mosque.html?id=mLIyAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">powers of dynasties</a>. </p>
<p>There was great community involvement with the mosque, primarily through attending daily prayers. But mosques also provided civic, educational and cultural spaces to provide for extensive community involvement. These buildings were intellectual, scientific and literary centres, playing a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042815054051">crucial role</a> in Arab-Islamic civilisation.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519215/original/file-20230404-24-nq3k5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The University of al-Qarawiyyin was founded as a mosque in the ninth century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The idea of a “civic mosque” dates back to the early days of Islamic civilisation, with universities attached to mosques, such as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_al-Qarawiyyin">University of al-Qarawiyyin</a> in Fez, Morocco.</p>
<p>The most famous mosque in the world is the Great Mosque of Mecca, or the al-Masjid al-Ḥarām. Located in Saudi Arabia and first built in 638 AD, it can be called a grand mosque because of its historical significance, its capacity of 2.5 million and the way it intersects with the global Muslim community. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519211/original/file-20230404-19-q8r0qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Al-Masjid Al-Haram, Mecca, Saudi Arabia has a capacity of 2.5 million.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ishan @seefromthesky/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi is a centre of science and knowledge which can accommodate 40,000 worshippers. The largest mosque in the UAE, its design includes references from Pakistani, Egyptian, Moorish, Arab and Indo-Islamic architecture. </p>
<p>Completed in 2019, Djamaa El Djazair in Algiers, Algeria, is the third-largest mosque in the world, with a capacity of 120,000 worshippers.</p>
<p>A “grand mosque” doesn’t need to have a capacity in the tens of thousands. With a capacity of 1,000 worshippers, the Grande Mosquee de Paris is the <a href="https://www.islamicity.org/8463/the-great-mosque-of-paris/">largest in France</a> and the third-largest in Europe. </p>
<p>Constructed in the 1920s, the mosque’s unique architecture and the provision of social and communal spaces all testify to the important role Islam plays in the diversity of Paris.</p>
<p>Through a combination of scale and architectural design, these grand mosques make their mark in the urban landscape. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519213/original/file-20230404-18-aiedni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grande Mosquee de Paris in the 5th arrondissement of Paris is the third-largest mosque in Europe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/french-row-over-mosque-isnt-simply-about-state-financing-it-runs-deep-into-islamophobia-and-french-secularism-158565">French row over mosque isn't simply about state financing – it runs deep into Islamophobia and French secularism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An Australian grand mosque</h2>
<p>The first contact of Muslims with Australia dates back to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14443050802471384">18th century</a>, when Macassan fishermen travelled to the Kimberley region and Arnhem Land to collect sea cucumbers. </p>
<p>Muslims began to settle in Australia from the 1860s, largely working as cameleers and pearlers. The first mosque in Australia was completed in 1882 in Maree, 600 kilometres north of Adelaide. Since then, mosques have been built in cities, towns and suburbs throughout Australia.</p>
<p>Now, Australia has its own grand mosque.</p>
<p>Melbourne’s Grand Mosque opened its doors <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-14/melbourne-grand-mosque-opens-in-tarneit/100906358#">last year</a>. </p>
<p>Planning, fundraising and building by the community are pillars of the new design processes and identity of mosques in Australia. The prayer hall can fit 2,000 worshippers. The building also includes a sporting centre, a community hall and a childcare centre. </p>
<p>Built for A$8.5 million, the community raised the funds to realise their vision over a period of ten years. The community wanted to make a grand architectural statement which would meet the spiritual and social needs of Australia’s Muslim community. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Melbourne Grand Mosque" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519989/original/file-20230409-24-p92xtj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Melbourne Grand Mosque, Tarneit, Victoria, Australia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afif Rashid</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Eventually the complex will incorporate a library, sports facilities, childcare, educational spaces and hospitality. </p>
<p>Architecturally, the mosque respects traditions of a central dome above the prayer hall, bringing light into the most sacred space. However, the dome is smaller than in traditional mosques and is set back into the building, allowing it to not dominate the streetscape. </p>
<p>This allows the building to play a social role in a suburb where there are multiple religious groups of similar size.</p>
<h2>A mosque for the community</h2>
<p>The “grand mosque” is not just about the scale of architectural features – the minarets, arches and calligraphy.</p>
<p>The grand mosque of today is about community: their involvement in the design processes and its openness as a hub for diverse communities of the 21st century.</p>
<p>Grand mosques have long punctuated the urban space in major cities. Today, the realisation of a grand mosque such as the one in Melbourne transforms the idea of “grand” to a level of social interaction and community aspirations.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/graffiti-arson-death-threats-new-research-finds-widespread-violence-against-australian-mosques-156843">Graffiti, arson, death threats: new research finds widespread violence against Australian mosques</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Majdi Faleh receives funding from Australian Research Council. Special Research Initiatives - Grant ID: SR200200989
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dijana Alic receives funding from Australian Research Council. Special Research Initiatives - Grant ID: SR200200989</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span> Md Mizanur Rashid receives funding from Australian Research Council. Special Research Initiatives - Grant ID: SR200200989</span></em></p>Grand mosques mark the urban space of major historical cities such as Mecca, Medina, Cordoba and Tunis. Now, Melbourne has its very own.Majdi Faleh, Academic Fellow in Cultural Heritage, Nottingham Trent UniversityDijana Alic, Associate Professor, Arts, Design and Architecture, UNSW SydneyMd Mizanur Rashid, Senior Lecturer in Architecture, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040012023-04-20T20:43:01Z2023-04-20T20:43:01ZRecent mosque attacks raise questions about the affinity between white supremacy and far-right Hindu nationalism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521950/original/file-20230419-2235-axsfat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C50%2C8317%2C5519&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People carry placards and shout anti-government slogans during a protest against Islamophobia in Bengaluru, India in April 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Aijaz Rahi)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During Ramadan, <a href="https://www.yorkregion.com/news/update-man-allegedly-tried-to-run-over-worshippers-at-markham-mosque-during-ramadan/article_ff54f3fe-bc6b-5993-8658-3435072a1d19.html">a man attacked a mosque in Markham, Ont.</a> He allegedly yelled slurs, tore up a Qu'ran, and attempted to run down worshippers in his vehicle. </p>
<p>Some people on Twitter have raised the idea that the attacker was connected to Hindu extremist groups; however, the investigation is still ongoing. </p>
<p>This is one of two <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9615942/man-47-charged-in-connection-with-suspected-hate-motivated-incident-at-markham-mosque/">hate-motivated incidents at mosques in Markham</a> in a week. Although police said <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/mosque-suspected-hate-motived-incident-april-9-markham-1.6807097">they don’t believe the incidents are connected,</a> as a researcher of online extremism I can theoretically link these events to a global trend of Islamophobic violence.</p>
<h2>Legal discrimination and violence</h2>
<p>From <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/4/empty-promises-the-us-muslim-ban-still-reverberates">the United States’ Muslim ban</a>, to India’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/10/analysis-islamophobia-is-the-norm-in-modis-india">Citizenship Amendment Act</a>, to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-21-london-attack-1.6059756">Québec’s Bill 21</a>, Muslims face legal discrimination globally. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niqab-bans-boost-hate-crimes-against-muslims-and-legalize-islamophobia-podcast-180012">Niqab bans boost hate crimes against Muslims and legalize Islamophobia — Podcast</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women wearing hijabs stand on the sidewalk outside a white building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521924/original/file-20230419-28-io0ue7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muslims have faced legal discrimination globally. Here community members gather outside the Islamic Society of Markham in Ontario.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Chris Young</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alongside these laws, Muslims face physical violence. This includes: the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-58406194">beating</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/25/obvious-religious-hatred-muslim-man-in-india-lynched-on-video">lynching</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/01/india-delhi-after-hindu-mob-riot-religious-hatred-nationalists">burning</a> of Muslims in India, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-attacks-strike-at-the-heart-of-muslims-safe-places-from-islamophobia-113922">Christchurch massacre in New Zealand in 2019</a>, the <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quebec-city-mosque-shooting">Québec City mosque shooting in 2017</a>, and more recently the murder of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/muslim-family-killed-in-terror-attack-in-london-ontario-islamophobic-violence-surfaces-once-again-in-canada-162400">Afzaal family</a> in London, Ont.</p>
<p>Collectively, these policies and killings demonstrate a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/india-islamophobia-global-bjp-hindu-nationalism-canada/">transnational quality of Islamophobic prejudice and violence</a>. </p>
<p>While the two incidents in Markham may not be directly linked to extremist groups, they have occurred within this <a href="https://iphobiacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Canada-Report-2022-1.pdf">global ecosystem of Islamophobia.</a> To me, the attacks indicate that these online conspiracies do not occur in a vacuum and can have potentially horrifying real consequences.</p>
<h2>Hindutva-based terrorism in Canada</h2>
<p>Over the last several years, I have carefully examined the digital and transnational connections between <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/12/13/why-white-supremacists-and-hindu-nationalists-are-so-alike">white supremacists in North America and far right Hindu nationalists in India</a>.</p>
<p>My preliminary findings show how <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twitter-investigation-reveals-what-the-freedom-convoy-islamophobes-incels-and-hindu-supremacists-have-in-common-177026">these two seemingly unrelated extremist far-right groups</a> have become increasingly allied on social media platforms as they position Muslims as a “common enemy.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/how-a-supremacist-political-ideology-from-india-is-said-to-be-gaining-influence-in-canada-1.6295956">Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)</a>, the right-wing Hindu nationalist organization, promotes the Hindutva ideology which believes India only belongs to Hindus.</p>
<p>A recent published <a href="https://www.nccm.ca/rss-in-canada/">report</a> by the National Council of Canadian Muslims and the World Sikh Organization documents how this organization has gained ground in Canada. Jasmin Zine is a Canadian scholar whose <a href="https://iphobiacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Canada-Report-2022-1.pdf">recent report</a> also outlines a network of Hindu nationalists that aids in the circulation of ideologies that promote Islamophobia.</p>
<h2>Governments spreading misinformation</h2>
<p>In 2014, the BJP, the most prominent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/23/what-you-need-to-know-about-indias-bjp">Hindu nationalistic right-wing party in India</a> came to power. Like the RSS, the BJP and other Hindu nationalist parties believe that India belongs only to Hindus. </p>
<p>Since elected, the BJP has actively spread <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003052272">misinformation and conspiracies about Muslims through social and mainstream media</a>, intensifying hostilities between Muslims and Hindus.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Indian prime minister Modi on the back of a car with two other men waving to a crowd of people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521947/original/file-20230419-16-oli2no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The BJP and other Hindu nationalists believe that India belongs only to Hindus, not minorities like Muslims.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ajit Solanki)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While seemingly different on the surface from white supremacy, my <a href="http://gmj-canadianedition.ca/current-issue/">research</a> shows how these two movements similarly mobilize emotional rhetoric and visual content to spread their influence. </p>
<p>Twitter, as one of the main platforms for both groups, has been used extensively to perpetuate new <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003052272-11/hindu-nationalism-news-channels-post-truth-twitter-zeinab-farokhi">forms of gendered Islamophobia and to forge surprising alliances</a> and affinities.</p>
<h2>The Love Jihad conspiracy</h2>
<p>One of the conspiracy theories shared by these groups is called Love Jihad. Originating in India by <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/3/201">Hindu nationalists in 2013</a>, this conspiracy alleges Muslim men actively seduce non-Muslim women to marry and convert them to Islam. </p>
<p>The #LoveJihad hashtag was quickly picked up on social media by <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1083">white extremists</a> and other Islamophobic groups in North America, modulating it to fit their own conspiracies such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13030201">The Great Replacement</a>.</p>
<p>This example demonstrates how anti-Muslim sentiment online spreads quickly and transnationally. </p>
<p>Groups I monitor on Twitter from India constantly talk about the perceived threat of Love Jihad. One such Hindu nationalist group, Hindu Jagruti Org, warns Hindu women against “dangerous, sexually aggressive” Muslim men. The tweet below is an example:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"746233106445668353"}"></div></p>
<p>These tweets portray Muslim men as “deceitful, sexual monsters” who view Hindu women as “objects to fulfill their lust.” Hindu extremists argue that to combat these “Muslim monsters,” precautionary measures are needed. </p>
<h2>#LoveJihad travels to North America</h2>
<p>The #LoveJihad conspiracy was quickly taken up by Islamophobic groups in North America. For example, Robert Spencer, who runs <a href="https://hindutvawatch.org/hindu-nationalisms-intense-hatred-for-christians-why-does-robert-spencer-ally-with-them/">Jihad Watch which has a large following among Hindu nationalists</a>, tweeted the following:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1424415135423156228"}"></div></p>
<p>The tweet includes an article that claims the Islamic State encourages Love Jihadis to target non-Muslim women and “abduct,” “forcibly convert, and marry” them.</p>
<p>Love Jihad has been proven a farce. </p>
<p>Yet, Spencer continues to claim there are “real cases that show how Muslim men have duped Hindu women into toxic romantic relations year after year.” </p>
<p>Responses from users to Spencer’s post demonstrate his success in establishing #LoveJihad as fact. For instance:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A screenshot of two tweets supporting the idea of a love jihad conspiracy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521978/original/file-20230419-26-hm4792.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Screenshot of tweets responding to Robert Spencer’s comments on Love Jihad.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As these posts indicate, Love Jihad easily reinforces belief in Muslim men as “terrorists” and “groomers” — that is, men who create trust with girls and young women in order to exploit them.</p>
<h2>Transnational alignment of hate</h2>
<p>This shared intense hatred of “monstrous” Muslim men brings Hindu and white extremists into a “transnational affective alignment.” That is, the mutual hate of Muslims and a mutual love for Hindu and white national ideals.</p>
<p>Social media platforms such as Twitter are important in creating these alignments and perpetuating related conspiracies, gaining considerable traction through their repetition.</p>
<p>This alignment is produced through the demonization of Muslim men and extremists’ shared hate and fear of them across borders. Through transnational responses and retweets, extremists forge a layered and cumulatively condensed affective message: Muslim men are dangerous. We fear them. Thus, we hate them.</p>
<p>While it remains to be seen whether or not the recent mosque attackers were directly influenced by online, transnational and affective Islamophobia, recurring incidences such as this should remind us that hate does not abide by international borders. </p>
<p>Misinformation and conspiracies find fertile ground in the echo chambers of social media. </p>
<p>Our response to such crimes — and their online equivalents — must consider that the fear and hate of Muslims does not happen by accident. </p>
<p>As the #LoveJihad conspiracy demonstrates, strange bedfellows are easily made when there is a perceived common enemy. Conspiracies and acts of anti-Muslim hate impact us all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204001/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zeinab Farokhi receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p>While the two incidents in Markham may not be directly linked to extremist groups, they have occurred within a global ecosystem of Islamophobia.Zeinab Farokhi, Assistant Professor (limited term appointment), Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies, University of Toronto Mississauga, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1783962022-03-17T12:11:46Z2022-03-17T12:11:46ZWhy Crimean Tatars are fearful as Russia invades Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452610/original/file-20220316-8063-s2t7c7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=82%2C8%2C5318%2C3509&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Crimean Tatars gathered for a rally commemorating the 70th anniversary of Stalin's mass deportation, in Simferopol, Crimea, on May 18, 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CrimeaTatars/787fdb2ac4624ded85e2fdabe56d8f95/photo?Query=crimea%20tatar&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=259&currentItemNo=15">AP Photo/Alexander Polegenko</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Vladimir Putin’s forces <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2022/02/24/1082795427/photos-show-the-calamity-as-russia-invades-ukraine">wage a brutal war</a> against Ukraine, the Crimean Tatars living in Russian-occupied Crimea and on the Ukrainian mainland feel particularly threatened by their historic enemy’s latest invasion.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Damnthatsinteresting/comments/t3vqg8/crimean_tatar_commander_isa_akayev_has_joined_the/">Some have vowed</a> to defend Ukraine, a land many fled to in 2014 after Putin’s forces invaded the Crimean Peninsula and began to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/12/russia-ukraine-crimean-tatars-dissent-repression">repress the local Crimean Tatars</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the risk of 15-year jail sentences for protesting Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatar World Congress <a href="https://twitter.com/Nkbayar/status/1498029810571952133?s=20&t=nT3Q4jFT88q9jsI4Ind6Bg">publicly came out against the invasion and said in a tweet</a>, “Our Congress recognizes its humanitarian and moral obligation to stand in solidarity with the Ukrainians … so help them in all ways they are capable.” </p>
<p>From 1997 to 1998, I lived with Crimean Tatars – both in their places of Stalin-imposed exile in Uzbekistan, where many still remain, and in their ancestral Crimean homeland – while <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190494704.001.0001/acprof-9780190494704">researching two books on this resilient ethnic group</a>. I found a people who had been through centuries of genocidal persecution, but emphasized their nonviolent approach to challenging Russian brutality. </p>
<h2>Crimea’s ancient inhabitants</h2>
<p>The Crimean Tatars formed as a distinct ethnic group from the 11th to the 15th centuries. This ethnic formation began when nomadic Turkic horsemen, known as Kipchaks, arrived from the vast Eurasian steppe, which extends from modern-day Kazakhstan through Ukraine to Moldova. They mixed with the long-settled populations living on the Crimea’s <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2043/ethnogenesis.pdf?1647370138">southern shores</a>, such as the Germanic Goths. </p>
<p>The final process of consolidation as an ethnic group was completed when the nomadic Mongols <a href="http://www.turko-tatar.com/ca303/UCLA200x.pdf">conquered Crimea</a> in the 1200s and their descendants converted to Sufism, a mystical form of Islam, after intermixing with the peninsula’s original population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the Tatar state in the 16th century, lying between Muscovy (Russia), the Black Sea and the Ottoman Empire." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451944/original/file-20220314-119643-1g92qfc.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Tatar state known as the Crimean Khanate on the Black Sea at its peak in the 16th Century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Khanate#/media/File:Crimean_Khanate_1600.gif">Oleksa Haiworonski via Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Mongol Golden Horde, a state founded by Genghis Khan’s grandson Batu Khan, subsequently ruled over Crimea and Russia for 240 years. When the Golden Horde disintegrated in the 1400s, the Tatars of the Crimea <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/soviet-genocide-putins-conquest-crimean-tatars/">created their own Khanate – a state governed by descendants of the Genghis Khan dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>The Crimean Khanate went on to <a href="https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/bwilliams.html">rule the region extending</a> from the Caucasus Mountains to Moldova for centuries, even after the Mongol empire in China, Russia and the Middle East collapsed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A painting of a palace with minarets going high up into the clouds in the sky and people outside it, some of horseback." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452615/original/file-20220316-8052-1v5j8u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Khan’s palace in Bakhchesaray painted by Carlo Bossoli, 1857.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Carlo_Bossoli_Khanpalast_von_Bachcisaraj_1857.jpg">Carlo Bossoli (1815–1884)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Crimean Tatars came to be feared by the Russians as <a href="https://jamestown.org/report/the-sultans-raiders-the-military-role-of-the-crimean-tatars-in-the-ottoman-empire/">horse-mounted raiders and enslavers of the Russian people</a>, their bold expeditions were carried out, in part, to prevent Orthodox-Slavic settlers from encroaching on their ancestral pasture lands. For centuries following Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s conquest of the Tatars of Siberia in the 1500s, Russian settlers had began an inexorable southward advance onto the steppe lands of the Tatars, known in Russian as the Ukraina, or the frontier. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Five boys doing a traditional dance, while locking their arms together, as people watch on the side." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452569/original/file-20220316-8350-1k0520e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Young boys doing a traditional dance during a Crimean Tatar wedding in the court of the Crimean Khans in Bakchesaray.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brian Glyn Williams.</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Soviet historians later tried to define the Crimean Tatars as “<a href="https://www.husj.harvard.edu/articles/hrushevskyi-on-the-tatars">a mob of wild, barbarian bandits</a>.” However, in my visits to their former capital of <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1820/">Bakchesaray, the Garden Palace</a>, located in a scenic gorge in the Crimean Mountains, I found Turkish-style imperial mosques and minarets, beautiful medieval marble fountains engraved with Arabic, and a palace evocative of a lost glory. </p>
<p>In 1774, the Russian Empire, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-crimean-tatars-9780190494704?cc=us&lang=en&">using vastly superior numbers</a> and new gunpowder technology, finally crushed the Crimean Tatars’ cavalry-based army and annexed their realm nine years later. </p>
<h2>Genocide under Stalin</h2>
<p>The Russian conquest of their homeland almost destroyed the Crimean Tatars as a distinct ethnic group. The once-free Tatar peasants were turned into serfs by their new Russian masters, their communal lands were confiscated, and their centuries-old mosques, bazaars and graveyards were <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2046/monderusse-39_%281%29.pdf?1647463830">destroyed</a></p>
<p>As hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars abandoned their southern mountain villages and nomadic yurt encampments to flee to Ottoman Turkey, the dwindling remnants of this ancient people in Tsarist Crimea <a href="https://iccrimea.org/Gaspirali/legacy.html">became a largely landless and repressed minority in a newly Slavic majority land</a>. </p>
<p>Worse was to come under the Tsars’ heirs, the Soviets. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin decided to ethnically cleanse the peninsula’s remaining Tatar population during World War II after accusing them of being a race of <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2044/the_crimean_tatar_exile_in_cen.pdf?1647370474">Nazi</a> collaborators. </p>
<p>Crimean Tatar women, children, and men, including those fighting in the ranks of the Soviet Army against Germany, were brutally deported in KGB cattle trains to the depths of Soviet Central Asia in May 1944. Approximately <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxiLDFxW8kE">1 in 3 Crimean Tatars died</a> in an ethnic cleansing that Ukraine and several other countries <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-tatar-deportation-parliament-genocide/27360343.html">later recognized as a genocide</a>.</p>
