tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/pravin-gordhan-16938/articles
Pravin Gordhan – The Conversation
2021-08-11T14:57:37Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165894
2021-08-11T14:57:37Z
2021-08-11T14:57:37Z
Why cabinet reshuffles in South Africa are bound to disappoint
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415467/original/file-20210810-15-pltebo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa's announcement of changes to his executive were met with mixed reactions. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>These days, there are two types of cabinet reshuffles in South Africa – those which disappoint immediately and those which keep the disappointment for later.</p>
<p>The cause of the disappointment is not the reshuffles themselves but the expectations which the country’s media, politicians and citizens’ organisations place on them. This fundamentally misunderstands the roles which ministers play in a democracy, making it inevitable that reality will never match their hopes.</p>
<p>Thanks largely to a media whose love of sensation dwarfs its interest in truth, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-changes-national-executive%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">early August reshuffle</a> is very much the “disappointment later” kind. </p>
<p>Before he announced changes to his cabinet, a story of what was at stake embedded itself in the media and sections of business.</p>
<p>It insisted that there were cabinet ministers whose incompetence had <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/riots-latest-is-ayanda-dlodlo-of-state-security-guilty-of-misleading-the-country-on-riots-looting-unrest-in-south-africa-bhei-cele-intelligence-product-report/">worsened the recent violence</a> which gripped two provinces recently, or whose ineptitude was obstructing economic growth. Everyone knew who they were and the only interesting question was whether Ramaphosa would do what “the national interest” required.</p>
<p>According to sections of the media, Ramaphosa did what he was meant to do. Lurid headlines announced that he had <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2021-08-05-ramaphosa-wields-the-axe-and-puts-allies-in-key-positions/">“wielded the axe”</a>, replacing opponents with allies across the board. This, of course, is why there is no immediate disappointment. But later disenchantment is inevitable – and not only because the claim that he used the reshuffle to remove all in his path and replace them with firm allies is a fantasy.</p>
<h2>The reshuffle</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa’s reshuffle replaced three ministers who were no longer available and whose positions had to be filled. (<a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/jackson-mthembu-dies-of-covid-19-related-complications-20210121-2">One passed away</a>, another was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zweli-mkhize-resigns-over-digital-vibes-scandal-8643a0df-74f1-4696-856d-408ea37610d2">embroiled in scandal</a> and the third <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/tito-mboweni-resigns-enoch-godongwana-named-sas-new-finance-minister-ef544c03-4f4b-46ba-8cfd-c4b1363d655e">asked to step down</a>.) </p>
<p>In each case, the political loyalties of the new minister are the same as their predecessor’s. He fired the defence minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, which was hardly surprising since she had <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-07-18-defence-minister-seemingly-contradicts-ramaphosa-says-there-is-no-evidence-of-an-insurrection/">contradicted him publicly</a> on the causes of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in July, has no significant support base and was not considered crucial to her portfolio. Before her dismissal, the minister was an ally of the president, so it not clear why her sacking meant he was purging enemies. Mapisa-Nqakula was the only minister sacked – others who were subjects of overheated speculation before the announcement were shifted between portfolios. And even she has not arguably lost anything – she is scheduled to become Speaker of the National Assembly, a post which, at least in theory, is higher in status than a cabinet job. </p>
<p>Shifting ministers between ministries is a boon to lurid pundits everywhere since they can place whatever spin they like on them. But about the only minister who has clearly been demoted is <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/lindiwe-nonceba-sisulu/">Lindiwe Sisulu</a>, who has moved from foreign minister to human settlements to tourism, probably because she is said to be <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2020-10-01-can-lindiwe-sisulu-be-the-ancs-next-president/">campaigning</a> for Ramaphosa’s job. </p>
<p>But, for the rest, who is to say whether a move from communications to small business or public administration to water and sanitation is a shift upwards, downwards or sideways? What is clear is that Ramaphosa did not shift the balance of power in his cabinet at all and that his chief goal seems to have been to show he had heard complaints about particular ministries without rocking any political boats.</p>
<h2>The role of ministers</h2>
<p>But this is only part of why later disappointment is inevitable. A more important reason is that the standard story of what reshuffles mean is based on very unrealistic ideas of the purpose of cabinet ministers.</p>
<p>Firstly, it confuses the opinions of a small group with the “truth”. Ministerial appointments are political – a minister is the political head of a department, not a technical advisor. This is why, contrary to a <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/government/292442-the-qualifications-of-south-africas-ministers.html">widely held belief</a> in South Africa, ministers need not hold any qualifications in their ministry’s area of interest. Post-1994 South Africa’s most widely admired finance ministers (in the market place), <a href="https://www.weforum.org/people/trevor-manuel">Trevor Manuel</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/pravin-jamnadas-gordhan-mr-0">Pravin Gordhan</a>, hold, respectively, a diploma in engineering and a pharmacy degree.</p>
<p>It is also why it is never “self-evident” that a minster should be hired or fired – since people hold differing political opinions, they will not agree on who is a “good” or “bad” minister. Outgoing finance minister <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/finance-ministry/tito-mboweni-mr">Tito Mboweni</a> was valued in much of business because he was seen as a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53935683">champion of markets</a>. For the same reason, sections of the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">governing alliance</a> and anti-poverty campaigners could not wait to see the back of him. Which side was speaking for the “national interest”? </p>
<p>The claim that a minister must stay or go is, and must always be, an expression of opinion only. A president who ignores that view is not rejecting “the national interest” – they simply have a different view of what that is.</p>
<p>The belief that all happy outcomes – better policing and intelligence or economic growth – can be achieved simply by replacing one minister with another is also a sure recipe for disappointment. As the political head of a department, the minister is responsible for giving it political direction and supporting it politically. These can be important tasks – but they do not mean that the strength or weakness of a department depends on who its minister is.</p>
<p>Most of the “heavy lifting” in government departments is the job of public servants. Ministers can nudge things in particular directions and give political support to officials whose work they value. But they cannot do much more. Two examples illustrate this.</p>
<h2>Reality versus hype</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most effective minister in South Africa’s democratic life was the late <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/zola-sydney-themba-skweyiya">Zola Skweyiya</a>. As social development minister, he was responsible for <a href="https://www.vukuzenzele.gov.za/legacy-dr-zola-skweyiya">extending social grants</a> to millions of people. But Skweyiya could have done none of this without the work of his senior civil servants. His role was crucial but it consisted largely of supporting senior officials.</p>
<p>By contrast, there was much enthusiasm before the reshuffle for the <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/featured/ramaphosa-must-fire-bheki-cele-khehla-sitole-cope/">removal of police minister Bheki Cele</a>. The reason was obvious – the police performed abysmally during the recent violence. But, whatever Cele’s merits, replacing him would make not an iota of difference to the police’s performance. </p>
<p>There are two reasons why policing the violence was so inept. First, South Africa has never had a competent police service – not under minority rule, when the police’s chief task was preventing black people from expressing themselves or policing racial laws, and not after it. The police are also <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-06-battle-lines-have-been-drawn-between-saps-factions-and-we-are-the-casualties/">deeply factionalised</a> and so it is never clear whether officers are failing because they don’t know how to act or because they choose not to.</p>
<p>None of this will change simply because a minister changes. Change will need a thorough strategy to alter the operational arms of the police and root out factionalism. If that did happen, political support from a minister would help to make a difference. Simply replacing one politician with another would not.</p>
<p>So, cabinet reshuffles are always much less important events than the hype which surrounds them would suggest. If the national debate understood that, it might save itself repeated disappointments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165894/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Cabinet reshuffles are always much less important events than the hype which surrounds them would suggest.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/130298
2020-01-22T10:19:43Z
2020-01-22T10:19:43Z
South Africa’s energy crisis has triggered lots of ideas: why most are wrong
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311154/original/file-20200121-117943-1tzi84q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most proposed solutions don't address the systemic problems facing Eskom, in particular its parlous finances.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since late last year South Africans have, once again, been subjected to power cuts by the power utility, Eskom. The need for what’s called loadshedding – planned power outages – led to the recent <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-01-10-eskom-chair-jabu-mabuza-resigns-over-load-shedding-debacle/">resignation of Eskom’s chairperson</a> and a flurry of concern about the current and future reliability of electricity supply. It has also raised questions about the lack of progress in resolving <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-restructuring-south-africas-power-utility-wont-end-the-blackouts-114333">Eskom’s financial and operational crises</a> since Cyril Ramaphosa became the country’s president in early 2018. </p>
<p>Besides the importance of electricity supply for ordinary people and businesses, the deluge of opinions and proposed solutions reflects a variety of corporate and political vested interests. One grouping is pushing for the removal of public enterprises minister <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/Pieter_du_Toit/pieter-du-toit-how-pravin-gordhan-became-the-principal-enemy-of-the-state-capture-project-20200114">Pravin Gordhan</a>. It argues that the recurrence of loadshedding demonstrates his failure to fix the power utility.</p>
<p>Another has blamed the country’s energy minister, <a href="https://m.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/gwede-mantashe-accused-of-hindering-efforts-to-tackle-sas-electricity-crisis-20200108">Gwede Mantashe</a>. A line of argument against him is that loadshedding would have been avoided if he’d commissioned new renewable energy projects and allowed greater decentralised electricity generation by large businesses.</p>
<p>These claims contain significant weaknesses. And most solutions that stem from them have a fatal flaw: they don’t address the systemic problems facing Eskom, in particular its parlous finances.</p>
<p>The basic objective of charting a way forward for Eskom must be to ensure a reliable and affordable supply of electricity for households and firms. That must be done in a way that does not undermine the stability of public finances. And any costs must be spread as equitably as possible across individuals and businesses, minimising negative effects on other important social and economic objectives. </p>
<p>Finally, decisions about energy must contribute to reducing future carbon emissions, in line with international treaties. This needs to be done because it’s essential for the planet, and because international regulation will make it increasingly expensive not to do so.</p>
<h2>Like an unreliable car bought with debt</h2>
<p>Ending the power cuts has to begin with understanding Eskom’s precarious financial position.</p>
<p>Imagine the following domestic analogy: you have bought a car with a bank loan and it starts breaking down regularly. But the dealership you bought it from has closed so it cannot be returned. You ask someone for advice and they tell you that the obvious solution is to buy a new smart car that uses less fuel and is more environmentally friendly. But you are still paying off the current car. So unless you have lots of extra money, or can borrow more from the bank, this “solution” is unhelpful.</p>
<p>This is where Eskom finds itself. It borrowed hundreds of billions of rand to build power stations that are <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Budget/how-medupi-and-kusile-are-sinking-south-africa-20191009">turning out to be unreliable</a>. And people who argue that the solution is simply to commission new renewable energy projects are like the person who annoyingly says “just buy a new car”. Since Eskom is almost bankrupt and government’s finances are under huge pressure, “just buying new power” is not realistic.</p>
<p>But it is a vicious cycle: an unreliable car can harm a person’s employment and income prospects, making it harder for them to afford repairs or an alternative. Similarly, unreliable electricity harms economic activity and therefore reduces the electricity revenue to Eskom and the tax revenue to the state. </p>
<p>Eskom has tried to avoid – or reduce – power cuts caused by failures of its main power plants by using <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/Business/eskom-blows-through-its-diesel-budget-20200120">expensive options like gas turbines</a>. This is is a bit like taking a taxi when you are paying interest on a bank-financed car that you aren’t using.</p>
<p>What about the idea that electricity users should be allowed to generate their own power? Well, that’s a bit like saying that to reduce the impact of your car breakdowns on your employer you let them hire and pay someone else to do part of your job. That’s great for your employer but not so great for you because it cuts your income – making it harder to service the vehicle debt or pay for repairs and alternatives. </p>
<p>Decentralised power supply will almost certainly be part of future energy systems. But without solving the systemic issues facing Eskom it could, in the short term, contribute to the power utility’s death spiral. Encouraging electricity users to move to alternatives may take pressure off Eskom’s operations, but it will have disastrous financial implications. </p>
<p>Big firms can afford to do this, and independent power companies will profit, but the resultant costs will fall on everyone else because Eskom has effectively borrowed on behalf of the country.</p>
<p>The car analogy should make it clear that “just procuring more power” could make Eskom’s financial crisis much worse. Wind and solar power have a role but also particular limitations that are often given inadequate attention. They cannot be relied on to produce electricity whenever it is needed. </p>
<p>If renewable energy producers cannot guarantee supply when it is needed, then the cost of measures to compensate for that must be recognised as a cost of renewable energy. </p>
<p>The renewables lobby, like the nuclear and coal lobbies in the past, offers apparently easy solutions to South Africa’s crisis. But it distracts attention from these basic principles – and many key questions that remain unanswered.</p>
<h2>Unanswered questions</h2>
<p>South Africans need to know what maintenance is needed to get existing power stations operating reliably enough to avoid long-term loadshedding. In the short term the country’s best option may be for predictable power cuts while the maintenance backlog is addressed. </p>
<p>Gas turbines can help to avoid loadshedding, reducing the impact on the economy, but they aggravate Eskom’s financial problems. How can this tradeoff be optimised? Would new renewable energy really create space for the maintenance that is needed? And how are these decisions currently being made in the national interest?</p>
<p>Eskom has effectively borrowed on behalf of citizens, so any financial gaps will have to be plugged through electricity tariffs, higher taxes or painful cuts to public spending. </p>
<p>The fact that there is still lack of clarity on such fundamental issues after almost two years under a Ramaphosa presidency suggests that those appointed to advise on Eskom and turn it around have failed. That is why it is not helpful to focus on politicians. </p>
<p>The country is running out of time and money; it cannot afford another round of misguided advice and ineffective efforts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130298/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Muller advises a range of government and other organisations, including Hidroelectrica Cahora Bassa and the Climate Bonds Initiative, on water, energy and climate issues and has received research funding from the Water Research Commission and the African Development Bank.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The deluge of opinions and proposed solutions to South Africa’s energy crisis reflects corporate and political interests.
Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Research Associate at the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (PEERC) and Visiting Fellow at the Johannesburg Institute of Advanced Study (JIAS), University of Johannesburg
Mike Muller, Visiting Adjunct Professor, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/126230
2019-11-01T06:57:23Z
2019-11-01T06:57:23Z
How failing power utility is fuelling South Africa’s economic crisis
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299841/original/file-20191101-88378-a8k21i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A main street of a poor neighbourhood in Cape Town during recent power cuts.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s state power utility Eskom is the biggest challenge facing the country. Mess up Eskom, and you mess up the country. And it looks as though key players are doing just that. </p>
<p>The past two weeks will be remembered as the start of a cataclysmic economic crisis caused by the failure of three powerful men to spend enough time in a room to find a comprehensive solution that would turn the current crisis facing the utility into a great opportunity for South Africa’s energy and economic future. And to finally break from the country’s past. By refusing to align their policies and strategies, the three ministers – from energy, finance and public enterprises – are responsible for triggering a crisis that will be resolved on the streets. </p>
<p>What we see in Chile, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/chile-protests-sharpen-calls-constitutional-change-grow-191030013911199.html">where public anger</a> has spilled out onto the streets, is what can be expected to emerge as ordinary South Africans experience the true implications of this failure to decisively resolve the crisis. </p>
<p>What’s at stake is not just the short-term crisis and how the country keeps its lights on. At the core, the crisis is about finally transcending the powerful minerals-energy sector (coal mines plus Eskom), which is a major pillar of the South African economy – a sector that has survived the end of apartheid.</p>
<p>The ministers, with decisive leadership from President Cyril Ramaphosa, had a golden moment to take the first step by releasing South Africa from the stranglehold of a debt-laden Eskom in an unstoppable death spiral.</p>
<p>But three opportunities were missed. They were: a new energy plan led by the Minister of Minerals and Energy; a roadmap for the power utility led by the Minister of Public Enterprises; and the medium term budget led by the Finance Minister. </p>
<p>They failed to combine their respective policies into an integrated framework for transitioning to renewables, transforming Eskom and managing the utility’s ballooning debt. </p>
<p>In the final instance, it is the President who needs to call his ministers to order. The open question is whether Cyril Ramaphosa can act decisively to coordinate them to clearly and unambiguously address the Eskom crisis. </p>
<p>This will require managing competing interests. The assumption in South Africa is that nothing can be done unless everyone is on board. But in a crisis of this magnitude, big decisions need to be made that will make vested interests equally unhappy so that the best can be done for the nation as a whole. </p>
<h2>The breakdown</h2>
<p>On October 18 Minister of Minerals and Energy Gwede Mantashe <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-gwede-mantashe-approval-integrated-resource-plan-2019-18-oct-2019-0000">announced</a> a new energy plan (the Integrated Resource Plan) for the country. This was an opportune moment to set the country on a new trajectory in terms of energy generation. But that’s not what happened. The lowest cost option – only renewables plus gas – was rejected. In addition to unlocking renewables and gas, the plan provides for 1500 MW of coal-fired power despite the fact that nearly all the biggest financial institutions in the world have said over the past 18 months they are divesting from coal. </p>
<p>On Tuesday October 29 the Minister of Public Enterprises, Pravin Gordhan, <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-10-29-public-enterprise-minister-gordhan-releases-eskoms-plan-to-produce-cost-effective-power/">announced </a> a new Roadmap for Eskom. Here the focus was on unbundling. The mooted plan is to create a “transmission entity”. There was also reference to a “just transition” – without saying how it will be funded – to manage the consequences of decommissioning most coal-fired power stations. </p>
<p>Mostly importantly, there was no reference to how the utility’s <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Budget/no-debt-relief-for-eskom-just-yet-says-mboweni-20191030">R450 billion debt </a> will be managed. Nevertheless, at least the Roadmap reinforced the notion of lowest cost option, repeatedly. </p>
<p>Next up was the Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni, <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2019/speech/speech.pdf">who delivered</a> his medium term budget on October 30. The expectation was that he would set out how the National Treasury planned to manage the power utility’s debt. The matter is urgent given that a restructured entity is expected to handle, at most, R200 billion worth of debt. But the Eskom debt is north of R450 billion. That leaves R250 billion worth of unserviceable debt. </p>
<p>Without clarity on how the unserviceable debt will be managed, the Roadmap for the utility cannot be effectively implemented because of complex cross-guarantees and the burden of running a utility that cannot service its debt obligations.</p>
<p>Expectations among South Africans, investors, businesses threatened by power cuts and international funders were high that Mboweni would relieve Eskom of R250 billion worth of debt so that it could be freed up to restructure. </p>
<p>But he didn’t. Mboweni said he wants to see the restructuring plan implemented before he considers debt relief. </p>
<p>It needn’t have been this way. There were alternatives. </p>
<p>On the debt front, as <a href="http://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/eskom-task-team-mulling-new-debt-relief-options-as-it-comes-to-terms-with-depth-of-crisis-2019-05-10">recommended</a> by the Eskom Sustainability Task Team appointed by the President, the R250 billion should have been ring-fenced into a special purpose vehicle with agreements on funding flows to ensure that it is “ratings neutral”. It was recommended that the funds for this would come from a number of sources, including the budget, revenues from the utility itself and carbon finance conditional on accelerated decommissioning. </p>
<p>This would have enabled Eskom to refinance itself. Without this kind of arrangement, Eskom is redirecting funds for maintenance and operations into servicing debt. If this continues it will face system collapse. </p>
<p>On restructuring, the Roadmap recommends a “Transmission Entity” that will be a subsidiary of Eskom Holdings. This is a good idea, but the unions will suspect it is the first step towards privatisation and will object. </p>
<p>On the energy plan, the lowest cost option to meet future energy needs should have been selected. The fact that it was rejected will cost South Africa an extra R100 billion just at the point when it needs the cheapest energy with maximum security of supply. This includes a rapid build programme which coal and nuclear cannot provide. </p>
<p>This means that – unlike most other countries which have accepted the inevitability of the energy transition – accessing climate finance (mainly grant funds, but also concessionary loans) to finance the transition becomes impossible. Again, this comes exactly when the country needs the cheapest possible finance. </p>
<h2>Broken promises</h2>
<p>The misalignment between the three ministers responsible for shaping the country’s response to the Eskom crisis has produced an outcome that is out of line with the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/cram0923.htm">statement</a> that President Cyril Ramaphosa sent to the UN Climate Summit on September 23, 2019. In it he made it clear that South Africa takes climate change seriously and that a just transition fund will be established. In his words:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In shifting to a low-carbon, inclusive, climate change resilient development path and embracing the global energy transition, we must ensure that we leave no-one behind. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Granted, the Roadmap echoes this by acknowledging that a global energy transition is underway and that the lowest cost option is preferred. And the energy plan does provide for 23,854 MW of additional renewables (wind and solar) by 2030. </p>
<p>But the failure of the medium term budget to provide for a ring-fenced facility to manage the debt Eskom cannot handle effectively reinforces the stalemate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Swilling receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>
It’s not clear whether South Africa’s president can coordinate his ministers in a way that provides clarity about dealing with the country’s energy crisis.
