tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/poland-1452/articlesPoland – The Conversation2024-03-14T16:25:45Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256252024-03-14T16:25:45Z2024-03-14T16:25:45ZUkraine war: a warning for Kyiv’s western allies from the failed Polish uprising of 1830-31<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581600/original/file-20240313-26-eed233.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C1016%2C678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Polish forces triumphed over a larger Russian force at the Battle of Stoczek, February 1831.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maciej Szczepańczyk/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-preparing-new-weapons-package-ukraine-officials-2024-03-12/">has been reported</a> that the US president, Joe Biden, has managed to scrape together US$300 million (£235 million) as an emergency measure to supply the Ukraine military with at least some ammunition as it struggles to hold the line against better-supplied Russian forces. </p>
<p>The news should stand as a reminder of just how urgent the situation is for Ukraine, which is begging its western allies to stand firm and maintain the levels of support that had given its army the edge over the invaders in the summer of 2022. After a few months of significant successes on the battlefield, growing shortages of weaponry stymied Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive in the late spring of 2023. The conflict has developed into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">war of attrition</a>, giving Russia – which has a far larger population from which to recruit – the advantage if things don’t change soon.</p>
<p>There are valuable parallels to be had by considering the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. On <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/November-Insurrection">November 19 1830</a>, Polish insurgents rose to free their nation from the sovereignty of the autocratic Russian tsar, Nicholas I. This was not simply a nationalist uprising. As with the current war in Ukraine, ideological principles were at stake with implications for all of Europe. </p>
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<p>The officer cadets who led the revolt had been outraged by the tsar’s suggestion that Polish troops might be used to suppress <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Revolutions-of-1830">liberal revolutions</a> in France and Belgium. Poland itself was partitioned between Russia, Austria and Prussia. </p>
<p>Russia’s share, the Congress Kingdom of Poland, was technically a constitutional monarchy, with a liberal constitution: the <a href="https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/the-napoleonic-code/#:%7E:text=The%201804%20Napoleonic%20Code%2C%20which,secular%20character%20of%20the%20state.">Napoleonic Code</a>, a free press and an elected assembly (the Sejm). </p>
<p>Yet the tsar held supreme power – he could dissolve the Sejm, veto legislation and send Polish troops to crush foreign revolutions. Nicholas’s own contempt for constitutional government manifested itself in the growth of an oppressive police state. The Poles rose in defence of their liberties.</p>
<p>As with Ukraine in 2022, liberal sentiment across Europe quickly rallied to their cause and <a href="https://www.porta-polonica.de/en/atlas-of-remembrance-places/german-polish-enthusiasm-1830">support for the Polish</a> was widespread. </p>
<p>The military history of the war also offers instructive parallels with the current war in Ukraine. The tsar’s determination to crush the insurrection and impose his will on the Poles in 1830 is a reminder of how deeply-rooted Russia’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657">strategic goals</a> in eastern Europe are. </p>
<p>It is, therefore, most unlikely that the current autocrat in the Kremlin – who has often <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/">lamented the loss of empire</a> with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s – will be sated with minor territorial gains in Ukraine. The resistance offered by the Poles, on the other hand, was redolent of the early successes won by Ukrainian arms in 2022.</p>
<h2>David v Goliath</h2>
<p>The odds seemed stacked heavily in Russia’s favour. A Polish army of 40,000 faced an invading Russian force of 120,000. Yet, as accounts by participants such as the Polish cavalryman <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/History_of_the_Late_Polish_Revolution.html?id=QEQCAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y">Joseph Hordynski</a> reveal, the skill and professionalism of Polish soldiers was enough to stall the Russian advance. </p>
<p>At battles such as <a href="https://securityanddefence.pl/The-canon-provider-starts-his-career-General-Jozef-Dwernicki-and-the-cavalry-battle,103157,0,2.html">Stoczek</a>, (February 14 1831), <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Battle_of_Bia%C5%82o%C5%82%C4%99ka">Białołęka </a>(February 24-25 1831) and <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/60867/pg60867-images.html#CHAPTER_XIII">Debe-Wielke</a> (March 30 1831) the Poles either defeated the Russians or fought them to a standstill. </p>
<p>Hordynski describes effective use of <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA528264.pdf">combined arms tactics</a>, skilful use of terrain, feigned retreats and ambushes. Russian forces seemed ponderous and uncoordinated in comparison, again echoing the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare">battlefields of 2022</a>. </p>
<p>In another parallel with the current conflict in Ukraine, widespread popular support fuelled Polish resistance. This extended even to areas outside Congress Poland, such as Lithuania, where <a href="http://museum.by/en/node/58511">Countess Emilia Plater</a> led insurgent forces against the Russians. Then, as now, the Russians faced attacks <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukrainian-attacks-within-russia-challenge-putins-war-narrative">in areas they had thought secure</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Painting of Emilia Plater in a skirmish at Šiauliai by Wojciech Kossak." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lithuanian resistance fighter Countess Emilia Plater led a small military unit during the uprising – she is now a national heroine in Poland and Lithuania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>And yet the Polish uprising was crushed within a year. It is the circumstances of that defeat that perhaps demand the most scrutiny at this moment, as the war in Ukraine settles into a relentless attritional struggle, where Russia’s material advantages threaten to overwhelm Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Russian military performance improved in 1831, and they won an important victory at <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Battle_of_Ostro%C5%82%C4%99ka_(1831)">Ostrołęka</a>, (May 16 1831). The resolve of Polish leadership wavered; General Józef Chłopicki and his successor General Jan Skrzynecki favoured reaching a negotiated settlement with the tsar. </p>
<p>While Polish battlefield tactics were bold, their national strategy was defensive and conciliatory. The uprising lost its impetus. By September 1831, the Russians had closed on Warsaw. The defending army withdrew, finally crossing into Prussia in defeat. </p>
<h2>Waning support</h2>
<p>The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/zelenskyy-rejects-talks-with-putin-he-already-demonstrated-dialogue-format-in-port-of-odesa/ar-BB1jLaWb">showing no such inclination towards a negotiated peace</a> that would, as in 1831, effectively equate to a Russian victory.</p>
<p>Yet there is another aspect of Poland’s defeat that suggests troubling parallels. The widespread popular sentiment in support of the uprising across Europe did not result in any meaningful material aid for the Polish cause. The preoccupations of domestic politics and narrow national self-interest combined to deny the Poles the means of sustaining their struggle. </p>
<p>The British were distracted by the debates over the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseofcommons/reformacts/overview/reformact1832/">reform bill</a>. In Vienna, the Austrian government was initially content to see Russia weakened but later, fearing the contagion of revolution, closed its border and handed over Polish refugees to the Russian authorities. </p>
<p>France’s government and new king, Louis-Philippe, presiding uneasily over a divided nation, settled on a policy of non-intervention. Prussia opted for pragmatism and opened its borders to Russian troops, allowed arms and provisions to cross its frontiers to alleviate Russian logistical weaknesses and arrested German volunteers travelling to join the Polish army. </p>
<p>Today, the wavering of international support for Ukraine echoes this situation. The Papacy <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pope-says-ukraine-should-have-courage-white-flag-negotiations-2024-03-09/">calls for capitulation</a> thinly veiled as negotiation, while in the US House of Representatives, Republicans <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240214-us-house-speaker-johnson-blocks-vote-ukraine-israel-taiwan-aid-passed-senate-donald-trump-republicans">block further aid to Ukraine</a>. European nations are also struggling to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-to-ukraine-half-is-better-than-nothing-when-it-comes-to-ammunition/">deliver the munitions promised to Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Ukraine cannot prevail without international support. Will its allies provide it – or will they abandon them, as they did the Poles in 1831?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gervase Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Waning support from Poland’s allies meant the war descended to an attritional struggle, giving Russia the advantage it needed to win.Gervase Phillips, Principal Lecturer in History, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257142024-03-13T14:57:43Z2024-03-13T14:57:43ZAbortion rights are featuring in this year’s European election campaign in a way we’ve not seen before<p>The recent landmark decision in France to inscribe the right to abortion in the constitution serves to protect the law that first legalised abortion in the country in 1975. This law – the so-called Veil law – was championed by Simone Veil, one of France’s most admired and respected political figures, and an icon of the women’s rights movement.</p>
<p>In 1974, Veil, a magistrate who had been asked by French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to serve as health minister in his government, delivered a momentous <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45MOc6PYoY8">speech</a>. She presented the public health case for the decriminalisation of abortion to the National Assembly, which at the time was composed almost entirely of men. </p>
<p>The speech was met by fierce opposition and hostility, especially by those on the political right. Veil nevertheless managed to convince a majority of the deputies to vote in favour of her proposal. Once approved by the Senate, the law entered into force in 1975. Veil thereby became a symbol of women’s empowerment and emancipation.</p>
<p>Following her political success at national level, Veil stood in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. Once elected, the parliament chose her as its president, and she became the first woman to head any of the European institutions.</p>
<h2>An election ahead</h2>
<p>Political parties are now gearing up for the latest round of elections to the European Parliament in June, more than 40 years after Veil first entered the institution. And issues of reproductive rights are on the agenda once again. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A black and white portrait photo of Simone Veil." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1138&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1138&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581645/original/file-20240313-16-e73bjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1138&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Simone Veil, legend of the women’s rights movement and European politics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simone_Veil#/media/File:Simone_Veil_bij_uitreiking_Four_Freedoms_Awards_in_Middelburg,_Bestanddeelnr_933-0124_-_Restoration.jpg">Wikipedia/Anefo photo collection</a></span>
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<p>In 2022, the European parliament felt the need to issue a <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0243_EN.html">resolution</a> strongly condemning backsliding in women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health rights. </p>
<p>This came in response to the US Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v Wade, which had guaranteed the constitutional right to abortion for 50 years. But it was also a response to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/abortion-right-europe-vary-widely-getting-squeezed/">developments</a> in some EU member states. </p>
<p>The resolution highlighted in particular the de facto ban on abortion that has come into force in Poland in recent years but also mentioned Malta, where abortion is illegal, Slovakia, where access is restricted, Hungary, where procedures are “not available” and Italy, where rights are being threatened. </p>
<p>Importantly, the resolution also calls for the right to abortion to be included in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would mean all women in the European Union would have the right to access reproductive healthcare of this kind, thereby offering them some protection from restrictions in their home nations. </p>
<p>This call was echoed by French president <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240308-france-s-macron-to-seal-abortion-becoming-constitutional-right">Emmanuel Macron</a> during the ceremony marking the new constitutional right to abortion in France.</p>
<p>Yet, the parliamentary resolution masks internal divisions between, and sometimes within, the political groups of the European parliament. As these political groups are launching their campaigns and election manifestos, it is clear that the issue of abortion has become part of the wider political polarisation seen across Europe.</p>
<p>Many far-right parties, which are predicted to <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/">make significant gains</a> in the upcoming elections, call for restrictions on abortion rights. The European Conservatives and Reformists, a right-wing group that brings together parties such as Brothers of Italy and Spain’s Vox, says it wants to “<a href="https://ecrgroup.eu/campaign/family_and_life">defend life, from its conception until its natural end.</a>”. </p>
<p>The political parties within the Identity & Democracy group do not share a common position on the issue, but several adopt a restrictive approach. For example, the Alternative for Germany recently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-parliament-bundestagvotes-to-remove-ban-on-abortion-advertising/">voted against</a> a proposal to ban a law preventing doctors from providing information on abortion procedures in Germany.</p>
<p>The centre-right European People’s Party, the biggest political group in the Parliament, remains <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/abortion-debate-european-parliament-division-hatred/">divided</a> on the issue, but most of its MEPs agree that abortion should remain a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.13378">matter of national competence</a>. </p>
<p>Groups on the other side of the political spectrum, meanwhile, are making explicit reference to the need to safeguard and expand reproductive health and rights in their European election manifestos. They include <a href="https://left.eu/mon-corps-mon-choix/">the Left</a> group, <a href="https://www.datocms-assets.com/87481/1708539548-egp_manifesto-2024_courage-to-change.pdf">the Greens</a> and the <a href="https://pes.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024_PES_Manifesto_EN.pdf">Socialist & Democrats</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the liberal group Renew Europe is pushing for greater alignment on abortion rights across the EU. It it is behind the recently launched <a href="https://www.simoneveilpact.eu/">Simone Veil Pact</a>, which calls for greater pan-European effort on gender equality.</p>
<h2>A new parliamentary term</h2>
<p>Veil considered the European parliament a key institution in the democratic development of the European Community. She saw the right given to Europeans to vote for the parliament as a <a href="https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/174d384d-d5c7-4c02-ad78-b1f6efc9740a/publishable_en.pdf">milestone</a> and a springboard for increased parliamentary involvement in European integration and decision-making. Under her leadership, the European parliament gained greater recognition and transformed into a real political actor.</p>
<p>Veil held the post of president for three years, and she remained a member of the European parliament until 1993. During her three terms as an MEP, she continued to support issues relating to women’s rights.</p>
<p>The arguments once made by Simone Veil, who in 2018 was honoured with a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20180629-liveblog-france-women-rights-abortion-simone-veil-holocaust-pantheon">burial in the Panthéon</a> (the Parisian mausoleum reserved exclusively for France’s most eminent citizens), are surfacing once again ahead of the hotly contested European parliament elections. </p>
<p>When the 720 newly elected MEPs meet for the next parliamentary term, discussions and debates around abortion and women’s rights are bound to continue. They may well take a different tone and occupy a higher position depending on the outcome of the elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Legendary European parliament president Simone Veil fought for women’s reproductive rights in France and in Brussels. Is her legacy about to be re-opened?Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194812024-02-27T01:14:35Z2024-02-27T01:14:35ZPoland has opened its arms to nearly 1 million Ukrainian refugees, but will they be able to stay for the long term?<p>Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European landscape has been completely transformed by Ukrainian migrants fleeing their homeland. </p>
<p>According to the European Union, around <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/">4.2 million Ukrainians</a> currently receive temporary protection in EU countries, which entitles them to residence permits, working rights and access to health care and education. </p>
<p>The largest number are in Germany, where 1.2 million Ukrainians were living as of November 2023. Surprisingly, the second-largest number of refugees (960,000) are in Poland, a country with <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003196327-2/poland-position-map-forced-mobility-european-context-karolina-sobczak-szelc-marta-pachocka-konrad-p%C4%99dziwiatr-justyna-sza%C5%82a%C5%84ska-monika-szulecka?context=ubx&refId=6660469b-8bf9-4be8-9247-9e8ed9a51310">no significant history of accepting forced migrants</a>. </p>
<p>In the weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Poland immediately opened its borders and became the primary recipient of Ukrainian refugees. By <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/acaps-briefing-note-refugee-influx-ukraine-25-may-2022">May 2022</a>, 3.5 million Ukrainians – or 53% of all people who fled the country – had crossed the border into Poland. </p>
<p>Many have since returned to Ukraine or settled elsewhere, but many have stayed. Why has Poland been so open to this large number of migrants – and how long will they be able to stay?</p>
<h2>Why Poland?</h2>
<p>The large number of refugees was no doubt facilitated by the <a href="https://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/rzesz/ASSETS_charakteryst_pogran.pdf">530-kilometre border</a> shared by the two countries. But Ukraine and Poland have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2024.2310245">much more in common</a>. They share a <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/poland-ukraine-history-divides/">complex, intertwined history</a> marked by territorial wars, mutual antagonisms and historical disagreements, as well as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/acaps-briefing-note-refugee-influx-ukraine-25-may-2022">linguistic and cultural similarities</a> and first-hand experience of communist rule.</p>
<p>During Poland’s post-1989 transition to democracy, migrants from Ukraine became an important part of the labour force. Then, in 2014, conflict sparked by Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine <a href="http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-7-no-2-2018/articles/employment-foreigners-poland-and-labour-market-situation">drove more Ukrainian migrants</a> to Poland. </p>
<p>Before the 2022 Russian invasion, roughly 2 million foreigners lived in Poland – <a href="https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022.pdf">some 1.35 million of them Ukrainians</a>. These Ukrainians were largely male workers, benefiting from the <a href="http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-7-no-2-2018/articles/employment-foreigners-poland-and-labour-market-situation">huge demand for labour</a> in a country with an ageing and shrinking workforce. </p>
<p>Given this history of migration, it stands to reason Poland would show solidarity with Ukrainians after the invasion. And the large Ukrainian migrant population already familiar with living in Poland <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2024.2310245">volunteered to help</a> the refugees when they arrived – mostly women with children. </p>
<p>This spontaneous welcome and support was also offered by <a href="https://theconversation.com/polands-hospitality-is-helping-many-ukrainian-refugees-thrive-5-takeaways-200406">ordinary Polish citizens and local NGOs</a>. They even opened their homes to refugees and <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">helped them find (or offered) employment</a>. The level of support from the public was unprecedented.</p>
<p>What drove this huge swell of public empathy? While some were <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">motivated</a> by their previous contact with migrants, <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">the collective memory</a> of Soviet invasion and occupation was also important.</p>
<p>As the war has dragged on, some Poles have begun to worry about the impact of refugees on the country’s finances and health care. While public support was nearly universal (94%) for <a href="https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2023/09_2023.pdf">admitting Ukrainian refugees in March 2022</a>, it slipped to 65% in September 2023. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576414/original/file-20240219-23-cer2j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Polish volunteers rushed to aid recent Ukrainian refugees arriving at the Wroclaw railway station in early 2022. Maksym Szyda/Shutterstock.</span>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/polish-generosity-risks-hardening-anti-immigrant-sentiments-towards-ukrainian-refugees-in-the-long-term-179161">Polish generosity risks hardening anti-immigrant sentiments towards Ukrainian refugees in the long term</a>
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<h2>A notable shift from the government</h2>
<p>The Polish government also swiftly adopted a <a href="https://ukraina.interwencjaprawna.pl/the-act-on-assistance-for-ukrainian-citizens/">special-purpose law</a> that gave Ukrainians temporary protection status and access to the same publicly funded services as Poles, such as welfare and employment rights, <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/01/12/almost-14000-ukrainian-businesses-created-in-poland-in-the-first-nine-months-of-2022/">including business ownership</a>. This law is rooted in the 2001 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729331/EPRS_BRI(2022)729331_EN.pdf">EU Temporary Protection Directive</a>, which was activated after the invasion for the first time.</p>
<p>By December 2023, <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">more than 1.64 million Ukrainians</a> had applied for asylum or temporary protection in Poland – by far the highest number in eastern Europe. Their protection status was <a href="https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/pomoc-obywatelom-ukrainy-przedluzona-do-30-czerwca-2024,525359.html">recently extended</a> until June 30 of this year, with a further extension expected. </p>
<p>This was a startling move for the right-wing, anti-immigration, populist government led by the Law and Justice party. After all, this is the same Polish government that <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/diminishing-solidarity-polish-attitudes-toward-european-migration-and-refugee-crisis">did not implement the EU relocation scheme</a> in response to the 2015–16 European migration crisis. It also responded with force when neighbouring Belarus <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI-Public_narratives_Poland_country_study-revMay23.pdf#page=18">manufactured another crisis</a> in 2021 by sending hundreds of migrants from the Middle East and Africa to the Polish border.</p>
<p>We believe this paradox can be explained by the Ukrainian refugees being aligned with the government’s then-criteria for acceptance. They were perceived as being “genuine” refugees (for example, women, children and elderly people fleeing war) and shared cultural traits with Poles. </p>
<p>This open-door response contrasted with the earlier rhetoric of right-wing politicians and media, who presented non-European refugees as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-018-9287-9">security risk</a> and a <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI-Public_narratives_Poland_country_study-revMay23.pdf#page=34">threatening “other”</a> forced on the government by EU quotas. </p>
<h2>Better opportunities beyond Poland</h2>
<p>Because Ukrainian refugees now hold various residency permits, thanks to their EU-mandated temporary protection status, they can cross borders easily. There have been more than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">17 million crossings</a> from Ukraine to Poland since the invasion, and nearly 14.7 million crossings in the other direction.</p>
<p>Between August 2022 and June 2023, some <a href="https://ewl.com.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Report_From-Poland-to-Germany_New-trends-in-Ukrainian-refugee-migration_.pdf">350,000 Ukrainian refugees</a> also left Poland for other countries. About 100,000 resettled in Germany, lured by stories of <a href="https://ewl.com.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Report_From-Poland-to-Germany_New-trends-in-Ukrainian-refugee-migration_.pdf">better wages and welfare benefits</a>. </p>
<p>Given their high mobility, it remains to be seen how many Ukrainian migrants decide to stay in Poland. The ability to work is key. In 2022, one survey showed the employment rate of Ukrainian refugees in Poland to be <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b0f40584-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/b0f40584-en&_csp_=f32aa69b63450530407ffa5853cb88a4&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e13274-b045ae91b8">65%</a> – the highest for displaced Ukrainians in Europe. A year later, it had only dipped slightly to <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">62%</a>. </p>
<p>According to other Polish surveys, between <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">48%</a> and <a href="https://openfield.pl/pdf/raport_ua_2023_eng.pdf">70% of Ukrainian refugees also hold tertiary qualifications</a>. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b0f40584-en/1/3/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/b0f40584-en&_csp_=f32aa69b63450530407ffa5853cb88a4&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e13274-b045ae91b8">just like in other OECD countries</a>, many Ukrainians in Poland have been working below their qualifications. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://openfield.pl/pdf/raport_ua_2023_eng.pdf">half the refugees</a> in one survey said they couldn’t find a job in 2023, double the rate the year before. And only 7.7% said they wouldn’t take a job below their qualifications, compared with 20% the year before. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-good-bad-and-ideal-refugees-176926">Ukraine: The good, bad and ideal refugees</a>
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<h2>Will they return home?</h2>
<p>Whether refugees ultimately return to Ukraine, however, depends on several factors. Surveys show upwards of <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">39%</a> of migrants intend to remain in Poland permanently or for the long term. The <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">main reasons</a> include the ability to work and provide for themselves and their families, job satisfaction, the opinions of their children, and better housing.</p>
<p>Although more Ukrainians are gaining Polish language skills, about a third report needing <a href="https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf">formal language training and assistance in finding employment</a>.</p>
