tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/russian-politics-39227/articlesRussian politics – The Conversation2024-03-13T19:15:28Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256452024-03-13T19:15:28Z2024-03-13T19:15:28ZRussia is about to hold another presidential election. It needn’t bother<p>Time for an early announcement: Vladimir Putin has won the upcoming Russian presidential election on March 15–17. It’s hardly a spoiler. Russian elections have been performative exercises in phoney democracy for many years now, and this latest round of theatre promises to be no different.</p>
<p>Official state analysts peg Putin’s likely support at <a href="https://tass.com/society/1744691">around 75%</a>. His only rivals are state-permitted and largely endorse both his platform and leadership. They include the Communist Party’s ageing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-is-off-ballot-russias-presidential-election-2024-03-11/">Nikolai Kharitonov</a>, who is polling around 4%, and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/03/11/what-do-we-know-about-russias-presidential-candidates-a84412">Leonid Slutsky</a>, the comparatively spry candidate from the misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (it’s actually an ultra-nationalist party), who is polling about the same. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most “liberal” candidate on the ballot is <a href="https://www.russian-election-monitor.org/who-is-vladislav-davankov-a-new-hope-for-opposition-in-the-presidential-election.html">Vladislav Davankov</a>, the deputy chair of the State Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament. Davankov has called for peace talks in Ukraine “on our terms, and with no roll-back”, and his main campaign slogan is the rather vague “Yes to changes!”. He is expected to receive perhaps 5% of the vote.</p>
<p>As Russians obediently line up to cast what amounts to little more than a mandatory expression of fealty, the only real questions worth asking are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>is there any semblance of opposition left?</p></li>
<li><p>and what kind of leader Putin will be in his fifth full term as president?</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>No real opposition figures left</h2>
<p>There is increasing evidence that Putin will become even more repressive. The Kremlin has overseen the elimination or marginalisation of any charismatic individual who might serve as a hub for popular opposition, and hence pose a threat to Putin – either on the ballot, or off it.</p>
<p>The death of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/putin-unrivalled#:%7E:text=Navalny%27s%20demise%2C%20in%20a%20far,penal%20service%20euphemism%20for%20torture.">Alexei Navalny</a> in a Siberian prison camp certainly sent that message, underscored by the arrests of several people who attended his funeral. </p>
<p>But throughout Putin’s tenure, plenty of other challengers, dissidents or opponents have been executed or attacked. They include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-02/sussex-who-killed-boris-nemtsov-and-why/6274442">Boris Nemtsov</a>, the popular moderate politician assassinated in 2015 </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/ten-years-putin-press-kremlin-grip-russia-media-tightens">Anna Politkovskaya</a>, the human rights journalist shot dead in her apartment in 2006 </p></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/23/chechnya-natalia-estemirova">Natalya Estemirova</a>, the anti-war activist kidnapped and killed in 2009 </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/21/the-magnitsky-affair-and-russias-original-sin-putin/">Sergei Magnitsky</a>, the lawyer who uncovered evidence of massive corruption and died after being beaten and denied medical care in 2009</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58637572">Aleksandr Litvinenko</a>, the former intelligence agent poisoned with polonium in 2006 </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/salisbury-nerve-agent/555071/">Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia</a>, who were poisoned with Novichok in the United Kingdom in 2018 </p></li>
<li><p>and the convenient plane crash that killed Wagner leader <a href="https://blogs.griffith.edu.au/asiainsights/wagner-chief-prigozhin-reportedly-killed-but-has-putin-cooked-his-own-goose/">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a> last year.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Other potential challengers have been ostracised or imprisoned. Nemtsov’s protégé, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68395030">Vladimir Kara-Murza</a>, for example, was arrested in 2022 and subsequently imprisoned for 25 years.</p>
<p>And so far this year, the Kremlin has jailed the elderly human rights campaigner <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-orlov-rights-activist-sentenced-prison-ukaine-war/32837174.html">Oleg Orlov</a> for “discrediting the military”; issued an arrest warrant for the exiled Russian author <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/01/13/russia-s-justice-ministry-adds-writer-boris-akunin-and-publication-kholod-to-foreign-agents-registry">Boris Akunin</a> for being a “foreign agent”; and labelled the exiled Russian chess grand master <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/chess-garry-kasparov-russia-extremist-list-honor/">Garry Kasparov</a> an “extremist and terrorist”. </p>
<p>In just the last day, Navalny’s former chief of staff, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/navalnys-aide-volkov-was-attacked-with-hammer-navalnys-spokesperson-2024-03-12/">Leonid Volkov</a>, has been hospitalised in Lithuania after being sprayed in the face with tear gas and beaten repeatedly with a hammer.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1767709387181748376"}"></div></p>
<h2>Elections mean very little</h2>
<p>The Kremlin has persisted with the charade of free elections throughout Putin’s rule, but with recent changes to this year’s ballot, those who have proven too popular have found themselves disqualified. </p>
<p>The ex-TV journalist <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/23/russia-bars-yekaterina-duntsova-from-contesting-in-presidential-election">Yekatarina Duntsova</a>, for example, was barred from running due to “violations” in the paperwork for her candidacy. She had been widely scorned as a Kremlin stooge, even though she planned to run on an anti-war platform.</p>
<p>So, too, was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-court-upholds-ruling-barring-anti-war-candidate-vote-2024-03-04/">Boris Nadezhdin</a>, who attracted significant attention for his pledge to end the war in Ukraine peacefully. But he also ran afoul of Russia’s Central Electoral Commission, which alleged he had failed to collect the necessary 100,000 signatures to qualify as a candidate.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1755700103262638568"}"></div></p>
<p>In the end, the political pantomime around who gets to contest Russia’s elections really doesn’t matter.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-election-fraud/31466758.html">ample evidence</a> of systemic electoral fraud in Russia for years. This includes ballot stuffing, “carouselling” (bussing voters to different booths to vote multiple times) and simple vote-rigging.</p>
<p>As early as <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203391104577124540544822220">2011</a>, United Russia – Putin’s de facto party of power in the parliament – was winning an unlikely 99% of the vote in Chechnya. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/vladimir-putin-secures-record-win-in-russian-presidential-election">2018 presidential elections</a>, millions of votes were recorded in districts that had surprisingly precise turnout figures of 85%, 90% and 95%. Some 1.5 million votes (about 2% of the total) simply appeared as “extras” after the final day of voting. </p>
<p>Evidently irked by repeated findings from monitors for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) about the lack of freedom in Russian elections, the Kremlin simply <a href="https://osce.usmission.gov/on-the-russian-federations-decision-to-deny-osce-election-observers-the-opportunity-to-observe-their-upcoming-presidential-elections/">denied</a> them access in 2024.</p>
<h2>Putin the autocrat</h2>
<p>It is often said that a marker of authoritarian governments is they generally tend to tolerate dissent. Autocratic governments, on the other hand, do not. That’s because they are the sole custodians of political power. Anyone seeking to challenge that is – by definition – an enemy.</p>
<p>Putin is embracing the autocratic type in his next stanza as president. That makes him incredibly dangerous. Now 71 years old, he has deliberately not anointed a successor, but has bound the fortunes of Russia’s leadership cadres to his own via <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/putin-angry-spectacle-amounts-to-declaration-war-ukraine">political blood pacts</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>He has created a polity comprised of serfs who compete for his attention, among whom he can place no trust. As the embodiment of Russia’s political gravity, his expectations of utter loyalty will increase. Every failure and setback will only serve to deepen a despotic determination to nourish his delusions of grandeur.</p>
<p>As Russia’s electoral circus unfolds in slow motion, we are already witnessing signs of this. In recent days, former president <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/dmitry-medvedev-unveils-map-with-new-russian-borders-in-anti-ukraine-screed">Dmitry Medvedev</a> prominently displayed a future map of Ukraine. The majority of it was swallowed by Russia, with Medvedev noting that “historic parts of Russia need to come home”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1764903672159617502"}"></div></p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/04bd3730-e8b4-40da-bc10-131843534504">40% of government spending</a> is now going to the war in Ukraine. And alarm bells have sounded in both Europe and the US that Putin’s ultimate aim is to fracture the West, either through war or the threat of it.</p>
<p>The only way to respond to Putin, therefore, is to resist him as vigorously as possible. After his sham election, he will preside over a regime that may exude strength, but is both fragile and brittle. Should this edifice come down, the results will be both terrible and terrifying for Russians. </p>
<p>But it increasingly seems that will be Putin’s legacy: not as Russia’s champion, but its wrecker.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225645/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin faces token opposition in the polls this weekend after his regime has viciously cracked down on opposition figures. He’s likely to be even more repressive in his next term.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242592024-03-13T00:48:29Z2024-03-13T00:48:29ZWhat can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia<p>There is very little drama in Russia’s upcoming presidential election this weekend. We all know Vladimir Putin will win. The only real question is whether he will receive more than 75% of the vote. </p>
<p>It could be tempting to see these results as a sign of the strength of the Russian system. Recent gains by the Russian army in Ukraine seem to further support this. </p>
<p>But my own research – soon to be published in a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/why-the-russian-constitution-matters-9781509972210/">forthcoming book</a> – shows the election results and Russia’s military gains in Ukraine hide a much more problematic reality for the country. </p>
<p>Russia’s system of government is not only undemocratic, rights abusing and unpredictable. It is also increasingly dysfunctional, trapped in a cycle of poor quality and weak governance that cannot be solved by one man, no matter how much power he has. </p>
<h2>The constitutional dark arts</h2>
<p>The weakness stems from the hyper-centralisation of power in Russia around the president. </p>
<p>This centralisation is the product of an increasingly common logic that I call the “<a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/why-the-russian-constitution-matters-9781509972210/">constitutional dark arts</a>”. This logic generally holds that democracy and rights protection are best guaranteed in a constitutional system that centralises authority in one elected leader. This line of thinking is present in many populist, authoritarian countries, such as Hungary and Turkey. </p>
<p>The foundation of this kind of system in Russia is the 1993 Constitution. It was drafted by then-President Boris Yeltsin and his supporters (many in the West) as an expedient for dismantling communism and implementing radical economic reforms. As such, it contains a number of rights provisions and democratic guarantees, alongside provisions that centralise vast power in an elected Russian president. </p>
<p>Yeltsin (and his Western supporters) described this system as democratic because it made the president answerable to the people. They also argued that rights provisions would allow courts to limit any abuses by the centralised state. </p>
<p>These reformers hoped Yeltsin could use this concentrated power to build democracy in Russia. Thirty years later, however, we can see how this use of the “constitutional dark arts” backfired spectacularly. </p>
<p>Since 2000, Putin has ruthlessly deployed this centralised authority to eliminate any checks on power. He has also transformed elections, the media and the courts from sources of accountability into mechanisms to project the image of strong presidential power. </p>
<p>The upcoming presidential election is just the most recent example. </p>
<h2>Poor quality governance in Russia</h2>
<p>Although this centralised system has allowed Putin to dominate politics, it fosters weak and poor governance, particularly outside Moscow. At least two factors are at play. </p>
<p>First, centralised decision-making in Russia is often made using incomplete or false information. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is an example. It was based on intelligence that the operation <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-invasion-ukraine-intelligence-putin/31748594.html">would be over quickly</a> and Ukrainians would likely welcome Russian forces. </p>
<p>Second, centralised directives are delegated to under-resourced, incompetent and weak institutions. Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was disastrous, in large part due to the poorly resourced regional authorities who were <a href="https://www.afr.com/companies/healthcare-and-fitness/the-extraordinary-failure-of-russia-s-pandemic-response-20210706-p587eg">overwhelmed</a> by a crisis of this scale. </p>
<p>This dysfunction has been a central message of the political movement led by the opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Before his death last month, Navalny and his team harshly criticised the corruption and weakness of the Russian regime and its inability to fix roads, provide health care and adequately pay teachers or doctors. </p>
<p>This message was potent, making Navalny the first opposition politician to build a broad coalition that spanned Russia’s 11 time zones. </p>
<p>This broad coalition frightened the Kremlin to such an extent that it led to Navalny’s poisoning in August 2020. Although it remains to be seen how his political movement responds to his death, this central criticism of the government remains one of its most potent messages. </p>
<p>Although it’s impossible to get independent polling on domestic issues during the Ukraine war, it does appear Putin and his administration are concerned about this weakness. In his February 29 address to parliament, Putin tacitly acknowledged these problems, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-election-promises-1875554">promising</a> new national projects to improve infrastructure, support families and enhance the quality of life. </p>
<p>These kind of promises, however, are unlikely to be implemented. Putin has traditionally promised these kinds of changes around presidential elections. But, when it comes to implementing them, Russia’s regional sub-units are often given <a href="https://tass.com/russianpress/692741">no resources</a> to do so. </p>
<p>With so much money now going to the war, it is unlikely the latest set of promises will be any different. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-had-a-vision-of-a-democratic-russia-that-terrified-vladimir-putin-to-the-core-223812">Alexei Navalny had a vision of a democratic Russia. That terrified Vladimir Putin to the core</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An increasingly dysfunctional Russia</h2>
<p>With Putin soon to start his fifth presidential term, this centralisation and personalisation of power is only going to increase. </p>
<p>Externally, this centralisation is likely to produce an increasingly unpredictable Russia, led by a man making decisions on the basis of an increasingly paranoid world view and incorrect or manipulated information. As former German Chancellor Angela Merkel once described Putin, he is really “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/26/world/europe/vladimir-putin-russia.html">living in another world</a>”. </p>
<p>This is likely to lead to more foreign policy adventurism and aggression. It will likely foster harsher repression of any dissenting voices inside Russia, as well. </p>
<p>We are also likely to see an increasingly dysfunctional Russia, one in which roads, housing, schools, health care and other <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/10/total-disgrace-anger-frustration-as-mass-heating-failures-across-russia-leave-thousands-in-the-cold-a83676">infrastructure</a> will continue to deteriorate, particularly outside of Moscow. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-corrupt-fractured-and-ostracised-how-vladimir-putin-has-changed-russia-in-over-two-decades-on-top-206086">More corrupt, fractured and ostracised: how Vladimir Putin has changed Russia in over two decades on top</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This extends to the military, which remains <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-running-out-ukraine">weak</a> despite its recent battlefield gains. For instance, Russia’s <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/03/the-roots-of-russian-military-dysfunction/">overly centralised command structure</a> has decimated the officer class and led to stunning losses of equipment. Although Russia has managed to muddle through by relying on its vast human and industrial resources, these systemic problems are taking a serious toll on its fighting capacity. </p>
<p>Despite escalating repression, these problems pose an opportunity for a democratic challenger, particularly when Putin is inevitably replaced by another leader. </p>
<p>Russia’s dysfunctional government is also an important reminder for Western media, policymakers and commentators. While it should not serve as a reason for complacency, highlighting Russia’s poor governance is an important tool in combating the Kremlin’s carefully curated image of power and control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224259/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Partlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A centralised system of government has allowed Putin to project power, but the country’s health care, schools, infrastructure and general quality of life have sharply deteriorated.William Partlett, Associate professor of public law, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250132024-03-12T12:31:57Z2024-03-12T12:31:57Z3 things to watch for in Russia’s presidential election – other than Putin’s win, that is<p>Russians will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-presidential-election-who-what-when-2024-03-11/">vote in a presidential election</a> from March 15-17, 2024, and are all but <a href="https://apnews.com/rusia-putin-election-2024">guaranteed to hand Vladimir Putin a comfortable victory</a>, paving the way for him to remain in power until at least 2030. </p>
<p>While the result may be a foregone conclusion, the election offers an important glimpse into the Kremlin’s domestic challenges as it continues a war against Ukraine that <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-war-in-ukraine-enters-third-year-3-issues-could-decide-its-outcome-supplies-information-and-politics-220581">recently entered its third year</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://politics.wfu.edu/faculty-and-staff/adam-lenton/">expert on Russian politics</a>, I have identified three key developments worth paying attention to during and after the upcoming election. Yes, we already know Putin will win. But nonetheless, this election is the largest public test of the Russian state’s ability to shape its desired result at home since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.</p>
<h2>1. Don’t mention the war (too much)</h2>
<p>The 2024 election is taking place during the largest interstate conflict to take place this century.</p>
<p>With Russian domestic media and politics all but gutted of dissenting voices, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/03/opinions/why-putin-wants-a-forever-war-galeotti/index.html">war has become</a> the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-war-ukraine-economy-policy-7428ef7b">organizing principle of post-2022 Russian politics</a>, shaping all major policies and decisions.</p>
<p>Yet, while the context of the war looms large, its role is largely implicit rather than occupying center stage. And for good reason: Banging the drums of war is not particularly popular.</p>
<p>In fact, the Kremlin’s strategy throughout the conflict has relied upon the general public’s acquiescence and disengagement from the war effort in exchange for <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alternate-reality-how-russian-society-learned-to-stop-worrying-about-war-pub-91118">a degree of normalcy</a> at home. </p>
<p>Officially, the war remains euphemistically termed a “special military operation,” yet it is also frequently framed by Moscow <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3874880-putin-says-ukraine-war-poses-existential-threat-to-russian-people/">as an existential struggle</a> for Russia and a <a href="https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/zapad-vedet-rukami-ukraintsev-voynu-s-rossiey-i-nazyvaet-eto-prekrasnoy-investitsiey/">proxy war</a> between Russia and the West.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman walks past a billboard with Russian words on and another will a soldier's head in a helmet depicted." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A billboard promotes the upcoming Russian presidential election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaElection/44d797eb397e446684e1d02a8d485433/photo?Query=Putin&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=now-30d&totalCount=604&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Russian public <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2023/10/31/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-otsenki-oktyabrya2023-goda/">still doesn’t agree</a> on what its aims are. There <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/wartime-putinism">are relatively few</a> ardent supporters of the war, outweighed by a <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/in-russia-clear-signs-of-war-fatigue/">more general sense of fatigue</a> among the public. This is supported by survey data that shows that <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2024/03/05/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-massovye-otsenki-fevralya-2024-goda/">consistent majorities</a> in Russia would prefer to start peace talks – though this of course does not tell us what type of peace they prefer.</p>
<p>Yet the war is putting pressure on the government’s ability to juggle ensuring a disengaged population and bolstering support for a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">grinding war that demands unprecedented</a> resources.</p>
<p>Putin’s public communication in the buildup to the election reflects this tension. He announced his intention to run during an awkward, poorly staged interaction with an officer at a military award ceremony in December 2023. That choice <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91234">surprised some insiders</a>, who expected Putin to weave his announcement into a high-profile, choreographed event focusing on domestic achievements and not the ongoing war. </p>
<p>More recently, his state of the nation address on Feb. 29 <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91872">began and ended by lauding</a> the achievements of the war, yet the bulk of the address – the <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/65e069269a794724567533c5">longest of the 19</a> he has delivered since he first became president in 1999 – was devoted to a laundry list of achievements, programs and goals largely disconnected from the war itself.</p>
<h2>2. Pressure to deliver results for Putin</h2>
<p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-autocrats-rig-elections-to-stay-in-power-and-get-away-with-it-95337">autocratic regimes like Russia’s have proved adept</a> at managing the electoral process to squeeze out rivals and mitigate against upsets, elections are still high-stakes events.</p>
<p>For officials, the election is a litmus test for their ability to muster administrative resources and deliver Putin an electoral windfall. Most <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/people-don-t-want-to-vote">reports suggest the Kremlin is hoping to engineer</a> that the turnout is at least 70%, with around 80% of the vote for Putin – which would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/vladimir-putin-secures-record-win-in-russian-presidential-election">surpass his 76.7% share</a> from 2018.</p>
<p>For observers of Russian politics, what will be of interest is not the result itself, but how the result is produced during wartime conditions.</p>
<p>Take, for example, securing high turnout. One prominent tactic used by local officials in Russia is pressuring state employees and workers at state-owned corporations to turn up at the polls en masse.</p>
<p>But with the economy on a war footing, and with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-short-around-48-million-workers-2023-crunch-persist-izvestia-2023-12-24/">acute labor shortage</a>, it is unclear whether this tried and tested approach will work. Moreover, political disengagement and the certainty of a Putin victory means that interest in voting is at an <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/people-don-t-want-to-vote">all-time low</a>. For local officials, the pressure is on.</p>
<p>At the head of efforts to engineer the election is Sergey Kiriyenko, Putin’s <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-viceroy">technocratic domestic policy czar dubbed</a> “viceroy of the Donbas” due to his role administering the occupied territories of Ukraine. Recent <a href="https://vsquare.org/kremlin-leaks-putin-elections-russia-propaganda-ukraine/">leaked documents</a> obtained by the Estonian website Delfi reveal how Kiriyenko’s team spent over US$1 billion in “pre-rigging” the election, sponsoring creative content such as films, TV series and video games replete with pro-government and anti-Western messaging.</p>
<p>Of course, it’s hard to say in advance whether such efforts will directly bear fruit. But the scale of the Kremlin’s investment in shaping the broader ideological environment indicates a degree of uneasiness with the public’s disengagement.</p>
<p>There are also new technical regulations that will boost Putin’s vote. The election will be held across three days instead of one. Together with this, the <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/03/07/the-digital-steal-en">rollout of electronic voting</a>, first used in Moscow elections in 2019, will make it easier to maximize turnout. These changes also make it difficult for observers to monitor the degree of fraud.</p>
<p>Beyond these subtler forms of manipulation, however, there are also overtly coercive ways to ensure vote targets are met. This is particularly the case for the millions of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/deportation-re-population-russia-occupied-ukraine-zaporizhzhia">currently under Russian occupation</a>, who are subject to intense pressure from the occupying authorities to acquire Russian citizenship and to vote.</p>
<h2>3. Silencing political opposition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">death of longtime Putin critic Alexei Navalny</a> in February 2024 was a huge blow to the opposition but is representative of the state of political repression in Russia.</p>
<p>Since 2018, some <a href="https://www.proekt.media/en/guide-en/repressions-in-russia-study/">116,000 Russians have faced</a> political repression. Under such circumstances, the presidential election will be the least pluralistic in post-Soviet Russia, with only four candidates on the ballot box and no openly anti-war figures featured among them.</p>
<p>In previous elections, there has usually been a candidate from the so-called “liberal opposition.” For a while it <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/01/26/the-situation-took-a-wrong-turn">looked as though this trend might</a> continue in the form of independent Boris Nadezhdin, whose explicit anti-war program saw him <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/world/europe/russia-putin-election-boris-nadezhdin.html">gain unexpected traction</a> compared to other would-be candidates.</p>
<p>But by barring Nadezhdin from running, the Kremlin likely wished to avoid a repeat of 2018, when the Communist Party’s Pavel Grudinin <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/01/26/grudinin-russia-communist-party-gets-capitalist-makeover-lenin-sovkhoz-a60185">unexpectedly struck a chord</a> with voters for his down-to-earth populism. This forced state media to go into overdrive, turning the election into a mudslinging contest. </p>
<p>Yet the scale of public mourning for Navalny and the enthusiasm for Nadezhdin reveal that despite draconian wartime censorship and repression, there remains a <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/said-without-enthusiasm">sizable bloc of Russians eager</a> for authentic political alternatives.</p>
<p>For now, the closest candidate to an alternative appears to be <a href="https://www.russian-election-monitor.org/who-is-vladislav-davankov-a-new-hope-for-opposition-in-the-presidential-election.html">Vladislav Davankov</a> from the liberal-leaning party “New People,” who will likely draw votes from some of this anti-war constituency.</p>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://davankov2024.ru/program">first point on his manifesto</a> calls for “peace and negotiations,” though “on our own terms.” Fresh <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6552544">polling data</a> from state-owned VTsIOM suggests that he might well take second place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lenton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Putin is all but guaranteed to win, war fatigue, electoral engineering and extreme risk-aversion suggest that the Kremlin is anxious to get these elections over and done with.Adam Lenton, Assistant Professor of Politics & International Affairs, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250082024-03-05T17:56:48Z2024-03-05T17:56:48ZThe Martyrdom of Saint Alexei: Navalny’s death is the latest instance of a long tradition of self-sacrifice in Russia<p>Since the news of Alexei Navalny’s death broke on Friday 16 February 2024, a good deal of analysts and journalists have taken to framing it in terms of sacrifice and martyrdom.</p>
<p>To the best of our knowledge, there is nothing to suggest that the Russian dissident was driven by any sense of <a href="https://www-cairn-info.ressources-electroniques.univ-lille.fr/revue-cliniques-mediterraneennes-2023-1-page-7.htm">“morbid enjoyment”</a>. Baptised, he described himself as a <a href="https://www.lavie.fr/actualite/geopolitique/mort-dalexei-navalny-fol-en-christ-orthodoxe-dresse-contre-le-kremlin-93100.php">“typical post-Soviet believer”</a>. And yet, having survived an <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-poisoning-what-theatrical-assassination-attempts-reveal-about-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-145664">attempted Novitchok poisoning</a>, he was also fully aware of the risks he was taking when he returned to Russia in January 2021. Were he to be killed, he had said his death would be a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4PxsTqcZtw">testament to the strength of his movement</a>.</p>