Mark Swilling, Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, Stellenbosch University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/122652
2019-09-02T12:47:19Z
2019-09-02T12:47:19Z
Politician who turned down a bribe offers a recipe to end South Africa’s malaise
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290322/original/file-20190830-165977-1dizvg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mcebisi Jonas appears at a commission probing grand corruption in South Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alon Skuy © Sunday Times.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A book whose author has <a href="https://qz.com/africa/825869/state-capture-report-south-africas-deputy-finance-minister-mcebisi-jonas-turned-down-a-44-million-dollar-bribe-from-the-guptas/">refused a R600 000 000 bribe</a> is a <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/08/14/euphoria-around-ramaphosa-s-new-dawn-quickly-dying-says-mcebisi-jonas">book that comes highly recommended</a>. But be warned. The book, After Dawn: Hope after State Capture, is devoid of all autobiography, except one page mentioning Mcebisi Jonas’s feeling of loss when being offered that bribe.</p>
<p>The book contains no biographical details. They are, nevertheless, <a href="https://www.gibs.co.za/news-events/events/forums/Pages/deputy-finance-minister-mcebisi-jonas.aspx">fascinating</a>. For example, he became politically active at the age of 14, and went on to leave South Africa for military training in Angola and Uganda. On his return from exile, his task was to play a crucial role to set up the African National Congress (ANC) and Communist Party structures in the Eastern Cape province.</p>
<p>The book is written to be readable: each chapter starts with a half-page box summary of its main points. After Dawn repeatedly stresses:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>None of the ideas put forward in this book are new, in fact they echo our existing policy … what is required is to put these ideas into action (page 202)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>“These ideas” turn out to be a passionate advocacy from cover to cover of the almost forgotten <a href="https://nationalplanningcommission.wordpress.com/the-national-development-plan/">National Development Plan</a>. This was a comprehensive policy document drawn up by a special ministerial body first constituted in 2009 by then-President Jacob Zuma. It was, however, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-national-development-plan-can-be-resuscitated-heres-how-84707">never implemented in full</a>.</p>
<p>Jonas has two overarching themes. The first is one of structure. That South Africa’s state-owned enterprises, national, provincial, and municipal bureaucracies must be purged of kleptocrats and incompetents to become meritocratic. The <a href="http://www.psc.gov.za/">Public Service Commission</a> – which was designed to keep the public service honest – must regain its powers to hire and to fire. Political appointees must be confined to the ministries, not departments.</p>
<p>Jonas’s second theme is agency. The task of these meritocratic bureaucracies should be to enable entrepreneurship, and to become entrepreneurial themselves. State-owned enterprises must once again pay their own way, be partly or wholly sold off, or re-absorbed into the line functions of a department.</p>
<p>All this is no less fascinating in its implications for being familiar, well-trodden ground. John Kane-Berman, veteran policy fellow of the Institute of Race Relations, regularly churns out blogs warning all and sundry that the ANC and its communist National Democratic Revolution is steering South Africa directly to communism.</p>
<p>It is clear that Jonas – an ANC leader so senior as to have formerly been a deputy minister of finance – has a communist party history which has left him on economic policy as post-Marxian as the current Communist Parties of China and Vietnam. </p>
<h2>Morale booster</h2>
<p>This book is definitely a booster to morale. Jonas reminds South Africans that their country achieved 5.3% economic growth in 2005. And that he believes it can do it again. </p>
<p>Another point worth boasting about is that the annualised returns on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are, over the long term, the highest in the world. (p.30) </p>
<p>Jonas argues that South Africa does not lack ideas. Where it falls short is implementation. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>….unlike Singapore, our focus in South Africa has too often been on the plan, rather than on what needs to be done and how to get it done. We stumble at the point of implementation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Jonas is clearly sympathetic to the concept of a German or Swedish style class compact to facilitate a return to economic growth. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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</figure>
<p>Jonas holds up Singapore as a model for South Africa to strive to emulate. He concedes that every country has its own idiosyncrasies and that not everything that works in one will work in another. Nevertheless, he expounds the virtues of the island nation’s early obsession with making sure that the majority of the population felt a sense of belonging. And making Singapore relevant to the world. This required absolute clarity of vision about what the country stood for. </p>
<p>Jonas’s favourite economists are <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/ricardo-hausmann">Ricardo Haussman</a>, César Hidalgo, and Sebastián Bustos (p.155). He particularly admires the way the three academics have developed the concept of economic complexity. As Jonas explains, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>this is a measure of the knowledge in a society (as measured by the notion of ‘person bytes’) as expressed in the products it makes. This, in turn, is closely linked to a country’s level of development and is predictive of its future economic growth</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This, they argue, makes it possible to calculate the economic complexity of a country based on the diversity of exports, their ubiquity, or the number of countries able to produce them. He notes that South Africa has failed to undergo complexity-led transformation. In fact, its portfolio of exports has declined since 1994.</p>
<p>Many of Jonas’s recommendations are in the National Development Plan. One central theme is: remove constraints to competitiveness. </p>
<p>South Africa needs a comprehensive push to higher job productivity because it cannot compete against low-wage countries. It needs to incentivise innovation and double its spend on research and development. Human capacity needs to be expanded. And it shouldn’t hesitate to import skilled persons. </p>
<p>The country’s vision must be to accelerate economic inclusion. To this end it needs a corruption-free, high-performance state. This in turn requires the nature of politics to change, including reform of the ANC.</p>
<p>This is a recurring theme for Jonas. He repeatedly emphasises the need for the ANC to reform itself. He believes strongly that this is vital if South Africa is to move onto a faster growth path.</p>
<h2>Quibbles</h2>
<p>I have some minor quibbles. The parsimonious publisher has not used colour, meaning that all the tables have lines in confusing shades of blurred greys. </p>
<p>As far as the substance is concerned, I disagree with Jonas that digital voting systems can prevent ballot fraud (p.215). A desktop search turns up numerous examples of error or fraud that have occurred in the US and other digital voting countries. </p>
<p>After Dawn deserves the media exposure it is getting. Popularising the ideas and arguments in the book will help them gain traction, and help marginalise the conspiracy theories and smears being pumped out by the kleptocratic fight-back campaign trying to derail efforts to clean up the country’s political and economic systems.</p>
<p><em>After Dawn, by Mcebisi Jonas. Picador Africa, imprint of Macmillan. Johannesburg. 2019. 277pp. Foreword by Cyril Ramaphosa.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
This book is a booster to morale. It tells South Africans they can enjoy the impressive economic growth they once achieved.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/121819
2019-08-15T07:45:08Z
2019-08-15T07:45:08Z
The battles of South Africa’s Public Protector: why the law must win
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288026/original/file-20190814-136203-cl097h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane listens to public complaints in Cape Town.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the <a href="https://www.biblestudytools.com/esther/">book of Esther</a>, the Bible tells a story from the 5th century BCE, when the Jews were in exile in Persia. The Persian king, Ahasuerus, had installed a Jewish woman, Esther, as his queen at the time that one of the king’s ministers started a genocidal programme against the Jews. Esther’s uncle, Mordecai, appealed to her to intervene. She pointed out to him that the law did not allow her to approach the king without invitation, and that the penalty for disobedience of this law was death. But when he insisted, she agreed to risk her life to protect her people.</p>
<p>South Africa’s Public Protector <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/profile-of-advocate-busisiwe-mkhwebane">Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane</a> invoked Esther at a press conference in early July 2019 when she <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-public-protector-releases-high-profile-reports-20190705">quoted</a> the queen’s words to Mordecai.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The book of Esther, Chapter 4, reads thus: ‘And so I will go to the King, which is against the law; and if I perish, I perish!’ </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mkhwebane and her supporters have long depicted her as a courageous warrior against corrupt incumbents in powerful positions. So it is not surprising that she drew on her Christian religion to strengthen her claim to be fighting evil. </p>
<p>But Mkhwebane’s choice of role model is intriguing, as Esther’s heroism required her to break the law. Indeed, the quotation from the Bible read out at the press conference makes that point expressly.</p>
<p>It was morally right of Queen Esther to defy the law, as the law itself was brutal and dictatorial. In addition it was, in this case, facilitating genocide. But what law does Mkhwebane intend to break? And why does she consider it heroic to do so? South Africa does not have a king, and it is not unlawful to approach anyone in power. </p>
<p>Indeed, Mkhwebane herself occupies an office which is meant to ensure that power is not abused to the detriment of the poor and the marginalised. </p>
<p>But the Public Protector’s Office became embroiled in political scandals soon after she took office in October 2016. In particular, she has been accused of using her considerable power to benefit a particular political faction; a claim that has now been included in the court papers of one of the many <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-07-24-mkhwebane-has-done-more-damage-than-any-other-pp-gordhan-argues">legal challenges to her reports</a>.</p>
<h2>The law and the Public Protector</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/59/Public-Protector">Office of the Public Protector</a> was created by South Africa’s <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>. </p>
<p>It is buttressed by a detailed legal framework of constitutional, statutory and common law principles. Together, these principles ensure that the office achieves the very goal she claims to pursue: protecting the poor and marginalised against corruption. They do so by, among other measures, requiring a fair procedure and requiring a “rational connection” between her findings and her decision-making process.</p>
<p>Unless it operates under the law, the Office of the Public Protector becomes an instrument of unconstrained power and can be used to fight factional battles. It can destroy the livelihoods or careers of innocent parties who were not granted hearings. Or, it can protect those who are guilty of corruption by not investigating them properly. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/storm-around-south-africas-public-protector-shows-robustness-not-a-crisis-120902">Storm around South Africa's public protector shows robustness, not a crisis</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Even without any intention to benefit political factions, a Public Protector operating outside the law will not be effective in creating remedies for those disadvantaged by corruption. Like any public office, therefore, the Public Protector is subject to review by the courts.</p>
<p>South Africa’s courts have in fact <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-07-26-call-to-remove-busisiwe-mkhwebane-from-the-office-of-the-public-protector/">overturned a number of her reports</a>. The reasons have varied.</p>
<p>On several occasions, courts have <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-public-protector-releases-high-profile-reports-20190705">ruled</a> that she <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-02-inside-the-latest-findings-of-public-protector-busisiwe-mkhwebane-to-be-set-aside-by-the-courts/">had not granted</a> a hearing to implicated parties. In another case a court found against her for excluding relevant factors, such as the evidence of the supposed beneficiaries in a corruption case involving a <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/estina-dairy-farm-approval-fast-tracked">dairy farm project</a>. </p>
<p>In a separate case she was found to have acted outside of her statutory powers by instructing Parliament to <a href="http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2018/2.html">amend the Constitution</a>. And in yet another it was found that she omitted remedies which would have recovered <a href="http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2019/132.html">money lost to corruption</a>. </p>
<p>The Public Protector and her supporters claim to be aware of the value of the law. She has frequently claimed merely to be fulfilling her constitutional duty of investigating corruption “without fear or favour”. </p>
<p>One of her biggest supports, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius Malema, stated that he merely <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/malema-believes-public-protectors-office-being-destroyed">wants all to be equal before the law</a>. This was his reason for rejecting the High Court’s finding that President Cyril Ramaphosa could delay disciplinary action against Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan until the Public Protector’s report against Gordhan had been reviewed. </p>
<p>But, if they were seeking compliance with the law, they would argue in terms of the law. They would engage with courts’ reasoning and produce evidence for their assertions. </p>
<p>Instead, the Public Protector has made unsubstantiated claims of <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/06/09/mkhwebane-lays-formal-complaint-against-those-who-ve-insulted-her">personal victimisation</a>, or simply restated arguments that had already been rejected, with full reasoning, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-05-21-mkhwebane-astonished-by-vrede-report-ruling-may-fight-back">by the court</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/mbuyiseni-quintin-ndlozi/">Mbuyiseni Ndlozi</a>, the EFF’s national spokesperson, ridiculed a judge holding against the party as <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-08-08-she-couldnt-even-read-her-own-judgment-eff-slams-judges-mkhwebane-finding/">illiterate</a> and Malema threatened to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/malema-hits-out-at-sas-old-and-traumatized-judges-in-womens-day-speech-20190809">resort to arms</a> if the courts continue to produce judgments of which he disapproves. </p>
<p>This is the very opposite of upholding the rule of law, not just because it undermines the institution that protects the law and keeps public power within its constraints – the courts – but because it refuses even to reason with law. It speaks another language completely: the rule of persons and not of law, of violence and raw power.</p>
<p>In her argument before the North Gauteng High Court, Advocate Mkhwebane insisted that the President should implement her remedial action immediately because his loyalty should lie with her office and not with one of his ministers. </p>
<p>She seems to have missed the point that both her own, and the President’s, loyalty must lie with the Constitution. She and her supporters will not perish if they are unable or unwilling to serve the Constitution and the law. But they should not be holding offices under it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121819/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathleen Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Public Protector’s Office has become embroiled in political scandals under the current incumbent, Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane.
Cathleen Powell, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/119401
2019-07-03T14:06:26Z
2019-07-03T14:06:26Z
Evolution of ANC economic policy sheds light on squabble over the central bank
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281112/original/file-20190625-81762-i8miak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Debate about SA Reserve Bank's mandate must be done in a more considered manner, informed by evidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/anc-heavyweights-divided-reserve-bank-mandate">squabble</a> over the mandate of the <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/Pages/default.aspx">South African Reserve Bank</a> has very little to do with real economic policies. It is rather emblematic of the intensely polarised levels of political distrust that currently exists within the <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress</a> (ANC), the governing party. Compounding the problem is the lack of any coherent grand vision from the post-apartheid leadership of the ANC about the road they wish South Africa to embark on.</p>
<p>The ANC has been largely clear on values and principles (non-racial, democratic, state led, re-distributive) that inform economic policy but short on specific details of what strategies could achieve these. This may have served the ANC well during its years in exile. However, since the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-6-negotiation-transition-and-freedom-chapter-1-transition-context-christopher-saunders">transition</a> to democracy in 1994, the costs of its inability to deliberatively focus on important issues in the economic realm have come back to haunt the party. </p>
<p>Now, as it muddles from one crisis to the next, the various factions of the party will use particular issues on the economy, and everything else from the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-06-09-00-clear-policies-needed-for-effective-land-reform">land issue</a> to the role of the ANC Women’s League, to fight their battles. What should concern all South Africans is the enormous costs this lack of coherence has on the economy – from <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">President Jacob Zuma’s</a> firing of Finance Ministers <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-19-nenegate-the-financial-cost-of-political-uncertainty">Nhanhla Nene</a> and <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2017/03/30/president-jacob-zuma-cabinet-reshuffle-pravin-gordhan-fired">Pravin Gordhan</a>, to the recent squabble, and the Public Protector’s outrageous <a href="http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/443.html">over-reach</a> in her bizarre Absa “findings”.</p>
<h2>Evolution of economic policy</h2>
<p>We have found no evidence of the official ANC policy stance on the Reserve Bank and monetary policy going into the negotiations that delivered the 1994 political settlement. It is mentioned only once. And that is in a administrative sense in the <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ancs-1994-election-manifesto">Ready to Govern</a> document the ANC published in 1992.</p>
<p>During the negotiations, the ANC’s stance on an independent central bank seems to have been informed by a visit, among others, to the <a href="https://www.bundesbank.de/en/bundesbank/organisation">German Bundesbank</a> by some members of its Department of Economic Policy. This visit convinced the ANC that support for an independent central bank would buttress the credibility of its economic policy management. For the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/national-party-np">National Party</a>, the objective was to keep what they perceived to be a populist and ‘socialist-inclined’ ANC away from the levers of monetary policy-making.</p>
<p>As it turned out, the sections of the constitution that dealt with the central bank were not debated much during the negotiations because the major parties were in agreement. </p>
<h2>How SARB’s mandate came about</h2>
<p>We do not yet have the official transcripts of what was discussed behind the closed doors of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">CODESA </a>. Such transcripts should shed light on how the decision on the independence of the Reserve Bank was contoured around the economic policy positions of the major parties.</p>
<p>Also noteworthy is the fact that the Constitutional <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Mandate/Pages/Mandate-Home.aspx">clause</a> on the mandate of the Reserve Bank bears an uncanny resemblance to the bank’s 1990 mission statement. This is no coincidence. <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/History/PreviousGovernors/Pages/DrChristianLodewykStals.aspx">Chris Stals</a> who was the Reserve Bank Governor at the time has said that the constitutional clause was drawn directly from the Reserve Bank’s mission statement. </p>
<p>The Reserve Bank’s 1990 mission statement stated that the Bank’s “primary aim was the protection of the internal and external value of the rand”. These words are virtually the same as those which entered the final Constitution in 1996. We understand that the ANC added in words to the effect that the Bank had to carry out its mandate in the interests of “balanced and sustained growth…”. </p>
<h2>Neither balanced nor sustainable</h2>
<p>The notion of ‘balanced growth’ is a curious and largely meaningless turn of phrase that has little or no traction in monetary or economic theory. The only <a href="https://www.economiainstitucional.com/eng/abstracts/rei39.htm">reference</a> we are aware of relates to its use in the early 1950s. That was in the famous debate between economists <a href="https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/65220/">Albert Hirschmann</a> and <a href="https://economicsconcepts.com/big_push_theory.htm">Paul Rosenstein-Rodan</a> about the best route to development for the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia.</p>
<p>To argue that this vague phrase means that the Reserve Bank also has <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Mandate/Pages/Mandate-Home.aspx">growth mandate</a> is disingenuous. The Reserve Bank has succeeded in its narrow (and narrowing) price stability mandate. But its policy stance has not helped to create sustainable or ‘balanced’ growth, however one interprets the latter. The growth of an economy with such high levels of income and wealth inequality, arguably the highest in the world, as well as unemployment of 40% (by the broader definition) is neither sustainable nor balanced. </p>
<p>We accept that economic reform is not a matter for monetary policy alone. But limiting the role of monetary policy to ensuring price and financial stability doesn’t help either. Added to this is the ruling out of activist fiscal policy because of the pre-occupation with budget deficits. This therefore means that the burden of economic policy reform will have to fall on microeconomic restructuring alone. If that is the position of government, perhaps <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-policy-on-sarb-has-not-changed-20190606">President Cyril Ramaphosa</a> should just say so.</p>
<h2>Historical anomaly</h2>
<p>The ‘ownership’ of the Reserve Bank is not a matter to get ourselves into knots about. That the SARB has private shareholders is an <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/should-central-banks-have-private-shareholders/">anomaly of history</a>. While most central banks established in the early 20th century had private shareholders, most have since changed this to state ownership.</p>
<p>This really is a matter that the ANC should have sorted during the negotiations phase of the transition to democracy but, as we have argued above, there was neither an appetite in the top echelons of the ANC to address this anomaly or related policy matters nor did they apply their minds to that matter in the hurly burly of the CODESA negotiations. </p>
<p>There was an opportunity again to address this in the early 2000s when the Bank came under fire from a group of right wing shareholders hell bent on <a href="https://www.unisa.ac.za/static/corporate_web/Content/Colleges/CEMS/Journals/SA%20Business%20Review/documents/Sabview_21_Chap1.pdf">gate-crashing</a> the Board and cashing in on the nationalisation of the bank they hoped would follow. It has now become a political football, symbolic of the political fractiousness we are now experiencing.</p>
<p>We would have no problem with, and in fact would strongly support, taking the central bank into state ownership while retaining its operational independence. This will bring it into line with the global norm. But this has to be done at the right time, under the right conditions. </p>
<p>Whatever the debate of the early 1990s may have been, the Reserve Bank was granted operational independence. Tampering with its independence now will be <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/south-africa-reserve-bank-attacks-could-hurt-rating-says-sp-20190607">risky</a> in the extreme, not least in terms of the country’s credit rating. One point worth emphasising is that most independent central banks are also state-owned. But we fear that those in a particular faction of the ANC pushing for the nationalisation of the central bank may have a far more insidious agenda.</p>
<h2>A matter for informed debate</h2>
<p>The issue of the mandate of the Reserve Bank is of course a matter that has been the subject of serious debate. Given the challenges of growth and employment in the economy, it is difficult to sustain the argument that these are entirely irrelevant to the Reserve Bank. On the contrary, any reasonable state would align its policy mechanisms and institutions to its overall economic agenda. </p>
<p>But the debate needs to be held in a more considered manner, informed by evidence. This should include inputs from specialists who understand how financial systems operate and how the economic growth process works.</p>
<p>We would argue that the debate about the mandate of the South African Reserve Bank needs to be located within a clearly articulated political vision and social compact on the transformative good society South Africans aspire to. Such a vision and a social compact have yet to emerge. When they do emerge, they must be accompanied by the mechansims of economic and social policy that will be required to give effect to such a vision.</p>
<p><em>Vishnu Padayachee and Robert van Niekerk are authors of “Shadow of Liberation: Contestation and Compromise in the Economic and Social Policy of the African National Congress, 1943–1996” (Wits University Press, October 2019)</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119401/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vishnu Padayachee. I have over my career received funding from a number of international and national foundations, but none related directly to the research that informed this article in Conversation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert van Niekerk receives funding from national and international organisations and foundations supporting research but this funding has no relevance for the article.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Imraan Valodia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The debate about the mandate of the South African Reserve Bank must be located within a clearly articulated political vision and social compact on the kind of society South Africans aspire to.
