tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/no-confidence-vote-37778/articlesNo-confidence vote – The Conversation2022-06-08T16:41:53Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1846812022-06-08T16:41:53Z2022-06-08T16:41:53ZConservative Party: who are the rebels and why do they want Boris Johnson gone?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467730/original/file-20220608-19-9jr1re.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">nui7711 via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Boris Johnson rose to power as the Conservative Party’s “<a href="https://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2012/04/boris-the-heineken-tory-who-reaches-parts-of-the-electorate-that-other-conservatives-dont.html">Heineken</a>” leader: deemed able to reach parts of the electorate that other Conservatives couldn’t. But fewer than three years after winning a stunning election victory, he now <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2022-06-06/from-theresa-may-to-margaret-thatcher-tories-who-have-faced-no-confidence-votes">has the distinction</a> of attracting the greatest vote of no confidence in any prime minister. </p>
<p>That he is simply carrying on, while claiming that a vote of 211 MPs supporting him to 148 expressing no confidence in his leadership is both <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/boris-johnson-claims-convincing-victory-rancour-tory-party-jgmwlxnkm">“decisive” and “convincing”</a> reminds us that he exceeds all his predecessors, too, in effrontery.</p>
<p>Consequences flow from attempted coups. Pre-eminent among them is the ministerial reshuffle, with a view to restoring authority through the principal lever open to a prime minister – patronage. After a failed coup, this is not only about hiring and firing but also rewarding and punishing. With a secret ballot, and a <a href="https://www.alistairlexden.org.uk/news/duplicity-conservative-mps">notoriously duplicitous electorate</a>, rebels can be hard to identify – particularly when this was a much broader insurrection than that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-46225949">faced by his predecessor</a>, Theresa May. But rebels there are aplenty.</p>
<h2>Broad church</h2>
<p>There have always been “ginger groups” or cabals in the parliamentary Conservative Party, but never so many as today. Facilitated by social media, some are little more than WhatsApp groups, but others have deeper roots.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.trg.org.uk/about-us/">Tory Reform Group</a>, formed in 1975, is the most hostile to Johnson, both personally and politically (some members <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JU0VTNaleU&t=8s">particularly publically so</a>). The similar <a href="https://one-nation-conservatives.com/">One Nation Conservatives</a>, exclusively MPs, draws on the ancestral lineage of Disraeli and his concerns about a socially divided country. Both are “wet”, to use a more informal designation from the Thatcher years.</p>
<p>In 1993, Eurosceptics established the <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-facts/what-is-the-european-research-group-erg/">European Research Group</a> (ERG), a then marginal outfit and a marginal concern which, within 20 years, was to transform British politics and effectively bring down two prime ministers. It has receded in prominence after its objective was achieved. But the post-Brexit parliament tribes sprouted.</p>
<p>There are the geographical. The very existence of the <a href="https://www.conservativehome.com/tag/northern-research-group">Northern Research Group</a> (NRG) is due to Johnson’s appeal in traditionally Labour seats (the “red wall”). The extent of its success will be measured in whether there still is an NRG after the next election. The <a href="https://chinaresearchgroup.org/publications">China Research Group</a> pushes for a harder line on policy towards Beijing.</p>
<p>There are the cultural. The Common Sense Group defends traditional values (and statues) in an age of “wokery”, while the overlapping <a href="https://www.bluecollarconservatism.co.uk/">Blue Collar Conservatism</a> promotes many of the causes which appealed to Ukip voters.</p>
<p>There are also the apparently practical policy associations, which are actually deeply ideological. The <a href="https://www.conservativehome.com/tag/covid-recovery-group">Covid Recovery Group</a> (CRG) broadly maintains that the state – practically and philosophically – exceeded its remit during the pandemic. In turn, the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-60572049">Net Zero Scrutiny Group</a> (NZSG) questions the certainties of the “green agenda”.</p>
<h2>An array of gripes</h2>
<p>Tory tensions are exacerbated through the ideological incoherence of Johnson himself: a social liberal, who took power through a populist nationalist movement, and then won a mandate based on state intervention (“levelling-up”), an inclination which the pandemic reinforced.</p>
<p>Thus the NRG is more partial to state spending than is the CRG or the Common Sense Group. The One Nation Conservatives are unhappy with, among other things, the Rwanda asylum seeker policy and privatisation of Channel 4. The CRG and NZSG dissent from the high-tax, high-spend – “un-Conservative” – nature of Johnson’s government.</p>
<p>A unique motivation for rebels – and one which traverses the tribal lines – is the personal integrity of the prime minister himself. No leading politician has so routinely been called a liar (one of several traits he shares with the similarly ideologically incoherent <a href="https://www.academia.edu/80988395/Donald_Trump_and_Boris_Johnson_The_Unfulfilled_Relationship">Donald Trump</a>). </p>