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<h2>The Russian ideal of self-sacrifice</h2>
<p>Navalny’s return to Russia can be explained by political considerations – namely, his refusal to go into permanent exile, as the Russian regime wanted. But insofar as he knew the risks to which he was exposing himself, his death – whether the result of “accidental” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/17/world/europe/navalny-health-prison-death.html">ill-treatment</a> or an <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/02/26/putin-killed-navalny-because-negotiations-for-his-release-in-prisoner-swap-were-nearing-completion-navalny-associate-maria-pevchikh-says">assassination in due form</a> – can be understood as self-sacrifice.</p>
<p>The phenomenon of martyrdom – particularly political martyrdom – is obviously <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/political-selfsacrifice/7FA97CDA5F984B12FD9D45CABC7F8081">not unique to Russia</a>. To regard it as an intrinsic component of a supposed “Slavic soul” is, in my view, a Western fantasy. That said, martyrdom and suffering <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg1cj">occupy an essential place in Russian history and culture</a>.</p>
<p>From autocracy to communism, Russia has throughout history experienced eminently repressive political regimes, often one after the next. The serfdom of a large section of the population until 1861, as well as the military’s critical role in bloody colonisation campaigns, have further helped to forge a culture of suffering as a way of life. Such a Russian ideal is marvellously illustrated by the works of Dostoevsky, Anna Akhmatova and Vasily Grossman – a list that is far from exhaustive. In fact, the etymology of the Russian word <em>moutchenik</em> (martyr) is “suffering” (<em>muka</em>), whereas in French or English, for example, “martyr” comes from the Greek <em>martus</em>, “witness”.</p>
<p>However, Russia’s singularity has less to do with the existence of a culture of sacrifice in defiance toward authorities, which I name here “defiant sacrifice”, than in a specific tension between it and sacrifice in the name of the State between “martyrs” on the one hand and patriotic “heroes” on the other. Understanding this dual culture of sacrifice can help us better grasp Navalny’s tragic fate.</p>
<h2>The martyr factory</h2>
<p>The first culture of “defiant sacrifice” comprises several historical layers, the oldest of which is religious. Russia’s orthodox Christianity is indeed based on the <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/ccmed_0007-9731_1981_num_24_93_2161">life and death of the saints</a>, while the country is also marked by the repression of dissident religious movements.</p>
<p>The best-known example of the latter is that of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/moscou-troisieme-rome--9782010107795-page-139.htm">Old Believers</a>, who opposed the reform undertaken by Patriarch Nikon in the mid-17th century to bring the Russian Orthodox Church into line with the Greek Church. The contested reform ultimately led to a schism within the Orthodox community, the <em>Raskol</em>. Convinced that the disappearance of the traditional Church marked the beginning of the reign of the Antichrist, the Old Believers <a href="https://www.rbth.com/history/332188-how-russian-old-believers-burned-alive">often set themselves on fire</a> to oppose authorities, whom they perceived as corrupt.</p>
<p>But Russia’s culture of sacrifice also extends to politics. In 1830-1840, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/histoire-de-la-russie-des-tsars--9782262042516-page-337.htm">the sociological stratum of the intelligentsia</a> emerges. The individuals constituting it are educated, but above all driven by political ideals inspired by the Age of Enlightenment.</p>
<p>On the death of Alexander I<sup>er</sup> in December 1825, a group of officers, the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/le-tsar-c-est-moi--9782130652182-page-397.htm">“Decembrists”</a>, demanded an end to the autocracy, with the view of ushering in a constitutional monarchy. The uprising, which saw its leaders executed, paved the way for what came to be known as the “revolutionary martyrs” from the second half of the 19th century onwards.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577592/original/file-20240223-15016-fl3i6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">During the Soviet era, the ‘Decembrists’ were often portrayed as heralding the revolution of 1917, and their fate was the subject of numerous hagiographies (Semion Levinkov, 1957).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cyclowiki.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:%D0%9B%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D0%94%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8B-1957-b.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>Their example nurtured several generations of opponents, right up to the generation of those who chose the path of violence. One of their heiresses was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/obituaries/overlooked-sophia-perovskaya.html">Sophia Perovskaya</a>, who helped orchestrate the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and was the only woman executed during Tsarism for a political crime. She, too, knew full well what price she might pay for her act.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ces-femmes-qui-ont-fait-la-revolution-russe-203955">Ces femmes qui ont fait la révolution russe</a>
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<p>The third dimension of Russian self-sacrifice was forged in the Soviet era, and is both religious and political in nature. Two groups stand out: the martyrs of the faith, including members of the Orthodox Church or other religious sects such as <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781442644618/conscience-on-trial/">Jehovah’s Witnesses</a>, whose martyrdom has a fairly limited influence. On the other, the historian can also note “liberal” dissidents, whose action has contributed to the emergence of a public diplomacy based on suffering – a phenomenon not seen since the tsars’ anti-Semitic policies provoked a crisis between Russia and the United States in the early 20th century.</p>
<p>Examples include the <a href="https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/la-fabrique-de-l-histoire/dimanche-midi-place-rouge-4754717">seven Soviets who defied the KGB</a> on 25 August 1968, demonstrating in Moscow against the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/series-d-ete/article/2022/08/04/andrei-sakharov-une-vie-a-combattre-l-inertie-de-la-peur_6137100_3451060.html">physicist Andrei Sakharov</a>, placed under house arrest in 1980 for openly denouncing the invasion of Afghanistan and the hunt for dissidents; or <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1986/12/11/l-etrange-fin-d-un-grand-temoin_2932068_1819218.html">Anatoly Marchenko</a>, whose death in a prison camp in December 1986 prompted Gorbachev to free Sakharov and extend his <em>glasnost</em> policy.</p>
<p>All knew perfectly well that by speaking out against the Soviet state they were exposing themselves to immense risks, but felt that the cost of inaction would have been higher.</p>
<h2>The factory of heroes</h2>
<p>This defiant self-sacrifice coexists in Russian political culture with another type of self-sacrifice, this time <a href="https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2017/11/03/role-war-sacrifice-russias-mythic-identity/ideas/essay/">in defence of the Russian and Soviet state</a>.</p>
<p>Weaponising the past toward political ends is absolutely central to what appears to be a process of heroisation through sacrifice, even if its impact on the population remains difficult to quantify. The history of this process is linked to the emergence of Russia as an ideological entity in the 16th century, as ideas such of Moscow as the <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Definitions/Lexique/Quand-Moscou-proclame-troisieme-Rome-2022-05-18-1701215666">“third Rome”</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1848883">“Holy Russia”</a> gain ground. Throughout the centuries, Russians are brought up on the idea of <a href="https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA66355314&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=02756935&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7E45a2d361&aty=open-web-entry">“Mother Russia”</a> (<em>Rodina</em>), which carves out a sacred homeland which must be defended at all costs.</p>
<h2>Navalny’s death and Russia’s future</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0265691419897533r">her book on the making of martyrs in Russia</a>, American civilisation scholar, Yuliya Minkova, describes the pervasiveness in Putin’s Russia of this phenomenon inherited from Stalinism, and the enduring tension between heroes of resistance and heroes of power.</p>
<p>Initially, during the years 2000-2014, a moderate Putinism had succeeded in defusing the risk of the emergence of martyrs who could have posed a risk to those in power. The first figure to bear the brunt of the repression, the oil tycoon <a href="https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/113639-003-A/un-livre-pour-ma-vie-mikhail-khodorkovski/">Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a>, was imprisoned between 2003 and 2013 following an eminently political trial, and had come to embody a Putin martyr during those years.</p>
<p>Khodorkovsky could have continued to languish behind bars had he not been pardoned by the president in December 2013. One of the reasons for his release was the death in prison in November 2009 of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2012/12/11/affaire-magnitski-l-histoire-sordide-d-un-machiavelisme-d-etat_1804010_3214.html">Sergei Magnitsky</a>, an accountant who uncovered large-scale embezzlement while he was working for an American businessman, Bill Browder. Khodorkovsky’s new freedom worked in Putin’s favour, as the former businessman, exiled in London, lost his aura of “messiah” and dashed the hopes of uniting the opposition.</p>
<p>The Putin regime’s headlong rush after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was accompanied by a confrontation unprecedented since the Cold War era between the defiant martyrs and patriotic heroes. Nowhere is this more visible than in the annual tussle between Russian progressives coming to lay flowers at the site where renowned opposition figure, Boris Nemtsov, was assassinated in 2015, and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nemtsov-memorial-removed-activists-detained/31112141.html">the authorities removing them</a>.</p>
<p>Let’s not forget that Putin’s immediate justification for invading Ukraine was the need to prevent the “genocide” of the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, victims of a Ukrainian regime described as “Nazi”. Imaginary martyrs, <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affaire_de_l%E2%80%99enfant_crucifi%C3%A9">such as the child supposedly crucified by Ukrainian forces</a>, had been invented to encourage Russian soldiers to sign up in the name of a noble cause, and then, later, to respond to the call for mobilisation.</p>
<p>For a long time, Putin’s government had succeeded in limiting Navalny’s influence, going to great lengths to deny his very existence. Putin’s refusal to name him or, for days, of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/17/navalnys-killers-refusing-to-hand-over-body-allies-say-a84125">returning his body to his family</a> was part of that strategy. By having him killed, the Russian leader has confirmed Navalny’s status as a martyr in the eyes of a section of the population – those who have not been “zombified” by propaganda and conspiracy theories about links between Navalny and the CIA – and at the same time, the criminal nature of the Russian regime.</p>
<p>Far from erasing Navalny’s message, Putin has on the contrary amplified it, undermining the effect of his own propaganda and undermining the already slim chances of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Ukraine: Navalny’s death has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/european-union-sanctions-russia-ukraine-war-28a5d7faabbcbc5fe3a0de3ec84fd87d">further strained relations between Russia and the West</a>. His widow, Yulia, has announced her intention to take up her husband’s torch. It remains to be seen whether she will be able to give substance to his project, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2024/02/16/alexei-navalny-firebrand-campaigner-for-beautiful-russia-of-the-future/">“The marvellous Russia of the future”</a>, so that his sacrifice will not have been in vain.</p>
<p>One thing appears to be certain: the courage of the thousands of mourners who came to Navalny’s funeral on 1 March only reinforced the existing tension between the culture of heroes as martyrs, who sacrifice themselves for Russia’s democratic future, and the culture of heroes as combatants of the “special military operation”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreï Kozovoï ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>In Russia, individual sacrifice is an integral part of the national psyche.Andreï Kozovoï, Professeur des universités, Université de LilleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248002024-02-29T17:30:08Z2024-02-29T17:30:08ZUkraine recap: fresh nuclear threats from Putin as France talks of western boots on the ground<p>Another day, another bloodcurdling threat from Vladimir Putin. The Russian president used his annual televised address to warn the west that he was prepared to defend his country, if necessary, by using nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>“They should eventually realise that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory,” Putin said, clearly referring to plans by some of Ukraine’s allies to supply medium- and long-rage missiles that could strike targets within Russia. “Everything that the west comes up with creates the real threat of a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and thus the destruction of civilisation.”</p>
<p>There has been a discernible sense of urgency about western discussions of Ukraine over the past fortnight. The loss of the town of Avdiivka, a key strategic position close to Donetsk, after weeks of heavy fighting and massive losses on both sides, has set off something of a domino effect in the area. Russia has used the momentum to push the frontlines several miles to the west as part of its winter and spring offensive. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the battle lines around Avdiivka and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, February 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The fall of Avdiivka has allowed Russian troops to shift the battle lines more than five miles to the west.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>In the previous Ukraine recap, we noted that Joe Biden has managed to get his US$95 billion (£75 billion) aid package through the US Senate. But the package still has to pass the House of Representatives, whose speaker, Mike Johnson, has yet to confirm it will even be given a vote. It’s clear from military reports emerging from Ukraine that the lack of ammunition is rapidly becoming an existential crisis.</p>
<p>Putin also probably had in mind the statement by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, at a security conference in Paris on February 26, that while there was as yet “no consensus” among Kyiv’s western allies about committing troops to the defence of Ukraine: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.”</p>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>This drew immediate pushback from most of the Nato leaders assembled at the conference, who raced to distance themselves from Macron’s position. Aside from anything else, there are major question marks about Nato’s ability to wage war in Europe against as formidable an adversary as Russia – which has, over the past two years, transformed into a war economy. </p>
<p>Kenton White, a Nato expert at the University of Reading, believes the increasingly ominous prospect of a confrontation between Nato and Russia will <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-wont-rule-out-using-western-ground-troops-in-ukraine-but-is-nato-prepared-for-war-with-russia-224086">require a major rethink</a> on the part of the western alliance. Hitherto, he writes, it has prepared to wage “come-as-you-are” wars, which would be fought with existing troops and weapons stocks. </p>
<p>Indeed, it appears such a rethink might already be happening. Nato is engaged in its largest exercises since the cold war – exercises designed specifically around the prospect of a war with a major power such as Russia. As Nato’s most senior military commander, Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, said last year: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-wont-rule-out-using-western-ground-troops-in-ukraine-but-is-nato-prepared-for-war-with-russia-224086">Macron won't rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, Stefan Wolff – a regular contributor to our coverage of the conflict over the past two years – struck a sobering note when he wrote that the west’s perceptions of the war had been <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">turned on their head</a> over the past 12-to-18 months by the lack of success of Ukraine’s counter-offensive. While Ukraine was scoring rapid successes on the battlefield in the summer and autumn of 2022, the talk was about finding an “off-ramp” to allow Putin a face-saving way out of an unwinnable war. But now, “increasingly, it’s the west that needs the off-ramp”.</p>
<p>Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, believes the west faces three choices. The preferable one in Ukraine’s eyes is for Nato to double down on its support, finding a way to ensure Ukraine gets the weapons it needs – not only to defend itself, but to inflict a comprehensive defeat on Russia. </p>
<p>However, talk is increasingly focusing on the second option – providing enough support to Ukraine to defend the territory it still has, which would involve making territorial concessions to Russia. The third, a comprehensive defeat of Ukraine, would have far-reaching consequences – none of them good.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<h2>Watching the war from space</h2>
<p>A feature of this war has been the way that thinktanks and analysts such as the Institute for the Study of War (whose maps we use in these regular updates) are able to pinpoint movements on the battlefield with such accuracy. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a pair of satellite views showing the same section of a city, one with intact buildings and green space and the other damaged or destroyed buildings and charred earth" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Satellite photography like these ‘before’ and ‘after’ images can provide a visceral sense of the destruction in the war in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-comparing-the-before-after-news-photo/1255499859">Satellite image (c) 2023 Maxar Technologies via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Sylvain Barbot and his team from USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the US, have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-at-2-years-destruction-seen-from-space-via-radar-223275">using open-source data</a> in order to analyse the development of the war from space. It has enabled them to build accurate before-and-after images of cities where the fighting has been fiercest, highlighting just how destructive the conflict has been.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-at-2-years-destruction-seen-from-space-via-radar-223275">War in Ukraine at 2 years: Destruction seen from space – via radar</a>
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<h2>Russia’s economic transformation</h2>
<p>Considering the regime of sanctions imposed by the west, Russia’s successful retooling of its economy to put it firmly on a war footing is nothing short of remarkable. This echoes a similar transformation achieved by Soviet Russia during the second world war – something that changed the course of the conflict, swaying it in favour of the Allies. </p>
<p>Now Russia’s economy is completely dedicated to winning the war in Ukraine – and this is the main thing driving the country’s economic growth. Renaud Foucart, an economist at Lancaster University, says that while this has kept Russia in the war and is arguably giving it the upper hand at present, it also means Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-economy-is-now-completely-driven-by-the-war-in-ukraine-it-cannot-afford-to-lose-but-nor-can-it-afford-to-win-221333">can’t afford to win</a>, as any attempt to transform back would be too costly.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-economy-is-now-completely-driven-by-the-war-in-ukraine-it-cannot-afford-to-lose-but-nor-can-it-afford-to-win-221333">Russia's economy is now completely driven by the war in Ukraine – it cannot afford to lose, but nor can it afford to win</a>
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<h2>Alexei Navalny and the Russian opposition</h2>
<p>For those of us who had been following the fate of Russian opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny, the news of his death in a prison camp in the Russian Arctic had a certain sad inevitability to it. Navalny flew back to Russia in January 2021 after recovering from being poisoned with Novichok on a flight across Siberia the previous year. No sooner had he and his wife, Yulia Navalnaya, disembarked from the flight to Moscow than he was detained, tried and sentenced.</p>
<p>Navalny spent the last three years being shunted to ever more unpleasant prisons across Russia, appearing every so often – usually via video link – to be sentenced to further prison time on spurious charge after spurious charge. Alexander Titov from Queen’s University Belfast <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">charts Navalny’s courageous career</a> – he was perhaps the biggest remaining thorn in Putin’s side.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">Alexei Navalny: reported death of Putin's most prominent opponent spells the end of politics in Russia</a>
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<p>So, where does Navalny’s death leave the opposition to Putin in Russia? According to Stephen Hall, who researches authoritarian regimes at the University of Bath, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">depressing answer</a> is that most opposition leaders are now either dead or in jail. Showing enormous strength, Yulia Navalnaya appeared at the Munich Security Conference hours after the news of her husband’s death had broken, to pledge to continue his work.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Keep on fighting’: Yulia Navalnaya vows to carry on her husband’s work after his death in a Russian prison camp, February 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Other than Navalnaya, perhaps the most effective opposition to the Russian president and the war in Ukraine will be the wives and mothers of the troops. If casualties continue to mount – and especially if the Russian military starts to suffer the same sort of setbacks as it experienced in late 2022 – then their voices can only gain in resonance, Hall argues.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">In Putin's Russia, the death of Navalny has left the opposition demoralised but not defeated</a>
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</em>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224800/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240502024-02-27T12:32:06Z2024-02-27T12:32:06ZYulia Navalnaya, widow of Alexei Navalny, steps forward to lead the Russian opposition – 3 points to understand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578049/original/file-20240226-31-5bo8d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yulia Navalnaya, the wife of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, attends the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 16, 2024, the day it was announced Navalny was dead.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yulia-navalnaya-wife-of-late-russian-opposition-leader-news-photo/2007795740?adppopup=true">Kai Pfaffenbach/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Alexei Navalny, one of Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s biggest critics and the country’s de facto opposition leader, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/russian-activist-and-putin-critic-alexei-navalny-dies-in-prison">died under suspicious circumstances</a> in an Arctic prison on Feb. 16, 2024. </p>
<p>Hours after his death was announced, Navalny’s wife, Yulia Navalnaya, appeared in a video on social media and said, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/navalnys-widow-yulia-i-will-continue-my-husbands-fight-free-russia-2024-02-19/">“I want to live in a free Russia, I want to build a free Russia.”</a>. </p>
<p>Navalnaya, who lives outside of Russia, accused Putin of killing her husband and also promised to “continue the work of Alexei Navalny.”</p>
<p>Since her husband’s death, Navalyana, who was generally not prominently involved in politics before, has shown other signs of stepping into politics. She is lobbying the European Union to enact new sanctions against Putin, for example. Navalnaya and her daughter also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/22/biden-meets-with-navalnys-widow-and-daughter-00142738">met with President Joe Biden</a>, to whom she reiterated her desire to keep up her husband’s fight against Putin. </p>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shattered-cracked-or-firmly-intact-9780190602093?cc=us&lang=en&">My research</a> <a href="https://liberalarts.vt.edu/departments-and-schools/department-of-political-science/faculty/farida-jalalzai.html">examining female leaders</a> worldwide recognizes family connections as an important pathway to power. </p>
<p>Navalnaya’s story fits squarely within a larger pattern of other female political leaders and activists who become publicly prominent after their husbands die or are imprisoned for their opposition to an authoritarian regime. </p>
<p>Here are three points to understand about Navalnaya’s sudden rise in politics, and the obstacles she faces in accomplishing her goal of bringing democratic change to Russia. </p>
<h2>1. There’s a long history of women subbing for men</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15544770802212224">Widowhood was</a> the main route American women took to becoming a member of Congress for decades, when they assumed their husbands’ seats, from the 1920s through the 1960s. </p>
<p>While men also often benefit from being born into political families, women disproportionately rely on their marital connections and other family linkages – such as being daughters of powerful men – to gain a foothold in politics. </p>
<p>Women also often ascend in the political arena under tragic circumstances. </p>
<p><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82428&page=1">Sirimavo Bandaranaike</a>, for example, was the widow of Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike, who was assassinated in 1959. Sirimavo Bandaranaike began to lead her husband’s political party, and following elections in 1960, she became the first female prime minister in the world.</p>
<p>Similarly, in Nicaragua, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-02-26-mn-1241-story.html">Violeta de Chamorro</a>, became the widow of the prominent news editor and publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in 1978. Unknown gunmen killed her husband following years of his reporting work that challenged the country’s repressive government.</p>
<p>Violeta de Chamorro then became involved in Nicaragua’s tumultuous politics and was elected Nicaragua’s president in 1990. She served in that role until 1997.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in dark sunglasses and a white head cover leans against the top of a car that she rides on as she speaks into a microphone. Several men stand or sit around her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578051/original/file-20240226-20-d7zvl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister of Pakistan, campaigns before the Pakistani election in October 1990.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-prime-minister-of-pakistan-benazir-bhutto-news-photo/561490955?adppopup=true">Derek Hudson/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Then there is the example of <a href="https://documentwomen.com/benazir-bhutto-first-muslim-women-leader">Benazir Bhutto</a>, former prime minister of Pakistan who served in the 1980s and ‘90s. Bhutto was the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was deposed in a military coup in 1978 and then <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/11/why-is-pakistans-top-court-probing-the-1979-hanging-of-former-pm-bhutto">executed in 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Today, women still sometimes take this route to power, often in Asia and Latin America. </p>
<p>Far closer to Russia, Belarus offers another recent example of how wives have assumed their husbands’ political posts when they are no longer able to continue their work. When Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko arrested leading critic Sergei Tikhanovsky and barred him from running in the 2020 presidential election, Tikhanovsky’s wife, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, ran in his place. </p>
<p>She lost her bid in 2020, during an election that featured rampant <a href="https://leads.ap.org/best-of-the-week/ap-exposes-election-fraud-in-belarus">voting irregularities</a>. </p>
<p>It is widely known that Tikhanovskaya, who initially said that she was not interested in politics, was allowed to run because Lukashenko thought she posed no real threat <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6167">since she was a woman</a>. </p>
<h2>2. Women can use feminine stereotypes to their political benefit</h2>
<p>Navalnaya, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/yulia-navalnaya-vladimir-putin-new-enemy-alexei-navalny-russia-opposition/">an economist</a> and a former banker, focused on raising children and supporting her husband as he gained a political following within the last decade. </p>
<p>Navalnaya <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/16/navalny-family-yulia-wife-children/">said in 2013</a>, “I imagine myself as his wife, no matter what he is.” When asked about her own political ambition in another interview in 2021, she <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/yulia-navalnaya-russia-opposition-leader-navalny-widow-putin-rcna139441">stated that</a> it was “much more interesting to be a politician’s wife.” </p>
<p>Being a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/supermadres-maternal-legacies-and-womens-political-participation-in-contemporary-latin-america/C5E4C8A4448BED97202936E1DBDF4090">wife and mother are identities</a> that can translate well to being considered a mother of a nation or a movement during inflection points.</p>
<p>Navalnaya and other women in a similar position are considered <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6167">accidental leaders</a>, only called into action under extreme circumstances. Though Navalnaya went with her husband to protests and rallies, her political activity was very limited until recently.</p>
<p>She was a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/yulia-navalnaya-russia-opposition-leader-navalny-widow-putin-rcna139441">key player</a> in getting Putin’s permission to take her husband to Germany to receive treatment when he was poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok in 2020. She increased her political role around that time, but to only highlight her husband’s plight and persecution. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A white, blonde haired woman wears a face mask and stands in a crowd of people, who all direct cell phone cameras at her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578050/original/file-20240226-30-4a4ioa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Yulia Navalnaya, center, is surrounded by people as she leaves Moscow’s airport in January 2021, shortly after her husband Alexei Navalny’s apprehension by the Russian police for alleged fraud.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-prime-minister-of-pakistan-benazir-bhutto-news-photo/561490955?adppopup=true">Derek Hudson/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>3. Navalnaya will face limits to real power</h2>
<p>While Navalnaya has received <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68336393">much international interest and praise </a> for stepping in to fill her husband’s shoes, she is living in exile. </p>
