tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/saudi-iran-rivalry-35685/articlesSaudi-Iran rivalry – The Conversation2023-10-11T13:25:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154732023-10-11T13:25:40Z2023-10-11T13:25:40ZIsrael-Gaza conflict: how could it change the Middle East’s political landscape? Expert Q&A<p><em>The surprise attack by Hamas launched on Israel on October 7 has already led to thousands of deaths in both Israel and Gaza, and sparked concerns that the conflict could escalate across the Middle East. An expert in the politics and relations of this region, Simon Mabon, explains how all the key players are likely to view this dramatic escalation in violence.</em></p>
<p><strong>Just before the attack by Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman had talked of progress on a “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141302">historic peace deal</a>” between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Is such an agreement dead in the water now?</strong></p>
<p>Not necessarily. The US-led “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/15/uae-bahrain-and-israel-sign-historic-accords-at-white-house-event-formal-relations-trump-netanyahu">Abraham accords</a>”, signed in September 2020, changed the dynamic of what was possible in the Middle East. While Egypt and Jordan had previously established diplomatic relations with Israel (in 1979 and 1994 respectively), the accords signalled that a wider “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/map-which-mena-countries-have-diplomatic-ties-with-israel">normalisation</a>” of relations between Israel and the Arab states was in process – and by virtue of this, that Saudi Arabia, which has never recognised Israel as a state, would also normalise relations at some point.</p>
<p>Speaking to Saudi friends, they had envisaged a revival of the 2002 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Peace_Initiative">Arab Peace Initiative</a>, which was driven by Saudi Arabia. Getting Israel to buy into that would have been the win that Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Saudi’s crown prince and prime minister, needed to make normalisation happen. Of course, following the shocking attack by Hamas on Israeli civilians, there won’t be any kind of peace initiative for now.</p>
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<p>Saudi Arabia has not publicly condemned the attacks, but has been <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2386901/middle-east">vocal in its calls for de-escalation</a>, joining a growing chorus of international voices expressing concern at what comes next. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/how-did-arab-states-react-hamas-attack-israel">criticised Hamas</a> for the murder of Israeli civilians. But Israel knows it’s a diplomatic game. In the longer term, the shifting political and economic landscape in the Middle East still points to a desire to establish relations with Israel, and to realign regional politics in such a way that Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are broadly on the same side of history.</p>
<p><strong>Was the attack on Israel an attempt to disrupt this process?</strong></p>
<p>The main driver of the attack on Israel by <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-group-that-attacked-israel-215288">Hamas</a>, the elected governing authority in Gaza since 2007, is the 16-year land, sea and air blockade of this Palestinian territory. In Gaza, more than 2 million people live in an area a quarter of the size of London with limited access to electricity and water.</p>
<p>But the timing of the attack certainly carries wider significance. It came during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-assault-echoes-1973-arab-israeli-war-a-shock-attack-and-questions-of-political-intelligence-culpability-215228">50th anniversary of the 1973 war</a>, when Egyptian and Syrian armies invaded Israel, which I think is symbolically important. And the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s move to normalise relations with Israel is also significant, because Hamas – and potentially others in the region – will see it as a bonus if the conflict serves to disrupt that dynamic.</p>
<p><strong>When MBS said that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/saudi-arabia-getting-closer-to-normalising-relations-with-israel-crown-prince-says">solving the Palestinian issue</a>” was key to the normalisation process, what did he mean?</strong></p>
<p>There’s a cynical answer to this, which is that Saudi’s leader was looking to use rhetoric to cultivate some support, and to reassure those people (in Saudi and elsewhere) who are concerned about the process of normalisation. To be clear, that’s the bigger prize for MBS – not the articulation or realisation of a Palestinian state.</p>
<p>In the context of Israel-Palestine and the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-palestine-the-legacy-of-oslo-and-the-future-of-a-two-state-solution-podcast-214107">two-state solution</a>”, peace is a mirage – an illusion held up by people seeking to solidify their positions of influence in Israel, Palestine and beyond. If you look at the facts on the ground, there is no two-state solution in process; Palestine is not even recognised as a state by a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine#:%7E:text=Among%20the%20G20%2C%20nine%20countries,the%20United%20States">large number of countries</a>. It has been described as a political football kicked around by political elites seeking to use it for their own advantage, with the Palestinian people being the ones suffering for decades.</p>
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<p>If we look at the Abraham accords, the positive spin for Palestinians was that there might be scope for states engaging Israel to put pressure on them, to try and force some kind of resolution. But we’re over three years into these accords and nothing has happened.</p>
<p><strong>What’s been Saudi Arabia’s gameplan?</strong></p>
<p>MBS wants to position Saudi as the driving force of regional affairs – and to ensure that he has the economic power to bring about his “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-saudi-arabias-vision-2030-mean-for-its-citizens-58466">Vision 2030</a>” transformation of the kingdom away from a reliance on oil. But to do that, he needs to address regional security concerns. He’s started doing that with Iran, and has already been doing it tacitly with Israel for a number of years.</p>
<p>There is back-channel dialogue, a lot of collaboration under the table, but recently this has become more open. And it’s not hugely popular among some Saudis and other Arab publics, who continue to see the Palestinian cause as important. So, you have a disjunct between elite leaders in the region, who regard Israel as “just another member” of this club of states, and their people, who view the occupation of Palestinian territories as a key element of the Arab portfolio.</p>
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<p><strong>What does Israel want from the normalisation process?</strong></p>
<p>Recognition. Saudi Arabia is the last major Arab player not to recognise Israel other than Qatar, which will not recognise Israel because of its politics and long history of supporting members of Hamas and political Islamist organisations who stand against Israel. And Saudi is hugely symbolic – it’s the leader of the Sunni Muslim world and the location of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina.</p>
<p>For Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel would bring an end, formally, to the Arab-Israeli wars that dominated the 20th century in the Middle East. It would hammer home that the new dividing line (a geopolitical line that, in reality, has been playing out over the past 20 years) is between the Arab states plus Israel, and Iran – although there has been an effort to try to reintegrate Iran into the region as well, culminating in a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85870/saudi-arabia-and-iran-the-politics-of-detente/">China-led normalisation agreement</a> with Saudi earlier this year.</p>
<p><strong>How does Iran feel about current events?</strong></p>
<p>The attack carried out on Israel was a hugely sophisticated, multi-pronged military operation, beyond anything that we’ve seen from Hamas before. That suggests some type of strategic involvement from “others” – but there’s been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/09/no-evidence-yet-of-iran-link-to-hamas-attack-says-israeli-military">no evidence presented</a> that Iran was involved.</p>
<p>Iran is often viewed as an irrational actor, trying to destabilise things – but that misreads the nature of the Islamic Republic and its foreign policy objectives. Firstly, its leaders are pragmatic – they want the republic to survive. Since its inception in 1979, it has faced a huge number of threats to its survival – and right now, it’s got a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-hijab-protests-challenge-legitimacy-of-islamic-republic-191958">very serious one internally</a>. So, while there may be an argument to say that a “rally round the flag” type of event might shift focus away from this domestic unrest, I think the stakes are so high that it wouldn’t want to risk openly engaging in conflict with Israel right now.</p>
<p>Iran just doesn’t have the financial resources. It needs the normalisation of relations with states such as Saudi Arabia and, by extension, the US, to have a cash injection to revive its oil and gas industry, which is in a state of disrepair. It needs a huge cash stimulus to get back on its feet. </p>
<p>However, there is an ideological dimension to the Islamic Republic which we shouldn’t ignore. It has positioned itself against the state of Israel for decades, and this is tied into its very essence. In this, Iran is at the vanguard of what it calls the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance#:%7E:text=The%20term%20Axis%20of%20Resistance,military%20alliance%20between%20Iran%2C%20militant">axis of resistance</a>” – a loose alliance of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and, previously, Syria.</p>
<p><strong>Do the other Gulf states have much influence on how this will play out?</strong></p>
<p>The UAE is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-after-israel-gaza-conflict-says-it-does-not-mix-trade-with-politics-2023-10-10/">invested economically in the West Bank</a>, as is Qatar. The UAE has taken a similar line to Saudi Arabia on the attack, calling it “a serious and grave escalation”. There’s a bit of competition between them in terms of exerting influence in the West Bank, but broadly they’re on the same path, given that UAE was involved in the Abraham accords and Saudi has been talking about normalisation.</p>
<p>History has shown us that there has sometimes been a willingness to disregard controversial issues in the region. For example, when the US embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/14/world-leaders-react-to-us-embassy-relocation-to-jerusalem">most states remained quiet</a> despite it being a hugely symbolic switch. But, of course, the attack on Israel is at an altogether different level of political sensitivity.</p>
<p>Qatar is trying to play a mediatory role in terms of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-leads-talks-swap-hamas-held-hostages-palestinians-israeli-jails-2023-10-09/">potential prisoner swaps</a>. It has a growing history of trying to engage in diplomatic initiatives, having been involved in <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/160109/da1df25567ebd34af26d634892934b03.pdf">Lebanon in the mid-2000s</a> and has been involved in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/qatar-expects-us-taliban-talks-to-have-successful-outcome-very-soon-/4812426.html">dialogue between the US and the Taliban</a>. But despite this diplomatic dimension to Qatari foreign policy, it hasn’t demonstrated that it’s able to exert much influence over Israel.</p>
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<p><strong>Where does this leave the Palestinian people?</strong></p>
<p>The Palestinian people are increasingly isolated – caught up in the contours of geopolitical machinations, abandoned by those who should be supporting them. While countries have some dialogue with Palestinian groups such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah">Fatah</a> in the West Bank, these groups are so weak and have so little legitimacy that it doesn’t really matter what they say. With such huge power disparities, there is limited inclination for the Israelis to engage in peace – even less so since the Hamas attack – and limited capacity for the Palestinians to engage in peace. </p>