<p>It’s no more than a measured judgement – though it sounds like a personal attack – to say that Johnson is the most dishonest prime minister since David Lloyd George, who survived similar scandals and misgivings before rising to the premiership (eventually to be brought down by Conservative MPs, who then formed the 1922 Committee to mark the occasion). Both were touched by a kind of genius that for their supporters absolved them of the tiresome pieties of honour and veracity.</p>
<h2>All about Europe?</h2>
<p>That the UK has left the EU does not mean that Europe has left British politics. The scarring of the Brexit wars will long remain visible – though this affects Johnson both less and more than might have been expected. The Northern Ireland Protocol – an attempt to get around the problem of having a hard border either in the Irish Sea or on the island of Ireland – remains a problem and is an affront for many of his MPs. </p>
<p>Northern Ireland apart, Johnson has largely neutralised Europe as an issue (for now at least) by effecting a hard Brexit – and then <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49563357">purging remainers</a> who continued to object. This has meant his MPs may be less divided on the age-old issue of EU membership, but his cabinet is weaker as it has been stripped of talent that would otherwise be on the front bench.</p>
<p>The party faces by-elections on June 23 in Honiton and Tiverton in Devon and in <a href="https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/politics/labour-on-course-for-landslide-victory-in-wakefield-by-election-new-polling-suggests-3721811">Wakefield in Yorkshire</a> in the heart of the red wall, both of which the Conservatives are expected to lose. </p>
<p>Johnson’s value to his party has been that he has never been regarded as being typical of it – that he possesses an appeal broader even than that of his church. But with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-61729892">0% growth forecast</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/may/18/uk-inflation-soars-to-highest-level-in-more-than-40-years">inflation the highest for 40 years</a>, the <a href="https://accountingpracticeonline.co.uk/new-levies-push-uk-tax-burden-to-highest-level-since-1950s/">greatest tax burden for 70 years</a>, the <a href="https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/politics/labour-on-course-for-landslide-victory-in-wakefield-by-election-new-polling-suggests-3721811">red wall about to be rebuilt</a>, and the results of a parliamentary inquiry into <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/privileges-committee-investigation">whether he’s a liar</a> pending, the grounds for rebellion will increase in fertility – and so the chance of an outcome truly both decisive and convincing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184681/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Tory party is a ‘broad church’ with many factions. And many of them are unimpressed with the prime minister at the moment.Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1845852022-06-07T17:15:10Z2022-06-07T17:15:10ZI correctly predicted the vote on Boris Johnson’s leadership – here’s how I did it<p>It would be nice to claim that the near complete accuracy of my prediction of the result of the Conservative Party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-wins-no-confidence-vote-but-the-margin-will-make-him-nervous-184492">vote of no confidence in Boris Johnson</a> was a glorious triumph of dedicated political science: I predicted that 211 MPs would vote for him to 147 against (the actual number was 148 – I assumed one MP might not vote). </p>
<p>But alas, that would be claiming too much. My forecast involved much guesswork and a fair bit of hunch, combining what the Guardian newspaper has called “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jun/07/professor-dubbed-mystic-meg-of-politics-says-boris-johnson-will-be-out-by-autumn">Mystic Meg</a>” crystal ball-gazing with mathematical modelling. </p>
<p>Insofar as serious calculations were involved, they involved adding up the number of pledges from Conservative MPs for or against the prime minister and comparing those tallies to Theresa May’s position when she faced a similar vote in December 2018. Of course, many MPs did not declare their intentions, but the basic picture could be ascertained via those who did. </p>
<p>Assessing the loyal or hostile protestations, it was apparent that Johnson would fare worse than his predecessor May had. May had significantly more public pledges of support from her MPs and fewer declarations of opposition. So, the first assumption was that Johnson would not reach her tally of 63% support. The next question was: how low could he go?</p>
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<p>It seemed safe to assume that those MPs pledging rebellion would remain true to their word. After all, that is their personal higher risk option. If Johnson did win big they risked permanent banishment on the backbenches, thwarting the vaulting ambition of some. Public affirmations of opposition had to be regarded as the absolute minimum scale of revolt, to which additions would be required. </p>
<p>From early on Monday, it was apparent that the momentum lay with Johnson’s opponents. As increasing numbers declared against him, there was a minor snowballing effect, increasing the confidence of other potential rebels to join in the fun. </p>
<p>By voting time, rebellion seemed a lower-risk move – and possibly even the wiser calculation. If the Johnson premiership was to be damaged beyond recovery, those MPs remaining loyal – or sitting on the fence – could become victims of a purge by a new leader.</p>