<p>If she returned to Russia and continued to oppose Putin’s regime, she would likely face <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/kremlin-critics-what-happens-to-putins-most-vocal-opponents">imprisonment or even death</a>, the fate of Putin’s other prominent critics. </p>
<p>But Navalnaya might not be able to gain real political headway if she does not return to Russia. Moreover, leading a movement from abroad could be used by her enemies as evidence that she is merely a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-has-yet-establish-official-cause-navalny-death-spokeswoman-says-2024-02-19/">puppet of foreign governments</a>. </p>
<p>A grieving widow is now arguably Putin’s biggest critic, and her foray into the political limelight is not wholly unexpected. What remains unclear is whether Navalnaya can move beyond being a symbol and proxy of her husband and unite Russia’s opposition movement to face Putin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Farida Jalalzai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The quick rise of Yulia Navalnaya in Russian politics closely mirrors the story of other female politicians who gain prominence after their husbands or fathers are no longer able to lead.Farida Jalalzai, Professor of Political Science; Associate Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243032024-02-26T17:20:44Z2024-02-26T17:20:44ZIn Putin’s Russia, the death of Navalny has left the opposition demoralised but not defeated<p>The still mysterious death of Russian opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny was greeted by some Kremlin critics as proof that the era of democratic <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">politics was over</a> in Russia. That any change or reset back to democratic governance will henceforth not be due to the ballot box, but will depend on a wave of popular protest galvanising enough support to topple Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Navlany’s death comes a few short weeks before Russia holds presidential elections. If Putin wins, the result will confirm him in office for another six-year term. </p>
<p>There are no serious opposition candidates, and the only registered opposition candidate to voice criticism of the war in Ukraine, Boris Nadezhdin, was recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/08/russian-anti-war-candidate-boris-nadezhdin-says-he-is-barred-from-election">disqualified from running</a>. Thanks to a 2020 constitutional amendment which removed term limits, Putin can stay in office until 2036.</p>
<p>So what becomes of Russia’s opposition, and the country’s fast-disappearing (if not defunct) democracy in the meantime. Who dares pick up Navalny’s standard in the campaign against Russia’s autocratic leader?</p>
<p>The death of democracy in Russia has been proclaimed several times. Within five years of Putin coming to power, analysts were already pointing to the lack of <a href="https://eusp.org/sites/default/files/archive/pss_dep/gelman_Political_Opposition_in_Russia.pdf">authentic opposition parties</a>. Meanwhile surveys by the Levada Center – Russia’s best-known opinion pollsters – found that by mid-2004 only 42% of Russians believed that political opposition still existed in the country.</p>
<p>By that stage, they had already seen the death of veteran opposition politician <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/enemies-kremlin-deaths-prigozhin-list/32562583.html">Sergei Yushenkov</a>, leader of the anti-Kremlin party Liberal Russia, who was shot in front of his Moscow home in April 2003. Deaths of other prominent opposition figures, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and lawyer and activist Sergei Magnitsky, followed in fairly rapid succession. Critics who had left the country, such as Alexander Litvinenko and Boris Berezovsky, were targeted in exile.</p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/boris-nemtsov-russian-opposition-leader-murdered/">Boris Nemtsov</a>, a former Yeltsin-era deputy prime minister who had once been tipped to take over, was shot dead on a Moscow street the day before he was due to lead a march against Russia’s incursions in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>By the time Navalny was poisoned on a domestic flight over Siberia in August 2020, he had become the main focus of Russia’s opposition. His poisoning and then subsequent return to Russia in January 2021 and his rearrest and imprisonment on what were clearly questionable charges, sparked a degree of optimism that Putin had over-reached.</p>
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<h2>Putin tightens the screws</h2>
<p>But the invasion of Ukraine in February was accompanied by the introduction of harsh new laws aimed at stifling dissent. The arrest of other opposition figures in 2022 under these new laws was effectively a <a href="https://theconversation.com/stalin-style-show-trials-and-unexplained-deaths-of-opposition-figures-show-the-depth-of-repression-in-putins-russia-203893">decapitation</a> of the opposition in Russia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/stalin-style-show-trials-and-unexplained-deaths-of-opposition-figures-show-the-depth-of-repression-in-putins-russia-203893">'Stalin-style' show trials and unexplained deaths of opposition figures show the depth of repression in Putin's Russia</a>
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<p>Under the new laws, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/moscow-police-arrest-children-for-laying-flowers-at-ukrainian-embassy">children were arrested</a> for the first time. The legislation imposed sentences of up to 15 years for spreading <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-latest-russia-law-b2028440.html">“false information”</a> – that is, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-protests-more-than-1300-arrested-at-anti-war-demonstrations-ukraine">voicing opposition</a> to the war.</p>
<p>Sentences meted out to high-profile protesters – such as artist and writer Sasha Skochilenko, who was given a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67437171">seven year jail term</a> for replacing supermarket labels with anti-war messages soon after the invasion in April 2022 – appear to have discouraged many from taking to the <a href="https://re-russia.net/en/analytics/0125/">streets in protest</a> at the war.</p>
<p>Now most well-known Russian opposition figures are either in exile or prison. Anglo-Russian journalist and activist <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65297003">Vladimir Kara-Murza</a> was sentenced in 2022 for 25 years for “treason”, having condemned the invasion of Ukraine, as was opposition politician <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/russian-opposition-figure-ilya-yashin-jailed-for-denouncing-ukraine-war">Ilya Yashin</a>. </p>
<p>Others, including former oligarch <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2022/05/03/exiled-former-russian-oligarch-mikhail-khodorkovsky-the-world-will-not-be-a-safe-place-as-long-as-putin-remains-in-power/">Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a>, Putin’s first prime minister <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/03/putin-critic-and-ex-pm-kasyanov-leaves-russia-a77892">Mikhail Kasyanov</a>, and former world chess champion <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/apr/30/garry-kasparov-interview-chess-vladimir-putin-russia">Garry Kasparov</a> fled abroad. While each is a vocal Putin critic, exile makes it difficult to shape change.</p>
<h2>Green shoots?</h2>
<p>Despite this, there are some green shoots that could rise to defy Russia’s political winter.</p>
<p>The day the news of Navalny’s death broke internationally, his widow – <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c501c5b-79c8-42ae-8190-94d7eeeeb9bb">Yulia Navalnaya</a> appeared in front of an audience of world leaders at the Munich Security conference.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Keep on fighting’: Yulia Navalnaya vows to carry on her husband’s work after his death in a Russian prison camp, February 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Navalnaya vowed to carry on her husband’s work, saying:</p>
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<p>The main thing we can do for Alexei and for ourselves is to keep on fighting. To unite into one powerful fist and hit this insane regime. Putin, his friends, the bandits in uniform, the thieves and murderers that have crippled our country.</p>
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<p>Her <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/20/europe/yulia-navalnaya-russian-opposition-challenges-intl/index.html">tenacity</a> could make her an effective force to revive opposition at home and abroad.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, another group of Russian women is making its voice heard across Russia, with a message that carries a significant amount of moral force due to their status in a country at war. The <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/putin-faces-growing-threat-wives-and-mothers-mobilized-soldiers">Council of Mothers and Wives</a> campaigned fiercely against Putin’s decision to call up reservists in the autumn of 2022, and the Russian president’s approval ratings (and that of his government in general) took a <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">significant hit</a>. </p>
<p>The Kremlin tried to reach out to the group, but its leaders refused to meet with the president, so a stage-managed meeting was held with a group of women hand-picked from pro-government organisations. The council, meanwhile, was declared a “foreign agent” and officially <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/28/russian-soldiers-mothers-group-announces-closure-after-foreign-agent-designation-a81989">closed in July 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Its focus was to bring troops home from Ukraine, rather than opposing the war itself. But the longer the war continues, the more wives and mothers will lose loved ones – and there will be plenty of women who fear this may happen to their own family.</p>
<p>Perhaps the voice of Yulia Navalnaya – a woman who lost her own husband to Vladimir Putin’s megalomania – will resonate among those women who fear the same may happen to their men.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of Vladimir Putin’s opponents are either dead, in jail or in exile. But it might just be ordinary people who can take over the battle for democracy in Russia.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238122024-02-18T04:28:27Z2024-02-18T04:28:27ZAlexei Navalny had a vision of a democratic Russia. That terrified Vladimir Putin to the core<p>Alexei Navalny was a giant figure in Russian politics. No other individual rivalled the threat he posed to the Putin regime. His death in an Arctic labour camp is a blow to all those who dreamed he might emerge as the leader of a future democratic Russia.</p>
<p>What made Navalny so important was his decision to become an anti-corruption crusader in 2008. Using shareholder activism and his popular blog, he shone a spotlight on the corruption schemes that enabled officials to steal billions from state-run corporations. </p>
<p>His breakthrough came in 2011, when he proposed the <a href="https://navalny.livejournal.com/603104.html">strategy of voting for any party</a> but President Vladimir Putin’s “<a href="https://navalny.livejournal.com/555608.html">party of crooks and thieves</a>” in the Duma (parliament) elections. Faced with a collapse of support, the regime resorted to widespread election fraud. The result was months of pro-democracy protests. </p>
<p>Putin regained control through a mix of concessions and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/europe/trial-sends-warning-to-rank-and-file-putin-foes.html">repression</a>, but the crisis signalled Navalny’s emergence as the dominant figure in Russia’s democratic movement. </p>
<p>Despite being convicted on trumped-up <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/alexei-navalny-found-guilty-embezzlement">embezzlement charges</a>, he was allowed to run in Moscow’s mayoral elections in 2013. In a clearly unfair contest, which included police harassment and hostile media coverage, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/09/18/navalnys-27-is-a-win-for-entire-nation-a27804">he won 27% of the vote</a>. </p>
<h2>Perseverance in the face of worsening attacks</h2>
<p>The authorities learned from this mistake. Never again would Navalny be allowed to compete in elections. What the Kremlin failed to stop was his creation of a national movement around the Foundation for the Struggle Against Corruption (FBK), which he had founded in 2011 with a team of brilliant young activists. </p>
<p>During the ensuing decade, FBK transformed our understanding of the nature of Putin’s kleptocracy. Its open-source investigations shattered the reputations of numerous regime officials, security functionaries and regime propagandists. </p>
<p>One of the most important was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g">2017 exposé</a> of the network of charities that funded the palaces and yachts of then-premier Dmitry Medvedev. Viewed 46 million times on YouTube, it triggered <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/26/world/russia-corruption-protests/index.html">protests</a> across Russia.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Exposé accusing Dmitry Medvedev of corruption.</span></figcaption>
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<p>No less significant was Navalny’s contribution to the methods of pro-democracy activism. To exploit the regime’s dependence on heavily manipulated elections, he developed a strategy called “intelligent voting”. The basic idea was to encourage people to vote for the candidates who had the best chance of defeating Putin’s United Russia party. The result was a <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/09/russias-elections-smart-voting-successes-alleged-tampering-and-more-a67204">series of setbacks</a> for United Russia in 2019 regional elections.</p>
<p>One measure of Navalny’s impact was the intensifying repression directed against him. As prosecutors tried to paralyse him with a series of implausible criminal cases, they also pursued his family. His younger brother Oleg served <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/oleg-navalny-released-from-russian-prison-after-3-1-2-years/29326978.html">three and a half years in a labour camp</a> on bogus charges. </p>
<p>This judicial persecution was compounded by the violence of the regime’s proxies. Two months after exposing Medvedev’s corruption, Navalny was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/europe/russia-aleksei-navalny-opposition.html">nearly blinded</a> by a Kremlin-backed gang of vigilantes, who sprayed his face with a noxious blend of chemicals. </p>
<p>More serious was the deployment of a death squad from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), which had kept Navalny under surveillance since 2017. The use of the nerve agent Novichok to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54246004">poison Navalny</a> during a trip to the Siberian city of Tomsk in August 2020 was clearly intended to end his challenge to Putin’s rule. </p>
<p>Instead it precipitated the “Navalny crisis”, a succession of events that shook the regime’s foundations. The story of Navalny’s survival – and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/21/labs-found-novichok-in-and-on-my-body-says-alexei-navalny-russia">confirmation</a> that he had been poisoned with Novichok – focused international attention on the Putin regime’s criminality. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/aleksei-navalny-new-film-about-jailed-dissident-who-dared-to-defy-the-power-of-putin-181118">Aleksei Navalny: new film about jailed dissident who dared to defy the power of Putin</a>
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<p>Any lingering doubts about state involvement in his poisoning were dispelled by Navalny’s collaboration with Bellingcat, an investigative journalism organisation, to identify the suspects and <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/12/21/if-it-hadnt-been-for-the-prompt-work-of-the-medics-fsb-officer-inadvertently-confesses-murder-plot-to-navalny/">deceive one of them</a> into revealing how they poisoned him.</p>
<p>The damage was magnified by Navalny’s decision to confront Putin’s personal corruption. In a powerful two-hour documentary film, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipAnwilMncI">A Palace for Putin</a>, Navalny chronicled the obsessive greed that had transformed an obscure KGB officer into one of the world’s most notorious kleptocrats. </p>
<p>With over 129 million views on YouTube alone, the film shattered the dictator’s carefully constructed image as the incarnation of traditional virtues.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A Palace for Putin.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>‘We will fill up the jails and police vans’</h2>
<p>It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the “Navalny crisis” on Putin, a dictator terrified of the prospect of popular revolution. No longer was he courted by Western leaders. US President Joe Biden began his term in office in 2021 by endorsing an interviewer’s description of Putin as <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/18/europe/biden-putin-killer-comment-russia-reaction-intl/index.html">a “killer”</a>. </p>
<p>To contain the domestic fallout, Putin unleashed a crackdown that began with Navalny’s 2021 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/17/alexei-navalny-detained-at-airport-on-return-to-russia">arrest on his return</a> to Moscow from Germany, where had been recovering from the Novichok poisoning. On the international stage, Putin secured a summit with Biden by staging a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/russian-military-buildup-ukraines-border-expert-analysis">massive deployment</a> of military force on the Ukrainian border, a rehearsal for the following year’s invasion.</p>
<p>The Kremlin’s trolling factories also <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13278-022-00908-6">tried to destroy Navalny’s reputation</a> with a smear campaign. Within weeks of Navalny’s imprisonment, Amnesty International <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56181084">rescinded his status</a> as a “prisoner of conscience” on the basis of allegations about hate speech. The evidence was some ugly statements made by Navalny as an inexperienced politician in the mid-2000s, when he was trying to build an anti-Putin alliance of democrats and nationalists.</p>
<p>What his detractors ignored was Navalny’s own evolution into a critic of ethnonationalist prejudices. In a speech to a nationalist rally in 2011, he had <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8AtH44_39c">challenged his listeners</a> to empathise with people in the Muslim-majority republics of Russia’s northern Caucasus region.</p>
<p>This divergence from the nationalist mainstream was accentuated by Putin’s conflict with Ukraine. After the invasion of Crimea in March 2014, Navalny denounced the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/opinion/how-to-punish-putin.html">imperialist annexation</a>” as a cynical effort to distract the masses from corruption. </p>
<p>Eight years later, while languishing in prison, he condemned Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/alexei-navalny-urges-russians-to-protest-daily-against-ukraine">exhorting</a> his compatriots to take to the streets, saying: </p>
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<p>If, to prevent war, we need to fill up the jails and police vans, we will fill up the jails and police vans. </p>
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<p>Later that year, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/30/alexei-navalny-parliamentary-republic-russia-ukraine/">argued</a> a post-Putin Russia needed an end to the concentration of power in the Kremlin and the creation of a parliamentary republic as “the only way to stop the endless cycle of imperial authoritarianism”.</p>
<p>Navalny’s tragedy is that he never had a chance to convert the moral authority he amassed during years as a dissident into political power. Like Charles de Gaulle in France and Nelson Mandela in South Africa, he might have become a redemptive leader, leading his people from war and tyranny to the promised land of a freer society. </p>
<p>Instead, he has left his compatriots the example of a brave, principled and thoughtful man, who sacrificed his life for the cause of democracy and peace. That is his enduring legacy. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/by-jailing-alexei-navalny-the-kremlin-may-turn-him-into-an-even-more-potent-opposition-symbol-154258">By jailing Alexei Navalny, the Kremlin may turn him into an even more potent opposition symbol</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Horvath received funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Like Nelson Mandela, Navalny might have become a redemptive leader, leading his people from war and tyranny to the promised of a freer society.Robert Horvath, Senior lecturer, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237662024-02-16T17:23:51Z2024-02-16T17:23:51ZAlexei Navalny: reported death of Putin’s most prominent opponent spells the end of politics in Russia<p>Reports <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/russian-activist-and-putin-critic-alexei-navalny-dies-in-prison">of the death</a> of Russia’s most famous opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, in an Arctic prison camp are shocking, but not entirely unexpected. It draws a line under Russia’s political development over the past two decades by highlighting that a challenge from within is no longer possible.</p>
<p>Navalny was the last public politician to pose a real challenge to the Kremlin, but his attempt to overthrow the regime failed long before what appears to be his untimely death in prison.</p>
<p>His unrealistic calculations about the impact of his return to Russia in 2021 led to the dismantling of the remnants of any organised opposition that was not sanctioned – and controlled – by the Russian state. </p>
<p>Navalny ended up in prison, his supporters arrested or fled abroad. As a result, when the invasion of Ukraine came, there were very few street protests against it.</p>
<p>Active in Russian politics for <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/protests-poisoning-prison-life-russian-opposition-leader-alexei-107288919#">more than 20 years</a>, Navalny’s main focus was identifying and rooting out state corruption, an issue with almost limitless material in modern Russia. He embraced new methods of bringing his investigations to as wide an audience as he could, notably the internet, particularly via his YouTube channel. Some of his <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1202972/most-popular-videos-by-alexei-navalny/">most popular clips</a> have tens of millions of views.</p>
<p>But corruption investigations and blogging were not enough to really challenge Putin’s status quo in Russian politics. That’s why Navalny increasingly turned to the direct action of mass street protests. </p>
<p>His big break <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/10/russia-protests-election-vladimir-putin">came in 2011</a>, when allegations of widespread fraud in the December 2011 Duma elections, coupled with the announcement of Putin’s return to the presidency the previous September, brought tens of thousands of protesters on to the streets of Moscow.</p>
<p>Although the protests were not organised by Navalny, his charisma and more radical rhetoric made him the most prominent face of the protests, overshadowing more established opposition leaders such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/boris-nemtsov">Boris Nemtsov</a>. However, the mass protests of 2011-12 failed to prevent Putin’s re-election in March 2012, and eventually fizzled out.</p>
<p>But the protests prompted the Kremlin to change tack and experiment with allowing the opposition to stand in elections. Navalny was the main beneficiary, being registered for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/alexei-navalny-recount-moscow-election">Moscow mayoral elections</a> in the summer of 2013. This was Navalny’s only real chance of winning power in Russia’s tightly controlled electoral system.</p>
<p>He campaigned enthusiastically and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/alexei-navalny-recount-moscow-election">won a respectable 27% of the vote</a>. But it also showed the limits of his appeal. Moscow was at the time one of the most opposition-leaning cities in Russia, one of the few regions where Putin got less than 50% in the 2012 presidential election. </p>
<p>If the opposition could really challenge the Kremlin, it was in Moscow. But turnout was extremely low at 32%, and the incumbent mayor, Sergey Sobyanin, won the 51% he needed to avoid a run-off with Navalny.</p>
<p>This was indicative of the opposition’s problem: reliance on restriction to a committed core of supporters whose passion for change didn’t spill over into the general population.</p>
<h2>Last roll of the dice</h2>
<p>Elections in today’s Russia are a foregone <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-is-sure-to-win-so-whats-the-point-of-elections-in-russia-93170">conclusion</a>, but they are also a potential vulnerability for the Kremlin. There is a fine balance that the Kremlin has to strike between control of elections and their legitimacy. Too much control, or outright fraud, and the legitimising value of the elections is reduced. </p>
<p>This can lead to potentially destabilising results, as the mass protests in Moscow in 2011 or the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/belarus-unprecedented-crackdown">protests in Belarus in 2021</a> showed, and as happened in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa">2004 Ukrainian elections</a>, which led to the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/">first Orange Revolution</a>.</p>
<p>Navalny understood this well, and made participation in the 2018 presidential election his main goal. His strategy was to cause enough trouble for the authorities in the run-up to the vote, particularly through various street demonstrations, to force the authorities to allow him to stand as an official candidate in these elections.</p>
<p>To this end, he set up a regional network of Navalny HQs that ran in parallel with his main anti-corruption organisation, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-navalny-corruption-foundation/31938527.html">FBK (the Anti-Corruption Foundation)</a>. This gave Navalny a potential nationwide reach, in contrast to the old Moscow-centred opposition.</p>
<p>This strategy didn’t produce the desired result of getting Navalny on to the ballot. But it seemed to rattle the authorities enough to want to take care of the “Navalny problem”. </p>
<h2>Poison and imprisonment</h2>
<p>In August 2020, Navalny <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-suspected-poisoning-why-opposition-figure-stands-out-in-russian-politics-144836">fell ill on a flight</a> and, according to the German doctors who treated him, escaped near-certain death from a Novichok weapons-grade chemical agent.</p>
<p>He returned from Germany in January 2021 and was <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-novichok-didnt-stop-russian-opposition-leader-but-a-prison-sentence-might-153480">immediately arrested</a> on landing in Moscow. The mass protests that followed were unusual for their regional scale, but not enough to really challenge the Kremlin. Instead, the authorities banned Navalny’s organisations in Russia and either arrested or forced those who worked for them to flee Russia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-novichok-didnt-stop-russian-opposition-leader-but-a-prison-sentence-might-153480">Alexei Navalny: Novichok didn't stop Russian opposition leader – but a prison sentence might</a>
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<p>Navalny’s fate became the main point of contention for Moscow in its dealings with western governments and media. Navalny was the obligatory subject of high-level contacts with the Russian authorities, with Joe Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56794744">warning that Russia would suffer consequences</a> if Navalny died in prison.</p>
<p>But all this paled into insignificance after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine at the end of February 2022. Overnight, Navalny’s fate seemed diminished against the backdrop of Europe’s biggest war since 1945.</p>
<p>Navalny’s own agenda of generating enough domestic protest to topple the regime became obsolete as the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-kremlins-ruthless-crackdown-stifles-independent-journalism-and-anti-war-movement/">new anti-opposition laws were enforced</a> and most of his most ardent supporters fled the country. Navalny tried to stay relevant by promoting his views from prison, including a <a href="https://4fishgreenberg.medium.com/alexey-navalny-on-the-anniversary-of-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-2aa18f5602c4">call to end the war</a> by handing over all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, and paying reparations to Ukraine. It’s not clear that he gained any supporters in Russia, but he certainly appealed to those in exile and to western governments.</p>
<p>With the West and its allies imposing an unprecedented level of sanctions on Russia and providing Ukraine with the military support to defeat Putin on the battlefield, there’s literally nothing else the west can do to punish Russia over Navalny’s fate.</p>
<h2>The rest is dictatorship</h2>
<p>Alexei Navalny was clearly a very brave and charismatic politician who posed the most significant domestic challenge to Putin’s regime in more than a decade. He never really came close to toppling Putin, and perhaps often <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-novichok-didnt-stop-russian-opposition-leader-but-a-prison-sentence-might-153480">overestimated his level of support</a> within Russia.</p>
<p>With the news of his untimely death in prison, the question remains whether he could have done more from exile in the west. He would have joined a long list of Russian opposition leaders, from former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky to chess champion Garry Kasparov, who have virtually no influence on what happens in Russia. But Navalny’s refusal to go down that road, and his belief in his own importance, is precisely what has made him stand out in Russian politics.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Navalny’s death draws a line under the era when politics was politics in Russia. Today there is only Putin’s own personal authoritarianism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Titov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The opposition leader was poisoned and sent to a brutal prison camp where he is reported to have died.Alexander Titov, Lecturer in Modern European History, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201472023-12-19T13:17:49Z2023-12-19T13:17:49ZAlexei Navalny disappears from jail – another in the long line of Russian dissidents to fall foul of Vladimir Putin<p>There is growing concern about Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny who is reported <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/russia-navalnys-enforced-disappearance-raises-grave-concerns-un-expert">to have disappeared</a> from the Russian prison colony in which he has been serving a lengthy sentence. Lawyers for the 47-year-old dissident said he had last been in contact two weeks ago. </p>
<p>Navalny’s imprisonment has been condemned by human rights organisations as “politically motivated” and he was due to face fresh charges. But it was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/18/courts-halt-cases-against-alexei-navalny-after-disappearance-of-jailed-activist">announced on Monday</a> that seven criminal proceedings that were pending had been put on hold. This has fuelled fears about his whereabouts and also his health, which has reportedly deteriorated due to the conditions in which he was being held.</p>
<p>There has been speculation that he may have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-navalny-prison-moved-incommunicado/32725465.html">transferred to a harsher prison</a>. Dmitry Peskov, press secretary to Russian president Vladimir Putin, declined to comment, saying he had “neither the intention nor the ability to track the fate of prisoners”.</p>