<p>How Poland responds to these needs will influence whether Ukrainian refugees feel welcome to stay and further integrate into Polish society, particularly under the newly elected, more liberal Polish government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219481/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marta Pachocka is an expert of the Team Europe Direct Poland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sabina Kubiciel-Lodzińska has collaborated academically (without financial reward) with the research company Openfield on a research report comparing pre-war Ukrainian migrants and refugees in Poland. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Golebiowska does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Polish public support for resettling Ukrainian refugees has slipped in recent months, while many new arrivals have had difficulty finding work that aligns with their qualifications.Kate Golebiowska, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Darwin UniversityMarta Pachocka, Assistant Professor, SGH Warsaw School of Economics and Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw School of EconomicsSabina Kubiciel-Lodzińska, Assistant Professor, Opole University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189512023-12-20T16:05:44Z2023-12-20T16:05:44ZPeople love to vote in a new democracy – and then they rapidly lose interest<p>Poland’s recent election has been hailed as a great triumph of democracy in <a href="https://v-dem.net/documents/30/V-dem_democracyreport2023_highres.pdf">a global environment of democratic backsliding</a>. It brought to power a coalition of pro-democratic forces led by <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-government-election-donald-tusk-mateusz-morawiecki-andrzej-duda/">Donald Tusk</a>, the former president of the European Council. </p>
<p>This election was also considered a historical landmark because it saw Poland record <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/huge-turnout-poland-decisive-elections/story?id=104004666#:%7E:text=Nearly%252074%2525%2520of%2520voters%2520turned%2520out%2520to%2520polling%2520stations%2520on%2520Sunday.&text=From%25207%2520a.m.%2520onward%2520Sunday,ballots%2520needed%2520to%2520be%2520printed.">its highest voter turnout since 1919</a>. Participation was even higher than the election that cemented the fall of Communism, paving the way for democracy in the first place.</p>
<p>Yet this election seems to be an outlier. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">Patterns of voter turnout</a> over several decades have shown <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">a systematic and consistent</a> decline. And this decline is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/does-democratic-consolidation-lead-to-a-decline-in-voter-turnout-global-evidence-since-1939/9A234A962871A9580C8A32D62FB6B717">much more accelerated in new democracies</a>, such as those that have transitioned away from communism following the end of the USSR. </p>
<p>This pattern is puzzling. We might expect enthusiasm for democratic transitions to boost voter turnout. Citizens who have ached to exert their democratic rights during a long period of political repression might naturally head out to the polls in their droves. </p>
<p>In the immediate term, this is the case. The euphoria and enthusiasm of the democratic transition can lead to higher turnout in a new democracy’s first election after transition. </p>
<p>I’ve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">examined electoral turnout</a> in 1,086 elections across 100 countries between 1946 and 2015 and found that turnout in the first election after a democratic transition is about three percentage points higher than other elections (in new and established democracies).</p>
<p>But the high turnout rate in the first election is a short-term phenomenon. The rate of participation in new democracies drops consistently as more elections are held.</p>
<p>Tunisia is a prime example. The turnout in its first parliamentary free election in 2011 after the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tunisia-can-bounce-back-authoritarianism-proper-support">fall of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a> was over 90%. But once the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">complicated realities of building democracy set in</a>, turnout tumbled dramatically. </p>
<p>Wrangling over institutional design and the redistribution of political power and resources meant that excitement dissipated and was replaced by <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/11/12/tunisia-a-failed-democratic-experiment/">disappointment with democracy.</a> Tunisians lost their faith in the ability of political actors to keep democracy alive. Participation declined sharply in this period. In <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/low-voter-turnout-in-tunisian-elections-casts-doubt-on-future-parliaments-legitimacy">the most recent election</a> in 2023, turnout barely reached 11%.</p>
<h2>Rapid disillusionment</h2>
<p>The plummet in voter turnout that new democracies experience could be explained by voters rapidly becoming disillusioned with the reality of democracy. That’s not to say they’d return to the undemocratic systems of their past but that they don’t feel enthusiastic enough to go to the polling station on election day.</p>
<p>In the first election after the transition to democracy, also referred to as the founding election, a country’s electoral politics naturally focuses on <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6207585/Book_Elections_in_Estonia_1990_1992_Transitional_and_Founding">pitting opponents and supporters</a> of the former autocracy against those who wanted to overthrow it. But that soon evolves into something more mundane – regular electoral politics in which parties compete over voters based on <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414006293857">partisanship, ideology or policy preferences</a>. </p>
<p>In other words, the binary choice between autocracy and democracy excites voters, while the choices of regular electoral politics may increase apathy among voters. More simply, <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/publications/uwp_41_final.pdf">voters in new democracies may not be used (yet)</a> to the complicated reality of elections in democracy.</p>
<h2>Young revolutionaries become active voters</h2>
<p>The evidence suggests that the way in which a country transitions to democracy <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-dissent-to-democracy-9780190097318?cc=us&lang=en&">plays a part</a> in the political attitudes and behaviours of its citizens. Transitions driven by <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/why-civil-resistance-works/9780231156837">non-violent, mass mobilisation</a> have the potential to socialise people into developing more pro-democratic attitudes. This is perhaps because citizens are made aware of their power to influence politics via participation and therefore become active participants in politics afterwards.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">My research</a>, which used survey data to capture electoral turnout among 1.2 million respondents from 85 democracies between 1982 and 2015, shows that this is a more powerful force among people who experience the transition to democracy during <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137941300084X">their formative years</a>. </p>
<p>Those who transition to democracy between the ages of 15 and 29 are two percentage points more likely to turn out to vote later in life compared to those who experienced the transition outside their formative years, or voters from established democracies that never experienced a transition. People who experienced a transition to democracy after they turned 30 were less likely to turn out to vote in new democracies.</p>
<p>The transition may have socialised the first cohort into being more pro-democratic because younger people are more likely to participate in protests – and experience the violent consequences of doing so. They are also more receptive to unorthodox ideas that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357881">challenge old forms of power</a>.</p>
<p>The different experiences of the older cohort may suggest the socialising effect of democratic transitions may not be able to fully replace <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414019858958?journalCode=cpsa">the socialisation experience of living under autocracy</a>. Being socialised in an environment in which political participation is discouraged and strictly regulated by the government <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/publications/uwp_41_final.pdf">creates habits of disengagement from politics</a> that may not be fully reversed by the excitement of experiencing a democratic transition. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">The global decline in voter turnout</a>, particularly in new democracies, is a worrying sign for the health of democracy. These findings suggest that countering this trend means encouraging people to see participating in democracy as being as important – and exciting – as overthrowing a dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roman Gabriel Olar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Voting patterns over decades show how hard it is to maintain enthusiasm for democracy.Roman Gabriel Olar, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Dublin City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197892023-12-13T18:06:06Z2023-12-13T18:06:06ZWhy did a far-right MP take a fire extinguisher to a Jewish menorah just as Poland’s new government was being voted into power?<p>In an attack caught on video, a member of the Polish parliament (Sejm) used a fire extinguisher to put out the Hanukkah candles on a menorah positioned in a public area of the building, filling the room with mist and covering bystanders with foam. Grzegorz Braun, an MP for the far-right alliance Konfederacja, then stated that “those who take part in acts of Satanic worship should be ashamed”. He was subsequently excluded from the sitting of parliament. Konfederacja <a href="https://twitter.com/KONFEDERACJA_/status/1734629552930885831">condemned</a> his actions on X (formerly Twitter).</p>
<p>Konfederacja was established in 2018 as an alliance of five far-right Polish parties, including Braun’s Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (Confederation of the Polish Crown). The alliance <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-election-results-opposition-donald-tusk-wins-final-count-civic-platform-pis/">won</a> 7.2% of the vote in this year’s election. </p>
<p>Braun himself has been an MP since 2019, and has been outspoken with his antisemitic, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-EU views and conspiracy theories. He infamously <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/anti-semitism-polish-protests-against-restitution">refers</a> to “the war which the Jews have waged against the Polish nation”, for example. </p>
<p>This isn’t his first publicity stunt. In June 2023, he <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/polish-radical-right-wing-mp-disrupts-lecture-on-holocaust/a-65795483">interrupted</a> a lecture on “Poland’s problems with the history of the Holocaust” by shouting “enough” and forcibly taking the microphone away from the speaker. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1734602565223174308"}"></div></p>
<p>Braun’s latest actions may have been a response to the results of the latest Polish election, which saw <a href="https://theconversation.com/poland-votes-for-change-after-nearly-a-decade-spent-sliding-towards-autocracy-but-tricky-coalition-talks-lie-ahead-for-donald-tusk-215618">Donald Tusk’s centrist Civic Coalition (KO)</a> receiving enough votes to form a coalition government with the Left and the centre-right Third Way. Braun’s antisemitic act came just as parliament was preparing for a vote of confidence in the new government. The vote went ahead and the motion passed, despite the disruption.</p>
<h2>Contextualising antisemitism in Poland</h2>
<p>The sight of Braun brandishing the fire extinguisher may have been depressing, but perhaps not surprising, to many Polish people. There is comparatively less stigma around overt antisemitism in Poland than in some other European nations. </p>
<p>It is true that countries such as France and Germany have also struggled with the phenomenon of historical competitive victimhood, feeling that the suffering of their non-Jewish populations during the second world war has been overlooked due to a focus on the Holocaust – but Poland is a particularly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17504902.2023.2245284?src=">prevalent example</a> of the problem.</p>
<p>Non-Jewish Poles suffered a huge amount under the Soviet and Nazi occupations. The Soviet Union did not recognise the Polish state and the Nazis considered all Poles to be subhuman. It is estimated that between <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/2000926-Poles.pdf">1.8 and 1.9 million non-Jewish Poles</a> died under the Nazis.</p>
<p>Accepting Jewish victimhood (<a href="https://holocausteducation.org.uk/teacher-resources/post-it-online-courses/jewish-life-warsaw/">90% of Polish Jews</a> were killed in the Holocaust) and considering the possible <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253010742/hunt-for-the-jews/">complicity</a> of non-Jewish Poles in the occupation is often felt to take focus away from the latter’s experience. Some consider that events such as the Katyn massacre of 1940 are overlooked and the hardship of non-Jewish Polish forced labourers forgotten. </p>
<p>In a recent poll by the Anti-Defamation League, 57% of respondents in Poland said that Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust, and scholars have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43783763">demonstrated</a> that feelings of victimisation correlate with antisemitic beliefs in Poland. This is compounded by the legacy of the communist regime in Poland as part of the Soviet Bloc. During that period, Jewish suffering in the Holocaust was generalised as part of the wider victimhood from fascism, rather than marked as something specific to the Jewish community.</p>
<p>The effects of this are still felt. As recently as 2018, the Law and Justice party (PiS), in government at the time, <a href="https://theconversation.com/poland-is-trying-to-rewrite-history-with-this-controversial-new-holocaust-law-91774">passed a law</a> making it illegal to accuse the Polish nation or state of complicity in the Nazi Holocaust. This was subsequently changed to make it a civil, rather than a criminal, offence.</p>
<p>Catholicism has also played a role in Polish antisemitism since before the Holocaust. This is now visible through religious media outlets such as Radio Maryja, which <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/radio-maryja-25-years-anti-semitism">broadcasts</a> antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as alleged Jewish infiltration in liberal politics, and fears of Jews reclaiming property stolen during the Holocaust. The latter is a particularly contentious issue in Poland, as it is the only EU country not to have passed any legislation to restore stolen property to the descendants of their Jewish owners.</p>
<p>Braun’s reference to “acts of Satanic worship” is also telling. It implies a belief in the <a href="https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/indelible-stain-hate">blood libel claim</a> – the idea that forms a key part of historical anti-Jewish hatred and alleges that Jews use Christian blood in their acts of worship. </p>
<p>Throughout its administration, PiS sought to present itself as the defender of Christian values. And, while not as overtly antisemitic as Konfederacja, PiS has arguably normalised antisemitism while in power due to its exclusionary narratives. The party has drawn on its Christian image to argue that it is defending Poland against Muslims, to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-54191344">ostracise members of the LGBTQ+ community</a> and to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/06/poland-womens-rights-activists-targeted">target</a> women’s rights activists protesting against abortion restrictions. The notion that the Polish in-group is comprised of traditional Catholics and no one else is detrimental to Poland’s Jews.</p>
<h2>The far right in western Europe</h2>
<p>While antisemitism is far from unique to Poland, the far-right parties that have seen electoral success in western Europe are more implicit in their expressions of antisemitism. Parties like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) have learned the gains to be made by refuting accusations of prejudice towards Jews. Braun’s Konfederacja is perhaps ideologically more akin to extreme parties such as Die Heimat (formerly the NPD) in Germany – which are electorally irrelevant now.</p>
<p>Electorally successful parties, such as the AfD, Rassemblement National in France, or the Freedom Party of Austria, are known for engaging in Holocaust relativism and occasionally using antisemitic code words, such as “globalists”. But as these parties have also constructed an image for themselves as pro-Jewish, predominantly through the narrative of wanting to “protect” Jews from Muslim antisemitism, it would be unlikely for these parties to engage in a stunt such as Braun’s, publicly attacking Jews for being Jews.</p>
<p>It is at least comforting that Braun’s stunt received such a backlash and that his alliance remains on the fringes of Polish politics. Meanwhile, Tusk’s new premiership hopefully heralds a time of greater inclusion in Polish society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Burchett receives funding from the London Arts & Humanities Doctoral Training Partnership. </span></em></p>Grzegorz Braun’s act was a reminder of how antisemitism has been normalised by the outgoing administration.Claire Burchett, PhD candidate in European Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163972023-10-31T12:34:32Z2023-10-31T12:34:32ZYoung, female voters were the key to defeating populists in Poland’s election – providing a blueprint to reverse democracy’s decline<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556721/original/file-20231030-27-inp92a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C47%2C6327%2C4164&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Tusk looks set to lead the governing coalition, in large part thanks to female voters.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-leader-of-civic-coalition-donald-tusk-celebrates-the-news-photo/1737953929?adppopup=true">Omar Marques/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The results of Poland’s <a href="https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2023/en">parliamentary elections</a> held on Oct. 15, 2023, have been lauded as a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/opinion/poland-has-shown-how-to-defeat-populism/">blow against populism</a> – and they may also hold important lessons for reversing democracy’s decline. </p>
<p>In the vote, the conservative and increasingly autocratic <a href="https://pis.org.pl/">Law and Justice Party (PiS)</a>, which has ruled since 2015, still received the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-election-results-opposition-donald-tusk-wins-final-count-civic-platform-pis/">largest number of seats</a> (35%) in Poland’s Sejm, the more powerful lower house of parliament. </p>
<p>But it was not enough to form a majority. Instead, it looks likely that the progressive Civic Platform will join forces with the Third Wave and New Left, which <a href="https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2023/en">together received 54% of the votes</a>.</p>
<p>Should that be the case, they will rule as a liberal, pro-European Union government – a far cry from the policies of the PiS, which during its tenure <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/disturbing-campaign-against-polish-judges/605623/">attacked the independence of courts</a>, limited the space for civil society and <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/21599165.2019.1608826">manipulated the public media</a>.</p>
<p>Heading into the national elections, there was no guarantee that politics in Poland would not continue down this route. There were, in fact, <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/red-lines-around-free-and-fair-polish-election">many reasons</a> to wonder whether the October elections were fair.</p>
<p>The PiS government used the elections as an opportunity to simultaneously hold a national referendum, <a href="https://referendum.gov.pl/referendum2023/en/pytania">asking voters to answer questions</a> about migrants, border walls, the retirement age and the selling off of state assets – issues known to be unifying for its supporters.</p>
<p>PiS also used <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/12/turning-propaganda-into-public-service-broadcasting-in-poland/">public media</a> to criticize the opposition. State TV, newspapers and social media – which critics say has, over the preceding eight years, <a href="https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/press-2023/poland-s-parliamentary-elections-were-competitive-but-marked-by-misuse-of-public-resources-and-public-media-bias-international-observers-say">stopped being pluralistic and independent</a> – consistently misrepresented facts and attacked the opposition, often with <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/10/04/leaked-emails-purport-to-show-polish-state-tv-planning-to-declare-opposition-march-a-failure/">outlandish allegations</a>. In addition, exploitation of <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/Red%20Lines%20Polish%20Election_V4.pdf">state-owned companies</a> and public funds gave PiS a “clear advantage” going into the polls, according to the election observers at the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-opposition-eyes-power-after-ruling-nationalists-appear-have-fallen-short-2023-10-16/">Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</a>.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://polisci.unl.edu/patrice-mcmahon">scholar of civil society in central Europe</a>, I was not surprised by the election results. My new co-authored book, “Activism in Hard Times in Central and Eastern Europe: People Power,” explores the role that <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/s10767-022-09440-z">informal activism</a> – that is, non-organized, individual action by citizens – can have in electoral politics.</p>
<p>Here are five factors that contributed to the Polish election result – and could have implications for other countries faced with democratic backsliding.</p>
<h2>1. Voters showed up</h2>
<p>Poles took the elections seriously. With almost three-quarters of the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/huge-turnout-poland-decisive-elections/story?id=104004666">electorate voting (74%)</a>, the turnout was unprecedented in recent times. It was even higher than the first free elections after the fall of communism in 1989. In fact, this was the highest voter turnout since 1919, a year after <a href="https://ipn.gov.pl/en/news/9969,On-11-November-Poland-celebrated-the-National-Independence-Day.html#:%7E:text=On%2011%20November%201918%2C%20after,the%20reconstruction%20of%20Polish%20statehood.">Poland emerged as an independent country</a>. </p>
<p>Part of the reason behind the high turnout was the stakes involved. Opposition parties insisted that <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/democracy-at-stake-in-polish-elections-opposition-says/video-67102078">democracy itself</a> was at stake, while the Law and Justice Party <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-election-parliament-explainer-eef3abebff2f31f29ec0dadde24e71a0">depicted the election as a clear choice</a> between Poland being forced by the EU to open its borders to illegal migrants and adopt a pro-LGBTQ+ agenda, and an independent government that would secure Poland’s borders and promote Christian traditions. Voter turnout was key to the opposition’s victory.</p>
<h2>2. Women mobilized</h2>
<p>For the first time in Poland’s history, more women than men voted. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/were-women-key-to-voting-out-polands-ruling-conservatives/a-67214867">Almost 75%</a> of eligible women voted – a 12% increase over 2019. In comparison, 73% of eligible male voters cast a ballot.</p>
<p>The election also saw a <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/10/19/record-number-of-female-mps-in-polands-parliament-after-elections/">record number of female candidates</a> (44%) and the largest percentage of women (30%) voted into Poland’s Sejm. </p>
<p>The growth in the women’s vote follows a period of increased feminist activism in Poland.</p>
<p>During the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/362981/pdf">communist period</a> that ended in 1989, women’s political participation was not significant. Post-communist governments, however, did not provide women with the rights they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/08/polish-women-communism-better-equality">expected or wanted</a>. </p>
<p>When PiS took office in 2015, Poland had one of the strictest abortion laws in Europe. After the ruling government tightened abortion restrictions further, Polish women took to the streets. In recent years, women have regularly protested what they perceive as the <a href="https://doi.org//10.1177/1350506814546091">anti-gender policies</a> of PiS, but little changed – at least on the surface.</p>
<p>Government restrictions and ongoing attacks on women’s organizations were having an impact on Polish women, especially younger women – and the October election provided a moment for women to have their say. A <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/were-women-key-to-voting-out-polands-ruling-conservatives/a-67214867">breakdown of the women’s vote</a> finds that many women voted for leftist and centrist parties that made women’s rights and liberalized abortion laws a priority.</p>
<h2>3. Young people mobilized</h2>
<p>Young Poles also participated in elections in record numbers, demonstrating that while young people might be seen to be <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/why-are-youth-dissatisfied-democracy">dissatisfied with democracy</a>, many of them still show up to vote. Among voters under 29 years of age, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/18/no-country-for-old-men-how-young-voters-helped-swing-the-elections-in-poland">69% turned out</a> compared with 46% in the previous elections in 2019 – a 22% increase. In fact, more people under 29 voted than people over 60. </p>
<p>This is partly because the ruling government had been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/21/young-voters-who-shaped-poland-election-result">particularly outspoken on issues</a> that matter to young Poles, such as LGBTQ+ rights and abortion. Meanwhile, opposition party candidates promised to make same-sex civil partnership and the legalization of abortion up to 12 weeks a priority.</p>
<h2>4. The role of civil society</h2>
<p>The number of civil society organizations is only one way to gauge the strength of civil society. PiS worked to shrink the space for civil society activism by reducing funding to certain organizations, resulting in a <a href="https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1069123">decline in the number of groups</a>. </p>
<p>But, as I explore in my research, such efforts simultaneously pushed activism online and fueled political and social engagement in other ways that are often harder to see – such as do-it-yourself <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2020.562682">aid for refugees</a>, volunteering and community initiatives. Seeing the elections as a “<a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/90707">make or break moment</a>,” formal groups and individuals working through informal channels visited towns, organized in parks, created leaflet campaigns and did whatever they could do to ensure that the population knew what was at stake in the election.</p>
<p>Expressing their strong opposition to the national referendum that was held on the same day of the elections, <a href="https://hfhr.pl/aktualnosci/stanowisko-organizacji-spolecznych-w-sprawie-referendum">Polish civil society organizations</a>, such as Action Democracy and the Homo Faber Association, urged people not to participate. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/poland-election-vote-720f7b81838c33ccb2865fb3bc6e0414">Exit polls</a> suggest that most Poles (60%) refused to take part in the referendum, making the results not legally binding. </p>
<h2>5. The economy matters</h2>
<p>Much of PiS’ tenure in government has coincided with significant economic growth in Poland. This allowed the government to provide monthly stipends for families to reduce child poverty, restructure the tax system to benefit the poor, and invest in rural Poland.</p>
<p>Yet earlier in 2023, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poles-feel-pinch-inflation-hits-peak-2023-03-15/">Poland’s inflation</a> was over 18%. With prices for food up by 24% and costs for housing, gas and electricity up by 22%, Poles – especially those on fixed incomes, many of whom were PiS voters – were unable to pay their bills. This helped turn Polish voters against the government. In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65803318">June, hundreds of thousands of Poles took to the streets</a> with a variety of complaints, including inflation and rising costs. </p>
