tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/mwai-kibaki-38469/articlesMwai Kibaki – The Conversation2023-09-13T13:09:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127102023-09-13T13:09:11Z2023-09-13T13:09:11ZKenyans don’t trust the courts - the main factors behind this trend<p>The international reputation of the Kenyan judiciary is <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/the-bbi-judgment-and-the-invention-of-kenya/">running high</a> following a raft of judicial reforms brought on by the 2010 constitution. The reforms, displays of judicial independence, and largely positive personal experiences might lead one to expect that public trust in the courts has increased. But among the Kenyan public it has not.</p>
<p>High-profile Supreme Court judgments have showcased a newfound judicial independence. The most notable include the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-supreme-court-nullifies-uhuru-kenya-s-re-election-orders-fresh-vote-1372638">nullification</a> of a presidential result in 2017, the rejection of government efforts to force through <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-s-supreme-court-declares-bbi-unconstitutional-3766868">constitutional changes</a> in 2021 and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001467772/supreme-court-gays-and-lesbians-have-a-right-of-association">confirmation</a> in 2023 of the rights of LGBTIQ+ people to form associations. </p>
<p>Personal experience of the courts is also largely positive. In March 2023 I commissioned Trends and Insights For Africa, a market research company based in Nairobi, to add questions on the Kenyan judiciary to a nationally representative face-to-face <a href="https://www.tifaresearch.com/azimio-protests-other-opposition-issues-2023-national-survey-post-post-election-issues/">survey</a>. </p>
<p>It revealed that 18.7% of respondents reported having been involved in a case in a Kenyan court room. Of these, 43.4% rated the experience as very positive, 25.1% as quite positive. Neutral responses made up 11.9%; 6.3% were quite negative; and 11.9% were very negative. Of the overall sample, 12.8% had a positive personal experience of the courts, and only 3.4% a negative one.</p>
<p>Public perceptions of the Kenyan judiciary have been tracked for nearly 20 years. According to 2021 data from the independent research network Afrobarometer, 16.9% of Kenyans had <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-9-data-2023/">no trust</a> in this key institution, up from 11.4% in <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-2-data-2003/">2003</a>. The only time that public trust was clearly lower was in 2008. This followed the 2007 election and post-election crisis, which drew attention to a <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC10308">perceived lack of judicial independence</a>.</p>
<p>More worryingly still, a majority of respondents in my March 2023 poll thought that Supreme Court judges were very often or sometimes bribed (58.1%) or intimidated (59.4%) to give a verdict unsupported by the evidence. There was hardly any distinction between public perceptions of the Supreme Court, High Court and magistrates.</p>
<p>This confidence crisis is a problem because people need to believe the judiciary is acting independently if it is to play its role. For example, the fact that the Kenyan opposition <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf">did not trust the courts</a> in 2007 led them to protest about the election on the streets, rather than bring a petition. It sparked the country’s worst crisis. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">political scientist</a> who has studied Kenya for 20 years. My current research focuses on the critical role of the judiciary, which is relatively understudied. </p>
<h2>What shapes perceptions</h2>
<p>It’s important to try to understand the confidence crisis.</p>
<p>Despite reforms there are still regular reports of judicial bias and <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/chief-justice-koome-cites-corruption-in-case-backlog-110117/">corruption</a>. There are also interactions that <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/ahmednasir-criticises-how-martha-koome-received-president-ruto-in-parliament/6dtt40t">suggest</a> a “cosy relationship” between the judiciary and the political elite. This casts a shadow over the whole judiciary. </p>
<p>Public perception reports must also be considered in context. The year 2003 was a time of great optimism in Kenya. It followed the landslide victory of Mwai Kibaki over the party that had ruled the country since independence. Kenyans were the <a href="http://www.gilanifoundation.com/homepage/eoy/2002_EoY02comment.pdf">most optimistic citizens in the world</a> at the end of 2002. Public confidence in other key institutions – including the president, parliament, electoral commission, police, and army – was higher in 2003 than any subsequent round of the <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/kenya/">Afrobarometer</a>. </p>
<p>Optimism soon turned to pessimism and finally <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf">deadly violence</a> following the disputed election of 2007. A new constitution in 2010 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11103008">failed to provide “quick fixes”</a>. Governance and socio-economic problems persist. </p>
<p>Scholars and the international observers have high regard for the Supreme Court’s 2017 presidential petition ruling and subsequent bold decisions. But public opinion in Kenya is divided. My March 2023 poll asked people whether there was a Supreme Court case that they disagreed with. Ordinary citizens cited exactly those cases that have been internationally lauded: 47.4% referred to the gay rights of association case (freshly concluded in February 2023); 21.2% cited the 2022 presidential petition, 8.6% the 2017 petition, and 5% the 2013 petition. </p>
<p>People’s views on these cases differ depending on their own views and interests, the opinion leaders they listen to, and their expectations of how a court should behave. For example, of the 26.3% of respondents who said they were dissatisfied with the way the Supreme Court handled the 2022 presidential petition, 43.8% said one of the reasons was that the decision was not based on evidence or was biased; 11.3% cited outside interference or coercion and 32.8% bribery. And 18.2% said that they were annoyed because the court didn’t nullify the election. </p>
<p>However, 24% said that they were dissatisfied because the court was rushed or had insufficient time and 10% because the ruling used rude or dismissive language. Those who cited time issues or language as one of the reasons for their dissatisfaction were a minority but they remind us of how public perceptions are informed not only by the substance of rulings, but by how judges behave.</p>
<p>It also means that acts that have attracted public criticism – such as the chief justice and deputy chief justice <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/ahmednasir-criticises-how-martha-koome-received-president-ruto-in-parliament/6dtt40t">lining up alongside politicians</a> to welcome President William Ruto to the opening of parliament in September 2022 – have helped to reinforce popular perceptions of a judiciary that is biased or liable to being bribed or intimidated. </p>
<h2>The role of the media</h2>
<p>High profile and highly divisive cases, such as presidential petitions, receive much traditional media coverage of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JK0GTl4WbI8">proceedings</a> and associated <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/azimio-responds-to-supreme-courts-full-judgment-on-presidential-election-petition-n306468">allegations of injustice</a>. This coverage places the Supreme Court in an almost impossible situation, earning the public ire of either the opposition (for example, the 2022 petition) or the government (for example, the 2023 gay rights association case). </p>
<p>At the same time, an increasing number of Kenyans gain their political news from social media either <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2023.2232160?src=&fbclid=IwAR2l_o889e75LO1rc3gM33RufPbpn69mFglO0yQvKdOdhdWgjd1C-zKbyrA">directly or indirectly</a> by sharing online stories offline. Traditional media are relatively careful about what they say about ongoing cases or judges – lest they be held in contempt of court or be sued for libel. Discussions on social media are not as regulated. It has become commonplace for opinion leaders of different political persuasions to <a href="https://twitter.com/makaumutua/status/1569342163573415936">publicly attack</a> the judiciary. </p>
<p>The allegations range from those likely to have some basis to misinformation. Views in 2023 are likely coloured by the failure of reforms to bring significant socio-economic change, and by a cost-of-living crisis. In this situation, negative information is more likely to resonate. </p>
<p>This interplay of factors helps to explain why public trust in the courts is lower than in 2003 after years of reform and investment, improved judicial independence and largely positive personal experiences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch received funding from the University of Warwick Policy Support Fund. </span></em></p>Kenya’s confidence crisis is a problem because people need to believe the judiciary is acting independently if it is to play its role.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082422023-07-09T11:35:15Z2023-07-09T11:35:15ZKenya at 60: six key moments that shaped post-colonial politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533521/original/file-20230622-8708-1flywg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta waves at a crowd. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harry Benson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya celebrates 60 years of independence this year. As a political scientist who has <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">studied</a> Kenya for the past 20 years, I consider a turning point from each decade that helped to shape the east African country’s post-colonial politics. I haven’t selected elections, assassinations or other moments that have enjoyed much coverage over the years. Instead, I turn to often-forgotten moments that shed light on the country’s key steps forward – and backwards – and the role of agency and institutions.</em></p>
<h2>1964: The Lanet mutiny</h2>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, governments across <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808104534id_/http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/mcgowan_2003jmas_-_african_military_coups_1956-2001-_frequency_trends_and_distribution.pdf">Africa fell</a> to military coups and countercoups. These nations suffered the arbitrary and authoritarian rule of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/ethnic-inequalities-in-kenya/EAFC4455E840815B624147EE930C1C34">military leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya managed to avoid this fate. A regiment based at Lanet in Nakuru did stage an unsuccessful mutiny in 1964. In response, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta – as Kenyan political scholar <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">Musambayi Katumanga</a> has detailed – opted to keep the military small. He relied instead on various police units. </p>
<p>Kenyatta also “gradually altered the military’s ethnic composition”, which, at that time, was disproportionately composed of officers from Kalenjin, Kamba, Samburu and Somali communities. He increased the number of co-ethnic Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest and most economically dominant ethnic group. </p>
<p>These measures helped to ensure the military’s loyalty to the regime. But at a cost. The multiplication of security units undermined control and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">accountabiliy</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy of ethnic recruitment and promotion reinforced a sense of an ethnically biased state. It was a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">strategy copied</a> by Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, after a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/nation-prime/how-ochuka-coup-attempt-changed-kenya-1910656">coup attempt in 1982</a>. Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki, also adopted it after the country’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007/8 post-election crisis</a>.</p>
<h2>1976: The Change the Constitution Movement</h2>
<p>By the mid-1970s, Kenyatta was unwell. To prevent the automatic succession of his vice-president, Moi, a group of prominent Kikuyu politicians attempted to <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress">change the constitution</a>. Their efforts were unsuccessful. Power transferred peacefully to Moi upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the attempt had three important legacies:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the military had once again been kept out of national politics </p></li>
<li><p>the new president was made acutely aware of the insecurity of his position</p></li>
<li><p>a popular sense grew of how a Kikuyu elite felt entitled to rule.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>1980: The crackdown begins</h2>
<p>For the first year or so, Moi largely followed in Kenyatta’s footsteps, or “nyayo” in Kiswahili. He blocked any real opposition but left space for broader political debate. </p>
<p>However, in 1980, Moi’s more authoritarian streak began to show. He banned the Nairobi University Students’ Organisation and deregistered the University Academic Staff Union and Kenya Civil Servants Union. He also ordered ethnicity-based associations to wind up their affairs in the interest of “national unity”. </p>
<p>Authoritarianism came to characterise the 1980s as people were required to follow in Moi’s footsteps. </p>
<h2>1990: Timothy Njoya’s new year speech</h2>
<p>In November 1991, the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/">Paris Club of donors</a>, an informal group of western creditors, suspended US$350 million in aid to Kenya until political reforms were initiated. The following month, a constitutional amendment was rushed through parliament, paving the way for a return to multi-party elections. </p>
<p>This timeline could mistakenly be taken to suggest that it was donor pressure that forced constitutional reform. But there was already substantive pressure for multi-party politics from within Kenya. </p>
<p>A tidal change occurred at the dawn of 1990 when, in a new year speech, theologian Timothy Njoya <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tmmTQgt0iXQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=i+say+to+you+ethnic+politics+kenya+lynch+&ots=u7HbNNpU6Q&sig=Fc0hDJagdL31LFjKxkRkf8E4qkc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=i%20say%20to%20you%20ethnic%20politics%20kenya%20lynch&f=false">speculated</a> on how much longer Kenya would be a one-party state. Opposition elements –- most notably, religious and civil society leaders, and politicians marginalised from the political centre –- became increasingly vocal in their demands for multi-party politics.</p>
<p>It was these domestic demands – together with the threat of suspended aid – that forced Moi’s hand and prompted a return to multi-party politics in the early 1990s. Still, Moi <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">sought to control</a> the transition. </p>
<h2>2005: The constitutional referendum</h2>
<p>In 2002, Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition ousted independence party Kanu in a landslide victory. This prompted a moment of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518447">great optimism</a> in Kenya. </p>
<p>However, divisions soon wracked the coalition as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2005.9627591">reports emerged</a> of corruption scandals and ethnic bias. Promises of constitutional reform were watered down. Popular frustration showed when Kenyans rejected the draft constitution in the 2005 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00020180601035674">referendum</a>.</p>
<p>The referendum and general elections that followed meant that Kenya was in intense campaign period for over two years. This elongated campaign drew attention to frustrated hopes. It also presented the government as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020180601035674">from and for the Kikuyu</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum also increased confidence in the electoral commission. This meant that people paid relatively little attention to developments like Kibaki’s unilateral <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2019.1592326">judicial appointments</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, the referendum fostered a sense that the opposition would win the 2007 election unless it was rigged. Together with a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67654/elections-ke-2007.pdf">problematic election</a> and history of unpunished election-related violence, these factors fuelled Kenya’s greatest post-colonial crisis. More than 1,000 people were killed and almost <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056240903346194">700,000 displaced</a> in violence after the 2007 election.</p>
<h2>2011: A new chief justice</h2>
<p>The 2007/8 crisis paved the way for a new <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2023-03/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_2010.pdf">constitution</a> in 2010. Among other things, it devolved power to 47 new county governments. It also established a new bill of rights and created the supreme court. The latter has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine presidential election petitions, and determine appeals from the court of appeal. It also determines cases that involve interpretation or application of the constitution. </p>
<p>As the highest court in the land, the leadership of the supreme court is critical. It marked a turning point when Willy Mutunga –- a highly respected human rights advocate –- was appointed as the court’s first chief justice. Some criticise Mutunga for having <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2015.1029296">validated</a> Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s election in 2013. However, he also presided over <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/SPECJU/2015/6.html">decisions</a> that protected the devolution of power and the bill of rights. And he oversaw <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/kenyas-democracy-hinges-strong-chief-justice">reforms and judicial learnings</a> that helped to establish a more independent court. Reforms that – together with his successor’s brave leadership – made the supreme court’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenyan-court-scraps-presidential-vote-kenyatta-calls-for-calm-idUSKCN1BC4A5">annulment of the August 2017 election</a> possible.</p>
<p>The lesson from these moments: individuals can make a difference for good or bad, particularly when they help to reshape the institutions that will outlive them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In recent years Gabrielle Lynch has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and University of Warwick. </span></em></p>Jomo Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap Moi set the tone for ethnic and authoritarian politics which Kenya has wrestled to free itself from in recent decades.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063502023-06-15T14:00:34Z2023-06-15T14:00:34ZMama Ngina Kenyatta at 90: the quiet power behind Kenya’s famous political family<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529907/original/file-20230603-15-pe3jy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mama Ngina Kenyatta</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Kenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few witnessed the building of the young Kenyan state from within as did Ngina Kenyatta, the widow of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Mama Ngina, as she is known, will mark her 90th birthday on 24 June 2023. She was by her husband’s side when Kenya won independence 60 years ago and for many turbulent years thereafter. Although Kenyatta was polygamous, it was the younger Mama Ngina who took on the roles of first lady. </p>
<p>Ngina married Jomo Kenyatta in 1952 at the age of 19. That year, Kenyatta was arrested and subsequently <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2012/04/kenya-jomo-kenyatta-sentenced-hard-labor/">jailed</a> on charges of masterminding the anti-colonial Mau Mau uprising. By then, he had spent years abroad (mainly in England), where he embraced anti-colonialist and Pan-African ideas. Back home he was elected president of Kenya African Union, before becoming the front figure of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party that would go on to lead Kenya to independence. </p>
<p>Kenyatta’s marriage to Ngina was his fourth. He had married Grace Wahu in 1920, Edna Clark in 1942 and Grace Wanjiku in 1946. The last marriage had political significance because Ngina was the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/queen-mother-mama-ngina-the-power-behind-uhuru-kenyatta-s-throne-3937204">daughter of a senior chief</a>, Muhoho wa Gatheca, who held an administrative position of great influence. By then, Kenyatta was expanding his political base, so this marriage secured an alliance with an important clan.</p>
<p>Mama Ngina is to be seen in many official photographs of the early days, protectively herding their young children in State House. The first-born was Christine Wambui-Pratt, who is today an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001450285/ku-to-award-uhurus-sister-doctorate">advocate</a> for people living with disability. The second was Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, who became Kenya’s fourth president (2013-2022). The third was Nyokabi Muthama, now a businesswoman and <a href="https://www.thekenyattatrust.org">philanthropist</a>. Muhoho Kenyatta, the reclusive last-born, is reputedly the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/muhoho-the-man-behind-kenyatta-family-business-empire-132182">engine</a> of the Kenyatta family business empire. </p>
