tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/peace-and-security-36074/articlesPeace & Security – The Conversation2021-05-02T07:49:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597492021-05-02T07:49:57Z2021-05-02T07:49:57ZNow there’s a chance of justice for Thomas Sankara, it’s useful to review what got him killed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397840/original/file-20210429-19-42ln0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thomas Sankara still casts a long shadow in Burkina Faso</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thomas_Sankara_portrait.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Update: On April 6 2022, Blaise Compaore was sentenced to life in prison for the murder of Thomas Sankara.</em></p>
<p>Earlier this month a court in Burkina Faso’s capital <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/13/trial-in-absentia-burkina-faso-ex-president-blaise-compaore">indicted</a> former <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/16930/life-after-power-burkina-faso-blaise-compaore-homesick-blues/">President Blaise Compaoré</a> for his role in the murder of his comrade, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46105/thomas-sankara-last-moments-last-witnesses-last-secrets/">Thomas Sankara</a>, on 15 October 1987. </p>
<p>The military court detailed Compaoré’s “complicity in the assassination”, the first time a court in the country has made such an accusation. Compaoré ruled the country until <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/world/africa/burkina-faso-protests-blaise-compaore.html">2014</a>, when he was forced to flee for neighbouring Cote D’Ivoire during a mass uprising. </p>
<p>The decision to try the former leader has been called a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/13/trial-in-absentia-burkina-faso-ex-president-blaise-compaore">landmark moment</a>. Sankara’s family has pursued justice for almost 34 years but while Compaoré was in power there was no possibility of bringing his murderers to justice.</p>
<p>The political history of Burkina Faso is one I have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2016.1251200">studied</a> and written about extensively, with a <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2015/10/the-murder-of-thomas-sankara/">particular focus</a> on the circumstances leading to Sankara’s assassination.</p>
<p>It is important to unravel this event and its significance if a trial of Compaoré is to be understood (or to take place).</p>
<h2>The Burkinabé revolution</h2>
<p>Thomas Sankara was the president of the West African state of Burkina Faso when he was murdered at the age of 37. He was the leader of a bold initiative to transform a country trapped in a dependent relationship with the rest of the world, particularly France.</p>
<p>From the early 1980s, Sankara emerged as a challenger to the cynical class of post-independence leaders. Sankara was a radical army officer who became disgusted by the circulation of a self-serving elite in his country since independence in 1960. During prolonged military training in Madagascar in 1970s he read extensively and studied the history of the continent’s militant movements, and witnessed the <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/malagasy-republicmadagascar-1960-present/">toppling of the government in Madagascar</a> itself by students and workers. </p>
<p>Sankara came to power in a popular coup on <a href="https://www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/mun/2018/ib-crisis-burkina-faso.pdf">4 August 1984</a>. The Burkinabé revolution, as it became known, took place at the start of the age of economic austerity on the African continent. This arose from the <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/140212/1/v24-i06-a05-BF02924735.pdf">structural adjustment policies</a> demanded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and from <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/140212/1/v24-i06-a05-BF02924735.pdf">cuts to funding</a> for public services. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com.gh/&httpsredir=1&article=5809&context=etd">Economic devastation </a>
and the largely unreformed relationships of African states with former colonial powers formed a pattern which Sankara <a href="https://www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/mun/2018/ib-crisis-burkina-faso.pdf">promised to break</a>. He refused to accept that poverty in West Africa was inevitable, and offered a new kind of freedom. </p>
<p>Development projects imposed by the West had failed, and he saw the future in securing <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com.gh/&httpsredir=1&article=5809&context=etd">Upper Volta’s</a> (as the country was known before 1984) separation from the exploitative linkages with France, the former colonial power. Sankara was an army officer who envisaged radical change instigated by a movement which could be directed from above, though with the mass participation of the poor. </p>
<p>Many of the reforms that were implemented under the brief period of Sankara’s rule were ambitious, and far-sighted.
Sankara’s government launched a mass vaccination programme in an effort to eliminate polio, meningitis and measles. From 1983, <a href="https://qz.com/africa/415257/why-burkina-fasos-late-revolutionary-leader-thomas-sankara-still-inspires-young-africans/">2 million Burkinabé were immunised</a>. </p>
<p>Before 1983 <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/thomas-sankara-and-the-black-spring-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">infant mortality in Burkina Faso was at roughly 20%</a> but fell in the period of Sankara’s presidency to <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/thomas-sankara-and-the-black-spring-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">140 per 1000 births</a>. These were vital and welcome initiatives, and they were introduced through state and community structures which had been introduced after the 1983 coup.</p>
<p>As part of the reforms, the <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5809&context=etd">Comités de Défense de la Révolution</a>, an institution tasked with policing the revolution, charged themselves with translating instructions and government orders into reality, occasionally resorting to coercive measures. The work of these state sanctioned committees were not straightforward. </p>
<p>Sankara’s project was delivered from above to Burkinabé society. This isolated and weakened him.</p>
<p>Due to the political control of the <a href="https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com.gh/&httpsredir=1&article=5809&context=etd">Conseil National Révolutionnaire</a>, the sovereign body of the revolution, with other parties and civil society organisations banned, Sankara was really vulnerable only to counter-coups from within the military – from forces who wanted to return, broadly speaking, to business as usual with French imperialism, and domestic interests who had profited richly from this relationship. Opposition, under Sankara’s instructions, had been marginalised or stamped out. This left him exposed, with only a small militant core by his side. </p>
<p>Sure enough, a counter coup came. It was ruthlessly planned and executed. Sankara was shot at the presidential residence by gunmen in military uniform. </p>
<p>Compaoré, who had been minister of state at the presidency during Sankara’s years, quickly denied involvement, claiming he was at home and sick. By the evening of the assassination, he was the new president. The new regime quickly returned <a href="https://leozeilig.com/portfolio-items/thomas-sankara-voices-of-liberation/">Burkina Faso to its place</a> in the global political–economic hierarchy – with little reaction from all the Burkinabé who had supported Sankara’s transformation ideas.</p>
<h2>Sankara’s murder</h2>
<p>There was no popular movement among the working class and the poor that might have resisted a return to the old state. Sankara had stripped himself of the ability to defend the transformation he had tried to achieve. </p>
<p>He had tried to substitute his popularity, charisma and oratory for a real movement that could confront the forces working towards his defeat. </p>
<p>When, in 1961, the Algerian revolutionary <a href="https://leozeilig.com/portfolio-items/frantz-fanon-a-political-biography/">Frantz Fanon</a> wrote about Congolese leader<a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Patrice-Lumumba"> Patrice Lumumba’s murder and isolation</a>, he was expressing the dangerous loneliness of the African radical intelligentsia, of which Sankara was a later representative: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>‘Each time his enemies emerged in a region of the Congo to raise opinion against him, it was only necessary for him to appear, to explain and to denounce for the situation to return to normal. He forgot that he could not be everywhere at the same time and that the miracle of the explanation was less the truth of what he exposed than the truth of his person.’</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With the possible arrest and trial of Compaoré for the murder of his comrade there might be a chance for justice. Compaoré delivered Burkina Faso and its great hopes for revolutionary change back into the hands of international power and French influence. For this he was overthrown by a popular insurrection in October 2014.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leo Zeilig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Burkina Faso is still in the throes of chaos decades after the assasination of the charismatic presidentLeo Zeilig, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1593562021-04-21T14:24:27Z2021-04-21T14:24:27ZWhy Kenya is on thin ice in its justification for sending Somali refugees back home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396275/original/file-20210421-23-158w7co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Somali refugee shops for fresh produce at a market in the Hagadera camp within the sprawling Dadaab complex.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In March 2021, the Kenya government gave the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees a <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001407329/kenya-gives-unhcr-14-day-ultimatum-to-close-dadaab-kakuma-refugee-camps">14-day ultimatum to submit plans</a> for the closure of the country’s two main refugee camps. The camps in northern Kenya – Dadaab and Kakuma – hold more than 400,000 people. Kenya emphasised there would be <a href="https://twitter.com/InteriorKE/status/1374625496147886080">no room for further negotiations</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-03-24-matiangi-issues-14-day-ultimatum-to-unhcr-on-closure-of-dadaab-kakuma-refugee-camps/">Planned terror threats from the two refugee camps</a> were cited as the main reason behind the closure. Citing similar threats, Kenya <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/24/kenya-orders-closure-of-dadaab-kakuma-refugee-camps#:%7E:text=The%20Dadaab%20and%20the%20Kakuma,whom%20are%20from%20South%20Sudan.&text=hosting%20400%2C000%20people-,Citing%20national%20security%20concerns%2C%20authorities%20in%20Nairobi%20first%20announced%20their,Somalia%20than%20Kakuma%2C%20in%202016.">attempted</a> to close Dadaab camp in 2017. The plan was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38917681">blocked by the country’s high court</a>, which called the move unconstitutional.</p>
<p>The Dadaab complex was <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ke/dadaab-refugee-complex#:%7E:text=The%20Dadaab%20refugee%20complex%20has,cross%20the%20border%20into%20Kenya.">first set up</a> in 1991, when refugees fleeing the civil war in Somalia started to cross the border into Kenya. Today the complex houses 224,462 refugees. Most are from Somalia. But there are also migrants from South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<p>But how does Kenya’s argument fit in with its legal, and moral obligations?</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2018.1482045">2018 paper</a> I set out to address why Kenya’s arguments that Somali refugees – and refugee camps – are falsely, and in blanket fashion, cast as abetting terrorism. Kenya has <a href="https://www.language-and-society.org/the-securitization-of-political-discourse-in-reinforcing-regimes-of-power-in-kenya/">repeatedly </a> framed Somali refugees as a threat to national security. It’s pretext has been the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.785">periodic terror attacks</a> carried out by the Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>My argument is that the Kenyan state has labelled refugees as a threat to national security so that it can prioritise the implementation of refoulement – the forced repatriation of refugees.</p>
<p>In my view Kenya’s disregard for the doctrine of non-refoulement has implications for its international standing as a key host country for refugees. The country’s Constitution and Refugees Act are compatible with international law. But the state has failed to comply with the law. </p>
<p>Under the guise of security, the state has abused its executive authority and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2018.1482045">disregarded its commitments to international humanitarian obligations</a>. By securitising refugees – in this case accusing them of instigating acts of terror – the Kenyan government is compromising their social, economic and political rights as set out in international law.</p>
<p>I conclude that the Somali refugees should not be compulsorily returned to Somalia – unless an exception applies in an individual case.</p>
<h2>Kenya’s case – according to the law</h2>
<p>The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">prohibits</a> states from returning a refugee or asylum seeker to countries or territories where the person’s life or freedom would be threatened. This could be on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. </p>
<p>Exceptions to non-refoulement on grounds of security are stipulated in Article 33 (2) of the convention. This provides for the withdrawal of refugees rights. These exceptions have the potential to overrule non-refoulement.</p>
<p>Article 33 (1) of the convention is reflected in Kenya’s <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/RefugeeAct_No13of2006.pdf">Refugee Act</a> passed in 2006. The Act conforms with international law and international and regional treaties or conventions. It also conforms to particular articles in Kenya’s Constitution. </p>
<p>But I argue that Kenya has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2018.1482045">derogated from its responsibilities</a> of protecting refugees by citing threats to national security. </p>
<p>Somali refugees forced back home face <a href="https://www.refworld.org/country,,,,SOM,,60760b4e4,0.html">considerable risk</a>. For example, Somalia cannot guarantee the sustainable safety and dignity of returning refugees. This is because the state is <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-74336-3_46-1">virtually absent</a> in large parts of the country. In addition, there are <a href="https://www.refworld.org/country,,,,SOM,,60760b4e4,0.html">limited livelihood opportunities</a> and a lack of basic services and poor infrastructure.</p>
<p>If the government wishes to repatriate on the basis of internal security, it needs to consider this on a case-by-case basis. In other words it needs to assess whether an exception applies in an individual case. </p>
<p>Although international and domestic refugee laws provide exemptions for non-refoulement, the Kenyan government argues that refugees are returning on a voluntary basis. As a country that has signed, ratified and domesticated the aforementioned international and domestic refugee instruments, the Kenyan government is required to facilitate voluntary returns. </p>
<p>But, in my view, a decision made by a refugee to voluntarily return home must be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2018.1482045">qualified</a>. A number of factors challenge refugees’ rights to make genuinely voluntary choices based on free will. </p>
<p>These <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ke/19945-kenya-unhcr-presents-sustainable-and-rights-based-solutions-for-refugees-residing-in-camps.html">rights-based concerns</a> are repeatedly raised by the UNHCR whenever Kenya threatens to close refugee camps. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Kenya’s high court has once again <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/8/kenyan-court-rules-against-govt-plan-to-close-refugee-camps">blocked the closure</a> of two refugee camps, albeit temporarily. Meanwhile, the UN refugee agency has proposed a set of measures for refugees living in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. These <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ke/19945-kenya-unhcr-presents-sustainable-and-rights-based-solutions-for-refugees-residing-in-camps.html">rights-based measures</a> include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>safe and dignified enhanced voluntary repatriation under COVID-19 pandemic movement restrictions; </p></li>
<li><p>providing alternative-stay arrangements to East African Community refugees so that they can contribute to the local economy; </p></li>
<li><p>expediting issuance of Kenyan national identity cards to those registered in the refugee database; and </p></li>
<li><p>resettling those refugees, unable to return home and face protection risks, to third countries. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Kenya’s argument that refugees are threats to national security to justify the closure of refugee camps and forced repatriation of refugees compromises its moral and legal obligations to protect refugees. This erodes its international image as a country that has hosted refugees safely for a long time. It also more has serious implications for refugees by threatening their safety from disease, hunger and repression when forcibly returned to their home countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By securitising refugees, in this case accusing them of instigating terror, the Kenyan government is compromising their social, economic and political rights as set out in international law.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, National University of LesothoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1576962021-04-12T15:23:14Z2021-04-12T15:23:14ZHow climate insecurity could trigger more conflict in Somalia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392819/original/file-20210331-15-1r3nhws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Climate change can trigger conflict between farmers and herders in Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Lafforgue/Art In All Of Us/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change effects such as droughts, flash floods, erratic rainfall, disruption to the monsoon seasons, strong winds, cyclones, sandstorms, dust storms and increased temperature are being experienced across Somalia. These effects are affecting livelihoods, and contributing to local grievances and community tensions. </p>
<p>Some of these <a href="https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/som01.pdf">insights and conclusions</a> were reached based on a special report done by the Somali government in 2013. This report remains the best estimate of the impact of changing weather patterns in the country as no newer data are available.</p>
<p>According to the report the country experienced a gradual and continuous <a href="https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/som01.pdf">increase in median annual temperatures</a> between 1991 and 2013. Median daily maximum temperatures range from 30°C to 40°C. The report estimates that temperatures will increase by between 3.2°C and 4.3°C by the end of the 21st Century.</p>
<p>Climatic changes such as drought fuel herder–farmer conflicts because settled communities and livestock herders must compete for fewer resources. In 2019, <a href="https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/News/Climate-Peace-and-Security-Fact-Sheet-Somalia">53,000 people</a> were forced from their homes due to crop failure and reduced livestock profitability due to drought. </p>
<p>They joined an estimated <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-bulletin-1-30-june-2019">2.6 million Somalis already displaced</a> by other factors like conflict. There were also disastrous droughts between 2000 and 2011; resulting in famine, food insecurity, water scarcity and loss of livelihoods. </p>
<p>These factors combined <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/publication/extreme-weather-and-civil-war-somalia-does-drought-fuel-conflict-through-livestock-price#:%7E:text=COVID%2D19-,Extreme%20weather%20and%20civil%20war%20in%20Somalia%3A%20Does%20drought,conflict%20through%20livestock%20price%20shocks%3F&text=Climate%20change%20leads%20to%20more%20frequent%20and%20more%20intense%20droughts%20in%20Somalia.&text=We%20find%20that%20livestock%20price,opportunity%20costs%20of%20conflict%20participation.">increase the risks of violent conflict</a>. Many affected believe that they have less to lose from joining armed groups to survive when their livelihoods are threatened.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306919809_Climate_Change_and_Conflict_Taking_Stock">Studies</a> have not found a direct causal link between climate change and conflict. Rather, researchers argue that climate change may exert an indirect and conditional effect on conflict risk. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/News/Climate-Peace-and-Security-Fact-Sheet-Somalia">fact sheet on Somalia</a> identifies multiple pathways through which climate-related change interacts with political, social and environmental stresses to worsen existing vulnerabilities and tensions.</p>
<p>These tensions could potentially undermine development gains, impact ongoing conflict dynamics, and disrupt fragile peace processes. Additional pressures, such as COVID-19, compound the risk of climate-related conflict. This makes a country like Somalia even more vulnerable to shocks and setbacks. </p>
<p>For example, it’s current constitutional crisis arose because <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/65471-somalia-postpones-presidential-elections-by-13-months-over-covid">elections were postponed due to the pandemic</a>. President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ Mohamed is now in office without an electoral mandate after his <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/somali-opposition-leaders-refuse-recognize-president-mohamed-official-term-expires">term expired</a> on 8 February 2021. </p>
<p>Thus, <a href="https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/News/Climate-Peace-and-Security-Fact-Sheet-Somalia">our research</a>, which was compiled by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, examines the intersection between climate, peace and security in Somalia. It is part of an ongoing <a href="https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/About-NUPI/Projects-centers/Climate-related-Peace-and-Security-Risks">project</a> which aims to generate actionable information and analysis on climate-related peace and security risks for selected countries and regions.</p>
<h2>Conflict over resources</h2>
<p>In Somalia, only 1.6% of the total land area is cultivated, and 69% is permanent pasture. For Somali farmers, livelihoods and labour cycles are closely linked to harvest seasons. For herders, calving is tied to specific months. And livestock migration is tied to grazing areas during wet seasons. </p>
<p>Thus, changing seasons and unpredictable shifts in the weather could have <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-policy-papers/climate-related-security-risks-and-peacebuilding-somalia">cascading effects</a> on the livelihoods of herders, farmers and entire communities. </p>
<p>One such effect is the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c08sI.pdf">conflict between herders and farmers</a>. Because of floods, heatwaves and droughts, farming and livestock outputs are diminishing. This means that settled communities and herders are competing for fewer resources like green grazing grounds and arable land. This could potentially fuel tensions.</p>
<p>And due to lack of government presence in parts of Somalia, pastoral communities sometimes resort to <a href="https://recsasec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/cattle-rustling-pdf.pdf">illicit trade and use of small arms and light weapons</a>. They do this to protect themselves and their livestock from rustlers. <a href="https://recsasec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/cattle-rustling-pdf.pdf">Rustling has been a problem in Somalia for years</a> but it is becoming an even bigger threat. This because more livestock are dying from the weather-related effects of climate change.</p>
<h2>Political considerations</h2>
<p>Climate change and environmental degradation are more likely to lead to local conflicts than to civil war. However, small-scale tensions can increase the risk of broader conflict when exploited by political elites and individuals or groups with more wealth, privilege, power or influence.</p>
<p>Those with power can use the disruptions of rapid-onset disasters like drought, floods, or the recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51348517">locust infestations</a>, to augment their control over critical resources. In Somalia there are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2211912412000041?via%3Dihub">cases</a> where minority communities were targets of looting and violence by more powerful majority clan militias where livestock and food stores were beseiged. </p>
<p>Political factions can exploit populations who have climate-change related grievances. These grievances include weather-related losses and resource scarcity due to extreme weather events. Those affected become susceptible to political agendas that promise to alleviate poverty. </p>
<h2>Migration and terror</h2>
<p>Climate-related migration can potentially exacerbate tensions between Somali communities. When clans migrate between regions the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c08sI.pdf">risk of violence</a> from dominant groups in those regions increases. These groups are often seeking to maintain control of resources in their areas. </p>
<p>When violence does occur, ordinary Somalis are then displaced from their homes leaving them without clan and family protection. Those who find themselves in internally displaced person camps become <a href="https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/10841IIED.pdf">vulnerable to recruitment from Al-Shabaab</a>.</p>
<p>During the early 2000s, Al-Shabaab seized parts of southern Somalia where they occupied arable lands, <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/making-climate-outlaw-122447189.html">extorted farmers</a> and exploited their fertile soil to generate income. This allowed the terror group to consolidate its stronghold in the region.</p>
<p>And in 2017, Al-Shabaab capitalised on floods and droughts to establish its dominance. The terror group provided services and relief to regions of the country that were out of government control. They <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39296517">set up drought committees to coordinate relief operations</a> in several administrative regions in different parts of the country. </p>
<p>Thus the effects of climate change have provided Al-Shabaab with an opportunity to capitalise on insecurity and the state’s weakness. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The Somali federal government and federal states must integrate climate risks into their security planning. This will enhance their ability to prevent climate-related violence. It will also prevent Al-Shabaab and other armed groups from taking advantage of climate impacts.</p>
<p>In addition, the United Nations and international partners must support the federal government to integrate responses to climate-related security risks across government. </p>
<p>This should be done in coordination with regional institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. Also, the African Union Mission in Somalia should increase its preparedness to support Somalia to respond to slow and rapid-onset climate-related impacts.</p>
<p>And finally, the United Nations Security Council should support the federal government to mainstream climate security into its peace processes.</p>
<p><em>Additional research was done by Anab Ovidie Grand. She is a junior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs where she works on climate-related peace and security risks, the effectiveness of peace support operations, the African Union, and stabilisation.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew E. Yaw Tchie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The federal government needs to address the relationship between climate-related realities and the country’s national security.Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Visiting Professor University of Buckingham, Norwegian Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1511152020-12-22T09:02:44Z2020-12-22T09:02:44ZHow member states and partners impede the African Union’s quest for financial autonomy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371995/original/file-20201130-23-zcyljp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Addis Ababa, November 2018. The African Union launches its own Peace Fund with the aim to ensure predictable financing for peace and security activities in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/45934294071/in/photolist-49pQg5-2bArPi4-JxXPZB-2adz2KE-2bArPeM-2bArPgF-2adz2WG-2cZ4gir-2cZ4g7e-2bArNVF-2adz2UC-2bArNUP-2bArNFH-2bArNZt-2cZ4fT8-6XMPfE-PgdTBE-Dqs8Ab-CDCz6F-DAXe7B-D9VHMs-zyz4nW-CDkYAm-25h7Kxm-DCMx8Z">paulkagame/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) has developed ambitious plans for the continent, ranging from <a href="https://au.int/en/flagships/silencing-guns-2020">security</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135">trade</a>. But when it comes to financing these ambitions the organisation is caught between a rock and a hard place. Since the AU does not have an independent source of income, it either has to affront members for their irregular payments or remain dependent on external partners.</p>
