tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/pakistan-terror-24184/articlesPakistan terror – The Conversation2024-01-30T10:53:31Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220262024-01-30T10:53:31Z2024-01-30T10:53:31ZIndia: visa problems for English cricketer reflect a longstanding security rift with neighbouring Pakistan<p>Young England cricketer Shoaib Bashir arrived in Hyderabad just in time to see the team triumph in style, inflicting a rare and unexpected victory against an Indian side considered nigh on unbeatable on its home turf. Bashir, a 20-year-old spin bowler who had been a surprise selection when the team was announced at the beginning of January, missed the first Test match because his Indian visa had been delayed.</p>
<p>This is not the first time a visiting cricketer has had visa problems in India. The same has happened to English cricketers Moeen Ali and Saqib Mahmood, while Australian opening batsman Usman Khawaja was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2023/feb/01/usman-khawaja-stranded-in-australia-with-visa-issues-ahead-of-india-tour">forced to wait 24 hours</a> before joining his teammates for a tour of India in February 2023. These are all cricketers with Pakistani heritage. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, during the cricket World Cup hosted by India in October 2023, visas for the Pakistan team were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/25/india-visa-delay-disrupts-pakistans-cricket-world-cup-2023-preparations#:%7E:text=Pakistan%20cricket%20team's%20preparations%20for,under%20way%20in%2010%20days.">subject to delays</a> while Pakistani fans and journalists were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2023/10/14/pakistan-fans-glaring-absence-india-match-icc-cricket-world-cup-2023#:%7E:text=Cricket%20World%20Cup-,Pakistan%20fans%20a%20glaring%20absence%20at%20India%20Cricket%20World%20Cup,Cup's%20marquee%20clash%20in%20Ahmedabad.">effectively barred</a> from the tournament completely.</p>
<p>The World Cup ban for journalists and fans appears to be a reflection of the current acrimonious state of relations between India and Pakistan. But the difficulties experienced by overseas players of Pakistani origin reflects a longer-term Indian suspicion towards visitors with Pakistani roots and has a degree of justification.</p>
<p>Terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008, which claimed the lives of 166 people, were orchestrated by terrorists of the Pakistan-based <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-lashkar-e-taiba">Lashkar-e-Taiba</a> (LeT) in collusion with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). But one operative responsible for conducting reconnaissance of the targets for attack was an American national of Pakistani origin named David Headley. Headley, in his visa application, had <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/RTI_IS-Idiv_130814_00002_1.PDF">concealed his Pakistani roots</a> and managed to visit India multiple times to reconnoitre the targets. </p>
<p>As a result, the Indian Home Ministry (MHA), which is in charge of internal security, decided to tighten the visa requirements. Since 2009, all visa applications made by people with Pakistani roots were to be vetted and cleared by the MHA – a process that can take up to 90 days.</p>
<p>Some observers have called this a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/14/india-visa-rule-persecutes-pakistanis">“racist”</a> move directed squarely at Pakistanis that violates UK, European, and international human rights law. Others, meanwhile, have termed it “collective punishment” of the kind that is <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/as-if-we-are-all-david-headley-news-288058">often seen in South Asia</a>.</p>
<p>The US and UK governments <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/21/britain-us-protest-india-tourism">lodged diplomatic protests</a> against India’s decision to tighten its visa rules, but the Indian government resisted the pressure. US citizens who complained to the US State Department were simply told that <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/as-if-we-are-all-david-headley-news-288058">India had a right to deny visas</a> as it chooses. </p>
<p>One reason for the western weakness in being able to press this issue with the Indian government was arguably because of their the west’s consistent failure in accommodating India’s counter-terrorism concerns over the years. Headley, for instance, was not only an LeT operative but <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/david-headley-homegrown-terrorist">also an agent</a> of the US government’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Indian security agencies believe US intelligence could have done more <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/did-the-u-s-know-more-than-it-let-on-about-mumbai-attacks-suspect/">to help prevent the attack</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the UK had an unsympathetic attitude towards India’s security concerns about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cables-india-mumbai-attacks">British Pakistanis</a>. Several requests by Indian intelligence officials to monitor suspected British Pakistanis had failed to elicit serious responses from their British counterparts.</p>
