tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/saddam-hussein-22095/articlesSaddam Hussein – The Conversation2023-04-26T12:27:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036422023-04-26T12:27:13Z2023-04-26T12:27:13ZThe invasion of Iraq defined US’ foreign relations – but in popular Iraqi literature, the war is just a piece of the country’s complex history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522380/original/file-20230421-4069-2z6dne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iraqis shop in Baghdad's famous book market in July 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1241645580/photo/iraq-daily-life.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=OQhTZ4qR5aPJyNaS_M-YkuDY40ockiWCrrwJ6g7wMyA=">Sabah Arar/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been just over 20 years since the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">United States invaded Iraq</a>. Some Americans have largely forgotten about the invasion, despite the fact the Sept. 11 attacks that precipitated it still loom large in U.S. national memory. Even during the heart of the war in 2006, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/14/upshot/if-americans-can-find-north-korea-on-a-map-theyre-more-likely-to-prefer-diplomacy.html">most young Americans</a> could not find Iraq on a map. </p>
<p>Many Iraqis, though, have a more nuanced, deeper understanding of the country’s recent history: An understanding which can be seen in their literature – and particularly in the contemporary, post-invasion literature that <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/middleeast/people/faculty/reneeran.html">scholars like me study</a>. </p>
<p>For the past two decades, <a href="https://sites.gold.ac.uk/comparative-literature/iraq-corporeality-and-memory/">Iraqi literature</a> in particular has undertaken a <a href="https://arablit.org/2022/01/05/focus-iraq-canonical-works-new-voices/">deep excavation</a> of its recent past, going far beyond the confines of the U.S. invasion. </p>
<p>Iraqi literature sometimes reflects on the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html">dictatorship of Saddam Hussein</a>, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War">Iran-Iraq war</a> in the 1980s, and the <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/IRQ/iraq/net-migration">experience of immigration</a> to Western countries – in addition to 9/11 and the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq following false claims of Saddam’s possessing weapons of mass destruction. </p>
<p>In other words, while many in the U.S. have focused on Iraq through the lens of the 2003 invasion, these events are not the heart of contemporary Iraqi literature.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing a hat has smiling eyes and looks toward a person who is obscured, except for their hand." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522378/original/file-20230421-4894-le0097.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Iraqi writer Hassan Blasim appears at a book event in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flickr.com/photos/bokmassan/21708918793/in/photolist-z5kTek-yP7h3S-2gEaEjT">Niklas Maupoix/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Literary timelines of Iraqi history</h2>
<p>The short stories of <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/313242/the-corpse-exhibition-by-hassan-blasim/">Hassan Blasim</a> and <a href="https://store.deepvellum.org/products/no-windmills-in-basra">Diaa Jubaili</a>, two modern Iraqi storytellers who have both found critical acclaim in Western media, offer a way to understand some of the literary narratives of recent Iraqi history. </p>
<p><a href="https://hassanblasim.net">Blasim, a filmmaker</a> and writer born in Baghdad in 1973, currently lives in Finland. Jubaili, born in 1977 in Basra near the borders with Kuwait and Iran, has remained in Basra.</p>
<p>Their stories present the U.S. invasion and its consequences as part of a longer history of foreign occupations and internal political violence in Iraq. </p>
<p>This history of violence, their fiction suggests, has roots in the mid-20th century. During that time, newly independent Iraq’s successive governments, and their foreign backers, attempted to chart a path forward for the country. </p>
<p>Blasim and Jubaili show that it is the intervening decades, as opposed to just the U.S. invasion in 2003, that have come to define modern Iraq. </p>
<p>In fact, several of their short stories are written about Iraq’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War">previous wars</a> and the dictatorship of Saddam, with no reference to the U.S. invasion. When their stories do reference the invasion, it is often as one of a litany of violent events.</p>
<p>Somewhat improbably, many of their stories creatively retell a broad swath of Iraqi history in just a few short pages – an undertaking that might make a historian or political scientist break out in hives. </p>
<p>How could one possibly reduce such complexity to a few pages? </p>
<p>To <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/arts-culture/books/2022/09/06/iraqi-author-diaa-jubailis-no-windmills-in-basra-is-a-surrealist-ode-to-his-home-town/">quote Jubaili</a>: “There is no need to write a story with a lot of words when the idea behind it can only sustain a few lines.” </p>
<h2>Simple ideas</h2>
<p>Jubaili’s themes – entailing the disorientation caused by cyclical wars – – seem to be summed up in a single line in one of his stories, “The Frog.” </p>
<p>In this story, an enterprising man realizes he will turn a large profit selling frogs that he catches in Basra’s Shatt al-Arab river to East Asian oil refinery workers. One day, he catches a “giant frogman” who has been living in the river since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Disoriented, the frogman panics, asking the frog catcher: “Is the war over?”</p>
<p>Which war, indeed? By virtue of its geographic position, Basra was at the epicenter of the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s.</p>
<p>But Iraq also experienced <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago">political revolutions in 1991</a>, during which armed Kurdish and Shiite minorities attempted to depose Saddam. <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/iraq-invades-kuwait">Iraq also invaded Kuwait</a> in 1990 because of territorial ambitions. This led the United Nations to issue <a href="https://archive.globalpolicy.org/previous-issues-and-debate-on-iraq/41759.html">crippling economic sanctions</a> for the next 13 years.</p>
<p>Like the frogman, the lives of Jubaili’s characters are marked by many of these events.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A brown-skinned middle-aged man looks directly at the camera. He wears a dark blue shirt and sits in front of a dark background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522379/original/file-20230421-14-3g9o5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Iraqi author Diaa Jubaili is an example of a writer from the country who mentions, but does not focus excessively on, the U.S. invasion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/ضياء_جبيلي_1.jpg">Diaa1977/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A closer read</h2>
<p>Where Jubaili’s stories are often absurd and vaguely humorous, Blasim’s prize-winning short stories are hard to read. His prose unflinchingly describes all manners of violence and human suffering. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://apersonalanthology.com/2019/10/18/the-hole-by-hassan-blasim/">2014 short story</a> “The Hole,” a man fleeing masked gunmen in Baghdad trips and falls into a deep pit. Quickly, he realizes that he is not the only person trapped there. There is another man: someone who claims to be a jinn – or genie – who fell in while fleeing persecutors during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Caliphate/The-Abbasid-caliphate">Abbasid Caliphate</a>, which ruled the area that is now Iraq from 750 to 1500 C.E. Also sharing the hole is the corpse of a Russian soldier from the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/finlands-winter-war-with-the-soviet-union/30280490.html">Soviet-Finnish war</a>, waged from 1939 to 1940. </p>
<p>After a few pages, a woman covered in electronics fleeing a dystopic, futuristic robot falls into the hole, as well. The hole becomes a metaphor for a chain that links “bloody fights, repetitive and disgusting” across time and space, according to the story. </p>
<p>History, it seems, acts as “a photocopier churning out copies” upon which are imprinted “the same face, a face shaped by pain and torment,” as Blasim writes. </p>
<p>In another of Blasim’s short stories, “The Madman of Freedom Square,” a man considered insane by the people of his town narrates three generations of his family history against the backdrop of the ebbs and flows of competing 20th-century political and religious ideologies. </p>
<p>In the story’s final lines, set in the present day, a stranger talks the unwitting narrator, “the madman of Freedom Square,” into wearing an explosives-strapped vest. </p>
<p>Ultimately, these stories encourage readers to elevate the importance of human lives over the events that are said to define them.</p>
<p>This literature resists narratives of the U.S. invasion as a supposedly exceptional event. It also resists the tokenized testimonies of the survivors of the occupation: those faces that are the usual focus of media coverage, academic scholarship and political punditry in the U.S. </p>
<p>And even in the stories’ insistence on the ever-presence of death, whether in Blasim’s macabre and violent tones or in Jubaili’s sometimes-humorous, sometimes-absurd ones, this literature becomes a metaphor for the immense fortitude that it takes to survive and give meaning to one’s world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Renee Ragin Randall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The short stories of modern Iraqi writers Hassan Blasim and Diaa Jubaili show that the 2003 invasion and subsequent war in Iraq are not at the heart of contemporary Iraqi literature.Renee Ragin Randall, Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature and Middle East Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2019882023-03-17T13:56:52Z2023-03-17T13:56:52ZIraq 20 years on: death came from the skies on March 19 2003 – and the killing continues to this day<p>The mass killings of Iraqis started on the night of March 19 2003 with the US-led coalition’s “shock and awe” bombing of Baghdad. They called it “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">Operation Iraqi Freedom</a>”.</p>
<p>Millions around the world sat transfixed in front of their TV screens, watching as bombs and missiles exploded. The reports came with the warning that they “contained flashing images”. True enough, the sky over Baghdad flashed orange and golden – but those were bombs, not flash photography. </p>
<p>The narrative of terror which began that day was to last for years. Terror from the sky, terror on the ground, terror from the foreign soldier, terror from one’s neighbour. By the time the invasion was completed, some 7,500 Iraqi civilians had been killed in the air strikes.</p>
<p>Each death was recorded by the <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/about/">Iraq Body Count</a> (IBC) database, with which I have been involved for some years. Among them were <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/x025">15 adults and children who lost their lives</a> in Baghdad’s Zafaraniya area on March 30 2003:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Iraq Body Count list of deaths of people in an attack in Baghdad on March 30 2003" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515787/original/file-20230316-22-wz7abs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iraq Body Count</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the war began, the US president George W Bush vowed to “disarm Iraq and to free its people” in a live television address, shortly after explosions had rocked the Iraqi capital. US military sources <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2866109.stm">told the BBC</a> that five key members of the Iraqi regime, including its president Saddam Hussein, were targeted in these first attacks – but that it was not known whether the targets had been hit and what damage might have been caused.</p>
<p>When it came to civilian deaths, an <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/press-releases/12/">IBC dossier</a> revealed the extent of the killings between 2003 and 2005. During the invasion and in the two years that followed, 24,865 civilians were reported killed – almost half in the capital Baghdad. </p>
<p>Nearly one-third of these civilian deaths occurred during the invasion phase before May 1 2003, when Bush made his “mission accomplished” speech from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, at the safe distance of the coast of San Diego. </p>
<p>US-led forces killed 37% of all civilian victims in the first two years. Anti-occupation forces and insurgents killed 9%, post-invasion criminal violence accounted for 36% of all deaths, and the remainder were killed by “unknown agents”. At least a further 42,500 civilians were reported wounded. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="List pf people responsible for civilian deaths in Iraq war." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516048/original/file-20230317-2026-ffgu2a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraq war: who did the killings? (2003-05).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iraq Body Count</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While mortuary officials and medics were the most frequently cited witnesses of these deaths, three press agencies (Associated Press, Agence France Presse and Reuters) between them provided more than one-third of all media reports.</p>
<h2>The aftermath</h2>
<p>Thousands of civilians have been killed each year since that first night of shock and awe. At its peak, in 2006, the <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/">conflict claimed</a> 29,027 people. At its calmest, in 2022, there were 740 deaths. </p>
<p>Two decades on, the killings continue. IBC’s 2022 security report, <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/residual-war/">Iraq’s Residual War</a>, revealed that the country is still effectively at war. </p>
<p>In 2022, in addition to civilian killings, 521 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State">Islamic State</a> fighters were killed by the Iraqi military in joint operations with the US, and 506 members of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party">PKK</a> (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) were killed by the Turkish military. Other conflict-related deaths included 97 Turkish and 80 Iraqi soldiers, 30 members of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Mobilization_Forces">Popular Mobilization Forces</a> (paramilitaries with links to Iran), and 23 federal police. </p>
<p>Pro-Iran parties dominate Iraq’s parliament, and more than 150,000 fighters of the former Iran-backed Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary forces have been integrated into the state military. </p>
<p>In 2021, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/313615_IRAQ-2021-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf">UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</a> published a study that highlighted the severe and enduring injustices of the Iraqi justice system – based on 235 interviews with current or former detainees, as well as discussions with prison staff, judges, lawyers, families of the detainees and other relevant parties. As <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraq-authorities-deny-prisoner-rights/2021/08/03/5f9d2c7e-f07a-11eb-81b2-9b7061a582d8_story.html">reported in the Washington Post</a>, the study detailed: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a labyrinth of unfairness, with detainees often denied due process at every turn … Confessions frequently come through torture … [such that] detainees frequently end up signing documents admitting crimes they did not commit. Few detainees see a lawyer until they appear in court. Methods of abuse include severe beatings, some on the soles of the feet, as well as electric shocks, stress positions and suffocation. Sexual violence was also reported.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There were also <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/residual-war/">1,352 arrests in Iraq in 2022</a> under the Terrorism Act. All these men face the death penalty.</p>
<h2>Traumatised country</h2>
<p>Since the 2003 invasion, Iraqis have been subjected to genocide, terrorism, the killing of protesters, poverty and the displacement of millions of people. When the war in Iraq officially ended in 2011 with then-US president Barack Obama <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_of_United_States_troops_from_Iraq_(2007%E2%80%932011)#:%7E:text=Full%20withdrawal%20(2011),-See%20also%3A%20U.S.&text=With%20the%20collapse%20of%20discussions,scheduled%2C%20on%2021%20October%202011.">declaring</a> the withdrawal of troops, a deeply traumatised country was left behind, with a bankrupt economy. </p>
<p>Economists say that, due to falling oil prices and the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/iraq/press-releases/children-make-majority-45-million-iraqis-risk-falling-poverty-and-deprivation-due">effects of COVID</a> on the country’s economy, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/02/03/961149079/in-iraqs-dire-economy-poverty-is-rising-and-so-are-fears-of-instability?t=1627992007423">Iraq’s poverty rate</a> may have shot up from 20% in 2018 to more than 30% in 2020, meaning that 12 million Iraqis were living below the poverty line. In 2019, the estimated <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/812116/youth-unemployment-rate-in-iraq/">youth unemployment rate in Iraq was 25%</a> – in a country where almost 60% of the population is <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/08/in-iraq-un-youth-envoy-says-young-people-are-most-valuable-force-we-have-to-shape-a-better-future/">under 25</a>.</p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>In July 2016, in his <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/">report</a> to the UK’s parliamentary inquiry into the Iraq war, Sir John Chilcot underlined the need for documenting the effects of military action on civilians. It was the government’s responsibility, he stated, to identify and understand the likely and actual effects of its military action. Referring to the war, he wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Greater efforts should have been made in the post-conflict period to determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects of military operations on civilians. More time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to efforts to determine the actual number. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One of Chilcot’s recommendations was that the UK government should be ready to work with others, in particular NGOs and academic institutions, to develop such assessments and estimates over time. The vast majority of civilian deaths in Iraq remain only partially documented. A respectful and humane account of all the Iraq war’s dead remains <a href="https://twitter.com/iraqbodycount/status/1625842108404727808">an unfinished task</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lily Hamourtziadou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iraq Body Count has kept a close tally of people killed in Iraq since the invasion started in March 2003.Lily Hamourtziadou, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000752023-03-16T14:07:04Z2023-03-16T14:07:04ZIraq war, 20 years on: how the world failed Iraq and created a less peaceful, democratic and prosperous state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515420/original/file-20230315-26-c915gj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=439%2C12%2C3708%2C2956&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khalid Mohammed/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two decades ago, Australia joined the US-led “coalition of the willing” that staged a major military intervention in Iraq.</p>
<p>To justify the war, leaders like US President George W. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard argued that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction and was harbouring terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Neither could be tolerated in a post-9/11 world.</p>
<p>However, when evidence for Iraq’s weapons program or links to terrorism failed to emerge, the coalition partners were forced to re-frame the war. The goals were threefold: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and bring peace to the Iraqi people</p></li>
<li><p>to replace the autocratic Baathist regime with a democratic government</p></li>
<li><p>to transform Iraq into a prosperous state governed by a free-market economy.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Twenty years on, the legacy of the war still looms large in Iraq. Despite the enormous human and financial costs, the coalition abjectly failed to achieve its central goals. Today, Iraq is not more peaceful, democratic or prosperous than it was in 2003.</p>
<h2>The costs of war</h2>
<p>Any reflection of the war must first address the staggering costs. </p>
<p>Although estimates vary, approximately <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">186,000 Iraqi civilians died</a> and an untold number were injured. And more than <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/refugees/iraqi">nine million Iraqis</a> were internally displaced or forced to flee the country. </p>
<p>Beyond such figures are a series of very real, but far less tangible, costs such as the damage done to much of Iraq’s rich cultural heritage or the deep emotional scars that come with two decades of war.</p>
<p>On the coalition side, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">4,487 US military and 238 other coalition troops</a> died during the operation. </p>
<p>The war effort also came at an enormous cost to US taxpayers: <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">US$756 billion (A$1.15 trillion)</a> in military spending from 2003-18. (The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-iraq-war-has-cost-the-us-nearly-2-trillion-129617">true cost</a>, however, is likely far higher.) Over the same period, the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aspis-decades-the-iraq-war/">cost of Australia’s military operations in Iraq</a> has surpassed A$4 billion. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-iraq-war-has-cost-the-us-nearly-2-trillion-129617">The Iraq War has cost the US nearly $2 trillion</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Goal 1: Peace at the barrel of a gun</h2>
<p>On the purported aims of the invasion, Iraq has clearly gone backwards on many metrics.</p>
<p>On the first goal of bringing peace to Iraq, it is true the coalition forces toppled Hussein and his entire Baathist regime in just six short weeks. He was later captured, put on trial and finally <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/29/middleeast/iraqi-voices-saddam-execution/index.html">hanged</a> in December 2006. </p>
<p>However, the coalition forces failed to adequately secure the nation after his regime was toppled. This created a security vacuum that was rapidly filled by a host of different militant groups. From 2006 onward, Iraq descended into a dark and unprecedented period of horrific sectarian violence.</p>
<p>This worsened considerably after the US troop withdrawal at the end of 2011. By 2013, the Islamic State had begun to conquer vast swathes of territory across both Syria and Iraq, eventually capturing the city of Mosul in mid-2014.</p>
<p>The group went on to impose strict Sharia law in the territory it controlled and enacted mass genocidal pogroms that included the slaughter, enslavement and forced exodus of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expelling-minorities">thousands of innocent civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Iraq remains one of the most violent places on earth. Since the expulsion of the Islamic State from Mosul in July 2017, over <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/">10,000 civilians have been killed in across Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The irony here barely needs to be stated: there was no credible terrorist presence in Iraq before the coalition forces staged their invasion, but by mid-2014 roughly a third of the country was controlled by terrorists who remain a threat today. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-been-20-years-since-the-us-invaded-iraq-long-enough-for-my-undergraduate-students-to-see-it-as-a-relic-of-the-past-199460">It's been 20 years since the US invaded Iraq – long enough for my undergraduate students to see it as a relic of the past</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Goal 2: Democracy as a pathway to authoritarianism</h2>
<p>The second key goal of the war was to bring liberal democracy to Iraq.</p>
<p>It, too, has a complicated legacy. On the one hand, the Iraqi people are to be admired for having embraced democracy. Millions of Iraqis vote in the nation’s regular provincial and federal elections. </p>
<p>Iraq is also now home to a strong culture of dissent, as is evidenced by the frequent protests that were not permitted under the former regime.</p>
<p>However, one of the unfortunate consequences of the war has been that many ethno-religious political factions viewed it as an opportunity to peddle their own relatively narrow and divisive political rhetoric. </p>
<p>This led the political elite to tighten their stranglehold on power and frequently crack down hard on Iraqi media and civil society.</p>
<p>According to the annual <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/">Democracy Index</a> released by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq has been consistently ranked as among the worst political regimes in the world. And the situation is actually getting worse. By 2022, Iraq had been downgraded to an “authoritarian regime” and was ranked 124th out of 167 countries in the democracy rankings. </p>
<p>So, while Iraq holds regular elections and allows mass protests, it fails to meet the minimum criteria by which we would normally measure a democracy. This speaks volumes about the merits of imposing a top-down model of democracy by force.</p>
<h2>Goal 3: Prosperity at any cost</h2>
<p>Third, the goal of turning Iraq into a beacon of prosperity driven by a free-market economy has only benefited a handful of corrupt elites.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Iraq’s real GDP (based on purchasing power parity) has skyrocketed in recent years on the back of its oil wealth, reaching an estimated <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/real-gdp-purchasing-power-parity/country-comparison">US$390 billion (A$583 billion) in 2021</a>. This is the 50th largest economy in the world. </p>
<p>Yet, this cash flow is not filtering down to the Iraqi people. In 2022, Iraq <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022">ranked 157th (out of 180 countries)</a> on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Index. </p>
<p>Also in 2022, the Sustainable Development Report ranked Iraq as <a href="https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/">115th (out of 163 countries)</a> on progress towards achieving the UN’s sustainable development goals. It was the worst-performing middle-income country in the world. </p>
<p>In other words, while corrupt Iraqi political elites and major Western oil companies extract billions of dollars in revenues from Iraq’s rich natural resources, millions of Iraqis continue to live in destitution in a country with crumbling and insufficient infrastructure.</p>
<p>Iraq may well be a free-market economy, but what use is that if ordinary Iraqis have sporadic electricity, limited potable water, few working sewage systems and inadequate health care and education?</p>
<h2>Australia’s obligations 20 years on</h2>
<p>All of this raises deep questions about the political responsibilities and moral obligations of the United States and its key coalition partners such as Australia.</p>
<p>While various Australian organisations run a handful of important programs across Iraq – especially in agriculture, human rights and mine-clearing – these fall well short of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people.</p>
<p>Australia could do much more. Politicians and policy-makers, for instance, could use the 20-year anniversary of the Iraq war to launch a renewed effort on three pragmatic and achievable fronts: education, security and democracy building. </p>
<p>Iraq’s education sector has been crippled by the legacy of war, autocratic leadership and international sanctions. This has left the schools and universities decades behind international standards. </p>
<p>The Australian government could do much more to train Iraqi teachers, fund schools and streamline the process of knowledge-sharing and exchanges between the Iraqi and Australian education sectors.</p>
<p>In terms of security, the Australian government and military must continue to work closely with Iraq’s security forces on training programs. This is needed to prevent
Iraq from returning to the grim days of sectarian violence or, worse still, the emergence of a new terrorist threat. </p>
<p>Finally, Australia should stick to its stated goal of supporting universal human rights and fostering democratic participation in the region. </p>
<p>By setting up capacity-building initiatives for Iraq’s media, unions and civil society movements, Australia could greatly enhance Iraq’s fledgling democracy and ensure it does not slip further into authoritarianism.</p>
<p>In fact, Australia is in a unique position to achieve these three goals. Its role as part of the “coalition of the willing” was generally perceived as being less heavy-handed than the US or UK. </p>
<p>This is a moment of consequence. Making good on our commitment to the initial goals of the war will influence how Australia is perceived in Iraq, the Middle East and across the world. And we owe the Iraqi people that much at least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200075/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan has received research funding from the Australian Department of Defence and the Australian Research Council. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of Defence or Government policy. </span></em></p>While some progress has been made, the coalition forces abjectly failed to achieve their central goals. But Australia has an opportunity now to make good on its promises.Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796242022-04-07T12:25:46Z2022-04-07T12:25:46ZWhy the best way to stop strongmen like Putin is to prevent their rise in the first place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456402/original/file-20220405-18-m5oam5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=61%2C24%2C8181%2C5462&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are few ways for the West to deter the rise of another dictator like Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-a-joint-news-photo/1238504428">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents foreign policymakers with few good options to punish Russian President Vladimir Putin, or to deter these types of aggressions in the future. The U.S. government, for example, continues to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/05/us-allies-to-impose-russia-sanctions-following-outrage-over-bucha.html">push for additional sanctions on Russia</a> in response to news of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas">Russian military atrocities</a>, even though prior sanctions <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-sanctions-may-make-russians-lives-worse-without-stopping-putins-assault-on-ukraine-179623">did not deter those abuses</a> in the first place. So it is worth thinking about what policymakers might do to prevent future world leaders from following Putin’s example.</p>
<p>Putin is what political scientists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DV5ECYgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">like</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=1-C0q3IAAAAJ">us</a> call a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/new-dictators">personalist dictator</a>. The <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-kremlinology-9780192896193">center of power</a> in Russia is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">not a political party or the military</a>. It’s him, personally. Strongmen’s choices are relatively unconstrained by these institutions. All power is thus concentrated in his hands, including, most notably, personal discretion and control over decision-making and appointments to state offices.</p>
<p>This is the type of dictator who causes <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302735">much of modern global strife</a>.