<h2>Newbies and the payroll vote</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, amid the tumult, the prime minister could count on significant sources of backing. In the privacy of the polling both there is no guarantee that the entire “<a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/payroll-vote">payroll vote</a>” – containing every government member of the House of Commons, from cabinet minister to parliamentary private secretary, will all remain loyal. There are some whose current level of preferment falls short of their own considerable perceptions of their capabilities. They are happy to turn on their leader. </p>
<p>But there are plenty of payroll devotees of the prime minister, grateful to be paid to be in their post. Ridiculously, the payroll vote, at between <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/payroll-vote">160-170 MPs</a>, forms nearly <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/payroll-vote">half of the parliamentary party</a>. That, in itself, was nearly enough to get Johnson over the line.</p>
<p>To the bulk of the payroll vote could be added most MPs from the class of 2019 – those <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50771014">58 Conservatives who captured seats</a> from other parties at the general election, many in the fabled one-time Labour “red wall”. A sizeable number feel indebted to Johnson for what they – and many others – might see as their unlikely victories. </p>
<p>In my own patch of northwest England they form one-third of the entire Conservative representation. Significantly, none came out publicly against their leader. There were exceptions elsewhere – such as the MP for Bishop Auckland, <a href="https://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/20190900.bishop-auckland-mp-reveals-voted-boris-johnson/">Dehenna Davison</a> – but most stayed loyal.</p>
<p>Adding the payroll vote and the “newbie” vote and then making some deductions gives you the very broad contours of the vote prediction. But the silence of some MPs in neither category made precision difficult. And that is where there was much forecasting reliance upon luck and guesstimates to get to a 59% to 41% prediction. </p>
<p>Johnson was always going to have more than a majority, so the predictive range was circa 55% to something only slightly below the Theresa May figure of 63%. A halfway house of 59% based on the analysis of the party seemed reasonable. </p>
<h2>What now for ‘Big Dog’?</h2>
<p>Even harder to predict is what now happens to Johnson’s prime ministership. It is almost inconceivable to think of another Conservative leader soldiering on when more than four in every ten MPs from their own side have called for his head. </p>
<p>But you have to take into account Johnson’s suspension of what many may regard as the normal rules of politics. And at least one of his allies <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/no-confidence-vote-boris-johnson-jacob-reesmogg-b2094765.html">insisted he would</a> defiantly stay on even if he only won by one vote.</p>
<p>So it may be unwise to place too much emphasis on the precedents of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and May departing either immediately or shortly after a bruising from their own side. Each departure was in different circumstances anyway.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-what-the-result-of-the-confidence-vote-means-for-the-pm-and-the-conservative-party-184500">Boris Johnson: what the result of the confidence vote means for the PM and the Conservative Party</a>
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<p>At this point, the Conservatives seem certain to lose the two looming by-elections in <a href="https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/politics/labour-on-course-for-landslide-victory-in-wakefield-by-election-new-polling-suggests-3721811">Wakefield in Yorkshire</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-04/johnson-is-taking-tories-to-heavy-loss-in-special-election-poll">Tiverton and Honiton in Devon</a> on June 23. In both cases the Conservative candidates are trailing their main opponents badly. But Johnson will be hoping to cling on after those big reverses until the summer parliamentary recess, beginning on July 22. </p>
<p>But his summer break will hardly be stress-free. Not long after Johnson cracks some jokes at the Conservatives’ annual conference in Birmingham in October, he will be confronted by a potentially very difficult report of the <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/privileges-committee-investigation">parliamentary privileges committee</a> on whether he misled parliament over “partygate”. </p>
<p>Only if the prime minister survives that unscathed can he begin to set his own agenda again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Tonge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politics professor Jon Tonge was pretty much spot on with his prediction for the result of the no-confidence vote. Here’s how he calculated the result.Jonathan Tonge, Professor of Politics, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/799312017-06-22T13:19:48Z2017-06-22T13:19:48ZA public protector’s job is to make sure people stick to the law - not to change it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175162/original/file-20170622-12027-uyy26c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Busisiwe Mkhwebane, the public protector of South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane has directed a parliamentary portfolio committee to initiate proceedings to amend a clause in the country’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">Constitution</a> that sets out the primary aim of the country’s Reserve Bank.</p>
<p>As many commentators have <a href="http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/absa-is-poster-child-for-apartheid-corruption-but-this-does-not-mean-the-public-protector-can-order-the-amendment-of-the-constitution/#more-9810">pointed out</a>, the Public Protector cannot order that the Constitution be amended. It is not part of her job and it’s outside her powers.</p>