Vishnu Padayachee, Distinguished Professor and Derek Schrier and Cecily Cameron Chair in Development Economics, School of Economics and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand
Imraan Valodia, Dean of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand
Robert van Niekerk, Wits School of Governance's Chair in Public Governance, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/117428
2019-05-21T13:41:08Z
2019-05-21T13:41:08Z
Ramaphosa’s cabinet: who and what’s needed to end South Africa’s malaise
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275677/original/file-20190521-23820-vt85gc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C38%2C1806%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa won't have free reign when choosing his Cabinet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africans recently went to the polls in a national election which the African National Congress (ANC) won by a wide margin. The incumbent president Cyril Ramaphosa will shortly appoint a cabinet after parliament officially declares him president. Thabo Leshilo asked Mzukisi Qobo, Cheryl Hendricks and Seán Muller what he should focus on.</em></p>
<p><strong>Given that Ramaphosa probably has less than five years in the job, what cabinet posts should be his top priority?</strong></p>
<p><strong><em>Cheryl Hendricks:</em></strong> He needs to leave a legacy and live up to his promise of a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-promises-corruption-crackdown-at-maiden-sona-20180216">new dawn</a>. He therefore needs to concentrate on a few things that will make maximum impact. These include changing the conditions that generate high levels of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-seriously-consider-taxing-its-wealthy-citizens-116073">inequality</a>, as well as those that have made South Africa’s state institutions dysfunctional and have reduced its international standing. </p>
<p>So his top priority cabinet posts should be: basic education and higher education, economic development, finance, trade and industry, rural development and land reform, public enterprises, international relations and science and technology. </p>
<p>Finally, he needs to attend to the representation of women. South Africa has lost a lot of ground in the struggle to translate gender representation into gender equality and women’s peace and security. </p>
<p><em><strong>Seán Muller:</strong></em> There are four main dimensions that could be considered: strategic institutions, policy direction, effectiveness of the state and institutions for delivery. Ideally, Ramaphosa needs to pursue major improvements on each of the four dimensions in parallel.</p>
<p>What will be crucial in the context of rolling back the influence of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">state capture</a> on strategic institutions will be who he appoints to justice and correctional services, police, state security, as well as the economics cluster (notably finance and public enterprises). </p>
<p>Then there are the posts that will be important in determining policy and delivery of social services. These include social development, health, education, water and sanitation, transport, and human settlements. Many of these are also important for economic services, along with departments like energy, mineral resources, communications, telecommunications and postal services, tourism and agriculture, forestry and fisheries. </p>
<p>Finally, there are departments that should play a key role in the effectiveness of the state itself. These include the departments of public service and administration, and cooperative governance and traditional affairs. Within the presidency there’s performance monitoring and evaluation. </p>
<p>To the extent that prioritisation is necessary, Ramaphosa has to ensure that reform of critical institutions is placed first – for the simple reason that everything else will be compromised if this fails. </p>
<p><strong><em>Mzukisi Qobo</em></strong> There are limits to Ramaphosa’s reform agenda in the next five years. For him to succeed, he will need to rely on highly competent technocrats to drive change within government, take bold and decisive action in reforming institutions early on, and take measures that may make him unpopular but have good results. For this to happen he will have to stare his party down and be his own man. The last time he put his cabinet together, his party constrained his options. The result was <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2018/03/07/ramaphosa_dilemma-divided-cabinet">a watered down compromise</a>. He can’t afford that this time.</p>
<p>But it will be hard for him to find capable ministers. This is true even in the economic cluster, apart from <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/finance-ministry/tito-mboweni-mr">Tito Mboweni</a> in the finance ministry and <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/pravin-gordhan/">Pravin Gordhan</a> in the department of public enterprises. Yet the economy is an area that will likely define the next five years of his term (if he completes it). With unemployment at <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">27.6%</a>, economic performance and job creation in particular will be yardsticks against which his success will be measured.</p>
<p><strong>What attributes should he be looking for in these key positions?</strong></p>
<p><strong><em>Cheryl Hendricks:</em></strong> People with integrity, people who have leadership skills and people who have a vision for the positions they will be stepping into. People with fresh ideas to deal with old challenges and who are willing to do the hard work it will take to rebuild the country. He needs a cabinet with a healthy mix of experience and youthfulness and gender balance. </p>
<p><em><strong>Seán Muller:</strong></em> A common error is to think that ministerial positions should be filled on the basis of area-specific expertise. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of ministers relative to senior officials (like the director general of a department). Ministers serve a political function and need not have any particular expertise in an area. </p>
<p>What matters is a general level of competence, commitment to their mandate and the public interest, and respect for the separation between political and bureaucratic competence. A minister’s core functions are arguably to ensure that the officials leading the department are the best – technically and ethically – and that they are allowed and enabled to do their job. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tito Mboweni will be hard to replace an Finance Minister.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Public confidence in the integrity of members of Cabinet is an intangible factor that is also important. But there’s tension between this and the challenges Ramaphosa faces within his own party. It is these that are likely to lead to the greatest compromises in cabinet appointments. Ultimately, it will do the country little good if he appoints the best Cabinet possible without factoring in party political considerations, only to then be so weakened within his party that he and his appointees cannot pursue the public interest.</p>
<p><strong><em>Mzukisi Qobo</em></strong>: The cabinet is a reflection of the quality and depth of the governing party’s leadership bench, whose heft has been in decline over the years. Even the best of its parliamentarians will struggle to bring renewed energy to the job. Many of them are recycled, as they were part of the political arrangements in the last nine years of corruption and institutional decay under former President Jacob Zuma. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-anc-itself-is-the-chief-impediment-to-ramaphosas-agenda-108781">Why the ANC itself is the chief impediment to Ramaphosa’s agenda</a>
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<p>And, there is no evidence that they did much to ameliorate its damage. Some, such as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jeffrey-thamsanqa-radebe-mr">Jeff Radebe</a>, have been in government for two decades. There is no evidence of innovative thinking in their approach to governance. </p>
<p>Under such circumstances, Ramaphosa may find himself relying a lot on informal networks, especially business links, outside of government. But this could undercut his credibility among constituencies within the governing <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">tripartite alliance</a>.</p>
<p>Success requires a combination of experience, competence, integrity, and fresh ideas. This is particularly true in ministries such as the National Treasury, and those that interface with critical sectors of the economy such as agriculture, telecommunications, mineral resources, energy, and transport. </p>
<p>Since early 2018 there have been strong indications that Ramaphosa will overhaul the current structure of cabinet as part of institutional reconfiguration of government. The low-hanging fruit will be to reduce the size of the cabinet. Even a country like China, 20 times larger than South Africa, has a cabinet with 24 ministers compared to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-would-do-well-to-fire-all-its-deputy-ministers-58809">South Africa’s 35</a>. There is more emphasis on quality and meritocracy and less on viewing cabinet positions purely from the view of dispensing patronage.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has a very difficult task ahead. Constitutionally, he can only appoint two individuals who are not members of parliament to his cabinet. That means he has to choose his cabinet from the list of MPs who are political fossils and were, by and large, part of the problem during Zuma’s administration. </p>
<p>The reality is that most MPs have a poor grasp of their oversight roles, are often out of depth on how government works, are under-prepared, and many see themselves as no more than deployees of the ruling party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller receives funding from a European Union-funded project, "Putting People back in Parliament", led by the Dullah Omar Institute (University of the Western Cape), in collaboration with the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Public Service Accountability Monitor (Rhodes) and Heinrich Boell Foundation (South Africa). He is affiliated with the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (University of Johannesburg), regularly making inputs to Parliament oversight of the national budget, advising civil society groups on public finance matters and consulting for private sector organisations on an ad hoc basis. He resigned from the South African Parliamentary Budget Office in 2016. The views expressed are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks is the Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa at the Human Science Research Council which receives funding from multiple funding sources.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mzukisi Qobo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
President Cyril Ramaphosa has to ensure that reform of critical institutions is placed first. Everything else will be compromised if this fails.
Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics and Research Associate at the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (PEERC), University of Johannesburg
Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research Council
Mzukisi Qobo, Associate Professor: International Business & Strategy, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/111101
2019-02-06T14:26:28Z
2019-02-06T14:26:28Z
A democracy or a kleptocracy? How South Africa stacks up
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257252/original/file-20190205-86213-uvn9y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The commission chaired by Justice Raymond Zondo has heard shocking testimony on the extent of corruption in government.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans have been held spellbound by the torrent of evidence of corruption emerging from two parallel commissions of inquiry – into <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture</a>, and the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-23-mokgoro-inquiry-on-hold-after-over-jibas-fair-trial-rights">fitness to hold office</a> of two senior officials of the National Prosecuting Authority.</p>
<p>These strengthen perceptions that South Africa under former <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/jacob-zuma-presidency-2009-2017-march">President Jacob Zuma</a> – from May 2009 to March 2018 – <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-turned-sa-into-mafia-style-lawless-kleptocracy-saftu-20170805">transformed</a> from a democracy into a <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/search?q=kleptocracy&searchBtn=Search&isQuickSearch=true">“kleptocracy”</a>: a country ruled by thieves.</p>
<p>The country scored only 43 out of 100 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2018 <a href="https://www.transparency.org/country/ZAF">Corruption Perceptions Index for 2018</a>, down from 47 in 2009. </p>
<p>So the question is: is it indeed the case that South Africa has become a kleptocracy? Has it travelled far along the road to joining states such as Russia and Equatorial Guinea, notorious for being ruled by authoritarian leaders in league with corrupt oligarchs at the expense of ordinary people? If this is so, is that condition reversible?</p>
<h2>Understanding kleptocracy</h2>
<p>Derived from the Greek words for thieving and ruling, the word “kleptocracy” entered the modern social science lexicon through the work of the Polish-British sociologist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2007/nov/20/guardianobituaries.obituaries">Stanislav Andreski</a> in the 1960s. His book <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/3139053/the-african-predicament-a-study-in-the-pathology">The African Predicament</a> identified post-independence African regimes as kleptocratic. </p>
<p>Basically, he presented kleptocracy as government by corrupt leaders who use their power to exploit the people and national resources of their countries to extend their personal wealth and political powers. But, the notion of kleptocracy didn’t gain much leverage until the present decade. This reflects a widespread belief that corruption is <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-dark-side-globalization">gaining ground</a> at an unprecedented rate in the world.</p>
<p>Key to contemporary understandings is that kleptocracy now extends beyond the boundaries of the countries that kleptocrats plunder, and is becoming a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-challenge-democracy">danger to democracy globally</a>. </p>
<p>Whereas there was previously a strong tendency to see kleptocracy as primarily a pathology of countries in what used to be referred to as the <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/de46/c4490c84d705062c389dd8a60633e3c43786.pdf">“third world”</a>, today it is recognised that the scourge has <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-challenge-democracy">gone global</a>.</p>
<p>President Vladimar Putin’s Russia is widely cited as leading the pack of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-power-and-plunder-putin%E2%80%99s-russia">kleptocrats</a>. It is strongly followed by other “emerging market economies” (such as Turkey and Malaysia), with African countries (such as Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria) continuing to feature strongly. Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest scoring region – that is, the most corrupt – in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018">Transparency International’s index</a>.</p>
<p>The most distinctive development of the contemporary era is that advanced capitalist democracies are viewed as under <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-challenge-democracy">threat from kleptocracy</a>. For instance, there are accusations aplenty that the presidency of the US is being systematically used to <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/31/15959970/donald-trump-authoritarian-children-corruption">enrich the family and companies</a> of President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>Also, it is widely recognised that despite the virtuous platitudes of the British government, London has become a major centre for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/london-is-now-the-global-money-laundering-centre-for-the-drug-trade-says-crime-expert-10366262.html">money-laundering</a>. So what has changed? </p>
<p>Simply put: globalisation and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-world">neo-liberalism</a> have hugely increased the capacity of rulers, corporations, oligarchs and criminal networks to obscure their movements of money through the international financial system,</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Retired Judge Yvonne Mokgoro is probing the fitness of two powerful national prosecutors to hold office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thulani Mbele/Sowetan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A combination of neoliberalism and globalisation has led to the development of a massive industry servicing kleptocrats. This spreads outwards from London and New York to offshore jurisdictions and real estate hotspots, often arranged by Western financial services providers. Offshore finance has become critical. Untraceable shell companies are being used to shift money <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-laundering-cash-whitewashing-reputations">from one country to another</a>.</p>
<p>Once money has been “cleansed”, it is increasingly invested in luxury housing and valuable real estate. Amid this, the laundering of reputations becomes critical. This often requires the hiring of politicians and lobbyists to re-brand kleptocrats as philanthropists and engaged global citizens. </p>
<h2>The case of South Africa</h2>
<p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa recently referred to the years of his predecessor Zuma as <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/ramaphosa-backtracks-on-nine-wasted-years-under-zuma-20190202">“wasted”</a>. But, typical of his style, this was an understatement. South Africa under Zuma advanced far down the road to becoming a kleptocracy.</p>
<p>Corruption became increasingly organised, politicians and parastatal managers being bought by <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/28/gordhan-says-anti-graft-efforts-face-dangerous-fightback">external private interests</a>. The Jacob Zuma Foundation appears to have served as a front for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-01-29-zuma-got-r300k-per-month-from-bosasa-says-agrizzi/">outright theft</a> and appropriation of public monies. Intermediaries like <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/262921/new-report-highlights-the-scale-of-kpmgs-losses-in-south-africa/">KPMG</a> and other auditing companies were used to hide the private appropriation of state resources from public gaze.</p>
<p>The London-based <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-pr-giant-bell-pottinger-made-itself-look-bad-83529">Bell Pottinger</a> public relations company was used to explain away the scandals of the Zuma regime. While by its nature money laundering is obscure, there can be little doubt that money has been squirrelled away in offshore accounts.</p>
<p>Revelations emanating from the two commissions of inquiry indicate that South Africa stands in great peril of falling prey to kleptocracy. Under Ramaphosa, the government of the African National Congress (ANC) has taken important steps to reverse the trend. These include the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/12/04/president-appoints-shamila-batohi-as-new-ndpp-head">appointment</a> of a highly respected advocate to be the country’s chief prosecutor. But much will depend on the political will of the ANC to rid its ranks of its in-house kleptocrats for this promise to bear fruit.</p>
<h2>Battle to defeat kleptocracy</h2>
<p>Tackling kleptocracy is enormously complex. Eliciting information from myriad international (often reluctant) sources takes time, money and patience. Legal action is time consuming and costly. Kleptocrats and their allies fight back strongly.</p>
<p>The good news is that South Africa has made a good start with the establishment of the commissions of inquiry. </p>
<p>The bad news is that the ANC government’s pursuit of the country’s kleptocrats may drop off once it has won the national elections in May. It will be up to opposition parties, the media and civil society to ensure that that doesn’t happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>
Corruption in South Africa became increasingly organised under former President Jacob Zuma.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/110101
2019-01-21T13:41:38Z
2019-01-21T13:41:38Z
South African commentators often don’t understand the ANC – or the country
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254504/original/file-20190118-100276-1a9rknv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African National Congress supporters during the recent ANC Election manifesto launch in Durban.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Regular media as well as social media in South Africa have much to say about the governing African National Congress (ANC). But much of the commentary fails to understand the party – or the country.</p>
<p>This was evident when the ANC launched its election manifesto at <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-sets-out-a-bold-vision-for-south-africa-but-can-he-pull-it-off-109784">a January rally in Durban</a>. Two reactions to the event mirror constant themes in the ANC commentary. Both miss important realities.</p>
<p>The first is related to former president Jacob Zuma’s role at the ANC manifesto launch. The second is the manifesto’s position on the South African Reserve Bank. </p>
<p>Much was made of the fact that Zuma was an honoured guest and reportedly received the <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2062149/watch-crowd-at-anc-manifesto-launch-goes-crazy-for-zuma/">loudest cheers</a>. For some, this showed that the ANC has not distanced itself from Zuma and <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-net-about-to-close-on-zuma-and-his-gupta-patronage-network-90395">patronage politics</a>. For others, it meant that he and patronage politics were making a comeback. Neither fear is valid.</p>
<p>What the current president, Cyril Ramaphosa, really thinks of Zuma is revealed by his speech to ANC activists a few days before the launch. He <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-01-08-cleaning-up-mess-of-last-nine-years-ramaphosa-says-anc-had-lost-its-way-under-zuma/">said:</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the past nine years, we started losing our way, corruption started settling in, we started weakening our institutions, or government processes started weakening. But fortunately, before we could go over the precipice, we realised that we have to wake up and pull the country back.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ramaphosa did not mention Zuma by name – he didn’t have to. His audience knew that “nine years” was the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jacob-Zuma">period Zuma spent in office</a>. </p>
<p>The speech was an unprecedented public criticism of Zuma’s record: ANC presidents do not denounce their predecessors in public. It signalled clearly that Zuma is not respected by the ANC leadership and is not about to regain his influence.</p>
<p>So why did the Ramaphosa-led ANC invite Zuma, say flattering things about him and promise to assign him tasks? Because the ANC remains divided. </p>
<h2>Symptoms of division</h2>
<p>One symptom of division is a loud pro-Zuma faction in KwaZulu Natal province, which is happy to disrupt meetings to show support for Zuma. A decade ago it <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/crowd-heckles-mbeki-305916">loudly heckled former president Thabo Mbeki</a> at the reburial ceremony of ANC stalwart Moses Mabhida.</p>
<p>Since a repeat would be embarrassing, the threat was defused by including Zuma in the event and downplaying differences between him and Ramaphosa. The “special tasks” are likely to consist mainly of joining a council of elders with no power. The intention was to defuse Zuma’s role, not enhance it.</p>
<p>The reaction to Zuma’s presence at the ANC launch was consistent with a pattern since Ramaphosa was elected. Commentators and citizens on social media repeatedly complain that Zuma supporters occupy posts in <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2018-10-18-cabinet-ministers-why-are-these-rogues-still-in-office/">the cabinet</a>. </p>
<p>This ignores two realities. First, in an ANC whose leadership is divided between supporters of Ramaphosa and Zuma, excluding the latter from the cabinet would mean political suicide. Second, as it did at the manifesto rally, Ramaphosa’s faction is aware of the fact that it has to accommodate its opponents.</p>
<p>The Zuma supporters do not occupy important Cabinet posts and have been unable to prevent the government from pursuing its anti-corruption programme. </p>
<p>Accurate analysis would recognise what the ANC is, not what commentators would like it to be.</p>
<h2>Misreading the central bank clause</h2>
<p>The second example is reaction to a clause in the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/must-read-the-anc-s-2019-elections-manifesto">ANC manifesto</a> which says it favours more flexible monetary policy. This, it says, should be implemented “without sacrificing price stability”, but should</p>
<blockquote>
<p>take into account other socioeconomic objectives, such as employment creation and economic growth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was interpreted to mean that the ANC would tell the central bank to make cheap money available – and that the bank would be forced to do <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/anc-targets-reserve-bank-mandate-wants-more-flexible-monetary-policy-20190114">what politicians tell it</a> to do. </p>
<p>In reality, the clause meant exactly the opposite.</p>
<p>A key consequence of the ANC’s divisions is pressure from the Zuma faction for <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-odd-meaning-of-radical-economic-transformation-in-south-africa-73003">more radical economic policy</a>: its aim is to get hold of resources, not to fight poverty. But it knows that this in an effective stick with which to beat Ramaphosa’s faction. </p>
<p><a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-poverty-numbers/">Poverty</a> and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-04-04-poverty-shows-how-apartheid-legacy-endures-in-south-africa/">inequality</a>, which are still largely racial, continue. So Ramaphosa’s faction cannot dismiss demands for radical change; they would be accused, credibly, of turning a blind eye to minority privilege. So they do accept demands for change – and try to manage them in a way that ensures they do not damage the markets or business confidence.</p>
<p>The central bank is a prime example. Ramaphosa’s faction is being pressed to end <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-14-00-nobodys-buying-ancs-reserve-bank-story">private shareholding of the bank</a>. This would not affect the decisions it takes. But it would be seen as hostile to the markets. </p>
<p>There is also pressure to change the bank’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-central-bank-row-points-to-dangerous-levels-of-intolerance-79884">very narrow mandate</a>, which <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Mandate/Pages/Mandate-Home.aspx">instructs</a> it to “protect the value of the currency in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth in the Republic.” A number of central banks are explicitly enjoined to take jobs and growth into account. </p>
<p>The manifesto aims to deflect both pressures. It says nothing about buying out the shareholders or changing the mandate. It simply repeats the government position on the bank which was spelled out nearly a decade ago by the then Finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, in a <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2010/2010021701.pdf">letter</a> to then governor of the bank, Gill Marcus.</p>
<p>The Ramaphosa faction’s move to protect the bank’s independence has been seen as an attempt to end it.</p>
<p>This, too, is no isolated incident. </p>
