tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/rosatom-27828/articlesRosatom – The Conversation2022-03-06T08:24:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1782502022-03-06T08:24:09Z2022-03-06T08:24:09ZRussia’s nuclear power exports: will they stand the strain of the war in Ukraine?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450001/original/file-20220304-23-1ekuk9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russias Novovoronezh plant in central Russia which is a sister project to Turkey's first nuclear power plant, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine has led to massive sanctions and resulted in heavy blows to its economy. It has also led to unprecedented condemnation of Russia’s leadership, as well as growing international isolation.</p>
<p>Regardless of the military outcome of the invasion, its aftermath will severely shake Russian diplomatic, trade and business initiatives with potential global partners. This includes the nuclear energy export sector, which is the preserve of the <a href="https://www.rosatom.ru/en/">Rosatom</a> state energy corporation.</p>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/reactors.html#tab=provider;construction=2011,2021">57 nuclear reactor constructions initiated between 2011 and 2022</a>, 13 involved Rosatom. Unlike China, the country most active in nuclear plant construction, ten of these were outside Russia’s borders, making it the world’s largest exporter in terms of nuclear plant development.</p>
<p>Interest in nuclear power plant construction <a href="https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Highest-Number-of-Reactor-Closures-in-a-Decade.html">slumped in the wake of Fukushima incident</a> in 2011. The intervening years have also seen <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/dec/01/renewable-energy-has-another-record-year-of-growth-says-iea">fast growth in the solar and wind sectors</a>.</p>
<p>But there’s still a pool of nations that has shown keen interest in nuclear energy, such as <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2025916/business-economy">Saudi Arabia</a> or, in Africa, <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202110250271.html">Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>Rosatom has been <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-29-african-countries-rush-to-sign-nuclear-deals-with-russia/">extraordinarily active</a> trying to corner this shrinking market. Only last year <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/zimbabwe-signs-mou-with-russia-s-rosatom-to-tap-nuclear-energy">Zimbabwe signed an agreement with the company</a> where these commit to a vague form of nuclear energy cooperation.</p>
<p>Nations seeking to set up a nuclear plant invariably face major deterrents. These include very high and sometimes unpredictable building cost, and long construction times. New plants typically only start producing electricity 10 or more years after a project is initiated. </p>
<p>For most countries that means seeking long term loans of the order of $US 10 billion or more that later have to be repaid with interest.</p>
<p>The complexity of the technology and supply of processed nuclear fuel also effectively ties the client country into a dependence relationship with the country developing and servicing the nuclear plant. This can mean agreements typically stretch over 40 years. Such a partnership can only function if both countries enjoy long term stability.</p>
<p>As the invasion of Ukraine is destabilising Russia economically and increasingly leads it to international pariah status, any potential nuclear power partnerships have now become at best severely stressed, and at worst doomed to collapse.</p>
<h2>Russia’s nuclear energy vending strategy</h2>
<p>In the deals Rosatom has struck in the last ten years it has adopted a highly aggressive <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/russia-is-creating-a-global-nuclear-power-empire/">commercial expansion strategy</a>. </p>
<p>It starts with Russia, usually through its agency Rosatom, signing nuclear energy cooperation memoranda with a country that has shown interest in nuclear power. These then lobby for the agreements to be broadened into statements of intent to jointly build new nuclear plants.</p>
<p>Rosatom has a lot in the pipeline. It had already started building – or was expected to start construction soon – on <a href="https://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects/">plants</a> in China, India, Bangladesh, Turkey, Hungary, Belarus, Finland and Egypt. In Africa, Russia <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-29-african-countries-rush-to-sign-nuclear-deals-with-russia/">has cooperation agreements</a> aspiring to eventually lead to nuclear build commitments with about twenty countries.</p>
<p>Russia has introduced attractive <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/business/russia-offers-soft-loan-to-fund-nuclear-20160429">low interest loans</a> for clients that are unable to afford the construction cost of a new nuclear plant. These loans typically require annual repayments that only start once a plant is operational, and continue for another 20 years or so years. And they are <a href="https://eu.boell.org/en/2021/04/26/russian-nuclear-power-whole-world-except-russia">heavily subsidised by the Russian state</a>.</p>
<p>Egypt’s El Dabaa project is a good <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclear-idUSKCN0YA1G5">example of how the loans are structured</a>. The loan is for US$ 25 billion, which is in theory projected to cover 85% of the building costs. The annual interest is 3%, with repayment kicking in in 2029 and continuing for 22 years thereafter.</p>
<h2>What if things go wrong</h2>
<p>Since the start of the attack on Ukraine, Russia has faced unprecedented international condemnation, sanctions and targeted blows to its economy.</p>
<p>An immediate consequence has been the suspension and possible termination of <a href="https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Fennovoima-Ukraine-events-put-Hanhikivi-at-major-r">Rosatom’s Hanhikivi project in Finland</a>. In Hungary, another European Union member, Rosatom’s Paks II nuclear plant <a href="https://hungarytoday.hu/debate-unfolds-over-hungarys-russia-financed-nuclear-power-plant-expansion/">is clearly in jeopardy</a>.</p>
<p>Other international projects will also come under increasing scrutiny. </p>
<p>The biggest threat to the Russian international nuclear power initiative will be to the financing of projects. An already weakened Russian economy hit by foreign sanctions and war costs is not going to be able to afford to offer the massive loans on which all its foreign nuclear projects depend. </p>
<p>In addition, a large part of the financing often comes from private companies. But they will now be deterred from investing in financially risky projects linked to Russia as they would then become themselves exposed to potential sanctioning and reputational damage.</p>
<p>Russian-driven nuclear developments are now also at a much greater risk of construction delays and cost escalations due to complications in material supplies procurement and financial transaction difficulties. The already <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nuclear-power-for-african-countries-doesnt-make-sense-96031">significant long-term economic dangers</a> associated with mega-scale nuclear developments will now be multiplied, and shy away potential clients.</p>
<p>There is also a political dimension to the zeal with which Russia has been relentlessly driving its global nuclear power initiative. A country receiving a loan and reliant on Russia for keeping its electricity supply going now becomes very dependent, and has to maintain the goodwill of the Russian government. This can compromise a country’s independence.</p>
<p>Nigeria has just announced that it is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/03/fg-opens-bids-for-nuclear-power/">seeking to build nuclear facilities</a>. Under previous circumstances, Russia would have been a front runner in the award of this contract. Given the geopolitical situation and associated financing challenges, it now however becomes almost impossible to envisage a situation where Rosatom could pull off this project.</p>
<p>Similar situations will likely arise even in some cases where construction is already under way. For example, Egypt’s El Dabaa build also <a href="http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=88454">relies on other partners</a> that favour isolating Russia.</p>
<p>The era of Russian foreign nuclear builds is therefore soon likely to be over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178250/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler has received funding from the South African National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Russia is a big player in the global nuclear power construction business. Why this era could soon be over.Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/960312018-05-15T13:23:19Z2018-05-15T13:23:19ZWhy nuclear power for African countries doesn’t make sense<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218822/original/file-20180514-100722-17f3iar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Russian President Vladimir Putin. Egypt seems likely to be the next African country with nuclear energy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the last few years <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-10-00-africa-buys-into-nuclear-dream">reports</a> have surfaced of a range of African countries planning nuclear power plants. </p>
<p>At the moment, the only nuclear plant in operation in Africa is South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-decommissioning-south-africas-koeberg-nuclear-plant-wont-be-easy-89888">Koeberg</a>, producing 1.86GW of power. This, according to some African leaders, is about to change. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni recently made the astonishing statement that his country is planning <a href="http://observer.ug/business/57393-uganda-nuclear-project-ambition-gets-another-boost.html">30GW of nuclear power by 2026</a>. That equates to 16 times the current total of nuclear energy on the entire African continent.</p>
<p>Uganda’s is only one of a number of countries <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenya-plans-to-set-up-nuclear-plant-by-2027/2560-4215876-14gd00jz/index.html">interested in nuclear power</a>. Russia’s nuclear agency <a href="https://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-highlights-its-solutions-for-africa/">Rosatom</a> has boasted that it’s concluded nuclear power memoranda of understanding with <a href="http://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects/">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/12/06/kenya-to-set-up-nuclear-power-plant-in-2024_c1680470">Kenya</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41818933">Nigeria</a>, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/2017-12-22-russia-signs-agreement-with-sudan-for-nuclear-power-plant/">Sudan</a> and <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201612080045.html">Zambia</a>. <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/uganda-signs-deal-atomic-energy/">Uganda</a> is also on the list.</p>
<p>Most African countries suffer from <a href="https://techcentral.co.za/inside-africas-electricity-crisis/64637/">severe</a> electricity shortages. The majority need to double their generating capacity to meet current needs. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.iea.org/statistics/">International Energy Agency figures</a>, Kenya, Sudan and Zambia are primarily dependent on hydroelectric power. A 2.4GW nuclear plant would double their electricity production. Nigeria’s dominant energy source is gas, and here it would take a 4.8GW nuclear plant to double its capacity.</p>
<p>Of the countries with Rosatom agreements, only Egypt has any concrete plans in place. A site for a 4.8GW nuclear plant has been identified at <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/egypt-dabaa-unit-1-complete-2026/">El Dabaa</a>, on the Mediterranean Sea, and building is understood to be imminent. In the other countries, the location and scale of the projects have yet to be determined.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.dw.com/en/belgium-aims-to-phase-out-nuclear-power-by-2025/a-15500989">Elsewhere in the world</a> countries like Germany, Belgium and the US are downscaling their nuclear plans or exiting it altogether. The reasons include perceptions of increased risk following the <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-the-legacy-of-the-fukushima-nuclear-disaster">Fukushima disaster</a> in Japan as well as economic factors. </p>
