tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/sahel-20200/articlesSahel – The Conversation2024-03-18T10:59:45Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230352024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024 Senegal election crisis points to deeper issues with Macky Sall and his preferred successor<p>The botched attempt by Senegalese president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a> to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">postpone</a> the presidential election has stirred unnecessary tension in an already strained electoral process. The move reflected deeper governance problems in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">Sall’s decree</a>, subsequently <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/16/constitutional-council-plunges-senegal-into-the-unknown-by-overturning-election-postponement_6531088_124.html">annulled by the Constitutional Council</a>, was the latest in a range of government interventions that exceeded the scope of the executive authority. These have included the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/22/sonko-wade-not-listed-among-official-candidates-of-feb25-presidential-election/">disqualification</a> of key opposition candidates, the manipulation of judicial procedures, and the arbitrary detention of dissenting figures.</p>
<p>Sall’s 12-year tenure has been marked by contradictions. His administration boosted investment in transport and urban infrastructure. Notably, he worked on the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/319731593403262722/text/Senegal-Transport-and-Urban-Mobility-Project.txt">motorway network</a>, the new Diass international airport, the development of major roads and the completion of public transport projects.</p>
<p>But these investments have not translated into improvements in the lives of Senegalese. Thousands of young people still go on <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1072143/politique/tribune-whatshappeninginsenegal-quand-le-drame-des-migrants-passe-au-second-plan/">perilous journeys</a> to Europe having lost hope of fulfilling their potential in their own country.</p>
<p>This is the backdrop to his move to postpone the elections in a last bid to secure a winning strategy for his camp. His anointed successor, <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/1109-44836-senegals-macky-sall-endorses-pm-amadou-ba-as-2024-successor">Amadou Ba</a>, remains a contested figure within the ruling <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amy-Niang">I have a research interest</a> in state formation in west Africa. As I <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786606525/The-Postcolonial-African-State-in-Transition-Stateness-and-Modes-of-Sovereignty">have argued</a> in my work, states sustain themselves by producing and alienating internal “others”. This refers to a scenario where governments assert sovereignty not against outside forces but against internal cultural groups and existing logics of governance. Sall’s style of government follows this pattern closely. </p>
<h2>Crisis within his party</h2>
<p>Sall <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/10/senegal-macky-sall-se-justifie-sur-le-report-de-la-presidentielle//">said</a> he was postponing elections because of an alleged conflict between parliament and the Constitutional Council. The parliament had approved the creation of a commission of inquiry into the process of validation of presidential candidacies by the Constitutional Council.</p>
<p>Sall in fact latched onto <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c1vywrx3xx9o">an accusation</a> of corruption levelled by Karim Wade against two Constitutional Council judges following Karim’s disqualification from running in the election due to his dual citizenship.</p>
<p>But the most plausible reason was a crisis within the ruling camp. The Alliance for the Republic is a divided party that is going to the elections in disarray. Sall’s chosen successor, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Ba</a>, has generated little enthusiasm among voters. He symbolises the status quo. An affluent candidate, Ba has the difficult task of convincing an impoverished electorate that he is up to the task. </p>
<p>Sall overstepped his constitutional powers. The Senegalese <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/SENEGAL_Constitution.pdf">constitution’s limitation</a> of the president’s term duration can’t be amended. Further, according to the <a href="https://dge.sn/sites/default/files/2019-01/CODE%20ELECTORAL%202018_0.pdf">electoral code</a>, the decree setting a date for presidential elections must be published no later than 80 days before the scheduled ballot. Sall postponed the poll just 12 hours before the campaigning was due to start, and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/14/senegal-authorities-restrict-internet-access-and-ban-march//">22 days before the ballot</a>.</p>
<p>Sall’s attempt at postponing the elections, which has fostered a climate of distrust in the integrity of the electoral process, has left Senegal embroiled in a serious constitutional crisis. His decree brought forth two important issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the government’s commitment to an orderly handover of power</p></li>
<li><p>the integrity of the democratic process.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Erosion of a democratic tradition</h2>
<p>Since 2021, a series of protests and riots have pitted Ousmane Sonko, a key opposition figure facing rape allegations, and his supporters against a government accused of manipulating the judiciary to thwart a serious candidate. As a result, the economy has been severely disrupted. Each day of protests causes an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/restaurants-water-towers-unrest-dents-senegals-economy-2023-06-09/">$33 million loss</a> in economic output. </p>
<p>Further, Sall has used security and defence forces to establish an order of fear. He has resorted to heavy-handed measures against opposition figures and dissenting voices within civil society through arbitrary detention and prosecution. His government has systematically <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent">restricted</a> the freedom of assembly, banned protests, suppressed independent media and mobilised public resources to bolster the ruling party.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, Senegal has seen an erosion of institutions meant to uphold the rule of law, foster political participation and ensure public accountability.</p>
<p>Sall was elected in <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00016260.html">2012</a> after a tumultuous period under the flamboyant government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">President Abdoulaye Wade</a>. Sall owes his entire political career to Wade’s patronage. Yet their relationship soured when it became evident that Sall harboured ambitions to challenge Wade’s son, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim</a>, who was being groomed to succeed his father. </p>
<p>Sall pledged to deliver virtuous and frugal governance. But public euphoria soon petered out as scandals involving cabinet ministers and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/25/senegal-soupconne-de-corruption-le-frere-du-president-macky-sall-demissionne_5481292_3212.html">close family members</a> laid bare the corruption within the administration.</p>
<p>In 2023, amid much brouhaha over the validity of a third term, Sall <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">yielded</a> to public pressure after <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegalese-opposition-rally-against-president-sall-s-possible-third-term-ambition-/7091705.html">violent protests</a>. These resulted in the most serious political crisis since the 1960s, claiming over 60 lives and leading to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/22/senegal-pre-election-crackdown">arrest</a> of over 1,000 people.</p>
<h2>Where to for Senegal?</h2>
<p>In compliance with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/senegal-presidentsets-presidential-election-for-march-24-4547872">Constitutional Council ruling</a>, Sall has finally agreed to organise elections before his exit.</p>
<p>As the election day of 24 March draws near, the absence of key contenders, and uncertainties regarding the electoral procedures, inject an element of unpredictability. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the erosion of trust is such that the Senegalese public still doubts Sall’s commitment to fulfil his obligations and facilitate an orderly handover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to postpone Senegal’s election indefinitely reflect deeper governance problems within Macky Sall’s administration, and the shortcomings of his chosen heir, Amadou Ba.Amy Niang, Head of Research Programme, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242092024-02-28T16:56:15Z2024-02-28T16:56:15ZEcowas: west African trade bloc shaken as three member states withdraw and form their own alliance<p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on January 27. Ecowas, which was formed in 1975, is a regional political and economic union of 15 mainly former British and French colonies located in west Africa. </p>
<p>The withdrawals come as no surprise. Throughout west Africa, there is growing frustration with Ecowas over its struggle to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">ensure security</a> in the region. Coups have become commonplace and west Africa has seen a dramatic increase in terrorist activity over recent years. Two west African states, Mali and Burkina Faso, are now among the the world’s five countries <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sahel-now-accounts-43-global-terrorism-deaths">most affected</a> by terrorism. </p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/what-is-the-new-alliance-of-sahel-states-challenging-neo-colonialism-in-west-africa/">perceived support</a> for leaders aligned with former colonial powers is also seen as contributing to the persistent poverty experienced by their populations. The leaders of several Ecowas member states have been accused of being <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/domino-effect-frances-disintegrating-influence-africa">“puppets”</a> under the influence of France, which critics <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">say</a> never really let go of its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Niger, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66406137">allegations</a> that the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, was a puppet for French interests were used to legitimise his removal from power in a military coup in July 2023. French colonial rule (1895–1958) established political systems designed to extract natural resources from African states.</p>
<p>The response to the coup marked a significant political shift in the region. Ecowas imposed economic sanctions on Niger and issued a seven-day <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/08/niger-ecowas-bazoum-nigeria-tinubu-military-intervention/">ultimatum</a>, vowing to use force to dislodge the military junta (a government led by a council of military officers) should it not restore Bazoum to power. But the junta refused to back down and Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">pledged</a> to counter any action by Ecowas troops in Niger.</p>
<p>The agreement of these leaders and their readiness to take military action against Ecowas revealed the extent of their animosity towards the organisation and its leaders. These three countries, which are also governed by military rulers who have ousted democratically elected leaders in recent years, have all been hit with punitive sanctions since 2021.</p>
<p>On September 16 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger signed a new <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a> named the Alliance of Sahel States. Ecowas is encouraging these countries to return to the bloc by <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">lifting its sanctions</a>. But new partners like Russia, which is looking to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">increase its influence</a> across the continent, are at the same time supporting their efforts to form a united front. </p>
<p>African governments have increasingly welcomed economic, diplomatic and security <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-growing-footprint-africa">ties</a> with Russia, facilitated in part by the state-backed <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">Wagner Group</a> (now called the “Expeditionary Corps”). The group is known for deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders.</p>
<h2>The company of the old guards</h2>
<p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa. In 1990, the military arm of Ecowas was deployed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">peacekeeping role</a> in Liberia. Despite some initial success, Ecowas was unable to prevent an escalation of hostilities that lasted for the best part of a decade. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite efforts by Ecowas to restore peace in Sierra Leone after a coup in 1997, a brutal civil war broke out, requiring the intervention of UN peacekeepers. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">Niger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ecowas has been instrumental in safeguarding democracy within the region as well. In 2016, Gambia’s incumbent leader, Yahya Jammeh, refused to leave office after losing a presidential vote to Adama Barrow. But, with Ecowas troops poised to march on the capital, Banjul, Jammeh <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ousted-gambia-president-jammeh-to-stand-down-adama-barrow-takes-power/a-37217907">relinquished power</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the 15 member states of Ecowas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas is a regional political and economic union of 15 countries in west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-2341602777">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, Ecowas has been inconsistent in its condemnation of military and civilian coups. And it has also been criticised for overlooking unlawful term extensions, a common practice among many entrenched leaders in the region. </p>
<p>In 2015, Ecowas leaders <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">dropped a proposal</a> to limit west African presidents to a maximum of two terms in office. As a result, there is no established protocol for penalising leaders from member states who seek to remain in power indefinitely.</p>
<p>This paved the way for the presidents of both Ivory Coast and Guinea (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201103-ivory-coast-president-ouattara-wins-re-election-to-third-term">Alassane Ouattara</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54657359">Alpha Condé</a> respectively) to secure controversial third terms in 2020. The failure of Ecowas to intervene resulted in Condé being <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/09/09/alpha-conde-the-president-of-guinea-is-ousted-in-a-coup">ousted from power</a> by a military coup one year later.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">Oge Onubogu</a>, the director of the Africa Program, a Washington-based think tank: “Ecowas is fast losing its effectiveness and support among citizens, who see it as representing only the interests of the leaders and not that of the masses.” </p>
<h2>The challenger group</h2>
<p>The loss of any member from Ecowas will affect <a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">trade</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africa-trade-will-take-a-hit-as-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-leave-ecowas-223098">economic development</a> and the movement of citizens within the bloc. But the decision by Ecowas to lift post-coup sanctions signals its readiness to negotiate and cultivate relationships with these countries, regardless of whether they rejoin the organisation. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">says</a> that the decision to lift sanctions was based on considering their impact on citizens and the need to maintain regional unity and security. Ecowas also <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">noted</a> the period of Lent and the approaching month of Ramadan as factors influencing their decisions. </p>
<p>Millions of young Africans are being <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">drawn</a> to the Alliance of Sahel States, signalling discontent with the ineffectiveness of Ecowas and disillusionment with the west. Russia has capitalised on this trend. The Wagner Group is reportedly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/20/putin-wagner-mercenaries-regime-survival-package-africa/">offering</a> military support to willing African leaders in the form of “regime survival packages”.</p>
<p>A competitor to Ecowas appears to have emerged in west Africa, and this alliance is not backing down. Only time will tell whether the new alliance will favour the citizens of west Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa – member states are now starting to leave.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonOlayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230982024-02-14T14:25:52Z2024-02-14T14:25:52ZWest Africa trade will take a hit as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso leave Ecowas<p>The membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has been whittled down from 15 to 12 following the unilateral withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">February</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Founded</a> in 1975, Ecowas is one of eight regional economic communities recognised by the African Union to foster regional integration on the continent. Its main objective is to <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">create</a> a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation.</p>
<p>Since 1975, Ecowas and its sister organisation the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known by its French acronym, Uemoa) have implemented numerous policies aimed at improving how west African countries trade with each other and how they are connected to the world.</p>
<p>Yet, progress towards regional integration has been <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315712482-21/regional-integration-1-olivier-walther">slow</a>. Intra-regional trade remains well below the levels of other regions and the west African economies still rely a lot on informal activities. The limited results achieved in regional integration mean that there is a mismatch between <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Regionalism-in-Africa-Genealogies-institutions-and-trans-state-networks/Bach/p/book/9781138091054">regionalism</a> as it should be on paper and as it is experienced on a daily basis. Despite the many agreements signed between west African countries to foster integration, west Africa is one of the world’s most expensive <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692319302182">regions in which to do business</a>.</p>
<p>Political elites bear a great part of the blame for this. In a political system that relies on interpersonal relations, regional integration goes against the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/boundaries-communities-and-statemaking-in-west-africa/0A31250856228556B68B91639E3120A9">informal arrangements</a> that politicians have established with wealthy traders. These networks have encouraged the development of informal trade between west African countries and prevented the <a href="https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/incentives-and-constraints-of-informal-trade-between-nigeria-and-its-neighbours_7aa64379-en#page21">implementation of trade facilitation initiatives</a>. Much of the trade between Benin, Niger and Nigeria, for example, relies on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">informal networks</a> that connect traders in border regions to state elites in the capital cities.</p>
<p>Why three landlocked countries, among the poorest in the world, would leave an organisation established to foster free movement of people, goods and capital across the region is a puzzling question, considering the potential consequences.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ecowas-why-withdrawal-of-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-signals-fresh-trouble-for-the-sahel-222720">Ecowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While the decision appears to have been made for political reasons, the economic consequences will be far-reaching. In the past, border closures between Sahelian and coastal countries have had devastating consequences on the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-effects-of-nigerias-closed-borders-on-informal-trade-with-benin/">regional economy</a>. They have also affected the livelihoods of millions of farmers, herders and city dwellers who depend on regional trade perhaps more than anywhere in the world. </p>
<p>It was precisely to foster these complementary relationships between the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that Ecowas was established in Abuja nearly 50 years ago.</p>
<h2>The integration conundrum</h2>
<p>The Sahel is a large semi-arid region that stretches from Senegal in the west to Chad in the east. Subject to constant climatic uncertainties, it includes some of the poorest and <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">least developed countries</a> in the world.</p>
<p>Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger depend more on regional trade than coastal countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana or Nigeria. This is because they are far less urbanised and industrialised than their neighbours. They tend to produce identical agricultural commodities, which they typically trade with other countries located on the Gulf of Guinea.</p>
<p>Livestock trade between the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea is also highly dependent on free movement between west African countries. Close to two thirds of the <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0232681">livestock movements</a> recorded in west Africa cross an international border. This is usually from the Sahel to big southern markets such as Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-6qSwQ" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6qSwQ/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="630" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>A purely Sahelian bloc, like the recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/16/mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-establish-sahel-security-alliance">created</a> Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), would never be able to replace Ecowas. This is simply because of the regional nature of human and economic flows in west Africa. The new bloc was established in 2023 by the military juntas that took power in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in reaction to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/8/economic-hardship-insecurity-spirals-in-mali-as-ecowas-exit-looms">sanctions</a> imposed by Ecowas.</p>
<p>Because Sahelian countries have hardly any industries, they <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">import</a> much of what they consume from the west African and global market, particularly from China. Much of the cement, petroleum products, cars, textiles, wheat, rice and plastics sold on the markets of Niamey, Ouagadougou and Bamako were produced elsewhere. They depend on the ports of the Gulf of Guinea to import them. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Coastal countries are far from being self-sufficient too. They import large quantities of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/9/8/a-coup-happened-in-niger-onion-prices-doubled-in-ghana-and-its-neighbours">onions</a> from the Sahel, for example. They also benefit enormously from import-export trade with the landlocked countries of the Sahel. </p>
<p>Some of them have transformed into “entrepot economies”. These are trading ports where goods from the world markets can be imported and stored before being re-exported with no customs duties imposed. Benin, for example, is specialised in importing goods that will eventually be <a href="https://www.karthala.com/economie-et-developpement/53-letat-entrepot-au-benin-commerce-informel-ou-solution-a-la-crise--9782865373604.html">re-exported illegally</a> to neighbouring countries where they are banned or subject to heavy taxes, such as Nigeria and Niger. </p>
<h2>The consequences</h2>
<p>Withdrawing from Ecowas is likely to have major consequences on the regional economy as a whole. Because of their landlocked situation, however, Sahelian countries will be more affected than the rest of the region by the reintroduction of tariff barriers. Without free access to the ports of Cotonou, Lomé, Abidjan or Tema, Sahelian imports will be far more expensive. </p>
<p>Informal trade is already the dominant form of economic exchange in the region. This will probably experience an unprecedented boom, particularly along the borders between <a href="https://anl.geog.ufl.edu/hausaland/">Niger and Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, leaving Ecowas and its free movement protocol could have catastrophic consequences for millions of Sahelians who live in – or wish to migrate to – coastal cities. Migration is mostly intra-regional in west Africa. <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/identifying-the-factors-driving-west-african-migration_eb3b2806-en">Sahelians mostly tend to migrate</a> to the Gulf of Guinea. Migrants from coastal countries go to Europe through the Sahara and, increasingly, to the US.</p>
