tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/nato-786/articlesNATO – The Conversation2024-03-22T10:15:51Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259442024-03-22T10:15:51Z2024-03-22T10:15:51ZUkraine war: Russia’s Baltic neighbours to create massive border defences as Trump continues undermining Nato<p>With Donald Trump leading in <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">many of the polls</a> for the upcoming US presidential election, his comments about global security and foreign policy have to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>In February, Trump flippantly remarked that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wanted to Nato states that failed to pay their <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html#:%7E:text=As%20president%2C%20Trump%20privately%20threatened,wants%20to%20weaken%20the%20alliance">bills</a>. In a follow-up interview on GB News this week he <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">warned allies</a> “not to take advantage” of the US. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this causing more concern than for the countries in the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.</p>
<p>Not only does Trump, sometimes, say he wants to halt all US military aid to Ukraine, but Trump wants to undercut article 5 of Nato’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-trump-spending-wesley-clark-treaty-article-5-2019-12?r=US&IR=T">treaty</a> – the principle of collective defence – something that has become increasingly important in the wake of Russia’s aggression. British military <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">sources are worried that</a> Trump’s remarks will strengthen Putin’s resolve over Ukraine, and could result in him advancing on even more territory.</p>
<p>Even before Trump emerged on the US political scene, the Baltic countries have been especially concerned about Russia’s growing ambitions. They have, after all, been <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states/Soviet-occupation">invaded and occupied by Russia before</a>, in 1940, and then forced to become part of <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004464896/BP000015.xml">the Soviet Union</a>. There’s plenty of people who can still remember life in the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Baltic states have been the loudest voices sounding the alarm about the existential threat posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-should-stop-westsplaining-and-listen-to-its-smaller-eastern-members-they-saw-the-ukraine-war-coming-226165">Russia</a>, and all three countries increased their military spending to more than 2% of their GDP, and recently agreed to raise it to <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1841298/baltics-agree-on-need-to-raise-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp">3%</a>.</p>
<h2>Building shared defences</h2>
<p>Amid growing security concerns, the defence ministers in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also agreed in January to set up a common Baltic defence zone on their borders with Russia and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/19/baltic-nations-to-build-defense-network-along-borders-with-russia-belarus-a83786">Belarus</a>. This would consist of building physical defensive structures such as bunkers.</p>
<p>Estonia will begin construction of 600 bunkers in early <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/baltic-nations-prepare-600-strong-bunker-defensive-line-with-russian-threat-in-mind/">2025</a>. The nations will also cooperate in developing missile artillery, and ensuring that their equipment, ammunition and manpower is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-lithuania-estonia-common-defense-zone-russia-border-security-concerns/">updated</a>.</p>
<p>Estonia has also doubled the size of its territorial defence force to 20,000 <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">people</a>, while Latvia reintroduced conscription in 2023 after becoming the only Baltic state to stop mandatory military service in 2006.</p>
<p>Latvia also plans to double the size of its armed forces to 61,000 by the year <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">2032</a>. Meanwhile, Lithuania has made an agreement with Germany to allow a permanent brigade of 4,800 of its troops to be combat ready on the Russian border by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-brigade-be-combat-ready-lithuania-russian-border-2027-2023-12-18/">2027</a>.</p>
<h2>Putin’s pledge to Russian speakers</h2>
<p>But given that Russia borders 14 countries, why are the Baltic states especially concerned about their security? In addition to being geographically close, a notable number of ethnic Russians live in the Baltic countries (5% in Lithuania; 25% in Estonia and 36% in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight/disquiet-in-baltics-over-sympathies-of-russian-speakers-idUSBREA2K07S20140323/">Latvia</a>. In the eastern Estonian city of Narva, 95.7% of the population are native Russian speakers and 87.7% are ethnic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/22/always-looking-shoulder-anxiety-estonia-russians-tallinn">Russians</a>. </p>
<p>This matters as Putin has argued that having substantial numbers of ethnic Russians living outside of Russia, due to the “catastrophic” dissolution of the Soviet Union, represents a “humanitarian <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2023.2162329">disaster</a> of epic proportions” as it left Russians cut off from “their motherland”. Putin has vowed to actively protect all “Russians” living <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/putin-vows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad/">abroad</a>. </p>
<p>In particular, Putin has said he was concerned about how ethnic Russians are being treated in the Baltics, remarking that the deportation of ethnic Russians (most notably in Latvia where there have been recent changes to its immigration laws), poses a threat to Russian national <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1733169?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com">security</a>.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has also protested the demolition of Soviet monuments in the <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/russia-protests-dismantling-of-soviet-monument.a198914/">Baltics</a>, placing Estonia’s prime minster, Kaja Kallas, <a href="https://news.err.ee/1609251885/kallas-on-russia-s-wanted-list-this-is-a-familiar-scare-tactic">on its wanted list</a> for doing so. </p>
<p>But these claims about wanting to protect Russians abroad, are really just a pretext to justify escalation with the Baltics, which will test Nato’s alliance and destabilise the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024">organisation</a>. So it’s not just important that there are ethnic Russians living there – there are strategic reasons as well that make them an easy target.</p>
<p>Even with the Baltic countries strengthening their troop numbers, Russia currently has 1.32 million active military personnel, and two million active <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1296573/russia-ukraine-military-comparison/">reserve</a>. Combined this is greater that Lithuania’s entire population of 2.8 million people, and far greater than Estonia and Latvia which have populations of 1.3 million and 1.8 million people, respectively.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-should-stop-westsplaining-and-listen-to-its-smaller-eastern-members-they-saw-the-ukraine-war-coming-226165">The EU should stop 'westsplaining' and listen to its smaller eastern members – they saw the Ukraine war coming</a>
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<p>For Lithuania, which borders Belarus and Russian-run mini-state Kaliningrad, there are concerns that it could be taken over first by Russian forces, which would then physically isolate Lithuania from the rest of the Baltics. The Kaliningrad region has become increasingly militarised in recent years, with Iskander ballistic missiles and S-400 <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/2022-12-05-BalticRussia-FINALweb.pdf">systems</a> installed. With Trump suggesting he would weaken the US’s commitment to Nato if elected, there won’t be much of a deterrent for Putin to grab low-hanging fruit.</p>
<p>The current Nato response force consists of approximately <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-increase-high-readiness-force-300000/">40,000 troops</a>, with plans to upgrade to 300,000 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61954516">troops</a>. But quick-reaction units could still be too slow to protect the Baltics from Russian forces as, ironically, moving large units, vehicles and ammunition <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/is-baltic-sea-nato-lake-pub-91263">across borders is bureaucratic and takes time</a>. It would be important to have excellent intelligence and to move quickly, something that will be made more difficult with the US potentially opting out of its commitments.</p>
<p>Though Russia has plunged much of its resources into winning the Ukraine war, Putin still aims to expand Russian sovereignty across the post-Soviet states and to effectively dismantle Nato, something that Trump takes no issue with. As Russia has been ramping up its war machine, the Baltic states firmly believe that Russian aggression will not stop at Ukraine, and that they <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1717545/if-ukraine-falls-baltic-states-will-be-next-says-russia-s-former-pm#:%7E:text=In%20Kasyanov%2C%20view%2C%20the%20war,be%20next%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20said.&text=Kasyanov%2C%2064%2C%20was%20sacked%20by,People's%20Freedom%20party%2C%20or%20Parnas">could be next</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Baltic states have high numbers of Russian speakers, who Putin has vowed to ‘protect’.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2263062024-03-21T03:40:33Z2024-03-21T03:40:33ZNo, the West is not to blame for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Why this myth – and others – are so difficult to dispel<p>It is no surprise the second anniversary of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine generated so much commentary. What is surprising, though, is that Kremlin propaganda remains so prevalent in what purports to be analysis.</p>
<p>This week, the ABC was forced to defend a documentary it aired on the conflict, which quoted Russian soldiers justifying the country’s invasion. Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/mar/19/abc-four-courners-russia-ukraine-war-documentary-bowl-of-vomit">said</a> it repeated “blatant lies” coming from the Kremlin. </p>
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<p>But this is not the only example. Among the other Russian assertions frequently <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306">repeated</a> by commentators are that the West is at fault for the war and the root cause lies in “NATO expansion”. Proponents of this line recycle the tired narrative that the West does not understand Russia’s world view and has failed to accommodate its “legitimate security interests”.</p>
<p>Another persistent <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/the-wests-bid-to-expand-nato-eastwards-was-a-mistake/news-story/51c13a5dd27498209637724fa6cb5a4c">line</a> is that the West’s failure to understand Russia’s thinking is to blame for the tensions that have marked relations between the two sides for the past 20 years. </p>
<p>On the contrary, Putin has been clear he is intent on recovering Russia’s “historic lands” in his war with Ukraine, in the process wantonly breaching security guarantees Moscow had given Kyiv twice in the 1990s.</p>
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<p>There is no misunderstanding Putin’s threat-infused nostalgia for “<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565">the legacy of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences</a>” of 1945, either. This was when the US, UK and Soviet Union carved up the territories of the vanquished following the second world war and demarcated their respective spheres of influence, denying tens of millions of people any say in their own future.</p>
<p>Accusing the West of sowing democracy on Russia’s doorstep today ignores the reality that, freed from 50 years of Moscow’s repressive domination, the countries of eastern Europe unequivocally saw their future security and prosperity as part of the European Union and NATO.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-is-on-a-personal-mission-to-rewrite-cold-war-history-making-the-risks-in-ukraine-far-graver-177730">Putin is on a personal mission to rewrite Cold War history, making the risks in Ukraine far graver</a>
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<p>While they have been understandably silent on the matter since February 2022, some of Russia’s leading foreign and defence policy thinkers – none of them Kremlin opponents – previously dismissed the idea that “NATO expansion” represented a threat to Russian security. </p>
<p>Defence analyst Alexander Khramchikhin <a href="https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-10-14/1_1162_alliances.html">argued</a> in the authoritative Military Industrial Courier in October 2021 that claims NATO was preparing to attack Russia were “shameful”. If NATO was preparing for war with Russia, he added, it was doing so defensively.</p>
<p>Similarly, Andrei Kortunov, formerly the influential head of the Russian International Affairs Council, <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/putins-nato-power-play-stirs-disquiet-among-russias-security-elite/">argued</a> on the now-shuttered Carnegie Moscow office website in January 2021,</p>
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<p>former Soviet republics have been desperately storming the gates of the Euro-Atlantic security structures, and the West, fully aware that accepting these new member states would weaken NATO, not strengthen it, had to respond to this pressure.</p>
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<p>Putin’s own policies have also substantially worsened Russia’s strategic circumstances, not least by driving <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478">Finland and Sweden</a> to pursue NATO membership. Moreover, NATO’s recent policies (including generally declining military expenditure from 1990–2014) in no way pointed to hostile intent towards Russia.</p>
<h2>Putin’s war aims were not limited</h2>
<p>In a similar vein, some <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/the-wests-bid-to-expand-nato-eastwards-was-a-mistake/news-story/51c13a5dd27498209637724fa6cb5a4c">believe</a> Putin’s aims in Ukraine are limited to securing disarmament and neutrality, as well as a special status for Crimea and the eastern region of Donbas. Advocates of this line implicitly condone Putin’s use of military force to unilaterally recast post-second world war borders.</p>
<p>It is clear serious planning and intelligence failures misled Putin and his narrow cohort of advisers into thinking Ukraine would fold in days. A history autodidact, Putin presumably had no interest in occupying western Ukraine, knowing this <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-has-long-used-the-historic-kyivan-rus-state-to-justify-expansionism-178092">traditionally</a> had been Catholic Polish and Lithuanian territory and never part of the Orthodox Slavic lands of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/02/long-history-russian-imperialism-shaping-putins-war/">Great Russia</a>.</p>
<p>We can reasonably surmise Putin’s goal was the swift capture of Kyiv, the political or physical elimination of President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the occupation of Ukraine east of the Dnipro River (and potentially the Black Sea coastline, including Odesa, founded by Putin’s heroine, Catherine the Great). </p>
<p>Thus, Putin would replicate the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russian-history-and-the-concept-of-smuta-turmoil-sheds-light-on-putin-and-prigozhin-and-the-dangers-of-dissent-210289">gathering of the lands</a>” of one of his distant predecessors, Tsar Ivan III, and consign what was left of western Ukraine to the eternal financial responsibility of Europe. </p>
<p>The revised map of Ukraine that former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev introduced on state television earlier this month makes clear this intent.</p>
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<p>Confident assertions, whether by the Kremlin or outside <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-sanctions/">analysts</a>, that Russia’s economy has withstood Western sanctions are also premature. </p>
<p>Sanctions work over the long term, and Russia’s much-touted growth rates mainly reflect its increased investment in the military and defence sectors. Credible <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-unsustainable-spending-spree">commentators</a> believe Russia’s economy shows clear signs of overheating. Only time will tell.</p>
<p>What is true, though, is some countries are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-find-way-around-sanctions-battlefield-tech-report/">conniving</a> with Russia to exploit loopholes and circumvent sanctions. Furthermore, many analysts are silent on the fact that Russia – a permanent member of the UN Security Council – is flouting the very sanctions it helped impose on North Korea by sourcing weapons and military material from Pyongyang.</p>
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<h2>Aiding Ukraine is not a distraction</h2>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/02/22/4-myths-about-ukraine-war-00142513">myth</a> being propagated in the West is the contention that aiding Ukraine diminishes US capacity to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>It is <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/war-ukraine-distracting-us-much-larger-challenge-china-poses-asia-specifically-and-us#:%7E:text=Assisting%20Ukraine%20is%20not%20a,Ukraine%E2%80%94sets%20back%20authoritarianism%20everywhere.">not a zero-sum game</a>. It is hard to see how unsettling allies and partners by dumping democracies – including one fighting for the very principles upon which the US was founded – would be a deterrent to China.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-china-gains-from-acting-as-peacemaker-204629">Ukraine war: what China gains from acting as peacemaker</a>
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<p>Neither Russia nor China has allies as we understand the term. Both see alliances as directed against someone or something, rather than being mutually reinforcing arrangements underpinned by common beliefs and values.</p>
<p>Both Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping seek to undermine confidence in US leadership and commitment through falsehoods and propaganda. We must be vigilant and forthrightly contest these efforts, regardless of the competing demands on governments and the distractions of our often fractious democracies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Tesch was Australian ambassador to the Russian Federation from 2016 to 2019.</span></em></p>Russian propaganda and talking points on Ukraine continue to be repeated, without being challenged, two years after the war began.Peter Tesch, Visiting Fellow at the ANU Centre for European Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254162024-03-11T18:49:24Z2024-03-11T18:49:24ZRecent gains point to a growing Russian advantage in the Ukraine war<p>The ongoing war in Ukraine is not featuring as prominently in western news media these days as it was earlier in the war, because it has been overshadowed by the unfolding human tragedy of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-rising-death-toll-from-hunger-a-stark-reminder-of-starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-225197">war in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>However, the war in Ukraine is still very much ongoing, and both sides are clearly suffering significant losses. Yet it appears that slowly but surely Russia is gaining ground on and off the battlefield. </p>
<p>The recent Ukrainian withdrawal from the stronghold of Avdiivka <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-withdraws-troops-avdiivka-1.7118227">did make the headlines</a>. On that sector of the front near the city of Donetsk, Russian forces have <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375">pushed beyond Avdiivka and continue to gain ground</a>. </p>
<p>Russian forces have also made limited gains <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">on other sectors of the front line</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Russian economy is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-economy-going-strong/video-68315706">increasingly mobilized for war</a>, and the government has been able to obtain <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-paused-shipments-russia-ukraine-report-2024-3">some military resources from abroad</a>, circumventing western sanctions.</p>
<p>All of this means that Russia is, relative to Ukraine, in an <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/a-year-later-and-things-are-very-different-in-moscow">increasingly strong position</a> as the war enters its third year.</p>
<h2>Russian advantage</h2>
<p>While Russian advances are clearly <a href="https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/c2050m20">costing their forces heavy losses</a>, the Ukrainian side too is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/20/us/politics/ukraine-prisoners-avdiivka-russia.html">taking significant losses</a>, often when defending increasingly untenable defensive positions. Russian forces typically have a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-army-ukraine-war-1.7122808">numerical advantage in terms of numbers of troops, artillery</a> and <a href="https://defence-industry.eu/russia-increases-artillery-ammunition-production-ukrainian-sources-say/">their munitions</a>. In terms of drones — where Ukrainian forces once had an advantage — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/some-ukraine-drone-pilots-fear-early-advantage-over-russia-now-lost-2023-11-09/">Russian forces seem to have caught up or even outpaced Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Some western commentators have portrayed Russian tactics as mindless attacks with hordes of infantry — <a href="https://cepa.org/article/surprised-that-ukraine-is-taking-combat-losses-you-shouldnt-be/">sometimes derogatorily described as orcs</a>. The reality is that the Russian army has adapted to the nature of the war today. It is now much better at co-ordinating the activities of artillery, drones and small groups of infantry. Even Ukrainian sources highlight how <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-skills-varied-avdiivka-from-well-trained-to-confused-soldiers-2024-3">at least some Russian troops are well-trained and capable</a>.</p>
<h2>Western support for Ukraine</h2>
<p>There is strong evidence of <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/cia-ukraine-russia/">western intelligence personnel already on the ground in Ukraine</a> — who were there long before February 2022. On top of NATO’s more overt military assistance, such revelations feed into the <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1567341">Russian narrative</a> that the war in the Ukraine is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/05/nato-ukraine-russia-germany-military-leak">proxy war between NATO and Russia</a>.</p>
<p>A growing challenge for Ukraine is decreasing western public support for military assistance. <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/513680/american-views-ukraine-war-charts.aspx">In a Gallup poll from November 2023</a>, 41 per cent of U.S. respondents said that the United States is doing too much to support Ukraine — an opinion that rose to 62 per cent among Republican voters. Back in August 2022, these figures were 24 and 43 per cent respectively. This trend is evident in different polls too, as a recent <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">Pew poll highlights</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-the-us-public-thinks-about-giving-military-and-other-aid-223064">Ukraine war: what the US public thinks about giving military and other aid</a>
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<p>While there is still strong support within the European Union for providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2022/public-opinion-on-the-war-in-ukraine/en-public-opinion-on-the-war-against-ukraine-20240223.pdf">surveys find that support for military assistance is decreasing</a>. </p>
<p>The Ukrainian government has stated its army’s problems can be solved with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-anniversary-ammunition-shortage-kyiv-a8909760655d83d2ffc0d67ad2a491ec">more western equipment and munitions</a>. Certainly, more of both would improve the Ukrainian position. However, western equipment is not a universal panacea for Ukraine’s problems. Recent reports suggesting Russian forces have destroyed <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/06/abrams-avdiivka-russian-propaganda/">a number of U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks on the Avdiivka sector</a> of the front highlight, unsurprisingly, that western equipment is far from infallible.</p>
<p>NATO countries continue to <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/">commit additional military assistance to Ukraine</a>, although additional U.S. assistance is <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2024/03/06/house-lawmakers-mike-johnson-ukraine-aid-gaza/72871579007/">being held up in Congress</a>. The recent scandal in Germany regarding the possible supply of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles to Ukraine</a> highlights that a further escalation of western commitments to Ukraine is not a given. </p>
<p>Whether western countries are willing to commit their own personnel to increasingly active roles in the war is unclear. French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/ukraine-war-briefing-macron-says-dont-be-cowards-as-he-digs-in-over-ground-troop-s">sending French combat troops to Ukraine remains an option</a>. However, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/macron-ukraine-russia-putin-1.7127500">most other NATO leaders</a> seem resolute that sending combat troops to Ukraine should not happen.</p>
<p>Yet, Macron’s position is apparently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-nato-russia-france-abd144aee256a72388c196dae8acaf7f">not without some support</a>. Such a step would undoubtedly increase the possibility not only of a direct NATO-Russia war, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-russia-increasingly-likely-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-182368">but also the use of nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Manpower issues</h2>
<p><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-peace/">Availability of personnel</a> is also a significant problem for Ukraine. Western-supplied equipment still has to be crewed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stated that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68397525">31,000 Ukrainian troops have been killed since February 2022</a>, however, this at best only tells part of the story. This figure is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66581217">less than half U.S. estimates of Ukrainian troops killed</a>, likely does not include those missing in action, and certainly not those taken prisoner by Russia, nor the tens of thousands of wounded. <a href="https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-struggles-to-find-troops-for-the-frontline/">Replacing such losses is proving increasingly difficult</a>. </p>
<p>Zelenskyy recently gave permission for conscripts who have been serving since February 2022 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-issues-decree-discharging-conscripts-2024-03-07/#">move into the reserves for at least 12 months</a> without further callup. Such a step will help improve wider morale, but won’t help with the recruitment crisis.</p>
<p>A significant number of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/desperate-to-avoid-the-draft">seek to avoid the draft by fleeing to neighbouring countries</a>. This is reminiscent of how <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">young Russians fled</a> to avoid being conscripted in late 2022, although <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-why-people-are-returning-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67022321">many have now returned</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@cbcnews/video/7330765611217210629?is_from_webapp=1\u0026sender_device=pc\u0026web_id=7246426044156249606"}"></div></p>
<p>The sinking of Russian ships in the Black Sea has to some extent replaced less positive news for Ukraine from the front line. The loss of warships such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/mar/05/ukraine-releases-footage-appearing-to-show-sinking-of-russian-warship-near-occupied-crimea-video">large patrol ship Sergei Kotov</a> to Ukrainian naval drone are setbacks for Russia. However, the war for the Donbas is primarily being fought on land, and such Ukrainian victories are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the ground war. </p>