<p>Poland’s immediate political future is still a little up in the air – and years of increasingly autocratic rule has left its mark. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/22/poland-election-eu-pis-populism-tusk-duda-germany-ukraine-russia/">Some observers worry</a> that there is no going back to a pre-populist Poland. Yet the outcome of the October election should serve as a reminder that democracy’s decline is not inevitable and can be halted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216397/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrice McMahon received funding in 2023 from the United States Department of State through the U.S. Fulbright Commission. </span></em></p>The autocratic Law and Justice Party looks set to be turfed out by a center-left coalition, which gained more than half of all votes.Patrice McMahon, Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-LincolnLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156182023-10-17T13:26:53Z2023-10-17T13:26:53ZPoland votes for change after nearly a decade spent sliding towards autocracy – but tricky coalition talks lie ahead for Donald Tusk<p>People were seen queuing in long lines outside polling stations in what appears to have been an election with record-breaking turnout (74.31%) in Poland. Now it seems the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) is on the way out of government. Although PiS came away with the highest percentage of votes (35.38%), a coalition of opposition parties looks more likely to end up in power.</p>
<p>The Civic Coalition (KO), an alliance of centre-right parties led by former European Council president Donald Tusk, has secured <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/50198396-4ea0-41cd-b7db-67bb0df700b2">157 seats in parliament</a>. This itself is shy of the 231 needed to form a majority but combining with Third Way, a centrist alliance which took 65 seats, and the New Left, which took 26 seats, a government is possible. </p>
<p>PiS took 194 seats by itself but this is not enough to form a government alone or in cooperation with the far-right Confederation (KON), which took just 18 seats. Even in an election <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-public-broadcaster-faces-accusations-bias-election-looms-2023-10-13/">not considered entirely fair</a>, the party that has ruled Poland since 2015 could no longer cling to power. </p>
<h2>The return of Donald Tusk</h2>
<p>Since coming to power in 2015, PiS has acted with <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-polish-people-support-the-eu-its-their-government-that-continues-to-antagonise-brussels-170324">antagonism towards the European Union</a>. This would appear to be out of step with public opinion given that support for the EU stands at 85% (and overt opposition just 10%) in Poland.</p>
<p>Even though Poland is a net financial beneficiary of the union, PiS has clashed with Brussels for failing to uphold European democratic values and human rights for women and LGBTQ+ people. </p>
<p>Tusk has vowed to turn back towards European Union partners and for Poland to keep pace with them on social issues, such as by introducing same-sex marriage. Women, who have seen their rights to abortion care ultimately vanish under PiS, can be hopeful of a shift back towards liberalisation under a Tusk administration. Tusk has said PiS has “dehumanised” too many people during its time in power. Ever since his first stint as prime minister between 2007 and 2014 (when he was appointed president of the European Council) Tusk has always been seen as a pro-European force.</p>
<p>Relations with the EU over Ukraine should also become less tense. PiS recently acted unilaterally and against the EU’s wishes by banning grain imports from war-torn Ukraine because it would hurt national farming interests. Tusk can be expected to be more prepared to align with European allies.</p>
<p>A Tusk-led government is expected to liberalise abortion (up to 12 weeks) and introduce the right for same-sex couples to form legally recognised civil partnerships. It is also expected to undertake reforms to bring back judicial and media freedom. The goal appears to be nothing short of bringing Poland back into the group of European liberal democracies. As Tusk himself put it: “It’s the end of the evil times”.</p>
<h2>The demise of PiS</h2>
<p>The PiS years have been characterised by a gradual dismantling of Poland’s liberal democratic order. Checks and balances on the government have disappeared and the separation of powers undermined by the deliberate erosion of judicial independence. V-DEM, the Varieties of Democracy project, based at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, considers Poland a case of <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">“engulfed in autocratization”</a>, making it a place where democracy is threatened. The end of communism brought democracy and European Union membership but the year 2015 marked a turning point. Donald Tusk and KO have won because Poles did not want to become an electoral autocracy, as forecast in the event of an unprecedented third term for PiS. The electoral results constitute a real “victory for democracy” (as Tusk said).</p>
<p>With time, and the fatigue of governing, PiS has clearly lost support. Economic challenges and increases to the cost of living have evidently taken a toll, with the economy <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/16/five-things-we-know-so-far-about-poland-election-results">cited</a> as the the most important issue for voters. PiS attempted to <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/10/11/wife-of-border-guard-criticises-opposition-in-new-polish-ruling-party-campaign-ad/">push immigration up the agenda</a> during the campaign rather than tackling these issues head on. But these were not convincing, particularly when combined with accusations that the government was issuing significant numbers of visas to Russians and that consular officials were offering visas to people coming from Asia and Africa <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/europe/eu-poland-visa-fraud-allegations-intl/index.html">in return for kickbacks</a>.</p>
<h2>Not quite a done deal…</h2>
<p>While Poland looks set to have a pro-European government in office soon, that result is not yet guaranteed. A new government might not be appointed until mid-December as PiS will try to attract support from some of the Third Way members and Tusk will need some time to accommodate the demands from the six parties that are expected to have a ministerial presence.</p>
<p>Andrzej Duda, president of the Polish Republic (and a PiS member), needs to decide who should form a government. Following established tradition, his first choice will be PiS because it was the most voted for party, even if it doesn’t have a majority. If the opposition parties together are able to form a majority, they may have a chance; if recent years tell us anything, it’s that PiS is willing to manoeuvre to stay in power.</p>
<p>And even if the opposition coalition does land in government, their alliance will not be an easy one. There are many parties involved and ideological differences aplenty. The talks will involve liberals, Christian-democrats, agrarians, social democrats and the radical left, so negotiations could be lengthy. If Duda fails to find a government after three attempts, he will have to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215618/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Law and Justice emerges as the biggest party but without a majority, leaving the door open for a large coalition led by the former president of the European Council.Simona Guerra, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, University of SurreyFernando Casal Bértoa, Associate Professor (Politics), University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2144522023-09-28T17:36:00Z2023-09-28T17:36:00ZSlovakia may be about to elect a government which plans to halt aid to Kyiv<p>Slovakians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/25/slovakian-elections-qa-country-votes-after-four-pms-in-five-years#:%7E:text=However%2C%20to%20be%20allocated%20parliamentary,with%20four%20members%20or%20more.">head to the polls</a> on September 30 to elect a new parliament. The result will not only have a huge impact on the domestic affairs of this small central European state but also, beyond its borders, on the balance of power in Europe and the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>After the outbreak of the illegal Russian war in Ukraine, Slovakia was one of the first states to <a href="https://www.mzv.sk/en/web/en/slovakia/blog/slovakia-understands-what-is-at-stake-in-the-war-in-ukraine">offer support</a> to its neighbour. Slovakians warmly welcomed <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/slovakia/slovakia-demonstrates-leadership-support-ukrainians-need-ministry-reintegration-temporary-occupied-territories">Ukrainian refugees</a> and its coalition governments have staunchly maintained <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-heger-scholz-ukraine-eu-membership-candidate/">political</a>, <a href="https://www.mzv.sk/en/web/en/slovakia/blog/slovakia-understands-what-is-at-stake-in-the-war-in-ukraine">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/slovakia-approves-a-new-package-of-military-aid-to-ukraine/">military</a> aid for Kyiv. </p>
<p>But this could very well change after the election. There are 25 political parties <a href="https://www.volbysr.sk/sk/politicke_strany.html">fielding candidates</a> and, based on the two latest polls, <a href="https://volby.sme.sk/pref/1/politicke-strany/p/focus/2023-09-26">eight</a> or <a href="https://joj24.noviny.sk/volby/parlamentne-volby-2023/joj24-volebna-encyklopedia-slovenska/838980-exkluzivny-prieskum-agentury-ako-pre-tv-joj-24-progresivci-tesne-predbehli-smer-sme-pred-volebnym-patom?_gl=1*afwxdi*_ga*MTEyODk0MTMzNy4xNjk1ODExNDYw*_ga_RHR53MHYFE*MTY5NTgxMTQ2MC4xLjEuMTY5NTgxMTU1OC4wLjAuMA">nine</a> of them are likely to pass the threshold of 5% support required to be allocated seats in the country’s system of proportional representation. </p>
<p>This always results in coalition governments and – like anywhere else with this system – comes with inbuilt insecurity as coalition parties <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovak-coalition-government-collapses-after-losing-no-confidence-vote-in-parliament">fall out and collapse</a>. Hence Saturday’s election, which comes after only three years of a four-year term in which there have been three different prime ministers. </p>
<p>The party thought likely to win the most votes is Progressive Slovakia (PS), led by Michal Šimečka, a vice-president of the European parliament. Opinion polls suggest that PS, at 18%, has a slight lead over the Smer-SSD (Smer) party (17.7%), led by three-times former prime minister Robert Fico, who is outspoken in his support for Russia and has said he would halt all military aid to Ukraine, should he form a government.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1707304471011701182"}"></div></p>
<p>The key for both sides is being able to put together a stable enough coalition to form government, and <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/slovakias-elections-big-decisions-but-not-necessarily-decisive/">here’s where it gets complicated</a>. </p>
<h2>Pro-Kyiv bloc</h2>
<p>When it comes to the war in Ukraine, the pro-Kyiv bloc is a coalition of parties with very different ideologies which could find it hard to form a stable government. Two parties that were previously part of pro-Ukraine coalitions, the Democrats, led by former prime minister <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-caretaker-prime-minister-eduard-heger-quit-momentum-pro-russia-rival-robert-fico/">Eduard Heger</a>, and We Are Family, led by Boris Kollar, are <a href="https://volby.sme.sk/pref/1/politicke-strany/p/focus/2023-09-26">not expected</a> to win enough votes to gain representation in the new parliament.</p>
<p>Other pro-Ukraine parties include the liberal centre-right Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), which is polling at roughly 7.3% according to the <a href="https://joj24.noviny.sk/volby/parlamentne-volby-2023/joj24-volebna-encyklopedia-slovenska/838980-exkluzivny-prieskum-agentury-ako-pre-tv-joj-24-progresivci-tesne-predbehli-smer-sme-pred-volebnym-patom?_gl=1*afwxdi*_ga*MTEyODk0MTMzNy4xNjk1ODExNDYw*_ga_RHR53MHYFE*MTY5NTgxMTQ2MC4xLjEuMTY5NTgxMTU1OC4wLjAuMA..">latest numbers</a>, and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), whose leader, Milan Majersky, recently caused controversy by referring to what he called LGBTQ+ “ideology” as a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/epp-backs-slovak-party-despite-leaders-anti%E2%80%90lgbt-remarks">“scourge” and a “plague”</a>. KDH is polling at 6.1%. </p>
<p>Another pro-Ukrainian party is Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Olano), a populist centre-right, anti-establishment party which is polling at 9.4%. Olano is led by Igor Matovic, the prime minister from 2020 to 2021 who was forced to resign over his <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/04/slovakia-igor-matovic-resignation-coronavirus-pandemic-corruption/#:%7E:text=But%20by%20this%20April%2C%20Matovic,handling%20of%20the%20coronavirus%20pandemic.">handling of the COVID crisis</a>, when he bought Russia’s Sputnik vaccine against the wishes of his coalition partners. </p>
<p>So, these are the main parties that PS will be looking to deal with should it get the chance to form a coalition – and depending on which pass the threshold to gain seats in the new parliament. But the prospects of PS having the numbers to form a working coalition are far from certain as the campaign goes into its final day. </p>
<h2>Anti-Ukraine bloc</h2>
<p>Reflecting the growing sentiment among the Slovak population that favours Moscow, and even blames Ukraine for the outbreak of war, is a group of parties led by the centre-left populist party Smer.</p>
<p>Smer and its leader, Fico, supports Slovakia’s membership of the EU and Nato, but is opposed to allowing Ukraine to join either alliance. The party has said it would halt economic and military support to Ukraine. Fico’s party is supported in this position by the Slovak National Party (SNS), a right-wing, Eurosceptic, Russophilic party whose leader, Andrej Danko, is a <a href="http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/45516/">strong advocate of Moscow</a>. SNS is currently polling at 6%.</p>
<p>To form a government, Smer and SNS would also need to gain support from Republic (5.4%), an extremist, far-right party which <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/28/europe/slovakia-election-russia-supporter-intl-cmd/index.html">blames</a> “Nato’s expansion policy” and Kyiv’s “aggression towards the Russian minority in eastern Ukraine” for the war. </p>
<p>The kingmaker in all this may be Voice - Social Democracy (Hlas), a centre-left, pro-EU, pro-Nato party formed by a group of breakaway MPs from Smer and led by another former prime minister, Peter Pellegrini, who has also said he would <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-11/slovak-firebrand-s-push-to-block-help-for-ukraine-hits-trouble?leadSource=uverify%20wall">halt military aid to Ukraine</a>. But Hlas, which is polling at 15%, is opposed to forming a coalition with <a href="https://strana-hlas.sk/dokument/deklaracia-hodnotove-principy-povolebnej-spoluprace/">extreme right-wing parties</a>.</p>
<h2>Danger signs for Kyiv</h2>
<p>As it stands, Slovakia may be the first country to change its policy and stop supporting Ukraine. But there are signs other countries could follow suit. Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/25/ukraine-grain-poland-election/">recent row</a> with Poland over grain exports has increased the prospect of a far-right, pro-Russia party winning the elections in Poland in mid-October – which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polands-pis-faces-far-right-challenge-over-ukraine-support-2023-09-19/">could halt military aid to Ukraine as well</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile in the US, the prospect of Donald Trump winning a second term in November 2024 and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/17/trump-ukraine-bartiromo/">stopping aid to Ukraine</a> is a distinct possibility. </p>
<p>This “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/26/ukraine-tries-to-keep-allies-close-as-war-fatigue-and-concerns-set-in.html">Ukraine fatigue</a>”, especially if it spreads to other countries, could not only protract the war, but ultimately lead to Ukraine’s failure on the battlefield.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Veronika Poniscjakova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Slovakia has steadfastly supported Ukraine in the war, but there are signs this may change after the election.Veronika Poniscjakova, Senior Teaching Fellow, Military Education, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143392023-09-26T19:12:29Z2023-09-26T19:12:29ZCanada’s House speaker quits: What the Hunka scandal reveals about Second World War complexities<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/canadas-house-speaker-quits-what-the-hunka-scandal-reveals-about-second-world-war-complexities" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Anthony Rota, the speaker of Canada’s House of Commons, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/speaker-anthony-rota-resignation-1.6978422">has resigned</a> from his post after inviting “war hero” Yaroslav Hunka to Parliament to take in the recent appearance of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.</p>
<p>That invitation — and the two subsequent standing ovations Hunka received from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, MPs of all parties and Zelenskyy — ignited <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/25/world/europe/canada-ukraine-nazi-apology.html">an international uproar</a>.</p>
<p>Hunka, now 98, served in a Nazi unit known as the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, fighting alongside Germany in the Second World War. The unit reportedly participated <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66919862">in a massacre of Jews and ethnic Poles.</a></p>
<p>Jewish organizations and Poland <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canada-needs-to-denounce-ukrainian-nazi-unit-not-honour-it-says-uottawa-professor-who-uncovered-veterans-ss-links">demanded an apology</a> from the Canadian government and Poland says it’s taking steps to extradite Hunka.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1706654204255678507"}"></div></p>
<p>Opposition leader Pierre Poilievre <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/anthony-rota-ukrainian-veteran-apology-1.6977117">has also accused</a> Trudeau of being responsible for Hunka’s invitation.</p>
<p>In Moscow, <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-09-25/kremlin-says-canadian-recognition-of-veteran-from-nazi-unit-is-outrageous">the Kremlin maintained</a> it was “outrageous” that Canada honoured a Nazi as a hero.</p>
<h2>The unit’s history</h2>
<p>The scandal illustrates a lack of knowledge among Canada’s political leaders about the eastern front during the Second World War. It also shows the close ties between the conflict and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. </p>
<p>The Germans initially deployed the unit to fight the advancing Soviet army, which was moving westward. Local Ukrainians were divided over its formation, some considering it mere <a href="https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/14th_Waffen_Grenadier_Division_of_the_SS_(1st_Galician)">“cannon fodder”</a> for the German army. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1706407951257248076"}"></div></p>
<p>The unit lost thousands of troops at the <a href="https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/battle-of-brody-disaster-along-wwiis-eastern-front/">Battle of Brody</a> but was later restored and took part in operations in Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. </p>
<p>In May 1945, it became the 1st Ukrainian Division and surrendered to the western allies. Many came to Canada as a result of a <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadas-soft-pedalling-ukraine-ss-galicia">cabinet-level exemption for SS members</a> in 1950. Hunka settled <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/canadian-institute-of-ukrainian-studies/media-library/newsletters/2020/2020-cius_newsletter-eng-optimized.pdf">in Canada in 1954.</a></p>
<h2>Whitewashing accusations</h2>
<p>The history of the SS Division and the arrival of some of its members in Canada were featured in the <a href="https://publications.gc.ca/Pilot/LoPBdP/CIR/873-e.htm">Deschenes Commission Report of 1985-86</a>, which cleared most soldiers of war crimes. </p>
<p>But the opening of former Soviet archives has led to new studies, some of which <a href="http://espritdecorps.ca/history-feature/whitewashing-the-ss-the-attempt-to-re-write-the-history-of-hitlers-collaborators">have accused the Canadian commission</a> of whitewashing the past.</p>
<p>Over the past few years, Russia has paid close attention to the Second World War — dubbed the “<a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-12-31/myth-great-patriotic-war-a-tool-kremlins-great-power-policy">Great Patriotic War</a>” — and has created new narratives to condemn what Vladimir Putin calls the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2022.2058179">“rehabilitation of Nazism”</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Putin’s speeches depict the war in Ukraine as aimed at “<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-speeches-propaganda-draws-on-soviet-era-nazi-germany-historian-2022-12">saving Russian civilization</a>.” He accuses the West of promoting lies reminiscent of the propaganda of infamous Nazi Joseph Goebbels. </p>
<p>In Russia, there is an investigation into the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/nazi-killings-pskov-russia/31431523.html">“genocide of Russians”</a> during the Second World War. Burial sites are uncovered, and the number of war dead has increased. Russian courts consider any alternative accounts to the official narrative to be historical revisionism and a criminal offence.</p>
<p>One such transgressor is imprisoned opposition leader Alexei Navalny — vilified for <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/03/17/russia-bans-insults-against-world-war-ii-veterans-a73274">“insulting” a Second World War veteran</a> — but the list is a very long one. Contemporary Ukraine fits into this false narrative: a state run by neo-Nazis since the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraine-looking-forward-five-years-after-the-maidan-revolution/">Maidan uprising of 2014.</a> </p>
<h2>Ammunition to Russia</h2>
<p>In this way, the past has merged with the present and is reborn. Russia seeks evidence in western countries that justifies its propaganda, and Canadian Parliament has provided it with much-needed ammunition for a tired and erroneous argument. </p>
<p>So how should Canada respond to the worldwide criticism? </p>
<p>Firstly, the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/ukraine">murders of Ukrainian Jews during the Second World War must be remembered</a>, and the complex context of Ukraine during the Second World War must be clarified. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-denazification-campaign-hits-babyn-yar-holocaust-memorial-to-33-000-murdered-jews-178403">Ukraine war: Putin's 'denazification' campaign hits Babyn Yar holocaust memorial to 33,000 murdered Jews</a>
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<p>Ukraine was the largest ethnic group in Europe to be <a href="https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CP%5CA%5CParisPeaceConference.htm">denied its own state</a> after the Paris Peace treaties that ended the First World War. These agreements divided Ukrainian ethnic territories among Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and mostly the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>The quest for independence endured amid <a href="https://www.history.com/news/ukrainian-famine-stalin">the brutal Holodomor</a> — in which millions of Ukrainians were deliberately starved by the Soviets in eastern Ukraine in the early 1930s — and by Polish pacification in the western territories. </p>
<p>In response, many Ukrainians in Poland abandoned democratic politics in the 1930s and <a href="https://museum.khpg.org/en/1164113212">joined extreme nationalist formations</a>. When war broke out, the Nazis offered new opportunities to form a Ukrainian state.</p>
<p>That history is too complex to be outlined here. Suffice it to say that <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Nazi-occupation-of-Soviet-Ukraine">Nazi occupation failed to provide support for Ukrainian statehood</a>, but some <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ounupa">Ukrainians in the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)</a>, as well as those in the 14th SS Division, committed war crimes. That fact should be acknowledged and accepted. </p>
<h2>Ukraine more democratic than Russia</h2>
<p>In the current era, there are no neo-Nazis in <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-zelensky-has-changed-ukraine/">the Ukrainian government formed in 2019</a>. Ukraine is far more democratic than Russia. There are far more <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-neo-nazis-fighting-ukraine/31871760.html">neo-Nazis in Russia</a> than in Ukraine. </p>
<p>So, Russia must return over and over to the Great Patriotic War to justify its argument — that Russia “saved” Europe and democracy. </p>
<p>Russia has obvious targets in Canada: </p>
<p>— Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland’s grandfather <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/chrystia-freelands-granddad-was-indeed-a-nazi-collaborator-so-much-for-russian-disinformation">lived under Nazi occupation</a>, so therefore he must be a war criminal, according to Russian propaganda. </p>
<p>— Ukrainians in Edmonton maintain <a href="https://edmontonjournal.com/news/crime/group-resumes-decades-old-fight-to-remove-statue-of-ukrainian-nazi-collaborator-outside-edmonton-cultural-centre">a bust of Roman Shukhevych</a>, the commander of UPA. </p>
<p>— In Oakville, Ont., there’s a <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/why-is-a-monument-commemorating-a-nazi-ss-division-still-standing-outside-of-toronto">cemetery honouring the SS Division</a>. </p>
<p>Accuracy about the Second World War can dispel Russian myth-making and expose its current imperialistic and savage war aims in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukrainians are the victims here, not the Russian regime. Ukraine is not the criminal. <a href="https://thecjn.ca/news/canadian-jews-are-opening-their-hearts-and-their-wallets-for-ukrainian-jews-now-facing-war/">Canadian Jews support Ukraine and Zelenskyy too</a>. </p>
<p>But honesty must start at home, with the Liberal government. It needs to do a lot more homework on the complicated history of eastern Europe during the Second World War.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Roger Marples does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia seeks evidence in western countries that justifies its anti-Ukraine propaganda, and Canadian Parliament has provided it with much-needed ammunition for a tired and erroneous argument.David Roger Marples, Professor, Russian and East European History, University of AlbertaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130162023-09-13T16:07:24Z2023-09-13T16:07:24ZRussia’s disastrous decision to invade Poland in 1920 has parallels with Putin’s rhetoric over Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547339/original/file-20230910-199965-8gkxww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1196%2C625&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Polish defences near Milosna, west of Warsaw, August 1920.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the beginning, Russia has framed its invasion of Ukraine as necessary for the defence of the country. According to Vladimir Putin, Nato’s deliberate and aggressive encroachment into a region once dominated by Moscow is to blame, as the west <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/25/opinion/putin-russia-conspiracy-theories.html">seeks to dismember Russia</a>. By extension, Ukraine – a country, according to Putin, without agency and turned into a Nato military outpost – is little more than a pawn in Washington’s nefarious game. </p>
<p>Some conspiracies in Russian propaganda come and go – notably the absurd claims that the US had <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/22/1087991730/russia-claims-u-s-labs-across-ukraine-are-secretly-developing-biological-weapons">developed bioweapons sites across Ukraine</a>. But Putin’s core geopolitical framing of the war has remained consistent: Nato and the forces of the “collective west” represent an existential threat to Russia.</p>
<p>Given the popular notion of rival geopolitical blocs and the “no-limits friendship” between Moscow and Beijing, comparisons to the former cold war are commonplace. Commentators and academics are keen to scrutinise various <a href="https://www.vox.com/23568071/are-we-in-a-new-cold-war-russia-ukraine">similarities and distinctions</a>. But there is an underappreciated comparison between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and another act of aggression a century earlier: the Red Army’s invasion of Poland in 1920 under Vladimir Lenin. </p>
<p>Although more than 100 years ago, the Bolsheviks framed this conflict in strikingly similar terms to the conspiracies running through Russian propaganda today. </p>
<p>The Soviet-Polish war of 1919-20 was one of several overlapping conflicts commonly, though simplistically, known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/summary/Russian-Civil-War">“Russian” civil war</a>, sparked in the aftermath of the 1917 revolution. Following escalating fighting between Polish and Soviet forces from 1919 in Belarus, Lithuania, and later Ukraine, Lenin decided to press a rolling Red Army counterattack in the summer of 1920 into a full-blown invasion of Poland. </p>