<p>Financing the AU goes to the heart of its pan-African agenda, which is driven by decolonial integration and development objectives. Having examined the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Finances-of-Regional-Organisations-in-the-Global-South-Follow-the-Money/Engel-Mattheis/p/book/9780367152468">finances of numerous organisations in the Global South</a>, we observe that the double dependency on member states and external donors poses important challenges for the establishment of independent and powerful administrations. The AU is a particularly telling case of this trend.</p>
<p>Unsustainable funding has hindered the AU from developing its full potential. Irregular payments from member states and fragmented external funding have led to repeated cash flow crises, often with serious consequences. For instance, in 2016 the AU’s mission in Somalia <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36624520">failed to pay allowances to its soldiers</a> for six months. </p>
<p>Achieving financial autonomy requires member states to improve their payment record. Simultaneously, the AU needs to wean itself from external funding, even if its administrative and institutional reforms make it ever more attractive to external partners.</p>
<h2>AU sanctions and member states’ arrears</h2>
<p>Although the 55 member states have in principle agreed to provide the AU with reliable and adequate financial means, African governments do not always consider it a priority in practice. Many states pay their yearly fees late or only in part. However, the AU is not powerless. </p>
<p>In 2018, a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36425-ext_assembly_dec._1-4xi_e.pdf">three-stage sanctions regime</a> came into effect to deal with defaulting states. The longer a member state fails to pay its financial contributions, the more rights it loses (see table below). While some consequences are primarily symbolic, others severely curtail their leeway in foreign policy, such as losing the right to host summits or run for office.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AU sanctions regime for non-payment of assessed contributions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author's compilation based on AU Assembly decisions</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In an institution that traditionally prefers consensus over confrontation, the imposition of sanctions constitutes a drastic measure. In one recent case, the new assertiveness has proven to be effective. In June 2020, it became public that South Sudanese officials had been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/african-union-sanctions-south-sudan-nonpayment">barred from attending AU meetings</a>. The country rushed to reduce its arrears just enough to have their sanctions lifted. In another recent case, Tunisia’s foreign minister publicly lamented his country’s first ever <a href="https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/13388173-au-imposes-sanction">sanctions for non-payment</a>.</p>
<p>However, the implementation of AU financial autonomy is much harder to achieve than general political agreements as it generates <a href="https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/publications/programme-based-budgeting-the-rollout-of-complex-reform-in-africa">conflict over public finances at the national level</a>. The urgency to cover AU membership dues is doubtlessly relayed by ambassadors in Addis Ababa, but time and time again, domestic budgeting issues undermine the disbursement. </p>
<p>Many treasuries are reluctant to give in because AU membership is a sizeable budgetary item. For example, in 2019 South Sudan’s contribution to the AU amounted to $2.2 million. This is a considerable percentage of its <a href="http://www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FY-2019-2020-Approved-Budget-Book.pdf">foreign ministry’s annual budget of $56 million</a> and far more than any of its other membership fees. </p>
<p>This widespread situation limits the capacity of the AU. As of October 2020, one third of member states were under <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181127/african-union-strengthens-its-sanction-regime-non-payment-dues">sanctions for non-payment</a>. Overtly pushing them for payment would generate a plethora of diplomatically embarrassing situations. The resulting rumblings in national governments would then provoke a backlash to the AU’s newly acquired sanction powers. </p>
<p>The AU prefers to deal with the delicate issue of non-payment behind closed doors. Public confrontations, as in the cases of South Sudan and Tunisia, are thus not instigated by the AU. They begin when foreign affairs officials relay the AU’s grievances to their governments. </p>
<h2>Old dependencies revisited</h2>
<p>The three-tier sanctions regime is part of <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">broader financial reforms</a> which aim to reduce the heavy dependency of the AU on external funding. However, international partners continue to flock to their ‘donor darling’. </p>
<p>Thanks to the reforms, the AU Commission is becoming more efficient and transparent in its spending. As a consequence the reforms that were supposed to wean the AU off its external dependence have had the unintended consequence of making the AU an ever more attractive partner for development aid. </p>
<p>In addition, the COVID-19 crisis amplified the AU’s attractiveness to international partners. It became a clearing house for donations to the continent. The African Centres for Disease Control has seen record contributions from around the globe, both from <a href="https://africacdc.org/news-item/the-european-union-supports-africas-covid-19-continental-response/">traditional partners such as the EU</a> and <a href="https://africacdc.org/news-item/jack-ma-and-alibaba-foundations-donate-covid-19-medical-equipment-to-african-union-member-states/">new private sector actors</a>. Although this income is a welcome cash injection it ultimately undermines the AU’s claim to financial autonomy.</p>
<h2>Overcoming the AU’s reform gridlock</h2>
<p>For now, AU financial reform has not durably addressed the low payment morale among its members. Its new sanctions regime is a step in the right direction but many member states still prioritise other expenses. The COVID-19 crisis could further increase the rate of non-payment, as countries embark on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/10/08/world-bank-confirms-economic-downturn-in-sub-saharan-africa-outlines-key-polices-needed-for-recovery">costly national recovery plans</a>. </p>
<p>Eventually, the AU will need to secure its own sustainable source of income, starting with the <a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing">0.2% levy on imports from outside the continent</a>. This will make the budget independent from the benevolence of members and international partners. But it faces many obstacles. <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38739-doc-report_on_financing_of_the_union_jun_2020_002.pdf">Only 17 countries</a> have implemented the levy since 2017.</p>
<p>Given the current challenges, the AU will have to change its approach in at least one of three regards: budget size, donor dependency, and culture of consensus. </p>
<p>First, a decrease of the budget, which <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180706/financial-reforms-african-union-lead-massive-cuts-unions-budget">the AU Commission has already proposed</a>, would reduce the financial pressure. Second, acknowledging international partners as permanent stakeholders would enable the AU to treat them as similar to members by enforcing more transparency and giving them sanctionable duties. Lastly, naming and shaming members for their lack of commitment undermines the AU’s culture of consensus but is likely to improve payments, at least in the short term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis coordinates a Jean Monnet project on the relations between the European Union and African regionalisms, which receives support of the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ueli Staeger receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation for his doctoral research.</span></em></p>Wavering commitment in African capitals and the continued attractiveness of the African Union to external funders risk stalling the crucial path to financial autonomy.Frank Mattheis, Researcher, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Ueli Staeger, PhD researcher, International Relations/Political Science, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1491332020-10-30T10:11:13Z2020-10-30T10:11:13ZTanzanian poll is likely to usher in a new era of authoritarianism. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366639/original/file-20201030-17-9xagv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President John Magufuli has closed down all the reliable means to evaluate allegations of foul play. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Tanzanians voted in their general election on October 28 in a poll that pitted popular opposition chief Tundu Lissu against incumbent John Magufuli. As the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54748332">results were</a> announced, Dan Paget explains why incumbent John Magufuli was declared the winner, and what his second term will mean for democracy in the East African nation.</em></p>
<p><strong>How do you rate the independence or fairness of the Tanzania election commission now and in the past?</strong></p>
<p>I <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/2020/10/24/a-letter-to-the-national-electoral-commission-of-tanzania-calling-for-free-fair-and-credible-elections-in-the-republic-of-tanzania-in-line-with-international-law-and-norms/">no longer have faith</a> in Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission or the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/29/opposition-leaders-allege-in-tanzanian-elections">validity of the election results</a>. The validity of elections should be something that is determined by independent bodies and rigorous procedures. However, I am afraid that guesswork and judgement are the only means at our disposal to assess the validity of these elections, because other avenues to verify it have been blocked in advance.</p>
<p>It is never easy to know when to give credence to allegations of election manipulation. Such accusations can always be made in bad faith. If the election commission were independent, and governed by a cross-party board, one might trust them to arbitrate these allegations. Instead <a href="https://urbanlex.unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/urbanlex//constitution_of_the_united_republic_of_tanzania_1977.pdf">the constitution</a> gives the president the authority to appoint the heads of the commission. The opposition has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Chadema-shifts-gear/2558-2294240-view-printVersion-e1qpr0/index.html">calling for the commission to be reformed</a> for years.</p>
<p>In the absence of an independent electoral commission, and independent courts, normally one would turn to independent observer missions. They routinely deploy large teams which observe the conduct of the election and assess irregularities, but these <a href="https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-john-magufuli-tanzania-elections-nairobi-33bce46190d61be88f839f2f98e42945">missions have been kept away</a>. So have many of the most respected domestic election observers, such as the <a href="https://www.humanrights.or.tz/">Legal and Human Rights Centre</a>. The conclusions of <a href="https://eisa.org/pdf/tan2020eom.pdf">the few observation missions</a> present will be important. So will be the judgements of <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/">Tanzania Election Watch</a>, which is assaying the conduct of the election remotely. I recommend their <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/download/tanzania-elections-watch-preliminary-election-report-on-the-general-election-held-in-the-republic-of-tanzania-on-the-28th-october-2020/">preliminary report</a>.</p>
<p>Altogether, the reliable means to evaluate allegations of foul play have been all but closed down. Given all that, it is hard to know what to do except to give <em>prima facie</em> credence to the widespread <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-election-tundu-lissu-rejects-fraud-election-results-2725484">allegations of election fraud</a> made by the opposition and <a href="http://www.vanguardafrica.com/africawatch/2020/10/26/former-tanzanian-intelligence-officer-in-a-free-and-fair-vote-the-opposition-wins">many analysts</a>. </p>
<p>Their claims acquire weight from the stream of videos and photographs shared via social media. These largely unverified reports appear to show <a href="https://twitter.com/aikande/status/1320005967342424069">the manipulation of the electoral register</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/aikande/status/1321148857737191426">ghost polling stations</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MariaSTsehai/status/1321384282993102849">pre-filled ballots</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MariaSTsehai/status/1320335563799580672">pre-printed ballots</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/ThinkBigmind/status/1321423028367040512">ballot-stuffing</a>, polling agents <a href="https://twitter.com/ChademaAgent/status/1319504151278161922">disqualified or barred access</a> to polling stations, and a variety of other irregularities.</p>
<p>What puts it over the top is the scale and character of the victory for the ruling party – Chama cha Mapinduzi. In its final results, the election commission <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54748332">said</a> the president took 84% of the vote, while Lissu received 13%. In addition, the ruling party’s victories have been declared in places you would least expect them to win, and at a scale which is hard to believe. </p>
<p>The popularity of the opposition and the ruling party alike is difficult to discern, especially given <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/beware-dodgy-opinion-polls-aidan-eyakuze/">the absence of opinion polls</a>. This makes the size of rallies one of the few indicators of party popularity left available to us. The rally is a <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/oped/1840568-5629534-37vgjq/index.html">treacherous indicator of party popularity</a>. Nonetheless, <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/event/tanzanias-2020-elections-whats-stake">as I have argued elsewhere</a>, we can draw a tentative, negative conclusion: opposition support has not collapsed. It is not negligible. If it had, we would not have seen large opposition rallies so consistently. This inference is consistent with the opposition’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/473/692/5250960">wide organisational base</a>.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, so far, officials have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/tanzania-opposition-loses-key-seats-in-vote-marred-by-fraud-claim">declared the defeat</a> of the opposition’s most admired leaders in their greatest strongholds. Household names like Zitto Kabwe, Freeman Mbowe, Joseph Mbilinyi, Halima Mdee, John Heche and Esther Bulaya have all lost their seats. These defeats, moreover, are by astounding margins. Altogether, it is hard to see why the National Electoral Commission and the wider infrastructure which oversees elections in Tanzania should be given the benefit of the doubt.</p>
<p><strong>The police made regular arrests of opposition candidates and broke up heir rallies. To what extent were the police – and by extension the government – a factor in the eventual outcomes?</strong></p>
<p>The police have certainly been a forceful presence in this campaign. The video evidence of them firing teargas, breaking up meetings, arresting opposition candidates and committing acts of brutality are available on social media for all to see. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1314273102277365769"}"></div></p>
<p>On the instructions of state officials, first the leading opposition candidate for the presidency of Tanzania, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/44469/tanzania-candidate-tundu-lissu-is-suspended-just-ahead-of-polls/">Tundu Lissu</a>, and then the leading opposition candidate for the presidency of Zanzibar, <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/ZEC-suspends-ACT-Wazalendo-s--Maalim-Seif--/1840340-5632184-156aug9/index.html">Seif Hamad</a>, were temporarily barred from campaigning.</p>
<p>It must all have had an effect on the election outcome.</p>
<p>Alongside the police has been the army. They have been deployed to oversee the election in parts of the country, and there are multiple albeit mostly unverified reports of brutality and murder at their hands.</p>
<p>But their actions need to be interpreted in the wider authoritarian context. Tanzania has always been an authoritarian state. The old authoritarian architecture was never removed after the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006174?seq=1">reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1992</a>. But there has been a sea-change since 2015 when <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/tanzania-shrinking-space-and-opposition-protest/">Magufuli came to power</a>. Things that were permitted in 2014 are not permitted today. The media are censored. Political parties are oppressed. Politicians and civic activists are harassed, in court and out of it. Rallies were banned for four years. There has been a spate of violence by anonymous actors, which context suggested but did not confirm were connected to the state. That context is key. The trajectory of party politics in Tanzania has been shaped by it. It is crucial to everything.</p>
<p><strong>Based on what you know so far, was the 2020 election a step forward or backward in Tanzania’s path to fully free and fair elections?</strong></p>
<p>So far, it seems that this election will usher in a new era of authoritarianism. Any resemblance that Tanzania has borne to a liberal democracy seems to be slipping away. Not only is the apparent scale of election manipulation unprecedented. The authoritarian landslide will be presented by the regime as a vindication of its <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/tanzanias-election-president-magufuli-and-struggle-ideas-27952">extreme authoritarian project</a> over the last five years.</p>
<p>My speculative opinion is that President Magufuli and his ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi will use their super-majority to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1779223">enact their authoritarian developmental vision</a>. They will institute a deeper and further-reaching authoritarian agenda. This might include lifting presidential term limits, but it is also likely to include the institution of further measures that consolidate the party’s authoritarian transformation of Tanzania.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Paget is a member of the British Labour Party.</span></em></p>As key opposition members lose seats in their strongholds, it is clear that Tanzania’s ruling party is set to establish a super-majority that will institute a deeper authoritarian agenda.Dan Paget, Lecturer in Politics, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1439082020-08-10T13:00:21Z2020-08-10T13:00:21ZWhy political killings have taken hold – again – in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351106/original/file-20200804-14-1jqvvdb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Political killings in the country are linked to the fierce competition for control of state resources within the governing ANC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Jon Hrusha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A kind of civil war erupted in South Africa in the 1980s, and ran into the first half of the 1990s. The country was going through convulsions as the fight against apartheid gathered steam and the state reacted with increasing vehemence and violence.</p>
<p>The violence spread into many corners of South Africa. It also manifested itself in rivalries between organisation such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, then a Zulu-nationalist party that had reached accommodation with the apartheid military, with its base in what was then known as Natal, now KwaZulu-Natal, and the then banned African National Congress (ANC), and its internal wing, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a>.</p>
<p>The violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC started in Kwa-Zulu Natal and then spread through to the black residential areas of Johannesburg and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Vereeniging">Vereeniging</a>, which lies about 60 km south of Johannesburg. It also spread to other parts of the country.</p>
<p>Within a decade an estimated <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2017.1422012?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=rsaj20">20,000</a> people had been murdered in this battle for supremacy, most in the four years between <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02335/06lv02357/07lv02372/08lv02379.htm">1990 and 1994</a>. </p>
<p>The arrival of democracy <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/timeline-20-years-democracy-1994-2014">in 1994</a> marked the beginning of the end of this era. The political killings tailed off and by the close of the millennium they had fizzled out, with the ANC taking over from Inkatha as the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304755258_The_Inkatha_Freedom_Party_Between_the_Impossible_and_the_Ineffective">dominant party in the KwaZulu-Natal</a>, drawing Inkatha strongmen into its fold, including some of its <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/greg-arde-war-party/jtfn-6893-g840">most notorious killers</a>. </p>
<p>But this political peace was short-lived. A new form of political violence broke out, again centred in KwaZulu-Natal, getting into its stride after Jacob Zuma became president in 2009. </p>
<p>This time it was not between parties and their warlords, and it had nothing to do with ideology and policy. Instead, it had everything to do with money.</p>
<p>According to researcher Mary De Haas’, around 90 municipal councillors, political party officials and senior municipal officials, have been murdered in KwaZulu-Natal <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-fails-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-killings-in-kwazulu-natal-128167">since 2015</a>. Most of the deceased were affiliated to the ANC, the party that governs both the province and the country. </p>
<p>The South African investigative journalist Greg Arde provides an impressively researched and well-written account of scores of political assassinations in the province in his <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/greg-arde-war-party/jtfn-6893-g840">book</a>, <em>War Party: How the ANC’s Political Killings are Breaking South Africa</em>.</p>
<p>Some of the victims of the killings were honest councillors and officials who had sought to expose corruption over tenders, kickbacks, budgets and fund allocation. Others were rivals, competing for access to power and the goodies it could buy.</p>
<h2>Political assassinations</h2>
<p>Arde shows how a culture of settling problems by physically eliminating the source has emerged from a toxic brew. This includes the history of political violence in the area with politicians accustomed to killing, and a ready source of assassins from within the violent minibus taxi industry, often emerging from hostels that house black migrant workers. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
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<p>Regions and municipalities all over the country are plagued by corruption, at huge cost to the residents they are supposed to serve. Port Elizabeth, in the Eastern Cape, for example, has become a <a href="https://jamba.org.za/index.php/jamba/article/view/830/1667">basket case</a>, and is not immune to political killings. But none can match the continual spree of assassinations that characterise local and regional politics in KZN, which escalated during Jacob Zuma’s years in power.</p>
<p>Zuma replaced Thabo Mbeki as leader of the governing ANC in December 2007, and went on to become the president of the country <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">in May 2009</a>. The eThekwini Municipality, the biggest in Kwa-Zulu Natal, served as the key political base for Zuma’s rise to <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/koers/v73n4/03.pdf">the presidency of the ANC</a>. </p>
<p>His reign was characterised by <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-democracy-or-a-kleptocracy-how-south-africa-stacks-up-111101">high levels of corruption</a>, ending in February 2018 when he was recalled by the ANC. </p>
<p>It is tempting to blame the violence on the grand corruption programme. In other words, to see the culture of corruption as something that starts at the top and filters down. But Arde’s book offers a different perspective, suggesting corruption also percolates from the bottom up.</p>
<h2>No action</h2>
<p>In 2016, the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government appointed the advocate MTK Moerane to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-27-moerane-omission-political-expediency-trumps-justice-once-again/">investigate killings in the province</a> from 2011. He concluded in a report delivered to the government in 2018 that corruption was the backbone of South African politics, “and that’s the cause of the violence”.</p>
<p>No action was taken on the <a href="http://www.kznonline.gov.za/images/Downloads/Publications/MOERANE%20COMMISSION%20OF%20INQUIRY%20REPORT.pdf">report</a> which has simply gathered dust, as Arde shows. And the killings continued.</p>
<p>One of those who gave evidence to the inquiry was Professor Paulus Zulu. His explanation started with the contentious point that some local councillors wouldn’t qualify for jobs as labourers based on skill levels. Once elected they adjusted their lifestyles and clung to their jobs, ensuring, without scruple, that nothing would prejudice their new livelihoods. This often meant eliminating opposition, with competition most fierce at the bottom of the pyramid. He said (quoted in Arde’s book, page 70)</p>
<blockquote>
<p>One either has the job or nothing at all. In the absence of qualifications, negative competition in the form of violence is the perfect recipe.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Arde is not afraid to go where the evidence leads. For example, he names the former eThekwini mayor Zandile Gumede who is on trial for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-11-ethekwini-municipal-manager-to-join-zandile-gumede-in-court/">massive corruption</a>. </p>
<p>He shows how ANC branches and the councils they run have been taken over by criminal groups. This is often closely tied to the lawless taxi industry, which is the subject of several chapters. Again, Arde is not shy to name names.</p>
<p>What Arde does so well is to use the narrative from case studies framed around short biographies of the killers and their victims. In this way he reveals how the corruption and violence play out. Patterns emerge as he pieces these accounts together.</p>
<p>His prose is eloquent and exciting, and the stories he tells are based on exhaustive research. The result is a well-structured book that is never less than shocking. The horror it exposes makes for uncomfortable reading.</p>
<p>There are some gaps. For example, an account of how Zuma’s state capture project both encouraged and drew from the local level corruption in Kwa-Zulu Natal is missing. Also, the author makes no attempt to give a statistical breakdown of the violence, or to offer clear political prescriptions for solving it.</p>
<h2>Pessimistic outlook</h2>
<p>The picture Arde presents so compellingly does not invite an optimistic prognosis. There is an obvious danger of the current corruption-based violence spreading to other provinces.</p>
<p>Arde notes at the end of the book that the ANC has become a “war party”, one that helped liberate South Africa from the tyranny of apartheid but is now consumed by avarice. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every day some of its members in power surely get up inspired to improve the lives of the poor and to commit themselves to such honest endeavour… But evidence shows that others, arguably a growing number, are getting up with murderous intent, prepared to kill one another in their quest for power or to satisfy their greed.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Author shows how politicians intent on settling problems by physically eliminating opponents tap into a ready source of assassins from within the taxi industry.Gavin Evans, Lecturer, Culture and Media department, Birkbeck, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1375412020-05-10T08:31:15Z2020-05-10T08:31:15ZSexual and gender-based violence during COVID-19: lessons from Ebola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332748/original/file-20200505-83725-1uiyp1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Survivors of sexual and gender-based violence suffer trauma that lasts long beyond medical crises.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Corbis News via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 <a href="https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020">pandemic</a> is a disaster that has severely disrupted the normal functioning of populations around the world and continues to proliferate indiscriminately. </p>