<p>The Constitution gives the Public Protector the <a href="http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-web/ch9.html">task of investigating</a></p>
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<p>any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice. </p>
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<p>The focus of her investigation is thus conduct. This is underscored and fleshed out by the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Act23of1994.pdf">Public Protector Act</a>. The Act empowers her to investigate, among other things: maladministration, abuse of power, dishonest acts or omissions, improper enrichment, and acts or admissions which result in unlawful or improper prejudice to any other person.</p>
<p>In this case, the Public Protector claimed to approach her investigation by asking two questions: what happened? And, what should have happened? </p>
<p>The first is a question of fact. But to answer the second question she notes that the focus moves to</p>
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<p>the law or rules that regulate the standard that should have been met by the government or organ of state to prevent maladministration and prejudice. </p>
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<p>In other words, it is the law that provides the points of reference which tell her whether the banks and government’s acts or omissions constitute misconduct.</p>
<p>But what the Public Protector wants to do is to change the law itself. She is not satisfied with determining whether the Reserve Bank and government obeyed the relevant, current rules: she wants to write new ones. </p>
<p>Indeed, her recommendation goes well beyond changing individual rules to overturning their very foundation, anchored in the Constitution. She has ordered that a major decision of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/drafting-and-acceptance-constitution">Constitutional Assembly</a>, which drew up the Constitution following the first democratic elections in 1994, on a complex matter of economic policy, be thrown out.</p>
<p>This can’t be right.</p>
<h2>No precedent</h2>
<p>We must not be persuaded that there is any precedent for this. In her <a href="http://www.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/State-of-Capture-14-October-2016.pdf">“State of Capture”</a> report, the previous Public Protector, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-public-protector-has-set-a-high-bar-for-her-successor-63891?sr=1">Thuli Madonsela</a>, found that members of Cabinet had violated their obligations under the Constitution and the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/emea1998252.pdf">Executive Members Ethics Act</a> by failing to prevent the misuse of state funds to upgrade the president’s private residence. </p>
<p>Part of her remedial action was to recommend that the secretary of Cabinet update the policy to provide ministers with more detailed guidance, and to recommend that the minister of police review the Apartheid-era <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/39147_gen874.pdf">National Key Points Act</a>. This review was required to clarify the Act’s application and to bring it in line with the Constitution. </p>
<p>There are two major differences between these recommendations and an instruction that a constitutional provision be reworded in a specific manner.</p>
<p>Mkhwebane prescribed the exact wording of the new provision. She said that the clause which currently reads:</p>
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<p>The primary object of the South African Reserve Bank is to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balance and sustainable economic growth in the Republic.</p>
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<p>Should instead <a href="http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-17/Report%208%20of%202017&2018%20Public%20Protector%20South%20Africa.pdf">read</a>: </p>
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<p>The primary object of the South African Reserve Bank is to promote balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic, whilst ensuring that the socio-economic well-being of the citizens is protected.</p>
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<p>This is quite a different matter. Neither of Madonsela’s recommendation sets out the wording of the new provisions, merely the goal they should achieve. And each is aimed at bringing the relevant provisions into compliance with higher laws to which they are subject – either the Executive Ethics Act or the Constitution itself. And this is because it is the job of the Public Protector to remedy specific misconduct, and the job of Parliament to make laws.</p>
<p>In its <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-text-constitutional-court-rules-on-nkandla-public-protector-20160331">judgment on the Nkandla case</a>, the Constitutional Court held that the Public Protector is subject “only to the Constitution and the law”. But she <em>is</em> subject to them. And the Constitution sets out a specific, thorough process for the passing of any law, and particularly a constitutional amendment. </p>
<p>The elected representatives of the people are meant to debate all laws and fashion them into the form they believe is best for the country. If the wording of any law is determined in advance of this process, then the process itself is rendered meaningless. The Constitution’s law-making requirements are discarded.</p>
<p>The Public Protector cannot throw out the Constitution. Her remedial action is therefore invalid.</p>
<h2>Effects of the recommendation</h2>
<p>If taken seriously, her recommendation has the potential to influence current political debates on economic development in South Africa, supporting the line advanced by groups such as <a href="http://blackopinion.co.za/2017/02/18/black-first-land-first-marches-reserve-bank-demand-absamustpay/">Black First Land First</a>, and reducing the independence of one of the few public bodies which has not yet been tainted by evidence of state capture.</p>