<h2>Fallacy of a pro-business agenda</h2>
<p>Since Ramaphosa took over, mainstream economic commentators have assumed that he was elected to do what conservatives in the marketplace want. Any sign that the government is not pursuing a strongly pro-business agenda is assumed to mean that it is a prisoner of communists. This ignores the reality in the country as well as in the ANC.</p>
<p>As long as poverty and inequality persist, and poor people are almost all black, no party leader who wants to win a national election can afford to ignore most voters’ needs. Governments cannot conform to the very narrow view of their role in supporting the economy. </p>
<p>The real question – whether plans to tackle poverty are likely to work – is ignored in the attempt to turn the ANC into a right-of-centre party and to wish away poverty in South Africa.</p>
<p>In both cases, we need analyses based on concrete reality – not wishful thinking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A great deal of analysis on South Africa and the ruling ANC seems to be based on wishful thinking, not concrete reality.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/107534
2018-11-23T14:34:57Z
2018-11-23T14:34:57Z
Shades of Brazil as anti-corruption drive in South Africa turns nasty
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247049/original/file-20181123-149326-133vsu2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julius Malema and his Economic Freedom Fighter are using President Cyril Ramaphosa's anti-corruption campaign against him. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kevin Sutherland</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What better way to derail an anti-corruption campaign than to beat it at its own game? You might damage or derail democracy in the process, but that is the country’s problem, not yours.</p>
<p>Anti-corruption campaigns are normally good for democracy. But they can threaten it: this happens when the people claiming to root out corruption are themselves corrupt. One recent example is Brazil, where an elected president, Dilma Rousseff, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/31/dilma-rousseff-impeachment-brazil-what-you-need-to-know">forced from office </a> by politicians who are far more corrupt and were covering their own tracks. Something similar seems to be afoot in South Africa.</p>
<p>One recent sign that not all fights against corruption are principled is an unexpected shift in strategy by the <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>, the country’s third biggest party.</p>
<p>The EFF, whose founding leaders were either <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-29-julius-malema-expelled">suspended or expelled</a> from the governing African National Congress (ANC) at the behest of former President Jacob Zuma, won the hearts of sections of the middle class when it joined the campaign against Zuma and his faction. Its brash style, designed to win maximum media attention, struck a chord among a middle class angered by Zuma’s patronage politics.</p>
<p>Now it has changed sides and is using the same style of politics to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/fighters-be-ready-malema-gets-ready-to-go-to-war-with-pravin-gordhan-20181120">go after Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan</a>, who plays a key role in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s fight against corruption.</p>
<p>This is part of a wider shift in approach in which it now says in public what the Zuma faction would like to say but which ANC discipline will not allow. It has <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gordhan-media-and-moyane-malema-lashes-out-20180705">supported </a> former head of the South African Revenue Service Tom Moyane <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-10-16-fire-tom-moyane-now-nugent-tells-president-cyril-ramaphosa/">whose dismissal was recommended by a judicial commission</a> of inquiry after hearing evidence that he had caused the Revenue Service huge damage in the service of Zuma’s faction. It has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/16-million-reasons-why-the-eff-defended-vbs-17428022">backed VBS Bank</a>, which was <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/business/2018-11-13-court-orders-vbs-bank-liquidation/">wound up</a> after an inquiry found it had been brought down by looting.</p>
<h2>Diverting Attention</h2>
<p>The EFF’s reasons for switching sides are not mysterious. Its leaders are <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-21-vbs-bank-heist-effs-family-ties-and-moneyed-connections/">accused of benefiting from VBS</a> and the party has received money from a company accused of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1977581/ndlozi-reaffirms-unapologetic-effs-links-to-cigarette-smugglers-are-no-secret/">benefiting from the illicit tobacco trade</a>: one of Moyane’s goals was to close down the Revenue Service’s investigations of this trade. So, like the Zuma faction itself, it is diverting attention away from its own dealings.</p>
<p>This confirms what the middle-class enthusiasm for the EFF ignored. Its campaign against Zuma was not a fight against corruption but pay-back for driving them out of the ANC. Before then, the EFF’s leader, Julius Malema, had been a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/we-will-kill-for-zuma-404646">loud supporter of Zuma</a> and was accused of much the same behaviour. Now that Zuma has gone, he and the EFF can return to defending the behaviour which once made them Zuma allies.</p>
<p>More interesting – and ominous – is how they are going about it. During the last period of Zuma’s presidency, his faction’s routine response to criticism of their links to key figures in the state capture project, the Gupta brothers, and campaigns against corruption, was that the critics were lackeys of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-07-05-zuma-faction-loses-white-monopoly-capital-battle-at-anc-conference/">“white monopoly capital”</a>. The EFF has not abandoned <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/fighters-be-ready-malema-gets-ready-to-go-to-war-with-pravin-gordhan-20181120">this theme</a> but has added one: instead of denouncing the anti-corruption campaign as a white plot, it has tried to turn it on those in the ANC who pose a threat to them by <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/shivambu-wants-enabler-of-state-capture-gordhan-to-resign-18180033">accusing Gordhan of corruption</a>.</p>
<p>Their first salvo was an attempt to link him to the Guptas by suggesting that, like <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-10-09-nhlanhla-nene-resigns-as-finance-minister/">recently resigned Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene</a>, he met them and did not disclose this. Later, they claimed he and his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/here-is-the-effs-evidence-on-gordhans-daughter-and-why-their-claims-are-bogus-20181122">daughter Anisha benefited financially</a> from their links to government.</p>
<h2>What’s behind the switch</h2>
<p>This campaign may not be all the EFF’s own work. Its many admirers in the media like to portray it as immensely powerful despite the fact that its share of the vote has <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/03/21/is-the-eff-2019s-dark-horse-lets-look-at-the-numbers_a_23391412/">never reached 10%</a> – they suggest that it has an army of sources feeding it information. </p>
<p>More likely is that ANC factions use the EFF to fight their battles by leaking it information about their opponents. The Zuma faction may also have leaked to the main opposition, the Democratic Alliance, the claim that Ramaphosa or his son <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/r500k-bosasa-donation-to-ramaphosa-is-nothing-short-of-a-bribe-says-maimane-18235689">received money from Bosasa</a>, a security company which does business with the government. If, as is probable, the faction is leaking the information to the largest two opposition parties, then it has decided that instead of denouncing the anti-corruption campaign, it will use it against Ramaphosa, Gordhan and their allies.</p>
<p>The obvious reason for this switch is that it is far more plausible. Anger at corruption is deep and widespread and so blaming white business for the campaign against it persuades no-one outside the faction. But precisely because many people are appalled by corruption, painting politicians who say they are fighting it as corrupt wins some sympathy from media and citizens who are more than willing to believe that all politicians are on the take. This is particularly so because the baleful effect of money on politics is not restricted to Zuma and his faction and many citizens know this.</p>
<p>If this strategy gains momentum, it could threaten democracy. Anti-corruption campaigns are essential to democracy – when they seek to replace corrupt people and practices in government with alternatives. When they signal that all office holders are corrupt, they breed cynicism which weakens or ends democracy. Why bother who wins and loses if all politicians are corrupt? Why fight for clean government when no-one will make it happen? But that does not deter those who smear their opponents – democracy is probably an obstacle for them anyway.</p>
<p>Fortunately for democrats, the new campaign is likely to fail. The evidence so far suggests that Gordhan has no case to answer and most voters will probably see this. Ramaphosa does have some explaining to do but voters are likely to see a President who did not know about an untoward payment and then rectified it as a better bet than one who tries to wreck government to hide those payments. </p>
<p>The EFF is a long way from challenging for control of a single province, let alone the country and so the only plausible winner is the ANC’s Zuma faction which is discredited among voters: if it took over the governing party, it would probably lose the <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/south-african-elections-2019-voting-dates/">next election in 2019</a>.</p>
<p>But, unless public debate distinguishes clearly between politicians who serve themselves and those who serve citizens, and continues to insist that corruption can be controlled, those who peddle cynicism to protect themselves will continue to threaten democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Economic Freedom Fighters’ strategy of painting President Ramaphosa and his allies as corrupt is unlikely to succeed.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/92126
2018-03-11T09:02:35Z
2018-03-11T09:02:35Z
Survey shows Zuma and ANC’s mutual dance to the bottom
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207126/original/file-20180220-116365-livi1q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Jacob Zuma sings at the ANC National Conference in December. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Opinion polls in South Africa have clearly shown the sharp decline in citizens’ approval of Jacob Zuma’s performance as president over the past three years. What has been less clear is the impact on the governing African National Congress (ANC). He was also the president of the ANC, until his term ended in December and he was <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. </p>
<p>For many years, Zuma was considered a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-03-18-parliament-diary-jacob-zuma-the-teflon-president/#.Wowjk4NubIU">“Teflon” president</a>. He seemed to maintain public support even in the face of controversial decisions and scandals because of his personal appeal as an affable populist. Several surveys placed his <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad66-south-africans-have-lost-confidence-zuma-believe-he-ignores-parliament-and-law">approval ratings in the 60%</a> <a href="https://upjournals.co.za/index.php/Politeia/article/view/3247">to 70%</a>
range throughout his first term in office. Once that image was finally pierced, one might have logically expected his downfall to be equally personal, and not take the party down with him.</p>
<p>But new results from the <a href="http://citizensurveys.com/sa-citizens-survey/">December 2017 South African Citizen Survey</a> demonstrate just the opposite. Asking a widely used measure of party support called partisan identification, a strong predictor of both voter turnout and vote choice, only 32% of those surveyed said they “felt close” to the ANC. This is the worst result recorded in the past 17 years, and statistically tied as the lowest level since 1994.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC Identification.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zuma, it seems, pulled the ANC down with him. But this question is not asked very frequently by South African polling organisations. Fortunately, it’s possible to turn to an alternative indicator to get a more fine grained take on recent trends in ANC support. </p>
<p>The South African Citizen Survey also asks respondents to rate how much they “like or dislike” each major political party on a scale of 0 to 10. In mid-2015, 61% of South Africans held a positive view of the ANC. Two and a half years later, only 43% feel this way. More importantly, the proportion who give the ANC a higher score than any other party has shrunk from over one half of the electorate in mid-2015 (55%), to just over one third (37%) in the most recent survey as shown below.</p>
<h2>Presiding over electoral decline</h2>
<p>To be sure, it was already clear from the ANC’s loss of seats in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures in the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-11-the-partys-over-anc-sees-decline-in-support">2009 and 2014 national elections</a> that Zuma was presiding over an electoral decline, however small. This should have become even clearer in 2016, when large numbers of ANC members lost their seats as municipal councillors, positions in executive councils, and mayorships of major metropolitan councils.</p>
<p>Yet many of these losses could have been pinned to the poor performance of the post-2008 economy. Indeed, ever since 1994, the degree of economic optimism (as measured by the proportion of South Africans who expect the economy to improve in the next year) has been a strong predictor of popular support for the ANC.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the evidence suggests that over the past year, voter support for the ANC became tied to their views of Jacob Zuma, rather than the economy. While Zuma’s popularity has fallen steadily since at least the end of 2015, the biggest single drop took place in April 2017 when his support levels plummeted by 12 percentage points on the heels of the public firestorm that followed the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/zuma-says-reshuffled-cabinet-to-improve-efficiency-and-effectiveness">March cabinet re-shuffle</a> and sacking of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. </p>
<p>Yet, even with the resultant damage to the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-30/south-africa-s-rand-extends-slump-as-zuma-fires-finance-minister">currency and the markets</a>, South Africans began to sense an economic turnaround. By year’s end, 48% expected the economy to get better in the next 12 months, and 59% expected their household living conditions to improve. But peoples’ evaluations of Zuma’s job performance continued to plummet (to just 22%), and the public image of the ANC remained at historically low levels.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC Zuma.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thus, voters finally turned on Zuma, but only after a long string of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/15/south-africa-s-divisive-president-zuma-s-many-scandals">personal scandals</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-must-fuse-fixing-broken-institutions-and-economic-policy-92017">bad political decisions</a>, and public outrage over the use of public money on his private homestead <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Public%20Protector's%20Report%20on%20Nkandla_a.pdf">Nkandla</a>, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/FULL-TEXT-Statement-by-Public-Protector-on-Nkandla-Report-20140319">“capture”</a> of key state institutions by Gupta-friendly ministers and directors, and cabinet reshuffles. </p>
<p>Yet the ANC continued to shield him from the courts, the <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/motshekga-calls-madonselas-powers-be-amended">Public Protector</a>, and from successive <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-confidence-vote-a-victory-for-zuma-but-a-defeat-for-the-anc-82244">votes of no confidence</a> in parliament. Indeed, the party came very close to electing his <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/president-publicly-endorses-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-for-anc-leader">hand-chosen successor</a>, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as its <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/markets/2017-12-19-ramaphosa-rally-stumbles-on-narrow-victory/">new leader</a> and presumptive national president.</p>
<p>But at some point in the past few months, a sufficient number of party members finally seemed to grasp the fact that Zuma’s continued presence threatened the electoral interests of the party as well as their own political futures, particularly those who appeared downwind on the party list. But it took them a very long time to reach this conclusion, and the party has paid dearly in terms of its connection with the electorate.</p>
<p>Zuma dragged the ANC down with him. Yet many might justifiably argue that it has been a mutual waltz to the bottom: while his behaviour and decisions damaged his own image, the ANC’s tolerance of his sins of governance has tarnished theirs.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa therefore faces a double challenge. Not only must he reestablish a positive connection between the presidency and the people, but he must also transform the battered image of the ANC.</p>
<p><strong>Tables updated 12 March 2018</strong></p>
<p><em>The South African Citizens Survey is based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 1,300 respondents a month. Results are reported quarterly on a total of 3,900 respondents, which produces results with a margin of error margin of error of ±1.5 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. Sampling sites are chosen at random across all provinces, and metro, urban and rural areas, with probability proportionate to population size, based on the latest StatsSA estimates of the population aged 18 and older. Interviews are conducted in English, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans, Sesotho, Sepedi, and Setswana. Weights are applied to ensure the sample represents the most recent national population with respect to province, race, gender, age and area type.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92126/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Mattes is Professor of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Honorary Professor at the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa at the University of Cape Town, co-founder and Senior Adviser to Afrobarometer, and has previously worked as a consultant to Citizen Surveys. He receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation, </span></em></p>
Former South African President Jacob Zuma’s bad behaviour damaged his image and the ANC’s.
Robert Mattes, Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/92940
2018-03-08T14:17:17Z
2018-03-08T14:17:17Z
Can Ramaphosa centre the ANC and quell opposition parties?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209526/original/file-20180308-30979-kg74rk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in parliament.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brenton Geach/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>These are early days for the new <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-01-ramaphosa-plays-the-hand-he-was-dealt">Cyril Ramaphosa-led government</a> in South Africa. Two crucial and inter-related strategic challenges face the new President: to consolidate support within the African National Congress (ANC), and to consolidate the ANC’s position as the dominant party in time for the 2019 national elections, seeking to reverse the decline it had experienced under Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>Dealing with internal ANC issues is the most difficult and the foundation for the others. Zuma is <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-time-is-up-but-what-does-it-mean-for-south-africa-91873">out of power</a>, and will not be back. Even though his departure will weaken their capacity to work as a coherent force, it will <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-zuma-regime-is-dead-but-its-consequences-will-linger-for-a-long-time-92066">take time</a> to dismantle the alliance that made up disparate elements he built around him. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has started the job by <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-26-cyril-ramaphosa-cabinet-reshuffle-reaction-anc-da-eff-ifp">removing</a> the most obvious symbols of Zuma’s alliance with the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a> who stand accused of being the major perpetrators of <a href="https://qz.com/825789/state-capture-jacob-zuma-the-guptas-and-corruption-in-south-africa/">state capture</a>. These include former ministers such as <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Communications-Minister-Faith-Muthambi">Faith Muthambi</a> who ran public administration and <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Mosebenzi-Zwane">Mosebenzi Zwane</a> who had been given the minerals portfolio. Both became notorious through combining incompetence and corruption, and have no independent power based within the ANC. </p>
<p>Others who had some internal support were demoted into less prestigious and powerful positions – <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/02/26/bathabile-dlamini-for-women-what-the-actual-hell-say-tweeters_a_23371557/">Bathabile Dlamini</a> who has been made minister of women and children and <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/malusi-gigaba">Malusi Gigaba</a> who is back at home affairs come to mind. </p>
<p>Picking fights carefully so as not to tackle all adversaries simultaneously is a wise political strategy. Having won with a small margin does not allow him to go ahead with massive purges, an unwise course of action in any event.</p>
<p>As far as trying to forge the ANC into a cohesive force again, Ramaphosa’s real challenge remains closer to the ground. Among local ANC members and representatives an entrenched ethos sees positions of power as key to material benefit and jobs for relatives, friends and political allies. Tackling this is not going to be easy and it’s not clear that Ramaphosa will be able to do it – certainly not in the immediate term.</p>
<h2>ANC as the dominant party?</h2>
<p>His urgent task is to address the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zumas-demise-is-bad-news-for-south-africas-opposition-parties-91771">electoral challenges</a> posed by the two main opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Both cater to different constituencies disillusioned. </p>
<p>The DA’s main policy platform focuses on good governance and rational management. The EFF’s on <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/is-julius-malemas-eff-a-nation-builder-or-a-wrecking-ball-20180307">radical social change</a>. Their shared opposition to the ANC has made them strange bedfellows in a number of key municipalities, thus removing the ANC from power. But this has already begun to unravel in the wake of Ramaphosa’s ascendancy. In <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-03-04-nelson-mandela-bay-effs-attempt-to-remove-trollip-ushers-in-a-new-unstable-era-for-coalition-politics/#.WqEhVWpubIU">Nelson Mandela Bay</a> the EFF has withdrawn support for the DA, its dominant coalition partner. More political shifts like this may take place in preparation for the next elections.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa can undercut the DA threat by his (re-)appointment of reputable and fiscally-responsible people. He has already done so in the National Treasury with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-has-chosen-a-team-that-will-help-him-assert-his-authority-92538">Nhlanhla Nene</a> and at public enterprises with <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/pravin-gordhan-back-this-time-as-minister-of-public-enterprises-20180226">Pravin Gordhan</a>. And eliminating blatant cases of nepotism and corruption will also <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-03-01-why-a-complacent-da-could-lose-cape-town-to-anc/">steal DA votes</a> for the ANC.</p>
<p>But tackling the EFF is a more complicated task, as illustrated by the recent reemergence of the land issue, which is now the <a href="https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/if-you-see-a-beautiful-piece-of-land-take-it-malema-20170228">its clarion call</a>. Can this issue affect the ANC’s electoral prospects? What seems to be Ramaphosa’s strategy in the face of this potential threat? </p>
<p>Land isn’t a new issue, having been a material and symbolic <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/land-act-dispossession-segregation-and-restitution">concern for centuries</a>. Colonial conquest and settlement centred on the acquisition of land by force, which played a crucial role in driving indigenous people into the labour market in the 19th and 20th centuries. Addressing the consequences of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/natives-land-act-1913">1913 Natives Land Act</a> was a formative experience for the ANC, which had been <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/anc-origins-and-background">created</a> in the previous year, and remains a challenge to this day. </p>
<p>Land dispossession entrenched the distinctive feature of the South African economy: <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/the-migrant-labour-system">migrant labour</a> as the foundation for black deprivation and white prosperity. </p>
<p>In 1994 a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/land-restitution-south-africa-1994">land restitution process</a> was put in place by the newly elected ANC government. But it hasn’t met the intended targets for a number of reasons. These have included bureaucratic inefficiency, inadequate support structures for small-scale farmers (in financing, marketing, skill development), conflicts among beneficiaries, corruption and limited interest due to the meagre political weight of claimants.</p>
<p>While it is clear that the cost of land due to the need to offer compensation is not the main problem hampering land reform, it has become symbolic of the obstacles facing the process. When the ANC <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-02-27-parliament-adopts-effs-land-claims-motion-but-anc-seeks-amendments/">joined</a> the EFF in parliament in referring the compensation clause for review, it recognised that opposing the motion would be risky, allowing the EFF to speak on behalf of land-hungry people. </p>
<p>It showed that the land conundrum is <a href="https://m.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/real-action-on-land-needed-to-counter-extreme-eff-rhetoric-20180306">electorally dangerous</a> for the ANC.</p>
<p>On the other hand, supporting the motion but amending it to conform to other imperatives (stable economy, increased agricultural production, food security) could keep the ANC ahead of the political challenge while retaining its ability to shape the outcome of the review to suit its general policy direction. </p>
<p>Meeting the challenges from the opposition parties will strengthen the ANC’s dominance and Ramaphosa’s control internally. The internal and external challenges could therefore be met in an integrated way. In a sense, this would allow it to return to the position it had enjoyed during Nelson Mandela’s tenure, exercising hegemony over state and society. </p>
<p>But the road is still long and full of obstacles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92940/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ran Greenstein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Meeting the challenges from the opposition will strengthen the ANC’s dominance. How well its new leadership copes will become clearer over the next few months.