<p>Disease outbreaks like COVID-19 threaten the health of all. But women and girls are <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/marianneschnall/2020/04/17/putting-a-gender-lens-on-covid-19-thought-leaders-weigh-in/#57fa9cb25b23">disproportionately affected</a>. During epidemics, the very measures taken to protect populations and keep health systems afloat leave women and girls especially vulnerable to violence. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.htm">Sexual and gender-based violence</a> is a hidden consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. As communities around the world are forced to stay at home, women and girls are at a heightened risk of <a href="http://blogs.biomedcentral.com/bmcseriesblog/2020/04/08/integrating-domestic-violence-prevention-and-mitigation-into-global-covid-19-preparedness-and-relief-efforts/">domestic violence</a>, <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/eclinm/article/PIIS2589-5370(20)30092-4/fulltext">intimate partner violence</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/opinion/coronavirus-child-abuse.html">child abuse</a>, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. </p>
<p>Because disasters exacerbate pre-existing gender inequities and power hierarchies, violence in the home may worsen as prolonged quarantine and economic stressors <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/COVID-19_A_Gender_Lens_Guidance_Note.pdf">increase tension in the household</a>. Women and girls are isolated from the people and resources that can help them, and they have few opportunities to distance themselves from their abusers. </p>
<p>During epidemics, it’s harder for sexual and reproductive health workers to appropriately screen for sexual and gender-based violence. And referral pathways to care are disrupted. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-97637-2_8">research</a> shows that an increase in sexual and gender-based violence was observed during the 2013-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. During that outbreak, response efforts focused on containing the disease. </p>
<p>This focus was important, but protocols were never established to protect girls and women from violence during the outbreak. Quarantines and school closures were put in place to contain the spread of disease. This left women and adolescent girls vulnerable to coercion, exploitation and sexual abuse. </p>
<p>There is already concern that COVID-19 is leading to an increase of sexual and gender-based violence. </p>
<h2>Rising levels of violence</h2>
<p>Sexual and gender-based violence does not begin with disasters like COVID-19. But the chaos and instability they cause leave women and girls more <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/humanitarian-action/facts-and-figures">vulnerable</a>. </p>
<p>The United Nations secretary-general, António Guterres, has sounded an alarm on a “<a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-04-05/secretary-generals-video-message-gender-based-violence-and-covid-19-scroll-down-for-french">horrifying global surge</a>” of domestic violence. </p>
<p>In Kenya, cases of sexual, gender-based and domestic violence have <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/coronavirus/fighting-%E2%80%98shadow-pandemic%E2%80%99-violence-against-women-children-during-covid-19">increased significantly</a> since the country began its response to the virus. In <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005253/domestic-violence-cases-surge-during-covid-19-epidemic">China</a>, domestic violence reports nearly doubled after cities were put under lockdown, with 90% related to the epidemic. </p>
<p>Helpline calls have increased in <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061132">Malaysia, Lebanon</a>, <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/issue-brief-covid-19-and-ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5006">France, Argentina, Cyprus and Singapore</a>. A sharp drop in calls in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-italy-violence/in-italy-support-groups-fear-lockdown-is-silencing-domestic-abuse-victims-idUSKBN21M0PM">Italy</a> suggests that the lockdown also prevented many women from seeking help. </p>
<p>According to the World Health Organisation, <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women">35%</a> of women around the world have already experienced some form of sexual and gender-based violence in their lifetime. In some crisis settings, this number skyrocketed to more than <a href="https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/actionaid_policy_report_on_the_frontline_catalysing_womens_leadership_in_humanitarian_action.pdf">70%</a>. </p>
<h2>Ebola experience</h2>
<p>Increases in sexual and gender-based violence were observed during the 2013-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Estimates concerning the scope are difficult to obtain and vastly under-reported. Survivors of violence <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/02/the-ebola-rape-epidemic-west-africa-teenage-pregnancy/">were ignored</a> as health workers counted the number of Ebola cases. </p>
<p>According to some reports, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-women/violence-against-women-rises-in-ebola-hit-nations-ministers-idUSKBN0ME30520150318">Guinea</a> reported a 4.5% increase in sexual and gender-based violence and twice as many rapes. More often than not, this violence was evident only by its devastating consequences for women and girls. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of Ebola, both <a href="https://www.savethechildren.org/us/about-us/media-and-news/2015-press-releases/children-report-increased-exploitation--teenage-pregnancies-in-e">Sierra Leone</a> and <a href="https://plan-international.org/news/2014-11-17-teenage-pregnancy-rates-rise-ebola-stricken-west-africa">Liberia</a> saw an upswing in teenage pregnancy rates.</p>
<p>The parallels between the response to Ebola and COVID-19 are striking. Public health infrastructure during Ebola came to a grinding halt. In a desperate attempt to control the virus, governments employed many of the current social distancing strategies. These included school closures, curfews, and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330085671_Gender-Based_Violence_Among_Adolescent_Girls_and_Young_Women_A_Neglected_Consequence_of_the_West_African_Ebola_Outbreak_Medical_Anthropological_and_Public_Health_Perspectives">quarantines</a>. </p>
<p>As Ebola spread throughout West Africa, heavily burdened relief efforts failed to account for particularly vulnerable populations. The needs of women and girls, especially concerning sexual and gender-based violence, were largely ignored in response and recovery planning. </p>
<p>Many organisations waited until Ebola was under control before addressing these needs. By then it was too late. </p>
<h2>Lessons learned</h2>
<p>One of the key lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak was that epidemics leave women and girls especially vulnerable to violence. Mistakes made during the Ebola epidemic are valuable lessons in the COVID-19 response. </p>
<p>Governments must ensure the protection of women and girls right from the beginning of an epidemic. However, a <a href="https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/701805">top-down approach</a> is not enough. Prevention and mitigation initiatives need to be integrated across sectors. </p>
<p>Research has found independent women’s groups to be the <a href="https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/en/GlobalStudy_EN_Web.pdf">single most important factor</a> in addressing violence against women and girls. In light of this, women and girls should be involved in the development and delivery of services during COVID-19. And comprehensive data on the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/75296.pdf">gendered impact of COVID-19</a> should be collected.</p>
<p>All protective services for women and girls must be classified as “essential” during any disaster. Domestic violence hotlines, safe spaces, sexual and reproductive health services, referral pathways, and justice mechanisms are necessary in pre-pandemic times, and even more important in crisis. </p>
<p>Governments should identify organisations already focused on sexual and gender-based violence and give them the tools and resources to continue supporting women and girls during the pandemic. Since social distancing limits screening opportunities, these organisations should explore <a href="https://gbvguidelines.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Interagency-GBV-risk-mitigation-and-Covid-tipsheet.pdf">alternate entry ways for women to access care</a>, especially in places like <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/31/824720162/france-announces-plan-to-aid-domestic-abuse-victims-during-coronavirus-crisis">supermarkets and pharmacies</a>. </p>
<p>As hospitals and clinics deal with infected patients, the health sector should collaborate with gender-violence organisations to deliver services creatively and strengthen referral pathways in accordance with virus mitigation measures. </p>
<p><a href="https://iawgfieldmanual.com/manual">High-quality clinical care</a> for survivors should be accessible at all times. <a href="https://wcaro.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA-WCARO-Ebola-Crisis.pdf">Community gatekeepers</a> including religious, traditional, women, and youth leaders should play a key role in both virus and violence mitigation initiatives. They can also serve as early warning and alert groups within the community.</p>
<p>Frontline workers should be trained to recognise and safely refer cases of sexual and gender-based violence. And women should be aware of the increased risk during times of crisis, and where to access help.</p>
<p>The consequences of sexual and gender-based violence do not end when medical crises are contained. The impact of COVID-19 will be wide scale, longstanding, and likely generational. Response and recovery planning must ensure that those most impacted by COVID-19 are not forgotten.</p>
<p><em>Additional research was done by Alexandra Regan, a Master of Public Health candidate at Boston University School of Public Health</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>During epidemics, the measures taken to protect populations and to keep health systems afloat leave women and girls vulnerable to violence.Monica Adhiambo Onyango, Clinical Associate Professor, Global Health, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1336402020-04-30T15:58:22Z2020-04-30T15:58:22ZWhat Kenya stands to lose and gain by withdrawing from Somalia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/325667/original/file-20200406-74279-1h3loxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Kenya Defence Forces have been in Somalia since 2011.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has started negotiating a <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-to-start-talks-on-KDF-exit-from-Somalia/1056-5477380-98ursbz/index.html">withdrawal</a> from Somalia by 2021. The country is <a href="https://nationaltelegraph.net/kenya-warns-somalia-after-deadly-clashes-plans-exit-from-peacekeeping-mission/">set to leave</a> as Ethiopia’s influence continues to <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalias-opposition-protests-ethiopias-violent-involvement-in-domestic-politics">rise</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya has achieved a lot since it intervened in 2011. Its intervention was a “game changer”, contributing to a momentum that led to al-Shabaab losing all major Somali cities. But it has fallen short of its goals to subdue al-Shabaab and end terrorism in Kenya. And it will leave a Somalia where its rivals are gaining power and challenging Kenyan national interests.</p>
<h2>The intervention</h2>
<p>Kenya’s public <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia">motive for intervening in 2011</a> was self-defence. Its defence forces moved into Somalia to stop al-Shabaab attacks and improve the country’s internal security. Since then, al-Shabaab has lost territorial control over all of Somalia’s larger cities. In 2012, Kenya <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/28/kenyan-soldiers-capture-kismayo-somalia">reclaimed Kismayo</a>. In the same year, it convinced Ethiopia to join the fight. </p>
<p>The combined forces of Kenya and Ethiopia were redeployed under the African Union Mission to Somalia. This was crucial in containing al-Shabaab between 2012 and 2016. This combined force weakened the terror group to the point that it is now unable to hold territories within Somali cities.</p>
<p>But this still does not mean that the intervention was successful. Since it began, al-Shabaab has launched three large attacks in Kenya. In 2013, it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-attack/islamists-claim-gun-attack-on-nairobi-mall-at-least-39-dead-idUSBRE98K03V20130921">attacked Westgate Mall in Nairobi</a>. In 2015, it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/03/al-shabaab-leader-responsible-for-garissa-attack-is-kenyan">attacked Garissa University</a> in northeastern Kenya. And last year it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46888682">attacked the Dusit Hotel complex</a>, also in the capital. </p>
<p>By late 2019, al-Shabaab’s infiltration in Kenya’s northeast intensified, and locals are increasingly accommodating their presence. </p>
<p>The situation in the area around the coastal town of Lamu is similar. Al-Shabaab is taking advantage of animosities between the Muslim Bajunis and the Christian elite who settled in the area in the 1970s.</p>
<p>Broadly speaking, Kenya has managed to curtail al-Shabaab activities in trouble spots in Kilifi and Mombasa. The country also managed to return a large number of <a href="https://fagarkivet.oslomet.no/en/item/asset/dspace:13332/2019-106.pdf">foreign fighters</a> to Somalia without much blow-back. Yet the intervention of 2011 failed to keep Kenya completely safe.</p>
<p>Nor did it fully vanquish al-Shabaab. The group is still strong, despite having lost much of its territory. It is richer than ever, propelled by its efficient taxing of the Somali business community, tolled checkpoints and investments, including some in the agricultural sector. Its leadership structure remains intact, with many key officers having served more than four years. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-shabaabs-attacks-come-amid-backdrop-of-wests-waning-interest-129706">Al-Shabaab's attacks come amid backdrop of West's waning interest</a>
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<h2>Kenya’s dilemmas</h2>
<p>Kenya’s withdrawal from Somalia will have its own drawbacks. For one, it will abandon its long-time allies inside Somalia. Thus, it will lose leverage with both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. </p>
<p>The government of Somalia’s president, known as Farmajo, has increasingly been at odds with Kenya. The two countries are <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1743984/us-uk-france-norway-pick-sides-in-kenya-somalia-maritime-row/">currently in a diplomatic row</a> over their shared maritime border. </p>
<p>Second, Farmajo’s <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-saga-of-mukhtar-robow-and-somalias-fractious-politics/">agenda</a> to place his preferred candidates in political office in Somalia’s regional states has challenged Kenya’s allies in Somalia and especially the regional state of Jubaland. </p>
<p>It has become clear that Farmajo is willing to draw <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/20/kenya-ethiopia-spar-over-jubbaland-polls-in-somalia-amisom-steps-in/">Ethiopian forces as well as the Somali National Army</a> into his quest to consolidate power by appointing political allies. This has pitched Ethiopia against Kenya, and <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/africa/Kenya-accuses-Somali-army-of-unwarranted-attack-on-border-town-885718">created tension</a>. Ethiopian forces have recently <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201911070290.html">intervened</a> in support of the Somali government in Mogadishu, targeting the <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalias-opposition-protests-ethiopias-violent-involvement-in-domestic-politics">enemies</a> of the Farmajo government. That government has been increasingly willing to <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/under-fire-aswj-leader-mohamed-shakir-cedes-power-to-sna-troops-in-dhusamareb">use military force</a> against the opposition (as well as the Somali <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/somalia-killings-corruption-and-censorship-besiege-media-freedom/">media</a>, and against the regional state of Jubaland, led by Kenyan ally Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe”. </p>
<p>Kenya leaves a Somalia where neighbouring Ethiopia plays an increasing role, and also works against Kenya’s former allies. Also, there are stronger totalitarian tendencies on the part of the Somali presidency than before.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-countries-take-sides-in-kenyas-maritime-row-with-somalia-124745">Western countries take sides in Kenya's maritime row with Somalia</a>
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<p>Its withdrawal will leave Ethiopia with a dominating position in the African Union Mission to Somalia. As Ethiopia’s alliance with Farmajo is strong, this is bad news for the Somali opposition, including allies of Kenya.</p>
<p>By withdrawing, Kenya has also let its allies down. It has shown that it cannot be trusted to stay the course. Yet the withdrawal follows a wider pattern in Kenyan politics, wherein the 2011 intervention was the exception.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-and-somalia-row-over-offshore-rights-is-rooted-in-the-carve-up-of-africa-112627">Kenya and Somalia row over offshore rights is rooted in the carve up of Africa</a>
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<p>Kenya’s foreign policy strategy has traditionally been passive and restrained. It has held back from the more aggressive politics of all of its neighbours. In the past, this strategy served Kenya well, and the country avoided much of the turmoil that plagued neighbouring countries like Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and even Tanzania. A Kenyan withdrawal is thus a return to Kenya’s traditional foreign policy, and saves Kenyan lives and resources.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moi-put-foreign-policy-at-the-centre-of-his-presidency-134048">How Moi put foreign policy at the centre of his presidency</a>
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<p>Kenya’s relationship with Ethiopia has been the cornerstone of its regional foreign policy, and a Kenyan withdrawal can repair the relationship. But that will be done on Ethiopia’s terms, enhance Ethiopian power in Somalia and leave Kenya with fewer allies within Somalia. </p>
<p>This is the dilemma faced by Kenyan decision-makers today, and their choices will have far-reaching consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By withdrawing its troops from Somalia, Kenya could be doing more harm than good.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1328082020-03-24T14:09:41Z2020-03-24T14:09:41ZHow the people of Sudan pulled off an improbable revolution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318607/original/file-20200304-66056-47rhqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman flashes the V for victory sign as Sudanese protesters demonstrate in Khartoum on July 25, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the turbulent and often tragic history of the past decade in North Africa is written, the 2019 <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">pro-democracy revolution in Sudan</a> will likely be considered one of the few bright spots. One of the world’s most brutal dictatorships —- in power for over 30 years —- was overthrown in a massive nonviolent civil insurrection involving millions of Sudanese. In its place is a liberal technocratic <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190808073257/https:/www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/sudan-military-council-opposition-reach-power-sharing-agreement-190705013332385.html">civilian administration</a>.</p>
<p>Whether civilian democratic rule will survive the serious challenges still facing the country remains to be seen. But for now a key question is: how did they do it?</p>
<p>Conditions in Sudan were not auspicious for a successful pro-democracy civil resistance movement. The regime was oppressive, entrenched, and had been successful in its divide and rule tactics when it came to the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sudan-population/">large and ethnically heterogeneous nation</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, three decades of repressive military rule had largely decimated civil society institutions like labour unions and human rights organisations and the reactionary Islamic leadership had put severe <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-one-of-worst-countries-for-women-s-rights-survey">restrictions on women</a>. Over <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=dxoqCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA49&lpg=PA49&dq=sudan+exiles+five+million&source=bl&ots=W1eX-FP-Pm&sig=ACfU3U0WauwEVWfIQWrFafR8t9ZUztC8WQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjnyMDl9a7oAhWFGDQIHSliBj0Q6AEwAHoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=sudan%20exiles%20five%20million&f=false">five million Sudanese</a>, including many of the country’s most educated people, had emigrated.</p>
<p>Lastly, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests/saudi-arabia-uae-to-send-3-billion-in-aid-to-sudan-idUSKCN1RX0DG">helping to prop up</a> the military regime. And most of the West had seemingly written off Sudan as a hopeless case.</p>
<p>Yet, starting in December 2018, a movement emerged which eventually brought millions of Sudanese onto the streets. By April 2019, General Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by fellow military officers. Protests continued and, despite hundreds of additional deaths, by August the military stepped down in favour of a civilian-led transitional government.</p>
<p>There are numerous reasons for the success of this uprising. The key ones range from the regime’s incompetence and the fact that the economy was in a mess, to the way in which the opposition forces organised themselves into a broad-based movement. Another major factor in their success was that they chose to use nonviolent tactics such as sit-ins and demonstrations.</p>
<h2>Ingredients of success</h2>
<p>A number of factors contributed to the success of the uprising. These included the regime’s weaknesses, as well as the tactics used by the opposition forces.</p>
<p>As far as the regime was concerned, there were at least four factors working against it. These included:</p>
<p><strong>Divisions:</strong> To the opposition’s advantage, some of the main elements of the repressive apparatus of the regime — the police, intelligence, military, and special forces — <a href="https://pachodo.org/latest-news-articles/news-from-various-sources/18878-rival-security-forces-clash-in-sudan-amid-anti-government-protests">were divided</a>. The opposition did an excellent job of exacerbating those divisions and using them to its own advantage, offering sanctuary for deserting troops, shaming families of the hardline forces, and winning over some junior officers.</p>
<p><strong>Incompetence:</strong> The state was in many respects weak and incompetent. <a href="https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/sudan-economy-and-military-fall-bashir">The economy</a> was in a shambles. This became particularly marked after the country lost access to oil reserves in the south after South Sudan became independent in 2011. Education, transport, health care, agriculture and other basic infrastructure had <a href="https://fanack.com/sudan/economy/">deteriorated significantly</a> during its three decades in power.</p>
<p><strong>Sanctions:</strong> international sanctions added to chronic corruption and mismanagement in weakening the economy.</p>
<p><strong>Disaffected youth:</strong> Young Sudanese had had enough. They felt they had no future and they had nothing more to lose. Interviews with young people during my visit in January revealed a sense of sheer desperation, a sense that “enough is enough”.</p>
<p>When it came to the movement itself, a number of factors contributed to strengthening its efforts, and making them more effective. Among them were:</p>
<p><strong>Scope and scale:</strong> While some civil insurrections have largely taken place in the capital with mostly middle class support, the Sudanese revolution took place all over country, in all regions, with diverse class and ethnic participation. Another key component was the fact that popular resistance committees were active in even the poorest neighbourhoods. </p>
<p>This was in conjunction with the role played by the Sudanese Professionals Association, an alliance of professional trade unions, which played a key leadership role.</p>
<p>Building such a broad coalition of forces was vitally important, given the size and complexity of the country.</p>
<p><strong>National unity:</strong> For decades, the regime had tried to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2182870/omar-al-bashir-exploited-sudans-ethnic-division-decades-now-people">divide Sudanese</a> by North and South, Arab and non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim. The pro-democracy protesters recognised that national unity was critical and consciously resisted efforts at divide-and-rule.</p>
<p>One example was the regime’s efforts at the beginning of the uprising to try and blame the uprising in Khartoum on Furs, the people indigenous to the Darfur region. In response, the largely-Arab but multi-ethnic protesters began chanting <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/01/12/sudans-genocidal-regime-is-under-siege">“We are all Darfur!”</a>. In solidarity, protesters in Al Fashir, the Darfur capital, started chanting “We are all Khartoum!”</p>
<p><strong>The role of women:</strong> strong leadership from women helped increase the numbers of protesters by encouraging women to join the protests. It also lent credibility to the protests and better popular perception of the movement and its goals by challenging notions that they were violent and dangerous.</p>
<p><strong>Nonviolent action:</strong> In my view, the single most important factor was possibly the decision to stress nonviolent action.</p>
<p>The Sudanese opposition had, on previous occasions, engaged in violent struggles. For example, in 1993 an armed guerrilla movement operating out of bases in Eritrea was launched. But it failed to provoke a more widespread popular uprising and was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4007063?seq=1">formally disbanded in 2006</a>. Similarly, protesters turned violent during <a href="https://sudanreeves.org/2013/09/29/uprising-in-sudan-what-we-know-now-september-28-2013/">the civil insurrection of 2013</a>. The uprising was crushed within days after scores of civilian deaths.</p>
<p>The choice of peaceful protests, sit-ins and strikes made it difficult for the regime to depict the movement in a negative light. And nonviolence meant that the movement attracted sympathy it would have lost through violent tactics. This swelled the number of people coming out onto the streets.</p>
<h2>What still needs to be done</h2>
<p>There is still much to do to consolidate democracy and civilian rule in Sudan. Though civilians dominate the transitional government, the military and other elements of the old guard are still part of the system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aus-role-in-brokering-sudan-deal-offers-lessons-for-the-future-121822">The AU's role in brokering Sudan deal offers lessons for the future</a>
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<p>But the accomplishment of toppling Omar al-Bashir can be a lesson to those struggling for greater political freedom and social justice through the greater Middle East – and beyond.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article first appeared in <a href="https://insidearabia.com/sudans-democratic-revolution-how-they-did-it/">Inside Arabia</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132808/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author wishes to thank the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict for supporting his research.</span></em></p>Remaining nonviolent despite enormous provocation made it difficult for the regime to depict the movement in a negative lightStephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of San FranciscoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1275542019-12-01T14:17:50Z2019-12-01T14:17:50ZWe set out to uncover the hidden costs of US airstrikes in Somalia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303679/original/file-20191126-112531-1cyhxrd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">America's military presence in Somalia could be causing more harm than good.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mazen Mahdi/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The US is an active participant in the war against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, efforts that have increased in the last few years <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/us/politics/us-somalia-airstrikes-shabab.html">under the Trump Administration.</a></p>
<p>The strategy involves using airstrikes to assist Somali ground forces in recapturing territory controlled by Al-Shabaab. In addition, there have been attempts to take out Al-Shabaab leadership, destroy training facilities, and eliminate rank-and-file members.</p>
<p>The US argues that military action is necessary for two main reasons: to counter the influence of Al-Shabaab locally; and to prevent the group from reaching out to members of the Somali diaspora community to inspire tragic terror attacks. Examples include <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/world/africa/kenya-mall-carnage-shows-shabab-resilience.html">the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya</a> that killed 67 people, and the attack on a university in Garissa <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/world/africa/garissa-university-college-shooting-in-kenya.html">that killed 147</a>. Earlier this year there was an attack on a hotel in Nairobi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/world/africa/nairobi-attack.html">that killed 14</a> people. </p>
<p>From the perspective of the US, this terror threat is compounded by the inability of the US-backed Somali Federal Government to consolidate power in the shadow of Al-Shabaab’s influence. This has created a roadblock to much-needed regional stability.</p>