<p>But if this was the intention, it could backfire, because the Public Protector can bring this influence only if she enjoys legitimacy in her own right. She does not, in part due to her <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/10/20/busisiwe-mkhwebane.-bares-claws-towards-thuli-madonsela">hostile treatment of her predecessor</a> and a perceived unwillingness to take steps against <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/16/listen-mkhwebane-denies-being-selective-in-state-capture-probe">President Zuma and his allies</a>. </p>
<p>She laid a criminal charge against her predecessor on receiving a complaint from the president, and then attempted to <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/4c9659804f2266a094cdd570ce873b7f/Public-Protector-says-she-did-not-lay-charges-against-Madonsela">deny the legal import of her action</a>. Staff closely associated with the former Public Protector or the State Capture report appear to have been <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/02/05/thuli-madonsela-staff-who-worked-on-the-state-capture-are-being_a_21707478/">forced out of their jobs</a>.</p>
<p>Mkhwebane could have found better ways of proving that she does not have a hidden political agenda than by <a href="http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-17/Report%208%20of%202017&2018%20Public%20Protector%20South%20Africa.pdf">producing a report</a> which throws her legal acumen into serious doubt. </p>
<p>Her foray into economics is also deeply embarrassing, as she justifies a drastic change in economic policy with eight lines of text, citing no authorities in economics and no evidence that her preferred approach does in fact, uplift the poor. </p>
<p>Her report is likely only to reduce the standing of her own office.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathleen Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The public protector’s proposal to change the mandate of South Africa’s Reserve Bank goes well beyond changing individual rules to overturning their very foundation, anchored in the Constitution.Cathleen Powell, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/785532017-05-31T14:48:58Z2017-05-31T14:48:58ZHow ANC presidential elections trump South Africa’s constitution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171489/original/file-20170530-30121-nrtck4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC leaders greet party supporters at a recent rally. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2002/b16.pdf">Constitution</a> is clear on a number of issues related to the relationship between the country’s parliament and its executive. It lays down that if the National Assembly passes a vote of No Confidence in the cabinet, the cabinet must resign and the president must appoint another one. Or, if it passes a vote of no confidence in the president then the president and the entire government must resign.</p>
<p>In a presidential system the president is directly elected by the voters, normally has a fixed term, and can only be removed through processes of impeachment. This usually require passage of votes of no confidence, or their equivalent, in the responsible legislature or congress. </p>
<p>In contrast, in a parliamentary system, a president or prime minister assumes office by virtue of his or her capacity to command a majority in the legislature. </p>
<p>Despite various hybrid features, the South African Constitution is more of a parliamentary system than a presidential one. The party enjoying a majority presents its candidate to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/parliamentary-democracy">National Assembly for election</a> – as required by the Constitution. In practice, that person has been chosen by the governing African National Congress (ANC) outside the legislature.</p>
<p>That’s not to say that the ANC is acting inconsistently with parliamentary practice. By selecting its leader outside the legislature, and getting the National Assembly to rubber stamp its choice, it’s acting in a manner fully consistent with parliamentary practice. But where it’s departed substantially from that script is by making a sharp distinction between the party and state presidencies. </p>
<p>The terms of office of the two presidencies are not in sync with one another, resulting in a “dual power” structure operating. This is because there’s a long gap between the ANC’s election of its president and the general elections which determine which party will have the majority in parliament, and consequently who will become president of the country. This gap is a recurrent source of potential instability so long as the ANC remains the majority party.</p>
<h2>Party president v state president</h2>
<p>The ANC elects its presidents at its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/President">five yearly National Congresses</a>. Notionally, the process of election is a grass roots one. Branches vote for their preference as leader. Their preferences are funnelled upwards through regions and provinces, with provincial delegations casting their vote for one of the candidates.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171487/original/file-20170530-30133-1gwjm2u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other ANC-linked organisations, such as the <a href="http://www.ancyl.org.za/">Youth League</a> and <a href="http://womensleague.anc.org.za/">Womens’ leagues</a>, can also cast their votes at the congresses. But they contribute just 10% of the delegates to the National Congresses. This means that the person elected to the presidency can notionally claim to be elected by the mass of the party’s membership.</p>