<p>Widely dispersed <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/75th-anniversary-the-deportation-crimean-tatars">from their ancestral lands</a> in the Central Asian deserts among a hostile local population, the surviving Crimean Tatars might have disappeared as a nation under Communist programs designed to wipe out their distinct identity. But they tenaciously managed to keep their collective identity alive and fought a decadeslong, transgenerational battle to <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/book-review-brian-glyn-williams-crimean-tatars-from-soviet-genocide-to-putin/">return to the romanticized “yeshil ada,” or the “green island,” of Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>As Soviet rule weakened and collapsed from 1989 to 1991, approximately 250,000 Crimean Tatars, roughly half the nation, <a href="https://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/20315/file.pdf">migrated back</a> to their homeland on the shores of the distant Black Sea. By that time, the Russian administration-dominated Crimean Autonomous Republic had been made part of Ukraine. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A man dressed in a suit and a black cap standing next to a woman in a white headscarf and floral pink dress." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452250/original/file-20220315-27-174lgf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An elderly Crimean Tatar couple who survived Stalin’s genocide and returned to live in a simple settlement in Crimea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brian Glyn Williams.</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the late 1990s, <a href="https://brianglynwilliams.com/crimea/pict_01a.html">I lived in a</a> squatter settlement with the Shevkievs, a Crimean Tatar family who had returned to the then-Ukrainian territory of Crimea from exile in Uzbekistan. I still fondly recall eating their famous chiborek fried meat pastries, hearing ancient folk ballads of the brave, horse-mounted Tatar warriors fighting the Russians, and being welcomed with open arms by this impoverished but resilient family and people. </p>
<p>By this time, the Russians <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/crimea-demographics-chart-2014-3">made up 58% of the Crimean autonomy’s population</a> and the indigenous Tatars only 12%. Anti-Tatar sentiment among the dominant Russians was widespread. I saw crowds in the Crimea <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/crimea/pict_38.html">marching with placards of Stalin</a> as an overt message of hostility toward the Tatars.</p>
<h2>The return of the Russians</h2>
<p>In 2014, Putin annexed the Crimea to punish Ukraine <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-annex-crimea-why-putin-invaded-2014-what-happened-nato-annexation-explained-1424682">for its efforts to</a> form closer ties with Western Europe and the U.S. For the Crimean Tatars who had rebuilt their devastated nation in democratic Ukraine, the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/crimean-tatars-face-russian-crackdown/3362590.html">conquest of their homeland</a> by their historical nemesis, now ruled by an increasingly autocratic Putin, was a nightmare come true. </p>
<p>Among the new Russian Federation authorities’ first measures after annexing the Crimea Autonomous Republic was to ban the Crimean Tatars’ parliament, known as the Mejlis, which had given women the right to vote in 1918. They also <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey/crimean-tatars-urge-global-community-stand-ukraine-war-russia">arrested, tortured and killed</a> Crimean Tatar activists. </p>
<p>Thousands of Crimean Tatars fled Russian oppression in Crimea following its 2014 annexation. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/why-capturing-ukraine-kherson-important-for-russia">Many settled</a> in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, or nearby Kherson, a town Putin’s forces <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-claims-it-captured-ukrainian-city-of-kherson-fighting-in-kharkiv-renews/">claimed they had captured on March 2, 2022</a>. </p>
<p>One displaced Crimean Tatar, who fled the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 to Ukraine, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-10508885/IAN-BIRRELL-Crimean-Tatars-victimised-Stalin-fight-Putins-Russia-death.html">declared in late February 2022</a>, “We have nowhere left to run, so we’ll have to fight.” </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Glyn Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who spent many years living with the Crimean Tatars explains their long history of persecution.Brian Glyn Williams, Professor of Islamic History, UMass DartmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680592021-10-25T12:34:51Z2021-10-25T12:34:51ZHow ethnic and religious divides in Afghanistan are contributing to violence against minorities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427863/original/file-20211021-21-1b4z10z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=80%2C17%2C5910%2C3808&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A powerful explosion Oct. 8, 2021, in a mosque in northern Afghanistan left several dead</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Afghanistan/40ef79cf2989416a8c9b87eff61f6ccc/photo?Query=afghanistan%20mosque%20explosion%20oct&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=21&currentItemNo=5">AP Photo/Abdullah Sahil</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Close to a hundred Afghan Shiite Muslims were killed in attacks on mosques in October 2021. One such attack took place on Oct. 15, when a group of suicide bombers <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/10/15/1046287550/suicide-bombers-attack-mosque-afghanistan">detonated explosives at a mosque in Kandahar</a>. Just over a week before that, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-prayer-religion-2b9d9863da38661ba6fa186a72ac5352">at least 46 people were killed in another suicide bomber attack</a> in northern Afghanistan. The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for both attacks.</p>
<p>Ethnicity and religion are key to understanding the politics and conflicts of today’s Afghanistan. <a href="http://sinno.com/publications---data.html">My research on Afghan affairs</a> can explain how they have created fault lines that have influenced Afghanistan’s politics since 1978.</p>
<h2>Afghanistan’s four largest ethnic groups</h2>
<p>The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Plant-and-animal-life#ref21424">estimated at around 45% of the population</a> and mostly concentrated in the south and east of the country, are the Sunni Muslim Pashtun.</p>
<p>The Pashtun population is split in half by the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.11588/iaf.2013.44.1338">has a long history of challenging state authority and the legitimacy of official borders in both countries</a>. Until recently, when Pakistan <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-bd8165697772792b69d65c8509633cd9">built a fence on the border</a>, Pashtun tribesmen and fighters crossed the border as if it did not exist. </p>
<p>The Pashtun are often characterized as being fiercely independent and protective of their land, honor, traditions and faith. The first time Pashtun fighters defeated an invading superpower was when they destroyed a British army sent to colonize Afghanistan in what is known as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Anglo-Afghan-Wars">the First Anglo-Afghan War, which lasted from
1838 to 1942</a>. </p>
<p>The Pashtun tribes’ and clans’ martial prowess makes them very influential in the politics of Afghanistan. Except for two short-lived exceptions, <a href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG150239">in 1929</a> and <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801475788/organizations-at-war-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/#bookTabs=1">between 1992 and 1994</a>, only Pashtun leaders have ruled Afghanistan since 1750. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the distribution of ethnic groups in Afghanistan" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pashtuns constitute Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/resource/g7631e.ct001105/?r=-0.797,-0.02,2.594,1.066,0">Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan are the Tajiks, <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/129100/schetter.pdf">a term that refers to ethnic Tajiks as well as to other Sunni Muslim Persian speakers</a>. The Tajiks, who constitute some 30% of the Afghan population and are mostly concentrated in the northeast and west, have generally been accepted by Pashtuns as part of the fabric of life in Afghanistan, perhaps because of their common adherence to Sunni Islam. </p>
<p>The third-largest Sunni Muslim group are the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634938408400451">Uzbeks and the closely related Turkmen in the north of the country</a>, who form around 10% of the population.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-hazara-of-afghanistan-an-expert-on-islam-explains-166776">The Hazara</a> – around 15% of the Afghan population – traditionally lived in the rough mountainous terrain in the center of Afghanistan, an area in which they historically sought shelter from Pashtun tribesmen who disapproved of their adherence to the Shiite sect of Islam. The Hazara have historically been some of the poorest and most marginalized people in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Communist government and Soviet occupation</h2>
<p>Most Afghans hardly reacted when a faction of Afghanistan’s communist party took power in April 1978, because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.715">the Afghan government had traditionally played a very limited role outside of the larger cities</a>. </p>
<p>They did, however, rise in impromptu revolts when the communists sent their activists to conservative villages to teach Afghan children Marxist dogma. When the Soviets invaded in 1979, resistance spread to much of Afghanistan. Mujahideen – the Muslim warriors defending their land – <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801475788/organizations-at-war-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/#bookTabs=1">from all ethnic groups played a role in resisting the Soviet military</a>. </p>
<p>Later, a brutish Uzbek communist militia leader named Abdul Rashid Dostum eliminated most Uzbek Mujahideen, and most Hazara Mujahideen parties made a tacit agreement with the Soviets to reduce hostilities. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400834532">Most Pashtuns and Tajiks, however, continued to resist until the Soviet withdrawal</a> and the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.</p>
<p>The Soviets promoted minority interests <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909150?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">and gender equality</a> in areas of Afghanistan they controlled, which led the larger cities they controlled to evolve culturally to a point that made city life unrecognizably alien to many rural Afghans.</p>
<p>The withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army in February 1989 led to the cessation of U.S. aid to the Mujahideen parties, which turned Mujahideen field commanders, whose loyalty to party leaders was based on their ability to distribute financial and military resources, <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801475788/organizations-at-war-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/#bookTabs=1">into militarized independent local leaders</a>. Similarly, the regime’s militias and units also became independent after its collapse in April 1992. </p>
<p>Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtun areas, became fragmented, with hundreds of local leaders and warlords fighting over territory, drug production, smuggling routes and populations to tax. While many local leaders cared about the welfare of their kith and kin, <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501746420/warlord-survival/">some were warlords who abused fellow Afghans</a>. </p>
<h2>The first Taliban era</h2>
<p>In 1994, a group of previous Pashtun Mujahideen <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032248">formed the Taliban and managed to control most of Afghanistan</a>, including Kabul, by the time the U.S. invaded in late 2001. </p>
<p>The Taliban’s rise <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032248">was fueled by rural Pashtun support for its agenda</a> of ending warlord-generated insecurity, bringing back Pashtun prominence and recreating traditional Pashtun village life – as they imagined it to have been. The Taliban’s conservative views reflected the values of a large section of the public they governed in the south and east of the country.</p>
<p>The conservative rural Taliban, traumatized by decades of war, encountered an alien cultural environment when they took over Kabul. They reacted forcefully, limited urban women’s access to education and labor and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/23/hold-the-taliban-and-sharia-law-in-afghanistan">imposed strict limitations on dress, appearance and public behavior</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of Afghan women grieving at a funeral." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan Hazaras face violence since the return of the Taliban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AfghanistanHazarasUnderAttack/18185cafd3314754a4d7ed874d9f5347/photo?Query=hazara&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=303&currentItemNo=7">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Afghans in urban areas, particularly women, and members of Afghan minorities did not by and large share the parochial Taliban understanding of their common faith. They were undermined, threatened or punished when they attempted to challenge Taliban restrictions. The Shiite Hazara, in particular, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0.htm">were subjected to brutal retaliatory attacks</a> when they resisted Taliban rule. </p>
<h2>The US occupation</h2>
<p>The U.S. military <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-led-attack-on-afghanistan-begins">invaded Afghanistan and allied with minority local leaders</a> and some Pashtun warlords to oust the Taliban. These warlords ended up filling most key posts in the regime the U.S.-led coalition established in Kabul.</p>
<p>For warlords from all backgrounds, it appeared to be a golden age. The rest of the Afghan population, even more so in Pashtun areas than in others, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/06/how-us-funded-abuses-led-failure-afghanistan">went back to suffering from warlords’ predatory behavior</a>.</p>
<p>In 2004, three years after the U.S. occupation began, the mostly Pashtun Taliban <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">reorganized as an insurgent force to fight the U.S.-led occupation</a> and the regime it established in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Enterprising urban youths, including women, from historically disadvantaged minorities, <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=gj_etds">particularly the Shiite Hazara</a>, took advantage of aid, education programs and foreign-driven employment opportunities to advance. In contrast, the rural Pashtun, who suffered the brunt of the warfare between the Taliban and U.S.-led coalition, were set back economically and hardly benefited from investments in health and education.</p>
<p>One of the byproducts of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">the development of a local branch of the Islamic State, the Islamic State-Khorasan</a> (an Arabic name for the region). The organization was formed by defectors from the Taliban who felt that their leadership was too soft on the Americans. This group has engaged in attacks on Shiite civilians, whom it considers to be heretics and agents of Shiite Iran. It was responsible for attacks on U.S. troops such as the August 2021 <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-france-evacuations-kabul-9e457201e5bbe75a4eb1901fedeee7a1">attack on the Kabul airport</a>. It is also <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">antagonistic toward the Taliban</a>.</p>
<h2>The return of Taliban</h2>
<p>The return of the Taliban to Kabul after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021 is a return to a rural Pashtun order. Most Taliban leaders are rural Pashtuns who received their education in conservative madrassas in Afghanistan or Pashtun areas of Pakistan. <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/whos-who-in-taliban-interim-government/2360424">Only three of the 24 members</a> of the Taliban interim government are not Pashtuns – they are Tajiks.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 115,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>And the Taliban are running the country <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032248">the way they imagine life in Pashtun villages used to be</a> before Afghanistan sank into perpetual war in 1979. The Taliban movement caters to the sensibilities of conservative rural Pashtun Muslims. Their understanding of Islam is not necessarily shared by other Afghans, religious as they may be.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the Islamic State group is conducting massive terrorist attacks on Shiite mosques, a tactic that originated with the Iraqi branch of the organization. One aim of the Islamic State’s attacks, I believe, is to drive recruitment that has weakened over the past years by appealing to anti-Shiite sentiment among the Pashtun, particularly after the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban successes on the battlefield.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdulkader Sinno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Afghan affairs explains the religious affiliations of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan and why they may not share a common understanding of Islam.Abdulkader Sinno, Associate Professor of Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659422021-09-14T12:12:48Z2021-09-14T12:12:48ZChile has a growing Muslim community – but few know about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420876/original/file-20210913-20-reb5do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=189%2C0%2C5561%2C3802&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chilean Muslims reflect significant diversity. The Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufis, a global Sufi order that originated in Central Asia, are among them.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Albert</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nora is a rare sight at the Universidad de Chile. Dressed in a long abaya, or Islamic robe, that covers all but her hands and face, her outfit distinguishes her from other students on campus. In between classes, she’ll often seek a quiet, sheltered space to lay out a small carpet and pray. </p>
<p>If one were to ask Nora, as we did, about her distinct appearance on campus, she would say she doesn’t mind. She’s content with her dress, her prayers and the way of life it reflects. Nora is a Chilean Muslim, and proudly so.</p>
<p>Chile is not a country where most people would expect to find a Muslim population. It is, however, not unique. Some of the earliest Muslims in Latin America, for example, arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries. <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15494.html">Known as “Moriscos,”</a> these Muslims traveled to the colonies hoping to evade persecution under the Christian crown in Spain. </p>
<p>Muslims also came to the Americas during the 18th century as <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/islam-brazil">enslaved Africans under the Portuguese and Spanish empires</a>. These Muslims came mostly from West Africa and, in Brazil, <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/mal%C3%AA-uprising">led one of the continent’s largest revolts</a> against slavery. Muslims in Latin America are also the result of <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/narbona-pinto-karam-crescent-over-another-horizon">Middle Eastern migrations from the Ottoman Empire during the late 19th and early 20th centuries</a>. </p>
<p>This history of Islam in Latin America is visible today in the <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-americas/">1.7 million Muslims</a> living across Central and South America. </p>
<h2>Why we did this research</h2>
<p>As scholars of <a href="https://aud.academia.edu/MatthewIngalls/Papers">religion</a> and <a href="https://memphis.academia.edu/MichaelVicentePerez/Papers">anthropology</a>, our interest in Latin American Muslims began in 2018. At the time, few studies on Muslim minorities in the Americas considered the experience of Muslims in Latin America. Moreover, much of the research in the Americas focused on questions of assimilation or terrorism and neglected the more basic issues of belief, practice and community. </p>
<p>Islam, in other words, was framed as a problem, not a way of life. And we found that, because of such research, large Muslim communities and their experiences had been excluded from the picture of Islam in the Americas. </p>
<p>As both scholars and converts to Islam ourselves, we understand the depth of meaning Islam can have for its believers. We therefore decided to focus our research on a growing community of Muslims in a region not typically associated with Islam. </p>
<h2>Diverse community</h2>
<p>In Chile, Islam is primarily the result of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian migrations from the 19th and early 20th centuries. Fleeing conditions in the Ottoman Empire, these Levantine immigrants and their descendants permanently settled in Chile and <a href="https://centroislamicodechile.cl/portfolio/historia-de-la-comunidad-musulmana-en-chile/">established the first Islamic institutions</a> in the 1920s. </p>
<p>Despite their national and religious differences, members of this early community combined their efforts as Muslims to lay the foundation for Islam in Chile. Now, almost a century after the first Islamic center was built, Chile boasts over 13 mosques and Islamic centers.</p>
<p>Home to <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100805091041/http:/pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf">approximately 5,000 Muslims</a>, including Sunnis and Shiites who have their own distinct mosques and centers, these sites are the communal epicenters for the Muslim minority in Chile. Together, they provide the spaces for Muslim education and practice and serve as an important source of their visibility. </p>
<p>Chile has one of the <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/">smaller Muslim populations in the region</a>. Its size notwithstanding, Chilean Muslims reflect significant diversity. In many ways, they are a microcosm of the Muslim world. In the capital city of Santiago, where the majority of Muslims live, the largest community is tied to the Mezquita as-Salaam. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Mezquita as-Salaam mosque in Santiago, Chile." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420882/original/file-20210913-22-1whq32z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Established in 1989, Mezquita as-Salaam mosque conducts daily ritual prayers and hosts all Islamic events, including festivals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Albert</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Established in 1989, Mezquita as-Salaam today is open daily for ritual prayers and hosts all Islamic events including nightly feasts during <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ramadan-is-called-ramadan-6-questions-answered-77291">Ramadan</a> and communal meals for the festival of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-eid-celebrated-twice-a-year-and-how-has-coronavirus-changed-the-festival-143647">Eid</a>. The mosque is currently managed by the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2058855">Tablighi Jamaat</a>, a global Muslim missionary movement, which provides most Islamic instruction and delivers the main lectures in Spanish and Arabic for Friday prayer. </p>
<p>The Tablighi Jamaat also sends Chile’s Muslim converts abroad for Islamic learning and takes them on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716203588001009">religious excursions</a> throughout Latin America as part of their mission to remind Muslims to adhere to Islamic traditions. </p>
<h2>Converts to Islam</h2>
<p>Mezquita as-Salaam is a diverse communal space. Despite its official affiliation with the Tablighi Jamaat, Chilean Muslims come from a range of backgrounds and experiences. </p>
<p>Many are native Chilean converts, like Khadija, who embraced Islam about a decade ago. We met Khadija in the Mezquita as-Salaam during Ramadan. She discovered Islam through her own online search and came to the mosque only after deciding she wanted to join the faith. Khadija does not identify with the approach of the Tablighi Jamaat and instead participates in study circles with Chilean converts and some of the Arab Muslim women who attend the mosque. </p>
<p>Together, they practice Quranic recitation; study the Quran and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0B69DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT5&dq=hadith+islam&ots=Fl9zEGZJBK&sig=mzWRIkQ0itxQgZxPvMd4XUW73-8#v=onepage&q=hadith%20islam&f=false">hadith</a>, the recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad; discuss the ethics of Islam; and share ideas for halal recipes. For Khadija, the mosque is an important space to connect with other Chilean Muslims and escape her experience as a minority. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Naqshbandi Sufi Dargha, a global Sufi Order that originated in Central Asia, in Santiago" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420878/original/file-20210913-23828-1nc179f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Naqshbandi Sufi Darghah, which the community visits regularly for informal gatherings, vegetarian meals, and prayers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Albert</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a working-class area about 6 miles west of the Mezquita as-Salaam is the center, or dargah, for the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203947432/naqshbandiyya-itzchak-weismann">Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufis</a>, a global Sufi order that originated in Central Asia. We were introduced to the Naqshbandis through a Tablighi imam who was providing Islamic education to the community. Led by a local Chilean sheikh who established the first branch in Chile, this small group of Muslims is connected to Naqshbandi Orders throughout the Americas, including Argentina and the United States.</p>
<p>From our visits with the Naqshbandis, we learned that they are almost exclusively converts. Many of them told us during interviews that they discovered Islam through what they said they experienced as personal encounters with the order’s sheikh, Muhammad Nazim al-Qabbani, during a dream. The community visits the dargah regularly for informal gatherings, vegetarian meals, and dhikr (devotional acts of prayer that remind Muslims of their connection to God), as well as prayers on Fridays. </p>
<p>They also meet to prepare and distribute meals in impoverished areas of Santiago. For the Naqshbandi, this is a critical dimension of their ethical labor. It is one of the most important ways to practice the Islamic principles of compassion and faith. </p>