<p>Away from family, Mama Ngina was often involved in supporting various <a href="https://theconversation.com/active-citizens-for-better-schooling-what-kenyas-history-can-teach-south-africa-92534">Harambee</a> (community development) projects. Yet very little was known about her and in particular her political influence during this period. </p>
<p>She was, and still is, certainly not uninterested in politics. Though not a frequent public political speaker, she has spoken out in defence of her family. In 2022, she <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/03/mama-ngina-supports-raila-for-the-presidency/">publicly campaigned</a> for Uhuru Kenyatta’s preferred presidential candidate, Raila Odinga. She also sought to <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/04/11/mama-ngina-and-field-marshall-muthonis-locs-sanitising-the-kenyattas/">associate</a> herself with the Mau Mau independence struggle in an apparent attempt to counter popular <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/48250-controversial-mt-kenya-musician-blasts-uhuru-new-hit-song">sentiment</a> against the Kenyattas among the Kikuyu. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mama Ngina Kenyatta (second left) and Jomo Kenyatta (right) host Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, during a visit to Kenya in 1972. (Photo by William Lovelace/Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Kenyatta’s death and after</h2>
<p>The way she handled the news of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/-end-of-an-era-as-mzee-jomo-kenyatta-dies-892138">Kenyatta’s death on 21 August 1978</a> suggests she was preparing her political survival. At that time, jockeying for succession was fierce and the Kenyan political elite was profoundly divided over it. So as the Mzee (“old man”) – as he was called – died, Mama Ngina and his stepsons Peter Magana and Peter Muigai informed their political allies with great discretion.</p>
<p>According to a report by the authoritative Weekly Review news magazine, one of the first to be informed was <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel Arap Moi</a>, then vice-president and constitutionally next in line to act as president. This placed Moi in the lead of the succession battle at a time when some were <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.id=&brand=ucpress">opposed</a> to his automatic succession. Only thereafter was <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mbiyu-koinange-the-politician-british-aptly-nicknamed-newt--466712">Peter Mbiyu Koinange</a>, Kenyatta’s long-time comrade and a prominent minister, informed, along with Kenyatta’s other children.</p>
<p>Mama Ngina took a low profile after the succession. She was <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kenyatta-business-empire-goes-into-expansion-drive-2045420">inheriting</a> a huge <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/rise-and-rise-of-the-kenyatta-family-business-empire-139094">business empire</a> which continued to expand. Today, the holdings include <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/political-families-own-half-of-private-wealth-952330">land</a> as well as shares in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/mama-ngina-listed-top-investor-at-kenya-power-with-2-2-million-shares-864034">companies</a> in banking, real estate, hospitality, mining, insurance, airlines, education, energy, dairy farming, transport and telecommunications. </p>
<p>Her role during the political transition was rewarded with political support by President Moi, according to news reports. </p>
<h2>Protecting “our son”</h2>
<p>In 2013, the matriarch bounced back to the centre of Kenyan politics, the first woman to have been spouse and now mother of a sitting president. That would not have seemed likely when Uhuru Kenyatta was indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/23/kenya-trial-international-criminal-court">crimes against humanity</a>. The charges stemmed from the 2007-2008 post-election violence, in which Uhuru and William Ruto were on opposite sides. With Mama Ngina’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/queen-mother-mama-ngina-the-power-behind-uhuru-kenyatta-s-throne-3944964">financial muscle behind them</a>, the two formed the unlikely alliance that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/3/10/kenyatta-wins-kenyas-presidential-election">swept to power in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>Planning began in April 2011, when Mama Ngina appeared at <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000137547/pre-icc-confirmation-prayer-rallies-united-uhuru-kenyatta-and-william-ruto">rallies</a> where prayers were said for the indicted duo. According to the Daily Nation, Mama Ngina brokered the coalition between the two. She also bankrolled the promotion of “our son” for president in Mount Kenya region, inhabited by her co-ethnics and related tribes.</p>
<p>Uhuru’s ICC case was dropped in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019">2014</a> and Ruto’s in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35965760">2016</a>. They soon fell out. Ngina blamed Ruto for the rift. This in her eyes meant Uhuru was not to blame for breaking his <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/01/16/fear-and-loathing-why-kikuyus-may-end-up-voting-for-ruto-in-2022/">2013 campaign promise</a> to back Ruto after his own term.</p>
<p>Now, for the first time, Mama Ngina has little or no influence over proceedings in State House. What’s more, the Kenyattas are seen as <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2023/01/section-of-kenya-kwanza-senators-accuse-kenyatta-of-sponsoring-azimio-rallies/">anti-government</a> for the first time since independence. </p>
<h2>Mau Mau uneasy legacy</h2>
<p>Mama Ngina recently came to the defence of the Kenyattas, who are <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/gachagua-criticises-kenyattas-over-mau-mau-neglect-land-troubles-4207716">accused</a> of sidelining freedom fighters and their families. The historical <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/217022">grievance</a> is that they did not benefit from post-independence allocations. </p>
<p>Ngina has sought to <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/04/11/mama-ngina-and-field-marshall-muthonis-locs-sanitising-the-kenyattas/">realign herself</a> with the Mau Mau. She has claimed that <a href="https://hardtalkkenyan.wordpress.com/2023/04/21/field-marshal-muthoni-wa-kirima-and-i-were-the-true-mau-mau-freedom-fighters-founding-first-lady-mama-ngina-kenyatta/">she was among the Mau Mau women fighters</a>. There is no archival evidence to support this, and her husband denounced the movement before independence. The group remained banned under his and the next presidency. It was finally <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2003-09-01-kenya-lifts-ban-on-mau/">lifted</a> in 2003.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that in an election campaign heavy with economic empowerment promises, this claim was her way of identifying with the marginalised, on behalf of the Kenyattas’ candidate. She can be counted on to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-02-04-ive-paid-all-taxes-stop-tarnishing-my-family-name-mama-ngina-tells-ruto-allies/">defend</a> the family name, in good times and bad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Angelo receives funding from the Austrian Science Fund. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catheline Bosibori consults to Africa politicum. she has previously received funding from KAAD . She is affiliated with The Adam smith Fellowship, Mercatus centre USA.</span></em></p>You can count on Mama Ngina Kenyattta to defend the family name, in good times and bad.Anaïs Angelo, Elise Richter Fellow, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Universität WienCatheline Bosibori N, Adam Smith Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050052023-05-16T10:59:38Z2023-05-16T10:59:38ZKenya’s political elites switch parties with every election – how this fuels violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524923/original/file-20230508-173480-qsf6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters at the launch of the Jubilee Party manifesto in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jubilee-party-supporters-of-kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-news-photo/801424352?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Barely seven months after leaving office, Kenya’s former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kanini-kega-led-jubilee-faction-kicks-out-uhuru-as-party-leader--4220148">is battling</a> to keep together the party that won him a second term and a majority in parliament in 2017. His <a href="https://web.facebook.com/TheJubileeParty/?_rdc=1&_rdr">Jubilee Party</a> performed dismally in the 2022 election. Only 27 out of 290 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/mps">members of the national assembly</a>, four out of 47 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-senate/senators">senators</a> and one county governor out of 47 were elected on its ticket. This isn’t surprising in Kenya where political elites switch parties and coalitions with every election. No political party or coalition has ruled for more than one term since the opposition deposed the independence movement, KANU, in 2002. Gilbert Khadiagala, a political scientist who has researched <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364268431_Coalition_politics_in_Kenya_Superficial_assemblages_and_momentary_vehicles_to_attain_power">the fluidity of Kenya’s political coalitions</a>, explains the impact of this.</em></p>
<h2>What is the background of Kenya’s fluid political landscape?</h2>
<p>The onset of the multiparty era in the early 1990s <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Multi-Party+Politics+in+Kenya">brought</a> a new phase of complex political coalitions and alliances. They were competing against the previously dominant political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Typical of Africa’s post-colonial dominant parties, KANU governed for more than two decades through authoritarian methods. Under presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002), KANU co-opted opposition figures into an elaborate system of patronage and coerced critics who didn’t toe the party line. </p>
<p>The coalitions that emerged were based primarily on ethnic and regional affiliations – they were overwhelmingly elite-based. The first was the Forum for the Restoration Democracy (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Forum-for-the-Restoration-of-Democracy">FORD</a>). However, barely a year into its existence, FORD broke into two major factions – FORD Kenya and FORD Asili – in August 1992. Further splits followed. </p>
<p>The dominant coalitions that participated in the August 2022 elections – the Kenya Kwanza alliance (led by William Ruto) and the Azimio alliance (led by Raila Odinga) – comprise many smaller parties. They are products of previous failed attempts at alliance building.</p>
<p>In 30 years of competitive politics, coalitions were expected to gradually stabilise into coherent political parties with national reach and resonance. Instead, political coalitions in Kenya have not advanced beyond their narrow bases. They remain fundamentally ethnic and regional machines that are frequently scrambled together on the eve of elections to win power. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3497247/Political_movements_and_coalition_politics_in_Kenya_entrenching_ethnicity">studied</a> Kenya’s politics for 30 years. It’s my view that Kenyan coalitions that rise and fall with every election do not provide the foundation for steady and enduring party systems. These coalitions postpone the evolution of national parties that would lend some predictability and stability to political competition.</p>
<p>Parties should broadly reflect – and manage – societal differences. In Germany, for instance, parties have come together to overcome certain historical differences by calling on shared interests. Germany’s coalition governments are largely based on well-established political parties, not conglomerations concocted before elections as in Kenya. And <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/nejo.12310">political parties negotiate</a> these governing coalitions after elections, not before.</p>
<p>Throughout Africa, where ethnic and regional divisions are paramount, political mobilisations deepen societal differences. Electoral violence occurs because winning coalitions control all the national resources. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/victors-go-spoils-how-winner-takes-all-politics-undermine-democracy-sierra-leone">winner-takes-all</a> political systems of countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone face a related problem: they have very small independent private sectors. So winners are tempted to use political power to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-08_Issue-2/nsia-pepra_e.pdf">grab</a> national resources. </p>
<h2>What are the main weaknesses of fluid political coalitions?</h2>
<p>They cause instability in the country. Unstable coalitions contribute to electoral violence as losing coalitions vent their grievances. Following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/12/kenyan-protests-against-kenyatta-election-victory-turn-deadly">violent aftermath</a> of the 2017 Kenyan elections, Odinga’s coalition at the time, the National Super Alliance (NASA), threatened to agitate for the secession of his support base from Kenya. </p>
<p>In 2002, there was a brief phase of optimism for an enduring coalition. The National Rainbow Alliance (NARC), led by Mwai Kibaki, was a grouping of the leading ethnic groups ranged against Moi’s chosen successor, Kenyatta. But it ended in <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">civil conflict</a> in 2007-2008 after Kibaki marginalised key allies largely on ethnic and regional lines. </p>
<p>The Government of National Unity <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/LS_Kenya_Powersharing_FINAL.pdf">crafted</a> by international actors in 2008 became an uneasy and unwieldy coalition. Its members decamped to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-government-of-national-unity-about-to-collapse">new coalitions</a> in the next elections. </p>
<p>Subsequent political alliances have reproduced the conditions for anxiety and chaos after every election. Despite the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a> giving more power to Kenya’s 47 counties, political elites remain fixated on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14662043.2015.1089006?needAccess=true&role=button">winning presidential elections</a> to gain power at the centre. </p>
<p>The unstable coalitions also account for widespread corruption. Winning coalitions <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-run-for-office-in-kenya-heres-how-much-itll-cost-you-183683">expend enormous resources</a> to fortify their power. To do this they have to loot state resources. </p>
<h2>What are the strengths of these loose coalitions?</h2>
<p>In societies where ethnic groups coincide with regions, coalitions are one of the means of organising competitive politics. The loose coalitions enable leaders who neither share policies nor vision to temporarily accommodate each other. This creates a semblance of national unity. The fluid coalitions are, therefore, essential in such political landscapes until national cohesion and coherence are achieved. </p>
<p>When the search for presidential power ceases to be politically relevant and salient, Kenya’s politics will be normalised. Transforming coalitions into solid parties may take time. But it’s the only way out of the prevailing political stalemate. </p>
<h2>What adjustments should be made?</h2>
<p>Kenyans do share basic bread-and-butter interests. When those interests are highlighted – instead of ethnic and regional affiliations – political parties with national outreach could emerge. </p>
<p>It’s elites who emphasise cultural and ethnic differences between regions. They have a large stake in the stalemate continuing, instead of building institutionalised parties. The puzzle for Kenya is how to transform ethnic diversities and identities into the foundations for predictable and organised politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fluidity of the country’s short-lived coalitions is a major cause of instability in Kenya.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990102023-02-08T14:28:18Z2023-02-08T14:28:18ZKenya’s president wants taxes to replace foreign debt – seven ways to get there<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507825/original/file-20230202-21-1mdptm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are fears that Kenya's debt has been funding mostly government salaries.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyas-cabinet-secretary-for-national-treasury-henry-rotich-news-photo/974392922?phrase=national%20treasury%20kenya&adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the run-up to Kenya’s 2022 polls, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THIygUIpS9w">economic issues</a>, particularly public debt and joblessness, took centre stage. The Kenya Kwanza team led by William Ruto suggested that Kenya had over-borrowed, a habit they pledged to stop. Ruto’s rivals <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/uhuru-defends-jubilee-s-sh6-7-trillion-debt-spree-3835802">defended</a> the debt, insisting investment in infrastructure would spur economic growth. </p>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://www.treasury.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Medium-Term-Debt-Management-Strategy-2023.pdf#page=24">nominal debt</a> stood at KSh9.14 trillion or US$74.1 billion by the end of December 2022. That accounted for 67% of the GDP. More than half of the debt, 51% (US$37.87 billion) was owed to foreign entities. A debt limit of no more than 64% of the national GDP is <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/509771468337915456/pdf/WPS5391.pdf">recommended</a> for developing countries such as Kenya.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-breached-its-public-debt-ceiling-how-it-got-there-and-what-that-means-190006">Kenya has breached its public debt ceiling – how it got there and what that means</a>
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<p>Global institutions like the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-19/imf-approves-447-million-for-kenya-to-address-debt-reforms?leadSource=uverify%20wall">International Monetary Fund</a> and the World Bank are concerned about Kenya’s debt sustainability. </p>
<p>Aside from the sheer amount being borrowed, there are fears that the debt has been funding <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/state-uses-sh162bn-loan-illegally-on-salaries-utilities-3950530">recurrent expenditure</a>, mostly government salaries. It’s true, though, that big projects like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mombasa-port-how-kenyas-auditor-general-misread-chinas-standard-gauge-railway-contracts-182610">standard gauge railway</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nairobis-new-expressway-may-ease-traffic-woes-but-mostly-for-the-wealthy-170164">expressway</a> have been partly funded by debt.</p>
<p>Debt politics has further been fuelled by the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-road-colonialism-chinese-characteristics">narrative</a> that by saddling Africa with debt, China is able to call the shots on trade, investment and even geopolitical issues. </p>
<p>Ruto is now in power and seems determined to reduce public debt. The government still has to rely on domestic and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/imf-approves-disbursement-44739-million-%20kenya-2022-12-20/">foreign</a> borrowing, but Ruto wants to reduce it. He intends to do that by <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/09/30/kenya-president-ruto-wants-to-reform-tax-system-to-reduce-inequality//">collecting more taxes</a> and using <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001460511/ruto-talks-tough-on-debt-eyes-pensioners-savings-to-fund-projects">national savings</a> to pay for what the country needs. </p>
<p>The Kenya Revenue Authority has been given new <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/president-ruto-s-tax-targets-leave-kra-in-a-pot-4077264">revenue targets</a> – US$10 billion more to raise in one year, an almost 50% increase. It is expected to double current collections in five years to US$48 billion by 2027, an election year.</p>
<p>The targets seem too ambitious under the current socio-economic circumstances. In trying to achieve the target, the formal sector is likely to be the hardest hit as its revenues are public and hard to hide. Higher taxes could depress demand too, leading to lower tax revenues and job losses. </p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>But increased tax collections could benefit everyone if the taxes are put to good use. Here are seven ways Ruto’s government can raise tax collection and cut reliance on foreign debt:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Focus on economic growth</strong> – Tax is charged on income or profit. To meet the target, Ruto should focus on accelerating economic growth. That is how former president Mwai Kibaki – who raised GDP growth to 7% – managed to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000049257/president-kibaki-s-economic-legacy">triple</a> tax revenues, from US$2 billion in 2002 to US$6 billion by 2011. </p>
<p>Of late, economic growth has been lower than expected, and is <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries-east-africa-kenya/kenya-economic-outlook">projected</a> to slow from 5.9% in 2022 to 5.7% in 2023. </p>
<p>The economy grows when we invest or consume more. Ruto should make Kenya a more investment-friendly country by looking at business regulations and laws.