<p>In the wake of the attack, Gazans have been <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-instructs-gazans-on-evacuation-routes-while-many-find-shelter-in-unrwa-schools/">instructed by Israel to flee their city</a> – but given there is a blockade and you have to have permission from the Israelis to leave through Israeli-controlled checkpoints, there is <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/hamas-israel-war-we-are-being-completely-strangled-aid-workers-report-from-inside-gazas-worst-ever-humanitarian-crisis-12981768">nowhere for them to go</a>. Gaza is effectively the largest open-air prison in the world, with infrastructure that has been devastated by the 16 years of blockade. The ongoing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-threatens-kill-captives-if-israel-strikes-civilians-2023-10-09/">Israeli air strikes</a> are further destroying its hospitals, schools, shops and homes.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-gaza-strip-why-the-history-of-the-densely-populated-enclave-is-key-to-understanding-the-current-conflict-215306">The Gaza Strip − why the history of the densely populated enclave is key to understanding the current conflict</a>
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<p>Hamas as a political entity is not particularly popular, because it hasn’t been able to achieve its goals. But as a militant group, it has cultivated legitimacy in certain constituencies. However, the morally repugnant act of killing civilians will, I think, prove to be a major strategic mistake for the organisation. Israel’s response to the Hamas attack is being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/hamas-attack-israel-us-opinion-divided">widely positioned</a> as part of the “global war on terror”, positioning Hamas alongside groups such as al-Qaeda and Daesh as Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, seeks to cultivate global support for his actions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestinian-Authority">Palestinian Authority</a> (PA), which is the broad umbrella organisation that regulates life in the West Bank and Gaza, is impotent, unable to exert any influence on Israel or the world stage. There’s a real frustration among Palestinian people with the PA, who will not come out and condemn Hamas because that would mean condemning resistance against an occupation that has caused such devastation in the years after the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39960461">1967 war</a>.</p>
<p>The attack has emboldened extremist voices on all sides, from Hamas militants in Gaza to the right-wing settler communities in Israel. The consequences of extremist voices gaining prominence, and the violence that follows, will be devastating.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and The Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>Is the much-heralded Israel-Saudi peace deal now dead? And how is Iran likely to respond? An expert in Middle Eastern politics explainsSimon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047242023-05-05T12:13:03Z2023-05-05T12:13:03ZCan China broker peace in Yemen – and further Beijing’s Middle East strategy in the process?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524428/original/file-20230504-17-av4fuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5742%2C3837&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Houthi fighter patrols an area during Yemen's civil war.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fighter-of-the-houthi-group-stands-while-patrolling-at-al-news-photo/1409540631?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After nearly a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">decade of grinding conflict</a>, Yemen looks to be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/11/progress-on-yemen-peace-talks-despite-prisoner-swap-delay">inching toward a peace deal</a>.</p>
<p>Talks between the Houthi movement controlling much of the country’s north and Saudi Arabia, the regional power backing an anti-Houthi coalition in the war, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-houthi-peace-talks-yemens-sanaa-conclude-with-further-rounds-planned-2023-04-14">are ongoing</a> and being <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">encouraged by international observers</a>.</p>
<p>On May 1, 2023, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-lenderkings-travel-to-the-gulf-4/">U.S. announced that it had sent</a> Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking to the Persian Gulf to “advance ongoing efforts to secure a new agreement and launch a comprehensive peace process.”</p>
<p>But the U.S. has far less of a role in steering negotiations than <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/04/07/yemen-war-ceasefire-china-saudi-arabia-iran/">Washington’s great global rival: China</a>. The recent breakthrough in Yemen has been undergirded by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia</a>, facilitated by Beijing in March 2023.</p>
<p>As an academic who specializes in <a href="https://polisci.colostate.edu/faculty-and-staff/mmahad/">U.S. and Chinese strategic engagement</a> across eastern Africa and the Middle East, I appreciate that the diplomatic breakthrough brokered by Beijing has implications for the region. It has the potential to reduce rivalries and strengthen stability in Yemen, along with other countries prone to sectarian violence, including Lebanon and Iraq.</p>
<p>But it has also led to speculation over China’s emergence as a major regional player in the Middle East. The development not only <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/15/world/us-saudi-china-relations-intl/index.html">challenges the United States’</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/world/asia/china-saudi-arabia-iran-us.html">long-established dominance</a> in the Gulf, but it also raises questions about Beijing’s strategic agenda and motives.</p>
<h2>Fragmentation and regional dynamics</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/the-broader-context-behind-chinas-mediation-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi-Iran breakthrough</a> might contribute to a lasting peace in Yemen.</p>
<p>But given the role that the rivalry between the regional powers has had in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks.html">fueling the fighting</a>, international observers have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1135477">expressed optimism</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">disintegration of Yemen</a> began with the collapse of its central government in 2011 after the Arab Spring uprising. In 2014, the Houthi group, a Shiite militia backed by Iran, took control of the capital, Sanaa, and forced transitional President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee to Aden. Hadi’s government struggled to establish itself in Aden and eventually relocated to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he resigned in 2022.</p>
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<p>Viewing the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia">Houthis as an Iranian proxy</a>, Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni conflict, backing those loyal to Hadi and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">bombarding Houthi areas from the air</a>. These <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/23/un-yemen-recovery-possible-in-one-generation-if-war-stops-now">Saudi-led attacks</a> contributed to a massive humanitarian crisis. The conflict has resulted in the <a href="https://yemen.un.org/en/176632-yemenunct-annual-report-2021">deaths of at least 377,000 Yemenis</a>, the United Nations projected in 2021, many through indirect causes such as starvation and disease. It has also led to widespread displacement of civilian populations and the breakdown of infrastructure.</p>
<p>The country remains fragmented, with militias controlling separate territories and no functional central government.</p>
<h2>China’s path through Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>So where does China come in? Beijing has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/">no formal diplomatic, economic or political ties</a> with any the numerous militias that currently govern parts of the country. But before 2014, China had a healthy trading and economic relationship with Yemen. According to the World Bank, in 2013 China was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=CN">Yemen’s second-largest trading partner</a> after Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Since 2014, trade between China and Yemen persisted, albeit in a mostly informal manner. Data from the international trade-tracking Observatory of Economic Complexity indicates that <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/yem">China imported US$411 million worth of products</a>, mainly crude oil but also copper, from Yemen in 2021. What remains unclear is which rebel factions have received revenue through the trade. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China has maintained formal <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/china-and-yemens-forgotten-war">diplomatic and economic ties</a> with Iran, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – each of which back militias involved in Yemen’s war. In fact, China has been intensifying its economic and political connections with all three regional powers. </p>
<p>In recent years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-china/xis-visit-to-uae-highlights-chinas-rising-interest-in-middle-east-idUSKBN1KA26K">visited both the UAE</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/08/1141202088/xi-jinping-saudi-arabia-china">Saudi Arabia</a> to underscore Beijing’s growing role as a partner in the region. Xi also <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230216_11025776.html">recently hosted Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi</a> during a state visit to China.</p>
<h2>What’s to gain from peace?</h2>
<p>This expanding relationship with key players in the Yemeni conflict puts China in a unique position as a potential peace broker. Yet uniting the three regional powers around a common peace plan has to date proved difficult.</p>
<p>The UAE can influence Yemeni factions it has provided military and financial support to, including the “<a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b728d5ba.html">Security Belt” forces</a> affiliated with the transitional government. However, the Emiratis’ goals may differ from those seeking a unified, independent Yemen. Since the conflict broke out, the UAE has displayed a tendency to undermine Yemen’s territorial integrity through, for example, taking <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/28/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-consolidating-strategic-positions-in-yemens-east-and-islands/">control of some Yemeni islands, such as Socotra</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Iran may be reluctant to accept any peace agreement that would diminish its influence in Yemen. Tehran’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">relationship with the Houthis</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/the-limits-of-irans-influence-on-yemens-houthi-rebels">has not been as consistently</a> solid as some outside observers suggest, but ties have <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/houthis-and-iran-a-war-time-alliance-121951">grown as a result of the conflict</a>. Should hostilities cease, the Houthis’ military dependence on Iran would decrease, diminishing Iran’s leverage.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, of the three, stands to gain the most from peace in Yemen. Cessation of conflict would likely halt <a href="https://apnews.com/article/4338ea6186ebefcd752c2c6e8f45d7a3">Houthi attacks</a> on the kingdom, save the Saudis money and resources dedicated to the Yemeni war, and potentially restore an international reputation tarnished by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">alleged war crimes in the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>To broker peace in Yemen, China would presumably need to concentrate efforts on working with the Saudis. </p>
<p>The Chinese-backed rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran could be a first step to this end. Although no direct mention of Yemen is made in the language of the agreement, it <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202303/t20230311_11039241.html">does talk of</a> both sides’ support for “the non-interference in internal affairs of states” and “keenness to exert all efforts towards enhancing regional and international peace and security.”</p>
<p>And since that agreement in March, there has been progress toward peace in Yemen. A Saudi delegation led by the kingdom’s ambassador to Yemen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-omani-delegations-arrive-sanaa-hold-talks-with-houthi-leader-2023-04-09/">held talks with Houthi leaders in Sanaa</a> on April 9. The talks were the first direct negotiations between the two sides on Yemeni soil since the war began in 2015.</p>
<h2>The thinking in Beijing</h2>
<p>But why is China invested in what happens in an ongoing conflict far from its borders – especially when it is already consumed with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-military-taiwan-us-7549c646a377f1f199d2cda983573279">perceived strategic and military threats</a> closer to home?</p>