<p>Iman, for example, is one of the founders of the food drive they call <a href="https://ollarabbani.com">Olla Rabbani</a>. Every week, she and other Naqshbandis travel to local markets to collect unspoiled food scraps and use them to prepare large pots of lentil soup for local distribution. Iman was a deeply spiritual woman who established her connection to God in the practice of dhikr. But Iman also found a connection to God through her work with the poor. For her, as with many of the Naqshbandi, feeding the hungry is as much a part of Islam as any other form of devotion. </p>
<p>The communities of Mezquita as-Salaam and the Naqshbandi dargah are only a fraction of Chile’s Muslim community. In Santiago and the throughout the country, there are other Sunni, Shiite and Sufi mosques and centers with their own communities. Some are mixtures of Chilean converts and Muslim migrants from abroad. Others are exclusively Muslim converts.</p>
<p>Together, however, they represent the Muslim minority population of Chile. More significantly, they are a part of the ever-expanding Muslim world. </p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Vicente Perez received funding from John Templeton Trust Global Religion Research Initiative and the American Academy of Religion International Research Collaborative Grant. Michael Vicente Perez is affiliated with the University of Washington. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Ingalls has received funding from the Templeton Religion Trust (Global Religion Research Initiative grant) and the American Academy of Religion. </span></em></p>Two scholars – both converts to Islam – set out to understand the Muslim community in Chile. Here is what they found.Michael Vicente Perez, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of MemphisMatthew Ingalls, Chair of the Department of International and Middle Eastern Studies and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, American University in DubaiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1585652021-04-15T12:40:29Z2021-04-15T12:40:29ZFrench row over mosque isn’t simply about state financing – it runs deep into Islamophobia and French secularism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395105/original/file-20210414-16-o5lk5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C0%2C5526%2C3709&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The storm over the construction of the grand mosque in Strasbourg has been long brewing.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-general-view-taken-on-april-6-shows-the-construction-news-photo/1232144648?adppopup=true">Frederick Florin/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Among the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/is-the-far-right-weaponizing-frances-charter-for-imams/">anti-Muslim slogans</a> discovered sprayed across an Islamic community center in western France on the morning of April 11, 2021, was a reference to a mosque that hasn’t even finished being built yet.</p>
<p>“EELV = Traitors” <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/des-inscriptions-anti-musulmanes-sur-une-mosquee-de-rennes-darmanin-se-rend-sur-place_fr_6072c8a9c5b6a74b3bdc92d9">read the graffitied message</a>, alongside others including “No to Islamization” and references to the Crusades. It was spray painted on an Islamic center in Rennes, but its target was Strasbourg’s leading Green (EELV) party, members of whom <a href="https://actu.fr/grand-est/strasbourg_67482/financement-d-une-mosquee-a-strasbourg-pourquoi-l-attribution-d-une-subvention-par-la-mairie-fait-polemique_40475337.html">voted on March 22</a> to subsidize the construction of the Eyyub Sultan mosque – also known as the Grand Mosque of Strasbourg – with a grant of 2.5 million euros (US$3 million), or 10% of the total costs.</p>
<p>Construction of what is slated to be the <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/macron-s-war-on-islamists-comes-up-against-erdogan-s-soft-power">largest mosque in Europe</a> – and especially the state’s role in its financing – has sparked controversy for many reasons. French Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin has condemned Strasbourg’s decision, citing the potential of “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210324-row-erupts-in-france-over-plans-to-use-state-funds-to-build-strasbourg-mosque">foreign meddling</a>.” His concerns relate to the future mosque’s leadership – the French branch of the Turkish-based Milli Görüs Islamic Confederation, an Islamic political organization for the Turkish diaspora across Europe.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man prays inside the Avicenna Islamic Cultural centre in Rennes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/395107/original/file-20210414-14-thqfvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man prays inside the Rennes Islamic center, which was subjected to racist graffiti two days ahead of the holy month of Ramadan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-prays-inside-the-avicenna-islamic-cultural-centre-in-news-photo/1232251681?adppopup=true">Jean-Francois Monier/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The vote and its backlash also come on the heels of a series of measures imposed in France under the guise of reinforcing secularism and stamping out radicalization – ones that critics say <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/23/why-france-islamist-separatism-bill-controversy-extremism/">unfairly target the country’s Muslim population</a> and contribute to a climate of Islamophobia. This includes the French Republican principles bill that <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20210413-french-senate-approves-toughened-version-of-bill-accused-of-stigmatising-islam-religion-muslims">was passed by the French Senate on April 12, 2021,</a> with stricter regulations on Muslim dress and prayer locations added to the text. </p>
<p>So where does the Strasbourg mosque controversy fit into all this? Is it motivated by geopolitical concerns and fears of an Islamist threat? Does it merely reflect confusion over state funding for religion in France? Or is it simply an extension of broader debates over how Islam fits into French secularism? </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.emerson.edu/faculty-staff-directory/carol-ferrara">research surrounding the politics of religion, secularism, Islam and pluralism in France</a> over the past 10 years suggests that it is most likely a mix of all of these factors.</p>
<h2>Funding religious buildings</h2>
<p>One contributing factor to the controversy over the Strasbourg mosque is the confusion over French laws restricting the funding of places of worship. </p>
<p>Notably, laws about the separation of church and state, or “laïcité laws,” <a href="https://books.openedition.org/editionsmsh/10860?lang=en">do not apply equally</a> to all French territories.</p>
<p>In 1905, when <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/secularism-and-religious-freedom-in-france-63815/article/secularism-and-religious-freedom-in-france">church and state were officially separated</a>, certain territories were exempted, such as Guyane, where the Catholic Church remains the only recognized religion. At that time, the now-French region of Alsace-Moselle – in which Strasbourg is situated – was part of Germany. When France recovered the territory in 1918, the region negotiated an exception to the 1905 law, instead choosing to remain <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Quest-concordat-2018-12-11-1200988851">under the Concordat of 1802</a>, which officially recognizes certain religions – though not Islam – and allows for direct state subsidizing of places of worship.</p>
<p>As such, officials in Strasbourg are well within their <a href="https://actu.fr/societe/une-municipalite-a-t-elle-le-droit-de-financer-la-construction-d-une-mosquee-en-alsace-moselle_40488853.html">rights to finance the mosque or any other house of worship</a>, so long as they adhere to <a href="https://www.associations.gouv.fr/le-droit-local-des-associations-en-alsace-moselle.html">local laws</a> that limit funding to 10% of construction costs.</p>
<p>But just because it’s legal doesn’t mean the move is popular.</p>
<p>In a 2021 <a href="https://www.ifop.com/publication/etude-sur-le-maintien-du-regime-du-concordat-et-le-financement-des-lieux-de-culte-en-alsace-moselle/">poll by the French Institute of Opinion and Marketing Studies (IFOP)</a>, more than two-thirds of respondents said they opposed all public funding of religious buildings or ministries. That number rises to nearly 79% when it comes to Islamic centers. Specifically, 85% of the overall French population said they oppose state funding for the Strasbourg mosque, with 79% of Alsace-Moselle residents against the move.</p>
<h2>Geopolitical fears</h2>
<p>Such opposition hasn’t been formed in a vacuum – the mosque’s controversy comes amid broader political debates over foreign intervention and fostering an “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/islam-france-macron/556604/">Islam of France</a>” that conforms with what is perceived as the national identity.</p>
<p>One of the main arguments against the mosque stems from its leaders’ affiliation with the Turkish-based Milli Görüs.</p>
<p>The French branch of Milli Görüs is one of the few Muslim organizations in France that refused to sign the recent state-imposed <a href="https://www.cfcm-officiel.fr/presentation-de-la-charte-des-principes-pour-lislam-de-france-au-president-de-la-republique/">charter of principles of Islam in France</a>. The authors of the charter, the French Council of the Muslim Religion (CFCM), along with the French government that initiated its formulation, say that it serves as a reminder that <a href="https://www.franceinter.fr/politique/que-contient-la-charte-des-principes-de-l-islam-de-france">Republican principles must come before religious convictions</a>. The charter strictly condemns political Islam and any foreign interference in mosque management. </p>
<p>But French Milli Görüs leaders have accused the state of <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/france/20210407-islam-de-france-les-associations-non-signataires-de-la-charte-d%C3%A9noncent-une-ing%C3%A9rence">“interference with Muslim worship” and political manipulation of Islam</a>. </p>
<p>They complain that they were not consulted at all in the charter’s drafting and that Milli Görüs is being unfairly accused of being “<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/france/20210407-islam-de-france-les-associations-non-signataires-de-la-charte-d%C3%A9noncent-une-ing%C3%A9rence">less Republican</a>” than other Muslim organizations for their abstention from signing.</p>
<p>Those wary of Milli Görüs’ leadership of the mosque also cite ties between the group <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-extremists/germany-trains-eye-on-turkish-group-in-wake-of-coup-crackdown-sources-idUSKCN1081LF">and Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling AKP</a>. It has prompted concerns over the possibilities of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/04/06/financement-public-d-une-mosquee-a-strasbourg-la-prefete-saisit-la-justice_6075772_3224.html">Turkish government meddling</a> in French sociopolitical affairs. </p>
<p>These fears of foreign intervention reflect <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691144214/the-emancipation-of-europes-muslims">a major policy shift</a> in France over the past few decades over how it perceives foreign ties to French Muslim organizations. Before the 1990s, the French state encouraged such relationships in a bid, some have argued, to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/integrating-islam/">keep Islam “foreign.”</a> But this changed as the public presence of <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20171201/how-frances-muslim-population-will-grow-in-the-future/">Islam in France grew</a> and amid post-9/11 suspicions of foreign manipulation. By 2016, then-Prime Minister Manuel Valls was calling for a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/07/29/comment-est-organise-l-islam-de-france_4976389_4355770.html">ban on foreign funding for mosques</a>. </p>
<p>This ethos has continued with provisions in <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/dossierlegislatif/JORFDOLE000042635616/?detailType=EXPOSE_MOTIFS&detailId=">the recent French Republican principles bill</a> that require strict declarations of any foreign funding for religious organizations and give authorities the ability to ban any donations if there is sufficient evidence of a “serious threat affecting a fundamental interest of society.” </p>
<p>From this standpoint, allocating state funds to subsidize a mosque with foreign ties seems to run counter to efforts to foster an “Islam of France” that’s more integrated into secular French Republican values. </p>
<h2>Mosques, moderation and Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Of course there are those who just don’t want more mosques in France no matter how they are funded, spurred by erroneous conflations between radicalization, Islamist separatism, and places of worship. </p>
<p>But research in the U.S. has shown that mosque attendance is often an <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/rel2040504">indicator of greater “social and political integration”</a> and civic engagement. Mosques are not just places of worship. They are gathering places, cultural centers, educational centers, community outreach hubs, interfaith facilitators, social resource centers and even sometimes places for non-Muslims to learn about Islam. </p>
<p>This is especially true for “grand mosques” such as the <a href="https://www.mosqueedeparis.net/">Grand Mosque of Paris</a> or the <a href="http://mosquee-lyon.org/">Grand Mosque of Lyon</a>, where space is deliberately allocated for public visits, educational programs and community events. Having visited Milli Görüs centers in France and spoken with some of their members, directors and school officials, I believe these mosques seem to fit this same community and civic engagement profile.</p>
<p>Regardless, many French politicians and ordinary citizens believe that the secular principles that undergird French society need to be protected from a growing “Islamist threat.”</p>
<p>Sentiment is riding particularly high in the long lead-up to the 2022 elections, in which President Macron may attempt to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210213-macron-has-helped-advance-the-far-right-france-s-mainstream-parties-veer-right-to-maintain-power">appeal to anti-immigrant voters</a> to curb the power of the far right.</p>
<p>In such an environment, those looking for Islamist threats seem to find them everywhere. Such fearmongering has seen scholars studying Islam and Islamophobia accused of advancing an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/02/22/france-macron-islamo-leftism/">Islamo-leftist agenda</a>, the dissolution of the nation’s <a href="https://www.islamophobie.net/les-nombreuses-contre-verites-sur-le-ccif/">largest anti-Islamophobia organization</a>, and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/11/18/le-projet-de-loi-contre-l-islam-radical-et-les-separatismes-finalise-et-transmis-aux-deputes-et-senateurs_6060131_823448.html">home-schooling parents</a> blamed for radicalizing Muslim youth.</p>
<p>The controversy surrounding the Strasbourg mosque has obvious geopolitical groundings and clearly fits into dominant political narratives of protecting France’s secular principles. But it also fits into popular Islamophobic rhetoric of an omnipresent Islamist threat – rhetoric that hinders French Muslim citizens from finding community and belonging in France, whether in mosques or elsewhere.</p>
<p>[<em>3 media outlets, 1 religion newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-3-in-1">Get stories from The Conversation, AP and RNS.</a>]\</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Ferrara does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Strasbourg officials are within their right to allow public funds to be used to build what may be the largest mosque in Europe. But that hasn’t stopped the backlashCarol Ferrara, Assistant Professor, Emerson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1568432021-03-14T18:54:13Z2021-03-14T18:54:13ZGraffiti, arson, death threats: new research finds widespread violence against Australian mosques<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389187/original/file-20210312-21-1r440ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dean Lewins/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The horrendous mass murders in New Zealand on March 15 2019 had a strong link with Australia.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/">New Zealand royal commission</a> into the attacks found the Australian perpetrator had long subscribed to violent right-wing Islamophobia and had taken this with him to New Zealand. In fact, Muslim communities in New Zealand <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/nz-failed-to-record-hate-crimes-for-years">had reported</a> threats and violence for years, including <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/police-reject-claim-officers-didnt-respond-to-suspicious-mosque-behaviour/MWZCGCH3JIOP27VC6GXEBFYRLY/">suspicious behaviour</a> at one of the mosques targeted in Christchurch.</p>
<p>After the Christchurch attack, we surveyed mosques in Australia to gauge the extent of anti-Muslim attacks here. We cannot understand the Christchurch massacre without comprehending the Australian context that at least in part incubated it.</p>
<p>Our research finds the threat of similarly motivated acts of hatred remains widespread. During 2020, we surveyed 75 mosques from five states and two territories of Australia about their experiences of violence in the five years from 2014 to 2018, as well as detailed questions about 2019. About half of the responses were from imams or mosque officials, 15% from volunteers and 35% from other congregation members.</p>
<p>Most concerning is that over half (58.2%) of participating mosques (or worshippers at them) had experienced targeted violence between 2014 and 2019. The threat of an attack increased in cases where there had been public attention. For example, mosques that were reported in the media (100%) or experienced online opposition to the development of the mosque (83%) experienced higher rates of victimisation.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-royal-commission-report-on-the-christchurch-atrocity-is-a-beginning-not-an-end-151663">The royal commission report on the Christchurch atrocity is a beginning, not an end</a>
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<p>The types of violence suffered by mosque attendees and the mosque buildings included arson, physical assault, graffiti, vandalism, verbal abuse and online abuse and hate mail, including death threats. There were notable geographical differences in these occurrences of violence. Despite being home to more mosques, attacks against Sydney mosques between 2014 and 2018 were proportionally lower (at 41% of the 51 respondent mosques) than for Melbourne (70% of 17 mosques) and Brisbane (89% of nine mosques).</p>
<p>The proportion of attacks against mosques in Australian states and territories was 29% in 2019, in the wake of the Christchurch massacre. Again, these were disproportionately distributed between the states, with a higher proportion of attacks directed at mosques in Brisbane and Melbourne.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389188/original/file-20210312-21-d7nmyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In the wake of the Christchurch terror attack, Australian mosques are still being targeted with threats and violence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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<p>In 2019 alone, 30% of respondent mosques had experienced a graffiti attack, with 17% reporting two or more instances. Some 12% had experienced one or more arson attacks, with one mosque reporting six such incidents in that year. Mosques were also vandalised, with 34% of participating mosques experiencing at least one such incident, and three mosques experiencing four to five incidents. Hate mail was received by 17% of the mosques.</p>
<p>Beyond attacks against mosques themselves, their attendees were targeted similarly by Islamophobic violence. Just under 40% of the mosques reported verbal abuse of their attendees in 2019. In addition, 17% had received threats of violence (with one actual physical assault), while 20% experienced objects thrown at them or the mosque.</p>
<p>Mosque attendees in Christchurch before the 2019 attacks reported similar experiences. Some were reported to police, some were shared within the communities. This ripple effect of community knowledge about safety and visibility no doubt shapes all mosque attendees’ experiences of religious observance.</p>
<p>Visibility enhances community connectedness, yet it also means hate crime perpetrators can easily find targets. </p>
<p>Some mosque officials attested anecdotally, during our follow-up, to a higher level of attention by mosque communities to security during 2019 in the aftermath of the Christchurch atrocity. They also said they feared drawing attention to their mosque out of concern for the safety of their attendees. This probably affected our survey’s response rate by making people wary of responding. </p>
<p>This was a pilot study, with a relatively small sample size. A larger survey completed by nominated mosque officials who consistently report incidents will provide more robust data in future studies.</p>
<p>In line with the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-09/coronavirus-covid-19-racist-attacks-data-collection-strategy/12229162?nw=0">calls by the Race Commissioner</a>, we suggest a national, independent hate crime reporting system is needed to capture the experiences of targeted communities in Australia. While the <a href="https://www.islamophobia.com.au/">Islamophobia Register Australia</a> offers a forum through which some Muslims can report their experiences of Islamophobic violence, a system of reporting these incidents at the mosque in real time may provide us with a better idea of their full impact. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groups-have-used-covid-to-expand-their-footprint-in-australia-here-are-the-ones-you-need-to-know-about-151203">Far-right groups have used COVID to expand their footprint in Australia. Here are the ones you need to know about</a>
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<p>Our findings from this pilot study suggest mosque attacks in Australia are neither new nor rare. Too often, only the most egregious cases of hate-crime violence, of which the Christchurch massacre is one of the worst, come to media and public attention. </p>
<p>This should not lead us to overlook the everyday terror that Muslim clergy and mosque attendees must grapple with when enlivening their faith at their places of worship. A systematic and timely analysis of mosque attack data will enhance long-term security for mosques and their communities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derya Iner is affiliated with
Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation, Charles Sturt University </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gail Mason receives funding from the City of Sydney and has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council.
She is Co-Convenor of the Australian Hate Crime Network.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole L. Asquith, Ron Mason, and Scott Poynting do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new survey of Australian mosques shows that, in the wake of the horrific Christchurch attack, they are still being targeted with threats and actual violence.Scott Poynting, Adjunct Professor, Charles Sturt UniversityDerya Iner, Senior Lecturer, Charles Sturt UniversityGail Mason, Professor of Criminology, University of SydneyNicole L. Asquith, Director, Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies, University of TasmaniaRon Mason, Research Associate, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1504252020-11-26T17:21:58Z2020-11-26T17:21:58ZAttacks on houses of worship are on the rise — and interfaith dialogue may combat this<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371360/original/file-20201125-23-1h5owg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C0%2C4423%2C2973&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Municipal policemen stand guard outside Notre Dame church in Nice, France, on Oct. 30, 2020, after three people were killed.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Daniel Cole)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Oct. 29, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54729957">three people were killed in a brutal attack at the Notre Dame Basilica in Nice</a>. This assault is the latest in a spate of high-profile attacks on houses of worship since 2015.</p>
<p>The attack in Nice took place two weeks after the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54632353">murder of school teacher Samuel Paty</a>, who had shown his students cartoons denigrating the Prophet Muhammad. French President Emmanuel Macron defended Paty’s actions, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2020/oct/28/protests-grow-across-muslim-world-against-french-president-emmanuel-macron-video-report">igniting protests around the Muslim world</a>. While the killings in Notre Dame are part of an ongoing conflict over free speech and the relationship between Islam and violent extremism in France, they should also be seen as part of a rising global trend in violence directed against people at worship.</p>
<p>Neither the perpetrators nor the victims of these attacks belong to a single religion. In June 2015, nine members of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-us-canada-33181651">Emmanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church</a> were killed in Charleston, S.C.; in October 2018, 11 people were killed at the <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4602489/pittsburgh-shooting-tree-of-life-synagogue/">Tree of Life Synagogue</a> in Pittsburgh; in March 2019, 51 died at <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c966094wvmqt/christchurch-mosque-shootings">two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand</a>; and co-ordinated bombings throughout Sri Lanka in April 2019 resulted in the deaths of 257 people, 145 of whom were attending <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/04/world/sri-lanka-attacks/">two churches on Easter Sunday</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Poeple stand outside a makeshift commemoration in front of a synagogue" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371359/original/file-20201125-17-c3ee4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Passersby pausing outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh on Oct. 19, 2019, on the first anniversary of the shooting at the synagogue that killed 11 worshippers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar)</span></span>
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<p>Houses of worship have long been flashpoints for religiously and ideologically motivated violence. But recent attacks are symptomatic of a rise in hostility directed at others on the basis of their religion. The perception of houses of worship as gathering places and for ethnic and religious others also increases their symbolic value as targets for politically, religiously and ideologically motivated assailants. </p>
<h2>Rise in hostility</h2>
<p>Canada has not escaped these trends. The most deadly recent attack on a house of worship occurred in January 2017, when a gunman entered the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/topic/Tag/Quebec%20City%20mosque%20attack">Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City</a>, claiming six lives and injuring 18 others.</p>
<p>According to Statistics Canada, 2017 saw <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/181129/dq181129a-eng.htm">a record high of 842 police-reported hate crimes committed against religious groups, an increase of 86 per cent over 2016</a>. The following year, 2018, saw the second-highest level since 2009, with <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200226/dq200226a-eng.htm">639 hate crimes against religious groups, a decrease of 24 per cent since the previous year</a>. And while incidents of hate crimes decreased overall, incidents of assault and mischief towards property used primarily for worship or by an identifiable group rose by six per cent and 43 per cent, respectively.</p>