<p>As the Russian army advances, albeit slowly, the available evidence suggests that resolve remains strong on both the <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2024/01/26/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-november-2023/">Russian</a> and <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">Ukrainian</a> sides. Outwardly, the majority of NATO leaders <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm#">retain their commitments to support Ukraine</a>. Both sides are clearly still only willing to <a href="https://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/diplomacy-is-the-art-of-compromise-thats-whats-needed-for-peace-in-ukraine/">consider negotiations on their own terms</a>. How much longer that will continue to be the case remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s armed forces continue to gain territory in Ukraine, at high cost to both sides.Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of CalgaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250202024-03-06T17:15:09Z2024-03-06T17:15:09ZA US with fewer allies threatens global security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579834/original/file-20240305-30-n3u2sq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C0%2C6657%2C4652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-soldiers-us-flag-troops-1170998920">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a recent election rally in South Carolina, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-68268817">said</a> he would “encourage” aggressors such as Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to Nato allies he considers to have not met their financial obligations. </p>
<p>Trump’s comments, however offensive, may merely be an electoral strategy. Why should, say, a South Carolinian citizen see their taxes go towards defending faraway lands, especially if they believe these partners are not willing to pay equally? </p>
<p>But there’s also a logic to his remarks that Europe should recognise, especially in light of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Many European nations need to build up their <a href="https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/EconPol-PolicyReport_45_0.pdf">own security capacities</a> again after years of lax spending on defence.</p>
<p>Regardless, such public comments from a presidential candidate have long been unthinkable. Since the second world war, America has sought out allies. What would it mean for the nation’s security, as well as that of the wider world, should they forego them?</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Trump says he ‘would encourage’ Russia to attack non-paying Nato allies.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>British precedent</h2>
<p>The modern US-led global order is in many ways a modern iteration of something developed by Great Britain at the beginning of the 19th century. Britain used the peace negotiations that followed the Napoleonic wars (1803–1815) to try and limit the power of expansive land empires like that of defeated France. </p>
<p>The 19th century is sometimes referred to as “Pax Britannica” (British peace) because of the relative absence of conflict between major European powers, with the notable exception of the Crimean War (1853–1856). It lasted until a unified German state emerged as a land power in continental Europe in 1871, upending the security presumptions of the post-Napoleonic peace.</p>
<p>One of Britain’s key reasons for fighting two world wars against Germany was to maintain its version of a global order. But, in winning, Britain depleted its finances – and <a href="https://www.antiquesage.com/world-war-ii-bankruptcy-of-the-british-empire/">capacity to maintain an empire</a> – through borrowing from the US. </p>
<p>The US had become the new economic heavyweight, with a military built up and spread by wartime necessity. Its adherence to basic principles meant the British did not resist America’s newfound global primacy. </p>
<p>Free trade was to remain sacrosanct. Sea trade routes were defended as these were (<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-airstrikes-on-houthi-rebels-are-the-us-and-uk-playing-fast-and-loose-with-international-law-222906">and still are</a>) vital for US economic superiority. The US would also maintain the kind of alliances that the British tended to turn to during times of war, where coalitions of allies share the costs and persevere towards victory. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-airstrikes-on-houthi-rebels-are-the-us-and-uk-playing-fast-and-loose-with-international-law-222906">With airstrikes on Houthi rebels, are the US and UK playing fast and loose with international law?</a>
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<h2>Lonely at the top?</h2>
<p>The US would actively shape the world to its own liking in the post-war period. After the hyper-nationalistic conquests that were characteristic of its enemies in the first and second world wars, the US wanted no more empires.</p>
<p>It set up institutions dedicated to spurring free trade and global stability like the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And it formed alliances, most notably Nato, which included befriending wartime enemies like Germany and committing themselves to a long-term global role.</p>
<p>These alliances allowed the US to station troops overseas in strategic positions without having to administer a costly and potentially discontented empire, like the British and basically every world power had done before them.</p>
<p>Much of this was motivated by the Cold War. The Soviets had exchanged Nazi occupation of eastern Europe for their own. And it was widely believed that in the absence of US security guarantees, western Europe would also be invaded and made communist – an ideology that the US considered incompatible with its own. </p>
<p>The great power competition soon led to US involvement in other zones of communist activity, such as Asia. This was a period in which the US intervened in foreign governments and carried out or supported ethically questionable conflicts. For US politicians, however, it was generally bipartisan to believe that US intervention was justified by a bigger conflict between democracy and authoritarianism.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white image of paratroopers jumping out of a plane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579835/original/file-20240305-26-olbpm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">US paratroopers carrying out a strike in the Tay Ninh province of south Vietnam in 1963.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/vietnam-war-march-1963-840-south-245961343">Everett Collection/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>US power was also different to, say, the heyday of the Spanish empire in the 16th century. This empire did an excellent job of antagonising other powers and depleting its own vast resources in endless wars over honour and Catholicism.</p>
<p>Although certainly not universally loved, US power is not completely resented. This has much to do with America’s <a href="https://news.illinoisstate.edu/2018/07/book-examines-american-cultures-influence-on-the-world/">globally exported culture</a>, from Hollywood to hip-hop. But also in how its power can be articulated as mutually beneficial to other nations, both in terms of trade and security. </p>
<p>We do not live in a peaceful world. But it is widely acknowledged that the world would <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/12/11/if-the-united-states-pulls-back-the-world-will-become-more-dangerous">become more dangerous</a> if the US were to suddenly disengage. US security guarantees, for instance, disincentivise allies like Germany and Japan from developing nuclear weapons for their own safety.</p>
<h2>Global security is American security</h2>
<p>Supporting US allies, which was once a bipartisan issue in American politics, is becoming a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/can-republicans-find-consensus-foreign-policy">zero-sum game</a> – even though it is just about the most dangerous issue to do this with. </p>
<p>Bringing global security guarantees into question is exactly what states hostile to the US want. They know it weakens a world order that protects democracies, global trade, and weaker states that could otherwise be imposed upon militarily. </p>
<p>The US protects these not merely as an act of charity, but also because they are in the vital interests of America’s own safety, even if it can seem indirect to some American voters or the politicians who recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">held up aid</a> for Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">US Senate passes US$95 billion aid package for Ukraine – what this tells us about Republican support for Trump</a>
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<p>Ironically, a worldview that sees raw, almost <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/mercantilism">mercantilist</a>, selfishness as the entirety of foreign policy is exactly the thing that the US’s global order of free trade and respecting national sovereignty has discouraged for almost a century. </p>
<p>If America First becomes America Only, it might be a world view that certain regimes wish to emulate. But morally, it will not do what the nation managed in the past. To convert souls to an American future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Rees receives funding from The University of Exeter and The Royal Historical Society.</span></em></p>A world where the US has fewer allies would be an even more dangerous place.William Rees, PhD Candidate in Modern American History, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248962024-03-05T14:18:54Z2024-03-05T14:18:54ZBritish troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/03/03/germany-intelligence-leak-uk-troops-ground-ukraine-nato/">Leaked communications</a> involving high-level German government and military figures appear to confirm that British army personnel are engaged on the ground in Ukraine. An unencrypted telephone call intercepted and leaked to Russian broadcaster RT suggested British troops were helping the defending forces in the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/british-soldiers-in-ukraine-germany-b2504462.html">use of Storm Shadow cruise missiles</a> the UK has supplied to help Kyiv’s war effort. </p>
<p>In response, the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, confirmed that there are a “small number” of British army personnel “supporting the armed forces of Ukraine”. But he added that “we haven’t got any plans for large-scale deployment”. </p>
<p>There have also been <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/polish-minister-saw-uk-special-forces-operating-in-ukraine/">unconfirmed reports</a> that British special forces personnel were operating inside Ukraine shortly after the beginning of Russia’s invasion in the spring of 2022. Again, this has not been confirmed by the UK ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Russia has consistently maintained that any non-Ukrainian military personnel training troops to operate weapons systems in-country would be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-says-british-training-troops-ukraine-could-be-legitimate-2023-10-01/">legitimate military targets</a> for Russia – as would the factories producing those weapons systems in third-party countries.</p>
<p>The episode raises some important questions as to whether training Ukrainian troops on the battlefield comprises an act of war – and whether this means Britain risks being designated a co-combatant alongside Ukraine. </p>
<p>Konstantin Kosachev, the deputy speaker of Russia’s federation council, was reported by Russia’s state-run news agency Tass <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1752055">as saying</a> that by supplying weapons to Ukraine, Nato countries were progressing along a path towards direct confrontation. Sending troops to Ukraine, he said, “can be interpreted as the alliance’s direct involvement in hostilities, or even as a declaration of war”. </p>
<h2>What international law says</h2>
<p>The day after Russia invaded Ukraine, as Kyiv’s allies scrambled to find a response, it was reported that the US government was reviewing the legality of providing arms to help with the country’s defence.</p>
<p>Within days, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, had declared that even imposing economic sanctions would be an “act of war”. His defence ministry released a statement that if third-party countries allowed Ukraine to use their bases as a safe haven for Ukrainian aircraft, then “subsequent use against the Russian armed forces can be regarded as the involvement of these states in an armed conflict”.</p>
<p>Since the second world war, the laws of neutrality <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/supplying-arms-ukraine-not-act-war">have been interpreted</a> so that states can provide weapons and other support to a state unjustly attacked by a belligerent country, to enable it to defend itself. According to this definition, third-party countries would become co-combatants only if they resort to armed force against Russia.</p>
<p>Russia’s incursion into Ukraine has been ruled as a flagrant breach of Article 2(4) of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#">UN Charter</a>, which prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. Russia’s war in Ukraine has been denounced as an act of aggression by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/un-general-assembly-demands-russian-federation-withdraw-all-military-forces-territory-ukraine_und_en#">UN general assembly</a> and the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/91781/taking-stock-of-icj-decisions-in-ukraine-v-russia-cases-and-implications-for-south-africas-case-against-israel/#">International Court of Justice</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, it is claimed that Russia has been implicated in <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">breaches of international humanitarian law</a> through its apparent indiscriminate bombing and other violent attacks, and <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">crimes against civilians</a>. This would mean that anyone supplying Russia – the belligerent in this conflict – with arms <em>is</em> in breach of international law.</p>
<p>But the question remains, if it is legal to supply Ukraine with weapons to help defend itself, would actually helping the Ukrainian military use them to hit Russian targets make the UK a co-combatant?</p>
<p>While the law is not settled, legal scholars believe supplying Ukraine with the means to defend itself against Russia does not in itself constitute a breach of international law – and nor does it make the UK a co-combatant. Any action by UK forces would only constitute a combat operation if these actions, carried out by UK personnel without any further action by Ukrainians, would launch a missile or any other kind of attack on Russian forces. </p>
<h2>Risk of escalation</h2>
<p>But there remains the question of escalation. Whatever the legal situation – and Russia has shown itself willing to ignore the rules of warfare by violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursions of 2014 and in the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – Putin and his senior ministers have regularly warned Kyiv’s western allies that their aid may constitute an escalation to which it would respond with all available means, including nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Accordingly, to prevent a direct confrontation with Russia, Nato countries have been wary about the kinds of weapon they will supply to Ukraine. The guiding principle has been that western-supplied weapons should not be used in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-general-jones-interview-long-range-weapons/32700251.html">attacks against Russian territory</a>. </p>
<p>But this may change. Germany has, up to now, been very reluctant to supply Ukraine with its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles</a>, which have a range of 500km and could be used against targets deep in Russian territory. However, recent reports suggest the German government is considering supplying these missiles to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, was quick, though, to insist that “German soldiers must at no point and in no place be linked to targets this system reaches”, making it absolutely clear that Germany would not risk its involvement being interpreted as a direct act of escalation.</p>
<p>And despite the Kremlin’s repeated threats, it is not eager to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/17/russia-ukraine-war-live-vladimir-putin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-latest-updates-live?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-657eb9f88f08a684d3bd8a12">engage Nato militarily</a>. So, despite all the strong words being exchanged by both sides, there has been no sign that Nato and Russia will face each other on the battlefield in Ukraine – for the moment, at least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Volkswagen Foundation and the British Council.</span></em></p>Helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression is not a violation of international law – but Russia might interpret it as escalation.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240862024-02-27T13:51:29Z2024-02-27T13:51:29ZMacron won’t rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?<p>The French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">has said</a> sending western troops to fight in Ukraine “could not be ruled out”. After hosting a meeting of 25 European leaders in Paris on February 26, Macron said that there was “no consensus” on committing ground troops to the conflict in Ukraine but added: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.” </p>
<p>Until now, Nato has confined itself to training Ukrainian military forces and supplying them with defensive weapons. Member states fear that directly confronting Russian forces in Ukraine would risk a massive escalation. And Vladimir Putin and his senior ministers have regularly issued <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-the-risks-that-russia-will-turn-to-its-nuclear-arsenal-178139">threats that</a> Russia could resort to using its nuclear arsenal in the case of a larger conflict.</p>
<p>At present, Nato is also conducting its largest military exercise since the cold war. <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/steadfast-defender-2024-signals-alliance-unity-and-preparedness/">Steadfast Defender</a> runs from January until May and involves all 31 member states. Aimed at enhancing the alliance’s collective defence capabilities and readiness, it is the largest exercise since <a href="https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/165109/1/165109.pdf">Reforger in 1988</a>, which involved 125,000 troops from the US, Germany, Canada, France and Denmark.</p>
<p>General Christopher Cavoli, Nato’s supreme allied commander for Europe, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/222847.htm">said</a>: “Steadfast Defender 2024 will be a clear demonstration of our unity, strength and determination to protect each other, our values and the rules-based international order.”</p>
<p>Importantly, one aspect of the exercises is the involvement of US and Canadian forces, which is designed to demonstrate the speed and size of Nato’s reinforcement capabilities. It acts both as a reassurance to European Nato member states and as a demonstration to potential enemies of the ability Nato has to put large forces into the field. Exercises are part of the communication of deterrence.</p>
<p>The exercise is meant <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-kick-off-biggest-drills-decades-with-some-90000-troops-2024-01-18/">to simulate</a> an, “emerging conflict scenario with a near-peer adversary”. This is a thinly disguised reference to Russia, which shows that Nato is beginning to take the threat of direct conflict with that country seriously.</p>
<p>During the cold war, Nato undertook regular large-scale exercises. For example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/18/world/british-start-war-games-on-continent.html">Exercise Lionheart, led by the UK in 1984</a>, involved nearly 58,000 British soldiers and airmen of a total force of 131,565, including troops from the US, the Netherlands and what was then West Germany.</p>
<p>Since the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, Nato has searched for a new identity. Its <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/reportch1.pdf">focus shifted</a> in the 1990s from protecting common territory to protecting members’ common interests, as it did by intervening in the wars in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm#">Bosnia in 1995</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#">Kosovo in 1999</a>, when it officially approved this new <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm">strategic concept</a>.</p>
<h2>Need for unity</h2>
<p>A demonstration of Nato unity and military capacity is important, coming after two years of disunity over how to respond to the war in Ukraine and amid wrangling over supplies of arms by Ukraine’s western allies. It has become more significant following recent remarks <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">by former president Donald Trump</a> that Nato members who did not meet the spending guidelines would no longer be protected by the US.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘I would not protect you’: Donald Trump threatens Nato members over defence spending.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Members are supposed to spend at least 2% of their annual GDP on defence – but it’s more complicated than that. Some nations’ defence spending is wholly allocated to Nato. Others, meanwhile, might set their defence spending at less than 2%, but their spending per head is greater than that of those who meet the Nato guideline. </p>
<p>For example, Luxembourg <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country">falls short</a> of the 2%, spending only 0.72%. But in per head terms it spends US$921 (£726), which is more than Poland (3.9%) or France (1.9%). </p>
<p>The US may spend 3.5% GDP on defence, but not all of that is allocated to Nato. Much of the US’s strength is deployed in the Pacific and on its home territories. So it’s misleading to judge the value of Nato membership in these terms. </p>
<p>They key clause in the Nato treaty is article 5, which governs collective security and compels members to respond if a fellow member is attacked by a hostile third party. The US is the only Nato member state to have invoked article 5, following the 9/11 attacks. It received assistance from other Nato members in Afghanistan and more widely in the “war on terror”.</p>
<h2>Is Nato battle ready?</h2>
<p>A significant problem Nato faces however, is not in deploying the troops it has, but in supplying them. As has been demonstrated by the efforts to provide equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, Nato has neither the stockpiles nor the manufacturing capacity to supply a lengthy modern war. </p>
<p>This is because Nato has long planned on what’s known as a “come as you are” war, which means it has the capacity to fight for only as long as the equipment and supplies last. For this reason, Nato’s strategy has always been, in the event of a conflict, to bring it to a conclusion as quickly as possible. </p>
<p>Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Nato’s most senior military commander and military adviser to its North Atlantic Council, spoke at the Warsaw Security Forum in October 2023. He <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66984944">said</a>: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.”</p>
<p>A number of European countries have already distanced themselves from Macron’s remarks, including Poland, the Czech republic and Sweden, whose Nato membership has finally been approved by Hungary and which is set to become the alliance’s 32nd member.</p>
<p>But Russia has seized on Macron’s remarks, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">telling reporters</a> that even discussing the idea of western troops being sent to fight in Ukraine represents a “very important new element”. He added: “In that case, we would need to talk not about the probability, but about the inevitability (of a direct conflict).”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending ground troops to Ukraine could provoke a wider and vastly more dangerous war with Russia,Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242452024-02-26T19:00:58Z2024-02-26T19:00:58ZShould world leaders worry about another Trump presidency?<p>Should American allies be worried that if Donald Trump returns to the White House next year, he will tear apart treaties, recast decades-old international arrangements and adopt a go-it-alone approach to global affairs?</p>
<p>Recent comments from Trump <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">disparaging</a> NATO allies have put this question on the front burner in Washington and other world capitals.</p>
<p>Trump is, of course, in the middle of a presidential campaign and is seeking to show he would be a very different president from Joe Biden. Given Biden’s difficulties on foreign policy, it is easy to see why.</p>
<h2>Biden’s mixed foreign policy record</h2>
<p>Biden’s approval numbers are near historic lows – <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/610988/biden-job-approval-edges-down.aspx">just under 40% of Americans approve</a> of the job he is doing. In particular, Biden’s foreign policy has been a problem. His plunge in popularity began around the time of the catastrophically <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-joe-biden-failed-the-people-of-afghanistan-and-tarnished-us-credibility-around-the-world-166160">mismanaged</a> US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan two and a half years ago. </p>
<p>Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza – and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian proxy attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria that followed – have only made Biden look weaker. In fact, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/610988/biden-job-approval-edges-down.aspx">recent polls</a> show only <a href="https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_022024/">a third of American voters approve</a> of his foreign policy.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/some-truths-are-self-evident-joe-biden-is-too-old-but-who-could-possibly-replace-him-223634">Some truths are self-evident: Joe Biden is too old. But who could possibly replace him?</a>
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<p>A resurgent Iran reminds older Americans of the more than 50 Americans <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises">taken hostage</a> in Tehran in 1979 and then-President Jimmy Carter’s failure to free them – one of the main reasons why Carter <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/20/jimmy-carter-republican-sabotage-iran-hostage-john-connally">lost</a> the 1980 presidential election to Ronald Reagan. The hostages were freed the day Reagan took office. </p>
<p>Today, Biden faces the same potential election-year problem with the Gaza war. Younger, progressive Americans, as well as Arab-Americans, are more likely to be aghast at Biden’s support for Israel’s assault on Hamas in Gaza and the consequent civilian deaths. Many Biden supporters are concerned this could <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/us/politics/biden-michigan-gaza.html">affect his chances</a> against Trump in November’s election, particularly in swing states like Michigan, which has a large number of Arab-American voters.</p>
<p>Also working against Biden is the war fatigue felt by many Americans. After 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans are ready to take a break from global leadership responsibilities.</p>
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<h2>A long tradition of placing America first</h2>
<p>Biden’s foreign policy weaknesses opens the door for Trump to show voters he will take a different approach. </p>
<p>Over the past four decades, starting with Reagan, successful presidential candidates have criticised foreign adventures, instead emphasising domestic investment. Political scientists use the term “<a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/04/the-strategy-of-retrenchment-and-its-consequences/">strategic retrenchment</a>” to describe this, but politicians are more likely to use a phrase like “<a href="https://time.com/4273812/america-first-donald-trump-history/">America First</a>.”</p>
<p>In 1984, for instance, Reagan ran one of the most effective presidential campaign ads in history called “Morning in America”, which depicted a return to domestic tranquillity and prosperity.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Reagan’s ‘Morning in America’ ad from the 1984 presidential campaign.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In 1992, Democratic strategist James Carville <a href="https://politicaldictionary.com/words/its-the-economy-stupid/">coined another famous phrase</a>, “It’s the economy, stupid”, which then-candidate Bill Clinton’s campaign evoked successfully to focus on domestic economic issues in his race against President George H.W. Bush. </p>
<p>Then, in 2000, then-Republican challenger George W. Bush <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/10/19/honoring-nation-building/15a113d0-7ee6-4f53-a4c6-82343c15f3b9/">sharply criticised</a> the Clinton administration’s focus on “<a href="https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/tools-foreign-policy/what-nation-building">nation building</a>”, comparing it to “international social work”. </p>
<p>When it comes to Trump, bombast is a feature, not a bug. When he ran for the White House for the first time in 2016, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/27/donald-trump-foreign-policy-speech">outlined</a> his isolationist, “America first” approach, criticising President Barack Obama and his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, for their “reckless, rudderless and aimless foreign policy”. He said, if elected, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I will return us to a timeless principle. Always put the interest of the American people and American security above all else.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He has returned to this rhetoric in the current campaign, even encouraging Russia to invade NATO countries that don’t spend the required 2% of their GDP on defence. While offensive at first blush, these comments serve the very useful purpose of showing a huge difference from Biden.</p>