<p>The cost of electricity generation from solar photovoltaic and wind technologies has come down dramatically. It already costs less than power produced by nuclear plants and renewable energy is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-02-south-africas-electricity-choice-part-2-renewable-energy-is-a-win-win/#.WvM40sEUlPY">set to become even cheaper</a>.</p>
<p>Given that South Africa has shelved its nuclear plans on <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Budget/Budget-and-Economy/gigaba-says-no-to-nuclear-20171029-3">affordability grounds</a>, surely less resourced African countries would find investments like this even more difficult? </p>
<h2>The loan agreements</h2>
<p>Nuclear power agreements are notoriously shrouded in <a href="http://safcei.org/secrecy-around-nuclear-and-uranium/">secrecy</a>. But it’s possible to get a sense of Rosatom’s plans for African nuclear contracts by examining recent examples where details of mutual commitments have become public.</p>
<p>A deal struck with Bangladesh provides a useful benchmark against which to understand other deals that have been done with Russia. In the case of the 2.4GW Rooppur nuclear plant, Rosatom is providing most of a <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/country/rooppur-nuke-plant-1265b-deal-inked-russia-192556">US$ 12.65 billion loan</a>. This only covers the estimated construction costs. Interest accrual, possible cost overruns, operations and decommissioning are likely to amount to <a href="http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/RUPPUR-NUCLEAR-POWER-PLANT-BANGLADESH-S-POTENTIAL">more than double</a> of this initial outlay. That makes a total cost of roughly US$ 30 billion likely.</p>
<p>Egypt’s earlier mentioned El Dabaa project has a similar funding arrangement. Here Rosatom has given a loan of <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/38587/EXCLUSIVE-Details-of-4-Dabaa-Nuclear-Power-Plants-contracts">US$ 25 billion</a>, which again is projected to only cover construction.</p>
<p>For both Rooppur and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclear/russia-to-lend-egypt-25-billion-to-build-nuclear-power-plant-idUSKCN0YA1G5">El Dabaa</a>, the annual interest for their loan is around 3%. In addition, the loan is structured in a way that ensures repayments only start 10-13 years after the loan is made, to continue in annual instalments for 22-28 years thereafter. </p>
<p>The country receiving the nuclear plant initially pays very little, but when the repayments kick in, the country’s fiscus and electricity consumers are suddenly faced with a massive burden that most African economies will never be able to meet. By then the 3% annual interest could have increased the amount owed by as much as 40%.</p>
<p>The nuclear industry also has a history of <a href="https://theecologist.org/2014/sep/19/three-every-four-nuclear-power-builds-worldwide-are-running-late">cost overruns and construction delays</a>. A country may therefore face a situation where it needs to service a higher-than-expected debt while being unable to recoup funds from electricity sales.</p>
<p>What is equally concerning is that the debt then places Russia in a position where it is able to exert <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-19-south-africas-electricity-choice-part-4-the-dangers-of-dealing-with-russia/#.WvWCnO-FPcs">disproportionate influence</a> over a country’s affairs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2018/03/01/zambia-develop-nuclear-power-plant-generate-electricity-luo/">Zambia</a> is eyeing a nuclear plant on the scale of Bangladesh’s Rooppur. The plant is expected to cost US$ 30 billion. Given Zambia’s total <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/29/finance-minister-felix-mutati-unveils-k71-6-billion-budget-2018/">annual budget</a> is US$ 7.2 billion this is clearly unaffordable. If one were to scale the Rooppur cost from 2.4GW to the 30GW nuclear power plants proposed by Museveni, the figure would be 15 times Uganda’s annual <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda">GDP of US$ 24 billion</a>. </p>
<h2>Cheaper options</h2>
<p>Are there cheaper alternatives to nuclear power to alleviate energy shortages in Africa? </p>
<p>A great deal of hope was placed on the 40GW <a href="https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/grand-inga-hydroelectric-project-an-overview-3356">Grand Inga</a> hydroelectric scheme on the Congo river. But the project isn’t going to come to fruition soon due to <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKBN19P0U5-OZABS">funding challenges</a>.</p>
<p>The most promising solution seems to be through multiple <a href="http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/05/23/small-scale-renewables-cheapest-rural-africa-says-dutch-report/">small-scale power production initiatives</a>, typically in bio-energy, solar heaters and photovoltaic modules. These provide cheaper electricity than nuclear and are in addition good <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-29-00-renewable-energy-sector-turns-into-employer-of-note">job creators</a>. With its extensive agricultural sector, all of Africa has great <a href="http://cleanleap.com/recovering-energy-waste-can-power-africa">bio-waste energy</a> potential.</p>
<p>Kenya has shown that there are excellent <a href="http://www.thinkgeoenergy.com/geothermal-energy-becoming-predominant-source-of-electricity-in-kenya/">geothermal energy</a> extraction possibilities along the Rift Valley.</p>
<p>Many countries, including Egypt and Kenya, enjoy ample sunshine, making them <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-solar-potential/solar-powered-africa-never-more-possible-and-less-expensive-energy-chief-idUSKBN15Z0VV">ideal for solar power</a> generation. With the right incentives, these could drive an African energy generation boom.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler receives funding from the NRF. He is a member of Save South Africa and OUTA, but writes in his personal capacity. </span></em></p>Are there cheaper alternatives to nuclear power to alleviate energy shortages in Africa?Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893132017-12-19T12:33:18Z2017-12-19T12:33:18ZWhy Kenya’s push for nuclear power rests on false or fanciful premises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199880/original/file-20171219-27607-6xp5go.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">High voltage electrical pylons on the outskirts of Kenya's capital Nairobi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya wants to go nuclear. Since 2012, Nairobi has been talking the talk and walking the walk. It has engaged the International Atomic Energy Agency and signed multilateral letters of intent in pursuit of nuclear power. </p>
<p>To date, Kenya reportedly has memoranda of understanding with <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Four-countries-sign-on-Kenya-s-nuclear-energy-plans/539546-3850138-jhb47lz/index.html">Russia, China, South Korea and Slovakia</a> which involve the building of four nuclear power plants with a total output of 4,000 MW. France is apparently also eyeing the potentially lucrative deals which would <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000229172/demand-setback-now-puts-kenya-s-mega-power-plan-on-the-back-burner">nearly double</a> Kenya’s current electricity capacity. </p>
<p>Kenya’s Nuclear Electricity Board <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/news/iaea-approves-kenya-nuclear-power-application/">secured the global atomic energy agency’s approval</a> in 2016. It hopes to have the first plant online anywhere from <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Four-countries-sign-on-Kenya-s-nuclear-energy-plans/539546-3850138-jhb47lz/index.html">2022</a> to 2027, leading a new African push for nuclear power. The only country currently generating nuclear is South Africa.</p>
<p>Other African countries have signed agreements with foreign firms. These include Nigeria’s <a href="http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/energy/going-nuclear-africas-energy-future/">plans</a> to build plants with Rosatom, the Russian firm. South Africa is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-presidents-last-ditch-effort-to-ram-through-a-nuclear-power-deal-87018">also pursuing a deal</a> for new nuclear power plants with the company as is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/663f5dd6-af72-36b7-a002-c27ab5b13a66">Egypt</a>. </p>
<p>In January, the international nuclear agency <a href="http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/energy/going-nuclear-africas-energy-future/">concluded</a> that Ghana had made “considerable progress in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure.” Uganda is also <a href="http://ugbusiness.com/4217/russia-likely-to-win-bid-for-ugandas-nuclear-energy-plans">reportedly</a> pursuing nuclear energy.</p>
<p>The cost of the Kenya plant is estimated at <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Four-countries-sign-on-Kenya-s-nuclear-energy-plans/539546-3850138-jhb47lz/index.html">Sh500 billion</a>. This is costly and, given the current energy consumption patterns in Kenya, would be a massive waste of money.</p>
<p>Kenya’s industrial and consumer demand, economic growth, relative poverty as well as the current grid and distribution network simply do not support this magnitude of power generation at such exorbitant costs. </p>
<h2>Myths about Kenya’s power situation</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/powering-africa">popular narrative</a>, Kenya suffers from the twin evils of electricity that is overly expensive and in short supply. Yet there is <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000229172/demand-setback-now-puts-kenya-s-mega-power-plan-on-the-back-burner">strong evidence</a> that Kenya’s power is relatively cheap and that successive governments have exaggerated both it’s economic growth trajectory and its need for a massive increase in power generation. </p>
<p>For example, Kenya has an installed capacity of just over <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000229172/demand-setback-now-puts-kenya-s-mega-power-plan-on-the-back-burner">2,400MW, against a peak demand of just over 1,600MW</a>. This is 800MW above peak hours demand.</p>
<p>While economies are required to have surplus power capacity, excess capacity can lead to higher power bills as consumers are often charged for idle power plants.</p>
<p>Thus the government, while promising ever cheaper power to consumers may actually be undercutting this promise in its pursuit of nuclear power plants and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312529345_Pipelines_Diplomacy_and_Power_An_Analysis_of_East_Africa%27s_Oil">other costly projects</a> that fail to reflect both industrial and private consumer demand.</p>
<h2>Note of caution</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="http://www.lahmeyer.de/en/item/article/masterplan-for-power-generation-and-transmission-in-kenya-lahmeyer-advises-the-government.html">study</a> by a German engineering consultancy further confirmed how exaggerated government figures about demand have been. It noted that Kenya’s maximum power demand would </p>
<blockquote>
<p>grow 72% to 2,259MW by 2020 from the current 1,620MW, when projects such as the standard gauge railway start operating fully. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Government <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">estimates</a>, on the other hand, project peak demand will jump threefold to 4,755 megawatts in the three-year period. This is twice as much as the consultant’s estimates. </p>
<p>On top of this, Kenya’s problem isn’t that it needs more energy. Rather it needs to address distribution issues. </p>
<p>Any project involving the generation of more power needs to pay equal attention to Kenya’s grid and distribution system which currently can’t <a href="https://qz.com/702604/it-wasnt-just-a-monkey-that-brought-down-kenyas-entire-electricity-grid/">handle additional power</a>. This includes corresponding efforts at regular, systematic maintenance work. Without these, any extra power generated from renewable and other energy sources will remain costly and wasted.</p>
<p>Yet another note of caution is in order. Demand from Kenya’s domestic consumers remains low even though a <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">total of 5.8 million customers</a> now have connections to power – a <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">five-fold increase</a> in the past seven years.</p>