<p>Houses of worship are especially vulnerable targets for violence. They are often highly visible, open to the public and actively welcoming of strangers and new visitors. Although attendance at religious services has been <a href="https://uofrpress.ca/Books/N/None-of-the-Above">declining in Canada for decades</a>, houses of worship remain vital community institutions that provide support, connection and meaning for many individuals. This is especially true for <a href="http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018.06.22_CardusWave1_2018.pdf">recent migrants</a>. </p>
<p>The government of Canada provides funding of up to 50 per cent to increase security measures at houses of worship through its <a href="https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/fndng-prgrms/scrt-nfrstrctr-prgrm-en.aspx">Security Infrastructure Program</a>, however, as a recent study by security consultant Katalin Petho-Kiss has shown, <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2020/issue-3/petho-kiss.pdf">many resist installing proactive security measures, such as installing bars or other barriers, or hiring security guards.</a></p>
<h2>Preventing violence</h2>
<p>The night of the attacks in Nice, mourners from across the city came to light candles in memory of the dead in front of Notre Dame. Many of those who gathered were Muslim. In the small town of Lodève, some 400 kilometres from Nice, a group of young Muslim men gathered to stand guard at the Catholic church in the centre of town during All Saints’ Day services. Elyazid Benferhat was one of them: “<a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/horrified-by-deadly-attacks-french-muslims-protect-church-1.5177524">We needed to do something beyond paying homage to the victims. We said, we will protect churches ourselves</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two Muslim men stand in a church's pulpit." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371356/original/file-20201125-17-pt5wg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Imam Abderrahim Qaq, left, and Boufeldja Benabdallah, president of Quebec’s Islamic Cultural Centre, at a community dinner marking the third anniversary of the mosque shooting, on Jan. 29 in Québec City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Jacques Boissinot</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Benferhat’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/06/us/rings-of-peace-toronto-trnd/index.html">gesture of solidarity was not unique</a>. The aftermath of violent attacks often results in inter-religious dialogue and statements of support for victims of violence. </p>
<p>In 2019, Pope Francis and Ahmad Al-Tayyeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, met in Abu Dhabi where they co-signed <a href="http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/2019/outside/documents/papa-francesco_20190204_documento-fratellanza-umana.html"><em>A Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together</em></a>. Among its resolutions, the document states: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[T]he protection of places of worship — synagogues, churches and mosques — is a duty guaranteed by religions, human values, laws and international agreements. Every attempt to attack places of worship or threaten them by violent assaults, bombings or destruction, is a deviation from the teachings of religions as well as a clear violation of international law.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Solidarity after disaster</h2>
<p>While global religious leaders and local congregations advocate for the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence, their calls for solidarity are not likely to be heeded by extremists. The challenge is made greater by <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/how-law-enforcement-is-struggling-to-control-hate-in-an-online-world-1.4501653">the expanded reach of religious, ethno-nationalist and populist ideologues made possible by social media</a>. </p>
<p>Still, research suggests that <a href="https://doi.org/10.5325/soundings.99.3.0267">interfaith dialogue may be the most effective means of combating religiously motivated violence</a>. And while dialogue between religions may not be able to prevent all atrocities, <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/blog/georgetown-conversation-explores-religion-and-resilience-after-tree-life-shooting">solidarity in the wake of violence can help to heal communities in the aftermath of trauma</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Otto receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p>Attacks on houses of worship are increasing, as part of a trend of growing global violence. The aftermath of these attacks often includes interfaith dialogue and community support.Jennifer Otto, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, University of LethbridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1462572020-10-14T14:20:15Z2020-10-14T14:20:15ZDissidents of the Turkish government are living in fear in Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363021/original/file-20201012-19-1s8bvkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2448%2C1667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan applauds during a conference in Istanbul in July 2020 as lawmakers made speeches before voting on a bill that would give the government greater powers to regulate social media.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Turkish Presidency via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey’s long arm and espionage activities against dissidents living in exile in Canada has become a growing concern. As revealed in a <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-fifteen-canadians-named-in-turkish-terrorism-probe-linked-to/">startling recent news report</a>, 15 Turkish-Canadians have been targeted by the Turkish government within the scope of a “terrorism” investigation. </p>
<p>Needless to say, the term “terrorist” has become a commonly applied label in Turkey describing almost all opponents of the Turkish government, in and out of the country. Turkey’s operations in Canada have an impact that goes beyond its immediate targets. Such planned and organized espionage activities could pose a danger to public safety.</p>
<p>In the last several years, the Turkish state engaged in a three-phase campaign abroad to silence its own citizens who are critical of the government:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Propaganda activities through Turkish state entities and pro-government civil society organizations to discredit opposition groups;</p></li>
<li><p>Intelligence-gathering and espionage activities;</p></li>
<li><p>Intimidation, threats and abduction.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Defaming dissidents</h2>
<p>Turkish authorities have been organizing defamatory propaganda activities against the dissidents. </p>
<p>The <em>Telegraph</em> in the U.K., for example, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/10/26/uk-turkish-groups-using-anti-kurdish-propoganda/">recently reported that mosques and community centres with links to Turkey in Britain</a> are used to disperse anti-Kurdish propaganda. Similarly, <a href="https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=581757099021871&id=100015627580736&__tn__=%2As%2AsH-R">as posted</a> on the Facebook page of the Turkish Canadian Religious Foundation, the religious affairs office of the Turkish Consulate General in Toronto organized a mosque visit and delivered booklets against opposition groups, apparently to demonize them in the eyes of other Islamic groups in greater Toronto area.</p>
<p>In the last several years, Turkey has been aggressively gathering intelligence about its citizens living in exile. It’s also been using certain organizations and communities as its eyes and ears to spy on dissidents. </p>
<p>An example of this is DITIB, a state-funded Turkish-Islamic union that runs more than 900 mosques in Germany. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-intelligence-mulls-putting-largest-turkish-islamic-group-under-surveillance/a-45586282">Imams of DITIB were accused</a> by German authorities of gathering intelligence about regime critics on behalf of the Turkish government. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People cross a street at an intesection with a mosque in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363024/original/file-20201012-15-oq90bu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People walk along a street in front of the DITIB mosque in Cologne, Germany, in March 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Martin Meissner)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such activities are being watched by authorities with concern and are believed to pose “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-intelligence-mulls-putting-largest-turkish-islamic-group-under-surveillance/a-45586282">a danger to the internal peace</a>.”</p>
<h2>Threats, disappearances, torture</h2>
<p>Many opponents have been the victims of enforced disappearance. As reported by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, dissidents on Turkey have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/">forcibly disappeared</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/29/turkey-enforced-disappearances-torture">and tortured</a> by government agents. There are also cases where they were abducted abroad, particularly in countries ruled by corrupt and authoritarian regimes.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing a blue suit and a red tie stands in a government building with his hands clasped in front of him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363019/original/file-20201012-17-1oidayz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pastor Andrew Brunson is seen outside the U.S. Senate chamber after giving the Senate opening prayer on Capitol Hill in October 2019. Brunson left Turkey in 2018 after a Turkish court convicted him of terror links but freed him from house arrest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/.premium-erdogan-s-long-arm-the-turkish-nationals-kidnapped-from-europe-1.6428298">Haaretz reported</a> that the current Turkish government snatched over 100 dissidents from other countries and brought them back to Turkey. The <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/jailed-turkish-mob-boss-claims-government-officials-dispatched-him-to-kill-american-pastor-andrew-brunson">recent revelations</a> from an imprisoned Turkish mob leader in Argentina on how some Turkish government officials had recruited him to kill American pastor Andrew Brunson demonstrated that mafia-type government operations aren’t rare.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1288151259036475394"}"></div></p>
<p>Intimidation is another tactic used to spy on opponents. Turkish agents threatened regime critics to convince them to provide information about targeted groups and organizations abroad. Those whose immediate family members are still in Turkey are particularly targeted. </p>
<p>According to a recording obtained by <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6661315">Radio Sweden</a>, the chairman of a lobby organization with ties to the Turkish state told a member of the Gulen movement — a group that has become a target of the government — that his wife, who was in Turkey at the time, would be arrested if he does not co-operate with Turkish authorities.</p>
<h2>Fear of abduction</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v9i4.1514">In a recent research project</a> with two colleagues, we examined how the activities of Turkish authorities in Canada influenced the daily lives and social interactions of dissidents. </p>
<p>The research revealed their fear of the Turkish state. Our findings indicate they’ve made significant changes in their lives to protect themselves. These changes include moving to another neighbourhood or city, changing daily routines and avoiding being in certain places and attending group activities. </p>
<p>They are also subjected to hate speech by their fellow nationals who have emotional or material ties with Turkish government. As a result of their experiences, they prefer not to connect with other Turkish people because they fear they’ll be spied on, abducted or forcibly returned Turkey.</p>
<p>For some dissidents, the fear of being oppressed by the Turkish government persists even in Canada. However, many of them view Canada as a safe country where they can raise their voices through democratic channels. They also hope that Turkey will ultimately abandon its aggressive policies against opposing voices and respect human rights in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Turkey reaches around the world to spy on and intimidate dissidents, new research shows Turks living in Canada are fearful and make frequent changes in how they live to protect themselves.Mehmet Bastug, Lecturer, Criminology, Lakehead UniversityDavut Akca, Researcher, Forensic Behavioural Science and Justice Studies, University of SaskatchewanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1476782020-10-07T15:01:47Z2020-10-07T15:01:47ZPasha special edition: The Muslim call to prayer controversy in South Africa, part 1<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362126/original/file-20201007-24-19o5676.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The call to prayer in Islam, or adhan, as it’s known in Arabic, has come under the spotlight in South Africa. Fed up with hearing the call to prayer from a neighbouring Islamic education centre in Durban, a resident took the centre to court alleging the call amounted to “nuisance noise”. The court agreed, ruling that the centre should only announce the call to prayer within the confines of its walls.</p>
<p>In today’s episode of Pasha, Thomas Coggin, a senior lecturer in property law at the University of Witwatersrand, discusses the case, the laws and rights surrounding it, as well as the judge’s decision and its impact. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Photo</strong>
Adhan Call icon. By T Vector Icons found on <a href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/adhan-call-icon-trendy-modern-flat-1217096164">Shutterstock</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Sound</strong>
“Azaan” By Jigmet, found on <a href="https://freesound.org/people/jigmet/sounds/479318/">FreeSound</a> licensed under <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/">Attribution license</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Music</strong>
“Happy African Village” by John Bartmann, found on <a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/John_Bartmann/Public_Domain_Soundtrack_Music_Album_One/happy-african-village">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">CC0 1</a>.</p>
<p>“Arabic 2-4” by nemaavla, found on <a href="https://freesound.org/people/nemaavla/sounds/510745/">FreeSound</a> licensed under <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">Creative commons license</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A man went to court to stop the call to prayer from a neighbouring property in Durban, South Africa. Here's what happened.Ozayr Patel, Digital EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1400512020-08-06T12:31:25Z2020-08-06T12:31:25ZHow the sound of religion has changed in the pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348990/original/file-20200722-30-l09jw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5226%2C3465&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Rev. Philip Dinwiddie sings to a pre-recording of mass at St. James Episcopal Church in Grosse Ile, Michigan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-rev-philip-dinwiddie-sings-in-his-office-adding-music-news-photo/1220888445?adppopup=true">Gregory Shamus/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Things sound different in a lockdown. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/22/upshot/coronavirus-quiet-city-noise.html">silence of usually bustling streets</a>, the two-tone whirr of ambulance sirens and the <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/04/after-hearing-birdsong-during-lockdown-french-cities-vote-green">sudden awareness of birdsong</a>, all formed an aural backdrop to the coronavirus pandemic.</p>
<p>Nowhere has the change in sound been more noticeable than at houses of worship. The voices of congregants praying, chanting and singing has been quietened in churches, mosques and temples. Instead, congregants have had to work in new acoustic settings, both <a href="https://religionnews.com/2020/06/10/are-religious-communities-reviving-the-revival-outdoor-worship-is-a-us-tradition/">in person</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/arts/quaker-meeting-zoom.html">online</a>.</p>
<p>In short, religion, too, sounds different during the pandemic. We know this, because we have been <a href="https://religioussounds.osu.edu/">documenting the sounds of religious life in America</a>. Over the last six years, our teams of faculty and student researchers at Michigan State University and The Ohio State University have cataloged hundreds of audio recordings, tuning in to what religion sounds like across a wide variety of spaces and traditions.</p>
<h2>Sound and space</h2>
<p>It might seem unusual to think about religion through sounds. Scholars are more inclined to define religions in terms of beliefs and doctrine, or focus on visual iconography and sacred architecture.</p>
<p>But there are good reasons why it is useful to turn to sound to understand religious diversity in the United States.</p>
<p>Listening for religion directs our attention to the things that religious people and communities do, not just what they believe. It brings us into formal spaces and times of religious life, as well as into more mundane moments of everyday practice, such as people chatting while preparing food for a religious festival or the sounds of removing shoes before entering a worship space.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351116/original/file-20200804-24-1kyy3mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Car horns mark ‘amens’ at drive-in church services, such as this one in Daytona Beach, Florida.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-in-cars-attend-easter-sunday-services-at-the-daytona-news-photo/1209761916?adppopup=true">Paul Hennessy/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Paying attention to religious sounds can serve as a reminder that religious practice is subjective, often spontaneous and shaped by participants – it takes place in particular moments and spaces.</p>
<h2>Listening for religion</h2>
<p>The religious sounds and silences being made during this pandemic provide extraordinary examples of the power of listening to understand the diversity of religious practices in the United States today. </p>
<p>Prior to the lockdown, we visited sites that might seem obviously religious, like churches, synagogues and mosques. But we also went to places that might seem ostensibly secular – a <a href="https://explore.religioussounds.osu.edu/public/recordings/100">race track</a>, <a href="https://explore.religioussounds.osu.edu/public/recordings/20">rodeo</a>, <a href="https://explore.religioussounds.osu.edu/public/recordings/70">political rally</a> or college football game. We adopted a broad approach to thinking about what counts as a religious sound or space.</p>
<p>By gathering these recordings together and curating them on a custom-built <a href="https://religioussounds.osu.edu/">digital platform</a>, we hoped to inspire new ways of thinking about religion in the United States.</p>
<h2>Sonic Zoom?</h2>
<p>When the coronavirus hit, we realized that we, too, would have to change the ways that we conducted our research. In March 2020, we announced <a href="https://religioussounds.osu.edu/call-sounds">a public call</a> for sounds and invited anyone with a smartphone or other recording device to submit audio recordings documenting how their practices were shifting.</p>
<p>We were overwhelmed by the public response. Since March, we have received over 120 audio files from across the U.S. And key patterns are starting to emerge from our collection.</p>
<p>We have noted a strong desire to maintain continuity of religious practices with the help of technology. For example, after the Baha’i House of Worship in Wilmette, Illinois, closed, its regular public worship transitioned to virtual prayer sessions via Zoom for hundreds of attendees from around the world.</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="67" data-image="" data-title="Baha'i Virtual Prayer" data-size="2688721" data-source="American Religious Sounds Project" data-source-url="" data-license="CC BY" data-license-url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2022/53-bahaivirtualprayer-clip.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
Baha'i Virtual Prayer.
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Religious Sounds Project</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a><span class="download"><span>2.56 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2022/53-bahaivirtualprayer-clip.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<p>Performing rituals online also opened up opportunities for religious tourism and hearing religious sounds in new places. Some of our submissions are live-streamed services recorded by practitioners who always wanted to visit a particular worship space in their own tradition, such as an Episcopalian attending Easter services at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. Others are recorded by people who wished to visit a new religious community, as in the case of non-Muslim contributors who “visited” online mosques during the month of Ramadan.</p>
<p>Along with this continuity of religious practice, there is acknowledgment that the circumstances of the pandemic require transforming rituals to align with the moment. We heard the sounds of a hospital chaplain in Quincy, Illinois, who replaced the Christian Maundy Thursday feet washing ritual with a ritual washing of hands in a health care context.</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="86" data-image="" data-title="Ritual Handwashing" data-size="3433775" data-source="American Religious Sounds Project" data-source-url="" data-license="CC BY" data-license-url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2015/covidsubmissions-maundythursdayhandwashingclip.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
Ritual Handwashing.
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Religious Sounds Project</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a><span class="download"><span>3.27 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2015/covidsubmissions-maundythursdayhandwashingclip.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<p>Another key theme emerging is the sounds of religious practices alongside sounds specific to the pandemic. For example, a New York Buddhist practitioner recorded herself chanting with an online community and captured the background sounds of neighbors clapping during the nightly 7 p.m. celebration for first responders. An Easter Sunday service in a parking lot in Walnut Grove, Missouri, recorded parishioners honking their horns to shout “Amen!”</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="66" data-image="" data-title="Buddhist chanting" data-size="2637209" data-source="American Religious Sounds Project" data-source-url="" data-license="CC BY" data-license-url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2016/covidsubmissions-brooklynzensanghachantingclip.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
Buddhist chanting.
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Religious Sounds Project</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a><span class="download"><span>2.52 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2016/covidsubmissions-brooklynzensanghachantingclip.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="49" data-image="" data-title="Cars Honking Amen" data-size="1962849" data-source="American Religious Sounds Project" data-source-url="" data-license="CC BY" data-license-url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2019/32-carshonkingamen-clip.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
Cars Honking Amen.
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Religious Sounds Project</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a><span class="download"><span>1.87 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2019/32-carshonkingamen-clip.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<p>Shelter-in-place orders opened up domestic spaces as primary locations for religious practice. We have heard from practitioners performing religious rituals at home. These spaces have created new worship sounds. Many of our recordings include pets vocalizing, phones beeping, babies crying and private conversations amplified that would generally not be heard in a formal worship setting. This ambient noise is part of the sound of religion during the pandemic.</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="85" data-image="" data-title="Baby crying" data-size="3424452" data-source="American Religious Sounds Project" data-source-url="" data-license="CC BY" data-license-url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2021/55-ramadancommunitydiscussion-clip.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
Baby crying.
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Religious Sounds Project</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a><span class="download"><span>3.27 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2021/55-ramadancommunitydiscussion-clip.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<p>Sometimes these new contexts produce innovative blending of religious and secular practices. A viral <a href="https://twitter.com/VaadHaBadchanim/status/1249429906607476736">Tweet</a> submitted to our archive of an Orthodox Jewish father chanting the children’s book “Goodnight Moon” to the tune of traditional Torah reading brought together the sounds of formal ritual practice with the increased demands of child care during this crisis.</p>
<p>The domestic worship spaces have also provided opportunities for new religious agency and authority. Lay practitioners are deciding how they will participate in services and, in some cases, performing rituals that ordinarily are reserved for clergy, as in a recording of Christian parents administering Communion to their children.</p>
<p>As religious communities navigate worship services via Zoom, the etiquette and practice around “muting” raises important questions about who should be heard and who has the authority to speak. It also presents challenges for communal singing and chanting.</p>
<p>In our archive we have multiple recordings of a Wiccan Coven in Westerville, Ohio participating in a Cone of Power ritual, a practice to raise energy for magical purposes. In the pre-pandemic <a href="https://explore.religioussounds.osu.edu/public/recordings/131#">version</a>, participants stood together in a circle with linked hands and wove their voices together like a beautiful tapestry. </p>
<p>In the recording produced during the pandemic, the group attempted to re-create this ritual via Zoom, but the overlapping sounds became too cacophonous. All the participants except the priests ended up muting their microphones, which produced a strikingly different sonic experience.</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="78" data-image="" data-title="Wiccan Beltane Ritual" data-size="3130514" data-source="American Religious Sounds Project" data-source-url="" data-license="CC BY" data-license-url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2020/65-wiccanbeltaneritual-clip.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
Wiccan Beltane Ritual.