<h2>A 19th century, populist world view</h2>
<p>It is also important to understand a deeper truth about these comments. In his bones, Trump does not truly value any formal alliances formed before his ascent to power. Call it narcissism or isolationism if you must (and neither is entirely inaccurate), the former president sees formal alliances as a lower priority than fair play and power politics. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Andrew Jackson portrait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>In this, Trump is a prime example of the Jacksonian tradition in American politics. Described best by the scholar and columnist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897216">Walter Russell Mead</a>, the Jacksonian tradition is based on the political beliefs of former President Andrew Jackson, who was president from 1829 to 1837. </p>
<p>Jacksonians, like Trump and his most ardent supporters today, have a highly sceptical view of America’s involvement in global affairs. As Mead <a href="https://pmachala.people.amherst.edu/Current%20Politics/Case%20Studies%20in%20American%20Diplomacy%20-The%20Readings%20FOR%20the%20FIRST%20and%20SECOND%20Class/Mead,%20The%20Jacksonian%20Tradition.htm">writes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They prefer the rule of custom to the written law, and that is as true in the international sphere as it is in personal relations at home. Jacksonians believe that there is an honour code in international life […] and those who live by the code will be treated under it. But those who violate the code – who commit terrorist acts in peacetime, for example – forfeit its protection and deserve no consideration. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Jacksonians, when a country welches on its obligations (such as, in Trump’s view, the level of defence spending of many European NATO nations), it is morally right to punish them by calling into question treaty obligations.</p>
<p>Seen as a liar and fabulist by his opponents, Trump embodies this Jacksonian tradition of “customary honour” for his supporters, whose contempt for global elites and international institutions is deep and profound. (Trump was so enamoured with Jackson, in fact, he had a <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/22/andrew-jackson-donald-trump-216493/">portrait</a> of the former president hanging in the Oval Office.)</p>
<p>This means, if Trump becomes president again, America’s allies, whether in NATO or the Indo-Pacific or elsewhere, will have to de-emphasise lawyerly arguments about international obligations and adapt quickly to the Trump-Jacksonian customary honour approach to diplomacy.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-is-already-flustering-foreign-leaders-who-are-trying-to-prepare-for-a-possible-presidency-223767">Donald Trump is already flustering foreign leaders who are trying to prepare for a possible presidency</a>
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<p>Superficially, this will mean global leaders offering praise for Trump’s various political performances. Going deeper, it also means finding a way to demonstrate that their relationship with the US is congruent with his sense of customary honour (and is also materially beneficial to the US, and maybe even to Trump himself).</p>
<p>The model for this is the late prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe. Within days of Trump’s surprising election win over Hillary Clinton in 2016, Abe <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/16/politics/japan-abe-trump-visit/index.html">visited</a> him at Trump Tower in New York and gave him a gold-plated golf club worth almost US$4,000. Trump immediately identified Abe as “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-golf-club-found-shinzo-abe-b2317572.html">friend</a>.”</p>
<p>After then-Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/04/full-transcript-of-trumps-phone-call-with-australian-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull">unpleasant phone call</a> with Trump in 2017, the Australian ambassador to the US, Joe Hockey, <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/joe-hockey-plays-golf-with-president-donald-trump/f2bbe51e-10ed-4121-adf5-a39b3b4d3c09">took to the links</a> with Trump. </p>
<p>With good humour and some personal charm, Hockey helped restore the diplomatic relationship – not by emphasising legalistic constraints but by developing a personal relationship that was grounded in common sense and customary honour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lester Munson is a Non-Resident Fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre. Lester Munson has worked for President George W. Bush and congressional Republicans during his public service career in Washington. </span></em></p>Here’s what to understand about Trump’s world view and what to expect, should he be elected president again.Lester Munson, Non-resident fellow, United States Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205812024-02-26T13:39:02Z2024-02-26T13:39:02ZAs war in Ukraine enters third year, 3 issues could decide its outcome: Supplies, information and politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577714/original/file-20240224-28-7jc86z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C37%2C8281%2C5508&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will war fatigue be a factor?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/february-2024-ukraine-odessa-a-gepard-anti-aircraft-gun-news-photo/2022536165?adppopup=true">Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In retrospect, there was perhaps nothing surprising about Russia’s decision to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230214-february-24-2022-the-day-russia-invaded-ukraine">invade Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin’s intentions were, after all, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion/2021/12/03/98a3760e-546b-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html">hiding in plain sight</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-western-military-backing-ukraine-threatens-russia-2021-10-21/">signaled in the months running up</a> to the incursion.</p>
<p>What could not be foreseen, however, is where the conflict finds itself now. Heading into its third year, the war has become bogged down: Neither is it a stalemate, nor does it look like either side could make dramatic advances any time soon.</p>
<p>Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, having secured the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68322527">latest major battlefield victory</a>, but Ukrainian fighters have exceeded military expectations with their doggedness in the past, and may do so again.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/tara-sonenshine">foreign policy expert</a> and former journalist who spent many years covering Russia, I share the view of those who argue that the conflict is potentially at a pivotal point: If Washington does not continue to fully support President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military, then Ukraine’s very survival could be at risk. I believe it would also jeopardize America’s leadership in the world and global security. </p>
<p>How the conflict develops during the rest of 2024 will depend on many factors, but three may be key: supplies, information and political will.</p>
<h2>The supplies race</h2>
<p>Russia and Ukraine are locked in a race to resupply its war resources – not just in terms of soldiers, but also ammunition and missiles. Both sides are desperately trying to shore up the number of soldiers it can deploy. </p>
<p>In December 2023, Putin <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-army-expansion-a2bf0b035aabab20c8b120a1c86c9e38">ordered his generals to increase troop numbers</a> by nearly 170,000, taking the total number of soldiers to 1.32 million. Meanwhile, Ukraine is said to be looking at plans to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-draft-b2ca1d0ecd72019be2217a653989fbc2">increase its military by 500,000 troops</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, here, Russia has the advantage of being able to draw on a population more than three times that of Ukraine. Also, whereas Putin can simply order up more troops, Zelenskyy must get measures approved through parliament.</p>
<p>Aside from personnel, there is also the need for a steady supply of weapons and ammunition – and there have been reports that both sides are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68364924">struggling to maintain</a> <a href="https://www.wbaltv.com/article/after-2-years-of-war-questions-abound-on-whether-kyiv-can-sustain-the-fight-against-russia/46940958">sufficient levels</a>.</p>
<p>Russia appears particularly eager to boost its number of ballistic missiles, as they are <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-sourcing-ballistic-missiles-to-bypass-ukraine-air-defense-isw-2024-1">better equipped for countering Ukraine air defense systems</a> despite being slower than cruise missiles.</p>
<p>Increasingly, Moscow appears to be looking to North Korea and Iran as suppliers. After Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, visited Russia in 2023, the U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67888793">accused Pyongyang of supplying Russia</a> with ballistic missiles. Iran, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">delivered to Russia</a> a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and drones.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in suits talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Sept. 13, 2023, in Tsiolkovsky, Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1661841029?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Ukraine, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220610-ukraine-dependent-on-arms-from-allies-after-exhausting-soviet-era-weaponry">dependent on foreign military equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Supplies were stronger at the beginning of the war, but since then, Ukraine’s military has suffered from the slow, bureaucratic nature of NATO and U.S. deliveries. It wasn’t, for example, until the summer of 2023 that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine">U.S. approved Europe’s request</a> to provide F-16s to Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukraine needs more of everything, including air defense munitions, artillery shells, tanks and missile systems. It is also <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-ukraine-war-medical-care-frontlines/#:%7E:text=In%20an%20open%20letter%20recently,stabilization%20posts%20with%20supplies%20and">running short of medical supplies</a> and has seen hospital shortages of drugs at a time when <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/4371240-the-invisible-enemy-in-ukraine-superbugs/">rampant infections are proving resistant</a> to antibiotics.</p>
<p>Perhaps the biggest factor that remains in Russia’s favor when it comes to supplies is the onerous restrictions placed on Ukraine from the West, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-shouldnt-use-us-arms-inside-russia-us-general-says-2023-05-25/">limiting its ability</a> to attack Russian territory with U.S. or NATO equipment to avoid a wider war. For example, the Ukrainian military had a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with a 50-mile range that could hit targets inside Russia, but it modified the range to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338">keep the U.S. military satisfied</a> that it would not cross a Russian red line.</p>
<p>If this policy could be relaxed, that might be a game changer for Ukraine, although it would raise the stakes for the U.S.</p>
<h2>The information war</h2>
<p>The Ukraine conflict is also a war of messaging.</p>
<p>To this end, Putin uses <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/putins-wartime-russia-propaganda-payouts-and-jail-151bb117">propaganda to bolster support</a> for the campaign at home, while undermining support for Ukraine elsewhere – for example, by planting stories in Europe that cause disenchantment with the war. One outrageous claim in the early weeks of the war was that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/pro-russia-disinformation-report/index.html">Zelenskyy had taken his own life</a>. The rumor came from pro-Russia online operatives as part of an aggressive effort to harm Ukrainian morale, according to <a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/information-operations-surrounding-ukraine">cybersecurity firm Mandiant</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, in France, stories appeared that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/30/france-russia-interference-far-right/">questioned the value of assistance to Ukraine</a> and reminded the public of the negative impact of Russian sanctions on the French. Stirring dissent in this way is a classic Putin play to raise doubts.</p>
<p>And investigative reporting points toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/16/russian-disinformation-zelensky-zaluzhny/">a disinformation network</a> being run out of the Kremlin, which includes social media bots deployed on Ukrainian sites spreading stories of Zelenskyy’s team being corrupt and warning that the war would go badly.</p>
<p>Given that Putin controls the Russian media and is quick to crack down on dissent, it is hard to really know what Russians think. But one reputable polling agency recently reported <a href="https://www.norc.org/research/projects/russian-public-opinion-wartime.html">strong support in Russia</a> for both Putin and the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukrainians, too, still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">support the fight against Russia</a>, polling shows. But some war fatigue has no doubt lowered morale.</p>
<p>There are other signs of domestic strain in Ukraine. At the end of 2023, tensions grew between Zelenskyy and his top military commander, General Valery Zaluzhny who had complained about weaponry. Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/world/europe/zelensky-general-valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-military.html">ended up firing the military chief</a>, risking political backlash and underscoring that not all is well in the top chain of command.</p>
<p>Should disunity and war fatigue continue into the war’s third year, it could serious impair Ukraine’s ability to fight back against a resurgent Russian offensive. </p>
<h2>The politics of conflict</h2>
<p>But it isn’t just domestic politics in Ukraine and Russia that will decide the outcome of the war. </p>
<p>U.S. politics and European unity could be a factor in 2024 in determining the future of this conflict.</p>
<p>In the U.S., Ukraine aid has become politicized – with aid to Ukraine <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">becoming an increasingly partisan issue</a>.</p>
<p>In early February, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/12/politics/senate-foreign-aid-bill-ukraine/index.html">Senate finally passed an emergency aid bill</a> for Ukraine and Israel that would see US$60.1 billion go to Kyiv. But the bill’s fate in the House is unknown.</p>
<p>And the looming 2024 presidential elections could complicate matters further. Former president Donald Trump has made no secret of his aversion to aid packages over loans, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/us/politics/trump-ukraine-biden.html">calling them “stupid</a>,” and has long argued that Americans shouldn’t be footing the bill for the conflict. Recently, he has made bombastic statements about NATO and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/02/13/how-donald-trumps-re-election-would-threaten-natos-article-5">threatened not to adhere</a> to the alliance’s commitment to protect members if they were attacked by Russia.</p>
<p>And uncertainty about American assistance could leave Europe carrying more of the financial load.</p>
<p>European Union members have had to absorb the majority of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/max-boot?utm_source=twtw&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TWTW2024Feb23&utm_term=TWTW%20and%20All%20Staff%20as%20of%207-9-20">6.3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country</a> since the beginning of the conflict. And that puts a strain on resources. European oil needs also suffer from the sanctions against Russian companies.</p>
<p>Whether these potential war determinants – supplies, information and politics – mean that the Ukraine war will not be entering a fourth year in 12 months time, however, is far from certain. In fact, one thing that does appear clear is that the war that some predicted would be over in weeks looks set to continue for some time still.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia appears to have seized the battleground initiative as the Ukraine war marks its second anniversary – but the conflict is far from over.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239422024-02-22T18:48:25Z2024-02-22T18:48:25ZWhat does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?<p>Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/trump-says-he-would-encourage-russia-to-do-whatever-the-hell-they-want-to-any-nato-country-that-doesn-t-pay-enough-1.6764435">recent candid admission</a> that he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members shirking their alliance commitments predictably dominated the news cycle for several days.</p>
<p>What this veiled threat means to <a href="https://theconversation.com/justin-trudeau-and-nato-the-problem-with-canadian-defence-isnt-cash-its-culture-204252">Canada, which perpetually fails to meet NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence</a>, is uncertain — but certainly worrisome.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/justin-trudeau-and-nato-the-problem-with-canadian-defence-isnt-cash-its-culture-204252">Justin Trudeau and NATO: The problem with Canadian defence isn’t cash, it's culture</a>
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<p>Even a potential Pierre Poilievre government would only <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/poilievre-says-he-would-cut-wasteful-foreign-aid-work-towards-nato-spending-target-1.6770426">“work towards”</a> meeting the target. Poilievre’s simultaneous <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-politics-briefing-too-early-to-say-how-conservatives-would-balance/">commitment to balancing the budget</a> suggests that any substantial spending increases on the Canadian Armed Forces are unlikely.</p>
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<h2>Unilateralism, not isolationism</h2>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/14/trump-foreign-policy-advisers-nato-remarks-00141287">some Republican</a> efforts <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4475656-graham-responds-to-trump-nato-comments-if-you-dont-pay-you-get-kicked-out/">to calm</a> the waters churned up by former president Trump, a <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/majority-trump-republicans-prefer-united-states-stay-out-world?utm_source=media&utm_campaign=ccs&utm_medium=atlantic">recent survey</a> conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs highlights the decreasing Republican appetite for foreign commitments.</p>
<p>It found that a majority of “Trump Republicans” would prefer the United States was less involved in global affairs. Findings like this <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/13/opinion/gop-senate-ukraine-aid.html">predictably inspire</a> headlines about <a href="https://bnnbreaking.com/politics/the-resurgence-of-isolationism-in-us-politics-shadows-over-foreign-policy">American isolationism</a>. The <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-stalled-u-s-aid-for-ukraine-exemplifies-gops-softening-stance-on-russia">recent stalled funding for Ukraine</a> in the U.S. Congress reflects this development. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt">According to historian Walter Russell Meade</a>, Trump pursued a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957209368">classical “Jacksonian” approach to governance</a> during his presidency: a minimalist government that aims “to fulfil the country’s destiny by looking after the physical security and economic well-being of the American people in their national home, and to do that while interfering as little as possible with the individual freedoms that makes the country unique.” </p>
<p>However, this approach is <a href="https://notesonliberty.com/2017/04/11/unilateralism-is-not-isolationism/">less about “isolationism” than it is “unilateralism</a>.” It’s in keeping with what Trump announced in his 2017 <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf">“America First” national security strategy</a> and later re-emphasized in his <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/">2019 address to the United Nations General Assembly</a> — U.S. domination unshackled by having to work with others.</p>
<p>This is evident in the Chicago poll finding that “half of Trump Republicans (48 per cent) say the U.S. should be <em>the dominant</em> world leader, while a majority of non-Trump Republicans (65 per cent) say the country should play a <em>shared leadership</em> role.” In essence, Jacksonians see no value in working with foreigners because that curtails America’s ability to make decisions solely in its own interests.</p>
<h2>What would the end of NATO mean?</h2>
<p>A bipartisan bill in the U.S. Senate passed in late 2023 <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/4360407-congress-approves-bill-barring-president-withdrawing-nato/">prohibits a unilateral presidential withdrawal from NATO</a> without a two-thirds Senate majority or a specific act of Congress. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-2024-reelection-pull-out-of-nato-membership/676120/">an American president could easily hobble NATO</a> by withdrawing Europe-based U.S. troops, forgoing active participation in NATO exercises and, more generally, by <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-nato-speech-article-5-2017-6">raising doubts about the sanctity of Article 5 of the NATO treaty</a>, which essentially assures collective defence if any member is attacked.</p>
<p>The end of NATO would mark the destruction of the post-Second World War international system and a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540">return to a balance-of-power arrangement</a>. In such a world, the largest powers would dictate the structures and rules under which their regional spheres of influence would be governed, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine">regardless of the wishes of the citizens of those sovereign nations</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-is-already-flustering-foreign-leaders-who-are-trying-to-prepare-for-a-possible-presidency-223767">Donald Trump is already flustering foreign leaders who are trying to prepare for a possible presidency</a>
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<p>What would this mean for Canada as part of the American sphere? While <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CAN/Year/LTST/Summarytext">most of Canada’s trade flows south</a> rather than across oceans — and although the collapse of the post-war multilateral system of relationships would normally be a disaster for a medium-sized trading nation like Canada — it would nonetheless probably be able to weather the storm thanks to its close attachment to the U.S. </p>
<p>But lacking the resources of a great power, countries like Canada rely on established norms, rules and institutions to make the world predictable and stable. These concepts are at significant risk when the great powers start acting unilaterally.</p>
<p>Remaining trans-Atlantic relationships would be of little strategic value to Canada in the face of American abuses of power. Its allies would be of no assistance in remediating <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/mercantilism">mercantilistic behaviour</a> from the United States. Canadian governments have never been able to shift our national economy <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/free-trade-20/has-north-american-integration-resulted-in-canada-becoming-too-dependent-on-the-united-states/">away from the pull of the U.S. market</a>, and it would be increasingly impossible to do so if NATO no longer existed.</p>
<p>The worst outcome, in fact, would be the strategic confinement of Canada to the North American continent.</p>
<h2>Special relationship on life support</h2>
<p>The “special relationship” Canada once enjoyed with the U.S. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/what-special-relationship-canada-grimaces-amid-hail-us-trade-blows-2021-06-22/">has largely disappeared</a>, save for a residual sense of <a href="https://today.yougov.com/travel/articles/24068-what-america-thinks-canada-might-surprise-you">good will Americans typically reserve for Canada</a>. The Trump administration demonstrated that <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/may-2020/rethinking-the-canada-us-relationship-after-the-pandemic/">no such bonhomie existed, and furthermore treated Canada with zero-sum precision</a> in its economic policies.</p>
<p>Still, the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/congress-executive-and-intermestic-affairs-three-proposals">complex and intertwined relationship</a> between the U.S. and Canada <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-hidden-wiring-of-the-canada-us-relationship/">would be difficult to disentangle</a>, and doing so wouldn’t be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2018.1542604">painless for the Americans, either</a>. The depth of the cross-border relationship might be its best defence against efforts to undo it. </p>
<p>But Canadians should not expect to be exempt from the growing mistrust within America, especially in the event of a second Trump presidency.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-canada-shouldnt-always-count-on-special-treatment-from-the-u-s-93235">Why Canada shouldn't always count on special treatment from the U.S.</a>
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<p>The security of the northern border <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/republican-presidential-candidates-turn-attention-to-border-with-canada-1.6739098">continues to arouse suspicion</a>. <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/u-s-officials-say-no-indication-rainbow-bridge-vehicle-explosion-was-terrorist-attack-after-canadian-caution-1.6656266">A car accident late last year near the Niagara Falls Rainbow Bridge</a> quickly raised fears of lax Canadian border controls <a href="https://toronto.citynews.ca/2023/11/23/some-were-quick-to-blame-terrorism-and-canada-after-fatal-rainbow-bridge-border-explosion/">by some American commentators</a>, even though those concerns turned out to be baseless. </p>
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<p>The Greek general Thucydides famously observed that “<a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191866692.001.0001/q-oro-ed6-00010932#:%7E:text=Thucydides%20c.&text=I%20have%20written%20my%20work,a%20possession%20for%20all%20time.&text=The%20strong%20do%20what%20they,weak%20suffer%20what%20they%20must.&text=Of%20the%20gods%20we%20believe,they%20rule%20wherever%20they%20can.">the strong do what they can and the weak suffer as they must</a>.” </p>
<p>An increasingly unilateral America under Trump will be far more predatory towards both Canada and Mexico. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-would-canada-approach-the-prospect-of-war-181106">Canada’s relative geographic isolation from the world</a>, which historically has kept the country remarkably secure, <a href="https://www.libraryjournal.com/review/canada-alone-navigating-the-postamerican-world-1800371">could then become something of a prison</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul T. Mitchell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada relies on established norms, rules and institutions to make the world stable. These concepts would be a great risk if Donald Trump made good on threats to disregard NATO.Paul T. Mitchell, Professor of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237672024-02-21T13:20:59Z2024-02-21T13:20:59ZDonald Trump is already flustering foreign leaders who are trying to prepare for a possible presidency<p>Donald Trump has not been elected the next president of the United States. He is not even the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-68351923">official Republican candidate</a>. But Trump’s presence in the 2024 electoral race is already dictating domestic and foreign political agendas – without him even setting foot in the White House for a second term.</p>
<p>The idea that presidential wannabes influence politics before an election is nothing new. Candidates shape the domestic agenda to help them win an election or govern afterwards. Other countries also always prepare for the new leader to come. Yet the influence Trump is having right now is more excessive and more disruptive than we’ve previously seen this far out from an election, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>Trump is having an unprecedented influence on US foreign policy – for example, in relation to Ukraine. Trump recently rallied his supporters to oppose a joint bill to provide aid to Ukraine and to tighten up controls <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/republicans-kill-border-bill-sign-trumps-strength-mcconnells-waning-in-rcna137477">at the Mexican border</a> in the US Senate. </p>