<p>The resilience of Al-Shabaab raises questions about the effectiveness of the current strategy. In addition, civilians being killed as a consequence of US strikes should not be taken lightly. Understanding when and why these targeted civilian killings occur as a consequence of US action is vital for US policymakers as well as those on the ground seeking to address the prolonged humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>We examined the hidden costs of US strikes in Somalia <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/15/4/589/5380600">in a recently published paper</a>. Our research shows that US strikes do have hidden costs in Somalia, with civilians becoming victims in the aftermath of strikes targeting military assets. This implies that efforts by the US to undermine Al-Shabaab’s war-making capabilities put innocent life at risk. And do little to combat the group’s influence in the region.</p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>In a bid to understand the impact of attacks, we hand coded data collected by the <a href="https://www.acleddata.com/">Armed Location and Event Data Project</a>. The project uses news sources to capture information on events associated with the onset, evolution, and escalation of political violence in much of the world. We examined the content of the media-generated events to identify incidents of Al-Shabaab murdering innocent civilians. </p>
<p>For targeted civilian killings, we only kept those instances in which Al-Shabaab purposefully executed or assassinated civilians. Examples included civilians executed by firing squad after being accused of being spies. In another case a group of civilians were called before a court only to be put to death in public. </p>
<p>We also did the same for data related to US strikes. We coded them based on the intended target, such as leadership, rank-and-file members, or military assets. We consulted the <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/">Bureau of Investigative Journalism</a> to ensure the strikes we captured were valid and complete.</p>
<p>Because the data were geo-referenced, we investigated whether the locations where US strikes occurred were associated with subsequent targeted civilian killings. </p>
<p>We found that US strikes made it 5.5 times more likely that civilians were murdered by Al-Shabaab. But when looking at the three different types of targets, we found important differences. </p>
<p>Strikes that targeted military assets made it five times more likely that civilians were murdered, whereas the killing of rank-and-file members reduced the likelihood of targeted civilian killings by 99%. We didn’t find any statistically significant relationship between attempts to assassinate leadership by the US and patterns of targeted civilian killings at the hands of Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>Importantly, killing rank-and-file members reduced the probability of targeted civilian killings. This shows that, while significant blowback does result from some strikes, others may actually reduce civilian victimisation by Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>The effectiveness of killing Al-Shabaab leaders remains open to debate. <a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec_a_00076">Previous research</a> on the effectiveness of this strategy came to different conclusions. It certainly appears that the outcomes are usually based on the characteristics of the group being targeted and nature of the conflict. </p>
<p>And, while <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383">some evidence exists</a> that killing leaders reduces violence, there is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671">also evidence</a> that such strikes can lead to the onset of revenge killings. This can put targets like civilians in harm’s way.</p>
<h2>Implications for US strategy</h2>
<p>Our study speaks only to US strategy in Somalia. </p>
<p>The influence of US strikes on armed non-state groups varies depending on the characteristics of that group and the conflict itself. Though a great deal of progress has been made in developing expectations that can be generalised, there’s still a great deal of work to be done. This is particularly true when it comes to examining the long-term implications of airstrikes.</p>
<p>Our findings challenge the simplistic <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-theory/article/just-assassinations/D4C198BEA4861B280F4AF3EED3A1F6A3">argument</a> that airstrikes, such as those used in Somalia, are “good” and “just” because they have the potential to prevent widespread war that would put innocent lives at risk. </p>
<p>Our findings point out that the issue for US policymakers is that strikes that destroy the war-making capabilities of Al-Shabaab lead to the brutal murder of civilians in retaliation. This unjust killing of innocent people, which would not occur in the absence of US strikes, should caution US policymakers. This is particularly true given given the apparent failure of the current strategy. </p>
<p>And, while the US may prevent murders by targeting rank-and-file members instead of military assets, these members can be replaced via new recruits, allowing Al-Shabaab to continue its reign of terror. </p>
<p>If civilians continue to suffer as part of this status-quo, both the utility and morality of airstrikes in the region need to be the subject of greater debate in the policy community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bryce W. Reeder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resilience of Al-Shabaab raises questions about the effectiveness of the current US military strategy in Somalia.Bryce W. Reeder, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1232892019-09-23T13:21:42Z2019-09-23T13:21:42ZInternally displaced people need more protection: insights from Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292228/original/file-20190912-190021-10n6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents of Sake in the Democratic Republic of Congo leave their homes to avoid clashes between rebels and government forces.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Dai Kurokawa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>New figures <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ph/figures-at-a-glance">show that</a> more than 70.8 million people are displaced worldwide – that’s the highest figure ever recorded. Of these, more than 41.3 million are internally displaced. This means that more than two out of three displaced people are not refugees, but remain within their own country. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Carolien Jacobs to give insights into their lives and what can be done to support them.</em></p>
<p><strong>In Africa, where can most internally displaced people be found and what’s driving the numbers?</strong></p>
<p>About <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/media-centres/10-million-people-internally-displaced-across-sub-saharan-africa-in-2018">10 million</a> of the world’s 41.3 million internally displaced people are based in sub-Saharan Africa. That’s more than any other region. </p>
<p>A recently released United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf">report</a> shows that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Ethiopia and Nigeria are the African countries with the highest numbers of internally displaced people. Of the 10 countries worldwide with the highest numbers of displaced people, <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data">seven are</a> African countries; Syria, Afghanistan and Yemen are the non-African countries.</p>
<p>The reasons for internal displacement vary from country to country, but violence is a common factor. </p>
<p>In the DRC, displacement is triggered by many different <a href="https://kivusecurity.org/map">ongoing conflicts</a>. It’s hard to be sure of the exact number, but between <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo">3</a> and <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66532">4.5</a> million Congolese were displaced at the end of 2018. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia">Somalia</a>, armed conflict and food insecurity (because people can’t grow their food or have their crops taken) are common causes of displacement. Ethiopia saw a remarkably high increase of 2.9 million newly displaced people in 2018, <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC-GRID-spotlight-ethiopia.pdf">caused mostly</a> by inter and intra-communal violence along the borders of the Oromia region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/nigeria">in Nigeria</a>, new displacement took place mostly in the marginalised north-east of the country due to the further rise of Boko Haram. Other causes of displacement in other parts of the country are related to competition between pastoralists and farmers, criminal violence, and flooding.</p>
<p><strong>What are the biggest challenges facing these people?</strong></p>
<p>Apart from insecurity, the biggest concerns of displaced people are to find shelter, find ways to make a living, access basic services – such as health care and education – and to become locally accepted. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/research-projects/law/everyday-justice-and-security-provision-for-displaced-and-residents-in-bukavu-dr-congo">our research</a>, which looked at the security and justice consequences of forced migration in eastern Congo, we saw that for many people displacement is not a once in a lifetime event. It’s something they <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-report-internal-displacement-2019-grid-2019-0">experience repeatedly</a>: when the security situation improves, they return. When it deteriorates, they move to a different place. This means that they have to rebuild their lives over and over again. </p>
<p>In situations where the root causes of displacement are not (or cannot be) addressed, the two most viable options are resettlement to another location (usually with support of <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/">UNHCR</a>, but only available for a very limited number of people) or local integration. For the UN, the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/50f94cd49.pdf">situation is solved</a> either when a person successfully and safely returns, resettles or integrates locally. </p>
<p>But, from our research, we saw that the main challenge displaced people faced was finding a safe place to stay. </p>
<p>Many displaced people don’t usually live in displacement camps, but are found in host communities. In DRC’s South Kivu province for instance, though there are close to half a million internally displaced people, no camps exist. A <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/5a8c27fb7.pdf">small number</a> of South Kivu’s internally displaced people reside in one of the camps in North Kivu province, where <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/25072019_Carte_Displacement-Sites.pdf">camps are more common</a>. This is not unusual. Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/un-habitat_reinteg_success_stories.pdf">hosts about 600 000</a> of the country’s 1.1 million internally displaced people. </p>
<p>They may initially be hosted by relatives or other members from their home community, but eventually need to find their own place to rent which means they need some income to pay the costs. </p>
<p>This becomes the next challenge. People usually find work through their networks, but many won’t have enough contacts. </p>
<p><strong>How do their experiences differ from those of refugees?</strong></p>
<p>On paper, it could be argued that internally displaced people have an “easier life” than refugees: they have citizenship (and rights that are connected to this) of the country in which they are displaced and should therefore enjoy their rights in the same way as other citizens. They don’t need to go through registration processes or asylum procedures and can move more freely. </p>
<p>But they’re usually in countries where the state can’t provide them a basic level of security. This is problematic because the rights of internally displaced people are less protected than those of refugees. Whereas refugees are often entitled to humanitarian aid and access to basic services (depending on country of refuge the support obviously differs greatly), internally displaced people are largely left to fend for themselves.</p>
<p>Refugees are generally protected through a number of international and national legal instruments – starting with the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">1951 UN Refugee Convention</a>. There are no global legally binding instruments to protect internally displaced people. In 2001 – 50 years after the Refugee Convention – the <a href="https://drc.ngo/media/1217434/guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement.pdf">UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement</a> were adopted, but they are guiding, rather than binding. </p>
<p>In Africa some steps have been taken towards their protection, in particular the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treaty-0039_-_kampala_convention_african_union_convention_for_the_protection_and_assistance_of_internally_displaced_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">2009 Kampala Convention</a>. </p>
<p>This makes it easier to hold nation states accountable and enforce protection regimes, but international actors are often reluctant to intervene in a country’s internal affairs, arguing that this could infringe on the sovereignty of the state. </p>
<p><strong>What can be done to support them?</strong></p>
<p>Internally displaced people need to be formally registered. Without registration they won’t be on the radar of authorities or humanitarian aid actors. Because they’re not in displacement camps it’s important to know who they are, and where they are, so that they can receive support. </p>
<p>People who manage to rebuild their lives – to find a proper house, a stable job, send their children to school – are the ones that are able to make use of their social connections through family, church, or a shared origin. But building and strengthening these connections isn’t always easy. It could therefore be worthwhile to help people in becoming better connected by facilitating meetings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolien Jacobs received funding from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research NWO under the Security & Rule of Law Programme of WOTRO Science for Development (grant numbers W08.400.2014.014 and W.08.400.155) between 2014 and 2017 for research to which this text refers. At present, she receives funding from the European Union's Horizon2020 research and innovation programme under grant no. 822453 for TRAFIG: Transnational Figurations of Displacement ((for more information, see: trafig.eu)</span></em></p>More than two out of three displaced people are not refugees, but remain within their own country.Carolien Jacobs, Assistant Professor, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1218222019-08-21T12:16:29Z2019-08-21T12:16:29ZThe AU’s role in brokering Sudan deal offers lessons for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288691/original/file-20190820-170918-hlkxpy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chairman of Sudan's transitional council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, speaks during the power sharing agreement ceremony.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Morwan Ali/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) came into existence after a restructuring of its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was created to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful continent. </p>
<p>While the AU has a clear mandate to deepen the process of economic and political integration on the continent, its predecessor was run on the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/78/311/197/16165?redirectedFrom=PDF">principle of non-interference</a> in the internal affairs of member states. This lessened its ability to resolve member states’ internal disputes. </p>
<p>However, the OAU did originate some of the standards that are at the foundation of the AU’s conflict resolution approach. One such standard is contained in the Lome Declaration which criminalises <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">unconstitutional changes of government</a>. </p>
<p>The AU now has a wider legal mandate for internal conflict resolution than its predecessor. This mandate is set out in its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a> and in its Peace and Security Council <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf">Protocol</a>. But, the implementation of this mandate is still a work in progress. </p>
<p>But the AU has in recent days been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/african-union-au-sudan-power-sharing-agreement-mediation-by-paul-mulindwa-2019-07">rightly praised</a> for using its regional laws to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/new-sudan-thousands-celebrate-as-protesters-army-sign-deal-20190818">broker an agreement</a> between the Sudanese military and the country’s civilian movement. The agreement comes after months of conflict that followed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47892742">the ouster</a> of Sudan’s despotic ruler Omar al-Bashir.</p>
<p>After al-Bashir was deposed, the military attempted to assume leadership of the country. It attacked protesters who were demanding that authority be transferred to a civilian administration. The attacks led to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/sudan-school-children-shot-dead-el-obeid-massacre-190729184528614.html">deaths and injuries</a>.</p>
<p>The agreement, which was brokered with the help of Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime minister, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/sudan-constitutional-declaration-190804182241137.html">set out key conditions</a>, including the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The establishment of a joint military and civilian sovereign council, which will govern the country for three years before elections are held. </p>
<p>Shared leadership of the council. A military leader will lead for 21 months followed by a civilian leader for 18 months.</p>
<p>A bill of rights and freedoms for all Sudanese citizens.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The AU’s involvement has proven the usefulness of its regional laws in <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-african-union-law-shape-a-new-legal-order-for-the-continent-99245">resolving internal disputes</a> in member States. So how did it reach this point, and what lessons have been learned from its work in Sudan?</p>
<h2>AU intervention</h2>
<p>The military takeover that followed al-Bashir’s removal from power amounted to an “unconstitutional change of government” which is prohibited by Article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act. </p>
<p>This breach of regional law empowered Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the AU Commission, to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190411/statement-chairperson-commission-situation-sudan">denounce the military’s actions</a>. </p>
<p>Following the official denouncement, the AU’s Peace and Security Council adopted a decision stating that the actions of the Sudanese military amounted to an <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-840th-meeting-of-the-psc-on-the-situation-in-sudan">unconstitutional change of government</a>. The Council is central to the AU’s legal framework. It was set up to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Its April 2019 decision also reiterated the need for a civilian-led and consensual transition and demanded that the military hand over power within 15 days. </p>
<p>Failure to hand over power should have led to the automatic suspension of Sudan from the activities of the AU as provided by the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">Council’s protocol</a>. However, an <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5N2253AZ">extension of three months</a> was subsequently agreed to allow for further negotiations. </p>
<p>In my view, the decision to grant the extension was problematic because it undermined the “automatic” nature of the suspension and allowed the military to continue attacks on civilians without repercussions. Due to lack of progress and escalating violence, the Council <a href="https://twitter.com/AU_PSD/status/1136596052088373248">eventually suspended</a> Sudan in June.</p>
<p>During the three-month notice period, the AU continued to engage with the key parties in the conflict. This happened even as the military continued attacks on protesters. Finally in July, the AU/Ethiopia mediation team convinced both parties to <a href="https://www.apnews.com/d691c59bdf3f407885803bd97cece7a3">resume talks</a>. This led to the signing of a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49213901">constitutional declaration</a>. </p>
<p>In the end, the AU’s mediation was successful. But during the drawn out negotiations over a hundred people <a href="https://www.apnews.com/6b47b66b2b68455b9c7047a78a73c048">were killed and hundreds more injured.</a> This begs the question: what could the AU have done differently?</p>
<h2>Lessons learned</h2>
<p>While it is laudable that the AU’s intervention in the Sudanese political crisis resulted in an agreement, there are lessons that should be learnt.</p>
<p>The most important lesson is regarding the implementation of the provision for suspension. The 15-day ultimatum that was originally given for the restoration of civilian rule is <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/04/29/the-quest-for-a-civilian-led-transition-in-sudan-is-african-unions-role-still-relevant/">consistent with previous practice</a> by the AU’s Peace and Security Council. </p>
<p>The threat of imminent suspension could have incentivised the military to act more speedily towards a resolution within a shorter time frame. It could have prevented or reduced the violence that ensued in the following months. </p>
<p>In addition, the AU and its Council need to develop a concrete strategy for dealing with continuing violence in the course of negotiations. The Constitutive Act gives these bodies the power to directly intervene in member states where there is serious threat to legitimate order and a need to restore peace and stability. The means and method of implementation of this power is left to the AU under the law, but could include the deployment of peacekeeping forces. </p>
<p>I would argue that the Sudan crisis warranted direct intervention. </p>
<p>This is not to downplay the crucial role that the AU and the Council played in helping to resolve the Sudan political crisis. Indeed, the role played by the regional body underscores the importance of its legal order and institutions in conflict resolution in Africa. </p>
<p>Its success in this respect will instil confidence among member states. It will also bolster the AU’s image as an effective and efficient organisation on the international stage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Femi Amao receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), UK . </span></em></p>The African Union’s role in Sudan’s political crisis proves that it’s legal framework is strong enough to resolve regional disputesFemi Amao, Senior Lecturer, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1218262019-08-19T13:06:11Z2019-08-19T13:06:11ZWhy South Sudan’s peace process is stalled one year on<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288041/original/file-20190814-136180-japyxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is it time for South Sudanese President Salva Kiir (right) and former vice-president Riek Machar to meet face to face? </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Philiop Dhil/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The prospect of peace in South Sudan has never been less certain. This is despite the fact that a peace agreement was signed less than year ago. The 2018 settlement revived a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/29/what-are-the-prospects-for-south-sudans-new-peace-agreement-here-are-the-critical-next-steps/">failed 2015 agreement</a> between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar. </p>
<p>The 2015 agreement collapsed in less than a year. Two more years of fighting left one-third of the pre-war <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70674">population forcibly displaced</a> and more than <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/south-sudan/food-assistance">half food insecure</a>.</p>
<p>Now the most recent agreement is facing implementation challenges. In three months Machar is scheduled to rejoin the government. But neither side has implemented the agreement’s safeguards, such as merging their armed forces, designed to prevent a return to war. Kiir and Machar have also resisted face-to-face meetings that could jump-start implementation by building trust and demonstrating commitment to the peace process.</p>
<p>The 2018 agreement was designed to solve two critical issues before Machar entered the government: merging government and opposition armed groups and redrawing the country’s internal borders. </p>
<p>In March <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/320719/final_ss_report_with_correction.pdf">we noted</a> that the parties were too far behind to finish either before the united government was scheduled to be formed in May. Commissions tasked with redrawing internal borders were not formed on time. Although they had stopped fighting, the parties’ armed forces had not stood down – the first step to creating a unified army and police.</p>
<p>Given this, Kiir and Machar agreed to wait to form the new government until mid-November, in order to complete the military unification and border demarcation. At the time, they rightly <a href="https://igad.int/attachments/article/2117/05-03-2019-R-ARCSS-Meeting-Resolution-f.pdf">pointed out</a> that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the unification of necessary forces is the most critical determining factor for the formation of the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite recognising the urgency of creating a unified army and settling the border issue, the parties are no closer to completing either than they were when they signed the extension. The entire peace process remains stalled. </p>
<p>In our research, we <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343314567486">developed a framework</a> for measuring how well signatories implement the reforms from a peace agreement. By our measure, South Sudan’s agreement is about 31% complete: basically unchanged from before the extension (29%) and well below the average progress of other peace agreements in our data in the same amount of time (41%). </p>
<p>Our research finds that low levels of implementation increase the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000381">risk of renewed fighting</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218778260">limit foreign investment</a> and keep opposition groups outside the agreement, such as the National Salvation Front in South Sudan, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168016640558">from joining the peace process</a>.</p>
<h2>Military unification</h2>
<p>Military unification remains stuck at the first hurdle. Under the agreement, all armed groups were to be assembled at designated sites where fighters could be either disarmed and demobilised, or integrated into the unified armed forces and police. In July the parties reported that the designated assembly sites still <a href="http://ctsamm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Outcomes-12th-CTC.pdf">lacked food, shelter and medicine</a>.</p>
<p>Despite this, the Joint Defence Board, which nominally oversees all armed groups, ordered all fighters to <a href="https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67816">report to these sites</a> by the end of the July.</p>
<p>Given the logistical shortfalls, cantonment was not completed. Even if it had been, this progress would still be far short of what was required by the agreement, which calls for the training and the deployment of unified armed forces prior to the formation of the national unity government.</p>
<h2>Border problems</h2>
<p>The 2018 agreement outlined a process to allow the government and opposition to jointly determine the number and boundaries of the constituent states within South Sudan. These had previously been unilaterally chosen by Kiir, allegedly to the benefit of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/south-sudan-next-civil-war-is-starting-shilluk-army/">his ethnic group</a>. Although the parties followed this roadmap, they have not been able to solve the issue.</p>
<p>Under the agreement, an Independent Boundaries Committee, consisting of representatives of the government, opposition and neighbouring states, was to make a binding recommendation on the number of states in South Sudan. However, government and opposition representatives <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/political-decision-could-break-deadlock-over-states-akol">could not reach a consensus</a>. </p>
<p>The committee is supposed to organise a referendum on the issue if it fails to make a recommendation. However, regional stakeholders are instead hoping for a political solution through face-to-face negotiations between Kiir and Machar.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Despite pressure from the United Nations, as well as regional partners, Kiir and Machar have been reluctant to meet in person. Machar currently resides in Sudan, and his deputies are leading the opposition delegation in Juba, South Sudan’s capital. In July, Kiir invited Machar to Juba. Machar accepted, but only under conditions that Kiir’s government dubbed “<a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-s-office-conditions-set-by-machar-unrealistic">unrealistic</a>”.</p>