<p>Sahelian traders have also developed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2015.1010152">extensive trade networks</a> across west Africa. They take advantage of the liberalisation of trade that has characterised the region since the 1980s. </p>
<p>From Abidjan to Lagos, trade networks that rely on well-established diasporas would be particularly affected by trade restrictions and immigration policies.</p>
<h2>Political motivations</h2>
<p>The decision to leave Ecowas has little to do with economic considerations. It is primarily motivated by the fact that the bloc’s approach to region-building is not confined to economic integration. Ecowas is also well-known for its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf">robust involvement</a> in peacekeeping and security operations to end conflict in the region.</p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/ecowasprot.htm">protocol</a> on democracy and good governance, adopted in 2001, prescribes a zero tolerance policy “for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. Furthermore, its 1999 protocol <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf#page=11">authorises</a> external interventions without state consent under certain conditions, including “the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government”. </p>
<p>This, rather than trade liberalisation, is the main reason why the putschists in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have decided to leave Ecowas.</p>
<p><em>An <a href="https://anl.geog.ufl.edu/ecowas/?">earlier version</a> of this article was first published on the University of Florida blog.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Walther receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. </span></em></p>Border closures between Sahelian and coastal countries have had devastating consequences for the regional economy.Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166742023-12-06T13:43:37Z2023-12-06T13:43:37ZGhana’s media treats terrorism as a threat from outside – it overlooks violence at home<p>In 2022, 43% of all <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2023-key-findings-in-5-charts/">global terrorism deaths</a> occurred in the Sahel – the region south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent. West Africa had recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">1,800 terrorism attacks</a> as of June 2023, resulting in nearly 4,600 deaths.</p>
<p>The region has also seen a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a>, making countries more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Coastal west African countries worry about terrorism in the Sahel spilling over into their territories. It is against this backdrop that discussions and commentary about terrorism are taking place in Ghana.</p>
<p>I have researched and analysed security and militancy in Africa for a decade. My most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142">recent research</a> examined how terrorism is viewed in Ghana in light of insecurity across the Sahel and the country’s reputation as an oasis of peace in the sub-region.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130921/9781526130921.xml">criticism</a> of the way terrorism is spoken of globally, due to its potential to be divisive and serve as justification for violence by security agencies and the abuse of citizens’ rights.</p>
<p>For this reason, my aim was to assess whether these global perceptions influenced views in Ghana. I also aimed to understand the security implications of the nature of the terrorism discourse.</p>
<p>I found the discourse to be contradictory, dangerous and simplistic. It lacked a coherent theme, except for repeating problematic narratives and platitudes.</p>
<p>One of these narratives was the mistaken idea that terrorism was foreign to Ghana, and now entering the country. Secondly, the discussion equated terrorism with violence involving jihadist groups. While jihadist forms of violence are present in the region, there are <a href="https://prezi.com/j5cptnaaxcsf/the-four-waves-of-terrorism-by-david-c-rapoport-2004/">other types of terrorism</a> too – including <a href="https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/state-terrorism-even-worse-than-the-sub-state-variety/">terrorism by states</a> and their agents.</p>
<h2>Analysing news articles</h2>
<p>I brought a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x">sceptical attitude</a> to the discussion of terrorism in Ghana by critically analysing the titles of 60 online news articles published between 2015 and 2022. </p>
<p>The titles were sampled from a Ghanaweb.com dossier captioned “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=661">Terror attack on Ghana</a>” and accessed between July and September 2022. Ghanaweb.com is the most widely used online news source in Ghana and has existed since the late 1990s.</p>
<p>The titles were selected using two criteria. The first was the use of threat and risk language. Here, I looked for titles that communicated space or place (for example, Sahel, Togo, Burkina Faso), vulnerability (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Porous-borders-fuelling-insecurity-as-Immigration-grapples-with-serious-logistical-constraints-627387">porous borders</a>”), pre-emption (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Terrorist-threat-Be-vigilant-don-t-be-scared-Christian-Council-1549604">be vigilant</a>”), othering (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Citizens-cautioned-against-hosting-strangers-1545251">strangers</a>”) and assurance (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Don-t-panic-over-ISIS-infiltration-Irbard-Ibrahim-617645?gallery=1">don’t panic</a>”). </p>
<p>The other criterion was the assumed authority of the source. I selected titles that cited security officials, analysts with significant media presence, politicians and religious leaders.</p>
<p>The analysis revealed that the character of the discourse was lopsided and gave an incomplete picture of the state of security in Ghana. </p>
<h2>Ghana’s overlooked culture of violence</h2>
<p>The discourse overlooked Ghana’s endemic culture of violence, including acts by militia groups, political assassinations and police brutality.</p>
<p>Recently, several militia groups have been involved in violent events in Ghana, including election violence in 2019 that led to two fatalities and 18 injuries. A security analyst has named <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/security-analyst-names-24-violent-groups-in-ghana/">24 violent groups</a> in the country, with names like Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys, Al Qaeda, Invincible Forces and Delta Forces.</p>
<p>On 16 January 2019, an investigative journalist was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47002878">shot dead</a> in front of his home in an alleged act of political assassination. </p>
<p>In 2020, a sitting MP and government minister fired gunshots during a voter registration exercise – an act <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/hawa-koomson-minister-fires-gun-at-registration-centre-4-arrested.html">she explained</a> was for her protection. In the same year, another MP threatened to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXJ0uzTZkEY">burn down</a> the house of a former president of Ghana.</p>
<p>There are many cases of violence by security agents, including the police <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/seven-shot-dead-by-police-not-armed-robbers.html">killing</a> of seven Muslim youths mistaken for armed robbers. </p>
<p>Ghana’s 2020 elections – its eighth since 1992 – recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/five-killed-in-ghana-election-violence-as-accusations-continue">five deaths</a> and scores of injuries. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford-Gyampo/publication/331152559_Proportional_Representation_as_Solution_to_Winner-Takes-All_Politics/links/5c6815eb92851c1c9de5ab39/Proportional-Representation-as-Solution-to-Winner-Takes-All-Politics.pdf">scholars</a> argue that extra-legal uses of force and violence in Ghana are due to a culture of impunity resulting from a “systemic decapitation of the police by the political elite”.</p>
<h2>Blaming the Sahel</h2>
<p>Despite the above terrorising acts of violence, the terrorism discourse in Ghana creates the predominant impression that terrorism and political violence are now heading towards Ghana from the Sahel.</p>
<p>The fear of the coming terrorists has united “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Everybody-needs-to-be-involved-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-Security-analyst-751355">everybody</a>” in Ghana to protect the country. The list includes community vigilantes, civil society organisations, political parties, business organisations, churches and traditional leaders. The measures to safeguard Ghana include <a href="https://ghanaguardian.com/brief-mps-anti-terrorism-drill-ablakwa">counter-terrorism drills</a>, vigilance, border security, prophecies and prayers.</p>
<p>This collective national effort presents political violence from other countries in the region as if terror events do not exist within Ghana. Commentators say that terrorism is now heading towards Ghana, causing Ghanaians to panic and grow apprehensive. </p>
<p>Three examples show how the terrorism discourse is contradictory and simplistic – hence deceptive.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Accra-safe-but-Ghana-not-out-of-the-woods-ACP-Eklu-753641">Accra safe but Ghana not out of the woods – ACP Eklu</a>” and “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-ready-for-terrorist-attack-National-Security-ministry-661540">Government ready for terrorist attack – National Security ministry</a>”. These claims are contradictory. They mean Accra and Ghana are safe and unsafe simultaneously. </p></li>
<li><p>The “terrorists are in our communities, they are our neighbours, they are our siblings, they are our fathers, they are our mothers”, claims an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adibsaani1/">analyst</a>. This claim is dangerous as it could create unnecessary social and communal tension.</p></li>
<li><p>Ghana is the only country bordering Burkina Faso that has not <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-the-coastal-states-of-west-africa/">experienced a terrorist attack</a>. This claim is simplistic and it is only true if terrorism is defined to mean “jihadist” political violence.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>My conclusion is that any future acts of terrorism and political violence in Ghana will not be anything new. Shooting to kill during elections and firing a warning shot at a polling station are acts of terrorism. Police brutality, election violence and assassinations are also acts of political violence. </p>
<h2>Implications of the discourse</h2>
<p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the so-called global war on terror shape how we think about security, even when those views create dire consequences such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_15">Islamophobia and more violence</a>.</p>
<p>These lopsided narratives can alienate some communities and threaten social cohesion. Worse, they undermine Ghana’s responsibility to address insecurity within the country. </p>
<p>To avoid such problems, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.988452">some</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.976011">scholars</a> have argued that terrorism should be defined to suit specific contexts. I have made a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.321567836600468">similar argument</a> elsewhere that terrorism is a process rather than an event. </p>
<p>This avoids the <a href="https://ombuds.umich.edu/article/danger-single-story">dangers of a single story</a> about terrorism and political violence in general. In particular, it creates a conducive environment for solutions that sustainably secure Ghana and its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the war on terror continue to shape thinking about security.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2159142023-11-16T14:47:22Z2023-11-16T14:47:22ZDevelopment aid cuts will hit fragile countries hard, could fuel violent conflict<p>Fragile and least developed countries have had <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE2A">their development assistance</a> cut drastically, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. For instance, net official development assistance to sub-Saharan African countries has shrunk by <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE2A">7.8% compared to 2021</a>. And <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/peace-official-development-assistance.pdf">development aid for peace and conflict prevention</a> has declined to its lowest in 15 years. </p>
<p>These cuts will hit <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-fa5a6770-en.htm">fragile countries</a> hard. Fragile countries make up 24% of the world’s population and account for <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-fa5a6770-en.htm">73% of the world’s extreme poor</a>. The list includes Mali, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>Budget cuts are already having far-reaching effects and fuelling humanitarian crises. The World Food Programme estimates that “<a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/new-wfp-analysis-shows-every-1-cut-food-assistance-pushes-400000-people-emergency-hunger">every one percent cut in food assistance risks pushing more than 400,000 people towards the brink of starvation</a>”.</p>
<p>UN secretary-general António Guterres has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118182">warned</a> that aid cuts threaten to undo gains in development. Keeping in mind that <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">poverty has increased in conflict-affected countries despite a global downward trend</a>, we anticipate that such a reversal could contribute to global instability. </p>
<p>Violent conflict has already been on the rise among countries that rely heavily on <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch">foreign financial assistance</a>. Decades of research (including ours) show that marginalised populations are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654408">most vulnerable to be (re-)mobilised into fighting</a> and are typically also <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/31090/">most affected by armed conflict</a> (even after violence ends).</p>
<p>It is true that political and societal context matters and needs to be taken into account. But the reduction in aid allocation to least developed countries and <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/31090/">especially those recovering from violent conflict</a> could put fragile countries on a trajectory of (renewed) political instability and underdevelopment. Already vulnerable populations will have to yet again carry the brunt of new cycles of violence and impoverishment.</p>
<p>We have been researching links between development and violent conflict for decades and close to a decade, respectively. Our latest research project is on the <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/institutional-legacies-violent-conflict">institutional legacies of violent conflict</a>. It shows how and why violent conflicts persist, how and why their legacies endure, and what can be done to reduce the risk and impact of violence. We recommend that development aid needs to correspond more closely with mounting peacebuilding and humanitarian needs in fragile settings.</p>
<h2>The impact</h2>
<p>Not all development aid <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00220388.2018.1487053?casa_token=QZ0K9qzIAHcAAAAA:RW6S9v2lP_EbHca4KngMwbO_lPPqdoULXTi9CBe06Vehr-1X3rk6FGw_kERh4QoSJ9R_PAqyOJvt%22%22">is effective</a> in bringing stability or building peace. Nevertheless, based on our analysis, development aid plays a crucial role in six key areas.</p>
<p>Firstly, development aid is effective when linked to the delivery of public services. These in turn <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00220388.2018.1487053?casa_token=QZ0K9qzIAHcAAAAA:RW6S9v2lP_EbHca4KngMwbO_lPPqdoULXTi9CBe06Vehr-1X3rk6FGw_kERh4QoSJ9R_PAqyOJvt">strengthen the social contract</a> and mitigate the risk of violence.</p>
<p>Secondly, financial assistance can help governments absorb the effects of <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/e/economic-shock">economic shocks</a>. Economies across the global south are already stifled by the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, climate risks and the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine. Fragile countries often rely on assistance to meet some of their population’s most basic needs such as food or water. </p>
<p>Without additional financial assistance many governments will not be able to manage their way through these shocks. That may <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/04/17/the-worlds-deadliest-war-last-year-wasnt-in-ukraine">embolden violent non-state actors to gain power</a>. </p>
<p>Two examples stand out. In west Africa <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa-sahel/could-jihadists-seize-parts-coastal-west-africa">violent non-state actors operating in the Sahel region</a> are set to expand their influence into new areas considered stable thus far, such as the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/b192-keeping-jihadists-out-northern-cote-divoire">north of Côte d’Ivoire</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the current <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine">Israel-Palestine conflict</a> risks spreading instability into neighbouring countries amid longstanding tensions and <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/09/debt-clouds-over-the-middle-east-adnan-mazarei">economic fragility</a>. </p>
<p>Thirdly, cuts in development aid may reduce the limited leverage western countries still have to prevent the rise of opportunistic armed groups such as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/08/world/europe/prigozhin-wagner-russia-africa.html">Wagner Group</a>, the spread of extremism and the risk of civil conflicts. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is also emblematic for this dynamic. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/watch-list-2023-spring-update">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have seen the deadliest year on record as their military transitional governments struggle to contain jihadist insurgencies. Since the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/08/31/niger-coup-s-outsized-global-impact-pub-90463">recent military coup in Niger</a>, which prompted withdrawal of both <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-07/niger-expects-2023-budget-to-shrink-40-after-coup-suspends-aid#xj4y7vzkg">aid</a> and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/10/french-troops-begin-withdrawal-from-niger_6161327_4.html">international troops</a>, the country has also experienced <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-extremists-be2573981d463e0b4498e32a3f8ba75e">a surge in militant violence</a>. </p>
<p>Fourth, worsening economic and security conditions in fragile and least developed countries are already reverberating into Europe. There have been <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/europe/arrivals">spikes in irregular border crossings into European Union countries in 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Fifth, rising discrepancy in development aid allocation could amplify <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/08/russia-ukraine-war-west-global-south-diplomacy-un-putin-g20/">mistrust in international institutions and western actors</a>. That could contribute to worsening security situations. Some governments in fragile countries are already reluctant to continue to engage with the UN and especially western actors to combat violent non-state actors. </p>
<p>An example of this is the Democratic Republic of Congo’s recent request to the UN for an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/massacre-goma-clouds-dr-congos-elections-and-un">“accelerated” withdrawal of troops</a>. It comes 24 years after the start of Monusco, the UN’s peacekeeping mission in DRC, one of the largest in the world. <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/09/21/fact-sheet-attacks-on-civilians-spike-in-mali-as-security-deteriorates-across-the-sahel/">Violence may increase in the absence of such international intervention</a>, as has happened since <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/minusma-closes-its-camp-kidal-marking-end-its-presence-region#:%7E:text=Mali-,MINUSMA%20closes%20its%20camp%20in%20Kidal%2C%20marking%20the%20end,its%20presence%20in%20the%20region&text=Bamako%2C%20October%2031%2C%202023%20%2D,by%20air%20and%20land%20convoy.">the withdrawal of Minusma</a>, the UN mission that was in Mali for ten years.</p>
<p>Sixth, the reduction in aid allocation to least developed countries and <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/31090/">especially those recovering from violent conflict</a> could result in continued political <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/institutional-legacies-violent-conflict">instability and underdevelopment</a>. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Development funding should be allocated in a way that corresponds more closely with peacebuilding and humanitarian needs. This is also made clear in the <a href="https://dppa.un.org/en/a-new-agenda-for-peace">UN’s New Agenda for Peace</a>. It calls for action now to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reinforce the cooperative frameworks that are necessary to move us from the path to destruction to the path to prosperity … based on a reforged commitment to multilateral solutions, grounded on trust, solidarity and universality.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Correcting course in aid allocation could address some of the growing mistrust among developing countries and support prospects for peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Justino receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Saavedra-Lux does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cuts in development aid could contribute to global instability; violent conflict is already on the rise in countries that rely heavily on foreign assistancePatricia Justino, Professor and Deputy Director, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations UniversityLaura Saavedra-Lux, Research Associate at UNU-WIDER, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164832023-10-27T14:09:00Z2023-10-27T14:09:00ZChad’s first dengue fever outbreak: what you should know<p><em>Chad has <a href="https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/dengue/chad-reports-its-first-dengue-outbreak">reported</a> its first dengue outbreak, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The country’s health ministry declared an outbreak on 15 August and so far 1,342 suspected cases have been reported, 41 of them confirmed in the laboratory. One death was reported among the patients with lab-confirmed cases. The outbreak started in Ouaddaï province in eastern Chad, currently the outbreak epicentre. Illnesses have also been reported in three other provinces. Godfred Akoto Boafo spoke to medical entomologist Eunice Anyango Owino about the disease.</em></p>
<h2>What causes dengue fever and how does it affect people?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue">Dengue fever</a> is a mosquito-borne viral disease caused by one of the four dengue virus serotypes. It is primarily transmitted by the <em>Aedes aegypti</em> mosquito and to a lesser extent the <em>Aedes albopictus</em> mosquito, mainly in the tropical and sub-tropical areas of the world. </p>
<p>Infection with one serotype provides long-term immunity to that particular serotype, but not the others. That means that, after recovery, a person can still be infected by the other three serotypes. Serotypes are groups within a single species of microorganisms, such as bacteria or viruses, which share distinctive surface structures.</p>
<p>Most infections produce only mild flu-like illness; 80% of cases are asymptomatic. But getting infected with different serotypes one after the other puts a person at a greater risk of severe dengue, also known as dengue hemorrhagic fever. It is characterised by serious internal bleeding and organ damage, and a sudden drop in blood pressure that causes shock which can be fatal. </p>
<h2>How widespread is it in the Sahel? Why is this first outbreak in Chad significant?</h2>
<p>Dengue fever has been <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37473544/">endemic in Sudan</a>, with outbreaks documented in 2010, 2013, 2017 and 2019. Unfortunately, due to years of political and civil conflicts, the control and response capacity of the public health sector in Sudan has been limited. </p>
<p>The risk of spread in the Sahel region, which includes Niger, Mali and Chad, has always been high. This is because these countries all host the suitable mosquito vectors (<em>Aedes</em>). They also share the same tropical climate with seasonal heavy rains and floods. </p>