<p>Democrats were forced to create a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">new bill on Ukraine aid</a>. The Senate <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-senate-passes-us-95-billion-aid-package-for-ukraine-what-this-tells-us-about-republican-support-for-trump-223502">finally approved</a> a bill giving Ukraine US$95 billion (£75.2 billion). Former speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, has warned that Trump has the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/grotesque-donald-trump-giving-republicans-green-light-to-stop-funding-ukraine-nancy-pelosi-claims-13075328">ability to empower</a> those Republicans opposed to funding Ukraine to prevent future support. The extent to which Trump’s position was taken seriously speaks volumes about his current political impact on foreign policy.</p>
<p>It is not just the US government having to react to Trump on foreign issues. The rest of the world is too. Harvard University professor of government Graham Allison identifies <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/trump-presidency-geopolitics/">two dynamics</a> at play: the “Trump hedge” and the “Trump put”.</p>
<p>The “Trump hedge” is where countries try to prepare for a Trump administration. This may sound like common sense, but the problem with hedging in the current climate is that it is difficult to know what you are hedging against with Trump. He is <a href="https://www.routledge.com/A-Trump-Doctrine-Unpredictability-and-Foreign-Policy/Bentley-Lerner/p/book/9781032364773">unpredictable</a>, something he says is a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html">deliberate strategy</a>. If your competitors don’t know what’s coming, they explicitly can’t hedge – which Trump suggests creates an advantage.</p>
<p>But unpredictability makes other countries feel insecure. Trump suggests big changes could (or perhaps could not) be coming, such as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/19/trump-nato-russia-republicans-europe/">leaving Nato</a>, abandoning US commitments to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/06/trump-climate-change-fossil-fuels-second-term">climate change</a>, and new trade rules for <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-68201370">China</a> and <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/914767/if-re-elected-trump-will-target-eu-with-trade-sanctions">Europe</a>. How do you make decisions when the world can transform on inauguration day? The “Trump put” expresses how states are now choosing to delay decisions to see what happens. This delay is not prudence. It is the product of confusion and a feeling that the world is in limbo. </p>
<p>Trump is already creating major disruption this way, and it is not beneficial for international politics. For example, Trump has always been useful to Vladimir Putin, who may be <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/18/john-bolton-trump-russia-putin-00142078">emboldened now</a> by even the promise of a Trump victory and be unwilling to resolve the Ukraine conflict before then. With Putin’s main opponent threat to the Kremlin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/alexei-navalnys-death-what-do-we-know-2024-02-18/">Alexei Navalny</a> now dead, this is a bigger concern than ever. Israel may also feel they can ignore current <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-68346027">US proposals for a ceasefire</a> if they know that the man who moved the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/06/trump-recognise-jerusalem-israel-capital-move-us-embassy-white-house">US embassy to Jerusalem</a> will soon be in charge.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">Alexei Navalny: reported death of Putin's most prominent opponent spells the end of politics in Russia</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nato-women-donald-trump-misogyny-mark-rutte-m3fll8vh9">Nato is</a> believed to have shifted away from appointing a female secretary-general, because of concerns about Trump’s lack of respect for women leaders. And in Canada, there’s talk of the <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/04/trudeau-plays-the-trump-card-00129689">date of the general election</a> being influenced by the Trump campaign.</p>
<h2>Back in the US</h2>
<p>Trump is also wielding power over domestic legislation with the final say on Republican policies. When Republican house representative Jason Smith put forward a $78 billion bipartisan tax deal earlier this year, he <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/02/trump-congressional-republicans-influence-00139061">ran the bill past Trump</a> first. While Trump has certainly <a href="https://rvat.org/">not won over</a> all Republicans, he is making his mark.</p>
<p>Yet Trump’s influence is more than lining up policy behind a potential new leader. Trump is shaping policy to bolster his chances at the ballot box. The Ukraine bill he stopped also addressed immigration. Trump rejected the bill to keep immigration alive as a hot-button issue for his campaign and to more easily promise harsher policies – such as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/trump-campaign-promises-second-term-rcna138621">revoking so-called “open borders” and instigating mass deportations</a>. One thing is clear: the US does not get any immigration policy until it suits Trump. Few presidential candidates have been able to claim such authority.</p>
<p>Trump is also pushing a political strategy aimed at clearing him of involvement in the 2021 Capitol Hill attack. Earlier this month, more than 60 House Republicans <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/us/politics/house-republicans-trump-jan-6.html">signed a resolution</a> stating that Trump did not “engage in insurrection”. Trump is influencing at the highest levels – able to shape the election by heading off claims he is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-66690276">not eligible</a> for office.</p>
<p>More widely, the right-wing of the Republican party is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/election-2024-conservatives-trump-heritage-857eb794e505f1c6710eb03fd5b58981">drawing on a potential Trump victory</a> to ramp up ideological battles in the US. Trump is the right-wing poster child, not least where his Supreme Court appointments facilitated the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/trumps-justices-decisive-long-campaign-overturn-roe-v-wade-2022-06-24/">overturning of Roe v Wade</a>, the historic case which had led to US-wide abortion rights. </p>
<p>Trump is shaping the 2024 election itself. He dominates the headlines for all the wrong reasons (most recently, a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/16/nyregion/trump-civil-fraud-trial-ruling.html">$355 million civil fraud penalty</a>). Yet this type of media attention has only served to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-address-supporters-after-3549-million-fraud-ruling-2024-02-17/">galvanise his supporters</a> at a time when Joe Biden is best known for his <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/health/bidens-memory-issues-draw-attention-neurologists-weigh-rcna138135">bad memory</a>. </p>
<p>Trump’s most critical influence right now is in making the election all about the issues he wants to campaign on – and which present him as the inevitable heir apparent to the Oval Office.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Bentley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rest of the world is already starting to react to a possible Trump presidency, but is finding it hard to plan.Michelle Bentley, Reader in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230962024-02-21T01:01:09Z2024-02-21T01:01:09ZWhy 2024 could be a grim year for Ukraine – with momentous implications for the world<p>Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s resistance remains remarkable. Confident initial predictions of a swift Russian triumph were repeatedly proven wrong. Instead, Russia’s military was beset by <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2523-1.html">poor logistics</a>, corruption, a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/">sclerotic command structure</a> and an inability to <a href="https://mickryan.substack.com/p/war-ukraine-and-adaptation">counter</a> Ukrainian tactics. </p>
<p>Kyiv’s armed forces successfully prevented a rash <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/">Russian attempt</a> to seize the Ukrainian capital and then stopped the entire Russian advance. After six months, they began turning the Russian invaders back, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/29/ukraine-offensive-kharkiv-kherson-donetsk/">recapturing</a> swathes of territory around Kharkov in the north and Kherson in the south. </p>
<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was feted by Western leaders, parlaying his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/09/zelensky-rhetoric-appeals-west-nato/">personal popularity</a> into commitments of military aid and insisting Ukraine could prevail with a more sophisticated arsenal.</p>
<p>Yet for all these early successes, the war soon devolved into repeated <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/human-wave-tactics-are-demoralizing-the-russian-army-in-ukraine/">human waves</a> of attacks by Russian conscripts against well-defended Ukrainian positions. The slow drip-feed of Western weapons forced Kyiv to significantly delay its 2023 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">counteroffensive</a>. This gave Russia’s armed forces time to design deep and elaborate defensive fortifications, minefields and tank traps. </p>
<p>Indeed, thanks largely to Russian efforts, Ukraine is now the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/22/ukraine-is-now-most-mined-country-it-will-take-decades-make-safe/">most heavily mined</a> country in the world.</p>
<p>Once Ukraine’s counteroffensive commenced, its forces made <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/MAPS/klvygwawavg/2023-12-21/four-factors-that-stalled-ukraines-counteroffensive/">little headway</a> and took heavy losses, especially given the lack of air support. </p>
<p>Facing personnel and equipment shortages, Zelensky dramatically <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/02/zelensky-ukraine-russia-war-leadership-zaluzhny/677334/">fired his military chief</a>, Valerii Zaluzhny, earlier this month, opting for a new strategy that seeks to build Ukrainian strength while blocking further Russian advances.</p>
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<h2>Russia: weakened, but determined</h2>
<p>After being humiliated by failing to immediately achieve the objectives of its “special military operation” in early 2022, the Kremlin attempted to cow an obstinately united West through bluff and bluster, while bludgeoning Ukrainian cities and military positions. </p>
<p>It repeatedly <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-nuclear-threats-and-nuclear-signaling/">rattled nuclear sabres</a>, mobilised isolationist and far-right groups throughout <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/russias-far-right-campaign-europe">Europe</a> and warned of a looming <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/25/putin-ally-we-are-probably-on-the-verge-of-a-new-world-war">world war</a>. President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric bordered on unhinged, punctuated by rants about the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSS8N2Z80G1/">moral decrepitude</a> of “Satanic” Western culture that only Russian traditional values could resist. </p>
<p>Tellingly, in a rare moment of honesty, Putin also admitted the obvious: invading Ukraine was about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands">restoring</a> what he saw as Russia’s “historic lands”. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/second-mobilization-russia-men-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war/">mobilising</a> hundreds of thousands of men for sacrifice in the Ukrainian meat-grinder, the Kremlin sought to project an image of a society <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/pulpit-propaganda-machine-tracing-russian-orthodox-churchs-role-putins-war">overseen</a> by a stable, albeit xenophobic troika. Putin was the wise tsar, the Orthodox Church was the steward of Russia’s conservative soul and the military served as Russia’s armoured bulwark. </p>
<p>With no good news to report, Kremlin propagandists created a bizarre narrative in which Russia was defending itself against NATO aggression, liberally labelling Russia’s opponents as “<a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/11/27/commentary/world-commentary/russia-nazi-propaganda/">Nazis</a>”. </p>
<p>But this failed to mask the reality that Russia itself was increasingly becoming Nazified, as its hyper-nationalist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-letter-z-fascist-symbol/31758267.html">“Z” movement</a> made clear. So, too, did repeated genocidal and antisemitic language: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61296682">crude observation</a> that both Adolf Hitler and Zelensky had Jewish blood</p></li>
<li><p>comparisons between Ukrainians and <a href="https://snyder.substack.com/p/playing-the-victim">vermin</a> </p></li>
<li><p>and overt calls by Kremlin-sponsored propagandists for a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/09/russia-putin-propaganda-ukraine-war-crimes-atrocities/">solution of the Ukrainian question</a>”.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Simultaneously, Russia’s draconian crackdown on internal dissent resulted in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-court-jails-kremlin-critic-kara-murza-25-years-treason-2023-04-17/">lengthy jail terms</a> for anyone found guilty of criticising the war or army.</p>
<p>Russia’s failures also brought the audacious revolt in June 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, and one of Putin’s closest confidantes. And despite Prigozhin’s subsequently convenient death, the fact he had managed to march largely unchallenged through Russia until voluntarily stopping 200 kilometres from Moscow made Putin look <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/prigozhin-dead-putin-still-weakened">considerably weakened</a>.</p>
<p>However, with the start of 2024, Russia’s forces have started pressing again on the battlefield, making small territorial gains.</p>
<p>A recent report puts the <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024">current number</a> of Russian military personnel in Ukraine at 470,000. And although it is believed to have lost a staggering <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/equipment-losses-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-mount/">8,800 armoured fighting vehicles</a> and some 315,000 dead and wounded – fully <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-intelligence-assesses-ukraine-war-has-cost-russia-315000-casualties-source-2023-12-12/">90% of the forces</a> it began the war with – the Russian armed forces have finally begun to adapt. </p>
<h2>What will the coming year bring?</h2>
<p>How the war unfolds in 2024 will have momentous implications for the world – a fact not receiving near enough attention in Western media coverage.</p>
<p>It will determine whether Ukraine is able to retain its territory and begin the painful rebuilding process. </p>
<p>It will be decisive for Putin’s wager that conquest comes without consequences, perhaps emboldening him to sets his sights on other states on its periphery. </p>
<p>It will confirm whether Europe can remain stabilised, secure and united, and whether America will continue to be seen as a reliable ally.</p>
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<p>For the Kremlin, the key question is whether it can keep domestic discontent muted long enough for the West to lose interest in the war and withdraw its support for Ukraine. It is unlikely to run out of weapons, having massively ramped up domestic production of armaments and sourcing drones and ammunition from a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">rogues’ gallery</a> of pariahs: Iran and North Korea. </p>
<p>Ukraine, which is fighting for national survival, faces a tougher and grimmer 2024. It will need to continue absorbing relentless Russian attacks, keep its economy afloat and rebuild its military strength for yet another attempt to evict Russia’s forces.</p>
<p>Zelensky’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html">famous</a> “I need ammunition, not a ride” response to a US offer to evacuate him in 2022 holds just as true two years later. Without a constant stream of military aid, Ukrainian resistance will be very hard to sustain.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<p>Aid from Ukraine’s most crucial supporter, the United States, has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68284380">stymied</a> by the extreme right wing of the Republican Party. This is causing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6594e548-8b2e-4c95-a589-7d9e358062d2">ammunition shortages</a> that are already being measured in Ukrainian lives and territory. </p>
<p>But a far greater threat lies on the horizon, in the real prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency. Putin is well aware Trump will give him a free hand in Ukraine and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/europe/trump-nato-putin-europe-analysis-intl/index.html">probably beyond it</a>, too. </p>
<p>Accordingly, he is investing significant efforts to back his candidacy. The extraordinary spectacle of Putin – the leader of a hostile foreign power – using an “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-history-lecture-reveals-his-dreams-of-a-new-russian-empire/">interview</a>” with ex-Fox News personality Tucker Carlson to rally the Trump base was a keen indicator of that.</p>
<p>Europe is finally beginning to wake up to the reality a Trump-led US could abandon NATO, in addition to Ukraine. But whether European nations are able to overcome their institutional inertia and webs of entangled interests to stoutly resist Russia on their own remains an open question.</p>
<p>It’s an old adage, but wars are world-shaping. Their outcomes are far-reaching: redrawing maps, establishing new fault lines, and ushering in the birth and death of nations. </p>
<p>Russia’s war against Ukraine is proving to be no different.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/unmarked-graves-violent-repression-and-cultural-erasure-the-devastating-human-toll-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-223337">Unmarked graves, violent repression and cultural erasure: the devastating human toll of Russia's invasion of Ukraine</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>Ukraine has fought off relentless waves of Russian attacks over the past two years, but if its Western support dries up, its resistance will be very hard to sustain.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237472024-02-20T15:56:55Z2024-02-20T15:56:55ZUkraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia<p>In the summer and autumn of 2022, there was much <a href="https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1014090/the-debate-over-putins-off-ramps-explained">discussion</a> about finding an “off-ramp” to allow Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, a face-saving way out of an unwinnable war. Now, as Ukraine heads into the third year of defending itself against Russia’s aggression, the suggestion persists – but increasingly, it’s the west that needs the off-ramp.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s prospects, after two years of a gruelling war that have taken an enormous human toll, are uncertain. Its population losses, both in terms of battlefield casualties and the flood of emigration that followed the invasion, will be difficult to remedy, and could have crippling <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukrainian-businesses-fear-new-mobilisation-law-could-paralyse-economy-2024-02-19/">consequences</a> for Ukraine’s already struggling economy. </p>
<p>Not only that but the cost of the war is increasing at a staggering rate. The latest joint <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released">assessment</a> by the EU, World Bank and UN of Ukraine’s recovery needs puts these at US$486 billion (£385.6 billion), up $75 billion since last year. This means Ukraine’s needs have grown in 12 months by one and a half times the total amount the EU has made <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_621">available</a> in support for Ukraine over the next four years. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/02_Publikationen/2023/Munich_Security_Index_2023.pdf">annual index of risks for 2023</a> produced by the <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/">Munich Security Conference</a>, a global forum for debating international security policy, Russia was perceived as the top risk by five of the G7 countries. In <a href="https://securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/02_Publikationen/2024/MSR_2024/MunichSecurityIndex2024.pdf">2024</a>, this perception is only shared by two G7 members. </p>
<p>Given the absolutely critical dependence of Ukraine on G7 political, economic and military support, this is worrying. It does not bode well for the ability of Europe’s political leaders to sustain the necessary public backing for continued aid transfers. Voters in France and Germany, for example, are significantly more <a href="https://securityconference.org/assets/01_Bilder_Inhalte/03_Medien/02_Publikationen/2024/MSR_2024/MunichSecurityIndex2024.pdf">concerned</a> about mass migration and radical Islamic terrorism than Putin’s designs for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Moreover, Ukraine is not the only crisis demanding the attention of the collective west. The war in Gaza and wider conflagration across the Middle East is, and will remain, high on the agenda. But there are numerous other flashpoints that often fail to grab global news headlines. </p>
<p>The ongoing civil war in <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-armed-forces-are-on-a-path-to-self-destruction-risking-state-collapse-223487">Sudan</a>, the intensifying conflict in the eastern <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, and rising <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">tensions</a> between Ethiopia and Somalia all have the potential to feed directly into the fear of western publics about yet another mass migration crisis.</p>
<p>Nuclear sabre rattling by <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-ramps-up-military-rhetoric-as-kim-gives-up-on-reunification-with-south-213696">North Korea</a>, Iranian <a href="https://www.navigatingthevortex.com/p/bidens-iran-dilemma-punish-and-deter">sponsorship</a> of terrorist proxies across the Middle East, and the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">apparent consolidation</a> of a new “axis of evil” between these two and Russia are unlikely to calm nerves in western capitals.</p>
<h2>Costly distraction</h2>
<p>Against this background, the war in Ukraine has become a major and increasingly costly distraction. Many leaders – in Europe in particular – are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/european-leaders-call-for-stronger-defence-ties-donald-trump-nato-remarks-russia">worried</a>, perhaps disproportionately, about a return of Donald Trump to the White House and the possible end of a meaningful transatlantic alliance. If the US withdraws support, there is a fear that a continuation of the war in Ukraine could expose Europe even more to Russian aggression than is already the case.</p>
<p>The key problem is that mere rhetorical commitments to supporting Ukraine are not just meaningless but counterproductive. They uphold the mirage of a winnable war without providing the required capabilities. As the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68325022">told the Munich Security Conference</a> on February 17, the military equipment shortages that Ukraine has experienced over the last several months were a key factor in the recent loss of the town of <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/russia-takes-full-control-of-avdiivka-coke-plant-defence-ministry-says/ar-BB1iv085">Avdiivka</a> to Russian forces. </p>
<p>The frontline may not have shifted more than a few hundred metres as a result of this loss, but the psychological impact is significant – including in the west, where <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/19/europe/ukraine-russia-war-avdiivka-defeat-intl/index.html">doubts</a> over the will and ability to sustain Ukraine’s efforts are on the rise again. If the conflict continues on its current trajectory – and even more so if the narrative of an unwinnable war gains more traction – western support is unlikely even to prevent Ukraine from losing badly, possibly leading to the kind of total defeat Putin <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-history-lecture-reveals-his-dreams-of-a-new-russian-empire/">imagined</a> in his recent interview with Tucker Carlson.</p>
<p>A Ukrainian defeat would be a dangerous humiliation for the west. In light of the continuing rhetoric about the west’s <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/583980-blinken-us-commitment-to-ukraines-territorial-integrity-is/">“iron-clad commitment”</a> to a just peace for Ukraine, a Russian victory would accelerate the decline of the current international order. It would usher in a drawn-out transition period to something far less favourable – and not just to western interests. </p>
<p>A return to the bloc confrontation of the cold war – but with a probably stronger Chinese-led alliance with Russia, Iran and North Korea facing off against a weakening and less united western alliance – would leave little room to address problems such as climate change and food security. This should also be a warning to those in the global south who think they have little, if anything, at stake in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Compromise solution</h2>
<p>Searching for an off-ramp does not mean letting Putin win. It means enabling Ukraine to defend the areas currently still under its control. This will require more western aid, but also serious consideration of negotiating a ceasefire. An end to the fighting would buy western Europe and Ukraine time to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3c87ef13-122f-4e78-a7af-54c75c30a91d">build up</a> stronger domestic defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Ukraine has concluded bilateral security deals with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-britain-sign-security-agreement-kyiv-2024-01-12/">UK</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-security-deal-with-france-is-ambitious-substantive-2024-02-16/">France</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-and-ukraine-sign-security-agreement-scholz-zelenskyy/">Germany</a> – and deals with other G7 members are likely to follow. These deals would provide more of a guarantee for Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty than the currently futile attempt to restore the country’s territorial integrity in full – or its hopes for imminent Nato membership that are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-ambassador-nato-expectations-summit-david-quarrey/">unlikely</a> to be fulfilled. </p>
<p>Reassessing current realities on the battlefield in this way will undoubtedly be seen as appeasement by some. But a more fitting analogy might be that of <a href="https://europe.unc.edu/the-end-of-wwii-and-the-division-of-europe/">West Germany in 1949</a> and, even more so, of <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/armistice-agreement-restoration-south-korean-state">South Korea in 1953</a>, both of which needed to establish internationally recognised borders in order to establish sovereignty in the face of hostile neighbouring powers. The challenge for Ukraine and its western partners is to establish the equivalent of the Korean peninsula’s 38th parallel. </p>
<p>The alternative, short of the west seriously doubling down on military support for Kyiv, is a slow and agonising defeat on the battlefield, with far-reaching consequences beyond Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223747/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p>Ukraine is just one of a daunting number of security issues facing Nato and the west.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234172024-02-15T13:34:55Z2024-02-15T13:34:55ZWhy the United States needs NATO – 3 things to know<p>Former President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/13/politics/fact-check-trump-nato/index.html">long made it clear that he deeply resents</a> NATO, a 75-year-old military alliance that is composed of the United States and 30 other countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">Trump escalated his criticism</a> of NATO on Feb. 10, 2024, when he said that, if he is elected president again in November 2024, the U.S. would not defend any member country that had not “paid up.” </p>
<p>Trump also said that he would encourage Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, “to do whatever the hell they want” with a NATO member that was “delinquent” in paying for its defense. </p>
<p>NATO is the Western world’s foremost defense organization. It is headquartered in Brussels. The central idea behind NATO’s existence, as explained in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">Article 5</a> of NATO’s 1949 treaty, is that all NATO countries agree to defend any other NATO country in case of an attack. </p>
<p>NATO has no standing army and relies on member countries to volunteer their military forces to carry out any operation. So all NATO countries agree to <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm#:%7E:text=In%202006%2C%20NATO%20Defence%20Ministers,ensure%20the%20Alliance%27s%20military%20readiness.">spend 2% of their annual gross domestic product</a> on military defense in order to support NATO. </p>