<p>Why is this the case?</p>
<p>Neither a lack of connectivity nor an unreliable supply is to blame for the low consumption of electricity by the vast majority of Kenyan consumers. Nor is it because of reportedly <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">relatively high electricity tariffs</a>. </p>
<p>Rather, it is simply because the majority of Kenyans still have low income levels. Many Kenyans simply <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235272851530035X">cannot afford</a> the luxury of modern appliances for cooking, heating or refrigerating. </p>
<p>This simple fact has neither been figured into government prognostications nor donor-driven last-mile connectivity scenarios. </p>
<h2>Grappling with reality</h2>
<p>Over two years ago, after Kenya signed an MOU with China to explore building a nuclear power plant, <a href="http://www.kenyaengineer.co.ke/2016-05-27-10-44-22/political-engineering/item/2093-why-kenya-should-avoid-the-nuclear-option">I argued</a> that sober analysis was required prior to walking further down that path. The situation remains the same today. </p>
<p>This is not a question of whether or not Kenya would be a responsible nuclear power producer. Indeed, all indications are that national nuclear electricity board (KNEB) and other relevant government agencies have acted scrupulously and responsibly. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, both the board as well as the international nuclear agency, the IAEA, should honestly conclude – and then publicly announce – that Kenya does not have a need for nuclear power. </p>
<p>Adding extremely expensive nuclear power to Kenya’s energy mix along with power from <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-the-new-government-should-do-to-help-kenya-meet-its-energy-needs-85436">other inadvisable projects</a> such as the Lamu coal power plant is arguably inexcusable as well as profligate. Lamu is expected to produce 5,000MW of power within a period of three years. </p>
<p>As such, Kenya needs to work overtime to set a power generation agenda that identifies real versus perceived needs. The country’s electricity agenda must not be driven by estimated consumption figures that fail to correspond to the true energy needs. <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">In the words of</a> a former Kenyan energy official, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It does not take much effort to notice the gap between what is on paper and the economic reality.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s government, while promising cheaper power to consumers may actually be undercutting this promise in its pursuit of nuclear power plants and other costly projects.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877752017-11-23T14:22:25Z2017-11-23T14:22:25ZGroundswell against nuclear in South Africa could put paid to a power deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196103/original/file-20171123-18021-1yzyemz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma has appointed David Mahlobo, a close ally as energy minister.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/17021409988/in/photolist-rW8bb1-Yhy8c7-ERPYjW-XDSmog-YTFW9K-YCpzhJ-Yhy8BW-sdyVQy-sdErJF-rgHcWh-rW8biL-rW9fRd-rgHcRN-rW9fGW-oSn1fQ-oSmX5a-SXVvZD-NhAf5r-A86rJJ-zRKvaP-A86sj1-quGejg-SXVw4M-SXVw2H-JP8nXL-JiEA1V-K68qnm-JiRvVQ-KfktUX-UB7iUz-ovabK9-oMo3VF-ww8xGr-q8r5Ut-AVMEMD-ZWLunK-p9Pg4U">Flickr/GovernmentZA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Jacob Zuma, has a maximum of 18 months left <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-10-zuma-i-will-never-stand-for-a-3rd-term">as head of state</a>. This time he hopes to rescue a nuclear power deal involving a proposed contract to build between six and eight new nuclear reactors in South Africa. </p>
<p>In an attempt to push through the deal, Zuma has appointed his former minister of state security, <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/news/president-zuma-appoints-mahlobo-energy-minister/">David Mahlobo as energy minister</a>. The president trusts that Mahlobo, a close ally for over ten years, will act decisively to implement the deal. He <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-05-mahlobo-said-to-be-fast-tracking-nuclear-deal/">appears to be under orders</a> to get a deal with Russia done and dusted. </p>
<p>The nuclear deal contract is for nuclear reactors to produce 9600 megawatts of power. This would be five times the amount of energy generated from Koeberg, South Africa’s only nuclear power plant which generates a maximum of <a href="http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/global/africa/publications/the%20true%20cost%20of%20nuclear%20power%20in%20sa-screen.pdf">1844 megawatts</a>. </p>
<p>But the facts show that the country does not need this extra power. Demand for electricity has come down <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=4045">every year since 2011</a>. And the National Treasury <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/nuclear-build-programme-is-unaffordable-gigaba-11721499">argues</a> that the costs, in the range of at least R1-1,8 trillion, will be prohibitive. </p>
<p>Nuclear energy will also be the most costly electricity source, according to work done by <a href="https://www.csir.co.za/sites/default/files/Documents/IRP%20Feedback%20-%20CSIR%20-%207Dec2016_v2.pdf">energy experts</a>. In a climate where the state utility Eskom is deeply in debt and is therefore trying to raise the price of electricity by <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/eskom-seeks-199-tariff-increase-report-20170605">19.9% for the next few years</a>, investment for nuclear will force up the cost to consumers, and meeting the borrowing requirements will put unnecessary pressure on an already stressed economy.</p>
<p>Zuma’s push for nuclear continues to emphasise how isolated he really is. The anti-nuclear lobby is no longer confined to environmentalists. Large sections of civil society, business, academia and even sections of government have come out against it. My hunch is that democracy will win, and the people will triumph over a tainted and over-extended kleptocrat.</p>
<h2>Massaging the energy strategy</h2>
<p>Zuma’s efforts to get the deal underway have been stopped in their tracks following a court ruling <a href="https://theconversation.com/court-ruling-on-zuma's-nuclear-deal-is-a-marker-of-south=africa's-political-health-76870">that declared previous attempts</a> to privilege Russian interests as illegal. The court ruled that before the deal can be reinstated, it has to go through a public participation process and parliament has to approve it. The court also ruled that state efforts to put Eskom in charge of procurement were illegal, as the proper procedures weren’t followed. </p>
<p>It is unlikely that even Mahlobo can meet these legal requirements in the time that his boss has left in office.</p>
<p>Mahlobo’s first step has been to try to speed up the state’s energy strategy – which was supposed to be updated in April 2018. Although the plan is supposed to be updated every two years the 2010 version – which called for more nuclear procurement – is officially still on the table. A subsequent revision in 2013 questioned the need for nuclear. But this plan was never tabled in parliament by the Department of Energy. </p>
<p>The 2018 plan being promised by Mahlobo is expected to re-emphasise the commitment to nuclear. Zuma wants the plan fast tracked. But by speeding it up, the government has indicated to parliament that it will be excluding a public participation process.</p>
<p>This is likely to be challenged given that the plan is the closest thing South Africa has to a national discussion on its energy future. </p>
<p>But even if the plan can be massaged in Zuma’s interests, it won’t be enough to ensure the deal goes through. It will be challenged by political parties and NGOs who are prepared to litigate to challenge a rigged plan if necessary.</p>
<h2>Additional hurdles</h2>
<p>The public participation process that the national electricity regulator must manage – as prescribed by the April 2017 court judgement – is far from being established. The regulator was berated by the court for not doing this. It has to happen before procurement takes place. The process will provide the perfect opportunity for organisations to make the case that the scientific, environmental and economic arguments against new nuclear are backed by solid evidence.</p>
<p>Even if this process approved the orders of new reactors, there are other hurdles to be cleared. Before the competitive procurement process can be initiated, South Africa would need to renew a series of legal memoranda of understanding with vendor countries. These include France, Russia, China, South Korea and the US. This would ensure that these are free of contractual content, and then sanctioned by parliament. Only then can the procurement proceed legally. And government would have to ensure that the process abides by the Constitutional requirements of “fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.”</p>
<p>This means that it will be illegal and unconstitutional to offer Russia preferential treatment in guaranteeing that it secures the deal.</p>
<p>Any transgression of the law or the Constitution will be met by litigation from the environmental lobby. It will be strengthened by an array of other actors, ranging from tax and anti-corruption to human rights activists. </p>
<p>Zuma can of course flout the rule of law, but would he want to jeopardise what is left of an already problematic legacy over this more or less unwinnable issue?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87775/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Fig has written many articles in the past questioning South Africa's nuclear policy. His book, Uranium Road (Jacana, 2006) received support from the Heinrich Boell Foundaton. He is a member of Earthlife Africa, one of the NGOs that litigated against government illegalities in the procurement process. </span></em></p>Even if the nuclear plan can be massaged in South African President Jacob Zuma’s interests, it won’t be enough to ensure the deal goes through.David Fig, Honorary Research Associate, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/870182017-11-09T13:39:08Z2017-11-09T13:39:08ZSouth African president’s last ditch effort to ram through a nuclear power deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193963/original/file-20171109-27161-1ya2z5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a lack of public support for nuclear in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Jacob Zuma’s term of office has been characterised by an absence of vision and <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/has-president-jacob-zumas-government-done-a-good-job/">associated initiatives</a>. Zuma is instead known for his inaction and overt <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/26/da-zuma-a-master-of-delaying-tactics">stalling tactics</a>. Examples include delays in setting up the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-13-state-capture-inquiry-zumas-unconstitutional-delay-the-focus-of-court-action/">State Capture Commission of Inquiry</a>, announcing a new board for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/concern-over-zuma-deliberately-delaying-sabc-board-appointment-20171009">state broadcaster</a>, and delaying the release of a report on the future of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-10-24-two-years-and-counting-university-fees-frustration-mounts/">university fees</a>.</p>
<p>His recent dramatic <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-31-iss-today-is-zumas-nuclear-gamble-still-in-play/#.WgMQOI-Czcs">push to fasttrack</a> an expensive and highly controversial nuclear power station build is therefore very much out of character. But Zuma’s advocacy of the nuclear build needs to be understood in terms of another hallmark of his presidency – <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-state-capture-controversy-has-influenced-south-africas-nuclear-build-58879">state capture</a>. This expression refers to the systematic takeover of state institutions by presidential allies and the resulting exploitation of institutions for commercial advantage and profit by his benefactors.</p>
<p>It’s already become clear who is likely to benefit from South Africa pursuing the option to build nuclear power stations. The list includes the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta brothers</a> and Zuma’s son Duduzane through their <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-01-18-zuma-the-guptas-and-the-russians--the-inside-story/">links to the Shiva uranium mine</a>.</p>