<p>To add to the problem, countries like Chad are grappling with a massive influx of refugees and returnees from Sudan who might be carrying the disease. The epicentre of the current outbreak, the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/chad/chad-humanitarian-update-june-2023#:%7E:text=Following%20the%20escalation%20of%20conflict%20in%20El%20Geneina,Sudanese%20border%20in%20the%20Ouadda%C3%AF%20province%20of%20Chad">province of Ouaddaï</a> at the eastern border with Sudan, hosts more than 400,000 refugees. </p>
<p>The cities at the border with Sudan are densely populated and have poor sanitation. This provides a favourable environment for the vectors to breed. </p>
<p>In addition, Chad lacks effective disease control programmes. This is its first dengue outbreak. It doesn’t have the necessary public health preparedness and response capacities. So the risk posed by this outbreak is high. </p>
<p>The movement of the <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2019-DON207">returning refugees</a> has the potential to spread the outbreak in Chad and even across the border to other countries in the Sahel, the rest of Africa, and the world at large. </p>
<h2>What treatment is available?</h2>
<p>There’s currently no available treatment for dengue in the world. Timely detection and case management, especially treatment of dehydration and plasma leakage by oral or intravenous rehydration, are key in preventing severe illness and death. </p>
<p>There is an approved dengue vaccine (Dengvaxia) for use in people aged 9-45 years. But for it to be effective they must have had one infection of dengue by any of the four serotype viruses, which must be confirmed by a laboratory test. </p>
<p>The vaccine is given in three doses within 12 months and protects against all the four dengue virus serotypes with an efficacy of 80%. However, its availability in developing countries in Africa isn’t assured, although it has been licensed by several national regulatory authorities. </p>
<p>Apart from the vaccine, the only other guard against dengue fever is prevention of mosquito bites and vector control.</p>
<h2>What is the way forward in controlling the disease?</h2>
<p>More investment should be put on expanding clinical and laboratory capabilities to deal with the disease. Given that this is Chad’s first outbreak, it needs to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>put in place standard operating procedures for clinical management of suspected and confirmed dengue cases </p></li>
<li><p>expand the capacity for early detection of cases – this could be done by procurement of rapid diagnostic tests and by alerting communities </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen disease surveillance and coordinate the response by actively finding cases. Cases within the community are likely to be underreported as dengue is unknown to the public. Also, clinicians might not be familiar with the disease presentation. It could be confused with other common fevers. </p></li>
<li><p>put in place effective vector control measures, like draining stagnant water around residential areas, cleaning and replenishing water storage containers on a weekly basis, distributing insecticide-treated nets, spraying indoors and using window and door screens.</p></li>
<li><p>strengthen surveillance to assess the vector breeding potential in containers and to monitor insecticide resistance. This is critical for selecting the most effective insecticides. </p></li>
<li><p>make communities aware of the risks of infection and how to protect themselves. Engaged communities can take ownership of the vector control strategy and adopt healthy behaviours. </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen cross-border collaboration. The current outbreak most likely spread from Sudan. The focus should be on prevention and vector control measures in border areas.</p></li>
<li><p>mobilise resources for a national contingency plan for dengue preparedness and response. And seek help from experienced organisations like the WHO.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eunice Anyango Owino receives funding from National Research Fund, Kenya. </span></em></p>The Sahel region is grappling with an outbreak of the deadly mosquito-borne disease.Eunice Anyango Owino, Medical Entomologist at the School of Biological Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120222023-09-05T15:07:08Z2023-09-05T15:07:08ZFrance in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger<p>French west Africa has experienced <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">five coups</a> in the past three years. Underpinning most of these coups is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66406137">hostility</a> towards France, a former colonial authority. Mohamed Bazoum of Niger’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-underlies-the-coup-in-niger/">downfall</a> in July 2023 comes after coups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/7/mali-military-promises-return-to-civilian-rule-in-march-2024">Mali</a> in August 2020, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/">Chad</a> in April 2021, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> in September 2022 and Gabon in September 2023.</p>
<p>The perpetrators of these coups have, among their <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/coups-in-west-africa-is-france-to-blame/">justifications</a>, mentioned the overbearing influence of France and its president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-in-africa-a-cynical-twist-to-repair-the-colonial-past-while-keeping-a-tight-grip-189175">Emmanuel Macron</a>, in their affairs. The influence of France in military affairs and maintenance of dominance in business has been a key cog of the Macron agenda. Unlike other former colonial powers, France still has military <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/06/06/france-will-further-cut-back-military-presence-in-africa_6029304_7.html">bases</a> in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon. </p>
<p>At the same time, Macron has put forward <a href="https://www.nation.sc/archive/259549/macron-embraces-african-entrepreneurship">entrepreneurship</a> as the best form of development assistance. This strategic pivot away from personal relationships with African leaders is rooted in Macron’s <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/03/emmanuel-macron-neoliberalism">neoliberal beliefs</a>. This is a political approach that favours free-market capitalism, deregulation and a reduction in government spending. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.uu.nl/staff/fplgerits">historian</a> who has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">researched</a> the relationship between France and its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Africa, Macron’s neoliberal turn has stripped France of the long-standing myth that it was somehow a more benevolent coloniser because of the cultural links it established with African elites. Macron’s approach has only increased distrust and anger because a large military presence has not been replaced by a <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/new-financial-order-will-help-the-world-overcome-poverty-and-climate-change/#:%7E:text=President%20William%20Ruto%20has%20said,the%20hands%20of%20the%20few.%E2%80%9D">new international economic order</a>, but with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-africa-reset-strategy-francafrique/">small-scale business deals and start-ups</a>. This is not what Africans <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43?ln=en">wanted</a>, but it is what they got.</p>
<h2>Neoliberal values are French values</h2>
<p>Rather than a remaking of the economic and financial infrastructure, Macron has pushed entrepreneurship as development assistance: promoting start-ups and training Africa’s youth. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/fr">Agence Française de Dévelopment</a> (France’s main institution for policy implementation) is still investing in education, agriculture and infrastructure. But what Macron wants observers to notice is that increasingly, French development aid in Africa has to be run by French businesses. </p>
<p>French corporations are no longer making money in secret, as in the era of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/macron-and-the-future-of-francafrique-6781/">Françafrique</a>. This was a period when French presidents supported African dictators to maintain influence. Rather, Macron’s speeches put forward business activities and neoliberal values as French values that benefit the continent. </p>
<p>This reliance on French culture and values can be seen as a continuation of a strategy that started with the French colonial project. Macron’s values, however, are the values of neoliberalism. At home he has pushed through a pension plan to limit French state debt. Abroad, he wants French development policy to be driven by private initiatives. </p>
<p>In light of that strategy, it becomes clear that sentiments among Africans have not become more anti-French. Rather, by elevating economics to a core value of his relationship to Africa, Macron has played into a widely accepted African worldview in which underdevelopment is the product of dependency on Europe and neocolonial exploitation.</p>
<p>Every visitor who talks to cab drivers or vendors in Dakar figures out quite quickly that the French are seen as colonisers first, possible friends second. What has changed is that Macron has unknowingly confirmed African suspicions about his intentions: he never wanted to change economic structures. Instead Africans get bread crumbs in the form of start-up money. </p>
<h2>The free market as the dividing line in west Africa</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is not universally loved on the continent. The belief in the free market as an engine for development has redrawn the battle lines in west Africa. Countries within the regional body Ecowas like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – which have had high economic growth in the past decade – are clashing with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – which have experienced deepening poverty. </p>
<p>While other African countries like Kenya are confronted with similar debates about how to stimulate development – Kenyan president William Ruto famously believes in the “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220913-william-ruto-kenya-s-hustler-in-chief-president">hustler nation</a>” – climate change and terrorism have led to a more combustible mix in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The juntas that have come to power therefore do not only present themselves as caretakers who are trying to do the job politicians will not do. They are also claiming they want a new ideological direction for their countries. <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso</a> has styled himself to be the successor to Thomas Sankara, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">Assimi Goïta</a> has cast himself as a reformer not a revolutionary. </p>
<p>In the past, the fires of African instability and anti-French sentiment were fanned by the French underdelivering on their – sometimes cynical – promises of big structural change. Today, instability is being fed by the opposite. It is African leaders who demand big structural change, but are met with small business efforts to maintain French influence on the cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The French president has struggled to maintain the influence his country gained in Africa through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124672023-08-30T09:08:34Z2023-08-30T09:08:34ZWagner Group: what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death means for stability in Africa<p>The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin after his <a href="https://theconversation.com/yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-boss-joins-long-list-of-those-who-challenged-vladimir-putin-and-paid-the-price-212181">private jet crashed</a> on August 23 has raised questions about the Wagner Group’s future. Many in the west <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/24/wagner-boss-yevgeny-prigozhin-reported-killed-death-russia-biden-suggests-putin">suspect Kremlin involvement</a> in his death and are asking what will become of the mercenary group without its charismatic leader.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group, often described as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/23/what-we-know-about-the-shadowy-russian-mercenary-firm-behind-the-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-syria/">a private military company (PMC)</a> is a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">state-linked</a> actor with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">close ties to the Russian military</a>. It has involved itself in the internal politics of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">numerous African countries</a>, advancing Kremlin interests while providing the Russian leadership with “plausible deniability”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">The Wagner Group comprises</a> former Russian soldiers, convicts and foreign nationals paid to provide mercenary services. It first emerged in Crimea in 2014 and has since extended its services to many other countries including many in Africa. </p>
<p>The death of the Wagner Group’s charismatic leader, a former close ally of Putin, raises questions about these African operations. Based on credible news reports, these include activities in: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">Equatorial Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Central African Republic (CAR)</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Chad</a>, <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">Mali</a>, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Burkina Faso</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Mozambique</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Madagascar</a>. The group reportedly has more than <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">5,000 operatives</a> across its Africa operations.</p>
<p>A common denominator among these countries is the presence of insurgencies or civil wars, abundant natural resources, corrupt leadership, and unconstitutional governance, among other factors. Many of these states, such as <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Libya-Remains-a-Failed-State-11-Years-After-NATO-Intervention-20220217-0006.html">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/24/sudan-is-heading-towards-complete-state-collapse">Sudan</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/07/mozambique-is-a-failed-state-the-west-isnt-helping-it/">Mozambique</a>, have many of the characteristics of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/failed-states">“failing” or “failed states”</a>. </p>
<h2>Wagner Group in Africa</h2>
<p>Designated by the US government as a “<a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/understanding-us-designation-wagner-group-transnational-criminal-organisation#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20declaring,United%20States.%E2%80%9D%20What%20constitutes%20a">transnational criminal organisation</a>” the Wagner Group offers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">a range of services</a>. These include conducting offensive combat operations, training, ensuring regime security, advising government leadership, and the management and extraction of natural resources. </p>
<p>Described by South Africa-based think tank In On Africa as “<a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2023/07/07/more-than-mere-mercenaries-the-wagner-group-in-africa/">more than mere mercenaries</a>”, the Wagner Group has also discreetly but effectively put stress on Afro-European relations while bolstering autocratic governments. </p>
<p>It has also promoted anti-neo-colonial figures, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/296849/russia-how-yevgeny-prigozhin-funded-kemi-seba-to-serve-his-own-african-ambitions/">such as Kemi Séba</a> (also known as Capo Chichi). Currently based in Moscow, Séba has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-09/niger-coup-prigozhin-wagner-exploits-anti-french-sentiment/102696370">gained celebrity status </a> through his social media presence and TV talk shows which frequently target French foreign policy. </p>
<p>This has helped to popularise and boost anti-French sentiment among francophone countries in west Africa. France has arguably <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/12/emmanuel-macron-france-erased-from-africa-niger-coup/">continued a neo-colonial approach to west Africa</a> and refused to accept that the era of its “<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/16585/">Francafrique</a>” sphere of influence is over, which has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/17/french-mistakes-helped-create-africas-coup-belt">exacerbated instabilities</a> across the region. For instance, the persistence of French <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/07/12/the-cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-in-africa/">control of the CFA Franc</a>, the common currency used among former French colonies, gave it control over their economies and political affairs.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in west Africa furthers Russian interests by challenging French dominance. The group has done this through the reportedly <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-internet-research-agency-disbands/">now defunct</a> <a href="https://blogs.prio.org/2023/03/soft-power-and-disinformation-the-strategic-role-of-media-in-wagners-expansion-in-africa/">Internet Research Agency</a>, known as “Russia’s troll farm”. This organisation orchestrated disinformation campaigns on social media to spread anti-colonial sentiments. </p>
<p>By doing this, it reinforced the <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/anti-french-sentiment-west-africa-reflection-authoritarian-confrontation-collective-west">already strong anti-French sentiments</a> in the Sahel region to discredit France and position Russia as better alternatives. The Internet Research Agency was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14/">directly associated with the Wagner Group</a> via Prigozhin as its founder and owner.</p>
<p>Beyond propping up failed and failing states, the Wagner Group has faced accusations of <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">targeting civilians</a> and committing severe human rights violations in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/24/mali-new-atrocities-malian-army-apparent-wagner-fighters">Mali</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/russian-mercenaries-accused-of-human-rights-abuses-in-car-un-group-experts-wagner-group-violence-election">CAR</a>. </p>
<h2>The circular business of conflict</h2>
<p>In addition to its military activities, the Wagner Group is estimated to have garnered <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">more than US$20 billion</a> (£15.9 billion) from its diverse business dealings, which range from <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746">gold mining in Sudan</a> to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/313233/how-wagner-prigozhin-teamed-up-with-the-cars-diamond-mafia/">diamond extraction in CAR</a>, where it is also reported to be heavily invested in the <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">forestry and timber business</a>. </p>
<p>Since mercenaries tend to thrive in conflicts, they are likely to profit by prolonging the conflicts they become involved in. So the activities of a PMC such as Wagner can exacerbate conflicts by prolonging hostilities, as witnessed in Libya, Mozambique and CAR. </p>
<p><a href="https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/06/when-private-military-operations-fail-the-case-of-mozambique/">For instance</a>, small raids against villages and police units in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where Wagner groups were deployed, escalated into a full-scale terrorist insurgency linked to the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43047/chapter-abstract/361462906?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Islamic State’s Central African Province</a>.</p>
<p>In Libya, meanwhile, Wagner Group units <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/108429/pdf/">first appeared in 2018</a>, according to a submission to the UK parliament, ostensibly to provide technical support for repairing and maintaining armoured vehicles for the Libyan National Army. Since then, the scope of their operations has expanded with increased funding from Russia and the fighting continues.</p>
<p>The involvement of Wagner or other PMCs in these countries almost inevitably leads to the erosion of sovereignty as unstable governments become dependent on the mercenaries for their survival. This situation may cause local leaders to favour the interests of the PMCs, reinforcing their roles as puppet leaders, causing mass exploitation of resources, leading to environmental degradation, poverty, grievances, intensified conflicts – all of which creates further demand for mercenary services.</p>
<p>As long as certain African countries and their leadership remain plagued by corruption, extended terms in office, election manipulations, neo-colonial influences, and looting of the national treasury, coups will remain a persistent concern. Military coups are on the rise again <a href="https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/as-coups-return-to-west-africa-frances-footprint-in-africa-fades/">particularly in west Africa</a>, stimulating an increased demand for mercenary services. As such, Prigozhin’s death is unlikely to significantly affect the Wagner Groups’s African operations. The more pertinent question is what the new leadership will look like and whether it will be more directly state-controlled. </p>
<p>But the use of mercenary companies such as the Wagner Group to help unstable or illegitimate governments hold on to power will not bring sustainable peace. Instead, dialogue, transitional governments reflecting people’s desires, the rule of law, and genuine democracy are essential. Otherwise, Africans will keep demanding positive change by all means.</p>
<p>To maintain popular support in an era of instability, African leaders must be seen to act in their people’s best interests. They must heed popular demands to halt misrule and the misuse of African resources across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Idris Mohammed receives funding from the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development to commission a report on sexual violence in the northwest region of Nigeria. He is a member of conflict research network of west Africa ( CORN West Africa). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia was using the mercenary group to further its foreign policy aims in west Africa. There’s no reason to think Prigozhin’s death will change that.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonIdris Mohammed, Conflict Researcher, Department of Mass Communication, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, SokotoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122092023-08-25T11:17:05Z2023-08-25T11:17:05ZNiger’s resource paradox: what should make the country rich has made it a target for predators<p>A month after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup in Niger</a> that toppled the democratically elected civilian government of Mohamed Bazoum, the country’s neighbours are still debating the possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">military intervention</a>. </p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) – a coalition of west African countries, which includes Niger – has said it intends to send in a taskforce to topple the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, which ousted Bazoum on July 26.</p>
<p>But the plan to intervene is not without controversy. Niger, a landlocked nation, shares borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. These countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/niger-coup-divisions-as-ecowas-military-threat-fails-to-play-out">have expressed solidarity with the military junta</a> and have committed to oppose any potential Ecowas intervention. </p>
<p>France, which <a href="https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/20-2%20Africa%20Field%20Study%20Book%20II%20Final%20reduced%20Part%20II.pdf">occupied Niger</a> from 1890 until independence in 1960, has also considered intervention – it has a small contingent of troops in the country ostensibly to combat jihadi insurgency in the Sahel region – which the junta has given them <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/23/niger-group-calls-for-withdrawal-of-french-troops//#:%7E:text=Some%201%2C500%20French%20soldiers%20have,its%20Sahel%20operation%20last%20year.&text=On%20August%203%2C%20Niamey's%20ruling,a%20one%2Dmonth%20notice%20period.">notice to withdraw</a>. Algeria has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention#:%7E:text=While%20the%20AU%20issued%20a,diplomatic%20efforts%20to%20restore%20democracy">denied France permission</a> to fly over the country.</p>
<p>For now, the situation remains fluid and uncertain. But beneath the surface of daily news headlines is an intricate web of geopolitical competition and strategic agendas that have profound consequences for the Nigerien people. </p>