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Religious Sounds Project</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a><span class="download"><span>2.99 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2020/65-wiccanbeltaneritual-clip.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<h2>Inclusion and innovation</h2>
<p>Our collection also includes voices that might not otherwise be heard – or welcomed – in formal religious settings. One of the submitted recordings is of a family participating in a Protestant worship service via Zoom. The audio includes the loud vocalizations of their autistic son. In this case, at least, online offerings made religious rituals more accessible and more inclusive.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>The recordings in our crowdsourced archive are helping us document in real time the numerous ways that COVID-19 is transforming American religious life. The sounds that we are hearing make audible how, even during a time of physical and social distancing, individuals are striving to worship together. </p>
<p>The pandemic is inspiring new, innovative ways of imagining what it means to be a community and who is included as part of that community.</p>
<p>As houses of worship begin to reopen, we are interested in tracking which of these changes may endure and which may prove more fleeting.</p>
<p><em>You can contribute recordings to the American Religious Sounds Project <a href="https://religioussounds.osu.edu/call-sounds">religioussounds.osu.edu</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Derogatis receives funding from the Henry Luce Foundation for the American Religious Sounds Project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isaac Weiner receives funding from the Henry Luce Foundation for the American Religious Sounds Project.</span></em></p>A team of scholars have been documenting the sound of worship for six years. Since the lockdown, they have heard a different form of religious expression.Amy Derogatis, Professor of Religion and American Culture, Michigan State UniversityIsaac Weiner, Associate Professor of Comparative Studies and Religious Studies, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1369412020-05-28T19:59:29Z2020-05-28T19:59:29ZPakistan’s religious leaders defied coronavirus mosque restrictions then compromised<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336551/original/file-20200520-152302-16wgbcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=444%2C0%2C2187%2C1955&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man marks places in a mosque for worshippers to maintain distance during prayers after the government relaxed the weeks-long lockdown that was enforced to curb the spread of the coronavirus, in Peshawar, Pakistan. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Muhammad Sajjad)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The outbreak of COVID-19 has left governments scrambling for resources and forcing them to take measures to contain its growth. The Pakistani government has also taken such steps, including instituting <a href="https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/pakistan-extends-lockdown-chinese-army-doctors-arrive-help-combat-virus">partial lockdowns</a>, cancelling <a href="https://www.newsweekpakistan.com/pakistan-extends-till-may-15-ban-on-international-flights/">international flights</a> and <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/health-pmn/pakistan-limits-flights-shuts-borders-and-schools-over-coronavirus">closing schools</a>. </p>
<p>Although these measures are controversial, it is the government’s decision to <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/17/837007264/pakistan-limits-worshippers-at-mosques-many-worshippers-are-defiant">restrict access to mosques</a> that has attracted outsized attention and intense debate.</p>
<p>The state’s decision to limit mosque gatherings to no more than five people provoked strong reactions from several leading ulema (religious leaders and scholars) in Pakistan. Many were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/pakistanis-gather-friday-prayers-defying-coronavirus-advisory-200417104036221.html">initially defiant</a>, but later negotiated with the government. </p>
<p>The negotiations and ensuing compromise between the ulema and Pakistani government authorities are signs of the tensions that exist between Islamist political thinking (presented and argued in theological language) and secularized reasoning that doesn’t rely on otherwordly claims to explain a phenomenon. What the ulema or other Islamists of different stripes aspire to (notwithstanding differences in their method) is a state and society ordered around God’s law.</p>
<p>These negotiations between the ulema and the government authorities led to the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/24/pakistan-ramadan-coronavirus-pandemic-mosques/">easing of restrictions</a>, allowing mosques to remain open if they implemented social-distancing measures. The ulema have since <a href="https://nation.com.pk/21-Apr-2020/ulema-back-pm-s-lockdown-strategy">assured the state that they are maintaining these rules</a>.</p>
<h2>Reaction and counter-reaction</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/644708-lockdown-rejected-ulema-announce-congregational-prayers-taraveeh">initial reaction</a> of the ulema to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-and-islam-pakistani-clerics-refuse-to-shut-down-mosques/a-52969639">state’s decision</a> and the ensuing compromise generated widespread <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1553101">debate</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/amid-covid-19-pakistan-launches-an-islam-friendly-action-plan-to-keep-mosques-open/">disapproval</a>. But the compromise is also supported by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-pakistan-congregat/god-is-with-us-many-muslims-in-pakistan-flout-the-coronavirus-ban-in-mosques-idUSKCN21V0T4">followers of these leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s leading English daily, <em>Dawn</em>, wrote a scathing <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1551497/reverse-the-decision">editorial</a>, noting that the ulema were being unreasonable in their insistence to keep the mosques open.</p>
<p>Some have contended that the ulema’s objection has less to do with theological injunctions and more to do with the ulema’s fear of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/asia/pakistan-coronavirus-ramadan.html">dwindling charitable contributions</a> if the mosques remain closed. </p>
<p>Others have argued that the ulema reacted to <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/23/841886317/pakistan-calls-off-limits-on-mosque-attendance-in-time-for-ramadan">protect their turf</a> when the government tried to intervene in the internal affairs of religion. </p>
<p>Historically, the state has had a hard time countering Islamists because of their <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048316000031">enormous street power</a> and effectiveness as a pressure group. Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Islamic discourse, reasoning and cultural norms have become <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-desecularization/98C7240B0F22D73E38760CE59013CD4B">more commonplace</a>, effectively giving more space to religious leaders, Islamist political actors and extremist groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336552/original/file-20200520-152292-3jndw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A family break their fast on a sidewalk after receiving free food from a nearby distribution point in Karachi, Pakistan, on May 10, 2020. Muslims across the world are observing Ramadan when the faithful refrain from eating, drinking and smoking from dawn to dusk.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Fareed Khan)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Theism and modern culture</h2>
<p>While the economic and political factors explain the intensity of the reaction, one element that has been ignored is the broader ideological conflict between traditional theistic thought and modern culture. </p>
<p>Commenting on the fate of traditional theism in late Victorian Britain, <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Religious_Significance_of_Atheism.html?id=fpXXAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre noted</a> that secular culture, which was becoming less beholden to theism’s hegemony, created a series of crises for theism. </p>
<p>For MacIntyre, theism relied on a pre-scientific logic and rationale that its proponents conveyed in religious or transcendental language. By contrast, those who identify with secular culture makes claims in a language that is scientifically explainable. Therefore, the vocabulary used by one group is often absent in the worldview of the other. Their ways of arguing are often irreconcilable. </p>
<p>In other words, theism is challenged from the perspective of an emergent, secular culture that claims to prize reason and devalues dogma and pre-scientific, faith-based reasoning. </p>
<p>Confronted with such a crisis, theism had to respond. One response was to <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Religious_Significance_of_Atheism.html?id=fpXXAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">refuse to reformulate theism</a> in the image of modern thought. This was achieved through secluding itself from modern culture by “renouncing and denouncing contemporary secular culture as a false culture.”</p>
<p>Although theism is seldom overtly challenged in Pakistan, <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1553101">the English-speaking intelligentsia has been critical</a> of the <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/649740-">ulema’s reaction</a> to COVID-19. On the other hand, a prominent Pakistani clergyman, Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rahman, went so far as to say that the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/pakistanis-gather-friday-prayers-defying-coronavirus-advisory-200417104036221.html">criticism of the ulema</a> was actually a negation of religion, prayer and an attempt to empty the mosques. </p>
<p>Muneeb-ur-Rahman and others like him were attempting to refute and reject the progressives’ claim to superiority. They refused to reconceptualize religion on the terms set by Pakistani progressive culture.</p>
<p>In my view, the fragmentation of culture in the postmodern era means that the progressives and theists have carved out subcultures for themselves, where crosscurrents and intellectual exchanges are rare. More often than not, segments from these subcultures talk at cross purposes, each guarding its own narrative. It is for this reason that the ulema are often trying to convince their own target audience, for instance, by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/asia/pakistan-coronavirus-ramadan.html">exhorting followers to attend the Friday prayer in even greater numbers</a>.</p>
<p>The ulema’s authority is derived from religion. They have a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400903049499">sizeable influence in Pakistan</a>. The conflict between religious and non-religious authority means that, at least for traditional theists, ulema are in the right. Thus, Pakistani Muslims are quick to justify why the ulema are right because they view Islam as already under attack from more secular-minded Muslims.</p>
<p>While some argued that <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/16/islamic-authority-and-arab-states-in-time-of-pandemic-pub-81563">several Muslim states have closed the mosques</a> (including Saudi Arabia’s closure of the two holy mosques), both the ulema and their followers argued that banks and supermarkets are also open, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/pakistanis-gather-friday-prayers-defying-coronavirus-advisory-200417104036221.html">so why not mosques</a>? In reality, this was a way to counter the charge that their demand to open mosques was unreasonable.</p>
<p>More importantly, criticism of the ulema or self-reflection rarely germinates within the subculture of Islamist thought. The ulema and <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520083691/the-vanguard-of-the-islamic-revolution">Islamist political actors</a> are considered bastions of a yet-to-be-realized Islamic society. And in Pakistan, theism is often viewed as under threat and perpetual war <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/statement-30-prominent-pakistani-islamic-scholars-taliban-are-not-terrorists-do-not-look#_edn1">by forces of “unbelief”</a>. </p>
<p>Any open criticism of the ulema from within the rank and file is seen as undermining the larger project of further Islamizing the Pakistani state and society. Since traditional theism can condemn Pakistani liberal thought as “false culture,” it only really needs to convince or address members of its own audience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Faisal Kamal receives funding from Ontario Graduate Scholarship. </span></em></p>The ulema’s reaction to the government’s decision to limit access to mosques — and the civil society’s counter-reaction — should be viewed in terms of challenges to traditional theism in modernity.Faisal Kamal, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1373232020-04-29T15:43:27Z2020-04-29T15:43:27ZRamadan under lockdown is encouraging Muslims to talk about the way they worship<p>You’ve only got to consider the many names used to refer to Islam’s holiest month to see quite how diverse – and divided – the Islamic world can be. If you come from Saudi Arabia you are likely to refer to it as <em>Ramadan</em>. But equally people from India call it <em>Ramazan</em>. My parents, who hail from Sialkot in Punjabi Pakistan taught me to call the month <em>Rozay</em>. </p>
<p>There’s been an increased focus on Ramadan in 2020 as mosques have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/uk-muslims-embrace-technology-for-ramadan">shut down</a> thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic. This means that the month-long daytime fast experience has moved from being something institutionalised to an individual thing. For non-Muslims it’s a chance to see Islam less as a monolith and more as a diverse collection of people who are Muslims.</p>
<p>The fasting month is one of the central tenets of Islam – it is the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/culture-history/2019/05/ramadan-understanding-its-history-and-traditions">holiest month in the Islamic calendar</a>. It is a full month when the faithful are expected to fast from dawn till dusk, abstaining from food and drink. It is an act of worship that the divine scripture, the Qur’an, prescribes as an experience to draw closer to God. </p>
<p>It’s a month when <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/generous-donors-urged-to-give-safely-to-registered-charities-this-ramadan">Muslims give abundantly</a> and mosques are bustling – it’s seen as a refresher month for Muslims to keep up their regular prayers and do more in solitary or in congregation, including the extra congregational nightly prayers known as <em>tarawih</em>.</p>
<p>This year is very different, however – Muslims throughout the world are fasting in confinement as the coronavirus has altered the rhythm of the sacred month. These intense debates began when many governments took the difficult decision to close public spaces, including mosques, and have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/tarawih-coronavirus-scholars-call-home-ramadan-prayers-200422110654018.html">included discussions</a> on the permissibility of Friday congregational prayers to be conducted online.</p>
<h2>Islamic law</h2>
<p>Scholars from around the world have presented various theories and philosophies from the Islamic legal traditions to help make sense of these unusual times. Islam has a sophisticated jurisprudence tradition known as <em>fiqh</em>. In Ireland, one Imam, <a href="http://www.islamiccentre.ie/about/meet-the-imam/">Shaykh Umar al-Qadri</a> issued a <em>fatwa</em> (ruling on a point of Islamic law) in favour of online prayers. This was rejected by many who argued that Friday prayers need to be conducted in a physical congregation. Al-Qadri countered <a href="http://www.islamiccentre.ie/wp-content/uploads/Fatwa-on-Permissibility-of-Online-Jumuah-Taraweeh-during-Covid19-Islamic-Centre-of-Ireland-2.pdf">with the statement</a> that an “unprecedented situation requires an unprecedented solution”.</p>
<p>In an online Islamic studies discussion that I am part of, South African Islamic scholar <a href="http://www.religion.uct.ac.za/religion/staff/academicstaff/sadiyyashaikh">Sa'diyya Shaikh</a> told us about a women-only online Friday prayer where families join via Zoom: “Often living Muslim practice is ahead of the <em>fiqh</em>”, she wrote.</p>
<p>There have been similar agreements and disagreements on the validity of virtual <em>tarawih</em> – and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/tarawih-coronavirus-scholars-call-home-ramadan-prayers-200422110654018.html">general opinion appears to be</a> that “virtual prayer” is not valid, as congregational prayers need to be held in the same physical space as the imam. But these majority-led ideals may inadvertantly deny the beliefs and wishes of anyone who doesn’t fit into this mainstream.</p>
<h2>Diverse faith, different practices</h2>
<p>It’s important to remember that Muslim experience of these sacred rituals at mosques is far from monolithic – especially for many women. A tweet from <a href="https://faculty-directory.dartmouth.edu/zahra-ayubi">Zahra Ayubi</a>, an Islamic scholar at Dartmouth College in the US, went viral before the month started as she called out the many Muslim men who were upset at not being able to pray in the mosque.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1240235905983614978"}"></div></p>
<p>The increasing visibility of some queer Muslims is also challenging stereotypes. One illustrative episode in popular culture came recently <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/news/jeff-goldblum-islam-rupaul-drag-race-jackie-cox-women-homosexuality-a9483536.html">on the show Drag Race</a>, when actor Jeff Goldblum questioned why Iranian-American drag queen Jackie Cox was wearing a star-spangled hijab, suggesting Islam was “anti-homosexuality and anti-woman”. Cox explained she had donned the outfit in response to the “Muslim ban” imposed by the US president, Donald Trump, and that, as an American of Iranian heritage, it was possible to be Muslim and gay.</p>
<p>Queer Muslims fight the double battle of Islamophobia and homophobia and for many the month of fasting is a triggering event because they don’t feel the same sense of community as others do. But moves are being made to rectify this, with more specifically queer-friendly mosque spaces being set up, such as <a href="https://masjidalrabia.org/">Masjid al-Rabia</a> in Chicago and <a href="http://inclusivemosque.org/">Inclusive Mosque Initiative</a> in London UK. These sites <a href="http://inclusivemosque.org/inclusive-ramadan-practice-in-quarantine/">offer advice and personal testimony</a> about how individual queer Muslims are navigating Ramadan in isolation.</p>
<p>Do any Muslims not fast? <a href="https://theculturetrip.com/asia/india/articles/remembering-mirza-ghalib-the-great-urdu-and-persian-poet/">Mirza Ghalib</a>, the prolific 19th-century Mughal poet who wrote much of his poetry <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/527591/remembering-mirza-ghalib-on-his-222nd-birth-anniversary/">while completely drunk</a>, was once summoned by his ruler, the last Mughal emperor <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41884390">Bahadur Shah Zafar</a>, and asked if he had fasted. His reply? “My Lord, I did not keep but one.” </p>
<p>It would be easy to dismiss Ghalib in our definitions of what counts as religion but it would be a huge shortcoming to overlook his unequalled masterpieces of devotion to God, similar to the life and work of Scotland’s irreverent bard, Robert Burns, who <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/arts/robertburns/works/holy_willies_prayer/">challenged the church with his poem Holy Willie’s Prayer</a>.</p>
<p>Muslim experience differs not just from mosque to mosque but Muslim to Muslim. The solitary act of devotion to God inevitably means that religious experience cannot be typified and replicated. This surely means we are free to experience the colours of Islam in our own way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanullah De Sondy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islam is not a monolith and not all Muslims are experiencing lockdown in the same way.Amanullah De Sondy, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam, University College CorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1271662020-03-09T12:22:34Z2020-03-09T12:22:34ZI was in China doing research when I saw my Uighur friends disappear<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317850/original/file-20200228-24659-1dwo7th.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=54%2C31%2C5140%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Uighur woman rests near a barricaded structure and heavily armed Chinese policemen in Urumqi.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/China-Big-Brother-Moves-In/6943484fb2664a44851b01a55863a342/6/0">Ng Han Guan/AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recently <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/02/asia/xinjiang-china-karakax-document-intl-hnk/">leaked</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51520622">Chinese government documents</a> reveal how <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/world/asia/china-reeducation-camps-leaked.html">local officials</a> targeted <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-51097159/the-kazakh-muslims-detained-in-china-s-camps">Muslim minorities in China</a>. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-01/satellite-images-expose-chinas-network-of-re-education-camps/10432924">Satellite images</a> show that many of them have been held in detention camps across the vast <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/culture/i-cant-sleep-homage-uyghur-homeland">Uighur homeland</a> in northwest China.</p>
<p>China is home to <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674594975">10 different Muslim minority</a> groups. The <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/04/961387-concentrationcamps-china-xinjiang-internment-kazakh-muslim/">Kazakhs</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7_bdiaX85wIVhNdkCh1_7QcbEAAYASAAEgKH8PD_BwE">Uighurs</a> are two groups that have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/opinion/china-camps-uighurs-xinjiang.html">targets of the Chinese government</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/china-says-13000-terrorists-arrested-in-xinjiang-since-2014-idUSKCN1QZ08T">Beijing claims</a> that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/asia/china-xinjiang-leaks-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">their actions</a> provide <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/14/china-claims-muslim-internment-camps-provide-professional-training">re-education</a>, <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1148676.shtml">create stability</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/world/asia/china-camps-muslims.html">prevent terrorist attacks</a>. But China’s actions have been <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/uighur-muslim-china-xinjiang-united-nations-human-rights-uk-religious-freedom-a9177191.html">condemned internationally</a> and the country accused of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang">repressing of human rights</a> of its Muslim minorities.</p>
<p>In total, the vast network of camps hold <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997">1 to 3 million Uighurs</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/04/961387-concentrationcamps-china-xinjiang-internment-kazakh-muslim/">Kazakhs</a> who were sent there without trial. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/02/asia/xinjiang-china-karakax-document-intl-hnk/">A range of behaviors</a> – such as praying, getting married in a traditional ceremony and growing beards – can make the Chinese government suspicious over what it labels “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">religious extremism</a>.” </p>
<p>Simply having a family member in an internment camp can be a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/world/asia/china-reeducation-camps-leaked.html">reason for detention</a>.</p>
<p>I began <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AOl7P5MAAAAJ&hl=en">my doctoral dissertation research</a> in 2014 in the capital city of the Uighur homeland, Urumqi, and lived there for 24 months. </p>
<p>Urumqi is a <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/china/townships/urumqi/">large, diverse city of more than 3 million people</a>. In addition to being the home of Muslim ethnic minorities such as the Uighurs, the city is also home to Han Chinese residents. I interviewed <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">66 Han Chinese and 98 Uighur people</a> during my stay.</p>
<p>I saw the early years of the surveillance in Urumqi and by February 2017 some of my Uighur neighbors started to disappear.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317662/original/file-20200227-24694-106cinl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A police stations and surveillance cameras in the Uighur neighborhoods of Uruqmi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah Tynen</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Police surveillance</h2>
<p>Chinese law requires <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2017.11.002">rural migrants to all Chinese cities</a> to register <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2018.06.008">at the local police station</a> for city resident permits. However, those born in the city or <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275117309058">homeowners</a> do not have to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08111146.2016.1159190">register</a>.</p>
<p>Each and every home was under the combined jurisdiction of a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778">neighborhood committee</a>” and local police station. The <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801479359/the-government-next-door/#bookTabs=1">neighborhood committees</a> are the lowest administrative level of the government and <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=6335">legacies of Mao-era organization</a>, when they were used for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23462281">social security benefits</a> as well as <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781786431622/9781786431622.00033.xml">surveillance</a>. </p>
<p>These neighborhood committees processed applications for city resident permits. In contemporary Urumqi, Han, Uighur and Kazakh people were employed as workers at the neighborhood committees. </p>
<p>As a foreigner in Urumqi, I was classified as a “migrant minority” and had to abide by government requirements when registering for my city resident permit. The following observations are based on <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">official policy instructional documents</a> given to me during my stay from 2014 to 2017.</p>
<p>I soon discovered that in Urumqi, the rules <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778">varied according to neighborhood</a>. City resident permit applications in Uighur-majority districts in Urumqi were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778">under stricter regulations</a> than those in Han-majority districts in Urumqi. </p>
<p>I lived in a Uighur-majority district, called Tianshan Qu in Chinese. For Uighur migrants living in this district, each application for a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778">city resident permit required several layers of permission</a>.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">my fieldwork findings</a>, the permit application required migrant Uighurs to bring the following documents to their neighborhood police chief: household registration card from their village and their ID card. </p>
<p>The application also required other official documentation, such as a marriage license, children’s vaccination cards, apartment lease, proof of employment and background check clearances, and a required meeting with the landlord.</p>
<p>Additional letters of permission and signatures had to be obtained from people in different offices of police and government agencies. Signature and fingerprint from a “guarantor” that agreed to take responsibility for any crimes committed by the applicant, were also required. </p>
<p>Uighur migrants had to re-apply every six months.</p>
<p>Han Chinese migrants living in Urumqi also had to register for city resident permits, but <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778">the requirements for them were more relaxed</a>: The process required only their ID card. It did not require multiple background checks and signatures. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">the instructional documents</a> given to me during my fieldwork, this discrepancy was an official policy: All minorities, except Han, had to abide by this process <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">neighborhood committee officials in Urumqi told me</a>. Their reason was that some Uighurs were suspected to be terrorists. </p>
<p>As scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/darren-byler-755196">Darren Byler</a> <a href="https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/42946/Byler_washington_0250E_19242.pdf">points out</a>, in Xinjiang people were “segmented,” not just by family but by “ethnicity and work units.” They were also “bifurcated by urban or rural legal residency status.”</p>
<p>The <a href="https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/42946/Byler_washington_0250E_19242.pdf">application requirements</a> made it very <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-into-a-police-state-like-no-other">difficult for poor, rural migrant Uighurs</a>.</p>
<p>The information from the city resident permit applications was recorded into a computer and <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">created a detailed database</a>.</p>
<h2>Home raids</h2>
<p>Regular home inspections were carried out by the neighborhood committees, primarily to ensure migrant Uighurs complied with registration requirements. They had been occurring on a <a href="https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/42946/Byler_washington_0250E_19242.pdf">regular basis since 2014</a>. </p>