Higher taxes eat into investors’ profits and could discourage investment. Kenyan entrepreneurs should be able to start businesses without worrying about the taxman <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kra-in-fresh-bid-to-shut-down-keroche-breweries-3885398">closing</a> their premises. </p>
<p>What encourages economic growth is offering quality goods and services that are globally competitive. The economy should reward innovators and those who go the extra mile. Providing services like roads, sewers, power and security will attract investors. Giving citizens confidence creates demand and economic growth. </p>
<p>Once the economy grows, tax revenue grows, whether it’s value added tax or income tax. So, before setting a tax revenue target, Kenya should start with an economic growth target like the 10% rate envisaged in Kibaki’s <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/">Vision 2030</a>. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Choose optimal tax rates</strong> – The government should pick tax rates that yield maximum tax revenue. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/tax/here-is-everything-you-want-to-know-about-laffer-curve-and-tax/tomorrowmakersshow/51098997.cms">Theory</a> has it that high tax rates can produce lower tax revenues. High tax rates could lead to inflation as entrepreneurs load the extra charge onto prices. That could lead to lower demand for goods and services, and depress tax revenues.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Share the burden</strong> – Have more people pay taxes. That includes the informal sector. If citizens can see how taxes are working for them, they will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-study-shows-text-messages-can-boost-tax-compliance-heres-what-worked-177522">encouraged</a> to pay. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Eliminate tax exemptions</strong> – There is no need for tax exemptions for investors or firms just because they can lobby the government. Progressive tax rates (high rates for top earners and low ones for smaller incomes) can do all the magic. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Address corruption</strong> – About a third of Kenya’s budget is lost through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-corruption-idUSKCN0WC1H8">corruption</a>, and former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/president-kenyatta-says-over-ksh-2-billion-is-stolen-from-govt-daily-4563455">alluded</a> to this. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Boost national savings</strong> – Higher savings would reduce interest rates on treasury bonds and bills. Since banks and other institutions would be awash with cash, the government would not need to raise rates to attract investment in government paper. Savings would make credit available to the private sector too, leading to lower interest rates and more borrowing, which is an economic stimulus. The national savings level for <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/business/kenya/2021-07-25-kenyans-saving-culture-poorest-in-east-africa--survey/">Kenya</a> is currently low. The government should craft a <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/articles/how-can-policymakers-raise-household-saving">policy</a> to help boost savings among households.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Cede roles to philanthropy</strong> – Many services being provided by the government could be ceded to philanthropists. Examples include mission hospitals and schools. That would reduce the need for tax revenues. The government should come up with an incentive framework for philanthropists. Additionally, some services currently offered by the government can be offered through the private sector more cheaply and efficiently. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Collecting more tax should be coupled with prudent government spending. That has political implications; it could lead to <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/sh300bn-budget-cuts-await-css-3967308">job losses</a> in the public sector, but create efficiency – which is good for the economy in the long run.</p>
<p><em>Since the article was first published, data on Kenya’s debt statistics in the second paragraph has been updated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>XN Iraki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>William Ruto is determined to reduce public debt by collecting more taxes to pay for what the country needs.XN Iraki, Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1943502022-11-11T14:37:28Z2022-11-11T14:37:28ZPresidential term limits will be hard to scrap in Kenya – here’s what it would take<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494625/original/file-20221110-26-6ww6p8.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President William Ruto inspects a guard of honour in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A member of parliament in Kenyan president William Ruto’s governing coalition created a firestorm by suggesting that there was a plan to remove presidential term limits in the country. </p>
<p>Kenya’s constitution sets a <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/310-142-term-of-office-of-president">two-term presidential limit</a>. </p>
<p>The extent of support for the plan within the president’s party, the United Democratic Alliance, is not clear. In early November 2022, the member of parliament, Salah Yakub, mentioned only that there had been “closed-door discussions” on it. </p>
<p>Yakub is a <a href="https://nairobinews.nation.africa/quick-facts-about-fafi-mp-salah-yakub-who-wants-to-scrap-presidential-term-limits/">first-time member of parliament</a>. His statement drew <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/81461-uda-issues-statement-over-extending-rutos-term-limit">public rebuke</a> from senior lawmakers aligned to the president’s party. This appears to indicate that Yakub is neither part of the president’s inner circle nor a policy stalwart within the party. It’s possible that his proposal is an ambitious effort to improve his standing within the party.</p>
<p>The United Democratic Alliance distanced itself from Yakub’s statement on the day it was reported.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1589910785584955392"}"></div></p>
<p>If, however, the idea was ever realised, it would mean that Ruto, who is 55 years old, could potentially seek re-election for three additional terms. His main political adversary, <a href="https://theconversation.com/odinga-is-running-his-fifth-presidential-race-why-the-outcome-means-so-much-for-kenya-180605">Raila Odinga</a> of the Orange Democratic Movement party, would effectively be prevented from ever running for president again – he is 77.</p>
<p>Kenya’s term limit was introduced before the 1992 elections and retained in the country’s 2010 constitution. The country is still considered a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/15/world/africa/kenya-election-william-ruto.html">beacon of democracy</a> in a region pervaded by dysfunctional and non-democratic regimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/fafi-mp-salah-yakub-wants-presidential-term-limit-removed-age-reduced-to-75-n309014">Yakub’s view</a> is that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>if a president is doing a good job, then he or she should not be limited by terms.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This mis-states the function of term limits. </p>
<p>They’re not designed to discourage poor performance. The Kenyan constitution provides other ways of dealing with presidents who engage in gross misconduct. This includes <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/313-145-removal-of-president-by-impeachment">impeachment</a>. </p>
<p>The purpose of term limits is to minimise corruption and abuse of office, open the government to new people and ideas, and infuse the government with more innovative and creative ways to solve national problems. </p>
<p>Most importantly, term limits reinvigorate the country’s democracy and curb the potential for monopoly. They protect the democratic system from turning into a de facto dictatorship, and prevent the incumbent from becoming a president-for-life. </p>
<p>Term limits are especially important in a country such as Kenya where most citizens still believe that an incumbent administration will favour the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-kibaki-news-idUSGOR34261320071223">president’s ethnic group</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately for Kenya and its democracy, it will be difficult for any government to get rid of term limits. </p>
<p>The constitution provides <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/160-chapter-sixteen-amendment-of-this-constitution/424-255-amendment-of-this-constitution">complex mechanisms</a> for amending certain fundamental provisions, including the term limit for presidents. One of the requirements is that the proposal would have to be approved by Kenyans in a referendum. Voters are <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2019/08/22/bbi-and-the-referendum-another-false-start/">unlikely to accept</a> any efforts to interfere with what is a robust and effectively functioning constitutional system.</p>
<h2>What stands in the way of changing term limits</h2>
<p>Kenya’s constitution sets down the process for amending its provisions. Changing the president’s term requires:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>securing the votes of two-thirds of both houses of parliament – the senate and national assembly</p></li>
<li><p>and the support of a simple majority of the citizens of Kenya voting in a referendum.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These provisions show that the drafters of the 2010 constitution were aware of the importance of constitutional stability and predictability. They were also alive to the value of certain provisions in the proper and effective functioning of the country’s democratic institutions, and the rule of law. </p>
<p>This explains why the drafters adopted more stringent mechanisms for amending democracy-enhancing provisions, which, apart from the presidential term, include those protecting judicial independence and those protecting fundamental freedoms as set out under the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms">bill of rights</a>.</p>
<p>The conditions for securing changes to the constitution are designed to allow Kenyans to participate fully in amendments that could radically alter the nature of their democratic governance architecture.</p>
<p>The 2010 constitution was expected to provide more peaceful mechanisms for dealing with election-related disagreements. A dispute over the presidential results following the 2007 election led to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse">widespread violence</a> that killed more than 1,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. After elections in 2013, 2017 and 2022, Kenyans made use of constitutional mechanisms to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/5/odinga-accepts-but-disagrees-wi-court-decision-on-kenya-election">peacefully resolve</a> related disputes. Thus, Kenyans have gradually come to accept and respect the rule of law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It’s not likely that a constitutional amendment to change the presidential term would garner the two-thirds majority in parliament. </p>
<p>First, the ruling party doesn’t hold a two-thirds majority in either house and would need the support of the opposition. The opposition is not likely to grant it, considering the amendment could significantly enhance the president’s ability to remain in power for more than two terms. </p>
<p>Second, Kenyans would probably see the amendment as a naked power grab and a danger to their constitutional order. They could punish the proposal’s supporters during future elections. </p>
<p>Third, the complex and prolonged process involved in amending the constitution could derail Ruto’s policy agenda and reduce his re-election prospects. </p>
<h2>Low chances of success</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that politicians have proposed amendments to presidential term limits. It came up when former president Mwai Kibaki wound up his term of office in 2012. It was inferred in the failed <a href="https://www.bbi.go.ke/">2020 effort</a> to amend the constitution. There were also those who thought that at 61, former president Uhuru Kenyatta was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/05/atwoli-says-uhuru-just-going-on-leave-hes-young-expect-him-back/">too young</a> to leave office in 2022. </p>
<p>None of these efforts moved beyond politicians’ wishes. Opportunistic constitutional changes are unlikely to succeed, given the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60941860">scrutiny from the courts</a> and Kenya’s robust civil society. </p>
<p>In my view, the main party in the ruling coalition should have issued a much stronger statement than it did against the suggestion to increase the president’s term limit. It should have condemned the effort as undemocratic, and designed to weaken Kenya’s relatively robust democratic institutions and the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku receives funding from Weber State University.</span></em></p>The purpose of term limits is to minimise corruption and open the government to new ideas that could solve national problems.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1892582022-09-07T15:17:30Z2022-09-07T15:17:30ZKenya’s Lamu Port was meant to deliver great things. But, as the story of local fishermen shows, it hasn’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480808/original/file-20220824-16-gtivzu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A container ship docks at the Lamu Port in Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dihoff Mukoto/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly two decades, successive Kenyan governments have <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/">promoted</a> mega infrastructure projects as a pathway to development. The Lamu Port has been one of them. </p>
<p>In 2012, then president Mwai Kibaki – at the inauguration ceremony for a transport corridor that stretches from the Lamu Port to South Sudan and Ethiopia, and known as <a href="https://www.lapsset.go.ke/">Lapsset</a> – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17231889">stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have no doubt that this day will go down in history as one of the defining moments – when we made a major stride to connect our people to the many socio-economic opportunities that lie ahead.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24694452.2022.2062292">my research shows</a>, the reality of these mega projects is more complex than state officials acknowledge. </p>
<p>Instead of bringing development, a better society and a happier life, mega infrastructures result in hardship, especially for vulnerable, historically marginalised groups of people. This is vividly illustrated by Lamu’s fishermen. </p>
<p>The story of the fishermen provides a good lens through which to understand how vulnerable communities are affected by mega infrastructure projects. In Lamu, 70% of the local population depends on <a href="https://www.banktrack.org/download/the_lamu_county_biocultural_community_protocol/lamucountybcp2018.pdf">artisanal fishing</a>. This is characterised by small-scale, low-cost and low-technology fishing practices.</p>
<p>In my research, I conducted interviews with representatives of the Lapsset Corridor Development Authority, officials of the Kenya Ports Authority and local government, civil society groups and key local informants. I also held interviews and informal conversations with Lamu’s fishermen while I observed and participated in boat maintenance, fishing and social gatherings. </p>
<p>The fishermen’s experiences illustrate how communities can challenge the way big infrastructure projects are done. The <a href="https://www.savelamu.org/">Save Lamu</a> alliance, comprising civil society groups that focus on human rights, took the Kenyan government to court in 2014 over the port construction. </p>
<p>Through <a href="https://www.banktrack.org/download/the_lamu_county_biocultural_community_protocol/lamucountybcp2018.pdf">community-based research and mobilisation</a>, the alliance sought to demonstrate how historically vulnerable groups of people, such as artisanal fishermen, are deliberately excluded from state development plans. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-mega-railway-project-leaves-society-more-unequal-than-before-170969">Kenya’s mega-railway project leaves society more unequal than before</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Lamu’s fishermen</h2>
<p>The construction of the Lamu Port displaced fishermen from their traditional onshore fishing grounds in Manda Bay. This is located at the southern corner of the Lamu Archipelago on Kenya’s coast. It’s a deep and sheltered bay with a wide, navigable entrance channel.</p>
<p>The port’s construction began in 2012 and is expected to hold 32 berths. So far, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2022-06-21-phase-1-of-lamu-port-complete-as-second-third-berths-opened/">three berths</a> have been completed. They have claimed five square kilometres of Manda Bay. The first berth <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/2021/05/20/president-kenyatta-inaugurates-first-berth-of-new-32-berth-lamu-port/">began operating</a> in May 2021.</p>
<p>The port construction works – including reclaiming land from the sea, and digging and dredging – destroyed coral reefs and mangroves that are main fish breeding grounds. The works also polluted these breeding grounds by bringing up dirt and sand. This made the area <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24694452.2022.2062292">unsuitable for fishing</a>. </p>
<p>Fishing activities are entirely undertaken close to the shore in Manda Bay. There are fishing grounds further offshore, but local fishermen <a href="https://aquadocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/7347/ktf0290.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">lack appropriate fishing gear</a> to explore deep-sea areas. As a result, Lamu’s fishermen – estimated to be between 4,700 and 7,000 individuals – are witnessing a shrinking operational space for their livelihoods. </p>
<h2>Resistance to unsustainable corridor development</h2>
<p>These drastic effects on fishermen – and concerns about more negative impacts on the environment in the future – led to community mobilisation in Lamu. </p>
<p>In 2014, Save Lamu submitted a <a href="https://wagingnonviolence.org/2021/06/kenyans-lapsset-save-lamu/">court case</a> against the Lapsset Corridor Development Authority for not considering how the project was going to affect local people’s livelihoods. </p>
<p>Four years later, in an unprecedented ruling, Save Lamu won this legal battle against the national government. </p>
<p>A three-judge bench <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/kenya-court-declares-construction-of-lamu-port-violates-indigenous-communitys-right-to-information-healthy-environment-culture-orders-compensation/">ruled</a> that the construction of Lamu Port violated the rights to public participation, public information, a clean and healthy environment, and culture. </p>
<p>The court also found that the local county government of Lamu wasn’t involved in the planning and implementation of the port. </p>
<p>Regarding artisanal fishermen’s livelihoods, the judges ordered the government to recognise fishing rights as amounting to property, and pay US$170 million in compensation to 4,700 fishermen displaced by the port construction. </p>
<p>Kenya’s civil society celebrated the ruling as a historic win for human rights. But the national government immediately appealed it. </p>
<h2>Local versus national</h2>
<p>The port’s construction <a href="https://naturaljustice.org/one-year-after-landmark-judgment-on-lamu-port-violations-construction-continues-unabated/">continues unabated</a>. </p>
<p>The fishermen have <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/payment-sh1-7bn-for-lamu-fishermen-displaced-by-port-3413984">not been compensated</a> for lost livelihoods. This follows an ongoing disagreement between the national government, Lamu’s local government, Save Lamu and representatives of Lamu fishermen on how many individuals should receive this compensation, and how it should be spent. </p>
<p>The central government <a href="https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/lapsset-compensate-lamu-fishermen-capacity-building/">prefers state–controlled development</a> of the local fishing industry. This would include state-supervised acquisition of boats and fishing gear for deep-sea fishing. </p>
<p>The government has proposed development schemes that would provide the necessary equipment to clusters of 10 fishermen. This, it says, would address the long-existing problem of overfishing and enable fishermen to exploit deep-sea resources. This position is supported by Save Lamu, which advocates for long-term sustainability and fishing cooperatives. </p>
<p>Fishermen’s representatives, however, have rejected these proposals. They say fishermen lack access to the infrastructure to repair or maintain new equipment provided by the central government. Instead, they prefer to use boats that can be built and maintained locally. They also deeply mistrust the central government to provide any meaningful assistance. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/TNrjLhQvLpc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>After years of dispute, in May 2022 the Lamu County commissioner Irungu Macharia <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNrjLhQvLpc&feature=youtu.be">assured</a> Lamu fishermen of their compensation. It’s still not clear when this will begin. </p>
<h2>Lessons about infrastructure development</h2>
<p>The dynamics of infrastructure development in Lamu demonstrate how mega projects don’t result in the prosperity promised by the central government. Instead, they become implicated in national and local politics, and conflicts over different preferences for “development”. </p>
<p>In such contexts, the most vulnerable people whose livelihoods are directly affected by these developments suffer the most. </p>
<p>Even if civil society is successful in representing their interests, it doesn’t result in any meaningful changes. </p>
<p>These groups are not assisted to adapt to changing socio-economic circumstances brought by mega infrastructure. Big projects entrench existing inequalities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gediminas Lesutis receives funding from Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Individual Fellowship (Project ID: 101023118).</span></em></p>Mega infrastructure projects entrench existing inequalities when they ignore the economic realities of vulnerable groups.Gediminas Lesutis, Marie Curie Fellow, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884782022-08-10T09:16:04Z2022-08-10T09:16:04ZKenya’s election: institutional safeguards are still a work in progress<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478491/original/file-20220810-23-x8t51l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GettyImages</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has held its seventh national election since the reintroduction of multiparty competition in the early 1990s. Elections in the country are never dull affairs. They are always contested by ever-shifting and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2013.871182?casa_token=P4HRefgqCOQAAAAA%3AW1PjZtyeRQF2mfznxTFumZGxTmGgLAMaiw_XVRORdVsqLcVl9mjmq1pXh6WeXDujQ0Osww5HUOtx">unstable political alliances</a> that employ vibrant campaigns to sway both <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414015617963?casa_token=TW5beTU_ragAAAAA%3AG4hqTD-tlANh15YR6XG9-FYEy2GDYzc0IlrVbLU2MmWPKXl86q5dRxmi0ATYEbFdkBVVBBmeevcm">core and swing voters</a>. This happens right up to election day. </p>
<p>The 2022 race <a href="https://twitter.com/TifaResearch/status/1552933072567418884">proved no exception</a>.</p>
<p>The election landscape has had many ups and downs resulting from the country’s evolving institutional dynamics since the 2007-08 election, which triggered unprecedented post-electoral violence. These dynamics are driven in particular by the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010. Many of its provisions regarding the bodies responsible for managing the election and adjudicating any disputes continue to underscore many opportunities – as well as challenges – Kenya faces with democratic deepening.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/abs/political-economy-of-reforms-in-kenya-the-post2007-election-violence-and-a-new-constitution/23A02E870AEEE6DA780F5DB43810BA72">constitutional reform process</a> itself was enacted on the heels of a contested result in the December 2007 election between then-president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. Odinga <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802058435?casa_token=gLkAc7MefboAAAAA%3A4GbaNF5_HDzU19X4ZOjI3PjC2HY8QWjxbyfmHmcBhFmUDlHlmNxQHvJT4fZbDCASEdmqIrJug57k">cried foul</a> on Kibaki’s certified victory, resulting in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802095536">post-election clashes</a>. More than 1,000 civilians were killed and upwards of 700,000 displaced. </p>