<p>Kiir’s office also appeared to rule out meeting <a href="https://audioboom.com/posts/7325577-kiir-spokesperson-machar-is-free-to-return-to-juba">Machar outside Juba</a>, noting that under the 2018 settlement Machar agreed to come to Juba to participate in the peace process and new government. Despite this, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which is the regional mediator, seems to have negotiated a tentative meeting, saying that “<a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/preparations-underway-for-kiir-machar-meeting-igad">the meeting will take place soon</a>”.</p>
<p>In most peace processes, rebel leaders remain in the country. In Sierra Leone, the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/abidjan-peace-agreement">1996 accord failed</a> when Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader, left the country. </p>
<p>In Mozambique, the peace process stalled in early 1993. In response, President Joaquim Chissano and former rebel leader General Afonso Dhlakama held <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/demobilization-general-peace-agreement-mozambique">five days of talks</a> that built the confidence and trust necessary for completing the demobilisation process and holding elections in 1994.</p>
<p>While a possible meeting is good news, getting South Sudan’s peace agreement back on track will require long term cooperation between Kiir and Machar. Two critical pending issues – the armed forces and internal boundaries – are badly off track halfway through the extension and will require additional negotiations to be resolved. </p>
<p>An initial face-to-face meeting can establish trust between Kiir and Machar, and demonstrate to sceptical international partners that both sides remain committed to the peace process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Sudan has been in the business of building peace for years but is no closer to implementing the roadmap to peace than when it drafted the first agreement.Matthew Hauenstein, Postdoctoral Research Associate, University of Notre DameMadhav Joshi, Research Associate Professor & Associate Director, Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217012019-08-12T13:27:52Z2019-08-12T13:27:52ZWhy Sidama statehood demand threatens to unravel Ethiopia’s federal system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287513/original/file-20190809-144873-rmi5qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The thread that holds Ethiopia together could be unravelling.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephen Morrison/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement was designed to empower ethnic groups with the right to self administration rights. But it’s facing a major test. The current challenge comes from the Sidama ethnic group from a region commonly known the Southern Ethiopia Regional State. </p>
<p>Ethnic Sidamas have been granted self administrative rights by controlling political powers in the Sidama Zone administration. Zone administrations are the second tier of Ethiopia’s local government structure, just after regional states. But those pushing for statehood contend that the size of the Sidama population, which is about <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population/">4%</a> of Ethiopia’s total population, should empower it to have its own regional state. </p>
<p>This demand is two decades old. It has gained new momentum over the past year following political changes that swept through the country and led to the rise of Abiy Ahmed as <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-brings-new-hope-but-faces-some-familiar-old-problems-109668">prime minister</a>, a reformist who remains highly popular thanks to his pro-unity stance.</p>
<p>Ethnic federalism, as an institutional design, has its backers and its detractors. Those who defend the system argue that its failures are due to the fact that it hasn’t been implemented in the way in which it was designed. They contend that local governments are stripped of their constitutional powers, thanks to a dominant central government that interferes in regional affairs. </p>
<p>But those who oppose the system argue that it pits one group against the other. They point to the fact that Ethiopia has a very large number of internally displaced people due to numerous ethnic conflicts. Although its framers believed that the federal arrangement could promote unity in diversity, those who oppose it believe that internal displacements have occurred mainly because some groups want to homogenise the regions they administer. They also argue that the rise of ethno-nationalist movements are evidence that the federal arrangement is unravelling. </p>
<p>The Sidama demand for statehood presents one of the greatest challenges Ethiopia’s federal system has faced since its inception in 1995. It has already led to violence after the federal government announced it was delaying a referendum to settle the secession demand. But it poses a much bigger threat: if Abiy gives into the Sidama’s demands, he could signal the unravelling of Ethiopia’s federal system of government. </p>
<p>Here is why. Sidama’s secession from the Southern regional state would end the region’s status as a symbol of Ethiopian unity and would come at the most trying and divisive times in the country’s history. Such a decision will also pave the way for more Southern groups to push with similar <a href="https://borkena.com/2019/05/20/wolayta-demonstration-for-statehood/">quests for statehood</a>. </p>
<p>The Sidama secession debacle is another example of the fact that a constitution that has prioritised the promotion of group rights over individual rights is under strain. In my view the solution remains that of political compromise followed by constitutional reform that guarantees all Ethiopian ethnic groups and citizens equal rights to live, work and prosper across the country. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-why-the-sidama-secession-demand-needs-to-be-negotiated-120734">Ethiopia: why the Sidama secession demand needs to be negotiated</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Background</h2>
<p>After the fall of the military regime in 1991, the provisional government charter created 14 regions that established Ethiopia’s new federal order. But a year later when the country’s new constitution was ratified, the governing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front made some major changes. The biggest was that it consolidated five of the transitional era regions from the Southern part of the country into just one regional state. This was named Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region, although commonly referred to as Southern Ethiopia regional state. </p>
<p>The effects of this decision continue to be felt. The one consequence was that it sowed the seeds of disaffection among the Sidama. Another is that the Sidama secession from the Southern region would massively affect the ruling party. This is because the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement is one of the four members that form part of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. Sidama’s secession would weaken the voting capacity of Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement at the federal level. This could worsen if other groups in the south follow the Sidama example. This, in turn, would weaken the ruling democratic front.</p>
<p>This goes to explain Abiy’s responses. His administration seems to have controlled a situation that had the potential to trigger a nationwide disaster. </p>
<p>Abiy and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, which was mandated to organise and hold the referendum for Sidama’s statehood demand, tactfully delayed the decision. This appears to reinforce Abiy’s conviction that the country’s federal order and national unity need to be maintained, at least until the constitution is reformed.</p>
<p>Abiy’s actions are not without a recent precedent. A few months after he assumed office, the Somali region, which was led by Abdi Ile, with the help of his trusted <em>Liyu</em> (special in Amharic) Police, had attempted to force the regional parliament to discuss secession. Abiy ordered the Ethiopian army, then led by the late Chief of Staff General Seare Mekonnen to step in. The army foiled the regional President Abdi Mohammed Iley’s plans and subsequently put him in jail. Immediately, a new Somali regional administration was established with Mustafe Oumer, a popular former Somali activist at its helm. Since then, the Somali region has been relatively stable.</p>
<p>The fact that the situation seems calmer does not mean the political tension is over. Such political challenges indicate that Ethiopia’s federal arrangement remains extremely vulnerable. </p>
<p>There’s still a great deal of work to be done. Abiy’s government must make sure some of the most serious issues of disagreement are sorted once and for all. And the issue of constitutional reform needs to be addressed. The only outcome that will ensure Ethiopia steers away from imploding is if self administration rights – whether in the form of statehood demands or merger with other regions – are respected. But with the country’s constitution as a guideline.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohannes Gedamu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls for secession in Ethiopia could destabilise the entire nation.Yohannes Gedamu, Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1185722019-06-11T14:11:19Z2019-06-11T14:11:19ZJune 12 is now Democracy Day in Nigeria. Why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278871/original/file-20190611-32317-w5r6dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Muhammadu Buhari has endorsed June 12 as Nigeria's official
Democracy Day</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Esther Addy/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy Day in Nigeria is being celebrated on the 12th of June this year. This is the first time the day has been marked on this date. And the change carries heavy symbolism for a country that’s known more years of being ruled by military men than by democratically elected leaders.</p>
<p>Until last year the date on which Nigeria commemorated <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/3310433">the restoration of democracy</a> was May 29. But last year President Muhammadu Buhari declared June 12 to be the new <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/buhari-signs-june-12-democracy-day-bill-into-law/">Democracy Day</a>. </p>
<p>June 12 carries huge significance for older Nigerians. It was on this date in 1993 that presidential elections were held for the first time since the 1983 military coup. It was an event many observers have described as the <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/meaning-june-12">most significant</a> in Nigeria’s post-independence political history. It is still viewed as the freest, fairest and most peaceful election ever held in Nigeria. </p>
<p>On the day, an estimated 14 million Nigerians – irrespective of ethnic, religious, class, and regional affiliations, (in a period when religious acrimony and tension had reached its zenith) – <a href="https://www.academia.edu/2123541/_The_dawn_of_constitutionalism_in_Nigeria_in_Mbondenyi_M._K._and_Ojienda_T._eds._Constitutionalism_Constitution_Making_and_Constitutional_Reform_in_Africa_Contemporary_Perspectives_from_Sub-Saharan_Africa">defied</a> bad weather to elect their president with the hope of ending eight years of military dictatorships.</p>
<p>The euphoria was short-lived. The results of the election were never released. But unofficial results gathered through the various polling stations by civil society groups across the country indicated <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abacha-regime-and-the-june-12-crisis-by-ebenezer-babatope-lagos-ebino-topsy-1995-available-from-beacons-books-london-pp-215-1295-paperback/AB05F1D76A8A5D3A6E45DBB40F5329E4">broad national support</a> for the presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola.</p>
<p>Abiola was a businessman, publisher, politician and aristocrat of the Yoruba Egba clan. He made his fortune through various enterprises, including communication, oil and gas. He made his first, unsuccessful run at the presidency in 1983. By then, Nigeria had endured a great deal of political upheaval since its 1960 independence. It was a <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria">deeply divided</a> nation, riven along ethnic, religious and regional lines. Political and military power was held by the north.</p>
<p>Then came Abiola, a man from the South. He brought a different perspective to the table and was able to <a href="https://www.nigerianinfopedia.com/biography-mko-abiola-nigerias-president-never-was/">connect with people across divides</a>. Come 12 June 1993, he tried for the presidency again.</p>
<p>Despite his popularity, and the turnout, the elections stalled. The then military head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, decided to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4186945?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">annul the results of the election</a>. He <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/24/world/nigerian-military-rulers-annul-election.html">justified the annulment</a> on the grounds that it was necessary to save the nation. He alleged that political activities preceding the election were inimical to peace and stability in Nigeria.</p>
<p>Some people however believe that the military <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/the-military-underrated-abiolas-popularity-sen-zwingina-campaign-manager/">underrated Abiola’s popularity</a>. It also did not envisage the level of crisis after the annulment of the election result. </p>
<p>The June 12 election and subsequent annulment marked the beginning of a decades long struggle to see the election result restored and democracy rehabilitated.</p>
<h2>The fallout</h2>
<p>The annulment of the election result was not taken lightly in the south-Western part of the country. Civil violence in the South Western states provoked by electoral fraud and political exclusion previously contributed to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">the breakdown of the first and second republics</a>. These ran from 1993 to 1999 when Nigeria had its return to democratic rule.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">According to</a> political scientist Professor Emmanuel Ojo, Southern resentment over Abiola’s rebuff also threatened to create fissures within the military. This in turn raised the spectre of wider civil conflicts and state collapse. In his official reaction to the annulment, Abiola was <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">quoted as saying</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I might embark on the programme of civil disobedience in the country. If those who make the law disobey the law, why (should) I obey it? There is a limit to the authenticity one could expect from a military ruler who is obviously anxious to hang on to power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abiola’s statement threw the country into unprecedented crisis. The Campaign for Democracy spearheaded mass protests by calling for a five-day non-violent protest. </p>
<p>Protests later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/06/world/nigerian-protests-erupt-in-violence.html">turned violent</a>. At least 100 protesters were killed, shot by police. The violence prompted a mounting exodus from the major cities, as southern ethnic groups (most especially the Ibos), fearing a recurrence of the communal purges which had preceded the 1967 Civil War, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087814532585?journalCode=ioaa">fled to their home regions</a>. Author B.O Nwabueze lucidly and graphically described the crisis <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">like this</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The annulment of the June 12 presidential election plunged the country into what indisputably is the greatest political crisis in its 33-year life as an independent nation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Never before, except during the <a href="https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nigerian_Civil_War">murderous confrontation of 1966 to 1970</a>, had the survival of Nigeria as one political entity been in more serious danger. The impasse created was certainly unequalled in the country’s history.</p>
<h2>Push for change</h2>
<p>Civil society groups pushed for the re-democratisation of Nigeria. Their first call was that the mandate be returned to Abiola. During this period there was a great deal of fear and insecurity in the country. But, as Ebenezer Babatope, in his book “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Abacha-regime-June-crisis-democracy/dp/B0006F671A">The Abacha Regime and the June 12 crisis</a>” notes, people mobilised to face the challenges of a military leadership that had reneged on its promise to hand over power to democratically elected leaders. </p>
<p>Under tremendous pressure, the Abubakar administration arranged for elections to be held. </p>
<p>These took place – for state governorships, the senate and local councils – over a few months from late 1998 to February 1999. </p>
<p>Finally, Abubakar’s transition reached the climax with the declaration of General Olusegun Obasanjo, who had retired from the military, as the president elect in late February 1999. He was duly sworn in on 29 May 1999.</p>
<p>This explains why May 29 became the official public holiday on which Nigerians celebrated the country’s return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>During most of this time, Abiola was in jail. In 1994 he declared himself Nigeria’s lawful president after returning from a trip to win the support of the international community for his mandate. After declaring himself president he was accused of treason and arrested on the orders of then military President General Sani Abacha, who sent 200 police vehicles to bring him into custody. </p>
<p>Abiola died in suspicious circumstances on the day that he was due to be released, 7 July 1998.</p>
<h2>Democracy today</h2>
<p>Buhari’s decision to mark 12 June as Democracy Day should be viewed as an attempt to placate the South Western Nigerian State, which has always set aside the day to remember Abiola’s stolen mandate and an annulled election that many still view as the country’s freest and fairest in the history of Nigeria and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damilola Agbalajobi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>June 12 is widely regarded as the most important day in Nigeria’s post-independence poltiical historyDamilola Agbalajobi, Lecturer, Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1143192019-04-09T13:25:08Z2019-04-09T13:25:08ZWhy Nigeria’s insecure forests are fertile ground for cattle rustlers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267661/original/file-20190404-123437-7i9xep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cattle rustling is big business in Northern Nigeria.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Northern Nigeria has become a thieving and killing field for cattle rustlers who maraud the region’s ungoverned forests, stealing cattle and killing herders. </p>
<p>Attacks <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict">have taken place in</a> in Benue, Nassarawa and Plateau states in north-central Nigeria and the situation <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-factors-that-foster-conflict-in-nigerias-kaduna-state-109899">appears to be worsening</a>. In January alone last year 371 people were <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/nigeria-thousands-living-in-fear-as-zamfara-armed-bandits-ramp-up-attacks/">killed by cattle rustlers</a> in the northwestern state of Zamfara. </p>
<p>Commercial farms, including those owned by influential politicians, revered clerics and prominent traditional rulers, haven’t been spared. Former Vice-President Namadi Sambo, the Emir of Zazzau, Alhaji Shehu Idris and Benjamin Kwashe, the Anglican Bishop of Jos, have all <a href="https://www.blueprint.ng/unexplained-issues-cattle-rustling/">lost herds to rustlers</a>. </p>
<p>Three main reasons are usually given for the rise of cattle rustling in Nigeria. One is pastoral culture and tradition. The second is climate change. And the third has to do with state failure and proliferation of light weapons across Africa.</p>
<p>The problem with these explanations, however, is that they ignore one critical aspect: the role of ungoverned forests. <a href="https://nomadit.co.uk/conference/ecas2019/paper/48832">My research</a> shows that ungoverned forests provide an enabling environment for cattle banditry to flourish in northern Nigeria. </p>
<h2>Reasons for rustling</h2>
<p>Pastoral culture and tradition is one of the major reasons for cattle rustling in Nigeria. It encourages cattle theft as a way of replenishing stock after losing herds to drought. Some traditions exclusively confer cattle husbandry to nomads and <a href="http://www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr/article/download/1776/1919">recommend rustling</a> against non-pastoral groups who dare to rear cattle. </p>
<p>The second is climate change. Researchers confirm that climate change has triggered the shrinking of Lake Chad. This has furthered the desertification of northern Nigeria.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-clashes-are-on-the-rise-between-farmers-and-herdsmen-in-the-sahel-95554">Why clashes are on the rise between farmers and herdsmen in the Sahel</a>
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<p>As herders migrate from the north in search of greener pastures in the Middle Belt and Southern regions their herds are often plundered by bandits and <a href="http://venturesafrica.com/boko-haram-makes-cash-from-stolen-cattle/">marauding Boko Haram militants</a>.</p>
<p>Thirdly, cattle rustling is attributed to state failure, <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.at/">intra-state wars</a> and the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/112/447/216/79247">proliferation of light weapons</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>This leads to countries becoming what’s <a href="https://fundforpeace.org/2018/04/24/fragile-states-index-2018-annual-report/">described as fragile states</a>. Nigeria is no exception. In addition to its internal political, economic, and domestic terrorism challenges, the country is geographically located in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/persistent-needs-sahel-conflict-driving-massive-displacement">conflict-ridden Sahel region</a>. </p>
<p>Weapons and arms flowing from these war zones are <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-proliferation-of-small-arms-absence-of-war-does-not-equal-peace-70090">ferried through Nigeria’s unmanned borders</a> into the hands of criminal groups, which include cattle rustlers.</p>
<p>These three factors are rightly cited as facilitating the cattle rustling scourge. But, based on my research, I’d argue that the main reason for the continued existence of cattle bandits is the lack of effective governance of Nigeria’s forests.</p>
<h2>Ungoverned forests</h2>
<p>Northern Nigeria covers about 60% of Nigeria’s land area and hosts a <a href="https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/4867">large expanse of forest land</a>. The government has designated one third of the region’s land mass as <a href="https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/4867">official forest reserves</a>.</p>
<p>With a rich repertoire of plants, animals, streams, river tributaries, and waterfalls, the forests crisscross rural communities and towns in the region.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorists operate the most <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2013/04/20/border-security-arms-proliferation-and-terrorism-nigeria-lt-col-sagir-musa">clandestine and sophisticated network</a> of cattle rustlers and sellers within these forests. They have taken control of the Sambisa forests, a land mass which is <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Isaac_Albert/publication/323201884_Beyond_Nigeria's_Sambisa_Forests_insurgency_and_counterinsurgency_in_Africa/links/5a85bfbc458515b8af88fa9c/Beyond-Nigerias-Sambisa-Forests-insurgency-and-counterinsurgency-in-Africa.pdf">estimated to be the size of Lagos</a>.</p>
<p>They have been able to do this because the forests have <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201511180337.html">been neglected</a> for years. They are unmanned, unpoliced, acutely underfunded and poorly managed. Like other government agencies, forestry departments are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228351571_Forestry_Extension_Implications_for_Forest_Protection">hugely understaffed</a> and operate on lean budgets that are often mismanaged. </p>
<p>Forestry policy also adopts a top-to-bottom approach that disregards host communities. When these communities are alienated they are less inclined to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268216469_Challenges_of_forest_management_and_security_issues_in_Nigeria">take “ownership”</a> of the forests. </p>
<p>So, the forests become a hotbed of criminals and safe haven for cattle bandits. Boko Haram’s seizure and subsequent occupation of Sambisa forests, for instance, has been blamed on years of government neglect and community apathy.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-poor-management-of-nigerian-forests-led-to-exploitation-by-criminals-108434">How poor management of Nigerian forests led to exploitation by criminals</a>
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<h2>Managing the menace</h2>
<p>The Nigerian government only started to respond to cattle rustling in 2014. Yet the plague has been on a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict">steady rise</a> for more than 10 years. Government response has been slow and lethargic and policy discussions have not yet translated into concrete policy actions. </p>
<p>Its <a href="https://starconnectmedia.com/igp-sets-up-task-force-on-cattle-rustling-associated-crime/">strategies for combating cattle banditry</a> have either involved uncoordinated police action or un-sustained military exercises. For instance, Operation Ayem Apatuma, organised in 2018 to tackle cattle rustling in Nigeria’s north-central region, was <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/operation-cat-race-army-ends-exercise-ayem-akpatuma-in-benue-taraba-kogi/gm57bnf">too short</a> to make any lasting impact. It ended after three months.</p>
<p>The government must review its approach to cattle banditry. It needs a clear and specific policy. One aspect of this should be an effort to move herders away from open grazing and encourage them to embrace modern ranching practices. Confining the movement of cattle to ranches ensures a higher level of security and reduces their nuisance value.</p>
<p>The government must also reassess forest governance so that the management of forests becomes an inclusive practice that takes people’s needs into account. In addition, forest guards need to be empowered and equipped to discharge their duties effectively. </p>
<p>The government will also need to liberate the Sambisa forests from Boko Haram’s control. This would allow for the establishment of cattle colonies within the forests lands. Restricting the movement of herders to colonies within their cultural communities could go a long way in reducing their <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-factors-that-foster-conflict-in-nigerias-kaduna-state-109899">perennial conflict</a> with farmer communities. </p>
<p>More importantly, the establishment of cattle ranches and colonies would promote the development of associated industries such as dairy, leather and shoe industries, and the long-awaited revolution of meat production in northern Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114319/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ifeanyi Onwuzuruigbo receives funding from the Carnegie Foundation. </span></em></p>Northern Nigeria’s cattle rustling problem is aggravated by the regions ungoverned forests.Ifeanyi Onwuzuruigbo, Visiting Scholar in the Department of Political Science and also affiliated to the Centre of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1025032018-09-09T10:07:06Z2018-09-09T10:07:06ZExplainer: the role of foreign military forces in Niger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235213/original/file-20180906-190668-dm6qu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The people of Niger have been protesting against the presence of foreign troops in their country</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arnaud Roin/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Niger is one of the most militarised countries in Africa. In November 2017, this came to wider notice when four American Special Forces soldiers and at least four of their Nigerien counterparts died in an ambush. Since then, the military presence has only intensified. Why are these forces there, whose interests are they serving and are they having the impact that was intended?</p>
<p>The US is not the only nation with a military presence in Niger. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/10/operation-barkhane-frances-counter-terrorism-forces-in-africa/543834/">France</a>, <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/12/23/german-military-presence-in-africa-the-morning-call/">Germany</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-training-niger-1.4016277">Canada</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-diplomacy-niger-libya/italy-approves-military-mission-in-niger-more-troops-to-north-africa-idUSKBN1F6270">Italy</a> also have troops in the West African country. </p>
<p>In April this year, Niger hosted <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51351:exercise-flintlock-2018-begins-in-niger-&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105">Exercise Flintlock</a>, a military exercise that brought together 1900 troops from more than 20 partner countries. <a href="https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock">Sponsored by the US</a>, it purported to <a href="https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock">develop capacity and collaboration</a> among African security forces to protect civilians against <a href="http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Security_Threats.pdf">violent religious extremism</a>. </p>