<p>The recent coup underscores <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">a geopolitical rivalry</a> deeply rooted in colonial and neo-colonial legacies and intensified by some western nations’ drive for the control of Niger’s resources.</p>
<p>Although Niger <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">grapples with extreme poverty</a>, leading to widespread malnutrition and hunger among its citizens, it is the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/01/uranium-niger-france-coup/">seventh-biggest producer of uranium</a>. This juxtaposition of mineral wealth and societal poverty underscores the irony of a nation abundant in resources yet plagued by profound economic hardships.</p>
<p>First <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx#:%7E:text=Uranium%20was%20discovered%20at%20Azelik,(CEA)%20initiated%20further%20studies.">discovered in 1957 at Azelik</a> by a French colonial expedition looking for copper deposits, Uranium now ranks as Niger’s second-largest export in monetary value – <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">surpassed only by gold</a>. The country is a <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">principal supplier of uranium to the European Union (EU)</a> and contributes between 15% and 17% of the uranium fuelling France’s electricity generation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the country <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230814-power-cuts-worsen-in-niger-following-sanctions-from-ecowas">struggles to produce its own electricity</a> because Nigeria <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">recently terminated</a> its power supply to the nation as a sanction against the military junta, leaving much of the country in darkness.</p>
<h2>Western exploitation</h2>
<p>Given its abundant natural resources, it seems counterintuitive for Niger to rank among the world’s poorest nations. Yet its economic and political struggles have deep roots in historical <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">foreign interventions, exploitation and resource extraction</a>. This situation has, for decades, been further compounded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">misguided and ineffective leadership</a>, often conniving in exploitation by foreign interests.</p>
<p>While some Ecowas members oppose the coup in Niger and have threatened <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/18/africa/niger-ecowas-d-day-military-intervention-intl-hnk/index.html">military intervention against the coup leaders</a>, some western countries are manoeuvring to uphold their interests. The Nigerian senate <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-senate-cautions-against-niger-military-intervention/a-66450388">opposes military intervention</a>, with one of its <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/niger-coup-dont-allow-us-france-push-you-to-unnecessary-war-orji-kalu-tells-tinubu/">members alleging</a> that Ecowas would merely be doing France and America’s bidding. Senator Orji Uzor Kalu suggested that if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by French and US troops.</p>
<p>Colonial powers and other major geopolitical actors have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee6fb170-3284-46fa-9eb7-da64212c4989">profoundly influenced</a> Niger’s contemporary situation. France, referred to by the New York Times recently as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">Former Coloniser that Stayed</a>”, has already warned that any attack on its interests in Niger will be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/30/france-warns-attacks-on-its-interests-in-niger-will-not-be-tolerated">met with retaliation</a>. Meanwhile the reported presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in the country, after a request from the coup leaders, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/05/niger-junta-wagner-group-mali-mohamed-bazoum-ecowas/">is a proxy for Russian interests in Niger</a>. </p>
<p>But following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733">reported death of Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Progozhin</a>, after his private jet is understood to have crashed on a trip from St Petersburg to Moscow on August 23, the status of the Wagner Group activities in Niger – and Africa generally – is uncertain. However, their operations may come under the direct control of Russia’s military. </p>
<h2>African resources, western interests</h2>
<p>Another important resource issue threatened by instability in Niger is the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-countries-seek-to-revive-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-dream/a-62778681">trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP)</a>, designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger and on to Algeria and then to Europe. One of the drivers of this project in the past two years has been the European need to wean itself off Russian gas supplies in light of the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet again, western resource needs are dictating events in supposedly independent and sovereign African countries.</p>
<p>The dominant narrative in west Africa frequently presents foreign interventions as benevolent efforts to stabilise the Sahel region, in particular, against the threat of jihadi insurgency. Yet a deeper examination <a href="https://journal.iag.ir/article_118383_en.html">uncovers a more intricate reality</a>. As western powers strive to shape political dynamics in Niger – driven not just by a desire for stability but also to preserve their dominance and <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">control over resource allocation</a> – they portray Niger, and by extension, Africa, as mere markets within the global economy. This ignores the potential <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-coup-could-exacerbate-humanitarian-crisis">humanitarian consequences</a> of such interventions for the people of Niger and west Africa in general.</p>
<p>As Niger faces political instability and possible violent conflict, there’s a pressing need to critically evaluate the motives and repercussions of foreign intervention. </p>
<p>Beyond the veneer of the quest for democracy and stability, the various players’ deeper strategic intentions must be scrutinised. This is the key to understanding the multifaceted dynamics in the Sahel region and their broader global implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A geopolitical struggle for valuable resources such as uranium is behind the wrangling over Niger.Francis Okpaleke, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Security, University of WaikatoOlumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112242023-08-15T11:17:32Z2023-08-15T11:17:32ZBandits in Nigeria: how protection payments to militias escalate conflict in the north-west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542100/original/file-20230810-19-9yfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Weapons recovered from bandits during Operation Safe Haven in Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>North-western Nigeria has become increasingly violent. This is due to the activities of militias, known locally as “bandits”. These are loosely organised armed groups, reportedly over <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/criminal-gangs-destabilizing-nigerias-north-west/">120 factions</a> with 28 to 2,500 members. They are now deadlier than the well-known <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct3tpy">Boko Haram</a>, which operates in north-eastern Nigeria.</p>
<p>The origins of the conflict in north-western Nigeria can be traced back to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2022.2061320?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab">2011</a> following disagreements between Hausa farmers and Fulani pastoralists over changes in land ownership and encroachment on grazing routes, primarily due to environmental and climatic factors. They were characterised by small-scale disputes and isolated hit-and-run attacks resulting in crop damage and livestock theft. This conflict also included skirmishes with primitive weapons, such as sticks, daggers and locally crafted Dane guns.</p>
<p>And then in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad033">2018</a>, many Hausa-dominated communities in the region formed “peace committees” to engage the Fulani militias. Through these committees, they entered an <a href="https://dailytrust.com/dining-with-the-devil-how-villagers-co-habit-with-bandits/">ad-hoc agreement</a> to give the militias “protection payment” – levies in cash or kind, in exchange for protection from attacks.</p>
<p>The militias send letters to village heads for payment, leaving a phone number to contact when the villagers were ready to pay. The village heads would call their council and peace committee members to determine how much each resident should contribute. The system was comparable to how rural communities in pre-colonial Nigeria paid farm and livestock taxes and levies to traditional leaders. </p>
<p>But unlike standard taxation, the protection payment does not imply support for militias. Many residents attempted to avoid direct involvement while adhering to the terms of the agreement. The militias are also not motivated by a desire to rule over the communities. Instead of advancing a political or ideological cause, their primary goal is to enrich themselves.</p>
<h2>Dangerous consequences</h2>
<p>In a recently published <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/2/ksad033/7206860">article</a> which is based on my PhD research on the dynamics of political violence in Nigeria, I argued that payments to the militias provided some communities with short-term safety. But that, in the long term, they are leading to dangerous consequences. </p>
<p>The strategy resulted in less violence for the first few months and encouraged more communities to pay the protection levies. However, the militias gradually began to demand more payment, and more militia groups emerged (competing against one another) to forcefully demand protection against their attacks.</p>
<p>As a result, violence against civilians increased, including rising fatalities, sexual violence, population displacement, asset destruction and economic disruption.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-be-done-to-fight-rural-banditry-in-northern-nigeria-122776">What can be done to fight rural banditry in northern Nigeria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>.</p>
<h2>Protection payment pathways</h2>
<p>I explained that the protection payment escalates the conflict in the region through two pathways: acquiescence and resistance. Acquiescence occurs when a community pays a militia to protect them from other militias. This leads to increased predation and demands for more payments. Resistance occurs when a community pays a militia to protect them. If they refuse to continue payments, the militia responds with violence to punish the community and instil fear.</p>
<p>While many communities initially paid the militias as a self-protection strategy, it has become extortion as the militias became predatory over time. They are now <a href="https://dailytrust.com/bandits-impose-levies-on-sokoto-communities-issue-ultimatum-for-payment/">demanding more money</a> than initially agreed and adopting a criminal mode of operation. They forced the villagers to pay additional “<a href="https://dailytrust.com/bandits-impose-tax-on-katsina-farmers/">harvest fees</a>”, buy fertiliser or work on militia farms before they could till their land.</p>
<p>A 2022 <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/557418-merchants-of-terror-1-paying-blood-taxes-helpless-communities-sustain-nigerias-terrorists.html?tztc=1">investigation</a> in hard-to-reach communities of Zamfara and Sokoto states identified civilian protection payments as one of the primary sources of revenue that militias use to finance their operations. Journalists estimated that communities in 13 of the 14 local government areas of Zamfara had paid over 538 million Naira (about US$711,080) in protection levies in less than a year.</p>
<p>The militias <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/557418-merchants-of-terror-1-paying-blood-taxes-helpless-communities-sustain-nigerias-terrorists.html?tztc=1">spend the money</a> on more guns, readily available on the region’s illicit arms market, primarily smuggled in from the Sahel through porous borders. They also use the protection payment to pay “informants”, civilian collaborators who go about their daily lives while <a href="https://dailytrust.com/explainer-how-to-identify-bandits-informants/">providing intelligence</a>. When communities refuse to pay additional fees, they attack them with lethal weapons such as assault rifles and submachine guns, often killing many civilians in one attack. </p>
<p>When I conducted field research in Zamfara last summer, many vulnerable communities fled or continued to pay protection levies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-new-police-chief-faces-structural-challenges-5-key-issues-to-tackle-209113">Nigeria's new police chief faces structural challenges - 5 key issues to tackle</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the conflict, my research indicates that paying militias for protection is risky. It escalates conflict and violence against communities. </p>
<p>Instead, planned flight to safer areas is suggested as a safer alternative to protect civilians during armed conflicts. The government must also step up efforts to safeguard smaller towns and villages, which are frequently more vulnerable to attacks than state capitals. This could be done by deploying more security forces and, if possible, through dialogue with the militias.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211224/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Imrana Buba’s doctoral research is supported by the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under grant number 852816 for the project ‘Resilience Building: Social Resilience, Gendered Dynamics, and Local Peace in Protracted Conflicts’ (PI: Jana Krause).</span></em></p>Civilian protection payment is not a sustainable self-protection strategy in north-west Nigeria.Imrana Buba, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of OsloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113532023-08-11T15:39:27Z2023-08-11T15:39:27ZMilitary coups in Africa: here’s what determines a return to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542141/original/file-20230810-25-hyb3hk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's July 2023 coup celebrate in the capital, Niamey. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Slightly more than two years after Niger’s first peaceful handover of power from one civilian president to another, the military seized power in July 2023. The coup – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13943662">the fourth in Nigerien history</a> – follows on the heels of recent military interventions in Africa. Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Sudan (October 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the number of military coups has <a href="https://arresteddictatorship.com/coups/">declined sharply</a>. However, francophone west Africa now accounts for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">approximately two-thirds of all military coups</a> that have occurred since then. </p>
<p>As a political scientist analysing African politics, I have <a href="https://people.clas.ufl.edu/selischer/">studied</a> military coups and their outcomes for the last decade and a half. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">recent article</a>, Justin Hoyle, a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Florida, and I demonstrate that since 1989, military coups across the world have resulted in two outcomes. </p>
<p>First is the withdrawal of the junta from executive power. This means the junta doesn’t participate or interfere in post-coup elections. While it is necessary for the transition to democracy, it isn’t sufficient in itself. This scenario played out in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/110/439/295/164122">Nigerien coup of 2010</a> and the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472330701651929">Thailand coup of 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Second is electoral rigging by the junta in favour of its own candidate. This scenario establishes a regime in which coup leaders entrench themselves in executive power.</p>
<p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy. It also provides insights into the effect of coups on the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">quality of democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">studied</a> five countries and 12 post-coup transitions: Egypt (coups in 2011 and 2013), Mauritania (coups in 2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010), Fiji (2000 and 2006) and Thailand (1991, 2006 and 2014). </p>
<p>Overall, we examined slightly more than a third of all military coups between 1989 and 2017.</p>
<p>Out of a total of 32 post-coup environments, we found that in half of all cases, juntas withdrew from executive power in the coup’s aftermath.</p>
<p>However, even with the military’s withdrawal from power, the transition period to civilian rule was highly volatile. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, counter-coup attempts by a rival faction within the armed forces intending to remain in power occurred rather frequently. This was the case most recently in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/09/17/441222504/presidential-guard-announces-takeover-of-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Although many coups result in the withdrawal of juntas from executive power, many of the cases from our study were near-misses – the country could’ve ended up under <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">military authoritarian rule</a>.</p>
<p>We examined four key variables and their influence on coup outcomes. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the internal coherence of the armed forces</p></li>
<li><p>the ability of civil society organisations and political parties to mobilise against the junta</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of donor leverage </p></li>
<li><p>trade dependency on regional and western partners. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, we argue that the two that matter the most are: the internal cohesion of the military and the vibrancy of civil society groups. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">analysis</a>, we found that the single most important variable that accounts for different coup outcomes is the internal coherence of the military.</p>
<p>When there’s internal coherence, militaries generally feel <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/12/2/192/2367607">inclined</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">withdraw</a> from executive power. This is because holding on to power <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">challenges</a> their internal cohesion.</p>
<p>Internal cohesion <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">is based on</a> the factors that triggered the coup. If a coup occurs in response to threats to the country’s territorial integrity, to the preservation of public order, or to the military’s material or reputational benefits, the junta will have the backing of the military at large. This is because the benefits of seeking power outweigh the risks of not being in power. </p>
<p>If a coup occurs for reasons outside these, the junta either won’t seek power or will face resistance from within the military and withdraw. We found this confirmed in all the coups that we analysed.</p>
<p>Another relevant yet less significant variable is the positioning of civil society toward the junta. </p>
<p>Where civil society groups manage to rally the population to demand a return to democratic civilian rule, juntas depart from power. The most prominent example of this was in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=xSZwAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=egypt+2011+nepsted&ots=r-G56kRRmg&sig=YmiQioJNNM-ECTabvUcrsIT2w_c#v=onepage&q=egypt%202011%20nepsted&f=false">Egypt after the 2011 coup</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly, we didn’t find that aid dependency or membership in an international organisation with anti-coup rules exerted any discernible influence on juntas. This means that domestic variables – and in particular the drivers of the coup – influence political aftermaths.</p>
<h2>What it all means</h2>
<p>For the current transitions in parts of Africa, these findings are troubling. </p>
<p>In Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, militaries overthrew their governments because of threats to their countries’ territorial integrity or to the military’s material benefits. The juntas in these countries can rely on the backing of the military at large. This decreases the likelihood of a return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The implications of our findings for Niger and Guinea are less straightforward, however. Here, coups were staged by a sub-section of the military, even though such a move wasn’t in line with the interests of the armed forces at large. Our research findings suggest a more volatile dynamic for these two post-coup states.</p>
<p>At this stage, no one can predict how the motives of Niger’s presidential guard will shape future action. Much will depend on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">coup leader Abdourahmane Tchiani’s</a> ability to convince the military that a coup was the right thing to do politically. </p>
<p>Generally, military coups bode ill for democratic processes. In instances where juntas withdraw from power, democracies don’t emerge. When juntas rig post-coup elections, they <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">become entrenched in power</a> in the medium to long-term. This has devastating consequences for the political and civil rights of their populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sebastian Elischer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy.Sebastian Elischer, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107212023-07-31T13:33:38Z2023-07-31T13:33:38ZWhat caused the coup in Niger? An expert outlines three driving factors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540134/original/file-20230731-17-4d3tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's Gen Abdourahamane Tchiani declares himself head of state on 28 July 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ORTN-Télé Sahel/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>At an emergency meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 30 July, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/pro-coup-protests-niger-west-african-leaders-meet-2023-07-30/">demanded</a> the “immediate release and reinstatement” of Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. He had been held by the military since 19 July.</p>
<p>The regional bloc gave the military in Niger a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/30/west-african-govts-give-niger-coup-leaders-a-week-to-cede-power">one-week ultimatum</a> to comply and warned it would take all measures necessary – including force – to restore constitutional order. </p>
<p>On 28 July, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230726-presidency-sealed-off-in-coup-prone-niger">declared himself</a> head of state after the military seized power. </p>
<p>Beyond warning against any regional and foreign interventions, the military leaders in Niger have given no indications of ways forward. </p>
<p>This coup d’etat will have a significant impact on peace and stability in Niger and the entire Sahel region. </p>
<p>Although Niger has recently enjoyed its longest democratic rule since independence, there has been a constant threat of coups. When Bazoum was elected president in 2021, there was a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56589168">coup attempt</a> about 48 hours before his inauguration. It failed as presidential guards fought off the coup plotters. </p>
<p>As a political scientist with expertise on international security, conflict analysis and governance in Africa, including knowledge on Niger, I <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">explained</a> then, the coup attempt pointed to deep fissures in the country. It suggested that the military had not fully embraced democracy. </p>
<p>The current coup plotters have blamed rising insecurity and a lack of economic growth. They <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-nigers-presidential-guard-blockade-presidents-office-security-sources-2023-07-26/">stated</a> that the intervention was necessary to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country. I believe, however, there are other issues that precipitated the latest coup d’etat. These are: ethnicity; the presence of foreign forces; and the weakness of regional bodies.</p>
<h2>Factors that led to the coup</h2>
<p>There are no doubts that the rise in insecurity and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">declining economic prospects</a> contributed to fragility in the country. </p>
<p>Despite the increase in foreign forces, especially from the <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">US</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/which-western-countries-have-foreign-forces-niger-2023-07-28/#:%7E:text=FRANCE,in%202021%20and%202022%2C%20respectively.">France</a>, and military bases in Niger, the leadership has been unable to stop insurgent attacks.