<p>The argument that a cessation of hostilities in Yemen would <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/">grant China economic benefits</a> by <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/bab-al-mandab.htm">providing access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait</a> – a key strategic channel on the Arabian peninsula for commerce and trade, with an estimated 4% of global oil supply passing through it – ignores some critical factors, I believe. Rebuilding a war-shattered Yemen and establishing a stable government may take time – and the investment required to do so might outweigh short-term economic gains.</p>
<p>Moreover, China already has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3">a military base in Djibouti</a>, giving it access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait even without peace in Yemen.</p>
<p>It could be that China is seeking to be seen as a global peacemaker as part of a strategy that has been referred to as “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/02/olympics-china-uyghurs-genocide-boycott/">diplomatic whitewashing</a>” – that is, making friends overseas and playing the “nice guy” to distract from China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037">treatment of its Uyghur minority</a> at home and Xi’s increasingly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/20/world/asia/xi-china-us.html">confrontational posture on Taiwan</a> and the South China Sea.</p>
<p>But it also fits a wider geopolitical trend. The counterbalance to China’s growing role in the Middle East is the declining influence of the United States in the region.</p>
<p>Priorities in Washington have shifted to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">strategic concerns in East Asia</a> <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/why-the-united-states-must-stay-the-course-on-ukraine/">and Ukraine</a>, leading to a diplomatic opportunity for China – one Beijing is seemingly keen to exploit.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia have cooled, in part due to the Yemeni war. And Washington has had <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-iran/">no formal diplomatic relations with Iran</a> for decades.</p>
<p>As a neutral player, China can engage with Tehran and Riyadh in a way the U.S. simply cannot. That was evident in China’s role in the rapprochement, and it could be the case in resolving Yemen’s war.</p>
<p>For China, it provides opportunities for another diplomatic success from which it could emerge as a reliable partner in a changing geopolitical landscape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204724/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Yemen’s brutal civil war has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. But a recent Beijing-brokered rapprochement between two regional powers could unlock a path to peace.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1241232019-11-14T09:52:19Z2019-11-14T09:52:19ZHow Saudi-Iranian oil rivalry has been shaped by American power<p>The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both oil-rich states in the Middle East, has oscillated from co-operation to conflict throughout history. Alongside <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/saudi-arabia-and-iran-9781788316323/">a range of factors that shape their rivalry</a> including sectarianism and nationalism has been the politics of oil. </p>
<p>Oil is <a href="http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-00746-X.html">a strategic international commodity</a>, and its use as a political tool is widespread. Its role in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry can’t be understood without unpicking the international context, and the power structures that govern the way countries interact with each other. At the heart of this is the dominance of the US over this international system. </p>
<p>The dynamics between the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia over oil were laid bare in September 2019, after a series of drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities. The attacks caused the suspension of <a href="https://www.saudiaramco.com/en/news-media/news/2019/incidents-at-abqaiq-and-khurais">5.7m barrels per day</a> (mbpd) of crude oil production, nearly half the Saudi output. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">Houthis, a Yemeni faction</a>, claimed responsibility. However, American and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/18/saudi-oil-attack-rouhani-dismisses-us-claims-of-iran-role-as-slander">Saudi</a> government officials accused Iran of committing these attacks. In return, the Iranians <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190922-iran-rouhani-blames-foreign-forces-causing-insecurity-gulf-saudi-arabia-usa">blamed foreign forces</a> in the region for the insecurity and told the US to leave the area. </p>
<p>While the Saudi-Iranian oil rivalry is ostensibly the business of these two countries, it has always had an international dimension, overshadowed by the US.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-and-iran-how-our-two-countries-could-make-peace-and-bring-stability-to-the-middle-east-118696">Saudi and Iran: how our two countries could make peace and bring stability to the Middle East</a>
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<h2>After the revolution</h2>
<p>The 1979 Iranian revolution marked a turning point for the place oil played within the Saudi-Iranian relationship. Before then, both countries were important allies of the US, a position which brought with it political and economic benefits particularly to their oil industries. But the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran paved the way for a separation of paths. </p>
<p>While Saudi Arabia remained a staunch ally of the US, Iran adopted a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Iran_Saudi_Arabia_Relations_and_Regional.html?id=MhCgBAAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">revolutionary and anti-Western foreign policy</a>, which prompted its isolation from an international system that was dominated by the US. </p>
<p>As a result, ever since 1979, the Iranian oil industry has been subject to American pressure, through a range of economic sanctions and embargoes, which has crippled Iranian oil production. Iran has been unable to reach the level of oil production of over six mbpd that it had in the pre-revolution years. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html">Saudi oil production</a> reached over 12 mbpd in 2018.</p>
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<p>This led to the Iranian oil industry being deprived of necessary foreign investment and technology transfer, and it <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/impact-of-the-iranian-revolution-on-oil-still-lingers-1.818541">has fallen behind</a> Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s state-owned oil company, and other regional competitors. Saudi Arabia has largely backed the US policy of isolating and sanctioning Iran, particularly the Iranian oil industry, which has, as I’ve argued elsewhere, contributed to the ongoing <a href="https://www.sepad.org.uk/announcement/oil-in-saudi-iranian-relations">tensions in the Saudi-Iranian relationship</a>. </p>
<p>As Saudi Aramaco prepares for an IPO in December that could make it the <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-aramcos-1-5-trillion-ipo-flies-in-the-face-of-climate-reality-126544">world’s biggest publicly listed company</a>, Iran is desperate to revitalise its own outmoded oil industry. As Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh admitted in early 2019, many of Iran’s ageing oil facilities are in fact “<a href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/012219-iran-seeks-enhanced-oil-recovery-boost-for-aging-fields">operating museums</a>”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-aramcos-1-5-trillion-ipo-flies-in-the-face-of-climate-reality-126544">Saudi Aramco's $1.5 trillion IPO flies in the face of climate reality</a>
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<p>The US continues to have such an influence on Middle Eastern oil politics because of the way it has successfully pushed its own international agenda since 1945. After World War II, the US cemented its dominance over an international system built on the basis of liberal and capitalist principles. While the US rewards its allies with economic and political benefits, it punishes its challengers through a range of political and economic measures, not least economic sanctions. </p>
<p>Oil became a strategic international commodity in the post-World War II period, and began to <a href="http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-00746-X.html">play a pivotal role</a> in the way the US maintained its global dominance. To do this, the US aimed to open up and transnationalise oil rich economies in the Global South such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, to <a href="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/book-search?search_api_views_fulltext=Global+Energy+Security+and+American+Hegemony&Search=Submit">both promote its national interests</a> and solidify its privileged position within the current system.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the supply of Middle Eastern oil into international markets without disruption – and at a reasonable price – became an essential instrument for maintaining American dominance, even though the US didn’t need to import oil from the Middle East.</p>
<h2>A world of US dominance</h2>
<p>The political economist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706758?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Susan Strange</a> provided a theoretical framework back in 1987 to explain the structure of US dominance over the international system through four main dimensions: production, finance, security and knowledge. This is also a useful way to understand how the US shapes the international oil market – and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.</p>
<p>By 2018, in the wake of a shale boom, the US became the largest oil-producing country in the world <a href="https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html">by reaching production of 15 mbpd</a>. Financially, oil has been priced and traded in US dollars, in particular since the early 1970s when a series of negotiations and agreements linking the sale of oil to the US dollar were made between Saudi Arabia and the US. This has increased global demand for US dollars, and <a href="http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/1086/1/MCI%2BTwo%20pillars%20of%20US%20global%20hegemony.Gokay.pdf">helped the US deal with its trade deficit</a> and keep its interest rates low. It has also helped the US to monitor the petroleum trade by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dollar-powers-american-dominance-rivals-are-building-workarounds-11559155440">controlling global bank transfers</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300905/original/file-20191108-194637-1cg0mr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A system dominated by the US.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anton Watman/Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>The US also stands as a main security provider to oil-rich Gulf monarchies, with publicly acknowledged <a href="https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases-and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf">military bases in over 12 countries</a> in the Middle East. Additionally, it has a supremacy over global knowledge, most obviously through its continued domination and control of the sector’s technological needs. By leading global innovation and technological development <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de">in the shale revolution</a>, for example, and having the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?end=2017&locations=GB-FR-DE-RU-US-JP-CN&start=2002">highest budget for research and development</a>, the US largely controls global technology transfer. This has also deprived Iran of necessary technology, capital and know-how to modernise its ageing oil industry, constraining production.</p>
<p>Therefore, despite the fact that the Saudi-Iranian oil rivalry seems like a regional issue, the role of American power in a globalised world has been key to shaping this regional political competition over oil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sukru Cildir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US dominance over the international oil system has influenced the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran.Sukru Cildir, PhD Candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1239582019-09-25T00:12:59Z2019-09-25T00:12:59ZTrump scorns United Nations as tensions with Iran flare over Saudi oil attacks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293821/original/file-20190924-51410-63m9xq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trump addresses the United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters, Sept. 24, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/UN-General-Assembly-Trump/ea00a88b8dc74811bed293e273e0718f/2/0">AP Photo/Mary Altaffer</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump made his disdain for the United Nations quite clear in his Sept. 24 address to the General Assembly, saying the future “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2019/sep/24/trump-bolsonaro-and-johnson-to-open-un-general-assembly-live-news">belongs to patriots not globalists</a>.” </p>