They <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/strongmen-and-straw-men-authoritarian-regimes-and-the-initiation-of-international-conflict/4352949B5F1550DD67076468BFB1BB8F">start conflicts with other nations</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12080">invest in nuclear weapons</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/706049">repress their own citizens</a>. In addition to Putin, notable examples from recent history include Moammar Gadhafi, Saddam Hussein, Idi Amin and three generations of North Korean leaders.</p>
<p>Our research has found that once these type of leaders start repressing their own citizens at home or initiating conflicts abroad, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">there are few good ways to stop them</a>. But that doesn’t mean their rise to power in the first place is inevitable.</p>
<h2>A source of international trouble</h2>
<p>There are several reasons personalist dictators initiate most international conflicts. They face <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801479823/dictators-at-war-and-peace/#bookTabs=1">relatively little domestic opposition</a>, so when trouble starts, nobody checks them by highlighting their faults or mistakes.</p>
<p>In addition, these leaders surround themselves with compliant staffers who retain their own power only if they say what the dictator wants to hear. So he or she gets <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/dictators-and-dictatorships-9781441173966/">less accurate intelligence</a>, because the people giving briefings are afraid to give bad news.</p>
<p>In addition, personalist leaders are the type most likely to be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866">ousted violently</a>. Their fear of what might happen to them upon leaving power pushes them to use conflict as a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/es/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/leaders-and-international-conflict?format=PB">diversionary tactic</a>. An international crisis can boost domestic support among the people and among the elites, who are key to the dictator’s success.</p>
<p>Indeed, Putin’s domestic popularity <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putins-crimea-effect-ebbs-away-5-years-on/a-47941002">soared</a> after he annexed Crimea in 2014; and he <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-public-approval-is-soaring-during-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-but-its-unlikely-to-last-177302">remained popular</a> at home as he prepared for war in 2022. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-poll-ratings-climb/31781913.html">latest polls</a> suggest Putin is even <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/">more popular in Russia today</a> than at the start of the war.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man strides toward the center of a stage with a crowd behind him waving Russian flags" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456407/original/file-20220405-20-jkiji1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 remains popular in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaCrimeaReunificationAnniversary/25189daa46304783ac1a46a68a2157d1/photo">Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stopping them before they start</h2>
<p>The most common international response to personalist dictators causing problems are economic sanctions – but our research finds these <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">rarely work when dictators export oil or other natural resources</a>. In fact, they often lead to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">increased repression and harm for ordinary citizens</a>, who suffer the brunt of the sanctions.</p>
<p>Direct military intervention is sometimes possible against these dictators’ regimes. But those rarely go well. U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which led to further <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan">deadly</a> <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">conflicts</a>, ended with a fragile state in <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Iraq/fragile_state_index/">Iraq</a> and the return of personalist-style Taliban rule in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2022/feb/17/inside-taliban-return-to-power-afghanistan-mazar-i-sherif">Afghanistan</a>. Even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-usa-military-factbox/factbox-western-military-assault-on-libyas-gaddafi-idUSTRE72L7X720110322">U.S. military strikes</a> to stop Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi from slaughtering his own citizens resulted in a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ten-years-ago-libyans-staged-a-revolution-heres-why-it-has-failed/">failed state</a> rife with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya">civil war</a>.</p>
<p>In the present situation, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-and-where-are-they-180382">Russia has nuclear weapons</a>, and Putin has <a href="https://theconversation.com/would-putin-use-nuclear-weapons-an-arms-control-expert-explains-what-has-and-hasnt-changed-since-the-invasion-of-ukraine-178509">signaled he might use them</a> if he views the conflict as escalating. </p>
<p>That leaves practically <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0198746997/ref=olp_product_details?ie=UTF8&me=">no way for Western democracies</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-in-realpolitik-from-nixon-and-kissinger-ideals-go-only-so-far-in-ending-conflict-in-places-like-ukraine-179979">shut down Putin’s aggression</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed men stand on a dock next to a large yacht." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456408/original/file-20220405-18-v7k6kt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spanish and U.S. police seized this yacht, owned by a Russian oligarch closely linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SpainUSOligarchsYachtSanctions/da2e3664c9ba46b5977ef167dec724c9/photo">AP Photo/Francisco Ubilla</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shielding the money</h2>
<p>In recent decades, Western governments have aided – whether intentionally or by accident – the rise of personalist dictators in three ways.</p>
<p>First, Western governments enable dictators’ cronies to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/russian-oligarch-money-london-uk-economic-crime-bill/">launder the illicit gains</a> paid by the dictator in exchange for their loyalty. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/06/how-london-became-the-place-to-be-for-putins-oligarchs">London</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/real-estate/russian-money-flows-us-real-estate-rcna17723">Miami</a> have become havens for Russia’s oligarchs to <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/defending-the-united-states-against-russian-dark-money/">stash</a> their <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w23712">payouts</a> from Putin. </p>
<p>To protect these investments, Russian oligarchs have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/48c4bfa6-7ca2-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560">funded political campaigns</a> throughout <a href="https://euobserver.com/foreign/137631">Europe</a>, and especially in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/23/oligarchs-funding-tories">U.K.</a>, with well-heeled London <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-02/london-lawyers-say-no-comment-on-links-to-rich-russian-clients">lawyers lobbying</a> Boris Johnson’s government on behalf of Russian clients in a bid to prevent too harsh a crackdown.</p>
<p>Some of this money <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/14/russian-oligarch-charged-illegal-political-donations-00017090">flows to political campaigns in the U.S.</a> as well.</p>
<h2>Buying oil and gas</h2>
<p>Second, rising commodity prices, especially a spike in oil or gas prices, provide a windfall for many personalist dictators, enabling them to consolidate domestic power by using the extra revenue to pay loyal supporters. In 2009, political commentator Thomas Friedman proclaimed the “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/16/the-first-law-of-petropolitics/">First Law of Petropolitics</a>,” which states that as oil prices rise, dictators undermine political freedoms. But recent research shows that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.14">increasing oil revenue</a> facilitates the rise of personalist dictators, who are the ones largely <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/706049">responsible for repressing their citizens</a>. </p>
<p>In the short term, Western governments are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-drives-u-s-hunt-for-more-oil-to-help-tame-rising-prices-11646935216">scrambling</a> to find substitutes for Russian energy imports. One long-term solution may be to <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25932/accelerating-decarbonization-of-the-us-energy-system">decarbonize Western economies</a> so energy markets are not at the mercy of dictators in oil-rich countries such as Russia and Venezuela – and perhaps someday Saudi Arabia.</p>
<h2>Military support</h2>
<p>Third, foreign military support for dictators helps them to consolidate power. In general, dictators have trouble purging military elites who oppose them: The men with guns can oust the leader anytime. In most autocracies, therefore, the military acts as a limiting force on the leader’s power. But with <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/63/1/43/5290475">support from foreign allies</a>, a dictator can more easily install a cadre of personally loyal military and security leaders.</p>
<p>Sometimes this support comes in the form of an actual military occupation. Soviet occupation of North Korea in the late 1940s paved the way for Kim Il Sung to oust his generals, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.8">creating a personalist dictatorship</a> that still confounds policymakers decades later. Foreign powers often supply dictators with money to purchase military equipment, in the process making the dictator into a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000039">reliable customer</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/rwanda-paul-kagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963/">U.S.</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38568629">U.K.</a> have been known to train dictators’ sons at their military schools. For example, leaders of personalist dictatorships in the <a href="https://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/perspective/2019/12/19/dominican-playboy-causes-stir-at-cgsc/">Dominican Republic</a> and <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/35854/rwanda_president_visits_west_point">Rwanda</a> sent children to be trained in the U.S., while <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200102020065.html">Uganda’s president sent his son to a British military school</a>.</p>
<p>And Belarussian strongman Alexander Lukashenko has apparently sent his youngest son, who frequently <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/10/12/europes-last-dictator-lukashenko-has-mini-me-young-son/73813498/">appears with his father</a> in military <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/06/belarus-nikolai-lukashenko">outfits</a>, to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/09/17/protest-plagued-belarus-strongman-transfers-son-to-moscow-school-reports-a71474">study in Moscow</a>. When these relatives <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/6767/musevenis-speedy-promotion-of-son-and-a-new-african-trend/">ascend the ranks</a> of their nations’ military, they ensure the most loyal person possible is in charge of the weapons. </p>
<p>Or dictators may simply mount a countercoup to reinstall “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/mapped-the-7-governments-the-u-s-has-overthrown/">their man</a>” should the military bite back in the face of repeated purges. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/21/archives/gabon-president-resumes-office-mba-restored-by-french-vows-total.html">French paratroopers</a> saved the necks of multiple <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538120675/Historical-Dictionary-of-Modern-Coups-D%E2%80%99%C3%A9tat">West African leaders</a> when their militaries attempted coups in response to policy failures and purges in their ranks.</p>
<p>Foreign support also protects dictators from domestic insurgents. In 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama sent additional troops to Iraq and authorized <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA388-1.html">airstrikes</a> to save the U.S.-backed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/world/middleeast/echoes-of-a-strongman-in-baghdad-today.html">strongman</a> in Baghdad from an Islamic State group advance. And in <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html">2015</a>, the Russian military helped <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-russia-20170406-story.html">save</a> Syrian president Bashar al-Assad from defeat at the hands of Syrian rebels.</p>
<h2>Is it too late to respond effectively?</h2>
<p>Putin’s regime joins personalist dictatorships – including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Venezuela – that have confounded policymakers for decades. </p>
<p>Once a leader successfully <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/US/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/how-dictatorships-work-power-personalization-and-collapse">consolidates power and transforms his rule</a> into a personalist dictatorship, he is likely to keep causing trouble on the world stage. And once these rulers do bad things, it is often too late to stop them.</p>
<p>[<em>There’s plenty of opinion out there. We supply facts and analysis, based in research.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-no-opinion">Get The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Wright has received funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Minerva Research Initiative of the U.S. Department of Defense.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Escribà-Folch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In recent years, Western governments have, in effect, aided the rise of personalist dictators in Russia, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Venezuela.Joseph Wright, Professor of Political Science, Penn StateAbel Escribà-Folch, Associate Professor of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu FabraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799792022-04-04T12:31:06Z2022-04-04T12:31:06ZLessons in realpolitik from Nixon and Kissinger: Ideals go only so far in ending conflict in places like Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455555/original/file-20220331-19-22c29.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C25%2C3319%2C2201&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Ukraine, like these demonstrators in Boston on Feb. 27, 2022, are likely to be disappointed by any peace deal. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-hold-signs-during-a-peaceful-stand-for-ukraine-news-photo/1238820038?adppopup=true">Vincent Ricci/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. has limited options in confronting Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s strategy is moderated by what’s known as “realpolitik.” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/us/politics/us-ukraine-russia-escalation.html">The U.S. is not willing to risk a larger war with Russia</a> by any level of involvement that might bring Washington and its allies into direct military conflict with Moscow, risking an escalation into nuclear war. </p>
<p>In a recent column for The Washington Post, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/13/biden-us-ukraine-lessons-cold-war/">journalist Matt Bai lamented</a> that President Joe Biden “will be forced to take a realpolitik view that most of us will find hard to stomach.”</p>
<p>“No matter how unjust Ukraine’s fate, he must continue to reject any measure that threatens to put U.S. troops in direct conflict with the Russians,” Bai wrote.</p>
<p>This means that, even as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-set-censure-russia-over-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-02/">much of the world decries the savagery of the Russian invasion</a> and the intense suffering of Ukrainians, President Volodymyr <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-wants-a-no-fly-zone-what-does-this-mean-and-would-one-make-any-sense-in-this-war-179282">Zelenskyy’s call for efforts like a NATO-enforced no-fly zone</a> will go unanswered by both Washington and NATO allies. </p>
<p>And, as a <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1006509">scholar and practitioner of U.S. foreign policy</a>, I believe any agreement produced by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/29/world/ukraine-russia-war">peace talks between Ukraine and Russia</a> will reflect the U.S. realpolitik approach and likely disappoint Ukraine’s supporters.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two smiling older men toast each other as they stand in the front of a banquet table and are watched by a crowd of people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455558/original/file-20220331-24-2ku1im.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Richard Nixon, left, and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai toast each other at the end of Nixon’s first day of his visit to the People’s Republic of China on Feb. 21, 1972.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NixonInChina/f3231bc8c0294725b49c435dc7ca68cd/photo?Query=Nixon%20China&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=342&currentItemNo=33">AP Photo/Bob Daugherty</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The costs of realpolitik</h2>
<p>What exactly does realpolitik mean? </p>
<p><a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/realpolitik-its-many-distortions-14678?utm_source=pocket_mylist">Realpolitik</a> refers to the philosophy of states’ pursuing foreign policies that further their national interest, even at the expense of human rights, or compromising intrinsic liberal values in pursuit of their interests abroad. </p>
<p>In the U.S., you can’t discuss realpolitik without referring to the <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/nixon/foreign-affairs">foreign policy of U.S. President Richard Nixon</a>, guided by his national security adviser and later secretary of state, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/kissingers-realpolitik-and-american-exceptionalism">Henry Kissinger</a>. The two men, in the most audacious example of their practice of realpolitik, set in motion events that led to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/23/1082250128/nixons-trip-to-china-laid-the-groundwork-for-normalizing-u-s-china-relations">normalized relations with China</a>. President Nixon put aside his virulent anti-communist leanings in favor of an approach he hoped would ultimately strengthen the U.S. </p>
<p>Yet Kissinger <a href="https://www.henryakissinger.com/interviews/henry-kissinger-interview-with-der-spiegel/">dismisses the notion</a> that he is or was a proponent of realpolitik. </p>
<p>“Let me say a word about realpolitik, just for clarification. I regularly get accused of conducting realpolitik. I don’t think I have ever used that term. It is a way by which critics want to label me,” <a href="https://www.henryakissinger.com/interviews/henry-kissinger-interview-with-der-spiegel/">Kissinger told German news magazine Der Spiegel in 2009</a>.</p>
<p>Yet later in the interview, Kissinger sounds like the realpolitik practitioner he is <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-kissinger-effect-on-realpolitik/">frequently characterized as</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The idealists are presumed to be the noble people, and the power-oriented people are the ones that cause all the world’s trouble. But I believe more suffering has been caused by prophets than by statesmen. For me, a sensible definition of realpolitik is to say there are objective circumstances without which foreign policy cannot be conducted. To try to deal with the fate of nations without looking at the circumstances with which they have to deal is escapism. The art of good foreign policy is to understand and to take into consideration the values of a society, to realize them at the outer limit of the possible.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In essence, Kissinger is not arguing for a foreign policy devoid of morality. Instead, he believes in recognizing the limits of furthering the national interest if policy is circumscribed by idealism. </p>
<p>To contain communism meant engaging in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552537">foreign policies that contradicted “traditional” American values</a> of respect for human rights and self-determination. To Nixon and Kissinger, winning the Vietnam War, or at least ending it in a way the American public would find acceptable, meant taking unsavory actions, including <a href="https://gsp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/walrus_cambodiabombing_oct06.pdf">carpet-bombing Cambodia</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in suits talking to each other in a large, elegant room with high ceilings, standing next to a window." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=780&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=780&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=780&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=981&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=981&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455574/original/file-20220331-21-zqkijv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=981&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Richard Nixon, left, with U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in 1972.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/american-president-richard-nixon-with-united-states-news-photo/74932537?adppopup=true">Frederic Lewis/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Containing communism also translated into support for the dictator and human rights violator <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82588&page=1">Augusto Pinochet in Chile</a> during Kissinger’s tenure. Post-Kissinger, <a href="https://www.salon.com/2015/02/10/7_fascist_regimes_america_enthusiastically_supported_partner/">realpolitik meant support for right-wing anti-communist dictators in Central America</a> during <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/foreign-affairs">the Reagan administration</a>.</p>
<h2>Realpolitik without guns</h2>
<p>Realpolitik isn’t only about the justification and conduct of wars. Nixon and Kissinger also sought to exploit the emerging rift between the Soviet Union and China. They made the decision <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d3">to try to improve relations</a> with China, which had been almost nonexistent since the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">Chinese Communists defeated the U.S.-backed nationalists in 1949</a>. Their efforts culminated in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nixons-1972-visit-china-50">Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972</a>. </p>
<p>The staunch anti-communist in Richard Nixon <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2022/02/20/nixon-china-mao-visit-1972/">believed improved relations with China</a> served the national interest, further driving a wedge between Beijing and Moscow and setting the course for a safer world, in perhaps a generation. </p>
<p>To set this in motion meant backtracking from <a href="https://watergate.info/1960/08/21/nixon-the-meaning-of-communism-to-americans.html">his – and many Americans’ – anti-communist leanings</a>. Ideology took a back seat to pursuit of the national interest.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/">views itself</a> as a proponent of universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law, self-determination and sovereignty of nations. But not at the expense of its own global position. At times, domestic politics can influence adventurism abroad and how strongly American values are incorporated into foreign policy. There are times when Americans are angry and want to see an adversary punished even if it means <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/171653/americans-continue-oppose-closing-guantanamo-bay.aspx">violating the nation’s ideals</a>.</p>
<p>Public sentiment after the 9/11 attacks, for example, gave President George W. Bush wide latitude in foreign policy. But as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan stretched on, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-war-afghanistan-twenty-years-public-opinion-then-and-now">American public’s appetite</a> for the wars and overseas policing diminished greatly, forcing Presidents <a href="https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-pol-obama-at-war/">Obama</a>, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/18/1028607717/strange-bedfellows-indeed-the-trump-biden-consensus-on-afghanistan">Trump</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/">Biden</a> to bring the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end without a clear victory, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/political-instability-iraq">leaving behind</a> <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-bidens-washington/not-our-tragedy-the-taliban-are-coming-back-and-america-is-still-leaving">unstable nations</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men shake hands as they meet." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455581/original/file-20220331-15-yrmxd4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chilean dictator President Augusto Pinochet, left, greets Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the president’s office on June 8, 1976.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chilean-president-augusto-pinochet-greets-secretary-of-news-photo/515114332?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How the Ukraine war ends</h2>
<p>What will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/opinion/ukraine-war-end-putin.html">the end</a> of the Ukraine war look like?</p>
<p>Realpolitik in American foreign policy means restraint in Ukraine. A direct confrontation with Russia is not in the U.S. interest, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/a-tale-of-two-crises-why-us-strategy-in-ukraine-has-few-implications-for-taiwan/">Ukraine’s strategic value is limited</a>. An <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-law-says-putins-war-against-ukraine-is-illegal-does-that-matter-177438">illegitimate war</a> in which hundreds if not thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/civilians-are-being-killed-in-ukraine-so-why-is-investigating-war-crimes-so-difficult-178155">Ukrainian civilians have already been killed</a> won’t move the U.S. away from this position, because the risks of escalation are too high. And nuclear escalation would be likely, because <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070">the U.S. is far superior to Russia in terms of nonnuclear forces</a>. </p>
<p>Without the U.S. and NATO engaging militarily in the war, Ukraine will likely be forced to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/30/ukraine-is-ready-for-painful-concessions/">make concessions</a> and accept at least some terms that Russia wants in any peace agreement. That may include a Ukraine with different territorial borders and a security relationship with Russia that it does not entirely like.</p>
<p>This may be hard for some – both inside and outside Ukraine – to stomach. But however much realpolitik is attributed to a Kissinger-dominated era of history, it <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807847732/thank-god-theyre-on-our-side/">has been</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/06/14/137171315/for-u-s-dealing-with-dictators-is-not-unusual">still is present</a> in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. </p>
<p>From tacit <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/">support of the murderous dictator Saddam Hussein</a> in the Iran-Iraq War – in which <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">the U.S. knew</a> of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons – to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/12/07/131884473/Afghanistan-After-The-Soviet-Withdrawal">letting Afghanistan fall into a political vacuum</a> after the Soviet pullout in 1989 – leading to the rise of the Taliban – to Washington’s close relationship with <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-repressive-saudi-arabia-remains-a-us-ally-156281">brutal human rights abuser Saudi Arabia</a>, the U.S. frequently chooses to put its own interest ahead of its professed values. </p>
<p>[<em>There’s plenty of opinion out there. We supply facts and analysis, based in research.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-no-opinion">Get The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation. </span></em></p>The US frequently chooses to put its own interest ahead of its professed values. That approach to foreign policy is called ‘realpolitik’ and it may lead to an unsatisfying peace deal in Ukraine.Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796472022-03-28T15:47:56Z2022-03-28T15:47:56ZUkraine war: The history of conflict shows how elective wars ultimately fail<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454520/original/file-20220327-19-fg9dym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5499%2C3647&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Ukrainian police officer is overwhelmed by emotion after comforting people evacuated from Irpin on the outskirts of Kyiv on March 26, 2022. History shows that wars launched for nebulous reasons generally backfire on those who launch them.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/ukraine-war--the-history-of-conflict-shows-how-elective-wars-ultimately-fail" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Throughout history, elective wars like the one in Ukraine — armed military conflicts that countries wage without compelling and urgent reasons for action — have mostly failed to achieve their aims. Instead, they worsen the problems they set out to solve and often become the undoing of those who started the conflict.</p>
<p>Of the oldest written records of how this dynamic played out <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/thucydides">is contained in the work of Thucydides</a>, the Athenian historian and general who chronicled <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/peloponnesian-war">the Peloponnesian War</a> (431-404 BCE) between ancient Greece’s most powerful city-states: Athens and Sparta. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm"><em>History of the Peloponnesian War</em></a>, Thucydides records that in 416 BCE, the Athenians decide on a whim to invade the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Melos">island of Melos</a>, which, although an ally of Sparta, didn’t join Sparta in the war against Athens. </p>
<p>The Melians’ pleas for justice fell on the deaf ears of the Athenians who demanded that the Melians surrender, pay tribute to and join Athen’s confederacy or face destruction. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Peloponnesian-War">The campaign ended tragically</a> with the entire civilian population of Melos facing all kinds of atrocities for refusing to surrender to the Athenians, who saw their unbridled power as sufficient basis to inflict grave injustice. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A painting of a funeral during the ancient Peloponnesian War." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454379/original/file-20220325-23-13sm9km.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A painting shows Pericles’ funeral oration at the end of first year of the Peloponnesian War on a 1955 Greece 50 drachma banknote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Intoxicated by power, the Athenians’ reply, according to Thucydides’ account, was essentially: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” This principle, Thucydides shows, was the driving force behind Athens’s aggressive approach toward its neighbours. </p>
<p>Over time, it fuelled deep-seated anger and resentment among Melians and citizens of other city-states who sought revenge by ultimately <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/peloponnesian-war">joining forces with Sparta to defeat Athens in 404 BCE</a>. </p>
<h2>Downfalls triggered</h2>
<p>As the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates, the dynamics of great power politics haven’t changed much in more recent history. The lure of using brute force to achieve quick economic and geopolitical gains has created a rolling tide of military mobilization that has carried countries into battle.</p>
<p>History often repeats itself in that those battles trigger the downfall of the stronger party who unnecessarily drew the first blood.</p>
<p>In the 1930s, fascist regimes used offensive wars as consolation when grandiose promises proved hollow. As <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-depression">the Great Depression</a> dragged on, Italy’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benito-Mussolini">Benito Mussolini</a> sought to divert public attention from his economic failures through a series of costly military adventures <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/italy-invades-greece">in Greece</a>, <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/axis-invasion-of-yugoslavia">the former Yugoslavia</a> <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Italo-Ethiopian-War-1935-1936">and Ethiopia</a>. </p>
<p>These episodes created economic havoc for Italians rather than glory before Italy’s entry to the Second World War. The war accelerated Mussolini’s downward spiral even among <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/26/mussolini-loses-grip-on-italy-archive-1943">his own fascist clique, which ousted him in 1943</a>.</p>
<p>In the same time period, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/adolf-hitler-1#section_19">Adolf Hitler</a> thought Germany needed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_01.shtml"><em>Lebensraum</em></a> — living space — to ease its economic strains. He then proceeded with unprovoked invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland to expand Germany’s territory, sparking the Second World War in 1939. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photo shows a group of men in military uniforms." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454521/original/file-20220327-25-x6hpb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">High-ranking officials of the Nazi and Fascist Parties. Left to right: Herman Goering, Benito Mussolini, Rudolph Hess and Adolf Hitler.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(National Archives of Canada)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To achieve his ideal of a racial utopia, Hitler’s war not only unleashed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Holocaust">a genocide of six million Jews</a> and persecution on a scale few could have imagined, it also undermined the entire German economy and the country’s military capabilities. </p>
<p>Hitler’s delusional leadership ultimately resulted in <a href="https://www.historynet.com/hitlers-greatest-blunders/">a series of defeats</a> <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rudolf-Hess">and defections</a>, culminating in <a href="https://www.history.com/news/6-assassination-attempts-on-adolf-hitler">assassination attempts</a> on Hitler himself and finally the collapse of Nazi Germany and <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/adolf-hitler-commits-suicide">the führer’s suicide</a> on April 30, 1945.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-vladimir-putin-be-ousted-over-his-ukraine-invasion-179182">Could Vladimir Putin be ousted over his Ukraine invasion?</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East">The Middle East</a> also saw a number of elective wars that marked the beginning of the end of the regimes that waged them. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi">Muammar Gadhafi’s</a> <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chad.htm">war against Chad (1978-87)</a> is one example. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saddam-Hussein">Saddam Hussein’s</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/1/thirty-years-on-iraqs-invasion-of-kuwait-still-haunts-region">1991 invasion of Kuwait</a> is another. </p>
<p>Both regimes envisioned wars of national glory only to plunge their countries into quagmires that took huge human and economic tolls and severely diminished public confidence in their leadership. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Oils wells burn and black smoke rises into the sky in a large oil field." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454522/original/file-20220327-13-dhxpj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this March 1991 photo, Kuwait’s oil wells burn after defeated Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why elective wars fail</h2>
<p>War is often a failure in itself. However, elective wars constitute a special kind of failure. </p>
<p>First and foremost, they lose public support quickly. They often <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-saber-rattling-or-preparing-for-war/6323352.html">begin with sabre-rattling</a> and narratives that exalt <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009404042129">an alleged heroic past and envision a war of national glory</a>, similar to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric prior to the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A balding man smiles with a red, blue and gold flag behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454523/original/file-20220327-15-3175z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Putin attends a meeting with young award-winning culture professionals via video conference in Moscow on March 25, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But as the war drags on and the futility of war becomes more obvious, people begin to question the strategic importance and moral foundations of war. It’s difficult for regimes to galvanize public opinion or maintain people’s willingness to accept the sacrifices associated with war — especially when <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfq001">it’s a drain on resources, causes economic hardship and lowers living standards</a>.</p>
<p>When that happens, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316336182.008">regimes face two hard choices</a>. One is to admit their mistake and reverse action. That rarely happens. The second is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-control-over-ukraine-war-news-is-not-total-its-challenged-by-online-news-and-risk-taking-journalists-179540">suppress dissenting opinions</a>, project an image of popular support for the war and stay the course despite mistakes that later lead to further errors and conflict within the power elite. </p>
<p>Elective wars often fail because they attempt to eliminate old animosities but instead create new ones. <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/axis-invasion-of-yugoslavia">They also shred the ethnic bonds within conquered territories</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two long-haired girls join hands and dance in front of a burning effigy of Vladimir Putin." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454709/original/file-20220328-23-1iyzd3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators dance around a burning an effigy of the Russian President Vladimir Putin during an anti-war protest in Tbilisi, Georgia — a former Soviet republic — on March 27, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This results in time bombs that can go off at any moment, since few modern economies can function well within a hostile environment. </p>
<p>“The empires of the future are empires of the mind,” <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Winston-Churchill">Winston Churchill</a> presciently said <a href="https://www.harvardmagazine.com/churchill-18">in a 1943 speech</a> at the height of the Second World War.</p>
<p>Churchill seemingly realized that wars aimed at territorial expansion won’t ensure national security or economic prosperity, and the future belongs to those who invest in education, knowledge production and innovation rather than wage meaningless wars that create nothing but misery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Adam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s difficult for regimes to galvanize public opinion or maintain people’s willingness to accept the sacrifices associated with a war waged for questionable reasons.Edmund Adam, Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Communication Studies & Media Arts, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1706992021-12-14T13:28:16Z2021-12-14T13:28:16Z‘Strangers in their own land’: Iraqi Yazidis and their plight, 7 years on from genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435459/original/file-20211202-27-luymt6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=76%2C13%2C2896%2C1953&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tens of thousands of members of Iraq's Yazidi religious minority are now living in shelters and camps.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastIraq/424fa63ae89b4882a59a2d89979f17b3/photo?Query=yazidi%20iraq%20Kurdistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=21&currentItemNo=10">AP Photo/Seivan Salim</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each year in the second week of December, Iraqi Yazidis, an ethnoreligious minority in northern Iraq, celebrate <a href="https://syriacpress.com/blog/2020/12/18/yezidis-in-north-and-east-syria-mark-eda-rojiet-ezi-most-important-feast-on-yezidi-calendar/">Rojiet Ezi</a>, a festival that follows three days of fasting. During <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/houman-oliaei-1283674">my ethnographic fieldwork</a> in a refugee camp in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2019, I witnessed how this festival brings joy to the displaced Yazidis as they celebrate with family and friends and assemble in festive clothes. At the same time, however, the fasting festival was filled with sorrow and grief. </p>
<p>More than 200,000 displaced Iraqi Yazidis are living in refugee camps, where poverty is deepening. Many families are still <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/06/iraq-minorities-yazidis-kidnap-syria-isis.html">searching</a> for nearly <a href="https://www.state.gov/statement-on-missing-yezidi-women-and-children/">3,000 Yezidi women and children</a> who were kidnapped by the Islamic State group in 2014. The Yazidi homeland in the Sinjar region in northern Iraq remains a war-torn area, as the prospect of economic and political stability in Iraq remains unclear.</p>