<p>Nalvany’s apparent disappearance comes as Putin has launched his campaign for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/08/vladimir-putin-to-run-for-russian-president-again-in-march-2024">fifth term of office</a>. Elections scheduled for March 2024 are generally thought to be no more than a formality, given the lack of any real opposition. </p>
<h2>Silencing dissent</h2>
<p>The Russian government has penetrated, intimidated, or silenced most opposition inside Russia. It accomplishes this through a spectrum of methods that ramp up depending on the type of activity and the prominence of the opposition leader. The severity of opposition action determines the intensity of response. </p>
<p><strong>How the Putin government deals with its opponents</strong></p>
<p>If anyone in Russia criticises the Putin regime – either online or in person – the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s powerful internal security agency, can initiate human or technical monitoring. Human monitoring involves the FSB recruiting a person and instructing them to become acquainted with a suspect, listen to their conversations, and initiate opposition-themed discussion to draw out the suspect’s reactions.</p>
<p>The FSB has several options if a person takes the bait and expresses agreement with the anti-government provocation. It can approach the person and recruit them as a source to report on colleagues, often using the threat of arrest as incentive. It can invite them to a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2023.2280430">“prophylactic” conversation</a>, informing them that the FSB is aware of their activity and recommends they cease before they get into real trouble. Or the FSB can arrest them and hold them briefly to frighten them into stopping their oppositionist speech. In lower-level cases, the goal is to disrupt the activity before it becomes dangerous.</p>
<p>In combination with human operations, the FSB also has <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/isw-russias-fsb-supports-law-expanding-digital-surveillance/">legal access to Russian internet</a> and voice communications to monitor conversations, determine the intensity of oppositionist speech, and identify group leaders. Communication intercepts <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-net/2022">are allowed</a> in Russia with a formal court order. </p>
<p>But the wide spectrum of criminal violations that the FSB is responsible for investigating – from economic and fraud laws to terrorism laws – and the broad latitude the FSB enjoys in interpreting those laws, makes it easy to find a reason to justify a communication intercept warrant. The expansion of laws <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/07/russia-criminalizes-independent-war-reporting-anti-war-protests">prohibiting anti-war rhetoric</a> since the Russian invasion of Ukraine makes it even easier.</p>
<h2>Harsh treatment</h2>
<p>The next level of intensity involves a person joining and actively participating in an opposition movement, such as in anti-regime demonstrations or publications. In such cases, like those that occurred in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-1000-protesters-arrested-ukraine-invasion/31738786.html">February and March 2022</a>, the FSB can arrest or physically restrain participants, with support from the Russian National Guard, and charge the organisers with a spectrum of crimes. These can range from terrorism and extremism to treason. </p>
<p>Becoming an opposition figurehead and gaining a following that potentially rivals Putin is the highest form of anti-regime activity and prompts the most intense response. That most often means long jail sentences. Anti-Putin politician Vladimir Kara-Murza was arrested in April 2022 and charged with treason in August 2023. He’s now serving <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-opposition-politican-kara-murza-loses-appeal-against-treason-sentence-2023-07-31/">25 years in prison</a>.</p>
<p>Navalny, who has continued to criticise Putin even from prison, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/20/russian-opposition-figure-alexei-navalny-says-faces-new-charges">was charged with terrorism</a> in October 2022, which will probably keep him in prison for life – however long that turns out to be, given recent reports of his ill-health and the conditions in which he is held.</p>
<h2>Ultimate sanction</h2>
<p>Beyond long jail sentences, a few select opposition figures warrant the highest form of punishment: assassination. This comes when other methods of persuasion and intimidation fail and an opposition leader becomes a symbol. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31669061">Boris Nemtsov</a>, Navalny’s and Kara-Murza’s political partner, died under suspicious circumstances in February 2015. He had been arrested for anti-Putin speech in 2007, 2010 and 2011, before being shot dead in Moscow. Kara-Murza survived <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-kara-murza-trial-poisonings-treason/32320597.html">two suspected poisonings</a>, in 2015 and in 2017. </p>
<p>Navalny was targeted for assassination in 2020 when the FSB reportedly <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-poisoning-what-theatrical-assassination-attempts-reveal-about-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-145664">tried to poison him</a> using the chemical weapon Novichok. The investigative journalist organisation Bellingcat assessed that Kara-Murza and Navalny had been under investigation for years and the same FSB element <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/02/11/navalny-kara-murza-tailed-by-same-fsb-squad-before-alleged-poisonings-investigation-a72911">had been tailing</a> both of them.</p>
<p>But assassination is a last resort for suppressing opposition because of the prospect that an individual could become a martyr – even more popular in death than in life. A long prison sentence allows an opposition leader to remain a symbol of defeat for the Russian population to see. </p>
<p>Navalny’s apparent disappearance is probably the result of his continued ability to make anti-regime statements from prison. Some <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/12/14/alexei-navalny-russias-opposition-leader-is-missing-in-the-gulag">western media reports</a> have speculated that he has been murdered. But it is more likely he has been transferred to another prison where his ability to communicate with the outside world is more firmly controlled.</p>
<p>Former Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who became prominent for his criticism of the Russian military’s handling of the war in Ukraine, went a step further and turned his company’s military power on Moscow. His <a href="https://theconversation.com/yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-boss-joins-long-list-of-those-who-challenged-vladimir-putin-and-paid-the-price-212181">sudden death</a> in an airplane crash in August 2023, possibly caused by an anti-aircraft missile, is not surprising in the context of the intensity scale.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220147/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Riehle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Navalny survived poisoning only to be arrested and sentenced to more than 30 years in jail. Now he has disappeared.Kevin Riehle, Lecturer in Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122212023-08-24T20:51:05Z2023-08-24T20:51:05ZVladimir Putin’s suspected elimination of Yevgeny Prigozhin: The hunter to become the hunted?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544594/original/file-20230824-3987-zkdg4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3988%2C2167&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People carry a body bag away from the wreckage of a crashed private jet near the Russian village of Kuzhenkinoi on Aug. 24, 2023. Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group, reportedly died in the crash along with nine other people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/vladimir-putins-suspected-elimination-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-the-hunter-to-become-the-hunted" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, is presumed dead. Russia’s Air Transport Agency has said <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/24/prigozhin-wagner-plane-crash-list-dmitry-utkin/">he was on the passenger manifest of 10 people on board a private jet that came down in a fiery crash</a> close to Moscow, killing everyone on board, while a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/24/prigozhin-presumed-dead-final-nail-in-coffin-for-russias-wagner-group.html">Telegram channel associated with Wagner confirmed his passing.</a></p>
<p>Plane crashes do happen, but in Russia, any unexpected events with political links are viewed with great suspicion. An incident of this magnitude will invariably cast suspicion on the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin’s regime is unlikely to be able to disown the crash — and there will most certainly be unforeseen and unintended consequences.</p>
<p>Many believed Prigozhin was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/24/opinions/wagner-chief-prigozhin-borrowed-time-putin-treisman/index.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20founder%20Yevgeny%20Prigozhin,mutiny%20against%20Russia's%20military%20leadership.">living on borrowed time</a> ever since he led an unsuccessful uprising against Russian forces in June, when he not only demanded a change in Russia’s military leadership but challenged Putin’s rationale for his war on Ukraine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-wagner-group-revolt-in-russia-could-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-208428">What the Wagner Group revolt in Russia could mean for the war in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Eliminating opponents</h2>
<p>Though Prigozhin said his actions <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/putin-defense-chief-who-was-focus-of-wagner-mutiny-visits-troops?in_source=embedded-checkout-banner">weren’t an act against Putin</a>, there could hardly have been a more brazen affront. Normally, Putin <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/list-of-people-putin-is-suspected-of-assassinating-2016-3">promptly and mercilessly eliminates opponents for far less.</a></p>
<p>In fact, during the morning of the mutiny, Putin <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9791119/putin-wagner-group-rebellion/">labelled the mutineers traitors and their actions treason</a>. Yet by the afternoon, faced with the reality that his military and his security services had shown no inclination to fight for him, Putin granted the mutineers amnesty. Several days later, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/world/europe/putin-prigozhin-meeting-wagner.html">he met with Prigozhin</a> without punishing him.</p>
<p>The Russian leader was clearly faced with an intractable dilemma. His personality-centred regime — despite well-intentioned attempts by scholars to provide <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282669">sophisticated theoretical characterizations of “Putinism”</a> — does not fit the standard mould for authoritarian leaders.
Various historical strands, philosophies or precedents for clues simply muddy the waters when it comes to Putin’s rationales and motives.</p>
<p>In certain ways, Putin’s rule is both more simple and more sinister. He is all about power and privilege, and given the nature of his corrosively corrupt regime, which <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/08/23/yevgeny-prigozhins-reported-death-may-consolidate-putins-power?utm_content=article-link-1&etear=nl_today_1&utm_campaign=a.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=8/23/2023&utm_id=1734548">the <em>Economist</em> magazine calls a “mafia state,”</a> he must ruthlessly and visibly punish challengers to deter anyone from infringing on his powers.</p>
<p>Normally, Putin’s brutality has paid off and reinforced his image of invincibility. Opponents have been shot, poisoned, fallen out of windows or committed sudden suicide. Antony Blinken, the United States secretary of state, quipped recently: <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-21-23/h_57611fbdfa9f02986dafbb36c1dff340#:%7E:text=US%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20Blinken%20said%20that%20Wagner%20founder,has%20an%20open%2Dwindows%20policy.">“NATO has an open-door policy; Russia has an open windows policy.”</a></p>
<p>Putin, however, also appreciated the risks of eliminating Prigozhin. He had good reason to be cautious. </p>
<h2>Prigozhin loyalists</h2>
<p>Unlike other political opponents, or various dissidents, Prigozhin commanded a powerful base. The Wagner Group, co-founded by Dmitry Utkin, may have been bloated by the recruitment of thousands of convicts, but at its core the organization is comprised of highly trained former Russian military men, often from elite units, who have been fiercely loyal to Prigozhin.</p>
<p>These men could be profoundly dangerous if angered and focused on a particular cause.</p>
<p>Yet Putin could not afford to have the leader of the mutiny go unpunished.</p>
<p>The early reaction of the Wagner Group to the death of Prigozhin, (and his No. 2, Utkin) — declaring on the social media platform Telegram that Prigozhin was a “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/plane-allegedly-carrying-wagner-chief-prigozhin-crashes-after-mutiny-against-putin/#:%7E:text=On%20its%20Telegram%20group%2C%20Wagner,had%20been%20on%20the%20plane.">hero of Russia, a true patriot of his Motherland… (who) died as a result of the actions of traitors to Russia”</a> — offers a noteworthy warning of events to come.</p>
<p>In fact, just weeks before the mutiny, Prigozhin was portrayed as a hero in Russia. In Rostov-on-Don, he and the mutineers were greeted by the population with enthusiasm. </p>
<p>As news began to spread of his death, Russians began leaving masses of flowers at Wagner headquarters in St. Petersburg.</p>
<p>The risk here for Putin is that rather than looking strong and fearsome — which could be the case in the short-term amid state media’s reporting of the crash — he will also appear duplicitous and increasingly desperate. </p>
<p>Over the long term, it’s hardly inconceivable that the core members of Wagner, who so admired and were so loyal to Prigozhin, will seek revenge against the Russian leader. In that case, Putin, who always views himself as a hunter, might well become the hunted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurel Braun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The core members of the Wagner Group, who are loyal to the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, will likely seek revenge against Vladimir Putin for his death. Is the Russian leader now living on borrowed time?Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121802023-08-24T09:15:32Z2023-08-24T09:15:32ZWagner chief Prigozhin reportedly killed, but has Putin cooked his own goose?<p>Perhaps the most unexpected thing about the plane crash that reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-66599774">killed</a> Yevgeny Prigozhin, the bombastic head of Russia’s infamous Wagner group, is that it happened a full two months after he brought Russia to what President Vladimir Putin warned at the time was the brink of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-military-wagner-civil-war/32477931.html">civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Prigozhin certainly seemed to be living on borrowed time. His <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagners-rebellion-may-have-been-thwarted-but-putin-has-never-looked-weaker-and-more-vulnerable-208436">bizarre revolt</a> against Russia’s military leadership, which saw an armoured Wagner convoy proceed largely unchallenged through southern Russia until it stopped just short of Moscow, flew in the face of the twin rules for survival in Putin’s Russia. One, you don’t rock the boat. Two, you don’t challenge the tsar.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagners-rebellion-may-have-been-thwarted-but-putin-has-never-looked-weaker-and-more-vulnerable-208436">Wagner's rebellion may have been thwarted, but Putin has never looked weaker and more vulnerable</a>
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<p>But the popular assumption that Prigozhin would swiftly be eliminated – which shifted to surprise when he wasn’t – tells us much about the current weakness and fragility that surrounds Russian politics. In fact, Prigozhin’s apparent elimination is likely to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/prigozhin-dead-putin-still-weakened">exacerbate that weakness</a> rather than lead to a magical reassertion of Putin’s authority.</p>
<p>First, it shows Russian elites they can’t trust anything their president says. That’s a significant departure from the Kremlin’s previous modus operandi, whereby those in positions of power and influence were <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/12/01/centrifugal-forces-why-russian-oligarchs-remain-loyal-to-the-putin-government-op-ed-a59760">protected</a> by Putin. They could count on him as long as they played by his rules. </p>
<p>Although Prigozhin eventually departed from that, he went out of his way for many years – even <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230710-russian-president-putin-met-wagner-chief-prigozhin-in-moscow-days-after-failed-mutiny">after</a> his mutiny – to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin. </p>
<p>Following the Wagner revolt it seemed <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90161">perplexing</a> for Putin to give Prigozhin and his Wagner co-conspirators a public assurance they would be safe from retribution. Now, Prigozhin’s subsequent likely death – the crash was reported by Wagner’s Telegram channel as having been caused by a Russian <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/jet-believed-to-be-carrying-wagner-boss-prigozhin-crashes-in-russia/">air defence missile</a> – means it matters very little whether it was an accident: nobody will believe this was anything other than revenge. </p>
<p>While that may initially give the more ambitious members of the Kremlin clans some pause, they now have real incentives to seek out an alternative. Put simply, Putin’s politics of terror has a self-destructive flaw: ruling through fear and deception inevitably prompts those who might be targets (which is essentially anyone) to eventually try to change the rules of the game.</p>
<p>Second, Prigozhin’s death won’t spell the end for private military companies (PMCs) in Russia. On the contrary, they’re likely to continue to <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/06/ukraine-is-a-breeding-ground-for-russian-pmcs.html">proliferate</a>. Already the energy giant <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/02/22/the-coming-hurricane-russian-energy-giant-gazprom-is-creating-an-army/?sh=5d11fa9842e9">Gazprom</a> has several of them, with operators in Ukraine as well as Russia. There is also speculation the fast-expanding <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-other-mercenary-companies-ukraine/32424520.html">Redut</a> group may now try to step in to fill the Wagner void.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-how-a-one-time-food-caterer-became-vladimir-putins-biggest-threat-208450">The rise of Yevgeny Prigozhin: how a one-time food caterer became Vladimir Putin's biggest threat</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>But this has a bearing on Russian domestic politics too: PMCs are likely to be used by influential figures as private armies for their own protection from the Russian state, just as much as they might be employed as proxies in its service. </p>
<p>That, in turn, raises the spectre of a society of warlords – not just confined to strongmen on Russia’s periphery, such as the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/20/mad-dogs-what-are-chechen-fighters-doing-in-ukraine">Kadyrovites</a> who are loyal to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov – but in other parts of Russia closer to the centres of power in Moscow and St Petersburg. Under those circumstances, the prospects for stability in Russia are grim. </p>
<p>Ironically, perhaps the least significant impact of Prigozhin’s death will be on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Wagner forces had been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-25/kyiv-defences-repel-russian-drone-attack-officials/102393300">withdrawn</a> from combat a couple of months previously. They have not been redeployed to the front since Prigozhin’s revolt. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-under-pressure-the-military-melodrama-between-the-wagner-group-and-russias-armed-forces-205475">Putin under pressure: the military melodrama between the Wagner group and Russia’s armed forces</a>
</strong>
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<p>Wagner troops have been offered the choice of joining other Russian PMCs or signing contracts with the Russian armed forces: the former remains the preferred option given the regular Russian military is <a href="https://qz.com/wagner-group-pay-russian-military-yevgeny-prigozhin-1850575697">poorly paid</a> in comparison. There will also be those who choose neither option, leaving the problem of significant numbers of Russian men trained for violence at large in its society.</p>
<p>As for the future of the organisation itself, Wagner is at a crossroads. In addition to Prigozhin, two other victims in the crash were Wagner’s alleged co-founder <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">Dmitry Utkin</a>, who was responsible for its combat operations, and its head of security <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-group-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-passenger-list-plane/story?id=102497445">Valery Chekalov</a>. The crash has therefore not only killed a Putin rival, but also permanently erased Wagner’s senior command structure. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1694443355663733109"}"></div></p>
<p>Yet Wagner remains important for the promotion of the Kremlin’s interests in damaging US and European influence in Africa. Beyond its active role in Syria, it has been instrumental in <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/it-s-time-australia-branded-russia-s-wagner-group-terrorist-organisation">boosting Russian prestige</a> by propping up regional dictators in Mali and the Central African Republic, which have rewarded Wagner with lucrative natural resource contracts. It may continue in an abridged form under new management, or be subsumed into another proxy Russian force.</p>
<p>A final important puzzle concerns why the Kremlin waited so long to rid itself of Prigozhin. We can only speculate here, but one theory is the intelligence services needed time to discover how deeply the pro-Wagner rot had extended into the armed forces and other power structures. </p>
<p>It is striking that Sergei Surovikin (the former commander of Russian forces in Ukraine who had disappeared under suspicion of being a Wagner sympathiser) was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/23/russia-removes-sergei-surovikin-as-head-of-aerospace-forces">formally removed from his post</a> as Russia’s Air Force chief at almost the exact same time as Prigozhin’s plane went down. </p>
<p>Prigozhin’s career trajectory saw him rise from a convicted felon to presidential caterer, then Russia’s main disinformation peddler, and eventually the wealthy and brutal head of a semi-private military company that sought to outcompete Russia’s own Defence Ministry for influence. </p>
<p>But despite his colourful CV, one suspects his real legacy will be that in abortively mounting a challenge to Moscow’s established power structures, Prigozhin ultimately established a precedent for one that succeeds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>The apparent death of the warlord in a plane shot down over Russia tells us much about the fragility that surrounds Russian politics.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083302023-07-06T12:26:31Z2023-07-06T12:26:31ZRussia’s kidnapping of Ukrainian children is not unique – Putin and others have long used children as political pawns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534668/original/file-20230628-17-r6tpca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People in Brussels attend a memorial for the Ukrainian children who have been forcibly taken to Russia. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1247413833/photo/avaaz-demonstration-for-ukrainian-children-kidnapped-by-russia.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=9h-qz3QRujrOfaZteTqg0aimHxEuSz-EMiTSo_b-6FY=">hierry Monasse/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian soldiers have forcibly taken an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/29/i-was-so-scared-the-ukrainian-children-taken-to-russia-for-financial-gain">16,000 Ukrainian children</a> to Russia. <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/more-300-deported-ukrainian-children-104447714.html">Over 300 children</a> have since returned home, but it is not clear what happened to most of the rest.</p>
<p>The mass abductions led prosecutors at the International Criminal Court to issue <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">arrest warrants in March 2023</a> for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s children’s rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova. Moscow counters that the children it has brought to Russia – its estimates are as many as 744,000 Ukrainian children – <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/07/life-on-the-margins-the-fate-of-ukraines-forcibly-deported-children">have been evacuated </a>from conflict zones.</p>
<p>I am <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/clementine-fujimura-1339930">an anthropologist</a> who <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Clementine-Fujimura">studies marginalized communities</a>, including youth subcultures in Russia and other places, including the United States and parts of Europe. </p>
<p>The kidnapping of Ukrainian children offers a reminder of how Putin and other Russian leaders have historically used children as pawns in international politics. </p>
<h2>A Soviet promise to children</h2>
<p>I explore the lives of homeless and abandoned Russian children, including kids in orphanages and other similar institutions in Moscow, in my 2005 co-authored book, “<a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/russias-abandoned-children-9780275979096/">Russia’s Abandoned Children: An Intimate Understanding</a>.” </p>
<p>My research included numerous trips to Russian orphanages between 1990 and 2000, as well as time spent living and volunteering in an orphanage and shelter for babies. </p>
<p>It’s helpful to understand that before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Soviet government presented a myth that all children – including those in institutions – would receive excellent care. The Soviet government <a href="https://thevieweast.wordpress.com/2012/06/21/the-littlest-enemies-children-of-the-stalinist-era/">promised these children</a> that their <a href="https://blogs.bu.edu/guidedhistory/russia-and-its-empires/elise-alexander/">futures were promising</a> and that they would receive an education and have help getting a job.</p>
<p>Other than adults who worked in these Soviet orphanages or psychiatric hospitals, no one was allowed to see what went on inside. </p>
<p>The myth of these orphaned children’s perfect childhood calmed citizens’ potential concerns, my research shows. </p>
<p>However, the public began to realize Russian orphans’ plight once the Soviet Union broke apart. Orphans and otherwise abandoned children in orphanages began to escape the institutions when possible. They formed their own version of kinship groups, gathering on city streets and in underground train stations. </p>
<p>I discovered in my research that many abandoned children preferred being homeless to living in orphanages. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5T_O-L5Mis">trend of youth vagrancy</a> became a sore spot for the Russian government, as it tried to grow its economy and rebrand itself in the West.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Six infants lie together in a crib, with a flower printed mattress." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534669/original/file-20230628-19397-ksv329.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soviet orphans play in a crib in 1991, the year the Soviet Union fell.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/635964925/photo/infants-playing-in-a-crib.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=-6y1U5oVu3CUu9wsPz9K01pXzT6a2sJC7y4D64926mI=">Peter Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Russia’s struggle to care for kids</h2>
<p>Russia’s decision to end adoptions to American families in 2012 offers another example of how the Russian government has used children for nefarious purposes in the past few decades. </p>
<p>The Russian government first opened the doors for international adoption in 1991. Citizens from the U.S. and other Western countries eagerly responded, welcoming the new openness of Russia. </p>
<p>This helped boost Russia’s image in the West as a kinder country than it was during the Cold War. At the time, around 371,700 Russian children were <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2012/03/28/russia-struggles-to-reform-soviet-era-orphanages-a13621">growing up in state institutions</a>. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-orphans-government-takes-custody-of-children-when-parents-cant-cope/2013/05/02/4d17ff4a-a757-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html">Most of these kids</a> had at least one living parent. </p>
<p>In some cases, government <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-orphans-government-takes-custody-of-children-when-parents-cant-cope/2013/05/02/4d17ff4a-a757-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html">deemed some parents unfit</a> for the job and moved the kids to an institution. </p>
<p>U.S. citizens adopted more than 60,000 Russian orphans <a href="https://www.adoptivefamilies.com/resources/adoption-news/russian-adoption-a-brief-history-whats-behind-the-current-media-attention/">from the early 1990s</a> until 2013.</p>
<p>During my time spent with teachers, doctors and children in Russian orphanages and shelters, it was clear that Russia struggled to care for abandoned and otherwise institutionalized children, including those taken from parents. </p>
<p>There <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-dec-17-mn-54995-story.html">were also widespread reports</a> of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/russia2/Russ98d-02.htm">children being neglected</a> and mistreated. </p>
<p>In the orphanage I studied, children did not eat fresh fruits and vegetables, and the caretakers often lamented the food’s lack of nutritional value. I was asked to bring vitamins, diaper rash cream and other basic necessities. </p>
<p>The fact that the Russian government could not handle its orphans was a source of embarrassment. Putin, who served as president from 2000 through 2008 and again starting in 2012, saw the need to change the narrative of the poor Russian orphan, if only for the sake of the country’s public image. </p>
<h2>‘It’s hard to believe’</h2>
<p>In 2008, a Russian toddler born with the name Dima Yakovlev <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/adopted-russian-toddler-dies-in-texas/2013/02/19/493b3862-7aa0-11e2-9a75-dab0201670da_story.html">died of heatstroke</a> while left unattended in his adoptive father’s parked car in the Washington, D.C., area. </p>
<p>This news made international headlines. Some Russian officials pointed out the lack of oversight and abuse that adopted Russian children experienced in the U.S. This narrative helped weaken the U.S. in the eyes of Russian citizens, thereby strengthening the image of the Russian government. </p>
<p>“When we <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/world/europe/04adopt.html">give our children to the West</a> and they die, for some reason the West always tells us it was just an accident,” Russian politician Tatyana Yakovleva reportedly said in 2009. “It’s hard to believe.”</p>
<p>This case and other news stories about a few U.S. adoptive families <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/us/adopted-child-returned/index.html">treating Russian children poorly</a> coincided with another political controversy. </p>
<p>Russian police arrested <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/world/americas/kremlin-adoptions-sanctions-russia.html">attorney Sergei Magnitsky</a> on questionable grounds. Magnitsky had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/world/americas/kremlin-adoptions-sanctions-russia.html">uncovered a tax fraud</a> worth US$230 million. Magnitsky <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jul/06/who-was-sergei-magnitsky-and-how-did-uk-sanctions-come-about">died while in custody</a> in 2009, before he could stand trial. </p>