<p>I experienced one such raid when I was visiting a friend. While the official did not question my friend when she said there were three members in her family, instead of six, he left her with strict instructions to report if anything changed. </p>
<p>Uighur residents were kept under tight surveillance, yet they mistrusted the government and many managed to <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">avoid the authorities</a> as much as possible in small forms of quiet opposition, such as not complying with registration requirements or <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">hiding during inspections</a>.</p>
<p>Other scholars have confirmed such observations. As an anthropologist at the University of Washington, <a href="https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/42946/Byler_washington_0250E_19242.pdf">Darren Byler found that</a>, in looking for unregistered occupants, the police “looked in closets and under beds.” He also found that the police would “vary the timing of inspection to make sure that the occupants would be unprepared.” </p>
<h2>Evictions and arrests</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/opinion/china-camps-uighurs-xinjiang.html">The detentions, as reported by The New York Times, began in early 2017</a>.</p>
<p>As the year 2017 progressed, Uighur migrant friends began to tell me, in whispers or coded text messages, that they had to go back home and they could no longer contact me. I never heard from many of them again. For those that stayed in the city, I frequently heard stories about friends’ relatives being taken in the middle of the night. </p>
<p>Nobody knew where they were kept, how long they would be gone, or why they had disappeared. Religious practices <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1534802">started to change</a>. For example, during my fieldwork from 2014 to 2016, I witnessed people who prayed, fasted and wore headscarves openly. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317687/original/file-20200227-24685-1y4d2u9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A fabric market in Urumqi with a mosque in the background, where Uighur women are comfortable covering their heads.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah Tynen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beginning in early 2017, however, the authorities began <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-researched-uighur-society-in-china-for-8-years-and-watched-how-technology-opened-new-opportunities-then-became-a-trap-119615">detaining Uighurs for any sign of religious activity</a> in Urumqi.</p>
<p>As Uighur scholar <a href="https://www.ncl.ac.uk/sml/staff/profile/jsmithfinley.html#background">Jo Smith Finley</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1534802">explains</a> that when a state puts a label of “religious extremism,” on a group of people, all religious behavior becomes suspect. Finley points to the “extreme forms of religious policing in rural Xinjiang.” She writes about “sweep-and-search operations” in Uighur homes “violating” private Uighur spaces.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/gere.12360">Uighurs censored their speech</a>. By spring 2017, I stopped hearing people openly give thanks to Allah, the Arabic word for God, after meals. Even saying the words “Ramadan fasting” became taboo.</p>
<p>From February to October 2017, <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">the government changed the rules that affected Uigher people’s social lives</a>. For example, in a culture where asking guests to stay overnight was once common, police first began requiring overnight guests to register their stay. Then they said only daytime visitors were allowed to visit Uighur homes. Two weeks later, <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">police prohibited Uighurs from having guests at all</a>.</p>
<p>In 2017, housing restrictions on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778">Uighurs were increased</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318142/original/file-20200302-18275-1aa3se9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Chinese character meaning demolish marks a Uighur restaurant in Urumqi in May 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah Tynen</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In March 2017, Uighur newcomers to the city were not allowed to rent homes in the city, forcing many Uighurs to return to the countryside. By June 2017, according to my fieldwork and interviews in Urumqi with Han and Uighur residents, all Uighurs – regardless of migration or registration status – <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">were prohibited from renting homes in Urumqi</a>.</p>
<p>The streets emptied of the usual markets and Uighur people.</p>
<p>I witnessed many Uighur shops being <a href="https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/7w62f830j">demolished with bulldozers in April and May of 2017</a>.</p>
<p>I left China in October 2017. Currently, according to conservative estimates at least <a href="https://qz.com/1599393/how-researchers-estimate-1-million-uyghurs-are-detained-in-xinjiang/">10% of Uighurs</a> are detained in camps.</p>
<p>I’m not in contact with any of my Uighur friends because contacting a foreigner would be grounds for detainment. I don’t know how many of them are in detention camps. One Uighur friend told me in 2017, “We are all just waiting for the knock on our door.”</p>
<p>[<em>You’re too busy to read everything. We get it. That’s why we’ve got a weekly newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybusy">Sign up for good Sunday reading.</a> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Tynen received funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>A scholar who spent 24 months in the Uighur-dominated regions of China recalls when the Chinese crackdown on Uighurs started in 2017 – people were picked up and never returned.Sarah Tynen, Instructor, University of Colorado BoulderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1317942020-03-06T16:34:18Z2020-03-06T16:34:18ZThe forgotten women who helped to build British Islam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318719/original/file-20200304-66056-ocq13e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C216%2C799%2C353&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Group photo outside the Memorial Hall at the Shah Jahan Mosque complex in Woking.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.wokingmuslim.org/photos/kh-early.htm">Woking Mission Photos Index</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The two first British mosques were established in 1889 in Liverpool and Woking, and women played a major contribution to the communities that helped to set up these mosques. But you wouldn’t necessarily know it. Indeed, women’s contributions throughout history are consistently forgotten – often lost so the past becomes “his story”. I hope <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/11/2/62">my new research</a> will play a part in changing this.</p>
<p>I used archive material linked to the two earliest British mosques to examine the everyday lives of women in these historical communities. This research presents a coherent and compelling narrative of women’s lives and roles as contributors and leaders of their communities.</p>
<p>Women in these communities were usually middle-class converts, who encountered Islam through travel, mosque publications or public lectures. They lived in an environment that viewed Islam and Muslims with suspicion and ridicule. British Muslims were perceived as <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/loyal-enemies/">“loyal enemies”</a> and <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-infidel-within/">“infidels within”</a> the society of that time.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1258&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1258&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318400/original/file-20200303-66106-mziqfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1258&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One woman, Jessie Ameena Davidson, wrote about her conversion in The Islamic Review in June 1926.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At both the Liverpool and Woking mosques, women were included in Eid celebrations, debates and other events. The women at the Liverpool mosque also ran a home for the city’s “destitute” children, which was established in January 1897. </p>
<p>Women wrote for mosque publications, which also celebrated women’s achievements. In January 1895, the Liverpool Mosque newsletter noted that Mrs Zubeida Ali Akbar had the honour of being presented to the Queen. On March 20 1895, it noted that Miss Teyba Bilgrami, “a young Mahommedan lady of Hyderabad”, had passed the first exam in the arts at Madras University. </p>
<h2>Refreshments and entertainment</h2>
<p>Women were nearly always in charge of refreshments and “entertainment” at mosque events, including an annual Christmas breakfast that the Liverpool Muslim Institute organised. Women were initially excluded from the literary and debating society – this being only for “young men”. Then in March 1896, for the first time a woman, Rosa Warren, gave a talk on the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow . </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318402/original/file-20200303-66106-1ezb4qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this photograph from the Woking Mosque Archives, a few women sit at the back participating in the prayer.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Articles in mosque publications, usually written by men, show how Muslim patriarchy of the time converged with that of Victorian society to marginalise women. For example, poetry published in the Liverpool Mosque newsletter derides “the New Woman” who: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>had studied mathematics … knew all about mythology … her mind was drilled in science … knew all the dates of history … Could talk with great loquacity on questions of capacity, but couldn’t sew a button on her little brother’s pants.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Trailblazing women</h2>
<p>Yet there were also women who challenged these patriarchies. As part of my research, I uncovered many interesting stories of women and their roles in the mosques. There was Mrs Nafeesa T Keep, for example, a convert to Islam who arrived in Liverpool from the United States. She gave talks on Islam and women’s rights, challenging both patriarchal understandings of Islam and stereotypes of Islam. She was appointed the assistant superintendent of the Medressah-i-iyyum-al-Sebbah, an institution aimed at educating young Muslims on religion. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1020&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1020&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318404/original/file-20200303-66052-8z7r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1020&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zainab Cobbold (born Lady Evelyn Murray) was a Scottish diarist, traveller and noblewoman who was known for her conversion to Islam in the Victorian era.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There was also Madame Teresa Griffin Viele (1831–1906), who took the Muslim name Sadika Hanoum. She was a news correspondent for the Liverpool Mosque, writing the “Resume of Political Events” in its journal from September 1894 to April 1895. And Lady Evelyn Zainab Cobbold, a high-profile convert from an aristocratic British family, who became one of the first European women to perform the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. Extraordinarily for her time, she performed the pilgrimage on her own, in a motor car and then wrote a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Pilgrimage_to_Mecca.html?id=rBwuAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">best-selling book</a> in 1934 about her experiences. </p>
<p>Other women in this community include Fatima Cates, who was a key member and indeed founding treasurer of the Liverpool Muslim Institute, the body that itself founded Britain’s first mosque in the city. Meanwhile, another woman, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Muslim_Women_Reform_and_Princely_Patrona.html?id=y0a3AAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">Begum Shah Jahan</a> of Bhopal, India, funded Britain’s first purpose-built mosque in Woking. Women were therefore central to the foundation of the first mosques in Britain.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/318406/original/file-20200303-66099-s7lkqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Shah Jahan Mosque in Oriental Road, Woking, England, is the first purpose-built mosque in the UK.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rewriting history</h2>
<p>Indeed, as my research shows, history puts women at the centre of the establishment of Islam in Britain. And in their own different ways, these women took on roles of leadership and representation. They lived at a time that was socially and culturally extremely different from that of contemporary British Muslims. Yet the issues these women encountered in their practice of Islam, their negotiations with multiple patriarchies, and their daily lives are not unlike the issues around gender and mosque leadership debated in contemporary Britain.</p>
<p>By shining a light on the history of Muslim women in Britain, contemporary issues seem less insurmountable. These women shaped the Muslim communities of their time and it is imperative that their stories are known.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was funded by the British Academy and Leverhulme Trust small grants scheme (grant number SG151945)</span></em></p>My new research highlights a little known story of women’s roles in British Muslim history.Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor, Assistant Professor in Faith and Peaceful Relations at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294982020-01-09T13:33:24Z2020-01-09T13:33:24ZWhat Trump’s tweet threatening Iran’s cultural sites could mean for Shiite Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309119/original/file-20200108-107200-a4s7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Golden Iwan, Shrine of Fatima Masuma, built in the eighth century, is also a leading Shii seminary in Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kishwar Rizvi</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump warned the Islamic Republic of Iran in a tweet on Jan. 4 that the U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/trump-iran-cultural-sites.html">would target Iranian cultural sites</a>, if provoked. </p>
<p>His threat followed the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/iranian-general-qassem-soleimani-killed.html">United States’ killing</a> of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force, the foreign branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which set off fears of retaliation. The Iranian government <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-news-qassem-soleimani-funeral-deaths-today-revolutionary-guard-threatens-us-allies-live-updates-2020-01-07/">vowed to avenge</a> his death, followed by missile strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq on Jan. 7.</p>
<p>Trump’s angry tweet, which was immediately <a href="https://news.artnet.com/art-world/trump-iran-cultural-sites-threat-1745940">condemned</a> by many, may never become reality, even as tensions in the region escalate. The Pentagon, contradicting Trump, has ruled out the possibility of attacks on cultural sites and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/politics/trump-esper-iran-cultural-sites.html">acknowledged</a> that such an action would be a war crime. Talking to reporters later, Trump said, that he “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2020/01/07/iran-weapons-america-foreman-tapper-lead-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/tensions-with-iran/">likes to obey the law</a>.”</p>
<p>Nevertheless, it is important to understand the significance of Iran’s heritage sites to its people, and to the broader Shiite community – and what the world would lose with their destruction. </p>
<h2>A diverse architectural heritage</h2>
<p>Trump did not name the 52 cultural sites he threatened to attack. But as a <a href="https://academicminute.org/2017/03/kishwar-rizvi-yale-university-iran-and-global-exchange-in-the-early-modern-period/">scholar of Islamic art and architecture</a> who has done <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-safavid-dynastic-shrine-9781848853546/">fieldwork</a> on religious and national monuments in Iran for the past 25 years, I can imagine that among his targets would be several remarkable monuments that exemplify Iran’s glorious history. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Apadana Palace, Persepolis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Takhteh_Jamshid.jpg">Marmoulak</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ancient palace complex of <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Persepolis.html?id=KorZMqmTOJgC">Persepolis</a> was designated a World Heritage site by <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/114/">UNESCO</a> in 1979. Persepolis, located in the Fars province of southern Iran, was the capital of the Achaemenid Empire, which ruled this region from 550 BC to 330 B.C. </p>
<p>The magnificent structures of ancient <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/323723">Persepolis</a> reflect the history of Iran as part of a great Persian empire, which once extended from the Balkans to western India. </p>
<p>The audience hall of one of the oldest buildings at Persepolis, Apadana Palace, was built by the Persian King Darius I. Massive stone reliefs on its processional stairways that depict a royal feast are important examples of the architecture of the ancient Near East. Its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18803290">history is intertwined</a> with that of other great civilizations, such as the Greeks, who sacked Persepolis in 330 B.C. under the leadership of Alexander the Great. </p>
<p>Then there is the heavily populated city of Isfahan, in central Iran – the capital of the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jis/article/18/2/259/726956">Safavid Empire</a>, which ruled Iran from 1501 to 1736. The city has some of the <a href="https://arthistory.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/1-Rizvi_Shah2.pdf">finest examples of Islamic architecture</a> in the world. </p>
<p>Two iconic monuments on Isfahan’s Naqsh-i Jahan Square, a monumental plaza built at the end of the 16th century and sometimes compared to Venice’s San Marco Plaza, are the Imam Mosque and the Ali Qapu palace. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Naqsh-i-Jahan Square Isfahan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Naghshe_Jahan_Square_Isfahan_modified.jpg">Arad Mojtahedi</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/isfahan-and-its-palaces-9781474437196?lang=en&cc=us">The mosque</a>, constructed in 1612 by the Safavid King Shah Abbas I as the main place of Friday congregational prayer, is covered with ornate, multicolored calligraphic and floral tiles. The Ali Qapu palace is similarly majestic, with its five-story gateway decorated with intricate wall-paintings and mosaics. </p>
<p>Isfahan and its monuments reflect the glory of the Safavid empire and its central role in trade and politics of the early modern world. As such they are considered national treasures, reflecting the best of Iranian art and culture. </p>
<p>But Isfahan, the third largest city in Iran, is also home to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11927720">two important nuclear facilities</a>, including a plant for the conversion of uranium, making it a vulnerable target for military aggression. </p>
<h2>Shiite shrines and pilgrimage networks</h2>
<p>Iran’s renowned heritage sites include religious centers venerated by Shii Muslims. The country has been majority Shiite since the 16th century, and views itself as the leader of the global Shii community. It is the primary patron and builder of <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469621166/the-transnational-mosque/">Shiite institutions across the world</a>, with a focus on holy sites in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. </p>
<p>Shiite Muslims revere the family of the prophet, Muhammad, and see his descendants as the rightful leaders of the Muslim world. They <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">differ in their beliefs</a> from Sunni Muslims on the succession that followed the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D. This schism is the fundamental point of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809">contention</a> between Iran and Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia, its regional rival. </p>
<p>The primary sites of Shii veneration are the shrines of the Shii imams and their offspring, which are important pilgrimage destinations, especially during the holy months of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ramadan-means-to-muslims-4-essential-reads-116629">Ramadan</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ashura-how-this-shiite-muslim-holiday-inspires-millions-122610">Muharram</a>. Among them is the tomb of the eighth imam, Reza, in Mashhad, in northeast Iran. A tomb of his sister Fatima Masuma in Qum, near Tehran, is also of particular significance. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/shah-abbas-the-remaking-of-iran/oclc/271772575">shrine of Imam Reza</a> was expanded and embellished in the early 17th century as a magnificent architectural complex. It is centered on his mausoleum and includes royal tombs, a massive mosque and an unparalleled collection of historical manuscripts and cultural artifacts.</p>
<p>The shrine of Fatima Masuma in Qum, like that of Imam Reza established in the eighth century, is also a leading Shii seminary. The library and madrassa, or Islamic school, serve thousands of students and scholars. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the ideologue of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40267811?seq=1">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, studied and preached there. </p>
<p>They are the only major Shii monuments in Iran. The others are in neighboring Iraq, which explains to some extent the <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/5/iraq-parliament-votes-expel-us-military/">close military and ideological ties</a> between the two countries. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Khomeini_Mausoleum.JPG">Ali Khamenei website</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, located midway between Qum and the Iranian capital of Tehran, has itself become a highly popular pilgrimage and tourist site. It is at once a religious icon and a <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/muqj/20/1/article-p209_11.xml">national symbol</a>.</p>
<h2>Iran’s importance to Shiite Muslims</h2>
<p>The global Shii community reaches from Canada to Tajikistan, from Lebanon to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-protests-iran/thousands-protest-in-pakistan-over-us-killing-of-iranian-commander-idUSKBN1Z40NR">Pakistan</a>. When Trump threatens to destroy Iranian cultural sites, he risks angering not only Iran but also more than 200 million Shii Muslims worldwide for whom these monuments hold deep religious meaning.</p>
<p>Such aggressive tactics mimic the strategy employed by the Taliban when it destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas, or when Daesh <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/24/opinions/destruction-mosul-mosque-opinion-rizvi/index.html">blew up</a> the 12th-century Mosque of Nur al-din Zangi in Mosul. These extremist groups use the destruction of cultural sites as a tactic of war, to display their unilateral power and an absolute disregard for histories not allied with their own political agenda. </p>
<p>Moving American military policy away from only targeting military assets to threatening symbolically and religiously meaningful architectural monuments, in my view, would be provocative and expose the U.S. to <a href="http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html">international condemnation</a>. Thankfully, so far, the Pentagon has ruled out any such action. </p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kishwar Rizvi has received funding from Title VI Department of Education Grant.</span></em></p>Trump recently warned Iran that the US could target its cultural sites. Many of Iran’s cultural sites carry deep religious meaning for a global Shii community and such a threat risks alienating them.Kishwar Rizvi, Professor in the History of Art Islamic Art and Architecture, Yale UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1137022019-03-19T10:45:24Z2019-03-19T10:45:24ZWhat is the significance of Friday prayers in Islam?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264462/original/file-20190318-28475-nedo6o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslims praying in a Chicago mosque following the shooting in New Zealand, on Friday, March 15.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mosque-Shooting-Sanctuaries-No-More/25413c31406d425c80f8c74188be4ed9/1/0">AP Photo/Noreen Nasir</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the terror attack on two New Zealand mosques last week, many Muslim communities across the world <a href="https://www.dailydot.com/irl/mymosque-new-zealand/">gathered as usual for their most important weekly ritual</a> – Friday prayers. </p>
<p>In the past few years, Muslims have been attacked and killed while praying, many times on a Friday. Worshippers have been targeted in countries such as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30250950">Nigeria</a>, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/04/pakistan.mosque.blast/">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/middleeast/mosque-attack-egypt.html">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2018/11/23/Bomb-attack-on-mosque-kills-26-Afghan-troops-during-Friday-prayer/1261542990965/">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/world/middleeast/suicide-bombing-saudi-arabia-shiites-sunnis-yemen-mosque.html">Saudi Arabia</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-10/two-killed-75-injured-by-twin-mosque-bombing-in-libyas/9418602">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28900340">Iraq</a> and <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/explosion-hits-kuwait-shia-mosque-during-friday-prayers/article7358023.ece">Kuwait</a>. </p>
<p>Muslims pray five times a day every day, but the most important prayer of the week is “jumah,” or the day of gathering, on Friday. </p>
<p>So why are Friday prayers so central to the Islamic faith?</p>
<h2>The religious significance</h2>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://www.callutheran.edu/faculty/profile.html?id=raslan">scholar of Islam</a> who researches and writes about Muslim ritual practices. The Qur’an invokes the importance of Friday as a sacred day of worship in a chapter called <a href="http://al-quran.info/#62">“Al-Jumah,”</a> meaning the day of congregation, which is also the word for Friday in Arabic.</p>
<p>It <a href="http://al-quran.info/#62">states</a>, “O you who believe! When you are called to congregational (Friday) prayer, hasten to the remembrance of God and leave off trade. That is better for you, if you but knew.” </p>
<p>Muslims believe Friday was chosen by God as a <a href="http://seekershub.org/ans-blog/2011/08/22/the-rulings-related-to-friday-prayer/">dedicated day of worship</a>.
In addition to the prayer itself, which is shorter than the usual midday prayers, Friday services include a sermon, usually given by a professional male Muslim clergy member in Muslim majority countries, but in the West, they are also given by a male lay community member. </p>
<p><a href="http://seekershub.org/ans-blog/2011/08/22/the-rulings-related-to-friday-prayer/">Muslim men are required</a> to attend Friday prayers as long as they not traveling, while women <a href="http://aboutislam.net/counseling/ask-the-scholar/acts-of-worship/can-women-perform-friday-prayer/">are given the option</a> to attend, given their traditional role in the household when Islam was established. </p>
<p>In some countries, such as <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/kerala-muslim-women-group-to-move-top-court-seeking-women-entry-in-all-mosques-1930611">India</a>, <a href="https://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/32949/i-was-not-allowed-to-enter-memon-mosque-in-karachi-because-i-am-a-woman/">Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/tajik-women-fight-mosque-exclusion">Tajikistan</a>, women are not usually permitted to pray in mosques whereas in countries like Iran and Kenya, <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/22/gender-differences-in-worship-attendance-vary-across-religious-groups/">they attend in larger numbers</a>. In almost all mosques, men and women pray separately. In some places women are behind the men in the same room and in others, women are in a different room or behind a barrier. </p>
<p>In the West, many women choose to attend prayer if they can get time away from work or other duties. In Los Angeles and elsewhere in North America and Europe, women lead their <a href="http://rsn.aarweb.org/articles/friday-prayer-their-own">own Friday prayer services</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://seekershub.org/ans-blog/2011/08/22/the-rulings-related-to-friday-prayer/">To prepare for prayers</a>, Muslims bathe, apply perfume and brush their teeth to make their appearance pleasant to their fellow worshippers.</p>
<p>The Prophet Muhammad spoke of the value of praying in congregation rather than individually, <a href="http://seekershub.org/ans-blog/2011/08/22/the-rulings-related-to-friday-prayer/">promising spiritual rewards</a>, such as answered prayers and forgiveness for one’s sins. Attending Friday prayers, the Prophet said, is <a href="http://seekershub.org/ans-blog/2011/08/22/the-rulings-related-to-friday-prayer/">equivalent to one entire year</a> of praying and fasting alone.</p>
<p>A song by U.S. Muslim singer Raef Haggag describes how Muslims prepare and perform jumah prayers and their benefits. It provides a light but serious message about the significance of Friday prayers, especially for Western Muslims.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Song on Friday prayers.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The tradition of prayer</h2>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2013/jun/24/when-weekend-start-saudi-arabia">Muslim majority countries</a>, such as Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, include Friday as part of the weekend, with Saturday sometimes being a holiday, and Sunday being a regular workday. </p>