<p>The fighting and ensuing political stalemate ended in February 2008 with the formation of a power-sharing Government of National Unity. It included Kibaki, Odinga and their coalitions.</p>
<p>Included in a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28167/chapter-abstract/213005469?redirectedFrom=fulltext">reform package</a> under this mediation, the government pursued constitutional revision. Passed by popular referendum in 2010, the constitution provides two relevant groupings of institutional reforms. These were designed to improve and streamline the electoral process to prevent another 2007-style debacle. </p>
<p>As I argue in this article, the results have been mixed. Kenya is not unlike any other country where democratic deepening requires a “two-steps forward, one-step back” outlook. </p>
<h2>A new electoral commission</h2>
<p>The 2010 constitution overhauled the institution responsible for managing the vote and certifying the outcome. A new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission replaced the Electoral Commission of Kenya. It was responsible in 2007 for creating anxiety about the manner of tabulation and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531050802058435?casa_token=gLkAc7MefboAAAAA%3A4GbaNF5_HDzU19X4ZOjI3PjC2HY8QWjxbyfmHmcBhFmUDlHlmNxQHvJT4fZbDCASEdmqIrJug57k">announcement results</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/171-chapter-seven-representation-of-the-people/part-2-independent-electoral-and-boundaries-commission-and-delimitation-of-electoral-units/255-88-independent-electoral-and-boundaries-commission">constitution</a> and <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/electionlaws/?Electoral_Acts">subsequent legislation</a> improved managerial oversight and operations by specifying that the new electoral commission’s appointment of commissioners must be non-partisan. The institution is also empowered to regulate political party activities and implement procedures to improve voter registration and voting procedures. </p>
<p>Most critically, it is charged with the tabulation, transmission and certification of results.</p>
<p>The ability of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to oversee a robust election under the new constitution has been undermined by a number of what seem to be errors. Some were unforced, some forced. Some were of their own doing and some not. </p>
<p>For example, in 2013 and 2017 the commission was beset by scandals <a href="https://africog.org/the-dark-business-of-election-2017/">over the tendering processes</a> of sensitive election materials and technologies. These are often procured from suppliers abroad.</p>
<p>Some of these actions probably arise from compressed timelines and uncertain budgets. But others imply improper actions by commission staff and political agents trying to influence it. </p>
<p>The commission has turned to new technologies to improve the voting and tabulation of results. These include the introduction of biometric voter registration and the Kenya Integrated Election Management System. In 2013, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/512744">the biometric system failed</a>. This was due to the inability of laptops and fingerprint scanners to work properly or receive power at many polling stations. </p>
<p>The election management system is probably the most controversial and consequential aspect of the commission’s reliance on technology. It was designed to improve the transmission of results from polling stations to the commission’s headquarters. But many kits (or some would argue the whole system) failed in 2013 and 2017. This was as a result of intentional or unintentional user “error”, network connectivity problems, cyber-hacking, or <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1594072">some combination of the above</a>. </p>
<p>The commission improved transparency in 2022 by demonstrating to the public <a href="https://twitter.com/iebckenya/status/1534887400605995008">how the results transmission works</a> and performing a pre-election nation-wide field-test of the management system. It also encouraged media and civil society to conduct their own <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/217962/kenya-will-parallel-tallying-of-results-ensure-transparency-in-august-poll/">“parallel” tallies</a>.</p>
<h2>The Supreme Court</h2>
<p>The second constitutional reform involved the dispute mechanisms available to contest results. As the thinking went, Odinga and his supporters took to the streets in 2007-08 because they did not see credible legal avenues available, given a corrupt and sclerotic judiciary stacked by Kibaki’s allies.</p>
<p>In response, the 2010 constitution provided for numerous reforms to the judicial branch. It specifically empowers a Supreme Court to hear and be the final arbiter on all electoral petitions. Odinga used this path because of documented irregularities in 2013 and 2017.</p>
<p>In 2013, the court heard his petition but ruled in favour of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. It certified Uhuru Kenyatta’s first-round victory.</p>
<p>Despite all the controversies in the commission’s performance, Odinga – importantly – abided by the court’s actions. <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/512745/summary?casa_token=tt2z0EgfDRoAAAAA:bIHnsalQ5CKmCxWkEnY05IX4zpPxLaB-KC80j7xsFpHdSzCVH-Q-f1jZNm9s3NnkHgGVwOQW2Q">Voters perceived the sourt as the legitimate arbiter</a>. And the outcome was peaceful.</p>
<p>In 2017, the court shocked the country when it ruled against the commission’s certification of Kenyatta’s re-election and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/africa/kenya-election-kenyatta-odinga.html">nullified the presidential result</a>. The verdict was based on evidence from petitions and its own investigation. </p>
<p>On one hand, this unprecedented action demonstrated the Kenyan judiciary’s newfound independence and willingness to take aggressive action to improve electoral integrity. On the other, it helped to quell tensions between Odinga and Kenyatta’s supporters. </p>
<p>Although the nullification required a revote, the commission proved inept at providing credible improvements. Odinga boycotted the re-run.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The new constitution enhances election management, some of which the commission has improved on from its predecessor. But challenges remain. And unlike 2007, the constitution also provides new dispute mechanisms to encourage any petitioners to pursue legal, as opposed to violent, objections to results. </p>
<p>The lessons from 2013 and 2017 indicate that the media, parties, civil society and citizens should be as vigilant as ever. If the commission can improve its performance, the Supreme Court will simply become the “arbiter of last resort” rather than the “go-to” solution for the losing side.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188478/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James D. Long does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya is not unlike any other country where democratic deepening requires a ‘two-steps forward, one-step back’ outlook.James D. Long, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1879412022-08-08T13:40:49Z2022-08-08T13:40:49ZProsecution or compensation? What Kenyan choices tell us about international justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476724/original/file-20220729-18-ysejqp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Uhuru Kenyatta's supporters celebrate after the ICC dropped charges against him in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In December 2007, the Electoral Commission of Kenya <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-31176820071230">announced</a> that Mwai Kibaki had won a second five-year term as president. It was a surprising outcome, given his opponent, Raila Odinga, had held a significant early lead in the polls. </p>
<p>Kibaki was hastily sworn in, sparking <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-violence-and-kenyas-crisis-governance">inter-ethnic violence</a>. Odinga’s supporters, who were mostly from the Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups, attacked Kibaki’s Kikuyu supporters, which led to retaliatory clashes across the country.</p>
<p>This violence <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR32/001/2014/en/">resulted in</a> over 1,000 dead, more than 600,000 displaced and innumerable victims of sexual assault. </p>
<p>In 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/kenyas-post-election-violence-icc-prosecutor-presents-cases-against-six-individuals-crimes">six prominent Kenyans</a> with inciting the violence. According to the prosecution, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2012_03827.PDF">William Ruto</a> – at the time an Odinga supporter – instigated violence by rallying his Kalenjin co-ethnics to attack Kibaki’s Kikuyu supporters. </p>
<p>The court alleged that <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2011_03178.PDF">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> responded by mobilising his Kikuyu co-ethnics to attack those who purportedly backed Odinga. </p>
<p>To date, however, there have been no convictions. Evidentiary difficulties were primarily to blame. The ICC accused the Kenyan government of failing to cooperate in providing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-withdrawal-charges-against-mr">documentary evidence</a>. The government also failed to <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-regarding-trial-chambers">protect witnesses</a>. It was additionally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-icc-idAFLDE74S08720110529">accused</a> of creating “a climate of fear”.</p>
<p>According to Kenyatta and Ruto, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019">collapse</a> of the Kenya cases was a victory. They <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/kenya-trials-keytoiccafricarelations.html">called</a> the ICC an imperialistic institution that is biased against Africans. </p>
<p>Fatou Bensouda, a former prosecutor of the court, <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/icc-prosecutor-says-relentless-intimidation-sunk-kenya-case-180705978.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall.&guccounter=1">disagreed</a>, lamenting the continued impunity and denial of justice for the many victims of post-election violence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/icc-case-against-kenyan-lawyer-gicheru-it-matters-but-not-for-victims-of-the-violence-178938">ICC case against Kenyan lawyer Gicheru: it matters, but not for victims of the violence</a>
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<p>We set out to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002719893740">investigate</a> whether the ICC’s failure to secure convictions mattered to Kenyans. More broadly, we wanted to learn about the justice preferences of individuals in countries emerging from mass violence and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Our research findings have two implications. First, despite years of campaigns against the ICC by Kenya’s elected leadership, and little on-the-ground outreach from the court, it still has supporters in the country. Second, victims or witnesses to violence are less likely to buy into anti-ICC narratives. When denied justice locally, they may be willing to support the court’s quest to deliver justice and accountability. </p>
<h2>Prosecution vs compensation</h2>
<p>We conducted our research in Kenya in 2015. Our research team carried out face-to-face surveys of more than 500 Kenyans in five regions in the country where violence had occurred. Our results have been published over the last three years, most recently in a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00223433211065573">May 2022 paper</a>. </p>
<p>We asked respondents whether they preferred prosecutions or compensation for the harms they or their fellow citizens had suffered during the 2007-2008 post-election violence. </p>
<p>Citizens may prefer both, but we phrased the question this way because in post-conflict situations, countries don’t always have the resources to pursue every available justice mechanism. For those who preferred prosecutions, we asked whether they preferred that the alleged perpetrators be tried in Kenyan courts or at the ICC. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/20-years-on-the-international-criminal-court-is-doing-more-good-than-its-critics-claim-186382">20 years on, the International Criminal Court is doing more good than its critics claim</a>
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<p>As far as we are aware, ours is the first study that asks Kenyans to choose between prosecution and compensation. It’s also the first to consider how the option of ICC prosecutions might moderate preferences. Our study additionally collected data on ethnicity and on whether the respondent was exposed to post-election violence as a witness or victim.</p>
<p><a href="https://open.bu.edu/handle/2144/38762">Some researchers</a> suggest that individuals’ justice preferences will align with those of their ethnic leaders. This is because these are the people they turn to for material and other support. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286745711_A_psychological_jurisprudence_model_of_public_opinion_and_international_prosecution">Other scholars</a> theorise that people exposed to violence will prioritise psychological over material benefits. That is, they’ll be pulled towards mechanisms that might hold abusers accountable. </p>
<p>We tested these theories using data we gathered when the ICC’s case against Ruto was still pending. </p>
<p>Our findings remain relevant as the Kenyan post-election issue continues before the ICC. Lawyer <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/gicheru">Paul Gicheru</a> is awaiting a decision on his trial after closing statements were made in June 2022. Gicheru has <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2021_06271.PDF">been accused</a> of corruptly influencing witnesses in cases stemming from the 2007 election crisis – including the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-11-02-what-paul-gicherus-decision-to-surrender-to-icc-means-for-ruto-case/">case against Ruto</a>.</p>
<h2>Role of ethnicity</h2>
<p>Our research found that first, most Kenyans didn’t favour compensation over the retributive justice afforded by prosecutions. </p>
<p>Second, ethnicity generally played a role in respondents’ preferences. Respondents who identified as Kikuyu or Kalenjin – Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s ethnicities, respectively – were less likely to support trials than Kenyans of other ethnicities. </p>
<p>Material self-interest may explain this finding. Respondents may believe they would benefit if their co-ethnics remained in power. </p>
<p>Third, and perhaps most importantly, Kenyans who self-identified as witnesses or victims of violence generally preferred prosecutions over compensation. Additionally, they preferred prosecution at the ICC rather than at a domestic court. </p>
<p>This result held for co-ethnics of Kenyatta and Ruto. Even though Kikuyus or Kalenjins generally had higher levels of support for compensation than those who identified as other ethnicities, victims who identified as either Kikuyu or Kalenjin decreased their support for compensation by about 11 percentage points (from 52% to 41%). Kikuyu or Kalenjin victims were also about 11 percentage points more likely than Kikuyus or Kalenjins who were not victims to support trials at the ICC over domestic trials. </p>
<p>In short, even though Kikuyu or Kalenjin individuals show higher levels of support for compensation than trials compared to other ethnic groups, exposure to violence has a similar impact across ethnicities: it increases support for trials and the ICC. </p>
<p>While Kenyatta and Ruto sought to discredit the international court after they were charged, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002719893740">our research</a> found that witnesses of violence and victims were less likely than the average Kenyan to buy into this narrative. </p>
<h2>What it means</h2>
<p>Our research findings suggest that personal experiences with violence influence attitudes towards post-conflict justice mechanisms. </p>
<p>Individuals who have encountered violence are more likely to prioritise “righting the wrong” even if it means their co-ethnics will be punished. They further demonstrate the key role the international court plays for victims of mass violence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-and-the-icc-is-it-worth-getting-your-man-if-you-jeopardise-your-mission-119317">Al-Bashir and the ICC: is it worth getting your man, if you jeopardise your mission?</a>
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<p>Many have criticised the court for, among other reasons, its paucity of convictions. However, our research shows that the court has an important role to play in providing justice for those for whom justice is denied domestically. </p>
<p>The ICC, however, can only deliver justice if countries cooperate with and support it. The outcome of the Kenya cases (so far) shows what happens when states fail to do their part: victims are denied their day in court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eamon T. Aloyo acknowledges funding for this research from The Hague Institute for Global Justice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Dancy has received funding from the National Science Foundation and from Global Affairs Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvonne M. Dutton acknowledges funding for this research from The Hague Institute for Global Justice.</span></em></p>Research in Kenya finds victims or witnesses to violence are less likely to buy into anti-International Criminal Court political narratives.Eamon T. Aloyo, Assistant professor, Leiden UniversityGeoff Dancy, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of TorontoYvonne M. Dutton, Professor, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818482022-04-30T17:03:21Z2022-04-30T17:03:21ZKibaki’s capitalist outlook on education in Kenya brought mixed results<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460279/original/file-20220428-14-qpi6gw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emilio Mwai Kibaki, the recently deceased third president of Kenya </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paula Bronstein/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emilio Mwai Kibaki, retired third president of independent Kenya <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenyas-former-president-kibaki-dies-90-2022-04-22/">who has died </a>, had a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mwai-kibaki-president-who-squandered-the-opportunity-to-fix-kenya-141631">rich and multifaceted legacy</a> as a long serving public official. </p>
<p>But it is in education that he left an indelible, but complex, mark. </p>
<p>Kibaki’s personal achievement as a highly accomplished intellectual looms large over his long policy and political career. A graduate of Makerere University College and the London School of Economics, he became <a href="https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/mwai-kibaki">a member of parliament</a> at independence in 1963. This set the stage for his appointment in the executive. </p>
<p>He rose from an assistant minister of finance and chairman of the Economic Planning Commission in 1963 to become commerce and industry minister in 1966. He was appointed finance and economic planning minister in 1969, and became vice president in 1978. He held the finance docket until 1982.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Daniel-arap-Moi">President Daniel arap Moi</a> demoted him to health minister in 1988. Three years later Kibaki left the ruling party to form the Democratic Party. He became president in 2002, a position he held until his retirement in 2013.</p>
<p>Kibaki’s influence on education in Kenya became visible in the early years of independence when government spending on education rose steadily. By the 1970s, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291121000036">Kenya devoted 30%</a> of its budget to the sector. As chairman of the economic planning commission, he had a major role in drafting government policy plans that guided the country’s ideological and policy thrust.</p>
<p>Kibaki gave Kenya’s education a free market capitalistic orientation. Documents such as <a href="https://repository.kippra.or.ke/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2997/Development%20Plan%201964-1970.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y#page=13">the 1964–70 Development Plan</a> and the 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10 show how he wanted to introduce cost-sharing through <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/618851468765930700/pdf/multi0page.pdf#page=62">a loans scheme for university students</a>. </p>
<p>Many years later, Kibaki’s first major policy pronouncement as president was the declaration in January 2003 that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/07/kenya.schools">primary education would be free</a>.</p>
<p>While he favoured mass education for all Kenyans, his capitalist orientation paved the way for entry of private providers. Also, although he generally supported provision of free basic education, especially at primary level, he disapproved of fully subsidised higher education. Instead, he favoured cost-sharing and privatisation. </p>
<h2>Free-market adherent</h2>
<p>As a free market adherent, Kibaki worked closely with the policy advisors from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the early 1970s, Kenya was among the non-oil producing countries that experienced budgetary constraints following the sharp rise of global oil prices. Kenya turned to the Bretton Woods institutions for financial support.</p>
<p>As was to become the norm, the institutions would only advance support on condition that governments reduced recurrent expenditure. Education was one of the areas targeted for cuts.</p>
<p>The IMF and the World Bank required that government implement the university loans scheme that it had outlined in its policy plans. Senior education officials opposed the scheme but were overruled by Kibaki, then Minister of Finance.</p>
<p>The scheme became official in July 1974. This marked a fulfilment of Kibaki’s desire to control higher education expenditure.</p>
<p>Under the scheme, the government would continue providing free tuition to university students. But it would advance them loans to cover expenses such as accommodation, food and books. The loan advanced to students attracted annual interest of 2% and repayment would commence 3 years after graduation. </p>
<p>The first university cohort to be advanced loans graduated in 1977, with their first loan repayments due in 1980. </p>
<p>But the scheme never succeeded. The main reason was due to failure by the ministry of education to enforce recovery. This failure marked the flagging political fortunes of Kibaki in the early 1980s. He steadily became eclipsed politically by the newcomers in Moi’s government. </p>
<p>The final blow to the loans scheme came in 1982 when Kibaki was transferred to the less glamorous ministry of home affairs. This ended a 13-year-run as minister of finance. He retained the vice-presidency until 1988. It was not until 1995 that Moi’s government revived the university loans scheme. This was done through the creation of the Higher Education Loans Board.</p>
<p>Kibaki would further reveal his free market inclinations in 1984. As the country’s vice-President, he contradicted the education officials who had refused to recognise degrees offered by two pioneering private universities. These were the United States International University and the Catholic Higher Institute of Eastern Africa (now the Catholic University of East Africa).</p>
<p>The Ministry of Higher Education had accused the United States International University of providing substandard education. And it had denied a request by the Catholic Higher Institute of Eastern Africa to convert to a university.</p>