<p>In 2012, the U.S. Congress approved new legislation, called the Magnitsky Act, which identifies and imposes sanctions on Russian officials who are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20857068">accused of human rights violations</a>. </p>
<h2>A halt to adoptions</h2>
<p>In 2012, Putin signed the law banning international adoptions to the U.S.</p>
<p>Putin’s <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/NEWadoptionassets/pdfs/AdoptionsNoticesPDFs2019/2013AdoptionArchive/Russia%20_Alert_Legislation%20to%20Ban%20Intercountry%20Adoption%20by%20U.S.%20Families_January%202%2C%202013.pdf">law, which went into effect</a> in early 2013, halted <a href="https://world.time.com/2012/12/20/why-has-moscow-passed-a-law-to-ban-u-s-adoption-of-russian-orphans/">thousands of adoptions</a> already in progress with American families. </p>
<p>U.S. scholars and journalists have argued that Putin’s adoption ban was a direct <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/magnitsky-act-kremlin/535044/">retaliation to the Magnitsky Act</a> and was not about Putin’s concern for Russian orphans. Putin <a href="https://www.fpri.org/2015/10/putins-hidden-victims/">promised to improve</a> the Russian child welfare system in 2013. Some outside analysis by groups like the World Bank have <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/11/services-to-protect-children-in-russia-have-improved-significantly-but-further-progress-needed-says-world-bank#:%7E:text=The%20country%20has%20seen%20significant,percent%20from%202009%20to%202020.">documented positive changes</a> at Russian institutions for children, such as more funding. But there remain challenges – including the fact that Russia has a much higher rate of institutionalized children than other middle- to high-income countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A child swings in front of a destroyed, burned looking building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534671/original/file-20230628-19670-zqtm6v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While some abducted Ukrainian children have come home to their families, most remain unaccounted for.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1238745447/photo/russia-starts-large-scale-attack-on-ukraine.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=509Cik2_BZn4WySDVaBWKW7LkJjG2ZHviqGmLu0RdwU=">Pierre Crom/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A similar playbook</h2>
<p>In the face of evolving battlefield failures in Ukraine, Putin has pivoted to a familiar playbook of using and abusing children, continuing to call for the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/18/how-ukraine-kidnapped-children-led-to-vladimir-putins-arrest-warrant-russia">evacuation” of Ukrainian children,</a> both from Ukrainian orphanages and from their families. These children are being moved to Russian orphanages and camps, where they learn <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/14/ukraine-war-news-russia-has-relocated-more-than-6000-children.html">how to be Russian.</a> </p>
<p>In order to become <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/03/06/ukrainian-kids-kidnapped-by-russia-sent-to-re-education-camps/">citizens of Russia</a>, these children <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747093/EPRS_BRI(2023)747093_EN.pdf">have been forced</a> to abandon their Ukrainian heritage, both physically and mentally, and to get a new education in Russian <a href="https://ge.usembassy.gov/russias-re-education-camps-hold-thousands-of-ukraines-children-report-says/">propaganda and history</a>. </p>
<p>Russian citizens, in turn, are once again presented with the myth that children in Ukraine are being saved from the war and <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/ukraine-fact-fait.aspx?lang=eng">offered a better life</a>.</p>
<p>But for Ukrainian families and orphanage staff involved, these abductions amount to a form of torture, with parents and caretakers clamoring to find their children and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/save-ukraine-children-abduction-russia-war-rescue-operation/">bring them home</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The USNA is not responsible for the content found in this article. In addition,
the content of this article does not reflect the opinions, standards, policy,
or endorsement of the Naval Academy or the United States Government.</span></em></p>Russia’s systematic manipulation of children dates back long before the war in Ukraine, to when the Soviet Union first made false promises to its large population of orphans.Clementine Fujimura, Professor of Anthropology, Area Studies and Russian, United States Naval AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2084302023-06-25T13:51:56Z2023-06-25T13:51:56ZWagner’s mutiny punctured Putin’s ‘strongman’ image and exposed cracks in his rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533851/original/file-20230625-29-vp3n6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3387%2C2265&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Open defiance in Rostov-on-Don.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-poses-for-a-photo-in-front-of-the-wagner-group-news-photo/1259024080?adppopup=true">Feodor Larin/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Less than 24 hours after the mutiny began, it was over. </p>
<p>As the rebelling Wagner column <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/06/24/1184166949/wagner-group-moscow-halting-march-russia">bore down on Moscow</a>, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/06/2023/649746e59a79475d3216e36a?from=from_main_1">brokered a deal</a> under which Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to drop criminal charges against the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and allow him to seek asylum in Belarus. The departing Wagner <a href="https://meduza.io/video/2023/06/25/prigozhin-vyvel-naemnikov-chvk-vagnera-iz-rostova-na-donu">troops were given</a> a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66006860">heroes’ send-off</a> by some residents of Rostov-on-Don – the southern Russian town they had taken control over without firing a shot earlier in the day.</p>
<p>Prigozhin gambled and lost. But he lives to fight another day – for now at least.</p>
<p>The events of June 24, 2023, had observers searching for the right term to describe what was going on: Was this a coup attempt, a mutiny, an insurrection?</p>
<p>Did Prigozhin seriously think that he would be able to enter Moscow? Perhaps he genuinely believed that Putin would accede to his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/06/23/1184090744/russia-wagner-group-yevgeny-prigozhin-criminal-case">demand to fire Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu</a> and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov – two men that the Wagner group head has previously harshly criticized for their conduct of the war. </p>
<p>More radically, Prigozhin may have hoped that he would receive support from elements in the Russian military. Indeed, that seemed to be the case – his group encountered <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/leader-of-wagner-mercenaries-says-forces-entered-russian-city-of-rostov-facing-no-resistance#:%7E:text=Prigozhin%20claimed%20early%20Saturday%20that,'t%20fighting%20against%20children.%E2%80%9D">no resistance in taking over Rostov-on-Don</a> or heading north for some 350 miles (600 kilometers) through Voronezh and Lipetsk provinces – though they were <a href="https://defence-blog.com/russian-mercenary-claim-they-have-shot-down-another-military-helicopter/">reportedly attacked by a helicopter gunship</a>, which they shot down. Prigozhin claimed to command 25,000 troops, though the actual number may be half that figure.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A smiling man in the back seat of a car." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533853/original/file-20230625-104821-qa1qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Head of the Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin leaves Rostov-on-Don.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/head-of-the-wagner-group-yevgeny-prigozhin-left-the-news-photo/1259027097?adppopup=true">Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But while the mutiny was short-lived and its goals unclear, it will have lasting effects – exposing the fragility of Putin’s grip on power and his ability to lead Russia to victory over Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Putin’s impotence</h2>
<p>Prigozhin’s abortive insurrection has punctured the “strongman” image of Putin, both for world leaders and for ordinary Russians.</p>
<p>He was unable to do anything to stop Prigozhin’s rogue military unit as it seized Rostov-on-Don – where the Russian Southern Military Command is headquartered – and then sent a column of armored vehicles up the M4 highway toward Moscow. Putin was forced to <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6067670?from=spot">make a televised address</a> at 10 a.m. local time on June 24 describing the revolt as a “stab in the back” and calling for harsh punishment of the mutineers. But it was the intervention of Belarus President Lukashenko that brought about an end to the mutiny, not any words or actions from Putin. Somewhat uncharacteristically, both Prigozhin and Putin exercised restraint and stepped back from the brink of civil war by agreeing on the compromise deal that allowed Prigozhin to escape punishment.</p>
<p><iframe id="AThA4" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/AThA4/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Exiled Russian political scientist Kirill Rogov <a href="https://re-russia.net/en/analytics/083/">has argued</a> that the most challenging development to Russia’s leaders may not be the mutiny itself, but the rhetoric that Prigozhin used to justify his actions. In an <a href="https://news.zerkalo.io/world/42087.html">interview released on social media</a> a day before taking control of Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin argued that the Ukraine war was a mistake from the beginning, launched to benefit the personal interests of Defense Minister Shoigu and an inner circle of oligarchs. Prigozhin brushed aside all the ideological claims Putin has made about the war – the need to denazify Ukraine, the threat of NATO expansion – as just cover for self-interest. “Our holy war has turned into a racket,” he said.</p>
<p>Prigozhin’s words and actions have exposed the vulnerability of Putin’s grip on power and the hollowness of his ideological framing of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s place in the world.</p>
<h2>Nationalist discontent</h2>
<p>Putin’s constant refrain is that any opposition to his rule – whether it be from the Kyiv government or from protesters at home – is part of a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-kyiv-moscow-6ccaef3a9d9d5ccd370d70126db78c5a">Western plot to weaken Russia</a>. It is hard to imagine that his propagandists will be able to argue that Prigozhin is also a tool of the West.</p>
<p>Over the past 10 years, and especially since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Putin has ruthlessly deployed the coercive apparatus of the state to crush any liberal opposition. At the same time, radical ultra-nationalists – not only Prigozhin but also the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65179954">military bloggers and correspondents</a> reporting from the war zone – have been given a relatively free hand.</p>
<p>For the most part, they were kept out of state-controlled television broadcasts, but they have reached a wider Russian audience through social media channels such as Telegram, VKontakte and YouTube.</p>
<p>Prigozhin, a former convict who went on to provide catering for the Kremlin before founding the Wagner group, has seen his profile and popularity in Russia rise during the war in Ukraine. In May 2023 polling, he was <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2023-05-31/russian-public-support-for-putin-remains-high-despite-concerns-about-ukraine-war-poll">cited among the top 10 trusted political figures</a>.</p>
<p>It is unclear why Putin was tolerating the nationalists, Prigozhin included, as they increasingly questioned Russia’s war performance. It may be because the Russian president is ideologically aligned with them, or saw them as useful in balancing the power of the generals. Perhaps, also, Putin had come to believe his own propaganda – that nobody could be more nationalist than Putin himself and that Russia and Putin were one and the same thing – echoing presidential aide Vyacheslav Volodin’s <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2595599">2014 comment</a>: “No Putin, no Russia”.</p>
<p>Certainly prior to the Wagner mutiny, there were growing winds of discontent among nationalists. On April 1, 2023, one group of prominent bloggers, including <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Girkin">Igor Girkin</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Gubarev">Pavel Gubarev</a>, announced the formation of a “Club of Angry Patriots.” As Wagner soldiers marched toward Moscow on June 24, the club <a href="https://vk.com/krprus">issued a statement</a> of indirect support for Prigozhin. </p>
<p>Prigozhin might now be in the Belarusian capital, Minsk, where – theoretically at least – he can do less damage to Putin. But there are other discontents still in Moscow, and politically active.</p>
<p>Security services in Russia have begun raiding Wagner group offices, but it remains unclear what will happen to Prigozhin’s extensive business operations around the world. Wagner soldiers will be offered the chance to sign contracts with the defense ministry – if they did not take direct part in the insurrection.</p>
<h2>A lame-duck president?</h2>
<p>Putin has no one to blame but himself for the crisis. Prigozhin’s Wagner group was created with his blessing and promoted by the Russian president. It was a tool that Putin could use to further Russia’s military and economic objectives without direct political or legal accountability – initially in the Donbas in eastern Ukraine in 2014, then in Syria, Libya and <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">elsewhere in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>It was not until July 2022 that Wagner was officially acknowledged to be fighting in the Ukraine war. But over the past six months, they have played an increasingly prominent role and have been rewarded with praise in the Russian media.</p>
<p>But as his prestige grew, so too did Prigozhin’s criticism of those around Putin. Starting in December 2022, he began openly challenging Shoigu. He avoided direct criticism of Putin, though in an expletive-laced tirade on May 9 – the day Russia commemorates the end of World War II – he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/head-russias-wagner-group-says-still-no-sign-promised-ammunition-2023-05-09/">complained about the lack of ammunition</a> for Wagner fighters and talked about “a happy asshole Grandfather,” in what has been taken to be a clear reference to Putin.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/06/24/putin-konchilsia">remains a mystery</a> why Putin did not move to get rid of Prigozhin before now – one of the many mysteries of Russian politics over the past century.</p>
<p>Prigozhin has inflicted significant damage on his once all-powerful benefactor. Exiled Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/vladimir-putins-weakness-unmasked-yevgeny-prigozhins-rebellion">goes so far as to argue</a> that the failed mutiny has exposed Putin as a “lame-duck” president; likewise, sociologist Vladislav Inozemtsev <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/06/24/putin-konchilsia">asserts</a> that “Putin is finished.” </p>
<p>Such definitive judgments are premature, I feel. Putin is a tough and resilient politician who has faced down the most serious challenge to his authority since he came to power in 2000. But there can be no doubt that the aborted mutiny has exposed profound structural flaws in the Russian system of rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Rutland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Signs of discontent among Russian nationalists and Wagner had been growing before a column of paramilitaries began an aborted march on Moscow.Peter Rutland, Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2078932023-06-20T12:28:10Z2023-06-20T12:28:10ZAs Ukraine takes the fight to Russians, signs of unease in Moscow over war’s progress<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532469/original/file-20230616-4884-ehn6o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6463%2C4729&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Facing harder questions at home.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-attends-the-spief-2023-st-news-photo/1258743279?adppopup=true">Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: This article was written before the events of June 24, 2023, during which Wagner Group paramilitaries seized a town in southern Russia and headed towards Moscow before standing down. On June 25, The Conversation published this article – <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagners-mutiny-punctured-putins-strongman-image-and-exposed-cracks-in-his-rule-208430">Wagner’s mutiny punctured Putin’s ‘strongman’ image and exposed cracks in his rule</a> – analyzing how the short-lived mutiny will impact Russian President Vladimir Putin.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Whether or not <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/13/ukraines-counteroffensive-begins-what-do-we-know-so-far">the Ukraine counteroffensive</a> that began in early June 2023 succeeds in dislodging Russian troops from occupied territory, there are growing signs that the push has prompted <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates">anxiety back in Moscow</a>.</p>
<p>Such unease was, I believe, detectable in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting on June 13 <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71391">with a group of influential military bloggers</a> – people who support the war but have at times been critical of the way it is being fought. The meeting was unusual: In recent months, Putin has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/12/world/europe/putin-skips-news-conference.html">avoided public</a> <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/putin-avoiding-events-amid-increasing-criticism-military-failures-isw-1767245">statements about the war</a> and <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/putin-postponed-annual-marathon-phone-105540229.html">postponed his annual Russia Day phone-in</a> show scheduled for June. He similarly <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/14/ukraine-war-and-popularity-worries-why-putin-is-skipping-his-annual-press-conference-a79702">canceled both</a> the June call-in in 2022 as well as his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/12/world/europe/putin-skips-news-conference.html">annual news conference in December</a>. </p>
<p>And the set-piece events he has attended have been less than convincing. At the June 13 meeting with military bloggers and war correspondents, Putin faced some pointed questions. In answering, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-ukraines-losses-are-vast-so-far-failed-counteroffensive-2023-06-13/">used the term “war</a>” a number of times – deviating from his line that what is happening in Ukraine is a “special operation” – and conceded that Ukrainian attacks across the border into Russia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/13/us/putin-ukraine-war-interview.html">had been damaging</a>.</p>
<h2>On the defensive?</h2>
<p>The meeting was Putin’s first public assessment of the conflict since Ukrainian forces took the war into Russian territory, with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-hit-several-buildings-moscow-mayor-2023-05-30/">drone strikes on Moscow</a> on May 1 and again on May 30 and shelling and forays across the border <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65786624">in the Belgorod region</a> on May 22. The latter <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/12/world/europe/russia-war-belgorod.html">led to the evacuation</a> of tens of thousands of Russian civilians.</p>
<p>These developments further undermine Putin’s argument that this is a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/22/putin-war-ukraine-special-operation/">special military operation</a>” and not a war, and that life can continue as normal for ordinary Russians.</p>
<p>At the same time, Putin is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-yevgeny-prigozhin-and-the-warrior-constituency-that-could-threaten-putin-from-the-right-206875">facing a political challenge</a> from <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/04/07/governor-of-the-grey-zone-en">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a>, the erstwhile chef-turned-mercenary leader. Prigozhin heads <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">the Wagner Group</a>, a private company that has recruited some 50,000 fighters for the Ukraine war on behalf of Moscow. They played a key role in the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-bakhmut-79ce2a44951613509ce9d1afede86f97">capture of the Ukrainian city Bakhmut</a>, which fell on May 20 after a 224-day siege. After the fall of Bakhmut, polling indicated that Prigozhin broke into <a href="https://russiapost.info/society/no_end">the list of top 10 trusted officials</a> as seen by ordinary Russians for the first time. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bald man stands while wearing a dark coat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532489/original/file-20230617-29-36s0x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Wagner Group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Prigozhin has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/13/yevgeniy-prigozhin-mercenary-wagner-putin/">openly critical</a> of the way Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and head of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov are conducting the war. In May 2023, Prigozhin organized a <a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2023/05/31/esli-my-voyuem-dalshe-nado-ob-yavlyat-mobilizatsiyu-uzhe-seychas">series of town meetings</a> across Russia laying out his demands. In an attempt to rein in Prigozhin, Shoigu <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/06/12/kto-ne-pod-nami-tot-protiv-nas">ordered that all volunteer fighters</a> must sign a contract with the defense ministry by July 1 – something Prigozhin refuses to do. </p>
<p>Prigozhin’s business empire includes media outlets, the Internet Research Agency that the U.S. asserts <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/28/politics/state-department-ira-troll-farm-russia/index.html">interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections</a>, a movie series and social media channels that enable him to reach tens of millions of Russians. It forms what reporter Scott Johnson has <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/general-news/russia-wagner-group-prigozhin-propaganda-movies-1235507691/">dubbed the “Wagnerverse</a>.” </p>
<h2>Facing questions</h2>
<p>With the background of more open criticism of a war that has now blown back across the Russian border, Putin faced <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/13/us/putin-ukraine-war-interview.html">some tough questions</a> at the meeting with war correspondents.</p>
<p>One asked why is it that private military companies are not legal in Russia. Putin merely said that it is time to change the law.</p>
<p>Another asked why different regions are allowed to pay different bonuses to contract soldiers from their area. In response, Putin could only offer that Russia is a federal system, and regions spend what they can afford. One blogger pointed out that the border districts inside Russia are not considered part of the “special military operation,” which means that soldiers fighting there do not get combat pay. Another asked about troop rotation and when Russians will know that the war has been won. Putin’s answers were equivocal on both points.</p>
<p>One participant asked Putin about the problem of “parquet generals,” a <a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2023/05/31/esli-my-voyuem-dalshe-nado-ob-yavlyat-mobilizatsiyu-uzhe-seychas">term used by Prigozhin</a> that refers to people sitting in comfortable offices far from the front line. Putin agreed that some generals are not up to the job, but he supported Shoigu’s order that all volunteers should register with the defense ministry. </p>
<p>It wasn’t a full-on grilling, but neither was it a cozy chat.</p>
<h2>Desperate measures</h2>
<p>Judging by <a href="https://russianfield.com/godsvo">opinion surveys</a>, there are few signs as yet that the military setbacks have caused <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/10/why-support-for-putins-war-is-rife-in-russias-worst-hit-regions-a81426">any decrease in popular support</a> for the war in Russia. Many Russians seem to believe that even if it was wrong to start the war, it would be a <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/06/03/the-only-thing-worse-than-war-is-losing-one">mistake to allow Russia to be defeated</a>. </p>
<p>However, members of the Russian elite seem to share the growing unease aired among the bloggers. On May 20-21, Russian officials and policy experts attended a meeting of the influential <a href="https://globalaffairs.ru/">Council on Foreign and Security Policy</a> think tank. Judging by reports from people who attended, such as State Duma Deputy Konstantin Zatulin, there was a clear sense that the war is going badly.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://zatulin.ru/vystuplenie-konstantina-zatulina-na-forsajt-forume-kakaya-ukraina-nam-nuzhna">June 1 speech</a>, Zatulin, a prominent nationalist lawmaker, noted that none of the initial goals of the “special operation” have been realized and admitted that “Ukrainians hate us because we are killing them.” </p>
<p>Zatulin said that at the Council on Foreign and Security Policy meeting, one attendee suggested dropping a nuclear bomb on Rzeszow – the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/weapons-for-ukraines-fight-against-russia-flow-through-small-polish-border-towns-11648066417">transport hub in southeastern Poland</a> through which most of the West’s weapons flow into Ukraine. Indeed, Sergei Karaganov, the head of the council, published an article on June 14 in which he <a href="https://www.rt.com/russia/578042-russia-nuclear-weapons/">argued for the demonstrative use of a nuclear weapon</a> to force the West to stop supplying arms to Ukraine. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, Karaganov was seen as a liberal who supported Russia’s integration with Europe. Now, he apparently believes that Russia’s inability to defeat Ukraine poses a serious threat to its security. Moreover, his talk of deploying nuclear weapons hints at an increasing view among Russian elites that the country cannot win by conventional means alone. Indeed, on June 16, Putin announced that Russia has already started <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russia-positions-nuclear-bombs-belarus-warning-west-2023-06-16/">transferring some tactical nuclear weapons</a> to Belarus.</p>
<p>In the meantime, mercenary leader Prigozhin remains a wild card. Rarely in history have mercenary generals been able to seize political power. Perhaps the <a href="https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/albrecht-von-wallenstein/">most famous mercenary of all time</a>, Albrecht Von Wallenstein, successfully commanded an army of 50,000 during the Thirty Years’ War. He became so powerful that his <a href="https://www.habsburger.net/en/chapter/wallenstein-death-murder">Hapsburg paymasters had him assassinated</a>. </p>
<p>In Russia’s tightly controlled political landscape, there are no precedents for a figure such as Prigozhin. He seems to have few allies among the military establishment or regional governors. As such, it is hard to imagine a scenario where he would be allowed, for example, to create his own political party, still less run for the presidency in 2024.</p>
<p>Yet he is clearly proving to be a thorn in Putin’s side. And the lack of progress toward victory over Ukraine is seemingly making the Russian elite increasingly nervous about how to maintain social stability and stave off political challenges from nationalists who are arguing for more aggressive prosecution of the war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207893/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Rutland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Putin was put on the defensive during an increasingly rare Q&A over the war’s progress. Meanwhile, disquiet among potential rivals is growing.Peter Rutland, Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2008542023-03-01T10:56:09Z2023-03-01T10:56:09ZGleb Pavlovsky obituary: the man who turned Vladimir Putin into Russia’s action man<p>Vladimir Putin’s former adviser and spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/27/ex-kremlin-adviser-gleb-pavlovsky-dies-at-71-a80344">who has died aged 71</a>, was once described as <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/Interview_Kremlin_Political_Consultant_Sees_Medvedev/1936080.html">“Putin’s Karl Rove”</a>. He was the man who got things done in the Kremlin, like Rove did for his political master, George W. Bush.</p>
<p>Pavlovsky – a dissident turned apparatchik turned dissident again – was at the heart of Russian political thinking, whether on the inside or the outside, for the best part of five decades. He is credited as one of the key architects of Russia’s post-Soviet political system, which has become known as the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/super-presidential-risks-and-opportunities-in-russia/">super-presidency</a>” and was instrumental in orchestrating the cult of personality which surrounds the current Russian president.</p>
<p>Many years later, as an outsider and prominent Kremlin critic after falling out with Putin in 2011, Pavlovsky reflected on his work in building the “myth” of Putin:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This myth that Putin decides everything, that there is no alternative to Putin, we worked on constantly throughout his first two terms. Just as everyone knew the Soviet Union was Lenin’s state, for the majority of Russians today Russia is Putin’s state.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Pavlovsky first rose to prominence as a dissident student from Odesa, now a heavily contested and key port city in Ukraine. He edited the dissident journal <em>Poiski</em>, for which he was arrested for <a href="https://chronicle-of-current-events.com/2019/02/16/the-trial-of-gleb-pavlovsky/">false fabrications</a> and exiled internally for three years in the Soviet Union’s far-north Komi Republic in 1982. </p>
<p>Returning to Moscow in 1985, Pavlovsky became an enthusiastic supporter of the reforms of the then Soviet general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev. Quickly establishing himself as a shrewd political operator, in 1995 he founded a political consultancy, the Effective Policy Fund, which Yeltsin hired to work on his 1996 presidential campaign. Pavlovsky went on to work on the 2000 campaign of Yeltsin’s heir apparent Putin, and in all spent 16 years at the heart of Kremlin strategy and image-building.</p>
<p>He quickly made a name for himself as a “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/gleb-pavlovsky/">political technologist</a>” (his own term, apparently) and was front-and-centre of this new approach under both Yeltsin and Putin. Political technology is simply another way of saying <a href="https://www.deciphergrey.com/post/the-globalisation-of-political-technology">political manipulation</a>, by which a figure like Pavlovsky used all the organs of power at his disposal to help ensure the regime could remain in power.</p>
<p>His effectiveness is amply demonstrated in the way he helped Yeltsin win reelection to the presidency in 1996, just months after the incumbent’s appproval had hit a low of <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article-abstract/30/3/255/409/In-Pursuit-of-the-Russian-Presidency-Why-and-How?redirectedFrom=PDF">8%</a> and a year after Yeltsin’s bloc of allied parties lost to the Communist-Nationalist bloc in the 1995 parliamentary elections. Pavlovsky helped devise an <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/gleb-pavlovsky-final-act/">electoral strategy</a> of “no alternative to Yeltsin”, which played on the idea that if Yeltsin lost, the Soviet Union would return.</p>