<p>Mindful of international pressure to <a href="https://www.livemint.com/Leisure/29lXP57cHDAloqUf2uJOHM/Why-India-didnt-attack-Pakistan-after-2611-Mumbai-attacks.html">exercise restraint</a> in the aftermath of the attacks, the then Manmohan Singh government instituted several defensive counter-terrorism measures, including the new visa rules. But <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Pakistan_April2014.pdf">India-Pakistan relations</a> remained active, despite the problem of cross-border terrorism. </p>
<h2>Modi’s neighbourhood policy</h2>
<p>After Modi came to power in 2014, despite his Hindu nationalist image, his government made peaceful overtures over the next couple of years in pursuit of what India called its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Asian_foreign_policy_of_the_Narendra_Modi_government">“neighbourhood-first policy”</a>. This aimed to encourage cross-border cooperation and business enterprise across South Asia and focused on building deeper people-to-people ties.</p>
<p>But as terrorist attacks from Pakistan continued, India changed its tack to more forceful measures targeting terrorist bases within Pakistan. As a result, a new mantra became popular in Indian government circles: <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/home-minister-rajnath-singh-appeals-to-kashmiris-not-to-visit-gunfight-sites/articleshow/66334471.cms?from=mdr">“terror and talks cannot go together”</a>.</p>
<p>In August 2019, India overturned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/11/whats-article-370-what-to-know-about-india-top-court-verdict-on-kashmir">Article 370</a>, which allowed it to split the contested state of Kashmir into two centrally administered provinces: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. This angered the Pakistan government which felt it should have been consulted. Pakistan then announced any further security cooperation would be conditional on <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-pmo-no-talks-unless-india-revokes-art-370-move/articleshow/97072776.cms?from=mdr">India’s restoration of Article 370</a>. Since then there has been a total standstill in bilateral relations.</p>
<h2>Focus on counter-terrorism</h2>
<p>Meanwhile a focus on regional counter-terrorism has become something of a mantra for Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Consistent with this, the Modi government declared <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/india-pro-israel-narendra-modi-bjp-government">support to Israel</a> following the October 7 attacks and to the recent Iranian air strikes against Pakistan, claiming <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/37515/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_media_queries_regarding_Irans_air_strikes_in_Pakistan">“zero tolerance towards terrorism”</a>.</p>
<p>Seen within this paradigm, India’s approach towards Pakistan is unlikely to change as the country expects its general elections in April. Recent speeches by Indian officials <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37514/Remarks_by_MoS_Dr_Rajkumar_Ranjan_Singh_at_the_19th_NAM_Summit__Ministerial_Meeting">further indicate</a> that, while the neighbourhood continues to remain a high priority for Modi, it is <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/34940/Remarks_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_the_Inaugural_Session_of_the_Training_Module_on_Indias_Neighbourhood_Lal_Bahadur_Shastri_National_Academy_of_Administr">“with the exception of Pakistan”</a>. </p>
<p>A poll taken in India in August 2023 reflected a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/08/29/indians-views-of-other-countries/#:%7E:text=Indians'%20views%20of%20Pakistan,-Strained%20bilateral%20relations&text=About%20seven%2Din%2Dten%20Indians,view%20of%20the%20neighboring%20country.">growing public negativity</a> towards Pakistan. The Pew Foundation poll found that 73% were unfavourable towards Pakistan (57% very unfavourable). In light of this, in the run-up to the April election, Modi is likely to feel that any positive gestures towards Pakistan might by politically unviable. </p>
<p>It’s a similar situation in Pakistan in the run-up to the general election there in February. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pakistani-election-looms-the-military-maintains-its-grip-on-the-countrys-politics-221395">hostile military</a> in control of domestic politics combined with <a href="https://www.samaa.tv/20873539-evolving-pakistani-views-on-india-kashmir-dispute-terrorism-and-diplomacy">strong anti-India public opinion</a> invalidate any prospects for reestablishing ties with India. This is despite the obvious need for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/india-pakistan-imf-trade-border-kashmir-debt/">stronger economic cooperation with India</a> to ease its current domestic crisis.</p>