Ran Greenstein, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/92538
2018-02-27T15:19:14Z
2018-02-27T15:19:14Z
Ramaphosa has chosen a team that will help him assert his authority
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208119/original/file-20180227-36680-1x0i4mv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa during the late night announcement of his new cabinet. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elmond Jiyane, GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/graphic-all-the-changes-ramaphosa-made-to-cabinet-20180227">has announced</a> his cabinet. As widely expected, he either fired or demoted almost all cabinet ministers implicated in corruption or considered incompetent who served under Jacob Zuma. In their stead Ramaphosa appointed his dream team to key ministries, bringing back former finance ministers Nhlanhla Nene and Pravin Gordhan both of whom had been fired by Zuma. But, contrary to expectations, he kept some ministers widely believed to have made a hash of their jobs. Politics and Society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Keith Gottschalk for his perspective.</em></p>
<p><strong>Is the new Cabinet fit for purpose - is it better equipped to do what needs to be done?</strong></p>
<p>This was a major shuffle, affecting two-thirds of ministers, more than most analysts had expected. </p>
<p>The new cabinet is undoubtedly better than the one that served under Zuma. The ministers incriminated in subverting procurement procedures for the benefit of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-brothers">Guptas</a>, or at best, above their level of competence, have vanished. The Guptas’s were allied to Zuma and were at the heart of corruption and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/FULL-TEXT-Statement-by-Public-Protector-on-Nkandla-Report-20140319">state capture </a> in the country.</p>
<p>The independence and competence of Gordhan, who has come back to serve as minister of Public Enterprises, and Nene who returns to the finance minister post, are welcome and will be well received by the markets. The appointment of <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/grace-naledi-mandisa-pandor-ms">Naledi Pandor</a> to Higher Education and Training is a good fit. Her views and temperament match with the vice-chancellors of higher education institutions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa appointed two former ministers to their previous jobs: <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/derek-andre-hanekom/">Derek Hanekom</a>, who was fired by Zuma, is back running tourism and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f45af228-1a10-11e7-a266-12672483791a">Malusi Gagaba</a>, who relinquished the finance ministry, has been put back in charge of Home Affairs. An obvious posting for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who ran against Ramaphosa for the position of president of the African National Congress, would have been her former portfolio in international relations. Instead she has become a minister within the presidency.</p>
<p>The country is onto its eleventh minister responsible for energy since 1994. This time the post has gone to <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jeffrey-thamsanqa-radebe-mr">Jeff Radebe</a>. Each of the previous incumbents lasted an average of 2.4 years. </p>
<p>In future the revolving door of ministers, directors-general and deputy directors general will need to end.</p>
<p>Before then, there will be at least one more shuffle and pruning when, as Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-16-ramaphosa-promises-to-cut-bloated-cabinet/">indicated</a>, the cabinet and the number of state departments are cut back. </p>
<p>It is a rule of thumb in political science that the poorer a country, the bigger its cabinet. The USA’s includes the Vice President and the heads of <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-administration/the-cabinet/">15 executive departments</a>. South Africa’s is <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/1083">35</a>, up from 30 <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1994-cabinet">under Nelson Mandela</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What does all this augur for the future, and Ramaphosa’s success?</strong></p>
<p>Politics, except under a dictatorship, involves negotiating trade-offs with those with whom you have to negotiate, not only with those you would like to have as your allies. A winner only wins because he or she has formed a coalition of factions which outnumbers the rival coalition of factions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa had to do some fancy footwork. This is because there’s broad consensus that his narrow victory over Nkosazana for the presidency was solely due to the intervention of the premier of Mpumalanga David Mabuza who ordered his followers to switch their votes at the last minute. Ramaphosa squeaked through. And, notwithstanding Ramaphosa’s preference for Pandor as his deputy, Mabuza won the necessary backing. Ramaphosa announced Mabuza’s appointment as deputy president of the country as part of his cabinet announcement. (Convention has it that the president and deputy president of the ANC serve as president and deputy president of the country.)</p>
<p>Making Dlamini-Zuma a minister within the presidency is clearly also a gesture of inclusivity to the anti-Ramaphosa faction.</p>
<p>Overall, Ramaphosa has a cabinet that forms a team he can work with, and that will help him assert his authority. As he <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-announces-changes-national-executive">said</a> in announcing it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These changes are intended to ensure that national government is better equipped to implement the mandate of this administration and specifically the tasks identified in the State of the Nation Address.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92538/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
Overall South Africa’s new president has a cabinet that forms a team with whom he can work.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/92051
2018-02-20T13:01:19Z
2018-02-20T13:01:19Z
South Africa must resist another captured president: this time by the markets
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207235/original/file-20180221-132680-1l9blwl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa addresses MPs after being elected president of South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African National Congress (ANC) has made a dangerous habit of bringing post-apartheid South Africa to the brink of instability and the common ruin of all. The <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-02-14-president-jacob-zuma-resigns/">resignation</a> of former President Jacob Zuma and his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-goodbye-zuma-hello-president-cyril-20180215">replacement</a> by Cyril Ramaphosa was such a moment. It brought home the point that the over-concentration of power in the office of the president has clearly not worked. </p>
<p>A rethink on president-centred politics and the threats it poses to the democracy are crucial for the post-Zuma period. South Africa needs to re-imagine democratic practice, leadership and how power works. </p>
<p>Some sections of South African society have reduced the Zuma problem to a corruption problem. Dismantle Zuma’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-turned-sa-into-mafia-style-lawless-kleptocracy-saftu-20170805">kleptocratic network</a>, the argument goes, and all is solved. Zuma’s demise and a few high profile prosecutions will suffice. </p>
<p>But another view on the Zuma problem – and one with which I concur – suggests it is a problem of contending class projects inside the ANC. The <a href="http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1789">neoliberal class project</a> under Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki saw South Africa integrated into global markets. It maintained stability through modest redistributive reforms. This project laid the basis for a new black middle class to <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/2003/01/01/neoliberalism-and-resistance-in-south-africa/">emerge</a> while systematically <a href="http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/14466/theresponsesoftradeunionstotheeffectsofneoliberalisminsouthafrica.pdf?sequence=1">weakening</a> labour and the left.</p>
<p>But it <a href="https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-neoliberal-squeeze-on-post-apartheid-democracy-reclaiming-the-south-african-dream/28453">surrendered</a> the state (including the presidency) to transnational capital and the power of finance. </p>
<p>The Zuma project, on the other hand, <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/zumas-radical-economic-transformation-is-state-looting-20170404">advanced looting</a> as the basis of accumulation and class formation. The <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/the-fatal-flaw-in-project-state-capture-20171205">extra-constitutional state</a> that emerged deepened the macroeconomic, institutional and legitimacy crisis of the ANC-led state. The left and labour, aligned with the ANC in the tripartite alliance, were <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/sa-workers-must-brace-for-a-dark-new-year/">co-opted</a> and divided. Both these projects are entrenched in the ANC.</p>
<p>Now what? Messiah-centred presidential politics is extremely dangerous. This is particularly true in a country of extreme inequality and with a formal concentration of power in the office of the president. If politics is not represented, thought and acted beyond this, South Africa is going to repeat historical mistakes.</p>
<p>Since the ANC’s December 2017 conference the media, the banks and international institutions have been talking up a narrative of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/25/the-gaining-rand-and-the-cyril-effect-what-it-means-for-your-pocket_a_23343014/">“Cyril effect”</a>. Zuma’s removal is attributed to this. In fact the Cyril effect is a <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/02/12/will-sas-economy-really-benefit-from-the-cyril-effect_a_23359238/">narrative</a> of capture of South Africa’s new president by transnational and financial capital.</p>
<p>South Africa’s democracy cannot afford another captured president beholden to <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ratings-agencies-note-ramaphosas-election-but-swift-upgrade-unlikely-20180215">credit rating agencies</a>, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/opinion-ramaphosa-isnt-the-only-winner-so-is-the-rand-12486405">currency fluctuations</a>, investment flows and business <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-economy/south-african-mining-seen-a-winner-as-ramaphosa-woos-investors-idUSL8N1PJ4EN">perceptions</a>. South Africa’s democracy has to be grounded in the needs of its citizens and the mandates given by its Constitution.</p>
<h2>The ‘Cyril effect’ is hyperbole</h2>
<p>The end of Zuma was in fact not because of the Cyril effect. In the main Zuma was removed by the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17450447">people’s effect</a> which connected the dots of corruption, a mismanaged state and rapacious capitalism. </p>
<p>This resistance was expressed over 15 years through various institutions and social forces. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Battles inside the South African Communist Party (SACP) against <a href="https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/south-africa-zumafication-left-politics-alliance">Zumafication</a> but which led to expulsions;</p></li>
<li><p>By feminists during Zuma’s rape trial and subsequently through <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-09-rememberkhwezi-zumas-rape-accuser-dies-never-having-known-freedom/#.Wovpsa6WbIU">#RememberKhwezi</a>;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.zapiro.com/120520st">Artists</a> and cartoonists lampooning Zuma, including with <a href="https://www.zapiro.com/">shower heads</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The ongoing struggles in communities against <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ancs-path-to-corruption-was-set-in-south-africas-1994-transition-64774">corrupt officials</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-shining-the-light-on-police-militarisation-and-brutality-in-south-africa-44162">Marikana massacre</a> in 2012. This produced rage among workers and major realignments away from Zuma’s ANC;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2014/04/20/Numsa-calls-for-Zuma-to-resign">call</a> by trade unions like the metalworkers’ Numsa for Zuma’s removal;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-statement-by-the-sidikiwe-vukani-vote-no-campaign-calls-on-south-africans-to-endorse-campaign-16042014-2014-04-16">Vukani-Sidikiwe</a> campaign during the 2014 elections which opened up a national debate on how citizens should vote; </p></li>
<li><p>The rise of #ZumaMustGo Campaign. This was in response to the sacking of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">Nhlanhla Nene</a> as finance minister in December 2015. The NUMSA-led United Front played a crucial role in this;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-zumamustfall-and-feesmustfall-have-in-common-and-why-it-matters-53115">#FeesMustFall</a> movement. Students’ demands included labour insourcing as well as quality, decommodified and decolonised higher education;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/results/lge">2016 local government elections</a>. These were a harbinger of seismic political realignments against the ANC in key cities;</p></li>
<li><p>The role of <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/">investigative and nonpartisan media</a> in probing corruption scandals. And the publication of the <a href="http://www.gupta-leaks.com/">Gupta-leaks</a> as well as <a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/new-releases-65840/a-simple-man-kasrils-and-the-zuma-enigma-detail">“A Simple Man”</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-books-that-tell-the-unsettling-tale-of-south-africas-descent-87044">“The President’s Keepers”</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The courageous role from 2010 onwards of then <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thulisile-nomkhosi-madonsela">public protector Thuli Mandonsela</a> in drawing attention to ethics and legal violations by Zuma;</p></li>
<li><p>Court decisions affirming the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/display-judicial-independence-south-african-court-denies-zuma-again">judiciary’s independence</a> in relation to Zuma;</p></li>
<li><p>Zuma’s miscalculation in <a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550">firing finance minister Pravin Gordhan</a>, the rallying of activists and the rise of <a href="http://www.savesouthafrica.org/">#SaveSouthAfrica</a>. What followed were some of the largest post-apartheid <a href="https://theconversation.com/rebellion-is-on-the-march-against-zuma-but-will-it-be-enough-to-oust-him-75862">protest marches</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The powerful voice of liberation struggle veterans like <a href="https://theconversation.com/ahmed-kathrada-exhibit-a-of-the-values-imbued-in-south-africas-freedom-charter-75339">Ahmed Kathrada</a> and others who called for Zuma to resign.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The ANC’s legitimacy crisis</h2>
<p>As a result of all this activity the crisis of legitimacy in the ANC – and the ANC state – has deepened. This has placed immense pressure on the party to act. In this context, Ramaphosa is playing out his role out of necessity and to secure the ANC’s electoral fortunes.</p>
<p>For middle class and rich South Africans Ramaphosa’s <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/state-nation-address-president-republic-south-africa%2C-mr-cyril-ramaphosa">state of the nation</a> speech represented a return to normalcy – a democracy that works for a few. That’s not to say that the new president didn’t make some important announcements in his state of the nation address. This included his comments about state owned enterprises, redistributive state programmes and anti-corruption mechanisms. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the speech struck chords that resonated with the “return to normalcy” narrative.</p>
<p>But South Africans can’t repeat the mistake made in 1994 when progressive civil society <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2012.666011?scroll=top&needAccess=true">demobilised</a>. The people’s effect has to continue to shape a post-Zuma democracy in the interests of all. The ANC has abused majority support and cannot be trusted with the future of South Africa.</p>
<p>People’s power has to be strengthened and continuously mobilised around strengthening democratic institutions, ending corruption, fundamental economic transformation and advancing systemic alternatives to the climate crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vishwas Satgar receives funding from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the National Institute of the Humanities and Social Sciences. He has been engaged in various activist initiatives against the Zuma Regime. </span></em></p>
Jacob Zuma was removed by the people’s effect, which connected the dots of corruption, a mismanaged state and rapacious capitalism.
Vishwas Satgar, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/90955
2018-02-07T14:41:32Z
2018-02-07T14:41:32Z
South Africa’s future hinges on Ramaphosa’s strategic skills
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205323/original/file-20180207-74509-d1kson.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deputy President of South Africa and leader of the country's governing party, the ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s 2018 State of the Nation address by the president of South Africa has been <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/07/curiosity-confusion-and-comedy-after-sona-postponed">postponed</a>. This unprecedented step makes it clear that the country is seeing the final days of Jacob Zuma as president although it may take a day or a week or two before things are finalised.</p>
<p>What’s important is that Zuma isn’t allowed to detract from the momentum that newly elected ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa has started to build. This has included a successful trip to Davos where he unequivocally pulled the carpet from under the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/we-have-excess-power-and-no-money-ramaphosa-on-nuclear-plan-12934073">nuclear power programme</a> favoured by Zuma.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has been working diligently to corral Zuma’s remaining freedom of action. Zuma was finally persuaded to establish a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/state-capture-commission-must-investigate-all-state-corruption-focus-on-guptas-20180125">commission of enquiry into state capture</a> and Ramaphosa started restoring credibility to the management of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1789190/new-eskom-ceo-and-board-chair-appointed-koko-and-singh-others-to-be-removed-says-presidency/">state owned enterprises</a>. </p>
<p>The momentum built by Ramaphosa seems sufficient to avoid the most pressing concern, the spectre of a <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/moodys-now-places-sa-inc-on-downgrade-review-20171129">downgrade</a> of South Africa’s long term local currency debt rating by the rating agency Moody’s. Such a step would trigger South Africa being excluded from <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/sa-faces-many-economic-headwinds-12486144">Citi’s World Governance Bond Index</a>. RMB Morgan Stanley projects a potential <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/sa-faces-many-economic-headwinds-12486144">outflow of US $5 billion</a> if this happened.</p>
<p>But his freedom of action is severely constrained by his narrow victory during the ANC’s leadership elections and the divisions within the party’s top leadership. The party has no choice but to design an early exit strategy for Zuma, or suffer significant political damage during the 2019 elections.</p>
<p>A downgrade would constrain growth and severely affect the ANC’s 2019 election prospects. Ramaphosa needs his own mandate, which only the 2019 national elections can deliver. </p>
<h2>Economic growth</h2>
<p>In November last year Ramaphosa outlined an economic plan aimed at <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/">generating jobs and economic growth and tackling inequality</a>. The plan set a growth target of 3% for 2018, rising to 5% by 2023. </p>
<p>For its part the Reserve Bank has forecast the economy will grow by a measly 1.4% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. The International Monetary Fund is even more pessimistic, forecasting growth of 1.1% for this year. </p>
<p>Nothing is more important for South Africa – and Ramaphosa as the country’s incoming president – than growth and translating that growth into employment creation. That, in turn, requires foreign and domestic investment, which is only possible with policy certainty and rapid movement to a new leadership. It also requires a positive partnership with the private sector.</p>
<p>Assuming Zuma’s exit is imminent, serious consideration needs to be given to the team that Ramaphosa must put in place to help him achieve the economic turnaround he envisages. This brings us to the need for a cabinet reshuffle, including the appointment of a credible minister of finance. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>South Africa has a cabinet which is double the size required. A few ministers, such as Rob Davies at trade and industry and Naledi Pandor in science and technology, have established their credibility. But a large number of the current cabinet shouldn’t be considered for inclusion under a Ramaphosa administration. </p>
<p>The most important post is the minister of finance. Given the fact that former finance minister Nhlanhla Nene seems to have moved on, it is likely that either Pravin Gordhan or his then deputy Mcebesi Jonas will be invited back.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa needs to turns his narrow victory into a positive outcome. And he must convince non-voting ANC supporters who abandoned the ANC under Zuma to return to the fold of the governing party in 2019. </p>
<p>It will also depend on legal processes – such as the various probes into corruption and state capture – to strip out the internal contradictions within the top leadership of the ANC.</p>
<p>Long term voting trends indicate declining support for the ANC and as things stand, a divided ANC remains a plump target for opposition parties. It could see support decline from its current 62% nationally by around 10 percentage points in 2019 if that trend is not reversed. The impact of these developments were set out in a recent book <a href="http://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/fate-of-the-nation-detail?Itemid=6">Fate of the Nation</a> that included political and economic scenarios to 2034.</p>
<p>A more positive party future requires the ANC to rapidly rediscover its unity although this seems unlikely in the short term. And here is the nub – as much as the traditionalist faction is associated with corruption and state capture, it also represents a strong ideological current that could still derail the party and even lead to it splintering. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has been dealt a weak hand but he has proven to be a consummate strategist. The next few days and weeks will be crucial and are likely to determine South Africa’s future for several years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jakkie Cilliers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
President Jacob Zuma shouldn’t be allowed to detract from the momentum that Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president of the ruling ANC, has started to build.