<h2>Putin as ‘Stirlitz’ – Russia’s favourite macho man</h2>
<p>At the end of the 1990s, Russians craved stability above all and were looking for a strong figure to sort out the chaos created under Yeltsin. Pavlovsky and his team of spin doctors held focus groups which offered a range of strong figures from Russian history including Lenin, Stalin and Peter the Great. </p>
<p>They also threw in a character from a popular Soviet-era drama, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventeen_Moments_of_Spring">Seventeen Moments of Spring</a>, in which a Russian spy, Maxim Isaev, infiltrates the Nazi party under the name of Max Otto von Stirlitz. As Pavlovsky was to recall many years later:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We even did an experiment in one magazine. They did a cover: “President Year 2000”. This magazine was extremely popular. It pictured this Stirlitz character wearing [the] SS uniform. We realised that we needed a young, strong, powerful intelligence officer. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Pavlovsky gave them Putin as Russia’s <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/gleb-pavlovsky/">modern-day</a> Stirlitz. One of the selling points was that you could hardly get someone more different to the hapless and unpopular Yeltsin.</p>
<h2>Managed democracy through ‘permanent referendum’</h2>
<p>Pavlovsky played a crucial role in this campaign and in the “<a href="https://www.eurozine.com/the-politics-of-no-alternatives-or-how-power-works-in-russia/">permanent referendum</a>” that followed. The term referred to the way in which all key decisions were presented publicly with the message that it was Putin’s way or a return to the bad old days. </p>
<p>With a series of what came to be referred to as “colour revolutions” breaking out in former Soviet bloc countries – including neighbouring Ukraine – the Kremlin was concerned that such popular dissent would prove contagious for Russia. Pavlovsky’s strategies of political technology <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/postorange_2947jsp/">were mobilised</a>, from creating <a href="https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii88/articles/gleb-pavlovsky-putin-s-world-outlook">“opposition” parties</a> that competed with each other to the <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/05/12/rise-and-fall-of-surkovs-sovereign-democracy-a23891">manipulation of electoral systems</a> to ensure the right result, the ending of gubernatorial elections, and the development of <em>dramaturgiya</em> (<a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russias-elections-the-rise-and-fall-of-dramaturgiya/">scripted election themes</a>) to present one’s candidate leader as a safeguard against an invented threat – such as all-powerful oligarchs, for example.</p>
<p>While the concept of “sovereign democracy” was developed by another senior Putin adviser, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1324acbb-f475-47ab-a914-4a96a9d14bac">Vladislav Surkov</a>, it was eagerly taken up by Pavlovsky. He helped <a href="https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/sovereign-democracy-a-new-russian-idea-or-a-pr-project/">develop the idea</a>, which essentially means executive power with elected representatives whose <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/sovereign_democracy_4104jsp/">sole function</a> is to rubber-stamp decisions.</p>
<h2>Putinist to dissident</h2>
<p>In 2008, Putin – having served the two four-year terms allowed by the Russian constitution – relinquished the presidency to his faithful lieutenant, the prime minister Dmitry Medvedev. As we know, Putin intended to resume the presidency in 2012 – but in 2011, Pavlovsky broke with Putin and declared his backing for a second Medvedev term.</p>
<p>After this, the former Putin apparatchik was a constant thorn in his side, giving interviews and penning books and articles criticising his former patron. Of the decision to invade Ukraine, Pavlovsky told <a href="https://pressroom.rferl.org/about-us">RFE/RL</a> in April 2022 that the Russian president had “stepped into a trap”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ukraine was supposed to be a lever for pressuring the west into discussion over security issues – it’s a game of strategy. I was flabbergasted to see him throw away all negotiating opportunities over the genuine security of Russia, and instead opt for this strange pogrom that he calls a “special military operation”.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2016 Pavlovsky predicted that, while Putin has embedded himself firmly into the system so that nothing happens without his say-so, he has also embedded his <em>sistema</em> so deeply into Russian politics that <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/russian-politics-under-putin">it will outlast him</a>, however his regime ends. </p>
<p>“In all likelihood, it will not matter who climbs to the top; the only way he will be able to rule is through sistema,” Pavlovsky explained – having played such a key role in creating this sistema for his then master.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200854/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pavlovsky became the ultimate insider – until he fell out with the boss he had helped make all-powerful.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics, International Relations and Russia, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1933482022-10-27T15:35:07Z2022-10-27T15:35:07ZUkraine war: what, if any, are the chances of toppling Putin and who might take over?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492096/original/file-20221027-20183-rftpk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">h</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Speculation regarding how secure Vladimir Putin’s position is surfaces every few years, but has intensified since the invasion of Ukraine, particularly in light of Russia’s military failures in recent months. Many of these speculative debates discuss either who will take the leadership position or what sort of regime – and led by who – will replace Putin at the top.</p>
<p>There’s a great deal of uncertainty about what a post-Putin Russia might look like. Projections range from <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/planning-for-the-chaotic-post-putin-world/">violent destruction</a> of the Russian state to the reestablishment of democratic norms and a system of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-west-should-not-fear-the-prospect-of-a-post-putin-russia/">substantive checks and balances</a> – presumably under the “liberal” elite and technocracy. </p>
<p>There is a consensus among most of the Russian elite, including liberals (although it seems to be waning in recent times): there is no such thing as a truly post-Putin Russia. Putinism is so embedded in the country’s political, social and economic institutions and relationships that it’s almost impossible to imagine. </p>
<p>A realistic prognosis of a post-Putin Russia and succession plan must take this into account.</p>
<p>Putin most likely does not have a clear succession plan in place, other than the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-putin-succession-plan-2020-6?r=US&IR=T">prescribed procedure</a> which hands the presidency to the prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, and calls for elections in the event of a premature departure of the current president. In other words, a voluntary change of leadership is <a href="https://jordanrussiacenter.org/news/the-ukraine-war-and-the-putin-succession/#.Y1kkynbMJhE">unlikely to take place</a>. Even if there were plans in place before the war, these are now likely to have changed with circumstance. </p>
<p>If there is a succession plan at all, it would be enacted after the war and post-conflict settlement. This implies that the regime will try to prolong the conflict for as long as politically and economically possible given the uncertainties and widespread problems that Russian military failures have introduced into the system.</p>
<p>So any speculation on leadership or regime change must take this into account. Several scenarios are possible regarding the outcome of the war.</p>
<h2>Scenario 1: military stalemate</h2>
<p>In the fairly likely event of a stalemate and a return to <a href="https://zaborona.com/en/we-asked-the-historian-to-write-down-three-scenarios-for-the-development-of-events-in-ukraine/">frozen conflict in the east of Ukraine</a>, the Kremlin would probably spin this as a Russian victory – even if there was a return to the pre-February lines, something which would be seen elsewhere as a failure. The state apparatus would blame the influx of western support as the major contributing factor, leaving room for regime elites to squabble among themselves.</p>
<p>Regime loyalists would likely blame Russian losses on silent liberals and more vocal hawks. The former didn’t readily support Russian military actions, and the latter’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/01/world/russia-ukraine-war-news">incompetence led to massive failures</a> during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. </p>
<p>This would be likely to result in increased pressure on the regime from both liberals and technocrats as well as the military and security elite (the <em>siloviki</em>). The state would have to mollify the disaffected elites or silence them. This system would result in increased elite <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87341">autonomy and factionalism</a> leading to prolonged infighting – and the siloviki would reap most of the benefits. We’re seeing this beginning to play out. For instance, two of Putin’s biggest supporters of the war – Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and the leader of the mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin – have come out in open attacks against the defence minister, Sergei Shoigu.</p>
<p>It’s less clear if Putin can maintain his status as an arbiter between elites in both the military and business spheres. </p>
<p>But a stalemate in Ukraine would also result in the continuation of the status quo of the type of electoral authoritarianism that has developed since 2012 when the regime <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/05/russian-election-skewed-putin-favour">tightened its grip on the electoral process</a> and further rigged the playing field in its favour.</p>
<p>Putin would not seek a successor in the medium term and would continue to exert control over politics via his tried and tested electoral authoritarianism. But Putin’s power would be likely to decrease in the long term, leading to an unregulated succession with no obvious candidate to replace him. The siloviki would probably use the state apparatus to install an agreeable leader.</p>
<h2>Scenario 2: A Russian victory</h2>
<p>In this unlikely instance, which I envisage as decisive battlefield advances and control over annexed territory, competent managers in the technocracy and siloviki are given preferential treatment while liberals are largely excluded. As in the previous scenario, no immediate succession plan is on the cards for the foreseeable future. The regime fully consolidates into a hegemonic authoritarian regime under Putin.</p>
<p>A transition of power in this scenario would take place in the future and with similar conditions to the recent transitions in Central Asia such as the replacement of Nursultan Nazarbayev <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kazakhstan-elects-tokayev-as-nazarbayev-successor-as-hundreds-protest/a-49123470">with his favoured candidate, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev</a> in Kazakhstan. But Tokayev’s recent unrest and <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-key-nazarbayev-cronies-undergo-apparent-purge">subsequent purges</a> of Nazarbayev-era officials are still fresh in the memory of Putin’s regime. They have probably learned from the Nazarbayev’s missteps in those regards. </p>
<p>Both technocrats and siloviki have a strong footing in this potential regime. But a moderate, noncontroversial and controllable candidacy from the technocracy is preferable if Putin simply steps back but not out of power (for example, maintaining control over the budget, security and intelligence). Succession will be well regulated.</p>
<p>The power in this state would continue to flow through Putin rather than the executive. But a powerful siloviki faction would almost certainly try to “<a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/21/ukraine-says-hit-black-sea-oil-platform-used-by-russia-troops-a78064">tighten the screws</a>” and solidify the hegemonic regime after a transition.</p>
<h2>Scenario 3: A Ukrainian victory.</h2>
<p>This plausible scenario comes with the most uncertainty out of the three. The growing autonomy of the elite during the war will create the conditions for extreme factionalism: Siloviki v liberals and technocrats. Putin’s decisions will largely be irrelevant and an unregulated and sudden succession seems plausible for the short to medium term. This may take shape if Putin is forcibly removed or voluntarily removes himself from office. </p>
<p>Factional elites will compete for power, but it remains unclear how the process of selecting a new executive will unfold. The siloviki will have the impetus and capacity to seize higher positions but would come into conflict with the technocracy and liberals. In the case of a <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/21/ukraine-says-hit-black-sea-oil-platform-used-by-russia-troops-a78064">weakened pro-war bloc</a>, the siloviki will face staunch opposition.</p>
<p>In the event of a leadership election – considering social discontent, and economic and political disruption – the silent liberals and technocrats would secure the necessary votes. Still, they would face opposition from the factional forces mentioned above. Russia would probably fall into a mishmash of Yeltsin-era instability and technocratic authoritarianism, where non-democratic technical interventions are required to maintain the new status quo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas James does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russians find it hard to envisage a Russia after Putin.Nicholas James, PhD Candidate, Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1911582022-10-12T13:03:45Z2022-10-12T13:03:45ZRussia is enlisting hundreds of thousands of men to fight against Ukraine, but public support for Putin is falling<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489232/original/file-20221011-11-ighiyh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A military cadet stands near a billboard promoting army service in Saint Petersburg on Oct. 5, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/military-cadet-stands-in-front-of-a-billboard-promoting-contract-army-picture-id1243742974">Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Even as Russia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/10/world/russia-ukraine-war-news">intensifies its attacks</a> on Ukraine, its military appears to be suffering <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uk-would-expect-see-indicators-any-russian-nuclear-activity-spy-boss-2022-10-11/">setbacks</a> – from <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-6ef2407371c67f0736459378833fab7a">mounting casualties</a> to dwindling military supplies.</p>
<p>The Group of Seven countries – the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom – convened an emergency meeting on Oct. 11, 2022 <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-ukraine-updates-g7-leaders-say-will-hold-putin-to-account-for-missile-strikes/a-63399139">and condemned</a> Russia’s recent missile strikes on Ukraine. The latest onslaught began on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63192757">Oct. 9, 2022,</a> targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and multiple cities. That may indicate a more <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/11/politics/putin-rage-against-civilians-analysis/index.html">brutal phase</a> of the nearly eight-month-long military adventure.</p>
<p>But even before those attacks rained down on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed his insufficient military strength and authorized a partial draft on Sept. 21, 2022 of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-partial-mobilisation-will-see-300000-drafted-defence-minister-2022-09-21/">300,000 men</a> to help Russia sustain what many experts consider an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/oct/08/vladimir-putin-war-russia-draft-asylum-refugee-ukraine">illegal offensive</a>. So far, Russia reports that an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-over-200000-drafted-into-army-since-putins-decree-2022-10-04/">200,000 new fighters have been drafted</a> into the military. </p>
<p>The draft has triggered a new wave of discontent across Russia. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/border-fear-then-relief-men-fleeing-russia-2022-10-05/">Hundreds of thousands</a> of Russians have fled the country. There have also been multiple violent <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-military-recruitment-centers-attacked-amid-mobilization-pushback-11664190066">attacks on</a> Russian military recruitment centers.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has worked to subdue <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/more-than-1300-detained-anti-mobilisation-protests-across-russia-rights-group-2022-09-21/">anti-mobilization protests</a> and has arrested more than <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/09/27/why-don-t-russians-march-on-moscow">2,400 demonstrators</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">public opinion polls</a> by the Levada Center, Russia’s leading independent polling group, continue to show that Russians overwhelmingly support Putin and the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1127881">“special military operation,”</a> as he has called the war. </p>
<p>But as a scholar of <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/experts/arik-burakovsky">Russia and public opinion</a>, I think that public approval of the president and the assault on Ukraine is nevertheless shifting in light of the mobilization, as more families are torn apart by the hostilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two young adult men stand looking at a phone in an airport, with rolling suitcase at their sides." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489236/original/file-20221011-11786-26lqs2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russians arrive at an airport in Yerevan, Armenia on Sept. 21, 2022, the same day Russia announced a partial draft.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/russians-arrive-at-yerevans-zvartnots-airport-on-september-21-2022-picture-id1243408145">Karen Minasyan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Most Russians still support the war</h2>
<p>Since the Ukraine invasion was launched in February 2022, Russians largely have been either sympathetic or apathetic toward the war. The public swiftly united behind Putin, and the war gradually became a backdrop to everyday life in Russia.</p>
<p>Nearly 50% of Russians polled have consistently said they <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2022/09/29/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-sentyabr-2022-goda/">“definitely” support</a> Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, another roughly 30% “rather” support them, and only 20% do not support them.</p>
<p>The population has mostly accepted the war based on an unwritten <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/87/6/1459/2449985">social contract</a> with the Kremlin, in which people obey the regime in exchange for better living standards and a lack of interference in their private lives. Russians generally feel more comfortable subscribing to prevailing narratives about the war espoused by Russian state media than grappling with <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/07/my-country-right-or-wrong-russian-public-opinion-on-ukraine-pub-87803">negative information and difficult news stories</a>.</p>
<p>When Russia annexed four eastern and southern Ukrainian regions on Sept. 30, 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/extracts-putins-speech-annexation-ceremony-2022-09-30/">Putin spoke</a> publicly about what he called Russia’s Western enemies. He blamed them for propping up the “Kyiv regime” and staging “inhumane terrorist attacks” in Ukraine’s contested Donbas region. In doing so, Putin sought to justify the war’s resulting hardship by arguing that Russians are fighting for their survival.</p>
<p>Russians still overwhelmingly believe that the West is hostile to Russia and that the war is defensive. In August 2022, 71% of people surveyed said they hold <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/09/16/attitude-towards-countries-and-their-citizens/">negative attitudes</a> toward the United States, and 66% reported having negative views toward Ukraine.</p>
<p>Some sociologists contend that polls in Russia may not be fully reliable due to a range of factors, including <a href="https://ridl.io/on-the-harmfulness-of-russian-polls/">leading questions, incorrect wording</a>, <a href="https://ridl.io/can-you-trust-russia-s-public-support-for-a-military-operation-in-ukraine/">widespread indifference</a>, and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20531680221108328">wariness</a> about criticizing <a href="https://www.ponarseurasia.org/is-putins-popularity-still-real-a-cautionary-note-on-using-list-experiments-to-measure-popularity-in-authoritarian-regimes/">Putin and the government</a>. </p>
<p>Other experts argue that surveys reveal mainly what people are <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/07/fresh-look-at-russian-public-opinion-on-war-in-ukraine-event-7935">willing to tell pollsters</a>, not necessarily what they truly think. </p>
<p>But new polls indicate an emerging shift in public attitudes. By breaking the impression of normalcy, the draft may be pushing more Russians out of their psychological comfort zone.</p>
<p>The percentage of Russians who say they intently monitor the situation in Ukraine <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/09/14/conflict-with-ukraine-august-2022/">slowly declined</a> after March 2022. But this trend recently reversed, and the proportion of Russians reporting they “very closely” follow the war <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2022/09/29/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-sentyabr-2022-goda/">rose from</a> 21% in August 2022 to 32% in September 2022. </p>
<p>The most common emotions evoked by the war are no longer national pride but rather “anxiety, fear, horror” and “anger, indignation,” people say in the latest polls.</p>
<h2>Shaking trust in the military</h2>
<p>Russians traditionally have <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/10/19/russians-now-trust-army-more-than-putin-opinion-a63246">considerable confidence</a> in their army.</p>
<p>A survey in December 2021 demonstrated that Russians <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2021/10/12/trust-in-public-institutions/">trusted the military</a> more than any other state institution or official, including the president. </p>
<p>Russian law requires all men aged 18 to 27 to serve in the military for one year. A poll in July 2021 showed that 61% of Russians felt that “<a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2021/07/13/military-conscription/">every real man should serve in the army</a>.” Women chose this response more often than men, and the elderly chose this option twice as much as those of military age. </p>
<p>However, the war seems to have made Russians more <a href="https://cepa.org/article/russias-military-manpower-crunch-will-worsen/">reluctant to</a> serve in the army. Although the military typically meets its conscription targets, Russia did not meet its goals in a previous campaign to recruit more soldiers from April 1, 2022 to July 15, 2022. In that effort, the Russian Ministry of Defense sought to bring in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-drafts-134500-conscripts-says-they-wont-go-ukraine-2022-03-31/">134,500 soldiers</a> but only enlisted <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/09/24/how-russia-is-conscripting-men-to-fight-in-ukraine">about 89,000</a>.</p>
<p>The Russian military is now facing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/world/europe/putin-russia-army-criticism.html">more criticism</a> – even from its supporters – because of its recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-problems-on-the-battlefield-stem-from-failures-at-the-top-189916">battlefield failures</a>. There is currently heightened concern among Russian elites about how the military is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/09/29/world/russia-ukraine-war-news">mismanaging the draft</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/01/world/russia-ukraine-war-news">Russian troops retreating</a> from territories they previously occupied.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large stage shows people from a distance, with two large screens on either side showing a middle-aged to older white man." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489235/original/file-20221011-23-gksapm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during a concert on Sept. 30, 2022, shortly after Russia annexed regions of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-the-concert-in-support-picture-id1243625753">Contributor/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The future of Putin’s public approval</h2>
<p>Authoritarian leaders like Putin need to keep up the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/Working_Paper_132.pdf">appearance of popularity</a> to maintain unanimity and social consensus. It is difficult to predict whether Putin’s public support will remain strong enough for him <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691212463/weak-strongman">to remain in power</a>. </p>
<p>Putin’s <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/09/14/approval-of-institutions-ratings-of-politicians/">approval ratings</a> dropped from 83% in August 2022 to 77% in September 2022. Most Russians continue to believe the country is moving in the right direction, but public sentiment may change as more people are mobilized into the army.</p>
<p>Putin has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/13/russia-ukraine-war-end-of-putin-predictions/">outlived many predictions</a> about his fall from power before, and the public may ultimately come to accept the mobilization. </p>
<p>Yet the regime becomes more fragile as public support declines. Resentment toward the Kremlin may <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/21/putin-just-called-up-young-men-war-hes-taking-big-risk/">increase as</a> more young men, who previously showed little interest in the war, worry about being sent to fight.</p>
<p>Most Russians expect the war to last at least <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2022/09/01/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-avgust-2022-goda/">another six months</a>, but it is unclear how much patience they will have as the bloodshed goes on, without a clear resolution in sight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arik Burakovsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Russian public opinion polls show continued support for the war, there are questions about the polls’ reliability and indications that public approval of Putin is declining.Arik Burakovsky, Assistant Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1896762022-08-31T03:21:07Z2022-08-31T03:21:07Z‘A consequential but ultimately tragic figure’: last leader of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev dies aged 91<p>Few world leaders have cut a more consequential but ultimately tragic figure than Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, whose <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-31/ex-soviet-leader-mikhail-gorbachev-dead-at-91/101389174">death</a> at the age of 91 has been announced by Russian state media. </p>
<p>In a way it was fitting that as the last leader of the USSR, Gorbachev was probably its only truly humane one. And it’s equally sobering that Gorbachev has passed away at a time when political repression in his native Russia has become stifling once more, and the spectre of conflict in Europe which long overshadowed the region during the Cold War has become reality. </p>
<p>These were outcomes Gorbachev strived to avert. He was a man who became associated with opening up Soviet society, encouraging hope and debate rather than stifling it. He sought to revitalise the USSR, foreseeing a coming century of peace in which the Soviet Union joined a “Common European Home”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/this-december-is-the-30th-anniversary-of-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union-how-does-an-empire-collapse-172869">This December is the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union – how does an empire collapse?</a>
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<h2>Gorbachev’s achievements</h2>
<p>Gorbachev’s accomplishments were numerous. They included the negotiation of arms reduction treaties with the United States during a number of summits with US President Ronald Reagan. His suggestion to Reagan in Reykjavik that the US and USSR should eliminate nuclear weapons blindsided a US foreign policy establishment that initially saw Gorbachev as little more than a younger version of the gerontocrats he had succeeded.</p>
<p>After initially vacillating, he admitted the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, accepting that doing so would weaken him both at home and abroad. In 1988 he unilaterally <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-12-08-mn-1507-story.html">drew down</a> Warsaw Pact forces in Europe without waiting for a reciprocal agreement with NATO nations.</p>
<p>Earlier in his tenure he had developed a personal rapport with Margaret Thatcher, who famously told the BBC he was <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/a-man-one-could-do-business-with-how-mikhail-gorbachev-became-a-friend-of-uk-leaders-12685730">a man the West could do business with</a>. He withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988-9, and admitted their presence was a violation of international law.</p>
<p>He refused to intervene in many of the spontaneous demonstrations seeking to overthrow entrenched communist leaders across the Warsaw Pact, pressuring them not to use force against their own citizens.</p>
<p>And perhaps most notably, he was the chief architect of a grand plan to revitalise the Soviet Union’s economy (through “perestroika”, or restructuring), its society (via “glasnost”, meaning openness), and its politics (“demokratizatsiya”, or democratisation). </p>
<h2>Gorbachev’s rise</h2>
<p>There were few clues during Gorbachev’s unremarkable rise through the ranks of the “nomenklatura” system of Soviet elites that he would come to champion such a radical program. Born in 1931 as the son of peasant farmers in Stavropol, a region cataclysmically impacted by forced collectivisation of agriculture, Gorbachev followed an established path to influence in Soviet politics.</p>
<p>He joined the Komsomol, the youth league of the Communist Party, and was accepted to study law at Moscow State University. After becoming First Secretary of Stavropol, and then the province’s party chief, he began cultivating an image as a moderate reformer, offering bonuses and private plots of land to farmers who exceeded crop production norms.</p>
<p>Gorbachev’s political career could have ended there. But like many successful political elites, he benefited from networks of patronage, with the Communist Party’s main ideologue Mikhail Suslov and the KGB head Yuri Andropov both seeing him as a valuable fresh face in an increasingly sclerotic Soviet leadership. </p>
<p>Casting himself as a vigorous opponent of corruption, Gorbachev was promoted to the Party’s Central Committee, and then to the Politburo, the main policymaking body of the USSR. When the Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, Andropov took the reins and gave Gorbachev increasing control over the economy. He was effectively the second most powerful figure in Soviet politics until he eventually took over as General Secretary in 1985, following the deaths of Andropov a year earlier, and then the ailing General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. </p>