<p>Some countries, like the U.S., the U.K., Poland, Finland, Greece and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, devote more than 2% of their GDP to military defense. About half of NATO’s members, including Germany, France, Norway, Spain and Turkey, <a href="https://www.forces.net/news/world/nato-which-countries-pay-their-share-defence#:%7E:text=Ukraine%20war&text=Poland%20is%20the%20alliance%27s%20biggest,3.01%25%20the%20next%20closest.">spend less</a>. </p>
<p>NATO leader Jens Stoltenberg said in a written statement on Feb. 11 that <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html#">Trump’s suggestion</a> “undermines all of our security, including that of the U.S., and puts American and European soldiers at increased risk.” Other political leaders also criticized Trump’s comments as highly dangerous. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=bs9WVS0AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of history and international affairs,</a> it is clear to me that Trump does not seem to understand the many advantages the U.S. gets from being part of NATO. Here are three major benefits for the U.S. that come with NATO membership: </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two cookies are seen on a plate - one has frosting designed like the American flag, and the other is blue with a white compass on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NATO and American flag cookies are seen at a meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Jan. 29, 2024, in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/and-american-flag-cookies-at-a-meeting-between-defense-news-photo/1963151870?adppopup=true">Julia Nikhinson/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>1. NATO gives the US reliable allies</h2>
<p>Militarily and economically, the U.S. is a hugely formidable power. It has the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">largest nuclear arsenal</a> on earth and continues to be the largest economy in the world. </p>
<p>Yet, without its allies in Asia, and above all without those in Europe, the U.S would be a much diminished superpower. </p>
<p>NATO provides the U.S. with a leadership position in one of the strongest military alliance networks in the world. This leadership goes well beyond the security realm – it has profound and very positive political and economic ripple effects. For instance, most Western countries <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/03/14/global-arms-sales-us-dominates-russia#">purchase their arms and military</a> equipment from the U.S. </p>
<p>Russia counts controversial regimes known for human rights violations such as Iran, North Korea and, to some extent, China, among its most important allies. The U.S. considers economically strong countries like Canada, Germany, France, Italy and many other established democracies as its friends and allies.</p>
<p>NATO has invoked <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> only once – immediately after the U.S. <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm#:%7E:text=12%20September%202001&text=Later%20that%20day%2C%20the%20Allies,abroad%20against%20the%20United%20States.">was attacked on Sept. 11, 2001</a>. America’s NATO allies were ready to come to the aid of the U.S. – and, for good or for bad, many subsequently participated in the United States’ war in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>2. NATO provides peace and stability</h2>
<p>NATO provides a blanket of protection and mutual security for all its members, helping explain why the vast majority of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/03/30/7-former-communist-countries-join-nato/476d93dc-e4bd-4f05-9a15-5b66d322d0e6/">countries in central and eastern Europe</a> clamored to join NATO after the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union">fall of the Soviet Union</a> in 1991. </p>
<p>Today, Ukraine continues to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3455199/leaders-agree-to-expedite-ukraines-nato-membership/">push for NATO membership</a> – though its application to join appears unlikely to be granted anytime soon, given the military commitment this would create for the alliance. </p>
<p>Russia fought short wars in recent <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91277">years with Moldova</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">Georgia</a> and also with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/">Ukraine prior</a> to 2022, but Putin has not invaded neighboring countries that are NATO members. Invading a NATO country would bring the entire alliance into a war with Russia, which would be a risky gamble for Moscow.</p>
<p>Despite international concern that Russia’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/us/politics/ukraine-war-expansion.html">war in Ukraine could spill over</a> into neighboring NATO countries, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/29/poland-says-russian-missile-briefly-entered-its-airspace#:%7E:text=%22Everything%20indicates%20that%20a%20Russian,from%20%5BNATO%5D%20allies.%22">like Poland</a> and the three Baltic nations, it has not yet happened. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Donald Trump enters a stage with an American flag on it, with blue-lit lighting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former President Donald Trump arrives at a news conference during the July 2018 NATO summit in Brussels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-arrives-to-speak-to-the-media-at-a-news-photo/996942026?adppopup=true">Sean Gallup/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>3. NATO has helped the US get stronger</h2>
<p>The Soviet Union’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_138294.htm">military alliance, called the Warsaw Pact</a>, required the USSR and its satellite states in central and eastern Europe, including East Germany, Poland and Hungary, to join. NATO, on the other hand, is a voluntary military alliance, and countries must go through a demanding application process before they are accepted. </p>
<p>The United States’ current presence in Europe – and Asia – has not been imposed by force. Instead, U.S. troops and influence in Europe are generally welcomed by its allies. </p>
<p>By joining NATO and accepting the military leadership of Washington, the other NATO countries give the U.S. unprecedented influence and power. Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad called this an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338602300305">empire by invitation</a>.” This informal empire has deeply anchored the U.S. and its influence in Europe. </p>
<h2>A split in opinion</h2>
<p>President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that under his leadership the U.S. would “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-calls-trumps-nato-remarks-un-american-rcna138670#:%7E:text=%22As%20long%20as%20I%27m,a%20rally%20in%20South%20Carolina.">defend every inch</a> of NATO territory,” speaking primarily in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine. </p>
<p>Biden has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/30/biden-warns-putin-on-nato-threat-as-russia-annexes-ukraine-regions.html">repeatedly warned Putin</a> that he would face the consequences if Russia attacks a NATO member.</p>
<p>For Trump, however, transatlantic solidarity and mutual defense appear to count for nothing. For him, it seems to be all about the money and whether or not NATO countries spend 2% of their GDP on defense. And despite Putin having begun a terrible war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Trump has continued to voice his <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/trump-putin-ukraine-invasion-00010923">admiration of the Russian leader</a>.</p>
<p>Trump does not view Putin’s Russia as an existential threat to the U.S.-led global order. And thus he does not seem to realize that the U.S. and its European allies need protection from Putin’s Russia, the kind of protection offered by NATO. NATO’s existence gives the U.S. strong and reliable allies, provides Washington with great influence in Europe and makes sure that most of Europe remains stable and peaceful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus W. Larres does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump has threatened to not defend some NATO countries if Russia attacks them. But the US also benefits from the power that NATO gives it, as well as the stability it helped create in Europe.Klaus W. Larres, Professor of History and International Affairs, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223522024-02-08T20:28:17Z2024-02-08T20:28:17ZAre American nuclear weapons returning to the United Kingdom?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574141/original/file-20240207-20-1vhhx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C225%2C5184%2C2925&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. Air Force fighter jet takes off from RAF Lakenheath in the U.K. in 2018. American nuclear weapons may soon be hosted there.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In August 2023, nuclear weapons researchers <a href="https://fas.org/publication/increasing-evidence-that-the-us-air-forces-nuclear-mission-may-be-returning-to-uk-soil/">Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists reported</a> it was increasingly apparent the United States was upgrading its <a href="https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/raf-lakenheath">Lakenheath military base</a> in the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>This base hosted American nuclear weapons in the past, which raises questions about whether they’re returning. Citing Pentagon documents it obtained, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/01/26/us-nuclear-bombs-lackenheath-raf-russia-threat-hiroshima/"><em>The Telegraph</em> also reported</a> on the developments, noting it would be the first time in 15 years that U.S. nuclear weapons would be stationed on British soil. </p>
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<p>While there is no official confirmation about the move, <em>The Telegraph</em> reports that the U.S. is currently building the specific facilities needed to store nuclear weapons at Lakenheath. </p>
<p>This would also mean that for the first time since 1972, NATO is considering an expansion to its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm">nuclear sharing arrangements</a>. Through these arrangements, the U.S. has stationed some of its nuclear weapons on its allies’ territory since the early days of the Cold War. </p>
<h2>Hosting American nukes</h2>
<p>At its height in the 1960s, 13 states hosted American nuclear weapons at the same time, including Canada. Yet in the last few decades, this number has gradually dwindled to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nuclear-weapons-europe-mapping-us-and-russian-deployments">only five NATO members: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey</a>. <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/canada/">Canada withdrew in 1984</a>, as did Greece in 2001. The United Kingdom was the most recent country to exit the scheme in 2009.</p>
<p>The nuclear weapons hosted by the five participants are <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3571660/department-of-defense-announces-pursuit-of-b61-gravity-bomb-variant/">B61 gravity bombs</a> and can be delivered by aircraft, such as German and Italian Tornados, F-22s and the newer American F-35s. Under nuclear sharing, they would be flown into combat by the European participants’ own pilots. </p>
<p>Their yield is variable, and can be as high as more than <a href="https://www.popsci.com/technology/new-nuclear-gravity-bomb-b61-13/">five times</a> that of the <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/wwii/wwii-pacific/bombardment-japan/bombs-atomic/little-boy-hiroshima.html">“Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima that killed more than 100,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>While B61 gravity bombs are perceived to have little military utility, this move is important in terms of optics and is clearly connected to Russia’s hostility toward the West, its war in Ukraine and Moscow’s <a href="https://time.com/6266418/russia-belarus-nuclear-weapons/">own announcement</a> that it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65932700">would deploy</a> some of its nuclear weapons in Belarus. </p>
<h2>High international threat environment</h2>
<p>Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally altered the international security environment. European members of NATO, especially those bordering Russia, are experiencing heightened insecurity. </p>
<p>Whereas the post-Cold War security environment had made NATO members question the relevance of nuclear sharing, recent events have reignited the debate on the alliance’s nuclear capabilities. </p>
<p>In the 2010s, members <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2021.1941603">like Germany</a> were questioning their participation in the scheme. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that is no longer the case: consensus among nuclear sharing participants has been strengthened. </p>
<p>In a forthcoming research article in <em>International Affairs</em>, we surmise this kind of reinforcement or expansion of nuclear sharing could be the result of the Ukraine war and the changing threat perception of NATO members, which has slowed down the political momentum of anti-nuclear voices.</p>
<p>From NATO’s perspective, nuclear sharing serves two important goals. The first is to deter rivals or potential enemies by demonstrating U.S. resolve and strength. The second is to reassure NATO’s own members. </p>
<p>Stationing its bombs in Europe means the United States cannot sit out conflicts in the region. Reassuring NATO nations is the goal that appears most closely connected to this new development, as European members have repeatedly called for a reinforcement of NATO’s stand against Russia.</p>
<p>NATO members, particularly those in eastern Europe, fear a Russian invasion of their territory. By stationing some of its nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom again, the U.S. is matching Russia’s new deployment in Belarus. But more importantly, it makes clear its presence in Europe isn’t fleeting.</p>
<h2>Nuclear sharing remains contentious</h2>
<p>Ever since the 2000s, there has been considerable pressure coming from citizens in NATO nations to withdraw from nuclear sharing. German, <a href="https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2014/01/KDGnonproliferatie.pdf">Belgian and Dutch</a> decision-makers publicly considered removing the bombs from their territory. </p>
<p>In the absence of credible and overt threats to their security, and without forceful pressure coming from NATO itself, it had become difficult for these countries’ leaders to uphold the arrangement. After all, it’s hard for a democratic state to pursue certain avenues when it lacks the public support to do so. </p>
<p>The current Russian threat has overtaken these preoccupations.</p>
<p>Much like any other political arrangement, however, NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement can be contentious and subject to renegotiations, as shown by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-05/poland-is-in-talks-with-us-about-nuclear-weapons-president-says">Poland’s demands</a> to also host American nuclear weapons. </p>
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<p>NATO and its member states will no doubt use this opportunity to update its case for nuclear sharing and the existence of the alliance itself as it marks its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_222205.htm">75th anniversary</a> in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm">July 2024</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Émile Lambert-Deslandes receives funding from the Department of National Defence's MINDS program and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stéfanie von Hlatky has received funding from the NATO Science For Peace and Security Programme for research on Women, Peace, and Security.</span></em></p>NATO members, particularly those in eastern Europe, fear a Russian invasion of their territory. By stationing some of its nuclear weapons in the U.K. again, the U.S. could ease those fears.Émile Lambert-Deslandes, PhD student in International Relations, Queen's University, OntarioStéfanie von Hlatky, Associate Professor of Political Studies and Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194472024-02-01T23:18:48Z2024-02-01T23:18:48ZNATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence to open in Montréal: What does it mean for Canadian security?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572896/original/file-20240201-29-vhq8wo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6240%2C4156&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">NATO's Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) is set to open this year in Montréal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/nato-climate-change-and-security-centre-of-excellence-to-open-in-montreal-what-does-it-mean-for-canadian-security" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>This year Montréal is set to become the home for the <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/nato-otan/centre-excellence.aspx?lang=eng">North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s new Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE)</a>. The CCASCOE, as the name would suggest, is set to provide specific expertise on the environment and the impacts of climate change for NATO security.</p>
<p>When announcing the new centre, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau declared it will “<a href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/07/12/prime-minister-announces-additional-measures-support-ukraine">enable Canada, NATO allies, and other global partners to understand and address the serious security implications of climate change, including in the Arctic …[and]… it will contribute to Montréal’s status as a global hub for international organizations.”</a> </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm">NATO centres of excellence (COE) system</a> provides a valuable network of expertise to support innovation, and to “assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned, improve interoperability and capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation.” </p>
<p>Amid escalating geopolitical risks, Montréal’s new centre represents a strong commitment to climate security and will be crucial to promoting a co-ordinated global response that strengthens Canada’s capacity to address climate-specific concerns. As the federal government set out in a <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/nato-otan/centre-excellence.aspx?lang=eng">recent statement</a>:</p>
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<p>“Climate impacts may test the resilience of military installations and equipment, create harsher or more complex operational conditions, and change the nature of the strategic environment, which poses unique challenges for military and security entities charged with maintaining our security.”</p>
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<p>The new centre is specifically designed to address these evolving concerns.</p>
<h2>Climate security collaboration</h2>
<p>In June 2021, the Canadian government proposed hosting the CCASCOE at a NATO Summit in Brussels. A year later it announced Montréal as the planned host city, with Canada providing $40.4 million in “direct support” for CCASCOE as host nation over five years.</p>
<p>The CCASCOE’s founding document governs “<a href="https://www.act.nato.int/about/centres-of-excellence/">the relationship between participating countries and the Centre of Excellence</a>” and was <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/nato-otan/centre-excellence.aspx?lang=eng">signed by Canada and 11 sponsoring nations</a>.</p>
<p>NATO’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm#:%7E:text=The%20overall%20responsibility%20for%20COE,CAN">Allied Command Transformation ACT</a> is responsible for establishing, accrediting and preparing the centres of excellence in co-ordination with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. </p>
<p>The centres of excellence network provides a global array of expertise and practices that can benefit the development of the CCASCOE and facilitate information-sharing to climate change-related security capabilities. That ranges from the development of climate-related rapid response exercises to environmental disasters and other related engagements.</p>
<p>NATO has a long history of co-operation on doctrine development, which could serve as a valuable template for CCASCOE activities.</p>
<p>For instance, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/">in Tallinn, Estonia, provides</a> “interdisciplinary expertise” through joint initiatives that include research, training and exercises. Meanwhile, the <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/exercises/crossed-swords/">Crossed Swords</a> exercise simulates adversaries’ perspectives to identify NATO’s own strengths and weaknesses. </p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/exercises/locked-shields/">Locked Shields</a> is a team exercise focused on “realistic scenarios, cutting-edge technologies and simulating the entire complexity of a massive cyber incident.” </p>
<p>These existing exercises could offer the CCASCOE a helpful framework to structure engagements supported by the existing centres of excellence network. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-view-on-climate-change-its-eroding-our-national-security-and-we-should-prepare-for-it-65535">A military view on climate change: It's eroding our national security and we should prepare for it</a>
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<p>Another area where CCASCOE can lead innovation is through the hosting of exercises to train disaster-response capabilities for climate security challenges. An annual flagship exercise or a series of shorter practical workshops could support this leadership and help NATO members combat climate security challenges, build capacity and enhance public awareness.</p>
<h2>Developing strategies</h2>
<p>ACT’s <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/act-enhances-natos-understanding-of-climate-change/">Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 report</a> will update NATO’s understanding of the security implications of climate change to the alliance. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/sfa-topics-climate/">update will highlight</a> the importance of international co-operation to mitigate climate change, given that “strategic competitors may exploit disruptive changes, undermining alliances through false narratives and weaponizing critical technologies.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-creating-security-threats-around-the-world-and-militaries-are-responding-173668">Climate change is creating security threats around the world – and militaries are responding</a>
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<p>At the Vilnius summit in June 2023, NATO released a series of <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217212.htm">climate strategy reports</a>, including a climate security assessment, a collection of best practices and guidelines to measure greenhouse gas emissions for civilian and military infrastructure. </p>
<p>These initiatives emphasized the required civilian and military collaboration on climate security challenges — co-ordination that Canada and the CCASCOE are ideally placed to support.</p>
<h2>Melting Arctic, rising tensions</h2>
<p>This development occurs amid rising tensions.</p>
<p>The Arctic is <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-38511-8">predicted to experience the first September free of sea ice in history as early as the 2030s-2050s irrespective of emission scenarios</a>. As a result, the Arctic will increasingly become more active and see increased demand for resource access, shipping routes and territorial claims. The increased activity and strategic significance placed on the Arctic will heighten geopolitical risk.</p>
<p>For example, in August 2023, Russia’s <a href="https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/fsb-signs-maritime-security-cooperation-china-murmansk">FSB Border Guard Service and China’s Coast Guard were reported</a> to have increased co-operation in the northern port of Murmansk. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2023/06/19/russian-vtb-bank-to-finance-the-construction-of-icebreakers/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2023/06/28/third-chinese-polar-icebreaker-will-carry-deep-sea-submersibles/">China</a> have also invested in ice-breakers designed to increase a regional presence in the north.</p>
<p>These moves present serious challenges to the NATO alliance. </p>
<p>High on the agenda at this summer’s annual NATO summit will no doubt be the development of a co-ordinated approach to support climate security innovation. And in this regard, Canada — and the CCASCOE — will likely play an active role in developing this new strategic agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan Atkinson receives funding from the Canadian Defence and Security Network and previously worked at NATO.</span></em></p>Climate and environmental insecurity is set to grow in severity as the world warms. The upcoming launch of a new NATO climate change and security centre in Montréal aims to address these concerns.Ryan Atkinson, Postdoctoral Fellow, Defence Policy, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175172024-01-25T13:18:18Z2024-01-25T13:18:18ZA Western-imposed peace deal in Ukraine risks feeding Russia’s hunger for land – as it did with Serbia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562953/original/file-20231201-26-35fbaf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3808%2C2529&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman with flowers walks past a building fortified with sandbags in the Podil neighborhood of Kyiv, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIX%20Russia%20Ukraine%20War%20Daily%20Life/36cd7048eb8347298d1f560a490b4bd7?Query=ukraine%20daily%20life&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=988&currentItemNo=125">AP Photo/Jae C. Hong</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in Ukraine will soon be heading into its third year with no sign of a ceasefire. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that many in the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">West are growing impatient</a> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-endgame-analysis-1.6911021">with the emerged stalemate</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">reluctant to provide</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">continued military support</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>However, wars do come to an end, often with one side making <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-1-settle-now-all-wars-end-negotiating-table">concessions in exchange for peace</a>. And over the course of the Ukraine war, influential voices in the West – be it those of the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/">Henry Kissinger</a>, former President <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/03/trump-blurts-out-peace-plan-hand-russia-chunks-of-ukraine.html">Donald Trump</a> or high-ranking NATO official <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ukraine-membership-cede-territory-russia/">Stian Jenssen</a>, to name a few – have raised the prospect of Ukraine having to cede land to Russia in exchange for peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://baker.utk.edu/overview/faculty-and-staff/">expert on Western military interventions</a> in transnational ethnic conflicts, I have seen how well-intentioned peace agreements offered to the perceived aggressor can inadvertently plant the seeds for renewed conflict. This is because such agreements can deliver in peace what the aggressor pursues in war: territory. </p>
<p>Rather than resolve the root cause of conflicts, this can reward <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/revanchist-seeking-revengeand-not-just-with-territory-11642775416">revanchism</a> – that is, a state’s policy to reclaim territory it once dominated – and embolden an aggressor to use war to achieve its aim. This is especially true when the West rewards aggression with generous peace agreements. </p>
<p>Take the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>It has been more than 20 years since the end of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-world-and-yugoslavias-wars">the Yugoslav wars</a>, a series of conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. During these wars, Serbia sought to unify large swaths of territories populated by Serbs and non-Serbs into a “Greater Serbia.”</p>
<p>The wars ended with <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-ten-day-war-slovenian-independence.html">military victories for Slovenia</a> <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Croatia.pdf">and Croatia</a> over Serbia, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-bpfy.htm">NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo</a>. In the cases of the latter countries, NATO intervention was followed by numerous Western-imposed peace plans.</p>
<p>But two decades on, the region <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/3/are-kosovo-and-serbia-on-the-brink-of-war">borders on renewed conflict</a> as Serbia insists that its survival is dependent on it ability to solely <a href="https://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/2021/Prilog2-StrategijaNacionalneBezbednostiRS-ENG.pdf">represent and protect</a> all Serbs, wherever they live.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and women hold candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candles for three killed Serbs in the northern Serb-dominated part of the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, Kosovo, Sept. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaShootout/99c7b994087c4ba7ac7543d03e180b4b/photo?Query=armed%20attack%20serbia&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, each war is different, and the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Ukraine are unique.</p>