There are several insurgent groups, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State</a> affiliates, as well as <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html#:%7E:text=Boko%20Haram%2C%20which%20refers%20to,replace%20it%20with%20a%20regime">Boko Haram</a> operating in the country. </p>
<p>These attacks have resulted in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">thousands of deaths and displacements</a> in the last decade. Hundreds of youths in the capital, Niamey, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/power-impasse-continues-in-niger-48-hours-after-coup">gathered to celebrate</a> the July coup, waving Russian flags and chanting “Wagner”. This suggests that some people in Niger believe the military, supported by Russia and the private military contractor, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, would do a better job of fighting insurgents.</p>
<p>In addition to insecurity and economic stagnation, three other issues help explain the recent coup d’etat.</p>
<p>First, the debate over the ethnicity and legitimacy of Bazoum was an issue during the last election campaign. Bazoum is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority and has always been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">labelled</a> as having foreign origins. </p>
<p>This did not sit well within the military circle, which is predominantly composed of the larger ethnic groups – even though Bazoum got <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/22/nigers-top-court-confirms-mohamed-bazoums-election-win">about 56%</a> of the vote and is from the same party as former president Mahamadou Issoufou. </p>
<p>There is a lot of emphasis on ethnic military composition in the country; understanding this helped Issoufou complete two terms as president. Appointments in the military are made <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">along ethnic lines</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the large number of foreign military troops and bases in the country has not been well received by the military. They believe this undermines them. Niger is a key ally of western countries in the fight against insurgency in the region. France’s <a href="https://www.africanleadershipmagazine.co.uk/france-eyes-africas-mining-industry-with-550m-investment/">huge investments</a> in Niger’s mining sector are another reason for its interest in security. </p>
<p>In 2019, the US opened a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">drone base</a> in Niger despite protests. As I have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">pointed out</a> before, the drone base could make Niger a target for terrorists and increase instability.</p>
<p>In 2022, France and other European allies withdrew their forces from neighbouring Mali. Bazoum was quick to invite them to Niger. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/18/after-mali-exit-niger-accepts-foreign-forces-to-secure-border">Nigerien military leadership</a> and some influential individuals in the country denounced the increase in foreign forces. </p>
<p>Third, I suggest the failure of regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union to take a firm stance against military power seizures in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali emboldened the Nigerien military. ECOWAS leaders have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/31/ecowas-leaders-give-niger-one-week-ultimatum-to-restore-president/">now threathened to use force</a> to restore Bazoum if the coup plotters do not reinstate him. </p>
<p>In the last four years, there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">seven coup d’etats</a> in the region. Three were successful. Leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union have threatened sanctions on these three countries, but nothing much has been done to deter other opportunistic military leaders. </p>
<p>In a round table organised by the think tank Chatham House London on the impact of military intervention in west Africa, one of the leaders from the region stated that they kept avenues of communication open with the three military presidents as a courtesy. This creates an impression that there is no deterrence for military takeovers. </p>
<h2>Implications for Niger and the region</h2>
<p>The latest coup d’etat has severe consequences for Niger and the entire Sahel region. Niger is a strong ally of western nations, especially France, the US and the European Union in fighting insurgency and curbing illegal migration to Europe. </p>
<p>Efforts to address these issues will be affected. And the new military leaders will want to use these issues as leverage in negotiations and to force acceptance of the new regime. </p>
<p>The new leaders in Niger might also engage with the Wagner group to combat the Islamist insurgency. The leader of the group has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exiled-russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-hails-niger-coup-touts-services-2023-07-28/">praised</a> them for seizing power. The influence of Russia and Wagner in the region could grow. </p>
<p>Yet Wagner has been unable to halt terrorist advancement in Mali and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>Finally, a successful military takeover in Niger would be a major drawback for democracy in the region and Africa as a whole. The military regimes of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso already plan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-guinea-mali-juntas-plan-three-way-partnership-2023-02-10/">to form a “military alliance”</a>, supposedly to combat insecurity. </p>
<p>African leaders need to do more to prove that they are working for the masses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethnic politics, the presence of foreign troops and the weaknesses of past responses to coups encouraged Niger’s recent military takeover.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2106722023-07-29T09:23:19Z2023-07-29T09:23:19ZNiger coup: Military takeover is a setback for democracy and US interests in West Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540017/original/file-20230729-17212-tattnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C17%2C3988%2C2209&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">General Abdourahmane Tchiani, Niger's new leader.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-video-frame-grab-image-obtained-by-afp-from-ortn-t%C3%A9l%C3%A9-news-photo/1559603798?adppopup=true">ORTN - Télé Sahel/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The West African nation Niger is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66324875">under military rule</a> following a coup in which President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown and held captive by members of his own guard.</em></p>
<p><em>On July 28, 2023, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">coup leaders named General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> as the new head of state, while <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">international observers called for democratic norms</a> to be reinstalled.</em></p>
<p><em>Where the coup leaves the country and what happens next is unclear. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://polisci.ufl.edu/leonardo-a-villalon/">Leonardo A. Villalón</a>, political scientist and West African expert at the University of Florida, for some answers.</em></p>
<h2>How did this coup come about?</h2>
<p>At first it was unclear whether this even was a coup. Although there have been indications of tensions both inside the military and between military and civilian leaders, a coup certainly wasn’t expected. I was in Niger last month, and there was nothing to suggest that a coup was about to take place. And in contrast to what happened in Mali or Burkina Faso in recent years, the coup wasn’t preceded by widespread protests or popular calls for a change in leadership.</p>
<p><iframe id="Qy5vH" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Qy5vH/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>So, when members of the presidential guard seized Bazoum on July 26, it wasn’t immediately clear what was going on, or whether their actions would be successful. The first real test for the coup leaders was whether the rest of the military would back their actions. If they hadn’t, it could have set off widespread fighting in the country. But it has turned out – so far, at least – to be a bloodless coup. After <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">initial wrangling between different factions</a> over who would take control, the country’s generals did back the coup.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the democratically elected president continues to be <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/07/28/niger-president-in-good-health-as-coup-leaders-secure-army-backing/">held hostage under house arrest</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the consequences of the coup?</h2>
<p>Although it has so far been a bloodless coup, the consequences are nonetheless catastrophic for Niger and for the region.</p>
<p>The nation is among the least developed on Earth, with <a href="https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world">high levels of poverty</a> and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">history of instability and coups</a>.</p>
<p>But it has emerged in recent years as a relatively <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/27/explainer-niger-a-linchpin-for-stability-in-africas-coup-belt">stable force in the region</a> and as a key ally for the West in dealing with terrorism and violence that has spiraled since a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html">coup in neighboring Mali in 2012</a>. That event, itself triggered by the NATO intervention in Libya and the fall of Moammar Gadhafi, kick-started a decade of instability in the region.</p>
<p>Yet just two years ago, Niger saw its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56175439">first ever democratic transfer of power</a> from one elected president to the next. The election was by no means perfect, but it was rightly seen as a significant accomplishment. That is why this coup is particularly problematic: It represents a rolling back of the progress made in recent years in slowly building functional state institutions and democratic processes.</p>
<p>The coup also has major consequences for the region. Neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso have broken away from former colonial power France, and the West in general, and moved toward Russia. Meanwhile Chad, another neighbor, is engaged in a problematic effort at a transition to an elected government. Against these countries, Niger represented a civilian-led pragmatic ally in international efforts to stem a tide of jihadist violence in the Sahel region. We have no clear indication at the moment how Niger’s new military leaders will align themselves in this context.</p>
<h2>How does this differ from past coups in Niger?</h2>
<p>That’s the really interesting thing. Niger is often described as prone to coups. But with each previous coup, circumstances have allowed coup leaders to justify their actions as necessary, or at least as justifiable and understandable by some rationale. But that doesn’t appear to be true for this latest takeover by the military. </p>
<p>Niger’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1974/04/18/archives/niger-announces-military-council-colonel-kountie-who-led-coup-is.html">first coup in 1974</a> took place amid a backdrop of terrible drought and famine across the Sahel. That created a level of frustration and disappointment in the shortcomings of the country’s first post-independence government and provided a rationale for the military to overthrow it and to claim legitimacy with a renewed focus on development.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">subsequent coups in Niger</a> – in 1996, 1999 and 2010 – were all triggered by specific political crises. In 1996, the new democratic regime that had been installed in 1993 found itself gridlocked by institutions that made it difficult for the executive and legislative branches to work together. The military justified the coup as a necessary step to unblock this gridlock. Three years later, those coup leaders failed to follow through on their promises and were themselves ousted – and soldier-turned-president <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/10/president-of-niger-assassinated/c8287bd2-32c8-42dc-92c4-d38c7218ea0c/">Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara was killed</a> – when they attempted to remain in power by rigging the elections.</p>
<p>As promised by the leaders of the 1999 coup, within a year Niger had adopted a new constitution and elected a new government. Unfortunately, after two terms and 10 years in power, President Mamadou Tandja attempted to extend his mandate beyond the constitutionally allowed limits, triggering a prolonged political crisis. In the end, the military again stepped in, and in 2010 soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/world/africa/19niger.html">attacked the presidential palace</a> and captured Tandja after a bloody gun battle. The military justified this coup as a necessary step to end the crisis and stop the erosion of democracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Billowing black smoke emerges from a building behind a crowd of mostly men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pro-coup demonstrators attack the headquarters of the party of overthrown President Mohamed Bazoum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-billowing-smoke-as-supporters-of-the-news-photo/1557046635?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All three of the previous coups in Niger could thus be presented as attempts to “press reset” on Niger’s progress toward democracy. And in each case they were justified by the coup leaders in those terms. </p>
<p>The same cannot be said about the latest coup. President Bazoum has only been in power for two years, and his 2021 election win, although contested, was in the end widely accepted. He came to power on a promise to improve the country’s security, invest in education and fight corruption – and some real <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/28/niger-coup-democratic-region-mali-democracy/">progress has been made</a> in that direction. And there was no obvious political impasse or institutional gridlock on a scale that would have justified a coup.</p>
<p>As such, it seems that this latest coup was very much driven by internal politics and dissatisfaction among parts of the military, rather than any clear triggering crisis.</p>
<h2>How are the coup leaders justifying their actions?</h2>
<p>Beyond a very general claim of “poor governance” and a “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-tensions-presidential-guard-96f8f63b838af5467d4c95ba7b998b32">degraded security situation</a>,” there hasn’t been a clear rationale articulated by those who are now in charge to justify the coup or to legitimize themselves as leaders. This marks a change not only from the coups of Niger’s past but also contrasts with those in neighboring Mali in 2021 and Burkina Faso the following year.</p>
<p>In each of those coups, military leaders claimed that they were ousting deeply unpopular regimes that were deeply corrupt and had proven ineffective at combating instability and violence. They presented themselves as leaders who would mark a break with existing political systems by establishing new alliances. </p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>It is very difficult to see a coherent way out of this. The coup leaders have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">suspended the constitution</a> and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230726-niger-soldiers-say-president-bazoum-has-been-removed-borders-closed">closed Niger’s borders</a>. But it isn’t really clear yet what the long-term plan is.</p>
<p>In Mali and Bukina Faso, the ills of those countries were blamed on France, with coup leaders <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">looking to Russia for support</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">accepting support</a> from the Moscow-backed mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>The fear among those in the West – and many inside Niger – is that in the need to articulate a rationale, the new military leaders now will present the Nigerien experiment with democracy itself as a failure and similarly seek support from Russia and the Wagner Group. Wagner’s mercenary boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">offered Niger’s new leaders the support</a> of his men, praising the coup as an anti-colonial struggle.</p>
<h2>How big a blow is this for US interests in the region?</h2>
<p>In recent years, Niger has been the partner of choice for Washington in regards to the Sahel. It is seen as a linchpin in the fight against terrorism in the region, and its importance has escalated significantly as Mali and Burkina Faso turned to Russia.</p>
<p>Neighboring Chad is also a key ally for the U.S. But Chad is problematic, having been led by the autocratic Idriss Déby for 30 years until his death in 2021, only to be succeeded by his son, Mahamat Déby – who is now himself leading a so-called transition that seems designed to keep him in power.</p>
<p>With Chad, the U.S. has had to hold its nose while doing business. Niger, by contrast, was presented as a democratic model and seen as open, pragmatic and friendly toward Washington.</p>
<p>We will have to see how things unfold, but it is clear that this coup could deal a serious setback to U.S. interests in the region. But above all, it is a terrible blow to Niger’s efforts at building stable democratic institutions and to fostering the peace and stability that could better the lives of people living in one of the world’s poorest countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonardo A. Villalón currently receives funding from the Minerva Initiative of the US Department of Defense for a basic social science research project on the impact of climate change in the Sahel.</span></em></p>Niger had been seen as a relatively stable nation in an unstable region. The coup could spark fears in the West that the nation may align interests with Russia and the Wagner Group.Leonardo A. Villalón, Professor of Political Science and African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102102023-07-26T14:54:12Z2023-07-26T14:54:12ZMali crisis: UN peacekeepers are leaving after 10 years – what’s needed for a smooth transition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539038/original/file-20230724-19-ph4kyq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malians march against the UN peacekeeping force in Bamako in September 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ousmane Makaveli/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Security Council voted on 30 June 2023 to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138257">end its peacekeeping mission in Mali</a>, <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en">Minusma</a>, after Mali officially requested its complete withdrawal. Over <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/personnel">11,000 military personnel from 53 countries</a> are expected to leave the country by 31 December 2023. </p>
<p>Minusma was first deployed in Mali in <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history">April 2013</a> to support the country’s political process and help <a href="https://betterworldcampaign.org/mission/mali-minusma#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Multidimensional%20Integrated,fragile%20transition%20to%20constitutional%20order.">restore peace and stability</a>. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/2012-coup-and-warfare-in-the-north">In mid-2012</a>, the north of the country was under the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/echogeo/13466?lang=en">control of terrorist groups</a>.</p>
<p>Mali’s recent request for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60419799">withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops</a> comes as no surprise. </p>
<p>After a coup in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53830348">2020</a> and another in <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-malis-coup-within-a-coup-161621">2021</a>, the relationship between Malian authorities and Minusma deteriorated. The UN published <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/malian-troops-foreign-military-personnel-killed-over-500-people-during">a report</a> accusing Malian troops and their allies of massacring at least 500 civilians in 2022. It also accused the Malian government of <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads">interfering with operations</a>. </p>
<p>These events prompted some countries to begin withdrawing their soldiers from the peacekeeping mission. In <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads">November 2022</a>, Côte d'Ivoire informed the UN that its 900 soldiers would leave the mission. Three days later, the UK said it would also withdraw its troops. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-troops-to-withdraw-from-mali-what-will-change-in-terms-of-security-209765">UN troops to withdraw from Mali: what will change in terms of security</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>I’m a political scientist with a <a href="https://scholar.google.ca/citations?hl=en&user=9T47R7AAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research focus</a> on security issues in the Sahel, which includes Mali. In my view, for Mali to make a peaceful transition to democracy, two key elements are needed.</p>
<p>First, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">new terrorist threats</a> in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahel">the Sahel</a> require the development of new instruments and approaches to warfare, including a joint fight against Islamist terrorist insurgents. No single country in the region has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350213273_Gestion_des_menaces_terroristes_au_Sahel_et_en_Afrique_de_l'Ouest">the necessary strength</a> to lead the fight against terrorism alone. Mali must coordinate military efforts with its neighbours: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. </p>
<p>Second, Mali must accompany the military aspect of the fight against terrorism with development initiatives to prevent radicalisation. Without these measures, the country and its citizens could face increased instability.</p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>On 3 July 2023, Malian authorities and a Minusma delegation agreed on a <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/minusma-presents-its-withdrawal-plan-to-malian-foreign-minister">withdrawal plan</a>. This will transfer tasks, logistics, security and strategic communication to Bamako by December.</p>
<p>Mali has had measures in place for the withdrawal of UN troops since a new government took over after the 2020 coup. The National Transitional Council approved the creation of a war school in September 2021 to <a href="https://www.maliweb.net/armee/le-mali-cree-son-ecole-de-guerre-2945251.html">strengthen the national security apparatus and train future army cadres</a>. </p>