<p>Nor did he ask the United Nations to get involved in the aftermath of recent attacks on <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/16/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-attacks-on-saudi-oil-facilities-yemen-houthis-iran-who-attacked/">two oil refineries</a> in Saudi Arabia. Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility, but the U.S., Saudi Arabia and several European countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/france-germany-britain-leaders-iran-saudi-oil-attack-190923201421030.html">blame Iran</a> for the attacks, which knocked out the facilities responsible for <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-saudi-oil-why-didnt-prices-go-crazy-123823">half of all Saudi oil production</a>. Iran, which may have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/16/why-iran-is-getting-blame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/">supplied weapons to the Houthis in the past</a>, denies any involvement. </p>
<p>This is precisely the kind of international conflict the United Nations was <a href="https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/">created in 1945</a> to address. </p>
<p>But what does the United Nations actually do when there are allegations of misconduct by one country toward another?</p>
<h2>More than a talk shop</h2>
<p>I’m an <a href="https://udayton.edu/news/articles/2018/05/shelley_inglis_human_rights_center_executive_director.php">international law professor</a> who worked as a policy adviser for 15 years at the U.N. All U.S. presidents since the end of the Cold War, both Republican and Democrat, have sought action through the U.N. to tackle international conflict and crisis. </p>
<p>Established to usher in a new era of global peace, social and economic progress, and to protect international law and human rights after World War II, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-iii/index.html">the U.N. has six principal organs</a>, or units. Two would be particularly relevant to the current situation between the U.S., Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml">United Nations General Assembly</a>, now underway in New York, decides on the U.N.’s budget, oversees its subsidiary bodies and creates the international norms and standards which guide countries’ behavior and commitments. </p>
<p>When heads of state and premier diplomats from <a href="https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html">193 countries</a> meet in New York each September to discuss the international issues of the day, the General Assembly serves as the court of public opinion. It is the place to generate policy positions on global challenges, from nuclear disarmament and terrorism to human rights and poverty eradication.</p>
<p>When there is a threat to international peace, the U.N. <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">Security Council</a> – the most powerful U.N. body – is likely to get involved. Its role is to determine threats to peace and decide measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.</p>
<p>To do that, the Security Council can <a href="https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/">make legally binding resolutions</a>, like requiring sanctions or weapons inspections, authorizing a peacekeeping mission or calling for negotiations. In some instances, it may even create ad hoc war crimes courts or authorize a coalition of U.N. countries to intervene directly in a conflict.</p>
<p>Fifteen countries sit on the Security Council, but only five – the U.S., U.K., France, China and Russia – are permanent members. Permanent members have veto power, meaning each can stop or obstruct any proposed Security Council action.</p>
<h2>US engagement with the UN</h2>
<p>The U.S. has frequently engaged the Security Council during times of tension with Middle East countries.</p>
<p>The United Nations first major test after the end of the Cold War came under President George H.W. Bush in 1990, when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait. Bush, a former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., worked with the U.N. extensively to try to avoid and, eventually, to <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/history-lesson-when-funding-the-un-was-a-bi-partisan-cause/">obtain authorization for the first Iraq War</a>. </p>
<p>The Security Council responded immediately to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait with a <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/660">resolution condemning</a> the incursion and demanding Iraq withdraw. When Iraq refused to comply, the U.N. passed 12 more resolutions, ultimately authorizing member states to use “<a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678">all necessary means</a>” to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait.</p>
<p>This is the authorization the United States ultimately <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/fogofwar/docdirective.htm">used as the basis for Operation Desert Storm</a>.</p>
<p>A decade later, Bush’s son, George W. Bush, <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/un_006.asp">also sent diplomats to the U.N.</a> to assert the administration’s right to <a href="http://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">invade Afghanistan</a> after the Sept. 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks based on self-defense – a justification the Security Council recognized. </p>
<p>Things went less well for President Bush the next time he appealed to the the U.N. for help.</p>
<p>In New York in <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html">September 2002</a>, Bush made the case that Iraq, amassing weapons, had once again become a <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.transcript/">threat to international peace</a>. A few months later, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued to the Security Council that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa">Iraq</a> must face military consequences for violating <a href="https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf">Security Council resolutions prohibiting it from amassing weapons of mass destruction</a>. The Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations.</p>
<p>The Security Council did not <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">explicitly endorse that U.S.-led intervention in Iraq</a>, but the Bush administration invaded anyway. Many policymakers argued that its actions were lawful based on the prior U.N. resolutions. </p>
<p>Others disagreed, saying the second Iraq War <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">violated international law</a>.</p>
<h2>Who needs the UN?</h2>
<p>So the U.S. may not always get the outcome it wants at the U.N. But it has traditionally taken pains to demonstrate that it recognizes the United Nations as an essential institution.</p>
<p>While Trump addressed Iran in his speech to the General Assembly, his lack of a call for a response to recent events breaks with this history. But it is not surprising from this president.</p>
<p>Trump has taken steps to withdraw the United States from <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/04/26/717547741/trump-moves-to-withdraw-u-s-from-u-n-arms-trade-treaty?t=1569313953456">certain U.N. programs</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/02/trump-stealthily-seeks-to-choke-off-funding-to-un-programs/">decrease funding for its operations</a>. He also withdrew the United States from the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/">Iran nuclear deal</a>, which was <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11974.doc.htm">unanimously approved by the U.N.</a> in 2015.</p>
<p>The U.N. secretary-general has called for “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046952">maximum restraint</a>” after the attacks on Saudi oil facilities. There seems to be little interest in an escalation of regional tensions. </p>
<p>Still, the U.N. remains the place to go when a head of state wants to build support among the world’s leaders to tackle a major issue of peace and security. Despite President Trump’s posture at the General Assembly, there really is nowhere else to turn. </p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has historically asked for international support when brewing conflicts in the Middle East boiled over.Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/933382018-03-19T16:06:28Z2018-03-19T16:06:28ZTrump believes he can make an Israeli-Palestinian deal. Don’t hold your breath<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210652/original/file-20180315-104694-1657y7t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinian laborers work at a construction site in an Israeli settlement near Jerusalem in 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Oded Balilty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, U.S. presidents have been unable to broker a long-term settlement between Israel and Palestine. Deal-maker Donald Trump would like to accomplish what his predecessors could not in this area, and administration officials say the plan will be unveiled soon. </p>
<p>Could Trump succeed?</p>
<p>I’m <a href="https://www.umass.edu/spp/people/faculty/david-mednicoff">a scholar</a> who teaches about the high stakes of Middle East conflict. I think we should look beyond obvious obstacles to consider why Trump may believe he can achieve a deal. However, past failures and present Palestinian-Israeli hostility suggest that skepticism about an agreement remains warranted.</p>
<h2>The basic obstacles to peace</h2>
<p>The barriers to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement are numerous. </p>
<p>On the Israeli side, a deal would be unpopular among <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel/israels-right-wing-has-grand-plans-for-trump-era-idUSKBN1531YK">Israelis</a> <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Public-opinion-poll-No-Palestinian-state-in-five-years-501329">on the political right</a> and require tremendous change. For example, Israel’s military and security position would be entirely different if it disengaged from much of the West Bank. And Israeli governments have faced relatively <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/the-real-reason-the-israel-palestine-peace-process-always-fails">low political costs to leaving the conflict unresolved</a>. </p>
<p>Israeli leaders have established massive security measures in the West Bank, restricted contact between Israelis and Palestinians through the <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/feb/13/ron-johnson/border-fence-israel-cut-illegal-immigration-99-per/">border wall</a> and allowed politically influential Israeli settlers to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-settlements/israel-planning-15000-more-settlement-homes-in-jerusalem-idUSKBN17U1OS">expand settlements</a>. All of this cements Israeli de facto control over internationally recognized <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/middleeast/settlements-explainer/index.html">Palestinian land</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, its economic and military strength and regional strategic importance to the West put Israel under little pressure to address the conflict.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Palestinian <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/looming-transition-palestinian-leadership">leadership is aging, fragmented</a> between Gaza and the West Bank and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-leaders-health/aging-and-ailing-who-will-succeed-current-palestinian-leaders-idUSKBN1AP1K8">losing credibility</a> among its people. Few Palestinians believe that <a href="https://www.vox.com/2015/1/22/7324107/palestinian-abbas-peace-process">the U.S.-led negotiating process can deliver a fair agreement</a>. Palestinian leaders may consider negotiations less useful than building <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/12/08/the-world-should-respond-to-trumps-jerusalem-declaration-with-sanctions-on-israel/">broader international pressure</a> to raise the cost to Israel of maintaining the status quo. </p>
<p>Even before Trump, the U.S. was <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/oslo-revisited-has-us-ever-been-honest-broker-419354388">viewed by many Palestinians as a dishonest broker</a>. Thus, Palestinian leaders have little reason to prioritize negotiations that seem stacked against them, over a longer diplomatic game in which American power may become weaker. This is especially so, given that Palestinians may think that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/6-58-million-each-palestinians-claim-theyll-be-as-numerous-as-jews-in-historical-palestine-next-year">their growing population will supplant Israeli Jews over time</a> and, in turn, increase their international bargaining power.</p>
<p>These are among the obstacles that <a href="http://www.mepc.org/israeli-palestinian-conflict-has-us-failed-0">diplomats faced in recent years</a> when trying to make progress toward a solution. </p>