<p>So, given the strong likelihood of a <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/politics/story/a-hattrick-for-pm-modi-in-2024-lok-sabha-elections-almost-inevitable-says-this-british-paper-411430-2024-01-01">Modi victory</a> in April and Pakistan’s intransigence in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/03/pakistan-terrorism-crisis-inconsistent-policy-military-economy/">sponsorship of terror outfits</a>, the visa hassles for Pakistanis or westerners with Pakistani roots are unlikely to stop any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dheeraj Paramesha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>India changed its visa rules after the 2008 Mumbai massacre to make it more difficult for Pakistanis to visit.Dheeraj Paramesha, Lecturer in Intelligence, Security and Policing, School of Criminology, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/676512016-10-31T03:46:05Z2016-10-31T03:46:05ZTwin suicide bombings in Pakistan point to deep security problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143404/original/image-20161027-32322-1dbobo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Pakistani flag flies at half-mast in honour of the victims of the bomb attack on the police training centre.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Jamal Taraqai</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The continuing prevalence of violence in Pakistan has been <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/gunmen-kill-dozens-in-attack-on-police-academy-in-pakistani-city-of-quetta-20161025-gsa1fk.html">reinforced recently</a>) with the mass murder of at least 62 police trainees and wounding of nearly 100 others in Quetta in the troubled province of Baluchistan. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37007661">In August this year</a>, the target was the legal fraternity at a hospital in Quetta, where many had gathered to mourn the murder of the president of the Baluchistan Bar Association. The bomb attack left 70 people dead and many more wounded. </p>
<p>The list of violent attacks in Quetta goes on. In September, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-02/pakistan-bomb-blast-kills-dozen-lawyers-police-at-court/7810854">a court house in the city of Mardan was bombed</a>, killing 12 people and injuring 50 more. The assailants have <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37253739">reportedly been identified</a> as members of divergent offshoots of the Taliban. The Police Barracks attack has been attributed to the group <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.aspx">Lashkar-e-Jhangvi</a>, while the hospital attack has been attributed to <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/us-state-department-lists-jamaat-ul-ahrar-as-terrorist-group.php">Jamaat-ul-Ahrar</a>. A faction of the Taliban based in the Mohmand Tribal region, Jamaat-ul-Ahrer has also been implicated in other large scale attacks such as <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3511528/Dozens-mothers-children-52-killed-suicide-bomber-targeted-Christians-celebrating-Easter-park-Pakistan.html">the Easter attack in Lahore</a> earlier this year that killed 70 people.</p>
<p>The situation in Baluchistan is further complicated by the presence of a long running insurgency conducted by ethnic Baluchis against the <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/706042/balochistan-govt-writ-to-be-maintained-anti-pakistan-elements-to-face-tough-measures">writ of the Pakistan government</a>. The Pakistan government has been especially shy about <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/07/28/we-can-torture-kill-or-keep-you-years/enforced-disappearances-pakistan-security">responding to charges</a> of actively undertaking or at least being complicit in assassinations, mass murders and arbitrary detention. It has also been accused of securing the assistance of silent partners, <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/11/03/world-view-pakistans-lashkar-e-jhangvi-lej-continues-plan-to-exterminate-shias/">who some allege</a> includes the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.</p>
<p>This “silent” war has long antecedents. Following the East Pakistan War of 1971, when the Pakistani army sought to suppress Baluch nationalism, General Tikka Khan earned the sobriquet the “Butcher of Baluchistan”. </p>
<p>The security situation in Pakistan then is complex, with both overt and shadowy alliances between government and militant groups. These conflicted relationships are one of the many reasons it has been so difficult for any Pakistani government to effectively extinguish militant groups there. </p>
<p>Added to this equation is the prickly issue of alleged Pakistani support for militant groups involved in such recent events as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37399969">September 2016 attack of an Indian Army base</a> about 100 kilometres from the State Capital of Srinagar. The attack killed 17 Indian soldiers, the worst of its kind for two decades.</p>