<p>And then there’s Zuma himself. Speculation about why the president appears to be favouring a deal with Russian company Rosatom ranges from allegations of grand scale <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1692639/malema-accuses-zuma-of-chasing-nuclear-deal-repaying-russia-with-new-energy-minister/">individual kickbacks</a> to alleged commitments linked to <a href="http://sa-monitor.com/putin-south-africas-anc-friends-troubled-times-south-african-monitor-13-october-2016/">funding</a> for the African National Congress.</p>
<p>The controversy around the nuclear power option was precipitated three years ago when it emerged that <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-12-exposed-scary-details-of-secret-russian-nuke-deal">the government</a> had signed an agreement with Russia that paved the way for the use of Russian technology in planned new nuclear power stations. The problem was that there’d been a complete <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/environmentalists-sa-did-sign-nuclear-deal-with-russia-20160330">lack of due process</a> – no costing, no public consultation, no proper proclamation and no competitive bidding. It was no surprise that the courts declared the awarding of the nuclear build to Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-nuclear-energy-option-for-south-africa-for-now-at-least-76751">illegal</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this a very strong case has been mounted against South Africa pursuing nuclear power. Reasons include the fact that it <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-03-29-nuclear-too-costly-and-sa-does-not-even-need-it/">can’t afford it</a>, and <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/new-study-points-to-90-renewables-mix-being-least-cost-by-2050-2017-09-15">doesn’t need nuclear</a> in its energy mix. </p>
<p>Despite all of these developments, and the growing controversy and mounting opposition to the deal, Zuma appears determined to get it done before his term as president of the ANC ends in December. In the last of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/10/17/strongman-david-mahlobo-key-in-cabinet-reshuffle_a_23245770/">reshuffles</a> he appointed one of his closest allies, David Mahlobo, to the energy portfolio. This is generally seen as a last ditch attempt to roll out the nuclear build in the face of now massive opposition. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/277533/mahlobo-seems-to-be-the-russians-favourite-cabinet-minister-adriaan-basson">Reports</a> suggest that this reshuffle was occasioned by Russian displeasure over what they see as a broken promise to award the building contract to Rosatom.</p>
<h2>The energy minister’s next steps</h2>
<p>Mahlobo appears to have devoted his first few weeks in office entirely to furthering the nuclear project. He has been active in <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/18/listen-will-new-energy-minister-push-nuclear-deal-through">the media</a> declaring the nuclear build as a given – and necessary. </p>
<p>Mahlobo’s next steps are likely to be:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>He is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mahlobo-rushes-nuclear-deal-20171105-2">reported</a> to be planning to release – in record time – a new energy plan. This, some suspect, will be <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/fast-track-sas-energy-plan-with-immediate-effect---david-mahlobo-11801614">biased towards nuclear</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Heightened public lobbying. This could include <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/zuma-slams-critics-of-his-nuclear-plan-foreign-agents-11872687">verbal attacks on nuclear critics</a> as already initiated by the President.</p></li>
<li><p>The issuing of a request for proposals to build the nuclear plants to potential developers like Rosatom. Most observers expect the evaluation to favour Rosatom regardless of the merits of the other bidders.</p></li>
<li><p>Signing an agreement with Rosatom. This could mirror the USD$30 billion deal Russia signed with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclear/russia-to-lend-egypt-25-billion-to-build-nuclear-power-plant-idUSKCN0YA1G5">Egypt</a> which, on the surface, will appear attractive because it would offer favourable terms such as annual interest of only 3% and the commencement of repayments after 13 years. But when scaling the 4.8 GW Egyptian agreement up to the 9.6 GW envisioned for South Africa, the total cost then already exceeds R1 trillion. Annual repayments from year 14 to year 35 then amount to about 5% of South Africa’s annual fiscus. Any cost overruns, which are common in many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/03/hinkley-point-c-is-22bn-over-budget-and-a-year-behind-schedule-edf-admits">other nuclear builds</a>, would vastly increase the debt further.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What’s changed</h2>
<p>The global energy landscape has changed dramatically since South Africa first mooted the idea of supplementing its power mix with more nuclear. Major developments and changes include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Growing <a href="http://news.world.edu/?p=24718">mistrust in nuclear energy</a> in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster; </p></li>
<li><p>A dramatic fall in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/06/spectacular-drop-in-renewable-energy-costs-leads-to-record-global-boost">cost of renewable energy</a> and;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-11-15-eskom-from-a-crisis-of-capacity-to-a-crisis-of-rising-prices-declining-demand-and-funding/#.WgMWOo-Czcs">Lower than expected growth</a> in energy demand in South Africa.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Not even government’s own recent energy plans have promoted nuclear. </p>
<p>A 2013 draft energy plan argued against immediate nuclear growth. (The plan was <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/anc-misrepresenting-irp-2013-to-aid-russian-nuclea">never formally adopted</a>). </p>
<p>The last <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-energy-plan-has-sparked-strong-emotions-heres-why-69383">draft plan released in 2016</a> went as far as declaring new nuclear unnecessary until 2037.</p>
<h2>Will it happen?</h2>
<p>Nuclear plants are major long term investments, and these projects will not survive lengthy construction and operation periods without broad public support. There is definitely a lack of public support in South Africa.</p>
<p>The Zuma-Mahlobo work plan will face major opposition by other parties, civil society and even critics within the ruling party. Lengthy <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/threat-of-court-action-if-govt-steps-out-of-line-with-nuclear-plans-20171022">court challenges</a> will query the validity of the energy plan process, the public consultation, the regulatory aspects, the site selection and the constitutionality of the entire process. Public <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-23-sas-students-take-on-union-buildings">protests</a> highly effective in other spheres would now be directed against the nuclear build. The ruling party would probably abandon the scheme if it proves politically costly.</p>
<p>The danger is, however, that huge funds will have been wasted in coming to this realisation.</p>
<p>The stakes are high. Zuma’s efforts to promote this unpopular nuclear project are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-24-news-analysis-zumas-waning-power-exposed-by-stalled-nuclear-plan">weakening him politically</a>. Even party comrades perceived to be in his inner circle – like newly appointed Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba – recognise that going ahead with the programme at this stage would <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/nuclear-build-programme-is-unaffordable--gigaba-11721499">cripple the country economically</a>. Repeated <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/17/zuma-s-cabinet-reshuffle-rocks-political-fraternity">ministerial reshuffles</a> to sideline his critics has further damaged Zuma’s standing in the ruling party and in broader society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler receives funding from the NRF. He is a member of OUTA and SaveSA, but writes in his personal capacity.</span></em></p>South African President Jacob Zuma’s efforts to promote his unpopular nuclear project are weakening him politically but he still seems keen to pursue it.Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777432017-05-16T16:13:21Z2017-05-16T16:13:21ZThe South African government hasn’t given up the fight for nuclear<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169508/original/file-20170516-11948-10k9i5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Energy Minister Mmamoloko Nkhensani Kubayi (R) being sworn in.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nuclear energy in South Africa is a highly contested issue; so much so that a court recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-nuclear-energy-option-for-south-africa-for-now-at-least-76751">ruled against</a> the government’s plans to issue a contract for the construction of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-not-build-eight-new-nuclear-power-stations-49967">eight new nuclear power stations</a>. </p>
<p>The ruling appeared to have delivered a significant <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-29-court-ruling-on-zumas-nuclear-deal-is-a-marker-of-south-africas-political-health">blow</a> to President Jacob Zuma, and those who support him, who had set their sights on immediate nuclear expansion. The court’s decision was met with <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2017/04/26/celebrations-as-government-s-nuclear-programme-set-aside-by-court">jubilation</a> by those opposing the nuclear plan.</p>
<p>The expectation was that the government would <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/expert-slams-anti-nuclear-lobby-says-court-ruling-must-be-appealed-20170427">appeal</a> the decision. It didn’t, but this shouldn’t be read as a shift in its thinking. </p>
<p>Minister of Energy Nkhensani Kubayi <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/sas-nuclear-procurement-process-to-start-afresh-kubayi-20170513">made it clear</a> after the court ruling that, while there would be no appeal, the government remained fully committed to nuclear expansion, and was planning to initiate a new process without delay.</p>
<p>This signals a realisation by government that an appeal would have little chance of success, and that a lengthy court process would tie up the parties in legal cases for months or even years. This would delay a nuclear build even further.</p>
<p>The minister has made it clear that the government is not giving up on its push for the controversial nuclear plan. But it has realised the process must start from scratch. This is the clearest indication yet that Zuma intends launching the nuclear build before his term of office ends in 2019. </p>
<p>Adding to fears that the government isn’t giving up the fight was the surprise reinstatement of Brian Molefe as CEO of the country’s power utility <a href="http://www.eskom.co.za/Pages/Landing.aspx">Eskom</a>. Molefe left the job under a cloud six months ago. His reappointment led to immediate and widespread <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/molefe-reappointment-cope-da-protest-outside-eskom-hq-20170515">public outrage</a>. Many have interpreted his return as <a href="http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2017/05/12/molefe-back-eskom/">beefing up the quest for nuclear</a>.</p>
<p>Molefe’s return, however, isn’t as critical to the nuclear project as imagined, as Eskom has maintained his <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/eskoms-koko-firm-about-sas-need-for-nuclear-20170330-2">pro-nuclear stance</a> in his absence. </p>
<p>What’s more important is that it’s clear that contestation around the future of South Africa’s energy sector will continue unabated. This despite the president having been severely <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/05/15/ferial-haffajee-zumas-defences-are-floundering_a_22087340/?utm_hp_ref=za-homepage">weakened</a> in recent months, and with it the power of the pro-nuclear lobby supported by his faction.</p>
<h2>What the court ruled</h2>