<p>The result is an enduring impasse that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/opinion/israel-70th-anniversary.html">may endanger the democratic nature of Israel</a> and the basic rights of Palestinians. Long-term subjugation of an occupied population <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/">threatens Israeli democracy</a> by encouraging further militarization and discrimination in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Palestinians live with a lack of economic opportunities and basic <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-idf-demanding-palestinians-personal-details-at-west-bank-checpoints-1.5883906">freedom of movement</a>.</p>
<p>Given these dynamics, some <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestine-israel-two-state-solution-dead-says-peace-architect-marwan-muasher-1961898659">knowledgeable experts argue</a> that a <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-too-late-for-a-two-state-solution-in-israel-palestine-48803">two-state solution is dead</a>. </p>
<p>Why then would the Trump administration raise hopes that its inexperienced foreign policy team can succeed where others have failed?</p>
<h2>Why Trump might be acting</h2>
<p>Trump may well believe that present conditions and his willpower can move the Palestinian-Israeli conflict toward resolution. </p>
<p>His likely rationale is that his good relationship with Israel’s government might align with the strategic interest of key Arab states to push Palestinians into a credible, if unfavorable, deal.</p>
<p>Trump appears to have <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-and-netanyahu-bromance-blossoms-scandal-ridden-leaders-reaffirm-their-831464">strong rapport</a> with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Even if <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/case-4000-what-next-benjamin-netanyahu-corruption-inquiry-seeks-answers-827884">Netanyahu’s legal problems</a> neutralize his power, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/middleeast/israeli-jerusalem-west-bank.html">Israel’s more rightward-looking political forces are pleased</a> both with the Trump administration’s recent plan to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and their close ties with <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-why-is-u-s-ambassador-david-friedman-trolling-for-right-wing-israel-1.5829552">some in his administration</a>. They may therefore be willing to consider a peace plan proposed by this White House. </p>
<p>Moreover, Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner both enjoy a warm relationship <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/29/jared-kushner-saudi-arabia-244291">with Saudi Arabia</a>. Saudi Arabia, in turn, has been <a href="http://www.mepc.org/commentary/saudi-arabia-and-egypt-forge-closer-ties">working closely</a> with Egypt in regional politics. Thus, the two most populous and influential Arab states are cooperating closely with the U.S. </p>
<p>Trump insiders can point to several developments that present an unusual opportunity for a settlement. </p>
<p>First is <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/art-the-peace-deal-what-can-be-done-israel-palestine-22951">the respect hawkish Israelis hold</a> for the Trump administration. Second is the strong U.S. coordination with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who <a href="http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-arab%E2%80%93israeli-alliance">might themselves wish to step up ties to Israel</a> in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/25/middleeast/israel-saudi-relations/index.html">broader effort to combat Iran</a>. Third is the possible economic benefit to both Israel and Palestine of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/how-a-saudi-israeli-alliance-could-benefit-the-palestinians/546248/">increased regional cooperation</a>. That would happen if the barrier that the Palestinian problem represents to clearer Arab-Israeli ties were removed. Indeed, the White House has suggested that Palestinians are unlikely to get foreign aid <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/nearly-finished-us-peace-plan-wont-call-for-two-state-solution-report/">if they don’t join new peace talks</a>.</p>
<p>Trump may anticipate a deal that would allow Israel to keep many key settlements in the West Bank and establish embassies with key Arab states, in exchange for some version of an independent Palestinian state. The latter would likely be a patchwork of Palestinian lands to allow Jewish settlements to be integrated into Israel.</p>
<p>The White House may contend that a deal is possible based on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/us/politics/trump-middle-east-peace-plan.html">its proposed detailed approaches to key issues</a> in the conflict, including humanitarian aid for Gaza and national status for Palestinians, backed by generous financial commitments by the Saudis and other Gulf and Western states to the new state.</p>
<h2>So why won’t it work?</h2>
<p>In the end, though, a Palestinian-Israeli deal is unlikely for two key reasons. </p>
<p>First is the Trump administration’s deficits in diplomacy. This presidency’s disregard for foreign policy expertise is illustrated by Trump’s use of inexperienced aides like Kushner and by his cuts to State Department funding. Add to that State Department instability caused by the replacement of Secretary Rex Tillerson with Mike Pompeo, a military and CIA man with limited experience in diplomacy and <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/03/mike-pompeo-has-a-problem-with-islam.html">likely mistrust of political Islamists</a>, such as the Hamas group that rules in Gaza.</p>
<p>The U.S.’ current disadvantage in global diplomacy may matter little on the Israeli side. But it is likely to make work harder with Palestinians and other Arabs who remain concerned about Palestinian rights. This was illustrated recently in the strong negative reactions to Trump’s Jerusalem embassy move, which <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/trump-jerusalem-move-blunder-consequences-171213115706262.html">is widely regarded outside of Israel as a major blunder</a> that has angered Arabs.</p>
<p>There is a second key reason to be skeptical of a possible Palestine-Israel pact any time soon. A two-state deal remains the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-state-solution-still-the-most-popular-option-among-israelis-and-palestinians/">popular, and only clear, arrangement</a> that could give both sides security and self-determination. Both sides must agree on such a deal and sell it to their people for it to stick. But decades of Israeli security control over the West Bank and decreasing Israeli-Palestinian contact make this unlikely.</p>
<p>Palestinians see Israelis mainly as coercive overlords who control central aspects of their lives in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/occupied/checkpoint">humiliating ways</a>. Israelis have little direct contact with Palestinians, other than during their mandatory military service. This facilitates images of Palestinians as mainly <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-the-west-bank-a-violent-storm-is-brewing/">violent agitators</a>. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/opinions/israel-settlements">growing integration of West Bank settlements into Israeli society</a> makes it much harder for them be to dismantled in a peace deal.</p>
<p>Trump and his allies in Cairo and Riyadh may think they can make an offer that Israelis and Palestinians can’t refuse. Yet leaders on each side remain accountable to diverse – and divided – voters. </p>
<p>The parties on the ground have had reasons to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/the-real-reason-the-israel-palestine-peace-process-always-fails">refuse U.S.-brokered deals</a> in the past. Though people who care about peace and justice in the Middle East may wish otherwise, I doubt that Trump has found a new way to change this entrenched dynamic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Trump administration may believe they have the key to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement – when others have failed. But it ignores how Israelis and Palestinians feel about such an agreement.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/926132018-03-06T11:34:25Z2018-03-06T11:34:25ZWhy Pakistan has troops in Saudi Arabia – and what it means for the Middle East<p>Pakistan recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-saudi/pakistan-to-send-troops-to-saudi-arabia-to-train-and-advise-idUSKCN1G00YI">announced</a> that it will send military personnel to Saudi Arabia. The details of the deployment remain elusive, but a composite brigade of the Pakistani military will reportedly fulfil <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1389722">advisory and training roles</a>. It seems Islamabad and Riyadh’s longstanding relationship is getting stronger – so what are the implications?</p>
<p>First of all, Pakistani troops have been deployed in the Saudi kingdom before. Pakistani military engagement started when <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/pakistan-in-talks-with-saudi-arabia-to-send-combat-troops-to-protect-the-kingdom-1.44396">its special services participated</a> in the operation to eliminate fundamentalist elements that seized the Grand Mosque in Makkah in 1979. Afterwards, tens of thousands of Pakistani troops remained in Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war. Most were recalled after the war ended in 1988 – but <a href="https://futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/3178/pakistani-viewpoint-general-raheel-sharif-as-the-head-of-imaft">a smaller contingent stayed on</a>.</p>
<p>The two countries’ close ties were tested in 2015 when the Pakistani parliament <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32246547">unanimously rejected</a> a Saudi request for Pakistani troops to support its Yemen campaign, but the relationship never quite broke down. Despite the parliamentary rejection, Pakistan still <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-saudi-uae-war-effort-in-yemen-part-1-operation-golden-arrow-in-aden">provided some naval assistance</a> early in Saudi’s Yemen operations, and since then, the two militaries have conducted joint exercises.</p>
<p>Former Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif was made the head of the Saudi-led <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/saudi-led-islamic-military-alliance-counterterrorism-or-counter-iran/a-41538781">Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism</a>, and Saudi troops participated in the 2017 <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/chinese-saudi-troops-march-in-pakistan-day-military-parade/story-pQZXpeu3FQ3gAYmBJlXqWJ.html">Pakistan Day Parade</a>.</p>
<h2>On alert</h2>
<p>Reports broke in early 2017 of <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-pakistan-sends-combat-troops-saudi-southern-border-248886071">Pakistan sending a brigade</a> of its troops to Saudi Arabia, but there was never a confirmation from Islamabad. The decision to send troops was finally made in February 2018 and announced in a <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/1635965/1-pak-army-contingent-sent-saudi-arabia-training-advisory-mission/">surprise press release</a> from a Pakistan military spokesperson on February 15, 2018. The military was clearly the decisive authority here, as parliament was apparently not consulted on the deployment. The timing of the announcement also spoke volumes about Pakistan’s current worries.</p>
<p>At around the same time, the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, completed a successful trip to the Middle East. He received a warm welcome in the UAE, and the prospect of a closer partnership between the two states <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-uae-statement-indirectly-targets-pakistans-terror-play/articleshow/62878872.cms">clearly left Pakistan rattled</a>. </p>
<p>Equally, Pakistan has deep reservations about Indian activities on Iranian soil. During Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s <a href="http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/02/17/552691/Iran-India-finalize-deal-over-control-of-Chabahar-port">recent trip</a> to India, a deal was struck that grants New Delhi operational control of the Chahbahar port in southern Iran. The <a href="https://iramcenter.org//d_hbanaliz/analysis_Pakistan_-_Iran_Relations_The_Current_State_of_Affairs.pdf">Indian-Iranian connection</a> has caused problems before: two years ago, Kulbhushan Yadav, an alleged operative of the Indian intelligence agency’s Research and Analysis Wing who ran his operations from Chahbahar, was arrested as he entered Pakistan from Iran.</p>
<p>So Pakistan’s military has been prompted to counterbalance Indian influence in a more vigorous manner, safeguarding its strategic interests. The Pakistan military’s footprint within the Saudi kingdom is growing in proportion to its sense of security in the Middle East writ large – and that’s especially apparent in its <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1388075">ever more vocal support</a> of Riyadh’s war in Yemen.</p>
<h2>Sense of insecurity</h2>