<p>On this day, many Muslims spend the day with their families, attend the prayer and also relax, although practices can vary. Commercial activities always continue after Friday prayers, but in Muslim-majority countries, most people get the day off. </p>
<p>Many people who do not have time to attend the mosque during the week will make a special effort to attend during Friday prayers. </p>
<p>In countries where the call to prayer is projected from loudspeakers, entire cities will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-richard-dawkins-doesnt-get-about-the-muslim-call-to-prayer-100576">saturated with their sounds</a>. Sermons too are often publicly broadcast, and in many cities, including in Western countries <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2011/04/07/on-a-mat-and-a-prayer">such as France</a>, congregants overflow into the streets around mosques. </p>
<p>Crowded cities are often empty and quiet, up until the prayers, after which they are full of people enjoying their day off. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7TGS560TkRc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Friday prayer practice in Cairo.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the United States, Muslims have to receive <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e3a833eb-73d6-4dfe-ac7e-bd42284715f8">special accommodation</a> from their workplace to visit a nearby mosque. Some workplaces such as universities, hospitals or corporate offices, allow employees to <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=WjM5DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PA28&ots=34Bacmd7a9&dq=muslims%20organize%20jummah%20prayers%20at%20workplace&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q&f=false">organize their own Friday prayer</a> on site. </p>
<p>As a religious ritual that goes back to the practice of the Prophet, Friday prayers hold a special place for Muslims.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rose S. Aslan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Last Friday, Muslims were killed while praying at two mosques in New Zealand. For Muslims, Friday is the day of gathering, the most important prayer day of the week.Rose S. Aslan, Assistant Professor of Religion, California Lutheran UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1061102018-11-02T10:53:39Z2018-11-02T10:53:39ZHow safe is your place of worship?<p>Many Americans may be wondering what security measures are in place at their place of worship after a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/28/us/san-diego-synagogue-sunday/index.html">gunman’s attack on a San Diego synagogue</a> service this past weekend left one person dead and three others wounded. </p>
<p>The same question was raised after 11 people were killed in the Oct. 27 shooting at the <a href="https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2018/10/27/heavy-police-presence-near-synagogue-in-squirrel-hill/">Tree of Life synagogue</a> in Pittsburgh.</p>
<p>The San Diego synagogue, Chabad Poway, had no security guards – it couldn’t afford them. <a href="https://forward.com/fast-forward/423408/poway-chabad-synagogue-shooting-border-patrol/">An off-duty border patrol agent was among the congregants</a>, and there are reports he both tried to disarm the shooter and then chased after him outside of the synagogue. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/28/us/synagogue-shooting-chabad-poway.html">Chabad Poway Rabbi Yisroel Goldstein told The New York Times</a> that a hired security guard may have stopped any attack before it began. </p>
<p>“This may have been prevented if we had that,” said Goldstein, who was injured in the attack.</p>
<p>President Donald Trump <a href="https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2018/10/27/trump-reacts-to-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting/">also alluded to this question</a> when he said “the results would have been far better” if the Tree of Life congregation had armed guards or members.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/pittsburgh-mayor-peduto-rebukes-trump-armed-guards-idea-2018-10">news reports</a> at the time, the Tree of Life synagogue did not have armed guards present at the time of the shooting. Many community leaders rebuked Trump’s statements and argued that increasing armed security was not the solution.</p>
<p>We are a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=6_MGHUYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra">sociologist</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=c__pMnMAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">criminologist</a> who in 2015 conducted a national study of religious congregations’ experiences with, fears of and preparations for crime.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-017-0316-3">Our study</a>, which was supported by the National Science Foundation, featured a survey of over 1,300 places of worship and in-depth interviews with more than 50 congregational leaders. </p>
<p>We asked each leader – individuals with significant knowledge of the congregation’s operations – about the congregation’s history of crime, its security measures, the individual’s assessment of future crime risk and fears, and a variety of questions about the congregation’s operations and neighborhood. </p>
<p>While neither the Chabad Poway nor the Tree of Life synagogue was part of our study, the results of this work may hold useful insights for conversations about crime and security in places of worship. Here’s what we found.</p>
<h2>Threats and fear</h2>
<p>Crimes, most commonly vandalism and theft, were committed at about 40% of congregations in the year prior to the survey. This overall percentage was not significantly different across religious traditions.</p>
<p>When we dug deeper, though, we found that synagogues and mosques deal with crime-related problems that are much different than the average church.</p>
<p>Our survey found, for instance, that synagogues and mosques were three times more likely than congregations overall to have received an explicit threat in the prior year. </p>
<p>Respondents also reported significantly greater fear that congregants would be assaulted or murdered on the congregation’s property. This <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-017-0124-z">helps explain</a> another pattern we found: Jewish and Muslim congregations are in many ways far ahead of congregations representing other religious traditions when it comes to thinking about and implementing security measures.</p>
<h2>Security measures</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-017-0316-3">survey showed that 40%</a> of congregations have in place at least four of the 18 security measures asked about in our survey. About 43% of congregations have an alarm system, 28% use security cameras and 25% have taken steps to restrict the number of entries into their buildings.</p>
<p><iframe id="SqI07" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/SqI07/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Our interviews found that most places of worship have a hard time implementing security. Some of this is simply not enough money. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057%2Fs41284-017-0124-z">Larger and wealthier congregations</a> tend to have more security in place.</p>
<p>Beyond resources, our interviews consistently found that places of worship view security measures as a potential threat to their mission of creating a sacred space that is open to their communities.</p>
<p>However, our survey also found that synagogues and mosques were much more likely than the average congregation to have security cameras, restricted entry points, security guards and other security measures. For example, only 17% of all the congregations in our survey reported any use of security guards, whether full-time, part-time or for special events. This compares to just over 54% of synagogues and 28% of mosques. Synagogues are also more likely to have communicated <a href="https://academic.oup.com/policing/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/police/pax045/4080318">with their local police</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond the statistics, our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19361610.2018.1387736">in-depth interviews with leaders of congregations</a> found that synagogues and mosques tend to put a great deal of thought into security. For synagogues in particular, our interviews found that local organizations are effective at sharing information and resources about security threats and strategies – for example, the Jewish Community Relations Councils.</p>
<h2>Future steps</h2>
<p>The U.S. must find ways to address the threats and violence against synagogues, mosques and other places of worship. In the meantime, congregations can evaluate their security risks and precautions.</p>
<p>The sparse resources of most congregations present some limitations, but there are steps they can take at little or no cost. For instance, congregations can assess whether entry points should be restricted to increase the ability of staff and members to observe who enters the building. </p>
<p>Congregations are not alone in these efforts. Many local police departments will conduct a security assessment for specific congregations or offer a workshop for multiple congregations. Furthermore, many congregations have members who have relevant skills, from installing new locks to setting up security cameras. Simply starting a conversation within your community can help your congregation identify these resources. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on Nov. 2, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106110/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Scheitle receives funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffery T. Ulmer receives funding from the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p>A national survey of over 1,300 congregations found that religious leaders struggle to balance security concerns with carrying out a mission to be open to the communities they serve.Christopher P. Scheitle, Assistant Professor of Sociology, West Virginia UniversityJeffery T. Ulmer, Professor of Sociology and Criminology, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1044712018-10-16T10:41:12Z2018-10-16T10:41:12ZThe mosques that survived Palu’s tsunami and what that means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240442/original/file-20181012-109222-15y5ijq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Floating Mosque of Palu that survived after the earthquake.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Indonesia-Earthquake/0e2d8ee2f4884356b817d356e224d943/10/0">AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the <a href="http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2018/10/07/missing-toll-soars-5000-engulfed-indonesia-quake-neighbourhoods">devastation</a> that followed the earthquake and resulting tsunami in the Indonesian city of Palu in Central Sulawesi, many Muslim religious sites were destroyed. </p>
<p>Two mosques, however, survived, with little to no damage to their structure. </p>
<p>In a province where <a href="http://ardi-lamadi.blogspot.com/2013/07/jumlah-penduduk-berdasarkan-agama-di_5795.html">85 percent</a> of the <a href="https://sulteng.bps.go.id">3 million residents</a> are Muslims, the survival of these particular mosques and not others has started a discussion about the very nature of Islam. </p>
<h2>Mosques of Palu</h2>
<p>I came to know Palu well while doing fieldwork in Central Sulawesi in 1984 as part of my research <a href="https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1117&context=bookshelf">on “traditional rituals.”</a> Palu is the administrative and cultural hub for the whole Sulawesi province.</p>
<p>Of the 24 mosques, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tO8IPYkluaU">20 were severely damaged in the tsunami</a>. The worst hit was the <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/BoTP2oqBMWS/?utm_source=ig_share_sheet&igshid=1j6x68chxh7vw">Baiturrahman Mosque</a>, where 300 people were killed during evening prayers. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="http://alkhairaat.sch.id/sejarah-alkhairaat/">Alkhairaat Mosque,</a> and the Arkham Babu Rahman Mosque, known locally as the <a href="http://bangka.tribunnews.com/2018/09/30/gempa-dan-tsunami-palu-donggala-allahuakbar-masjid-terapung-ikon-kota-palu-tetap-berdiri-kokoh">Floating Mosque</a> survived. The Floating Mosque dominated the Palu Beach with its dramatic walkway from the shore to mosque. After the tsunami, the mosque’s access from the shore has been cut off and it is now literally floating in Palu Bay. </p>
<p>Though partially submerged, its structure remains intact. Palu residents, commenting on Facebook in the first few days after the tsunami, noted how “it remained miraculously untouched.” </p>
<p>At a time when people are trying to make sense of the death and destruction, the survival of Alkhairaat and Arkham Babu Rahman is seen to be a sign of saintly power and the mercy of Allah. Thousands have turned up to pray at Alkhairaat Mosque and walk reverently past the mosque floating in water.</p>
<h2>The mosques that survived</h2>
<p>The history of the Floating Mosque is dedicated to the 17th-century founder of Islam in Palu, <a href="http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/54501/tracing-datuk-karama-the-first-islamic-preacher-in-palu">Datuk Karama</a>. Karama came from the western island of Sumatra and preached Islam to the people of Palu. </p>
<p>The Alkhairaat mosque was erected by a Yemeni merchant
<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/28176852">Sayyid Idrus Al-Jufri</a> in 1930. Al-Jufri also founded religious schools after discovering upon his arrival that many people did not have basic education. The first school eventually became the Alkhairaat University. </p>
<p>The tombs of Al-Jufri and Datuk Karama are located near their mosques, where people come to seek <a href="https://jurnalharmoni.kemenag.go.id/index.php/harmoni/article/view/245">spiritual guidance</a>. The street where Alkhairaat Mosque is located as well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutiara_SIS_Al-Jufrie_Airport">airport in Palu</a> have been named after Al-Jufri. </p>
<h2>What it means to Palu survivors</h2>
<p>In private comments on Facebook’s instant messenger, people have asserted that the Alkhairaat Mosque and the <a href="http://bangka.tribunnews.com/2018/09/30/gempa-dan-tsunami-palu-donggala-allahuakbar-masjid-terapung-ikon-kota-palu-tetap-berdiri-kokoh">Floating Mosque</a>
survived because of the mystical power of the saints who “guard” these mosques. </p>
<p>These comments have revealed tensions between what people refer to as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/14/indonesias-moderate-islam-is-slowly-crumbling/">“old Islam” and “reformist Islam.”</a> In Palu, <a href="http://science.jrank.org/pages/8030/Islamic-Reform.html">reformist Islam</a> includes beliefs of Salafis and Wahhabis, who want to go back to a purer form of Islam. They see the belief in saints as a <a href="https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=socanth-faculty-publications">“recent” addition</a> to the original Islam that was <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e207">revealed to Prophet Muhammad</a> in the 7th century A.D. </p>
<p>In fact, during the early 2000s, some of the more <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/04/suicide-bombing-hits-restive-poso.html">radical Wahabi and Salafist</a> sects used extreme, violent methods to convince Central Sulawesians to change their beliefs in the mystical power of saints or “old Islam.” </p>
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<p>The educational institutions led by the <a href="https://alkhairaat.com/">Alkhairaat Foundation</a> have played a considerable role in fostering the old Islamic beliefs. The foundation runs 43 boarding schools, and 1,700 religious schools across Eastern Indonesia and a large university in Palu. All emphasize tolerance. However, Salafi and Wahabi schools, promoted by Saudi funding in the 1990s, argue that the tolerance taught by <a href="https://jurnalharmoni.kemenag.go.id/index.php/harmoni/article/view/245">Alkhairaat was the “wrong kind of Islam.”</a>“ </p>
<p>In 2000, Alkhairaat students at a school in Poso, a port town near the southern coast of Central Sulawesi <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3351481?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">were targeted by terrorists</a>. The region’s 14 percent minority Christians have also been under attack. </p>
<p>Since 2010 there has been no violence, but even as recently as 2016, the Indonesian government has been searching for <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/26/peace-process-ongoing-poso.html">terrorist cells</a> in the mountain jungles of Central Sulawesi.</p>
<h2>Palu’s future</h2>
<p>Despite the reformists’ activity, Alkhairaat’s influence in Palu remains strong. As a major philanthropic organization in Palu and beyond, with many graduates of Alkhairaat University serving in government and private sectors, Alkhairaat has helped counter hate rhetoric and actions. </p>
<p>Some of the comments on Facebook reveal survivors’ loyalty to <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/28176852">Alkhairaat values</a>. Post-tsunami, however, Alkhairaat’s resources are likely strained, as graduates say in private conversations on Facebook with me. </p>
<p>The question is will this tragedy bring outside funds that once again disturb the internal harmony among Muslims? If so, will Palu sustain its spirit of tolerance? </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Nourse receives funding from Fulbright and the University of Richmond Faculty Research Committee. </span></em></p>A majority of the over 24 mosques spread over Palu were damaged in the tsunami. Two of them survived, though one of them is gradually sinking.Jennifer Nourse, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994972018-07-30T10:31:18Z2018-07-30T10:31:18ZWhat are madrasa schools and what skills do they impart?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227170/original/file-20180711-27036-5uqcko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students at a madrasa in the Assaba region of southern Mauritania in May 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/m1key-me/15126255339/in/photolist-p3E1HR-4KG5QD-i9b5JE-bew4F2-jEDJvj-4KLmdy-4KG4Yp-9dPT9n-9AoQBu-8sBf39-jjM3q4-qaaB8N-ekwwrB-ogmgXy-8FdFqD-Ut18e1-oxb1dz-9YcgT7-8sBbN9-56Sgro-duaKv1-6WPUjG-6WKks2-8sy9xg-7LjtKM-jECzmP-8NhyXw-4KLmh3-8sBdas-hbLEGr-sgQftr-5QNWKm-ak3Eza-XvDj7W-qugCLc-asTdau-8LGJtH-asTdg9-bevzXz-yyTSg-22mUMx2-ofXnTt-5D4xoX-asQAft-avhh2S-rz2A4L-am6di1-seyXTu-3bwr4k-jEzFQ9">Michal Huniewicz</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey’s recently reelected president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-election-religious-schools.html">has made expansion of Muslim schools</a> a top priority. Erdogan’s government is reported to have approved a religious education budget of US$1.5 billion this year, an increase of 68 percent.</p>
<p>Whether or not they receive public funding like those in Turkey, religious schools are a common feature of Muslim life. The most common of these schools is known as a <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/610822">madrasa</a>. In general, madrasas focus on teaching the Qur’an, the recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, sacred law and other Islamic subjects. </p>
<p>The question is: How well do these schools prepare students for jobs in economies based on contemporary knowledge and technology? </p>
<h2>History of the madrasa</h2>
<p>Madrasas have a long and rich history. After the birth of Islam in the seventh century, Muslims who wanted a religious education joined <a href="http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/education-islam-role-mosque">study circles</a> in mosques where teachers provided instruction.</p>
<p>Over the next 400 years, additional centers of learning, founded and endowed by rulers, high officials and wealthy members of the community, met in public and private libraries. These were early forms of <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/610822">madrasas</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229514/original/file-20180726-106517-1sqcv7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Abdulaziz Khan Madrasa built in 1652 and located in Bukhara, Uzbekistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/9508280@N07/16256491531/in/photolist-qLwLyK-4KG5QD-bew4F2-jEDJvj-4KLmdy-8hHMDo-9AoQBu-ekx8VK-XvDj7W-8sBf39-i9b5JE-ekwwrB-qaaB8N-8FdFqD-Ut18e1-9dPT9n-9YcgT7-8sBbN9-4KG4Yp-8FgQ8J-8NhyXw-sgQftr-ekwDfg-p3E1HR-qugCLc-us8z9d-5FFQhb-bexqGP-9cLPjf-beywcz-Vp4ZRo-jEmLXi-ogmgXy-oxb1dz-56Sgro-VVL3p5-6WPUjG-jECzmP-22mUMx2-8os5MM-WekBXL-jEMREd-ak3Eza-eaM9EH-av2nrh-5FBym2-5FFQ6s-kPXXx-asTdg9-F1PbUJ">Dan Lundberg</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20050305093937/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf">By the 11th century</a>, madrasas were well-established independent centers of learning with some of the features they retain today. They had permanent buildings, paid staff and resident scholars with living quarters and stipends. Students were given room and board, and received a free education. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/610822">Madrasas generally taught</a> calculation, grammar, poetry, history and above all the Qur’an and sacred law. At a higher level they taught literary subjects and arithmetic. While memorization of texts was emphasized, personal instruction, lectures and imitation of the teacher by students were also held to be <a href="http://jiscnet.com/journals/jisc/Vol_3_No_1_June_2015/5.pdf">crucial to minimize errors</a> in religious understanding. </p>
<p>These schools spread quickly. During the Middle Ages, while fewer than 5 percent of the West’s inhabitants learned how to read and write, <a href="http://jiscnet.com/journals/jisc/Vol_3_No_1_June_2015/5.pdf">thousands of madrasas spread literacy</a> as far as <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=en&lr=&id=D2-LAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Hasan+Zaidi.+(August+8,+2005).+Schools+of+hate.+India+Today+International.&ots=JkRi6FlJc2&sig=yP39VPVLn1kzrmeRLbmMbRyTueo&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Hasan%20Zaidi.%20(August%208%2C%202005).%20Schools%20of%20hate.%20India%20Today%20International.&f=false">Russia, Mongolia, the Chinese plains, India and the Malay archipelago</a>.</p>
<p>During the 19th and 20th centuries, Christian missionaries and colonial rulers such as the British opened schools that were based on a Western educational model and offered courses in English, science and technology. </p>
<p>As economies modernized, Muslims who continued to choose madrasas over other schools found that they lacked the training needed for well-paid jobs. Their socioeconomic mobility suffered. Nonetheless, many madrasas refused to integrate nonreligious subjects into their curricula. As a result, <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=en&lr=&id=D2-LAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Hasan+Zaidi.+(August+8,+2005).+Schools+of+hate.+India+Today+International.&ots=JkRi6FlJc2&sig=yP39VPVLn1kzrmeRLbmMbRyTueo&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Hasan%20Zaidi.%20(August%208%2C%202005).%20Schools%20of%20hate.%20India%20Today%20International.&f=false">a dual system of schooling</a> became the norm: one Islam-centered, the other Westernized. </p>
<h2>Why do parents choose madrasas?</h2>
<p>Today, madrasas are most dominant in Pakistan – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-religion-army/army-chief-says-pakistan-should-revisit-islamic-madrassa-schools-idUSKBN1E12F6">20,000 are registered</a> and thousands more are unregistered – but the number of madrasas is growing in many parts of the world. </p>
<p>In Egypt, they increased from 1,855 to 4,314 <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2005/12/01/inside-the-madrasas/">between 1986 and 1996. In Mali</a>, one out of four primary school children attended madrasas during 2005. In India, where 14 people out of 100 are Muslim, the government reports that, overall, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/indias-emerging-modern-madrasas/">4 percent of Muslim students attend madrasas full-time</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229513/original/file-20180726-106508-bf05e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Students at a madrasa in India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/94592664@N00/1254830480/in/photolist-2UTkoh-7ruvDY-LKVBk-3euPGE-8LCds4-HZ8Wp5-eUQeLt-68a9pt-peWgQw-5q54mR-ekx2aT-mkNTKv-ekvZ4v-qTouMx-XymxJv-8N9EN8-9BZ7ro-TKDwxr-Wx2h8e-4AgbZk-ovqCxs-68askH-68eCHJ-asTdB7-WekyyS-67por1-pFjXvc-WukNkx-s2pde7-67pow7-99DPgK-6jiJqB-siQHYf-25aUJLm-jpYbQ8-ejXPBc-PVw59w-6hgocx-ovnQTL-qJpeuG-ogmKsH-8iubyp-8LC91k-ekCw2W-MHHtgw-X9mma3-9XBjJ2-ox8wUv-8RV3qV-hZquAW">Two Circles</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During 2013, a study by scholars of a rural district in northwestern India illustrates <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042814016140">why some parents choose madrasa</a> education for their children. In this impoverished district, called Mewat, which is majority-Muslim, nearly <a href="http://islamicvoice.com/May2012/FACTUALLYSPEAKING/">10 percent of Muslim students</a> – more than twice the national average – are enrolled in madrasas.</p>
<p>Most graduates from Mewat’s madrasas find poorly paid jobs in madrasas, mosques or shrines of saints, a few others in farming. Only 3 percent attain a higher level of socioeconomic development. </p>
<p>The majority of Mewat’s Muslim families want madrasas to offer technical courses and vocational training. However, the study’s authors found that the religious leaders who could approve changes are “set against the modern education.” </p>
<p>Such madrasas contribute to a vicious circle of poverty. Mewat’s free government schools could serve as an alternative, but, perhaps due to their low quality of instruction, nearly three-quarters of Muslim families said that if they had the financial means to do so, they would choose fee-based, private, nonreligious schools. </p>
<p>In Pakistan’s four main provinces, where most Muslim families are wealthier than Mewat’s, three-quarters of parents who opt for madrasas <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/09/30/the-decline-of-turkish-schools">supplement their children’s education</a> by sending them to other schools.</p>
<h2>Turkey’s shift to religious schools</h2>
<p>To return to Turkey, technically speaking, this country eliminated madrasas nearly 100 years ago. In 1924, the first president, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/610822">Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, replaced madrasas</a> with nonreligious schools based on a Western educational model or converted them into schools called Imam Hatip for the training of Muslim preachers.</p>
<p>However, when Erdogan assumed power in 2002, he and his Justice and Development party <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-election-religious-schools.html">turned Imam Hatip schools</a> into religious middle and high schools whose graduates could apply into any university program. Between 2003 and 2012, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/610822">enrollment in Imam Hatip schools tripled</a>. Fifteen years ago, there were 450 such schools. Today there are 4,500. </p>
<p>Erdogan’s government implemented further educational reforms in 2017. Imam Hatip schools now require students to study the concept of holy war, to learn that Muslims should not <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/09/30/the-decline-of-turkish-schools">marry atheists, and to believe that wives should obey husbands</a>. These schools also <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/09/30/the-decline-of-turkish-schools">emphasize rote learning</a> over critical thinking.</p>
<p>At a time when Erdogan has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkish-leader-takes-oath-with-new-powers-and-high-ambitions-1531168532">pledged to boost Turkey</a> from the 17th world economy to the top 10, the approach that he has chosen to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-election-religious-schools.html">raise a pious generation</a>” may derail this ambition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99497/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud is affiliated with the Parliament of the World's Religions. </span></em></p>Madrasas, or Islam-centered schools, have long spread knowledge and literacy throughout the Muslim world. However, can they prepare students for today’s tech-based economies?Myriam Renaud, Ph.D. Candidate in Religious Thought and Ethics, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966902018-05-17T10:41:22Z2018-05-17T10:41:22ZA peek into the lives of Puerto Rican Muslims and what Ramadan means post Hurricane Maria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219228/original/file-20180516-155573-1iweii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslims praying in Puerto Rico.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Tomas van Houtryve</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For Juan, Ramadan is a balancing act. On the one hand is his religious faith and practice. On the other is his land, his culture, his home: Puerto Rico.</p>
<p>Although he weaves these two elements of his identity together in many ways, during Ramadan, the borderline between them becomes palpable. For the <a href="http://mvslim.com/salaams-from-puerto-rico-a-preview-of-islam-in-the-caribbean/">Puerto Rican Muslims</a> like Juan, the holy month of fasting brings to the surface the tensions they feel in their daily life as minorities – and as Muslims among their Puerto Rican family and Puerto Ricans in the Muslim community.</p>
<p>That is even more true this year in the wake of Hurricane Maria, the storm that made landfall in the southeastern city of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/09/photos-of-puerto-rico-after-hurricane-maria/540786/">Yabucoa on Sept. 20, 2017</a>, and devastated parts of Puerto Rico. Even today, many parts of the island are <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/puerto-ricos-recovery-7-months-after-hurricane-maria">without essential services</a>, such as consistent electricity and water or access to schools. </p>