<p>The intention was to replace foreign troops with local ones in the event of a withdrawal. The <a href="http://news.abamako.com/h/277568.html">first cohort</a> has already completed its training. The second class is nearing graduation. </p>
<p>While the UN’s withdrawal will create a security vacuum, <a href="https://www.lareussitemali.com/mali-la-2eme-promotion-de-lecole-de-guerre-fait-sa-rentree-solennelle/">increasing Mali’s vulnerability to security and terrorism-related challenges</a>, graduates of the war school could help fill this void. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/france-has-started-withdrawing-its-troops-from-mali-what-is-it-leaving-behind-170375">France has started withdrawing its troops from Mali: what is it leaving behind?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But for this to work, Malian authorities must ensure local soldiers are capable of occupying areas previously under the control of peacekeepers. Additionally, the government will need to provide employment opportunities for the more than 800 civilians working with Minusma, and create new economic activities to fill the gaps left by its departure. This will minimise any additional negative impact on Mali’s <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-intensive-investment/countries/WCMS_327090/lang--en/index.htm">already fragile unemployment rate</a>. Bamako has said <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/3/what-next-for-mali-after-minusma-withdrawal">it’s capable of securing its 23 million citizens</a>, but has yet to detail how it plans to do so. </p>
<p>The government also needs to implement the recommendations of a national conference on <a href="https://modelemali.com/2021/12/30/conclusions-des-assises-nationales-de-la-refondation-de-letat-niveau-national-decembre-2021/">the refoundation of the state</a>. This includes organising credible, fair and transparent elections. A transition agreement adopted by <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/02/21/mali-parliament-approves-new-charter-allowing-a-five-year-democratic-transition//">parliament in 2022</a> gave the transitional government two years to hand power back to civilians. </p>
<p>However, progress on this has already been put to question. Interim president Assimi Goïta recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">adopted a new constitution</a> that enhances his powers.</p>
<p>The major concern now is whether the military government will honour the transition period and organise elections that would restore power to a democratically elected president by 2024. Delivering this requires <a href="https://www.studiotamani.org/29484-mali-la-cedeao-favorable-a-une-transition-supplementaire-de-12-mois">government measures</a> that restore security throughout the country, foster <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/01/02/mali-peuls-et-dogons-des-freres-devenus-ennemis_1771562/">national reconciliation</a> and promote good governance. </p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>The withdrawal of UN troops from Mali could have negative consequences on the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-troops-to-withdraw-from-mali-what-will-change-in-terms-of-security-209765">security situation</a> and economic growth. It could also complicate <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/09/03/mali-ex-rebels-and-the-government-return-to-talks-after-almost-a-year//">dialogue and negotiation efforts with ex-rebels</a>. </p>
<p>A loss of support and commitment from the international community could lead to a reduction in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/minusma-liquidation-process-unpacked">financial aid and political support</a> in the fight against insecurity. This would have a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/3/what-next-for-mali-after-minusma-withdrawal">direct impact</a> on the country’s – and Sahel region’s – stability.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-peace-talks-successful-the-4-factors-that-matter-206299">What makes peace talks successful? The 4 factors that matter</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The path of constructive dialogue remains an essential condition for a peaceful political transition and the construction of “<a href="http://www.maliweb.net/societe/politique-espoir-mali-koura-salue-le-discours-2993460.html">Mali Koura</a>”, or a new Mali. </p>
<p>Mali needs to reconstruct its society. Its people are <a href="https://www.studiotamani.org/43945-democratie-au-mali-les-aspirations-profondes-du-peuple-n-ont-pas-ete-comblees">thirsty for true democracy and development</a>. The transitional authorities should ensure an end to bad governance, political mismanagement, corruption and nepotism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210210/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mady Ibrahim Kanté does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Constructive dialogue is an essential condition for a peaceful political transition in Mali.Mady Ibrahim Kanté, Lecturer, Université des sciences juridiques et politiques de BamakoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2073542023-06-14T13:34:39Z2023-06-14T13:34:39ZNigeria’s response to the Sudan crisis is lacking – it could play a leading role in bringing peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531660/original/file-20230613-29-m9x1lj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People fleeing war-torn Sudan on 13 May 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khaled Desouki/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hostilities between rival military parties in Sudan had claimed more than <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-from-sudan-war-rises-to-more-than-600/7086508.html">600 lives</a> by May 2023. </p>
<p>The infighting has mostly been between the Sudanese Armed Forces loyal to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s current military ruler, and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, a paramilitary force led by his deputy <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, “Hemedti”</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan and Nigeria have regional and geographical connections, especially through Chad, which is a neighbour to both. </p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-ye7Xy" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ye7Xy/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="500" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>As I have <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/01/sudan-war-chad-sahel-small-arms-car-iswap/">previously noted</a>, the fallout of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region, of which Nigeria is a core member, directly affects the country’s peace and security. </p>
<p>Nigeria is duty bound to respond to the unfolding situation, considering the 5,500 Nigerian nationals and the over <a href="https://dailytrust.com/we-have-over-5-million-sudanese-of-nigerian-origin-in-our-country/">5 million</a> Sudanese of Nigerian origin in Sudan. </p>
<p>Aside from helping the Nigerians trapped in Sudan, Nigeria needs to offer relief and assistance because a spiralling Sudan will have an impact on Nigeria’s own peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/author/folahanmi-aina/#:%7E:text=Folahanmi%20Aina%20is%20an%20associate,Basin%2C%20and%20the%20Sahel%20region">international security expert</a> with a regional focus on west Africa, I argue that without Nigeria’s input, the prospects of lasting peace in Sudan remain elusive, as no other country in Africa has what it takes to fill this role. </p>
<p>Sudan could experience a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65409730">prolonged conflict</a> that the sub-region cannot afford to manage. The situation in Sudan offers Nigeria an opportunity to reassert a leadership role. Nigeria also has the legitimacy and recognition to take the lead on providing an African solution to an African problem. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s regional role</h2>
<p>Nigeria dominates the west African sub-region. It has the largest population in Africa at over <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG">213 million people</a>, and the largest economy by gross domestic product at <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG">US$440.8 billion</a> as of 2021. </p>
<p>With an estimated total military personnel of <a href="https://punchng.com/nigeria-maintains-35th-position-in-global-military-ranking/">215,000, of which 135,000 are active</a>, Nigeria has the most formidable military force in west Africa. </p>
<p>A recurring argument is that given Nigeria’s current economic woes, which include a <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/578847-nigerias-public-debt-rose-to-n44-06trn-in-q3-2022.html">rising debt profile</a>, it may not be able to take the leadership role. If it doesn’t, who will, and what would the implications be? </p>
<h2>A history of interventions</h2>
<p>Nigeria has a record of intervening to achieve stability in west Africa. It did this during <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/nigeria-spent-13bn-on-liberation-of-sierra-leone-liberia-says-envoy">the first (1989-1996) and second (1999-2003) Liberian civil wars, and Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002)</a>. In both cases, Nigeria played a leading role in restoring peace and security. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s decision at the time reflected a willingness to avert a regional humanitarian crisis and the potential spillover effects of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>Nigeria has also helped to sustain democratic rule in west Africa. A case in point was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ecowas-ivorycoast-20110323-idAFJOE72M0NU20110323">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, where after a disputed election, Laurent Gbagbo refused to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara. </p>
<p>In 2016, following Yahyah Jammeh’s refusal to relinquish political power in The Gambia, Nigeria <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/foreign/west-africa-foreign/255739-gambias-president-reveals-buharis-statement-helped-sack-jammeh.html?tztc=1">mobilised</a> regional support. This regional intervention <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-politics-idUSKBN15305Q">led to the emergence of Adama Barrow</a> as president. Nigeria also contributed to the 4,000 troops who remained in The Gambia. </p>
<p>In July 2022, Nigeria <a href="https://punchng.com/fg-wades-in-mali-cote-divoire-row-over-detained-soldiers/">waded</a> in on the crisis between Mali and Cote d’Ivoire over detained soldiers.</p>
<h2>Sudan’s impact on Nigeria</h2>
<p>The situation in Sudan has already led to a worsening humanitarian crisis in the region. The UN refugee agency recently noted that <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/number-of-refugees-who-fled-sudan-for-chad-double-in-week-/7095241.html">55,000</a> people have fled from Sudan to Chad. </p>
<p>With a 1,300km border between Sudan and Chad, the unfolding situation could lead to an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/01/sudan-war-chad-sahel-small-arms-car-iswap/">influx</a> of small and light arms and displaced people, which could worsen the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions. </p>
<p>For Nigeria, this would mean increased pressure on infrastructural facilities arising from the arrival of refugees. </p>
<p>There is also the possibility of an upswing in violence if foreign terrorist fighters from across the Sahel region seek new recruits and safe havens. </p>
<p>For Nigeria, this would be one trouble too many. The country’s security forces have been stretched responding to multiple security threats at home. </p>
<h2>What Nigeria should do</h2>
<p><strong>Mediation:</strong> the United States is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/307029/sudan-whats-wrong-with-the-us-saudi-mediated-talks-in-jeddah/">attempting</a> to play the role of a mediator but the chances of it brokering a peace deal are slim. </p>
<p>Citizens in west African states like Mali and Burkina Faso see the west, including France, as part of the problem rather than the solution. </p>
<p>A state-led mediation effort from an African regional power like Nigeria offers a better chance at acceptability and recognition. It avoids the suspicion that comes with the involvement of western powers. </p>
<p>Nigeria should send a special envoy to Sudan and rally continental efforts through the African Union. </p>
<p><strong>Effective manning of entry points:</strong> Nigeria needs to guard potential illegal entry points and use aerial surveillance.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s Immigration Service and its National Identity Management Centre must also be ready for rapid documentation of foreign nationals finding their way into the country. </p>
<p><strong>Refugee management:</strong> emergency refugee camps will be needed to accommodate refugees from the war in Sudan.</p>
<p><strong>Provision of relief materials:</strong> the Nigerian Air Force should be willing to airlift medical and relief materials into Sudan. Nigeria’s vast experience in this regard would make a difference on the ground. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>As a regional leader, Nigeria must not sit by at a time of turbulence such as this. </p>
<p>Doing so widens the existing “policing gap” across the region, especially since <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment">France’s exit</a> from Mali. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s foreign policy actions and inaction will be closely watched. The unfolding situation in Sudan reinforces the need for Nigeria to come up with an articulate <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/240218/why-nigeria-needs-a-grand-strategy/">grand strategy</a> that reflects its position and national interests in a complex and fast-changing region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spiralling Sudan will affect peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin region, of which Nigeria is a member.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2042992023-04-27T15:53:49Z2023-04-27T15:53:49ZSudan: questions about Wagner Group involvement as another African country falls prey to Russian mercenaries<p>After more than a week of intense fighting between Sudanese government troops and paramilitary forces in Khartoum, many western countries – including the US and UK – are evacuating their nationals from the strife-torn city.</p>
<p>While the conflict has been billed as a clash between rival warlords, there are questions about the role played by the private Russian mercenary company, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">the Wagner Group</a>. This group, allegedly associated with Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ally Yevgeny Prigozhin – although he has denied any involvement – is heavily engaged in several African countries, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/25/russia-wagner-group-africa-terrorism-mali-sudan-central-african-republic-prigozhin/">exacerbating</a> regional instability.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">Sudan: violence between army and militia is a symptom of an old disease that is destroying Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Aid organisations have warned of a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/other/influx-of-sudan-refugees-in-neighbouring-countries-could-worsen-humanitarian-crisis-in-region/ar-AA1agYd8">humanitarian crisis</a> as, in recent days, tens of thousands of people have fled Sudan to neighbouring countries that already face their own internal issues. </p>
<p>The potential involvement of Russia and the shadowy Wagner Group in the region complicates things further. While the group <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russias-private-wagner-group-denies-it-is-operating-in-sudan/ar-AA1a4YoB">has denied</a> involvement in the current conflict in Sudan, these denials appear <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-wagner-offered-arms-to-sudanese-general-battling-army-c71f65f3">increasingly questionable</a>.</p>
<p>There is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/20/africa/wagner-sudan-russia-libya-intl/index.html">growing evidence</a> of Wagner’s role in arming the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces which are engaged in a violent power struggle against the Sudanese military. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, this week confirmed Washington’s belief that the group of mercenaries is involved in the conflict, stating:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We do have deep concern about the engagement of the Prigozhin group (the Wagner Group) in Sudan … Its engagement simply brings more death and destruction with it.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Wagner Group in Africa</h2>
<p>Students taking the <a href="https://www.brunel.ac.uk/study/postgraduate/intelligence-and-security-studies-distance-learning-ma">Master’s degree in intelligence and security studies</a> at Brunel University London were tasked with assessing the capabilities and intentions of the Wagner Group (and Russia) in Africa. They collected publicly available material (sometimes referred to as “<a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/open-source-intelligence-definition">open source intelligence</a>”) to assess the group’s influence. This information was then subjected to <a href="https://www.cia.gov/static/955180a45afe3f5013772c313b16face/Tradecraft-Primer-apr09.pdf">structured analytic techniques</a> used by the UK intelligence community and elsewhere, as part of a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850600600829940?needAccess=true">Brunel Analytical Simulation Exercise</a> to prepare the students for roles as professional intelligence analysts. </p>
<p>They found numerous examples of how the Wagner Group has expanded its operations in recent years – often at the request of national governments. In January, the UK Ministry of Defence <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1616323761392812033">estimated</a> there were as many as 5,000 Wagner operatives across Africa in 2022.</p>
<p>Despite the war in Ukraine, leaked <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/23/wagner-russia-africa-leaked-documents/">US intelligence documents</a> suggest the group is developing a “confederation” of anti-western states. These include Chad, to the west of Sudan, where US intelligence reports allege that Wagner mercenaries are involved in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-intelligence-points-to-wagner-plot-against-key-western-ally-in-africa-29867547">destabilising the government</a>. Chad is a key ally of the US in this region of Africa.</p>
<p>Sitting directly beneath Chad is the Central African Republic (CAR), where the Russian ambassador Alexander Bikantov <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-envoy-says-1890-russian-instructors-central-african-republic-ria-2023-02-03/">said in February</a> there are 1,890 “instructors” involved in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/wagner-mercenaries-sustain-losses-in-fight-for-central-african-republic-gold">fighting between the government and rebel troops</a>. </p>
<p>The Wagner Group has reportedly had a presence in CAR for several years, initially providing training and back-up services and latterly involved in combat operations against rebel insurgencies. According to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic">International Crisis Group</a>, although the CAR’s president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, has denied signing a contract with the Wagner Group, “its presence … is barely a secret”.</p>
<p>The Crisis Group’s report continued:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Rather than eradicating armed groups, the contractors are perpetrating abuses that increasingly drive violence in the provinces and fuel guerrilla warfare against government troops by rebels scattered in the bush.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Wagner mercenaries are also reportedly active in Sudan’s north-western neighbour, Libya, which has been in a state of armed chaos since the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi in 2012. In 2020, the BBC reported a leaked UN document saying there were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52571777">1,200 Wagner personnel in Libya</a>. They have reportedly been supporting rebel warlord <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/wagner-group-sudan-war-army-b2327044.html">Khalifa Hafter</a>’s forces against the Tripoli-based government, alongside other mercenaries from Belarus, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Shifting influence</h2>
<p>In Mali, the Wagner Group has supported the military junta to enforce its rule, with a large base at <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">Bamako International Airport</a>. The group’s increasing influence in that part of Africa has coincided with a dilution of western involvement. In February 2022, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/17/world/africa/mali-france-withdrawal.html">French government announced</a> the withdrawal of its forces after nine years of trying, and failing, to counter Islamist insurgency. </p>
<p>In March 2022, Malian state forces – reportedly supported by “suspected Russian mercenaries” (although no group was identified) – <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60997602">massacred</a> civilians and militant fighters. Calls by the UN Security Council for an independent investigation into the massacre were <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/04/10/mali-russia-blocks-un-security-council-request-for-investigation-into-moura-massacre/">blocked by Russia</a>, and the UN was not granted <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14856.doc.htm">access</a> to the site.</p>
<p>There is also growing evidence of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-raises-questions-about-growing-russian-involvement-in-west-africa-191909">Wagner Group’s presence in Burkina Faso</a> and the <a href="https://tfiglobalnews.com/2023/01/22/has-us-incompetence-pushed-drc-away-to-russias-side/">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> (DRC). Burkina Faso has experienced two coups in the last 12 months, and is facing escalating threats from <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/attacks-kill-dozens-in-burkina-faso-security-sources-say-/6927428.html">Islamic State-linked groups</a>. </p>