<p>The High Court decided that three international intergovernmental nuclear agreements and two ministerial proclamations to kick start the establishment of new nuclear power plants were <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-nuclear-energy-option-for-south-africa-for-now-at-least-76751">unconstitutional and illegal</a>.</p>
<p>The order nullified an agreement in which South Africa had committed to appointing Russian agency <a href="http://rosatom.co.za/">Rosatom</a> to build new nuclear plants. The agreement had allocated the build to Rosatom without costs being established or a competitive tender process. </p>
<p>The court also negated the government’s decision to delegate nuclear power procurement to Eskom and ruled that the country’s <a href="http://www.nersa.org.za/">energy regulator</a> was compelled to engage in meaningful public consultation before any major development can proceed.</p>
<p>By saying that it will restart the process from scratch, the government came to the obvious conclusion that it could only achieve its objective without the double albatross of the Russian agreement and the short circuiting of consultative processes hanging around their head.</p>
<h2>Nuclear isn’t needed, but remains in play</h2>
<p>The drive to develop 9.6 GW of new nuclear energy generating capacity is the result of a governmental <a href="http://www.energy.gov.za/files/irp_frame.html">Integrated Resource Plan</a> for electricity drafted in 2010. But the plan is now completely <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-energy-plan-has-sparked-strong-emotions-heres-why-69383">outdated</a>. It overestimated electricity demand growth, and did not anticipate the dramatic drop in the cost of renewable energy technology, particularly solar photovoltaics.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.energy.gov.za/files/irp_frame.html">latest draft</a>, published in 2016, does not foresee any need for nuclear for the next 20 years. <a href="https://www.csir.co.za/study-shows-abundance-wind-and-solar-resources-south-africa">Studies</a> have also shown that a larger renewable energy investment is more feasible in South Africa than was previously thought.</p>
<p>Nuclear’s main drawback is the excessively <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-gordhans-silence-on-south-africas-nuclear-option-is-a-good-sign-73287">high costs</a>. It has been widely argued that this technology is <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/94677/r1-trillion-nuclear-plans-are-simply-disastrous-for-sa/">unaffordable</a>.</p>
<p>So why the inexplicable urgency to drive this highly expensive programme?</p>
<p>One answer is that it shows there’s massive outside pressure influencing the push. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-state-capture-controversy-has-influenced-south-africas-nuclear-build-58879">influence</a> over the president enjoyed by politically connected business people, in particular the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, suggests that local oligarchs might be manipulating the president.</p>
<p>It is, however, probable that the dominant source of the pressure on the president are <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-01-18-zuma-the-guptas-and-the-russians--the-inside-story/">Russian interests</a>, in particular President Vladimir Putin. There is no proof, only <a href="http://citizen.co.za/opinion/opinion-columns/1316406/zuma-putin-knife-sa/">speculation</a>, about the high degree of influence the Kremlin has over the South African head of state. What is known is that Zuma endorsed the nuclear agreement concluded without due process with Russia in 2014 after a private <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-09-25-jzs-secrete-nuke-stich-up">meeting with Putin</a> in Moscow.</p>
<h2>What is likely to happen next</h2>
<p>In line with the ministerial announcement, expectations are that new intergovernmental nuclear cooperation agreements will be concluded and tabled in parliament before the end of this year. The Russian agreement is likely to be aligned with agreements that have been signed with France, China, South Korea and the US, removing all specifics that afford Rosatom an advantage. Despite this, perceptions will remain that the Russians have been promised the nuclear build.</p>
<p>Even so, and despite the president’s current efforts, new nuclear power plant developments remain improbable in the next decade. This is because the publication of the final energy plan document – expected in the coming months – and any adjustments to the draft in favour of nuclear are likely to be vigorously challenged in the now mandatory consultative process. This will make it almost impossible to initiate a nuclear build before 2019.</p>
<p>The political terrain will become even trickier after that as the country will go to the polls in a general election in 2019. The ruling party won’t be able to afford being associated with a controversial nuclear agenda during an election year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler receives funding from the NRF. He is a member of OUTA and Save South Africa, but writes this article in his personal capacity.</span></em></p>The South African government is not giving up on its push for a controversial nuclear power plan. But it’s chances of succeeding have been greatly reduced.Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/768702017-04-28T13:46:26Z2017-04-28T13:46:26ZCourt ruling on Zuma’s nuclear deal is a marker of South Africa’s political health<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167175/original/file-20170428-12999-eanx54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Celebrations outside the Western Cape High Court after it ruled against the South African government's proposed nuclear deal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nic Bothma/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government’s plan to bulldoze through a nuclear energy deal has been dealt what might be a <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/04/26/Court-finds-nuclear-deal-with-Russia-to-be-unlawful">fatal blow by the Cape Town High court</a> which has declared the plan invalid. It found that the government had not followed due process in making the decision to pursue a nuclear power option, as well as in other critical areas. </p>
<p>The court’s decision has put paid to President Jacob Zuma’s hopes of clinching the nuclear build programme before leaving office in <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/anc-pins-2019-fortunes-on-zuma-successor-20161130">2019</a> if he completes his term. </p>
<p>The case was brought to court by <a href="http://earthlife.org.za/">Earthlife Africa</a> and the Southern Africa Faith-Communities’ Environmental <a href="http://safcei.org/">Institute</a>. The two NGOs were challenging the way in which the state determined the country’s nuclear power needs. The plan would have seen South Africa purchasing <a href="http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp%20files/IRP2010_2030_Final_Report_20110325.pdf">9,600 megawatts</a> of extra nuclear power. </p>
<p>The judge, Lee Bozalek, ruled the government’s action unconstitutional and found that five decisions it had taken were illegal. These included the government’s decision to go ahead with the nuclear build and the fact that it had handed over the <a href="http://www.eskom.co.za/news/Pages/Dec20B.aspx">procurement process</a> to the state utility Eskom. The court also ruled that Eskom’s request for information from nuclear vendors, a step taken to prepare the procurement, which ended on <a href="http://www.eskom.co.za/news/Pages/Dec20B.aspx">28 April 2017</a> was invalid. </p>
<p>If it still wants to pursue the nuclear deal the government will have to start all over again. To do so legally it would have to open up the process to detailed public scrutiny. The country’s electricity <a href="http://www.nersa.org.za/">regulator</a> would have to have a series of public hearings before endorsing what would be its highest ever spend on infrastructure. And any international agreements would have to be scrutinised by parliament. </p>
<p>All this will take time – something Zuma doesn’t have. And it’s unlikely that his successors will be as eager to champion a new deal as he has been. Meanwhile the facts about the deal will become public. This will undoubtedly demonstrate two of the biggest <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-not-build-eight-new-nuclear-power-stations-49967">criticisms</a> of the deal to be true: that the country can’t afford it, and that it’s energy needs have shrunk, making the vast investment redundant. </p>
<p>The court’s ruling has turned the nuclear procurement issue into one of the key markers of South Africa’s political health. It’s not yet clear whether the South African government will appeal the Western Cape High Court’s decision, or comply with the judgement. A third option is that Zuma simply ignores the courts and continues to pursue the deal. </p>
<h2>Demand and affordability</h2>
<p>South Africa currently has more than enough <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-not-build-eight-new-nuclear-power-stations-49967">electricity</a> to meet its needs. This wasn’t the case about five years ago when widespread <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/crippling-blackouts-paralyse-south-africa-150312044353795.html">outages</a> hit the country. Since then new electricity generation <a href="http://www.eskom.co.za/news/Pages/Nov3B.aspx">capacity</a> has been added, through the the rapid roll out of <a href="http://www.ujuh.co.za/window-4-renewable-energy-nets-r194bn-for-south-africa/">renewables</a>, and the opening up of two new giant coal burning plants. Consumption, particularly by industry, has steadily declined due to faltering economic growth and higher electricity prices. Demand has dropped so much that Eskom plans to <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/numsa-fumes-over-eskom-plant-plant-closure-plans">close</a> five coal burning power stations. </p>
<p>The argument that the country needs another 9,600 megawatts was identified in documents that produced in 2011. These are now widely acknowledged as being badly out of date. Recent <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-06-will-putin-pay-for-sas-100bn-nuclear-plan">studies</a> by the University of Cape Town’s Energy Research Centre have shown that the country doesn’t need to consider nuclear for another 20 years. </p>
<p>A number of studies have also shot holes in the government’s argument that the country can afford the proposed nuclear build. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research has developed <a href="http://www.ee.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/RE-Futures-Windaba-CSIR-3Nov2016_FINAL.pdf">models</a> showing that new nuclear is likely to be much more expensive than coal or renewables. The price ticket for nuclear – which <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-07-r1trillion-nuclear-tender-bidding-war">some estimates</a> put at more than R1 trillion – doesn’t take into account the costs of operation, fuel, insurance, emergency planning or the regulation or decontamination at the end of the life of the reactors. </p>
<p>It would also impose a <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/nuclear-programme-could-burden-future-generations-committee-told-1414434">financial burden</a> on the country’s fiscus which it can <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-cabinet-reshuffle-opens-the-door-for-nuclear-deal-in-south-africa-75553">ill afford</a> particularly now that the economy has been rated at junk status.</p>
<h2>Ulterior motives</h2>
<p>So why is Zuma still pushing for the deal to go ahead? One source of pressure might be the Russians. South Africa’s former energy minister, Tina Joemat-Pettersson, had been instructed to signed a deal with the Russian utility, <a href="http://www.ujuh.co.za/south-africa-enter-into-brave-nuclear-deal-with-the-russians/">Rosatom</a> to build the reactors. South Africa has also already signed nuclear power <a href="http://www.polity.org.za/print-version/unravelling-south-africas-opaque-foreign-nuclear-cooperation-agreements-2014-08-19">cooperation agreements</a> with other countries like the US and South Korea, which the court has declared void.</p>
<p>A more likely reason for Zuma’s zeal is the involvement of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a> with whom he has close ties. The family’s web of interests around the nuclear deal are complex. </p>