<p>The plan was to seize Warsaw and “sovietise” the country, creating a <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1920/07/polish.htm">“revolutionary bridge”</a> that would eventually stretch as far as Germany. Considering the extent to which the Soviet military was already stretched and the hostile reception that awaited invading Red Army soldiers, this was a colossal risk. But, despite doubts from some senior Bolsheviks (most notably Joseph Stalin), Lenin was certain that Poland was on the cusp of a workers’ revolution. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, out-of-touch Polish Bolsheviks in Moscow gave support to Lenin’s misapprehensions that Polish workers would rise and side with invading Red Army soldiers. So the Soviet leader decided to take the gamble.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Józef Piłsudski, Polish military officer inspecting a line of soldiers in 1919." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548051/original/file-20230913-27-jpk44o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Poland’s saviour: chief of state, Józef Piłsudski, inspects Polish troops, Minsk 1919.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (digital file no. 31084)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the end, and in a moment sometimes depicted as a <a href="https://bitwa1920.gov.pl/en/dabernon/">turning point</a> in modern history, Lenin’s offensive came crashing down in spectacular defeat outside the gates of Warsaw in mid-August 1920. In a matter of days, Polish supreme commander, <a href="https://www.pilsudski.org/en/about-us/history/jozef-pilsudski">Józef Piłsudski</a>, had successfully exploited the strung out Red Army forces. </p>
<p>The Polish Army smashed through its opponent’s overstretched lines, forcing them into humiliating defeat, later immortalised as the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/miracle-on-the-vistula-the-1920-war-between-russia-and-poland/30744735.html">“Miracle on the Vistula”</a>.</p>
<h2>Capitalist encirclement</h2>
<p>Before the <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/08/12/norman-davies-the-battle-of-warsaw-one-hundred-years-on/">Battle of Warsaw</a>, not all Bolsheviks had agreed with Lenin that “sovietising” Poland was a realistic strategy. But the party leadership, as well as Soviet Russia’s foreign and intelligence commissariats and military establishment, were unanimous on one thing: Poland was not the primary enemy. </p>
<p>They pointed instead to the capitalist west. At the time this was represented by the “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-relations-2085155/The-Triple-Entente">Entente powers</a>” – Britain and France – who were, apparently, coordinating, supplying and sometimes giving direct orders to the Polish Army in an attempt to reverse the revolution. </p>
<p>In truth, Britain and France – which had been Poland’s closest allies since it was reconstituted as an independent state in 1918 – offered little tangible support in the Soviet-Polish war and had moved away from <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/allies.htm">intervention in Soviet Russia</a> by 1920. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks grossly exaggerated the threat from the western powers. “All the Entente states are doing their utmost to incite Poland to make war against us,” Lenin remarked at a meeting of the central executive committee in <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/feb/02.htm">February 1920</a>.</p>
<p>It’s tempting to dismiss Lenin’s public addresses as purposeful propaganda. But the same conspiracies run through masses of internal Soviet correspondence. To take just a few examples, writing in private in 1919, Stalin described how a “single unified command” was preparing operations against Soviet Russia using bases in Riga in Latvia to the north, Warsaw in Poland, and as far as Chișinău in Moldova in the south.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing Polish borders in 1919." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548052/original/file-20230913-25-imqte4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Poland and the surrounding region, 1919 with the 1920 post-war borders in black.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PBW_March_1919.png">Halibutt in GIMP via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Stalin later described to Leon Trotsky, again in private, that the Entente’s “hypnosis” was “extraordinarily strong” over the countries on Russia’s western borders: the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania. Chief diplomat, <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/chicherin/index.htm">Georgy Chicherin</a> claimed without evidence that British and French forces might launch parallel attacks against Soviet Russia, supported by Finland, the Baltic States and Italy. </p>
<p>A complicated anti-Soviet conspiracy loomed large in the Bolsheviks’ minds. Poland, in this fantasy, was seen as possessing little agency of its own – nothing more than a puppet of capitalist Britain and France.</p>
<p>Bolshevik fears of international conspiracies were not unique to the Soviet-Polish war. “<a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/">Capitalist encirclement</a>” was a deeply rooted conviction stemming from the international isolation of the 1917 Revolution. But the humiliating defeat to Poland in August 1920 – and the way the Bolsheviks explained this in conspiratorial terms – amplified an instinct to see “anti-Soviet blocs” everywhere. </p>
<p>Soviet military intelligence went on to write continuous inaccurate reports to this effect throughout the 1920s. And before Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, Stalin – behind closed doors – identified a coalition of Poland and the Baltic States, backed by Britain and France, as the <a href="https://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/3946/">central threat to Soviet security</a>.</p>
<p>Putin, of course, is not a Bolshevik and how much he believes his own propaganda is hard to determine. And while Poland received relatively little support in 1920, the same cannot be said of Ukraine today. But echoes in Putin’s rhetoric and Russian propaganda of an older Soviet worldview – exaggerating interventionist blocs encircling Russia while refusing to recognise the agency of Ukraine – precisely how Lenin once saw Poland – are hard to ignore.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213016/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Whitewood receives funding from the British Academy and Hoover Institution, Stanford.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin’s propaganda about the Russian invasion of Ukraine reflect themes once propagated by Vladimir Lenin.Peter Whitewood, Associate Professor of History, York St John UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114572023-08-16T15:40:38Z2023-08-16T15:40:38ZAre Europeans really democrats?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542339/original/file-20230725-15-b29u3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2723%2C1802&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Europeans aren't happy with the way their country's politics are run. Does this mean they could accept to live in a regime other than a democracy? Photo taken at a protest against pension reform, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jmenj/49268357162/in/album-72157689446880593/">Jeanne Manjoulet / Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In France, the year 2022 saw the government repeatedly resort to <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-governments-long-record-of-bypassing-parliament-a-brief-history-of-article-49-3-202185">Article 49.3 of the constitution</a> to force unpopular reforms through parliament. The date of 16 March, in particular, marked the 100th time under France’s Fifth Republic that the executive chose to use these special powers. With this in mind, many French people now perceive their political system as undemocratic. Elsewhere in Europe, several countries have gone on to develop more or less authoritarian political systems over the past two decades, notably Poland and Hungary. In almost every country on the continent, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-materiaux-pour-l-histoire-de-notre-temps-2021-1-page-16.htm">far-right parties are gaining momentum</a>.</p>
<p>Alongside this, political elites, especially parliamentarians, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-a-t-on-ou-pas-confiance-dans-les-responsables-politiques-72483">heavily criticised</a> for being corrupt, too out of touch with their population’s wants and needs, and incapable of passing effective legislation. A number of countries have experienced youth revolts <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-informations-sociales-2011-3-page-60.htm">betraying social malaise</a>, including France in its working-class suburbs. <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/terrorism-eu-facts-figures/">Terrorist attacks</a> are also weakening European societies. It therefore appears European democracies are in crisis.</p>
<p>Beyond the events on which the media focus their attention, what can we learn about the values of Europeans and more particularly about their attachment to democracy?</p>
<p>A large number of European countries are members of the <a href="https://www.touteleurope.eu/fonctionnement-de-l-ue/l-union-europeenne/">European Union</a>. They are therefore expected to organise themselves in accordance with the fundamental principles set out in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaties_of_the_European_Union">Union treaties</a>.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M002">Article 2</a>:</p>
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<p>“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”</p>
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<p>A fine programme, but the <a href="https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu">surveys</a> carried out among Europeans show that they are far from being as democracy-minded citizens as the treaties set them out to be. The collective research I have just overseen, <a href="https://www.pug.fr/produit/2045/9782706151620/les-europeens-et-leurs-valeurs"><em>Europeans and Their Values: Between Individualism and Individualisation</em></a> (in French, <em>Les Européens et leurs valeurs. Entre individualisme et individualisation</em>) clearly shows this. It is based on an analysis of the results of the <a href="https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu">European Values Studies</a> (EVS), a major survey carried out by European researchers every nine years to monitor changes in values in different parts of the continent (nearly 60,000 people interviewed in 34 countries between 2017 and 2020).</p>
<h2>Some positive trends, others less so</h2>
<p>The data reveals that, contrary to what many people think, the values of <a href="https://theconversation.com/comment-la-solidarite-se-reinvente-en-temps-de-crise-155248">solidarity</a> are slowly gaining ground, notwithstanding temptations of individualistic withdrawal. Individuals’ desire for autonomy and freedom to choose their own lives is asserting itself strongly in the areas of the family, politics, work and even religion.</p>
<p>But Europeans’ attachment to democracy is less obvious, as our survey shows. Virtually all Europeans say they are supportive of the democratic system, and three quarters consider it important to live in a country organised on this basis. 57% would like to have a greater say in their needs at work and in their daily environment. Expectations of democracy are therefore high. But criticism and dissatisfaction are predominant: only a third of Europeans believe that their country is governed democratically, and only 20% are satisfied with the way the political system works. This is a sign of a crisis in representation.</p>
<h2>Only 38% are “exclusive democrats”</h2>
<p>It is important that we put Europeans’ apparent enthusiasm for democracy into perspective. Indeed, for many, the choice of the democratic system is not exclusive. 52% of them would accept a government made up of experts who take decisions, 32% would welcome the power of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-france-penche-t-elle-vers-plus-dautoritarisme-184569">authoritarian leader</a> and 14% might even support a military regime. In total, only 38% of “exclusive democrats” find democracy good but other systems bad. In a fairly large part of the population, democratic values are not deeply rooted. Were a political crisis to occur, the pull toward an anti-democratic system may be strong.</p>
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<p>While many Europeans view democracy positively, they do not all have the same conception of it. Central features of representative democracy (free elections, civil rights, equality of men and women) are considered essential by most.</p>
<p>Some are also attached to economic aspects. For them, help for the unemployed, redistribution through taxation and income equalisation are also essential aspects of a democracy. These economic expectations are higher in Southern Europe and Russia.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 85,000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues</em>. <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=france&region=fr">Sign up now</a>]</p>
<p>Finally, the survey tested three characteristics usually considered to be undemocratic: obedience to those in power, the army taking power, and the regulation of politics by religious authorities. Admittedly, these values are not often considered essential to a democracy. But 57% of Russians and 45% of southern Europeans consider obeying those in power to be a strong feature of democracy. This principled obedience to those in power does not sit well with criticism or protest of those in power, both fundamental democratic rights.</p>
<h2>Where are people most attached to democracy?</h2>
<p>There are far more exclusive democrats in the Nordic countries and in western and southern Europe than in the east of the continent, particularly in countries that joined the EU in the early 2000s. And the exclusive attachment to democracy does not seem to have changed much in 20 years.</p>
<p>According to the map, democracy appears to be fairly solid in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Estonia, while it is much more fragile in Croatia and Romania (only 10% and 8% exclusive democrats respectively). This is problematic given that these two countries are members of the European Union and must therefore respect its values.</p>
<p>In Western Europe, the Germans and the Swiss are clearly more attached to democracy than the French. The French are hardly more exclusive democrats than the average European: while 89% think that democracy is a good system, 48% say the same for an expert-led government, 23% for the authoritarian power of a strongman and 13% for a government of the army.</p>
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<p>In Russia, given Putin’s leadership, the survey results may come as a surprise. The level of exclusive democrats is as high in Russia (41%) as in several other European countries, notably France (40%). 81% of Russians consider democracy to be a good system. 32% would accept the government of an authoritarian leader and 19% of Russians would accept a military government. The level of support for a regime of experts is particularly low compared with many countries: only 38% would accept it, which sounds like a disavowal of the technocrats in the presidential entourage, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-futuribles-2022-1-page-37.htm">judged to be responsible for everything that goes wrong</a>.</p>
<p>All in all, democracy in many EU countries is more fragile than many people might think. Politicians and civil society actors should consider ways of strengthening citizens’ attachment to the democratic system. In a context where elected representatives are heavily criticised, democracies need to re-legitimise themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Bréchon ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Sweeping new research shows many Europeans could accept to live under a non-democratic regime.Pierre Bréchon, Professeur émérite de science politique, Sciences Po Grenoble, Auteurs historiques The Conversation FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110082023-08-03T16:54:29Z2023-08-03T16:54:29ZUkraine recap: counter-offensive gathers pace while Wagner Group takes on new role<p>Reports from the front lines of the various conflict zones reveal daily just how difficult Ukraine is finding its summer counter-offensive. Russia has had months to build defensive fortifications and Ukrainian troops are having to fight their way through territory which – according to Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine’s security council – is liberally seeded with landmines. </p>
<p>“The number of mines on the territory that our troops have retaken is utterly mad,” he told Ukrainian television this week. “On average, there are three, four, five mines per square metre.”</p>
<p>That said, there is geolocational evidence that Ukraine is gradually pushing back Russian troops in some sectors and there have been suggestions that Ukrainian troops have broken through Russian lines in some area, liberating settlements in the southeast of the country. </p>
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<p>Chris Morris, an expert in military strategy at the University of Portsmouth, says that, as part of a concerted push before the weather begins to turn, Ukraine is now committing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-two-months-of-slow-progress-the-long-awaited-counteroffensive-is-picking-up-speed-why-has-it-taken-so-long-210653">significant portion of its available forces to achieve progress</a>. That includes a number of brigades trained and equipped by Kyiv’s Nato allies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-two-months-of-slow-progress-the-long-awaited-counteroffensive-is-picking-up-speed-why-has-it-taken-so-long-210653">Ukraine war: after two months of slow progress the long-awaited counteroffensive is picking up speed. Why has it taken so long?</a>
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<h2>The trouble with the Wagner Group</h2>
<p>Russia is having to do without the assistance of Wagner Group fighters, who – following the “mutiny” at the end of June – are now mainly domiciled in neighbouring Belarus, where they are apparently training that country’s armed forces. </p>
<p>As you’d expect, this has prompted deep concern in Warsaw, which is aware of the strategic importance of the Suwalki gap. This is a 60-mile stretch of Polish territory on its border with Lithuania, linking Belarus with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko mischievously quipped to Vladimir Putin that he might not be able to control the Wagner mercenaries who, he said, were itching to “go west”.</p>
<p>Natasha Lindstaedt, professor of international relations at the University of Essex with a special interest in non-state paramilitary groups, says that while Lukashenko was clearly joking, mercenary companies such as the Wagner Group are <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-joke-about-wagner-group-invading-poland-highlights-regional-security-fears-of-rogue-mercenaries-210304">notoriously difficult to control</a>. It remains unclear as to the extent to which their boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains sympathetic to the Kremlin’s war aims. Poland isn’t taking any chances, moving troops to its eastern border to counter any threat from inside Belarus.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lukashenkos-joke-about-wagner-group-invading-poland-highlights-regional-security-fears-of-rogue-mercenaries-210304">Lukashenko's 'joke' about Wagner Group invading Poland highlights regional security fears of rogue mercenaries</a>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>The role Lukashenko played in dealing with the Wagner Group’s apparent and abortive “rebellion” has given the Belarus leader a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-wagner-group-boss-and-belaruss-president-are-still-manoeuvring-for-power-205333">degree of leverage with Putin</a>, writes Jennifer Mathers, a senior lecturer in international politics at Aberystwyth University.</p>
<p>As Mathers notes, Lukashenko had previously been beholden to Putin for his political survival. But by providing a face-saving solution that allowed both Prigozhin and Putin to step back from what threatened to be high-risk confrontation, the Belarus leader appears to have regained a degree of autonomy. This, she says, is important as Lukashenko continues his balancing act of trying to acquiesce to Moscow’s demands while also resisting a more direct involvement in a war which is deeply unpopular with his own people.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-boss-and-belaruss-president-are-still-manoeuvring-for-power-205333">Wagner Group boss and Belarus's president are still manoeuvring for power</a>
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<h2>Scramble for Africa</h2>
<p>Prigozhin, meanwhile, was spotted on the fringe of the recent Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg. The summit followed hot on the heels of Putin’s decision not to renew the grain deal, which had allowed Ukraine to export wheat and other foodstuffs, much of it to African countries. As Stefan Wolff of the University of Birmingham notes, Putin spent a fair bit of time at the gathering trying to justify his decision, which had gone down very badly with those African countries that have been heavily dependent on grain imports from Ukraine. </p>
<p>Wolff writes that Putin’s pledge to “to provide, free of charge, a supply of 25,000–50,000 tonnes of grain each to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Eritrea” <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-putin-offers-unconvincing-giveaways-in-a-desperate-bid-to-make-up-for-killing-the-ukraine-grain-deal-210330">rings pretty hollow</a> when compared to the volume of food that had been flowing from Ukrainian ports before Russia pulled out of the deal. </p>
<p>But what Putin may not be able to achieve through diplomacy in terms of influence in Africa, Russia’s Wagner Group proxies appear to be securing by propping up unstable regimes (and destabilising others) across west Africa. Wolff sees this as another front in Putin’s cold war against the west.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-putin-offers-unconvincing-giveaways-in-a-desperate-bid-to-make-up-for-killing-the-ukraine-grain-deal-210330">Russia-Africa summit: Putin offers unconvincing giveaways in a desperate bid to make up for killing the Ukraine grain deal</a>
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<h2>Crimean Tatars’ guerrilla war</h2>
<p>Another important non-state group that is playing an increasingly prominent role in the war – this time on Ukraine’s side – are the Crimean Tatars. The Atesh (fire) movement was formed by fighters from this ethnic group native to the Russian-occupied peninsula. It is waging what appears to be a highly effective guerrilla campaign, disrupting logistics, sabotaging key targets and stoking discontent against – and within – the Russian army.</p>
<p>Gerald Hughes, a reader in military history and intelligence studies at the University of Aberystwyth, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-crimean-tatar-fighters-are-playing-an-increasing-role-in-resistance-to-russian-occupation-210484">tells the story of Crimea’s Tatars</a>. Their history of mistreatment at the hands of the Soviet Union and again by the Russians after Crimea was annexed in 2014 has given them ample reason to mobilise against the invaders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-crimean-tatar-fighters-are-playing-an-increasing-role-in-resistance-to-russian-occupation-210484">Why Crimean Tatar fighters are playing an increasing role in resistance to Russian occupation</a>
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<p>Whether the Tatars were involved in the recent attack on the Kerch bridge, which links Crimea with the Russian mainland, is not known. It’s the second time the bridge has been badly damaged in an act of sabotage. As well strategically disrupting Russian supply lines, the attack had symbolic importance. </p>
<p>The bridge was a pet project for Putin who drove the first truck across on its completion in 2018 and again after the damage from last year’s attack had been repaired in December last year. As Stefan Wolff writes, following June’s Wagner Group “mutiny”, it’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-crimean-bridge-attack-is-another-blow-to-putins-strongman-image-209934">another blow</a> to Putin’s aura of invincibility.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/crimean-bridge-attack-is-another-blow-to-putins-strongman-image-209934">Crimean bridge attack is another blow to Putin's strongman image</a>
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<h2>Russians on the home front</h2>
<p>Despite all this, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at home remains very high: 80% of people told a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/">Statista survey in July</a> they approved of their president’s activities. And polls conducted by the Levada Center consistently record approval ratings of 70% or above towards the conflict in Ukraine, although a majority would like to see an end to the war as soon as possible.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, ordinary people in Russia are <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russians-are-rallying-on-the-home-front-to-support-their-boys-207696">doing what they can to support “their boys”</a>, writes Anna Matveeva, a visiting senior research fellow at King’s College London who specialises in conflict and peace studies. Matveeva has spoken with ordinary Russians who either donate funds or run grassroots campaigns to provide everything from stretchers and medical supplies to drones and other weaponry to help fill perceived shortfalls. </p>
<p>As Matveeva notes, these volunteers tend to be solidly middle class. Oligarchs are “conspicuous by their absence”, she says. But there’s a sense that by helping the men at the front, it could reduce the prospect that their own sons might be called up.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russians-are-rallying-on-the-home-front-to-support-their-boys-207696">Ukraine war: how Russians are rallying on the home front to support 'their boys'</a>
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<h2>Nato matters</h2>
<p>One of Russia’s stated aims in invading Ukraine was to combat what it saw as Nato’s pernicious expansion into its neighbourhood. So the announcement last month that Turkey and Hungary had dropped their objections to Sweden joining the alliance will have come as a desperate blow. </p>
<p>Sweden’s accession to Nato – coming hot on the heels of Finland’s in April – will <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">vastly strengthen the alliance’s presence</a> across Russia’s western borders, write international relations experts Simon J. Smith of Loughborough University and Jordan Becker of the United States Military Academy West Point. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">Sweden is joining Nato: what that means for the alliance and the war in Ukraine</a>
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<p>In a sense, the accession of Sweden and Finland were fairly predictable in the face of Russia’s aggression towards its neighbour Ukraine. And it recalls the reason that Nato came into being in the first place. By 1949, Soviet plans for expansion in eastern Europe and Germany were becoming increasingly clear, especially with the blockade of Berlin still in place. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to give Nato its full name, was the obvious response.</p>
<p>As Jan Ruzicka and Gerald Hughes – experts in international security and military history at the University of Aberystwyth – write, the foundation of Nato nearly 75 years ago has <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">parallels with today</a>: </p>
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<p>The most decisive impulse to Nato’s existence came from a threat to a people and a territory that were not originally part of the alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) only became a Nato member in May 1955. Today, Ukraine’s resistance has clearly reinvigorated Nato.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">Soviet aggression prompted the birth of the Nato alliance – here's why that matters now</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of the best of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099272023-08-01T12:54:59Z2023-08-01T12:54:59ZUkraine war: what young Poles think about their nation’s role – here’s what our survey shows<p>Of the 8 million Ukrainian refugees registered in Europe, some 1.6 million are now in <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">Poland</a>. They have joined another <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10272-022-1053-6%22%22">1.5-2 million </a> who arrived after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. Ukraine’s two main languages, Ukrainian and Russian, are now <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-welcomed-refugees-with-open-arms-at-first-but-survey-shows-relations-are-becoming-more-strained-196080">heard everywhere in Poland</a>. </p>
<p>Symbols of Polish support for Ukraine and Ukrainians remain visible in the streets, such as flags and signs in shop windows. But despite the many signs of public sympathy, and the country’s <a href="https://www.nato-pa.int/news/poland-plays-leading-role-garnering-support-ukraines-defence-reconstruction-and-accession-euro">political support for Ukraine</a>, public opinion about the future role of Ukrainians in Poland has shifted in the past 12 months.</p>