Jakkie Cilliers, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of Pretoria
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/87395
2017-11-14T12:26:23Z
2017-11-14T12:26:23Z
What the hijacking of South Africa’s Treasury means for the economy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194547/original/file-20171114-27625-1plraev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are claims President Jacob Zuma may push through irresponsible proposals relating to higher education funding.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa has been rocked by <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-13-top-treasury-official-quits-in-row-over-free-tertiary-education/">news</a> that President Jacob Zuma has bulldozed the country’s National Treasury to adopt a fee free higher education proposal without following standard process and scrutiny. This is reportedly what’s behind the resignation of the Treasury’s respected head of budgeting, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/13/treasury-confirms-michael-sachs-resignation">Michael Sachs</a>. The Conversation Africa’s Sibonelo Radebe asked Seán Muller to weigh up the implications.</em></p>
<p><strong>How significant is the resignation?</strong></p>
<p>Reports indicate that the resignation came as a result of interference in the budgeting process. There appears to have been an attempt to push through irresponsible proposals relating to higher education funding. From a technocratic perspective this is a serious a blow to the Treasury’s credibility.</p>
<p>What’s unfolding can be seen as a continuation of the “state capture” inspired attack on National Treasury that began in 2015 with the firing of the then finance minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-gird-itself-for-tumultuous-times-52161">Nhlanhla Nene</a>. The attack was temporarily halted and Zuma had to reverse the appointment of trusted ally Des van Rooyen.</p>
<p>The president relented by bringing back trusted finance minister <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-03-30-report-president-jacob-zuma-has-fired-finance-minister-pravin-gordhan">Pravin Gordhan</a>. But then he fired Gordhan early this year and replaced him with another ally <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/south-africas-new-finance-minister-tries-to-assure-the-markets/">Malusi Gigaba</a>. This was followed by the departure of the department’s director general <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-04-05-lungisa-fuzile-quits-will-more-senior-treasury-officials-follow/">Lungisa Fuzile</a>.</p>
<p>The head of the budget office is arguably one of the most important positions within the Treasury. The incumbent, Sachs, played a pivotal role in protecting the country’s public finances while also increasing transparency and engagement with civil society. </p>
<p>He is the son of former constitutional court judge and anti-apartheid activist Albie Sachs, and a former member of the ANC’s Economic Transformation Committee. He had unparalleled insight into both the bureaucratic and political sides of the budget process. His resignation indicates the extent to which political dysfunction has compromised responsible management of public finances.</p>
<p><strong>How does the proposal for increasing higher education funding compromise the budget process?</strong></p>
<p>One of the major achievements of post-1994 governments was to embed a thorough, bureaucratic and political process of developing the annual national budget and the medium-term budget. Within this process, any major changes to budget priorities are signalled in the medium-term budget. They are then gradually integrated into successive national budgets. </p>
<p>Any intention to dramatically change the structure of the budget – for instance, by cutting social grants in order to pay university fees – should have been contained in the medium-term budget.</p>
<p>In the current case, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sa-doesnt-have-money-for-free-higher-education-heher-commission-20171113">Heher Commission</a>, under retired Judge Jonathan Heher was established to investigate higher education funding. It <a href="http://www.presidency.gov.za/press-statements/release-report-commission-inquiry-feasibility-making-high-education-and-training">handed its report to the president on the 30th of August</a>, before the presentation of the 2017 medium-term budget policy statement. Its findings should have been released earlier and any decision reflected in the medium-term budget. That would have provided a basis for Parliament to facilitate democratic oversight of the proposals and alerted citizens and stakeholders to government’s intention.</p>
<p>What’s more worrying are reports that the president has ignored the Heher Commision’s recommendations. Given the extensive consultation by this commission, it would arguably be irrational and irresponsible to ignore its findings and implement an ill-conceived, “populist” removal of university fees. </p>
<p>Regardless of the merits of such proposals, to try and ram them through in the period between the medium term budget, in October, and the national budget in February is reckless. It will undermine the credibility of South Africa’s public finance management and carries negative implications for investment, credit ratings and economic growth.</p>
<p><strong>What is your view on the call for free university education?</strong></p>
<p>We should start with the widely accepted principle that no student who is suitably qualified for university education should be prevented from pursuing it. Given this principle we then need to ask the following questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>How many students does the basic education system adequately prepare for higher education?</p></li>
<li><p>How many of those need financial support and to what extent?</p></li>
<li><p>What are the total cost implications of providing all such students with the necessary support, whether in grants or loans? </p></li>
<li><p>Can the country afford to do this for all such students immediately?</p></li>
<li><p>Even if we can afford it, is it the most equitable use of such funds?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-feesmustfall-protests-some-inconvenient-truths-67516">argued previously</a> that too many students are being admitted into the higher education system. Many are ill-prepared given the poor quality in the schooling system.</p>
<p>Evidence on the household incomes of students in higher education indicates that – relatively – they are much <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-feesmustfall-protests-some-inconvenient-truths-67516">better off than the majority of South African youth</a>. Youth outside the further education system get little, if any, direct support from government. And so a large increase in funding for university students is not the best way to assist poor youth.</p>
<p><strong>What are the implications beyond education?</strong></p>
<p>There are two major implications.</p>
<p>Firstly, it increases the chances of a downgrade of the country’s debt that’s held in local currency. Even before these recent events I <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-budget-underscores-desperate-state-of-south-africas-finances-86362">argued</a> this was almost inevitable. My view then was mainly informed by the revenue shortfalls indicated in the medium term budget, poor economic growth forecasts and the government abandoning its policy of fiscal consolidation (stabilising government debt).</p>
<p>The resignation of the head of the Treasury’s budget office makes the situation even more dire. The interference that induced it constitutes an unprecedented subversion of the country’s national budget process and National Treasury’s mandate to ensure stability and sustainability of public finances. </p>
<p>Secondly, the way in which the president intends to unilaterally ram through his favoured approach to higher education funding signals that a similar approach could be taken with a decision to pursue nuclear power. At the time of the medium-term budget, Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Budget/gigaba-sa-cant-afford-nuclear-yet-20171025">indicated</a> that government cannot afford nuclear. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-allies-are-once-again-gung-ho-about-nuclear-will-they-get-their-way-87022">shortly afterwards</a> the new minister of energy, David Mahlobo, and Zuma both suggested that they are preparing to push it through. If that happened, it would further compromise South Africa’s public finances and economic growth.</p>
<p>There was some hope that a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-09-14-ramaphosa-leads-anc-leadership-race-analysts/">victory</a> in December for the anti-state capture grouping in the governing African National Congress’s elective conference might be able to stabilise governance and public finances. But it now appears that a great deal more damage could still be done by the president before then.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller has received support from the Heinrich Boell Foundation to participate in parliamentary oversight processes relating to the 2017 medium-term budget policy statement, and is actively involved in providing technical support and advice to a number of civil society organisations on a range of public finance matters.</span></em></p>
The imposition of the fee free higher education proposal on South Africa’s National Treasury without due consideration represents an escalation of the state capture led by President Jacob Zuma.
Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/86373
2017-10-25T18:27:53Z
2017-10-25T18:27:53Z
South Africa’s finance minister admits situation is grave: but offers no solutions
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191877/original/file-20171025-25502-ldfp48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba has been forthright in recognising the crises facing the country.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The first <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/MTBPS/2017/default.aspx">mid-term budget</a> delivered by South Africa’s newish Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba was always likely to be judged largely on three issues: whether he was able to inspire confidence, what the government plans to do with the crises at the various state owned enterprises and whether he would pronounce definitively on its commitment to firming up a nuclear deal with Russia. </p>
<p>Whatever else Gigaba said was likely to be regarded as extra. </p>
<p>On balance, he did reasonably well on the confidence issue. He spoke clearly and with assurance, even with authority. To be sure, he delivered a lot of flannel. He reminded South Africans of the promises of the National Development Plan and the government’s commitment to Vision 2030; he spoke about the iniquities of the maldistribution of wealth and inequality and the government’s commitment to redistribution; he deplored “the challenges” (that overused word) faced by state owned enterprises, the high level of concentration in the private sector and the need to make the economy more globally competitive. And he inevitably he hailed the urgent need for “radical socio-economic transformation”. Words, words, words, one might say. </p>
<p>Against that, Gigaba’s speech was forthright in recognising the immediate crises facing the country. While stressing the importance of economic growth, he indicated that growth was expected to fall to 0.7% per annum, down from a previous somewhat less miserable estimate of 1.3%. </p>
<p>He recognised that the budget deficit was expected to increase from 4.3% from 3.1%. And he conceded that with lower economic activity government revenue was going to fall: indeed, the consolidated government deficit would climb to 60% of GDP by 2022. </p>
<p>Against these grim statistics, he stressed the need for greater tax morality, expenditure cuts, greater efficiency in government’s supply chain management and increased vigour in fighting corruption in state owned enterprises. And he even managed to say all this without smirking. </p>
<p>While it was important that he made it clear that the government recognises the mess the economy is in, he was extraordinarily light on detail about how it intended to clear it up. </p>
<p>The ratings agencies will doubtless be pleased that Gigaba announced no hike in corporation tax. For its part the African National Congress and its alliance partners would have been equally pleased that he announced no rise in Value Added Tax, which would hit the poor hardest. By the same token, he left it unclear – save by vague commitments to cutting costs – how the increasing gap between revenue and expenditure is to be tackled.</p>
<h2>Raiding the piggy bank</h2>
<p>The biggest news in Gigaba’s speech was his announcement that the government intends to sell a portion of its shares in Telkom to enable a recapitalisation of South African Airways and the South African Post Office. Many would say that he was left with little choice. While he thanked the banks for not pulling the plug on the airline by not demanding repayment of their loans, his raiding of Telkom’s piggy bank was an acknowledgement that no-one else was going to risk their money. </p>
<p>He also addressed the crisis in state owned enterprises by highlighting governance issues. This included the appointment of new boards for the airline as well as the state broadcaster and the need for them to recruit efficient managers and to tighten up governance and accountability. </p>
<p>Fine words, but equally, this was no announcement of the government drawing back from its notion of state owned enterprises as key drivers of the “developmental state”. Their current crises had obscured much that they had achieved, he said, such as the development of a pool of competent state managers. </p>
<p>Many would say that it’s a pity that their competence is not more evident.</p>
<p>If Gigaba said just enough to indicate that the government intends to do something to address the problems faced by state owned enterprises, the most glaring gap in his speech was any firm indication of how to tackle the cesspit of corruption that the state power utility Eskom has become. </p>
<p>Far worse than that were his weasel words about any prospective nuclear deal. </p>
<p>Speculation is rife that President Jacob Zuma is determined to sign off a deal to build nuclear power stations with the Russian nuclear agency, Rosatom, as quickly as possible – a deal which many reckon would bankrupt the country. Yet Gigaba chose not to calm the market’s nerves but to remain as vague as possible. Very deliberately, he chose to repeat a previous statement by Zuma that the signing of any nuclear deal would take estimates of the potential supply and demand for energy into full consideration, and would only proceed on the basis of “affordability”. Nobody is likely to believe that.</p>
<h2>No sign of a change in direction</h2>
<p>So, what’s to be made of this first substantive effort by Gigaba? The good news is that he didn’t try and obscure the grim financial situation that the government is facing. </p>
<p>But the bad news is that despite the waffle about the need for “radical socio-economic transformation”, there was nothing in his speech to indicate that the government is considering a significant change in direction. </p>
<p>Yes, there was the commitment to selling Telkom shares, but that was merely akin to selling the family silver to keep the household finances afloat for a little bit longer. Apart from that, there was no real suggestion that the government will start doing things differently. And there was no indication about how it intends to close the steadily increasing deficit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>
South Africa’s finance minister was honest about the problems facing the country. But he made no real suggestions that the government will start doing things differently.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/84540
2017-09-27T17:04:38Z
2017-09-27T17:04:38Z
What the South African KPMG saga says about shareholder activism
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187763/original/file-20170927-24149-ko2oer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">KPMG South Africa stands accused of advancing state capture and has come under immense pressure.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Isabelle OHara/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Accounting and consulting firm, KPMG South Africa, is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-11-op-ed-the-kpmg-failure-ethical-test-for-sa-business-and-company-directors/#.Wbjzr7Kg_IU">reeling</a> after it was exposed to have played a part in the <a href="https://www.enca.com/coverage/gupta-high-flyers">Gupta inspired</a> state capture activity. The <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/kpmg-bleeds-clients-20170924-3">fallout</a> has been remarkable. Some major firms have fired KPMG as an auditor and more Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies are expected to follow suit.</p>
<p>KPMG offers tax, advisory and auditing services and is one of the Big Four auditors, along with Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).
Despite their integration into the economy, all four of these audit firms have experienced significant <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-09-26-conjuring-fears-of-systemic-risk-from-kpmg-disgrace-delays-the-remedy/">lapses of judgement</a>.</p>
<p>The KPMG case provides a potential example of how shareholders can attack the soft underbelly of the private sector state capture enablers. Globally, the number of <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/08/shareholder-activism-business-response-explainer/">shareholder challenges</a> has increased dramatically from 520 episodes in 2013 to 758 in 2016. Around <a href="https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/corporate-development-hardware-software-shareholder-activism-silicon-valley/">two thirds</a> of these challenges were successful, double the rate of just a decade ago.</p>
<p>South Africa’s shareholder activism is following international trends. This is partly function of the fact that that <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">over 50%</a> of the market capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is owned by foreigners. </p>
<p>Shareholder activists are using their powers as company owners to examine company financial reports, monitor executive remuneration, enforce good corporate governance, and push for increased sustainability and transparency.</p>
<p>KPMG has a <a href="http://www.biznews.com/global-investing/2017/08/10/kpmg-gupta-state-capture/">client base</a> of about 70 listed companies in South Africa. This means that pressure from shareholder activists is likely to pile up. <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/sasfin-drops-kpmg-after-18-years-over-gupta-and-sars-saga-20170919">Some companies</a> have already cancelled their use of KPMG services and others have stated that they are reconsidering their relationship. But most of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/business/1660727/jse-listed-companies-are-divided-on-kpmg-relationship/">KPMG’s clients</a> have either remained silent. Others said they’re waiting for the outcome of reviews by the country’s regulator, the Board for Auditors, as well as KPMG International.</p>
<p>The directors of companies that have chosen not to take a stand fail to realise one critical thing. In a world of shareholder activism, they may soon face serious questions from their own shareholders about their inaction and ongoing association with KPMG. </p>
<h2>Key drivers</h2>
<p>A key driver of shareholder activism in South Africa has been the introduction of minorities’ rights in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/new-act-expected-to-heighten-shareholder-activism-816251">new Companies Act</a>.</p>
<p>Minority shareholders with as little as 10% holdings can call an annual general meeting. This means that it’s become easier for shareholders to take legal action against directors and officers, including having directors removed.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=KingIV">King codes</a> of corporate governance have also played a significant role. They emphasise ethical leadership, sustainability and good corporate citizenship. </p>
<p>The codes have entrenched the idea that boards of directors must act in the best interests of the company and that their responsibilities extend to shareholders and other stakeholders. Companies are expected to establish sound governance structures, create “an ethical culture” and ensure that they’re “seen to be a responsible corporate citizen”.</p>
<p>A key factor underpinning these governance principles is the creation of more transparency. By putting more information in the hands of shareholders and the public, these measures create greater potential to hold boards to account for behaviour that fails to meet minimum standards.</p>
<h2>KPMG’s Complicity</h2>
<p>Alongside other names such as consultants McKinsey, the IT giant SAP, heavy machinery manufacturer Liebherr, and Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, KPMG has been implicated in alleged <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-11-op-ed-the-kpmg-failure-ethical-test-for-sa-business-and-company-directors/#.Wbjzr7Kg_IU">large-scale corruption</a> involving the Gupta family. The firm stands accused of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>allegedly overlooking numerous conflicts of interest while auditing 36 Gupta-linked companies until dumping the Guptas in 2016 by<a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/gupta-owned-oakbay-finds-new-auditors-20160421">withdrawing</a> their auditing services. A local auditing firm, SizweNtsalubaGobodo, replaced KPMG but seems to have also felt the pressure and has <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/another-auditing-firm-drops-oakbay-resources">withdrawn</a> its services.</p></li>
<li><p>allegedly providing tax advice to ensure that the public funds extracted from the South African fiscus were placed in Dubai to avoid tax payments. KPMG may have thus also become a possible <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-needs-to-develop-new-ways-of-stemming-illicit-financial-flows-58892">enabler</a> of illicit capital flows in the process. </p></li>
<li><p>compiling a report for South African Revenue Services about an alleged <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/09/15/how-kpmgs-rogue-unit-report-was-ludicrous-from-the-beginning_a_23210784/">rogue spy unit</a> within the tax authority. The report was used as part of a campaign against former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, and other senior government officials. By its own <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/09/15/kpmg-withdraws-sars-spy-unit-report-s-findings">admission</a>, KPMG appears to have ignored both sector-wide best practice as well as its own standards of due diligence. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>On a wider scale, KPMG seems to have given little consideration to the risks and damage that its activities would do to South Africa’s institutional integrity and governance frameworks.</p>
<p>Pressure has been gathering. Eight senior executives of the South African office, including the CEO, Trevor Hoole, have <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-09-15-heads-roll-at-kpmg-trevor-hoole-and-nine-others-out">resigned</a>. The firm has withdrawn all of its findings‚ recommendations and conclusions contained in the notorious “rogue unit” report. It has also instituted an international <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-09-10-kpmg-review-of-work-done-for-guptas-to-be-completed-by-end-of-month/">review</a> of all work done for the Gupta family. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely that these actions will be enough to forestall litigation and possible collapse of KPMG South Africa.</p>
<h2>Shareholder Tinderbox</h2>
<p>Shareholder activism in South Africa has <a href="http://scholar.ufs.ac.za:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11660/1251/LekhesaMW.pdf?sequence=1">historically</a> mostly been between institutional investors or individual activists and investee companies. But this may well begin to change. Mounting <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-09-01-the-hawks-where-state-capture-evidence-goes-to-die/">frustration</a> at the slow pace of investigations into allegations of state capture by state institutions such as the Hawks and National Prosecuting Authority is forcing investors to become more active. Shareholders could start directing their attention to fighting corruption through the private sector.</p>
<p>But are South African shareholders prepared to step up to ensure good governance in the face of governance failures elsewhere in the system? There’s a great deal to lose if they don’t. </p>
<p>If shareholders don’t take a proactive role, South Africa is in far more danger than simply losing its top spot on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1">Report</a> for auditing and reporting standards.</p>
<p>Once trust is lost in both the public and private sectors’ ability to root out or prevent corruption, the country could see <a href="http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/511/151512.html">further capital flight</a>, greater tax avoidance, and a more pervasive sense that the rule of law is negotiable. </p>
<p>As revelations of systemic failures in governance pile up, the economy may very well depend on shareholders taking up the burden of providing the necessary levels of accountability. KPMG may be teaching South Africa an important lesson. Shareholders can also be anti-corruption activists. Anyone who is connected to the South African economy, must dearly hope that shareholders are up to the task.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84540/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Gossel receives funding from the University of Cape Town.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy London works for the Allan Gray Centre for Values Based Leadership which receives funding from the Allan Gray Orbis Foundation. The Centre is a part of the Graduate School of Business at the University of Cape Town.</span></em></p>
KPMG South Africa sets a potential example of how shareholders can attack the soft underbelly of private sector state capture enablers.