<p>Who are Yazidis, and why, even after seven years, have they not been able to return their lives to normalcy?</p>
<h2>Yazidi beliefs</h2>
<p>Yazidis, colloquially called “the people of the Peacock Angel,” are the followers of a monotheistic religion. Although the religion of Yazidis contains elements similar to those of other faiths, such Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam, it maintains strikingly <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jps/10/1/article-p87_6.xml">different interpretations and practices</a>. </p>
<p>Yazidis believe that God, whom they refer to as Xwedê, handed over the worldly affairs to seven holy beings, <a href="https://mellenpress.com/book/Yezidism-Its-Background-Observances-and-Textual-Tradition/1585/">known as Heft Sir</a>. The Peacock Angel, or Melek Tawus, is the preeminent figure among these holy beings and is believed to be the main representative of God on the face of the Earth.</p>
<p>For centuries, European and Islamic scholars erroneously <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/yezidis-9781350149274/">conflated</a> the figure of Peacock Angel with the devil in Abrahamic religions. This misconception has caused Yazidis to be mistakenly labeled as <a href="https://kurdishstudies.net/journal/ks/article/view/461">devil-worshippers</a>.</p>
<p>The history of the Yazidi community in northern Iraq is laden with oppression and violence. For almost six centuries, Yazidis were subjected to persecutions during the Ottoman Empire that ruled between 1299 to 1922. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the British Army <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/other-kurds-9781860641701/">targeted</a> Yazidis and other ethnic groups in northern Iraq in the early 20th century. </p>
<p>The violent campaigns against Yazidis continued during the Baath regime that was in power from 1968 to 2003. The destruction of Yazidi villages at the time resulted in <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/9253?lang=en">Yazidis’ mass displacement</a>. In 2007, A few years after the American invasion of Iraq, the Yazidi community endured one of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/18/iraq.topstories3">deadliest car bomb</a> attacks in post-Saddam Iraq.</p>
<p>The Yazidi lore attests to 74 persecutions throughout history. </p>
<h2>A region left defenseless</h2>
<p>The 2014 Islamic State group attack, known as “The Black Day” or Roja Reş, which led to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/08/for-yazidis-a-mountain-once-close-to-heaven-has-turned-into-hell-on-earth/">the fall of Sinjar</a> and the mass exodus of the Yazidi community, was not an isolated event. Rather, it had its roots in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and the power struggle that ensued.</p>
<p>Following the American invasion, the Sinjar region fell under the category of “<a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/04/iraqs-disputed-territories">disputed territories</a>.” These territories, which mostly consist of oil-rich areas, have long been at the heart of the Arab-Kurdish conflict in Iraq. Before the American invasion, these areas were mostly under the control of the Iraqi Army. However, after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government came to control parts of these areas, including the Sinjar region, with the support of the U.S. military. The sectarian environment and the political vacuum following the fall of Saddam contributed to the rise of the Islamic State group in the region. </p>
<p>On the eve of the terrorist attack in 2014, thousands of Yazidis put their hope in the promises of Kurdish authorities for protection. However, the <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-favored-kurds-abandoned-the-yazidis-when-isis-attacked">hasty withdrawal of Kurdish forces</a> left the entire region defenseless.</p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of Yazidis escaped to the Sinjar Mountain in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraqi-yazidis-stranded-on-isolated-mountaintop-begin-to-die-of-thirst/2014/08/05/57cca985-3396-41bd-8163-7a52e5e72064_story.html">scorching summer heat</a> as the Islamic State group took over the region. The majority of the Yazidis were ultimately resettled in refugee camps in Iraqi Kurdistan, where I conducted my fieldwork. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three women sitting on a carpet with a child on a cot in front of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436450/original/file-20211208-17-m150st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Displaced Iraqi Yazidis take shelter at a school in Dahuk, 260 miles northwest of Baghdad, in 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastIraqYazidis/d660a22acadc4debb6c4e23604df48b7/photo?Query=yazidi%20iraq&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=673&currentItemNo=29">AP Photo/Hadi Mizban</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Pandemic and despair</h2>
<p>Seven years after the Islamic State group attack, Iraqi Yazidis still suffer from the same structural challenges rooted in the sectarian divide and grapple with the ramifications of the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14514.doc.htm">2014 genocide</a>.</p>
<p>I witnessed how displaced Yazidis struggled to gain access to basic services such as electricity and clean water. The high cost of health care often prevents them from receiving treatment, or even if they do, it leads to immense financial hardships. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.pmo.iq/pme/press2020en/9-10-20201en.htm">agreement</a> signed by the Kurdistan and Iraqi governments in 2020 to restore stability in the Sinjar region has not been implemented yet. This agreement provides a framework for the deportation and disarmament of all armed groups in the region and assisting displaced Yazidis to return to their homeland.</p>
<p>The pandemic has further pushed displaced Yazidis into despair and worsened their living conditions in the <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/through-the-lens-of-crisis-covid-19-and-the-people-on-the-frontlines-of-conflict-sinjar/">refugee camps</a>. Many have had to choose either to remain in the camps, enduring extended lockdowns and losing their livelihoods, or to embrace the risks of the political and military violence involved in returning to their homes. </p>
<p>During the fasting festival in 2019 when I was conducting my fieldwork, I saw Yazidi children, dressed in new clothes and smiles, cheerily visiting each tent to collect candy. At the same time, however, their parents wrestled with the pain and anguish of occupying a space where they are viewed as outsiders. As a displaced Yazidi told me during my fieldwork: “It feels as if you are a stranger in your own land.”</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Houman Oliaei does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In 2019 a scholar visited the Iraqi Kurdistan, where Yazidis have been resettled. He explains their religious beliefs and their current conditions.Houman Oliaei, PhD Candidate, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1670272021-09-07T19:11:06Z2021-09-07T19:11:06ZHow someone becomes a torturer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418948/original/file-20210901-14-isgjnf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C25%2C5615%2C3707&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">At the Amna Suraka museum in Iraq, exhibits show the torture that was carried out in the cells.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/shiborisan/30530053203">Hélène Veilleux/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every day, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/torture-around-the-world/">thousands of people are tortured</a> in police stations, security offices and prisons around the world. Human rights organizations protest torture and advocate for survivors, but neither they nor the public knows much about the torturers themselves.</p>
<p>Where do torturers come from? How can they do such terrible things? And most important, is there a way to stop torture by stopping the people who do it?</p>
<p>Answering these questions is difficult because torture, or the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx">infliction of severe mental and physical suffering by government authorities</a>, is illegal under international law. Torturers do their work in secret, and few have ever agreed to talk to journalists or researchers. </p>
<p>As part of the Iraq History Project, an <a href="https://law.depaul.edu/about/centers-and-institutes/international-human-rights-law-institute/projects/Pages/iraq.aspx">oral history project conducted by DePaul University’s Human Rights Law Institute after Saddam Hussein’s fall</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2021.1932442">14 of Saddam’s former torturers were interviewed about what they did and why they did it</a>. Their stories went into a human rights repository, and I analyzed them as part of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2021.1932442">recent research project</a>.</p>
<p>While some earlier research found that torturers were psychologically normal people forced to engage in acts against their will, my research shows how recruits voluntarily engaged in torture and how they justified their actions to themselves. </p>
<h2>Who becomes a torturer?</h2>
<p>Most of the men who were interviewed expressed regret about what they had done. Some of them attributed their choice of careers to traumatic childhoods where they endured violence from abusive, alcoholic fathers. </p>
<p>One explained that he hated his father so much and “had a strong desire to take revenge on him.” In search of something that “made me of value and position,” he applied for a job with the security forces. When his application was accepted, he welcomed the “happy news,” as he “was going to have power over people like my dominant father.”</p>
<h2>How are they recruited?</h2>
<p>All of the torturers in the study joined Saddam’s security forces of their own free will, sometimes using family connections or paying bribes to get the prestigious and well-paid job of security officer. </p>
<p>They thought they would become investigators, tasked with the job of finding and arresting enemies of the state. They were shocked when they were assigned the job of torturer, where they would have to torture dissidents while interrogating them and force them to confess to political crimes.</p>
<p>Unable to ask for a transfer, the recruits faced a stark choice: lose their job or become a torturer. Many who stayed did so because they were poor and needed the money. One recalled telling his mother that he had gotten a great job with the security forces and assured her that he would take care of her and she would no longer have to live in poverty. </p>
<p>When he found out he was assigned the job of torturer, he said he “was not able to say anything because of my fear of losing the job, and because of my fear of going back to my mother and disappointing her after all the promises I had made.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A figure of a person handcuffed to a wall, next to a sign explaining this form of torture." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418950/original/file-20210901-12-7d418l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A figure of a person handcuffed to a wall demonstrates that many torture victims were forced to stand for long periods of time.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://ladentdeloeil.net/red-prison-sadam-irak-kurdes/">Hélène Veilleux</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How are they trained?</h2>
<p>Novice torturers received practical instruction in how to torture, sometimes in classrooms and always on the job under the supervision of experienced torturers. They learned how to most effectively cause pain by beating people with cables, using electric shock, beating the soles of the feet and suspending victims by their arms from the ceiling.</p>
<p>Recruits were urged to do away with their natural feelings of empathy and compassion. One recruit recalled being told he had to be “a destroying monster,” “tough-hearted” and “having no mercy for others,” and he had to stop being “a human being with a heart of friendliness or mercy.” Another was told “never to show any mercy to those who would want to harm the country or the President Saddam Hussein, who was like the father of our house.”</p>
<h2>How are they supervised?</h2>
<p>The Iraqi torturers worked under orders and were sometimes ordered to do specific acts of torture. Their superiors placed security cameras in the torture rooms to make sure they obeyed. Two of the torturers say they suffered torture themselves when they refused to harm a victim. </p>
<p>When they did their jobs well, they were rewarded with praise and promotions. After getting one important prisoner to confess, one recalled, “all the officers were proud of me for my satisfactory performance, and all my colleagues at the directorate started to regard me as an important person.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A figure of a person suspended by the arms from a bar across a room, with their feet unable to reach the ground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418952/original/file-20210901-25-1z0zo0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Another museum exhibit shows a different form of torture: being suspended by the arms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/shiborisan/31207080112/">Hélène Veilleux/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How do they justify their actions?</h2>
<p>Torturers convinced themselves that they were saving the country and that their victims deserved what they got. After his first day of training, one asked a colleague, “What sins did those persons who were tortured in front of me commit?” </p>
<p>The colleague answered: “Their sins are huge and cannot be forgiven! Their sins are that they want to topple the regime, disturbing our government and dispersing chaos, terrorism, looting and killing. Don’t you ever believe that any one of those is a victim! We are the victims of them.” </p>
<p>The recruit “spent that night thinking of how I would be able to hold the cable and beat those people with it. … However, I remembered his words and that those people were just traitors and criminals, and I thought to myself, ‘Yes! They deserve all that torture, as they are trying to betray the country, and so they have to get what they deserve!’”</p>
<h2>How can torture be prevented?</h2>
<p>Studying torturers is strange and disturbing, and understanding their actions may seem like excusing them. But studying torturers is important: Only by understanding how and why they do it can people begin to prevent torture. Like a doctor who studies cancer in order to cure it, social scientists must study torture in order to help human rights groups and governments prevent it.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Justin Einolf does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Interviews with former torturers in Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq reveal what it takes to be a torturer – which could help explain how to reduce the number of people who get tortured around the world.Christopher Justin Einolf, Associate Professor of Sociology, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1662562021-08-17T18:24:37Z2021-08-17T18:24:37ZAfghanistan only the latest US war to be driven by deceit and delusion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416513/original/file-20210817-23-5jd92s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C6%2C4013%2C2673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Aug. 16, 2021, thousands of Afghans trapped by the sudden Taliban takeover rushed the Kabul airport tarmac.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAfghanistan/fc21a8d017e442fa909ff86d38c1fa5f/photo?Query=afghanistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=73239&currentItemNo=35">AP Photo/Shekib Rahmani</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-army-police/">American hubris</a> – the United States’ <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/">capacity for self-delusion</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-vietnam-to-afghanistan-all-us-governments-lie-128695">official lying</a> – has struck once again, as it has repeatedly for the last 60 years. </p>
<p>This weakness-masquerading-as-strength has repeatedly led the country into failed foreign interventions. The pattern first became clear to me when I learned on Nov. 11, 1963, that the U.S. embassy and intelligence agencies <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/vietnam/2020-11-01/new-light-dark-corner-evidence-diem-coup-november-1963">had been directly involved in planning a coup to depose the president of South Vietnam</a> and his brother, leading to their executions. </p>
<p>I was a Fulbright Fellow, <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/gadams.cfm">starting a long career in national security policymaking</a> and teaching, studying in Europe. On that day, I was in a bus on a tour of the battlefields of Ypres, Belgium, led by a French history professor. </p>
<p>As I watched the grave markers sweep by, I was reading a report in Le Monde exposing <a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/diem-coup">this U.S. effort to overthrow another government</a> and I thought, “This is a bad idea; my country should not be doing this.” And the war, in which the <a href="https://history.army.mil/html/books/091/91-1/CMH_Pub_91-1-B.pdf">U.S. was directly involved for 20 years</a>, marched on. </p>
<p>The American people were told we had no hand in that coup. We did not know that was a lie until <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pentagon-Papers">The New York Times and Washington Post published the Pentagon Papers in 1971</a>. By then, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War">58,000 Americans and possibly as many as 3.5 million Vietnamese soldiers and civilians had died</a> – and the goal of preventing the unification of Vietnam had died as well. </p>
<p>For 15 years, the American foreign policy establishment struggled to overcome what it called the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/22/its-called-the-vietnam-syndrome-and-its-back/">Vietnam Syndrome</a>” – the rational reluctance of the American people to invade and try to remake another country. </p>
<p>American hubris reemerged, this time as “<a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm">the global war on terror</a>.” Afghanistan is now the poster child for the sense that the U.S. can remake the world. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people surrounds a swimming pool while a helicopter flies overhead" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 1975, helicopters evacuated Americans and Vietnamese people from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/crowds-of-vietnamese-and-western-evacuees-wait-around-the-news-photo/523984154">Nik Wheeler/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘A sea of righteous retribution’</h2>
<p><a href="https://qz.com/2047556/a-timeline-of-us-involvement-in-afghanistan/">Osama bin Laden gave American interventionists</a> eager for the next fight a huge justification – an attack on the U.S., which washed the Vietnam Syndrome away in a sea of righteous retribution against al-Qaida. </p>
<p>The al-Qaida attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon also <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31715.html">gave interventionists the opening to invade Iraq</a>, as an extension of the war on terror. We built on the terrorism lie – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552281">Saddam Hussein was no friend of the 9/11 terrorists</a> – by arguing that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-or-white-house-spin/">he had weapons of mass destruction</a>. American hubris ran the full course as we invaded another country, overthrew its government and aimed to build a new nation, all of which have kept American troops in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">a dysfunctional Iraq for 18 years</a>. </p>
<p>And the truth, which insisted on penetrating the American delusion, was that the war meant <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2019/direct-war-death-toll-2001-801000">the deaths of 8,500 American troops and civilians and at least 300,000 Iraqis as well</a>. No modern, rebuilt Iraqi nation has emerged.</p>
<p>And now the country faces the dark at the end of the tunnel in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">where lying and self-delusion have continued for 20 years</a>. </p>
<p>An initial mission intended to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">remove the Taliban and close the al-Qaida training camps succeeded</a>, though Osama bin Laden slipped away for another 10 years. But <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/07/08/panel-u-s-began-afghanistan-war-with-unrealistic-expectations">hubris kept the U.S. from stopping there</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg82115/html/CHRG-107shrg82115.htm">The mission expanded</a>: create a modern democracy, a modern society and, <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/easier-get-war-get-out-case-afghanistan#toc-4-0-0">above all, a modern military</a> in a <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/as-the-taliban-rise-again-afghanistans-past-threatens-its-present">country with little history of any</a> of those things. </p>
<p>A new generation of U.S. officials in uniform and policymaker suits and dresses <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/afghan-security-forces-capabilities/2021/08/15/052a45e2-fdc7-11eb-a664-4f6de3e17ff0_story.html">fooled the American people and themselves</a> by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">lying about how well the effort was going</a>. </p>
<p>The failure was actually there to see, this time, <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/">well documented by the systematic auditing and reporting</a> of the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, John Sopko. But government officials and the media blew by those truths, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/19/americans-are-not-unanimously-war-weary-on-afghanistan/">giving voice instead to the lies out of more visible officials’ mouths</a>. The human price tag of hubris grew – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-afghanistan-43d8f53b35e80ec18c130cd683e1a38f">6,300 U.S. military and civilian deaths</a>, and an <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghans-lives-and-livelihoods-upended-even-more-as-us-occupation-ends-165059">understated estimate of 100,000 Afghan deaths</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man on a ladder covers a statue's face with a U.S. flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. soldiers cover the face of a statue of Saddam Hussein before pulling the statue down in Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastIraqUnendingWar/a330bac33b214abfaa0ffea704fba353/photo">AP Photo/Jerome Delay</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three strikes and you’re out</h2>
<p>Three times now this country has been lied to and the media deluded as America marched stolidly over the cliff into failure.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/15/us/politics/afghanistan-collapse-politics.html">Recriminations are flying back and forth</a> – who lost Afghanistan is the latest version of who lost Vietnam, Iraq and, for those with long memories, all the way back to 1949 and “<a href="https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/who-lost-china">who lost China</a>.” What America has lost is, I believe, the capacity to learn, to learn from history and from our own experience.</p>
<p>I’d argue that no one who was paying attention should be <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">surprised that the Taliban swept back into Kabul in a nanosecond</a>. Or that a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse-taliban/">failed enterprise like the Afghan national army collapsed</a>. Army and special operator trainers who went there <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/afghan-security-forces-capabilities/2021/08/15/052a45e2-fdc7-11eb-a664-4f6de3e17ff0_story.html">could see the corruption, the personnel who left in the night</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-business-lifestyle-b34e8480c8a0d80072fb2b4414914156">disdain for corrupt political authorities in that army</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/06/21/elite-afghan-troops-were-left-die-battle-taliban-officials-say.html">Many brave, honorable Afghans fought there</a>, but the cohesion and commitment, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/world/asia/afghanistan-rapid-military-collapse.html">the belief in their mission, was not there</a>. </p>
<p>By contrast, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/books/review/carter-malkasian-the-american-war-in-afghanistan-craig-whitlock-the-afghanistan-papers.html">the Taliban were organized, dedicated and coherent</a>, and armed and trained for the actual combat taking place, not for European-style trench and tank warfare. The Taliban clearly had a plan that worked for that country, as the speed of the takeover shows. It succeeded; the U.S. and the Kabul regime failed in what became mission impossible.</p>
<p>The fall of Kabul was inevitable. Washington, once again, deluded itself into thinking otherwise. The secretary of state said, “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/15/this-is-not-saigon-blinken-defends-us-evacuations-from-kabul">This is not Saigon</a>.” </p>
<p>It is Saigon. It is Baghdad. It is Kabul. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 110,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166256/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Adams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the US Afghanistan pullout is not a repeat of failures in other recent wars. “This is not Saigon,” he said. A seasoned foreign policy expert disagrees.Gordon Adams, Professor Emeritus, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1608812021-05-14T16:09:30Z2021-05-14T16:09:30ZIraq: thousands of police officers have died in the line of duty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400770/original/file-20210514-23-6nlatm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2986%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Ahmed Jalil</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Being a police officer in post-Saddam Iraq is an incredibly dangerous career choice. Since the invasion of Iraq toppled the dictator in March 2003, <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/">at least 14,000</a> Iraqi police officers have lost their lives in the line of duty. And things are not getting much safer. In the first four months of 2021, <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/">23 policemen have been killed</a> – most recently in the Diyala province, eastern Iraq, in an attack by Islamic State.</p>
<p>On April 22 a police patrol <a href="https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-global-jihad-april-22-29-2021/">was attacked</a> while responding to an IED attack on an army vehicle in the Al-Waqf region, northwest of Baqubah, which had killed one soldier and wounded three others. The police were hit by gunfire and another IED. Six policemen, including an officer, were killed, and two others, one of them a captain, were wounded.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">Iraq Body Count</a>, a project for which I am a senior researcher, reveals that Iraqi policemen die as a result of shootings, car bombs, suicide bombers and executions by terrorist groups. They are killed as they monitor checkpoints, patrol streets, protect towns and villages from attacks, dismantle bombs, enter booby-trapped homes and engage in clashes with terrorists and insurgents. </p>
<p>Or they are killed just for being in the wrong place at the wrong time: 40 policemen were confronted by Islamic State <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/a0482">and killed</a> for not swearing allegiance to the terrorist group on January 10 2015 at Ad Dawr, a small town in Tikrit province, north of Baghdad. </p>
<p>In Iraq, police officers are the biggest, most vulnerable and most targeted non-miltary victim group. Largely recruited after the 2003 invasion, Iraq’s police officers tend to be drawn from the communities they serve and the police service is <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/ips.htm">generally reflective</a> of the demographic makeup of its neighbourhoods. In 2018 a <a href="https://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/11/12/ministry-of-interior-officially-inaugurates-the-local-police-ser.html">road map</a> was drawn up by Iraq’s interior ministry in consultation with the United Nations Development Programme. The road map outlines the core policing functions in Iraq: to prioritise security and protection, crime management, traffic enforcement and community policing. </p>
<p>Partly as a result of their security function, police officers come under attack on a daily basis, mainly by irregular fighters: terrorists, guerrilla forces and insurgents – groups who target <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/irregular-war-9781784538446/">centres of power</a> such as government officials, politicians or those who serve them in positions of legitimate authority.</p>
<p>Warfare in Iraq is irregular, waged mainly for political purposes, used by insurgents to demonstrate the ineptitude and powerlessness of the ruling authorities and to intimidate and coerce populations. Violence is used by ethnic or religious groups to achieve power, control and legitimacy, through unorthodox or unconventional approaches.</p>
<h2>Enemies on all sides</h2>
<p>As agents of the state, the police are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.13169/jglobfaul.2.1.0098.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A223e37fc72ce5b1e6096f540c00f2da7">attacked by enemies on all sides</a> whether Shia or Sunni, Ba'athists (supporters of Saddam Hussein’s administration), Salafi and Wahhabi “jihadists”, or Shi'a (Iran-backed) militias. Iraq remains a very dangerous place. </p>
<p>In addition, Iraqi police enjoy little public confidence, receive inadequate training to be able to handle the country’s enormous security challenges and have <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/research/Iraq-Research/local-policing-Iraq-after-ISIL">struggled to assert their authority</a>. Iraq may be a democracy since its first parliamentary elections in 2005, but it remains a state with domestic vulnerabilities and internal threats to its leadership. The regime lacks legitimacy, because the majority of citizens don’t identify with the state, but with <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2020/">their ethnic, religious or tribal groups</a>. It is one of the most corrupt countries in the world and home to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/iraqs-new-government-what-know">an array of armed militias with different allegiances</a>.</p>
<p>Lack of public confidence and lack of trust in state leaders and institutions means lack of confidence and trust in the agents of the state: the police.</p>
<p>Islamic State is responsible for the killing of more Iraqi police officers than any other single group. IS is best known in the west for its attempts to establish a caliphate in and around Mosul, for videos of beheadings and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55968068">Yazidi massacres</a> in northern Iraq. IS members have participated in the mass killings and rapes of women and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351458.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7833e55d044231242c6ba854a983a4a9">enslavement of children</a>. With so many horrific crimes committed against the civilian population of Iraq since 2014, it is easy to forget that policemen and security forces were its main targets from the start. </p>
<p>Policemen like <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/a4175">Yousef al-Namrawi</a>, killed as he entered a booby-trapped house in Kubaisa, on March 28 2016. Or police majors <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/a2294">Abdul Rahman al-Jubouri and Ahmed Khalid al-Abbasi</a>, abducted and executed by Islamic State in September 2015. Colonel Khaled Fadel Muhammad, the director of administration with the Diyala police, who was <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/a3819">blown up by a magnetic bomb</a> stuck to his vehicle in Baquba on February 21 2016. Or Lieutenant-Colonel Basim al-Hadeethi, Captain Saeed al-Obeidi and Major Mashkoor al-Hadeethi, <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/a3491">who were killed in al-Baghdadi district</a>, west of Anbar, on January 27 2016 by suicide bombers. </p>
<p>These were people’s parents and children. There have now been 14,000 of them, leaving grieving, often angry families. Tasked with making Iraq a safe place for its citizens, they are among the most threatened. They deserve to have their stories told and their names recorded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lily Hamourtziadou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 14,000 Iraqi police officers have been killed since the US invasion in 2003.Lily Hamourtziadou, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1561402021-02-26T17:32:54Z2021-02-26T17:32:54ZGulf War: 30 years on, the consequences of Desert Storm are still with us<p>It was a short message to end a short war. On February 26 1991, Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz put his signature to a letter addressed to the United Nations Security Council: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have the honour to notify you that the Iraqi Government reaffirms its agreement to comply fully with Security Council Resolution 660 and all other UN Security Council resolutions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A few hours later, at 8am Baghdad time, a ceasefire entered into effect. The international military campaign, dubbed by the United States as “Operation Desert Storm”, had lasted only a few weeks. And yet, as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/17/security-breach-iraq-officials-denounce-erbil-rocket-attack">recent rocket attacks against US targets in Iraq</a> illustrate, its consequences are still with us today. </p>
<p>But how did it all begin? The then Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein criticised what he saw as Kuwaiti “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44376191.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Afee1d1e419e0f23c9d76953eec49a4b6">economic treachery</a>” related to the production and pricing of oil. When Kuwait refused to lower its oil production, Saddam began what would become a shortlived military intervention in the neighbouring oil-producing country. </p>
<p>Saddam’s motives in fact related to his need to replenish an impoverished Iraqi economy that had been severely undercut by a protracted and costly war against Iran (1980-1988), which resulted in more than 1.5 million estimated Iraqi and Iranian deaths. </p>
<p>Not quite grasping what <a href="http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/391121">the waning of the cold war</a> would mean for his own regional ambitions, Saddam ordered the invasion and annexation of Kuwait on August 2 1990. </p>
<p>Once diplomatic and economic pressure to deter Saddam failed, the US – under then president George HW Bush, assembled the largest international coalition since the second world war and – with the authorisation of the UN Security Council – began a five-week military operation that pushed Saddam’s forces back into Iraq and reinstated the Kuwaiti royal family at the helm of the country. </p>
<p>Military action included the systematic targeting of Iraqi infrastructure, including the sustained – and controversial – attack against retreating Iraqi military personnel along the road connecting Kuwait with Iraq, which was subsequently dubbed the “Highway of Death”.</p>
<p>The rapid military campaign was a success – and its implications were potentially massive. Before the intervention, <a href="https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217">Bush had addressed the US Congress</a>, stressing the importance of the “unique and extraordinary moment”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The crisis in the Persian Gulf offers a great opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times … a new world order can emerge: a new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The rapid success of the international military campaign, whose legitimacy was reinforced by unequivocal UN authorisation, ushered an era of triumphalist confidence in the possibilities of such a “new world order” and in the US ability to mould it.</p>
<h2>Reasons to be cheerful?</h2>
<p>Back then, there were reasons to be optimistic. One of them related to the cooperation – unseen up to that point – between Americans and Russians. Despite Iraq having been one of its main cold war clients in the region, the Soviet Union quickly endorsed the US-led military operation. Indeed, at the time of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, US secretary of state James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze were in a meeting together and rapidly issued a joint statement of condemnation of Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Typed record of phone conversation between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, 7 August 1990, with 'secret' written and crossed out at the top" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386674/original/file-20210226-17-1rf11q2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Declassified telephone conversation reveals the true US-Soviet difficulties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">George H.W. Bush Presidential Library; National Security Archives digital collection edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, ‘Inside the Gorbachev-Bush Partnership on the First Gulf War 1990’.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2020-09-09/inside-gorbachev-bush-partnership-first-gulf-war-1990">Recently declassified sources</a> show that US-Soviet cooperation back then was more difficult than the leaders’ statements led the world to assume at the time. Yet speaking in October 1991, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?22391-1/middle-east-peace-conference-session">underlined</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>without a radical improvement and then a radical change in Soviet-US relations, we would never have witnessed the profound qualitative changes in the world that now make it possible to speak in terms of an entirely new age, an age of peace in world history.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He added that, “the right conclusions have been drawn from the Gulf War.” But had they? In Iraq, Saddam remained in power, and bombing and sanctions against his regime continued into Bill Clinton’s presidency. Until in 2003, in the wake of 9/11 and of the invasion of Afghanistan, the then president George W. Bush declared a new war against Iraq with the disputed justification of Iraq’s alleged development of weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p>Many commentators saw the conflict as a way to deal with the “<a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2001/12/06/unfinished-business">unfinished business</a>” of the first Gulf War started by Bush’s father. Military “contractors” flooded into Iraq, with complex consequences that are still playing out. One of the last acts of the US presidency of Donald J. Trump involved pardoning four Blackwater security contractors. These were responsible for the 2007 Nisour Square massacre, a shooting that killed 14 Iraqi civilians, including nine-year-old Ali Abdul Razzaq. UN human rights experts condemned the presidential pardon as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26633&LangID=E">an affront to international justice</a>. </p>
<p>The war of the early 2000s left behind a much weakened Iraqi state infrastructure, and a high body count – a situation that rendered Iraq an easy prey to the forces of the Islamic State, which took over Mosul in 2014, continuing a legacy of violence and brutalisation. </p>
<p>Many saw the end of the 1991 Gulf War as the beginning of an “age of peace”, to quote Gorbachev. The hope at that time was that the country – and the region – could prosper. Instead, the ceasefire of February 28 marked the end of a conflict that had been remarkably short, but whose consequences and unintended outcomes are still being felt to this day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156140/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amir Taha receives funding from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research Humanities PhD program.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lorena De Vita does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 1991 Gulf War was seen as the start of an age of peace, but paved the way for much future conflict.Lorena De Vita, Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityAmir Taha, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Humanities, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1445422020-09-09T12:17:48Z2020-09-09T12:17:48ZThe largest contemporary Muslim pilgrimage isn’t the hajj to Mecca, it’s the Shiite pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355168/original/file-20200827-16-1qsxjrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=61%2C30%2C5059%2C3040&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shiite Muslims attend a mourning ritual during the Islamic month of Muharram, in the central shrine city of Karbala.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/iraqis-attend-a-mourning-ritual-as-shiite-muslims-news-photo/1228172416?adppopup=true">Photo by Mohammed SAWAF / AFP) (Photo by MOHAMMED SAWAF/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every year, Shiite Muslims mark the death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussain with a mourning period that lasts a total of 50 days. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ashura-how-this-shiite-muslim-holiday-inspires-millions-122610">Ashura</a>, the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram, commemorates the day Hussain died. </p>
<p>For millions of Shiites, this mourning period culminates in a pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq. This pilgrimage has, in recent years, become the <a href="http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/Shia_Pilgrims_Survey.pdf">largest gathering of people in the world for a religious reason</a>. This year Ashura was observed on Aug. 30 and the pilgrimage, 40 days later, will end on Oct. 9, 2020. </p>
<p>My research focuses on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743812000050">Shiite shrines</a> and <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/500163">Muharram mourning practices</a>.