<p>Three main reasons are given for this military presence: countering terrorism, preventing migration of Africans to Europe, and protecting foreign investments.</p>
<h2>Terrorism in the region</h2>
<p>North Africa’s Sahel region, which includes Niger, hosts <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/menara_papers/future_notes/the_transmutation_of_jihadi_organizations_in_the_sahel_and_the_regional_security_architecture">a number of Islamic extremist groups</a>. The Sahel has been described as the <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35765:trans-sahel-new-frontier-in-global-counter-terrorism-operations&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115">‘new frontier’</a> in global counter-terrorism operations. The US has a <a href="http://afjn.org/u-s-military-presence-and-activity-in-africa-sahel-region/">military presence</a> in Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Chad as well as Niger. As far as we know, only <a href="https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-military-is-cozying-up-to-sudan-of-all-countries/">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/congressman-pushes-eritrea-us-military-partnership/3972539.html">Eritrea</a> do not host US troops. The Sahel has also hosted <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35765:trans-sahel-new-frontier-in-global-counter-terrorism-operations&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115">“a range of second-tier external actors”</a> including armed forces from the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/clingendael_monitor_2016_en/2_the_eu_as_a_security_actor_in_africa/">European Union</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/israel-goals-west-africa-170701021641836.html">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/mabel-gonz%C3%A1lez-bustelo/us-and-colombia-building-exportable-model-of-security">Colombia</a>, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/08/31/rising-sino-japanese-competition-in-africa/">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>America’s involvement in the Sahel has its roots in the post 9/11 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/911-terror-militarism-war-fear-160911055050615.html">war on terror</a>. In 2003 it set up the <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/9538/ASC-1241486-052.pdf?sequence=1">Pan-Sahel Initiative</a>, which brought together Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to train military units. In 2004, the initiative was replaced by the <a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=1eVMMQ4qMUdMke4zw5o8vnxDkwqo8ronR">Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership</a>. The <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP">expanded partnership</a> includes Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Its aim is to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism.</p>
<p>In 2014, the heads of State of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad signed a convention establishing the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/">G5 Sahel</a>, aimed at ensuring “development and security to improve the population’s quality of life.” </p>
<p>In 2017 the same heads of state established the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security">Joint</a> <a href="https://www.apnews.com/b251443a01f5468fac90a9071649717d/In-Africa,-US-special-forces-shifting-approach-on-extremism">Force</a> of the G5 Sahel - a decision sanctioned by both the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-679th-psc-meeting-on-the-draft-strategic-concept-of-operations-conops-of-the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12881.doc.htm">United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>The purpose of the Joint Force, which is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/05/foreign-troops-should-not-be-fighting-in-niger-says-countrys-president">now chaired</a> by Nigerien president Mahamadou Issoufou, is more comprehensive in nature when compared to other joint security operations in the region. In addition to improving security along shared borders, its scope encompasses “<a href="http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/9/33">soft security</a>” issues. </p>
<p>The US has provided each member state with military support and <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security">pledged $60 million</a> in bilateral support to the initiative. </p>
<h2>Strategic importance</h2>
<p>Niger occupies a <a href="https://www.google.co.za/maps/place/Sahara+Desert/@25.9258004,6.6623805,4z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x13883b64fb267151:0xd6406bdc582d7390!8m2!3d23.4162027!4d25.66283">central geographical position</a> in the Sahel region. Unfortunately for its citizens, the country is surrounded and affected by <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/13/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-niger-and-its-unstable-neighbors/">instability</a>.</p>
<p>And then there’s the fact that Niger has historically <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/niger-europe-migrants-jihad-africa/553019/">served as a gateway</a> for migrants between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. And recently, it has become a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/niger-europe-migrants-jihad-africa/553019/">popular transit point</a> for people seeking better opportunities in Europe. Countries like Italy are now deploying troops to Niger to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-diplomacy-niger-libya/italy-approves-military-mission-in-niger-more-troops-to-north-africa-idUSKBN1F6270">prevent illegal migration</a>. </p>
<p>Foreign armed forces in Niger <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-25-00-why-is-the-us-chasing-congolese-rebels-in-the-northern-cape">train African troops</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/pentagon-niger-drones.html">fly drones</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/us/politics/drone-base-niger.html">build bases</a>, <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/why-is-the-u-s-military-occupying-bases-across-africa/">engage in cross-border raids</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_story.html">collect intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>The scope of these activities points primarily to countering terrorism and controlling migration. However, Africa’s <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/lions-still-on-the-move-growth-in-africas-consumer-sector">growing potential for consumption</a>, which explains the <a href="http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/protect-us-interests-africa">expanding</a> economic and trade relations with the continent, offers a further reason for the increasingly diverse foreign military presence in Niger and in the region more broadly.</p>
<h2>A willing host</h2>
<p>What of Niger’s own interests? Its government has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies#img-5">welcomed the presence of foreign troops</a>. President Mahamadou Issoufou is happy to support Washington’s interests in the region as long as the US is willing to mentor and train his armed forces. </p>
<p>US involvement in Issoufou’s military affairs will help him fulfil his election promise to “<a href="https://ewn.co.za/2016/02/22/Niger-holds-tense-vote-with-Issoufou-running-for-2nd-term">crush Islamist militants</a>.”</p>
<p>Niger’s cosy relationship with the US is of particular significance given the recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/america-should-beware-a-chadian-military-scorned-trump-travel-ban/">strained relations</a> between America and Niger’s neighbour, Chad. In late 2017, US President Donald Trump added Chad to his travel ban - a move that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-muslim-ban-chad-travel-countries-list-immigration-restrictions-a7969021.html">baffled foreign policy experts</a> and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-muslim-ban-boko-haram-chad-niger-travel-restrictions-a8000451.html">clearly upset</a> the Chadian government. The travel ban has <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/trump-chad-us-travel-ban-muslim-majority-north-korea-venezuela-a8300061.html">since</a> been lifted. </p>
<h2>The cost of foreign military presence</h2>
<p>Has the presence of foreign forces in Niger achieved the aims of combating terrorism and stemming migration? And at what cost? Have there been unintended and potentially dangerous consequences?</p>
<p>There is certainly a view that their presence has had a negative impact on domestic politics in Niger.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies">report</a> published in the months following the deaths of US troops suggests an increasingly oppressive and undemocratic political culture in Niger.</p>
<p>Civil society and opposition political leaders who offer their testimony in the report argue that the building of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/13/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-niger-and-its-unstable-neighbors/">foreign military bases</a> in Niger is <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/">unconstitutional</a>. They view the foreign military presence in the country and the concurrent <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/security-concerns-in-niger-polls/">securitisation</a> of Niger’s political and civil society arenas as a means to strengthen a government lacking in domestic support. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-election/boycott-helps-niger-president-issoufou-win-re-election-idUSKCN0WO0ZN">Niger’s 2016 elections</a>, which gave Issoufou a second term, were reportedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies">“plagued by serious irregularities”</a>.</p>
<p>Niger’s military build-up is also cause for concern in a country where the <a href="http://secgovcentre.org/2013/03/securing-the-sahel-from-mali-to-niger/">Forces Armées Nigeriennes</a> is “an intensely politicised organisation” with “a distinct distaste for civilian oversight”. Such a force may prove valuable to a president who wishes to entrench his power beyond democratic means. </p>
<p>This year, citizens took to the streets chanting <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-29-what-exactly-are-foreign-troops-protecting-in-the-sahel-2/">“French, American and German armies, go away!”</a>. Issoufou responded by cracking down on further protests in March. He defended the move by saying it was important to have a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/05/foreign-troops-should-not-be-fighting-in-niger-says-countrys-president">democratic but strong</a>” state.</p>
<p>What the future holds is unclear, particularly given a recent report that Washington is considering <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/world/africa/pentagon-commandos-niger.html">withdrawing most of its troops</a>. For those opposing foreign military presence in Niger, this couldn’t happen soon enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Bailie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The build-up of foreign armed forces does not bode well for the citizens of Niger.Craig Bailie, Lecturer in Political Science (Mil), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1007432018-08-20T14:13:30Z2018-08-20T14:13:30ZGovernor’s race in Ekiti points to problems in national Nigerian poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232720/original/file-20180820-30596-1gxjh4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are widespread concerns in Nigeria about vote buying and intimidation.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IIP Photo Archive</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With less than 200 days to Nigeria’s next general election - scheduled for February 16, 2019 - there are apprehensions about how vote buying, violence and the deployment of security agents could affect the 2019 polls. Concerns about the fairness of the national poll have been heightened by events surrounding the <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/07/16/ekiti-election-pdp-apc-bought-votes-tmg-releases-full-report/">election of the governor in Ekiti State</a> in southwestern Nigeria. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://punchng.com/by-elections-kogi-katsina-pdp-reject-results-as-apc-wins-in-three-states/">by-elections</a> in Bauchi, Katsina and Kogi states have raised similar concerns with the opposition People’s Democratic Party alleging that the elections were neither free nor fair, and insisting that they were marred by violence, snatching of ballot boxes, and vote-buying. </p>
<p>These elections raised <a href="https://cleen.org/2018/08/06/ekitidecides2018-improved-security-49997-deployed-security-personnel-unjustifiable/">two central problems</a> within Nigerian electoral politics - vote buying, and the deployment of the police and military to intimidate opponents and their supporters. </p>
<p>These two factors featured prominently in the Ekiti state poll. The election was won by the ruling party candidate Kayode Fayemi who ran against the incumbent deputy governor Olusola Kolapo Olubunmi.</p>
<p>That election was significant because it was said to prove that the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) is still popular among Nigerians in the southwest of the country. Of the six states in the southwest, only Ekiti was controlled by the People’s Democratic Party. As things stand, the entire southwest is now an All Progressives Congress zone. </p>
<p>The Ekiti state election victory was therefore a big win for the ruling party. This is particularly true because of President Muhammadu Buhari’s <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/270010-buharimeter-nigerians-rate-buhari-low-on-corruption-security-economy-poll.html">dwindling popularity</a>. The president’s approval rating is at 40%, which marks a 17 percentage point decline from the 57% rating recorded in the 2017. This is part of the reason why the party <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=733z2P591Q0">went all out</a> to ensure a win in Ekiti. </p>
<p>The final outcome of the gubernatorial election, however, still hangs in the balance - the opposition party <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/ekiti-governorship-poll-pdp-candidate-eleka-files-700-page-petition/">has rejected the result</a> and challenged it at the <a href="https://punchng.com/ekiti-poll-olusola-asks-tribunal-to-declare-him-winner/">election tribunal</a>. </p>
<p>Even election observers say that the election <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/ekiti-poll-short-of-global-best-practices-electoral-standards-observers/">fell short of global best practices</a>. Nonetheless, the ruling party’s win in Ekiti has been seen as a <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/07/15/ekiti-election-breeze-fayemis-victory-will-sweep-south-east-2019-bso/">harbinger of what’s to come</a> in Nigeria’s 2019 general election. </p>
<h2>Intimidation by security agents</h2>
<p>The Ekiti election showed the government pulling out all the stops when it comes to the deployment of the country’s police force.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://punchng.com/ekiti-election-police-deploy-30000-personnel-two-choppers-others/">police headquarters deployed</a> 30,000 policemen – out of total of 370 000 in the whole country – two helicopters, 250 patrol vehicles, and 10 armoured personnel carriers, to man the election in Ekiti, which has a population of just 2.3 million. </p>
<p>The police were used to harass opposition with Ayodele Fayose – who is the outgoing incumbent governor – allegedly being <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2G8KXFJI8c">slapped and teargassed</a>. <a href="http://www.aitonline.tv/post-election_observers_condemn_ekiti_violence">Election observers</a> condemned the absence of campaign security, which the government should have provided, and the violence which injured opposition party supporters. </p>
<p>The events in Ekiti showed that Nigeria’s security organs are more loyal to the government in power than they are to the country and its citizens. </p>
<p>The levels of police presence – and the use of violence – are not unprecedented even by Nigerian standards. What it points to is the possibility that a similar pattern will be repeated in the national poll. Although it may be difficult for the government to muster the same levels of police presence across the whole of Nigeria. </p>
<p>But there’s a strong possibility that security agents will be deployed in states where president Buhari’s chances are slim. This would affect voter turnout as people may fear violence.</p>
<h2>Cash for votes</h2>
<p>Another trend that was in evidence in the Ekiti election was vote buying.</p>
<p>This isn’t unique to Nigeria and has <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/mbalula-mthembu-accusing-each-other-of-buying-votes">been reported</a> in country’s across Africa including Kenya and South Africa. The practice has diluted Africa’s fledgling democracies for years. </p>
<p>The prepaid vote buying strategy was adopted by both the ruling party and the opposition. For this strategy, state <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/money-rain-in-ekiti-as-pdp-apc-entice-voters-with-cash/">residents were paid</a> to vote for either the ruling party or the opposition. The outgoing governor was reported to have <a href="https://punchng.com/i-received-n3000-alert-from-govt-to-vote-pdp-candidate-ap-candidate/">wired N3,000 naira</a> (USD$8) into civil servants and pensioners’ accounts days before the election to buy their allegiance. </p>
<p>This appears to be a very small amount of money. But <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html">more than half</a> of the Nigerian population lives below the poverty line. On top of this, government workers in the state <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/workers-demand-payment-of-outstanding-salaries-as-fayose-promotes-40-100-workers.html">haven’t been paid for 10 months</a>. Pensioners are also <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouth-west/234788-pay-n19-7billion-benefits-ekiti-pensioners-tell-fayose.html">owed money</a>. </p>
<p>The result is that many are struggling to survive on meagre resources, so much so that come election time, voters cards become a commodity which are <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/gram-matenga/cash-for-votes-political-legitimacy-in-nigeria">sold for as little as 500 naira (USD$1)</a>. </p>
<p>In some cases, political operatives employed a postpaid strategy. For this strategy voters would take photographs of their ballot papers using their mobile phones, and then show them to their party agents who would then give them cash for their “yes” vote. </p>
<h2>Poverty curse</h2>
<p>Despite the vote-buying and the massive security presence in Ekiti the federal government described the victory as an endorsement of Buhari’s performance. </p>
<p>But the evidence suggests otherwise. Unless poor Nigerians understand the power of the ballot this mockery of voters by political merchants will be front and centre during the 2019 election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oludayo Tade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigerians go to the polls in 2019 in an election that the incumbent Muhammadu Buhari wants to win by any means necessary.Oludayo Tade, Lecturer of Criminology, Victimology, Deviance and Social Problems, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/988672018-06-26T13:36:26Z2018-06-26T13:36:26ZScene is set for interesting contest in Zimbabwe’s upcoming poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224856/original/file-20180626-112611-15e9m20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa (centre) at a ZANU-PF rally in Bulawayo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are heading to the polls on July 30. They will be making their decisions not only on what appears to be a dramatically changed political landscape, but with looming fears of a destabilised country following the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/breaking-news-attempt-on-eds-life/">recent bomb blast</a> at a Zanu-PF election rally in Bulawayo. Reports say that the attack targeted President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Opposition parties now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/zimbabwe-opposition-fears-crackdown-election-rally-bombing-emmerson-mnangagwa">fear a crackdown</a>.</p>
<p>But Mnangagwa and his <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/nothing-will-stop-zimbabwes-election-vice-president/">deputy</a> immediately pledged that the bomb attack wouldn’t <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/nothing-will-stop-zimbabwes-july-election-vp-chiwenga-20180624">stop</a> the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44593338">elections going ahead</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the incident is likely to create a climate of fear, insecurity, intense polarity and high securitisation of the state. Even before it happened civil society actors and think-tanks in Zimbabwe had raised questions about the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vdno_qu25b0">possibility of a rigged election</a>. </p>
<p>But be that as it may, the circumstances are very different from when Zimbabweans went to the polls in 2013. Then Zanu-PF won a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/Mugabe-gets-two-thirds-majority-20130802">two thirds majority</a>.</p>
<p>The upcoming elections will be closely fought between the 75-year-old Mnangagwa and new leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-Alliance), Nelson Chamisa (40). In addition, the polls will be contested without two men who have dominated Zimbabwe’s politics for decades - Robert Mugabe, who was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">deposed</a> in 2017 and Morgan Tsvangirai who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-dies-aged-65">died</a> in February this year.</p>
<p>These two factors – new leaders and the absence of old ones – set up an interesting contest.</p>
<p>As things stand, the MDC-Alliance is seeking to regain its relevance in the absence of Tsvangirai. Across the aisle, Mnangagwa is seeking to legitimately secure his authority, and the dominance of his party following the November 2017 transition after 37 years of Mugabe’s rule. </p>
<p>The elections are significant for average Zimbabweans too. Citizens are eager for new leaders to kick start the economy after <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/11/21/this-is-how-mugabe-broke-zimbabwes-economy_a_23284108/">years of decline</a> under Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<h2>Restoring legitimacy</h2>
<p>A lot is at stake for Zanu-PF. The party has aggressively pursued an agenda to restore its legitimacy regionally and internationally. For example, the Mnangagwa administration has repeatedly promised that the election will be credible. It has even taken its reform agenda to the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/zimbabwe-s-international-re-engagement-and-socio-economic-recovery">international stage</a>. </p>
<p>To bolster its credible election claim, the administration has also <a href="https://www.ndi.org/publications/joint-iri-ndi-delegation-zimbabwe-issues-pre-election-statement-2018">invited international observers</a> from the European Union, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, to witness the upcoming poll. Observers weren’t welcome in Mugabe’s time owing to his strained relations with the West for over <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-to-observe-zimbabwe-polls-for-first-time-in-16-years-20180528">16 years ago</a>. </p>
<p>Although the administration has made delivering a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/18/zimbabwe-president-pledges-free-and-fair-vote-in-four-to-five-months">credible election</a> a top priority, its promises haven’t inspired confidence among ordinary Zimbabweans and opposition parties. </p>
<p>What remains worrisome is that several issues related to the <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chamisa-election-agent-zecs-justice-chugumba-in-violation-of-oath-of-office-must-apologise/">biometric voter register</a> remain a bone of contention among the contesting <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/06/21/mdc-zec-row-threatens-polls">parties</a>. If un-addressed, they will raise concerns about the credibility of the poll.</p>
<p>And with just a few weeks remaining until the election and after the official <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/371590-2/">confirmation of candidates</a>, the voters’ roll has <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/confusion-reigns-over-voters-roll-release-as-parties-deny-zec-claims/">not been made available</a> to opposition parties. </p>
<p>On top of this a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/nothing-can-stop-the-election-says-zimbabwe-elections-body-15539555">comment</a> by Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission (ZEC) chairperson Justice Priscilla Chigumba has raised concerns because it suggests that the elections will take place, no matter what. Her words were:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The first thing to take note of is once the President has proclaimed the election date, there is nothing short of an earthquake which can stop the election so whether candidates scrutinise the voters’ roll, whether they see any anomalies in it, whatever the anomalies are, whatever legal recourse they have will not stop the election. I want that to be very clear, that is the law.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Split opposition vote</h2>
<p>Another concern is the fact that the political space is very crowded given that there are <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/371590-2/">23 aspirant presidential candidates</a>. One possible outcome is that the opposition vote will be split. The likelihood of this happening is more so, given that the main opposition parties have been unable to come together and field a single candidate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-rainbow-coalition-joice-mujuru/4079821.html">People’s Rainbow Coalition</a> led by Joice Mujuru, Elton Mangoma’s <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/code-nominates-mangoma-presidential-candidate/">Coalition for Democrats</a>, Thokozani Khupe’s <a href="http://www.zbc.co.zw/khupe-mdc-t-to-field-112-parly-candidates/">MDC-T</a>, and Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-zec-mdc-alliance/4425687.html">MDC-Alliance</a> are all fielding candidates in most constituencies nationwide. </p>
<p>The over-crowded opposition field have diminished chances that Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF could be dislodged. </p>
<p>There are also concerns that a <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/15/mdc-alliance-threatens-to-boycott-forthcoming-polls/">bloated ballot paper</a> will confuse the average voter. </p>
<h2>More questions than answers</h2>
<p>Questions abound as Zimbabwe prepares for the polls. Would Mnangagwa have risked dethroning Mugabe only to allow the opposition to assume the reins of power without a fight? In a telling sign of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/mukupe-offside-on-military-intervention-if-chamisa-wins/">what might be in store for Zimbabwe</a>, Deputy Finance Minister Terence Mukupe and Minister of State for Masvingo province, Josiah Hungwe revealed that the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/05/25/mnangagwa-will-shoot-to-keep-power">army would not accept a Chamisa win</a> in the event that Zanu-PF lost. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s favourite <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-05-08-the-voice-of-the-people-is-the-voice-of-god-says-emmerson-mnangagwa/">dictum</a> is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the voice of the people is the voice of God.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Will it still be the case once the people have spoken in the upcoming historic poll?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Mwonzora is a Research Fellow at Rhodes University</span></em></p>The world waits to see if Zimbabwe will pass the democracy test as it holds its first election after Robert Mugabe next month.Gift Mwonzora, Post-Doctoral Research fellow (specializing in Political Sociology) in the Unit of Zimbabwean studies - Sociology Department at Rhodes University, South Africa., Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/954642018-04-26T08:21:53Z2018-04-26T08:21:53ZBuhari and Trump: a chance to reset Nigeria’s relationship with the US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216264/original/file-20180425-175035-mj18op.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is scheduled to meet Donald Trump in Washington.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Reynolds/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is scheduled to meet US President Donald Trump next week. His visit comes less than four months since <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-13/donald-trump-addresses-immigration-comments-haiti-africa/9326034">Trump made the comment about “shithole”</a> countries in Africa. Trump’s comments were followed by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/12/unkind-divisive-elitist-international-outcry-over-trumps-shithole-countries-remark">swift denial</a> and a lukewarm attempt to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-letter-africa-respect-shithole-countries-a8181031.html">mend fences</a>. </p>
<p>But his lethargic attitude to the continent is undeniable. This was underscored by the fact that the president <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/13/rex-tillerson-ousted-us-secretary-state/">sacked former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson</a> when he was on an African tour, forcing him to cut his trip short. Further evidence of his <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/02/01/trumps-africa-policy-unclear-and-uncertain/">perceived indifference</a> is the fact that he has not appointed substantive senior leadership within the state department to handle African affairs. As a result, his African policy is driven by a makeshift team that has shown no real desire to mediate Africa’s strategic interests and aspirations. </p>