<p>But I believe the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo show that Western-sponsored treaties, when they sacrifice land for peace, can store up trouble for later – especially when it comes to revanchist nations.</p>
<h2>Russia and Serbia revanchism</h2>
<p>Russian and Serbian revanchism has been evident ever since the countries they once dominated – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively – broke up in the early 1990s.</p>
<p>In 1992, Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/transdniestria-moldova-and-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-pub-87609">seized Transnistria</a>, the Moscow-backed breakaway part of Moldova that borders southwestern Ukraine, under the pretext of securing peace. The same year, Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm">intervened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia</a>, autonomous regions within Georgia populated by pro-Russia but non-Georgian peoples, to “end the ethnic fighting.” In 2008, Russia expanded further into Georgia. The same scenario recurred in 2014 when Russia sent forces to Crimea and the Donbas to “protect” ethnic Russians from “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">Nazi</a>” hordes.</p>
<p>Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has similarly sought to reclaim its dominance of that region. It has done this under various pretexts. Serbia’s decadelong wars began in 1991 and included fighting in Slovenia purportedly to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/28/yugoslav-army-attacks-slovenia-meets-resistance-at-border-posts/bdf68be0-2013-4ba5-98b6-9c22c5699d81/">keep Yugoslavia together</a>”; in Croatia, it was to protect ethnic Serbs from the “<a href="https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/23666/Serbsxasxvictimsx-xgenocidexinxthexrhetoricxofxSlobodanxMilosevic.pdf?sequence=1">fascist</a>” regime; in Bosnia, Serbia claimed to be preventing the founding of an “<a href="https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1751&context=ree">Islamic state</a>”; and in Kosovo, the stated aim was to fight “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/fear-and-loathing-belgrade-what-serbian-state-media-say-about-kosovars">terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>Yet, a quarter of a century on – and despite hopes that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">the fall of former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000 might usher in a more peaceful era – political elites in Serbia continue to pursue the unification of all Serb-populated lands, or at minimum gain the West’s acceptance of a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serb world</a>” – that is, a sphere of Serbian influence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro where Serbia dominates.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in uniform gestures." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kosovo police officer guards a road near the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaTension/c26eccb374754e3db37a3bc2e6a15ce4/photo?Query=serbia%20war&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6098&currentItemNo=46">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Walking the Balkan path</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/">various peace treaties</a> meant to stabilize and bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Kosovo have, to various degrees, failed, due in no small part, I would argue, to the very terms of settlement.</p>
<p>In Bosnia, the U.S.-brokered <a href="https://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Accords of 1995</a> brought the Bosnian War to an end. But it also reorganized the state into two subnational units: the majority-ethnic Serbian Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>
<p>The accords awarded 49% of the recently independent Bosnia’s territory to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-republika-srpska/a-64373205">Republic of Srpska</a> despite Serbs constituting 31% of the general population and having <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/">committed genocide and ethnic cleansing</a> in pursuit of crafting a Serb state within Bosnia.</p>
<p>Now, the Republic of Srpska seeks to secede and contravene the Dayton Accords through the establishment of <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2022_en">parallel institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2022-05-11/top-global-official-bosnian-serbs-are-trying-to-secede">the withdrawal of its members</a> from Western-brokered institutions.</p>
<p>In Kosovo, with each European Union-sponsored peace agreement to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, security threats from Serbia escalate, as evidenced by a recent <a href="https://www.state.gov/condemnation-of-violent-attacks-on-kosovo-police/">armed attack</a> led by Milan Radoičiċ, an associate of Serbia’s president. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, what critics see as Western <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement of Serbia’s revanchism</a> has led to further concessions in regard to Kosovo. In contrast to Bosnia, the Kosovo model involves incremental appeasement through various peace agreements – the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf">Ahtisaari Plan</a>, <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2022">Brussels 1</a> and <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">2 Agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-annex-agreement-path-normalisation-relations-between_en">Ohrid Agreement</a>, and the <a href="https://usercontent.one/wp/www.burimramadani.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/www.burimramadani.com_EU-Draft_Statue_October-2023.pdf">Draft-Statute proposal</a>. These plans offer political concessions to Serbia in exchange for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<h2>The same fate for Ukraine?</h2>
<p>To suggest that a similar fate to Bosnia or Kosovo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/27/why-ukraine-should-not-accept-a-dayton-accords-style-peace">may await Ukraine</a> is not beyond the realms of reality.</p>
<p>Any such solution could be an off-ramp to war, but it would hand Vladimir Putin what he wants: control over Russian-speaking people and key strategic territory in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If the West follows either the Bosnia or Kosovo model for peace for Ukraine, the result would likely be the same: First, it would result in the reorganization of Ukraine into two political-administrative units, one under control of a pro-Western government in Kyiv, the other under the influence or direct control of Moscow. Second, it would see the promotion of complex political arrangements, such as ethnic veto powers, dual sovereignty and international representation, that yield institutional dysfunction and political instability. And third, there would be no robust security deployments or guarantees from the U.S. or NATO to deter future Russian aggression.</p>
<h2>From Kosovo to Kyiv</h2>
<p>The current <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">Western support</a> for Ukraine’s defense will likely lead to its heavy involvement in any peace negotiations. </p>
<p>But ultimately, the implications of a Western-imposed peace in Ukraine may, if the past is any indicator, do little to appease Russian revanchism and may, in fact, encourage Russian elites to pursue a similar policy in Estonia and Latvia – states where Russians make up a quarter of the population. </p>
<p>The West may hope that a plan based on land for peace helps Ukraine by stopping the bloodshed, while at the same time appeases Russia and solves a geopolitical problem for the EU and the U.S. </p>
<p>But if the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo are anything to go by, it could on the contrary only whet Russia’s appetite for more territorial claims, and leave Ukraine feeling betrayed.</p>
<p><em>Drita Perezic, a security sector expert with the <a href="https://balkansgroup.org/en/about-us-2/">Balkans Policy Research Group</a>, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elis Vllasi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fragility of peace settlements in the Balkans provides a cautionary tale. US and EU policymakers may inadvertently make matters worse by acceding to the aggressor’s territorial ambitions.Elis Vllasi, Senior Research Associate & Lecturer in National Security & Foreign Affairs, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218882024-01-24T17:21:20Z2024-01-24T17:21:20ZUK press warns of Nato war with Russia – newspapers are clearly keen to avoid mistakes of WWII<p>“Britain must prepare for war. America won’t save us this time,” declared the headline on a <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/01/19/britain-must-prepare-for-war-america-wont-save-us-this-time/">column in the Daily Telegraph</a> on January 19. The Daily Mail, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12981021/Nato-braced-war-Russia-20-years.html">asserted on January 18 that</a> Nato is “braced for all-out war with Russia in the next 20 years”. It cited a Nato official’s advice that civilians should “prepare for cataclysmic conflicts and the chilling prospect of being conscripted”. </p>
<p>The Sun has <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/25372068/grant-shapps-grow-army-ww3-threat/">alerted its readers</a> to the prospect of “wars in Russia, China, Iran and North Korea in five years”. In the Spectator, a <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-west-must-stop-playing-mr-nice-guy/">recent column noted</a> the defence secretary Grant Shapps’ assertion that the UK is “moving from a post-war to pre-war world” and suggested that “the west must stop playing Mr Nice Guy”. </p>
<p>Another column in the New Statesman similarly <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/2023/12/robert-kaplan-war-world-disorder">warned that</a> a “worldwide, bipolar military conflict” will be “the organising principle of geopolitics for years to come”. It quoted Shapps as saying: “Old enemies are reanimated. New foes are taking shape. Battle lines are being redrawn.”</p>
<p>As fears of a new war emerge, I have delved into the newspaper print archives to explore how journalists reported the risk of conflict during the years before the world wars of the 20th century.</p>
<p>Press coverage in the years preceding the second world war served a generation of readers haunted by the appalling death toll of mechanised trench warfare between 1914 and 1918. Public concern was reinforced by fear of bombing, which newspapers and cinema newsreels depicted in searing images from the civil war in Spain between 1936 and 1939 and the Japanese bombing of China in 1931.</p>
<p>Despite the nature of Hitler’s regime in Germany, the Conservative prime minister of the time, Neville Chamberlain, was determined that British newspapers must promote appeasement. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-neville-chamberlains-adviser-took-spinning-for-the-pm-to-new-and-dangerous-levels-147533">Press management</a> became a political priority for Chamberlain. </p>
<p>He was helped to achieve it by two key lieutenants. Downing Street press secretary George Steward and Sir Joseph Ball, the chairman of the Conservative Research Department, worked closely with the prime minister to persuade British newspapers that appeasement was in the national interest. Chamberlain insisted that hostility to his approach would weaken Britain’s influence abroad.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-neville-chamberlains-adviser-took-spinning-for-the-pm-to-new-and-dangerous-levels-147533">How Neville Chamberlain's adviser took spinning for the PM to new and dangerous levels</a>
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<h2>Munich agreement</h2>
<p>When Chamberlain negotiated the notorious <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/znxdnrd/revision/9">Munich agreement</a> with Hitler in September 1938, The Times did not oppose the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany without Czech consent. Instead, Britain’s most prestigious establishment broadsheet <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24402688">declared that</a>: “The volume of applause for Mr Chamberlain, which continues to grow throughout the globe, registers a popular judgement that neither politicians nor historians are likely to reverse.” </p>
<p>It predicted that Chamberlain’s diplomacy would end in “an era when the race for armaments will be seen for the madness that it is and will be abandoned because it has ceased even to be profitable”.</p>
<p>The mass market Conservative Daily Mail chastised Labour’s Clement Attlee for complaining about the “shameless betrayal” of the Czechs and accused Attlee of issuing “frothy diatribes”. It promoted Conservative optimism that the agreement would guarantee peace.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Tear-out of Guardian coverage of Munich agreement" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571149/original/file-20240124-17-ecipr0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Guardian was unimpressed by the Munich Agreement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Manchester Guardian, 1 October 1938.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The liberal Manchester Guardian loathed Hitler and harboured grave doubts about appeasement, but it could see no practical alternative. In a leader column on October 3 1938, it cautioned: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Now that the first flush of emotion is over it is the duty of all of us to see where the ‘peace with honour’ has brought us. The Prime Minister claims that it has brought us ‘peace for our time’. It is an inspiring claim, and if it proves to be a just one, he will have earned a place in history.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The following day’s edition of the popular left wing Daily Mirror was similarly unconvinced. It feared the “further strengthening until it becomes invincible of the Nazi domination of Europe”. The Mirror believed peace could only be secured by military strength brought about by rapid rearmament, but it could identify no alternative to compromise and deterrence. It feared a “world so armed and so explosive that it will blow itself to bits”.</p>
<p>In a subsequent leader on October 7, 1938, The Guardian hoped new weapons and additional recruitment to the armed forces might reinforce British diplomatic influence. However, it warned that if British foreign policy did not change substantially, “ordinary men and women” would not be persuaded that “the diplomacy our armaments are to serve” would work.</p>
<h2>Doomed to repeat mistakes?</h2>
<p>Journalism’s failures between 1936 and 1939 were less appalling than the jingoistic press campaigns that preceded the first world war and continued throughout it. </p>
<p>Between 1914 and 1918, newspapers downplayed misery and extolled victory. Soldiers found their behaviour hard to forgive. Such reporting promoted the belief that newspapers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/27/first-world-war-state-press-reporting">could not be trusted to tell the truth</a>. It won newspapers a reputation as the main backer, and perhaps even an instigator, of conflict. </p>
<p>Later, their failures during the era of appeasement meant that British newspapers were not entirely trusted by their readers when the second world war was declared in September 1939. They were widely read but little loved.</p>
<p>In highlighting the risks facing the world as Ukraine resists Russian aggression and fighting rages in Gaza, newspapers suggest that they have learned from conflicts of the past. They are neither encouraging war nor disguising the possibility that Nato may be called upon to defend borders and democracy. </p>
<p>Britain has better newspapers than it had in 1914 or 1939. Would their editorial strengths survive the outbreak of war? I fear that now – as it was in the past – truth may still be the first casualty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Luckhurst has received research funding from News UK and Ireland Ltd. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and a member of the Society of Editors and the Free Speech Union</span></em></p>How newspapers reported the risk of war in the age of appeasement.Tim Luckhurst, Principal of South College, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218902024-01-24T17:21:18Z2024-01-24T17:21:18ZNew Fortnite-style recruitment video shows how UK armed forces are getting serious about prospects of Nato war with Russia<p>Anyone with teenagers in the house might have heard sounds from bedrooms that give the impression that a raid or heist is being orchestrated by a gang. In reality, they are probably fighting a war on their games console against other armies that might be made up of other kids from their street. Of course, it might just as easily be a foe from anywhere on the planet. </p>
<p>This artificial environment, perhaps best exemplified at the moment by gaming company <a href="https://www.roblox.com/games/8113818034/World-Conquest">Roblox</a> has <a href="https://gosurabbit.com/gen-z-ers-and-millennials-are-buying-into-gaming-and-so-should-you/">overtaken the movies and music industries</a> enjoyed by previous generations. So you can see why the army might want to attract attention for military games through recruitment videos that resemble the games young people play. </p>
<p>But does the UK armed forces’ new <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unja96P135Q">Fortnite-style recruitment video</a> reveal anything more on the changing character of war in the 21st century?</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/unja96P135Q?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The British army’s new games-style recruitment tool.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the things that could be driving the creation of futuristic and exciting new recruitment videos is the need to grab the attention of a generation who might otherwise not be particularly interested in a military career. </p>
<p>After the <a href="https://theconversation.com/out-of-afghanistan-joe-biden-and-the-future-of-americas-foreign-policy-166914">withdrawal from Afghanistan</a>, teenagers or young adults might consider foreign policy decisions taken by the United States and its allies to have led to disastrous “unnecessary wars” that ended up producing more chaos around the world than greater security. That is similar to how many young people <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/vietnam-war-veterans-military-1844503">felt after the Vietnam war</a>.</p>
<p>On a more mundane level, young people in the UK might hear about the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/12/05/military-housing-in-a-far-worse-state-than-anticipated/">poor living conditions</a> in the military and problems with kit and supplies. It might <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/millenials-too-self-interested-military-career-british-army-chief-of-general-staff-sir-nick-carter-a7523866.html">not look like a career</a> for the best and the brightest who might be more interested in becoming a social media influencer or the next Elon Musk. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, if you are interested in joining up, why not experience the danger at a safe distance, in your bedroom, in the Roblox world?</p>
<p>In a more complex multicultural world where young people might have friends and family outside of the UK – and outside of the Euro-American world – the military career might need an eye-catching advertising campaign to make it more appealing. And it might be that the values and world-views of our current teenagers and 20-somethings are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2021/nov/20/dr-sarah-ogilvie-generation-z-explained-interview">different from previous generations</a>.</p>
<h2>Battlefields of the future</h2>
<p>There might be another reason for using futuristic video games as a way of getting the attention of this generation of gamers, however. War is changing. There are new tactics of war where the <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/toward-an-information-warfare-theory-of-victory/">“information war”</a> is becoming a vital part of conflicts in the 21st century. We are seeing this both in Ukraine and Gaza where claim and counterclaim are central to the way the conflicts are being fought by all sides. </p>
<p>The terrains – or domains – of conflict and competition are changing. What type of terrains or domains will an 18 year-old in 2024 be tasked with intervening in by the time they have more senior roles? There is a concern that warfare will soon <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/human-machine-teams-driven-by-ai-are-about-reshape-warfare-2023-09-08/">involve technologies</a> that are currently the stuff of science fiction. Future warfighters might be “teamed with AI tools and partners”.</p>
<p>Domains such as space will be increasingly significant in the decades ahead. States will confront ethical and strategic challenges unlike anything confronted in history. Societies and armies will risk being deceived in the information-rich battle spaces of the digital age.</p>
<p>Military planners will need to find creative ways to deceive the enemy using the tools of the digital age. Deception – and the possibility of getting your enemy to make mistakes – has been viewed as a vital element in war, going back to the writings of the <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/deception-chinese-way-war">Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu</a>, as far back as the 5th century BC. A generation brought up on complex and innovative games might be well suited to the complexity of the future battlespace.</p>
<p>The use of games in the military is now about much more than advertising. There seems to be a renewed interest across Nato members in exploring how games could be used to prepare policymakers and military commanders for complex conflicts and global challenges. I was involved in the development of a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5A-WiOluxY4">role-playing game</a> inspired by Dungeons and Dragons. I wrote about the experience in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/4/ksad062/7473270">this article</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/5A-WiOluxY4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How gaming is influencing warfare.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Developed by a group of “military designers” based in Toronto, the game sets out to encourage thinkers to reflect on how they respond to the kinds of messy and complex situations they might confront in their careers. The game is being <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-61229305">used across Nato members</a> and new games are in development.</p>
<h2>Next-generation warfare</h2>
<p>Gaming seems to be have caught the attention of states and organisations – both as a way of appealing to new generations and as a way of preparing young people for the complexity and uncertainty of future wars. I explore this topic in my book <a href="https://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/-(35e06a08-ff54-4739-9a5f-96bb6bf0509d).html">Theorising Future Conflict: War Out to 2049</a>.</p>
<p>So, this Fortnite-inspired video might reflect much more than a fancy social media campaign. The video reflects the way that militaries are looking for new skills.</p>
<p>We live in a time where young people can experience war increasingly as a video game through the clips filmed on phones or <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/israelhamas-war-video-hamas-gunmans-chilling-gopro-footage-shows-deadly-rampage-and-his-death-101697476315112.html">GoPro video cameras</a> in Gaza, Israel or Ukraine. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the visceral and brutal insights into the reality of war and violence will shape the views of the young people of liberal democracies considering a career in the military in a world that feels more dangerous than it ever has.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Lacy is affiliated with the Archipelago of Design, Toronto.</span></em></p>The army has released a new recruitment video on social media that resembles a Fortnite-style game.Mark Lacy, Senior lecturer, Politics, Philosophy, and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214452024-01-18T18:06:27Z2024-01-18T18:06:27ZUkraine recap: possibility of imminent Russian offensive focuses minds on Kyiv’s weapons shortages<p>As you’d expect, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has been working the room at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week. After a disappointing end to 2023 on the battlefield, with signs of battle fatigue among some of his key allies, Zelensky will be aware of the need to press his country’s case to so many world leaders. An estimated 60 heads of state and government are thought to have made the trip to Switzerland for this global forum, more than in previous years. </p>
<p>It was preceded by a meeting of more than 90 national security advisers, for whom a key agenda item was coming up with a viable peace plan for the conflict in Ukraine. Zelensky will also have been aware of the way the focus of global attention has moved to events in the Middle East, so a chance to get in front of his allies at this point is like gold dust. </p>
<p>There were positive noises from Nato’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, as well as US national security adviser Jake Sullivan, who emphasised Ukraine’s success in winning back more than half the territory Russia had occupied since February 2022, as well as – for now at least –
breaking Russia’s blockade in the Black Sea to allow grain ships in and out of its ports. Sullivan also praised the way Ukraine had managed to establish a viable defence industrial base. </p>
<p>The fruits of this were demonstrated this week when a hybrid “FrankenSAM” air defence system, which merges advanced western missiles with a Soviet-era launcher, successfully shot down an Iranian-made Shahed drone. Ukraine is also reported to be ramping up domestic production of Nato-compatible ammunition.</p>
<p>All of which will be doubly important if, as is now being widely reported, Russia is preparing to launch a major new ground offensive in the coming weeks. As Stefan Wolff and Tetyana Malyarenko report, Russian forces have intensified their attacks on various sectors along the frontline in Ukraine, and have made some small territorial gains in the past week or so. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing Ukraine and the main areas of fighting and control January 17 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570144/original/file-20240118-29-s87ycg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine, January 17 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Wolff and Malyarenko, international security experts from the universities of Birmingham and Odesa respectively, highlight the extent to which shortages of weapons and ammunition are making it <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talk-of-russian-spring-offensive-raises-fears-that-kyiv-is-ill-prepared-to-face-it-221142">increasingly difficult for Ukraine to hold the line</a>, let alone deliver the sort of battlefield breakthroughs that Kyiv – and its western allies – so desperately need. </p>
<p>Both sides are also short on manpower. Zelensky has said he wants to be able to field an additional 500,000 troops this year, and has introduced more stringent measures to clamp down on draft dodging.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Russia, which can currently rely on a steady supply of 30,000 extra troops a month, has also signalled it’s intentions to boost troop numbers by switching off the heating at many of its prisons – the better to encourage criminals to swap their jail sentences for a spell at the frontline.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talk-of-russian-spring-offensive-raises-fears-that-kyiv-is-ill-prepared-to-face-it-221142">Ukraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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</figure>
<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>War in the air</h2>
<p>Given all this, it’s easy to understand why Kyiv raced to announce what it claims as a major coup in the air war. The reported (though not yet confirmed) destruction of a Russian A-50 radar early-warning plane and an Ilyushin Il-22M airborne command post on January 14 will seriously degrade Russia’s ability to provide real-time aerial intelligence to its troops on the ground, according to Matthew Powell, a specialist in aerial warfare at the University of Portsmouth.</p>
<p>Powell <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-kyiv-is-cock-a-hoop-about-shooting-down-two-russian-aircraft-221339">writes here</a> that Russia is reported to only have three A-50s in service. They cost an estimated US$330 million (£260 million) to replace. But it isn’t so much the expense of replacing the aircraft that will hamstring Russia. They are a very specialised piece of equipment and the 15-person crew takes years to train – so replacing that capability will be very difficult.</p>
<p>It’s been reported that the two aircraft were caught by a Patriot ground-based air defence system, of the kind provided by the US late in 2022. If correct, this will give Joe Biden’s administration a chance to parade the effectiveness of US military aid to recalcitrant members of Congress who continue to block the president’s US$110 million aid package for Ukraine.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-kyiv-is-cock-a-hoop-about-shooting-down-two-russian-aircraft-221339">Ukraine war: why Kyiv is cock-a-hoop about shooting down two Russian aircraft</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Death to Spies!</h2>