The city of Karbala, which I visited twice in 2013, is located 60 miles southwest of Baghdad and 45 miles north of Najaf, the other important Shiite shrine city in Iraq. </p>
<p>The pilgrimage and the city of Karbala have been through many changes over a more than 1000-year-old history. This year, the pilgrimage and the holy city are faced with a new challenge: COVID-19. </p>
<h2>The historic battle at Karbala</h2>
<p><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3928">Karbala</a> is the place where Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussain was killed during what is known as the Battle of Karbala in A.D. 680. According to Shiites, Hussain and his men were martyred in this battle on the day of Ashura.</p>
<p>Following the death of Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/191146">there was a dispute over who would be his rightful heir</a>. Sunnis, who make up the majority of Muslims, believe that Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s friend and father-in-law, rightly succeeded Muhammad in A.D. 632. Shiites believe that Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, should have been Muhammad’s successor.</p>
<p>After years of civil war, as well as wars of expansion, the Arab Umayyad dynasty established its rule over the region, from the Middle East to North Africa from A.D. 661 to 750. But there were those who decried Umayyad rule.</p>
<p><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0304">Hussain had been invited by the inhabitants of Kufa</a>, which was a garrison town near Najaf, to come and lead them in a revolt against the Umayyad caliph in Damascus. Umayyad forces first put down the unrest in Kufa and then met and killed Hussain and his men on the desert plains of Karbala. </p>
<p>For Shiite Muslims, Hussain was their third imam, a worldly and spiritual leader whose direct relationship to Muhammad gave him special status and authority.</p>
<p>After Hussain’s death, a tomb was soon built which <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-25-1-78">attracted devotees and benefactors</a>. Najaf is where Hussain’s father, Ali, lies buried. </p>
<h2>The pilgrimage throughout history</h2>
<p>Over the years, Hussain’s shrine was <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3928">destroyed, rebuilt, remodeled and expanded</a>. </p>
<p>Muharram mourning rituals, whether in Karbala or elsewhere, have been used for political ends. Sometimes, Muharram practices were sponsored by rulers who sought to gain popular support. At other times, the rituals turned into anti-government protests. Fearing civil unrest, some rulers <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/500163">prohibited or limited pilgrimage</a> to Karbala. </p>
<p>For example, Mutawakkil, a caliph of the Abbasid dynasty, which ruled over a vast Islamic empire from the eighth to the 13th century, feared that the rituals <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-25-1-78">inflamed anti-regime fervor</a>. He <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3928">destroyed the tomb in A.D. 850 and banned the pilgrimage to Karbala</a>. </p>
<p>Karbala and Najaf grew in importance in the 16th century with the founding of a Shiite state in Persia, today’s Iran, under <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300035315/introduction-shii-islam">Shah Ismail I</a>. From then on, the Iraqi shrine cities attracted increasing numbers of pilgrims.</p>
<p>Many pilgrims brought bodies of deceased relatives because of a belief that <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691115757/the-shiis-of-iraq">being buried close to Ali or Hussain</a> ensures that when the deceased stands in front of God on Judgment Day, Ali or Hussain will appeal to God’s mercy to allow the person’s soul to enter heaven. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355170/original/file-20200827-16-tziofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Imam Ali mosque in Najaf, Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-shows-a-partial-view-of-the-imam-ali-mosque-at-news-photo/1228135688?adppopup=true">Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This has led to “<a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000228324">Wadi al-Salam</a>,” Arabic for “Valley of Peace,” in Najaf becoming one of the world’s largest cemeteries, holding up to 5 million corpses. </p>
<p>The transport and burial of corpses provided employment for a wide strata of the population in Najaf and Karbala. Higher fees were charged from those wanting to be closer to Ali or Hussain in the burial site. </p>
<p>Blaming the corpse traffic as one of the reasons for several outbreaks of cholera in 19th-century Persia and Ottoman Iraq, the Ottoman government, which ruled over Iraq from the 16th to the beginning of the 20th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201U-2010-031">sought to restrict and control the number of corpses that were brought in</a>. </p>
<p>Yet even under these restrictions, around <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000228324">20,000 dead bodies were brought to Najaf each year at the start of the 20th century</a>. Today, roughly 100,000 are brought for burial in Najaf annually. </p>
<h2>From decline to rebirth</h2>
<p>Under the authoritarian Iraqi Baath regime, from the early 1970s to 2003, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/iraq-since-1958-9781860646225/">Shiite pilgrimage was closely monitored and limited</a>.</p>
<p>Like many previous rulers, Saddam Hussain feared that the rituals would be used in order to incite rebellion against his regime, that the pilgrimage would turn into a protest. But once Saddam was overthrown by U.S.-led forces in 2003, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/pi.4.1.61_1">the pilgrimage flourished again</a>.</p>
<p>In 2004, more than 2 million pilgrims walked to Karbala, and the most common route was from Najaf to Karbala. Since then, the pilgrimage to Karbala has even eclipsed the <a href="https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/haj_40_en.pdf">hajj, which annually draws between 2 and 3 million</a>. In 2014, <a href="http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/Shia_Pilgrims_Survey.pdf">17 million people</a> reportedly completed the walk to Karbala. By 2016, the number of pilgrims increased to 22 million. </p>
<p>This year, fear of the spread of COVID-19 has greatly restricted many pilgrimages, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/hajj-cancellation-due-to-coronavirus-is-not-the-first-time-plague-has-disrupted-this-muslim-pilgrimage-135900">the hajj</a>. Only a limited number of Muslims already inside Saudi Arabia was allowed to attend. </p>
<p>As a precautionary measure, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a top Iraqi Shiite leader, <a href="https://mainstay.us/muharram-message-2020/">encouraged his followers to mourn at home</a>, rather than visit Karbala. </p>
<p>For Ashura this year, Shiites gathered in Najaf and Karbala, but on a much smaller scale. There was social distancing, but not everywhere. <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2020/08/iraq-religion.html">Not all pilgrims wore masks</a>. In the absence of stringent measures, the <a href="https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-09-highest-virus-iraq.html">number of infections in Iraq has already spiked</a>. Whether the government will respond with stricter policies for the pilgrimage at the beginning of October remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edith Szanto does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Millions of Muslims travel to Karbala in Iraq for one of the largest annual pilgrimages. The pilgrimage has adapted and changed over its centuries-old history.Edith Szanto, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, University of AlabamaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1292162020-01-24T13:38:00Z2020-01-24T13:38:00ZIn the terrorism fight, Trump has continued a key Obama policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310348/original/file-20200115-134789-10ozqvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C1952%2C1392&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. special operations troops are a crucial element of the fight against terrorism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/EA-AP-I-AFG-XWS101-AFGHANISTAN-US-FORCES/f4e88254cbe0da11af9f0014c2589dfb/193/0">AP Photo/Wally Santana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump has rescinded, reversed or otherwise ended many of former President Barack Obama’s signature policies – but not a prominent one. </p>
<p>When it comes to fighting terrorism, the current commander-in-chief has upheld, and even extended, his predecessor’s linchpin strategy: using U.S. military special operations forces and targeted killings on a grand global scale. </p>
<p>This strategy is highlighted by Trump’s recent orders for the military to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/politics/hamza-bin-laden-al-qaeda-dead/index.html">kill or capture al-Qaida leader Hamza bin Laden</a> in September 2019 and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-dead.html">Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> in October 2019 – and in January 2020, for a drone strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thomas Knowlton depicted at the battle of Bunker Hill.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thomas_Knowlton_(The_Death_of_General_Warren_at_the_Battle_of_Bunker%27s_Hill_cropped).jpg">John Trumbull, Museum of Fine Arts/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The tactic of sending specially trained operatives into hostile territories dates back to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/george-washingtons-commandos-special-ops-during-the-american-11572">America’s Colonial days</a>. In September 1776, Lieut.-Col. <a href="http://www.americanwars.org/ct-american-revolution/knowltons-rangers-1776.htm">Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers</a> carried out one of the first U.S. reconnaissance missions, identifying enemy positions around what today is Manhattan. They quickly found themselves engaged in a firefight with the British. </p>
<h2>Increasingly called upon</h2>
<p>In the mid-20th century, America developed groups of <a href="https://sofrep.com/news/rare-footage-of-lrrps-in-vietnam/">covert combatants</a>, including units that preceded <a href="https://www.navysealmuseum.org/about-navy-seals/seal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-storyseal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-story/seal-history-underwater-demolition-teams-in-the-korean-war">the Navy SEALs</a>, to operate in parallel with larger conventional military forces. For instance, during the Korean War, U.S. Underwater Demolition Teams accomplished what only specially trained troops could do consistently and effectively – <a href="https://www.navysealmuseum.org/about-navy-seals/seal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-storyseal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-story/seal-history-underwater-demolition-teams-in-the-korean-war">destroying bridges and railroad tunnels</a>.</p>
<p>The rise of international terrorism in the 1970s led President Jimmy Carter to establish the Army’s <a href="https://www.military.com/special-operations/delta-force.html">1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta</a>, better known as Delta Force.</p>
<p>Obama, however, transformed special forces from an auxiliary arm into the tip – and at times, the whole – of America’s counterterrorism spear. He boosted special operations forces <a href="https://time.com/5042700/inside-new-american-way-of-war/">by 15,000 troops and support staff, bumped their budget 12% to US$10.4 billion</a>, and deployed them much farther and wider – <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176048/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_a_secret_war_in_135_countries">more than doubling their geographical footprint from 60 to 135 countries</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has eagerly embraced this strategy, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005450516/special-ops-war-on-terror.html">deploying 8,000 special operations personnel to 80 countries</a>. Today, they operate in predictable places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as <a href="https://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176060/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_success,_failure,_and_the_%22finest_warriors_who_ever_went_into_combat%22/">surprising settings such as South America’s Andes Mountains and Africa’s Sahel region</a>.</p>
<p>It took me 10 years of research to fully grasp Obama and Trump’s shared approach. In 2017, I co-produced “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005450516/special-ops-war-on-terror.html">How Special Ops Became Central to the War on Terror</a>” with Retro Report for the New York Times. PBS recently aired a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/video/retro-report-on-pbs-season-1-episode-7-how-us-came-rely-special-ops-forces/">shorter version</a>. I’m also directing “<a href="https://news.psu.edu/video/603135/2020/01/07/research/penn-state-professor-holocaust-survivor-documentary">Cojot</a>,” which tells the little-known story of a hostage who played a key role in the first special operations rescue mission in a hostile country – the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/25/entebbe-raid-40-years-on-israel-palestine-binyamin-netanyahu-jonathan-freedland">1976 Operation Thunderbolt</a>, better known as Israel’s daring Entebbe raid.</p>
<p>My conclusion is that this strategy offers significant benefits, often in terms of speed and competency, but brings along severe risks, as well – such as lack of transparency and accountability, and potentially conflicting national priorities.</p>
<iframe width="100%" height="332" src="https://player.pbs.org/viralplayer/3034688767/" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" seamless="" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<h2>Clear advantages</h2>
<p>Using a select group of elite troops and choosing very specific targets can be a highly efficient way for presidents to advance military and foreign policy goals that otherwise might take countless years, hundreds of billions of dollars, massive deployments, intense debates with Congress and thorny international entanglements. </p>
<p>Imagine, for instance, if President George W. Bush had simply sent special operations troops to kill Iraqi president Saddam Hussein rather than getting mired in an endless war in that country. Trump recently offered an example, albeit on a smaller scale, of how this approach works: Shortly after announcing the pullout of U.S. troops from northern Syria, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/27/isis-islamic-state-leader-baghdadi-killed/">he successfully deployed Delta Force to take out al-Baghdadi</a>.</p>
<p>This strategy is also relatively inexpensive: Special operations spending in the 2020 federal budget amounts to <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf">US$13.8 billion</a> – an enormous sum that is nevertheless just 1.87% of the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/21/trump-signs-738-billion-defense-bill.html">$738 billion overall defense budget</a>. </p>
<p>And high-profile successes can boost presidents’ public approval ratings. Obama’s climbed from <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/147437/obama-approval-rallies-six-points-bin-laden-death.aspx">46% to 52%</a> after Osama bin Laden’s killing, and Trump’s rose from <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_trump_job_approval-6179.html">41% to 45%</a> after al-Baghdadi and Soleimani’s deaths.</p>
<p>Using small dedicated groups can also fill gaps in intelligence-gathering left by <a href="https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/04/22/technology-has-changed-intelligence-gathering.aspx">satellites, drones and technological spying</a>. Special operations soldiers can track leads on the ground, interrogate suspects and flesh out information needed to make sound decisions and execute complex missions. Zeroing in on specific marks can minimize harm to civilians who might live or work nearby – rather than destroying a village to kill one man, commandos can just attack that individual in his home. </p>
<p>With this approach, the United States uses force more in line with its opponents. Unlike the skyjackers of the 1960s and 1970s, today’s ideological killers do not negotiate. They tend to be extremists, like religious fanatics or white supremacists, rather than attention-seeking secular political activists. They play by different rules, and so do special operations forces. </p>
<p>Unlike conventional forces, special operators do not have to constantly answer to the public, face media scrutiny or become a political punching bag. In fact, the American people have rarely demanded to know more about exactly what special operations forces are up to. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Special operations forces can function in ways regular troops don’t.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/f469ceeec9cb49a0a6a251ee80741376/102/0">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Serious drawbacks</h2>
<p>One of the problems with the dependence on special operations forces is that it exhausts the very people on whom it relies.</p>
<p>“The force has been stretched to the max,” <a href="http://javadc.org/news/press-release/wade-ishimoto-inducted-as-distinguished-member-of-the-special-forces-regiment/">former Delta Force intelligence officer Wade Ishimoto</a> says in my co-production with Retro Report, “How Special Ops Became Central to the War on Terror.” </p>
<p>“Special operations should not be the panacea for every kind of difficulty,” he continues.</p>
<p>Ishimoto warns that special operations soldiers are bound to burn out because there are too few of them to handle all the assignments in far-flung locations. Indeed, in recent years, they have experienced an increase in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/179/3/301/4160774">alcohol abuse</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/suicides-nearly-triple-among-elite-forces-1315810">suicides</a>.</p>
<p>Yet Americans are often in the dark about their special operations. With specialized, clandestine forces, presidents likely find it easier to wage war without consulting Congress and without clear strategic plans. </p>
<p>The recently released <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/">Afghanistan Papers</a> show presidents can <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-nation-building/">keep significant</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-strategy/">secrets</a> about wars, such as the 18-years-and-counting Afghanistan conflict. </p>
<p>The most obvious downside is that special operations missions can fail miserably. In April 1980, when Delta Force tried to rescue the American hostages held in Iran, the troops <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/">never made it past their initial rendezvous point</a> in the desert. In 2017, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/u-s-soldiers-niger-were-pursuing-isis-recruiter-when-ambushed-n813746">al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists in Niger ambushed U.S. special forces soldiers</a>, killing four of them. </p>
<p>The enigmatic nature of the operations means it is possible some special forces deaths never make the nightly news or morning papers. </p>
<p>Still, I doubt this strategy will change in any significant way, regardless of who wins the November 2020 presidential election. It’s not just that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks – it’s that, to many people, <a href="https://www.strategy-business.com/article/09403?gko=c6aca">there is no better alternative</a>. If there were, Trump would probably be quite happy to scrap yet another Obama policy.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Boaz Dvir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending specially trained operatives into hostile territories dates back to Colonial days. In the past decade, special operations forces have become central to America’s counterterrorism efforts.Boaz Dvir, Assistant Professor in Journalism, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1298442020-01-16T18:38:26Z2020-01-16T18:38:26ZUS and Iran have a long, troubled history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310315/original/file-20200115-134764-71x1uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C233%2C6490%2C2841&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-flag-iranian-political-map-shape-1610522878">Benny Marty/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the United States and Iran have been fraught for decades – at least since the U.S. helped overthrow a democracy-minded prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in August 1953. The U.S. then supported the long, repressive reign of the shah of Iran, whose security services brutalized Iranian citizens for decades.</p>
<p><iframe id="KMqX1" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/KMqX1/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The two countries have been particularly hostile to each other since Iranian students took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, resulting in, among other consequences, <a href="https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-countries-in-conflict-like-iran-and-the-us-still-talk-to-each-other-129591">severing of formal diplomatic relations</a> between the nations. Since 1984, the U.S. State Department has listed Iran as a “<a href="https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/">state sponsor of terrorism</a>,” alleging the Iranian government provides terrorists with <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm">training, money and weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the major events in U.S.-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations’ views, but others arguably presented real opportunities for reconciliation.</p>
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<h2>1953: US overthows Mossadegh</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mohammed Mossadegh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mohammed_Mossadegh_in_middle_age.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1951, the Iranian Parliament chose a new prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, who then led lawmakers to vote in favor of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-and-iran-the-forgotten-history">taking over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company</a>, expelling the company’s British owners and saying they wanted to turn oil profits into investments in the Iranian people. The U.S. feared disruption in the global oil supply and worried about Iran falling prey to Soviet influence. The British feared the loss of cheap Iranian oil. </p>
<p>Unable to settle the dispute, President Dwight Eisenhower decided it was best for the U.S. and the U.K. to get rid of Mossadegh. Operation Ajax, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/world/secrets-history-cia-iran-special-report-plot-convulsed-iran-53-79.html">a joint CIA-British operation</a>, convinced the shah of Iran, the country’s monarch, to dismiss Mossadegh and drive him from office by force. Mossadegh was replaced by a much more Western-friendly prime minister, <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html?_r=0">hand-picked by the CIA</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in Tehran demand the establishment of an Islamic Republic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-Associated-Press-International-News-IRAN-/7598c27645984aa982d79f639e2b9986/18/0">AP Photo/Saris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1979: Revolutionaries oust the shah, take hostages</h2>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theperspective.com/subjective-timeline/politics/us-iran-relations-ww2-hostage-crisis/">more than 25 years</a> of relative stability in U.S.-Iran relations, the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-politics-revolution/29752729.html">Iranian public had grown unhappy</a> with the social and economic conditions that developed under the dictatorial rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. </p>
<p>Pahlavi enriched himself and used American aid to fund the military while many Iranians lived in poverty. Dissent was often violently quashed by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/05/09/savak-a-feared-and-pervasive-force/ad609959-d47b-4b7f-8c8d-b388116df90c/">SAVAK, the shah’s security service</a>. In January 1979, <a href="https://apnews.com/343d87fdb960424e9ec0f4a90dc64fcb">the shah left Iran</a>, ostensibly to seek cancer treatment. <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ayatollah-khomeini-returns-to-iran">Two weeks later, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile</a> in Iraq and led a drive to abolish the monarchy and proclaim an Islamic government.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian students at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran show a blindfolded American hostage to the crowd in November 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Hostage-Crisis-Timeline/298028f123e3417bad960911275bd097/41/0">AP Photo, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October 1979, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/17/magazine/why-carter-admitted-the-shah.html">President Jimmy Carter agreed to allow the shah</a> to come to the U.S. to seek advanced medical treatment. Outraged Iranian students <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/05/archives/teheran-students-seize-us-embassy-and-hold-hostages-ask-shahs.html">stormed the U.S. Embassy</a> in Tehran on Nov. 4, taking 52 Americans hostage. That convinced Carter to sever U.S. diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. </p>
<p>Two weeks later, the U.S. military launched a mission to rescue the hostages, but <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/">it failed, with aircraft crashes in the Iranian desert</a> killing eight U.S. servicemembers.</p>
<p>The shah died in Egypt in July 1980, but the hostages weren’t released until Jan. 20, 1981, after 444 days of captivity. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian cleric, left, and an Iranian soldier wear gas masks to protect themselves against Iraqi chemical-weapons attacks in May 1988.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-iranian-clergyman-wearing-a-turban-and-gas-mask-stands-news-photo/104045722">Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1980-1988: US tacitly sides with Iraq</h2>
<p>In September 1980, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm">Iraq invaded Iran</a>, an escalation of the two countries’ regional rivalry and religious differences: Iraq was governed by Sunni Muslims but had a Shia Muslim majority population; <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/">Iran was led and populated mostly by Shiites</a>. </p>
<p>The U.S. was concerned that the conflict would limit the flow of Middle Eastern oil and wanted to ensure the conflict didn’t affect its close ally, Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">supported Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein</a> in his fight against the anti-American Iranian regime. As a result, the U.S. mostly turned a blind eye toward Iraq’s <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq24.pdf">“almost daily” use of chemical weapons</a> against Iran. </p>
<p>U.S. officials moderated their usual opposition to those illegal and inhumane weapons because the U.S. State Department did not “<a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf">wish to play into Iran’s hands</a> by fueling its propaganda against Iraq.” In 1988, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/iran-iraq-war">the war ended in a stalemate</a>, with a combined total of more than 500,000 military deaths and 100,000 civilians dead on both sides.</p>
<h2>1981-1986: US secretly sells weapons to Iran</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lt. Col. Oliver North is sworn in to testify before Congress about a U.S. deal to sell weapons to Iran, in breach of an embargo, and use the money to support rebels in Nicaragua.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-A-DC-USA-APHS-Iran-Contra-North/6873ba10cf0d45d6ac31f6063ad350d0/90/0">AP Photo/Lana Harris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf">imposed an arms embargo</a> after Iran was designated a state sponsor terrorism in 1984. That left the Iranian military, in the middle of its war with Iraq, desperate for weapons and aircraft and vehicle parts to keep fighting. </p>
<p>The Reagan administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html">decided that the embargo would likely push Iran</a> to seek support from the Soviet Union, the U.S.’s rival in the Cold War. Rather than formally ending the embargo, U.S. officials agreed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html">secretly sell weapons to Iran</a> starting in 1981. Later, the transactions were justified as incentives to help Iran persuade militants to release <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/arms-for-hostages-plain-and-simple.html">U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon</a>. </p>
<p>The last shipment, of anti-tank missiles, was in October 1986. In November of that year, a Lebanese magazine exposed the deal. That revelation sparked the Iran-Contra scandal in the U.S., in which Reagan’s officials were found to have collected money from Iran for the weapons, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/10/world/iran-contra-hearings-boland-amendments-what-they-provided.html">illegally sent those funds to anti-socialist rebels</a> – the Contras – in Nicaragua.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">At a mass funeral for 76 of the 290 people killed in the shootdown of Iran Air 655, mourners hold up a sign depicting the incident.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-IRN-APHS166203-USS-Vincennes-Iran-A-/cb6c1e3b2e77457b97c5e10a9f225a81/7/0">AP Photo/CP/Mohammad Sayyad</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1988: US Navy shoots down Iran Air flight 655</h2>
<p>On the morning of July 8, 1988, the USS Vincennes, a guided missile cruiser patrolling in the international waters of the Persian Gulf, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/07/the-vincennes-downing-of-iran-air-flight-655-the-united-states-tried-to-cover-up-its-own-destruction-of-a-passenger-plane.html">entered Iranian territorial waters</a> while in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk/index.html">skirmish with Iranian gunboats</a>. </p>
<p>Either during or just after that exchange of gunfire, the Vincennes crew mistook a passing civilian Airbus passenger jet for an Iranian F-14 fighter. They shot it down, killing all 290 people aboard. </p>
<p>The U.S. called it a “<a href="https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/VINCENNES%20INV.pdf">tragic and regrettable accident</a>,” but Iran believed the plane’s downing was intentional. In 1996, the U.S. agreed to pay US$131.8 million in compensation to Iran.</p>
<h2>1997-1998: The US seeks contact</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian President Mohammad Khatami.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/istanbul-turkey-november-12-iranian-reformist-276222344">Prometheus72/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In August 1997, a moderate reformer, Mohammad Khatami, won Iran’s presidential election. </p>
<p>U.S. President Bill Clinton sensed an opportunity for improved relations between the two countries. He <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iran/stories/iran010998.htm">sent a message to Tehran</a> through the Swiss ambassador there, proposing direct government-to-government talks. </p>
<p>Shortly thereafter, in early January 1998, Khatami gave an interview to CNN in which he expressed “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html">respect for the great American people</a>,” denounced terrorism and recommended an “exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists and tourists” between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>However, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei didn’t agree, so not much came of the mutual overtures as Clinton’s time in office came to an end. In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke to the U.S.-based American-Iranian Council and <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000317.html">acknowledged the government’s role in the 1953 ouster of Mossadegh</a>, but punctuated her remarks with criticism of Iranian domestic politics. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President George W. Bush delivers the 2002 State of the Union address.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Bush_at_State_of_the_Union.jpg">Eric Draper/White House/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm">2002 State of the Union address</a>, President George W. Bush characterized Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting an “Axis of Evil” supporting terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass destruction, straining relations even further.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inside these buildings at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, technicians enrich uranium.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iran-IRAN-NUCLEAR/16101ec8c3e4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/139/0">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2002: Iran’s nuclear program raises alarm</h2>