<p>So how does Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest economies, fit into America’s unclear vision for the continent? With a population of more than 180 million people, Nigeria is an African power house. And because of its complex religious, ethnic and regional dynamics, it presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the US.</p>
<h2>The agenda</h2>
<p>Perhaps Buhari’s trip to Washington will be used to reset Nigeria-US relations, particularly after the fallout from Trump’s shithole comment. The comment was particularly disturbing in Nigeria because <a href="https://qz.com/1034362/nigerians-really-love-donald-trump-well-some-of-them/">over 700,000 Nigerians</a> were found to be following Trump’s tweets – that’s more than 2% of his 32 million followers. This shows just how interested Nigerians are in the American president and his policies.</p>
<p>The official line from the Trump administration is that Buhari’s visit is an opportunity for the two leaders to discuss issues of mutual importance like economic growth, reforms and trade, terrorism, peace and security, and Nigeria’s <a href="https://cesran.org/nigerias-leadership-role-quests-the-race-of-the-crippled.html">role as a leader</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>But it’s also worth remembering that Nigeria remains one of <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/10-most-corrupt-countries-ranked-by-perception">the most corrupt countries in the world</a>. Levels of corruption have even <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/boko-haram-feeds-corruption-nigeria-170413082413479.html">diluted the country’s efforts</a> in the war on terror. </p>
<p>Nigeria has been unable to deal decisively with the Boko Haram menace despite buying military equipment worth <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-approves-a-29-sale-to-nigeria-despite-concerns-439980/">millions of dollars</a> from the US. Its inability to wipe out Boko Haram has destabilised the West African region and caused a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-boko-haram-aid/fear-of-boko-haram-drives-thousands-to-flee-from-niger-to-chad-idUSKBN1AG2EB">widespread refugee crisis</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond the twin challenge of corruption and terrorism, Nigeria has been <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/15402-nigeria-yet-to-reap-benefits-of-agoa-since-2008-re-strategises.html">unable to fully benefit</a> from America’s special economic growth and development initiative, the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This is because of structural bottlenecks like insecurity, sluggish economic growth, weak local capacity, and infrastructural problems. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.borgenmagazine.com/agoa-and-mca-modernization-act-passes">act</a> gives selected sub-Saharan countries easier access, tax and duty free exports of selected products to the US market. But Nigeria’s performance has been dismal. Buhari’s wish list should therefore include support for private sector capacity building to meet international trade and export standards. </p>
<p>It should also include enhanced security cooperation and support and increased foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Something else that could come up during Buhari’s visit are the human rights violations by the Nigerian military in its campaign against Boko Haram. The violations stopped the Obama administration from <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-u-s-prevented-sale-of-israeli-helicopters-to-nigeria-1.5365081">fully committing</a> to Nigerian military support.</p>
<p>In fact, the lowest point in US-Nigeria relations came in 2014 when Nigeria <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2856602/Nigeria-cancels-US-military-training-fight-Boko-Haram.html">cancelled</a> a joint military exercise because the US refused to equip its military with helicopters. </p>
<h2>From “shithole” to “deep respect”</h2>
<p>Despite its challenges, Nigeria has long been a continental and regional power house that has supervised a vast security apparatus through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Under Nigeria’s stewardship ECOWAS ensured that the Gambian strong man Jammeh Yahya was <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/13/west-african-leaders-arrive-gambia-convince-yahya-jammeh-step/">forced to step down</a> in favour of his challenger who had been validly elected. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s role in the Gambia proved that, while it has a lot of other problems, electoral injustice is not one of them. Successive administrations have respected the constitutional norms that require an incumbent to step down after <a href="https://qz.com/373327/the-challenger-in-nigerias-election-looks-set-to-defeat-its-sitting-president/">fairly losing an election</a>. This kind of democratic leadership is strategically important to the US. </p>
<p>And as one of <a href="https://qz.com/758947/south-africa-just-leapt-over-nigeria-to-become-africas-largest-economy-again/">Africa’s largest economies</a> Nigeria can boost economic growth in the region. The country is in a strategic position to take advantage of Trump’s promise to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-letter-africa-respect-shithole-countries-a8181031.html">“increase free, fair and reciprocal trade”</a> with Africa. </p>
<p>Finally, as Africa’s <a href="https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8882-nigeria-is-now-worlds-largest-petrol-importer">largest</a> oil and gas producer Nigeria could become an important ally in Trump’s <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/oil-price-hike-predicted-as-trump-blasts-opec-20180423-2">efforts to control the volatile oil prices</a> fronted by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.</p>
<h2>Benefits to both parties</h2>
<p>In the final analysis, what should Africa make of Buhari’s visit to Washington? Is it a just reward for Nigeria’s continental leadership, or a carefully choreographed opportunity to make Trump popular again? </p>
<p>I argue that it is both. Despite claiming that he has a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-letter-africa-respect-shithole-countries-a8181031.html">“deep respect”</a> for Africa, Trump is still believed to be indifferent towards the continent. </p>
<p>This visit has the potential to reset the US-Nigeria dynamic. And at the end of the day, Buhari will have a White House photo op that will come in handy now that he intends to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-09/nigeria-s-president-buhari-to-run-again-in-2019-aide-says">run for a second term</a>.</p>
<p>And Trump will have the opportunity to showcase his “deep respect” for Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US President Donald Trump will have an opportunity to showcase his “deep respect” for Africa when his Nigerian counterpart visits.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/949252018-04-25T13:06:39Z2018-04-25T13:06:39ZRwanda can’t achieve reconciliation without fixing its democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215027/original/file-20180416-587-ss3tux.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's Genocide Memorial burial site.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ahmed Jallanzo/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This month Rwanda marks 24 years since the <a href="http://thefactfile.org/rwandan-genocide-facts/">genocide</a> that left almost one million people dead. Healing is paramount in a society that’s not quite moved beyond the horrors of 1994. To ensure the past isn’t repeated, Rwanda needs to work towards meaningful political representation for all the country’s ethnic groups.</p>
<p>There is a model that other countries have adopted that could help it do this. It has been shown that <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572786.001.0001/acprof-9780199572786-chapter-5">consensus democracy</a> is the best political mechanism to eradicate violent competition for power.</p>
<p>This kind of democracy – which is based on a power sharing model of government – has proven to be effective in the <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm">United States</a>, <a href="https://miliux.wordpress.com/dutch-consensus-democracy/">The Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://nl.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?hspart=adk&hsimp=yhs-adk_sbyhp&p=consensus+democracy+in+switzerland&param2=e3c5f38c-dfa6-4846-90f0-5d008e68eb9f&param3=email_1.3%7ENL%7Eappfocus94&param4=bing-bb9%7EChrome%7Econsensus+democracy+in+switzerland%7E036BF5C38C06692EE0397501EA8B0530&param1=20180327&type=">Switzerland</a>. It also worked in <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">South Africa</a> during the country’s transition to democracy. </p>
<p>The challenge facing Rwanda is that it’s an <a href="http://rwandaises.com/2011/07/rwanda-briefing-by-general-kayumba-nyamwasa-col-patrick-karegeya/">autocratic regime</a>. The democratic space in the country has shrunk dramatically. Independent thinkers and alternative voices have been <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/letters/truly-hostile-environment/2009939.article">silenced </a>. President Paul Kagame has walked in the footsteps of his predecessors by <a href="https://kellogg.nd.edu/content/political-governance-post-genocide-rwanda-filip-reyntjens">concentrating power</a> in the hands of a tiny political and military elite.</p>
<p>Should Rwanda continue <a href="https://medium.com/@dhimbara/power-addiction-and-the-rwandan-tragedy-65fff19d6c1b">this legacy</a>, Kagame could be violently replaced by another autocrat. Experience has shown that a change of guard without deep structural transformation is not sustainable. </p>
<p>What is the way forward from here? We believe consensus democracy holds the answers.</p>
<h2>Genesis of a genocide</h2>
<p>To understand how Rwanda has reached this point, it’s important to explore the country’s history. </p>
<p>The intensity and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2015.1028206?src=recsys">destructive scale of the genocide</a> in 1994 were unprecedented. But the underlying <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title1">dynamics of ethnic violence</a> started in the late <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title6">1950s</a> when Rwanda was struggling to achieve independence from Belgium and <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title6">to establish a democratic republic. </a></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title8">First Republic</a> led by President <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/gregoire-kayibanda/">Grégoire Kayibanda</a> and his Republican Democratic Movement – also known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Party-for-Hutu-Emancipation">MDR-Parmehutu</a> – was established in 1962 to heal the wounds left by colonialism and the Tutsi monarchy. The monarchy had been <a href="https://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/the-hutu-jacobin-revolution-1959/">overthrown in 1961</a> by a Hutu elite which was backed by the <a href="http://education.seattlepi.com/impact-did-belgian-presence-rwanda-spark-further-conflict-5558.html">Belgian administration</a>. </p>
<p>The overthrow forced the monarch, his followers, and many ordinary Tutsis into exile. In the face of threats posed by <a href="http://www.olny.nl/RWANDA/Archives/Dossier_Premiere_Republique/C_Nkurunziza_Republique_Inyenzi_Divisions.html">exiled Tutsi insurgents</a>, President Kayibanda <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050902972956?journalCode=rjea20&">consolidated his power</a>, making Rwanda a Hutu republic, not a motherland for all its sons and daughters. Tutsis were executed or forced into exile. Those who remained became second class citizens. </p>
<p>The MDR-Parmehutu regime used the Tutsi insurgency <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994">as a pretext to silence all its political rivals</a>. It killed some of their leaders and co-opted others. By 1965, Rwanda had become a <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Rwandan+general+election,+1965&item_type=topic">one-party state</a>. </p>
<p>It came as no surprise, then, that at the end of Kayibanda’s term in 1973 his associates called for constitutional change <a href="http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve?codeEve=601">to allow him seek a third term in office</a>. </p>
<p>But rather than focus on a power struggle that was simmering among the Hutu elites, the regime sponsored another wave of violence against the Tutsi. This scapegoating strategy proved counter productive and paved the way for a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title9">coup d’état in July 1973</a>. The coup ended with the death of Kayibanda and his close aides. Many other key figures of the First Republic were imprisoned and held under harsh conditions. </p>
<p>The coup leader, Major General <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juvenal-Habyarimana">Juvénal Habyarimana</a>, took over and vowed to build the Second Republic around the triple goal of <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title9">“peace, unity, and development”</a>. For many years, he succeeded at maintaining relative stability and economic development, becoming the darling of the donor community. Rwanda was hailed as a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233151232_Development_Ideology_the_Peasantry_and_Genocide_Rwanda_Represented_in_Habyarimana's_Speeches">model of African development</a>.”</p>
<p>But Habyarimana failed to tackle two vital challenges: the ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi, and the Tutsi refugee problem. </p>
<p>The unresolved refugee problem paved the way for the 1990-1994 war, which pitted the Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the Hutu-dominated government. The war also paved the way for the assassination of the president himself on April 6, 1994. This triggered the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, from which Kagame’s RPF emerged as the new ruling force. </p>
<p>Like its predecessors, Kagame’s RPF put forth <a href="http://gsdrc.org/document-library/supporting-the-post-genocide-transition-in-rwanda-the-role-of-the-international-community/">impressive objectives</a>, including reconciliation and national unity, good governance, and resolution of the refugee problem. </p>
<p>But the regime soon proved to be yet another <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31027704_Rwanda_ten_years_on_From_genocide_to_dictatorship">dictatorship</a>. It has been widely reported that Kagame’s regime is responsible for <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/38/un-mapping-report-documenting-serious-crimes-democratic-republic-congo">war crimes and crimes against humanity</a> and serious <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Front-Line-Rwanda-Disappearances-Intimidation/dp/095478832X">human rights violations</a> against both the Hutu and the Tutsi. The regime operates on a <em>de facto</em> single-party system that’s increasingly <a href="https://politicalmatter.org/2015/09/02/rwanda-inc-paul-kagames-odyssey-from-rebellion-to-tyranny-by-dr-noel-twagiramungu/">intolerant of dissenters</a>. </p>
<h2>Consensus as a path to reconciliation</h2>
<p>Consensus democracy in Rwanda would be characterised by free and fair elections, political accountability, rigorous check-and-balance mechanisms and concerted power-sharing arrangements. This model would entail the representation of all ethnic groups in every branch of government including in strategic cabinet departments and top security services.</p>
<p>Without these guarantees, extremists from each community will continue to have unfettered access to hijack the political system by harking back to past grievances and amplifying legitimate fears.</p>
<p>Consensus democracy could lay the foundation for healing by creating a sense of physical and emotional security within Rwanda’s two main ethnic communities. This would put an end to the historical cycle of vengeful violence.</p>
<p>It may seem unlikely at this stage to convince Kagame and his supporters that this is the way to go. As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/27/rwanda-freedom-of-speech">American journalist Stephen Kinzer once wrote</a>, Kagame, who seemed to have “the chance to enter history as one of the greatest modern African leaders”, could also be remembered as another failed African big man.</p>
<p>It’s high time Rwanda and its true friends heeded the call for collective healing through consensus democracy. Such a move would mark the beginning of a new journey that frees the energy and resources necessary to build a Rwanda that is reconciled, democratic and prosperous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Rwanda marks the 24th anniversary of the 1994 genocide, much more needs to be done to unite the country.Noel Twagiramungu, Visiting Assistant Professor, UMass LowellJoseph Sebarenzi, Ph.D., Visiting Professor, SIT Graduate InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776852017-09-03T09:42:01Z2017-09-03T09:42:01ZAfrican states don’t prioritise maritime security – here’s why they should<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176750/original/file-20170704-808-mna83z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Port workers secure berthing ropes belonging to a container ship as it prepares to dock at the port of San Pedro, Ivory Coast</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luc Gnago/Reuters </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Piracy off the African coastline has been a headline grabbing phenomenon for more than a decade. For a few years though, Somali pirates appeared to have a quiet spell. Then, recently they had their first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/somali-pirates-release-oil-tanker-and-crew-after-first-hijack-for-five-years">successful attack</a> against a merchant vessel since 2012. </p>
<p><a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/as-somali-pirates-return-chinese-navy-boasts-of-anti-piracy-operations/">Other attacks followed</a>, including one in April that was foiled by Chinese and Indian navies. </p>
<p>On the other side of the continent, attacks against ships in the Gulf of Guinea remain a concern for shipping companies, particularly off the coast of Nigeria. </p>
<p>The State of Maritime Piracy <a href="http://obp.ngo/reports/sop">report</a> reiterates that the Nigerian coastline is a dangerous area for seafarers and has been for years.</p>
<p>However, coastal states affected by piracy often have other priorities. Take Somalia for example. The country is battling <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/london-somalia-conference-2017">many issues</a> including the effects of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/20/weve-never-seen-this-drought-this-disease-famine-looms-in-somalia">long drought</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/al-shabab-in-somalia">frequent Al-Shabaab attacks</a>.</p>
<p>The situation is similar in other countries. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies points out that national security and economic policies <a href="http://africacenter.org/spotlight/maritime-safety-security-crucial-africas-strategic-future/">rarely emphasise</a> maritime security. This is due to a lack of awareness, political will and resources. </p>
<p>For years maritime security has been neglected throughout Africa. Recently however, there has been renewed focus on maritime issues. This was highlighted by the African Union’s <a href="https://www.au.int/en/documents/30928/2050-aim-strategy">maritime strategy</a> and the Lomé <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/fulfilling-the-promise-of-the-lome-maritime-summit">maritime summit</a>. </p>
<p>These developments show that maritime matters have become more important. But this is still not enough. To develop their <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/beyond-piracy-what-next-for-african-maritime-security">blue economy</a> coastal states need to start addressing maritime security issues beyond just piracy. </p>
<p>It should also include factors such as <a href="https://www.odi.org/publications/10459-western-africas-missing-fish-impacts-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-under-reporting">illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing</a>. Unfortunately politicians and academics have traditionally framed maritime security in Africa as a purely <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/23/the-world-beat-somali-pirates-why-cant-it-stop-west-african-piracy/">counter-piracy affair</a>. The debate needs to be broadened significantly to include an appreciation of the economic potential of the seas. </p>
<h2>How to secure the oceans</h2>
<p>Sea based economic activities (known as the blue economy) include; <a href="https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/oil-and-gas-review-2016.pdf">offshore oil and gas production</a>, <a href="http://shipsandports.com.ng/maritime-trade-facilitation-economic-development-africa/">maritime trade</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/illegal-fishing-is-a-major-threat-to-africas-blue-economy-61176">fishing activities</a> and <a href="http://www2.unwto.org/agora/tourism-development-coastal-areas-africa-promoting-sustainability-through-governance-and-manag">coastal tourism</a>.</p>
<p>While these activities happen at sea, solutions to improve maritime security must be developed by national governments first. It is not enough to relegate security to navies and coastguards. Governments must first determine where patrols are needed. </p>
<p>In theory, they can do this using comprehensive surveillance techniques to gather intelligence on all activities within their exclusive economic zones. However, many governments in the developing world lack the sufficient <a href="https://www.uneca.org/es-blog/maritime-safety-security-and-development-africa">technical capabilities</a> to do so.</p>
<p>However, if Africa’s coastal states are really committed to developing their blue economies they will also need to employ a wide-reaching <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.774639">maritime strategy</a> over and beyond basic security. The island nation of <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/seychelles-the-worlds-first-blue-economy-enters-the-investment-spotlight">Seychelles</a> has been particularly active in this area. </p>
<p>Maritime strategies help to identify the resources needed to realise the economic potential at sea. They are also the basis for security cooperation between neighbouring countries. This is because maritime insecurity is often a transnational problem.</p>
<p>National security agencies, the international community and NGOs should collaborate to develop a maritime strategy. At the national level, missing capacities can even be provided by the <a href="http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/188441">private sector</a>. To manage this multi-agency approach national governments must ensure that their own priorities are front and centre. </p>
<p>Limiting maritime security to counter-piracy activities will not lead to sustainable solutions. Governments must adopt a more holistic approach to securing the oceans. </p>
<p>It does not make sense to focus on pirate attacks while ignoring other <a href="https://qz.com/978203/illegal-fishing-costs-west-africa-2-3-billion-annually-and-collaboration-between-governments-is-the-only-way-to-stop-it/">criminal activities at sea</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Traditionally maritime security has been defined through the narrow lens of piracy. But as the blue economy grows, African states need to embrace a broader strategy.Dirk Siebels, PhD Candidate (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/779972017-05-30T13:56:01Z2017-05-30T13:56:01ZFrance and Africa: Macron’s rhetoric shouldn’t be confused with reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170581/original/file-20170523-5799-1poproa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron with Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Christophe Petit Tesson</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2017 French election was watched with great nervousness by millions across Francophone Africa. That’s because the French president remains a pivotal figure in about <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20100214-1960-year-independence">20 former French colonies</a> on the continent. </p>
<p>Over the past 60 years France has maintained disproportionate influence over its former African colonies. This has included control over their <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/11/the-ongoing-relationship-between-france-and-its-former-african-colonies/">military and currencies</a>. </p>
<p>Despite being led by different presidents over the past six decades, the French government’s policy on Africa has been faithful to its neo-colonial roots and grounded in a yearning for the lost <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/French_Empire">Empire</a>. </p>
<p>But will Emmanuel Macron’s presidency herald a significant change to France’s relationship with its ex-colonies? </p>
<p>Unlike any other French leader Macron has openly expressed remorse for aspects of France’s <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170219-french-presidential-hopeful-macron-apologises-controversial-comments-colonialism">colonial past</a>. His election rhetoric suggested that he viewed France’s neo-colonial dominance with some embarrassment, preferring to loosen France’s hold on its <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39843396">former colonies</a>. </p>
<p>But it’s one thing to speak of France’s need to confront its colonial past. When it comes to restoring <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/macron-vows-restore-france-global-status-170514171704652.html">French “confidence”</a>, as Macron has promised, policy continuity, rather than change, will prevail.</p>
<h2>A long legacy</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of World War II, Charles De Gaulle formulated a strategy that was meant to define France’s relations with Africa in the post-imperial era. </p>
<p>The plan was to shore up France’s international standing by ensuring a continued <a href="https://www.worldpittsburgh.org/the-french-legacy-in-africa/">relationship with its colonies</a>. In fact, the short-lived Franco-African Union of the 1940s-50s was an attempt to establish a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358536008452284?journalCode=ctrt20">form of federation</a> between France and its former colonies. </p>
<p>Instead, what sprung up across Francophone countries in West and Central Africa was <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/france-loots-former-colonies/">a network</a> of French commercial, military and political interests. These interests worked to maintain the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mahamadou-lamine-sagna/franceafrique-breaking-th_b_3318530.html">status quo</a> of African economic and political elites. </p>
<p>Francafrique had strong <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/france-loots-former-colonies/">colonial underpinnings</a>. Former French colonies provided France with valuable raw material and minerals while opening their markets to French imports. In return, France <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/22/europes-former-imperial-powers-target-aid-ex-colonies">guaranteed</a> national security and a steady flow of aid. </p>
<p>France also propped up francophile leaders, in particular Senegal’s <a href="http://peterbaxterafrica.com/index.php/2012/11/19/leopold-sedar-senghor-the-life-of-a-french-african/">Leopold Sédar Senghor</a> and Cote d’Ivoire’s <a href="http://sites.psu.edu/afr110/2014/10/14/felix-houphouet-boigny/">Felix Houphouet-Boigny</a>. Both saw themselves as the guardians of a paternalistic order that kept Francophone Africa under French tutelage. </p>
<p>More than that, France retained control of the CFA – the basic monetary unit of Central and West Africa. To this day African countries such as Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Gabon, are required <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/france-loots-former-colonies/">to deposit two-thirds</a> of their foreign exchange surpluses into a French operations account. </p>
<p>During Francois Mitterrand’s term in office (1981 - 1995) <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eternal-plight-france-in-search-of-a-new-africa-policy-a-546796.html">60,000</a> French troops were stationed in Francophone Africa. They supported several unsavoury governments, including the Hutu regime presided over by Juvenal Habyarimana in Rwanda, which went on to <a href="http://survivors-fund.org.uk/resources/rwandan-history/statistics/">murder 800,000 Tutsis and some Hutus</a> in the 1994 genocide. French soldiers <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eternal-plight-france-in-search-of-a-new-africa-policy-a-546796.html">did little</a> to stop the bloodbath. </p>
<p>However, relations between France and its former colonies entered a new phase in the post 9/11 era. The Islamic Sahel and Arab North Africa became a <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/terror-came-sahel/">new frontier</a> in the global fight against terror. </p>
<p>French investment and commitment to development faded, paving the way for <a href="http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/french-assistance-institutional/french-assistance-delivery/article/french-bilateral-aid">bilateral funding</a>. Policy moved from guarding strategic assets to securing economic assets by any means necessary. </p>
<p>Under President Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), French policy was <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eternal-plight-france-in-search-of-a-new-africa-policy-a-546796.html">distinctly interventionist</a>.