<p>To find out more about social attitudes, we surveyed more than 2,000 young Poles, aged 16-34, in <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/research/research-clusters/youth-in-eastern-europe/defining-the-nation-young-poles-and-their-sense-of-identity">March 2022 and again in May-June 2023</a>. Our analysis found that between 2022 and 2023, increasing numbers of young Poles – now 52%, up from 42% a year ago – believe that refugees should be offered temporary status, with the assumption that they return to Ukraine as soon as it becomes safely possible.</p>
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<p>Around 56% of young Polish women (16-34) wish for a <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-report/young-poles-in-times-of-dramatic-change-refugees-identity-and-social-engagement">return of Ukrainian refugees</a> to their home country as soon as the war is over, compared with 49% of young Polish men. </p>
<p>The overall percentage of young Poles who want Ukrainian refugees to be offered the opportunity to integrate into Poland for the long term has remained at a stable 25%, with around 31% of men and 20% of women continuing to see this option as more desirable.</p>
<p>This gender difference seems to be driven mostly by men’s lower involvement in everyday challenges of Polish life, such as limited spaces in state-sponsored nurseries or access to healthcare – something that was clear from the <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-report/young-poles-in-times-of-dramatic-change-refugees-identity-and-social-engagement">focus groups we conducted in 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Different political and social views result in different attitudes to what should be offered to Ukrainians. Those young people who self-identify as Catholic in our survey are 10% more likely than others to desire their return to Ukraine when this becomes possible. This is also true of those who support the far-right Konfederacja, a party that has opposed the Polish response to the war in Ukraine, who are 13% more likely to express that view than others.</p>
<p>There has been a fundamental shift when it comes to the stance that young Poles think their government should adopt in the war in Ukraine. In 2022, an overwhelming majority of 83% argued that the government should support Ukraine – but this number has changed drastically.</p>
<p>Now, 65% of respondents back continuous support for Ukraine, whereas the remaining 34% wish for Poland to stay neutral. Clearly, more than one and a half years into the current phase of the conflict and amid fears of other countries being pulled into the war, young people have become more cautious.</p>
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<p>In particular, the oldest people in our sample of young Poles (those aged 25-34) express the strongest wish for political neutrality, as do those from cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants and young people who have not engaged in helping Ukrainians over the last 18 months.</p>
<p>Neutrality is also more likely to be desired by those who are politically less engaged – for example, mentioning in our survey that they do not intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections.</p>
<p>This shift in attitude goes hand-in-hand with <a href="https://cepa.org/article/polands-far-right-advances-on-anti-ukraine-sentiment/">increased political support for Konfederacja</a>. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the far-right political party has lobbied for Poland not to support Ukraine, while warning about the “<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/international-news/20221112-far-right-poles-have-ukraine-on-their-minds-at-independence-day-march">Ukrainisation of Poland</a>”. </p>
<p>Some of the <a href="https://wiadomosci.radiozet.pl/polska/polityka/grzegorz-braun-podbija-rosyjskie-media-denazyfikacja-ukrainy-banderyzacja-polski">slogans used during demonstrations</a>, such as demands for the “denazification of Ukraine”, are very similar to those used in Russian propaganda. Poland’s parliamentary elections <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/dont-take-polands-role-granted-far-right-government-may-not-support-ukraine">later this year</a> will show whether support for the far-right has increased further.</p>
<p>Asked about the type of support that people consider appropriate for Ukraine, our most recent (2023) data shows that only 2% of young Poles want the national army to be involved in the Ukraine war. And while 60% support offering humanitarian aid, only 28% want Poland to offer weapons. Those supporting the far-right (roughly 20% of our respondents) are most likely to oppose the sending of weapons.</p>
<h2>Rise of the far right</h2>
<p>With an <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/07/10/can-the-opposition-win-this-years-polish-election/">election this autumn</a> and the profound <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10272-022-1053-6">socio-demographic shift </a> caused by Ukrainian migration, which has turned Poland into a more multicultural country than at any time since 1945, the political discourse has become extremely polarised.</p>
<p>The governing Law and Justice party (PiS) is looking for potential coalition partners – and scapegoats (in the last presidential campaign, the <a href="https://lefteast.org/rainbow-resistance-lgbtq-activists-poland-repression/">Polish LGBTQ community</a> was designated by PiS as the nation’s key enemy).</p>
<p>Until now, the governing party’s rhetoric has been mostly <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/88507">anti-German</a>, and has tried to find ways to discredit pro-EU politician (and former president of the European Council) Donald Tusk, who currently leads the centrist Civic Platform party. The impending election campaign is likely to bring a new degree of conflict into Polish politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Félix Krawatzek is Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), an independent research institute funded by the German government, and an Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of Oxford. The institute also receives funding from German and international research councils. Félix Krawatzek currently is the PI on an ERC funded research project entitled "Moving Russia(ns): Intergenerational Transmission of Memories Abroad and at Home (MoveMeRU)".</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Piotr Goldstein is Research Fellow at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) and at the German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM) - two independent research institutes funded by the German government. Both institutes also receive funding from German and international research councils and foundations. Piotr Goldstein is currently hired withn the project "VISION: Envisioning Convivial Europe" funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.</span></em></p>More young Poles want the country to stay neutral in the Ukraine war than in 2022, a survey says.Félix Krawatzek, Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies and Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of OxfordPiotr Goldstein, Research fellow, Centre for Eastern European and International Studies (ZOiS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2103042023-07-25T11:19:50Z2023-07-25T11:19:50ZLukashenko’s ‘joke’ about Wagner Group invading Poland highlights regional security fears of rogue mercenaries<p>Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko reportedly remarked – suppposedly in a joking tone – during a recent meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg that Wagner mercenaries are <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-lukashenka-wager-poland/32515408.html">eager to move into Poland</a>. </p>
<p>While Lukashenko may not have been being totally serious about a possible mercenary excursion into Warsaw, the presence of Russian Wagner Group troops in neighbouring Belarus is problematic for a number of reasons.</p>
<p>The first issue is that it’s not clear how effectively Belarus will be able to control the Wagner Group. Lukashenko <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24072023-wagner-troops-in-belarus-want-to-go-west-into-poland-lukashenka-quips-during-meeting-with-putin/">claimed</a>: “The Wagner guys have started to stress us. They want to go west.”</p>
<p>While he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/23/hosting-lukashenko-putin-says-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed">is reported to have added</a>, “I am keeping them in central Belarus, like we agreed,” it’s clear that having the mercenary troops in Belarus is cause for concern.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/03/statement-un-working-group-use-mercenaries-warns-about-dangers-growing-use">Research</a> on mercenaries, paramilitaries, private security companies and the like has pointed to some of the negative repercussions of granting violent non-state actors too much power and autonomy in a conflict. </p>
<p>Lacking regulations, mercenaries can go rogue, as the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20020128.pdf">Gurkha Security Guards</a>, which were hired by the government of Sierra Leone did in 1994, or in the case of <a href="https://sk.sagepub.com/books/global-politics-and-violent-non-state-actors">right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia</a>. </p>
<p>As these groups feel immune from state retaliation, they are often willing to take on greater risks and commit human rights abuses with impunity, as in the two cases above. </p>
<p>Using these types of violent non-state actors not only makes it more difficult for states to monitor and control them, but these types of organisations often also lack professionalism and a willingness to adhere to international law. War becomes <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20020128.pdf">defined by a profit motive</a> which can corrupt local warring groups. </p>
<p>Their use can also lead to the spread of cheap infantry weapons such as when <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/04/dead-dictators-impact-gadhafi-guns-africa">Muammar Gaddafi’s mercenaries</a> left Libya after his regime fell and took their weapons further across Africa, seriously adding to the instability there.</p>
<p>Wagner mercenaries appear to have become emboldened by their failed march towards Moscow, rather than deterred. This has sparked concern for neighbouring countries in the region, particularly Poland, which is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/07/22/exp-poland-moves-troops-wagner-belarus-rdr-072202aseg1-cnni-world.cnn">moving troops eastwards</a> to face any possible incursions. </p>
<p>While the Russian president went on national television <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/26/opinion/international-world/putin-russia-uprising.html">vowing to “crush” the armed mutiny</a>, it was not the Russian military that pushed Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner group out, but an amnesty deal that was struck with the help of Lukashenko to save face.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-boss-and-belaruss-president-are-still-manoeuvring-for-power-205333">Wagner Group boss and Belarus's president are still manoeuvring for power</a>
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<p>The Wagner Group was given the impression that Moscow was unable to stop it, and Russian forces were essentially paralysed. Wagner’s forces were also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/24/rostov-on-don-russia-residents-welcome-prigozhin-wagner-forces">warmly greeted</a> by many Russian citizens in Rostov-on-Don in Russia as they crossed on their march out of Ukraine towards Moscow in June.<br>
Though Lukashenko has claimed that he has the Wagner Group under control, it is the Wagner fighters that have been training Belarusian special forces <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/23/wagner-group-fighters-want-attack-poland-lukashenko-belarus/">near the border with Poland</a>, not the other way around.</p>
<h2>Stirring the pot</h2>
<p>What does Lukashenko have to gain from all this? Lukashenko’s recent quips appear mostly to be an attempt to maintain attention and position. The Belarus president has revelled in being at the centre of world events, after he brokered the Wagner Group deal. </p>
<p>Lukashenko <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-s-vassal-belarus-in-the-inner-russian-power-struggle-a-33eaadaf-76b5-45d4-b36c-c89d2e5d163b">claimed that</a> Putin had complained to him that Prigozhin wasn’t responding to his calls. The Belarus leader boasted that he alone had been able to resolve the situation.</p>
<p>Lukashenko also appears to relish being Putin’s sounding board and enjoys having the Russian president’s ear. In return he has received a fresh security assurance: any Polish attack on Belarus would constitute an <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/23/wagner-group-fighters-want-attack-poland-lukashenko-belarus/">attack on Russia</a> which would be responded to “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/21/russia-invasion-ukraine-poland-belarus-vladimir-putin/">with all the means at our disposal</a>”. </p>
<h2>Moscow-Minsk axis</h2>
<p>For all this, Belarus remains firmly the junior partner in its alliance with Russia. In addition to allowing Belarus to serve <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/belarusians-wary-of-being-drawn-into-russias-war-in-ukraine">as a base</a> to launch attacks into Ukraine, some of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons have been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6prAB2srKDg">stationed in Belarus</a>, something that most Belarusians <a href="https://euroradio.fm/en/more-supporters-nuclear-weapons-belarus-survey">remain opposed to</a>.</p>
<p>But Minsk has little choice at this point. Belarus only survives because Russia provides it with crude oil, gas and other goods. It pocketed <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6364a92e-0939-4cbe-9a4b-f7e05d80e2c2">US$1.7 billion (£1.32 billion) last year</a> by selling on Russian crude oil to other countries. </p>
<p>While Lukashenko occasionally tried to lean towards the west, offering some occasional criticisms of Moscow and making promises to ease repression, the west has never been convinced of his bona fides. Attempts in 2014 and 2015 to hold talks in Minsk with Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France to alleviate tensions <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/17/minsk-agreement-ukraine-russia-peace/">also failed</a>.</p>
<p>But this loyalty has come at a price. Thousands of companies have <a href="https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-1000-companies-have-curtailed-operations-russia-some-remain">left Belarus since the war started</a> and Minsk has been slapped with sanctions. And the vast majority of people in Belarus <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-10/reluctant-co-aggressor-minsks-complicity-war-against-ukraine">do not want</a> their country to get directly involved in the war against Ukraine. </p>
<p>By providing a safe haven for Wagner’s mercenaries, Lukashenko pushes the limits of Belarus’s involvement in the conflict while also lifting his perceived status with Putin.</p>
<p>This comes at a time when Lukashenko’s approval rating in Belarus is <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/in-its-struggle-to-hold-on-to-power-the-lukashenko-regime-risks-belarus-future/">below 30% and falling</a>. And now Lukashenko has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-wagner-ukraine-mercenary-mercenaries-lukashenko-82d304924c6531b95fba279acd783a84?">8,000 mercenary troops</a> that he might not be able to control.</p>
<h2>High risk</h2>
<p>Though it’s not clear what the Wagner group will do next, going into Poland and bringing Nato directly into the conflict by triggering Article 5 of the Nato treaty – under which an attack on one member state is considered an attack on all members – would be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-natos-defense-obligations-could-be-triggered-by-ukraine-conflict-2022-11-15/">last thing Putin needs</a>.</p>
<p>An expansion of the war into another country would strain Russia even further at a time when its armed forces have already lost at least <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/06/13/putins-generals-are-still-dropping-like-flies/">15 generals</a> in the conflict, and about <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/14/1187847548/how-many-russians-have-died-in-ukraine-new-data-estimates-soldier-casualties">47,000 soldiers</a>, according to recent modelling by independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Mediazona.</p>
<p>In any event, both Putin and Lukashenko are taking on huge risks with their dealings with mercenaries – something that will not only make their own countries more insecure but could also have dire consequences for regional security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wagner Group mercenaries in Belarus remain a worrying wild card with possible consequences for the conflict and the wider region.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048842023-07-24T12:59:14Z2023-07-24T12:59:14ZDeSantis’ ‘war on woke’ looks a lot like attempts by other countries to deny and rewrite history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536350/original/file-20230707-15-306n0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">SB 266 aims to stop college professors from teaching about systemic racism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/florida-governor-ron-desantis-speaks-to-police-officers-in-news-photo/1467938775">Spencer Platt/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266">Florida law</a> that took effect on July 1, 2023, restricts how educators in the state’s public colleges and universities can teach about the racial oppression that African Americans have faced in the United States. </p>
<p>Specifically, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266/BillText/er/PDF">SB 266</a> forbids professors to teach that systemic racism is “inherent in the institutions of the United States.” Similarly, they cannot teach that it was designed “to maintain social, political and economic inequities.” </p>
<p>We are professors who teach the modern history of the <a href="https://gufaculty360.georgetown.edu/s/contact/00336000014RpbOAAS/rochelle-a-davis">Middle East</a> and <a href="https://www.conncoll.edu/directories/faculty-profiles/eileen-kane/">Eastern Europe</a>, and we know that even democratically elected governments suppress histories of their own nations that don’t fit their ideology. The goal is often to smother a shameful past by casting those who speak of it as unpatriotic. Another goal is to stoke so much fear and anger that citizens welcome state censorship. </p>
<p>We see this playing out in Florida, with SB 266 being the most extreme example in a series of recent <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/here-are-the-states-where-lawmakers-are-seeking-to-ban-colleges-dei-efforts">U.S. state bills</a> that critics call “<a href="https://pen.org/more-than-meets-the-dei/">educational gag orders</a>.” The tactics that Gov. Ron DeSantis is using to censor the teaching of American history in Florida look a lot like those seen in the illiberal democracies of Israel, Turkey, Russia and Poland. </p>
<p>Here are four ways SB 266 relates to attempts used by modern governments to censor history. </p>
<h2>1. Invent a threat</h2>
<p>One strategy that DeSantis shares with other world leaders is to invent a threat that taps into anxieties and then declare war against it.</p>
<p>In Russia, President Vladimir Putin has been waging a brutal war against Ukraine in the name of “<a href="https://www.rapsinews.com/legislation/20140505/271257417.html">denazifying” the country</a>. This claim that Ukraine is a Nazi bastion <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-claim-to-rid-ukraine-of-nazis-is-especially-absurd-given-its-history-177959">is a fabrication</a>. Nevertheless, it stokes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/world/europe/russia-victory-day-may-9.html">real fear and hatred of Nazis</a>, whose 1941 invasion of the USSR led to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/06/21/stalin-no-longer-liable-wwII-deaths-a61939">27 million Soviet deaths</a>.</p>
<p>In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/">labels critics of state violence “terrorists</a>.” More than 146 Turkish academics who signed a 2016 peace petition condemning Turkey’s violence against its Kurdish citizens faced trials for “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/05/turkey-academics-trial-signing-petition">spreading terrorist propaganda</a>.” Ten were convicted and served jail terms before Turkey’s Constitutional Court, in a 9-8 decision in 2019, <a href="https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/actions/academics-for-peace-turkey/">overturned their convictions</a> because of the violation of their freedom of expression. </p>
<p>In Florida, the phantom threat is “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-wokeness-has-become-the-latest-battlefront-for-white-conservatives-in-america-207122">wokeness</a>,” a reference to a term that the <a href="https://www.vox.com/culture/21437879/stay-woke-wokeness-history-origin-evolution-controversy">Black Lives Matter movement made mainstream</a>. To “stay woke” means to be self-aware and committed to racial justice. Republicans have co-opted the term and use it sarcastically to denigrate progressive ideas and drown out discussions about the reasons for America’s <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/racial-inequality-in-the-united-states">stark racial inequities</a>. </p>
<h2>2. Criminalize historical discussions</h2>
<p>Once a fake threat has been ginned up, world leaders can use it to create new laws to criminalize speech and critical discussions of history. </p>
<p>In Russia, Putin uses so-called “<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/02/03/russias-ministry-of-higher-education-approves-new-history-curriculum-includes-notion-of-instability-belt-around-russia-en-news">memory laws</a>” to, among other things, prevent knowledge about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/28/world/europe/russia-memorial-human-rights.html">scale of crimes</a> committed by former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin against the Soviet people from the 1930s to the 1950s. And in 2018, Poland’s right-wing leadership added an amendment to one of its own memory laws to defend the “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/21/poland-distorts-holocaust-history-gross-jedwabne/">good name</a>” of Poland and the Polish people against accusations of complicity in the Holocaust. Historians who defy this gag order have <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-historians-under-attack-for-exploring-polands-role-in-the-holocaust">faced harassment</a> and death threats.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Turkish government has a law against “denigrating the Turkish nation” <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/10/turkey-nationalism-killer-penal-code-article-has-come-back.html">that makes it a crime</a> to acknowledge the early-20th-century <a href="https://theconversation.com/armenian-genocide-us-recognition-of-turkeys-killing-of-1-5-million-was-tangled-up-in-decades-of-geopolitics-129159">Armenian genocide</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/magazine/the-era-of-people-like-you-is-over-how-turkey-purged-its-intellectuals.html">Turkey’s purge of its intellectuals</a> resulted in the firing of more than 6,000 university instructors in an effort to silence critical teaching about the nation’s past and present.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266/BillText/er/PDF">SB 266</a>, meanwhile, requires general education courses to “provide instruction on the historical background and philosophical foundation of Western civilization and this nation’s historical documents.” It also prohibits general education core courses from “teaching certain topics or presenting information in specified ways.”</p>
<p>The vagueness is deliberate. Teaching virtually anything related to <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/2270-racecraft">America’s history of racism</a>, particularly as it relates to racial inequalities in the present, could be seen as violating SB 266. Florida professors may refrain, for example, from teaching that <a href="https://newjimcrow.com/">Jim Crow laws</a> were designed to deny African Americans equal rights. These are the same laws that <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691172422/hitlers-american-model">Hitler used as a model</a> for the Nuremberg Laws that stripped Jewish citizens of Germany of civil rights.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Demonstrators hold signs that read 'Protect Black history' and 'Black history is US history'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest Gov. Ron DeSantis’ plan to eliminate AP courses on African American studies in Florida high schools.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-protest-florida-governor-ron-desantis-plan-to-news-photo/1247974907">Joshua Lott/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Punish transgressors</h2>
<p>With laws in place that criminalize dissenting interpretations of history, governments can then punish those who violate them. Punishment can involve threatening arrest and imprisoning individuals, and stripping funding from institutions. </p>
<p>For example, in 2011 Israel enacted the <a href="https://www.adalah.org/en/law/view/496#:%7E:text=The%20%E2%80%9CNakba%20Law%E2%80%9D%20authorizes%20the,as%20a%20day%20of%20mourning.%E2%80%9D">Nakba Law</a>, which authorizes the minister of finance to cut funding to institutions that commemorate or acknowledge what Palestinians refer to as the Nakba – or “catastrophe” in Arabic. The <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/about-the-nakba/">Nakba</a> is the displacement of more than half of the Indigenous Palestinian population and destruction of their communities that resulted from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.</p>
<p>Likewise, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266/BillText/er/PDF">SB 266</a> defunds diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in public colleges and universities and empowers school administrators and boards to take action against those who defy the rules. It comes in the wake of Florida’s 2022 <a href="https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Stop-Woke-Handout.pdf">“Stop WOKE” law</a> – which restricted discussions about race in K-12 schools and led teachers to <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/book-bans-florida-public-schools/">purge their classrooms</a> of books they worried could get them a five-year jail sentence.</p>
<h2>4. Write new history</h2>
<p>With actual historical events denied or suppressed, governments can then rewrite history to further monopolize truth and impose ideology. Russia offers the most egregious example of this. </p>
<p>In 2021, Putin published a 20-page article, “<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181">On the Historical Unity of the Russians and Ukrainians</a>,” in which he argued that the Ukrainian and Russian people are one and the same. <a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/news/putin-historical-unity">Alarmed critics</a> rightly saw this as a preemptive justification for escalating his war against Ukraine, which he did with a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-putin">full-scale invasion of the country</a> in February 2022. </p>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/4/28/23037788/ron-desantis-florida-viktor-orban-hungary-right-authoritarian">right-wing ideologues in other parts of the world</a>, DeSantis claims to be defending U.S. history from falsehoods <a href="https://floridaphoenix.com/2021/03/17/gov-desantis-has-found-a-new-culture-war-enemy-critical-race-theory/">pushed by ideologues</a>. In his attempts to rewrite history, calls for a reckoning with America’s history of anti-Blackness are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/04/conservatives-ron-desantis-florida-education">ridiculed as indoctrination</a>, and <a href="https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/revamped-florida-civics-education-aims-for-patriotism-will-it-catch-on-elsewhere/2022/07">bigotry gets repackaged as patriotism</a>. </p>
<p>If the way governments are rewriting history in other parts of the world is a guide, DeSantis’ and other states’ legislation could be the prelude to an even greater assault on accurate history and freedom of thought.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eileen Kane receives funding from the MacArthur Foundation</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rochelle Anne Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tactics used to censor the teaching of American history in Florida schools bear much in common with those seen in the illiberal democracies of Israel, Turkey, Russia and Poland.Rochelle Anne Davis, Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Georgetown UniversityEileen Kane, Professor of History, Connecticut CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2004062023-03-02T13:24:45Z2023-03-02T13:24:45ZPoland’s hospitality is helping many Ukrainian refugees thrive – 5 takeaways<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512769/original/file-20230228-5972-nl8frz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=42%2C639%2C5633%2C3119&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">These Ukrainians arrived in Poland from Kyiv by train in December 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainians-exit-the-passport-control-as-they-arrive-from-news-photo/1245693633">Omar Marques/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">8 million Ukrainian refugees have entered Poland</a> since Russia’s February 2022 invasion. About <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">1.5 million of them have remained in the central European country</a> rather than moving on to other places or returning home amid <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/hk/en/73141-ukraine-fastest-growing-refugee-crisis-in-europe-since-wwii.html">Europe’s biggest refugee crisis</a> since World War II.</p>