<p>Russia is courting Burkina Faso through <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-63171771">military and political</a> endeavours, and has stated its intent to aid nations in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahel">Sahelian region</a> in combating the jihadist threat in their countries. DRC, Mali, CAR and Sudan have all <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/un-tells-russia-to-leave-ukraine-how-did-countries-vote">abstained or voted against</a> requiring Russia to remove troops from Ukraine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-raises-questions-about-growing-russian-involvement-in-west-africa-191909">Burkina Faso coup raises questions about growing Russian involvement in west Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It’s unclear to what extent the Wagner Group does the Kremlin’s bidding as Prigozhin himself has repeatedly denied any involvement. But as a private enterprise, the profits for them in Africa are spectacular. And, as with so many of the biggest Russian businesses, Wagner’s successes are owed to the Russian state and the kleptocratic elites who are likely to share in its revenue.</p>
<p>The Kremlin provides direct support where profit interests align with Russia’s political interests. At the moment, the troubled countries in which the Wagner Group is alleged to be involved in conflict and destabilisation provide resources and political support at the UN, which are important for Russia’s war on Ukraine. Further regional instability is to be expected.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Brunel MA students Laura Collins, Freya De Santis and Bobby Payne assisted with the research for this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The role of the Wagner Group in the Sudan crisis is not yet clear, but its mercenaries are reported to be involved in a number of African countries.Kristian Gustafson, Reader in Intelligence & War, Brunel University LondonDan Lomas, Lecturer in Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University LondonNeveen S Abdalla, Lecturer, International Relations, Defence, and Security, Brunel University LondonSteven Wagner, Senior Lecturer in International Security, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2009412023-03-07T10:23:47Z2023-03-07T10:23:47ZMilitant Islamist violence in Africa surges – deaths up nearly 50%, events up 22% in a year<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513135/original/file-20230302-16-w2o9n4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burkina Faso servicemen hold portraits during the burial of soldiers killed in an Al-Qaeda attack in Gaskinde in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olympia de Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surges-deaths-up-nearly-50-events-up-22-in-a-year-200941&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Militant Islamist violence in Africa set <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">new records for violent events and fatalities</a> this past year. This continues a relentless decade-long upward trend. </p>
<p>In a recent Africa Center for Strategic Studies <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">analysis</a>, we found that there were 6,859 episodes of violence involving militant Islamist groups in Africa in 2022. This is a 22% increase from 2021. Fatalities linked to these events shot up 48% to 19,109 deaths. This reflects a sharp rise in deaths per event. </p>
<p>Notably, the spike in violence was marked by a 68% increase in fatalities involving civilians – from 4,307 in 2021 to 7,220 in 2022. This figure is significant: these militant groups are not focused on winning hearts and minds so much as intimidating local populations into compliance.</p>
<p>The threat is also accelerating. Both violent events and fatalities have almost doubled since 2019. In 2019 there were 3,520 events and 10,336 fatalities. </p>
<p>This analysis draws from data compiled by the <a href="https://acleddata.com/about-acled/">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a> (ACLED) – a non-profit data collection and crisis mapping organisation. It aggregates violent events from local and international news sources, as well as UN, government and NGO reports. The Africa Center then corroborates the data through independent sources. These include the jihadist monitoring group <a href="https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/">SITE Intelligence</a>, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/">International Crisis Group</a> and <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants">Stanford University’s Mapping Militants Project</a>. </p>
<p>Having monitored the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sahel-and-somalia-drive-uninterrupted-rise-in-african-militant-islamist-group-violence-over-past-decade/">trends of Africa’s militant Islamist groups</a> for many years, we are concerned by this spike. A more comprehensive and contextualised response is needed. This must integrate the efforts of local communities with those of national, regional and international actors. </p>
<h2>Violence concentrated in Sahel and Somalia</h2>
<p>The militant Islamist threat is not monolithic but comprised of over a dozen different militant groups. Each has distinct leadership, objectives, organisational structure, funding and supply of weapons. </p>
<p>They are motivated by a host of factors. These include: religious ideology, money, revenge against real and perceived government abuses, criminality, ethnic polarisation and political ambition. </p>
<p>The threat is concentrated in five theatres: the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, northern Mozambique and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. </p>
<p>The Sahel and Somalia accounted for 77% of all such violent events in the past year. This is a growing trend. In 2020 the Sahel and Somalia accounted for 58% of events, in 2021 for 73%. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Sahel – specifically Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – experienced the most rapid expansion of militant Islamist violence of any theatre over the past year. It accounted for 7,899 deaths, more than 40% of the continental total of fatalities. The groups driving this violence are the Macina Liberation Front, Ansaroul Islam, Ansar Dine and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.</p>
<p>Militant Islamist <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/five-zones-militant-islamist-violence-sahel/">violence in the Sahel has also spread geographically</a>. From northern Mali, violent events have shifted to the more populated regions of central and southern Mali. This includes the capital, Bamako, which has <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-militant-islamist-insurgency-bamako-doorstep/">seen attacks on an increasingly regular basis</a> after years of relative insulation.</p>
<p>Militant Islamist violence has similarly spread rapidly into northern, western, and eastern Burkina Faso. Today, Burkina Faso experiences more violent events than any other country in the Sahel.</p>
<p>Once seen as highly unlikely, there is now a real chance that Bamako and Ouagadougou – the capital cities of Mali and Burkina Faso, respectively – could fall under militant control. Both countries have struggled with a breakdown in governance and an <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/">acceleration of militant Islamist violence following coups</a> starting in 2020.</p>
<p>The erosion of security in Burkina Faso, in turn, threatens bordering countries, especially Togo and Benin. Both nations saw double digit increases in the number of violent events involving militant Islamist groups in the past year.</p>
<p>In Somalia, fatalities linked to al-Shabaab shot up from 2,606 in 2021 to 6,225 in 2022. This 133% increase was accompanied by a 29% rise in violent events. This reflects an escalation in both the pace and lethality of violence. The tempo of fighting significantly accelerated after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called for an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-president-vows-total-war-against-al-shabab/6714508.html">all-out offensive</a> against al-Shabaab. Driven from areas it once controlled, al-Shabaab has reverted to retaliations against soft targets. One example is the October 2022 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-president-least-100-people-killed-car-bombs-2022-10-30/">twin bombings in Mogadishu</a> that killed over 100 people.</p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin region (northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and southeastern Niger) saw a levelling out of violence from Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the past year. However, this obscures a 33% increase in violence against civilians. There’s also been a geographic spread of attacks from northeastern Nigeria to regions in the west and centre.</p>
<p>In northern Mozambique, violent events linked to Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’a (ASWJ) rose by 29% in 2022. They had initially dropped when forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwanda intervened in 2021. Dislodged from the coastal cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia, ASWJ has shifted its attacks to districts further west and south. ASWJ is notorious for mounting a higher share of violent attacks against civilians than seen in any other region in Africa.</p>
<p>North Africa is the one region that has seen a demonstrable drop in activity over the past year. There’s been a 32% decline in violent events. In 2022 there were 162 events, compared to 238 events in 2021. Roughly 90% of the 2022 incidents, resulting in 276 fatalities, were in Egypt involving the Islamic State in Sinai. </p>
<h2>Time for a rethink</h2>
<p>These developments underscore that the overall trajectory of militant Islamist violence is trending in the wrong direction. African militant groups are becoming increasingly resilient, particularly in the Sahel and Somalia. </p>
<p>In both regions, these groups have been operating for years. They’ve established the capacity to recruit, train, supply and deploy their forces. Vitally, they’ve also become adept at generating revenue. This occurs through a combination of looting, extortion, control of mining sites and trade route domination. In most cases, this equates to becoming more criminally rather than ideologically motivated. This operational and financial resiliency suggests that these groups are unlikely to fade away anytime soon.</p>
<p>The flipside of this reality is that these militant groups thrive in regions with weak governments. They are a symptom of fragility rather than a demonstration of militant strength. When confronted with an effective and capable statutory force, they take heavy losses and are forced to retreat. </p>
<p>This points to the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR291z1/RAND_RR291z1.pdf">central role that governance plays</a> in defeating an insurgency. Experience shows that effective counterinsurgency requires: government legitimacy, political will, control of corruption, investment in development activities and the mitigation of human rights abuses, among other factors. This makes sense. Successful counterinsurgency entails gaining the trust and support of local populations. </p>
<p>The ineffectiveness of the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso are illustrative of this. In addition to intimidating dissenters and forsaking government services, the Malian junta, by partnering with the notorious Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, has become party to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">serial human rights abuses</a>. <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">Four out of five people killed by the Wagner Group</a> alongside the Malian junta were <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">civilians</a>. Meanwhile, militant violence is accelerating.</p>
<p>In addition to reestablishing legitimate governance processes, <a href="https://africacenter.org/publication/strengthening-sahelian-counterinsurgency-strategy/">effective counterinsurgency efforts</a> will require:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>sustaining pressure on militant groups, including holding territory retaken</p></li>
<li><p>protecting civilians</p></li>
<li><p>building support with and providing services to local populations</p></li>
<li><p>cutting off revenue flows for militant groups.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Regional security forces</h2>
<p>Experience from countering militant Islamist groups in Africa has also highlighted the vital role played by regional security forces. </p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/25/3/article-p236_002.xml#:%7E:text=amisom%20was%20designed%20to%20support,Shabaab%20and%20other%20militia%20groups">AMISOM/ATMIS</a> in Somalia, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique">SADC</a> in Mozambique and the <a href="https://trainingforpeace.org/publications/a-quest-to-win-the-hearts-and-minds-assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> in the Lake Chad Basin have all been instrumental in mitigating the threats faced, supporting overstretched government forces. </p>
<p>The juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, meanwhile, have done just the opposite. They have alienated the G-5 Sahel, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma">MINUSMA</a> and European Union forces. This has resulted in a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/">dramatic downsizing of security partner support</a> at the very time that militant Islamist activity is accelerating.</p>
<p>Effective counterinsurgency operations are hard. Moreover, success is not guaranteed. Even when legitimate governments <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR291z1/RAND_RR291z1.pdf">demonstrate political will</a>, it takes six years on average to prevail in a counterinsurgency. </p>
<p>African countries facing insurgencies and their regional partners should be prepared for a long slog to reverse the deteriorating trends of militant Islamist group violence. The alternative is an ever more emboldened and enriched Islamist militancy with expansive ambitions on neighbouring countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The spike in violence was marked by a 68% increase in fatalities involving civilians.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandWendy Williams, Associate Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1983212023-02-26T04:45:20Z2023-02-26T04:45:20ZNiger is Africa’s fastest growing country – how to feed 25 million more people in 30 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506424/original/file-20230125-20-c49exc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most of Niger is infertile. Two-thirds of the country is located in the Sahara desert.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Niger, a landlocked country in the dry <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahel">Sahel region</a> of Africa, struggles to feed its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NE">25 million</a> people. It currently ranks 115th out of 121 countries on the <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/methodology.html">Global Hunger Index</a>, and the number of people not getting enough to eat has increased from about 13% of the population in 2014 to <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/niger.html#:%7E:text=In%20the%202022%20Global%20Hunger,of%20hunger%20that%20is%20serious">20% in 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Things could deteriorate even further as Niger confronts a “perfect storm”. The country has one of the <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/">highest population growth rates</a> in the world, with few signs of slowing down. Its <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/files/documents/2020/Feb/un_2019_wpp_databooklet.pdf">fertility rate</a> – at an average of seven children per women – is the highest in the world.</p>
<p>Added to this, most of the country is infertile. Two-thirds of its area is located in the Sahara desert. Most of the country’s <a href="https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/land-cover/land-use-land-cover-and-trends-niger">agricultural land</a> lies in a narrow band close to the Nigerian border in the south and is being encroached on by the desert.</p>
<p>Niger’s population also has among the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI">lowest human capital indexes</a>, which among other things mean people cannot earn enough to afford to buy food. This challenge is even greater given the recent <a href="https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_summary_report_0.pdf">shift in budgetary priorities</a> away from social development and towards national security due to growing instability in the Sahel region.</p>
<p>To make matters worse, Niger is one of the regions most <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap22_FINAL.pdf">vulnerable to climate change</a>. It has high exposure to heat and a low ability to adapt to changes in climate, like increasingly unpredictable rainfall. This will negatively affect crop yields in a country where <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.IRIG.AG.ZS?locations=NE">less than 1%</a> of the cultivated land is irrigated. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506422/original/file-20230125-18-v2hepg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An aerial view of Diffa in Niger.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Janie Barrett/The Sydney Morning Herald/Fairfax Media via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s projected that <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-022-01319-3">an additional two million Nigeriens</a> will be pushed into undernourishment by 2050 by the effects of climate change on crop yields and because agricultural workers (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=NE">around 75% of the total employed population</a>) will struggle to work in the heat. </p>
<p>So, how will Niger go from feeding 25 million people today to its projected population of 50 million people in 2050? </p>
<p>In a recently published <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-022-01319-3">study</a>, my colleagues and I wanted to figure out how to achieve this – or get as close as possible. </p>
<h2>Increasing food security</h2>
<p>We identified three interventions to address food availability: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>better food supply, with accelerated investments in agricultural research and development </p></li>
<li><p>less food demand through slower population growth </p></li>
<li><p>global market integration. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But what should take priority to get the best outcome? </p>
<p>We created a model (which we called <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-022-01319-3">SIMPLE-Niger</a>) to figure this out. It used data from various sources, including household and farm surveys and satellite images.</p>
<p>Based on our model simulations, we argue that unless fertility rates fall, rapid population growth and climate change setbacks are likely to outpace possible advancements in agricultural productivity.</p>
<p>When it comes to the supply side – what’s put into agriculture – interventions and spending must focus on higher farm productivity such as climate smart research investments, and farmers’ access to and adoption of new technologies. </p>
<p>Greater integration into regional markets will also help to combat undernourishment. It will make food commodities more accessible and available through more trade and better <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263970147_Market_Integration_and_Spatial_Price_Transmission_in_Niger_Grain_Markets">regional price integration</a> (the effect of price in one market on another market).</p>
<p>Here’s how we got to these conclusions. </p>
<h2>Integration, investment and human capital</h2>
<p>As dire as the food security situation sounds, there are signs of improvement. We believe that further interventions in these areas are crucial to improve the situation. </p>
<p>Agricultural productivity has been <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-022-01319-3">increasing</a>, driven by:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://oar.icrisat.org/7351/">new crop varieties</a></p></li>
<li><p>local soil and water <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652618308709">conservation technologies</a> like zai pits (small, shallow pits in the ground, which keep plant roots damper)</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://fmnrhub.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Rinaudo-2007-Development-of-FMNR.pdf">farmer-managed natural regenerations</a> in which farmers use their indigenous knowledge to select and promote the natural regeneration of trees and shrubs.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190707/operational-phase-african-continental-free-trade-area-launched-niger-summit">African Continental Free Trade Agreement</a> is expected to lead to greater market integration and more trade in goods and services in the agri-food sector, from surplus to deficit regions. </p>
<p>Niger’s informal and formal non-tariff barriers are <a href="https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/aggregated-ranking">high</a>, however.</p>
<p>The country will need improvements in <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/37297">trade and transport-related infrastructure</a>, especially temperature-controlled logistics for agricultural products, ease of arranging competitively priced shipments, and efficiency in customs procedure. While designing interventions, it is also important to remember that a large share of the trade happens through <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/incentives-and-constraints-of-informal-trade-between-nigeria-and-its-neighbours_7aa64379-en">informal cross-border trade</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510841/original/file-20230217-349-fwtd60.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fulani herdsman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy Kayenat Kabir</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There must also be additional investments in local agricultural research and dissemination, and to transform this into <a href="https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/45045/35520_err145.pdf?v=0">agricultural productivity growth</a>. The adoption rate for new technology and varieties is low among Nigerien farmers, even by Sahelian standards. Improved support for local researchers, enhanced extension services, private sector partnerships for technology dissemination, and input market access can boost adoption of <a href="https://ispc.cgiar.org/crop-improvement-adoption-and-impact">new technologies</a> by farmers, which will accelerate recent productivity growth. </p>
<h2>Likely setbacks</h2>
<p>Agricultural productivity growth will likely be outpaced, however, by population growth and climate change setbacks. This means the population growth rate must fall. </p>
<p>Funds must be allocated towards family planning and health. But fertility is a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41229000#metadata_info_tab_contents">deeply political and challenging issue</a>, which makes allocation of funds for these purposes difficult.</p>