<p>Pakistan is also worried about its own deteriorating relationship with the US. Washington has not only withheld hundreds of millions of dollars in security aid to Islamabad, but is taking further punitive actions to press Pakistan to do more over alleged Taliban sanctuaries. </p>
<p>At the intergovernmental <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/">Financial Action Task Force</a> meeting in February 2018, the US, the UK and France jointly moved a resolution that sought to place Pakistan on an international terror-financing watchlist. The move met <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-avoids-inclusion-on-international-terror-financing-watch-list-1519257040">resistance</a> from Turkey, China and Saudi Arabia – and while US pressure finally prevailed in putting Pakistan’s name on the list from June 2018 onwards, the episode showed that an array of states are emerging as Pakistan’s new supporters at international forums.</p>
<p>According to the Pakistani <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/283383-pak-troops-not-to-take-part-in-yemen-war-minister-assures-senate">defence minister</a>, the latest troops sent to Saudi Arabia have embarked on a training and advice mission, and will not be dispatched onward to Yemen. The Pakistani army has apparently developed significant expertise in mountain warfare and counter-insurgency during recent military operations in Pakistani tribal areas and the Swat Valley, and will be transferring these skills to Saudi forces. And the only mountainous region within the kingdom that’s currently a conflict zone is on the Yemeni border.</p>
<p>But whatever specific role this deployment plays in Saudi Arabia’s Yemen campaign, it’s part of something bigger. This new chapter in the Pakistani-Saudi relationship is part of a story unfolding across the Middle East, where political, economic and security partnerships are being <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-war-at-home-is-giving-way-to-dangerous-proxy-conflicts-92203">realigned and tested</a>. The region’s balance of power will soon look very different indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92613/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Umer Karim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With Iran and India on manoeuvres and the war in Yemen still unfolding, Pakistan’s stakes in the Middle East are as high as ever.Umer Karim, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/872872017-11-13T16:46:59Z2017-11-13T16:46:59ZWhy Lebanon faces another crisis – and what Saudi Arabia stands to lose<p>The Twitter account of Lebanon’s prime minister, <a href="https://twitter.com/saadhariri">Sa'ad Hariri</a> has been inactive since November 6, just after he announced his resignation in the Saudi Arabian capital, Riyadh. Hariri justified his decision as a move to escape an assassination plot. So far, both Lebanon’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/lebanon-verge-conflict-171105081031851.html">Internal Security Forces</a> and Ministry of the Interior have declared that they were not aware of any such attempt. </p>
<p>Rumours continue, however, that Hariri’s absence <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics-hariri-exclusive/exclusive-how-saudi-arabia-turned-on-lebanons-hariri-idUSKBN1DB0QL">was not voluntary</a> but instead imposed by the Saudi government, in particular Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, Riyadh’s newly empowered strongman. Despite Hariri’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/saad-hariri-return-lebanon-days-171112184704752.html">protests to the contrary</a>, the theory that this was a Saudi intervention is certainly plausible. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics/exclusive-lebanon-believes-saudi-holds-hariri-demands-his-return-idUSKBN1D914F">some onlookers pointed out</a>, Hariri’s speech used expressions and terms that are typical of Saudi public rhetoric against Iran. He explicitly accused Iran of interfering in Lebanon’s domestic affairs and in disrupting Arab politics, and referred to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/hezbollah-4783">Hezbollah</a>, the militarised Lebanese Shia movement, as an Iranian proxy force – even though he became prime minister partly thanks to Hezbollah’s tactical support. Lebanon’s president, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics-aoun/lebanese-president-presses-saudi-to-say-why-hariri-has-not-returned-idUSKBN1DB0ET">Christian Maronite Michel Aoun</a>, even called on Saudi authorities to immediately “release” Hariri.</p>
<h2>Feeling the heat</h2>
<p>Relevant to all this is that the Saudi government is under serious internal and external pressure. The day before Hariri resigned, the Shia-led Yemeni rebel government fired a long-range missile aimed at the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/yemen-houthi-fire-missile-saudi-arabia-riyadh-171104180946302.html">International Airport of Riyadh</a>. And two days later, Crown Prince Mohammad ordered the arrest of dozens of leading Saudi political and business personalities, in what he termed a campaign against corruption. In practice, this seems a strategy to give way to his uncontested leadership in the country.</p>
<p>This clampdown on Saudi Arabia’s opposition and civil society groups started a few months ago, and the wealthy businessmen now under arrest are just the tip of the iceberg. The rich princes’ fate is, it seems, not too grim: they reside in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/how-saudi-elite-became-five-star-prisoners-at-the-riyadh-ritz-carlton">five-star Ritz Carlton Hotel</a> in the capital. Opposition members, meanwhile, are held in prison.</p>
<p>The Saudis’ moves are pushing the Middle East ever closer to the outbreak of a major international conflict at an already tumultuous time. While the so-called Islamic State has lost almost all its territory in Syria and Iraq, the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa by Iraqi and Syrian forces – backed by a pluralistic coalition of Russian, Iranian, Kurdish, and popular resistance groups – has shifted the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>From a Saudi viewpoint, the new geopolitical calculus strengthens Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, and his erstwhile allies Iran and Hezbollah. Riyadh, which for many years supported insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq, could soon be left behind.</p>
<h2>Tipping the balance</h2>
<p>At the root of it all is the deadly, long-running rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which has its roots not in the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia Islam, but in the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Since then, the two countries have confronted each other multiple times, but never directly; Lebanon has been one of their main proxy battlegrounds.</p>
<p>After the events of 1979, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards helped to establish a local resistance movement against the Israeli Occupation of Lebanese territory. This became Hezbollah, which today is a powerful political and military force, boasting elected MPs and government positions. Thanks to Hezbollah, Iran’s regional influence surged, making the group a primary target for the Saudis, and by extension Israel and the US.</p>
<p>Just as the Saudi authorities’ hysterical invective against Iran in recent weeks has dramatic implications for the Middle East at large, Hariri’s resignation is a crisis in itself. The collapse of the Lebanese government, the fourth since 2005, could undo critical progress towards political reform and stability. Lebanon faces a massive humanitarian crisis; it’s now host to well over 1m Syrian refugees, who make up <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/saad-al-hariri-lebanon-big-refugee-camp-170401045951087.html">around a quarter of the total population</a>. It also <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/remittances">relies heavily on remittances</a> from Persian Gulf countries. </p>
<p>Added to that, Saudi Arabia’s strange Lebanese ventures might pave the way for a more overt intervention by Israel, which last took action there in July 2006. That war left Lebanon, especially the southern region, in total infrastructural disarray. A reprise would do little good for Saudi interests; after the kingdom’s recent debacles in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/yemen-6632">Yemen</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/qatar-blockade-and-saudi-arabia-could-there-be-a-power-shift-in-doha-86592">Qatar</a>, the last thing it needs is a conflict that would galvanise support for Hezbollah – and by extension, further embolden a resurgent Iran.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Billie Jeanne Brownlee receives funding from the ESRC.. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maziyar Ghiabi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A kingdom under pressure is fomenting crisis elsewhere.Billie Jeanne Brownlee, ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow, University of ExeterMaziyar Ghiabi, Postdoctoral fellow at the Paris School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS), University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/802882017-07-03T12:26:15Z2017-07-03T12:26:15ZSaudi Arabia’s new crown prince embraces a risky interventionism<p>Behind the closed doors of the royal palace in Riyadh, there are secret whispers of plots, scheming and scandal. Members of the House of Saud are known to make and remake the rules of dynastic succession to suit their ever-changing interests. Intelligence agencies and the media often <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/21/opinions/saudi-game-of-thrones-ghitis/index.html">refer to it</a> as Saudi Arabia’s “game of thrones”, a political world that more closely resembles a fictional world of court intrigue than ordered government. </p>
<p>But rarely does court intrigue lead to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/21/promotion-of-saudi-arabias-mohammed-bin-salman-dubbed-a-soft-coup-by-iranian-state-news/?utm_term=.6b417be26677">soft coups</a>. No other term best captures what befell Mohammad bin Nayef, until recently first in line to succeed the elderly King Salman as Saudi Arabia’s next ruler. </p>
<p>Bin Nayef had <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/saudi-crown-prince-nayef-now-next-in-line-for-throne">made a name for himself</a> as the country’s top counter-terrorism chief, the “prince of darkness” who had built an internationally well-regarded security apparatus to crack down on radical Saudi Islamists. But even his ties to security services worldwide couldn’t save him from being knifed in the back – and he proved no match for the king’s favoured son, Mohammad bin Salman. After he was displaced, he was unceremoniously <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/29/deposed-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-nayef-confined-to-palace">placed under house arrest</a> while his replacement began making his mark.</p>
<p>Coming on the coattails of a devastating war in Yemen, bin Salman’s meteoric rise to power is raising eyebrows the world over. In his two-year tenure as <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-most-dangerous-man-in-the-world-a6803191.html">minister of defence</a>, the young prince packaged himself as energetic and charismatic, while championing an authoritarian and populist brand of politics that now permeates every religious establishment and consumer outlet in the country. Even <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-mcdonald-s-burger-king-pledge-allegiance-bin-salman-1732908935">fast-food chains</a> in Riyadh are obliged to pledge allegiance to the new crown prince.</p>
<h2>A country not yet transformed</h2>
<p>Mohammad bin Salman represents a new generation of Saudi princes with a zeal for grandiose modernisation. As deputy crown prince, he made international waves with the <a href="http://vision2030.gov.sa/en">Vision 2030</a>, a bold but probably unrealistic strategy to boost the Kingdom’s non-oil economy concocted by the consulting firm <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/05/11/saudi-arabias-mckinsey-reshuffle/">McKinsey</a>.</p>
<p>The plans aim to generate $100bn in non-oil revenue by 2020 and create 6m jobs in non-oil sectors by 2030. This would represent a wholesale restructuring of the economy accompanied by massive privatisations, a restructuring of the Saudi welfare state, and, importantly, selling 5% of the state oil company <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-aramco-ipo-will-make-history-and-transform-saudi-arabias-economy-75759">Aramco</a> to international bidders to help fund the notoriously expensive Saudi war machine. Critics question whether these epochal plans make any rational sense in a country that couldn’t even manage to cut down on expensive perks for its <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/10d40fc5-ef38-3ef8-851d-46a79c6b4097?mhq5j=e1">lavishly funded civil service</a>.</p>