<p>Although Gorbachev was venerated in the West as the man who ended the Cold War, he became almost <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/31/mikhail-gorbachev-a-divisive-figure-loved-abroad-but-loathed-at-home">equally reviled at home</a> as a foolish leader who brought about something he didn’t even intend: the collapse of the USSR.</p>
<p>And while he will be most remembered in Europe and the US as one of history’s great peacemakers, Russians saw an entirely different face to Gorbachev, as the personification of instability and decline.</p>
<p>By the time the East European communist dominoes fell in 1989, culminating in the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November and the defection of a large chunk of East Berlin’s workforce to the West virtually overnight, the USSR had lost its empire. It was also in the process of losing its unifying national idea. </p>
<p>The chief reason for this was that Gorbachev’s social reforms were far too successful, while his economic reforms were an abject failure. Perestroika served only to reveal how deeply inefficient and corrupt the Soviet command economy had become. Beginning as a program of economic acceleration, and ultimately morphing into a 500-day plan to shift the Soviet economy from the plan to the market, Gorbachev relied on a new cadre of younger technocrats to push through his reforms while many of the old guard remained in top positions.</p>
<p>Campaigns against alcoholism saw him publicly ridiculed as the “Mineral Water Secretary”, and his wife Raisa’s expensive tastes in Western clothing became an object of popular anger. As the gap between economic performance and the people’s ability to criticise it widened, Gorbachev blinked too late. In 1990, he intervened to put down civil unrest in Baku, and blockaded Lithuania, which had voted for independence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/writing-history-30-years-on-a-former-moscow-correspondent-reflects-on-the-end-of-the-ussr-172788">Writing history: 30 years on, a former Moscow correspondent reflects on the end of the USSR</a>
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<p>While Gorbachev struggled to hold the USSR together, the old Soviet guard launched a hard-line coup in August 1991, placing Gorbachev under house arrest at his villa in the Black Sea resort town of Foros. Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the Russian Federation, became the face of the resistance, emulating Lenin by climbing onto a tank and demanding Gorbachev’s release as well as free and fair elections. With the Russian army refusing to fire on the crowd of demonstrators, the coup collapsed.</p>
<p>Gorbachev returned to Moscow but as a diminished figure, resigning as General Secretary of the USSR and eventually its President after the constituent parts of the USSR negotiated the end to the Union Treaty and the beginning of their own sovereign statehood. As President of Russia, the main component of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin inherited the USSR’s seat on the UN Security Council and eventually the entirety of its nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>After losing power, Gorbachev initially ran in Russian presidential elections (never attracting more than a tiny fraction of the vote), wrote books and memoirs, and later as he gradually withdrew from public life came to express his regrets about how history had played out. Gorbachev initially praised Putin’s ability to unite Russia, but as the Russian journalist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/30/gorbachev-political-legacy-destroyed-by-putin">Alexei Venediktov</a> revealed in 2022, he became bitterly disappointed that Putin had destroyed everything he had worked to create.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the tragedy of Gorbachev was his misplaced faith in Soviet economics, and how badly he mistook the desire of the people of the USSR for national self-determination for a willingness to revitalise the Soviet idea.</p>
<p>Yet his enduring belief in enlightened progress and a preparedness to take risks to achieve it stand in stark contrast to the caricature Russia resembles today, which celebrates what divides rather than what might unite us.</p>
<p>Sadly Gorbachev’s humanism, flawed though it was, has no place in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which has turned its back on modernity, cultivating a culture of victimhood and glorifying Russian chauvinism in the cynical pursuit of personal power.</p>
<p>Like other tragic reformers in history, then, Gorbachev’s chief legacy is to remind us about what might have been, rather than what subsequently transpired.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute, and and various Australian government agencies.</span></em></p>Like other tragic reformers in history, Gorbachev’s chief legacy is to remind us about what might have been, rather than what subsequently transpired.Matthew Sussex, Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1891292022-08-25T20:03:52Z2022-08-25T20:03:52ZRussia is fighting three undeclared wars. Its fourth – an internal struggle for Russia itself – might be looming<p>Now entering its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/24/world/europe/ukraine-russia-six-months.html">seventh month</a>, Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine shows no sign of resolution.</p>
<p>It has become a grim battle over territory between dug-in forces, resembling the conflicts of last century instead of the complex melange of covert operations and hybrid warfare that supposedly characterise contemporary “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/todays-wars-are-fought-in-the-gray-zone-heres-everything-you-need-to-know-about-it/">grey zone</a>” contests.</p>
<p>Both sides are playing to their strengths: Russia to its dominance in <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/strange-debacle-misadventures-in-assessing-russian-military-power/">firepower</a>, and Ukraine to its ability to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/ukraine-corrodes-russian-forces-in-southern-counteroffensive">corrode</a> the invader by targeting its supply lines.</p>
<p>Yet this is only part of the picture. Putin is actually waging three wars, each of them undeclared. He simultaneously seeks to control Ukraine, to dominate Russia’s region, and to hasten the fall of the West. And is there an internal struggle on the horizon?</p>
<h2>Russian expansion</h2>
<p>Putin’s “Special Military Operation” is an undeclared war of imperial expansion seeking to enlarge Russian territory by, as Putin himself <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/3518666-putin-compares-self-to-peter-the-great-says-he-is-taking-back-russian-lands/">put it</a>, taking back “our lands”. </p>
<p>Depending on how we assess its war aims – which have pivoted from conquest and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3186482/russia-seeking-regime-change-ukraine-lavrov-says-moscow-expands">regime change</a> to “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-25/russia-says-ukraine-operation-focused-on-donbas-interfax">protecting</a>” the people of Donbas and back again – Russia’s performance is mixed. Certainly it has succeeded in bringing Ukraine to the brink of state failure. It has already left a reconstruction burden that will take decades to overcome.</p>
<p>Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s perfectly understandable desire to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/opinion/letters/russia-ukraine-war.html">keep fighting</a> until all Russian invaders leave its territory, in even the most optimistic outcome for Kyiv the complete restoration of Donbas or Crimea is far from assured.</p>
<p>But Putin has also decimated Russia’s conventional forces for surprisingly little gain in six months. Along the way, he has blunted his own rhetoric about Russian power, demonstrated a callous disregard for human rights, and revealed his <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044">armed forces</a> to be corrupt, poorly managed, and deficient in doctrine, discipline and capabilities.</p>
<h2>Struggle for regional primacy</h2>
<p>Putin’s second undeclared war is aimed at consolidating control over a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/30/whose-rules-whose-sphere-russian-governance-and-influence-in-post-soviet-states-pub-71403">sphere of influence</a> stretching from Central Asia to Central Europe.</p>
<p>It is most certainly a war: Russia destroyed Georgia’s armed forces in <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">five days</a> during 2008 over the disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has threatened Moldova with invasion if it <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-russian-threat-neutrality-invasion-ukraine/31868367.html">abandons neutrality</a>. And it has intervened with military forces in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59918004">Kazakhstan</a>, and in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/ukraine-war-is-reshaping-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-pub-86994">conflicts</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>Putin is badly losing his struggle for regional primacy. Russia’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08013?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents">diminishing influence</a> relative to China – especially in Central Asia – has long been recognised. But the war against Ukraine shows just how much the Kremlin’s reach has slipped.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/kazakhstan-cancels-victory-day-in-protest-over-putins-ukraine-war/">Kazakhstan</a> has called the Russian invasion a war, and sent aid to Ukraine. Moldova is <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/pt/press-room/20220429IPR28232/grant-moldova-eu-candidate-status-say-meps">actively seeking</a> to join the EU. With the exception of Belarus, all of the states that were once part of the USSR either voted for, or abstained from, a UN General Assembly resolution deploring Russia’s invasion and calling for it to withdraw its forces from Ukraine. </p>
<p>Putin’s <a href="https://tass.com/world/1408599">stated desire</a> to prevent Ukraine becoming an “anti-Russia” has failed utterly. Even Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenka, beholden to Putin for his political survival, has <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/russias-war-on-ukraine-is-deeply-unpopular-in-belarus/">resisted</a> attempts to lure him directly into the conflict. And the decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO has brought the military alliance closer to Russia, lengthening its <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/will-finland-s-1-300-kilometer-border-become-nato-russia-frontier-/6569130.html">border</a> with the alliance by some 1,300 kilometres.</p>
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<h2>War with the West</h2>
<p>Putin’s third undeclared war is his most nebulous, taking the form of a global struggle against the West, with an eye on resetting Europe’s strategic map.</p>
<p>It has three main components: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>political warfare designed to fragment European and North American societies from within</p></li>
<li><p>exploiting dependencies for strategic purposes</p></li>
<li><p>and seeking to weaken Western influence by courting the parts of the world where its reach is weakest.</p></li>
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<p>Putin’s war with the West is important for his <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/06/russia-and-ukraine-are-trapped-in-medieval-myths/">great power vision</a> of Russia as a Eurasian Third Rome. It also carries the most risk for those who seek to contain him. The spectre of Putin running rampant in Europe under the indifferent eye of a second Trump administration should underline the urgent task of healing America’s fractured society.</p>
<p>A looming <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-fears-a-long-cold-winter-if-russia-ends-supply-of-natural-gas-11658258177">hard winter</a> for many Europeans will reinforce the lesson that deterrence comes with costs, as does over-dependence on resource giants who can <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-warns-of-winter-price-pain-as-gas-hits-new-records/">weaponise energy</a> for strategic leverage. The West must also recognise that comfy rhetoric about Russia being a <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-being-made-a-pariah-state-just-like-it-and-the-soviet-union-were-for-most-of-the-last-105-years-182028">global pariah</a> is untrue: there are plenty of nations sympathetic to Kremlin disinformation about NATO’s historic culpability for today’s events in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The West’s future credibility also relies on how well it withstands Russian pressure at home and abroad. It will need to resist the temptation of inward-looking statism and continue supplying Ukraine with the weapons and assistance it needs. It will also need to actively counter false Russian narratives currently flooding <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-61351342">India</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/06/27/russias-narratives-about-its-invasion-of-ukraine-are-lingering-in-africa/">Africa</a>, and parts of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/19/why-are-indonesians-on-social-media-so-supportive-of-russia">South-East Asia</a>.</p>
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<h2>But is another undeclared war on the horizon for Putin?</h2>
<p>The car-bomb killing of Darya Dugina, daughter of Russia’s neofascist philosopher <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/OP294_aleksandr_drugin_laruelle_2006.pdf">Alexander Dugin</a>, has prompted an outpouring of bile from the Russian <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/08/22/putin-under-fire-from-the-ultranationalists-after-daria-dugina-s-assassination_5994386_4.html">extreme right</a>.</p>
<p>With it has come the first hint of domestic fragility in Russia since February’s invasion, which saw 15,000 anti-war <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/03/22/more-than-15000-russians-have-been-arrested-in-anti-war-protests">protesters</a> arrested.</p>
<p>Both Dugin (who is neither <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain">Putin’s “brain”</a> nor his muse) and Dugina (who promoted <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/08/23/she-died-for-russia-hundreds-mourn-pro-kremlin-ideologues-slain-daughter-a78634">far-right</a> <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0899">propaganda</a>) are bit players in Russian politics at best. However, the targeting of an ultranationalist is a rare event in Russia, where assassinations, poisonings and “accidental” deaths overwhelmingly afflict moderates.</p>
<p>Russia’s Federal Security Service (shortened to FSB) took a lightning-fast 36 hours before unconvincingly announcing <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/daria-dugina-car-bombing-russia-fsb-blames-ukrainian-intelligence/">it had cracked the case</a>. Displaying a Ukrainian National Guard ID card (<a href="https://twitter.com/IssandJumal/status/1561781504975540225?s=20&t=3TD3sI-68ixwTXa1l3RlfA">likely faked</a>) it claimed the perpetrator was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/russias-fsb-blames-ukrainian-intelligence-for-car-bombing/2022/08/22/5771f7f6-220f-11ed-a72f-1e7149072fbc_story.html">Natalya Vovk</a>, a member of the Azov Regiment, which Russia falsely claims to be a Nazi-dominated military unit. According to the FSB, Vovk had moved into Dugina’s apartment block, followed her for weeks, carried out the bombing, and then escaped to Estonia with her young daughter and her cat.</p>
<p>While we will probably never discover the true identity of Dugina’s killer, any remotely plausible explanation is damaging for Russia. If Ukraine was indeed to blame, how did Russian security fail to stop Vovk at the border, since deep background-checks of all Ukrainians entering the country are supposedly routine? And why was she permitted to leave?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/crimea-ukraine-uses-new-tactics-to-attempt-to-take-back-strategic-territory-from-russia-188951">Crimea: Ukraine uses new tactics to attempt to take back strategic territory from Russia</a>
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<p>Alternatively, if the killing was carried out by the FSB itself, was it a rogue anti-Putin faction, or acting on <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/22/alexander-dugin-daughter-car-bombing-distrust-official-narrative/">Putin’s orders</a> to whip up flagging support for the war? If the former, it points to a deep rift in Russia’s elite. If the latter, Putin has cynically targeted Russia’s ultra-right, which has criticised him for not being tough enough on Ukraine.</p>
<p>Finally, very few observers believe the hitherto-unknown <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/21/ex-russian-mp-claims-russian-partisans-responsible-for-moscow-car-bomb">National Republican Army</a>, which claimed responsibility for the killing, was to blame. But if it were, then it points to the real possibility of organised domestic terrorism in Russia.</p>
<p>So any way you cut it, the killing of Darya Dugina brings Putin’s own leadership into question. This is something he has scrupulously avoided. He is obsessed with control, and enjoys the support of a massive propaganda machine to turn defeats into triumphs and blame others for his mistakes.</p>
<p>That’s a common vehicle for autocrats to deflect criticism, and has certainly worked for Putin. But unlikely though a Russian revolution from below may be, history is replete with examples – including the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself – where lies, repression and personalised power eventually revealed the Emperor’s nakedness. </p>
<p>So perhaps three undeclared wars are not enough for Putin. Has he just lit the spark of another, personally more dangerous one?</p>
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<p><em>Correction: this article originally said all the states, with the exception of Belarus, that were once part of the USSR abstained in the United Nations vote on Russia’s invasion. It has now been corrected to show that with the exception of Belarus, all of the states that were once part of the USSR either voted for, or abstained from, a UN General Assembly resolution deploring Russia’s invasion and calling for it to withdraw its forces from Ukraine.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189129/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government agencies.</span></em></p>Putin simultaneously seeks to control Ukraine, to dominate Russia’s region, and to hasten the fall of the West. And is an internal struggle on the horizon?Matthew Sussex, Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811182022-04-21T15:55:33Z2022-04-21T15:55:33ZAleksei Navalny: new film about jailed dissident who dared to defy the power of Putin<p>One of the last lines jailed Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny speaks in the eponymous new CNN documentary is a quote usually attributed to the 18th-century philosopher Edmund Burke: “The triumph of evil is for good people to do nothing.” It is unclear whether Navalny sees Russian politics as a black-and-white, good-versus-evil scenario or is playing to the film’s primarily US audience. </p>
<p>I urge everyone to see the film, Navalny. It is a fascinating depiction of Russian opposition to the country’s increasingly autocratic leader and shows the lengths to which the Kremlin will go to stop it.</p>
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<p>I do have criticisms. It is unclear on the access the director and film crew had to Navalny. They seem close to him during the time he spent in Germany, recuperating from being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/02/alexei-navalny-poisoned-with-novichok-says-german-government-russia">poisoned with the Novichok nerve agent in 2020</a>, but their contact appears highly managed. </p>
<p>There are moments of even-handedness, including a visibly uncomfortable Navalny explaining away his <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-evolution-of-alexey-navalnys-nationalism">previous ultra nationalism</a> and speeches at the 2009 Russian March. The Russian March is an annual nationalist demonstration – and is attended by many people with neo-Nazi links. It is good to see that the film’s director, Daniel Rohr, address this. Yet, when it comes to Navalny and the western media more generally, there is an air that because Navalny is against Vladimir Putin, he is somehow pro-western. This sense of “good” (Navalny) versus “evil” (Putin) pervades the documentary.</p>
<h2>Legal issues</h2>
<p>Certainly, Navalny faces some significant hurdles. Two court cases, in 2012 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-navalny-idUSL6E8JA5S120120810">(involving the theft of timber)</a> and in 2014 <a href="https://us.fashionnetwork.com/news/Navalny-yves-rocher-affair-a-court-case-tinged-with-politics,1277376.html">(for defrauding the Russian subsidiary of Yves Rocher)</a> hang over Navalny like the Sword of Damocles. These cases, which initially resulted in suspended sentences, have been conveniently closed and reopened depending on whether the Putin regime has needed to restrict Navalny’s movements. Most recently, in 2021, the suspended sentence in the Rocher case was replaced with a real <a href="https://tass.com/society/1251939?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com">three-and-a-half year sentence</a>.</p>
<p>There’s no question Navalny has faced intense pressure, as expected of any opposition politician working in an autocracy. But there remain questions about his past. In 2007, Navalny allegedly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ba9004d6-7d98-11e0-b418-00144feabdc0">shot a man</a> in a brawl with an <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/navalny-emerges-fore-new-generation-russian-opposition-flna6c10696293">air pistol</a>. In the intervening years, Navalny has made himself presentable and become more of a western-style politician.</p>
<p>This is the image that the film tries to portray. Navalny comes across as likeable – but there remains the feeling that, behind this facade, is someone who isn’t quite the progressive hero he is represented as. His comments about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/world/europe/navalnys-comments-on-crimea-ignite-russian-twittersphere.html">Crimea being Russian</a> and previous nationalist rhetoric against <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2021/02/09/alexey-navalnys-views-on-migrants-run-counter-to-his-pro-democracy-discourse/">Central Asian and Caucasian migrants</a> point to this. Having spoken with some in the Russian opposition, I felt that some think that if Navalny was president, Russia would merely swap dictators.</p>
<h2>Divided opposition</h2>
<p>This raises a further point not addressed in the film. The Russian opposition is divided. For years, it has been hobbled by in-fighting. Rather than unite against a common enemy, opposition figures have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/inside-the-nyet-campaign-russia-s-divided-opposition-and-the-doomed-battle-to-scupper-putin-s-vote/30701128.html">often been riven</a> by which strategy to use. Some opposition parties, such as A Just Russia (<a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0029178/">Spravedlivaia Rossiia</a>) are licensed by the Kremlin and largely support Putin. Others, including the People’s Freedom Party (<a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/political-parties-parnas.htm">RPR-Parnas</a>) – the party of Boris Nemtsov before he was assassinated in Moscow in 2015 – are bitterly opposed, and this continues to muddy the waters.</p>
<p>The film does not address these divides which – perhaps inadvertently – results in the perception that Navalny is the only opposition leader. There is no denying that Navalny’s anti-corruption campaigns have resonated across Russia and overseas. Navalny’s expose of Dmitry Medvedev’s wealth directly contributed to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/04/26/should-medvedev-resign-almost-half-of-russians-questioned-in-poll-think-so-a57823">45% of Russians saying Medvedev should resign</a> as prime minister in a poll taken in March 2017. Another video, Putin’s Palace: History of World’s Largest Bribe, which was written and narrated by Navalny and launched online in February 2021 was watched by at least <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2021/02/08/the-film-palace-for-putin/">26% of Russian adults</a>.</p>
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<p>And here’s the problem. In an autocracy, people are unwilling to protest. Watching a video does not necessarily mean supporting the cause. A <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2021/02/08/the-film-palace-for-putin/">Levada Centre survey</a>, which asked if respondents had watched the Putin’s Palace video, found that of the 26% who had, 77% felt their view of Putin was unchanged. It remains difficult to get people out of their comfort zone.</p>
<p>The 2021 anti-corruption protests were the first countrywide demonstrations. Navalny showed that he and his team could organise protest, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-moscow-government-and-politics-5a396b96b9f79d193d943499ab8dae57">offices across Russia</a>. But there were only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/21/top-navalny-aides-arrested-protests-jailed-opposition-leader-russian-police-moscow">10,000 demonstrators in Moscow</a>, a nominally liberal city of nearly 12 million people.</p>
<p>Of course, organising protests in an autocracy is nearly impossible and Navalny is fighting the odds. But there is a cognitive dissonance in the west that he is the answer and the Kremlin fears him. If Putin remains in power, there will not be free elections – so it is conjecture whether Navalny would win. A free(ish) election in Moscow in 2013 saw Navalny get <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/10/02/why-do-leaders-manipulate-or-not-elections-revisiting-the-2013-moscow-mayoral-elections/">27% of the vote</a>. This is not a bad result, but highlights that the opposition is not well supported, even in the capital.</p>
<p>Navalny is not the only opposition figure of consequence. But Leonid Volkov, Mariya Pevchikh and Lyubov Sobol <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7961ab73-43ee-4ee3-a868-9a69f7226cfd">are now all abroad</a> and the opposition remains divided. Having become the figurehead of disparate groups, Navalny gets the most attention – but he is more of an enigma then the film shows. </p>
<p>Navalny’s “good men” quote leaves you thinking he is the “good man” who is at least trying to do something. But here’s a flaw in an otherwise excellent film – it portrays Navalny as the only Putin alternative and reduces his chequered history to insignificance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new CNN documentary about jailed opposition figurehead Aleksei Navalny offers insights into Putin’s challengers.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics, International Relations and Russia, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1815002022-04-20T19:57:15Z2022-04-20T19:57:15ZHow long can Vladimir Putin hold on to power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458726/original/file-20220419-25-lr98jh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Mikhail Klimentyev</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the war in Ukraine drags on and sanctions start to bite, key questions are being asked. How long can President Vladimir Putin remain in power? Will he be overthrown in a palace coup, as recent rumours <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-20/vladimir-putins-fsb-purges-reflect-his-frustrations-with-ukraine/100997186">have suggested</a>? And can the system of centralised rule he built outlast him? </p>
<p>We <a href="https://academic.oup.com/icon/advance-article/doi/10.1093/icon/moac006/6569412?searchresult=1">can find neglected answers</a> to these questions in the Russian Constitution. This document, and its forgotten importance to Putin’s authority, suggest that although Putin is likely to remain in office in the short term, Russia faces significant long term instability. </p>
<h2>Russian crown-presidentialism</h2>
<p>The conventional story of Putin’s grip on the presidency rightly points to his informal power over Russia’s elites, grounded on his <a href="https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1346415/1/Ledeneva_Sistema_Russia.pdf">training in spycraft</a>. But these accounts forget the central role of formal constitutional rules in keeping Putin at the top.</p>
<p>The story starts almost 30 years ago, amid the ruins of the collapsing Soviet Union. After Russia nearly descended into a civil war in the autumn of 1993, then-President Boris Yeltsin made key changes to the working constitutional draft. </p>
<p>He did not change the provisions protecting individual rights, but he did insert rules that created the basis for a vastly powerful presidency, one that could dominate both formal and informal politics. This “crown-presidential” constitutional design has undermined Russian democratic state-building ever since.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, Yeltsin and his Western supporters saw these powers as a necessary expedient, a kind of “democratic battering ram” able to make the difficult (and often unpopular) choices seen as necessary for building free market economics. Yeltsin used these constitutional powers to pursue neo-liberal economic reforms and wage a brutal war in Chechnya.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458769/original/file-20220420-17-4z0ccn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The power of the Russian president can be traced back to constitutional changes made by Boris Yeltsin in 1993.</span>
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<p>But, constrained by the West and some of his advisors, Yeltsin also decentralised power to the regional governors and tolerated a pluralistic media. Focusing on these checks on presidential power, as well as the long list of rights and democratic guarantees in the constitution, most observers and commentators declared Russia to be a young democracy.</p>
<p>This all changed in 2000, when Vladimir Putin became president. Declaring a “dictatorship of the law”, Putin empowered central legal institutions to enforce Russia’s constitutional system of presidential dominance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-can-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-end-heres-how-peace-negotiations-have-worked-in-past-wars-180778">How can Russia's invasion of Ukraine end? Here's how peace negotiations have worked in past wars</a>
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<p>This allowed Putin to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/article/putins-artful-jurisprudence-7882">assert personal control</a> over the oligarchs and the regional governors. It also allowed him to monopolise television media, giving him control over the type of political information being given to the Russian people.</p>
<p>Since then, Putin has continued to rely heavily on the constitutional order to maintain his personal power. In the aftermath of the fraudulent 2011 election, Putin used his control over prosecutors and courts to crack down hard on a growing opposition movement. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458771/original/file-20220420-11-kqziui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">After large demonstrations in the wake of the 2011 election, Vladimir Putin used his powers to crack down hard on the opposition.</span>
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<p>In 2020, he <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/five-things-to-know-about-russia-s-constitutional-amendments">changed key provisions</a> in the constitution to further consolidate personal control over Russian politics. These presidential powers remain a critical aspect of his personal power today.</p>
<h2>What does this mean for Russia’s future?</h2>
<p>This central role of constitutional law in Russian governance tells us a great deal about Russia’s future. In the short-term, the vast powers granted to the office of the president will ensure Russian stability, allowing Putin to retain loyal associates and remove any dissenters. </p>
<p>However, in the long-term, these presidential powers will foster Russian instability. The personalisation of power in this kind of system has already weakened institutions (such as the Russian military) and triggered poor decision-making (such as the decision to invade Ukraine). These problems will worsen.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-the-west-do-to-help-ukraine-it-can-start-by-countering-putins-information-strategy-177912">What can the West do to help Ukraine? It can start by countering Putin's information strategy</a>