<p>Kibaki insisted that government had no “restrictions on the setting up of private universities in the country.” This is documented by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/State-University-Experience-East-Africa/dp/1868888274">Michael Kithinji</a> in his investigation of the dynamics that influenced the development of university education in Kenya and East Africa before and after independence. </p>
<p>Kibaki’s intervention helped open the doors to the flourishing of private universities.</p>
<h2>Complex legacy</h2>
<p>During his presidency Kibaki pursued a duo policy of free basic education and largely unsubsidised higher education, with mixed results. </p>
<p>The introduction of free primary education had an immediate impact on primary school enrolment. The <a href="https://kessa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/6.pdf">student population rose by more than a million</a> from 6.3 million in December 2002 to 7.6 million by the end of 2003.</p>
<p>Some analysts <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263389119_Education_Development_in_Kenya_Enhancing_Access_and_Quality">have faulted</a> Kibaki’s free primary education program for causing overcrowding and overburdening teachers. But criticism overlooks the existing neglect and decay of education facilities that Kibaki encountered when he became president. The challenges caused by free primary education only served to uncover the deep malaise that had hindered educational access to thousands of school age children.</p>
<p>Expansion of primary education exerted pressure on higher levels of learning. To accommodate the growing numbers of students completing primary education, the government and communities across the country established additional secondary schools especially for day scholars. </p>
<p><a href="https://ajoeijournals.org/sys/index.php/ajoei/article/view/149">Similar transformation</a> occurred at the university level where the number of full and constituent public universities increased dramatically and private sector ones from a handful to over 25.</p>
<p>But universities, both public and private didn’t live up to their calling as centres of excellence due to minimal research output. And university expansion under Kibaki happened at the expense of other tertiary institutions. The majority of vocational and technical institutes converted to universities. This meant that the 80% of students who missed university admission lacked opportunities to gain professional or artisanal skills.</p>
<p>Kibaki’s policies on education demonstrate his pro-market position that endeared him to the Bretton Woods institutions and the West in general. It is therefore not surprising that in 1974 Time Magazine ranked him among the top 100 individuals around the world with the potential to become head of state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Mwenda Kithinji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kibaki gave Kenya’s higher education sector a free market capitalistic orientation, endearing him to the World Bank and the IMFMichael Mwenda Kithinji, Associate Professor, University of Central ArkansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818472022-04-26T18:05:54Z2022-04-26T18:05:54ZKibaki’s Kenya education legacy: well-intentioned, with disastrous consequences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459426/original/file-20220425-12-tcmyi7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s former president Mwai Kibaki, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/mwai-kibaki-president-who-squandered-the-opportunity-to-fix-kenya-141631">died last week</a>, was widely praised for his economic transformation of Kenya, first as finance minister from 1969 to 1982 and then as the third president of Kenya from 2002 to 2013. </p>
<p>But Kibaki also left an enduring legacy on Kenya’s education sector. </p>
<p>Kibaki left his mark on education in two areas: the widening of access to education and the embrace of a business-style model for universities. </p>
<p>When Kibaki came to office, there was an education access crisis in both basic and higher education. </p>
<p>Numerous charges introduced by schools (such as building funds and activity fees) had increased the cost of education for the poor. Primary school enrolment was around <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/ejes.v5no1a2">86%</a> but, in 2002, the transition rate, from primary to secondary school stood at <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/10300.pdf">just 46%</a>. </p>
<p>The growing demand for university education, due to population growth, limited access to only those who had performed exceptionally well in secondary education. Furthermore, university governance and operations had been constrained by political interference by the political class. </p>
<p>Kibaki’s goals were to expand access both in primary and university education, and to make universities more efficient and self-sustaining by reforming management and commercialising them. </p>
<p>These contributions, though positive, also had their drawbacks. </p>
<h2>Free primary education</h2>
<p>When he took office as president in 2003, Kibaki launched the widely praised <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/free-primary-education-policy-freed-many-from-ignorance-124677/">Free Primary Education</a> programme. Under it, all fees in primary schools were abolished. This wasn’t the first time this had happened. Primary school fees were first abolished in 1978 but, due to declining state support, schools introduced a myriad of non-tuition fees. This defeated the goal of free primary education.</p>
<p>Kibaki’s government strategy <a href="https://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/default/files/ressources/kenya_kessp_final_2005.pdf">allocated</a> each public school grants based on student enrolment. This allowed them to buy textbooks and meet other operational costs. This meant <a href="https://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/default/files/ressources/kenya_kessp_final_2005.pdf">increasing</a> the education budget from 12.4% of the national budget in 2004 to 17.4% in 2005.</p>
<p>The Free Primary Education programme <a href="https://wenr.wes.org/2015/06/education-kenya">enabled</a> millions of poor children to enroll in school. It is estimated that primary school enrolment <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-2005/giant-step-kenya%E2%80%99s-schools">rose from</a> 6 million in 2000 to 7.4 million in 2004. </p>
<p>Free Primary Education was, and continues to be, a noble program that addresses equality in primary education access. Nevertheless, its implementation had disastrous consequences for equity and quality in education. </p>
<p>No extra classrooms were built nor additional teachers hired. This resulted in overcrowded classrooms with overworked teachers. Indeed, the teacher-student ratio <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015571488">increased from</a> one teacher to 40 students, to one teacher for 60 students. The deterioration of quality of public schools became evident and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-bad-economics-of-free-primary-education/">poor performance</a> in national exams proved this. </p>
<p>Those that could afford it, removed their children from well-performing public schools and enrolled them in expensive private academies. It is during Kibaki’s regime that the country saw the rise of high-cost private schools populated by scions of the middle and upper class. Indeed, enrolment in private academies <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-bad-economics-of-free-primary-education/">almost tripled</a> between 2005 to 2009 from 4.4% to 10.5%.</p>
<p>I also believe it nurtured an education entrepreneurial class whose interest in education was merely profit rather than the overall education of the child.</p>
<p>Equally troubling for Free Private Education programme was the weak financial oversight that resulted in massive theft of public funds. While some reports in 2009 <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/exposed-how-officials-looted-schools-millions--618150?view=htmlamp">indicated</a> that Ksh.178 million (US$1.54 million) of the program’s funds were squandered by senior education officials and headteachers, other reports <a href="https://kenyastockholm.com/2011/12/27/kibakis-free-primary-education-how-funds-were-looted-part-2/">estimate</a> that billions could have been stolen. </p>
<p>Upon his election in 2002, president Kibaki had declared corruption <a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/war-against-corruption-kenya">would cease</a> to be a way of life in his government. However Kibaki’s vaunted anti-graft campaign found its waterloo in his pet education project.</p>
<h2>Commercialisation of universities</h2>
<p>Kibaki’s reform footprints in education are also still evident the university sector. Kibaki’s presidential term saw the greatest expansion of public university education in the country. When he took office, Kenya had only six public universities. When he left in 2013 the number had grown to 22. Most of the 17 (77%) public universities were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015612519">established in one year</a>, between 2012-2013. </p>
<p>Student enrolment <a href="https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1083615.pdf">grew</a> from 71,832 in 2003 to <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20140508075050866">195,428</a> in 2013. Kibaki valued access to quality higher education as the key drive to economic growth. He <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20130208120627703">argued</a> that Kenya’s university education should be benchmarked against global standards and market needs.</p>
<p>Kibaki’s ultimate aim for universities was that they raise their own revenue and be less dependent on government. Hitherto, public universities depended on state funding for development, maintenance and operations supplemented by a modest state-regulated student tuition fees. </p>
<p>To do this, he commercialised universities and set about infusing them with corporate-style governance structures. He depoliticised the chancellorship by appointing corporate leaders and scholars as public university chancellors. This was a dramatic break from the past. His predecessor, Daniel arap Moi, was the chancellor of all the public universities. </p>
<p>In this new leadership structure, Kibaki expected policies and decisions in the universities be driven by financial and academic considerations rather than political calculations. This meant universities also had to plan for resources that would come from elsewhere, rather than the exchequer.</p>
<p>It is policy that saw public universities launch a range of initiatives in a bid to commercialise their operations. Ventures included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>academic programmes that included parallel programs, that is, admission of additional self-sponsored students who paid higher tuition fees beyond the normal government-funded students </p></li>
<li><p>the creation of mortuaries: medical schools in universities started offering body mortuary services to the public at a fee </p></li>
<li><p>establishment of branch campuses to admit more fee-paying self-sponsored students beyond the immediate location of the main university</p></li>
</ul>
<p>But Kibaki’s vision of vibrant well-resourced public universities raising additional revenues to supplement government grants failed to materialise. </p>
<p>Today, many public universities are on the brink of financial insolvency with debts to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2019.97.10949">tune of</a> Ksh10 billion (US$87 million). Many are unable to meet basic operating expenses.</p>
<p>But these university reforms had unintended consequences. Their extensive commercialisation of universities and expanded access resulted in decline in quality of learning, a challenge that still haunts the universities today. </p>
<p>In 2016, the government <a href="https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2016.86.9370">had to reverse</a> course and outlaw branch campuses and parallel programs to stem the tide of quality decline. </p>
<p>Significantly, Kibaki’s expansion of public universities was in response to demand by ethnic groups for a campus in their jurisdiction. Thus, while he espoused corporate-style management of universities, his expansion strategy was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/hep.2012.18">laced</a> with ethnic politics of university ownership. He awarded charters for establishment of public universities in response to pressure from ethnic groups seeking universities in their locality. </p>
<h2>In pursuit of the impossible</h2>
<p>The benefits of Kibaki’s education reforms were less obvious than many of the transformative economic blueprint which delivered considerable benefits to the country. </p>
<p>He wanted to achieve the impossible in education: pursue equity through expanded access while infusing excellence through neoliberalism. But the lack of a focused and clear strategy only magnified the unintended consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ishmael Munene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kibaki’s goals were to expand access to education, and to make universities more efficient and self-sustaining.Ishmael Munene, Professor of Research, Foundations & Higher Education, Northern Arizona UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1547562021-02-08T08:18:58Z2021-02-08T08:18:58ZSimeon Nyachae: the larger-than-life civil servant who made his mark on Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382869/original/file-20210207-15-z743ze.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Simeon Nyachae (right) welcomes President Uhuru Kenyatta to his alma mater, Kisii School in western Kenya, during the institution's 80th anniversary in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/120898464@N04/14995103431/in/photolist-8dfzcw-oR4PQ4/lightbox/">State House Kenya/Courtesy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Simeon Nyachae, who <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-02-02-nyachae-wealthy-politician-who-controlled-gusii-politics/">passed away</a> in early February at the age of 88, was among the men who shaped Kenya and made it one of Africa’s leading economies. For Kenya’s first 40 years of independence he was highly visible in government and helped to craft an economy oriented to the private sector that also was favourable to both large and small-scale agriculture.</p>
<p>Nyachae held senior leadership positions under all three of Kenya’s first presidents – Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki – from 1963 to 2007. </p>
<p>Nyachae was among the favourite sons of <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/biography-of-chief-musa-nyandusi/oclc/32825246&referer=brief_results">Musa Nyandusi</a>, who was the senior chief in Kisii District in western Kenya and supervisor of its other chiefs. This was the highest government post an African could hold in the colonial government. As independence approached Nyandusi was able to influence an appointment for Nyachae as district assistant (or officer) – which had been the entry grade for British colonial officers – in Kisii. He then moved to Machakos district bordering the capital Nairobi. </p>
<p>After independence President Kenyatta made Nyachae district commissioner for Nyandarua. He was then promoted to provincial commissioner for the Rift Valley, the largest of the country’s eight provinces. Subsequently, he was moved to Central Province, the president’s home province outside Nairobi. </p>
<p>As Kenyatta was a strong centraliser and ruled through the civil service, these positions were equivalent to a governor or prefect. He was effectively in charge of the local activities of other government officials. The places where Nyachae served gave him considerable authority over the transformation of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1792632?seq=1">“White Highlands”</a> estates from European hands into African-held small and large farms. This meant that his position was highly political. </p>
<p>Under President arap Moi, Nyachae rose in 1979 to the office of chief secretary and cabinet secretary, from which he retired in 1987. </p>
<p>Moi was much less of a centraliser than Kenyatta had been. He was interested in seeing a better distribution of resources among Kenya’s ethnic (or tribal) regions. To this end, Nyachae formed an alliance with Harris Mule, then the permanent secretary in the ministry of planning, and together they shepherded the “<a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/9018">District Focus for Rural Development</a>” into policy in the mid-1980s. </p>
<p>This involved devolving significant financial authority and responsibility to district county councils. In turn this presaged the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/138-chapter-eleven-devolved-government">decentralised structure</a> provided by the current Kenyan constitution promulgated in 2010. </p>
<p>The purpose of both changes was to give Kenya’s multiple “tribes” greater control over the local distribution of government resources. In this way Kenya sought to mitigate the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-divided-pasts-to-cohesive-futures/kenyas-four-ages-of-ethnicity/47BB799B6C95D3E2659C1EE1B8B148BE">intensity of “tribal” competition</a> for national political office which had been building up over the years. Indeed, it boiled over into considerable violence after the 2007 elections. </p>
<p>After retirement from the civil service, in 1992, Nyachae was elected a member of parliament from his home in Kisii and was re-elected in 1997. As an MP, Nyachae served in Moi’s cabinet, first as agriculture minister from 1992, and then as water minister. After the 1997 election, he served in finance before moving to industry. </p>
<p>He broke with Moi and <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/ken2002results.htm">contested</a> the presidency in 2002, but lost to Mwai Kibaki. Nonetheless, President Kibaki appointed Nyachae as minister of energy in a government of national unity. In 2005 Nyachae chose to retire from public life for health reasons.</p>
<h2>Wealth and interests</h2>
<p>With financial support from his father, Nyachae had begun a very small bakery even before he joined the civil service. At Kenya’s independence, most African leaders of the independence generation were given opportunities by Kenyatta to take over previously European parts of the economy. </p>
<p>They had <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft8p3008fh;query=;brand=ucpress">privileged access</a> to farms in the ‘White Highlands’, loans, government permits, contracts, and the like and became instantly wealthy. Nyachae was no exception. His bakery expanded, he acquired at least two large farms, and other businesses he established did well.</p>
<p>As was true for other members of the new African elite, the agricultural commodities they produced were largely the same as those of small farmers. By pursuing public policies that profited their farms, they were helping a large number of poorer Kenyan farmers as well. This Kenyan coincidence of large and small-holder agricultural interests was very unusual in Africa and a part of the key to its economic success. </p>
<p>Nyachae shared those interests and thus joined in promoting business, agricultural and rural development policies with long-term, broad benefits that reached widely in the economy. Furthermore, unlike many others he was a <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft8p3008fh;query=;brand=ucpress">‘nationalist’</a>, in that he was concerned with the welfare of all parts of the country and much less focused on immediate personal gain or in advancing sectional (that is, ‘tribal’) advantage.</p>
<p>Nyachae’s wealth also gave him the economic independence to risk government displeasure when he wanted to quietly oppose political measures he found unwise. He believed strongly in supporting the interests of the presidents he served, but when others with political influence tried to gain unseemly advantage at government expense, Nyachae was willing to interfere. Several times he <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110527054529/http://mvuleafricapublishers.com/walking-through-the-corridor-of-services-hard-cover/">blocked conspiracies</a> to remove dedicated civil servants who were in the way.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110527054529/http://mvuleafricapublishers.com/walking-through-the-corridor-of-services-hard-cover/">believed</a> the efforts he made to stop corruption were behind Moi’s decisions to transfer him to minor cabinet portfolios from being minister of agriculture and later of finance. </p>
<p>Ultimately, particularly around the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf">Goldenberg corruption scandal</a> in which senior government officials were implicated, he lost influence with President Moi and broke with him in 1999. </p>
<h2>Round the clock manager</h2>
<p>Nyachae always served at the intersection of politics and administration. Nevertheless, he was more of a firm manager than a politician. In addition to being a ‘nationalist’ he was known for his exceptional drive, long hours, self-discipline and the speed with which he wrote memos. </p>
<p>More important, his success as a manager came from the support he provided gifted civil service professionals in gaining links to presidential support and in his willingness to take risks in opposing misguided endeavours of lesser politicians.</p>
<p>Nyachae is survived by numerous children and their offspring, but he insisted when I last spoke to him that it was contrary to Gusii tradition to enumerate them. He had four wives and was very proud of the effort he put into keeping their children united under his leadership. In this he was successful, as witnessed by the many occasions until the very end in which they were there to support him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154756/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David K. Leonard received funding from the US National Science Foundation and the US Fulbright programme in the mid-1980s. to research a 1990 book on Nyachae and others.</span></em></p>Nyachae always served at the intersection of politics and administration. Nevertheless, he was more of a firm manager than a politician.David K. Leonard, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, BerkeleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465482020-09-28T18:55:32Z2020-09-28T18:55:32ZElection violence in November? Here’s what the research says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360160/original/file-20200927-16-1vvp0ql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C12%2C8582%2C5704&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man carrying a club is seen as the Proud Boys, a right-wing pro-Trump group, gather with their allies in a rally against left-wing Antifa in Portland, Oregon, Sept. 26, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-carrying-a-club-is-seen-as-the-proud-boys-a-right-wing-news-photo/1228751842?adppopup=true">John Rudoff/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After Kenya’s 2007 election, as incumbent President Mwai Kibaki declared victory, the opposition alleged the election had been rigged. </p>
<p>A wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-people-participate-in-election-violence-insights-from-kenyas-2007-elections-143016">protests, riots and ethnic violence</a> followed. As many as 1,500 citizens were killed and another 600,000 forcibly displaced.</p>
<p>As the U.S. presidential election draws near, many have expressed <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/8/18/21371964/2020-transition-integrity-project-simulation-trump">concern that a similar scenario may unfold here</a>. Some envision President Donald Trump’s supporters using <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/03/trump-stay-in-office/">misinformation to mobilize vigilante militias</a> to clash with leftist protesters. Others envision that groups on the left will <a href="https://time.com/5892945/law-enforcement-post-election-violence/">refuse to accept the results and mobilize</a>, leading to violence and deaths across the country.</p>
<p>Having a contested election in times of crisis, however, is by no means a guarantee of violence. The front-runners in the 2017 French presidential election, for example, were <a href="https://www.daily-sun.com/post/223523/Violence-scars-Frances-preelection-May-Day-marches">as politically polarizing</a> as their U.S. 2020 counterparts, with centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron calling right-wing leader Marine Le Pen’s party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/marine-le-pen-defeated-front-national-far-from-finished">racist and xenophobic</a> and Le Pen charging that Macron was “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39802776">the candidate of savage globalisation</a>.”</p>