<p>All well and good – except that in practice the ANC electoral process is distorted by money, patronage, factionalism, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2012-12-20-elective-processes-something-is-rotten-in-the-kingdom-of-the-anc/">vote-rigging</a>. and, quite often, <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/kzn-anc-wants-inquiry-into-political-killings-20160719">violence </a>. It can be argued, with good reason, that ANC practices negates the democratic legitimacy that it claims. Nevertheless the way in which it chooses its own presidents remains its own business, and is in no way in violation of the constitution.</p>
<p>What’s more problematic is first, that the ANC insists that it “deploys” its party president to the state presidency. In practice, this means that if he or she wants to remain secure in office, a president needs to command a majority in the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0">National Executive Committee</a>. A second issue is that there is a substantial period – usually between 16 and 17 months – between the election of a party president by a National Congress and the election of a state president by the National Assembly. </p>
<p>When there’s consensus between the party and state presidents there is no problem. This happened after Mbeki’s election as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-national-conference-1991-2013">party leader in December 1997</a> to succeed Mandela, who stayed on as state president until the April 1999 election. </p>
<p>Yet when there’s tension, the constitutional authority of the National Assembly is directly undermined. This occurred after <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">Zuma’s victory at Polokwane in 2007</a>, with Mbeki remaining as state president until he was told to resign the office by the party in September 2008.</p>
<p>It was probably more by accident than design that the elections of ANC presidents and state presidents are so badly misaligned. The ANC’s negotiators during the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-6-negotiation-transition-and-freedom-chapter-1-transition-context-christopher-saunders">transition to democracy</a> probably simply failed to identify this as a potential problem. Yet the “dual power” situation which can arise, with a state president not knowing whether or not his or her actions might be countermanded by the party, is inherently destabilising, and a recipe for intra-party factional struggle. </p>
<p>It’s a situation South Africa can ill afford.</p>
<h2>The next round</h2>
<p>The ANC’s recent <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-committee-following-meeting-held-26th-28th-may-2017">National Executive Committee meeting</a> made it clear that any MP voting for an opposition party sponsored motion of No Confidence in the president will be disciplined. This means that the motion will be defeated, even if there is a secret ballot. True, there may be a handful of dissidents on the government’s benches prepared to speak and act openly against the president. But they will do so in full knowledge that it may cost them their seats in parliament.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171485/original/file-20170530-30127-w4j8re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1003&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC secretary general warns party MPs not to support to oust President Zuma.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (the president’s former wife and <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/20/Dlamini-Zumas-campaign-to-become-next-ANC-leader-struggles-to-find-feet-outside-KZN">favoured candidate</a>) is elected party president at the next party congress in December 2017, it’s possible that Jacob Zuma may ostensibly bow to popular pressure and resign as state president. This would enable the ANC majority in the Assembly to elect her as state president. </p>
<p>Alternatively, Zuma may opt to remain as state president, allowing his former wife to mobilise support for the ANC around the country prior to the 2019 general election. Even if Zuma does stand down, allowing the two offices to be combined, we may assume that he will continue to be the power behind the throne, and that Dlamini-Zuma will be kept on a tight leash – at least until the election.</p>
<p>A victory for the Zuma faction in December 2019 could provoke the breakaway of the defeated faction, which would probably be headed by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. This could herald the reshaping of the South African party system and the formation of a coalition government following the 2019 election. Many would say “Bring it on!” to the idea of a split within the ANC, although a triumphant Zuma faction is likely to make major efforts to prevent that happening. </p>
<p>Alternatively, if the anti-Zuma faction was to win, and Ramaphosa was to be elected party president, he would likely face a massive backlash from Zuma loyalists, who would fear the loss of patronage positions and gravy. A divided ANC in which the present factional battles continued to openly wage is an ANC which could well go down to defeat.</p>
<p>Whatever the outcome of the present battles within the ANC, the party would do the country a favour by bringing the two presidencies into alignment. The person elected to the party leadership should be immediately presented to parliament for election as state president.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The internal processes of South Africa’s ruling ANC for electing the president is distorted by money, patronage, factionalism and vote-rigging. It negates the democratic legitimacy the party claims.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/761182017-04-12T16:56:03Z2017-04-12T16:56:03ZANC military veterans and the threat to South Africa’s democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165248/original/image-20170413-25898-1lzqft3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC military veterans guard the party’s headquarters.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We may look back on the days in April 2017 when tens of thousands of South Africans marched demanding that President Jacob Zuma <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/06/anti-zuma-protest-gains-momentum-outside-parliament">should fall</a> as the beginning of something bigger.</p>