<p>The attack also dangerously set the sabres rattling between the two nuclear weapons capable states, worsening their already deteriorating relationship. Both subsequently accused each other of human rights abuses in Baluchistan and Kashmir.</p>
<p>What is clear is that Pakistan can ill afford to allow this cycle of egregious violence to continue. This is recognised within Pakistan, but remains an issue infused with competing agendas between the government and the most powerful institution in the country – the army. </p>
<p>Pakistanti commentators have to be brave to voice an opinion on internal security and international relations. Sometimes it is to their detriment, as demonstrated by the most recent case of the journalist Cyril Almeida. </p>
<p>Earlier this month, Almeida earned the ire of the army by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/pakistan-cyril-almeida-dawn-exit-control-list-161010204921917.html">reporting on</a> conflicts between the army and the government on the handling of “home-grown” militancy. Almeida was prevented from leaving Pakistan, even though the veracity of his story was confirmed.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/10/12/why-cyril-almeida-s-story-has-created-a-political-storm-in-pakis/">Almeida’s apparent revelations</a> on the differences of opinion between the government and the army were met with a firestorm of back-tracking from government figures anxious not to upset the army.</p>
<p>Pakistan remains infected with a host of militant groups who are sometimes co-opted by the government and operate with impunity. Others attack the apparatus of the state, including the military and the police as demonstrated by this latest attack.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s militancy woes do not end there. Sectarian militants prey on their perceived enemies within the nation, with anti-Sunni, anti-Shia, anti-Christian, and anti-Hindu groups, among others, determined to prevent expressions of diversity through violence.</p>
<p>If it can be done, Pakistan needs to be teased off this pathway, with continued censure of unacceptable practices by the US, Australia and other members of the international community who would like it to become a truly democratic country. At the same time, there needs to be continued “soft power” engagement to wean the army off stymieing its perceived enemies. In 2008, noted security scholar Bruce Riedel wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. All of the nightmares of the 21st century come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, military dictatorship and above all international terrorism…“ </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It would seem that Riedel’s 2008 description remains as valid today. It will continue to do so unless there is a commitment in Pakistan to unravel its Gordian Knot of militancy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Briskey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Pakistani government has a complicated relationship with the army and militant groups. Until they are sorted out, security will continue to be jeopardised.Mark Briskey, Senior Lecturer, National Security and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/569302016-03-30T11:31:09Z2016-03-30T11:31:09ZSuicide bombing in Lahore park is the latest attempt to shut public spaces and silence minority voices<p>The public park targeted in the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/27/asia/pakistan-lahore-deadly-blast/">recent suicide bombing</a> in Lahore was popular with families. It is one of the largest green spaces in the city; a place where middle- and working-class Pakistanis go to picnic, exercise, and play with their children. The attack targeted Christians – a predominantly <a href="http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/christians-required-only-as-sweepers/">working-class</a> community in Pakistan – who were celebrating Easter. Yet most of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35916578">72 people killed</a> were middle- and working-class Muslims. </p>
<p>This suicide bombing is the latest in a series of attacks seeking to eliminate Pakistan’s religious minorities from the public realm. But while these atrocities target members of religious minority groups, attacking them in public spaces means that the damage is borne by all members of Pakistan’s middle- and working-classes. </p>
<p>In Pakistan, there are few places where working- and middle-class families can spend time together, outside of their homes and places of worship. This is partly because many public places are not seen to be appropriate places for women. </p>