<p>And the first round of voting in France took place just after a shooting in the heart of Paris sent the country into a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ae9439a65ff04fb19bf8e102a0840703">state of emergency</a>. Yet, as the votes were counted and Macron was declared the winner, Le Pen <a href="https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2017/05/07/le-pen-concedes-defeat-in-french-election/">conceded defeat</a>, allowing for a peaceful transition.</p>
<p>With the barrage of 24/7 media coverage of the upcoming U.S. election, it can be hard to tell what’s real and what’s not – and that can be frightening. It’s important to step back and ask: What does the research say about the likelihood of election-related violence in November?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters around a bonfire" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Deadly violence followed the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya, including in this Nairobi slum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyans-demonstrate-30-december-2007-at-the-kibera-slum-as-news-photo/107605579?adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Predicting political instability</h2>
<p>When <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/koren-ore.html">social science researchers like me</a> try to predict political violence, we look at a large number of historical cases across multiple countries, and try to identify which events have resulted in many casualties. </p>
<p>In taking this approach, we can systematically evaluate what explains these extreme events, pinpointing specific issues that were present in most of the situations, and avoiding the inaccuracies that can happen by relying too much on anecdotal stories. </p>
<p>Such studies have highlighted three factors relevant to the upcoming election.</p>
<p>First, strong political institutions are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x">especially effective</a> in reducing the risk of violence. Many have voiced concerns that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/04/how-to-destroy-a-government/606793/">President Trump has weakened American political institutions</a>. But as one of the world’s longest-enduring democracies, the United States and its democratic institutions have proven their capacity to maintain order through <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html">crises and abuse of presidential power</a> before.</p>
<p>In the U.S., for example, despite allegations to the contrary, <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-fraud-is-very-rare-in-american-elections/">electoral fraud is extremely rare</a>. Even if uncertainty and chaos were to ensue in the wake of the election, the authority to decide a winner is vested in an independent institution such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-of-biden-versus-trump-or-how-a-judge-could-decide-the-presidential-election-146367">the U.S. Supreme Court</a> or by the <a href="https://history.house.gov/Institution/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/">House of Representatives</a>. Kenya in 2007 had no comparable institutional anchors to help ensure post-election stability.</p>
<p>Second, research, including <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/2/274/4909422">my own</a>, finds that mass political violence usually happens in countries that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3118222.pdf">have no capacity to prevent it</a>. In Kenya, for example, most violence was perpetrated by unofficial militias affiliated with ethnic or religious groups, such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20406424.pdf">Mungiki</a>, which the government was unable – or unwilling – to curb.</p>
<p>In the U.S., if any political leader calls for vigilantes to mobilize, both the federal government and states have the capacity to expeditiously eliminate this threat. Militias may be armed, but they are no match for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/remind-us-what-exactly-is-the-national-guard-94621">well-trained National Guard</a> or Army regiment. This should help deter the risk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">violence by vigilantes</a>. </p>
<p>Some, however, fear that the president will send <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/09/19/assessing-donald-trumps-use-of-the-homeland-security-department">federal agencies to seize ballots</a>. Although military officers continue to express <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/pentagon-election-insurrection-act/index.html">formal commitment</a> to <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/west-point-grads-raise-concerns-about-politicization-of-military-urge-class-of-2020-to-uphold-ideals-1.633448">keeping the military nonpoliticized</a>, such actions, if taken, may result in a violent backlash by left-wing vigilantes. But federal agents acting under orders from the White House will have the tactical upper hand in such clashes, which greatly adds to their deterrent capacity.</p>
<p>Finally, an especially strong predictor of election violence is a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/15/4/473/1862712?casa_token=QxU1-hjGgBYAAAAA:6TdId2CGSKQi-Kaj6pKm64uGluAQ-RnhlbbXSOwr1ulk2LeKTQ_zbFI2MQIN7SDLOxBdvbjDXpQ">history of armed political conflict</a>. After the 2016 elections, America experienced <a href="https://www.politico.com/gallery/2016/11/2016-election-protest-photos-002366?slide=0">massive protests and some rioting</a>, but little in the way of deadly political violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women protesting Trump's 2016 election." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the 2016 elections, America experienced large protests and some rioting, but little deadly political violence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-fill-5th-avenue-in-midtown-manhattan-during-a-news-photo/959107274?adppopup=true">David Cliff/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the numbers say</h2>
<p>Is post-election violence impossible in 2020 America? No. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">data suggests</a> it is unlikely. </p>
<p>Ninety-five percent of the 12,607 political demonstrations in the U.S. between May 24 and Sept. 19, 2020, were peaceful. There were 351 other kinds of incidents, including imposing curfews and perpetrating physical attacks. In 29 of those, there was violence against civilians, where 12 people were killed, nine of them by the police. And in an additional five drive-by shootings, three police officers were killed by the extremist group the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/19/magazine/boogaloo.html">Boogaloo Bois</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the number of people involved in the recent Black Lives Matter and COVID-19 protests, and the fact that <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">many were heavily armed</a>, these casualty figures are surprisingly low. According to <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">the data</a>, the majority of deaths were caused by police, not vigilantes or protesters, and all of the perpetrators (with the exception of two drive-by shooters), police and civilians alike, were taken into custody.</p>
<p>Like the U.S., France experienced protests and riots, in addition to multiple terrorist attacks, prior to Election Day. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/18/secret-plans-protect-le-pen-french-republic-emerge">There was even a government plan</a> to handle the potential violence and instability that might ensue if Le Pen were elected. And yet, as the most polarizing elections in decades concluded, there were few riots and no killing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="French riot policemen advance during clashes with protesters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French riot police clash with protesters at a demonstration against the presidential candidate for the far-right Front National party, Feb. 25, 2017 in Nantes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/french-riot-policemen-advance-during-clashes-with-news-photo/645260214?adppopup=true">Jean-Sebastien Evrard/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>So, what will happen in November?</h2>
<p>Researchers cannot perfectly predict political violence. Their analyses rely on the past. </p>
<p>Add to the equation a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-promised-this-kind-of-presidency--unpredictable-ad-hoc-and-impulsive/2018/03/10/e928b73e-23ef-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.html">notoriously unpredictable incumbent</a> against a backdrop of <a href="https://time.com/5876599/election-2020-coronavirus/">unprecedented social and economic conditions</a>, and making accurate predictions about potential post-election bedlam is impossible, as much as scholars and others may try.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>While I think some concern is valid, it is important to remember that there is a big difference between using a call to arms to mobilize your voters and instill fear in the other party’s supporters, and staging a post-election insurrection, which could subject its instigators to charges of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381">sedition, if not high treason</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the three factors discussed here suggest that fears of widespread violence by vigilantes and activists during and after Election Day should be treated as fears, not as a probable outcome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In the past, Ore Koren received funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Are the conditions ripe in the US for violence before, during or after the presidential election?Ore Koren, Assistant Professor, Indiana University Bloomington; International Security Fellow, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1319372020-02-20T13:24:47Z2020-02-20T13:24:47ZKenya: why elite cohesion is more important than ethnicity to political stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316133/original/file-20200219-10985-uyrefr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) shakes hands with the opposition coalition leader Raila Odinga to symbolise a truce in March 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan politics is often depicted as a battle between different ethnic “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BWSwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT63&lpg=PT63&dq=big+men+cheeseman+dictionary&source=bl&ots=k77TdO0CjU&sig=ACfU3U3YUa-b2AJSq_G5OTIX-qK90Og2vw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi-wNfI59PnAhWGSxUIHfCJB_sQ6AEwCXoECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=big%20men%20cheeseman%20dictionary&f=false">Big Men</a>” who can mobilise their supporters with a click of their fingers. The ability of successive generations of the Kenyatta family to rally the support of the Kikuyu community, and of Odingas to command the loyalty of Luos, means that it is also seen to be dominated by a small number of dynasties – a <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-elections-are-much-more-than-just-a-ruthless-game-of-thrones-81957">Game of Thrones</a>, if you will. </p>
<p>But this is a gross over simplification. Our new <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Oxford-Handbook-Kenyan-Politics-Handbooks/dp/0198815697/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=handbook+kenyan+politics&qid=1581777297&sr=8-1">Handbook of Kenyan Politics</a> – which features 50 chapters on different aspects of political life – tells a very different story. Ethnic leaders often fail to carry the support of their own group, either because they are not seen to have the <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Who-should-lead-the-Kenyan-opposition/440808-3873434-12ql970z/index.html">community’s interest at heart</a>, or because a rival appears to have a more credible chance of winning power. </p>
<p>And while the role of ethnicity is overstated, class is much more important than is commonly thought. Class here might more accurately be called elite cohesion, given the lack of clearly demarcated social classes. </p>
<p>This finding might surprise some readers, but while ethnicity clearly shapes how people think and vote it is the degree of elite cohesion that determines whether the country is politically stable or not. </p>
<p>The long period of relative stability in the country from the 1970s to the early 1990s was founded on the willingness of members of the elite from different ethnic groups to put aside their differences and use their influence to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228276928_Democratization_Sequencing_and_State_Failure_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Kenya">demobilise movements and militias</a> that might otherwise have threatened the status quo. </p>
<p>They did so to protect the highly unequal political and economic system on which their own privileged positions depend. It is when this elite pact ruptures, as it did around the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228276928_Democratization_Sequencing_and_State_Failure_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Kenya">2007 general elections</a>, that violence and unrest come to the fore. </p>
<p>Kenya is not alone. In general, we are far too quick to jump to “ethnic” explanations, and far too slow to recognise the way that elites collude to preserve their privileges. Our book sheds light on how this happened in Kenya.</p>
<h2>How ethnicity matters</h2>
<p>The classic view of Kenyan politics as an ethnic census runs something like this. First, power is secured by, and used to the advantage of, the president’s own ethnic group. This generate a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255669297_The_Political_Economy_of_Kenya's_Crisis">winner-takes-all</a>” logic. </p>
<p>Second, the knowledge that losing power means losing access to resources increases the stakes of political competition and hence the purported drive to stick together along ethnic lines.</p>
<p>Third, heated and controversial elections increase the divisions within Kenyan society, further strengthening ethnic identities. </p>
<p>Parts of this story are certainly true. Successive governments have tended to favour their own. Voting patterns, too, reveal clear ethnic patterns, and the last three elections have been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331943100_Kenya's_2017_elections_winner-takes-all_politics_as_usual">extremely divisive</a>. But the reality is more complicated. </p>
<p>Politicians can’t simply rely on the support of co-ethnics. Many ethnic groups actually split their vote between two or more candidates. This means that politicians must persuade voters to support them. In doing this, they often face stiff competition both from within and without their own ethnic group. As a result, they have to demonstrate that they are willing to fight for their community, have a good <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Development-Elections-Leadership-Politics-Government/440808-2631464-format-xhtml-9wv3coz/index.html">track record on development</a>, and can be trusted. </p>
<p>An example of what can happen if leaders don’t pay attention to these rules is the fate of Luhya leader <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-21581017/musalia-mudavadi-why-i-want-kenya-s-top-job">Musalia Mudavadi</a> in the 2013 presidential election. Having left Raila Odinga’s opposition alliance in the hope of being picked as the presidential candidate with the support of the then president Mwai Kibaki, Mudavadi was humiliated when key Kibaki allies changed their minds at the last minute and formed the new Jubilee Alliance. </p>
<p>In the end Mudavadi stood on his own. But his reputation was fatally tarnished because he was not seen to be a credible candidate, or to have been true to his own ethnic group. As a result, his own community <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=69187">turned its back on him</a>, with more Luhyas voting for Odinga – a Luo – than for their “own man”. </p>
<h2>Mutual economic interests</h2>
<p>The chapters in the book also highlight the fact that ethnic differences have not prevented the emergence of a self-conscious political and economic elite that is capable of coordinating its actions to maintain the system on which its privileges depend. </p>
<p>As Kenyan political scientist <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/kenya-class-ethnicity-kenyattaodinga-deal/">Nicholas Nyangira</a> argued in the 1980s, the route to power in Kenya involves first establishing control over an ethnic group – and then bargaining with other members of the elite for acceptance, using one’s support base as leverage. </p>
<p>Once part of the elite, leaders have typically used their influence over their own communities to demobilise and co-opt protest movements and militias. Even after some of the most heated periods of inter-elite struggle, such as the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of some Kikuyu leaders to <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-817696-il6m7dz/index.html">prevent Daniel arap Moi</a> – a Kalenjin – from replacing Jomo Kenyatta as president after his death in 1978, members of the elite came back together to stabilise the system. </p>
<p>Whenever this elite pact has ruptured, the consequence has been major political instability. In 2007, for example, the controversy over who had won flawed presidential elections resulted in leaders who had previously controlled their communities instead calling on them to take to the streets. Along with a heavy handed state response, this resulted in the death of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-600000-displaced-in-kenya-unrest/">over 1,000 people and the displacement of almost 700,000 more</a>. </p>
<p>Yet even in these most tense and dangerous of moments, the elite found a way to come back together. The violence in 2007 was ended by a power-sharing agreement that brought all major leaders into the government. </p>
<p>Another dangerous political stand-off following controversial elections in 2017 was resolved when, to the surprise of many, the two main candidates – Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta – publicly <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/kenya-class-ethnicity-kenyattaodinga-deal/">shook hands</a> and announced that they had buried the hatchet. </p>
<h2>The role of inequality</h2>
<p>It is clear from these events that Kenya will remain politically stable so long as the mutual economic interests of the elite outweigh their ethnic differences.</p>
<p>What’s equally true is that the country will simultaneously remain incredibly unequal. </p>
<p>According <a href="https://kenyanwallstreet.com/higher-taxes-kenyas-rich-can-lower-extreme-inequality-oxfam/">to Oxfam</a> less than 0.1% of the population – just 8,300 people – owned more wealth than the bottom 99.9% in 2018. While a dynamic economy is projected to create around 7,500 millionaires over the next 10 years, Kenya currently features the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Kenya-8th-on-extreme-poverty-list/3946234-4635310-79pa9rz/index.html">eighth highest number of people living in extreme poverty</a> in the world.</p>
<p>In addition to paying themselves some of the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/siasa/2019-05-11-new-house-allowance-puts-mps-salary-way-above-world-super-powers/">highest salaries</a> earned by any politicians in the world, Kenyan leaders use their control over the legislature to set low taxes – the highest rate of income tax <a href="https://www.taxkenya.com/income-tax-rates-in-kenya/">is just 30%</a> – and to give tax exemptions to politically connected companies. </p>
<p>Because it determines whether ethnic tensions are contained or exacerbated, and keeps millions in poverty, elite cohesion, much like ethnicity, is a matter of life and death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman co-edited the Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch co-edited the Oxford Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karuti Kanyinga co-edited the Handbook of Kenyan Politics, published by OUP in 2020.</span></em></p>Even in the most tense and dangerous of moments, the elite has found a way to come back together.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamGabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickKaruti Kanyinga, Associate Director, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1306022020-01-29T13:19:55Z2020-01-29T13:19:55ZCrisis at Nairobi University has its roots in decades of political interference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312036/original/file-20200127-81362-15y2o5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jomo Kenyatta, wearing a gold and scarlet robe and leopard cap, is installed as Chancellor of the University of Nairobi in December 1970.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The University of Nairobi, Kenya’s oldest institution of higher learning, is steeped in a crisis after the education secretary <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001356950/magoha-dissolves-uon-council-revokes-prof-kiama-appointment-as-vc">revoked</a> the appointment of a new vice-chancellor. The university council has also been disbanded. </p>
<p>Far from being unusual, however, the crisis falls within an established pattern of government intervention in universities going back decades. </p>
<p>Successive Kenyan governments have sought to control universities. This has been with varying degrees of success. One of the earliest attempts to assert executive control dates back to 1969 when the east African countries <a href="https://www.iucea.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1:overview-of-the-iucea&catid=81&Itemid=529">resolved to dissolve</a> the regional University of East Africa. Each country was to elevate constituent colleges to national universities. </p>
<p>The Kenyan government appointed a committee to develop a plan for a new university. The committee was made up of two academics, Professor Arthur Potter, Principal of the University College, Nairobi and his deputy Professor Bethwell Ogot, as well as civil servants. But it was <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=z-UUUIZ5wTYC&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=university+college+nairobi+committee+njonjo&source=bl&ots=GsQTFArfD1&sig=ACfU3U1eapgcmxhfWfF_eDILzi_DsDuAJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjazqv64aPnAhWDlFwKHXw2B-0Q6AEwBXoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=university%20college%20nairobi%20committee%20njonjo&f=false">dominated by civil servants</a>, including the permanent secretary for education, permanent secretary for finance, and the comptroller of State House. </p>
<p>An unusual addition to the committee was a junior official in the Ministry of Education, who was also the sister of the powerful Attorney General of Kenya, Charles Njonjo. Her involvement indicated that the government considered the establishment of a national university a sensitive matter that needed close monitoring by trusted insiders.</p>
<p>The committee convened against a tense backdrop. By the late 1960s the government of Jomo Kenyatta had started viewing the University College, Nairobi – the forerunner of the University of Nairobi – with disdain because of frequent student protests against the state. As I observed in my recent <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/State-University-Experience-East-Africa/dp/1868888274">book</a>, the government even banned the members of faculty from using certain publications because it considered them subversive and likely to inculcate radical ideas among students. These included the Political Thoughts of Mao, Quotations from Chairman Mao, and the Communist Manifesto.</p>
<p>The suspicions of the government became even more clear in 1970 after the elevation of the institution to a national university. The government appointed Dr Josphat Karanja, a career civil servant as its vice-chancellor. Until his appointment he had served as Kenya’s high commissioner in the UK.</p>
<p>The appointment came as a shock to the university fraternity. The expectation had been that Professor Ogot would be appointed vice chancellor. He had served as deputy principal of the college. The irregular appointment became a trendsetter. </p>
<p>When President Moi came into office after Kenyatta in the late 1970s, he made sure that he filled the vice-chancellor positions with those he deemed loyal. The consequence of this executive interference in the appointment of university heads was twofold. The practice disregarded skills, credentials, and competencies which meant that the best qualified people were not appointed. Secondly, the practice resulted in the erosion of academic freedom and university autonomy.</p>