<p>In August 2002, an exiled rebel group announced that <a href="https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/other-iaea-document/irans-nuclear-power-profile-iaea">Iran had been secretly working on nuclear weapons</a> at two installations that had not previously been publicly revealed. </p>
<p>That was a violation of the terms of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact">the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a>, which Iran had signed, requiring countries to disclose their nuclear-related facilities to international inspectors. </p>
<p>One of those formerly secret locations, Natanz, housed centrifuges for enriching uranium, which could be used in civilian nuclear reactors or enriched further for weapons. </p>
<p>Starting in roughly 2005, U.S. and Israeli government cyberattackers together reportedly targeted the Natanz centrifuges with a custom-made piece of malicious software that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html">became known as Stuxnet</a>.</p>
<p>That effort, which <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Stuxnet-virus-set-back-Irans-nuclear-program-by-2-years">slowed down Iran’s nuclear program</a> was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html">one of many U.S. and international attempts</a> – mostly unsuccessful in the long term – to curtail Iran’s progress toward building a nuclear bomb.</p>
<h2>2003: Iran writes to Bush administration</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An excerpt of the document sent from Iran, via the Swiss government, to the U.S. State Department in 2003, appears to seek talks between the U.S. and Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.scribd.com/document/170613340/2003-US-Iran-Roadmap-proposal">Washington Post via Scribd</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In May 2003, senior Iranian officials <a href="http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000467.htm">quietly contacted the State Department</a> through the Swiss embassy in Iran, seeking “a dialogue ‘in mutual respect,’” addressing four big issues: nuclear weapons, terrorism, Palestinian resistance and stability in Iraq.</p>
<p>Hardliners in the Bush administration <a href="https://archive.org/stream/ABCNews19781979/Libya-FT-1990-to-2007-c.txt">weren’t interested in any major reconciliation</a>, though Secretary of State Colin Powell favored dialogue and other officials had met with Iran about al-Qaida.</p>
<p>When Iranian hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005, the opportunity died. The following year, <a href="http://mideastweb.org/ahmadinejad_letter_to_bush.htm">Ahmadinejad made his own overture to Washington</a> in an 18-page letter to President Bush. The letter was widely dismissed; a senior State Department official told <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1006509">me</a> in profane terms that it amounted to nothing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Representatives of several nations met in Vienna in July 2015 to finalize the Iran nuclear deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/minoritenplatz8/19067069963/">Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs/Flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2015: Iran nuclear deal signed</h2>
<p>After a decade of unsuccessful attempts to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Obama administration undertook a direct diplomatic approach beginning in 2013.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/an-iran-nuclear-deal-built-on-coffee-all-nighters-and-compromise.html">Two years of secret, direct negotiations</a> initially bilaterally between the U.S. and Iran and later with other nuclear powers culminated in the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal. </p>
<p>The deal was signed by Iran, the U.S., China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom in 2015. It severely limited Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and mandated that <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">international inspectors monitor and enforce Iran’s compliance</a> with the agreement. </p>
<p>In return, Iran was granted relief from international and U.S. economic sanctions. Though the inspectors regularly certified that Iran was abiding by the agreement’s terms, in May 2018 President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the agreement.</p>
<h2>2020: US drones kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An official photo from the Iranian government shows Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a Jan. 3 drone strike ordered by President Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-photo-dated-september-18-2016-shows-iranian-news-photo/1191356889">Iranian Supreme Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On Jan. 3, 2020, on the orders of President Trump, an American drone fired a missile that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, leader of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-are-iran-s-secretive-quds-forces-n1110156">Iran’s elite Quds Force</a>, as he prepared to leave the Baghdad airport. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/qassem-soleimani-iran-elite-quds-force-leader-200103033905377.html">Soleimani is described</a> by analysts as the second most powerful man in Iran after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.</p>
<p>At the time, the Trump administration asserted that he was directing an imminent attack against U.S. assets in the region, but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/us/politics/trump-suleimani-explanations.html">officials have not provided clear evidence</a> to support that claim.</p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/world/middleeast/iran-fires-missiles-us.html">responded by launching ballistic missiles</a> that hit two American bases in Iraq. As Iran entered a heightened state of alert, preparing for a possible U.S. retaliation, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/middleeast/missile-iran-plane-crash.html">it accidentally shot down</a> a commercial Ukrainian airliner departing Tehran for Kyiv, killing all 176 people aboard.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.</span></em></p>Some of the major events in US-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations’ views, but others presented real opportunities for reconciliation.Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297362020-01-15T13:46:44Z2020-01-15T13:46:44ZHow Iraq’s relationship with Iran shifted after the fall of Saddam Hussein<p>Following his capture by American troops, Saddam Hussein made <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/24.pdf">a startling admission to George Piro</a>, the FBI investigator tasked with interrogating him. The reason he had played cat and mouse with UN weapons inspectors for over a decade was not because he was trying to hide Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction from the west. </p>
<p>Rather, the decision to embark on such a perilous course – one that had ultimately led to Hussein sitting ignominiously in front of his FBI interrogator in a US base at Baghdad Airport – was taken to conceal from Iran that Iraq had lost much of its weapons capabilities. </p>
<p>Iraq’s fear of Iran vastly overshadowed its fear of the US. Iran’s weapons capabilities, Hussein told Piro in 2004, had increased dramatically while Iraq’s had been largely eliminated due to UN sanctions. The effects of this, he concluded, would be felt acutely in the future.</p>
<p>At a time when the US seems to be engaging Iran in a proxy war on Iraqi soil, Hussein’s warning appears almost prophetic. But as my own ongoing research on the recent history of Iraq and its relationship with Iran is showing, the tensions between the two countries have long dominated the decision making of their leaders. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-next-for-irans-proxy-network-after-killing-of-qassem-soleimani-129303">What next for Iran's proxy network after killing of Qassem Soleimani</a>
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<h2>War by proxy</h2>
<p>Successive military coups in Iraq led to the takeover by the Ba’ath Party in 1968 and Hussein’s gradual ascent to power through the 1970s. During this period, both Iran and Iraq actively used proxies to undermine each other. As I also explore in a forthcoming book on Iraq’s history, Iran supported an <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137487117">ongoing Kurdish rebellion</a> in Iraq, with secret assistance by the CIA and Israel. Meanwhile, Iraq sponsored various secessionist movements in Iran’s “Arabistan” province, called Khuzestan.</p>
<p>In March 1975, Hussein agreed to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328101?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">humiliating redrawing of the borders</a> between the two countries along the Thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab river in exchange for cessation of Iranian logistic support for the Kurdish rebels. Iran’s Shah sold out his proxies and Hussein brutally finished the Kurdish rebellion. </p>
<p>Yet, tensions between the two countries continued. Helped by unprecedented oil revenues following the nationalisation of Iraq’s oil industry in 1972, Hussein constructed a fierce war machine – intent on redressing his earlier concession to the Shah. </p>
<h2>Iraq invades Iran</h2>
<p>When Iran erupted in Islamic Revolution in 1978-9, Hussein saw his opportunity. In September 1980, amid Iranian turmoil, Iraq invaded the country. Far from the rapid victory Hussein had envisaged, however, the <a href="https://openlibrary.org/works/OL3238919W/The_longest_war">war dragged on</a> for eight long years, killing and injuring more than a million people and devastating both countries materially. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310212/original/file-20200115-134777-1ectdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Iran’s President Abolhassan Banisadr on a jeep in 1981, during the Iran-Iraq war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abulhassan_Banisadr_iran_iraq_war.jpg">Via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Through the war and its aftermath, Iran cultivated links with Iraq’s domestic Shia opposition – the Da’wah Party. Before the war, Iraq had executed Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, the spiritual leader of the party, and father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr, the influential Shia cleric. Much of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993703?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">organised Shia opposition was suppressed</a>, and many of its leaders eventually sought refuge in Iran, where in 1982 the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was set up as a Shia political party.</p>
<p>Iraq’s failed invasion of Kuwait and defeat by the international coalition in early 1991 triggered domestic uprisings by the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north. These were defeated, but sanctions and UN inspections throughout the 1990s meant that Hussein’s regime effectively ceded autonomy to the Kurds in northern Iraq. Meanwhile, Iran continued to sponsor both the Iraqi Kurds and Shia. </p>
<h2>After the 2003 invasion</h2>
<p>The 2003 war ended Hussein’s regime, and, as he had predicted, saw Iran’s influence in Iraq and the wider region grow exponentially. Although <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001441917.pdf">CIA</a> analyses throughout <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001188931.pdf">the 1990s</a> had consistently warned that this was a likely scenario upon the removal of the regime, the George W Bush administration decided to enact “regime change” regardless and with little planning for what would come after. </p>
<p>The outcome, as predicted, was that Iran filled the new Iraq with its proxies. Soon after the fall of the regime, exiled Da’wah and SCIRI leaders made their way back to Iraq. Together they <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Iraq-From-War-to-a-New-Authoritarianism-1st-Edition/Dodge/p/book/9780415834858">have dominated every election since the invasion</a>, creating in effect an “elected dictatorship” where, for demographic and sectarian reasons, no other bloc or group has any realistic chance of winning an election. </p>
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<p>For several years, though, an uneasy Iraqi truce seemed to exist between Iran and the US, where both countries assessed the new lay of the land while effectively backing the same Shia and Kurdish leaders. This was particularly evident during the premiership of Nuri al-Maliki between 2006 and 2014, who retained the support of both the US and Iran. </p>
<p>When Maliki stepped down in 2014 in favour of his Da’wah comrade Haidar al-Abadi, Islamic State (IS) was threatening the very existence of the Iraqi state. The uneasy truce between the Americans and Iranians was upheld to fight this insurgent threat. </p>
<p>Iraq’s army and government institutions were too weak and soon so-called Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), also known as Hashd al-Shaabi, <a href="https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICSR-Report-From-Battlefield-to-Ballot-Box-Contextualising-the-Rise-and-Evolution-of-Iraq%E2%80%99s-Popular-Mobilisation-Units-1.pdf">were formed to fight IS</a>. Consisting of a wide array of ideological and sectarian militias – many of whom are Shia and attached to specific political groupings, the PMU were an integral part of the defeat of IS and have continued to play important roles as many have refused to disarm. </p>
<p>During the fight against IS, US troops were again stationed in Iraq and neighbouring Syria. Iranian troops and proxies, coordinated by the commander of its Quds Force, Major-General Qassem Soleimani – who was assassinated by the US in early January 2020 – were also <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-security-soleimani-newsmaker/soleimani-was-irans-celebrity-soldier-spearhead-in-middle-east-idUKKBN1Z20CF">integral to the defeat of the jihadists</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-next-for-irans-proxy-network-after-killing-of-qassem-soleimani-129303">What next for Iran's proxy network after killing of Qassem Soleimani</a>
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<p>It was during these last few years of uncertainty that the inevitable clash of US and Iranian interests in Iraq became particularly visible. A situation where Iraq’s political leaders are ideologically affiliated with Iran while the US has sought to shape Iraq in its own image with free elections and a liberal political system, plus <a href="https://www.ibtimes.com/us-iran-relations-after-attack-big-oil-companies-chevron-exxon-mobil-evacuate-2897336">economic ties with western energy firms</a>, was bound to cause friction eventually. </p>
<p>Whatever happens next, one thing is certain. Iraq is the big loser in an Iranian-American proxy war played out on Iraqi soil, and the Iraqi people continue to suffer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129736/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johan Franzen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A short history of modern Iran-Iraq relations.Johan Franzen, Senior Lecturer in Middle Eastern History, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1286952019-12-20T13:58:45Z2019-12-20T13:58:45ZFrom Vietnam to Afghanistan, all US governments lie<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307804/original/file-20191218-11939-ml2f68.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A memorial procession for Sgt. James Johnston, who was killed in Afghanistan in June, passes through Trumansburg, N.Y., Saturday, Aug. 31, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/The-War-Comes-Home/7ca25e91bd09419897a3da85aec7093b/135/0">AP/David Goldman</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Washington Post has, after more than two years of investigation, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">revealed</a> that senior foreign policy officials in the White House, State and Defense departments have known for some time that the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was failing. </p>
<p>Interview transcripts from the <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/">Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</a>, obtained by the Post after many lawsuits, show that for 18 years these same officials have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/">told the public the intervention was succeeding</a>. </p>
<p>In other words, government officials have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/09/afghanistan-papers-military-washington-post-analysis">lying</a>.</p>
<p>Few people are shocked. That’s a stark contrast to 1971, when the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers">Pentagon Papers</a>, a classified study of decision-making about Vietnam, were leaked and published. The explosive Pentagon Papers showed that the U.S. government had systematically lied about the reality that the U.S. was losing the Vietnam War.</p>
<p>The failure of the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan has been known for years. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-goals-in-afghanistan-seem-more-remote-after-attack">Virtually none of the U.S. goals have been met</a>. These goals included a strong, democratic, uncorrupt central government; the defeat of the Taliban; eliminating the poppy fields that contribute to the world’s heroin problem; an effective military and police and creating a healthy, diversified economy. </p>
<p>The Inspector General has repeatedly documented the reality in its widely available (and widely reported) <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/audits/auditreports/index.aspx?SSR=2&SubSSR=11&WP=Audit%20Reports">audits</a>.</p>
<p>Despite this public record of failure, <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=829643">officials continued to trumpet</a> political and military gains on the ground, even that the U.S. could prevail. </p>
<p>Privately, they have been wringing their hands.</p>
<p>Shades of Vietnam. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307805/original/file-20191218-11929-44xbi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Public confidence in government was shaken by the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-Associated-Press-Domestic-News-New-York-/61378866a8224e64be95556e7b29dcb5/32/0">AP/Jim Wells</a></span>
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<h2>Sad history of Vietnam</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pentagon-Papers-Secret-History-Vietnam/dp/0553072552">Pentagon Papers</a> revealed that senior officials asserted in the 1960s that the Viet Cong were dying in record numbers, enemy leadership was decapitated and there was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/30/arts/general-disputes-quote-in-cbs-trial.html">“light at the end of the tunnel</a>.” Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his commanders, who knew the reality, continuously called for even more force from 1961 to 1969. </p>
<p>H.R. McMaster, <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/9780060187958/dereliction-of-duty/">in his classic study of Vietnam decision-making</a>, excoriated the military for not bringing the truth to President Lyndon Johnson, for presenting Johnson with the “lies that led to Vietnam.” </p>
<p>The U.S. was winning in Vietnam, until it was not. Right up to the moment <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/last-helicopter-evacuating-saigon-321254">diplomats in the U.S. embassy turned the lights off</a> and were airlifted off the building’s roof. </p>
<h2>Are comparisons justified?</h2>
<p>Afghanistan is not Vietnam, it is said. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-served-in-afghanistan-no-its-not-another-vietnam/2019/12/12/72b958f0-1d1d-11ea-b4c1-fd0d91b60d9e_story.html">Former Afghanistan Ambassador Ryan Crocker argues</a> that the U.S. must be in Afghanistan for America’s security even if reconstruction fails. <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-washington-post-gets-wrong-about-united-states-and-afghanistan">Brookings analyst Michael O’Hanlon asserts</a> that there were no lies; officials were clear the policy was in trouble. He avoids discussing the voluminous true statements The Washington Post uncovered that were not made publicly.</p>
<p>The U.S. was ignorant about both countries. <a href="https://quincyinst.org/author/gadams/0">Serving in the Obama transition in 2008</a>, for example, I learned that Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the Bush-Obama Afghanistan coordinator, <a href="https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/15/obamas-failed-legacy-in-afghanistan/">was carrying out a policy review process that led to a military surge</a>. </p>
<p>Now we learn, courtesy of The Washington Post, that, when interviewed in 2015 as part of Special Inspector General’s “<a href="https://www.sigar.mil/lessonslearned/">Lessons Learned</a>” project, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/?document=lute_doug_ll_01_d5_02202015">Lute said</a>, “We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan … we didn’t have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking.”</p>
<p>While Afghanistan is clearly not Vietnam, Washington is still Washington. </p>
<h2>Prevarication as policy</h2>
<p>After <a href="https://quincyinst.org/author/gadams/0">more than 30 years of policy work, government experience, teaching and research,</a> I see no mystery here. Concealment, deception and outright lies have characterized U.S. national security policy for decades – from the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days">overthrow of democratically elected governments in Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.umbc.edu/che/historylabs/lessondisplay.php?lesson=101">Guatemala</a> to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/28/iraq.military">overthrow of Saddam Hussein</a> and more.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307806/original/file-20191218-11919-13t2tc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. secretly plotted and carried out the overthrow of the democratically elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq, in 1953. Here, an Iranian protests U.S. involvement in the coup.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://ir-psri.com/">Pahlavi Dynasty, public domain</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-op-viewpoint-aregood-vietnam-war-20170928-story.html">But Vietnam was the big lie</a>, permanently exposing the gap between myth – the government knows everything better – and reality – that policy is failing. </p>
<p>Since Vietnam, the media and congressional, think-tank and scholarly investigators have suspected something with every intervention. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/05/after-17-years-of-war-in-afghanistan-more-say-u-s-has-failed-than-succeeded-in-achieving-its-goals/">To the public</a>, the truth about Afghanistan has been clear; public opinion has been way ahead of what The Washington Post revealed. </p>
<h2>Good reasons for lies</h2>
<p>Lies are an integral part of national security operations. They seek credibility for government policy. They mislead adversaries, cover up mistakes and failures. </p>
<p>Above all, they are intended to secure public support for policy and defeat opposition at home. Political scientist John Mearsheimer has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/why-leaders-lie-9780199975457?cc=us&lang=en&">noted</a> that governments don’t often lie to their allies and adversaries, “but instead seem more inclined to lie to their own people.” </p>
<p>In particular, secrecy and deception convey power. As philosopher Sissela Bok <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/15606/lying-by-sissela-bok/">says</a>, “Deception can be coercive. When it succeeds, it can give power to the deceiver.”</p>
<p>Secrecy allows policies to be tweaked <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/library/wyden.html">outside public view</a>. Insiders gain influence arguing for new approaches to the same goals. Even the goals can shift as interventions deteriorate. The political consequences of failure may be avoided. </p>
<p>It is rare for an official to acknowledge failure and reverse policy; personal, political and national credibility may be at stake. President Johnson insisted that he was not going to be the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/vietnam-legacy-america-struggles-to-find-meaning-in-defeat/a-18419618">“first president to lose a war.”</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-strategy/">Bush, Obama and even Trump</a> did not want to “lose” Afghanistan. </p>
<p>An act of political courage – like the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">1960-61 Algeria departure decision of French President Charles de Gaulle</a>, who understood France had lost its fight, is rare.</p>
<h2>Trust broken</h2>
<p>Why has The Washington Post series not been explosive? </p>
<p>In part, the Pentagon Papers <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/40-years-after-leak-weighing-the-impact-of-the-pentagon-papers">broke the code of secrecy; the bond of trust</a> between the policymakers and the American people was severed forever. </p>
<p>In part, the lies about Afghanistan have been in plain sight for years, courtesy of the media and the Special Inspector General. </p>
<p>And in part, the public is less directly engaged. The warriors are now <a href="http://www.avfforum.org/home.html">volunteer professionals</a>, not conscripts drawn from the general public. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/magazine/afghan-war-casualty-report-october-2019.html">Casualties are one-twentieth</a> of what they were <a href="https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics">in Vietnam</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, lying about military interventions carries a serious risk. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/how-americans-lost-faith-in-the-presidency/537897/">The Pentagon Papers eroded public faith</a> in the credibility of our democratic government. That erosion was later reinforced by the Watergate scandal. As <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=NyuxeAMcpU8C&pg=PA49&lpg=PA49&dq=Deception+of+this+kind+strikes+at+the+very+essence+of+democratic+government.&source=bl&ots=kATFM1v6J3&sig=ACfU3U2faXa3JgWJIXBgsg9wdh2cDkLxJg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiozeDh-L_mAhWrUt8KHZAFBbEQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=Deception%20of%20this%20kind%20strikes%20at%20the%20very%20essence%20of%20democratic%20government.&f=false">Bok, the philosopher, wrote</a>, “deception of this kind strikes at the very essence of democratic government.” </p>
<p>British leader Winston Churchill <a href="https://www.archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/weitzman-remarks-june-1999.html">said</a>, “In war-time truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” Deception aimed at the public and the Axis was an essential part of Churchill’s war strategy.</p>
<p>The Afghanistan papers reveal yet again that statesmen still believe the truth should be concealed. But the credibility of statecraft and leadership itself were seriously eroded by the Vietnam lies, weakening the fabric of democracy. </p>
<p>The mild reaction to lying in plain sight about Afghanistan suggests the U.S. may be well down the road to unravelling government’s credibility and our democracy altogether.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Adams is a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute.</span></em></p>US officials have consistently lied over decades about progress in the Afghanistan war. The lies are no surprise, writes a foreign affairs scholar – but they have profound consequences.Gordon Adams, Professor Emeritus, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1256362019-11-21T20:15:55Z2019-11-21T20:15:55ZBroken trust: How Iraqis lost their faith in Washington, long before the Kurds did<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302762/original/file-20191120-479-15lbg25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mass grave is excavated in Khan Al-Rubea in 2003 that witnesses say is filled with the remains of Shia whom Saddam executed in 1991. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-IRAQ-M-/7ad839139fe5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/8/0">AP/Hasan Sarbakhshian</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In all the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/trump-betray-kurds-support/599737/">hand-wringing</a> that critics and commentators have done since President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria, one of the common refrains emphasizes the breach of trust between Washington and its Kurdish militia partners.</p>
<p>Some scholars of <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/foreign_pol_walt.pdf">international relations</a> put little stock in trust. Countries are selfish, after all. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Eamoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf">Others</a> see trust in impersonal terms, embedded in the rules, norms, institutions and alliances that bind countries to each other. </p>
<p>It turns out, though, that trust does matter in international relations. And in the Middle East, trust is often seen in personal terms. </p>
<p>For the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/opinion/trump-turkey-kurds-syria.html">American personnel</a> who worked, ate and lived with the Syrian Kurds, trust-building was also a deeply personal experience. Trust underpinned the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/world/middleeast/isis-kurds-baghdadi.html">crucial intelligence cooperation</a> between the U.S. and its Kurdish partners. That cooperation helped plan and execute the raid that led to the capture killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.</p>
<p>As one former American special operator has <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/abandoning-kurds-america-hurt-itself/161201/">written</a>, “Trust is a powerful commodity that has saved many lives in shadowy battlefields across the Middle East. But it takes a long time to build and can be gone in an instant.”</p>
<p>By contrast, mistrust, even if it is based on perception alone, can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals.</p>
<h2>Defeating the Islamic State</h2>
<p>I observed the long-term consequences of broken trust next door to Syria, in Iraq. </p>
<p>I served as a U.S. diplomat in the southern Iraqi city of Basrah during 2015 and 2016, the height of the war against the Islamic State group, also known as IS.</p>
<p>At the time, after years of sectarian strife, dishonest governments and their broken promises, Iraqis seemed united around the common purpose of defeating IS. The <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind">corrupt and sectarian regime</a> of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had been ousted. And the U.S. was leading an international coalition to help the Iraqi government in the fight against IS, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-13-2017-united-states-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-iraqi-people">humanitarian assistance</a>. </p>
<p>You might think that a war that the U.S. was fighting on behalf of the Iraqi people, a war that was truly an existential one for the majority Iraqi Shia, would have produced at least some goodwill toward the United States.</p>
<p>Instead, when I arrived in Basrah in 2015, I discovered that many Iraqis, including the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-27945271/iraq-crisis-the-sunni-shia-divide-explained">majority Shia Muslim</a> population among whom I lived, believed that the United States was somehow in cahoots with the Islamic State. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">U.S. tacit support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s made Iraqis cynical about U.S. trustworthiness after Hussein was deposed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-SADDAM-/3b22e19e04f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/42/0">AP photo</a></span>
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<h2>Mistrust for decades</h2>
<p>The Middle East is rife with conspiracy theories. But this one was particularly jarring given that the United States was then engaged in a costly and very public effort to defeat the Islamic State, a terrorist group which declared the Shia apostates and said they must be killed.</p>
<p>Over time, I began to understand the roots of these attitudes. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">Disinformation</a> and propaganda, especially from Iran, fueled them to some extent. </p>
<p>But there were deeper issues at play. </p>
<p>“The United States defeated Saddam’s armies in a matter of weeks,” incredulous Iraqis I met would say to me. “So how is it that you can’t defeat a ragtag army of jihadists in two years?” </p>