<p>What is known is that the Gupta family <a href="http://www.oakbay.co.za/">controls</a> South Africa’s only dedicated uranium mine. The family has developed close relationships with key individuals at Eskom. In November last year the country’s then <a href="http://www.ujuh.co.za/state-of-capture-public-protectors-report/">Public Protector</a> pointed to overlapping directorships between Gupta-owned companies and Eskom. </p>
<p>The report also suggested that Brian Molefe, Eskom’s CEO, had a close relationship with the family. These revelations led to his <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-11-breaking-brian-molefe-resigns-from-eskom">resignation</a> shortly after the report was published.</p>
<p>Another strand in the complex web is the fact that Zuma’s son <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/gupta-link-with-duduzane-zuma-no-risk-oakbay-ceo-20170120">Duduzane</a> is a business partner of the Guptas while other relatives are directly employed by them.</p>
<p>Despite his determination, Zuma has become increasingly isolated in his quest for nuclear procurement. The African National Congress is clearly divided on the issue. This is evident from the fact that Zuma has resorted to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-cabinet-reshuffle-opens-the-door-for-nuclear-deal-in-south-africa-75553">reshuffling</a> his cabinet to make way for more compliant ministers without reference to party officials as would be the norm. </p>
<p>The private sector has also come out <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/why-governments-nuclear-deal-will-destroy-sa-20160915">against</a> the idea while the list of civil society organisations opposed to nuclear expansion goes well beyond the environmental lobby and includes a broad spectrum of foundations, faith communities, human rights campaigners and defenders of the country’s constitution. </p>
<h2>High stakes</h2>
<p>The nuclear judgement in Cape Town indicates that South Africa’s legal system has not yet been “captured” by private interests. </p>
<p>The key question is whether Zuma and Eskom will accede to the verdict, or whether they challenge it while continuing to ignore the rule of law. Not only would this subvert the country’s constitution and its democratic form of government, it would also deny the constitutional right to popular participation in energy democracy. </p>
<p>The stakes are high – for the country as well as for the president. Will he continue to treat the country’s energy future with impunity? Or will this judgement symbolise the rollback of the democratic dispensation envisaged by the authors of the country’s constitution?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Fig has had a long association with Earthlife Africa, and serves on the steering committee of the African Uranium Alliance. </span></em></p>The Cape High Court ruling which declared South Africa’s nuclear energy plan as illegal may have put paid President Jacob Zuma’s ambitions of clinching the deal while he is still in office.David Fig, Honorary Research Associate, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/692302016-11-23T21:02:48Z2016-11-23T21:02:48ZVietnam cancels nuclear reactor deal: a lesson for South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/147012/original/image-20161122-11005-kf1wed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A miner takes a break from sorting through coal at a mine in Vietnam. The country relies heavily on coal imports.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Julian Abram Wainwright/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Vietnam recently <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/massive-setback-for-rosatom-as-vietnam-scraps-nuclear-deal-20161120">announced</a> that it would be cancelling its contract to buy two nuclear reactors from <a href="http://www.rosatom.ru/en/">Rosatom</a>, the Russian nuclear vendor. The decision was subsequently <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/vietnam-nuclear-power-program-national-assembly-scraps-atomic-energy-project-russia-2450250">ratified</a> by the Vietnamese National Assembly in Hanoi. The vice-chair of the parliamentary committee on science, technology and environment, Le Hong Tinh, has <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/vietnam-ditches-plans-to-build-2-nuclear-plants">stated clearly</a> that the nuclear programme would not be continued.</p>
<p>After the purchase of the two Russian reactors, Vietnam was due to buy a further two from <a href="https://nuclear-news.net/2016/11/19/japans-nuclear-marketing-disappointment-vietnam-to-cancel-reactor-order/">Japan</a>. These plants would have been the socialist republic’s first power reactors. The orders were placed at a time of economic boom in the country during 2009 and 2010. But the more recent downturn in economic activity, the drop in electricity demand, and the doubling of the overnight cost of the reactors to $18 billion, caused the government to think again.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-vietnam-nuclearpower-idUSKBN13D0RK">According to Mycle Schneider</a>, a Paris-based energy analyst: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Vietnam is only the latest in a long list of countries, including more recently Chile and Indonesia, that have postponed indefinitely or abandoned entirely their plans for nuclear new-build.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Vietnam’s decision is for outright cancellation of a contract for two reactors which were to be part of a sequence of purchases. But South Africa is not being as decisive. Yet South Africa is realising that it must at least postpone its nuclear plans. In its latest <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-22/south-africa-delays-nuclear-plant-plan-as-economy-stagnates">Integrated Resources Plan 2016</a>, one option is to delay completion of the first reactor until 2037.</p>
<p>A postponement would mean that South Africa wouldn’t need to start building new nuclear plants until the mid-2020s. The country’s energy provider Eskom, however, is still bent <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/eskom-to-push-ahead-with-nuclear-despite-proposed-delay-20161122">on initiating the procurement process</a> very soon. </p>
<h2>Vietnam’s economy</h2>
<p>Vietnam has a population of about <a href="http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/vietnam-population/">90 million</a>, almost double South Africa’s <a href="http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/population.htm">54 million</a>. As one of the world’s biggest exporters of <a href="http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/vietnam-big-year-for-coffee-rice-exports/1519414.html">rice and coffee</a> its production is mainly agricultural. </p>
<p>Since the end of the war against the US in 1975 policies have begun to accommodate market capitalism with ultimate power still in the hands of the state. Personal income or per capita GDP, is up from US$200 in the 1980s to <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/vietnam/gdp-per-capita">$5635 today</a>. South Africa’s is <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/gdp-per-capita">$13046</a>. Vietnam’s growth rates have been in the vicinity of <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/vietnam/gdp-growth">6% to 7% per annum</a>.</p>
<p>Vietnam relies on small amounts of coal, hydro and offshore gas, but imports coal for most of its <a href="http://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/vietnam-hungry-for-electricity-turns-into-net-coal-importer-3471924.html">electricity generation</a>. The over reliance on imported coal, the impact of its use on climate change, and the rapid rise in economic production and electricity usage, led the government to consider <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/vietnam.aspx">the nuclear route</a>. Reactors would be acquired in sequence, amounting to a total fleet of 13 installed at sites in five provinces on the central coast. </p>
<p>Vietnam currently has a small nuclear research reactor <a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/projects/r2d2/workshop7/country-reports-and-reviews/vietnam.pdf">at Dalat</a>. The <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/IT-Vietnam_passes_law_on_nuclear_energy-0406085.html">law</a> covering nuclear energy was not regarded as robust enough by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to take account of the proposed nuclear expansion.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, Vietnamese environmental organisation, <a href="http://en.greenidvietnam.org.vn/">Green Innovation and Development (Green ID)</a>, approached myself and other international experts to comment on the expected revisions to the law and we were invited to Hanoi to address parliamentarians. But the law was never revised. </p>
<p>Then on October 3 we were asked to brief the National Assembly committee on science, technology and environment. The next day we also addressed the <a href="http://www.vusta.vn/en/">Vietnamese Union of Scientific and Technological Associations</a>. Our contributions aimed to provide scientific evidence to dissuade Vietnam from going ahead with the nuclear order.</p>
<h2>Expert advice</h2>
<p>Klaus-Peter Dehde, the mayor of a small town in northern Germany, spoke about the reasons for the new German energy transition away from nuclear energy and his community’s struggle with the question of nuclear waste disposal.</p>
<p>Kanna Mitsuta from Friends of the Earth Japan, whose expertise was on the effects of the Fukushima accident, briefed the audiences on its impact. This included mass evacuation, sterilisation of agricultural land, economic dislocation and the extensive contamination of land and sea. Failure to manage the accident effectively caused Japan to switch off all but two of its <a href="https://theconversation.com/japan-cant-afford-to-leave-nuclear-power-switched-off-11807">54 reactors</a>. The cost of the accident has so far amounted to two trillion yen or roughly <a href="http://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/08/29/public-cost-fukushima-cleanup-tops-40-billion-and-expected-climb">$40 billion</a>.</p>
<p>I spoke of the need for long-term management of nuclear waste, and the full cost of the reactors. Vendors usually quote the overnight costs, covering acquisition of the land and the construction. This is nowhere near the full cost as it does not include operation, insurance, waste management, emergency management, setting up a regulatory apparatus, or decommissioning the reactor after use. </p>
<p>In the case of Vietnam, as in South Africa, it would be the state that has to cover most of these costs.</p>
<p>Our interventions resulted in lively questioning. The information we provided was the first time many participants had heard counter-arguments to nuclear. Many participants commented afterwards on how open the discussions had been of a formerly taboo subject. Vietnam is still a one-party state, and the traditional role of the MPs has been to endorse policy measures coming from higher up in the party. The nuclear discussion suggests a new openness in decision making.</p>
<p>We left Vietnam thinking that our intervention might lead to a deferment of the order for the reactors while the parliamentarians continued to grapple with revision of the law. Its decision to scrap the orders – which was made shortly after our visit – was therefore a great surprise. Vietnam has been able to act rationally in considering all arguments before making its mind up.</p>
<h2>Lessons for South Africa</h2>
<p>Nuclear energy is unnecessary for the country’s progress as a developing nation. It swallows up too many resources for too little electricity in return. The nuclear fuel and the waste have to be safeguarded for many millennia, and the reactors have to be operated safely. Accidents contaminate huge areas and affect millions of people. </p>
<p>There are a number of safer and cleaner renewable alternatives, especially solar and wind. If Vietnam is brave and shrewd enough to step away from the nuclear abyss, so can South Africa. Instead of postponement of nuclear procurement, South Africa should reject this technology outright.</p>
<p>The country’s Integrated Resources Plan decides on the ratio of different power sources in the total energy mix. South Africa needs to listen more clearly to its scientists. And it could learn some useful lessons from Vietnam’s approach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Fig received funding from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation to brief the Vietnamese parliamentary committee on science, technology and environment and the Vietnamese Union of Scientific and Technological Associations.