Sean Gossel, Senior Lecturer, UCT Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town
Timothy London, Senior Lecturer, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/83167
2017-09-04T15:41:21Z
2017-09-04T15:41:21Z
How South African business can help government fix the economy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/183977/original/file-20170830-29224-1kdzd3z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What business is willing to say to itself is as important, as what it says to government. Which is why the document, a contract with society, released by an organisation representing big business, <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/south-africas-big-business-embarks-of-fight-back-political-campaign/">Business Leadership SA’s Contract with South Africa</a> may be setting a new tone not only on how business deals with government but also how major economic actors deal with the economy’s problems.</p>
<p>When most commentators are asked how South African business should respond to government, the common response is that it should <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/172211/how-businesses-can-fight-back-against-the-sa-governments-junk-policies/">complain</a>, loudly and in public. This view has no doubt firmed since the March <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-lost-a-key-line-of-defence-against-corruption-what-now-75549">cabinet reshuffle</a> damaged the economy and denouncing “white monopoly capital” became a refrain of the ANC’s patronage faction. Business, as the argument goes, should stand up for itself even if that means offending government.</p>
<p>But, while this approach makes great headlines and makes many people feel better, it does little or nothing to advance business interests or fix the economy. </p>
<p>Those who want business to shout at government seem to assume that this country has no history. But it does, and it is a history in which business is associated – and not only in the minds of patronage politicians - with the minority privilege which apartheid ensured. No one would use the phrase <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-people-in-south-africa-still-hold-the-lions-share-of-all-forms-of-capital-75510">“white monopoly capital”</a> if it did not seem to describe the world in which many black business and professional people feel that they live.</p>
<p>This makes the relationship between business and government more difficult than in most other countries. It also means that politicians cannot afford to be seen to be ordered about, by business. After all, what better way to confirm that “white monopoly capital” rules us all than to insist that business people tell politicians off in public? </p>
<h2>Yelling is not the solution</h2>
<p>Yelling at government is not helpful to the economy because it keeps alive the myth that its difficulties are caused by government alone. But, as very mainstream figures such as International Monetary Fund deputy MD <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2016-07-27-economy-bridled-by-high-number-of-excluded/">David Lipton</a> have pointed out, the fault is not government’s alone. Other economic actors, including business, have also contributed to the problem.</p>
<p>If businesses want a healthier economy, they need to look at what they can change as well as what the government can fix. This will undermine the “white monopoly capital” claim by showing that businesses are willing to change what they do as well as asking the government and other interests to change.</p>
<p>This is precisely what Business Leadership SA’s contract seeks to do. It feels as strongly about the “white monopoly capital” slur as others. It’s chief executive officer, Bonang Mohale, said at the contract’s launch that it hoped to undo the legacy “of the ugly and deceitful white monopoly capital campaign (which) sought to blame business for all the problems that beset this country”. He said the campaign was “dishonest”; it “tried to deflect from the real issues of state capture”. It had severely damaged business’s reputation. </p>
<p>All of this is music to the ears of the “give government a proper scolding” school. The key difference is that the organisation seeks to counter the campaign not simply by denouncing it but by <a href="https://theconversation.com/business-needs-to-change-and-stop-blaming-others-for-south-africas-ills-64942">taking responsibility</a> for fixing the problems which made the campaign possible in the first place. </p>
<h2>Problem is not just government</h2>
<p>The contract recognises that <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-business-must-own-up-to-its-part-in-the-corruption-scandals-81905">corruption</a> is a two-way process. It vows to root out corruption in the private sector too and wants companies to sign an integrity pledge, to fight corruption.</p>
<p>It also commits to fighting economic exclusion by creating jobs, encouraging and empowering senior black leadership, building skills, investing in communities and supporting small businesses.</p>
<p>Only after making these commitments does the organisation’s document say something about government. It says it cannot achieve these goals on its own. The government “must also step up” and create the conditions necessary for the country and economy to succeed.</p>
<p>This approach is more likely to dispel the “white monopoly capital” campaign than one which yells at the government. While those who coined the slogan will not be impressed, it’s not them to whom businesses are talking. Their audience is the tens of thousands of South Africans who have no axe to grind but want the economy to offer opportunities to more people. </p>
<p>The contract recognises the problem that undermines the image of large businesses as arrogant vehicles of power. By showing that they are sensitive to economic exclusion and those who suffer it offers to do something to solve the problem.</p>
<h2>Conversation is the key</h2>
<p>The document also creates opportunities for <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-bargaining-not-another-magic-plan-will-get-south-africas-economy-growing-82471">mending the economy</a> by opening the way to a bargain between government, business and other economic interests. This is the essential route to change because none of the economic interests are strong enough to impose their favoured solution on the others.</p>
<p>By spelling out in broad terms a willingness to change, the contract enables politicians and government officials who do want to negotiate change to begin a discussion on the specifics. This promises to restart the <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-bargaining-not-another-magic-plan-will-get-south-africas-economy-growing-82471">conversation</a> between government and business which was beginning to blossom during the later days of Pravin Gordhan (former finance minister) and Mcebisi Jonas (former deputy finance minister) at National Treasury.</p>
<p>It also makes negotiation possible by taking the three steps all the parties need to take to create a negotiation climate:</p>
<ul>
<li>it acknowledges that the economy needs to change, </li>
<li>spells out what business is willing to do to change it, and </li>
<li>what it expects in return. </li>
</ul>
<p>This opens the way for the other parties to do the same – if they do, the negotiations will have effectively begun and a way out of the economy’s dead end will be possible.</p>
<p>Business Leadership SA’s contract is hardly guaranteed to succeed. In the past, initiatives which depended on business and other economic interests making changes ran aground because business leaders, like the other negotiators, lacked the muscle to take those they represent with them. </p>
<p>It is not at all clear how many businesses are willing to follow Business Leadership SA’s approach. Nor is it clear if government and labour, whose participation is crucial, are willing and able to respond with their own bargaining positions.</p>
<p>What is clear is that the economy’s revival depends on the business strategy for change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
South African business can beat back the toxic ‘white monopoly capital’ title by doing things differently and not by shouting from roof tops.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/82471
2017-08-16T16:23:09Z
2017-08-16T16:23:09Z
Hard bargaining, not another magic plan, will get South Africa’s economy growing
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181991/original/file-20170814-12098-1i26bjz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's Finance Minister, Malusi Gigaba, needs more than the 14-point plan to revive the economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Finance ministers in today’s South Africa should be judged not by whether they have plans to rescue the economy themselves, but by their plans to get others to help them to do it.</p>
<p>South Africa’s new finance minister Malusi Gigaba recently unveiled a <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/">14-point plan</a> to revive the economy. He did this as part of his campaign to restore trust in the economy, partly damaged by the cabinet reshuffle in which he replaced a minister respected in the market place. </p>
<p>The plan has not achieved the desired effect – credit ratings <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/20/fitch-raises-red-flags-over-gigaba-s-14-point-plan">agencies</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/lorenzo-fioramonti-176997">commentators</a> have rejected it, labelling it a restatement of existing government commitments which will do little or nothing to grow the economy.</p>
<p>On one level, the complaint is accurate. Gigaba’s plan, like the governing African National Congress’s economic discussion <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-isnt-ready-to-radically-transform-the-south-african-economy-75004">document</a>, fails to move out of the rut which currently hobbles the economy. It, too, assumes that the solution lies in doing what is currently being done better rather than in doing things differently.</p>
<p>In particular it has nothing to say about how to include millions who are shut out of the mainstream economy. It’s difficult to see how South Africa’s economy can achieve sustained growth until and unless this problem is addressed.</p>
<p>On another level, the complaint that Gigaba did not come up with a plan which will rescue the economy misses the point – that, given the balance of power in South Africa, no government plan could rescue the economy on its own. Government promises to revive the economy should be judged not on whether they tell the country that the government – on its own – has come up with a cure, but on whether it has a credible plan for ensuring that all the key economic actors play a role in negotiating change.</p>
<h2>Bargaining is the key</h2>
<p>Those who expect the government to solve the economic problems on its own believe, of course, that government created them on its own. In this view, South Africa’s economy worked well until politicians came along and damaged it. All that’s needed is for politicians to behave differently and the economy will again function as it should.</p>
<p>But growth levels are too low to offer a better life to all, and other obstacles which ensure that South Africans do not all enjoy rising living standards, didn’t emerge when the current president took office or even in 1994, when the governing party took over the reins. To take one example: unemployment began rising in the 1970s, a quarter century before apartheid ended. The economy has always excluded most people – what we see now continues patterns set decades ago.</p>
<p>The government obviously does have a role in addressing these problems. But it’s not the only source of the problem and so it cannot be the only source of a solution. Some of what business or labour or the professions or educational institutions do is also responsible for the problem. And so they all need to become part of a solution by changing some of what they do.</p>
<p>While this picture of all the parties coming together to work out solutions sounds attractive, getting them to the table is difficult. And finding solutions will be even harder because they are deeply divided on what the problems are, and so on what the solutions may be. </p>
<p>Any particular idea for change will force one or other party to give up something in order to reap dividends later. Naturally, they all think that the others should do the sacrificing. </p>
<p>So a process which placed the economy on a sustainable path would require some hard bargaining and would need to continue for quite some time. It’s this bargaining process, not a magical government formula, which will place the economy on a new growth path.</p>
<h2>Rebuilding trust</h2>
<p>The government clearly has a key role in triggering the process of bargaining. This is precisely what the National Treasury seemed to be doing under Gigaba’s predecessor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">Pravin Gordhan</a>. </p>
<p>Its attempts to stave off a downgrade by ratings agencies began an <a href="http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Economy/gordhan-to-showcase-sas-phenomenal-positives-to-rating-agencies-20170324">exchange</a> between government, sections of business and labour which may have developed into a negotiation about change. The chief priority for Gigaba – or any other finance minister – is to revive the process which ended when the <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">cabinet reshuffle</a> destroyed the trust which made it possible.</p>
<p>Gigaba’s plan does contain two points which might begin the revival. One is a commitment to a <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017071301%20Government%E2%80%99s%20inclusive%20growth%20action%20plan.pdf">financial sector summit</a>, the other a promise to resume talks on a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/new-mining-charter-will-be-a-disaster-for-industry--da-9806482">mining charter</a>. </p>
<p>Both may well fall short of what is needed. The summit idea repeats a flaw in government thinking on bargaining with business which has been evident for decades. It assumes that deep –rooted problems can be solved, and deep divisions healed, by a grand summit which gets the parties into a conference venue for a few days to hammer out a joint declaration. </p>
<p>This has been tried repeatedly and, each time, the declarations sounded good but were ignored. This is hardly surprising: precisely because the divisions are deep, they cannot be bridged at one event. Change is likely to need a process – not a summit. This should take as long as needed and concentrate on reaching agreement on what can be agreed, and building from there.</p>
<p>It is possible, however, that both initiatives could be the start of a productive process in which parties will be willing to negotiate changes which entail giving something up provided they get something in return. This is far more likely if this process too is not left to government alone. </p>
<p>Gigaba’s plans for negotiation may be improved, and so may move the economy towards growth which includes many more people. But only if commentators and interest groups treat them with the same seriousness they now reserve their hopes for a magic government plan to save the economy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
South Africa needs to restore trust and effective bargaining mechanisms between key stakeholders to revive the ailing economy.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/82388
2017-08-13T08:32:41Z
2017-08-13T08:32:41Z
Zuma won, but the ANC will never be a united party again
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181778/original/file-20170811-1192-1dhctmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of South African President Jacob Zuma celebrate his triumph in the no confidence vote.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To say there is victory in defeat sounds like a contradiction in terms. But, this is exactly what happened when South Africa’s opposition parties failed to remove President Jacob Zuma through a motion of no confidence.</p>
<p>When National Assembly Speaker Baleka Mbete announced the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">results</a> - 177 “Yes” against 198 “No” - ANC parliamentarians broke into song. But were they really the winners? </p>
<p>I don’t believe so. But to understand the party’s real defeat we need to go beyond the song.</p>
<p>A day before the vote the ANC was thrown into disarray by the speaker’s decision to <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2017/08/08/this-is-not-setting-a-precedent---speaker-mbete-on-zuma-secret-ballot">give MPs the right to a secret ballot</a>, something the party had vehemently <a href="http://www.enca.com/coverage/zumas-secret-ballot-test">opposed</a>.</p>
<p>Mindful of rebellious members within the ranks of its own parliamentary caucus – such as <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-07-19-pravin-gordhan-makhosi-khoza-pull-no-punches-on-zuma/">Makhosi Khoza, Pravin Gordhan</a>, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2016-11-28-fellow-ministers-back-hanekom-as-anc-meeting-on-zuma-continues/">Derek Hanekom</a> – the ANC didn’t know <a href="https://theconversation.com/opposition-parties-have-found-the-ancs-achilles-heel-jacob-zuma-82322">how many more silent rebels</a> it harboured in parliament. </p>
<p>The evening of August 7, the day before the vote, will be remembered as the night of telephonic bombardment as ANC MPs got panicky calls from both their party and opposition parties. After each call, the dilemma they faced was: “Do I listen to my conscience, or ignore it?”</p>
<p>The human soul expresses itself through people’s faces. A smile tells us that the soul is brimming with good nourishment. A grimace suggests a troubled person. Before 2pm on August 8, the starting time for the debate on the motion of no confidence, the tormented state of the souls of both ANC and opposition party leaders was masked by a deliberate effort to feign confidence – even though no one was certain of victory. For a few hours there was a disconnect between the soul and the face.</p>
<p>The rest is history. Zuma remains in office – for now. How, then, could this be interpreted as a victory for opposition parties when they were clearly trounced? </p>
<p>It is victory because they succeeded in proving to the ANC that party bosses in <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/contacts">Luthuli House</a>, the ANC’s headquarters in Johannesburg, have lost control of a number of their MPs. It’s true that the ANC was divided before August the 8th. But, despite the subsequent singing, the injuries it suffered in the no confidence vote are now impossible to conceal.</p>
<h2>The unravelling of the ANC</h2>
<p>ANC bosses and parliamentarians no longer trust each other. Given the secrecy of the ballot, it’s impossible to sniff out all the rebels and flush them out of Parliament. It is like living with the knowledge that a dangerous snake lurks somewhere in your own house.</p>
<p>It is also a strong possibility that those who voted with the opposition enjoy the support of some party leaders. Given the fractiousness of the ANC, the party cannot embark on a united witch hunt against rebels in Parliament because the rebels are clearly part of an anti-Zuma campaign. It can therefore be assumed that most of them support Cyril Ramaphosa, not Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma – the two frontrunner contenders for the presidency of both the ANC and the country – as the successor to Zuma. It would be self defeating for Ramaphosa to hunt them down. They are his underground troops.</p>
<p>Four months before the ANC’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">national elective conference</a> there is no time for the party to waste in complicated disciplinary hearings. In any event its factions are more interested in securing their own victory than chasing down those who voted in favour of the no confidence motion.</p>
<p>Before the vote the party could sell the propaganda that the problem was Zuma, not the ANC. By voting to keep him in the job, the party has now made it plain that the problem is the whole ANC, not just Zuma.</p>
<p>The bitter attitude of ANC leaders who spoke inside and outside Parliament before and after the vote added fuel to growing public anger at the arrogance of ANC power. The most shocking statement came from the ANC Women’s League president – and staunch Zuma supporter – Bathabile Dlamini who told reporters that she hadn’t voted with her conscience because her conscience had not <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1604598/bathabile-dlamini-says-her-conscience-didnt-put-her-in-government/">“sent her to parliament”</a>.</p>
<p>And South Africans are very angry – in taxi ranks, in churches, at funerals and in shebeens across the country. They cannot believe what has happened to the ANC of Nelson Mandela. When asked what to do, people say, “2019 is coming” – a reference to the country’s next national elections. Increasingly South Africans seem to be gaining a deeper appreciation of the power of the vote. The 2016 municipal elections, which saw the ANC <a href="https://theconversation.com/sharp-tongued-south-african-voters-give-ruling-anc-a-stiff-rebuke-63606">lose three metropolitan councils</a>, were a turning point.</p>
<h2>Who’ll save the party?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/watch-zuma-sing-along-endorsing-ndz-campaign">Should Dlamini-Zuma</a>, Zuma’s anointed successor, win in December, the ANC shouldn’t be surprised by the punishment meted out to them at the polls. She will be rejected overwhelmingly by citizens who are sick and tired of Zuma and the Guptas, his friends and architects of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture.</a></p>
<p>Even Ramaphosa, her main competitor for the presidency of both the ANC and the country, will have no smooth ride to power. Indications are that, should he win, the ANC may lose voters in KwaZulu-Natal. There the Inkatha Freedom Party – which is firmly and unabashedly tribalist in its Zulu stronghold – is <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ifp-wins-nquthu-by-election-20170525">once again gaining groud</a>. Even though South Africans don’t like admitting it, tribal consciousness is a feature of the country’s politics.</p>
<p>Should Ramaphosa succeed Zuma, he will have to do a great deal of explaining. Where was he, and what did he do, when Zuma and the Guptas were looting public resources? Why did he continue to support a discredited president? Zuma will haunt Ramaphosa like a ghost.</p>
<p>It doesn’t matter who takes over the ANC in December. The party will never be a united party again. After the vote of no confidence, the party is seriously injured. It will limp all the way to the 2019 elections. Such is the contradictory victory scored by the ANC on August 8.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prince Mashele does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The bitter attitude of ANC leaders who spoke inside and outside Parliament before and after the no confidence vote added fuel to already existing public anger at the arrogance of the governing party.
Prince Mashele, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/82280
2017-08-09T18:43:08Z
2017-08-09T18:43:08Z
Lessons from South Africa: parliamentary conscience and the courage to rebel
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181564/original/file-20170809-32183-tz0vr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The motion of no confidence against President Jacob Zuma displayed tension between party and conscience</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Mark Wessels</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prior to the motion of <a href="http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2017/07/05/zuma-no-confidence-motion/">no confidence in President Jacob Zuma</a> in South Africa’s National Assembly, former Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, among others, urged the African National Congress (ANC) MPs to be <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-07-19-pravin-gordhan-makhosi-khoza-pull-no-punches-on-zuma/">guided by their conscience</a>, implying that they should break ranks with their party and vote with the opposition. </p>
<p>The thrust of Gordhan’s argument was that under Zuma the presidency had become corrupt and morally compromised. Therefore a vote against Zuma’s continuance in office would be in the national interest. </p>
<p>The further implication was that voting for Zuma to go would be in the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/266526/nec-decision-to-back-zuma-ill-advised-says-anc-mp-mondli-gungubele">long-term interest</a> of the ANC. The reasoning behind this was that, unless the party is to return to the values for which the liberation struggle was fought, it will wreak its own destruction.</p>
<p>The counter-argument by the ANC hierarchy was that ANC MPs were bound by obligation to the voters who had elected them to vote the way the party instructed. MPs in the South African system are not elected as individuals, but merely as members of their party. To vote against the party line would be to overturn the logic of democracy. </p>
<p>A further argument put forward by ANC speakers in the debate was that the opposition was seeking unconstitutional “<a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">regime change</a>”. This was quite correctly challenged. The opposition pointed out that the motion had been put in terms of the constitution, and that they were seeking to replace the President and not the ANC government. </p>
<p>And yet, although the ANC argument was manifestly “rubbish” (to quote Wits academic Ivor Sarakinsky in <a href="https://www.enca.com/media/video/south-africans-concerned-about-the-constitution">commentary</a> on a local television stations eNCA), the debate highlighted a very real tension at the heart of South Africa’s democracy. Should MPs have the right to vote according to their conscience?</p>
<h2>The role of the political party</h2>
<p>Universally, the rise of political parties alongside the expansion of parliamentary democracy inevitably came at the cost of the independence of individual MPs. It is rare today for any individual not belonging to a political party to secure a seat in any parliament. Belonging to a political party has become a necessity except in the most exceptional of circumstances.</p>
<p>In turn, belonging to a political party requires that MPs or representatives sign up to a <a href="https://www.faust.com/legend/pact-with-the-devil/">Faustian deal</a>. If they want to progress politically, they have to follow the party line, even on occasions where they disagree with party policy. </p>
<p>This is entrenched in the communist notion of ‘democratic centralism’ – once the party has ‘democratically’ made its decision, the individual is politically bound to implement it. </p>
<p>In practice, however, party systems are not always so rigid as this implies.</p>
<p>Parliamentary histories are stuffed not merely with internal party rebellions but individual MPs voting against their own governments. Internal rebellions are prone to occur where party leaderships lose the confidence of their backbenchers (who are usually relaying extra-parliamentary discontent). And individual MPs may choose to vote against their party’s line – often for religious or ethical reasons. They may also do so because they see themselves as representatives of constituencies or interests that are offended by party policy.</p>
<p>Political parties handle such problems in different ways. Often they will seek to fudge policies so as to contain intra-party differences. Alternatively, minority factions within parties may grow to become a majority and secure a change in party policy. </p>
<p>Where parties are split down the middle, party leaderships may try to resolve difficulties by suspending party directives and allowing a free vote (as during the Brexit referendum debate). On key issues, individual MPs who threaten to vote against their parties may be bribed by promises of bounty for their constituents or by compromises made to relevant policy proposals, although ultimately the threat of expulsion from the party lies in waiting. </p>
<p>Individual MPs may also be buoyed up by the honour that accrues to them if they are perceived to be standing their ground on matters of political or moral principle. They may earn the respect of their political opponents as much as the brick-bats of their party colleagues.</p>
<h2>Challenge for the ANC</h2>
<p>The variations, inconsistencies and flexibility built into modern party systems clearly stands as a challenge to the contemporary ANC mantra that MPs are slaves to their party’s requirements. Yet the ANC position is by no means without logic. It is indisputable that under South Africa’s electoral system, as it stands, MPs are elected as party representatives and not as individuals.</p>
<p>National-list proportional representation allows for no individuality of candidates. Voters do not have individual MPs. They simply vote for a party. Under this system MPs are allowed minimal scope for conscience. </p>
<p>But, ultimately, the ANC has no answer to the popular expectation that, when pressed on major issues, MPs should vote for what they think is right. They should vote against that which they think is wrong. They must be guided by their conscience rather than their pockets. </p>
<p>Voters seem to expect that when MPs refer to each other as ‘honourable’ that they should indeed embody ‘honour’. Yet equally, the public distaste for blatant political opportunism, as displayed during the <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/soufloorcross.htm">floor-crossing episodes</a> of yesteryear when minority party MPs jumped ship, mainly to join the ANC for personal and financial reasons, it is clear that voters expect MPs to respect the outcomes of elections.</p>
<h2>Discipline yes, but courage too</h2>
<p>Seemingly there is no consistent set of principles and practices which will satisfactorily resolve the tension between party demands and individual conscience. Yet what does become clear is that there is much more scope for flexibility, tolerance of dissent, and – yes – freedom of conscience in systems where MPs are directly responsible to constituents rather than, as in South Africa, they are wholly accountable to their parties.</p>
<p>Is this why the ANC so forthrightly rejected the recommendations of the Van Zyl Slabbert <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/van-zyl-slabbert-commission-report-electoral-reform-january-2003">Commission on Electoral Reform</a>? The commission recommended a mixed electoral system, whereby MPs would be elected on party platforms but from multi-member constituencies.</p>
<p>There is no escaping the necessity of party systems to get the job of government done. Voters understand the need for party discipline. Yet as the vote of no confidence also shows, they also want MPs to have the courage to rebel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82280/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>
The motion of no confidence against South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma showcased tension at the heart of South Africa’s democracy. Should MPs have the right to vote according to their conscience?