<p>So far, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/un-expert-praises-generosity-towards-ukrainian-refugees-poland-and-urges">Polish citizens</a> have demonstrated incredible solidarity and generosity, in many cases hosting Ukrainian refugees in their own homes. Many Poles told me that they appreciated <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/02/21/remarks-by-president-biden-ahead-of-the-one-year-anniversary-of-russias-brutal-and-unprovoked-invasion-of-ukraine/">President Biden’s visit to Warsaw in February 2023</a> and his acknowledgment of their work and sacrifices. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/all-wars-eventually-end-here-are-3-situations-that-will-lead-russia-and-ukraine-to-make-peace-197780">the end of the war</a> is still not in sight.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/08883254221085308">scholar of civil society and peace building</a> who is spending six months in Poland to research the country’s response to this influx of refugees. Here are five takeaways from what I’ve learned. </p>
<h2>1. Volunteers have mobilized on a vast scale</h2>
<p>Particularly in the earliest days of this mass displacement, when no international refugee aid organizations were operating yet in Poland and while the Polish government was still organizing its own support programs and policies, Polish people and local nonprofits did most of the work. </p>
<p>By all accounts, the <a href="https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_101_22.PDF">scale, nature and reliability</a> of these volunteer efforts have been unprecedented. Within the first three months of the war, <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">over 70% of Polish citizens</a> had provided some kind of assistance, whether it was food, clothing or money. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf">Polish Economic Institute</a>, Polish citizens provided about US$1 billion in cash, goods or both.</p>
<p>More than half have donated money or goods, about 20% helped refugees sort out various issues, 17% volunteered on a regular basis and 7% said they had made their homes available to one or more refugees. In a [July 2022 survey] more than half of respondents declared that they or someone in their household regularly helps Ukrainian refugees in some way.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/02/23/over-1-3-million-ukrainian-refugees-remain-in-poland-one-year-since-russias-invasion/">Polish government estimates</a> that Polish families have hosted 1.6 million Ukrainian refugees in their homes at some point since the invasion. </p>
<h2>2. Societies can become more welcoming</h2>
<p>As recently as 2021, most Poles were so determined to keep all refugees out that one poll indicated almost <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/08/26/most-poles-opposed-to-accepting-refugees-and-half-want-border-wall-poll/">half of the country in 2021</a> supported building a wall on the country’s eastern border to block their entry. <a href="https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_101_22.PDF">Surveys published in August 2022</a> indicated that the share of Poles who support Polish aid for Ukrainians had decreased from 94% immediately after the start of the Russian invasion to 84%. But that still meant the vast majority supported Poland accepting Ukrainian refugees and providing support for them.</p>
<p>Scores of new Polish initiatives have sprung up to provide Ukrainian refugees with short-term assistance or to work with members of the Ukrainian diaspora on long-term development in both Poland and Ukraine, like <a href="https://hf.org.pl">Polish Humanitarian Action</a>.</p>
<p>Some of these initiatives, like <a href="https://hf.org.pl/en/">Homo Faber</a>, a human rights group, and the <a href="https://en.federa.org.pl/">Foundation for Women and Family Planning</a>, a nongovernmental organization that protects reproductive health and women rights, are supplementing Poland’s safety net while also promoting solidarity between Poles and Ukrainians and integrating newcomers for a potentially long-term stay.</p>
<p>Two of the largest groups – the <a href="https://pmm.org.pl/en/">Polish Medical Mission</a> and the <a href="https://ceo.org.pl/english">Center for Civic Education</a> – provide legal aid and counseling services for all Ukrainian refugees and assist Ukrainian refugees with special needs. Given that <a href="https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_101_22.PDF">nearly 80% of Ukrainian refugees in Poland indicated in July</a> that they planned to remain there until the situation in Ukraine improves, these organizations, as well as more informal grassroots initiatives, are signs of a society that has become more welcoming to at least some outsiders.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women work at and browse an outdoor Christmas market." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512770/original/file-20230228-6120-muw0xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">With the help of a U.N. agency, Ukrainians who fled the war and found refuge in Krakow, Poland, organized a Christmas market in December 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/displaced-ukrainians-and-visitors-walk-around-the-ukrainian-news-photo/1245399015">Omar Marques/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Poland’s divided government is getting some hard things done</h2>
<p>When Ukrainians began to arrive in Poland in big numbers, the Polish government stepped up. The federal government’s <a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia-en/the-government-has-adopted-a-special-act-on-assistance-for-refugees-from-ukraine">Act on Aid for Ukrainian citizens</a>, passed in March 2022, was extensive.</p>
<p>It gave Ukrainian refugees many benefits, including the right to live in Poland, work legally and receive many of the government benefits available to Poles, like free health care.</p>
<p>Although the country is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716218809322">deeply divided politically</a>, local governments led by mayors who belong to parties that oppose the federal government’s Law and Justice Party followed through on the directives of the federal government without pushback. And jurisdictions led by different political parties established and sustained 36 support centers to provide ongoing aid and information to refugees. Poland spent <a href="https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2022_30fe16d2-en#page107">more than $8.8 billion</a> on supporting refugees from Ukraine in 2022 – more than any other member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group of 38 largely high-income nations.</p>
<p>Educating Ukrainians has been a high priority for Polish political leaders. More than <a href="https://amnesty.org.pl/kampanie/szkola-dla-wszystkich/">200,000 Ukrainian children</a> are already in Polish schools, more are going to university for free, and many more adults are taking free Polish language classes. By <a href="https://scienceinpoland.pap.pl/en/news/news%2C92274%2Cnearly-5700-ukrainians-applied-study-polish-universities-after-russia-attack.html">May 2022</a>, about 5,700 Ukrainians had applied to Polish universities, and Polish universities have pledged to provide those who are accepted with financial aid, as well as free tuition.</p>
<h2>4. Some Ukrainian refugees are putting down roots</h2>
<p>Although they have had to leave their homes and give up their livelihoods, many Ukrainian refugees are adjusting to life in Poland.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.ukrainianlessons.com/ukrainian-and-russian-languages/">Polish and Ukrainian are similar Slavic languages</a>, most of the Ukrainian refugees I’ve encountered in Poland have already learned to communicate well in Polish, with children outpacing their parents. Between <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/02/08/ukrainian-refugees-prove-their-value-in-poland-and-elsewhere/">60% and 70% of Ukrainian adult refugees</a> are already working, even though most professionals are not able to use their full educational backgrounds in these positions. Instead, <a href="https://magazynpismo.pl/obraz/okladka/veronika-kotyk-only-pigeons/?seo=pw">most of the refugees</a> are working in the service industry or in factories. </p>
<p>Some Ukrainians are putting down roots, joining the more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/living-limbo-displaced-ukrainians-poland">1.3 million Ukrainians</a> who had already settled in Poland before the war. And in 2022, Ukrainians <a href="https://ksiegowosc.infor.pl/obrot-gospodarczy/dzialalnosc-gospodarcza/5649709,20-tys-firm-zalozyli-w-2022-roku-Ukraincy-w-Polsce.html">registered 20,000 new businesses</a> in Poland. </p>
<p>I think it’s reasonable to say that Ukrainians are not just surviving, they are thriving.</p>
<h2>5. There are limits to Poland’s generosity</h2>
<p>In the summer of 2022, the <a href="https://wyborcza.pl/7,173236,28602569,polish-government-cuts-financial-aid-for-families-hosting-ukrainian.html?disableRedirects=true">Polish federal government ended its subsidies</a> for Polish families supporting Ukrainian refugees in their homes.</p>
<p>In February 2023, some shelters decided that they needed to charge refugees room and board. City governments, private foundations and generous individuals continue to provide these refugees with support. But <a href="https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/hidden-hardship/hidden-hardship-1-year-living-in-forced-displacement-for-refugees-from-ukraine.pdf">funds are depleting and assistance is waning</a> for Ukrainian refugees – and not only in Poland.</p>
<p>Ukrainians are no doubt <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/pl/pl/pages/zarzadzania-procesami-i-strategiczne/articles/Uchodzcy-z-Ukrainy-w-Polsce.html">helping Poland’s economy</a> grow. In 2022, the country’s gross domestic product expanded by 4.9%. And this immigration surge has reduced the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/how-displaced-ukrainians-in-poland-find-work-while-benefiting-its-economy/6771810.html">country’s labor shortage</a>. But inflation is at a 25-year high. It stood at <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/15725179/2-18012023-AP-EN.pdf/e301db8f-984c-27e2-1245-199a89f37bca">15.3% in December 2022</a>, much higher than the European Union’s average of 10.4%.</p>
<p>Like other European countries, Poland has faced soaring energy prices, especially after Russia cut off natural gas exports to Poland in April 2022. In <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/12/21/poland-freezes-gas-prices-in-2023-for-households-schools-hospitals-and-churches/">December 2022</a>, energy prices were almost 37% higher than a year earlier. </p>
<p>Even before Ukrainians arrived, Poland faced a housing shortage. Depending on how long Ukrainians stay, <a href="https://oko.press/ukraincy-w-polsce-polska-stanie-sie-krajem-dwunarodowym-system-musi-sie-zmienic-raport">Poland could need at least 200,000</a> new apartments and probably even more dwellings to house them, according to a new report. </p>
<p>In short, 2022 was a challenging year for Poland. But I see many reasons for cautious optimism that Poland is managing Europe’s biggest refugee crisis since World War II well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200406/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrice McMahon receives funding for her work at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland, from the U.S Department of State through the Fulbright Program.</span></em></p>About 1.5 million refugees are still there, with some putting down roots.Patrice McMahon, Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-LincolnLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1980492023-02-14T15:53:02Z2023-02-14T15:53:02ZBy policing history, Poland’s government is distorting the Holocaust<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509630/original/file-20230213-22-vsqclm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=37%2C113%2C3556%2C2549&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Monument to the Ghetto Heroes in Warsaw, Poland, commemorating the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. History surrounding the Holocaust has become increasingly controversial in Poland in recent years.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 2018, the Polish parliament <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur37/7858/2018/en/">passed a law</a> that imposed prison terms of up to three years of anyone who claimed Poles had any responsibility for or complicity in crimes committed by the Nazis during the Holocaust. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A banner for the event with Jan Grabowski" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509895/original/file-20230213-16-kb2qti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/society-societe/icw-ca/index-eng.aspx">Prof. Jan Grabowski will talk about his research on the Holocaust in an interview with Ibrahim Daair, The Conversation Canada's Culture + Society Editor. Click here to join the event for free by registering.</a></span>
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<p>The law was intended to silence historians, and indeed, it has created a chilling atmosphere within academia and beyond.</p>
<p><a href="https://iupress.org/9780253010742/hunt-for-the-jews/">My research</a> focuses on the relations between Polish Jews and the surrounding non-Jewish population.</p>
<p>In my case, the Polish government (acting directly or through proxies) has decided to use civil litigation. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/university-of-ottawa-professor-wins-libel-case-1.6143539">I have been sued for libel</a> and Polish organizations have requested my removal from my position as professor of history at the University of Ottawa. </p>
<p>More recently, I have been questioned by Poland’s <a href="https://www.abw.gov.pl/en">Internal Security Agency</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/ziobropl/status/1427525611019546634">the country’s justice minister has expressed outrage</a> about my work. </p>
<p>These are just some of the legal and extra-legal challenges related to writing the history of the Holocaust in Poland today.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/poland-is-trying-to-rewrite-history-with-this-controversial-new-holocaust-law-91774">Poland is trying to rewrite history with this controversial new holocaust law</a>
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<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A statue of a man carrying a child with other children following behind." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C10%2C3464%2C2664&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509565/original/file-20230211-22-klk8sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A memorial to Janusz Korczak, who died in the gas chamber of the Treblinka death camp in 1942, together with the children of the Jewish orphanage that he ran in the Warsaw Ghetto.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>History and nationalism</h2>
<p>The notion of wartime complicity by segments of Polish society in the Holocaust has long been considered a taboo subject.</p>
<p>In 2015, the far-right <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34631826">Law and Justice party came to power in Poland</a>. Defending the <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/as-poland-re-writes-its-holocaust-history-historians-face-prison/">good name</a> of the nation has become one of the focal elements of its political platform and a sure way to consolidate its electoral base.</p>
<p>As a result, independent historians and educators, <a href="https://www.tvp.info/52369152/dalej-jest-noc-historyk-dr-piotr-gontarczyk-engelking-padla-ofiara-wlasnej-metodologii">myself included</a>, have become targets of vicious hate campaigns in state-owned and state-controlled media.</p>
<p>There is a saying among scholars of the Holocaust: “I did not choose to study the Holocaust, it chose me.”</p>
<p>Trained as a historian of the 17th and 18th centuries, I came to the study of the Holocaust rather unexpectedly, at the turn of the century, while on a trip to Warsaw visiting <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-historians-under-attack-for-exploring-polands-role-in-the-holocaust">my ailing father, a Holocaust survivor</a>.</p>
<p>With some time on my hands, I did what most historians do: I went to the local archives. That’s when I stumbled upon thousands of files of the German courts from occupied Warsaw.</p>
<p>What made me curious was the fact that hundreds of files concerned Jews from the <a href="https://www.yadvashem.org/holocaust/about/ghettos/warsaw.html">Warsaw Ghetto</a>. I found out that the Germans prosecuted them for the breaches of various Nazi regulations: Refusing to wear <a href="https://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/voices/info/yellowstar/theyellowstar.html">prescribed armbands with the star of David</a>, for leaving the ghetto without permission, for violating curfews, for buying and smuggling food from the “<a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/aryan-1">Aryan</a>” side to the ghetto or for “slandering the good name of the German nation” — which usually meant telling jokes about the occupation.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Flowers next to a grave stone with a star of david." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509564/original/file-20230211-713-yg8q94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A memorial in Wojslawice, Poland, to the 60 Jews executed in the town during the Holocaust.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Holocaust’s ‘bystanders’</h2>
<p>The eminent scholar on the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg, divided the human scenery of the Holocaust into three categories: <a href="https://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-06-019035-4">perpetrators, victims and bystanders</a>. Over the years, we have learned much about the Holocaust’s German perpetrators and Jewish victims, but much less about the ill-defined last category.</p>
<p>Who were the bystanders? Were they people who knew nothing about the ongoing Jewish catastrophe? Or people who were conscious of the event but who chose indifference?</p>
<p>Poland was an epicentre of the Holocaust. It was a place where the Nazis built death camps, and where <a href="https://www.yadvashem.org/holocaust/about/fate-of-jews/poland.html">most of the Jewish population was murdered</a>. In my research, I found that it was simply impossible — I saw that very clearly — for people to remain distant or aloof from the genocide.</p>
<p>Not all the Jewish ghettos (<a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/ghettos-in-poland">and there were hundreds of ghettos in Poland</a>) were isolated from the outside world. Most of the ghettos were either open (no walls), or with flimsy fences that did not prevent contact between the Jews and other Poles.</p>
<p>Then, in 1942, the liquidation actions began. The Germans, together with local helpers, rounded up the Jews and drove Jewish families towards the nearest railway station, where they were placed on <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/german-railways-and-the-holocaust">death trains</a> destined for the death camps of Treblinka, Bełżec, Sobibór and Auschwitz.</p>
<p>All of this happened in plain view of the surrounding non-Jewish population. Once the masses of Jews had been deported to their deaths, the emptied ghettos became the sites of massive robbery. Tens of thousands of houses, apartments and furniture were all for the taking.</p>
<p>That is when uncounted thousands of Jews who chose to hide in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/surviving-the-holocaust-uncovering-secret-hideouts/video-60539431">ingenious hideouts</a> under and inside their houses were detected, pulled out and delivered into the hands of the Germans for immediate execution.</p>
<p>Some Jews fled the ghettos altogether, seeking shelter in the forests, most often, with locals who offered assistance either for a fee or for altruistic reasons.</p>
<p>During this last, final stage of the Holocaust — one which the Germans called Judenjagd or “hunt for the Jews” — the hidden Jews, from the German standpoint, became largely invisible. During this last phase (which continued until the end of the war), it was often one’s non-Jewish neighbours who decided who lived and who died.</p>
<p>It was my research into this stage of the Holocaust that led me to believe that being a bystander in Eastern Europe and, most of all, in Poland, was simply impossible. The whole idea of “bystanding” needed to be re-examined, questioned and perhaps even dismissed.</p>
<p>My research generated discussion among historians but, at the same time, in Poland, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/jan-grabowski-holocaust-hate-campaign-1.4169662">it also raised ire and anger among nationalists</a>.</p>
<h2>Night Without End</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Red and black book cover with the words: Night without end, the fate of Jews in German-occupied Poland." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509563/original/file-20230211-25-n022k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Night Without End by Jan Grabowski and Barbara Engelking.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Indiana University Press)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was within such a political context that <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253062864/night-without-end/"><em>Night Without End</em></a>, a book that I co-wrote and co-edited, was published in 2018. The two-volume, 1,600-page study is a specialized inquiry into the fates of Jews in selected areas of wartime Poland. We looked at the Jewish struggle for survival and German genocidal policies.</p>
<p>We also tried to understand the attitudes of the surrounding Polish society to the Jewish catastrophe. The results were grim: the results of many years of research pointed to the fact that at least two-thirds of Jews who went into hiding had either been murdered or betrayed to the Nazis by their Polish neighbours.</p>
<p>The reaction of the authorities was swift and furious. My co-author and I have been <a href="https://www.tvp.info/52288441/kiedy-historyk-boi-sie-babci">denounced in the press</a>. An unprecedented campaign of hate, followed by civil lawsuits and criminal accusations, ensued.</p>
<p>Attacks on historians and on history itself go hand in hand with attacks on other vital parts of open and democratic society. The defence of history and the struggle to preserve our right to know what has happened are among the foundations of the democratic system. </p>
<p>“Who controls past, controls the future,” <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nineteen-Eighty-four">George Orwell wrote</a> in <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em>. His words have never rang more true.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Grabowski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Holocaust has become a contentious issue in Poland in recent years. And those challenging the government’s historical narrative have faced condemnation and lawsuits.Jan Grabowski, Professor, Department of History, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982832023-01-23T13:22:44Z2023-01-23T13:22:44ZJewish doctors in the Warsaw Ghetto secretly documented the effects of Nazi-imposed starvation, and the knowledge is helping researchers today – podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505661/original/file-20230120-22-xwbvu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C20%2C791%2C453&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Starvation was omnipresent in the Warsaw Ghetto for both young and old.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-134-0771A-39,_Polen,_Ghetto_Warschau,_Kind_in_Lumpen.jpg#/media/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-134-0771A-39,_Polen,_Ghetto_Warschau,_Kind_in_Lumpen.jpg">Blid Bundesarchiv/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the years of suffering and tragedy that defined the Warsaw Ghetto in the midst of World War II, a team of Jewish doctors secretly documented the effects of starvation on the human body when the Nazis severely limited the amount of food available in the Jewish ghetto. The doctors collected this work in a book and, 80 years later, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=HyTsVigAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Merry Fitzpatrick</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/warsaw-ghettos-defiant-jewish-doctors-secretly-documented-the-medical-effects-of-nazi-starvation-policies-in-a-book-recently-rediscovered-on-a-library-shelf-182726">rediscovered the brave efforts of these doctors</a> hidden in a library at Tufts University, in Massachusetts in the U.S. In this Discovery episode of The Conversation Weekly, we speak to Fitzpatrick about how she found this piece of history, the story of its creation and how modern scientists are learning from the knowledge so bravely documented by the Jewish doctors. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/63ce902162c0100011034184" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Merry Fitzpatrick is an assistant professor at Tufts University who studies food security and malnutrition, especially in conflict zones. One day, she was searching through the school library and came across a book that she had never heard of in the basement.</p>
<p>“I went and pulled it off the shelf, and it was this crumbling little book. Its pages were just brown and brittle, and you could tell it hadn’t been opened in a long time,” she says. The foreword described the conditions of the Warsaw Ghetto and the anguish of doing research there. It was written by Israel Milejkowski, who Fitzpatrick calls the “Fauci of the ghetto”, after the former chief medical advisor to the U.S. president Anthony Fauci.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children climbing a wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505666/original/file-20230120-20-qgtd0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smuggling was how most people in the ghetto got food, and children were often the ones sneaking out of the ghetto to do it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Food_smuggling_Warsaw_Ghetto.jpg#/media/File:Food_smuggling_Warsaw_Ghetto.jpg">nieznany/unknown via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>Over the course of 1941 and 1942, Milejkowski and his colleagues saw an opportunity to produce something good from the horrors of the Nazi-controlled ghetto. The lack of food was extreme. “The Jews were given a ration of 180 calories a day at one point. That’s like half a cookie,” says Fitzpatrick. As the doctors took care of the Jewish population in the ghetto – including their friends and colleagues – they documented the effects of starvation, too. These doctors then collected their research into the book that Fitzpatrick found. </p>
<p>Even today, the research done by the Jewish doctors is shedding light on some mysteries within the field of starvation and malnutrition research. Tuberculosis was very common in the ghetto, but when the doctors would test starving children with obvious symptoms of tuberculosis, the tests would often come back negative. As Fitzpatrick explains, “What it was was that in starvation, the body pretty much gives up on immunity – that’s not the priority. So when you do a test, you’re looking for an immune response that isn’t there.” </p>
<p>To find out how this idea is helping Fitzpatrick better understand HIV in malnourished children and the rest of Milejkowski’s story, tune in to this week’s episode of The Conversation Weekly.</p>
<hr>
<p>This episode was produced by Mend Mariwany and hosted by Dan Merino. The executive producer is Mend Mariwany. Eloise Stevens does our sound design, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl.</p>
<p>You can find the original story written by Merry Fitzpatrick and her colleague Irwin Rosenberg <a href="https://theconversation.com/warsaw-ghettos-defiant-jewish-doctors-secretly-documented-the-medical-effects-of-nazi-starvation-policies-in-a-book-recently-rediscovered-on-a-library-shelf-182726">on The Conversation</a>.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Merino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A researcher at Tufts University near Boston discovered an old book full of research on starvation written by Jewish doctors imprisoned in the Warsaw Ghetto.Daniel Merino, Associate Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979652023-01-18T15:43:24Z2023-01-18T15:43:24ZUkraine war: why Poland is piling pressure on allies to increase military support for Kyiv<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505110/original/file-20230118-13-kokk6q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Poland's president Andrzej Duda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Alamy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Polish president Andrzej Duda has been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/davos-world-economic-forum-poland-lithuania-pressure-germany-tanks-ukraine-war-russia-andrzej-duda-gitanas-nauseda/">putting pressure on</a> Nato allies to support Ukraine with more tanks at the World Economic Forum in Davos.