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<p>The question of who will replace Putin will also trigger a bitter and destabilising struggle to gain control over the Russian presidency. A post-Putin Russia must change these constitutional rules to not only build democracy, but also ensure long-term stability.</p>
<p>Moreover, the fact the West backed this constitutional system in 1993 shows how much we have to learn about the centrality of constitutional provisions ensuring checks and balances on presidential power in ensuring democracy and human rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181500/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Partlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Much of what is happened in Russia right now can be traced back to changes to the constitution in 1993.William Partlett, Associate Professor, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1797952022-04-19T12:19:33Z2022-04-19T12:19:33ZPranks and propaganda: Russian laws against ‘fake news’ target Ukrainians and the opposition, not pro-Putin pranksters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458332/original/file-20220415-22-mhi8p7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C0%2C4521%2C3110&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian pranksters and anti-free speech advocates Vladimir "Vovan" Kuznetsov, left, and Alexei "Lexus" Stolyarov in Moscow in 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-pranksters-vladimir-vovan-kuznetsov-and-alexei-news-photo/516279026?adppopup=true">Yuri Kadobnovav/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When they launched their war on Ukraine in late February 2022, Russian authorities also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/europe/russia-censorship-media-crackdown.html">unleashed an all-out assault</a> on dissent at home. Within weeks, the Kremlin blocked access to nearly all remaining critical media outlets as well as to Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.</p>
<p>As part of the communication crackdown, the Russian parliament – the State Duma – passed draconian laws to limit speech relating to the Russian-Ukrainian war, laws that lawmakers deemed necessary to fight against fake news. In its first move, in early March, the legislature unanimously <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">criminalized</a> “public dissemination of false information under the guise of truthful messages” about the Russian army. Sentences for violating the law extended up to 15 years in prison. </p>
<p>Later that month, Russian lawmakers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russians-who-spread-fake-news-about-officials-abroad-face-jail-interfax-2022-03-25/">expanded</a> the law’s application to include false information about the work of all officials serving abroad, including the National Guard troops, the Federal Security Service or any other state organs involved in the Ukrainian campaign.</p>
<p>The combination of the law’s intentional vagueness and severity is meant to stifle criticism of the Russian invasion. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/russia-fake-news-law-misinformation/">“fake news” laws</a> swiftly <a href="https://www.niemanlab.org/2022/03/an-information-dark-age-russias-new-fake-news-law-has-outlawed-most-independent-journalism-there/">devastated</a> <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/03/28/russias-novaya-gazeta-suspends-operations-after-kremlin-warnings-a77109">media organizations</a> that weren’t already controlled by the state. </p>
<p>The latest series of fake news laws isn’t the Kremlin’s first use of a tragedy to enhance its power. And the earlier instance didn’t need a war to trigger it – it was triggered by pranksters.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a large bearded young man in a yellow shirt is used to illustrate a Moscow Times story whose headline is 'Russia Investigates Ukrainian Blogger for Spreading Fake News About 300 Deaths in Kemerovo Fire.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458336/original/file-20220415-16-rq7iab.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian prankster Evgeniy Volnov made a prank phone call in 2018 that helped pave the way for adoption of repressive news laws in Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/03/28/russia-investigates-ukrainian-blogger-spreading-fake-news-about-300-deaths-kemerovo-fire-a60966">Screenshot, The Moscow Times website</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hoax sparks punitive law</h2>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/russia-russian-president-signs-anti-fake-news-laws/">passed</a> its original fake news legislation in March 2019. The law established penalties for spreading “socially significant false information distributed under the guise of truthful messages.” </p>
<p>The law’s passage followed a Ukrainian prankster’s hoax that built on a real tragedy. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43543109">On March 25, 2018, a fire</a> in a shopping mall in the Russian mining city of Kemerovo killed 60 people, most of them children. </p>
<p>Evgeniy Volnov, a Ukrainian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBfw2HObgGk&t=700s">media provocateur who fancies</a> himself an information warrior against Russia, posed as an emergency services official to prank call the Kemerovo morgue. He told officials there to arrange for 300 incoming bodies. </p>
<p>Volnov then published his phone call, which sparked local residents’ anger at the authorities. Residents then wrongly suspected officials of hiding the real number of victims. In response, the <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/24346/">Russian Investigative Committee – the main federal investigating authority in Russia – opened</a> a criminal case against Volnov for “inciting hatred or animosity” and <a href="https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1213375/?print=1?print=1">issued</a> a warrant for his arrest in absentia. </p>
<p>The Russian government promptly exploited Volnov’s prank to further curtail domestic freedoms. </p>
<p>In the days after the fire, state officials argued for the need to regulate fake news to safeguard Russian society from destabilization by disinformation. Citing Volnov’s prank, <a href="https://tass.ru/politika/5078947">Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, for example, suggested</a> that foreign governments could use fake news to instigate regime change in Russia. He singled out the Ukrainian government, in which he claimed “representatives of the CIA and the U.S. State Department work in the intelligence services.”</p>
<p>Russia’s most famous <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/03/31/if-you-re-sliding-into-totalitarianism-you-might-as-well-do-it-glamorously">pranking duo</a>, Vladimir Kuznetsov – known as Vovan – and Alexey Stolyarov – known as Lexus – spearheaded the media campaign for fake news legislation. </p>
<p>Kuznetsov and Stolyarov’s <a href="https://rutube.ru/channel/23610070/videos/">pranks</a> target foreign high-profile cultural and political figures who oppose the Kremlin’s agenda. Russian media then <a href="https://aif.ru/politics/world/bomba_dlya_nacistov_kak_ministr_oborony_britanii_s_prankerami_govoril">widely</a> <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/27370/4562912/">cover</a> <a href="https://rg.ru/2022/03/25/na-videohostingah-opublikovan-prank-s-ministrom-vnutrennih-del-velikobritanii-patel.html">the pranks</a> to present them as evidence for the regime’s mythology of Russia as <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Fortress+Russia%3A+Conspiracy+Theories+in+the+Post+Soviet+World-p-9781509522651">a besieged fortress</a> fending off unending Western scheming against it.</p>
<h2>Pranking politics</h2>
<p>Pranks are mischievous practical jokes played on unsuspecting victims. A classic phone prank involves a caller posing as someone else, usually in front of an audience of co-conspirators, to dupe their targets into doing or saying something silly, revealing or both.</p>
<p>Political pranking is <a href="https://nyupress.org/9780814796290/pranksters/">traditionally thought</a> of as <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/anti-afd-activists-prank-populists-with-hoax-corporate-ads/a-46744218">benign foolery targeting</a> the powerful. My research into pranking politics shows that <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/03/15/happy-to-be-a-weapon-russian-prank-callers-target-kremlin-opponents-a52163">sometimes pranksters bolster</a> the status quo instead. </p>
<p>Kuznetsov and Stolyarov were the <a href="https://www.piter.com/collection/spisok-bykova/product/vovan-i-leksus-po-kom-zvonit-telefon-2">founding figures</a> of Russia’s phone pranking scene in the 2000s. At the time, the community consisting of teenagers and college students mostly pranked the downtrodden and pop culture celebrities. The jokesters’ aim was to drive their target to angry stupor for the enjoyment of fellow pranksters. </p>
<p>In 2014, upon discovering their shared support for Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea, the veteran pranksters joined forces to dupe Ukrainian and Western elites. The pair pranked Ukrainian President <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/61c3a0eaecab3f7c1750a8277234ff96/">Petro Poroshenko</a>; <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/c88a956b17ef31cba880bfcd8b9ca0dd/">Filaret</a>, patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church; Kyiv Mayor <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/e355ace7031294480a49b18ee192867f/">Vitali Klitschko</a>; and other Ukrainian leaders. Posing as friendly figures to entice their victims into informal chatter, Kuznetsov and Stolyarov broached a wide range of topics, including nationalism, Russian gas exports and homosexuality. </p>
<p>The pranksters’ goal was to provoke their targets into saying something that Russian media could then spin using <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/28/dominant-narratives-in-russian-political-and-media-discourse-during-the-crisis/">the Kremlin’s characterization</a> of <a href="https://ibidem-verlag.de/pdf/00-fedor.pdf">post-2014 Ukraine</a> as an inept, fascist and morally corrupt Western puppet. In 2018, Ukrainian authorities <a href="https://society.fakty.ua/281374-skandalnym-rossijskim-prankeram-zapretili-vezd-v-ukrainu-eksklyuzivnyj-dokument">barred</a> Kuznetsov from entering the country.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A balding light-haired man with a round head, wearing a white shirt, dark tie and black blazer, looking pensive." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458337/original/file-20220415-14-grnzy1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a number of repressive press laws during his tenure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russias-president-vladimir-putin-looks-on-during-talks-with-news-photo/1239931346?adppopup=true">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The law of Vovan and Lexus</h2>
<p>Because of Kuznetsov’s and Stolyarov’s reputations as patriotic experts in fakery, they took on the role of <a href="https://ura.news/news/1052328807">promoting</a> the <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/26811/3847766/">fake news law initiative</a>. <a href="https://ria.ru/20180328/1517450554.html?in=t">Calling</a> Ukrainian prankster Volnov’s prank a “disgusting informational sabotage by Ukrainian nationalists,” the pair vowed to prevent “informational attacks from abroad” by proposing legal solutions in their capacity as members of the State Duma’s advisory Council on Information Society and Media Development. </p>
<p>In explaining the duo’s enthusiasm, <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/26811/3847766/">Stolyarov distinguished</a> between their socially “useful fakes,” which uncover hidden truths about domestic and world politics, and what they said were unlawful pranks like Volnov’s that only destabilize society. </p>
<p>The duo’s public support for fake news legislation was so vociferous that <a href="https://www.bfm.ru/news/381070">one critic referred</a> to the initiative as “the law of Vovan, Lexus, and Volodin.” After lobbying for the law in the media, however, the pranksters were sidelined from meaningful participation in its drafting.</p>
<p>Following monthslong parliamentary discussions and revisions, Vladimir Putin signed the fake news proposals into law in March 2019. The law set fines for spreading alleged disinformation ranging from US$450 to $22,900, depending on who was doing the spreading and its consequences – for example, whether it led to bodily harm or death. As critics had warned, <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2019/04/29/how-does-russia-actually-enforce-its-ban-on-fake-news">the authorities applied</a> the law almost exclusively to opposition activists and organizations.</p>
<p>When the COVID-19 pandemic began in spring 2020, Russia <a href="https://ipi.media/new-fake-news-law-stifles-independent-reporting-in-russia-on-covid-19/">used the existing fake news framework to criminalize</a> what it said were coronavirus-related fakes in an effort to curb unwanted coverage of the public health emergency. The law carried a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.</p>
<h2>Pranksters non grata</h2>
<p>Since the renewal of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, Vovan and Lexus again put their pranking talents in the Kremlin’s service. In late March, the duo published pranks with the U.K. Home Secretary <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/a110abfc133cbdfa4b3772a1f7bb973d/">Priti Patel</a> and Secretary of State for Defense <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/2e3a2631dec32df3a3401f4be4187f8a/">Ben Wallace</a>. </p>
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<p>Posing as Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, the pranksters trolled the U.K. ministers with ridiculous questions surrounding the war. At one point, faux-Shmyhal asked Patel if the British were afraid that neo-Nazis would enter the U.K. among Ukrainian refugees, a reference to the Kremlin’s claim that the goal of its invasion of Ukraine is “denazification.” The startled official replied with an assurance of the Brits’ determination to help in the Ukrainian refugee crisis. </p>
<p>The leading Russian state information agency, RIA Novosti, twisted Patel’s response. The <a href="https://ria.ru/20220324/prank-1779936160.html">headline read</a>: “The U.K. Home Secretary shared with the pranksters her willingness to help neo-Nazis.” </p>
<p>After the U.K. government urged YouTube to block the videos as “Russian propaganda,” the <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/youtube-removes-account-publishing-hoaxes-223136077.html">U.S.-based platform removed</a> the pranksters’ channel as part of its investigation into “influence operations linked to Russia.” </p>
<p>The pranking war rages on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stanislav Budnitsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Political phone pranksters played a big part in the passage of draconian laws that strangle free expression in Russia.Stanislav Budnitsky, Postdoctoral Fellow, Russian and East European Institute, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1783122022-03-04T02:46:42Z2022-03-04T02:46:42ZAs the Ukraine war drags on, how secure will Putin’s hold on power remain?<p>There has been constant speculation for most of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 22 years in power as to what it would take to bring about his departure. Authoritarian leaders tend to depart according to two scenarios (beyond natural causes): forced out by the elite or by the street. </p>
<p>In light of events in Ukraine, has the time finally come that either of those scenarios might come to pass?</p>
<h2>Putin appears to be isolated from advisers</h2>
<p>It was generally accepted among Russian political experts that the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-new-autocracy/">really big decisions</a> in Russia, such as whether to annex Crimea or invade Ukraine, were made by a small circle of advisers from the security services. These are people who also have close personal ties to Putin going back many years. </p>
<p>There is also a technocratic elite in Russia that has kept the economy and social services going under his supervision. And there is a group of rich businesspeople (the oligarchs and others), who in return for obsequiousness, were allowed to keep making money.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/world/europe/putin-ukraine-advisers.html">first sign of a potential crack</a> in Putin’s small circle of security advisers came at the meeting of the Russian Security Council on February 21, at which Putin extracted an agreement for Russia to recognise the breakaway Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk as independent states. It was this decision that led to parliamentary approval of the use of Russian troops to “protect” those republics from Ukrainian aggression, which brought on the invasion. </p>
<p>The meeting revealed that the security chiefs who were considered Putin’s closest cronies were not in the loop. And many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/putin-angry-spectacle-amounts-to-declaration-war-ukraine">appeared uncomfortable</a> and expressed, very carefully, their reservations. It took humiliating bullying to get them all onside. </p>
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<p>It is unclear where Putin gets his advice from today, but a process of elimination suggests it might be just the military and the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-sanction-russia-defense-minister-sergei-shoygu/">minister of defence, Sergey Shoigu</a>. Seasoned observers have suggested even Shoigu looked shocked when Putin ordered him to place Russia’s nuclear forces on alert.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1497928429353713664"}"></div></p>
<h2>Some oligarchs distancing themselves</h2>
<p>However, there is no sign these worried and humiliated members of the security elite are so discontented as to take action against Putin. And the technocratic elite claims to be loyally taking on the task of preparing the nation for crippling sanctions. </p>
<p>That leaves the economic elite. And here, there are signs of discontent, particularly the Yeltsin-era oligarchs, such as <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/deripaska-oligarch-ukraine-russia-war/31734624.html">Oleg Deripaska</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/03/roman-empire-rise-fall-abramovich-reign-chelsea-fc">Roman Abramovich</a>, who do not totally owe their wealth to Putin. </p>
<p>Deripaska, a billionaire who has been sanctioned by the West, has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/28/business/oligarchs-russia-ukraine-fridman-deripaska/index.html">broken ranks with the Kremlin</a> and called for the war to end, as has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/two-top-russian-billionaires-speak-out-against-invasion-of-ukraine">Mikhail Fridman</a>, one of Russia’s richest men. </p>
<p>Abramovich, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-03/russian-billionaire-roman-abramovich-puts-chelsea-up-for-sale/100877478">selling</a> the Chelsea football club he owns and setting up a foundation for victims of the war (although he <a href="https://au.finance.yahoo.com/finance/news/growing-pressure-roman-abramovich-condemn-080837770.html">has yet to condemn</a> the war outright).</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1497979277484040193"}"></div></p>
<p>Such public challenges by oligarchs have been rare in Russia since ex-oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/business/06nocera.html">targeted by the Kremlin</a> and spent years in prison on charges his lawyers maintain were trumped up. </p>
<p>Even if it’s starting to hit home for some oligarch that their businesses and wealth are under serious threat, there is not enough here to suggest a palace coup. It doesn’t help that the Russian president is directly elected, and can only be removed through impeachment, a drawn-out process that cannot be organised conspiratorially. </p>
<h2>Will street protests gather momentum?</h2>
<p>Nervous elites might get braver if there is enough tumult on the streets. What are the chances of popular protests bringing about Putin’s downfall? </p>
<p>Putin has always enjoyed high levels of popularity. He brought a style of open bluntness to the presidency that could be charming or brutal, depending on the circumstances. He was lucky with oil prices, which with some judicious economic management allowed him to preside over a dramatic improvement in people’s living standards. </p>
<p>Putin’s once-restrained but constant insistence that Russia was by right a great power and must be recognised as such did his popularity no harm. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 drove his poll ratings through the roof in an outpouring of patriotic fervour (<a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">peaking at 89% in June 2015</a>, according to an independent pollster).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-approval-has-stayed-strong-over-the-years-war-in-ukraine-could-change-that-178179">Putin's approval has stayed strong over the years – war in Ukraine could change that</a>
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<p>There’s been a decline ever since, as the economy stagnated, opposition leader Alexei Navalny was poisoned, and elections were manipulated. His <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">rating dipped to 59% in mid-2020</a> and has hovered in the 60-70% range since then.</p>
<p>There have been people on the streets <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-29/vladimir-putin-have-some-tea-russian-city-anti-kremlin-protest/12609698">countless times</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/10/russia-protests-election-vladimir-putin">over the years</a>, but they have never been able to maintain momentum, fading away before policy brutality, arrests and imprisonment. </p>
<p>Thousands have already been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/more-than-2000-arrested-at-anti-war-protests-in-russia">arrested</a> during street protests since the start of the Ukraine invasion.</p>
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<img alt="Police detain a demonstrator." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449949/original/file-20220303-9263-fnkzvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Police detain a demonstrator during a protest against Russia’s attack on Ukraine in St. Petersburg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dmitri Lovetsky/AP</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>The mass in the middle</h2>
<p>In what direction will things go this time? There are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/more-than-2000-arrested-at-anti-war-protests-in-russia">anti-war petitions</a> garnering millions of signatures, and people continuing to gather on the streets, despite the risks. But prior to the invasion, polls showed an <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-approval-has-stayed-strong-over-the-years-war-in-ukraine-could-change-that-178179">improvement in Putin’s rating to 71%</a>. </p>
<p>Anecdotal evidence suggests a mass in the middle who don’t know what’s happening in Ukraine or choose to avoid knowing. For a political scientist, the issue is how to account for the apathetic middle when judging the survivability of a regime. Which side will they take when things get serious, given the fact Western sanctions are bringing about serious economic pain? </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ahead-of-constitutional-reform-vote-two-thirds-of-young-russians-think-vladimir-putin-should-step-back-from-power-141306">Ahead of constitutional reform vote, two-thirds of young Russians think Vladimir Putin should step back from power</a>
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<p>Those in the middle will put off taking sides for as long as possible. For many, the measure of serious economic pain is the severe hardships of the 1990s, which led many Russians to reject the Western model.</p>
<p>There is no reason to believe a new plumbing of the depths will produce a different response.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Fortescue does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some oligarchs have broken ranks with the Kremlin, there is no sign yet other elites are so discontented as to take action against Putin.Stephen Fortescue, Associate Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1781502022-03-02T19:41:11Z2022-03-02T19:41:11ZWhy the ‘Putinisation’ of sport must no longer fool the world<p>At the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, there were <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/world-cup-2018-china-viewing-fugures-russia-who-support-which-country-a8417241.html">sixty-thousand Chinese fans in attendance</a> even though their national team hadn’t qualified for the tournament. By comparison, there were only fifteen-thousand England fans, who eventually saw their team make the Semi-Final stage.</p>
<p>One reason for this can be traced back to events at the 2016 UEFA European Championship in France, when a group of well organised <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/12/russian-hooligans-savage-organised-england-fans-marseille-euro-2016">Russian football hooligans attacked England fans in Marseille</a>. Some observers speculated that these Russians had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/18/whitehall-suspects-kremlin-links-to-russian-euro-2016-hooligans-vladimir-putin">links to the Kremlin</a> hence many English fans subsequently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/08/world-cup-england-gay-lgbt-fans-safety-risk-russia-say-mps">feared for their safety</a> should they head to the 2018 World Cup.</p>
<h2>Shock and awe</h2>
<p>Yet for the relatively small number of English who visited Russia, indeed for many other people from around the world, they left and headed for home in 2018 with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/england-belgium-world-cup-score-russia-kaliningrad-stadium-fans-adnan-januzaj-a8422161.html">very positive views</a> of the country. Many extolled Russia’s virtues as a hospitable, safe country that had organised a very successful event.</p>
<p>Therein lay a number of important lessons about Russia, one of which is that the country has a very different relationship with China and with other countries from outside the Western alliance. However, it was the way in which Vladimir Putin’s government deployed sport that was more striking, seemingly a duplicitous cocktail of shock and awe combined with charm and seduction.</p>
<p>This template has been apparent for years indeed it has been evident even during the last couple of months. Back in 2014, Russia staged the Winter Olympics in Sochi, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2015.1040432">spending $60 billion</a> on the stage-managed event. As the world looked on at the event’s magnitude, a matter of weeks later <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/26/crimea-putins-olympic-diversion/">Putin ordered the annexation of Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>At this year’s Winter Olympics, most sport fans spent the first week marvelling at the performances of teenage Russian skater Kamila Valieva, then the second week snarling at and berating Russia for <a href="https://www.cbssports.com/olympics/news/winter-olympics-explaining-the-kamila-valieva-doping-scandal-that-is-clouding-the-russian-figure-skater/">yet another episode</a> of the cynical way in which the Kremlin has weaponised sport, particularly through its <a href="https://time.com/5746344/russia-banned-olympics-2019/">state-sponsored doping programme</a>.</p>
<h2>Sport washing?</h2>
<p>The DNA of this cynicism has also been evident across, for example, sponsorship deals in which Russian state-owned corporations have been engaged. For example, UEFA has had <a href="https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/news/0253-0d7ed218e698-bbe914af9c5e-1000--gazprom-becomes-champions-league-official-partner/">a deal with Gazprom</a> since 2013 which extends to 2024. While the gas giant has helped boost UEFA revenues and became a feature of Champions League football, the organisation has been <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/99026745/gazprom-and-russia-s-foreign-policy">involved in more insidious activities</a>.</p>
<p>Government in Moscow long since took the decision to <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/gas-pipeline-nord-stream-2-links-germany-russia-splits-europe">route Gazprom’s supply pipelines under the Baltic Sea to Germany</a> so that Ukraine and Poland would have no influence or control over Russia’s European gas supplies. Similarly, by not crossing their territories, Russia has also avoided paying valuable gas supply transit fees to Kyiv and Warsaw.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">EXPLAINER: Russia’s grip on UEFA | Gazprom, Champions League, Putin, Ukraine, Off The Ball, 25 February 2022.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Some observers have referred to Russia’s activities as <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-14/world-cup-dream-sportswashing-russia-appalling-record/9867166">sport washing</a>, a practice associated either with cleansing a country’s image and reputation or with deceiving people into believing an aggressor is something other than who or what we might think they are. But for the people of Ukraine, Poland and elsewhere, there have never been any doubts about Putin’s intentions. The strategy and the stains were always clear to see.</p>
<p>Other people take the view that Russia’s use of sport has been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283840572_The_Sochi_Winter_Olympics_and_Russia%E2%80%99s_unique_soft_power_strategy">a form of soft power</a>, whereby it has sought to attract overseas audiences by seducing them through the allure of sport. While there are some grounds for concluding that this is what Kremlin strategists have been seeking to achieve, the predisposition of Putin’s regime toward <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8">deception, divisiveness and destruction</a> indicates that use of the word ‘soft’ is misplaced.</p>
<h2>Putinisation</h2>
<p>If neither sport washing nor soft power appropriately or sufficiently explain how the Russian government has deployed the likes of football and athletics, then surely a better explanation is that global sport has been ‘Putinised’. At its heart, this ‘Putinisation’ has seen state-led strategy focused on building power and exerting control across the world, executed through the divisive deployment of sport. But now, the tipping point has come and global sport must respond.</p>
<p>Short-term, many of the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/sports-bodies-move-isolate-condemn-russia-83154354">measures now being implemented by sport to sanction Russia</a> are to be applauded. Yet ‘Putinisation’, demands that clubs, governing bodies, event owners and others more fundamentally change their ways. The Kremlin clearly doesn’t engage with sport on the basis of sport or rational economics, its decisions are much more <a href="https://lookcharms.com/moscow-sees-sport-as-an-instrument-of-power/">geopolitically charged</a> than this. As such, those sport organisations that have taken money from Russian sponsors or investors need to start thinking less about their financial coffers and more about the risks when associating with Putin and his ilk.</p>
<p>As for Russia, events in recent days have proved one thing: that Putin can’t be trusted nor, for the time being at least, can Russian sport. For the country to be reintegrated back into the system of global sport will require measures to be put in place that not only reassure us but also provide tangible evidence that sport is not being manipulated or exploited for geopolitical purposes.</p>
<p>What this means and whether it can be achieved are complex matters, though sport simply cannot afford to be fooled any longer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chadwick ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin has built a state-led strategy focused on building power and exerting control across the world, through the use of sport.Simon Chadwick, Global Professor of Sport | Director of Eurasian Sport, EM Lyon Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.