<p>Iranian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">disinformation campaigns</a> blaming the U.S. for the Islamic State were effective because of a deep gulf of mistrust between the U.S. and Iraqis, which led to widespread cynicism among ordinary Iraqis about U.S. motives. </p>
<p>The origins of this mistrust go back decades, from tacit U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, when Washington turned a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/14/books/turning-a-blind-eye.html">blind eye</a> to the dictatorship’s atrocities against Iraqi Kurds. </p>
<p>The lack of trust helps explain why the U.S. had such a hard time stabilizing Iraq after 2003, despite toppling a feared despot and despite investing billions of dollars in the country. </p>
<h2>Roots in betrayal</h2>
<p>Iraqi Shia are the largest Muslim sect in the country, but have less political power than Sunni Muslims. The Shia in particular have painful memories of an event that they see as a massive breach of trust between them and the U.S. </p>
<p>In 1991, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago">encouraged</a> by then-President George H.W. Bush, the Shia rose up against Saddam, only to be abandoned by the U.S. </p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm">slaughtered</a>. </p>
<p>I visited a memorial to the victims of Saddam’s suppression of the uprising, where I saw a leaflet displayed that was dropped by U.S. and coalition aircraft calling on Iraqi soldiers and civilians to “fill the streets and alleys and bring down Saddam Hussein and his aides.” </p>
<p>“We thought this meant that the Americans would help us,” my guide at the museum told me.</p>
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<span class="caption">President Trump visited U.S. troops at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, Dec. 26, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Iraq/0c7bb5c680f7487b954c45e5c87a1d5d/11/0">AP/Andrew Harnik</a></span>
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<p>Many Iraqis I met also recalled the devastating 1990s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.html">sanctions</a> on their country that were championed by the United States. Others talked of Washington’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/">failure to stabilize</a> the country after 2003. Then there was the perception that the Obama administration came late to the war against the Islamic State. </p>
<p>Other Iraqis I met – young ones – told me of their resentment at U.S. support for a political class in Baghdad that is seen as deeply corrupt. Some of them are no doubt <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/protesters-tahrir-square-iraq-191111195848776.html">protesting</a> in the streets and squares of Iraqi cities today. </p>
<p>I attended lots of meetings with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders in the south. They saw the Obama administration’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow">2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops</a> and general disengagement from Iraq as a betrayal of trust. They saw it as handing over Iraq to Iranian influence, which they fear. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Iraqis did not see the U.S. as a credible, consistent or committed partner. Some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-spy-cables.html">turned to Iran for assistance</a>, while turning against the United States. Perhaps it is no surprise that <a href="https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation">polls taken</a> at the time I worked in Basrah showed that Iraqis saw Iran and Russia as more favorable security partners.</p>
<h2>Can’t escape the past</h2>
<p>Iraq is by no means a perfect analogy for the shattered trust between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/middleeast/kurds-sense-of-betrayal-compounded-by-empowerment-of-unsavory-rivals.html">Washington and its Syrian Kurdish allies</a>. Yet the the Iraqi experience shows that distrust of the United States has deep roots in past U.S. actions. </p>
<p>In Syria, too, the U.S. has left a legacy of mistrust since 2011, from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/">Obama’s failure</a> to follow through on his call for Assad to step down, to his <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/4/15/17238568/syria-bomb-trump-obama-russia">failure to impose meaningful costs</a> on the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons. Trump’s withdrawal is just one episode in a longer story.</p>
<p>Despite breaches of trust, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/iraqi-official-us-support-vital-lasting-defeat">Iraqis continued to need U.S. support</a>. But that need paired with a lack of trust makes things difficult for American diplomats in Iraq. For me, it was often overwhelming to be at the receiving end of the immense disappointment, frustration and more rarely, hope, that the Iraqis have in the United States. </p>
<p>The Syrian Kurds, like the Iraqis, will still need the United States and continue to work with Washington. But the breach of trust will complicate cooperation, as it did in Iraq.</p>
<p>Not everything that Iraqis blame the United States for is fair. And it would be impossible for even the best-crafted U.S. policies to satisfy all of Iraq’s diverse people. </p>
<p>At times I tried to remind my unfailingly hospitable Iraqi interlocutors, especially those in the government, to be a bit more introspective about their own failings and responsibility for Iraq’s post-Saddam ills. I tried to remind them that the United States invested a lot in Iraq, with limited results. </p>
<p>In the end, the credibility of the message was undercut by a lack of trust in the messenger.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski has previously received funding from the United States government through a Fulbright grant.</span></em></p>Distrust of the US – even if misplaced – can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals. A former US diplomat in Iraq reflects on that country’s skepticism of US aid efforts.Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1207482019-07-22T15:48:02Z2019-07-22T15:48:02ZSaddam Hussein: how a deadly purge of opponents set up his ruthless dictatorship<p>The scene, a large smoke-filled room in Baghdad 40 years ago on July 22 1979. About a hundred unsuspecting <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bath-Party">Ba'athist party</a> members sat listening to their newly installed president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saddam-Hussein">Saddam Hussein</a>, denouncing a conspiracy against him.</p>
<p>Suddenly a man was brought before the conference, bearing the marks of torture and the vacant expression of a broken mind and soul. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle-2-15039/the-real-saddam-1-617460">Muhyi Adbek Hussein</a>, one of the senior Ba’athist leaders, proceeded to confess his role in a plot to overthrow Saddam’s new regime and name his alleged co-conspirators. One by one, 50 names were called out, each man escorted from the room by uniformed guards.</p>
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<p>It was a chilling sight. The remaining members, now visibly afraid, started chanting vociferous allegiance to Saddam in the hope of avoiding the fate of their colleagues. These survivors of his brutal crackdown were then handed guns, and ordered to execute their fellow Ba’athist colleagues, making them complicit in their leader’s crimes. Journalist <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/arts/christopher-hitchens-is-dead-at-62-obituary.html">Christopher Hitchens</a> compared the shocking scene to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Night-of-the-Long-Knives">Night of the Long Knives</a> in Nazi Germany, when Hitler ordered a similar purge of his own perceived opponents in 1934.</p>
<h2>A totalitarian regime</h2>
<p>Though this infamous party conference happened 40 years ago, it remains one of the most shocking episodes of violence in Iraq’s history, marking the beginning of Saddam’s 24 years of absolute power. There were <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2007/02/saddam-hussein-stalin-tigris/">comparisons with Joseph Stalin</a>, due to the way he moulded the Iraqi political structure into a one-party system, ruled by a small elite comprising close friends and family. But his <a href="http://cpd.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ComplianceResistanceFeb2015.pdf">penchant for public violence</a> would remain a notable difference.</p>
<p>Another discrepancy was reflected in the degree of control over each country’s economy. While Stalin managed to impose a fully centralised economy and forced industrialisation, Saddam opted for a <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot1_032504.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1">mixed economy</a> which allowed private possession of land and businesses.</p>
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<p>Even though the authoritarian Iraqi government was liable for establishing the prices of goods as well as making decisions regarding oil, around 50% of the Iraqi GDP was privately generated, demonstrating the less totalitarian approach of the regime in this respect. </p>
<h2>Political implications</h2>
<p>The purge shaped Saddam’s image as a ruthless dictator who would not tolerate any form of dissent. His Ba’ath ideology of Arab unity, freedom and socialism, and the struggle against imperialism and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080010/zionism-israel-palestine">Zionism</a> was nothing but a sham political agenda. He soon instilled a climate of fear and perpetrated <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11155798">torture, kidnapping and mass murder</a>, as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes prosecuted under the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about">International Criminal Court</a>. </p>
<p>It also established Iraq as an emerging regional power, disrupting the Middle East’s political status quo. Soon Saddam would be known to his people by <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3600554/Saddam-fooled-me-too.html">many names</a> – the Anointed One, Glorious Leader, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Field Marshal of the Armies. He wore a general’s uniform, decorated with medals awarded by himself, even though he had never served in the army.</p>
<p>Envisaging Iraq as a great regional power Saddam frequently engaged in military conflicts, the first being the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4260420.stm">Iran-Iraq war</a> which took place in the early 1980s. Iraq considered the war against Iran an opportunity to settle longstanding disputes over its borders, such as the annexation of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Khuzestan">oil rich province Khuzestan</a>.</p>
<p>Saddam Hussein also perceived Iran as a threat to the survival of his regime, as the neighbouring country was considered a great source of inspiration to the Shi’a revolutionaries of Iraq. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml">Shi’a</a> Muslims accounted for around <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-focus-elections">60% of Iraq’s 25m people</a>, yet were ruled and oppressed by the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml">Sunni</a> minority regime led by Saddam. In contrast, Iran had a Shi’a majority with Shi’a rulers.</p>
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<p>This led to close links between Iraqi Shi’a and Iran, whose new leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ruhollah-Khomeini">Ayatollah Khomeini</a> hoped they would rise up and overthrow Saddam’s perilous regime. The war <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/iran-iraq-war">ended in a stalemate</a> after eight years with both countries claiming victory. Saddam continued his quest for power and prestige by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/superpowers-unite-over-iraq-invasion-of-kuwait-1990">invading Kuwait</a> in 1990. The invasion had major consequences, bringing immediate economic sanctions upon Iraq from the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers">UN Security Council</a> (UNSC) and the commencement of the UNSC <a href="http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/peace/docs/scres687.html">Iraqi disarmament</a>. </p>
<h2>End of the Saddam era</h2>
<p>The imposed economic sanctions lasted until the end of Saddam’s regime in 2003, dramatically weakening his position and the Ba’ath party’s grip on Iraq. Although his regime was in its last stages by the late 1990s, the US government chose to launch “a pre-emptive, self-defence war” against Iraq, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/bush-war-iraq-190318150236739.html">aiming to overthrow him</a>.</p>
<p>With the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html">2003 execution of Saddam</a>, the chapter of one of the most authoritarian regimes in recent history was closed, ending the fiction – even as the noose placed around his neck – that he remained president of Iraq. The authoritarian despot had oppressed his country for quarter of a century, unleashing devastating regional wars and reducing his once promising, oil-rich nation to a stifled police state.</p>
<p>His insatiable desire for power made Saddam sacrifice his own people, inciting the ire of neighbouring states and the international community. Although Saddam and the Ba’athist Party used various methods of control, from indoctrination and surveillance to brutal repression, torture and mass killings, Saddam’s regime was never fully successful, demonstrated by the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2888989.stm">Shi’a uprisings in 1991</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29702440">Kurdish struggle for independence</a>.</p>
<p>Even though Saddam’s tyrannical rule came to an end 16 years ago, the new Iraqi democracy has barely kept a grip on power as decades of unresolved religious ethnic and social division have curdled into <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqs-surprise-the-persistence-of-democracy-1510933773">full-scale insurgency and sectarian bloodbath</a>, killing hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.</p>
<p>The unity of post-Saddam Iraq’s geography is yet to be reflected in its fractious society. The memory of sectarian conflict is ever present, still claiming the lives of Iraqis every month. Today Iraq is a fragile state where the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-iraqs-shiite-militias-expand-their-reach-concerns-about-an-isis-revival-grow/2019/01/09/52da575e-eda9-11e8-8b47-bd0975fd6199_story.html?utm_term=.c9fc8507f6b5">Shi’a abuse power</a>, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/186-saudi-arabia-back-baghdad">Saudis destabilise</a> the area to advance their own interests, and the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7401438.stm">Iranians pull the strings</a> in Baghdad. Ultimately, post-Saddam hopes of freedoms and basic human rights have failed to materialise, that democratic, stable and fair society still elusive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Contributing author: Roberta Dumitriu, (Mlitt/MSc) International Relations, University of Dundee.</span></em></p>Forty years ago this shocking event paved the way for a 24-year rule of fear that saw Iraqi citizens repressed, tortured and murdered.Abdullah Yusuf, Lecturer in Politics, University of DundeeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1197302019-07-11T11:02:05Z2019-07-11T11:02:05ZAn invisible government agency produces crucial national security intelligence, but is anyone listening?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283390/original/file-20190709-44497-1bvjq7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Harry S Truman established the initial version of the National Intelligence Council. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-ASSOCIATED-PRESS-Domestic-News-Dist-of-/06594794d10c41edbeae50e387b2d53c/44/0">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year marks the 40th anniversary of a little-known U.S. organization that has provided crucial intelligence and analysis to presidents for all those decades: the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=398&Itemid=776">National Intelligence Council</a>. </p>
<p>Right after World War II, President Harry Truman understood that the United States was embarking into a new world order and required, in the words of one observer, guidance on <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no2/peeling-facts-off-the-face-of-the-unknown.html">“the big job – the carving out of United States destiny in the world as a whole.”</a> </p>
<p>He established a <a href="https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc700905/m1/1/high_res_d/R40505_2009Apr10.pdf">Board of National Estimates</a> deliberately outside the White House, State Department and Pentagon so that strategic intelligence would be provided with a degree of independence and detachment. </p>
<p>As national security scholars and practitioners, we believe it was a wise judgment. In our experience, when intelligence analysts are close to policy operators, the risk grows that assessments will be cut to suit the cloth of policy – a frequent problem with military intelligence. </p>
<p>In the 1970s, the board was transformed into the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1973/09/20/archives/cia-will-abolish-estimates-system-form-a-new-board.html">National Intelligence Council.</a> The board had become too detached and academic, in the view of both the director of central intelligence, James Schlesinger, and the national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. </p>
<p>Schlesinger’s successor, William Colby, replaced the board with national intelligence officers, who later became the National Intelligence Council and took on the role of strategic intelligence analysis, drawing on the work of all the intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>We each served, at different times, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Our recent book, “<a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190940003.001.0001/oso-9780190940003?rskey=WQPI6M&result=1">Truth to Power</a>”, chronicles the history of the council, an organization well known inside government but little understood outside, and its involvement in almost all the major foreign policy challenges of the last decades. </p>
<p>Did the National Intelligence Council always get it right? Of course not. As Yogi Berra put it, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” And while the council, and U.S. intelligence more generally, would like to always “get it right,” the better standard is whether its work was useful in helping policy move in a wise direction. </p>
<p>On that score, it has played a critical role in supporting presidents ever since Truman’s time, often providing an important check on the wilder impulses of policymakers. </p>
<p>In a dangerous but shapeless world, strategic analysis has never been more important. Yet it is apparent that <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-foreign-policy-20190515-story.html">disdain for analysis</a> has also never been greater than under this administration.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283392/original/file-20190709-44479-1u20u99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters spell out ‘No War’ after Trump tweeted that ‘Iran made a very big mistake’ by shooting down a U.S. surveillance drone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Iran/32eca568e643458789b19c17b75ef066/23/0">AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The National Intelligence Council at work</h2>
<p>The council now is composed of fewer than 100 analysts, national intelligence officers and their deputies, organized like the State Department in geographic and functional accounts, like terrorism or technology. </p>
<p>When we each served as chairman of the council, if the <a href="https://www.dummies.com/education/politics-government/what-is-the-role-of-the-national-security-advisor/">national security advisor</a> or another senior <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/">National Security Council</a> officer wanted to know how “intelligence” assessed a particular issue, the question would go to the council. </p>
<p>The appropriate national intelligence officer would convene his or her colleagues from all the agencies to agree on the answer and produce an assessment. Disagreements would be noted in the assessment, which would first be given to the National Security Council, then often put in a form that, while still classified, could be distributed more widely, including to Congress.</p>
<p>The council is still answering questions, but there is <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/62439/trumps-moves-intelligence-community-crippling-u-s-national-security/">very little process in the Trump administration</a>. The main policy committees, the “principals” (Cabinet officers) and “deputies” (their number twos and threes), hardly meet, and decisions are made by tweet or held tightly by the national security advisor. </p>
<p>The process for the council’s <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/national-intelligence-estimates">National Intelligence Estimates</a> is similar to writing an assessment, but the point of the exercise is to look ahead, to identify connections among issues and their importance. From start to finish, an estimate can take months to complete. Finished estimates are approved by a meeting of the agency heads, the <a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/n/national-intelligence-board/">National Intelligence Board</a>, whose members are the heads of every U.S. intelligence agency. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283391/original/file-20190709-44479-9c5hty.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2002, a U.N. weapons inspector checks out a weapon in Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War#/media/File:WeaponsInspector.JPG">Petr Pavlicek/International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The need for strategic intelligence</h2>
<p>Perhaps the council’s most studied failure, the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/17/document-of-the-week-the-2002-national-intelligence-estimate-on-wmds-in-iraq/">2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction</a>, is a case in point about the limitations of intelligence in guiding policy. </p>
<p>That estimate was used to justify a war – not yet ended – in which over <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40824.pdf">4,000 Americans have died</a>, according to official Defense Department statistics, but Iraq did not turn out to have any of the weapons. The estimate cited evidence, but <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071225161422/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html">it turned out not to be evidence of weapons.</a></p>
<p>Surely, in assessing that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, the council got it wrong. But so did virtually everyone else, including the two of us, who nonetheless opposed the war. </p>
<p>Yet the bigger story of that estimate is that it didn’t make a difference to policy. The <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/196659/no-higher-honor-by-condoleezza-rice/9780307986788/">George W. Bush administration had long before decided on war</a>, according to then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/wmd-just-a-convenient-excuse-for-war-admits-wolfowitz-106754.html">and then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz</a>. And so the most the estimate did at the time was to perhaps provide some cover for skeptical Democrats in Congress who didn’t want to vote “no” to war. </p>
<p>The council did, however, provide good strategic analysis that – if heeded – could have averted policy fiascoes in the Middle East during this same period.</p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/politics/prewar-assessment-on-iraq-saw-chance-of-strong-divisions.html">two of the council’s assessments in January 2003</a> were cautionary about the planned U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. </p>
<p>The first assessed that the war would produce a spike in anti-American terrorist activity and recruitment, while the second noted that occupation would evoke bad associations with earlier foreign occupations of Baghdad, and so needed to be internationalized as soon as possible, presumably through the U.N. </p>
<p>They went <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/politics/prewar-assessment-on-iraq-saw-chance-of-strong-divisions.html">unheeded by the Bush administration</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, the Obama administration participated in the NATO operation in Libya aimed at preventing a bloodbath in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city. The administration did not heed the <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/29/hillary-clinton-libya-war-genocide-narrative-rejec/">warnings from intelligence and military leaders</a> that the operation could grow rapidly into a much greater involvement in that country’s political problems. </p>
<p>The operation quickly and predictably expanded from a limited humanitarian intervention into a much broader campaign to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011">overthrow the regime of Moammar Gadhafi</a>, which led to even more civilian casualties.</p>
<p>President Obama later called this <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/12/barack-obama-says-libya-was-worst-mistake-of-his-presidency">his “worst mistake,”</a> acknowledging that he was at fault for “failing to plan for the day after” the intervention. At least he wished he had heeded cautionary assessments. </p>
<p>We have both witnessed how presidents and Cabinet officers often don’t want strategic analysis. They have ascended to senior positions because they have (or want to project) a high degree of self-confidence and self-assurance. They don’t like their pet projects subjected to critical scrutiny. </p>
<p>But under President Trump, this has become a much more acute problem. Intelligence community <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/north-korea-isis-iran-and-election-interference-top-u-s-intelligence-community-concerns">judgments that North Korea would not give up its nuclear weapons</a> and that <a href="https://www.axios.com/intelligence-chiefs-donald-trump-iran-nuclear-deal-0333ce3b-dd4e-4928-8753-447b98cedcc4.html">Iran was in compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal</a> <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf">were wholly ignored by the Trump administration</a>.</p>
<p>Policymakers understandably want intelligence analysis to support their policies. But whether they know it or not, they also need intelligence as a somewhat detached check on their ambitions.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton received funding for the book on which this article is based from the University of Texas and the Smith Richardson Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Hutchings received funding for the book on which this article is based from the Smith Richardson Foundation.</span></em></p>The National Intelligence Council works inside government but is little understood outside. Yet it has helped respond to almost all the major foreign policy challenges of the last 40 years.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesRobert Hutchings, Walt and Elspeth Rostow Chair in National Security and Professor of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093992019-02-20T11:37:25Z2019-02-20T11:37:25ZIraq’s brutal crackdown on suspected Islamic State supporters could trigger civil war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257578/original/file-20190206-174857-lq01ke.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Family members of Sunni men and boys in Iraq accused of supporting ISIS hold up pictures of their arrested relatives. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.mayaalleruzzo.net/blog-1/2018/5/11/iraqs-counterterrorism-court">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Large portions of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">Islamic State</a> in Iraq have been either <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/world/middleeast/iran-airstrikes-hit-islamic-state-in-iraq.html">killed, captured or forced underground</a> over the past three years. </p>
<p>Eleven years after the U.S. invasion toppled dictator Saddam Hussein, triggering a war between Islamic State militants and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawal/last-u-s-troops-leave-iraq-ending-war-idUSTRE7BH03320111218">U.S.-backed Iraqi government</a>, Iraq has finally achieved some measure of stability.</p>
<p>But the Iraqi government isn’t taking any chances that this terrorist organization, commonly known as “IS,” could regroup. </p>
<p>Over <a href="https://www.apnews.com/aeece6571de54f5dba3543d91deed381">19,000</a> Iraqis suspected of collaborating with IS have been detained in Iraq since the beginning of 2013, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/iraq">Human Rights Watch</a>. Most of them are Sunni Muslims, according to reporting by <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge">Ben Taub</a> of the New Yorker. Sunnis are members of the sect of Islam from which IS predominantly recruits. </p>
<p>Suspected terrorists are often tortured into offering confessions that justify death sentences at trial. According to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/report-iraq/">Amnesty International</a>, common forms of torture include “beatings on the head and body with metal rods and cables, suspension in stress positions by the arms or legs, electric shocks, and threats of rape of female relatives.”</p>
<p>The government’s crackdown on Sunnis – even those with no evidence of ties with Islamic militants – sends a troubling signal about Iraq’s prospects for peace.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2017.1420313">research into conflict zones</a> shows that when post-war governments use violence against citizens, it greatly increases the risk of renewed civil war.</p>
<h2>Repression following civil wars</h2>
<p>The period after an armed conflict is fragile. </p>
<p>Citizens traumatized by violence wish fervently for peace. Defeated armed factions may have their sights set on revenge. </p>
<p>The post-war government’s priority, meanwhile, is to consolidate its control over the country. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2017.1296834">Sometimes,</a> leaders <a href="https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/islam-and-nation-separatist-rebellion-aceh-indonesia">use violent repression</a> to ensure their grip on power. </p>
<p>It is a risky strategy.</p>
<p>We studied 63 countries where civil war occurred between 1976 and 2005, including El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The results, which were published in the academic journal <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ccsd20/current">Conflict, Security and Development</a> in January, show a 95 percent increase of another civil war in places where governments engaged in the kind of torture, political imprisonment, killings and disappearances that Iraq’s government is now undertaking.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Iraqi Special Forces shoots at an Islamic State militant drone, December 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Iraq-Mosul/4475e96b7e1543b19a2b40791b556bd4/2/1">AP Photo/Manu Brabo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Civil war is most likely to break out in former conflict zones if civilians believe they will be targeted by the state regardless of whether or not they actually support an insurgency.</p>
<p>Often, our results show, people respond to indiscriminate clampdowns by arming themselves. That is easy to do in conflict zones, which are home to many former rebels with <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343304043775">extensive battlefield training and access to weapons</a>, including both active militant groups and the remnants of vanquished insurgencies. </p>
<h2>Assessing the risk of renewed war in Iraq</h2>
<p>Sadly, Iraq has been down this road before. </p>
<p>In 2007, the U.S. military surge sent more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/world/middleeast/11prexy.html">20,000 additional American troops into combat</a> in Iraq to help the government of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2012/12/10/world/meast/nuri-al-maliki---fast-facts/index.html">Nuri al-Maliki</a> – which came to power after Hussein’s demise – fight Al-Qaida and other Islamic militants. </p>
<p>The U.S. enlisted <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/06/did-the-iraq-surge-finger-sunni-insurgents-for-maliki-and-his-allies/">Sunni insurgents to help them find, capture or kill Al-Qaida operatives</a> during this period of the Iraq war, which is often called “the surge.”</p>