This is the latest attempt by Duda to rally other countries, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/davos2023/card/poland-s-duda-appeals-to-germany-to-support-leopard-tank-export-to-ukraine-oDp18n82PnQNMVo7XTcM">particularly Germany</a>, to support Ukraine with heavy armaments.</p>
<p>Duda had already announced that Poland intends to send a company of 14 German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, but needed permission from Germany to re-export them. German vice-chancellor Robert Habeck confirmed he would support such a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-leopard-tank-ukraine-war-germany-vice-chancellor-robert-habeck/">request</a>. Britain has also agreed to provide 14 Challenger II tanks.</p>
<p>This is a decisive shift in policy, because up to this point Nato countries had refused to provide armoured vehicles or tanks. Ukrainian authorities have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/092b8894-4441-4747-bfd4-5b21a0c68709">stated</a> they need 300 western battle tanks to enable them to free the occupied territory.</p>
<p>Ever since Russia began to mass troops near the Ukrainian border in preparation for the invasion, Poland as a frontline state has played a pivotal <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/11/poland-democracy-illiberalism-europe-ukraine-russia-war-eu-nato/">role</a>. Due to its geographical position, bordering both Ukraine and Belarus, Poland has become a major route for western supplies to Ukraine as well as a safe haven for Ukrainian refugees. </p>
<p>Poland and Ukraine have interlinked histories. Both emerged as Slavic successor states from parts of the Russian empire and parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The countries had a turbulent <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25778367">history</a>, with ethnic, political and cultural differences and territorial issues giving rise to armed conflict in <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/polish-ukrainian_conflict_over_eastern_galicia">1918-19</a>.</p>
<p>The interwar period saw the integration of Ukraine in the Soviet Union, while Poland became an independent state. The territorial boundaries between them have shifted over time, and some parts of western Ukraine have traditionally been part of Poland. <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2021/10/10/more-than-one-ukrainian-in-four-speaks-polish-new-survey-finds/">Polish</a> is still <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CP%5CO%5CPolishlanguageinUkraine.htm">widely understood in Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Since the end of the Soviet period, Poland has been a strong supporter of Ukrainian independence and democracy. Polish national security strategy includes support for Ukraine’s further involvement in European security arrangements (and its membership of Nato). This is important for Poland to counterbalance the influence of the Russian Federation.</p>
<h2>Poland’s risks</h2>
<p>Poland is a Nato state in an exposed position within the Ukraine war, which partly explains why it is so proactive in providing military support for Ukraine, and is pushing other allies to do more. On November 15 2022, after a large number of Russian missile attacks on Ukraine and its energy infrastructure, a missile hit an area in the south-east of Poland, killing two men. It was most likely caused by a stray Ukrainian air defence missile, but the event illustrated the potential risks Poland is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">facing</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of Ukraine and its neighbours." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In response to this incident, the German government offered to supply Patriot air defence systems to Poland, but the Polish defence minister Mariusz Blaszczak suggested that these systems should be provided for Ukraine instead. The German government agreed to consult within the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-poland-patriot-delivery-ukraine/32148907.html">alliance</a>.</p>
<p>Several hundred German soldiers will be stationed in Poland, accompanying the arrival of Patriot systems for Poland and Ukraine. Around 90-100 Ukrainian soldiers are expected to be trained by Germans based in Poland to operate one Patriot <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/poland-to-host-german-troops-receive-patriot-anti-aircraft-systems/">battery</a>. As Poland’s foreign minister Zbigniew Rau stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Every Pole is an expert on understanding what fighting for freedom, democracy and existential survival means. This is the case since, in our part of the world, the notion of independence means freedom from <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">Russia</a>.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the Polish perspective, the best way to prevent escalation is to provide Ukraine with the means to defeat Russian aggression. Unlike the rather restrained language of the US administration, the Polish government is quite clear in stating: “Imperialism must be stopped and defeated. Otherwise, it will be a constant threat to the free <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">world</a>.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-and-poland-why-the-countries-fell-out-in-the-past-and-are-now-closely-allied-184906">Ukraine and Poland: why the countries fell out in the past, and are now closely allied</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In January 2022, Poland announced that it would provide Ukraine with weapons, ammunition and humanitarian aid, and since then has provided US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) worth of aid (including US$1.8 billion of military <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">assistance</a>). On February 17 2022, a Polish-British-Ukraine trilateral pact was announced to improve cybersecurity and collaborate on energy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-60173211">security</a>.</p>
<h2>Poland’s supplies for Ukraine</h2>
<p>As the military conflict unfolded, Poland became the second-largest supplier of weapons – sending missiles, drones, tanks and other military <a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland-plays-a-key-role-in-aiding-ukraine#:%7E:text=Poland%20remains%20one%20of%20the,estimated%20at%201.7%20billion%20USD.">supplies</a> to Ukraine, as well as being a key route for the supply of weapons from the US and other Nato countries. Poland was even prepared to send MiG-29 fighter planes, although this was not approved by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polands-failed-deal-to-supply-mig-29s-shows-natos-fear-of-escalation-178860">US</a>. </p>
<p>However, Ukraine now needs more capable air defences due to the large-scale missile and drone attacks against infrastructure and civilians. </p>
<p>The US is gradually changing its policy, and has signalled that it will permit Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russian <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-drone-warfare-russia-732jsshpx">territory</a>. It also decided to provide Patriot systems to Ukraine, according to announcements in late December <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/patriot-ukraine-what-does-it-mean">2022</a>. The training period to operate these systems has been reduced to three months. </p>
<p>Military analyst at the Brookings Institution Michael O’Hanlon explained: “Going step by step has helped Ukraine patch up vulnerabilities, to be sure. But it hasn’t furthered the goal of formulating a strategy to end the war, or defining the capacity that will be ultimately <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/16/biden-ukraine-weapons-russia-tanks/">needed to do so</a>.” </p>
<p>A new phase of the conflict is beginning. For Poland, it is crucial that Ukraine defeats Russian aggression. Otherwise the security of Europe as a whole, and Poland in particular, would be at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Nuclear History Program, a NATO Research Fellowship, the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Leverhulme Trust</span></em></p>Poland’s robust arguments for more weapons for Ukraine is partly sparked by its own vulnerable position.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1960802022-12-07T16:19:43Z2022-12-07T16:19:43ZUkraine war: Poland welcomed refugees with open arms at first, but survey shows relations are becoming more strained<p>Around <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">1.5 million Ukrainians</a> have settled in Poland in the aftermath of the full-scale Russian incursion of Ukraine in February 2022. The latest group comprises mainly women and children, in contrast to those already there who were <a href="https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2022/number/3/article/the-war-in-ukraine-and-migration-to-poland-outlook-and-challenges.html">predominantly male and economically active</a> and who had migrated from Ukraine after the political upheavals of 2014 mainly for economic reasons. </p>
<p>Ukrainians now make up <a href="https://twitter.com/CMR_Warsaw/status/1589918563179331585">3% of Poland’s population</a>, whereas Poland was until recently practically mono-ethnic, with only a small number of minorities or <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/POL/poland/refugee-statistics">refugees</a>. Today Russian and Ukrainian can be heard on every major Polish street and the two languages have become part of the public landscape. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Screen in a window of a pharmacy in Łódź offering help to 'Ukrainian Brothers" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499503/original/file-20221207-11419-29psdd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Solidarity: a pharmacy in Łódź offers help to ‘Ukrainian brothers’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Piotr Goldstein</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the relationship between Poland and Ukraine is filled with tensions. Among them are diverging views on key historical events and figures. For example, the appointment of Ukraine’s former ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, as deputy foreign minister in November could cause <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/11/23/anger-in-warsaw-over-ukraine-appointing-minister-who-denied-wartime-massacre-of-poles/">friction between the two countries</a>. </p>
<p>Melnyk <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraines-envoy-to-germany-irks-israeli-polish-governments-with-wwii-comments/a-62335288">caused an uproar in Poland</a> earlier in the year when he claimed that the controversial Ukrainian nationalist leader <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00085006.2012.11092718?src=recsys%22%22">Stepan Bandera</a> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraines-envoy-to-germany-irks-israeli-polish-governments-with-wwii-comments/a-62335288%22%22">“was not a mass murderer”</a>. For many Poles, the killings in Volhynia that took place between 1943 and 1945 under Bandera’s leadership of the <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CU%5CK%5CUkrainianInsurgentArmy.htm">Ukrainian Insurgent Army</a> are regarded as genocide. The lower house of the Polish parliament, the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/poland-parliament-declares-volyn-massacres-/27874252.html">Sejm</a>, recognises them as such.</p>
<p>Central and eastern Europe’s contentious history is significant for understanding today’s Polish solidarity with Ukraine – and the challenges this solidarity faces. To explore this topic, the Berlin-based Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-report/young-poles-in-times-of-dramatic-change-refugees-identity-and-social-engagement">conducted a survey</a> in early 2022 among young Poles aged 16-34, and focus groups among young Poles and people over the age of 65, to understand the diverging reactions to the war in Ukraine among those born after the fall of the Soviet Union and those socialised during the communist era.</p>
<h2>Qualified solidarity</h2>
<p>The visibility of Ukrainians builds on a gradual change in Polish society that occurred during nearly a decade of <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/POL/poland/gdp-growth-rate">solid economic growth</a>. Since 2017, the unemployment rate in Poland has been low, oscillating at around <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/poland/unemployment-rate">7%</a>, due both to economic growth and mass emigration after Poland joined the EU in 2004. As a result, Poland has experienced a significant shortage of labour across economic sectors.</p>
<p>In our focus groups, the older generations in particular stressed the economic benefits of Ukrainian immigration – filling gaps in the workforce and contributing to the pensions system. Young respondents, by contrast, were more likely to mention increased competition over scarce resources such as access to childcare or healthcare.</p>
<p>The solidarity that Poles express vis-à-vis the overwhelmingly <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/special-report-refugees-ukraine-poland_en">female Ukrainian refugees</a> who have arrived since the February invasion also differs between age group, economic status and gender. The young respondents to our survey expressed a strong solidarity with this later wave. In March 2022, <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/war-in-ukraine-what-do-young-poles-think">50%</a> said Poland should let as many Ukrainians into the country as would be necessary.</p>
<p>As well as the difference in gender between refugees arriving this year and those who came after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the new arrivals have a markedly different socioeconomic profile. Before 2022, Ukrainians arriving in Poland responded to gaps in the country’s labour market, taking jobs with low social status. This has been reflected in the Polish vernacular: a middle-class resident of Warsaw referring to “<a href="http://www.czerwoneiczarne.pl/produkt/ukrainki/">a Ukrainian woman</a>” usually means a cleaner.</p>
<p>But now, many Poles are surprised that Ukrainians don’t seem to fit this stereotype of Ukrainian refugees as poverty-stricken people willing to take any job. The fact that some Ukrainian refugees are better off than the average Polish citizen has also led to confusion in the host country.</p>
<p>In our focus groups, some Poles complained about rich Ukrainians while others appreciated the newcomers’ hard work and entrepreneurship. There are still signs of solidarity between the two populations – but increasingly Ukrainian refugees are seen as a burden. </p>
<h2>Which eastern Europe?</h2>
<p>The solidarity with Ukraine also challenges another stereotype: a geographical one. Many Poles, especially young survey respondents, said their neighbour belongs to a “different” eastern Europe to the one with which they are more likely to identify – an eastern Europe which comprises Hungary and Czechia rather than Ukraine and Belarus.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graphic showing young poles Level of attachment to Europe" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499293/original/file-20221206-1581-whxfmx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Attachment to Europe expressed by young Poles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Félix Krawatzek and Piotr Goldstein (ZOiS)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Poland and Ukraine have a complex <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/poland-ukraine-history-divides/">historical relationship</a>. This can perhaps best be seen in Polish attitudes to the people who live in border ares once controlled by the Poles. Many Polish people still refer to these regions as “Kresy” – “[Poland’s eastern borderlands”]. So while Poles think of their Ukrainian neighbours as “brothers” – sharing a Slavic heritage and centuries of common history – this attitude often comes with a mixture of nostalgia and a faintly <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0038038514556796">neocolonial attitude</a>.</p>
<h2>A conflicting relationship</h2>
<p>Poland has changed profoundly in the past ten months. As Ukrainian newcomers try to establish their lives in Poland, their presence has raised completely new questions for Poles. What to do with talented Ukrainian high-school graduates blocked from accessing free higher education because of their insufficient Polish language skills? Will the Ukrainians have political representation in Poland – and, if so, who will fight for it?</p>
<p>In the run-up to the 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland, the topic of solidarity and the long-term participation of Ukrainians in Polish society is likely to be an issue of some debate. Thus far, the populist conservative Law and Justice (PiS) governing party has not addressed the topic.</p>
<p>How the debate will play out depends on how Ukrainians get involved in Polish society and whether their participation is considered valuable by native Poles. Limits to solidarity are visible – maintaining it requires a daily commitment from all sides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196080/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukrainians were initially welcomed with open arms in Poland, but there are signs the relationship might be becoming a little strained.Félix Krawatzek, Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies and Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of OxfordPiotr Goldstein, Research fellow, Centre for Eastern European and International Studies (ZOiS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948012022-11-23T19:48:35Z2022-11-23T19:48:35ZUkraine war: Why the missile incident in Poland is a warning of things to come<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496865/original/file-20221122-12-npaf9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C827%2C8372%2C4737&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Polish police officers search for missile wreckage in a farmer's field near where a missile struck, killing two people in the village of Przewodów near the border with Ukraine, Wednesday, Nov. 16, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/ukraine-war--why-the-missile-incident-in-poland-is-a-warning-of-things-to-come" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Since the beginning of November, Russia has engaged in its <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/15/world/kyiv-strikes-russia-zelensky-peace-intl/index.html">largest ever missile strike</a> against Ukraine’s infrastructure. On Nov. 15, 2022, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/europe/poland-missile-rocket-nato-przewodow-ukraine-intl">two civilians were killed by a stray missile</a> in Przewodów, on Poland’s southeastern border. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1592591248447373312"}"></div></p>
<p>Immediately, condemnations against Russia by western observers poured over social media as <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-poland-russia-nato-missile-biden-zelensky-clash-1760258">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused</a> the Russians of being responsible. </p>
<p>But facts quickly emerged to disprove this. Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty that allows it to call for an extraordinary consultation of the alliance’s member states to discuss the issue. </p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden, Poland’s Andrzej Duda and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that the deadly explosion was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/europe/ukraine-russia-poland-explosion.html">likely caused</a> by a Ukrainian <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/europe/poland-missile-s-300.html">S-300 missile</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A man holds his hand to his ear piece while speaking into a microphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496801/original/file-20221122-12-tbjsv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks during a news conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels after the Polish missile incident.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Olivier Matthys)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The aged S-300 systems were working overtime to protect Ukraine from a barrage of incoming air assaults, which led to the incident. It was a tragic but accidental case of friendly fire. </p>
<p>This series of events serves as a timely reminder of the perpetual risks of escalation that come from a conventional war being fought on NATO’s doorstep by one of its implicit allies. </p>
<p>It also offers three lessons to diminish the panic that any future incident is bound to create. </p>
<h2>The probabilities of wartime mishaps</h2>
<p>As Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the <a href="https://www.frstrategie.org/en">Foundation for Strategic Research</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/europe/poland-russia-missile-escalation.html">has argued</a>, wartime “friction” has a tendency to accumulate. </p>
<p>The longer a conflict lasts, the more risk there is of mishaps. Wartime friction <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2010.503678">is a combination</a> of luck, imperfect knowledge, means that are mismatched to accomplish their aims and uncertainty. It pervades every aspect of war. </p>
<p>As a war increases in intensity, there’s a bigger chance of accidents happening. In the Ukrainian context, the lesson here is clear: waiting for the facts before judging and condemning is crucial.</p>
<p>For the past month, Russia has been steadily increasing its bombardments of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-state-of-the-union-address-zelenskyy-biden-kyiv-7cc069b80178629a60f4f2d166348d45">According to Mariupol’s mayor</a>, Russian missile strikes on his city have killed up to 10,000 civilians. </p>
<p>The scale of these strikes means that the closer they get to NATO’s border, the more likely they are of leading to spillovers. This danger has been the cause of considerable <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/europe/poland-russia-missile-escalation.html">anxiety about escalation</a> in Washington, D.C., and other western capitals for months. But what if the next time an accident happens, the missile truly was purposefully launched from Russia? </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women in heavy coats walk past several destroyed and burnt-out apartment buildings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496803/original/file-20221122-22-sdmc84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Women walk past destroyed apartment buildings during heavy fighting in Mariupol, Ukraine on Nov. 4, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alexei Alexandrov)</span></span>
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<h2>How Article 5 works</h2>
<p>In the direct aftermath of the Polish missile incident, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/16/russia-poland-missile-nato-article-v/">there was debate</a> about whether Poland would invoke NATO’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5, which is the organization’s guiding principle of collective defence</a>. </p>
<p>While Poland ended up only invoking Article 4, which enabled the consultation of NATO members, it’s worth a reminder that much of the anxiety over Article 5 originated from misconceptions over how it works. The article states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them … will assist the Party … so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two points should be understood. </p>
<p>First, that <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-oblique-intent-trigger-armed-attack-and-activate-article-5-nato">it is unclear</a> whether an accidental missile strike by Russia on Polish territory would actually meet <a href="https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20196801022">the threshold of an armed attack</a>. </p>
<p>Had Russia been responsible for the Polish missile incident but wasn’t intentionally targeting Poland, its relatively low intensity and magnitude mean it would have probably been more aptly categorized as a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156512000131">frontier incident</a>” in legal parlance — in other words, a mishap.</p>
<p>That means it might not have qualified as an armed attack and would not justify self-defence. </p>
<p>Second, Article 5 doesn’t actually mandate an armed response. It mandates assistance as deemed “necessary” — nothing more. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">Could Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast</a>
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<p>For war to be judged the appropriate response, NATO would need to reach a unanimous consensus of its 30 members on two fronts. First, whether the incident reaches the threshold of an armed attack. Second, whether an armed response is appropriate. </p>
<p>Those are two high bars to meet. They are even higher to meet when there is widespread escalation anxiety within NATO over the Ukraine war.</p>
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<img alt="A female guard in uniform holds a black-and-white photo of a middle-aged man." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496807/original/file-20221122-25-n3y1vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Polish border guard carries a photograph of Boguslaw Wos, one of two Polish men killed in the missile explosion, ahead of his funeral on Nov. 19, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Diminishing the risks</h2>
<p>Similar incidents amid the war, whether they’re caused by Russia or Ukraine, should be anticipated — and prepared for. The recent cautious approach emphasizing fact-finding — adopted by the Biden administration, NATO and Poland — should be emulated.</p>
<p>Jumping to conclusions is dangerous, and maintaining uncertainty to score some momentary points over Russia would likewise be irresponsible. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1592701878198218752"}"></div></p>
<p>When the potential result of uncertainty is war between nuclear powers, waiting for the evidence and assessing it as it emerges is the best way to ease tensions.</p>
<p>That doesn’t mean excusing Russia’s relentless shelling of Ukraine’s civilian population, or doing nothing to diminish risks. </p>
<p>NATO allies should emulate the steps taken by countries <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-offer-poland-patriot-system-after-stray-missile-crash-2022-11-20/">like Germany</a> to help strengthen the eastern NATO members’ capacity to secure their airspace. The Germans provided Poland with Patriot defence systems capable of intercepting incoming missiles. </p>
<p>NATO should also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/16/f-16s-patriots-ukraine-negotiations-00057262">consider doing the same for Ukraine</a> since more of these incidents are likely as the war drags on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194801/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Émile Lambert-Deslandes receives research funding from the Ontario provincial government, Queen's University, and from the Network for Strategic Analysis, an independent initiative funded by the Canadian Department of Nation Defence and hosted at the Queen's University's Centre for International and Defence Policy. </span></em></p>The recent military mishap in Poland shows such incidents are bound to happen near war zones. We should be ready for them.Émile Lambert-Deslandes, PhD student in International Relations, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948732022-11-17T17:37:43Z2022-11-17T17:37:43ZUkraine recap: Poland missile scare a timely reminder of how dangerous this war is for everyone<p>The world held its breath on Tuesday afternoon when news reports came out of Poland that a missile had exploded in a village called Przewodów a few miles inside the the country’s border with Ukraine, killing two farmers. Could this be the moment that everyone has feared since the war began in February? For a time it appeared that this was a crisis that could spark escalation of the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders into a Nato country, pulling the alliance inexorably into war with Russia and all that would entail.</p>
<p>It’s still not entirely clear how the missile was fired into Poland. All sides agree that the missile appears to have been a Russian-made S-300, a Soviet-era missile used by both Russia and Ukraine and designed for shooting down aircraft, drones and incoming cruise and ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>Examination of the missile’s trajectory made it clear the missile hadn’t been fired from Russia. There’s a growing consensus that it was most likely fired by Ukraine in self-defence against Russia’s massive missile bombardment, which Moscow declared had targeted military installations and energy infrastructure and had come no closer to the Polish border than 35km (22 miles).</p>
<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>But, as Nato expert Kenton White of the University of Reading writes, the fault-line that runs across Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Romania – all Nato members – give these accidents an added sense of danger. Article 5 of the Nato treaty enshrines the principle of collective defence whereby an attack on one member is viewed as an attack on all members. </p>