<p>In fact, the <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-FR277-DHS-Final-Reports.cfm">desired family rate</a> is higher than the current family rate, meaning men and women want more children than they currently have. It’s important to consider the socioeconomic context in designing family planning programmes in Niger. </p>
<p>A big win would be to increase investments in <a href="https://www.unicef.org/niger/stories/girls-education-strengthens-economies-and-reduces-inequality-niger">women’s education</a> and labour force participation. It’s <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953614003736">widely known</a> that this would empower women to make birthing decisions freely and responsibly. Keeping girls in school also reduces the chance of child marriage, which is both a cause and consequence of pregnancy in adolescence. Investing in education is also <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315870571/end-world-population-growth-21st-century-wolfgang-lutz-sergei-scherbov-warren-sanderson">linked</a> to better food and nutrition security.</p>
<h2>Worth the investment</h2>
<p>These steps could get sidelined in a region that is witnessing <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2019/07/niger-clings-to-stability-in-west-africa/">growing instability</a>. But history tells us that a young and growing population facing food insecurity and unemployment can be a breeding ground for more <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-has-the-worlds-highest-birth-rate-and-that-may-be-a-recipe-for-unrest-108654">instability</a>. </p>
<p>Ensuring food security for Niger’s rapidly growing young population is just as important for its national security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kayenat Kabir is a Research and Teaching Associate at the Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, U.S.A. She consults with the World Bank HQ and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization HQ. The views in this article are solely the author's. </span></em></p>Better food supply, a reduction in population growth rate, and greater integration into global markets are three key steps Niger must take.Kayenat Kabir, Research and Teaching Associate, Purdue UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996282023-02-20T13:52:18Z2023-02-20T13:52:18ZIslamist terrorism is rising in the Sahel, but not in Chad – what’s different?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511155/original/file-20230220-18-cskr5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local residents gather around the biggest mosque in the region for the evening prayer in Bahai, Chad.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Di Lauro/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the rise of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria and the emergence of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">Islamist-Salafist</a> groups in northern Mali in 2013, the Sahel has increasingly been caught in the maelstrom of Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>The region is now described as the new <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133217">global epicentre</a> of violent extremism. The population is suffering immensely, and in some areas more than <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698048/EPRS_BRI(2021)698048_EN.pdf">2 million</a> people have been displaced. Agriculture and development have come to a halt there.</p>
<p>Five explanations are usually given for the rise of Islamist terrorism in the Sahel: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/salafism-in-nigeria/5EC64F70A4BCBD521C64C610A0A05FD8">dissatisfaction</a> with the political order, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">bad governance</a>, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=364364319">ethnic rivalries</a> to <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/money-talks-a-key-reason-youths-join-boko-haram">economic reasons</a> such as poverty or unemployment, especially among the youth. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/hope-better-jobs-eclipses-religious-ideology-main-driver-recruitment-violent-extremist-groups-sub-saharan-africa">recent study</a> cited economic precarity as the main factor. This is a scenario where young people in particular face high unemployment and thus lose hope about the future.</p>
<p>Chad is one of the <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks">poorest countries</a> in the world. It was ruled for 30 years by the authoritarian president Idriss Déby Itno, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">died in 2021</a> under unexplained circumstances. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno offered Chadians great hope, but ended up leaving a terrible legacy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The country fulfils all the conditions associated with Islamist terrorism. But, so far, the threat reaches Chad from the neighbouring countries and not from the inside. So then, what holds Chadian society together? </p>
<p>For my <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/contjas/article/view/239122">research</a> I drew on data from an opinion survey I conducted in five Chadian towns (the capital N’Djamena, Abéché, Sarh, Mongo and Moundou) from 2015 to 2016. My aim was to get the views of all ethnic and linguistic groups in the country. Long-term studies show that people do not change their political and religious attitudes overnight. In view of the actual political transition in Chad and the increase in Islamist terror in the region, the results are still valid today and could allow conclusions to be drawn for other countries.</p>
<p>The results show that one reason the threat of Islamist terrorism doesn’t come from inside is because Chadians want to live together peacefully. Other reasons include the fact that Chadians have high religious tolerance and Deby’s authoritarian regime favoured groups who had a tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas - appeasing them with economic benefits. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>My research sampled 1,857 people who answered about 130 questions in face-to-face interviews. By analysing the quantitative dataset, I identified groups within Chadian society according to their propensity for democracy, cohabitation and religiosity, and their religious fundamentalist tendencies.</p>
<p>The data confirmed a high fragmentation of Chad’s society along ethnic, religious and economic lines. </p>
<p><strong>Democracy:</strong> Chad is one of the <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TCD#pos4">least democratic</a> countries of the world. Yet more than half of the survey respondents supported democratic ideas. </p>
<p><strong>Tolerance:</strong> A substantial majority of respondents expressed the desire to live peacefully with other groups. But the respondents who labelled themselves Salafists – the spectrum of Salafism ranges from a spiritual renewal of Islam as in the times of Mohammed to a hybrid religious-political ideology seeking to establish a global caliphate – were the least inclined to social coexistence.</p>
<p>During individual interviews, religious Muslim and Christian leaders and opinion leaders also emphasised Chadians’ willingness to live together peacefully. They stressed that both religions are frequently represented in many families. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-rise-of-jihadist-movements-in-africa-42905">What lies behind the rise of jihadist movements in Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Religion:</strong> Chad, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/04/15/religious-affiliation-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/">a predominantly Muslim society</a>, is one of the few countries in the Sahel region to have a substantial Christian minority. This is partly a legacy of French colonial rule, which fostered a Christian educated elite in the south of the country.</p>
<p>It is also a consequence of Déby’s authoritarian and corrupt rule which emphasised the balance between the different religions. However, he favoured certain groups from the north who had been Islamised for centuries. Members of these groups were over represented in the highest income categories.</p>
<p>The data confirmed that religion played an important role in the daily life of most of those interviewed. The regular observance of religious practices is firmly embedded in the everyday life of Muslims and Christians. </p>
<p>The religious practices of the other religions were also acknowledged. </p>
<p>I was particularly interested in the respondents’ tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas that could possibly lead to religious violence. The dataset allowed me to create an “Islamist fundamentalism” index. </p>
<p>In contrast to “religiosity”, which measures religious affiliation, belief and practice, conceptualising the measurement of any <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4">religious fundamentalism</a> focuses on:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a literal understanding of the sacred book of the respective religion </p></li>
<li><p>the exclusivity of one’s religion </p></li>
<li><p>the importance of religion in societal life. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Islamist fundamentalism index also contained specific items like the introduction of Sharia law. In this way, I was able to identify respondents who were more inclined towards Islamic fundamentalism, and might even be willing to lean towards Islamist terrorism to achieve their goals.</p>
<p>The highest Islamist attitudes were expressed by more than a third of the sampled Muslim population. I found the strongest Islamist fundamentalist attitudes among respondents who attended an Arabic primary school or a Qur’anic school and had no further schooling, and among respondents with two years of higher education.</p>
<p>Only a minority of the respondents who never went to any school showed Islamist fundamentalist attitudes. </p>
<p><strong>Social profile:</strong> A large number of respondents who scored high as Islamist fundamentalists were merchants and came from high income groups. Most were most likely to have benefited economically during the Déby era. They displayed the biggest support for the late authoritarian president, embraced above average undemocratic attitudes, and supported authoritarian structures in general.</p>
<h2>What’s significant</h2>
<p>Why are these results noteworthy? </p>
<p>Research in other countries has shown that dissatisfaction and frustration about bad governance, corruption or poverty fosters the emergence of Islamist terrorism. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988">Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In Chad, however, the profiteers of the Déby regime were the most fundamentalist. They admitted that they were willing to take to violence if they did not agree with their political leader. But, with their own position secured, they seem not to have seen any need to turn against the corrupt structures that benefited them. They had made peace with the regime.</p>
<p>Déby’s son Mahamat Déby has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56836109">taken power</a> by violating the country’s constitution. He was appointed transitional president in October 2022 following a so-called national inclusive dialogue. Like his father, he has to deal with sporadic attacks by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria">Boko Haram</a> in the Lake Chad region, which is threatened by Islamist terrorism. The economic situation of the country is precarious. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chad-is-making-a-huge-effort-to-find-peace-chadians-arent-convinced-it-will-work-189268">Chad is making a huge effort to find peace: Chadians aren't convinced it will work</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Will Mahamat Déby continue to satisfy his wealthier, non-democratic compatriots, who are more inclined towards Islamist fundamentalist ideas and were the strong supporters of his father’s rule?</p>
<p>Or will he opt for democratic structures and fair distribution of resources and wealth so as not to give fundamentalist Islamist groups inside Chad a reason to turn to violence and against the state?</p>
<p>The answers to these questions are unclear. What’s needed is more knowledge about these groups and their attitudes, their behaviour and propensity for radicalisation. This will broaden our understanding of Islamist tendencies and threats, and to develop long-term peace in the Sahel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow received funding from the Gerda-Henkel-Foundation in the framework of the special research programme “Islam” for a research project about laicism in Chad. </span></em></p>Chad fulfils all conditions to be affected by Islamist terrorism. But the threat so far comes from its neighbours, not from the inside.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986002023-02-09T12:27:46Z2023-02-09T12:27:46ZWagner Group in Africa: Russia’s presence on the continent increasingly relies on mercenaries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506773/original/file-20230127-22-5wwdne.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mercenaries have been a fixture in Africa since the second half of the 20th century. They have been used to protect incumbent leaders or install new ones in conflict zones. </p>
<p>Their offering – guns for hire – has remained essentially the same for decades. However, they’ve recently undergone an evolution that forces countries to look more closely at their roles – which range from technical advisers to frontline combatants.</p>
<p>Today, mercenaries are employed to <a href="https://www.mironline.ca/outsourcing-war-mercenaries-as-a-foreign-policy-tool/">advance states’ foreign policy</a>. And Moscow is leading the way. </p>
<p>Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo have offered lucrative natural resource contracts and a landing pad for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">return of Russia to Africa</a>. Russia first gained influence on the continent during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War era</a> of the late 1940s when African states picked sides in the battle between the west and the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Moscow still considers Africa a region where it can project power – and profit from abundant natural resources. Russia’s strategy this time is rooted more in profit-seeking than ideology. It’s about cost efficiency and crude realpolitik, which pays little attention to morals or ethics. </p>
<p>While the Russian army is bogged down in a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589">war with Ukraine</a>, mercenary outfits like the Wagner Group – a quasi-private military company – are a placeholder for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sergey-lavrov-tours-africa-amid-diplomatic-isolation/a-60745880">Moscow’s geopolitical interests</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>Under President Vladimir Putin (1999-2008, and from 2012 to present), <a href="https://castbox.fm/episode/%5BBoots-Off-the-Ground%3A-Security-in-Transition-in-the-Middle-East-and-Beyond%5D-Episode-25%3A-Russian-Mercenaries-a-Weak-Link-in-Great-Power-Competition-id2055526-id490006090?country=gb">Russian private military companies</a> and mercenaries have become an essential component of Russian foreign policy. </p>
<p>In Africa, the Wagner Group has found a fertile ecosystem to spread Russian influence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">Five essential reads on Russia-Africa relations</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Over the last seven years, while researching on <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-private-security-firms-are-growing-their-presence-in-africa-why-it-matters-187309">Chinese</a> private security companies in Africa, I have also mapped the evolution of mercenaries and private military companies from Russia and <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkish-private-military-companies-are-learning-russia-204574">Turkey</a> across the region. In my view, in Africa, Russia has used the Wagner Group to protect influential leaders and advance Moscow’s geopolitical agenda. </p>
<p>The group helps secure mega investments and intervenes in crisis-ridden hotspots, often without regard for civilian losses. This profoundly affects the continent’s stability.</p>
<h2>What is the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Since Putin took power in 2012, the Russian ministry of defence has operated without independent parliamentary oversight. </p>
<p>Individual relationships have superseded military and intelligence bureaucracy. Private networks have allowed Putin’s inner circle to work in the shadows, and promote the use of paramilitary groups and mercenary outfits. </p>
<p>The Wagner Group is believed to have been set up by retired colonel <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58009514">Dmitri Utkin</a> – providing a link between the group and Russia’s military intelligence service. Details of its origins are obscure, but the outfit first hit international headlines in 2014 after Russia’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">invasion of Crimea</a>, eastern Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Wagner Group is thought to be financed by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/24/yevgeny-prigozhin-the-hotdog-seller-who-rose-to-the-top-of-putin-war-machine-wagner-group">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a>, a catering magnate turned notorious commander. </p>
<p>For years, the Wagner Group denied any official links to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Moscow/The-Kremlin">Kremlin</a>, the seat of Russian power. However, Prigozhin came out in the open in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/paramilitary-boss-contests-claim-that-russian-military-was-involved-in-soledar-fighting/">social media exchanges</a> between himself and Russia’s top military officials. </p>
<p>Considering the Kremlin’s penchant for military deception, however, Prigozhin could be an actor in the story. He may not necessarily hold the leading role.</p>
<p><a href="https://jamestown.org/program/unleashing-the-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-ukraine-crimea-and-donbas/">Sergey Sukhankin</a> researches Russian private military companies. He says Prigozhin is not an oligarch (an extremely wealthy Russian with political and social sway) able to create his own private army. </p>
<p>He likely represents another layer of obfuscation between Wagner and its absolute puppet master. </p>
<h2>Why Africa?</h2>
<p>From Mali to Sudan, the Wagner Group benefits from a lucrative combination: political instability, abundant natural resources and low-intensity armed opposition.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/russia-wagner-group-expand-ties-sudan">Sudan</a> in 2017, the Wagner Group provided security and logistical support to protect former president Omar al-Bashir. In exchange, Russian businesses secured diamond mining concessions. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a>, which has rich diamond and gold deposits, the group began supporting the government’s battle against rebel groups in 2017. In exchange, Russian advisers have gained the state’s ear on political and economic matters. </p>
<p>In gas-rich <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html">Mozambique</a>, the Wagner Group supported government forces fighting insurgents in the country’s north. A month before Wagner’s deployment in September 2019, Mozambique signed agreements on mineral resources, energy and defence with Russia.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">Mali</a> in 2021, the government contracted the Wagner Group to fight extremism in the Sahel. Russia’s foreign affairs minister, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">Sergei Lavrov</a>, confirmed this.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">reports</a> of Russian mercenaries’ violence towards non-combatants keep growing. </p>
<p>UN experts have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">called for investigations</a> into the group’s role in the massacre of several hundred civilians in Mali in March 2022. In January 2023, the US labelled Wagner a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220">criminal organisation</a>.</p>
<p>The group’s growing footprint in Africa has been met by tighter sanctions against its leaders and their companies. The <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220">US</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/13/eu-imposes-restrictive-measures-against-the-wagner-group/">European Union</a> have led the charge. Sixteen European nations, including France, the UK and Germany, have cited the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/12/24/africa/russia-mercenaries-mali-intl/index.html">Russian government’s involvement</a> in providing material support in Wagner Group’s deployment in Mali.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Despite the international uproar, sanctions have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b75d0b8e-fcd8-4722-9180-39a01279d3b4">limited impact</a>. It’s likely that Russian mercenaries will continue to increase their footprint in Africa. </p>
<p>In my view, the Wagner Group’s growing presence in Africa illustrates that “manageable chaos” is the final goal. </p>
<p>This means maintaining insecurity and profiting from the ongoing instability via <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/undermining-democracy-and-exploiting-clients-the-wagner-groups-nefarious-activities-in-africa/#reference19">exploitative relationships</a> with multiple African governments. </p>
<p>The Kremlin’s continued reliance on the Wagner Group sheds light on the <a href="https://africacenter.org/experts/joseph-siegle/russia-strategic-goals-africa/">strategic importance of Africa</a> in Russia’s foreign policy. As Moscow seeks to tap into Africa’s natural resources and challenge western influence, it’s found a receptive audience among states dissatisfied with the west’s track record. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">Russia’s war with Ukraine: Five reasons why many African countries choose to be ‘neutral’</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The history of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-rise-of-mercenary-armies-in-africa/a-61485270">mercenary activity in Africa</a> serves as a cautionary tale, however. </p>
<p>The exploitation of “manageable chaos” for profit leads to resource depletion, corruption, human rights abuses and impaired long-term development. Uncovering the true security capabilities of these mercenary outfits is a necessary step towards accountability and legitimacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198600/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Wagner Group has become a tool to further Russian objectives in Africa without attracting the scrutiny that regular military units would.Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.