<p>Worse yet, Saudi Arabia’s erratic economic policies are coupled with an even more dangerous militarism. Gravely alarmed by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/obamas-iran-legacy-is-noble-complicated-and-endangered-65928">incremental US-Iranian rapprochement</a> that began under Barack Obama, bin Salman and his father have decided to redraw the contours of Saudi foreign policy. They are the prime architects of Saudi Arabia’s uncompromising stance towards the Rouhani government in Iran, lately <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-defense-minister.html">vowing</a> to bring the two country’s long-running <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-years-of-proxy-war-saudi-arabia-and-iran-are-finally-squaring-up-in-the-open-52713">proxy wars</a> to Iranian territory. </p>
<p>As foreign policy has been moulded to suit the new hawkish tone, the royal administration has witnessed a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2017.1308643">centralisation of power</a> in the hands of the Salman family, undoing the consensual and deliberative model that had characterised the country’s decision-making apparatus for decades. Gone are the days of cautious and careful decisions by elderly statesmen which was the hallmark of Saudi Arabia’s step-by-step approach to policy for decades.</p>
<h2>Raising the stakes</h2>
<p>Mohammed bin Salman’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-two-years-of-war-yemenis-face-cholera-famine-and-state-collapse-77902">war in Yemen</a>, launched immediately after he was appointed deputy crown prince and minister of defence in 2015, and now his second “war” on Qatar, are bids to project strength domestically and outdo competitors at home. </p>
<p>While the Yemen War is fought with deadly weapons and air strikes, Qatar has been the target of a fierce media attack. Dozens of Saudi-employed public relations companies are working to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-30/gulf-spat-escalates-as-saudi-arabia-u-a-e-media-attack-qatar">tarnish Qatar’s credentials</a> in the Arab world, branding the country an Iranian stooge and supporter of terrorism – the latter a surprising charge given Saudi Arabia’s own <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/uk-report-terror-saudi-arabia-public-finding-618508">reputation</a> in that department.</p>
<p>The attempt to bring Qatar to heel is the first major test of the Riyadh leadership’s relentless new interventionism. The risk is that the push doesn’t garner support beyond a small coterie of less powerful countries who rely on Saudi oil. Qatar has so far <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/23/middleeast/gulf-nations-qatar-demands/index.html">vowed</a> not to relinquish its sovereignty or agree to the “outsourcing” of its foreign policy. </p>
<p>The whole incident has drawn an unflattering contrast between the Saudis’ short-termism and Qatar’s more orderly long-term thinking. Whereas the Saudis are motivated by the immediate gain of destroying Qatar’s independence even at risk to their long-term international reputation, the Qataris’ long-term strategic partnerships with <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/iran-stance-qatar-crisis-saudi-arabia-rivalry-assertion.html">Tehran</a>, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/turkey-military-qatar-crisis-egypt-saudi-arabia-uae.html">Ankara</a> and <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/12/qatari-investments-in-greece-highlight-soft-power-strategy.html">European capitals</a> are now paying off when they’re needed most.</p>
<p>With bin Salman now installed, this all augurs ill for Saudi Arabia’s future. The new politics of interventionism to which the young prince apparently subscribes does not match Saudi Arabia’s capabilities as a regional power – and Riyadh’s suddenly hawkish tone is less than palatable to even some of its close friends in the Gulf. And more worryingly still, many of the usual constraints don’t apply: with a vacillating, confused Washington unwilling or unable to rein in its dangerous partner, further turmoil is very much on the horizon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babak Mohammadzadeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As a crackdown on Qatar goes off half-cocked, the world is worrying Saudi Arabia’s new order could be even more dangerous.Babak Mohammadzadeh, PhD Candidate in Politics and International Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794802017-06-16T00:42:10Z2017-06-16T00:42:10ZCan tiny Qatar keep defying its powerful neighbors? It may be up to Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174096/original/file-20170615-24943-1sjg23z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nearly all of Qatar's residents live in its capital, Doha.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Doha skyline via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent decision by half the nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a few other countries to isolate fellow member Qatar came <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-05/saudi-led-alliance-cuts-qatar-ties-as-gulf-crisis-escalates">as a surprise to many</a> – though perhaps it shouldn’t have.</p>
<p>Essentially, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-other-gulf-states-cut-ties-with-qatar-78906">severed all ties</a> over <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">Qatar’s positive opinion</a> about Iran and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ap-explains-qatars-ties-with-iran-and-islamist-groups/2017/06/11/d8294df0-4ec9-11e7-b74e-0d2785d3083d_story.html?utm_term=.3678e572241f">support</a> for Islamist groups like Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Besides cutting those ties, <a href="http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-issues-qatar-list-10-demands-must-meet/">one of their demands</a> also included putting curbs on the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, which is based in Qatar’s capital of Doha and is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by its ruling family.</p>
<p>The diplomatic and security ramifications have so far taken center stage, with most Western nations, including the U.S., and countries in the region calling for a negotiated resolution to avoid further escalation. Yet the dispute that led to the recent outburst has been lingering for years – and erupted in a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">similar if smaller kerfuffle in 2014</a> – which begs the following questions: </p>
<p>What exactly has allowed Qatar to defy its more powerful GCC neighbors for so long? And what (or who) could possibly change that? </p>
<h2>Flouting its neighbors’ demands</h2>
<p>Qatar is the second-smallest country in the GCC with a national population of just 243,000. That swells to almost 2.4 million when you include expatriates, yet it’s still <a href="http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total-population-percentage-nationals-foreign-nationals-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2010-2016-numbers/">just a fraction</a> of Saudi Arabia’s 31 million total population or the UAE’s 8 million. </p>
<p>It also has the smallest military, at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_Armed_Forces">just 12,000 soldiers</a>, <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/03/26/saudi-arabia-gulfs-best-equipped-military/70494532/">compared with</a> Saudi Arabia’s 227,000. </p>
<p>Despite this large gap in population and military power, Qatar <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/timeline-qatar-gcc-disputes-170605110356982.html">has long ignored</a> the complaints of its stronger neighbors over its foreign policy positions that on some issues are diametrically opposed to theirs. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Al-Jazeera, which is based in Doha and partially supported by the government, is one of the sticking points between Qatar and its neighbors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/ Hamid Jalaudin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There’s essentially one reason Qatar can afford to do this: the American security umbrella, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">which includes basing</a> some 11,000 U.S. military personnel in Doha – the largest deployment in the region – as well as hosting the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center, which oversees air power in 20 countries. </p>
<p>Like the other GCC countries, Qatar has a <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/qatar-forrel-us.htm">bilateral security arrangement</a> with the U.S., and it hosts the United States’ largest military base in the region. The U.S. military protection not only shields Qatar against military threats from outside the region but empowers it to stand up to its larger GCC allies when it chooses to do so. </p>
<p>Qatar is not the only GCC member that takes advantage of U.S. military protection in this manner. Bahrain has also defied other GCC members on occasions. In 2005, this tiny island of one million and home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet upset Saudi Arabia when it signed a <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/archives/2004/may/us-and-bahrain-conclude-free-trade-agreement">bilateral free trade agreement</a> with the U.S., which violated the GCC common tariff <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200841012520998396.html">regulations</a>. In a sign of America’s pull in such disputes, it was Saudi Arabia that <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/economic-integration-can-ease-regional-tensions">ultimately backed down</a>. </p>
<p>Consequently, as long as Qatar remains under U.S. military protection, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can not resort to military options and have to limit their campaign to diplomatic and economic pressure. In other words, bilateral security relations with the U.S. serves as an equalizer in interactions among GCC countries regardless of their size. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defense Secretary James Mattis, second from right, greets an airman during a recent visit to the U.S. military base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pool Photo via AP/Jonathan Ernst</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How long can Qatar hold out?</h2>
<p>A secure and protected Qatar can afford to remain defiant in the face of economic isolation from its neighbors as long as it can tolerate the economic and financial costs. While these costs are hardly trivial, Qatar, as the <a href="https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/richest-countries-in-the-world?page=12">richest country in the world</a> on a per capita basis, can probably afford to ride them out for some time. </p>
<p>In terms of imports, Qatar’s reliance on other GCC countries and Egypt is relatively modest and easily substitutable. The main immediate impact of the severing of ties was a disruption of food imports <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/qatar-residents-rush-to-stock-up-food-supplies-as-border-closes">from Saudi Arabia</a>, but Qatar managed to quickly switch to air shipments from Iran and Turkey – notably more expensive than ground shipments via Saudi border. </p>
<p>Qatar’s dependence on these neighbors for exports is even less. In 2015, only 4.6 percent of Qatar’s US$80 billion worth of exports <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/qat/are/show/2015/">went to the UAE</a>, while just 1 percent <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/qat/sau/show/2015/">flowed to Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>A key reason for so little <a href="http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=F&Country=QA">trade</a> between countries in the GCC is that their primary exports (oil and gas products) and imports (food and industrial products) are very similar. </p>
<p>So all in all, economic disengagement from the UAE and Saudi Arabia will disrupt about 13 percent of Qatar’s commodity imports and 5.6 percent of its exports (trade with Bahrain and Egypt is insigificant). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, left, meets with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Doha in hopes of helping mediate an end to the crisis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KUNA via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Qatar also has financial and commercial investment links with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. By one account, 300 Saudi businesses are active in Qatar with <a href="https://english.mubasher.info/news/3120439/Qatar-could-lose-SAR50bn-of-Saudi-investments">investments worth $13.3 billion</a>, as well as <a href="http://qatarchamber.com/6030">1,075 UAE companies</a>. The same report estimated 4,200 Qatari businesses were engaged in the UAE in 2016. </p>
<p>While disruption of these business activities will also be costly for Qatar, the value of these investments is only a small share of its financial and commercial capital. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-11/qatar-sovereign-wealth-fund-s-335-global-empire">Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund</a>, for example, is estimated at $335 billion. </p>