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/82273
2017-08-09T14:12:33Z
2017-08-09T14:12:33Z
War of attrition against South Africa’s President ‘Zupta’ is in full swing
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181514/original/file-20170809-23494-13lwmyt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters march ahead of a vote of a no confidence against President Jacob Zuma. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The first big surprise was that <a href="http://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/1044">Baleka Mbete</a>, the speaker of the National Assembly, ruled in favour of the opposition parties’ request for a <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2017/08/08/this-is-not-setting-a-precedent---speaker-mbete-on-zuma-secret-ballot">secret ballot</a> in the eighth vote of no confidence against the president of South Africa.</p>
<p>Writing from memory, this is the first time that this speaker’s rulings have ever gone against Luthuli House, the headquarters of the governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a>, or the preference of the party’s chief whip, Jackson Mthembu. The significance is that a vote of no confidence is a three-line whip: where the caucus decision is binding on all MPs of a particular party. A secret ballot enables dissenting MPs to sidestep threats of party disciplinary action.</p>
<p>Her ruling will also recall memories that President Jacob Zuma dumped her to back <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/president-publicly-endorses-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-for-anc-leader">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma </a> as his preferred successor. In short Mbete apparently perceives her career, as chairperson of the ANC, has nothing more to gain from remaining beholden to Zuma.</p>
<p>This is another interesting example of how Zuma’s power is unravelling.</p>
<p>Her ruling gave rise to intense media speculation about how many MPs from the ANC would vote with their conscience, as ANC MPs Pravin Gordhan and Makhosi Khoza <a href="https://www.africanewshub.com/news/7082087-pravin-gordhan-makhosi-khoza-pull-no-punches-on-zuma">had publicly urged</a>. The Economic Freedom Fighters and others in opposition claimed that they had a list of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-21-malema-more-than-60-anc-mps-will-turn-on-zuma-if-there-is-a-secret-ballot/">60 ANC MPs</a> who would vote for the motion of no confidence. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/08/jacob-zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote-south-african-president">result</a> proved that they were kidding themselves.</p>
<p>The huge build-up in media hype made the result anti-climactic. Nonetheless, that there was only a margin of 21 to defeat the eighth no-confidence motion is unprecedented. It also shows the biggest erosion yet of Zuma’s support in the ANC caucus. At least 30 ANC MPs must have voted to remove Zuma from his presidency.</p>
<p>It’s not the parliamentary caucus, but the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/venue-anc-54th-national-conference">ANC’s elective conference</a> which will elect Zuma’s successor in four months’ time, and its composition will be subject to fierce tussling. Still, the <a href="http://caucus.anc.org.za/">caucus</a> contains a weighty cross-section of ANC players. The shift is therefore significant in terms of the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-05-19-ramaphosa-vs-dlamini-zuma-the-state-of-play-in-a-graphic/">Cyril Ramaphosa versus Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> contest to replace Zuma.</p>
<h2>The power of the party</h2>
<p>Does the vote imply that a majority of ANC MPs would vote for Dlamini-Zuma as opposed to Ramaphosa? This is not clear: many ANC MPs would agree with the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-still-wont-vote-against-zuma-anc-caucus-on-secret-ballot-ruling-20170622">caucus argument</a> – you cannot vote with the opposition for an opposition motion.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://thoughtundermined.com/2013/06/30/the-westminster-system-of-parliamentary-government/">Westminster-style democracies</a> a no-confidence debate is an annual fixture in the parliamentary calendar. But for a united front of opposition parties and civil society associations like Corruption Watch to organise mass <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/jonas-march-is-about-civil-society-holding-politicians-accountable-10681095">marches and demonstrations</a> outside parliament and across the country is certainly not routine. The smaller religious groups and pro-Zuma factions of the ANC who organised demonstrations <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-08-08-live-sa-braces-for-noconfidence-marches-and-vote/">against the no-confidence motion</a> show mobilisation of their groupings as well.</p>
<p>South Africa is a Westminster-derived democracy, so this situation brings precedents to mind. While votes of no confidence have not directly removed any British Prime Minister from office, one such narrow vote did lead to Tory caucus leaders telling <a href="http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/reference/the-british-parliamentary-system-in-the-age-of-churchill">Neville Chamberlain to step down</a> in 1940 before he was voted out. Similarly, it was Tory leaders withdrawing their support from Margaret Thatcher which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/22/newsid_2549000/2549189.stm">compelled her to resign</a> in 1990.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the national leadership structure of major political parties such as the ANC and main opposition Democratic Alliance dominate and control their parliamentary caucuses more than in the UK or other Commonwealth countries. Their national conferences also have greater significance.</p>
<p>In view of the media coverage, it is important to emphasise that the <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-are-the-guptas-2080935">Gupta family conglomerate</a>, which is at the heart of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture allegations</a>, is merely the wealthiest example of networks of <a href="http://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">“tenderpreneurs”</a> – businessmen who enrich themselves through government tenders, often dubiously. They are found across national government, the provinces and municipalities. There are many others and the work of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Gupta-leaks">investigative journalists</a> will no doubt uncover them. </p>
<p>But the Gupta web of influence is certainly the one that’s received the greatest attention. Malema’s coining of the name <a href="http://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/watch-live-malema-declares-war-on-the-gupta-family-20160204">“Zupta”</a> aptly and pithily captures the fusion of the Zuma and Gupta families, the <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/24/to-what-extent-can-neopatrimonialism-be-considered-significant-in-contemporary-african-politics/">neo-patrimonialism</a> which sucks out public funds for private enrichment.</p>
<h2>Crumbling empire</h2>
<p>This eighth vote of no confidence shows that civil society has organised a war of attrition against both Zuma and his system of subverting the procurement mechanisms in the public sector. This push back against corruption to defend the institutions of state will continue until Zuma is no longer in office. It is pivotal. The Auditor General has already <a href="http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Economy/there-must-be-bite-at-the-end-of-an-audit-ag-20170614-2">expressed concern</a> that there haven’t been any consequences to his reporting on fraud and corruption in public sector accounts.</p>
<p>The good news is that the Gupta empire <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-07/backlash-over-south-africa-graft-claims-threatens-gupta-empire">seems to be crumbling</a>. For one thing they can no longer laugh all the way to the bank – in an unprecedented move in the country <a href="http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2017/07/27/bank-of-baroda-gupta-outa/">all the banks</a> have, one by one, dropped this particular lucrative corporate client.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this analysis in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
The huge hype ahead of the vote of no confidence in President Zuma made the result anti-climactic. However, the fact that the motion was defeated by only a 21 vote margin is unprecedented.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/81112
2017-07-27T03:03:36Z
2017-07-27T03:03:36Z
Political irrationality is ruining South Africa, but can still be stopped
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179020/original/file-20170720-23992-83iazg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma was slammed as being irrational for the recent cabinet reshuffle.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In popular conceptions of what it means to be human is the universal notion that our species - <em>homo sapiens</em> - is essentially rational. It’s commonly believed that as rational beings, our thoughts and actions are informed by reason and logic that precludes the influence of emotions. On the other hand, irrationality is associated with defective reasoning, perverse thinking, being excessively emotional, or at worst, crazy.</p>
<p>Democracy, and by extension good governance, presupposes the capacity of political leadership to engage in reasoned debate, informed decision making and measured judgements. In the South African context, it’s assumed that this will all happen within the framework of the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">Constitution</a>.</p>
<p>In this way democratic governance is premised on rationality. It appears to be unthinkable without it. But is this true?</p>
<p>No. And certainly not in South Africa now. Irrationality is the term frequently used to describe the country’s political landscape. This is clear from the coverage of the embattled government of President Jacob Zuma, and its leadership. </p>
<p>The growing anxiety and uncertainty in the country is aptly articulated by the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-04-02-power-and-principle-has-zuma-checked-reason-and-rationality-at-the-door/">news headline</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Has Zuma checked reason and rationality at the door? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the unfolding drama of the far-reaching political scandal that threatens South Africa’s nascent democracy, known as “<a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/anc-calls-on-government-to-probe-gupta-email-allegations">Guptagate</a>”, political leadership has been repeatedly called out for its irrational behaviour. In response to Zuma’s most <a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550">recent cabinet reshuffle</a> where he replaced finance minister Pravin Gordhan, Bonang Mohale, deputy chairperson of Business Leadership South Africa, <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/251139/zuma-responsible-for-turmoil-recklessness-and-irrationality-blsa">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have the President [Zuma] to thank for all this turmoil, irrationality and absolute recklessness… </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For its part, the opposition Democratic Alliance went to court to have the president’s decision set aside on the grounds that it was <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/02/zuma-granted-leave-to-appeal-ruling-to-hand-over-cabinet-reshuffle-records">irrational and unconstitutional</a>. </p>
<p>More recently the South African Reserve Bank, known for its conservative stance, openly accused the Public Protector of being reckless and irrational in her attempts to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-27-reserve-bank-challenges-public-protector-report-in-court/">amend the Constitution</a>. Her recommendations in a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-06-hands-off-sarb-public-protector-meddling-a-great-threat-to-an-economy-crippled-by-serious-problems/">report</a> on a bank bailout, has been widely viewed as beyond the mandate of her office and a threat to the stability of the economy.</p>
<p>The use of the word “irrational” in South Africa’s political debates begs interrogation. Increasing accounts of political irrationality naturally raise concerns about the effectiveness of democratic governance – and its legitimacy.</p>
<h2>Dispelling the ‘myth’ of rationality</h2>
<p>Irrationality as a ubiquitous descriptor of political machinations is not peculiar to South Africa. It is well documented across climes and cultures. US President Donald Trump immediately comes to mind. As a world leader he has elicited both censure and derision as grossly irresponsible and fundamentally <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-donald-trump-hate-media-immigrants-20170501-story.html">irrational</a>.</p>
<p>The fact is humans are not rational by default. The <a href="http://danariely.com/2009/04/20/irrationality-is-the-real-invisible-hand/">“invisible hand”</a> that drives human behaviour is in fact, irrationality. Nobel laureate, psychologist <a href="http://bigthink.com/videos/daniel-kahneman-on-controling-irrational-tendencies">Daniel Kahneman</a> together with Amos Tversky and others have pioneered research in this field. </p>
<p>Wired by evolution, cognitive limits restrict how we select, compute, store and adapt to information. Research shows that we employ a range of heuristics (mental shortcuts) that lead to cognitive biases and distorted perceptions. Most of these we’re not even aware of. As behavioural economist <a href="https://www.amazon.de/Predictably-Irrational-Hidden-Forces-Decisions-ebook/dp/B002RI9QJE">Dan Ariely</a>, author of “Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions” asserts:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our irrational behaviours are neither random nor senseless – they are systematic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For example, humans have the tendency to select information (selection bias) that confirms preexisting beliefs (confirmation bias) while avoiding contradictory information that disturbs their preferred worldview. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/confirmation-bias-a-psychological-phenomenon-that-helps-explain-why-pundits-got-it-wrong-68781">well-researched bias</a> is at work when politicians choose to present skewed, biased evidence that makes them look credible with the public to achieve desired outcomes.</p>
<p>There’s also a self-interested bias where people are prone to distorted thinking because it benefits them in some way. <a href="http://rintintin.colorado.edu/%7Evancecd/phil3600/Huemer1.pdf">Rational irrationality</a> explains how:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(people) choose - rationally - to adopt irrational beliefs because the costs of rational beliefs exceed their benefit. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This goes some way in explaining the reckless actions of politicians like Zuma and Trump who devise irresponsible strategies in the interests of their “rational” endgame.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cep.ucsb.edu/McDermott/papers/rationality2004.pdf">Neuroscience</a> shows that when it comes to decision making, humans are wired to favour emotions over intellect. This means emotions have an impact on our decisions in various ways. For example, in the face of deep uncertainty – a persistent feature of our age – unconscious emotions and perceptions render us prone to cognitive biases and errors.</p>
<p>This refutes the ideal of the stoic “rational man”, a description that persistently devalues women and castes them as the “weaker” sex. This stereotype – of women as emotionally volatile and incapable of rational thought – has served to exclude them from the corridors of power. </p>
<h2>Political irrationality has dire consequences</h2>
<p>Because irrationality is inherently human, it’s been a persistent part of politics throughout history. There’s substantial evidence that entrenched and unchecked irrationality has devastating consequences. This has happened when political leaders eschew reason and logic. In South Africa’s case this is clear from the country’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/south-africa-credit-rating-junk-status-sends-rand-tumbling">crippled economy</a> and rising <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-23-op-ed-the-descent-of-jacob-zuma-in-31-steps-and-counting/">discontent</a>. </p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean that irrationality has to prevail. South African civil society and democratic institutions have come to the party. They are increasingly challenging the irrational, unconstitutional actions of the ANC-led government and its leadership. What’s patently evident is that a free, independent press, the rule of law as enshrined in the Constitution and an independent judiciary are the bulwarks of a democracy under assault.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81112/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lyn Snodgrass does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Democracy and good governance require politicians to engage in reasoned debate, informed decision making and measured judgements. This presupposes rationality. Is this always true?
Lyn Snodgrass, Associate Professor and Head of Department of Political and Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/80009
2017-06-25T10:01:03Z
2017-06-25T10:01:03Z
South Africa’s Jacob Zuma is fast running out of political lives
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175366/original/file-20170623-22683-1d6klld.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Jacob Zuma isn't blinking despite suffering another resounding loss in the Constitutional Court. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like the proverbial cat with nine lives, South Africa’s scandal-ridden president, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma</a>, may well have escaped yet again with his political life. This despite another resounding loss in the country’s highest court. </p>
<p>The Constitutional Court <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-22-read-in-full-concourt-ruling-on-secret-ballot/">ruled</a> that there was no constitutional bar to the Speaker of the National Assembly, <a href="http://www.news24.com/Tags/People/baleka_mbete">Baleka Mbete</a>, opting to employ a secret ballot in a no confidence vote in parliament. She’d originally asserted that she didn’t have the authority to make this decision, prompting several opposition parties – furious at Zuma’s increasingly dictatorial project of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/State-Capture">“state capture”</a> – to take the matter to court. </p>
<p>South Africa’s judicial system continues to hold firm. This is despite the fact that there appears to be a concerted and well coordinated campaign by a group of politicians and businessmen to undermine the integrity of state institutions as well as to exploit their weaknesses to prosecute a project of self-enrichment and rent-seeking. The campaign is pivoted around the now notorious <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-family">Gupta family</a>.</p>
<p>Zuma has been brought to book repeatedly by the courts. In March last year, the Constitutional Court <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/constitutional-courts-damning-judgment-zuma-violated-his-oath-of-office-20160331">found</a> that Zuma, as well as parliament, had violated the Constitution. They did so by failing to defend and uphold the constitutional authority of South Africa’s ombud – it’s Public Protector – who had conducted an investigation into the president’s private homestead, <a href="https://mg.co.za/report/zumaville-a-special-report">Nkandla</a>. She found that Zuma and his family had unlawfully benefited. He was required to pay back nearly R8 million to the state. Yet, following a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/04/01/Full-text-of-President-Zumas-speech-on-Concourt-Nkandla-judgment">half-baked apology</a>, Zuma held onto power. </p>
<p>In parliament he’s survived a number of no confidence votes <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/mps-reject-motion-no-confidence-against-president">mounted</a> by the opposition. He also dodged two such attempts in the national executive committee of his own party, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) – <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/27/anxious-wait-for-outcomes-of-hanekom-s-motion-against-zuma">one</a> in November last year and most recently <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1526627/netshitenzhe-tables-motion-of-no-confidence-in-zuma-at-nec-meeting/">in late May</a>. He’s been backed by an increasingly slender yet sufficient number of loyalists and nationalists for whom Zuma provides political cover for their populist and self-serving call for “radical economic transformation”. </p>
<h2>Tipping point</h2>
<p>The tipping point for the latest legal skirmish was Zuma’s reckless and apparently self-interested decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525?sr=16">fire</a> South Africa’s widely respected minister of finance, Pravin Gordhan, on 30 March this year. </p>
<p>Despite a cold war with Zuma, Gordhan had <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-cant-save-itself-just-by-talking-the-talk-it-must-walk-the-walk-73863?sr=7">held the line</a> against “state capture” for 15 months after his reappointment in December 2015. And so as night follows day, Gordhan’s removal precipitated an immediate ratings’ agency downgrade. The downgrade added further pressure to an already weak economy, undermining any prospects of economic growth to address the high levels of unemployment and inequality that threaten its precarious social stability. </p>
<p>Once again, in response to Zuma’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550?sr=21">ill-considered cabinet reshuffle</a>, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, tabled a motion of no confidence in the national assembly. There has been an apparent shift in attitude in the ANC’s parliamentary caucus suggesting that the no confidence vote might have a chance of succeeding. Many ANC MPs are now anxious about the party’s prospects at the 2019 national election and their own political future. </p>
<p>But there’s also concern over Zuma’s apparent hold over many backbench MPs. Many of them fear retribution and expulsion should they vote against the president. If an MP ceases to be a member of the party on whose list they stood at election time, they automatically lose their seat in parliament.</p>
<p>Because of this one of the smaller opposition parties, the United Democratic Movement, requested the speaker to use a secret ballot to enable MPs to vote with their conscience. Mbete, who is also the national chairperson of the ANC, refused. She claimed that she did not have the power to make the decision.</p>
<p>The Constitution is unclear. It provides for the president and the cabinet to be removed by the national assembly by a bare majority following “a vote”. In the secret ballot case, the court could have interpreted “a vote” to mean “a secret vote”. Equally, however, the failure of the Constitution to specify a secret ballot in the case of a no confidence vote could mean an open ballot was intended. </p>
<p>So on June 22, the Constitutional Court took neither route. It held that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Constitution could have provided for a vote by secret ballot or open ballot. It did neither.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rather it held that, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the national assembly has … in effect empowered the Speaker to decide how a particular motion of no confidence in the President is to be conducted. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Accordingly, the Court set aside the Speaker’s decision that she lacked constitutional power to order a secret ballot. Notably, Zuma had entered the proceedings to argue, like the Speaker, that there was no power to order a secret ballot and no need to do so. </p>
<p>The court pointedly observed that Mbete has “an enormous responsibility” to ensure that when she decides whether on a “situation specific” case-by-case basis a secret ballot should be employed. She should do so on a “rational and proper basis”, with due and careful regard to a purpose of the no confidence vote. Importantly, the court noted that the primary duty of MPs is to the Constitution and not to their parties. </p>
<p>The implication is that the ability of MPs to vote with their conscience in such a situation is clearly a factor that the speaker should take into account when making her decision. Some critics will regard the court’s “guidance” as insufficiently precise. But the court was clearly anxious not to encroach on separation of powers – perhaps mindful of the virulent claims from some quarters of “judicial over-reach”.</p>
<p>Mbete will have to choose between her loyalty to her president as one of the ANC’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/anc-top-six">“top six”</a> leadership and her duty to the Constitution as speaker. </p>
<h2>Zuma unperturbed</h2>
<p>Later on the same day of the judgment Zuma was <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/22/watch-zuma-answers-questions-on-state-capture">answering questions</a> in parliament. Judging by his typically thick-skinned signs of confidence, the president is not unduly perturbed by the court’s ruling. </p>
<p>While the court stated the power to decide on whether to hold a secret ballot or not should “not be exercised arbitrarily or whimsically”, Zuma has already made it clear that he expects Mbete to decide that a secret ballot is inappropriate or unnecessary. </p>
<p>Parliament returns after its current mid-year winter recess in August. If Mbete once again declines to hold a secret ballot, her decision will, in turn, then be subject to judicial review application. In due course the court could be forced to order her to hold a secret ballot. </p>
<p>So despite the Constitutional Court judgment, and the lucidity of it’s reasoning, a no confidence vote held with a secret ballot is still some way off. Until then, Zuma lives to fight another day. </p>
<p>But with every day passing, December’s ANC national elective conference gets closer. Then Zuma’s term as president of the ANC expires. Then his power will decline potentially decisively. </p>
<p>One way or another, Zuma is running out of political lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80009/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a member of the advisory council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) and a Director and Founding Partner of The Paternoster Group: African Political Insight. He also serves on the Board of the Open Democracy Advice Centre. </span></em></p>
President Jacob Zuma has been brought to book repeatedly by South Africa’s courts. He also faces a rising tide of discontent. One way or another, he seems to be running out of political lives.
Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.