<p>For example, markets are often viewed as male-dominated spaces, where women should not loiter. And while shopping malls and coffee shops are considered by many to be appropriate places for women to meet, entertain their children, eat and shop, many working- and middle-class families are excluded, either because of the location, or the prohibitive cost of the merchandise available there.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116764/original/image-20160330-15137-m6k8by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Parks are one of the few places in Pakistan where families of all backgrounds can gather.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/silentscience/16625840475/sizes/l">waqarism/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, public parks are places where families can socialise, exercise and take their families outside of the segregated religious spaces of mosques or churches. They are also some of the only locations in Pakistan where Sunni Muslim families share space with members of Pakistan’s minority communities – Shias, Christians and Ahmedis. </p>
<p>By targeting Gulshan-i-Iqbal park for the deadly attack, Taliban splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar are seeking to intimidate religious minorities into abandoning the public realm. Sadly, they are not the only ones seeking to silence Pakistan’s minority voices. </p>
<h2>No space for minorities</h2>
<p>At the same time as the bomb detonated in the Lahore park, 10,000 people were invading Islamabad’s parliamentary area to protest against the execution of a self-confessed murderer: Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/pakistan-hangs-mumtaz-qadri-who-killed-blasphemy-law-governor">hanged in February</a> for the assassination of former Punjab Governor, Salman Tasser, who had been seeking to reform <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12621225">Pakistan’s blasphemy laws</a>. </p>
<p>The blasphemy laws can lead to a death sentence for those accused of insulting Islam. Tasser <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12124761">had argued</a> that the law was being used to victimise Pakistan’s Ahmedi and Christian communities. The issue of blasphemy is politically sensitive, and attempts to amend the law have been virulently opposed by religious groups and conservative political parties. </p>
<p>The protesters gathered in Islamabad are <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Protesters-demand-martyr-status-for-Qadri-Sharia-in-Pakistan/articleshow/51593162.cms">demanding</a> the implementation of Shariah law across the country; the release of Sunni religious clerics charged with murder and terrorism; that Mumtaz Qadri be declared a martyr; and that members of the Ahmadi community and other religious minorities be <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/1248261/nearly-2000-pro-qadri-protesters-continue-sit-in-outside-parliament">removed</a> from key government posts. </p>
<p>When fights broke out between protesters and civilian police, the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/pro-blasphemy-protesters-clash-police-pakistan-160327142503305.html">military was called</a> in to secure the site.</p>
<h2>No space for debate</h2>
<p>The attack in Lahore and the protests in Islamabad reflect different political agendas. Yet both are aligned in that they seek to eradicate religious minorities from the public space: from parks, and from leadership positions in government. These groups form an influential political power bloc, which each of Pakistan’s successive governments has had to contend with and appease. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s government and military – the de-facto power holder – have each contributed to division and intolerance in the country by systematically removing forums for public debate on a range of issues: from the blasphemy law, to the insurgency in Baluchistan. Those in power have sought to silence any direct critique of the military establishment, intelligence agencies, or their senior leadership. </p>
<p>Indeed, in April 2015, a public event titled “Unsilencing Balochistan” at the Lahore University of Management Science <a href="http://lums.edu.pk/remappingjustice/page.php/unsilencing-balochistan">was cancelled</a> at the instruction of the government. The speakers sought to raise awareness of the enforced disappearance of an estimated 18,000 Balochis – people native to the Pakistani province of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/place/Balochistan">Balochistan</a> – in the conflict between separatists and national <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/lonely-vigil-pakistan-invisible-man-151015070242806.html">security forces</a>. </p>
<p>A local activist, Sabeen Mahmud, rescheduled the cancelled talk by hosting the event in the small community space she ran above a bookshop in Karachi. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/27/murdered-karachi-free-speech-sabeen-mahmud">Mahmud was assassinated</a> by unknown perpetrators as she left the event. </p>