<p>Beyond U.S. protection, the relatively small size of trade and investment links with Saudi Arabia and the UAE is what gives Qatar little immediate incentive to concede to <a href="http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-issues-qatar-list-10-demands-must-meet/">their demands</a>, even as it hopes <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/06/12/qatar-says-gulf-citizens-can-stay-despite-crisis">to avoid escalation</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Qatar recently agreed to buy up to 36 F-15 fighters from the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Amir Cohen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US still holds the key</h2>
<p>So while Qatar’s economy is under some stress, its substantial financial resources as well as diplomatic and economic <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/66128/irans-4th-food-shipment-sent-to-qatar">support from</a> several countries including Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Oman give it quite a bit of breathing room.</p>
<p>But in the end, it all comes down to its security patron, the U.S., and President Donald Trump, who <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872062159789985792">in a tweet praised and even seemed to claim credit for</a> the move by Saudi Arabia and the other countries. </p>
<p></p><blockquote><p>During my recent trip to the Middle East, I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar - look!</p>— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872062159789985792">June 6, 2017</a></blockquote> <p></p>
<p>Afterwards, officials at the <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/06/09/532294710/in-an-afternoon-trump-and-tillerson-appear-to-contradict-each-other-on-qatar">State</a> and Defense departments <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/donald-trump-qatar-tweets-us-diplomatic-damage">expressed a more neutral position toward this dispute</a> and called for a negotiated resolution, as some diplomats acknowledged Qatar’s efforts to prevent financial support for terror groups. </p>
<p>So if Qatar ends up making any major concessions, it will most likely be a response to demands from the United States, on whom Qatar depends for its security. A few years ago, Qatar’s former ruler Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/qatar-crisis-economy-diplomatic-links-torn-middle-east-russia-hacking-real-story-robert-fisk-a7778616.html">put that dependence this way</a>: Without the Americans, “my Arab brothers would invade me.”</p>
<p>And in a sign that the U.S. commitment to Qatar remains solid, the Pentagon <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-14/qatar-said-to-sign-deal-for-u-s-f-15s-as-gulf-crisis-continues">just announced a $12 billion deal</a> to sell as many as 36 F-15 jets to its ally. </p>
<p>In other words, apart from President Trump’s tweet burst, the U.S. government has given diplomatic breathing room to Qatar. But if the United States calls for significant concessions, it is unlikely that Qatar will risk its military protection by saying no.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saudi Arabia and the UAE led a group of countries that have severed all ties to fellow American ally Qatar over its foreign policy. The US will play a key role in whether it accedes to their demands.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/726362017-02-09T15:12:53Z2017-02-09T15:12:53ZFaith and money from the Middle East fuelling tensions in the Horn of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156015/original/image-20170208-9117-1gb0cd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A squadron of UAE Mirage fighter planes such as this one at the Dubai Airshow are stationed in Eritrea for Yemeni operations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Caren Firouz </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula go back centuries, with trade playing a key component in binding their people
together. Religion has also played a part. The expansion of <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudi-arabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism">Wahhabism</a> – the interpretation of Islam propagated by Saudi Arabia – has been funded by the massive oil wealth of the kingdom.</p>
<p>Mosques, Koranic schools and Imams have been provided with support over many years. Gradually this authoritarian form of Islam <a href="http://africacenter.org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/">began to take hold</a> in the Horn. While some embraced it, others didn’t.</p>
<p>Somalia is an example. While most Somalis practised a moderate form of Suffi Islam, the Islamic fundamentalists of al-Shabaab didn’t. Soon after taking control of parts of central and southern Somalia in 2009 they began imposing a much more severe form of the faith. Mosques were destroyed and the shrines of revered Suffi leaders were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8077725.stm">desecrated</a>. </p>
<p>The export of faith has been followed by arms. Today the Saudis and their allies in the United Arab Emirates are exerting <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20161224-uae-discreet-yet-powerful-player-horn-africa">increasing military influence</a> in the region. </p>
<p>But Saudi Arabia and other Arabian gulf states aren’t the only Muslim countries that have sought influence in the region. Iran, for example, has also been an active player. In the case of Eritrea, a struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran has played out over the past few years. This has also been true in neighbouring Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.</p>
<p>These are troubled times in the Horn of Africa. The instability that’s resulted from Islamic fundamentalism, of which al-Shabaab are the best known proponents, have left the region open to outside influences. The French have traditionally had a base in Djibouti, but they have now been joined by the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-attractions-djibouti-15533">Americans</a> and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690">Chinese</a>.</p>
<p>The growing Arab military, political and religious influence is only the latest example of an external force taking hold in the region.</p>
<h2>New powerful forces in the region</h2>
<p>The Eritreans had been <a href="http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/yemen_african_dimension_0">close to Iran</a> and supported their Houthi allies in the Yemeni conflict. This was of deep concern to the Saudis, who are locked in conflict with Tehran. This is a battle for influence that pits Iranian Shias against Saudi Sunnis. Eritrea is just one of the fields on which it’s being played out.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ASMARA33_a.html">US cable</a> leaked to Wikileaks put it in 2010, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Saudi ambassador to Eritrea is concerned about Iranian influence, says Iran has supplied materiel to the Eritrean navy, and recently ran into an Iranian delegation visiting Asmara. He claims Yemeni Houthi rebels were present in Eritrea in 2009 (but is not sure if they still are), and reported that the Isaias regime this week arrested six Eritrean employees of the Saudi embassy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since then Eritrea has switched sides. Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki paid a <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/president-isaias-pay-state-visit-to-saudi-arabia/">state visit to Saudi Arabia</a> in April 2015. Not long afterwards Eritrea signed a 30-year lease on the port of Assab with the Saudis and their allies in the Emirates. The port has become a base from which to prosecute the war in Yemen. The United Nations <a href="http://untribune.com/un-report-uae-saudi-leasing-eritean-port-using-eritrean-land-sea-airspace-and-possibly-troops-in-yemen-battle/">reported</a> that 400 Eritrean troops were now in Yemen supporting the Saudi alliance.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates has constructed a <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/analysis-uae-military-base-assab-eritrea/">major base</a> in Assab – complete with tanks, helicopters and barracks. In November 2016 it was reported that a squadron of nine UAE Mirage fighter planes were <a href="http://www.defenseworld.net/news/17633/UAE_Deploys_Mirage_2000_Jets_To_Support_Yemen_Ops#.WJhh8xCKSMk">deployed to Eritrea</a> from where they could attack Houthi targets on the other side of the Red Sea. In return the Gulf states <a href="http://www.madote.com/2015/05/djibouti-uae-diplomatic-crisis-brings.html">agreed</a> to modernise Asmara International Airport, increase fuel supplies to Eritrea and provide President Isaias with further funding.</p>
<p>Since then the United Arab Emirates has announced its intention to increase its military presence in the Horn. In January it signed an agreement to manage the Somaliland port of Berbera for 30 years. It also sought permission to have a naval base, Somaliland foreign minister Sa’ad Ali Shire <a href="https://www.alleastafrica.com/2017/01/11/uae-seeks-to-open-military-base-in-somaliland/">told reporters</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s true that the United Arab Emirates has submitted a formal request seeking permission to open a military base in Somaliland</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The UAE are also <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/">active</a> in the neighbouring Puntland. They have been paying for and training anti-piracy forces for years, while also financing and training its intelligence services. </p>
<p>They are a powerful force in the region, projecting an Arab influence as far as Madagascar and the Seychelles. It’s not surprising that the United Arab Emirates was labelled <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/15/3-ways-the-u-a-e-is-the-sparta-of-the-modern-day-middle-east/?utm_term=.d353884f8103">“Little Sparta”</a> by General James Mattis – now President Donald Trump’s Secretary of Defence.</p>
<h2>Ethiopian concerns</h2>
<p>These are worrying times for the Ethiopian foreign ministry. Once the dominant force in the region, its influence over the Horn is now in question.</p>
<p>To its north the Eritreans remain implacable foes, as they have been since the <a href="http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2492&context=faculty_publications">border war</a> of 1998-2000 that left these neighbours in a cold no-war, no-peace confrontation. </p>
<p>Addis Ababa is concerned that Eritrea’s hand has become stronger in recent years. Its mining sector is looking <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-approves-social-and-environmental-impact-assessment-for-colluli-potash-project/">increasingly attractive</a> with Canadian based firms now joined by Australian and Chinese companies. </p>
<p>Asmara’s role in the ongoing war in Yemen has allowed Eritrea to escape diplomatic isolation. The government in Asmara is now benefiting from funds and weapons, <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/eritrea-yemen-un-idINKBN12Z2JQ">despite UN sanctions</a> designed to prevent this from taking place. </p>
<p>To Ethiopia’s west lies Sudan, which is also now involved in the war in Yemen, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/400-more-sudanese-troops-arrive-yemen-1210506015">providing troops</a> to the Saudi and United Arab Emirates backed government. These ties are said to have been cemented after the Saudis pumped a billion dollars into the Sudanese central bank. In return the Sudanese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/sudan-siding-with-saudi-arabia-long-term-ally-iran">turned their backs</a> on their former Iranian allies.</p>
<p>To Ethiopia’s east the situation in Somalia is also of concern. No Ethiopian minister can forget the <a href="http://www.coldwar.org/articles/70s/SomaliaEthiopiaandTheOgadenWar1977.asp">invasion of the Ogaden</a> under President Siad Barre in 1977, when Somalia attempted to re-capture the lands lost to their neighbours during the expansionist policies of Emperor Menelik II in the nineteenth century. Siad Barre may be <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/obituaries/somalia-s-overthrown-dictator-mohammed-siad-barre-is-dead.html">long gone</a> but Ethiopian policy since the invasion has been to keep Somalia as weak and fragmented as possible.</p>
<p>Ethiopia has intervened repeatedly in Somalia to hold al-Shabaab at bay as well as to maintain the security of its eastern region. Addis Ababa’s policy of encouraging the inherent fragmentary tendencies of the Somalis has paid dividends: the country is <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-s-regions-slowly-evolve-into-federal-states-/2558-2833956-snxq7e/index.html">now a federation</a> of states and regions. Some of these only nominally recognise the authority of the government in Mogadishu. Somaliland, in the north is close to being recognised as an independent nation. Others, like Jubaland along the Kenyan border, are under Nairobi’s influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the Royal African Society</span></em></p>The growing Arab military, political and religious influence is only the latest example of an external force taking hold in the Horn of Africa.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.