David Fig serves on the Steering Committee of the African Uranium Alliance.</span></em></p>Vietnam recently cancelled it’s plans for the procurement of nuclear energy. There are lessons South Africa can take from this.David Fig, Honorary Research Associate, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/656822016-09-26T19:07:31Z2016-09-26T19:07:31ZQuestions mount over South Africa’s planned nuclear power deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138951/original/image-20160923-2562-169o94u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Koeberg is South Africa's only nuclear power station but that may change in the future.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/blyzz/4302733303/in/photolist-2xZxP-oQJ89b-p8bR1m-7ydCGX-oQJvBp-4wroNT-m2ZXBq-oQJrxJ-4tkLTi-84BVNG">Jim Sher/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nuclear energy in South Africa is a very contentious issue. The decision on whether to proceed with the construction of a fleet of nuclear power plants is destined to become the financially most far reaching and consequential defining moment of the Jacob Zuma presidency.</p>
<p>There is widespread public mistrust of the nuclear expansion process. Its roots lie in the extraordinary announcement in 2014 that the Russian nuclear agency Rosatom had secured the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-12-exposed-scary-details-of-secret-russian-nuke-deal">rights</a> to build the new South African nuclear plants. The South African government played down the announcement, claiming that it was <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/zuma-didnt-sign-deal-with-russia-1760005">inaccurate</a>. </p>
<p>But this precipitated a series of <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/02/02/zuma-the-guptas-and-the-russians--the-inside-story">media investigations</a>. These uncovered evidence that individuals close to the president and groups linked to the ruling ANC have significant financial interests in the matter.</p>
<p>Civil society organisations are taking government to <a href="http://safcei.org/tag/nuclear-court-case/">court</a> in an attempt to have the deal declared illegal. Their attempts to have details of the Russian agreement released are being resisted. This is likely to strengthen their case, and sway public opinion further.</p>
<p>It appears that those with a stake in the nuclear build are hoping to fast-track the process in the face of growing public opposition. This is evident from revelations that, bizarrely, contracts are being awarded, even though a formal process has not been set in motion by government.</p>
<p>The most recent revelation was that a member of a business family with close links to President Jacob Zuma has been awarded a massive R171 million <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-16-00-zuma-pals-clinch-first-nuclear-deal">tender</a> for a nuclear build programme management system.</p>
<p>The meaning of this is unclear. It has largely confirmed the fears that the nuclear build is being driven for the benefit of the politically connected rather than the national good.</p>
<h2>Burning questions</h2>
<p>The debate surrounding the nuclear project centres on three highly contested questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Is the country’s future energy generating potential and demand such that an expensive nuclear power station build is effectively unavoidable?</p></li>
<li><p>Can South Africa afford the associated costs and debt, especially in view of massive funding demands in other sectors such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/university-fees-in-south-africa-many-questions-lots-of-anger-and-fires-to-fight-65681">education</a>?</p></li>
<li><p>If approved, would the nuclear build lead to massive overspends, corruption and beneficiation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-state-capture-controversy-has-influenced-south-africas-nuclear-build-58879">politically connected individuals</a>?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The development of new nuclear power plants with a generating capacity of 9600 MW was initially presented in the Department of Energy 2010-2030 <a href="http://www.doe-irp.co.za/">Integrated Resource Plan</a> for electricity. According to this road map, nuclear would amount to 13% of South Africa’s 2030 generating capacity. This is compared to 46% coal, 11% solar and 10% wind.</p>
<p>But this plan is considered <a href="http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/Newsrunner/Story.asp?intContentID=1139">outdated</a>, with many making a strong case that improvements in <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/wind-solar-can-supply-bulk-of-south-africas-power-at-least-cost-csir-model-shows-2016-08-22">renewable energy technologies</a> and lower <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-15-academic-blasts-sa-neanderthal-power-policy">future energy demand</a> at the very least allow for the nuclear build to be postponed.</p>
<p>Furthermore, given the widely acclaimed early successes of the <a href="http://www.ipprenewables.co.za/">Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme</a>, it is difficult to understand why the renewable fraction is not being increased further, and why the national power utility Eskom, under the leadership of Brian Molefe, a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-07-29-what-brian-molefe-did-not-say-in-his-defence-of-the-guptas-and-nuclear/#.V-Omk2BaHcs">nuclear disciple</a>, now <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2016/08/29/brian-molefe-hardens-stance-against-independent-power-producers">opposes</a> new renewable energy developments.</p>
<p>The promotion of nuclear energy at the expense of renewables bucks global trends. An industrial nation like <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-energy-consumption-and-power-mix-charts">Germany</a> is phasing out nuclear power, and has a much higher renewable energy investment than sunny, windy South Africa. <a href="http://www.energypost.eu/chinas-electricity-mix-changing-fast-co2-emissions-may-peaked/">Chinese</a> renewables expansion currently exceeds nuclear development by far.</p>
<p>The nuclear option is expensive. The most realistic cost estimates range from <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/opinion/nuclear-power-is-the-only-sensible-way-to-go-2065696">R650 billion</a> – advanced by nuclear build proponents – to <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/why-governments-nuclear-deal-will-destroy-sa-20160915">R 1.2 trillion</a>, as determined by the civic watchdog group <a href="http://www.outa.co.za/nuclear-campaign/">OUTA</a>. The reported announcement by the CEO of the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa that the nuclear build would merely cost the country <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-13-00-go-figure-nuclear-will-cost-sa-just-1-bn">R 1 billion</a> is not considered to be serious.</p>
<p>Opponents of the deal point out that no persuasive cost-benefit analysis has been done. It is furthermore worrying that many recent nuclear construction projects elsewhere in the world have run into huge <a href="https://thinkprogress.org/the-nuclear-industry-prices-itself-out-of-market-for-new-power-plants-1421750327c3#.yecemx7h8">cost overruns</a> and delays.</p>
<h2>The ANC’s internal nuclear war</h2>
<p>The often obscure processes and overhasty developments require an insight into the present machinations within the governing party.</p>
<p>Tensions within the ruling party have escalated to the point where calls for the president’s resignation are now <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-is-a-disgrace-20160917">made openly</a>. And even <a href="http://www.news24.com/Opinions/Voices/anc-needs-an-overhaul-not-an-early-conference-20160902">party leaders</a> acknowledge that factions in their ranks are thriving on corruption.</p>
<p>The organisational fracture is equally evident in attitudes towards the nuclear build. Tensions over the issue have been cited as the major reason for Zuma’s <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-12-18-00-nuclear-price-tag-set-nene-against-jacob-zuma">dismissal</a> of the financially prudent former Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015.</p>
<h2>The official position</h2>
<p>Earlier this year Zuma announced that the nuclear build would proceed <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-power-in-south-africa-only-on-a-scale-and-pace-the-country-can-afford-54630">on a scale and pace the country can afford</a>. This position has been reiterated in recent weeks by both <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-08-govt-hasnt-made-a-nuclear-deal-with-any-country-ramaphosa">Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and Energy Minister Tina Joemat-Petterson. But it is not clear what this means in practice, given that scale and pace can be defined in many different ways.</p>
<p>The official process envisages a request for proposals to be issued on 30 September. This was set out in a Ministry of Energy <a href="http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/pr/2015/MediaStatement-Progress-with-the-Nuclear-New-Build-Programme-26December2015.pdf">press release</a> issued on 26 December 2015. It states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Any decision to proceed further with a Nuclear New Build Programme will therefore only take place after the RFP (request for proposals) process has been completed and a final funding model has been developed, and then referred back to Cabinet for consideration and approval. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The request for proposals invites nuclear plant constructors to issue concrete building and (hopefully) associated costing plans. </p>
<p>If this process is handled in a transparent way the public will be able to scrutinise the financial and other implications, including potential pitfalls. This would enable a far more meaningful analysis of the necessity and affordability of the nuclear build. In particular, the following needs to be clarified:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The technical details of the proposed reactors. Are they optimal, tested and considered safe?</p></li>
<li><p>Are there signs of associated developments amounting to wasteful expenditure? Alternatively, have critical additional aspects been considered like nuclear waste disposal and plant decommissioning, for example?</p></li>
<li><p>How will cost overruns and delays be dealt with?</p></li>
<li><p>What are the true costs and how will the development be funded? What are the long-term fiscal implications?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>But no-one is certain that this ideal scenario <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/will-nuclear-tender-lock-in-bid-price-energy-expert-asks-2016-09-14">will play itself out</a> because the legitimacy of the procurement process has already been undermined.</p>
<p>Looking ahead, actual construction would need to be preceded by the closure of funding agreements, the settling of legal disputes and further public engagement. This takes time.</p>
<p>In the unlikely event that the nuclear build actually does come to fruition, it will not commence any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>There are fears that that the nuclear build in South Africa is being driven for the benefit of the politically connected rather than the national good.Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/588792016-05-26T12:23:17Z2016-05-26T12:23:17ZHow the state capture controversy has influenced South Africa’s nuclear build<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124122/original/image-20160526-22038-1tv7tom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The biggest concern is that nuclear power is too expensive for South Africa and investing in it will cripple the economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is facing a critical decision that could see it investing about R1 trillion – or US$60 billion to $70 billion – in a fleet of new nuclear power stations. <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/11571/no-unaffordable-nuclear-power-stations-promises-zuma-but-what-can-sa-afford">Proponents</a> argue that it will greatly increase electrical base-load capacity and generate industrial growth. But opponents believe the <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2016/03/29/nuclear-too-costly-and-sa-does-not-even-need-it">high cost</a> would cripple the country economically. </p>