<p>I met Juan in 2015, when I first traveled to Puerto Rico in an effort to better understand the Puerto Rican Muslim story as part of my broader <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41603-017-0008-3">research on Islam in Latin America and the Caribbean</a>. What I have found, in talking to Muslims in Puerto Rico and in many U.S. cities, is a deep history and a rich narrative that expands the understanding of what it means to be Muslim on the one hand, and, on the other, Puerto Rican. This Ramadan, Muslims in Puerto Rico are using the strength of both these identities to deal with the havoc of Hurricane Maria. </p>
<h2>The history of Muslims in Puerto Rico</h2>
<p>Muslims first came to the island as part of the transatlantic colonial exchange between Spain and Portugal and the “New World.” There is <a href="https://books.google.com.pr/books?id=vbgXDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=karoline+cook+forbidden+passages&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjejoCI3MDUAhWC7iYKHWATDA4Q6AEIJTAA%23v=onepage&q=karoline%20cook%20forbidden%20passages&f=false">evidence that the first Muslims arrived</a> with the explorers in the 16th century. Many <a href="https://books.google.com.pr/books?id=vbgXDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=karoline+cook+forbidden+passages&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjejoCI3MDUAhWC7iYKHWATDA4Q6AEIJTAA%23v=onepage&q=karoline%20cook%20forbidden%20passages&f=false">“Moriscos,” or Iberian Muslims,</a> came to the Caribbean bypassing <a href="https://digitalcommons.asphs.net/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1231&context=bsphs">several Spanish laws</a> that <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/muslims-were-banned-americas-early-16th-century-180962059/">prohibited them from coming to the Americas</a> and served as merchants and explorers. Some were taken as slaves. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.com.pr/books?id=Kzm4-D1-ODQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=black+crescent&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjx476r3MDUAhVRziYKHUmvAPcQ6AEIJTAA%23v=onepage&q=black%20crescent&f=false">Enslaved Muslims from West Africa also came</a> to the island beginning in the 16th century. While exact numbers are not known, scholars believe <a href="https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories/collection/african-muslims-early-america">they were significant</a>. These Muslim slave communities did not thrive, or even survive, but Islam established itself across the Western Hemisphere. It became the region’s <a href="https://books.google.com.pr/books?id=2VGoAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=servants+of+allah&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJhdy13MDUAhVMOiYKHe7JCSMQ6AEIJTAA">“second monotheistic religion”</a> thanks to Muslim slaves, former slaves and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maroon_(people)">maroons</a> – Africans who escaped slavery and founded independent settlements. These Muslims left their mark and contributed to the <a href="https://books.google.com.pr/books?id=2VGoAAAAQBAJ&lpg=PR7&dq=servants%20of%20allah%20page%20251&pg=PA251%23v=onepage&q=servants%20of%20allah%20page%20251&f=false">culture and history</a> of the continents. </p>
<p>Due to conversion to Catholicism or the adoption of Afro-American religious traditions such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Candomble">Candomblé</a> or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Santeria">Santería</a> the influence and presence of Islam in the Americas faded over time. There is no evidence of direct links between present-day Muslim communities and the enslaved Muslims who came before. </p>
<p>Today’s Muslim communities largely comprise recent immigrants from Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria, with some descendants of the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/39111">late 19th- and 20th-century immigrants</a>. Ethnically speaking, nearly two-thirds of Puerto Rico’s Muslim population is made up of Palestinian immigrants, living in places like Caguas and San Juan, who came fleeing political turmoil or to pursue business interests.</p>
<h2>Recent conversions</h2>
<p>In recent years some Puerto Ricans have been reverting to the religion of their ancestors: Islam. In each of <a href="https://muslimahpr.wordpress.com/2010/08/14/a-database-of-islamic-centers-and-masajid-in-puerto-rico/">Puerto Rico’s nine mosques</a>, researchers have found <a href="http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.5744/florida/9780813060132.003.0006">an increasing number of recent local converts.</a> There is no accurate measure, but anecdotal evidence suggests rising numbers.</p>
<p>How do they wrestle with their identity as both Muslim and Puerto Rican?</p>
<p>Straddled between a predominately Arab Muslim population on the one hand and their avowedly Puerto Rican families, neighbors and co-workers who imagine Islam as a religion foreign to Puerto Rico, converts to Islam struggle to marry the two identities they now claim. They are in search of a “Boricua <a href="http://www.raceandreligion.com/JRER/Volume_8_(2017)_files/Espinosa%208%201.pdf">Islamidad”</a> – a unique Puerto Rican Muslim identity that resists complete assimilation to Arab cultural norms even as it re-imagines and expands what it means to be Puerto Rican and a Muslim. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175292/original/file-20170622-27880-ui7q93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Puerto Rico Islamic Center at Ponce in Barrio Cuarto, Ponce, Puerto Rico.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/roca-ruiz/5003763527/in/photolist-779boe-bmZtEH-8CaAyX">Roca Ruiz</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When I first met Juan at an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-muslims-celebrate-eid-twice-a-year-6-questions-answered-80949">Eid al-Fitr</a> celebration, the festival of breaking the Ramadan fast, at the San Juan Convention Center in 2015, the 40-something man said, “I came to Islam by asking questions: about the ills of society, the difficulties of life.” </p>
<p>For Juan, Catholicism, the religion adopted by his ancestors when they converted, was too confusing. The doctrine of “tawhid” in Islam – the oneness of God – was, as he saw it, simpler than what he believed to be the complex theology of the Trinity. Furthermore, he felt that Islam called for a higher morality and sense of self-discipline. And so, he “reverted” – that is, returned to the faith of his birth and the heritage of his Iberian forebears in al-Andalus, in what is modern-day Spain.</p>
<p>But Juan, like many other converts, is also searching for a sense of authenticity in his new community. While Juan finds that his Muslim brothers and sisters appreciate him, he still feels marginalized because of his cultural background. He finds ways to express his “Boricuan” (a term for resident Puerto Ricans, derived from the island’s indigenous name Borinquen) pride and his Muslim identity by sporting a “taqiyah,” a short, rounded skull cap, decorated with the Puerto Rican flag. </p>
<p>Another Puerto Rican convert from Aguadilla, Abu Livia, lives in this tension as well. He told me during an interview, “Too often we hear people say you have to wear certain clothes, speak a certain language, look like an Arab, talk like an Arab, behave like an Arab.” </p>
<p>Not just Juan and Abu Livia, as I found in my research, but many other Puerto Rican Muslims are looking toward Andalusia, or <a href="http://www.spanish-fiestas.com/history/moorish-spain/">Moorish Spain</a>, to search for their roots and define who they are in a Puerto Rican society that claims a mixed background of indigenous, African and European influences. </p>
<h2>‘Puerto Rico se levanta’</h2>
<p>Puerto Rican Muslims not only look across the Atlantic. They also look within themselves and are finding ways of expressing their Muslim faith through the symbols and struggles of Puerto Rican culture, whether it be their flag, their family traditions, or in how they respond to the trials of Hurricane Maria.</p>
<p>Following up with Juan after a year of struggle in the wake of the storm, he said, “Puerto Ricans are proud, committed, strong, and ‘pa’lante’ (moving forward). And that includes Muslims.” After the destruction of Hurricane Maria, the month of Ramadan, held special meaning for him. It held hope for “renewal.” </p>
<p>“‘Puerto Rico se levanta,’” he said, meaning Puerto Rico will rise, and “this Ramadan it will do so in the prayer, fasting, and charity of Muslims to help one another and their fellow Puerto Ricans prepare for a better future today and forever.” </p>
<p>For Juan, this is just another way his Puerto Rican identity helps him be a better Muslim. As he said, “We will fast this month, but we already know what it means to be in want.” </p>
<p><em>This incorporates elements of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/on-eid-2017-a-peek-into-the-lives-of-puerto-rican-muslims-78798">earlier article</a> published on June 23, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood receives funding from the Center for Global Islamic Studies at the University of Florida. Ken is also a member of the Religion Newswriters Association, the American Academy of Religion, and the Latin American Studies Association. </span></em></p>A scholar talks to Muslims in Puerto Rico and comes back with an understanding of their rich history and their struggles.Ken Chitwood, Ph.D. Candidate, Religion in the Americas, Global Islam, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/804362017-07-07T10:44:52Z2017-07-07T10:44:52ZBritain’s ‘missing’ Muslim women<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177048/original/file-20170706-26513-umk12g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim women pray behind men at mass prayers to celebrate Eid al-Adha in Birmingham. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joe Giddens/PA Archive</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whether British citizens with Muslim beliefs are sufficiently committed to “British values” and to a “British way of life” is a topic of intense political and media debate. Now a new report on “<a href="http://www.citizensuk.org/missing_muslims">Missing Muslims</a>” launched by the <a href="http://www.citizensuk.org/islam_public_life_commission">Citizens Commission on Islam, Participation and Public Life</a> on July 3 has challenged the <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/04/why-do-we-pretend-that-all-muslims-are-sweet-smiley-and-integrated/">allegation</a> that Muslim citizens are disengaged from the mainstream of British life. </p>
<p>It finds that “most Muslims in the UK are British citizens” and that a large majority of them actively identify as British. Muslim citizens have also been found to vote in elections at a higher rate than the general population, according to the report. </p>
<p>Such clear demonstrations of public engagement and belonging are set against a volatile sociopolitical context. A documented rise in <a href="https://theconversation.com/finsbury-park-attack-shows-the-harm-islamophobia-continues-to-inflict-on-muslim-communities-79682">Islamophobia</a>, anti-Muslim prejudice and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jun/20/anti-muslim-hate-surges-after-manchester-and-london-bridge-attacks">hate crimes</a> make it increasingly challenging for Muslim citizens to feel they are equally valued as citizens. But the report also finds much wanting within Muslim communities when it comes to participation in British public life – with barriers particularly affecting Muslim women.</p>
<p>The Citizens Commission on Islam, Participation and Public Life was established in 2015 by <a href="http://www.citizensuk.org/">Citizens UK</a>, a charitable civil society organisation that represents various churches, mosques, synagogues, schools, trade unions and other voluntary associations across England and Wales. Chaired by Conservative MP <a href="https://www.dominicgrieve.org.uk/">Dominic Grieve</a>, the commission has held a number of <a href="http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/i-lost-count-verbal-attacks-10430210">public hearings</a> and received evidence from both organisations and individuals. </p>
<p>Based on my own <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137405333">research</a> on Christian and Muslim women’s experiences of citizenship, I gave evidence to the commission’s hearing in Leicester. My focus was on the stereotyping and discrimination of Muslim women in wider society and on barriers to women’s participation in Muslim faith organisations.</p>
<p>The new report notes that, for Muslim women, “disadvantage in employment is particularly acute” and that Muslim women who wear headscarves are “more likely than men to feel unsafe” due to the verbal and physical abuse they suffer. In explaining Muslim women’s disadvantage in the labour market, the authors highlight discriminatory recruitment and hiring practices among employers. </p>
<h2>Women’s role in mosques</h2>
<p>The report also observes that Muslim women are missing from the governance structures of Muslim institutions. It says that many mosques “are not welcoming to women’s participation at any serious level”. Within this overall picture of male dominance, there is a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/muslims-in-britain/3F6E4E693BC225A6754D1D048BBDFD6C">growing participation</a> of Muslim women in mosques around the country that have created designated women’s spaces. There is also a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2016.1216142">desire among many Muslim women</a> to take on mosque leadership, management and teaching roles. </p>
<p>The commission makes a strong recommendation for all Muslim organisations to enable “equal access to leadership opportunities” for women. Whether this would include leadership of religious prayer is unclear, as the report falls short of recommending that women should be able to perform the role of an imam in a mosque. The issue of women leading Muslim prayer is <a href="http://forums.ssrc.org/ndsp/2015/04/29/woman-led-prayer-a-conversation-with-juliane-hammer/">controversial</a> and the commission appears to have simply bypassed the issue. </p>
<p>It also fails to mention the slow but growing emergence of women-led mosques, such as the <a href="https://www.indy100.com/article/meet-one-of-the-woman-imams-preaching-at-londons-feminist-mosque--bybuPRWAfW">Inclusive Mosque Initiative</a> in London and plans by the <a href="https://www.womenledmosque.co.uk/about-muslim-womens-council/">Muslim Women’s Council in Bradford</a> to build a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/worshipping-as-equals-plans-to-build-britains-first-women-led-mosque-a6933021.html">women-led mosque</a>. </p>
<p>The report also ignores that sexual minority groups and individuals (LGBT+) are often excluded from faith institutions. Groups such as <a href="https://imaanlondon.wordpress.com/">IMAAN</a> in London and <a href="http://al-jannah.proboards.com/">Al-Jannah</a> in Scotland should be acknowledged for the support they provide to individuals and their contribution to raising awareness and tolerance. </p>
<h2>A question of justice and equality</h2>
<p>In neglecting such contested issues surrounding gender and sexuality, the report risks homogenising all Muslim communities as deeply traditional and conservative. It also risks minimising the progressive changes that some Muslim women and men are currently engaged in towards developing more inclusive practices within their faith communities. </p>
<p>In attempting to explain why Muslim women experience barriers to participation stemming from their own communities, the report suggests a distinction between “religion” and “culture”. But by blaming this gender inequality on culture, it fails to recognise the importance of men’s interest in maintaining the status quo in order to serve their own privilege and control. The Muslim Women’s Network UK <a href="http://www.mwnuk.co.uk//go_files/resources/169296-PM%20Letter%20(Muslim%20Women%20Empowerment).pdf">has emphasised</a> these patriarchal structures as the main hindrance to women’s participation in faith communities. </p>
<p>This isn’t just a problem that affects Muslim women. Elsewhere in British life women are underrepresented in important political, economic and religious institutions ranging from the UK <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/british-election-results-record-number-women-parliament-623521">parliament</a> to business <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-race-for-boardroom-diversity-is-falling-at-the-first-hurdle-29866">boardrooms</a> and churches. But gender discrimination within these institutions is rarely excused as resulting from “culture” – as it is within Muslim organisations. Instead, such discrimination in wider society is talked about as relating to justice, equality and human rights for women.</p>
<p>Secularism does not guarantee gender equality, but neither does religion necessarily promote gender inequality and we must pay attention to specific contexts. By making <a href="https://theconversation.com/good-muslims-or-good-citizens-how-muslim-women-feel-about-integration-58796">comparisons</a>, such as between Christian and Muslim women, we can establish similarities and differences in experiences and views. Such comparisons are likely to reveal that, as the late MP Jo Cox said, there is <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2016/june/jo-cox-maiden-speech-in-the-house-of-commons/">more that unites us than divides us</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Line Nyhagen receives funding from the European Union.</span></em></p>A new report on missing Muslims under-emphasises women’s growing participation in civil society.Line Nyhagen, Reader in Sociology, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/800192017-06-23T16:00:10Z2017-06-23T16:00:10ZAfter years of destruction, Iraqis are rescuing their cultural identity<p>Just after Iraqi forces declared they were closing in on the old city of Mosul, they announced that the so-called Islamic State (IS) had destroyed the 12th-century al-Nuri Mosque and its famed leaning minaret, known as al-Hadbaa (the hunchback). IS-affiliated Twitter accounts condemned the act and, in a statement released by its news agency Aamaq, the group blamed a US airstrike for the destruction – but <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/iconic-grand-al-nuri-mosque-iraq-mosul-blown-170621193402284.html">footage released</a> by the Iraqi military suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>IS’s attack on the mosque, where its leader <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28177848">made his first videoed appearance</a> in 2014, was not unexpected. In fact, IS has systematically been targeting religious, cultural and historic relics (both Islamic and not) since it first took over Mosul. But whereas its previous acts of cultural destruction were announced and promoted, this one was not dressed up in any sort of theological narrative.</p>
<p>Back in 2015, IS started to destroy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/isis-fighters-destroy-ancient-artefacts-mosul-museum-iraq">supposedly idolatrous ancient artefacts</a> at Mosul museum. It targeted religious shrines and tombs, including the Tomb of Jonah in Nineveh, as well as Shia shrines and churches in Northern Iraq, and it did severe damage to the UNESCO world heritage sites at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/05/isis-video-confirms-destruction-at-unesco-world-heritage-site-on-hatra">Hatra</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37992394">Nimrud</a>. The ransackings continued even after IS suffered major defeats and lost territory.</p>
<p>The final fall of Mosul, still forthcoming after a months-long offensive, was meant to put an end to this. Perhaps the prospect of losing the city gave IS an incentive to blow up the mosque: to see victory against them declared from the very same mosque where the “caliphate” was announced would have been a hugely triumphant moment for the Iraqi forces. Blaming the US for the mosque’s destruction, meanwhile, may be a tactical ploy to appeal to its supporters and other Muslims.</p>
<p>But as expressed by the Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, the destruction of the mosque is an attack on Iraqi history and heritage, not religion per se. Unlike the Jonah tomb, for instance, the mosque was not perceived as a sacred religious site in itself. The majority of Iraqis are mourning the minaret as a historic landmark that embodied the history of Iraq in general – and Mosul in particular. </p>
<p>The al-Hadbaa minaret has long been one of the core symbols of Iraqi cultural identity, so much so that the city itself is sometimes referred to by Iraqis as al-Mosul al-Hadbaa. But, for some Iraqis, the mosque and even its minaret were tainted by the announcement of the “caliphate” and the bloodshed that ensued across the country.</p>
<h2>Coming together</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, most Iraqis agree that this sort of destruction cannot be allowed to stand. It is an attack on the historic and cultural heritage of Iraq, an attempt to erase the national identity of both the state and its people – an identity that’s already been fractured and fragmented along sectarian and ethnic lines. </p>
<p>To condemn and mourn these acts collectively is a small step towards healing those fractures, but it’s certainly not enough. What’s needed is a collective effort not just to remember what’s been lost, but to build new bridges across the gaps between Iraq’s different communities, to celebrate and embrace their diversity. Young Iraqis in particular are organising various campaigns to this end – and they deserve attention and support.</p>
<p>For the past two years, social media campaigns have been trying to raise awareness and bring people together around a sense of national identity that defines them as Iraqis above all else. </p>
<p>As Iraq prepares for the first anniversary of the deadly <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/07/baghdad-attack-devastating-scenes-carnage-karada-160704104614046.html">Karada attack</a> in Baghdad which killed more than 200 people, I recall the remarkable sight of people from the south to the north of the country defying sectarianism to show solidarity and sympathy with the victims. And when IS <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/26/isis-destroys-thousands-books-libraries">destroyed Mosul’s central library</a> in 2015, people joined a campaign to donate books. Volunteers have been also running relief campaigns for the refugees and the displaced. </p>
<p>On the anniversary of the 2014 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/21/iraq-hangs-men-convicted-speicher-massacre-shia-tikrit">Speicher massacre</a>, when IS rounded up and murdered hundreds of Iraqi military recruits, <a href="https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/iraqis-pay-tribute-1700-fallen-cadets-3rd-anniversary-speicher-massacre/">hundreds of Iraqis</a> paid tribute to the victims. Only recently, Iraqi civil society groups <a href="https://twitter.com/RashaAlAqeedi/status/877462559351328768">organised a trip to Mosul</a> during Eid, with a convoy set to depart from Baghdad to visit the city, including the university and the Jonah tomb, and activities and performances organised.</p>
<p>Still, however important and optimistic they are, these brave efforts to reclaim Iraq’s cultural and national identity will not succeed fully until the country is free of its corrupt and divided political elite. And only when that deep and abiding problem is solved will IS be completely defeated in Iraq. After all, it is in a climate of weakness and division that IS thrives – and true unity among Iraqis is its worst nightmare.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balsam Mustafa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The destruction of the al-Nuri Mosque and its minaret is a sad blow to Iraqi culture – and a rallying cry too.Balsam Mustafa, PhD Candidate in Modern Languages & Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/800022017-06-23T04:26:15Z2017-06-23T04:26:15ZDestroying Mosul’s Great Mosque: Islamic State’s symbolic war to the end<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175320/original/file-20170623-21202-1fjic2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Great Mosque's famous leaning minaret in 2013. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Faisal Jeber/Wikimedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On June 29 2014 – nearly three years ago to the day – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the pulpit at the Great Mosque of Al-Nuri in Mosul in northern Iraq. He <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-30/isis-declares-islamic-caliphate/5558508">announced the creation of a new Islamic State</a> that stretched across the borders of Iraq and Syria. Declaring himself Caliph Ibrahim, the leader of all Muslims, he implored the faithful from across the world to make the pilgrimage to come and serve.</p>
<p>Yesterday, in the midst of what are likely to be the final stages in the Battle for Mosul, the Islamic State appears to have <a href="http://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/anger-after-800yearold-mosque-is-demolished-by-islamic-state/news-story/d6a71812344255455a7b6bb6132bc135">destroyed the Great Mosque of Al-Nuri</a> and its iconic leaning minaret.</p>
<p>As the Iraqi poet <a href="https://ahmedzaidansite.wordpress.com/about/">Ahmed Zaidan</a> has said, the Great Mosque was not only a significant cultural heritage site for Muslims in general, but it was also regarded as an essential part of the Mosul skyline - a symbol of the city’s long past and diverse communities. The building itself was erected in 1172 by the great Nur Al-Din ibn Zengi (1118-1174), widely regarded as the man who launched the first successful holy war against Western crusaders.</p>
<p>Although there are conflicting reports about who destroyed the mosque – the IS blames American airstrikes – the available footage online suggests the site was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000005181126/evidence-that-isis-blew-up-al-nuri-mosque.html">bombed with explosives from the inside</a>. Such destruction certainly fits with their pattern of the Islamic State’s aggressive <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13527258.2017.1325769">destruction of religious imagery</a>, as we have <a href="https://theconversation.com/erasing-history-why-islamic-state-is-blowing-up-ancient-artefacts-78667">described recently</a>. </p>
<p>It would be cynical and unwise to dismiss the destruction of the Great Mosque as a last desperate effort by the IS, a fit of rage in the face of imminent defeat. From their inception, the IS have been engaged as much in a symbolic war as they have a military one. And as their capacity to hold and defend territory shrinks, this war becomes key to expressing their power and ideology and imploring their adherents to continue the fight.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175319/original/file-20170623-27922-15dzurm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Still from a video showing the destroyed mosque on June 21 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An attack on heritage, an attack on Mosul</h2>
<p>The IS has been involved in the deliberate destruction of sites that are held most dear by local populations. A key reason for this is to discourage the millions of refugees and displaced from returning and re-building their fragile and cosmopolitan communities. </p>
<p>As our ongoing research, which includes interviews with displaced Iraqis from Mosul, is starting to reveal, many <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/explainer/yazidi-people-who-are-they-and-why-are-they-run">Yezidi</a> and Christians have claimed that they will not go back to their traditional homelands. This is in no small part because their sacred sites – their spiritual connection to the place and their heritage – have been so systematically ruptured by the IS’s destruction.</p>
<p>The Great Mosque of Mosul is no different. The people of Mosul – and more broadly of Iraq – were extremely proud of the mosque and its leaning minaret, which appears on the <a href="https://www.banknotes.com/iq95d.htm">10,000 Iraqi dinar banknote</a>. They will lament the destruction of the mosque in much the same way that they continue to mourn the countless archaeological sites and churches that the IS has destroyed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175318/original/file-20170623-29738-j47dbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Great Mosque on Iraq’s 10,000 dinar note.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another key reason to destroy the Great Mosque of Al-Nuri is that it has already yielded them news attention from across the world. By destroying the mosque, the IS are drawing attention to the fact that many in the West might care more about the destruction of a mosque than the horrific human tragedies unfolding every day in Iraq. Such an attack is therefore also an attack on the “Western” ideology that values the preservation of heritage such as the mosque. </p>
<p>Finally, when Mosul is eventually re-taken from the IS it will be the product of a long and complex battle by a combination of Shia, Kurds and what the IS sees as crusaders (Westerners). It would be a disastrous symbol of defeat for the IS if such forces were to take the pulpit in the Grand Mosque and declare victory over the Caliphate. To destroy the mosque is to deprive their enemies of this opportunity. </p>
<p>The destruction of heritage is always deplorable, and forces us to ask how we value the past and what we can learn from it. However, heritage is also about the future - it is a fundamental part of the recovery of societies which have been affected by war and conflict; it is the glue that holds together such fragile and diverse communities. </p>
<p>The destruction of the Great Mosque is not only an attack on the social fabric of Mosul, it is also a deeper attack on the Iraqi people; a symbol of the many challenges that lie ahead as they try to re-build a peaceful and positive future after the horrors of the Islamic State.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan receives funding from the Australian Research Council (DE120100315) and the Australian Department of Defence. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of Defence or Government policy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Antonio Gonzalez Zarandona does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Great Mosque of Mosul - with its iconic leaning minaret - appeared on one of Iraq’s banknotes. Its destruction by the Islamic State is an act of great symbolic importance.Benjamin Isakhan, Associate Professor of Politics and Policy, Deakin UniversityJose Antonio Gonzalez Zarandona, Associate Research Fellow, Heritage Destruction Specialist, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.