<p>Anyone who, like me, grew up on James Bond will be familiar with the sinister Soviet counter-espionage organisation, Smersh. Who can forget the end of From Russia With Love, when Bond has to fight for his life against the dastardly Rosa Klebb and her fiendish poison-tipped shoes?</p>
<p>In reality, Smersh was established by Josef Stalin during the second world war to trap German spies. The name Smersh (a blend of Russian words <em>Smert’ Shpionam</em> which translates into English as “death to spies”) was supposedly coined by Stalin himself.</p>
<p>As you’d expect, Smersh did a fair bit of spying on ordinary Russians, too. In all, an estimated 30,000 German “spies” within the Red Army and at least 594,000 other Soviet soldiers were arrested, most of whom would have been either executed or consigned to the gulags.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman's legs in a pair of shoes with aknife sticking out of the toe of the right foot." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570185/original/file-20240118-27-vc4vp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Fiendish: Rosa Klebb’s poisoned shoes from the film From Russia with Love.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">United Artists</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mothballed in 1946, Smersh has now reportedly been reactivated by Vladimir Putin to root out any signs of dissent in Crimea or behind Russia’s lines in Ukraine. Marina Miron and Rod Thornton, intelligence and security experts at King’s College London, trace the organisation’s history and conclude from its revival that Putin considers the possibility of subversion and dissidence – or even plain old opposition to the war – to be a sufficient problem to warrant such a sinister move.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/smersh-why-putin-has-reinstated-stalins-notorious-and-much-feared-anti-spy-unit-220627">they conclude</a>, the resurrection of the name Smersh is “clearly the reaction of an increasingly oppressive state. Russian authorities, it can only be assumed, want to invoke fear again. This does not bode well for the Russian people.”</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/smersh-why-putin-has-reinstated-stalins-notorious-and-much-feared-anti-spy-unit-220627">Smersh: why Putin has reinstated Stalin's notorious and much-feared anti-spy unit</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>… and oppression for LGBTQ+ people</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Russia has moved to make life more difficult for another of Putin’s pet hates. In December 2023, a judgment of Russia’s supreme court banned what it referred to as the “LGBTQ+ movement” as an “extremist organisation”. </p>
<p>This effectively means that even identifying as LGBTQ+ in Russia is dangerous as it will lay a person open to charges of supporting extremism, <a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-of-lgbtq-history-in-russia-from-decriminalisation-in-1993-to-extremist-status-in-2023-220569">writes Sergey Katsuba</a>, whose research at University College Dublin focuses on Russia’s growing authoritarianism and the persecution of sexual minorities in the Putin era.</p>
<p>Katsuba traces a 30-year cycle from 1993 – when, under pressure from the Council of Europe, Boris Yeltsin’s government decriminalised consensual sex between men – to December’s supreme court decision. He finds a strong correlation between Putin’s increasing authoritarianism and the demonisation of sexual minorities in Russia.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-of-lgbtq-history-in-russia-from-decriminalisation-in-1993-to-extremist-status-in-2023-220569">30 years of LGBTQ+ history in Russia: from decriminalisation in 1993 to 'extremist' status in 2023</a>
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<hr>
<h2>Time to dig your bunker?</h2>
<p>There have recently been warnings emerging from a number sources, including the governments of Germany, Sweden and Estonia, that Putin is actively planning to extend his “special military operation” into a confrontation with Nato – something that everyone fears could quickly spiral out of control.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, as anyone following our coverage of the conflict in the Middle East will know, fears that the Gaza war could escalate into a regional conflagration pulling in Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US mount daily. And that’s before we factor in China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan, and North Korea’s bloodcurdling threats against the South.</p>
<p>If you feel as if all the wars in the world are about to join hands, you would not be alone. Mark Lacy of Lancaster University, who is presently writing a book on the future of war, considers what is often referred to as the “threat horizon”. </p>
<p>He believes the situation is made more complicated by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-worlds-conflicts-spread-should-you-be-digging-a-bunker-how-to-think-about-the-future-of-war-221418">changing nature of conflict</a>. Economic warfare, cyberwar and the increasing influence of artificial intelligence in the way conflicts are waged mean that the next major war will probably look completely different to what we might expect, yet be equally as devastating. So, while you may not feel the need to start digging your bunker quite yet, it may be best to keep a spade handy just in case.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-worlds-conflicts-spread-should-you-be-digging-a-bunker-how-to-think-about-the-future-of-war-221418">As the world's conflicts spread, should you be digging a bunker? How to think about the future of war</a>
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A selection of our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211422024-01-18T16:05:49Z2024-01-18T16:05:49ZUkraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it<p>Analysis suggests that Russia may be in the early stages of a new offensive in Ukraine. On the ground, Moscow’s forces have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fighting-intensifies-ukraines-east-russia-steps-up-offensive-action-2024-01-17/">intensified their attacks</a> along major sections of the frontline. They have made small territorial gains over the past few weeks, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024">taking new territory or reclaiming territory</a> liberated by Kyiv’s forces during last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops have switched to “active defence”, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ground-commander-says-his-troops-now-active-defence-can-still-surprise-2024-01-15/">according</a> to the commander of the country’s ground forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi. </p>
<p>Does this imply that Ukrainian efforts to resist and ultimately defeat Russia’s aggression are in serious peril should the offensive begin? This will depend on an assessment of both Russian and Ukrainian capabilities and political will. Regarding the latter, neither side shows any signs of backing down.</p>
<p>Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was unequivocal at a <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73275">forum with local government leaders</a> on January 16 that he was unwilling to enter into any negotiations with Ukraine. Instead he predicted <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73275">“a very serious blow”</a> to Ukrainian statehood as a result of the war.</p>
<p>Putin’s Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-urges-western-unity-stop-russia-2024-01-16/">speaking at the World Economic Forum</a> in Davos this week, left little doubt about his determination to continue fighting for the complete liberation of all of Ukraine’s currently Russian-occupied territories.</p>
<h2>Men and materiel</h2>
<p>But do Russia and Ukraine have the military capabilities to match their leaders’ rhetoric? This is an issue of both equipment and manpower. As is obvious from the repeated and increasingly successful Russian airstrikes against a wide range of targets across Ukraine, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-massive-air-attack-ukraine-least-10-dead-kyiv-2023-12-29/">Kyiv</a> and the country’s second-largest city, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missiles-hit-ukraines-kharkiv-wounding-4-officials-say-2024-01-16/">Kharkiv</a>, Russia has the arms and ammunition to continue its air campaign while Ukraine still lacks adequate air defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Similarly, Ukrainian ground efforts are hampered by increasingly serious ammunition shortages. Summarising several press reports, non-profit policy organisation the Institute for the Study of War <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2024">reported</a> on January 8 2024, that Ukrainian troops “are struggling to completely compensate for artillery ammunition shortages” while their use of small drones for combat purposes was hampered by “insufficient electronic warfare capabilities”. </p>
<p>When it comes to manpower, both sides are struggling. In his year-end press conference Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72994">ruled out</a> any further mobilisation. And, <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/interview/russians-motivated-to-fight-for-money-1000-1705323575.html">according</a> to Vadym Skibitskyi, the deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Moscow can rely on a steady stream of some 30,000 volunteers a month. As a consequence, however, the question facing the Kremlin is how the Russian economy will deal with manpower shortages as workers are diverted to the frontlines. </p>
<p>The planned mobilisation of around 500,000 additional troops in Ukraine is also likely to be difficult and divisive for very similar reasons.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">Ukraine war increasingly seen as 'fought by the poor’, as Zelensky raises taxes and proposes strict mobilisation laws</a>
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<h2>Friends and partners</h2>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1d1eb1dd-4fa0-4693-9512-23a219de5d77">benefited</a> enormously from Iranian and North Korean military supplies. As is obvious from the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/north-koreas-top-diplomat-in-moscow-for-talks-on-ties-amid-concerns-over-alleged-arms-deal/ar-AA1n3i6G">recent visit</a> of the North Korean foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, to Moscow, these links are likely to grow and further boost Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Ukraine is, in many ways, even more dependent on foreign aid to sustain its defence against Russia’s aggression – yet this aid has become much <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-and-shaky-international-support-putting-pressure-on-zelensky-216930">more precarious</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-and-shaky-international-support-putting-pressure-on-zelensky-216930">Ukraine war: stalemate on the battlefield and shaky international support putting pressure on Zelensky</a>
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<p>With no clear pathway to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d35e1a68-9bcc-43d3-80a1-ff6aeeebff3d">unlocking</a> further US military aid and <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/video/news/orban-versus-the-eu-on-ukraine-how-can-other-member-states-break-the-deadlock/vi-AA1mT2Xp">uncertainty</a> over future EU financial commitments, Ukraine has become dependent on a <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41LxvWwKZex-bar-stacked-horizontal-figure-2_csv_final">small number</a> of donors, including <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-raises-pressure-eu-countries-beef-up-military-aid-ukraine-budget-germany/">Germany</a> and the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9914/">UK</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s predicament is exacerbated by the fact that its own defence sector is not yet fully on a war footing, which is partly why it has struggled to manufacture sufficient ammunition for its troops in the field. Even if this were to <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base">change soon</a>, including with the help of western investment, Ukraine’s lack of strategic depth would remain an impediment. Russian drones and missiles have the reach to target military production facilities anywhere in Ukraine. Ukraine, for now, lacks the air defence systems to effectively counter such attacks.</p>
<h2>Security guarantees</h2>
<p>This leaves the question of deterrence as potentially the last obstacle in the path of a Russian counteroffensive that could deliver Putin’s threatened serious blow to Ukraine’s statehood. First raised in a G7 joint <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/06/g7-leaders-statement-6/#:%7E:text=We%20continue%20to%20support%20Ukraine,term%20security%20commitments%20and%20arrangements.">declaration of support</a> for Ukraine in July 2023, bilateral agreements between Ukraine and several of its western allies to strengthen defence and security cooperation are now beginning to take more concrete shape. </p>
<p>The UK-Ukraine <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf">agreement</a> on security cooperation was signed on January 12 2024. French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-travel-ukraine-february-finalise-bilateral-security-deal-2024-01-16/">has announced</a> that a similar deal between France and Ukraine will be finalised in February. </p>
<p>The UK-Ukraine agreement <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf">provides for</a> “comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders”. It pledges “prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, any military escalation and/or a new aggression by the Russian Federation”. It also promises “support for Ukraine’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions”. </p>
<p>Considered side-by-side, enthusiasm in the west for supporting a Ukrainian victory on the battlefield and for Nato membership is, at best lukewarm. However, if this is a model for similar deals in the future, if the US and other key Nato members reach similar agreements with Ukraine, and if these – as yet untested – commitments are followed through and don’t suffer the fate of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explainer-budapest-memorandum/25280502.html">Budapest memorandum</a> (a 1994 document that Ukraine agreed to remove all of its nuclear weapons in return for recognition from Russia and others of its statehood) whose <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf">security assurances</a> proved useless, this would indicate a clear western determination to prevent a major Russian counteroffensive resulting in yet another illegal Russian land grab. </p>
<p>These are many and significant “ifs” and Nato’s goal of preventing Ukraine’s defeat is far more modest than Zelensky’s war aims. Yet, precisely because they are more modest, and therefore more credible, they could prevent a much more dangerous broader escalation between Russia and west without condemning Ukraine to a permanent defeat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221142/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine is short of men and military equipment. It urgently needs security guarantees from the west.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206282024-01-12T18:02:56Z2024-01-12T18:02:56ZUS election: how a Trump victory could embolden Russia, China and Israel<p>A potential second term as president for Donald Trump is likely to result in an America-first, America-alone <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/donald-trump-foreign-policy-america-first/616872/">foreign policy</a>. </p>
<p>The ramifications for the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/03/us-elections-2024-trump-biden-policy-diplomacy-china-europe/">rest of the world</a> could be huge, potentially endangering international security around the globe. So it’s no wonder that the result of the November vote seems of more interest than normal to non-Americans.</p>
<p>Trump is neck and neck with President Joe Biden, each receiving 43% in YouGov‘s New Year’s <a href="https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/econTabReport_wOkNqe4.pdf">poll</a> showing voters’ plans for the upcoming presidential election.</p>
<p>A second term for the likely Republican nominee would have catastrophic effects on international diplomacy, according to Le Monde columnist, Sylvie Kauffman: “The G7 and NATO summits will once again become moments of unpredictable circus – or <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/01/10/the-destabilizing-shockwave-of-a-trump-re-election-would-reach-far-beyond-europe_6419250_23.html">absolute emptiness</a>.”</p>
<p>Continuing the focus of his first presidency, Trump has <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-fbi-atf-dea-control-border-nevada-rally-1234931576/">vowed</a> to move thousands of US troops stationed abroad, FBI agents, and Drug Enforcement Administration officials, to tackle the immigration crisis on the Mexican border.</p>
<p>Not only will this affect the US military presence around the globe – and potentially undermine allies’ security – it will also have a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/united-states-america/us-mexico-relations-and-their-impact-migrant-safety">devastating effect</a> on Mexico, which will have to deal with an increasingly log-jammed border with the United States.</p>
<p>Trump intends to launch what he describes as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/11/us/politics/trump-2025-immigration-agenda.html">largest deportation</a>” effort in US history of illegal immigrants and end <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-vows-end-birthright-citizenship-children-immigrants-us-illegally-2023-05-30/">automatic citizenship</a> for children born in the US to immigrants living in the country illegally.</p>
<p>In the same way that Trump <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact">re-negotiated</a> the North American free trade agreement into the United States, Mexico, Canada agreement in 2019, it’s likely he would restructure Biden’s economic agreements such as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-asia-united-states-c6878c7d14112e45a870a3e8735f7e71">Indo-Pacific</a> economic framework.</p>
<p>What will concern most diplomats in Europe is Trump’s <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/agenda47-preventing-world-war-iii">declared intention</a> to start “fundamentally re-evaluating NATO’s purpose and NATO’s mission”. It’s been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-2024-reelection-pull-out-of-nato-membership/676120/">suggested that</a> Trump will withdraw from Nato, or at least revise its doctrine that an attack on one member is an attack on all.</p>
<h2>Ending support for Ukraine</h2>
<p>He has already <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1844450/ukraine-war-russia-winning-putin-us-election">stated</a> that he would stop the “endless flow of American treasure to Ukraine” and demand European partners repay the US$75 billion (£58 billion) of aid that the US pledged to Ukraine.</p>
<p>What is concerning to many is whether Trump will try to uphold <a href="https://www.wsj.com/video/watch-trump-says-as-president-hed-settle-ukraine-war-within-24-hours/0BCA9F18-D3BF-43DA-9220-C13587EAEDF2">his promise</a> to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. It’s almost certain that Trump will discontinue the US’s membership of the 50-nation <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3462714/ukraine-defense-contact-group-members-remain-unified-in-support-to-kyiv/">Ukraine Defence</a> Contact Group dedicated to supporting Ukraine’s defence from Russia, weakening Ukraine’s potential to defend its territory.</p>
<p>US support of Ukraine extends beyond just logistics. In August 2023, the US agreed to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3504621/us-will-train-ukrainian-f-16-pilots-ground-crews/">train Ukrainian</a> pilots of the US-produced F-16 jets provided to Ukraine by its European allies. A continuation of this agreement will be vital to any Ukrainian hopes of withstanding Russian advances. </p>
<p>The war would not end simply because Trump wishes it, and any Russian gains from the conflict might encourage Russia to try to regain former territory in Moldova or any of the Baltic states.</p>
<p>And that the lack of opposition to any Russian territory grab is likely to encourage China to attempt to annex Taiwan. Trump, despite promising an aggressive <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/president-trump-will-stop-china-from-owning-america">trade relationship</a> with China, has <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/trump-won-t-say-if-he-would-provide-military-support-to-taiwan-against-an-invasion-from-china-193143877586">refused</a> to confirm whether he would send troops to help defend the island should China invade.</p>
<p>While much of Trump’s first term in office <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html">reversed many</a> of the Obama administration’s changes, a second term would be aimed at ensuring centralisation of power in the Trump presidency and rolling back the Biden administration’s initiatives.</p>
<p>One significant difference this time around is that Trump and his allies have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-2025-second-term.html">been planning</a> his term next since he left the White House. Trump would be surrounded exclusively with his loyalists, be free of any restrictive voices of reason and be more organised than his first term.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that Trump will continue <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/wrapup-blinken-uae-saudi-israel-monday-seeking-avert-wider-middle-east-war-2024-01-07/">Biden’s attempts</a> to moderate Israeli operations in Gaza. Trump has been a long-time ally of Israel and became the first US president to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html">formally, and controversially, recognise</a> Jerusalem as the Israeli capital in 2017.</p>
<p>On the day of the attack on October 7 in Israel, Trump <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12606613/Trump-calls-Hamas-CRUSHED-act-savagery-Israel-blames-weak-Biden-emboldening-terrorists-rousing-Iowa-rally.html">called</a> on Hamas to be “crushed” by Israel for it staking of hostages, but <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4331958-trump-mixed-messages-on-how-hed-handle-israel-hamas-war/">stated</a> that Israel needed “do a better job of public relations, frankly, because the other side is beating them at the public relations front”.</p>
<h2>Pulling out of green policies</h2>
<p>There is also determination to push back on Biden’s clean energy objectives. Trump’s energy policies are summed up by his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/05/i-am-your-retribution-trump-rules-supreme-at-cpac-as-he-relaunches-bid-for-white-house">campaign slogan</a> of “drill baby drill!”, are aimed at ensuring the US has the lowest-cost energy and electricity prices.</p>
<p>It is possible that Trump will pull out of policies agreed at COP28 in the same way that <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/">he announced</a> the US’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement in 2017. Although the US re-joined the agreement in 2021, Trump has <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/trump-2024-presidency-climate-change-rcna131928">pledged</a> to withdraw again should he be elected.</p>
<p>In August 2023, Trump <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/video/6334380407112">revealed</a> a radical new economic agenda. It included a 10% tariff on imports into the US, and a <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/agenda47/agenda47-cementing-fair-and-reciprocal-trade-with-the-trump-reciprocal-trade-act">Trump Reciprocal</a> Tariff Act to put further tariffs on any nation that taxes US exports.</p>
<p>Although a great deal of concern focuses on Trump’s potential re-election, his main opponents for the Republican nomination, Nikki Haley and Ron DeSantis, have both <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biggest-winners-losers-fifth-gop-debate-1859692">outlined</a> aggressive immigration policies and support for Israel, although only Haley has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67942133">indicated</a> that she would continue to support Ukraine.</p>
<p>While the election is still ten months away, the possibility of Trump being re-elected has already affected US foreign policy. Last month, President Biden <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-president-joe-biden-shelves-trade-pact-with-uk-2024-election/">decided</a> against signing a trade deal with the UK until after both countries have had their next elections. While this is significant, it is nothing compared to the impact that Trump’s re-election will have on the rest of the globe should he return to the White House.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump’s foreign policy plans include forcing an end to the Ukraine war and moving thousands of troops to the Mexican border.Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197612023-12-19T16:53:53Z2023-12-19T16:53:53ZUkraine war: with stalemate on the battlefield Nato needs unity and commitment more than ever<p>As the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, arrived in Washington earlier this month for talks aimed at securing further military aid, Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene <a href="https://twitter.com/RepMTG/status/1734267150628724931">posted on X</a> (formerly Twitter): “With Zelensky in town and Ukraine money running dry, why doesn’t anyone in Washington talk about a peace treaty with Russia?? A deal with Putin promising he will not continue any further invasions. Answer: Washington wants war, not peace. Isn’t that awful?! I’m still a NO.” </p>
<p>Greene and her hard-right Republican colleagues have been attempting to leverage domestic politics to influence the US response to an international crisis without truly understanding the consequences. What is not being made clear by those who argue an isolationist “America first” line to a receptive conservative audience is that a significant proportion of the aid given to Ukraine, possibly as much as 90%, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/29/ukraine-military-aid-american-economy-boost/">stays within the US</a>. It is used to buy American-made armaments and other goods. </p>
<p>But the geopolitical repercussions are very clear and very significant. If the US stops providing Ukraine with military aid, it will lose the war and leave Putin with the message that it has everything to gain from military aggression. </p>
<p>Greene and her ilk clearly haven’t grasped the coldblooded ease with which Putin has broken both Russia’s treaty obligations and international law with the illegal invasion of Ukraine. It demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of the realities of relations with Russia. </p>
<p>But it’s an ominous sign for Ukraine that a growing number of its allies within Nato are having these internal discussions over supplying Kyiv with military aid. It goes to the heart of Nato’s core task of crisis management and cooperative security, as described in its <a href="https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/">2022 Strategic Concept</a>, which identifies Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the key crisis facing the alliance.</p>
<p>The key question now is whether Nato can continue to provide a coherent and coordinated response to Russia’s aggression. </p>
<h2>Nato capabilities</h2>
<p>The war has put enormous pressure on Nato’s weapons manufacturing capability. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Nato strategy was to produce and stockpile a limited supply of weapons and ammunition to fight small or <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1021906">“come-as-you-are” wars</a> – a term often used to describe the sort of conflict that doesn’t require a shift to a wartime economy. </p>
<p>The question now is whether the west can ramp up its manufacturing capacity to fight what is in essence a proxy war. To give just one example, the number of Javelin missiles sent by the US to Ukraine from the end of February 2022 to August 2022 represented <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88">seven years</a> of regular production.</p>
<p>Perhaps Nato could learn from the experience of South Korea, which for the whole of its existence has been familiar with border tensions and the need to maintain a strong military capability. </p>
<p>For decades it has stockpiled weapons and ammunition and has shipped more 155mm shells to Ukraine than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/">all of Kyiv’s European allies combined</a>. Seoul now has one of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2022/11/07/south-korea-has-quietly-become-one-of-the-worlds-biggest-weapons-suppliers/">world’s biggest stockpiles</a> of weapons and ammunition. Perhaps Nato needs to do likewise.</p>
<p>But the main problem that this conflict presents to Nato is that on the one hand it is willing and ready to share its military doctrine with Ukraine, but on the other it has not been able – or willing, in some cases – to provide the wherewithal for Ukraine to fight the war accordingly.</p>
<p>Nato’s combined arms doctrine relies on the coordination of land and air power. Without one, the other will not provide the results demanded. And, as yet, Ukraine cannot control the skies above the battlefield as it has insufficient fighter jets and trained pilots. </p>