In 2002, France extended <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eternal-plight-france-in-search-of-a-new-africa-policy-a-546796.html">military support</a> to Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire when his regime was threatened by a rebel insurgency. It remained heavily involved in Cote d'Ivoire until 2011 when <a href="http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast">Gbagbo was dislodged</a> after a bitterly contested election. </p>
<h2>The post-Chirac era</h2>
<p>Chirac was the last of the paternalistic, Gaullist French leaders. After his presidency, France became unapologetically mercantilist: it remains in Francophone Africa to protect its nationals, to guard its assets and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/23/outlook.development">to counter Chinese competition</a> for natural resources and markets. </p>
<p>After Chirac, came President Nicolas Sarkozy who had little empathy for Africa. Sarkozy’s policy was centred on immigration, an issue that was at the top of his government’s agenda. As a way to deter immigration he adopted a “co-development” strategy, which saw France invest in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/sarkozy-and-africa-misunderstanding-or-change">education</a> in Francophone Africa.</p>
<p>Socialist president Francois Hollande (2012 - 2017) became more involved in Africa than any other president, contradicting his apparently <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20795750">progressive rhetoric</a>, which suggested a rethink of France’s neo-colonial relationship with the continent. </p>
<p>During Hollande’s term security issues that threatened French interests led to a series of military interventions. These included Operation Serval and <a href="http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/Five-strategic-failures-of-the-French-intervention-in-Mali">Operation Barkhane</a> in Mali. </p>
<p>There were also military interventions in <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20160430-france-boost-military-presence-cote-ivoire-0">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, and the <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/africa/operation-sangaris-france-s-military-mission-in-car-1.1920968">Central African Republic</a>. </p>
<p>What started out as an ideological policy to maintain soft power through cultural and economic ties between France and francophone Africa had gradually become a coercive, militarised relationship.</p>
<h2>The age of Macron</h2>
<p>During the election campaign Emmanuel Macron told <em>Le Figaro</em> that France’s colonial occupation of Algeria was mired by “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/87d6f430-f521-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608">crimes against humanity</a>” and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/87d6f430-f521-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608">“acts of barbarism”</a>.</p>
<p>Macron is the first self-styled apologist to take office in France. He is calling for the severing of France’s relationship with Francophone Africa, but on African terms. Macron argues that a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39843396">gradual phasing out</a> of the CFA franc and withdrawal of French troops should be implemented if that’s what Africans want. </p>
<p>But, nearly 60 years after African independence, France and Francophone Africa remain entangled beyond separation. French companies still have a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.html">quasi-monopoly</a> over the most strategic areas in Francophone economies. Examples include electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure, airports and harbours. France’s continued influence on Francophone African foreign policy is apparent in Africa’s policy alignments. </p>
<p>Macron is a neo-liberal and former investment banker determined to open Africa up for greater trade even amid security concerns. His <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39968319">first visit</a> outside Europe was to French military forces in Mali. Some see this as a sign that his presidency may have an increasingly <a href="https://guardian.ng/politics/what-macrons-election-means-for-africa/">militaristic impact</a> on Africa. </p>
<p>Macron’s sober view of colonial history therefore should be taken with a pinch of salt, as he’s unlikely to loosen France’s grip over Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meera Venkatachalam's primary affiliation is with the Observer Research Foundation in India.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite being led by different presidents over the past six decades, the French government’s policy on Africa has been faithful to its neo-colonial roots. Will Macron’s government be any different?Meera Venkatachalam, Senior Fellow, African Studies, University of Mumbai Amy Niang, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775682017-05-16T16:07:44Z2017-05-16T16:07:44ZWhy the role of the media is so important to free and fair elections in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169128/original/file-20170512-3689-1ommg0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga briefing the media in 2008 after post-election turmoil. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bernat Armangue/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The news media is usually one of first casualties of bungled or contested elections. From the recent <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/12/report-general-election-coverage-overwhelmingly-negative-in-tone-232307">US elections</a>, the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-latest-news-eu-referendum-media-coverage-acrimonious-divisive-report-kings-college-a7727716.html">UK’s Brexit</a> vote to <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/election-observers-in-zambia-report-media-biased-in-vote/a-19473207">Zambia’s controversial 2016 presidential elections</a>, the mainstream news media bore the brunt of much of the criticism that followed.</p>
<p>In Africa, biased media coverage, most often in favour of incumbent presidents, is one of the reasons voters have <a href="http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/index.php/resources/entry/no_big_deal_poverty_service_delivery_and_election_coverage_election_report_/">little faith</a> in the legitimacy of election outcomes. </p>
<p>In South Africa for example, the public broadcaster routinely comes under <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local-Elections-2011/DA-SABC-coverage-of-ANC-rally-biased-20110515">intense criticism</a> at election time for being a propaganda outlet for the ruling African National Congress. </p>
<p>Kenya’s state broadcaster has often shed its public mandate to become the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7143996.stm">governing party’s mouthpiece</a> during general elections. In countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia public broadcasters openly canvas for incumbent governments during elections.</p>
<h2>Media as independent arbiter</h2>
<p>Over the last few years, the nature of political campaigns in Africa has changed significantly. Politicians and political parties are now actively shaping their public profiles. They are engaging <a href="http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/04/06/how-british-pr-firm-helped-jubilee-win_c757891">powerful PR agencies</a> and even starting their own media organisations to market themselves. </p>
<p>In Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta’s governing Jubilee Party has engaged the services of British PR firm BTP Advisors, as well as the data mining company <a href="http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/05/10/uhuru-hires-data-firm-behind-trump-brexit-victories_c1557720">Cambridge Analytica (CA)</a>. </p>
<p>CA played a key role in Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential elections, and in the UK’s Brexit vote through aggressive data driven campaigning. </p>
<p>This changing political landscape has complicated the media’s role in the coverage of elections. But there’s still an expectation that the mainstream news media should play the <a href="https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/tools/kenya-elections.pdf">role of impartial arbiter</a>. </p>
<p>They are expected to provide an open platform for broader public deliberation particularly at election time.</p>
<p>It’s this expectation that informs criticism when the media fails to fulfil this important mandate. Indeed, while digital technologies such as social media have now been widely adopted in Africa, millions remain <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2016-04-29-africa-connectivity">unconnected to the Internet</a>. This means that that these new platforms are inaccessible to the masses. </p>
<p>Traditional media - particularly radio - therefore remain an important platform for public engagement. At election time, these kinds of legacy media formats are critical in enabling the public to make informed choices.</p>
<p>Elections in Africa are fiercely fought because the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ethnicity-an-african-predicament/">state is seen as a resource</a>. Winning elections makes accessing the state possible, usually to the exclusion of those who lose. </p>
<p>Because the stakes are so high, when people lose faith in the credibility of an election some resort to violence. This was the case in Kenya following the disputed 2007-2008 elections. </p>
<p>This led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/15/kenya-post-election-violence-amnesty-international">post-election violence</a>. Over 1000 people lost their lives, 600,000 were displaced and property worth millions of Kenyan shillings was destroyed.</p>
<h2>The peace narrative</h2>
<p>This August, Kenya goes to the polls again in what’s expected to be another bruising political context. For the country’s news media, the coverage of these elections will be extremely challenging. </p>
<p>The last elections held in 2013 were largely peaceful even if the outcome of the presidential tally was disputed. The peaceful elections, which were fought with as much passion as the disputed 2007 poll, didn’t happen that way by accident. </p>
<p>The Kenyan media adopted a new approach in 2013 after having been accused of <a href="http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/the-kenyan-2007-elections-and-their-aftermath-the-role-of-media-and-communication/">contributing to the violence</a> that engulfed the country in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.peacejournalism.org/Peace_Journalism/Welcome.html">“Peace” journalism</a> was uniformly adopted by all mainstream media. Controversial stories were not covered. Meanwhile, reference to politicians’ ethnic identities was avoided in media coverage. </p>
<p>Ethnicity remains an important characteristic of political competition in Kenya hence the sensitivity to ethnic markers of identity. But “peace” journalism remains controversial and the Kenyan media was <a href="http://www.journalism.co.za/blog/self-censorship-by-the-kenyan-media-in-the-2013-elections/">widely criticised</a> for adopting it. </p>
<p>Many argue that focusing on peace at the expense of the credibility of the elections, ignoring for example numerous electoral anomalies, was a case of <a href="http://freespeechdebate.com/discuss/124451/">self-censorship</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, renowned writers such as Michaela Wrong likened the Kenyan media to <a href="https://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/erring-on-the-side-of-caution-kenyas-media-undercovered-the-election/">“a zombie army”</a>. She argued that it had “taken up position where Kenya’s feisty media used to be, with local reporters going glaze-eyed through the motions”.</p>
<p>Local journalists didn’t agree. They argued that <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Ms-Wrong-is-wrong-on-Kenya-yet-again/440808-1728676-r3hpv7z/index.html">erring on the side of caution</a> was a sacrifice worth making in light of the 2007-2008 post-election violence, when the news media was accused of irresponsible coverage which contributed to it.</p>
<h2>Changing media landscape</h2>
<p>As the news media decides which approach to adopt in the coverage of the next general election, it must recognise that its role has changed considerably in Africa and around the world. While mainstream media remains an important space for public debate, it can no longer be regarded as an impartial arbiter due to three key changes. </p>
<p>First, the African media has become an active participant in the political process because quite a few outlets are now owned by politicians. In Kenya for example, <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/Kenyatta-business-empire-goes-into-expansion-drive/539550-2069704-liwltz/index.html">the current president owns Media Max</a>, a company with diverse media interests including TV, radio and newspapers. </p>
<p>Media outlets that are owned by politicians have been known to take sides either covertly or overtly. While this tradition is part of the political culture in the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/18/americas-tradition-of-media-bias/">United States</a> and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/british-media-is-the-most-right-wing-in-europe-yougov-finds-a6859266.html">Europe</a>, such partisanship is still only grudgingly accepted in Africa. </p>
<p>Second, elections have become an important <a href="http://aceproject.org/main/english/me/mec04b.htm">source of revenue</a> for the media with wealthy candidates and political parties spending large amounts of money in political advertising. As such, coverage is skewed in favour of those who can afford the high cost of advertising. </p>
<p>In Kenya for example, a staggering <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000064917/media-warms-up-to-political-cash">8 billion shillings</a> ($77 million) was spent on radio campaigns alone during the 2013 election cycle.</p>
<p>Finally, the number of news content providers has grown exponentially. Mainstream media now has to fight for audiences like never before. This has forced it to ignore some of the most fundamental features of journalism like the verification of stories and strong gate-keeping processes.</p>
<p>As political campaigns evolve in Africa, so must media coverage of elections. However, it remains incumbent upon the press to act responsibly and in the interest of democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Ogola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Media coverage of elections is changing as the industry adopts new practices and politicians become more invested in their personal brands. But can the press remain objective?George Ogola, Senior Lecturer in Journalism, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/732922017-03-06T18:04:44Z2017-03-06T18:04:44ZAfrican governments versus social media: Why the uneasy relationship?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159528/original/image-20170306-938-1t2lpfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The list of African countries blocking access to social media during elections is growing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many Kenyan social media users are worried that the government will shut down the internet during August’s general election. Kenya’s Communications Authority has attempted to reassure voters that this is <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Kenya-to-monitor-social-media-during-elections/2558-3515588-cwdl3i/index.html">unlikely</a>. However, fears that internet freedoms could be at risk are not unfounded. </p>
<p>The list of African countries that have blocked access to social media during elections and other politically sensitive periods is growing.</p>
<p>Over the past year this included; <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/cameroon-anglophone-areas-suffer-internet-blackout-170125174215077.html">Cameroon</a>, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/media-obstructed-during-chads-presidential-election">Chad</a>, <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/DR-Congo-orders-social-networks-shut-as-Kabila-term-expires/2558-3488600-58yc5gz/index.html">the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://qz.com/771996/gabon-is-the-latest-african-country-to-shut-down-its-internet-as-election-protests-grow/">Gabon</a>, <a href="https://qz.com/850002/gambias-government-has-shut-down-the-internet-on-the-eve-of-elections/">Gambia</a>, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/congo-orders-telecom-providers-to-shut-down-services-for-election-day/a-19129396">the Republic of Congo</a> and <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0Y30YC">Uganda</a>. </p>
<p>Countries like <a href="https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38450/Ethiopia-Computer-Crime-Proclamation-Legal-Analysis-July-(1).pdf">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/jail-terms-defaming-officials-online-under-new-law">Madagascar</a> and <a href="https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38058/en/tanzania:-cybercrime-act-2015">Tanzania</a>, have introduced cybercrime legislation that threatens freedom of expression. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, social media users, including journalists, have been prosecuted under existing legislation for content they have <a href="http://cipesa.org/?wpfb_dl=225">shared online</a>.</p>
<p>Such actions are often justified in terms of preserving peace and security because social media does offer a potential platform for the dissemination of hate speech and incitement to violence. </p>
<p>This is particularly problematic in contexts where political candidates draw on ethnic or religious differences to mobilise support. The role played by <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/76346/kenya-spreading-word-hate">incendiary text messages</a> in the violence around Kenya’s 2007 elections, for example, is often evoked as a reminder of the potential dangers of unregulated mass communication. </p>
<p>In South Sudan, the ongoing conflict has been fuelled by <a href="https://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2016/07/12/facebook-and-social-media-fanning-the-flames-of-war-in-south-sudan/">online rumours and hate speech</a>. Some even blamed a ‘false’ <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/13/africa/south-sudan-violence-questions/">Facebook post</a> for causing 150 deaths. </p>
<p>In parts of Africa, social media provides a tool for terrorist groups to <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/How-cyber-crime-complicates-war-on-terror/2558-2422854-item-0-485eum/index.html">recruit and communicate</a> with their followers.</p>
<p>However, government claims that social media is dangerous and shouldn’t always be taken at face value. New forms of communication are shaking up political competition across Africa as elsewhere. This has worrying implications for regimes that hope to cling to power. </p>
<h2>Alternative source of news</h2>
<p>Social media provides new ways of rapidly sharing information with large numbers of people. In the past a joke poking fun at a political leader might have been shared with a few friends. Today it could reach thousands. </p>
<p>Blogs and platforms, such as WhatsApp, have become major sources of news for many internet users. They sometimes <a href="http://www.ifree.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/State-of-Internet-Report-Kenya-2016.pdf">inform</a> what’s reported in the ‘traditional’ media. </p>
<p>Jokes aside, government violations of electoral procedures or other human rights violations can be exposed online. </p>
<p>Social media has played a role in empowering civil society and helps opposition movements to organise in some of Africa’s most <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/in-central-africa-citizens-are-using-social-media-to-build-democracy-heres-how/?utm_term=.5ff4a14d042b">authoritarian countries</a>. </p>
<p>The internet also gives localised political issues a global audience. This was the case during recent protests in Ethiopia, when opponents of the regime in the diaspora were able to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38076389">engage</a> through social media. </p>
<p>However, increased online communication also offers new opportunities for government surveillance and censorship. Internet shutdowns and ‘cybercrime’ prosecutions that target critics of leaders are tools with which to close down political space. </p>
<p>In countries such as Tanzania, restrictions on online debate have been accompanied by complementary offline measures. These include a ban on political rallies and <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/magufulis-bulldozing-leadership-questioned/a-19371737">prosecutions</a> of opposition members of parliament for sedition. </p>
<h2>Standing up to the state</h2>
<p>In the face of government censorship, citizens have attempted to resist restrictions on their internet freedom. For example, in 2016, many Ugandans undermined attempts to block social media by using virtual private networks (VPNs) to <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uganda-social-media-shutdown-proves-futile/2558-3086688-qki8pr/index.html">connect</a>. </p>
<p>Mobile network <a href="https://qz.com/903311/mtn-orange-telecom-should-do-more-to-stop-africa-internet-shutdowns/">operators</a> may face questions about whether they can do more to stand up to governments in future. </p>
<p>Challenging restrictive legislation in court may also prove successful. In Kenya, for example, a legal provision relating to ‘improper’ use of a telecommunications device was declared <a href="https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38343/en/kenya:-win-for-freedom-of-expression-as-repressive-law-declared-unconstitutional">unconstitutional</a>. </p>
<p>However, in neighbouring Tanzania an attempt to challenge the Cybercrime Act was <a href="http://dailynews.co.tz/index.php/home-news/47613-anti-cyber-crime-act-petition-quashed">dismissed</a>. </p>
<p>These are certainly not issues that only affect African countries.</p>
<p>Between June 2015 and July 2016 there were 81 short-term disruptions to internet access in 19 countries. They included <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/intenet-shutdowns-v-3.pdf">India, Turkey and Vietnam</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, the growth of social media has stimulated debate about where to draw the line between protecting freedom of speech and giving a voice to hatred and extremism. </p>
<p>Last year’s presidential campaign in the United States generated concerns about the role of social media in spreading <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/10/facebook-fake-news-election-conspiracy-theories">‘fake news’</a> with important political consequences. </p>
<p>These debates are urgent in parts of Africa. </p>
<p>In 2017, elections are due in a <a href="https://qz.com/876761/five-african-2017-elections-to-watch-rwanda-kenya-angola-liberia-and-drc/">number of countries</a> that have recent histories of electoral violence. Here, ethnic and regional divisions have in the past been manipulated by political candidates. </p>
<p>There’s therefore a need to consider how to ensure social media isn’t used to incite violence or spread dangerous rumours. The question remains as to how governments can be prevented from seizing the opportunity to restrict citizens’ rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charlotte Cross does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This is election year for several African countries and there’s a need to ensure social media isn’t used to incite violence. But can governments be prevented from restricting citizens’ rights?Charlotte Cross, Lecturer in International Development, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.