<p>The taboos around these issues have resulted in a national media which is reluctant to directly critique the government, the security forces, or conservative religious parties. Journalists reporting on these issues <a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MF04Df03.html">have been found dead</a> in suspicious circumstances. Many others <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/balochistan-pakistan-information-black-hole">have received threats</a>, both veiled and direct. Instead, the op-eds of major English language newspapers in Pakistan critique these institutions with vague allusions to “the Establishment” and “the Boys”.</p>
<p>Neither the ruling classes who hold government and leadership roles, nor the generals and brigadiers who staff the army, spend their time in public parks. They have their own private gardens, air-conditioned homes, and private security personnel. Meanwhile, the public spaces available to minority, working- and middle-class Pakistanis are getting smaller and smaller – and so are the forums to debate or critique the authorities’ failure to address these issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosita Armytage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Minorities are increasingly facing exclusion from Pakistan’s public realm; and it’s not only terrorists who are responsible.Rosita Armytage, PhD Candidate, Anthropology, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/534572016-01-21T17:36:49Z2016-01-21T17:36:49ZExplainer: the two Talibans and how they operate<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/university-under-attack-what-can-pakistan-do-to-counter-violent-campaign-against-educators-53455">attack on students of the Bacha Khan university</a> in Charsadda, northern Pakistan, played out according to what has become a disturbingly familiar pattern in the region. </p>
<p>It was what is described by armed Islamist groups there as a “<a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/report/10-fidayeen-attacks-that-shocked-the-nation/20160106.htm"><em>fidayeen</em> attack</a>”. Fighters of the Pakistani Taliban, TTP, were equipped to blow themselves up, but first shot all those they encountered until they were cornered and shot by security forces.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the attack, TTP recruits had received commando-style training and been designated fidayeen, or fighters who are prepared to give up their lives for God. An experienced TTP commander, referred to as an “ustad”, or professor, directed covert surveillance of the university. The ustad then devised an operational plan, including delivering the men and weapons to Charsadda without detection. It is now standard practice for the TTP commander to direct the operation by phone, staying across the border beyond the reach of Pakistani security forces.</p>
<p>One of the reasons that the university attack has been particularly shocking for Pakistanis is that it took place at a time when the country <a href="http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm">seemed to have passed the peak of terrorist violence</a>. After a decade of military operations, the Pakistan army has by now penetrated all of the tribal agencies along the frontier. Until June 2014, TTP fighters had secure bases and bomb factories around the towns of Mir Ali and Miranshah, but these were eliminated in the army’s <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44144&cHash=d4281630e5ad104ab6fbc0bd5f3bbf9f">North Waziristan operation</a>. </p>
<p>During 2015 the Pakistani government also pursued a 20-point agenda of counter-terrorism actions, designed to reduce terrorist financing, recruitment and freedom of operation throughout Pakistan – <a href="http://pkpolitics.com/2014/12/26/pm-announces-20-points-agenda-to-combat-terror/">the National Action Plan (NAP)</a>. Deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan duly fell by a third in 2015 relative to the previous year. But a spurt of other attacks during January point to the limits of what can be achieved through the military operations and NAP framework. Terrorist violence is down but Pakistan is still far from secure.</p>
<h2>Common ground</h2>
<p>On the same day as the university attack, a suicide bomber in Kabul <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3409686/Rights-group-condemns-attack-Afghan-TV-employees.html">blew up the staff bus of Afghan TV station, Tolo</a>, killing seven. The Afghan Taliban had previously threatened Tolo and claimed responsibility for the attack. Over the past month, the Afghan Taliban has directed a series of fidayeen operations against a mixture of soft targets and some associated with the military.</p>
<p>The ustads who plot the Afghan Taliban attacks in Kabul and the TTP attacks in Pakistan developed their skills in the old camps of Waziristan. In a sense they are all graduates of the same “<a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/insight-into-a-suicide-bomber-training-camp-in-waziristan">terrorist university</a>”. Both Taliban movements are still able to mount a terror campaign because they have used the time since summer 2014 to relocate themselves, reorganise their logistics, train new fighters and go back into action.</p>