<p>The third element of a combined military doctrine is sea power, which is where Ukraine has enjoyed a degree of success, denying Russia control of the northwestern Black Sea and launching several attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol, which has compelled Russia to move its naval assets to safer ports further afield.</p>
<p>Britain, the Netherlands and Norway have agreed to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/12/11/ukraine-allies-provide-ships-to-ward-off-russia-in-the-black-sea/">send mine clearing ships to Ukraine</a> to help secure shipping lanes against Russian attempts to set a blockade. </p>
<p>Significantly, access to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles is controlled by Turkey, a Nato member, and transit of warships of belligerent nations can be refused. Turkey has denied at least one Russian request to <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Most-read-in-2022/Turkey-rejects-Russia-s-request-for-navy-ships-to-pass-Bosporus">transit warships through the straits</a>, but it cannot refuse access to Russian ships which are based in the Black Sea.</p>
<h2>Playing politics</h2>
<p>The key concern, though, is political. In recent months – and certainly since the conflict in Gaza exploded into life on October 7 – there have been signs that support for Ukraine’s war effort from western countries may have a limit. </p>
<p>In the US, Republican senators <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67637679">blocked the passage</a> of an aid bill which would have delivered up to US$60 billion (£47 billion) for Ukraine as well as funds for Israel and aid for Gaza. Meanwhile Hungary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67724357">recently vetoed</a> a EU aid package of a further €50 billion (£43 billion).</p>
<p>Both the EU and the Biden administration in the US <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-limits-of-as-long-as-it-takes-why-ukraines-allies-need-to-update-their-strategy/">are confident</a> that they will eventually get their funding bills through, but voices calling for Ukraine to seek a ceasefire with a possibility of a territorial settlement with Russia have grown larger since it became clear that Kyiv’s summer counter-offensive would not be the success that had been hoped for.</p>
<p>Putin signalled in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">annual press conference</a> recently that Russia’s war aims had not changed, saying: “There will be peace when we achieve our goals. They haven’t changed. Denazification of Ukraine, the demilitarisation of Ukraine.”</p>
<p>Nato needs to be equally clear about what it wants the outcome of this conflict to look like.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nato is showing ominous signs of becoming war weary. It must maintain its support for Ukraine.Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188882023-12-11T15:50:07Z2023-12-11T15:50:07ZUkraine war: stakes are high for EU and Ukraine ahead of crucial European summit<p>When the EU’s heads of state and government come together in Brussels for their final European Council meeting of the year on December 14 and 15, their <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2023/12/14-15/">agenda</a> is likely to be dominated by the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>As you’d expect, the war has an agenda item of its own – but it is also central to discussions on enlargement, the budget and European defence. Decisions made at this meeting will have far-reaching implications – not only for Ukraine but also for the EU.</p>
<p>The EU has to balance its internal cohesion with its foreign and security policies, including preserving its appetite and capacity for further enlargement. This presents Brussels and member states with some important challenges.</p>
<p>First, Hungary’s prime minister, Victor Orbán, has been very <a href="https://twitter.com/PM_ViktorOrban/status/1731619765909647867">clear</a> that he does not support continued EU funding of Ukraine’s war effort. This is partly a gambit by Orbán to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/billions-frozen-funds-hungary-table-eu-seeks-ukraine-support-2023-10-03/">unlock</a> approximately €22 billion (£19 billion) of EU aid to Hungary <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/rule-of-law-conditionality-mechanism/">frozen</a> because of concerns over judicial independence, academic freedom and LGBTQ+ rights in Hungary. </p>
<p>Another issue concerns the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/08/ukraines-hungarians-in-spotlight-as-orban-threatens-to-block-eu-accession">situation</a> of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority, which Orbán claims has been neglected and discriminated against by Kyiv. </p>
<p>There <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6fabd355-c8ca-4ea6-b905-8a536f8d087b">appears</a> to be some progress on unfreezing EU aid to Hungary, with the European Commission approving an initial payout of about €900 million in November. And, in terms of minority rights, a bill addressing this issue was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-parliament-approves-minorities-bill-seen-key-eu-talks-2023-12-08/">signed into law</a> on December 8 as part of a tranche of legislation designed to ease Ukraine’s entry to the EU. </p>
<p>But given Orbán’s close <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-vladimir-putin-us-concerned-over-hungary-relationship-with-russia/">relationship</a> with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, it is not clear whether this will be enough to get Orbán to drop his veto.</p>
<p>Should the Hungarian premier persist, the EU’s next budget is also in peril. This would prevent the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6cd69168-aef4-4c8c-950c-62d7465fe5bb">unlocking</a> of €50 billion of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3345">aid</a> for Ukraine and block a proposed <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/european-parliament-supports-increase-in-2024-defence-budgets/">increase</a> in the EU’s defence spending. </p>
<p>This will have to increase significantly in the years to come because developing European capabilities to deter future Russian aggression is essential for the EU’s security. </p>
<p>A potential second Trump presidency puts question marks on US commitments to Nato and there is a danger of further increasing tensions with China in the Pacific distracting the US from Euro-Atlantic defence. </p>
<h2>Where does this leave Ukraine?</h2>
<p>These and other challenges faced by the EU leave Ukraine in increasing peril. With US funding <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ca16e42d-fda9-4c1d-b2c9-410d764745b7">running out</a> by the end of the year and no clear path to its renewal, Kyiv depends more and more on its European partners. Equally <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/ukraine-support-tracker-new-aid-drops-to-lowest-level-since-january-2022/">worrying</a>, new aid commitments are now at their lowest level since January 2022. </p>
<p>The EU has <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Media/Images/News_Press_Releases/2023/mi2023-12-07_Cumulative-heavy-weapon-v02-EN.svg">overtaken</a> the US as the largest donor of committed military aid. However, this is not an indication of broad European support, but the result of the efforts of a small core of countries, including Germany and Scandinavia.</p>
<p>Military aid is essential to Ukraine’s survival, but it is not sufficient. If the EU does not approve its proposed €50 billion support for Kyiv, the country’s economic survival would be at risk because of the massive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/will-western-aid-plug-ukraines-gaping-budget-deficit-2024-2023-12-05/">budget deficit</a> that Ukraine keeps accumulating due to its war effort. </p>
<p>A failure by the EU to open accession negotiations would also exacerbate the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91182">blame game</a> at the top between Ukraine’s political and military leaders and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-ex-president-says-he-was-blocked-leaving-country-2023-12-01/">squabbling</a> between government and opposition over Kyiv’s war strategy.</p>
<h2>Is Kyiv fighting a losing battle?</h2>
<p>For now, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has doubled down on his efforts to defeat Russia militarily by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-change-needed-ukraines-mobilisation-system-2023-12-01/">announcing</a> more, and more effective, mobilisation of troops. But, in light of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">failed</a> counteroffensive this year, he has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67587331">conceded</a> that more needs to be done to increase defences across the entire almost 1,000km frontline with Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine showing Russia's territorial demands and the territory it actually holds in Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukraine’s largely unsuccessful counter-offensive in the summer may mean that Kyiv has to cede territory to Moscow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-increases-maximum-size-armed-forces-by-170000-servicemen-2023-12-01/">announcing</a> a further increase in its armed forces by 170,000 new recruits to over 1.3 million servicemen in total, there can be little doubt that the <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4350776-ukraine-stalemate-shifts-war-putin-russia/">shift</a> on the battlefield in Russia’s favour is gaining momentum.</p>
<p>Even if the European Council meeting in Brussels later this week delivers the opening of accession negotiations and more financial aid, further territorial losses, such as around <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/whats-stake-russias-assault-avdiivka-2023-12-01/">Avdiivka</a>, and another Russian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/12/zelenskiy-warns-ukrainians-to-prepare-for-russian-attacks-on-infrastructure">campaign</a> against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure over the winter would prove difficult for Kyiv and raise more questions about the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2447a4b4-bbff-4439-a96c-e3c5404ed105">sustainability</a> of western support.</p>
<p>This leaves Ukraine and the EU with difficult choices to make. The accession process will be long, costly and protracted. Major <a href="https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748917366-06/supporting-recovery-reintegration-and-accession-opportunities-and-challenges-for-the-osce-in-ukraine?page=1">challenges</a> lie ahead in terms of the necessary reforms Kyiv needs to carry out, the financial burden that the country’s post-war recovery will involve and the difficulties that Ukraine will face when it comes to reintegrating liberated territories and populations. </p>
<p>Depending on when and how the war will end, there are four scenarios that Kyiv and Brussels can contemplate. </p>
<p>If the war ends soon and with a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline, a German scenario of prolonged division but eventual reunification is conceivable that would integrate at least part of Ukraine early into the EU, probably with credible security guarantees against further Russian aggression. </p>
<p>Along similar lines, a Cyprus scenario could unfold where the EU membership issue is fudged at the time of accession. In both cases, the government-controlled part of Ukraine could see further democratic consolidation and economic recovery.</p>
<p>Two alternatives are possible to think of if the war ends soon and with the restoration of all or part of currently Russian-occupied territories to Ukrainian sovereignty. </p>
<p>A Croatia-style scenario would imply a military defeat of Russia and reintegration of the country as a result. Given the current realities on the battlefield, this is highly unlikely. A Bosnia-style negotiated settlement leading to a dysfunctional state and no reintegration, by contrast, may be more likely, but is undesirable because it would all but rule out EU accession. </p>
<p>The challenge for EU leaders at their year-end summit will be above all to find a way forward that enables Ukraine to survive militarily and economically what will be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-are-both-sides-preparing-for-stalemate-217848">challenging</a> winter and year ahead. This could then open a pathway to both a negotiated settlement with Russia and EU membership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the prospect of a second Trump presidency halting military aid for Ukraine, it is vital for Kyiv that the EU finds a way to unlock more funding.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172192023-11-08T13:50:07Z2023-11-08T13:50:07ZRussia’s decision to ditch cold war arms limitation treaty raises tensions with Nato<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-formally-withdraws-key-post-cold-war-european-armed-forces-treaty-2023-11-07/#">pulled out</a> of an important cold war-era treaty which limited categories of conventional military equipment that Nato and the then-Warsaw Pact could deploy. The <a href="https://www.osce.org/library/14087">1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)</a> was intended to use the warming of relations between east and west to minimise the risk of war in Europe.</p>
<p>Announcing its intention to withdraw from the treaty, Russia’s foreign ministry said the push for enlargement of Nato had led to alliance countries “openly circumventing” the treaty’s group restrictions. It added that the admission of Finland into Nato and Sweden’s application meant the treaty was dead.</p>
<p>The CFE treaty had aimed to reduce the opportunity for either side to launch a rapid offensive against the other. It placed verifiable limits on certain types of military equipment such as tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces. These are the types of equipment that would be indispensable for a surprise attack, but also necessary to turn the attack into a larger-scale operation.</p>
<p>Nato leaders had always feared a bolt-from-the-blue attack by the Soviet Union. The advantage in numbers of the Soviets – both of personnel and equipment – could not be matched by Nato, which relied on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter any attack.</p>
<p>The Soviets – and later the Russians – viewed the treaty as undermining that superiority in numbers and availability of conventional weapons. Accusing the US of breaching the treaty, Russia suspended its participation in 2007 but kept lines of communication open with Nato. In 2015 it stopped any participation in the treaty, again citing US breaches. In its turn, the US <a href="https://www.state.gov/compliance-with-the-treaty-on-conventional-armed-forces-in-europe-condition-5-c-report-2020/">stopped actively implementing</a> the treaty in 2011.</p>
<p>So Russia’s formal withdrawal from the treaty is not perhaps as significant, on its own, as it might appear. But it does prepare the way for an increase in production and deployment of those items identified by the treaty as necessary for sudden attacks. The war in Ukraine has meant a significant increase in the production of military equipment. As Nato member states <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_211698.htm">are finding</a>, their manufacturing capacity for ammunition and weapons is well below the use and wastage involved in the Ukraine war.</p>
<p>Putin is reengaging with his view of world history which sees the fall of the Soviet Union as a “geopolitical disaster” and its reestablishment as a matter of time. Along with Russia’s withdrawal from the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90831">Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT)</a>, it can be seen as an attempt to present Russia’s security activities in a more positive light to its allies and to wavering non-aligned nations.</p>
<p>In fact, the US never ratified the treaty and Moscow and Washington have exchanged <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90831">angry words</a>, each accusing the other of undermining the NTBT. This has helped nobody – activity in both the US and Russia has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-19/us-nuclear-test-on-day-of-kremlin-s-treaty-abdication-fuels-doubt?leadSource=uverify%20wall">escalated tensions</a> over nuclear testing.</p>
<h2>Aggressive stance</h2>
<p>Moscow’s increasingly aggressive stance will certainly add to concerns for the Baltic states and Poland. With a significant number of ethnic Russians as part of their populations, the risks of civil unrest leading to an escalation is rather high. </p>
<p>An opportunity to distract the population of Russia from the quagmire of the war in Ukraine would be useful for Putin – and the political rhetoric from Moscow might be sufficient to begin to do that. Putin presents Nato as a hostile and menacing alliance – a perspective that has been a recurring theme in Russian political discussions since the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Certainly, Nato has its eyes fixed on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-all-eyes-on-lithuania-as-sanctions-close-russian-land-access-to-kaliningrad-185720">Suwałki Gap</a>. This runs along the border between Poland and Lithuania and is a potential weak point, connecting Belarus (which is firmly under the sway of Moscow) with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of eastern Europe highlighting the Suwalki Gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad/" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558318/original/file-20231108-19-y2ej8c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Suwalki Gap: a key sliver of territory that is making Nato nervous.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/suwalki-gap-political-map-known-corridor-2175422211">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-all-eyes-on-lithuania-as-sanctions-close-russian-land-access-to-kaliningrad-185720">Ukraine war: all eyes on Lithuania as sanctions close Russian land access to Kaliningrad</a>
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<p>A sudden assault here, against even a prepared Nato defence, could cut the links to the Baltic states quickly and present Nato with a fait accompli, blocking access to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Nato would then have to decide on its response, risking escalation. But the Russians would need to be more competent and capable in their military adventures than they have been shown to be in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The likelihood of a Russian attack is small, but Putin likes to keep his options open. He is also an experienced propagandist and will use whatever levers he has to try and prise Nato’s members apart. A political crisis caused by elements loyal to Moscow, but plausibly deniable by Putin, in this region could provide the type of rupture in Nato’s unity that he would welcome. </p>
<p>The north Atlantic alliance is not as united in its approach to the war in Ukraine as it might be – and public attention in many member countries has dropped off as the war has dragged on. The events in Israel and Gaza have increased the distraction from the war in Ukraine and provided Russia with greater opportunities to strengthen ties to anti-western groups and countries in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Announcements such as Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE should not necessarily be a major concern – not immediately, in any case. But Putin’s activities and his goals should not be underestimated either.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Moscow has pulled the plug on yet another safety valve preventing conflict with the west.Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162732023-10-29T10:05:40Z2023-10-29T10:05:40ZAgoa trade deal talks: South Africa will need to carefully manage relations with the US and China<p>South Africa must tread carefully in its economic relationships to avoid being caught in the escalating tension between east and west, and more specifically China and the US. The country’s hosting, and the outcome, of the <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16309-south-africa-confirmed-as-agoa-host-country-for-2023.html">2023 Agoa Summit</a> should strengthen its role in diplomatic relations and contribute towards safeguarding the country’s economic interests. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16309-south-africa-confirmed-as-agoa-host-country-for-2023.html">2-4 November 2023</a>, the US and 35 sub-Saharan African countries will meet in Johannesburg for the 20th Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (Agoa Forum). It entails strengthening trade and investment ties between the US and sub-Saharan Africa through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), US legislation which provides various trade preferences to eligible countries in the region. </p>
<p>Given Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine and its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm">rising tension with Nato</a>, plus the <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/trade-investment/us-china-trade-war">China-US trade war</a>, tensions between east and west are high. South Africa has <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-how-south-africa-blew-its-chance-as-a-credible-mediator-181101">come under attack</a> for its <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-state-of-non-alignment-in-south-africas-foreign-policy/">non-alignment role</a> in the Ukraine war. It refused to support UN resolutions condemning Russia. This resulted in some US congressmen pushing for the forum <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16226-warning-shot-fired-top-us-congressmen-urge-biden-to-move-agoa-forum-away-from-south-africa.html">to be moved out of South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>The country recently hosted the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">15th Brics summit</a>, which resolved to expand the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping to 11 member states. The enlargement will bolster Brics’ role as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200">geopolitical alternative to the west</a>, which is dominated by the US. Might this be a direct challenge to American hegemony?</p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.ufs.ac.za/econ/faculty-of-economic-and-management-sciences-home/general/staff?pid=zIFzQiuvO3o%3d">researching</a> major global economic developments, such as globalisation and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, for 20 years. This body of work shows the risks that come with behaviour like South Africa’s. The country could find itself in the middle of a tense situation. </p>
<p>South Africa needs to pull off an exceptional balancing act in managing its international relations in a sensible way that protects and advances its economic interests. </p>
<p>Note that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">geopolitical tensions between China and the US</a> are not just about trade disputes. They also include <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/U.S.-China-spy-battle-casts-shadow-over-push-for-Biden-Xi-summit#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%20%2D%2D%20The%20U.S.%20and,trade%20disputes%20and%20technological%20rivalry.">espionage</a>, China’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, climate change and environmental issues, and tensions over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden">Hong Kong, Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">South China Sea disputes</a>. </p>
<p>As a major source of infrastructure financing to sub-Saharan Africa, China is now the region’s largest bilateral official lender. Its total sub-Saharan African external public debt – what these governments owe to China – rose from less than 2% before 2005 <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/slowing-debt-accumulation-growing-risks-unveiling-complexities-sub-saharan-africas-debt">to over 17% in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Agoa might present a challenge to China as competition for its own interests in Africa. China would like African countries to untie or loosen their agreements with the US. It is thus a good moment to take stock of the actual benefits South Africa has derived from the Agoa agreement with the US.</p>
<h2>What Agoa is about</h2>
<p>The Agoa agreement was approved as legislation by the US Congress in May 2000 for an initial 15 years. On 29 June 2015 it was extended and <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/04/23/supporting-us-africa-partnership-through-agoa-extension-and-enhancement-act-2015">signed into law</a> by then president Barack Obama for a further 10 years to 2025. </p>
<p>It will come into review again in 2024, hence the importance of the upcoming summit. Recently, Louisiana senator John Kennedy <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16326-us-senator-wants-agoa-in-place-until-2045-to-deter-china-s-influence.html">introduced a bill</a> to the US Congress to extend Agoa by a further 20 years to 2045. This is a bid to counter China’s <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-expansion-of-chinese-influence-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9612">growing influence in Africa</a>, and to continue to allow sub-Saharan African countries preferential access to US markets. </p>
<h2>Agoa’s benefits to South Africa</h2>
<p>In 2021, the US was the second most significant destination for South Africa’s exports worldwide, mainly thanks to Agoa. China took the top spot; Germany was third. The US ranked third as a source of South Africa’s imports, following China and Germany. In that year, the total trade volume between South Africa and the US reached its zenith at $24.5 billion, with a <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/south-africa">trade imbalance of $9.3 billion in South Africa’s favour</a>. </p>
<p>Agoa offers preferential entry for about 20% of South Africa’s exports to the US, or <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16248-south-africa-asks-us-for-early-agoa-extension.html#:%7E:text=Agoa%20provides%20preferential%20access%20for,US%20market%E2%80%9D%2C%20Patel%20said.">2% of South Africa’s global exports</a>. The stock of South African investment in the US has more than doubled since 2011, <a href="https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-africa-reached-record-83-billion-2021">amounting to US$3.5 billion in 2020</a>. American foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa increased by over 70% over that period, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/south-africa/">to US$10 billion</a>. This made the US South Africa’s fifth largest source of FDI in 2019. The US was its third largest destination for outward FDI. </p>
<p>US investment in South Africa is mainly concentrated in manufacturing, finance and insurance, and wholesale trade, <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/south-africa">which is vital for economic growth</a>. American multinationals doing business in South Africa <a href="https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#436">employ about 148,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>More specifically, Agoa’s benefits include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for a wide range of South African products. This benefits South Africa’s textile and apparel industry in particular. To sub-Saharan African countries, Agoa provides duty-free access to the US market for <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/september/joint-statement-us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-and-minister-trade-industry-and-competition#:%7E:text=AGOA%20provides%20eligible%20sub%2DSaharan,Generalized%20System%20of%20Preferences%20program.">over 1,800 products</a>. This is in addition to the more than 5,000 products that are eligible for duty-free access under the US <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp#:%7E:text=GSP%20promotes%20economic%20growth%20and,products%20from%20least%20developed%20countries.">Generalised System of Preferences programme</a></p></li>
<li><p>export diversification, especially of items such as agricultural products, textiles, and manufactured goods. This is vital for increasing export earnings, which help to improve South Africa’s balance of payments, particularly its trade account.</p></li>
<li><p>capacity building through technical assistance and programmes to help South African businesses meet US standards, thus becoming more competitive in the global marketplace.</p></li>
<li><p>economic development and poverty reduction, which aligns with South Africa’s developmental goals.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Balancing economic interests</h2>
<p>China is the largest consumer of South African commodity exports, and thus a key influencer of the rand exchange rate. In addition, China and Russia’s planned move towards <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/currencies/de-dollarization">de-dollarisation</a> (trying to replace the petrodollar system with their own system) <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/10245294221095222">puts American interests under threat</a>. This means South Africa needs to carefully navigate its relations with the US and its Brics partners, China and Russia.</p>
<p>It will want to keep strong ties with the US through Agoa without getting into a difficult position between China and the US. The outcome of the November meeting will have serious economic implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arno J. van Niekerk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pretoria needs to pull off a balancing act in managing South Africa’s international relations to advance its economic interests.Arno J. van Niekerk, Senior lecturer in Economics, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.