<p>White believes that, while desperate not to allow this conflict to escalate into an intercontinental war, the alliance is bound to react by <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-missile-incident-shows-how-dangerous-the-conflict-could-be-for-nato-194760">increasing its assistance</a> – military and otherwise – to Kyiv.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-poland-missile-incident-shows-how-dangerous-the-conflict-could-be-for-nato-194760">Ukraine war: Poland missile incident shows how dangerous the conflict could be for Nato</a>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine and its neighbouring countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495920/original/file-20221117-16-ib8v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Dangerous neighbourhood for a war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">olenadesign via Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Article 5 has only been invoked once in Nato’s history: after the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11 2001. This led to the Nato-led mission in Afghanistan. Many analysts believed Poland would be more likely to invoke article 4 of the Nato treaty, which enjoins members to come together to consult “whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened”. But that seems unlikely now.</p>
<p>John Deni, an expert in security affairs – particularly in Nato – from the American University School of International Service, <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">discusses the two Nato articles</a> and how they apply to this crisis.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">Could Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast</a>
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<p>The most important thing Kyiv is looking for, of course, is more military aid from Nato and the west. State-of-the-art western defence systems and other weapons have given Ukraine the edge on the battlefield. But, as Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, never tires of reminding us, his country’s stocks of this equipment constantly need to be replenished. </p>
<p>Christoph Bluth, an international security expert from the University of Bradford, looks at <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">Zelensky’s shopping list</a>.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">Ukraine war: Polish missile scare has given Nato fresh resolve to continue its support for Kyiv</a>
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<h2>On the diplomatic circuit</h2>
<p>Zelensky, as is his wont, delivered this message by video link at the G20 summit in Bali this week. It was a curious summit, bringing together the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and the US president, Joe Biden – who would have been feeling pretty chipper after his party’s surprisingly good performance in the US midterms. Russia was represented by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who apparently chose to sit out Zelensky’s message at his hotel.</p>
<p>Of course, Ukraine was high on the G20 agenda. But for a while all eyes were on Xi and Biden, who had their first face-to-face meeting in five years on the sidelines of the summit and emerged to deliver their respective messages. Happily for the rest of the world, the pair agreed that nuclear war was out of the question and, in an aside that would have given Vladimir Putin heartburn, Xi emphasised the need to respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Birmingham University’s Stefan Wolff was <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-talks-biden-and-xi-attempt-to-play-down-superpower-tensions-but-ukraine-and-taiwan-loom-large-194471">watching the proceedings</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-talks-biden-and-xi-attempt-to-play-down-superpower-tensions-but-ukraine-and-taiwan-loom-large-194471">US-China talks: Biden and Xi attempt to play down superpower tensions but Ukraine and Taiwan loom large</a>
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<p>One of the concerns about the US midterms was that if the Republicans took control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, this could affect Biden’s ability to sign off on continuing massive military and humanitarian aid packages for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Indeed, hard-right Trumpist congresswoman, Marjorie Taylor Greene, had promised that “not another penny [would] go to Ukraine” if that was the case. But Dafydd Townley, a teaching fellow in international security at the University of Portsmouth, believes that the poor performance of Donald Trump’s congressional proxies means that this is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-midterms-what-the-result-means-for-us-backing-of-the-ukraine-war-194287">unlikely to happen</a>.</p>
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<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-midterms-what-the-result-means-for-us-backing-of-the-ukraine-war-194287">US midterms: what the result means for US backing of the Ukraine war</a>
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<p>Elsewhere on the diplomatic circuit, Russia has announced plans to begin direct flights to Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, a state recognised only by Turkey. Ross Bennett-Cook, a Turkey expert at the University of Westminster, and Bradford University’s Christopher Bluth, look at Ankara’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-cyprus-russia-opens-up-direct-flights-as-putin-builds-turkish-alliance-194005">increasingly friendly relationship with Russia</a> and the tensions between Turkey – a Nato member – and the rest of the alliance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-cyprus-russia-opens-up-direct-flights-as-putin-builds-turkish-alliance-194005">Northern Cyprus: Russia opens up direct flights as Putin builds Turkish alliance</a>
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<h2>Rave and rebuild</h2>
<p>Finally, after nearly nine grim months of war, Ukraine’s rave scene appears to be dusting itself off and getting a groove on once again. A group of young activists has launched Repair Together, a movement that is committed to rebuilding some of Ukraine’s public entertainment spaces while dancing to their favourite DJs.</p>
<p>Clare M. Cooper, a lecturer in design at the University of Sydney who is passionate about both music and activism, <a href="https://theconversation.com/raves-repairs-and-renewal-how-young-ukrainians-are-bringing-joy-to-the-rebuilding-effort-193842">brings us the story</a> – which has a refreshing spin on the idea of whistling while you work.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/raves-repairs-and-renewal-how-young-ukrainians-are-bringing-joy-to-the-rebuilding-effort-193842">Raves, repairs, and renewal: how young Ukrainians are bringing joy to the rebuilding effort</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1947612022-11-17T15:22:05Z2022-11-17T15:22:05ZUkraine war: Polish missile scare has given Nato fresh resolve to continue its support for Kyiv<p>For the first time since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the war has come close to spilling across the border in a Nato country. On the evening of Tuesday November 15, a Russian-made missile <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/world/europe/poland-ukraine-russia-nato.html">landed in a village</a> in Poland, killing two farmers. This was the nightmare scenario that Nato members had been fearing for some time.</p>
<p>After some confusion about who had launched the missile, it is now generally thought to have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/europe/ukraine-russia-poland-explosion.html#">fired by Ukrainian defence forces</a> trying to target an incoming Russian missile. Nato’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, said this did not absolve Russia of the blame for the incident. </p>
<p>“ Let me be clear: This is not Ukraine’s fault,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/world/europe/ukraine-russia-poland-explosion.html">Stoltenberg told journalists</a>. “Russia bears ultimate responsibility as it continues its illegal war against Ukraine.”</p>
<p>It was suggested that Poland might invoke article 4 of the Nato Treaty which calls for urgent <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">consultations</a> in situations when a Nato country is threatened. So far it has not done so.</p>
<p>Whether or not it turns out that this was an accident by Ukraine or deliberate act of aggression by Russia, there is a clear sense that Nato needs to send a strong signal to Russia not to escalate the conflict into any of its members’ territory as well as the need to show increased resolve to support Ukraine. The obvious risk is that unless there is a determined response, it could signal to Russia that it can get away with even deliberate strikes on the supply line from Poland to Ukraine which allows Kyiv to arm itself.</p>
<p>But any Nato response would need to be carefully calibrated to ensure it cannot be perceived as acts of direct military aggression against Russia. Possible options include deploying additional contingents of Nato troops to Poland and other frontline states as a warning of what might be in store were Russia to threaten to escalate beyond Ukraine’s borders.</p>
<h2>What are Nato’s options?</h2>
<p>The influential US-based thinktank, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has suggested that talks about establishing a no-fly zone could be revitalised. This idea was rejected by Nato early on in the war, as it was thought that the use of aircraft from Nato countries to patrol the skies over all of Ukraine would pose too much of a risk of direct armed confrontation with Russian aircraft. But analysts at Carnegie now believe that Nato air patrols over border regions might now be considered to deter Russia from using combat aircraft over western Ukraine or <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88428?fbclid=IwAR243sxHrd2Vk39hbXQoxsIiu23sbyOfmXunC9L7_KtxEsvaX0iXfTxRrG4">straying into Nato airspace</a>. </p>
<p>The least controversial option – and one most canvassed in the west – is for Nato countries to massively their supply of weapons systems to Ukraine. These should include short and medium-range air defence systems, including the US-built Raytheon national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (<a href="https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/missile-defense/air-and-missile-defense-systems/nasams">Nasams</a>) as well as along with more advanced weapons such as the Lockheed Martin’s high-mobility artillery rocket system (<a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/himars.html">Himars</a>). Other long-range weapons, including Lockheed’s army tactical missile systems (<a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/army-tactical-missile-system.html">ATACMS</a>) would give Ukraine the ability to strike Russian targets at a range of about 300km (180 miles).</p>
<p>Meanwhile modern western-built tanks, jets and artillery would boost Ukraine’s ability to <a href="https://epc.eu/en/Publications/Quadruple-military-aid-for-Ukraine%7E4b1c84">disrupt and cripple Russian offensives</a>. Germany is still holding out on tanks as the chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has steadfastly <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-germany-leopard-tanks-marder-blunt-criticism/32031613.html">rejected Kyiv’s requests</a> to provide Leopard battle tanks or Marder infantry fighting vehicles, to avoid escalation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-war-germany-has-leadership-problem-heres-why">conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, wasted no time in capitalising on the opportunity to make the case for increased western support. He said: “Ukraine reaffirms its full solidarity with Poland and stands ready to provide any necessary support. Collective response to Russian actions must be tough and principled”. He added that the possibility of an attack on Poland meant Ukraine should be supplied with “modern aircraft such as F-15 and F-16, as well as air defence systems, so that <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-government-emergency-security-session-russia-missile/">we can intercept any Russian missiles</a>”. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s armed forces have been training on western military equipment. In July, the US Congress passed the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/07/15/house-authorizes-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-to-use-us-aircraft/">National Defense Authorization Act</a>. This has approved US$100 million (£85 million) in funding for military training, including training pilots to use A-10 Warthog planes, which are <a href="https://time.com/6207814/watch-how-ukrainian-pilots-are-training-and-preparing-to-fly-u-s-attack-jets/">designed to destroy Russian tanks</a>. </p>
<h2>Ukraine’s changing shopping list</h2>
<p>Despite much of the news from the battlefield centring on ground offensives, Ukraine’s air defence has been vital to its success in the war so far. Were Russia to gain unhindered mastery of the skies above Ukraine, it could use its large fleet of fixed-wing bomber and multi-role combat aircraft to strike military and civilian targets inside Ukraine at will.</p>
<p>But the success of Ukraine’s air defences in countering this threat – shooting down a significant number of Russia’s most sophisticated (and expensive) aircraft – has made the air war extremely expensive for Russia. And, given the strictly enforced sanctions, these sophisticated aircraft are proving very difficult to replace. As a result, Russia has virtually ceased such operations. </p>
<p>However, Ukraine needs to be resupplied with the portable missiles (or “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/04/06/what-are-manpads-the-portable-missiles-bringing-down-russian-aircraft">manpads</a>”) it has used so successfully against Russian air attacks. Russia’s use of hundreds of Iranian kamikaze drones to target its power supply have made this all the more urgent.</p>
<p>Thinktank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence">also identified</a> an urgent need for “compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective” against systems like the Shahed-136. It warns that without swift and substantial rearming, Russia’s air force will “regain the ability to pose a major threat”.</p>
<p>So while the stray missile landing in Poland highlighted the perils of escalation in this war, it also represents an opportune reminder that Ukraine is the frontline in a war between Russia and the west. Western economies are facing rising fuel prices and inflation and support for massive aid packages to Ukraine may be softening in some quarters. The incident may encourage Nato and its allies to provide Ukraine with what it needs to continue to win the war against Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Volkswagen Stiftung</span></em></p>When a missile landed in Poland the world held its breath. But it showed the urgency of Ukraine’s demands for more military aid.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1947602022-11-16T16:05:59Z2022-11-16T16:05:59ZUkraine war: Poland missile incident shows how dangerous the conflict could be for Nato<p>Events of the past 24 hours have shown just how delicate the situation could become on Ukraine’s borders with Nato countries including Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Romania. Since the Russian invasion at the end of February, the big fear for the west’s most important military alliance is that hostilities could spill over into one of those countries, forcing Nato to intervene and become embroiled in the conflict.</p>
<p>These fears have surfaced again after a Russian-made missile landed on the village of Przewodów a few miles inside the Polish border on November 15, killing two farmers. This immediately gave rise to frantic speculation that the missile could have been launched by Russia, something which could have led Poland to invoke Article 5 of the Nato treaty.</p>
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<p>Article 5 does not <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">demand a military response</a> from Nato member states. But they are mandated to “assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”.</p>
<p>This article has been invoked only once before – after the al-Qaeda terror attack on New York on September 11 2001. Nato’s 1999 Strategic Concept had already identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting the security of member states. As a result, Nato launched its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic region when it <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm">sent a force into Afghanistan</a> to root out what it perceived to be the command and control structure of al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>To invoke Article 5 now, there would need to be clear evidence that the missiles landing in Poland had been fired by Russia as a deliberate act of hostility. But Poland’s president Andrzej Duda has said it is highly probable the rocket had been used by the Ukrainian air defence in an attempt to shoot down Russian missiles.</p>
<p>Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary general, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_209063.htm">also suggested</a> the incident in Poland was “likely” a result of Ukrainian air defence activity. The past few days have been marked by a concerted barrage of cruise and ballistic missiles against civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities including Kyiv and Lviv – which is close to Ukraine’s border with Poland.</p>
<h2>What comes next?</h2>
<p>What are Poland’s options and what does this mean for Nato? Poland could invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">which states that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Article 4 <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">has been invoked before</a>. Turkey did so in 2015 following terror attacks as a result of the Syrian War. And in March 2022, eight countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia – invoked the article in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Article 4 does not have the same implications for military escalation as Article 5, so would not necessarily signify a raising of tensions. And the BBC reports Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki as saying that most of the evidence gathered so far indicated it would not be necessary to trigger Article 4. But he added: “This instrument is still in our hands and we will, of course, take a decision on it.”</p>
<p>So it appears caution is the order of the day, at least for the time being. But what are Nato’s options in a case like this? Alliance member states have been providing limited, but increasingly effective, air defence equipment to Ukraine. Nato members are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/5/weapons-to-ukraine-which-countries-sent-what">also supplying</a> a range of weaponry including state-of-the-art tanks, NLAW anti-tank missiles and ammunition. Ukraine has also benefited from information supplied by member countries’ intelligence agencies.</p>
<p>Nato has been providing training for Ukrainian troops since the invasion of Donbas and Crimea in 2014. This has helped transform Ukraine’s army into the force that has been so effective in defence and, in more recent months, swift and flexible on the offensive. According to a <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-uk-programme-to-train-citizen-soldiers-is-expanding-12690320">report by Sky News in September</a>, around 4,700 Ukrainian troops had already been trained in military bases in the UK. Other western allies, including New Zealand, Sweden and the Netherlands, have also been providing training for Ukrainian troops.</p>
<h2>Ramping up assistance</h2>
<p>The incident in Poland is unlikely to result in Nato deploying significantly more troops to countries bordering Ukraine or Russia. Throughout the conflict, Nato has taken pains not to be manoeuvred into a situation where it becomes embroiled in any fighting. It is also keen not to be seen to escalate tensions in the region – something that a further mass deployment would risk.</p>
<p>What is more likely is that Nato’s high readiness forces will be put on the alert for a swift deployment. These troops are <a href="https://shape.nato.int/brilliant-jump">available at short notice</a> to deploy to areas of tension or conflict. The Brilliant Jump 2022 exercises held in Norway in March 2022, which involved 3,300 naval, air and land forces from 12 member nations as part of Nato’s Very High Readiness Brigade, focused on rapid deployment and interoperability.</p>
<p>So it appears that Nato’s response will be to do what it can to boost Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, while holding its forces in a state of readiness in case it is dragged into the conflict. The alliance will do all it can to avoid an escalation into an all-out war with Russia, while giving Ukraine everything but its soldiers’ boots on the battlefield.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world held its breath when a Russian-made missile landed in Poland. What would it take for Nato to intervene militarily?Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1947142022-11-16T02:49:11Z2022-11-16T02:49:11ZCould Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495529/original/file-20221116-19-o0ccgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C45%2C3735%2C2287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police officers gather at the site where offcials say a Russian-made missile fell.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PolandRussiaUkraineWar/77c6e3fdba804d7cbf828dad1159e648/photo?Query=Poland&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=87316&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The risk of the conflict in Ukraine expanding further into Eastern Europe escalated on Nov. 15, 2022, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-kherson-9202c032cf3a5c22761ee71b52ff9d52">reports of a Russian-made missile straying</a> into neighboring Poland.</em></p>
<p><em>It was not immediately clear if the apparent strike – in which two people were killed – was intentional or accidental, or where the missile had originated. Later, the Polish president said that the projectile <a href="https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1592841693443035136">likely originated from Ukrainian air defense</a>. Nonetheless, concern that a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, could become further embroiled in the conflict led to questions over <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202%202/11/15/what-is-article-5-nato/">whether Poland may invoke Article 4 or Article 5</a> of the NATO treaty if attacked – something that could lead to military intervention by other member countries.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked John R. Deni, <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/deni.cfm">research professor at the U.S. Army War College, a lecturer at American University</a>, and author of “<a href="https://librarycatalog.ecu.edu/catalog/4809141">NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense</a>,” to explain what invoking these articles would mean – and what would happen next.</em></p>
<h2>What is Article 5 of the NATO Treaty?</h2>
<p>Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">part of the treaty</a> that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 30 members of NATO and invoked by the entire alliance.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">NATO treaty</a> was signed in April 1949 and Article 5 is central to it. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Western European countries sought a way to defend themselves in the event Germany again arose as a security challenge. By the late 1940s, concerns shifted toward the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which stationed large military forces across Eastern Europe, <a href="https://scalar.usc.edu/works/dissolution-of-czechoslovakia/1948-czechoslovak-coup-dtat">staged a coup in Czechoslovakia</a>, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136188.htm#:%7E:text=Joseph%20Stalin%2C%20the%20Soviet%20leader,come%20to%20West%20Berlin's%20aid.">blockaded Berlin</a>.</p>
<p>Initially, the United States was skeptical of joining any kind of post-war alliance in Europe, but Soviet actions convinced American leaders to sign on as a way of maintaining Western Europe as free and open. </p>
<p>Article 5 doesn’t automatically get triggered once a NATO member is attacked; the country attacked needs to request that the alliance invoke it – in this case, that would mean Poland, should Polish officials conclude that Russian missiles were sent deliberately. </p>
<h2>What is the U.S. responsibility should it be triggered?</h2>
<p>In practice, invoking Article 5 would mean that the United States would be called upon to help defend any European ally, or Canada, if attacked.</p>
<p>But, there is an important caveat. Article 5 was <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">written in such a way</a> that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked.</p>
<p>In the case of U.S., the executive branch – that is, the president – would need to consider the views and responsibilities of the Congress. If the president were to decide on direct military action, then Congress would likely be involved in some capacity – and of course only <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/declarations-of-war.htm">Congress has the power to declare war</a>.</p>
<p>But Article 5 doesn’t necessarily require a military response. In fact, there is enough flexibility in the language of the treaty for a more nuanced response.</p>
<p>This is vital. Each member of NATO remains a sovereign state, and can’t be compelled into military action. Decision-making over the use of force remains at the national level; such choices are not simply handed over to a supranational organization.</p>
<p>That said, U.S. President Joe Biden – as with previous presidents – has been very clear about America’s willingness to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHPokI1FsFE">defend “every inch</a>” of NATO territory.</p>
<p>As such, if there were a deliberate attack on a NATO ally, I’d expect a robust response by the U.S. and potentially a military one.</p>
<p>It would, of course, depend on what the attacked ally requested, and what the U.S. believes it can and should provide.</p>
<h2>In what instances has it been triggered in the past?</h2>
<p>Article 5 has only been triggered <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">once in the seven decades</a> of NATO’s existence. That was on Sept. 12, 2001 – the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.</p>
<p>The European allies came to the U.S.’s defense on that occasion. They did this by deploying patrol aircraft in U.S. airspace. Additionally, when the decision was made to invade Afghanistan, several NATO countries in which American troops are based – especially Germany – provided guards for U.S. military bases overseas so that American soldiers could deploy.</p>
<h2>Could this apparent missile strike on Poland trigger Article 5?</h2>
<p>That is tricky to assess at the moment, as not all the details are known – there are lots of variables at play.</p>
<p>It makes a massive difference whether this was a targeted attack on Polish military or civilian sites, or whether it was stray missiles. There is also the possibility that this was debris from a strike in Ukraine. We know that the missiles fell close to the Polish-Ukrainian border, in a village <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/explosion-kills-two-poland-near-ukraine-border-2022-11-15/">just a few miles away from the border</a>. The loss of any innocent lives is tragic in any case, but I think the number of deaths resulting from the strike will also be a factor in whether Poland requests invocation of Article 5.</p>
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<p>If it looks like an accident, that will definitely affect how and if the alliance responds. And even if it was deemed an intentional strike, the Poles may still decide not to request invocation of Article 5. This is when Article 4 of the NATO Treaty comes into play.</p>
<h2>What is Article 4?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm">Article 4</a> can be invoked by any NATO member that feels threatened. Under its terms, a member state can request a consultation of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49763.htm">North Atlantic Council</a>, or NAC – the highest political decision-making body in the NATO alliance.</p>
<p>A NAC meeting in itself isn’t unusual. Every NATO summit is a NAC meeting at the level of heads of states. And a NAC meeting takes place every Wednesday at ambassadorial level in Brussels.</p>
<p>But what Article 4 does is open the way for a special meeting of the NAC to consult over the next steps that the alliance should take. This is still a big deal – just not as weighty as invoking Article 5.</p>
<p>Article 4 has been invoked several times over NATO’s lifetime. It was <a href="https://www.elojodigital.com/contenido/10978-syria-crisis-turkey-invokes-article-4-nato-charter">invoked by Turkey</a> amid concerns over cross-border terrorism as a result of the Syrian War. More recently, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-why-eight-nato-members-triggered-article-4-of-the-north-atlantic-treaty-178054">invoked by eight NATO members</a> in Eastern Europe after the Feb. 24 Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Poland is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-considering-nato-article-4-activation-says-spokesman-2022-11-15/">currently assessing whether to invoke Article 4</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated on Nov. 16, 2022 to account for new statement from Polish president.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Deni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Polish authorities are investigating what they initially believed to be a Russian-made missile blast close to the border with Ukraine. Later, the country’s president said it was likely to have been an accident.John Deni, Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.