<p>There’s been a wistful glint in the eyes of ageing activists as they gear up for action again, predicting a return to the 1980s. Many have embraced the idea of the reconstitution of a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front-style</a> multi-class, non-racial and popular anti-apartheid alliance of NGOs, community movements and religious groups to <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/08/south-africans-strengthen-calls-for-president-zuma-to-step-down">“Save South Africa”</a> from the capriciousness and corruption of the Zuma government.</p>
<p>We are told that Friday April 7, the day of the nationwide marches against Zuma, was the day when ordinary people stood up and said to the ANC: “Enough is Enough”! It was followed by another large demonstration of opposition political parties marching on the government’s seat of power in Pretoria, the Union Buildings, on April 12, which was also the president’s <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/12/Zuma-reveals-his-birthday-wishes-amid-protests1">75th birthday</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, while we should in no way underestimate this democratic stirring, we may look back and say that its greater significance was that it was this moment when it became manifest that Zuma’s faction of the ANC would be prepared to resort to violence to entrench its domination.</p>
<h2>Signs of intolerance of dissent</h2>
<p>Once the first marchers had marched, the ANC government sought to save face by proclaiming the day a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/07/ayanda-dlodlo-thanks-anti-zuma-protesters-for-their-conduct">triumph for democracy </a> – which, of course, it was. Yet during the build-up to the march, the ANC had filled the air with threats of violence. </p>
<p>The most explicit warning was delivered by the newly installed Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula. He did <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/04/mbalula-issues-stern-warning-to-violent-protesters">not want another Marikana</a>, he said, but implied the repeat of such an event, when police killed 34 striking miners, if protesters damaged property.</p>
<p>Other ANC officials, notably eThekwini mayor Zondile Gumede, issued <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/06/Durban-mayor-says-anti-Zuma-march-is-treason1">not-so-veiled threats </a> against those marching. Others sought to tie up the marchers’ right to march by <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/07/phahlane-insists-save-sa-march-is-illegal-despite-court-permission">denying permission</a>; others referred to marchers as <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2017/04/06/War-talk-from-MK-vets">“counter-revolutionary”</a>. </p>
<p>The most chilling threat was represented by the MK Veterans Association <a href="http://mkmva.anc.org.za/">(MKMVA)</a>, supposedly former members of the ANC’s armed wing uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Its press briefing before the marches took place stated that it was “mobilising” its members, who would be <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2017/04/06/War-talk-from-MK-vets">“combat ready”</a> to defend Luthuli House, the headquarters of the ANC. It was backed up by statements by the ANC Youth League that it was ready to defend the premises with <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zuma/watch-ancyl-backs-zuma-amid-calls-for-his-head-8497214">all the weapons at its disposal</a>.</p>
<p>Given that the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) had changed its initial plans to march upon Luthuli House, there was little or no need to “defend” the ANC’s headquarters from anyone. Even so, on the day, <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/07/MK-vets-gather-outside-Luthuli-House">some 700 MK “veterans”</a> assembled outside Luthuli House. </p>
<h2>Threat to democracy</h2>
<p>Dressed in military fatigues, the MK “veterans” explicitly presented themselves as the ANC’s armed wing ready to go into battle to counter the party’s enemies. In the event, they <a href="https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/toyi-toyi">toyi-toyied</a> and demonstrated – and were fortunately denied the opportunity by the police to prove their metal in clashes with the DA or anyone else. Yet the threat of violence was immanent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165060/original/image-20170412-25859-1tm0mv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supposed veterans of the ANC’s military wing perform the toyi-toyi protest dance outside the party’s headquarters in Johannesburg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The real issue is how MK, as it’s presently constituted, views itself and is viewed by key elements amongst the ANC’s leadership as a militia ready to be deployed against its political opponents – internal as well as external. How many of those who presented themselves outside Luthuli House were genuinely former MK veterans we do not know. But, we can be pretty sure that many if not most - too young to have fought against apartheid – have been more recent recruits, with no genuine claim to membership.</p>