<p>That decision inflamed the <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/">centuries-old sectarian divide</a> between Iraq’s two dominant religious groups, Sunni and Shia Muslims. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi leads a Shia-dominated government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://i1.wp.com/www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Adel-Abdul-MahdiDomACLKXgAYnz2f.jpg?resize=1200%2C800&quality=75&strip=all&ssl=1">ACMCU/Twitter</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During former Iraqi President Hussein’s rule, Sunni Muslims controlled the country, and his government actively repressed Shia citizens. Since Hussein’s ouster, however, Iraq’s government has been run by Shia Muslims. </p>
<p>After the U.S. withdrew its troops in 2011, the U.S.-backed al-Maliki government <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-needs-to-hold-nouri-al-maliki-accountable/2013/10/31/66af359e-424e-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f3cc98d63029">began a brutal campaign to consolidate its authority</a>. From 2012 to 2013, he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/world/middleeast/fading-hopes-of-unity-in-iraq-as-sectarian-tensions-rise.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMaliki%2C%20Nuri%20Kamal%20al-&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=167&pgtype=collection">expelled all Sunni officials</a> from Iraq’s government and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/opinion/renewed-tensions-in-iraq.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMaliki%2C%20Nuri%20Kamal%20al-&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=185&pgtype=collection">silenced opponents</a> using torture, political imprisonment, killings and disappearances.</p>
<p>At the time, our study of renewed fighting in conflict zones had just begun. The preliminary findings made us concerned that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE95004P20130601">al-Maliki’s use of violence</a> to assert control over Iraq could restart the civil war by pushing angry Sunnis into the arms of militant groups. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, we were right.</p>
<p>Starting in 2014, the Islamic State began moving swiftly from Syria – where it was based – to conquer major cities across neighboring western Iraq. </p>
<p>Iraqi Sunnis, who were excluded from politics after Hussein’s overthrow and fearful of government repression, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-malikis-iraq/">did little</a> to stop the incursion. Islamic militants increased their recruitment among Iraqi Sunnis by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-sunni.html">promising a return to Sunni dominance</a> in Iraq. </p>
<p>Many Sunnis took up arms against their own government not because they supported IS’s goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate across the Middle East but because they <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/04/18/304187407/sunni-discontent-fuels-growing-violence-in-iraqs-anbar-province">hated al-Maliki’s administration</a>. </p>
<p>By June 2014, the Islamic State had <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/mosul-isis-propaganda/532533/">captured Mosul</a>, Iraq’s second-largest city, just 250 miles north of Baghdad. It took three years of fighting and the combined force of Iraqi, U.S. and Kurdish troops, as well as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/this-iran-backed-militia-helped-save-iraq-from-isis-now-washington-wants-them-to-disband">Iranian-backed militias</a>, to rid the country of this terrorist organization. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria.html">In September 2017</a>, Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Abadi claimed victory over IS in Iraq. The international community turned its focus toward Syria, where Islamic militants were continuing their war on citizens and the government.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Iraq</h2>
<p>Still, the Islamic State remains a persistent and legitimate threat to both Syria and Iraq, with some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/">30,000 active fighters in the region</a>. Its commanders have reportedly buried large stockpiles of munitions in Iraq in preparation for renewed war.</p>
<p>American intelligence officials have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">warned against President Donald Trump’s plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria</a>, saying it will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/politics/trump-intelligence.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FIslamic%20State%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria%20(ISIS)&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=6&pgtype=collection">give IS more freedom to regroup</a> there and in Iraq.</p>
<p>The Iraqi government’s crackdown on Sunnis is, in part, an effort to eliminate this threat, since IS could draw renewed support from disaffected Sunni Iraqis across the border. </p>
<p>But many observers think Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi is also <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge">exacting revenge</a> on Sunnis for previously joining IS in armed warfare against Iraq’s government.</p>
<p>Rather than prevent more fighting, our research suggests, Iraq’s clampdown on Sunnis may spark another civil war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Keels receives funding from The National Science Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela D. Nichols does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iraq beat the Islamic State. Now, its Shia government is jailing and even executing all suspected terrorists – most of them Sunni Muslims. The clampdown may inflame a centuries-old sectarian divide.Eric Keels, Research Associate at One Earth Future Foundation & Research Fellow at the Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy, University of TennesseeAngela D. Nichols, Assistant Professor, Florida Atlantic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093962019-01-16T11:43:06Z2019-01-16T11:43:06ZGarbage collection in Syria is crucial to fighting the Islamic State<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253905/original/file-20190115-152968-1jsaeah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Garbage piled up in the opposition-held city of Afrin, Syria, in March 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria-Turkey/5b1c0d6cc2bf4ce9aa472088cb68640d/36/0">AP/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just a few years ago, I was a diplomat working on the Turkish-Syrian border. My job was managing the U.S. government team responsible for delivering aid to Syrian towns and cities loyal to the <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/181559921/syrian-opposition">Syrian opposition</a>. </p>
<p>These were towns that had turned against President Bashar al-Assad when the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and Assad ordered his army to shoot peaceful civilians protesting against him. </p>
<p>Now I’m retired from the Foreign Service and <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/maais/people/mark-ward/">teaching international relations</a> at the University of Washington in Seattle, where my students struggle to understand why the U.S. never seems to learn from past mistakes in the conduct of our foreign affairs. </p>
<p>Given recent decisions and announcements by President Trump about <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-troop-withdrawal-from-syria-risks-aid-effort-to-help-survivors-of-anti-isis-fight/2018/12/20/4092a078-03d5-11e9-958c-0a601226ff6b_story.html?utm_term=.076d9d8413d6">withdrawing much of our aid and our troops from northern Syria</a> while the civil war continues and the Islamic State Group, or “IS,” still threatens, it’s a timely question.</p>
<h2>Stability and local services</h2>
<p>To understand what’s at stake in Syria, it’s helpful to look at Iraq.</p>
<p>More than 15 years after the U.S. invaded Iraq and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/05/02/607652246/u-s-ends-major-ground-combat-in-iraq">eight years after the U.S. said it was leaving the country</a>, Iraq is unstable. Five thousand U.S. soldiers remain in Iraq today, <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/09/25/the-white-house-just-revealed-massive-mission-creep-in-syria-heres-why/">tasked with shoring up the still struggling Iraqi armed forces</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253907/original/file-20190115-152986-1qhk5la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman chants slogans in front of the provincial council building during a demonstration demanding better public services and jobs in Basra, Iraq, Jan. 11, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iraq-Protests/ad6d623048d940e2b2528b4740322b98/6/0">AP/Nabil al-Jurani</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the reasons for the instability is the U.S. decision in 2003 to dismiss nearly all leaders of <a href="http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1415/consequences-of-iraqi-de-baathification">the Iraqi civil service when it toppled dictator Saddam Hussein because they were members of Hussein’s Baath Party</a>.</p>
<p>With much of the civil service gone, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/deadly-protests-rage-in-iraq-over-lack-of-services-as-political-transition-deadlocks/2018/09/05/9bdd03bc-b081-11e8-8b53-50116768e499_story.html?utm_term=.c36ed061e024">local services like water and electricity fell apart</a> and essential public employees fled. That left a perfect vacuum for extremist groups like IS to exploit by taking control of essentially ungoverned territory. The U.S. continues to pay the price for this avoidable decision today.</p>
<p>If the U.S. cuts off support for communities inside Syria that oppose Bashar al-Assad and fly the Syrian Opposition flag, and withdraws American troops from the fight against IS – as President Trump has announced – we will be making the same mistake again. We’ll be creating a vacuum our enemies can exploit.</p>
<h2>Keeping local officials on the job</h2>
<p>The U.S. has supported these communities since 2012. I directed the distribution of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/12/the-delivery-man/">hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. government aid from 2012 until 2016</a>, as head of the team known as the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team. </p>
<p>Syrian refugees will never go back home if their towns can’t offer the basic services they enjoyed before the war. </p>
<p>Our simple strategy was that when peace returns to Syria, key local officials would still be on the job, ready to reconnect their communities to the national systems that provided services before the war.</p>
<p>Thus would begin the long, difficult process of reuniting Syria. </p>
<p>The money and supplies my team and I delivered helped keep important local officials on the job so they wouldn’t <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/">give up and flee their country to seek refuge</a> in Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan, like millions of others before them. These were experienced civilians who could keep the water and power on, manage the sewers and clean the streets. </p>
<p>We helped them with small stipends – a portion of their former salary – because the Syrian government had stopped paying them. And we provided equipment they needed to do their jobs: garbage trucks, generators, water tanks and fire trucks. We helped teachers, doctors and local police with small stipends, supplies and equipment, too.</p>
<p>Nothing was more satisfying for me than seeing videos of a new garbage truck that we sent from Turkey removing piles of garbage from the streets of Saraqib or one of the new ambulances we provided tending to innocent civilians injured in the latest barrel bombing in Aleppo.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253993/original/file-20190115-152986-a2ta7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">International aid paid for the rehabilitation of an unreliable electricity grid in a town near Aleppo, Syria in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://srtfund.org/articles/35_rehabilitation-and-expansion-of-the-electricity-grid-of-a-town-in-aleppo-governorate">Syria Recovery Trust Fund</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s in everyone’s interest to <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/285202.htm">keep civil service workers on the job</a>, paid something and equipped. That will help put Syria back together again someday and deny ungoverned space for IS and other extremist groups. The last thing the U.S. and countries in the region need is for Syria to disintegrate into warring regions, like Iraq and Libya today.</p>
<h2>International aid</h2>
<p>Other countries joined the effort to rebuild Syria, notably the U.K., the Netherlands and Denmark. Still more countries are contributing to <a href="http://www.srtfund.org/">an international fund based in Jordan</a> that helps the same communities; my team cooperated closely with this effort. </p>
<p>Stopping this funding means jeopardizing Syria’s future at the worst possible time, just as the conflict appears to be coming to an end. I believe that reuniting the country should be the priority now.</p>
<p>Syria’s neighbors, especially Turkey, long supported the U.S. approach because it kept Syrians in Syria, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-and-syrian-refugees-the-limits-of-hospitality/">diminishing the flood of refugees to Turkey</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, the Syrian government and its supporters, Russia and Iran, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-saudi-arabia-race-against-russia-iran-rebuild-syria-too-little-late-1078641">opposed our aid</a>. The assistance we gave sustained communities that the government and its allies continue to bomb into submission and surrender, particularly in Idlib province. </p>
<p>But the aid President Trump cut, sometimes called <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/285202.htm">stabilization assistance</a>, goes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/world/middleeast/syria-us-coalition-deaths.html">local civilian officials, working to help the sick and wounded and keep children in school</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253920/original/file-20190115-152977-15cebe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Larry Bartlett, senior adviser for the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team meets with members of the Civil Administration of Manbij, Syria, in August 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/4659976/start-senior-advisor-visits-manbij">U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Izabella Sullivan</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An opening for IS</h2>
<p>Similarly, withdrawing U.S. troops sent to Syria to eliminate IS – when our own count suggests at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/world/middleeast/isis-syria-prisoner-release-trump.html">1,000 IS fighters remain there</a> – may serve short term political ends, but will likely come back to haunt the U.S. and Syria’s neighbors. </p>
<p>President Trump may worry about the price tag for rebuilding Syria, once the war ends. He is right to be concerned. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/world/middleeast/syria-war-rebuilding-homs.html">The cost will be enormous</a> and arguably the U.S. should not spend a dime. </p>
<p>The old adage – you broke it, you fix it – applies to the Syria conflict. I believe we should let Syria, Russia and Iran pay the billions it will take to fix what they broke – the infrastructure of bombed-out cities and towns.</p>
<p>The modest U.S. investment in local communities that the White House cut off <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-ends-syria-stabilization-funding/">– $200 million, not billions –</a> could have helped prevent the collapse of communities in the future. </p>
<p>So, what do I tell my students in Seattle? </p>
<p>I remind them that they are our future leaders. I tell them that if we are not to repeat the mistakes of my generation, they should study and learn from history, and avoid short-term fixes to disentangle the U.S. from future foreign interventions. </p>
<p>“Silver bullets” don’t work – and usually force us to return later, at a greater cost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109396/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Ward does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Keeping the water and power on, managing sewers and collecting garbage will help communities shattered by the Syrian civil war rebuild – and keep out the Islamic State, says a former aid official.Mark Ward, Lecturer, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/955602018-12-01T14:28:33Z2018-12-01T14:28:33ZWhy we’ll miss George H.W. Bush, America’s last foreign policy president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248220/original/file-20181201-194950-1rdpjv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Unlike every president who followed him, George H.W. Bush had a background in foreign policy. In 1972, Bush was serving as U.S. ambassador to the U.N.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Dave Pickoff</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are many reasons to miss George H.W. Bush, the 41st president of the United States. A World War II hero, he later served his country with great distinction in a number of important positions before becoming vice president and then president. </p>
<p>The outpouring of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/us/george-bush-death-reactions.html">warm feelings</a> first for his wife, Barbara Bush, <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2018/04/barbara-bush-obituary">who passed away earlier this year</a>, and now for him, reflects not only the role President and Mrs. Bush played in American history but also the decency they represented in a political system that now has become full of indecency. </p>
<p>Strikingly, George H.W. Bush was also the last person elected president of the United States with any prior foreign policy experience. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=674&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=674&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=674&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248216/original/file-20181201-194950-1oshqy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">George H.W. Bush as a senate candidate in 1964.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ed Kolenovsky</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He entered office with one of the most impressive resumes of any president, having served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, ambassador to the United Nations and Ronald Reagan’s vice president. </p>
<p>He left office with an impressive list of achievements, including the unification of Germany within NATO. As historian Jeffrey Engel has reminded us in his excellent recent book, “<a href="https://www.smu.edu/News/2017/jeffrey-engel-book-02nov2017">When the World Seemed New,</a>” this was far from assured. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President Francois Mitterand were deeply opposed to Germany’s unification, while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev opposed not only unification but the incorporation of the former East Germany into NATO. Germany’s leadership in Europe as a force for democracy and human rights since those years has clearly vindicated President Bush’s instincts to support West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in his efforts in 1990. </p>
<p>A major high point of the George H.W. Bush presidency, however, was also the harbinger of disappointments to come: the swift military victory that reversed Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and seemed to herald a new era in world affairs – but left Saddam Hussein in power.</p>
<p>In 1991, it seemed America could do anything it wanted to in the world – politically, diplomatically and militarily. But no one could have imagined 27 years ago the role that Iraq would come to play in American foreign policy in the ensuing years and the loss of American lives, money, standing and self-confidence that resulted from U.S. involvement in that country. </p>
<h2>A new world order?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173308/original/file-20170612-307-1rwvabf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bush with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at Camp David on June 2, 1990.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Marcy Nighswander</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A month after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, in September 1990, Bush and Gorbachev issued <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18809">a joint statement noting that</a> “no peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.” That same month, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/09/12/bush-out-of-these-troubled-times-a-new-world-order/b93b5cf1-e389-4e6a-84b0-85f71bf4c946/?utm_term=.a71472024fb5">Bush declared</a>, “We’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders.”</p>
<p>The problem was that while the United Nations was set up to prevent powerful states from invading weaker neighbors, as Germany and Japan had done in the 1930s and 1940s, the main challenges of the post-Cold War world – prior to Russia invading Ukraine in 2014 – were different. They were mainly internal challenges: failed states and civil wars in places like Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, Afghanistan and eventually Iraq after the disastrous U.S. occupation following the 2003 war.</p>
<p>The U.S. effort to put together an international coalition against Iraq in 1990 was stunning. Secretary of State James Baker met with every head of state or foreign minister whose country held a seat on the U.N. Security Council. That meant not just meeting with those countries that had permanent seats like the Soviet Union and China, but also those holding rotating seats such as Ivory Coast, Romania and even Cuba. </p>
<p>Baker’s efforts were successful. The Security Council passed U.N. <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement">Resolution 678</a> on Nov. 29, 1990 and established Jan. 15, 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait or face a U.S.-led international coalition to force its withdrawal. </p>
<p>The coalition made good on the threat. As Colin Powell told my co-author Derek Chollet and me in <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/536355281">an interview for our book on the period</a>, “The Gulf War was the war against the Russians we didn’t have. There were no trees and no hills, but that’s what we were trained to fight. The Iraqis sat there and we kicked the shit out of them.”</p>
<p>For those who had suffered through the morass of Vietnam and the crisis of American confidence that followed, it was the ultimate feel-good moment. An estimated 800,000 people packed the National Mall to cheer their military heroes. Bush came out of the war with a <a href="http://www.politifact.com/new-jersey/statements/2012/dec/02/john-wisniewski/democratic-leader-offers-cautionary-tale-gov-chris/">90 percent public approval rating</a>.</p>
<h2>The Iraq problem</h2>
<p>And yet, the following year, a candidate with no foreign policy experience who had avoided military service in Vietnam won the presidency. By 1992, the Cold War was over, and Bill Clinton campaigned with the mindset that it was “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/us/1992-campaign-democrats-clinton-bush-compete-be-champion-change-democrat-fights.html?mcubz=0">the economy, stupid</a>.”</p>
<p>But while Clinton defeated Bush, he inherited the Iraq problem from his predecessor, who had chosen not to remove Saddam Hussein in order to keep his U.N. coalition together. Clinton was faced for eight years with patrolling the no-fly zones established over the north and south of Iraq to protect the Kurdish and Shiite populations. </p>
<p>Clinton passed the Iraq problem off to George W. Bush, who in the aftermath of the attacks of Sept. 11 made the fateful decision to go to war in 2003 – this time without U.N. authorization. Bush and his “coalition of the willing” removed Saddam Hussein, leaving the United States as an occupying power. And while <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2008/aug/12/barack-obama/obama-sticks-to-his-iraq-plan/">Barack Obama promised</a> – a promise on which, for a fleeting moment, <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-announces-end-of-iraq-war-troops-to-return-home-by-year-end/">he seemed to deliver</a> – a U.S. withdrawal from the country, he was forced to go back in militarily with the rise of the Islamic State, handing off the Iraq problem to his successor to manage. Even as Donald Trump presided over tremendous military success against ISIS, Iraq remains a diplomatic and military challenge for the United States. The 2003 war left Iran ascendant in the region, and it cost the United States not only significant blood and treasure, but so much of the standing and legitimacy it gained in 1991.</p>
<p>Thus the promise of the Gulf War – the U.S. dominant like no other since ancient Rome, confident that it could rule the world on behalf of freedom and democracy – gave way over time to doubt and confusion. In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. military was largely called upon to handle internal conflicts – in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and, throughout it all, Iraq – and the results have proved deeply dissatisfying. </p>
<p>In 1991, George H.W. Bush declared victory and celebrated with a parade. In 2011, there was no parade for Libya. There will be no parade for Afghanistan. If Donald Trump ever holds a military parade in Washington, D.C. as he once discussed, it will take place in an America exhausted from its long wars and feeling far less confident in its role in the world than it was back in the George H.W. Bush years.</p>
<p>It’s fitting that George H.W. Bush, World War II military hero and Cold War veteran, is the last president to preside over what at the time felt awesome: a major military victory fought on behalf of the entire world against a dictator. </p>
<p>His successors, none of whom served in the military and all of whom have wrestled with post-Cold War challenges, have been vexed not only by Iraq, but by challenges posed by nonstate actors while trying to manage regional threats emanating from China, Russia and Iran. While Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and now Donald Trump have each in their own way tried to define American leadership, George H.W. Bush’s presidency represents the moment at the end of the Cold War when anything seemed possible for the United States in world affairs, and the underlying challenges were only just beginning to become visible.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story <a href="https://theconversation.com/george-h-w-bush-americas-last-foreign-policy-president-77513">updates a version</a> published on June 12, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95560/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Goldgeier does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The first President Bush had some impressive foreign policies wins, but could he be best remembered for getting the US entangled in Iraq?James Goldgeier, Professor at the School of International Service and Visiting Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1052762018-10-19T10:37:57Z2018-10-19T10:37:57ZJamal Khashoggi: Casualty of the Trump administration’s disregard for democracy and civil rights in the Middle East?<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/12/saudi-arabia-fii-conference-withdrawal-jamal-khashoggi">The international crisis</a> over whether top Saudi Arabian leadership murdered U.S.-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is a striking example of the consequences of Donald Trump’s blanket disregard for democratic politics and human rights in other countries. This departure from decades of American foreign policy rhetoric remains comparatively undiscussed.</p>
<p>However, in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.umass.edu/jne/member/david-mednicoff">my area of expertise</a>, I believe this Trump policy shift opens the door to exactly the sort of flagrant attacks on individual freedom and safety that likely recently claimed Khashoggi.</p>
<p>Most criticism of Trump’s foreign policy has focused on two other <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/">major departures</a> from decades of past American practice. </p>
<p>First, Trump has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/opinion/sunday/trump-china-america-first.html">rejected the cornerstones of the post-WWII international order</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/liberal-world-order-rip">largely built by the U.S.</a>: deep alliances among Western democracies and global free trade. Second, Trump has shown <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/12/trumps-affinity-for-dictators-over-democrats/">an affinity for authoritarian rulers</a>, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, which has undermined American interests. </p>
<p>Yet, the Trump administration’s abandonment of support for democracy and civil rights hurts the interests of both Middle Easterners and Americans. </p>
<h2>Did the US walk the walk?</h2>
<p>In the past, U.S. leaders and officials within the government have shown interest in political rights and government accountability in other countries. Such talk has nonetheless often taken a back seat to considerations of geopolitical power or resources.</p>
<p>Perhaps the lack of attention to current U.S. disregard for democracy and rights in the Middle East has to do with <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/us-hypocrisy-cairo-tehran-1178298333">Washington’s inconsistency and perceived hypocrisy in the region</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232775/original/file-20180820-30608-10wvrxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, right, greets Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Washington in 1951. Two years later, the U.S. orchestrated a coup to oust democratically elected Mossadegh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even before the U.S. became a superpower after World War II, Western countries like England and France <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/07/the-real-reason-the-middle-east-hates-ngos/">trumpeted democratic values while engaging in colonial control</a> of the Middle East. This left a <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/post-colonial-states-and-the-struggle-for-identity-in-the-middle-east-since-world-war-two/">legacy of local suspicion</a> regarding the sincerity of Western leaders’ stated political values. </p>
<p>The U.S.’s own track record in the region of allying with repressive governments, mounting coups (<a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/cia-assisted-coup-overthrows-government-of-iran">as in Iran in 1953</a>) and overthrowing leaders by force (as in Iraq in 2003) are among examples where the <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/americas-middle-east-challenge/">U.S. practiced a politics other than what it preached</a>. </p>
<p>At best, the U.S. has <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170531_R44858_01bf19e7dcbc238101ec9032c54b16d72a714551.pdf">embraced democratization and human rights</a> as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/26/think-again-middle-east-democracy/">one of many goals</a> in the Middle East. More cynically, democratic talk could be seen as a cover for more <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2002/12/imperialism.html">imperialistic policies</a> in the region during and after the Cold War. </p>
<p>Yet these days even the pretense is gone that U.S. policy in the Middle East – or elsewhere – should advance political freedom. </p>
<p>When asked about why he refuses to criticize repressive rulers like Putin or Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Trump’s response is to question whether <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donald-trump-vladimir-putin/index.html">“our country’s so innocent</a>.” Denying that the U.S. is distinguishable from countries that penalize dissent, the current American leader disavows the very project of advancing democratic values abroad. </p>
<h2>Pretense matters</h2>
<p>Let me be clear that I am not suggesting that Middle Easterners should be, or are, dependent on foreign countries or activists for greater political rights. If so, why does an end to Washington’s inconsistent support for democratic politics and rights in the Middle East matter? </p>
<p>There are several reasons. </p>
<p>First, U.S. support for democratic values abroad – however variable – helps empower non-government organizations that consistently focus on rights in places like the Middle East.</p>
<p>That means <a href="https://www.hrw.org/">Human Rights Watch</a>, <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/">the World Justice Project</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/30/the-new-politics-of-human-rights-in-the-middle-east/">local movements these groups help</a> can improve human rights and legal accountability in part because they have allies in Washington’s broader political culture.</p>
<p>Second, advocates for democratic rights exist within the U.S. government, and enjoy influence, even if their superiors are less constant in their support for democracy abroad. </p>