<h2>A chequered history</h2>
<p>Mwai Kibaki, who succeeded Moi, set about reducing the level of executive interference at universities. The most important step he took was to discontinue the practice of having the president serve as the chancellor of all public universities. </p>
<p>But the legal framework that Kibaki inherited stayed in place until the University Act was passed in 2012. It introduced some fundamental reforms. These included giving the senate and alumni associations the powers of appointing the chancellor. </p>
<p>It also provided for the competitive appointment of vice-chancellors. Interviews were to be done by university councils which would make a recommendation to the Cabinet Secretary. </p>
<p>The new law seemed to create a fair process of appointing the vice-chancellor. But there were still deep flaws. One was that the councils consisted mostly of bureaucrats and members appointed by the cabinet secretary. This allowed powerful politicians to continue influencing appointment.</p>
<p>The flaw of the 2012 law was highlighted in 2018 when Isaac Kosgey was <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/education/Prof-Isaac-Kosgey-takes-over-Moi-University-vice-chancellor/2643604-4351108-70r1kt/index.html">appointed</a> as the vice-chancellor of Moi University. There were claims that some panellists <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Interview-ranking-for-Moi-University-VC-post-released/539546-4208402-14n3wjs/index.html">deliberately down-graded</a> Laban Ayiro who was considered a stronger candidate for the position. The intrigues surrounding the interview process prompted Margaret Kobia, chair of the Public Service Commission to <a href="https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Tribalism-in-public-institutions-worrying-/1950946-4212024-format-xhtml-mrmb1r/nation.co.ke">lament</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is worrying trend where some council members award scores that are outliers. It makes one wonder if the panel members are measuring agreed competencies or had a predetermined candidate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2018, the 2012 law underwent major amendments following the enactment of the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/AmendmentActs/2018/StatuteLawMischellaneousNo18of2018.pdf">Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2018</a>. This stripped university councils of the right to conduct interviews. Instead, this was transferred to the public service commission. </p>
<p>The appointment of Nairobi university’s new chancellor was done under this new regime. But cabinet secretary George Magoha revoked the appointment barely two weeks later. These actions have been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-01-23-uon-wars-court-stops-magoha-from-appointing-new-council/">challenged</a> in court. </p>
<p>It’s now clear that the 2018 law was deeply flawed.</p>
<p>Firstly, the idea of making the public service commission the fair arbiter in the recruitment of university administers has backfired. Secondly, it gave government enormous new powers. It was given the role of appointing the chancellor and vice-chancellor as well as other administrative positions. These included deputy vice chancellors, principals and deputy principals of constituent colleges. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The 2018 law therefore effectively eroded university autonomy and granted the state the ultimate powers in university governance.</p>
<p>It is time to bring sanity to universities by taking away the role of appointing university administrators from the state. This only serves to enable corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Instead, constitute appointment panels consisting of the university senate and alumni associations.</p>
<p>_Professor Kithinji is the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/State-University-Experience-East-Africa/dp/1868888274">“The State and the University Experience in East Africa: Colonial Foundations and Postcolonial
Transformations in Kenya”</a></p>
<p>Twitter: @MikeMwendaK</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Mwenda Kithinji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The crisis at Nairobi University falls within an established pattern of government intervention in universities going back decadesMichael Mwenda Kithinji, Associate Professor, University of Central ArkansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1118372019-02-21T14:17:42Z2019-02-21T14:17:42ZHow young filmmakers are protecting artistic freedom in Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259722/original/file-20190219-43281-n7svqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rafiki was banned from cinemas by the Kenya Film Classification Board for promoting same-sex relationships.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Artistic freedom was always tenuous in Kenya, but it’s become even less so since <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/People/uhuru_kenyatta">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> became president in 2013. The political pendulum has swung against political dissenters, intellectuals and a handful of media institutions that still believed in objective journalism.</p>
<p>Progressive gains made under the previous administration of President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/mwai-kibaki">Mwai Kibaki</a>(2002-2013), such as the freedom of press and speech, have disintegrated. In particular, Kenyatta and the men overseeing the country’s cultural landscape, have rolled back artistic freedom by banning films that attempted to expand identity or interpreted it differently. The most prominent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43922780">example</a> is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/may/09/rafiki-review-sweet-lesbian-romance-aims-to-change-kenyan-hearts-and-minds-cannes"><em>Rafiki</em></a>, a recent Kenyan film that was banned for “promoting lesbianism”. </p>
<p>Historically, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137574633_5">artistic freedom</a> has always been the outcome of struggle. For example, stage actors initiated the first struggle when post-colonial administrations outlawed theatre groups because actors associated themselves with institutions such as the University of Nairobi and Kenya National Theatre (see Ngugi wa Thiong'o’s <em><a href="https://www.uibk.ac.at/anglistik/staff/davis/decolonising-the-mind.pdf">Decolonising the Mind</a></em>). By and large, the two institutions hosted the most vocal government critics. It became standard procedure for the government to ask theatre groups to submit play scripts for “assessment” before it could issue a performance license. </p>
<p>Officials paid insignificant attention to musicians and film directors as they hardly antagonised the ruling elites and produced non-controversial items. An example was the sycophantic song, <em>Tawala Kenya Tawala</em> (“rule Kenya rule”), composed and produced by <a href="https://www.musicinafrica.net/fr/node/6327">Thomas Wasonga</a>. The lyrics exhorted Daniel Arap Moi, Kenya’s second post-colonial president, to rule eternally. Wasonga’s conservative counterparts in the film industry avoided politics, limiting their cinematic gaze to less controversial themes.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/UDqlqpB3m00?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Moi praise song.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Recently, however, a progressive group of young filmmakers has changed the contours informing cinematic themes. Ambitious and daring, they have inspired a national dialogue of what constitutes free speech as encapsulated in the country’s new <a href="http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken127322.pdf">Constitution</a>, as well as artistic freedom, and individual and societal identity. </p>
<h2>Ambitious and daring</h2>
<p>Unlike their forebears, young filmmakers are increasingly embracing cinema as an ideal platform on which to construct a pluralistic identity that includes the LGBTQ community. This has offended the government’s sensibility. Consequently, it has brought cinema under heightened scrutiny. </p>
<p>In September 2014, the Nest Collective, a production company that produced <em><a href="http://www.thisisthenest.com/sool-film">The Stories of Our Lives</a></em>, applied for a license to distribute and exhibit the film. They received a rejection letter from the Kenya Film and Classification Board, a government agency that regulates film content, which claimed that the film had obscenity, explicit scenes of sexual activities and it promotes homosexuality which, is contrary to our national norms and values.</p>
<p>The classification board drew the producer’s attention to a piece of legislation – the Film & Plays Stage Act – that borrows heavily from the colonial government’s <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=YXfMCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=The+Stage+Plays+and+Cinematography+Exhibitions+Ordinance,+1912&source=bl&ots=x_a7cGqGcG&sig=ACfU3U3YNvf5QPngp3icFy_ovI7hW4hk3w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiZkLOqqczgAhUiRxUIHSTrDH0Q6AEwBHoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q=The%20Stage%20Plays%20and%20Cinematography%20Exhibitions%20Ordinance%2C%201912&f=false">The Stage Plays and Cinematography Exhibitions Ordinance, 1912</a>. During the colonial period the ordinance was used to censor Hollywood westerns to shield African audience from undesirable ideas such as kissing, sex, shooting and nudity. </p>
<p>Rather than evoke Kenya’s Constitution – which protects the “freedom to seek, receive or impart information or ideas”, and the “freedom of artistic creativity” – to sue the board, the Nest Collective retreated. It took its case to social media, where, as expected, it died.</p>
<h2>Same tactic</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259726/original/file-20190219-43261-1x9n2mj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Rafiri’ director Wanuri Kahiu, with actors Samantha Mugatsia and Sheila Munyiva at the 2018 Cannes Film Festival.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Clemens Bilan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Four years later, classification board officials <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43922780">banned</a> <em>Rafiki</em> in May 2018 because, as they pointed out, it contained,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>homosexual scenes that are against the law, the culture and moral values of the Kenyan people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It warned that anyone found in possession of the film would be in breach of the law in Kenya, where gay sex is punishable by 14 years. </p>
<p>The film’s director, Wanuri Kahiu, <a href="https://www.out.com/entertainment/2019/2/15/director-sued-kenyan-government-screen-her-lgbtq-film">sued</a> the Board. She argued in court that the ban violated her constitutional right to free speech and artistic freedom of expression. Kahiu insisted that Kenya is,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>made up of different types of people with different imaginations. There should be freedom to express these imaginations, because imagination doesn’t have boundaries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The country’s high court agreed with her. They <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-45609494/kenya-lifts-ban-on-lesbian-film-rafiki-ahead-of-oscars">lifted</a> the ban for seven days, allowing the film to be screened and become eligible to be submitted as Kenya’s entry for Best Foreign Language Film at the Oscars. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Rafiki’s’ trailer.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Random act</h2>
<p>The censorship of cultural productions doesn’t happen in a vacuum, nor is it a random act designed to secure imagined norms and values. It is a calculated and premediated act of subjugation and an act of authoritarianism. In the cultural sphere this begins when the ruling class imagines and constructs a national identity that encompasses nonexistent and undefined principles — such as moral values and norms. It then moves to create competing categories of people, “us” versus “them”. Once this is complete, the chips are expected to fall in place. </p>
<p>However, young filmmakers are resisting this path. Resisting it is the only way in which artists can ensure they retain a freer artistic spaces. But that requires acts of courage. As Martin Luther King Jr <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/13/opinion/what-dr-king-wrote-and-what-he-did.html">reminded</a> the world in 1963 from a Birmingham jail:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor, it must be demanded by the oppressed. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This, exactly, is what <em>Rafiki</em>‘s Kahiu did when she sued the government. It’s what the Nest Collective failed to do. Local artists seeking artistic freedom must follow in Kahiu’s footsteps and peel back the veneer that legitimises censorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111837/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samson Kaunga Ndanyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Kenyan film director sued her country’s film board and won. Local artists should follow suit and fight censorship.Samson Kaunga Ndanyi, Assistant Professor of African History, Rhodes CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/962832018-05-09T14:11:05Z2018-05-09T14:11:05ZRapprochement between two leaders isn’t enough to fix Kenya’s deep divisions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218243/original/file-20180509-185500-1g2gjj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (left) with opposition leader Raila Odinga in March.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his latest <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-full-state-of-the-nation-address/1064-4541100-gqbp50z/index.html">state of the nation address</a> Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta called for opening a new chapter of national unity and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/kenyatta-and-odinga-call-reconciliation-kenya">reconciliation</a>.</p>
<p>This was Kenyatta’s first state of the nation address after last year’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2017/08/kenya-elections-bitterly-contested-170810154141394.html">disputed national elections</a> which went into a re-run. Kenyatta reemerged victorious. But it was a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-5010873/Uhuru-Kenyatta-president-facing-Pyrrhic-election-victory.html">pyrrhic victory</a> as his main challenger Raila Odinga had boycotted the rerun.</p>
<p>With both men at the head of their <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicity-factor-170806081143385.html">ethnically aligned</a> coalitions, Jubilee and National Super Alliance, the 2017 electoral season was highly charged and polarising. Odinga refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s victory and threatened disruption. One of his actions was being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/kenya-tv-networks-gagged-odinga-inauguration-180130081747894.html">sworn in as the people’s president</a>. The mock swearing-in ceremony escalated tensions, culminating in threats of arrests, arraignment and deportation of opposition leaders. The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/08/government-crackdown-threatens-rights-kenya">press and civil society</a> were also targeted.</p>
<p>Kenya’s politics has <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyatta-or-odinga-why-dynastic-politics-is-alive-and-well-in-kenya-80732">broadly been dominated by two families</a>, the Kenyattas from the Kikuyu and the Odingas from the Luo ethic groups. Uhuru, son of the founding president Jomo Kenyatta, has gone head to head with Raila for the presidential vote twice – in 2013 and 2017. Both elections were marked by ethnic coalition building in which Kenyatta led the most demographically dominant coalition, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/kenya-jubilee-party-uniting-or-dividing-kenyans/a-19540503">Jubilee</a>. </p>
<p>On both occasions, the outcome was a kind of ethnic census because <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-elections-ethnicity/kenyan-politicians-struggle-to-break-ethnic-voting-patterns-idUSKBN1AL049">Kenyan politics</a> is highly charged along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>Since last year’s tensions, there’s been a visible rapprochement between the two men. Does this signal a broader bottom-up reconciliation process? </p>
<p>Perhaps the reality is that the momentum has started from the top but will take time to get to the bottom. Kenyan politics is notoriously <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicity-factor-170806081143385.html">tribal</a>, in part because the system is built for zero sum gains in that it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/books/review/Hammer-t.html">creates winners and losers</a>. As long as this remains the case, Kenya will always remain susceptible to ethnic entrepreneurs as politicians seek to play the ethnic tramp card.</p>
<h2>The rapprochement</h2>
<p>The first sign of rapprochement between the two men took the country by some surprise. A staged <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/opposition-alliance-in-kenya-seen-dead-as-odinga-breaks-ranks">handshake</a> in March 2018 signalled a dramatic change of tone and de-escalation of tensions. </p>
<p>Government immediately mellowed its tone towards the opposition, signalling a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. Within days, Odinga was serving as <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Raila-attended-Winnie-Mandela-funeral-as--official-Kenyan-envoy-/1056-4394164-1205di2/index.html">official</a> government emissary to South Africa to attend Winnie Mandela’s funeral. And a joint team to oversee dialogue was announced.</p>
<p>But what does all this rapprochement mean? The <a href="http://www.president.go.ke/2018/03/09/building-bridges-to-a-new-kenyan-nation/">joint statement</a> following the first meeting sought to strike a new political tone. On the surface, it signalled the willingness of both men to draw a line under the acrimony that had emerged from the electoral crisis. </p>
<p>This perhaps points to Kenya’s politics as not only complex but also unpredictable. The country has been here before – after the 2008 elections of Mwai Kibaki thousands died <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html">in inter communal post electoral violence</a>. Undertakings were given and efforts were made to build national unity. Yet a decade later, Kenyans are witness to more of the same, albeit on a lesser scale. </p>
<p>Questions are therefore being asked if there is any depth to the Kenyatta-Raila “handshake” beyond portraying both leaders as magnanimous and willing to compromise for the national interests. Their joint statement sought to heal divisions and open a new chapter of inclusiveness and security for all. </p>
<p>For now it is too early to deduce tangible evidence of political inclusivity though tensions have been greatly dialled down. Kenyatta’s <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/I-am-sorry--says-Uhuru-Kenyatta--in-new-unity-plea-/1064-4541806-xiq0ajz/index.html">public apology</a> to those he “offended” was meant to portray him as a conciliatory statesman. </p>
<p>On the other hand Odinga had more political capital to gain by seeking compromise as a way out of the impasse. His <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1de27bbf-5abc-3e53-ad33-6c56f38d295c">defiance campaign</a> was always deemed more disruptive and a political nuisance than strategically meaningful as the <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171120-kenya-supreme-court-upholds-kenyatta-election-win">Supreme Court</a> had validated the elections.</p>
<h2>Much more is needed</h2>
<p>What Kenya needs is transformative change, including constitutional reforms. This should include strengthening structures in which everyone feels represented. And the country needs to design a formula to provide a competitive but an embracing political framework that can deliver enduring peace and prosperity for all Kenyans.</p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/548e1080-7f88-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff">lives were lost</a> in the post electoral violence. The two leaders bear special responsibility and should therefore lead efforts to help heal and bridge communal divisions. The recent warming of relations between the two protagonists point to this effort. </p>
<p>But they are not the only players. Others that would be equally important in bringing their communities on board in the broader effort of reconciliation. they include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.kenya-today.com/politics/meet-ruto-the-king-maker">William Ruto</a>, current deputy president and an ethnic Kalenjin, </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kalonzo-Musyoka-Skips-Raila-Odinga-Oath-Event/1064-4285500-7pd502z/index.html">Kalonzo Musyoka</a>, former vice president, wider democratic movement leader, co-principle of NASA and an ethnic kamba, and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Musalia-differs-with-Raila-on-fresh-elections/1064-4316288-egr9n4/index.html">Musalia Mudavadi</a> a co-principal of NASA, former vice president and deputy prime minister, leader of Amani National congress and an ethnic Luhya would
The role of civil society and religious leaders is also indispensable as partners in reconciliation and rebuilding inter-communal and institutional trust. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In the short and medium term, it’s overly optimistic to expect ethnic politics to dissipate in Kenya. This requires institutional change as well as a shift in attitude, values and culture like belief in collective prosperity, non-violent settlement of disputes and inter communal trust. For this Kenyan communities and their political leaders still have a great deal to do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Questions are being raised about the Kenyatta and Odinga relationship.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909652018-02-18T07:54:16Z2018-02-18T07:54:16ZWhat Kenya has to show for sending troops into Somalia seven years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206347/original/file-20180214-174963-1facoan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Somali man talks to Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) soldiers as they secure an area in the coastal town of Kismayu in southern Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siegfried Modola</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops crossed the border into Somalia. The <a href="http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/76111/Migue_Military%20diplomacy.pdf?sequence=3">official reason</a> was that Kenya’s national security was threatened by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab. The terrorist group had in fact carried out a number of <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation">cross-border raids</a> during the months preceding the operation. </p>
<p>There’s still considerable disagreement about the reasons for Kenya’s military action in October 2011. </p>
<p>More than six years after Nairobi made the drastic move, Kenyan troops are still in Somalia and Al-Shabaab is still considered a threat to Kenya. Numerous terrorist attacks have been carried out by the Somali group, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya">deadly siege </a> on the Westgate shopping mall in 2013. </p>
<p>There are a number of possible explanations as to why the Kenyan authorities made the decision to engage Al-Shabaab in Somalia. These range from trying to prop up the Kenyan army’s image, to currying favour with the West, to making the north east of the country safer. Some strategies have proved more successful than others.</p>
<h2>Proving a point</h2>
<p>One possible explanation for the action is that the Kenyan Defence Force was eager to show that it could actually fight a war. In the run up to the action, the Kenyan military had been stung by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s mocking remark that it was a <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-1233186-a5f0bfz/index.html">“career army”</a> ill-equipped to face a guerrilla insurgency.</p>