<p>We also know that under the national leadership of <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/kebby-maphatsoe">Kebby Maphatsoe</a>, the deputy defence minister, the Veteran’s Association has been deeply corrupted. Major questions posed about its internal finances are the subject of a <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mk-veteran-head-in-court-this-week-over-alleged-fraud-20160531">court case</a>. It’s been used to intervene violently in party <a href="https://theconversation.com/comrades-in-arms-against-apartheid-are-now-at-one-anothers-throats-64643">factional battles</a> on behalf of Zuma. Yet it has reserved its main animus for parties of opposition, regularly referred to by Maphatsoe as “the enemy”, “agents provocateurs”, and <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/south-africa-first-an-organ-of-the-counterrevoluti">“counter-revolutionaries”</a>.</p>
<p>It would be a mistake to dismiss all this as harmless political theatre. Rather, it constitutes a very real and present danger. It’s worth recalling that Siphiwe Nyanda, a former leading member of MK who became chief of the South African National Defence Force, has already referred to the veterans under Maphatsoe as a <a href="http://www.sundayworld.co.za/news/2012/09/03/mkmva-is-divisive---nyanda-slams-anc-s-army-veterans">“private army”</a>. If he’s worried, then so should we be. Armed militias aligned to a political party, or a faction within it, have no place in a constitutional democracy.</p>
<h2>Shades of Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>We have no need to look further than Zimbabwe to recognise the threats to democracy posed by armed militias. Formed in 2000, the <a href="http://dev.icicp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Country-Profile_Zimbabwe.pdf">National Youth Service</a> was subsequently responsible for the military style training of some 80 000 youths. Many of them went on to join the ruling Zanu-PF’s affiliated militias the <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f147ce2f.html">“Green Bombers”</a>which wreaked havoc upon supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change in the 2008 general election. </p>
<p>Subsequently, many were to be incorporated into security structures such as the military, police and prison service. They remain a major reservoir of violent support for Zanu-PF, which doesn’t hesitate to use to intimidate and liquidate its opponents. As we know, Zimbabwean elections have now become a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">farce</a>.</p>
<p>Following the ousting of Pravin Gordhan as South Africa’s finance minister in the recent <a href="http://www.gov.za/speeches/president-jacob-zuma-appoints-new-ministers-and-deputy-ministers-31-mar-2017-0000">cabinet reshuffle </a>, and the <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/breaking-fitch-downgrades-sa-to-junk-status-20170407">downgrade by ratings agencies</a>, fears that South Africa under Zuma has embarked down a road which leads to Zimbabwe-style authoritarian kleptocracy have gained considerable ground. For the moment at least, such fears are probably exaggerated. </p>
<p>Although Zuma may be dominant within ANC structures for now, and although he will probably survive the forthcoming vote of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/11/mbeki-calls-on-anc-mps-to-put-sa-first-in-vote-of-no-confidence-1">no-confidence</a> in the House of Assembly, his reshuffle has alienated many within the party. It has threatened his ability to secure the party presidency for his former wife, <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1394103/1394103/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, at the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">elective conference</a> in December.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165066/original/image-20170412-25898-vtmcu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Zuma’s supporters from the ANC Youth League disrupt a memorial service for anti-apartheid and ANC hero Ahmed Kathrada in Durban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Furthermore, the recent marches may have given backbone to some ANC MPs who fear the electoral consequences of the party continuing to cling to Zuma’s coattails. Yet the more desperate Zuma and his supporters become, the more the risk that they will turn to the MK Vets to help them. If, in turn, the Zuma faction was to prove triumphant in the leadership battle, it’s unlikely to hesitate to deploy MK vets (alongside its Youth League) against opponents during the lead up to the 2019 election.</p>
<p>Although the DA would go running to the courts, the militant <a href="http://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> would be likely to respond to violence in kind, rendering the 2019 election campaign the most violent we will have seen since 1994. We are not there yet, and hopefully we never will be. </p>
<p>But, an economy which is about to hit the skids and which offers a massive pool of <a href="https://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/images/pdf/PresentationIZA.1-31.pdf">unemployed youths</a> available for political recruitment, is highly combustible. In such a context, were MKMVA to receive the covert (or not-so-covert) backing of the ANC, the prospect of a Zimbabwean scenario would loom ever larger.</p>
<p>If the white right wing was to reconstitute and parade in public in military uniforms, the ANC and all democrats would be rightly outraged. Equally, there should be no place in our democracy for MKMVA to play the role of soldier: that should be left to the South African National Defence Force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>The militant talk and antics by the ANC’s ex-soldiers may seem like theatrics, but they are a chilling reminder of how Zimbabwe used armed militia to crash opponents and democracy.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.