<p>What should be an economic decision has now been clouded by controversy, with political pressure to push through the nuclear build and the increasingly apparent rewards it would bring to politically linked individuals.</p>
<p>The nuclear expansion programme needs to be considered exceptionally carefully given that the required financial commitment is roughly equal to the total <a href="http://www.sars.gov.za/About/SATaxSystem/Pages/Tax-Statistics.aspx">South African annual tax revenue.</a> Loan repayments could place a devastating long-term burden on the public and on the economy as a whole.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s energy needs</h2>
<p>South Africa is in the process of massively expanding and modernising its electricity generation capacity. The government-driven <a href="http://www.doe-irp.co.za/">Integrated Resource Plan</a> aims to increase total capacity from 42,000MW (peak demand of 39,000MW) to 85,000MW (peak demand of 68,000MW) in 2030. A key component of this plan is the construction of facilities to produce 9,600MW of nuclear power. However, this aspect of the plan has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-not-build-eight-new-nuclear-power-stations-49967">challenged</a>. </p>
<p>The biggest concern is that nuclear power is too expensive for the country. The debate gained momentum when the 2013 <a href="http://www.doe-irp.co.za/">update</a> to the 2010-2030 electricity plan found that electricity demand is growing slower than originally anticipated. Peak demand in 2030 is now expected to range between 52,000 MW and 61,000 MW. There is consequently widespread belief that new nuclear power stations can be delayed considerably.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s energy generation options</h2>
<p>South Africa has had remarkable success with speedy, cost-effective installation of <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/10/07/sas-renewable-energy-plan-a-global-success-story">renewable energy</a> power plants. In addition to this, technologies for harvesting South Africa’s plentiful wind and solar energy resources are rapidly becoming cheaper, raising the question of whether the country should not invest more in these options rather than in going nuclear.</p>
<p>The argument that nuclear energy provides a stable base load, independent of weather conditions, is mitigated by improvements in <a href="http://raconteur.net/sustainability/new-storage-technologies-for-energy-on-demand">energy storage</a> technologies. But also by the fact that South Africa, with its large coal power production, has a proportionally higher base load than many <a href="http://www.energypost.eu/interview-dimitri-pescia-agora-energiewende-baseload-germany-2030/">highly developed</a> industrialised countries. The pro-nuclear option is therefore not unavoidable, as nuclear proponents suggest, but rather a matter for thorough economic consideration.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124123/original/image-20160526-22086-uf621q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Africa
has had remarkable success with renewable energy like wind and solar power.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Zuma and the Russians</h2>
<p>The nuclear debate gained a political dimension when President Jacob Zuma and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, started to develop an unusually <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-vladimir-putins-quest-for-a-nuclear-monopoly">close relationship.</a> It culminated in an announcement that the Russian nuclear developer, Rosatom, had been awarded the potentially <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-09-23-sa-russia-agree-to-50-billion-nuclear-deal">highly lucrative contract</a> to build the new reactors. The agreement was later <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/02/17/Russias-Rosatom-accuses-South-Africans-of-being-too-emotional-nuclear-deal-not-done-yet">denied</a>. </p>
<p>Rosatom was considered the <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/new-nuclear-agreements-shows-sas-bias-towards-rosatom">preferred contender</a>, with other bidders only there to lend the process legitimacy, according to some observers. The lack of transparency surrounding the process, coupled with a history of corruption in South African mega-projects like the <a href="http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">arms deal</a>, has made the whole scheme seem <a href="http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2015/07/06/unpacking-sas-nuclear-proposal-little-wonder-voters-are-suspicious/">suspicious</a> to the broader public.</p>
<h2>A thickening plot</h2>
<p>A crucial thread in this saga involves the Shiva uranium mine, about 30km north-west of Pretoria, the country’s executive capital. It originally belonged to a company called <a href="http://www.uranium1.com/index.php/en/about-uranium-one">Uranium One</a>, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom. It was sold in 2010 to <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-08-guptas-and-duduzane-zuma-resign-from-oakbay/#.Vz8GEWBaHcs">Oakbay Resources</a>, a company controlled by members of the politically connected <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a> and the president’s son, in a deal that greatly <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/business/2016/04/22/two-sworn-enemies-in-the-mining-industry-agree-oakbay-is-a-dud">surprised economists</a>.</p>
<p>The mine was deemed unprofitable and thus unattractive to other mining companies. But it was still considered worth a whole lot more than the R270 million paid by Oakbay. The mine would, however, become highly profitable if it became the uranium supplier to the new nuclear power stations. Oakbay and its associates therefore have a very strong incentive for this nuclear build to happen. </p>
<p>It is here that the nuclear build drama feeds into the recent major controversy surrounding alleged <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-24-the-gupta-owned-state-enterprises">state capture</a>, meaning a corrupt system where state officials owe their allegiance to politically connected oligarchs rather than the public interest. This was highlighted by the shock dismissal of Finance Minister <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-12-09-nhlanhla-nene-removed-as-finance-minister">Nhanhla Nene</a>, a reported nuclear build sceptic, but also by subsequent allegations of <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/03/16/full-statement-by-deputy-finance-minister-mcebisi-jonas-on-gupta-job-offer">ministerial positions</a> being offered to people by members of the Gupta family.</p>
<h2>Political, legal and civil opposition</h2>
<p>The nuclear build’s association with the Zuma faction in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) will be a political hot potato for decades to come. The whole scandal also offers potential opportunity to opposition parties. With increasing evidence of individuals benefiting, opposition parties have found another spot to exploit, as they did with <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-02-09-nkandla-concourt-matter-about-more-than-money-parties">Nkandla</a>. A post-Zuma government would find it most convenient to simply dissociate itself from the whole scheme.</p>
<p>The South African courts have been <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/03/31/Nkandla-ConCourt-ruling">used very effectively</a> by pressure groups in the past. Already a number of environmental groups have initiated <a href="http://earthlife.org.za/2016/04/court-case-exposes-web-of-secrecy-in-government-nuclear-dealings/">legal applications</a>, and these might end up being escalated to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. This will delay any building initiative by years.</p>
<p>The South African experience with the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2010-07-06-world-cup-investment-paid-off-says-zuma">2010 World Cup</a> has shown that mega-projects can come to fruition when there is broad overall support for the initiative. At the same time, South Africans can be very disruptive and obstructive when this is not the case. For example, the public opposition to <a href="http://tollroadsnews.com/news/s-africas-e-toll-imperiled-by-protests-split-in-government-and-judges-stay-on-start-of-tolling">e-tolling</a>, an electronic toll collection on certain roads. </p>
<p>The two leading opposition parties, the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2015/10/continued-secrecy-around-the-financing-of-the-nuke-deal-shows-the-anc-government-has-something-to-hide/">Democratic Alliance</a> and the <a href="http://effighters.org.za/eff-urges-the-south-african-government-to-strongly-consider-germanys-advice-on-nuclear-energy/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a>, have already expressed their strong criticism of the planned nuclear build. Their supporters and civil society in general have demonstrated their capacity for mobilisation around <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/27/africa/fees-must-fall-student-protest-south-africa-explainer/">specific issues</a>. So the potential for an anti-nuclear protest movement cannot be discounted.</p>
<h2>A negative nuclear outlook</h2>
<p>Building these plants is a risky business proposition, especially for Rosatom, which is implicated in the developing scandal. The recent political mood swing against state capture and a likely <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2016/03/29/nuclear-too-costly-and-sa-does-not-even-need-it">credit rating downgrade</a> add to the risk.</p>
<p>Rosatom has suggested a nuclear build financing option that effectively amounts to it providing a <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/rosatom-says-state-loan-an-option-for-funding-sa-nuclear-plants-2014-12-04/rep_id:4136">loan</a>. It is, however, conceivable that a future government may not honour debt repayments if there is a view that the construction deal was secured irregularly.</p>
<p>The narrow public support base and downright hostility in some quarters to a nuclear build has already <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-power-in-south-africa-only-on-a-scale-and-pace-the-country-can-afford-54630">effectively stalled</a> local nuclear construction plans. The level of controversy, high costs and potential for further disruption mean that the planned implementation could only proceed under severe social strain. </p>
<p>Such a scenario could very well cost the ruling ANC the <a href="http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/southern-africa/2016/02/17/ramaphosa-polls-new-world-wealth/">2019 national elections</a>. And the party is becoming <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-09-anc-ngc-zuma-mantashe-ring-alarm-bells-as-membership-plunges-by-37/#.Vz7w7GBaHcs">increasingly aware</a> of this. As such, it is posited that the nuclear build will not happen any time as soon as planned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58879/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler receives funding from the National Research foundation. </span></em></p>South Africa’s nuclear plans have been put on hold. In light of recent events in the country, pressure is being put on the government to halt the process.Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.