<p>Added to this were <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13509/strategic-posture-review-kenya">Kenyan concerns</a> about Uganda’s growing military footprint in Somalia which could threaten the self-perception of the KDF as a superior military power in East Africa. So crossing the border deploying troops in Somalia was part of an exercise to <a href="https://textbookcentre.com/catalogue/operation-linda-nchi-kenyas-military-experience-in-somalia_10730/">enhance the image of the KDF</a> in the eyes of the population in the midst of allegations of corruption.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/114/454/1/2195212">reports have also suggested</a> that some senior officers expected that the Kenyan troops committed to Somalia could eventually join the African Union Mission in Somalia. The countries contributing to the mission at the time were Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti.</p>
<p>The integration of Kenya into the mission would have meant that some, if not all, of the costs of the military action would be funded by international donors. In these Kenyan officers’ calculation, joining the mission would mean the government would have to find less from the national budget. </p>
<p>Combined, these factors gave the Kenyan army a strong institutional interest in crossing over into Somalia. </p>
<h2>The Somali connection</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, the then Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia">appeared initially to have been hesitant</a> to approve the invasion. He seems to have been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2011-11-15/why-kenya-invaded-somalia">persuaded to go ahead</a> by the Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti, the Defence Minister Yusuf Haji, the Chief of the Defence Forces Julius Karangi and the head of the intelligence Services Michael Gichangi. </p>
<p>An important decision maker in this group was Yusuf Haji, an ethnic Somali. Haji was known to be <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kenya%E2%80%99s-intervention-somalia">behind the idea of establishing a state</a>, Jubaland, inside the borders of Somalia close to Kenya. Jubaland is a potentially rich region with lush rangelands and farmlands as well as offshore oil and gas deposits.</p>
<p>Haji was also known to back the push to unite his Ogadeni clan scattered across northern Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. Leading academic and expert on Kenyan politics David Throup has <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kenya%E2%80%99s-intervention-somalia">argued</a> that “personal economic and political interests of senior Kenyan politicians and soldiers from Northeastern Province’s Ogadeni Somali community” were decisive factors in the decision. </p>
<h2>Economic and military aid from the West</h2>
<p>There is a third factor. Since the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya has been perceived as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/434/97/72275?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic ally of the US in its counter terrorism efforts</a> on the continent. As a result, the country has become one of the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747731.2012.627722?journalCode=rglo20">largest recipients</a> of Western foreign aid and security assistance on the continent. </p>
<p>Despite the close relationship between the West and Kenya, in the years leading up to 2011 Washington had become <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34378.pdf">increasingly critical</a> about Kenya’s inability to implement political and economic reforms. Towards the end of 2011 Nairobi was facing the possibility of Washington reducing its assistance. </p>
<p>Kenya’s incursion could therefore be seen in the context of a country propping up its image as a reliable ally in the global war on terrorism. Nairobi was keen to present the intervention as part of the ongoing Western-led war on terror. A crucial official argument was that the invasion was an <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Risks-and-opportunities-in-Kenyas-intervention-in-Somalia/1064-1276082-a07ervz/index.html">anti-terrorist operation</a>.</p>
<h2>Making the northeast safe</h2>
<p>A fourth explanation is Kenya’s desire to make the vast semi-arid north-east safe for tourism and foreign direct investment. Further south lies Lamu, the focal point of the <a href="http://www.lapsset.go.ke/">country’s most ambitious infrastructure project</a>. Violent attacks by al-Shabaab in the north-east would not only keep the tourists away from the region but also deter potential foreign investors. </p>
<p>There are also great expectations related to <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">oil exploration</a> and to the establishment of huge transportation systems linking Lamu port with the Kenyan and South Sudan oil fields and the 80 million people in the Ethiopian market. </p>
<h2>Outcomes</h2>
<p>Only a few months after the Kenyan army started the incursions into the southern part of Somalia, a <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-signs-deal-with-S-Sudan-on-highway-to-Juba/-/539546/1679248/-/mocq70/-/index.html">billion dollar deal with South-Sudan</a> was signed. And less than half a year after October 2011, <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-strikes-oil-in-Turkana/996-1373886-format-xhtml-10osubz/index.html">Kenya announced the discovery oil for the first time</a>. </p>
<p>If the main reason for the incursion was to make Kenya safe from al-Shabaab and attract foreign direct investments, the impact is less obvious. There has been some foreign investment, but far from enough. </p>
<p>If the main driver was to improve the Kenyan army’s image, it can be described a success. The defence force has <a href="https://textbookcentre.com/catalogue/operation-linda-nchi-kenyas-military-experience-in-somalia_10730/">enhanced it’s standing</a> in the Kenyan population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gorm Rye Olsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya cited national security when it crossed into Somali territory in pursuit of Al-Shabaab militants. But there were numerous other potential aims at play.Gorm Rye Olsen, Professor, Institute for Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855402017-10-11T11:27:36Z2017-10-11T11:27:36ZWhat Odinga’s election pullout means for Kenya’s turbulent democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189756/original/file-20171011-16657-zvmrwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga announced his exit from the re-run of the presidential election scheduled for October 26. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Baz Ratner</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The leader of Kenya’s opposition coalition, Raila Odinga, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001256965/raila-odinga-withdraws-from-repeat-presidential-election">has withdrawn</a> from the repeat presidential election <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-Election-Petition-Supreme-Court-Judgment-Uhuru/1056-4079158-j52377/index.html">ordered</a> by the country’s Supreme Court. Only two candidates were scheduled to compete in the upcoming poll, the other being the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta.</p>
<p>A day after Odinga’s withdrawal, the Kenyan High Court <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/High-Court-include-Ekuru-Aukot-repeat-poll/1064-4134352-bub0gxz/index.html">ruled in favour</a> of including another presidential candidate in the ballot, meaning that the election is now likely to go ahead. The new candidate, Ekuru Aukot, was an interested party in the Supreme Court case that invalidated the August 8th election.</p>
<p>Odinga’s pullout came in protest at the perceived inability of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to carry out a free and fair election.</p>
<p>In the recent <a href="http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/filemanager_uploads/A%20-%20Presidential%20Petitions%202017/Rulings/Determination.pdf">petition to the Supreme Court</a>, his National Super Alliance (NASA) accused the electoral commission of having failed in its duties to conduct an election, and <a href="http://www.jfjustice.net/downloads/1505942396.pdf">demonstrated clear evidence</a> of irregularities such as missing and forged electoral forms.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court found in favour of the opposition coalition, and so fresh elections were scheduled within 60 days.</p>
<p>While there is consistency to Odinga’s distrust of the electoral commission, his position holds no legal consistency. The opposition made a petition to the Supreme Court and should therefore abide by its ruling.</p>
<p>The court found that the electoral commission failed to conduct the election appropriately, but that there were no grounds for saying Kenyatta’s coalition, the Jubilee Alliance, had been the ones to rig it.</p>
<p>Odinga’s opposition coalition petitioned the courts and got the result they wanted. They should therefore have stood by the ruling and continued to follow constitutional channels. By withdrawing Odinga is terminating the country’s democratic processes. If the need for IEBC reform was enough reason to delay the election further, a case could have been brought to the Supreme Court on this basis. </p>
<p>The IEBC is a commission created by the Constitution, meaning its duty to conduct free and fair elections is a democratic fundamental. As such, political opposition to its operations has a clear legal remedy. Instead, Odinga’s abandonment of the process has handed legal credibility to his rivals.</p>
<p>Kenya is in uncharted territory. The group that sought free and fair elections through lawful means – the opposition coalition – has now abandoned trust in the constitutional commission set up to bring about the poll.</p>
<p>In making the decision Odinga has also signed a death sentence on his political career stretching back 40 years.</p>
<h2>A history of hard fought battles</h2>
<p>Odinga has had a lot of practice over very many years in navigating the difficult path between acting according to the rules of the system and opposing manipulation of those rules. </p>
<p>In 2002 he joined a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289660924_Kenya_since_2002_The_more_things_change_the_more_they_stay_the_same">broader inter-ethnic coalition</a> to force leadership away from the Kenya African National Union (KANU). In power since independence in 1963, KANU had consistently thwarted the emergence of free and fair elections in Kenya in the 1990s under President Daniel arap Moi. </p>
<p>But those who initially spearheaded the inter-ethnic alliance also seemed to abuse the system to their advantage in the 2007 elections. Odinga led <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/31/kenya.topstories3">popular protests</a> against the swearing-in of President Mwai Kibaki in complaint of this. The standoff plunged the country into one of its worst periods of political violence, with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/02/15/i-just-sit-and-wait-die/reparations-survivors-kenyas-2007-2008-post-election">over 1,000 dead</a> and hundreds of thousands internally displaced.</p>
<p>In 2013 Odinga took the disputed election results <a href="https://kenyastockholm.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/full-judgement-petition-no-5-of-2013-judgement-final-2-april-16-2013.pdf">to the courts</a>. But the Supreme Court allowed Kenyatta’s election to stand.</p>
<p>Many therefore felt that Odinga had finally got the democracy he’d fought for when the Supreme Court invalidated the 2017 results and ordered fresh elections. But that conclusion appears to have been premature. Odinga’s exit from the democratic process means opposition supporters’ faith in the system is at the point of collapse.</p>
<p>Odinga has been consistent in his criticisms of the electoral commission. And he has acted in a principled way. He should be praised for both.</p>
<p>Indeed, the failure of the electoral commission dates back as far as the constitutional referendum in 2010. A British court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-sussex-31444228">found</a> that electoral commissioners accepted bribes from a UK firm to win the contract for printing ballot papers. In the 2017 elections, the accusation was that the local tallies did not match the central tallies being received electronically in Nairobi. The physical forms that would have reconciled the differences were then said to have been lost.</p>
<p>Despite the catastrophic failure to conduct this year’s election appropriately, the electoral commission chairperson <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/news/chebukati-storm-not-quitting/">refused to stand down</a>, reducing public credibility in the institution to nil.</p>
<h2>Complete new election?</h2>
<p>The NASA coalition has tried to substantiate its position. Technically-speaking, they say, their withdrawal means no election can take place, and so a complete new election should be organised. So rather than Kenyatta being handed victory on a plate, a longer time for fresh elections would be given, with all allowed to compete as if it were a very first round. That would provide a breather of at least 90 days, with additional time for parties to nominate new leaders.</p>
<p>But such a legal argument is fanciful. It is based on a misreading of article 138 (8) (b) of Kenya’s <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">Constitution</a> which says that a complete new election must be organised if one of the candidates dies during the campaign period. The NASA coalition are arguing that their withdrawal from the elections is an abandonment that is forced by the failure of the electoral commission, and therefore tantamount to the death of a leader during the campaign period.</p>
<p>If they believe this is a solid legal argument, they can again petition the courts to invalidate the preparations for the fresh elections. But the legal argument is weak, and I doubt they will try this route.</p>
<p>The twist that NASA did not expect was the High Court ruling that a minor candidate is allowed to take the place of Odinga. That will mean an election that gives greater validity to Kenyatta’s inevitable victory – an enormous blow to Odinga’s strategy.</p>
<p>The High Court decision to include Ekuru Aukot is based on the fact that he was part of the original case that disputed the 2017 election results. But the court has made a grave error of legal judgment: Aukot was an ‘interested party’ to that case, not one of the ‘petitioners’. This is, in legal terms, a big difference. If he was a successful petitioner in the Supreme Court case, and therefore a valid candidate now, the fresh elections should have involved him from the start and been contested by three candidates.</p>
<p>One cannot simply add candidates as one goes to make the election look competitive.</p>
<p>In any case, the inclusion of Aukot will be of no consequence to the result. In the disputed 8 August polls he <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/No-sideshows-as-judges-set-tempo-for-elections-case/1064-4073476-gl4ayc/index.html">received</a> a mere 0.18% of the vote, making him the 5th placed candidate. That compares against a supposed 54.17% for Kenyatta.</p>
<p>The electoral commission will, however turbulently, take forward the court judgments and hold an election between Kenyatta and Aukot. The polls will certainly mean Kenyatta is declared President of Kenya for his second term in a row. </p>
<p>This is the fault of Odinga who has taken the decision to exit lawful processes prematurely. The road to competitive free and fair elections in Kenya extends ever longer into the horizon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85540/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic Burbidge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s upcoming poll will continue despite opposition leader Raila Odinga’s decision to exit lawful processes prematurely. This will mean Kenyatta will likely win his second term in a row.Dominic Burbidge, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/799502017-07-05T14:03:04Z2017-07-05T14:03:04ZWhy Kenya’s electorate should be wary of bold education reform promises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176741/original/file-20170704-27390-1wm85y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya abolished primary school fees in January 2003.
</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan voters are being fed a daily diet of grand promises in the lead up to the country’s national elections. If either of the two main coalitions win power in polls scheduled for <a href="https://buzzkenya.com/date-2017-general-election-agreed/">August 8, 2017</a>, citizens can look forward to free maternity services, free public secondary school, farm subsidies, lower food prices and much more.</p>
<p>For better or worse, the education sector has been the easy target of numerous campaign promises. Kenya’s two rival political coalitions are both promising <a href="http://www.africanelections.org/new_news.php?nid=2013">free secondary school education</a> if elected. It’s an attractive offer given that it could ease the financial burden of millions of vulnerable families.</p>
<p>The pledge is not without some controversy. The ruling Jubilee Party and the rival National Super Alliance can’t seem to agree over who gave <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Free-schooling-my-idea--says-Kalonzo-Musyoka/1064-3955812-1qv54p/index.html">birth to the idea</a>. Each coalition also has its own implementation strategy. </p>
<p>The opposition alliance has the more ambitious goal of implementing free secondary education within a month of being elected. The incumbents on the other hand are bringing forward their timeline to 2018 rather than the initial 2019. </p>
<p>Kenyans are no strangers to education promises. At independence in 1963 the founding president Mzee Jomo Kenyatta promised – but didn’t deliver – free universal primary education. It wasn’t until 2003, four decades later, that the promise finally <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/07/world/primary-schools-in-kenya-fees-abolished-are-filled-to-overflowing.html">became a reality</a>.</p>
<p>It’s clear from the pronouncements made by both parties that not a lot of thought preceded the promises they are making and Kenyans are likely to be disappointed. In retrospect, the <a href="https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijhsse/v2-i5/8.pdf">implementation</a> of free basic education Kenyans reminds us that haphazard decisions have <a href="http://www.kenpro.org/papers/challenges-facing-free-primary-education-in-kenya.htm">serious ramifications</a> on the education sector and vulnerable members of society.</p>
<p>Already school heads are sounding the alarm bells. They want adequate <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201706190538.html">infrastructure</a> and deployment of more teachers to be in place before there’s a major change in policy.</p>
<h2>Free primary school education</h2>
<p>Free primary education is thanks to the winning coalition’s 2002 election manifesto. Apart from entrenching primary education as a basic right, the policy is credited with boosting enrolments. But the initiative faced numerous challenges. </p>
<p>There was no time to prepare the schools for the influx of learners just days into Mwai Kibaki’s presidency. School infrastructure was over stretched and the teachers were overworked. In spite of the overall success, moreover, free primary education has <a href="http://architecture.brookes.ac.uk/research/cendep/dissertations/PaulKenya.pdf">yet to reach all</a> school going children.</p>
<p>One immediate effect of the chaos was that some parents opted for low cost private schools, particularly in slum areas. Parents went out in search of smaller classes that are associated with individualised attention and quality education. </p>
<p>Free basic education ended up creating <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-free-education-policy-could-actually-be-deepening-inequality-48355">inequalities</a> that are more pronounced for poor households that can’t afford private education. </p>
<p>The current pledge of free secondary education comes smack in the middle of another unfulfilled promise: a free laptop for each pupil joining primary school. Many are still waiting for the Jubilee government to deliver on its 2013 campaign pledge that over a million learners would get free laptops in 2014. </p>
<p>Among the challenges along the way included <a href="http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/74034">poor planning</a>, procurement <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/High-Court-nullifies-laptops-tender/1056-2463916-1x8anu/index.html">disputes</a> and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000084770/6-000-primary-schools-picked-for-free-laptop-project">insecurity</a>. There was also lack of preparedness of public schools in terms of infrastructure development and re-skilling of teachers. </p>
<p>As of 2016, 11,500 pupils had <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000200542/laptop-dream-becomes-a-reality-for-11-500-pupils-across-kenya">received</a> laptops. But disparity between what has been delivered and the monumental amounts of money <a href="http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/06/fresh-sh17bn-allocation-for-laptop-project/">allocated</a> or spent is worrying and worth digging into.</p>
<h2>Secondary schooling in Kenya</h2>
<p>A secondary education subsidy was introduced in <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/03/kenya-free-secondary-schooling-policy-faces-testing-times/">2008</a> under the national coalition government of President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. The stated aim was to curb high dropout rates by paying Sh10,265 (about USD$100) per student per year towards <a href="http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1109168.pdf">tuition fees</a>. Parents would have to cater for boarding and uniform requirements. </p>
<p>The subsidy was further <a href="http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1109168.pdf">increased</a> by about 25% to Sh12,870 in 2014 under President Uhuru Kenyatta. The president has <a href="http://www.president.go.ke/2017/06/24/jubilees-free-secondary-education-to-kick-off-smoothly/">intimated</a> that the increase was in preparation for free secondary education resulting in annual subsidy allocation rising to Sh32 billion.</p>
<p>Kenya’s secondary schools has about <a href="http://www.treasury.go.ke/sector-reports-2018/send/127-2017/231-education-sector-report.html">2.72 million</a> learners. This is set to rise dramatically next year when, for the first time, the country plans to achieve <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201704280105.html">100% transition</a> from primary to secondary school.</p>
<p>With these increasing numbers, making secondary education free at the rate proposed of Sh22,244 (about USD$215) per student per year means that the current budget will double to more than Sh60 billion.</p>
<p>The budget is still likely to increase further if costs related to uniform and lunch are included so as to make secondary education <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-cost-providing-free-secondary-education-kenya/">truly free</a> as is being pledged. </p>
<p>Kenyans ought to be questioning whether the country is ready and able to offer free secondary education. In spite of the current subsidy many students are not attending school due to numerous hidden costs and fees associated with school uniform, materials, meals and administration. This is partly because the government has proved <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000186802/fees-shocker-to-parents-in-kenya-as-schools-defy-ministry-s-guide">unable to enforce</a> official school fee guidelines for public schools. The government has also <a href="http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/education/Release-free-learning-funds-now-/3126398-3980070-format-xhtml-nd936f/index.html">struggled</a> to remit the subsidy on time, making it harder for school managers to meet their obligations. </p>
<p>Planning for free education calls for sobriety to avoid a repeat of past mistakes. All stakeholders should be included in the planning of this major reform and leaders should be held accountable for the promises they make.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79950/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Beatrice M’mboga Akala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenyans should be demanding to know if the country is ready or able to offer free secondary education given past failures.Beatrice M’mboga Akala, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.