<p>The TTP, has suffered a series of splits since 2014. The nominal emir is <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/11306125/Mullah-Radio-terrorist-demagogue-behind-the-savagery-of-Peshawar.html">Maulana Fazlullah</a>, the notorious commander from Swat – but in reality the movement now has neither a charismatic leader nor an effective central command structure. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108885/original/image-20160121-9754-1v57vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">TTP warlord Maulana Fazlullah.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Salimswati</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Instead, multiple commanders who emerged while TTP held sway in Pakistan’s tribal areas, have established themselves in areas along the border, beyond the control of either government. </p>
<p>Each commander can still draw on his original fighters, who are mainly clansmen from the Pakistani frontier tribes. But the allure of being a mujahid is still sufficient that TTP commanders in eastern Afghanistan are also able to recruit local youths. Funding is largely decentralised, as the TTP commanders have long experience in kidnapping and extortion and sustaining their fighters from criminal activities conducted under the guise of jihad. </p>
<h2>Patterns of violence</h2>
<p>The TTP fighters have now reverted to a more autonomous pattern of warfare. Each commander strong enough to maintain a group of fighters is free to ally with other jihadi groups or conduct independent operations. This is the opposite of the Afghan Taliban’s organisational approach, which emphasises the idea of loyalty to a single emir. The TTP and Afghan Taliban pursue different strategic objectives. The <a href="http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551">Afghan Taliban</a> is fighting to restore its Islamic Emirate to power in Afghanistan. The TTP has no prospect of overthrowing the Pakistani state but fights an existential jihad, intent on maintaining its status as mujahideen by waging war against those it has designated enemies of Islam. </p>
<p>The inter-connectedness of Afghan and Pakistani security is highlighted by the fact that the two campaigns of fidayeen operations run in parallel. However, the political and military leaderships on both sides of the border react differently to violence depending on where it takes place. There was horror in Pakistan at the killing of innocents in Charsadda. In contrast, many in Pakistan still cling to the idea that bombs in Kabul strike a blow against occupation. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism measures have been directed against fighters who target Pakistan. </p>
<p>Residual sympathy and the confidence that Afghan Taliban does not directly threaten Pakistan, have kept clamping down on its operations low on Pakistan’s security agenda. The idea of proxy warfare – supporting cross-border armed groups to conduct tit-for-tat attacks – also persists. By this logic, Pakistan’s intelligence services have to consider the possibility that their Afghan counterparts deliberately harboured the Charsadda killers, to punish Pakistan.</p>
<h2>No-go areas</h2>
<p>The latest upsurge of TTP violence suggests that security in Pakistan ultimately depends on restoring security in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban’s campaign has destabilised Afghanistan and left Afghan security forces struggling to hold onto the country’s main towns. This has created multiple no-go areas which have been exploited by the TTP and other armed groups hostile to Pakistan. It is in these areas that the old TTP commanders have been able to regroup. For a while after the December 2014 <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/pakistan-school-attack">attack on the army public school in Peshawar</a>, it seemed as if the authorities might clamp down on Afghan Taliban. In the end the Afghan Taliban was spared. </p>
<p>This time round, the Charsadda attack comes soon after the <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/11/c_134997892.htm">launch of a quadrilateral process</a>, in which China and the US are meant to work alongside Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. The process has so far been limited to diplomatic discussions and planning work. </p>
<p>The public comments of the main Pakistani delegate at the launch of the process were designed to make it clear that Pakistan has no intention of being rushed into punitive measures against the Afghan Taliban. However, if Pakistanis start to conclude that the Charsadda massacre was a predictable consequence of tolerating Afghan Taliban activities in Pakistan, this might just inject a new sense of urgency into collective efforts to end the Afghan Taliban campaign of violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Semple and the ISCTSJ receive funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and ESRC. </span></em></p>The recent attack on a university in northern Pakistan is part of a resurgence in violence on both sides of the country’s border with Afghanistan.Michael Semple, Visiting Research Professor, Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.