<p>So, groups within the State Department, and government organizations like <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/">USAID</a> or the <a href="https://www.usip.org/">United States Institute for Peace</a>, work to improve citizen capacity and rights in places like the Middle East. In more rights-oriented presidencies, such groups <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/07/impact-where-america-needs-it">can affect broader government policy</a>.</p>
<p>Even in administrations less focused on human rights, the rhetoric of support for democracy can be politically useful or persuasive. President George W. Bush partly justified American military overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003 with the argument that a more <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/2003/11/07/a-bold-vision-for-the-middle-east">democratic Iraqi government might help transform the broader Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the lack of U.S. predictability around political rights in the Middle East can actually deter governments dependent on good relations with Washington from repressing their citizens. That’s because they can’t be entirely sure about political consequences. Tacit approval by the U.S. of human rights abuses could turn overnight into condemnation. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232776/original/file-20180820-30599-j4kka8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump greets Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi in 2017 in Saudi Arabia. Sisi has been accused of increasing repression in his country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The White House</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, Egypt’s pre-2011 authoritarian leader <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21201364">Hosni Mubarak was known for political oppression</a>. But he could not undermine democratic and human rights activists in his country altogether. He knew that, in a U.S. that provided billions of foreign aid to Egypt, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/1456332/Mubarak-cornered-over-US-push-for-Middle-East-reform.html">at least some policymakers scrutinized his coercive practices</a>.</p>
<h2>Lack of pretense matters</h2>
<p>Is it actually significant that the White House ignores political rights and freedom? </p>
<p>In the Middle East, the difference is large and palpable. </p>
<p>For one thing, increased deference to authoritarian leaders in the Middle East by the world’s most powerful democracy has allowed for the pursuit of deadly warfare and attacks on civilians. This is apparent in the actions of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/middle-east-civilian-deaths-have-soared-under-trump-and-the-media-mostly-shrug/2018/03/16/fc344968-2932-11e8-874b-d517e912f125_story.html">Syrian leader Hafez el-Assad</a>, who has <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/syria-chemical-weapons-assad-trump/557483/">not hesitated to use chemical and other extreme weapons on his population</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/trump-yemen-saudi-arabi-war-us-involvement-worsening-crisis">the Saudi government</a> uses <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/19/us-supplied-bomb-that-killed-40-children-school-bus-yemen">U.S.-supplied weapons to wage war in Yemen</a>. The White House has not responded to the devastating civilian casualties.</p>
<p>More broadly, and as the Khashoggi affair highlights, the U.S.’s current lack of interest in political rights emboldens Middle Eastern governments to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/jamal-khashoggi-what-the-arab-world-needs-most-is-free-expression/2018/10/17/adfc8c44-d21d-11e8-8c22-fa2ef74bd6d6_story.html?utm_term=.e631809b9348">crack down on dissent and the dissenters</a>, in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/europe/turkey-saudi-khashoggi-dismember.html">flagrant and shocking ways</a>.</p>
<p>Egypt under President Sisi is <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170526-world-leaders-find-freedom-repress-era-trump">more repressive politically</a> than it was prior to 2011 under Mubarak. Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia may be committed to increasing Saudi prestige and the selective enhancement of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-change-youth-crown-prince-modernise-wahhabism-mohammed-bin-salman-a8019876.html">less puritanical social mores</a>. Yet he also has shown <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/how-mohammed-bin-salman-has-transformed-saudi-arabia/">little tolerance for political opposition</a>. </p>
<p>When the Canadian foreign ministry <a href="https://twitter.com/CanadaFP/status/1025383326960549889">tweeted critically about Saudi political arrests</a>, the Saudis countered by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/saudi-arabia-ruptures-ties-with-canada-serving-notice-to-would-be-critics/2018/08/06/5ad193f6-99a7-11e8-b55e-5002300ef004_story.html?utm_term=.86b3ff411550">expelling the Canadian ambassador and suspending trade, flights and Saudi student exchanges with Canada</a>. </p>
<p>Such a strong reaction is hard to imagine in the days when at least pockets of the U.S. government showed concern about human rights in the Middle East. In this instance, the Trump Administration refused to support support Canada, its democratic neighbor. Similarly, Trump’s response to Khashoggi’s disappearance so far is to <a href="http://time.com/5421537/trump-saudi-arms-sales-jamal-khashoggi/">highlight the importance of Saudi-U.S. ties, particularly in the realm of weapons sales</a>.</p>
<p>The upshot is that Middle Easterners have grounds to believe that Washington cares little for their basic well-being, their hopes for more responsive political systems and, in Syria and Yemen, their very lives. </p>
<p>The volcano of popular <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/21/middle-class-frustration-that-fueled-the-arab-spring">resentment against authoritarianism that erupted most notably in 2011</a>, known as the Arab Uprisings, may have been capped temporarily. <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/1/8/2018-from-the-frying-pan-into-the-fire">It has not quieted</a>. </p>
<p>People in the Trump administration purport to care a great deal about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-saudi-idUSKCN18H00U">potential violence from Middle Easterners</a>. This is why it is puzzling that they side strongly with unelected leaders willing to use intimidation and violence to quell dissent.</p>
<p>It is tempting to argue that the inconsistency of U.S. efforts to further democratic values means that these efforts don’t matter. </p>
<p>At least in the Middle East, racked by ongoing war, the rising influence of autocrats, and increases in flagrant attacks on critical speech like Khashoggi’s death, I fear that the Trump administration’s abandonment of such efforts will in fact fuel more misery and anti-Americanism.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-trump-administration-casualty-democracy-and-civil-rights-in-the-middle-east-100366">an article</a> originally published on August 24, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105276/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Trump administration’s abandonment of support for democracy and civil rights abroad may be behind the sort of attacks on individual freedom that likely claimed journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s life.David Mednicoff, Chair, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1029672018-09-21T10:41:59Z2018-09-21T10:41:59ZThe US will have to accept second-class status in the Middle East<p>You may not have noticed it – the chair that wasn’t there. </p>
<p>The seven-year long Syrian civil war is ending with a government victory, <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/as-the-syrian-war-nears-its-end-a-tense-new-struggle-is-materialising-1.770121">aided by Russia and Iran</a>. Talks to end to the war are accelerating. </p>
<p><a href="http://time.com/5389823/putin-erdogan-rouhani-meet-syria/">Who</a> is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/world/middleeast/russia-iran-and-turkey-meet-for-syria-talks-excluding-us.html">at the table</a> in those talks? Russia, Turkey and Iran. Noticeably, not the United States.</p>
<p>The missing U.S. was starkly obvious from recent photos of the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Syria negotiating the next steps. </p>
<p>Yet despite the <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/08/its-long-past-time-rethink-us-military-posture-gulf/139940/?oref=d1-in-article?oref=d1-related-article">major</a> <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/01/how-should-pentagon-reshape-its-mideast-posture-four-indicators-watch/145317/?oref=d1-related-article">military</a> <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/08/toward-smaller-smarter-force-posture-middle-east/150817/">presence</a> of the U.S. in the region and a legacy of deep involvement in the Middle East, the U.S. is not among the faces of those who are determining Syria’s fate. </p>
<p>As a scholar and practitioner of foreign affairs, I believe that nowhere is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-world-is-dawning-and-the-us-will-no-longer-lead-it-98362">erosion</a> of U.S. global power more evident than in the upheavals in the Middle East. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/rami-g-khouri/no-mystery-about-arab-disarray">power shifts</a> are not temporary. The old order, in which the U.S. was the most influential force in the region, <a href="https://agenceglobal.com/2017/11/28/vladimir-putin-and-voltaire-walk-into-a-bar/">cannot be rebuilt</a>, and the U.S. is going to have to adjust to this diminished status.</p>
<h2>The region remembers</h2>
<p>The decline of the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/robert-gates-syria-red-line-obama-2016-1/">U.S. as the regional balancer</a>, some argue, is the result of President Barack Obama’s decision not to enforce his red line in Syria after President Bashar Assad used chemical weapons in 2013. </p>
<p>Others say it is President Donald <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ff2cbeba-5863-11e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0">Trump’s fault for taking sides</a> in some of the region’s central conflicts.</p>
<p>Both are wrong. </p>
<p>Obama’s leverage in Syria was always weak unless he was willing to deploy U.S. ground forces. </p>
<p>A one-off U.S. missile strike on Syria in 2013, after Assad attacked his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/">citizens with chemical weapons</a> would have had no more effect on the outcome of the war than the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/big-price-to-pay-inside-trumps-decision-to-bomb-syria/2018/04/14/752bdd9a-3ff9-11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html">Trump administration’s strike</a> after a similar incident in 2017. </p>
<p>And Trump’s policies simply accelerate the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-world-is-dawning-and-the-us-will-no-longer-lead-it-98362">rebalancing already well under way</a>.</p>
<p>It’s time for realism. Power has shifted in part as a direct result of U.S. policies and actions that for at least 50 years supported autocrats and undermined democratic efforts in the Middle East. Those actions are <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-trump-administration-casualty-democracy-and-civil-rights-in-the-middle-east-100366">long remembered in the region</a>. </p>
<p>The U.S was not alone <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/u-s-policy-toward-a-turbulent-middle-east/">in supporting autocrats</a>. The United Kingdom and France joined the U.S. in supporting strongmen in the region for decades and fiercely opposed anti-colonial nationalists like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education1">Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser</a>. The U.S. and U.K. joined to overthrow the democratic, reformist government of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup">Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in 1953</a>. The region remembers how the <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/cia-assisted-coup-overthrows-government-of-iran">CIA helped overthrow him</a> and put in place Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was heavily <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/1979/03/16/goodbye-to-americas-shah/">dependent on the U.S.</a> as leader of the country.</p>
<h2>The best-laid plans</h2>
<p><a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75060">The invasion</a> of Iraq in 2003 was facilitated by U.S. planning for a regional military role that had been underway for some time. That newly assumed role, intended to restore order or overthrow regimes, led to military actions that had negative consequences for U.S. standing in the region. </p>
<p>As a foreign policy scholar, I visited the Tampa, Florida, headquarters of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force in the early 1980s for an unclassified briefing. I learned about <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P6751.pdf">the planned network</a> of bases, landing and overflight rights, storage facilities and military exercises that would make U.S. intervention in the region possible. </p>
<p>Through these plans, Spain, Libya, Egypt and countries in the Gulf region would allow U.S. fighters and bombers to fly to the heart of the Middle East. They would provide storage locations for American military equipment, fuel for American operations and joint exercises that would enable them to operate with U.S. forces.</p>
<p>Using this network, the U.S. military was able to eject <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/17/world/meast/saddam-hussein-fast-facts/index.html">Saddam Hussein from Kuwait</a> in 1991. This intervention included the first ever U.S. military deployment in the region. The network also paved the way for the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10669920701616443">U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003</a>, which overthrew Saddam’s regime, unraveling the regional balance of power. This intervention and the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia provided a propaganda godsend to al-Qaida, the Islamic terrorist organization first led by Osama bin Laden. </p>
<p>The 2003 invasion, regime change and disastrous occupation <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/20/top-10-lessons-of-the-iraq-war-2/">opened a Pandora’s box</a> of troubles, destroying U.S. credibility and any capability it had to stuff the troubles back into the box. </p>
<p>The subsequent chaos from <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new-arab-order">Iraq to Syria to Lebanon</a> had many parents, including national, religious and ethnic forces repressed by authoritarian leaders. </p>
<p>But the massive strategic blunder of <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iraninsight/saudi-arabia-and-iran-may-be-headed-toward-war">invading Iraq and</a> the declaration of a “Global War on Terror,” gave Iran and al-Qaida huge incentives to expand operations, rebalancing power in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1204&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1204&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237334/original/file-20180920-129853-3a4sgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1204&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. removal of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi led to greater chaos in the Arab world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Abdel Magid Al Fergany</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Removing Moammar Gadhafi in Libya spread the chaos further. No amount of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/">reconstruction strategy and funding</a> after he left could prevent it. The parallel effort to bring democracy to the Middle East revealed the ineptitude and ignorance of U.S. policy. The region remembers.</p>
<p>Trump administration policy has further distanced the U.S. from a leading role. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement has not changed Iranian policies or actions; it has only reinforced the extremists. </p></li>
<li><p>Proposing a U.S.-Israel-Saudi Arabia-Gulf states alliance to confront Iran exacerbates the Arab-Persian confrontation and elevates Saudi Arabia and Israel as regional powers. </p></li>
<li><p>Picking fights with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has alienated the Turks. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Trump’s policies are an “accelerant,” hastening the decline of U.S. credibility across the Middle East and stimulating further rebalancing. </p>
<h2>Who’s in charge?</h2>
<p>The old regional order is <a href="https://theiranproject.com/blog/2018/09/16/the-iran-saudi-arab-conflict-and-the-path-to-peace/">dying fast</a>. The rising powers are Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Russia. </p>
<p>Only the Saudis and Israelis are close to the U.S. and it seems they, not Trump, are driving U.S. policy. Iran is not contained. Its influence in the region was clearly <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iraninsight/saudi-arabia-and-iran-may-be-headed-toward-war">enhanced</a> by the removal of Saddam Hussein. </p>
<p>Iran’s extension of political and military power across Syria to Lebanon and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interview/iran-supports-hamas-hamas-no-iranian-puppet">Hamas</a>, partly a defensive <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/07/trumps-iran-strategy-regime-change-on-the-cheap.html?utm_source=undefined&utm_medium=undefined&utm_campaign=feed-part">response</a> to the U.S., has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-02-13/iran-among-ruins">made it a player</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey, supposedly a U.S. ally, has clearly moved away, taking an independent stance on Syria, <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/08/27/in-familiar-dance-turkey-warms-to-russia-as-us-ties-unravel/">building</a> friendly relations with Russia, and <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-looks-china-security-cooperation-alternatives">exploring</a> stronger security ties with China. </p>
<p>Russia has long been a player in Syria. Despite the overall decline of Russian power since the USSR disappeared, Putin plays a weak hand well, <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-12-14/russia-s-influence-middle-east-growing">expanding</a> Russia’s influence more broadly in the region.</p>
<h2>US continued interest</h2>
<p>In my view, the U.S. will not roll back these changes, though it still has a stake in the region. </p>
<p>Terror attacks are a threat to the U.S. and others. The use of force to eliminate terrorist organizations by the U.S. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/01/30/why-trumps-policies-will-increase-terrorism-and-why-trump-might-benefit-as-a-result/">has increased</a>, rather than diminished this threat. An uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern oil continues to be an important goal, and it is a shared interest of producers and consumers around the globe. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is critical, which is why others support the Iran nuclear agreement. </p>
<p>Trump’s confrontational strategy is a counterproductive approach to promoting these interests. The only way back to the table, I believe, is for the U.S. to step back to a more neutral position, shrink its military presence, engage all the parties – including Iran – and commit to multilateral approaches.</p>
<p>Peace will not come soon to the Middle East. U.S. influence demands a dramatic change in attitude and approach. Power has shifted and other parties now have the biggest stake and role in the outcome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Adams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US was once the dominant force in the Middle East. That old order has disappeared. Now the new powers are Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Russia – and the US needs a new policy for the region.Gordon Adams, Professor Emeritus, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/991212018-07-11T11:14:00Z2018-07-11T11:14:00ZTrump isn’t the first leader to rattle the world order<p>Donald Trump’s recent trip to the G-7 summit <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-floats-end-to-all-tariffs-threatens-major-penalties-for-countries-that-dont-agree/2018/06/09/a06350be-6bf1-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.c92efef70139">smashed expectations of how world leaders should behave</a>. </p>
<p>Trump’s actions in Canada included exacerbating the growing trade war and accusing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of lying. Summit participants described the President as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/world/europe/trump-nato-summit-g-7.html">“angry, mocking, wandering and rude</a>.” Trump left the G-7 to meet in Singapore with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. This only added to G-7 members’ apprehension, as many believe the American leader is more apt to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-kim-summit-trump-says-we-have-developed-a-very-special-bond-at-end-of-historic-meeting/2018/06/12/ff43465a-6dba-11e8-bf86-a2351b5ece99_story.html?utm_term=.061062be8a64">befriend dictators than allies</a>.</p>
<p>As the President begins the NATO summit, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ahead-of-nato-and-putin-summits-trumps-unorthodox-diplomacy-rattles-allies/2018/07/06/16c7aa4e-7006-11e8-bd50-b80389a4e569_story.html?utm_term=.7c67f895b399&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1">many allies fear</a> that he will unilaterally take actions that will further call into question America’s support for their countries. Trump has already sent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news">“sharply worded”</a> letters to multiple NATO allies ahead of the summit, admonishing them to spend more on defense. </p>
<p>The President’s decision to hold a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/europe/trump-putin-helsinki-meeting.html">summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin</a> days after the Brussels meeting only heightens alliance worries.</p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://isd.georgetown.edu/McFarland">diplomatic historian</a> and practitioner of foreign affairs. History shows us that Trump isn’t the first leader to take a brutish approach to international affairs. It is worth looking back at some historical actors who ignored international norms and acted unilaterally and defiantly. </p>
<p>It’s also worth considering the results of their behavior.</p>
<h2>Kaiser Wilhelm’s follies</h2>
<p>Wilhelm II, German leader from 1888 to 1918, is an interesting and tragic historical figure, who has recently been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12/the-donald-trump-kaiser-wilhelm-parallels-are-getting-scary/">compared</a> to President Trump. Those references include one article entitled <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/what-happens-when-a-bad-tempered-distractible-doofus-runs-an-empire">“What Happens When a Bad-Tempered, Distractible Doofus Runs an Empire</a>?” Wilhelm was the grandson of England’s Queen Victoria. But he did enough to sour relations that even his family ties couldn’t stop Germany and England from <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/greatwar/g2/backgroundcs1.htm">going to war in 1914</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1577&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1577&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1577&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1981&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1981&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1981&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kaiswer Wilhelm II.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=438189">Public domain</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like his country, Wilhelm was both ambitious and insecure. “Deep into the most distant jungles of other parts of the world, everyone should know the voice of the German Kaiser,” <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/crips-column/2009/01/germany-wilhelm-war-austria">he once wrote</a>. “Nothing should occur on this earth without having first heard him.” </p>
<p>Wilhelm hated being questioned. One historian, Margaret MacMillan, describes how he “deliberately shook hands too hard <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/105817/the-war-that-ended-peace-by-margaret-macmillan/9780812980660/">with his strong right hand</a>.” MacMillan also wrote that he liked slapping male monarchs on their behinds and his adolescent playfulness appalled his fellow royals. </p>
<p>Wilhelm had numerous indiscretions and poor policy decisions prior to World War I. His infamous <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Kruger-telegram">“Kruger telegram” of 1896</a> infuriated London when he congratulated a group of independent south Africans for repelling a British-backed military raid. His decision to expand the German navy and the publication of an infamous <a href="https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Daily_Telegraph_Affair">1908 Daily Telegraph “interview”</a> that was insulting and perplexing to British readers also sparked rifts. <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/105817/the-war-that-ended-peace-by-margaret-macmillan/9780812980660/">MacMillan succinctly states that</a> “Wilhelm’s erratic behavior, his changeable enthusiasms and his propensity to talk too much and without thinking first helped to create an impression of a dangerous Germany.” </p>
<p>Ultimately, that perception helped lead to war.</p>
<h2>Saddam’s plans go awry</h2>
<p>Before <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/war-in-iraq-begins">America attacked Iraq in 2003</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/17/world/meast/saddam-hussein-fast-facts/index.html">ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein</a>, the strongman from Tikrit had already earned the international community’s ire with his August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. </p>
<p>That invasion came after a decade of regional instability with Saddam as a troublesome central player. </p>
<p>From 1980-1988, Saddam, angry at and fearful of Iranian interference in Iraq domestically, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War">fought Iran</a> in a vicious war that also sought territorial gains. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were afraid that Iran’s revolution would spread. Acting on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” they <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war">heavily funded Saddam’s war effort</a>.</p>
<p>Iraq was worn down and heavily indebted to Arab benefactors following the war’s end in 1988. For some time after, Saddam switched his focus to Kuwait. He laid claim to some of the country’s vast oil deposits and tried to wrest away ports that provided better sea access for oil tankers and cargo ships. </p>
<p>Saddam’s claims to these rich areas, which he called <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/A_History_of_the_Modern_Middle_East.html?id=LYe0CwAAQBAJ">Iraq’s “19th province”</a>, were accompanied by his demands for Kuwait to forgive billions of dollars of debt owed by Iraq. Saddam then claimed Kuwait was siphoning off oil from a shared oil field. Most egregious for Saddam, who was dependent on higher oil prices to rebuild Iraq, was Kuwait’s decision to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/08/business/new-opec-limits-meet-resistance.html">produce more oil than OPEC quotas</a> had set, driving prices down.</p>
<p>With no solution in sight, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/iraq-invades-kuwait">Saddam invaded and occupied Kuwait</a> in August 1990. </p>
<p>The Cold War was just ending and the United States was trying to usher in a <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/22029/a-world-transformed-by-george-hw--bush-and-brent-scowcroft/9780679752592/">“new world order”</a>, which, it was hoped, would make possible better cooperation among the great powers. That meant Washington and the international community would not, and could not, let Saddam’s actions stand. Ultimately, a military a coalition led by the United States <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0227.html">decimated Iraqi forces</a> and Kuwait was freed. Saddam’s grip on his country and the region would never be as strong.</p>
<p>Like many other leaders who disrupted diplomatic norms, Saddam’s actions ultimately failed.</p>
<h2>The Rough Rider lives up to his name</h2>
<p>An assassin’s bullet <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0906.html">killed President William McKinley</a> and made Theodore Roosevelt president in 1901. </p>
<p>The assassination brought a new kind of presidency to the United States: Not only was Roosevelt the youngest president ever, his boldness and his views of the office introduced what we now know as the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/political-bookworm/post/the-inevitability-of-the-imperial-presidency/2011/04/22/AFTRBoPE_blog.html?utm_term=.5fc1c0ff0f99">imperial presidency</a>.” </p>
<p>Freakishly bright and full of boundless energy, Roosevelt ran roughshod over his contemporaries, some of whom called him <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Major_Problems_in_American_Foreign_Relat.html?id=spA88Rt23soC">an imperialist and militarist,</a> while one described him as <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">“the mere monstrous embodiment of unprecedented and monstrous noise</a>.” He proclaimed to live by the motto: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=948&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=948&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=948&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Theodore Roosevelt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public domain</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This was probably most apparent in Latin America. Seeking a U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">Roosevelt bullied and cajoled</a> both regional and European nations when Washington’s interests were threatened, using threats of military <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">action and diplomatic pressure</a>. </p>
<p>Roosevelt’s bullishness <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/117455/theodore-rex-by-edmund-morris/9780812966008/">was felt in Venezuela</a>, where Britain and Germany had mounted a blockade over Venezelua’s unpaid debts to those countries. Roosevelt pushed the Europeans to <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/foreign-affairs">arbitrate rather than blockade</a>, fearing European ambitions for Venezuelan territory. <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/117455/theodore-rex-by-edmund-morris/9780812966008/">It was felt in Panama</a>, where he promoted Panamanian independence from Colombia in order to ensure U.S. <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/foreign-affairs">control over a canal</a> that would be built across Panama. That canal, in use to this day, would connect the Atlantic and the Pacific, although it is no longer under U.S. control.</p>
<p>His most famous, and likely most lasting, influence came with his 1904 “corollary” to the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe">Monroe Doctrine</a>.
President James Monroe’s 1823 proclamation stated America’s aim to be in predominant control of the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America. </p>
<p>Roosevelt went further. </p>
<p>Now, not only would the United States diplomatically oppose European intervention in the region, the U.S. would also directly intervene in Latin American countries if Washington felt it would forestall European intervention. </p>
<p>Roosevelt’s action, in part, led to numerous American regional actions in the following decades, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">in places such as Haiti, Mexico and the Dominican Republic</a>. These actions, left mostly unchecked by European powers, created a negative Latin American view of the United States as an imperialistic power, lasting in some quarters to this day. </p>
<p>These examples are by no means precise comparisons to today. But they do highlight that history is replete with leaders acting bullishly, with singular confidence in their path and lack of concern for the opinions of others, including allies. </p>
<p>And history is also filled with the mixed results – at best – of those actions.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the title of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kelly McFarland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO leaders meet in Belgium today; many are worried about US President Trump’s habit of breaking diplomatic norms. History is filled with other leaders acting bullishly, often with poor results.Kelly McFarland, Director of programs and research, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.