tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/silvio-berlusconi-1142/articlesSilvio Berlusconi – The Conversation2023-07-06T07:46:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085452023-07-06T07:46:50Z2023-07-06T07:46:50ZHow ‘La Grande Bellezza’ captured Italy’s Berlusconian era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535363/original/file-20230703-212535-54j063.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C1920%2C1077&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jep Gambardella, the narcissistic and excessive central character in Sorrentino's allegory of Silvio Berlusconi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Allociné</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Silvio Berlusconi, a leading figure on the Italian right, died on 12 June. His career was marked by a series of public and private scandals and by the school of thought that it gave rise to, <a href="https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/berlusconismo/">“Berlusconism”</a>. Many an Italian film <a href="https://www.rollingstone.it/cinema-tv/film/silvio-berlusconi-il-cinema-del-caimano-i-film-che-lo-hanno-raccontato/755244/">has attempted to capture it</a> since the 1990s.</p>
<p>One director in particular has distinguished himself in exploring the stigma left by Berlusconi on Italian society: Paolo Sorrentino. His 2018 film <em>Loro</em> (“Them”) is perhaps <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/transalpina/448">his most direct rendition</a> of the sulphurous figure of the <em>Cavaliere</em>. However, the major themes associated with the right-wing leader are already broadly sketched out in <em>La Grande Bellezza</em> (Oscar for best foreign language film in 2014), which follows the existential upheaval of protagonist Jep Gambardella, a worldly and disillusioned sexagenarian who eventually regains his lust for life by delving into his past.</p>
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<h2>Entertainment as “categorical imperative”</h2>
<p>Of the four salient features of Berlusconism shown in <em>La Grande Bellezza</em>, the most striking is that of the pursuit of individual pleasure. In an interview, Sorrentino said that Berlusconi raised entertainment during his tenure to the level of <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/movies/life-among-italys-ruins-20140122-318zw.html">“categorical imperative”</a>.</p>
<p>Take the sweeping, Fellinian scene of the night club in the first part of the film, for example. It is a perfect allegory of the Berlusconian pleasure principle, calling to mind various sex scandals that took place in the years prior to the film’s shooting. One thinks of the <em>Cavaliere</em>’s relationship with a then-18-year-old aspiring model, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/24/silvio-berlusconi-noemi-letizia-italy">Noemi Letizia</a> in 2008; the escort <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/02/patrizia-daddario-silvio-berlusconi">Patrizia D’Addario</a> in 2009, or <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-23034167">the underage Moroccan prostitute, Karima El Mahroug</a> in 2010, an affair which went on to become known as the Ruby sex case. The scene’s excesses are but a hyperbolic copy of the hedonistic parties held at Berlusconi’s villas, pictured in great detail by the Italian press at the time.</p>
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<p>The film’s characters embody respective facets of Berlusconism, namely, the desired and the desiring. On the one hand, we have Jep Gambardella, the party host and target of its dancers’ lustful glances; on the other, his friend Lello Cava, a businessman with a towering sex drive, seen shaking with excitement at the feet of a young woman dancing on a cube. Like many young women gravitating around Berlusconi, she’s there to <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-vacarme-2017-4-page-88.htm">make it as a showgirl</a>.</p>
<h2>Television and the cult of the self</h2>
<p>The second feature of Berlusconi’s life is television, a medium inextricably linked to his financial success and political rise. The party is held under the aegis of “Lorena”, an opulent woman who emerges from Jep’s enormous birthday cake, played by none other than Serena Grandi. One of Italy’s sex symbols from the 1980s and 1990s, she appeared on several TV entertainment shows in the 1980s and 2000s. Her character is somewhat of a caricature of her public persona, merging two themes – sex and television – dear to Berlusconi.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534768/original/file-20230629-29-7yoje7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Serena Grandi plays herself as a former party girl.</span>
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<p>The third grand Berlusconian theme is narcissism. In the first half of the film, we find it personified by Orietta, a woman who spends her time photographing herself and sending selfies to her admirers. This obsession with beauty and youth is also captured by the extraordinary scene in which a Botox guru administrates expensive injections to patients who revere him as their spiritual leader. It’s no secret that Berlusconi relished cosmetic surgery. The Cavaliere not only resorted to it extensively on himself, but also touted its merits to others, claiming women who had subjected themselves to the needle were “more beautiful”.</p>
<h2>Corruption at every level</h2>
<p>The last major feature of Berlusconi’s life to stand out in the film is corruption. From falsifying business accounts to bribing lawyers, the former Prime Minister has been charged with almost every offence under the sun. His right-hand man, Marcello Dell’Utri, has also been indicted for <a href="https://lejournal.info/article/berlusconi-et-la-mafia-le-pacte-impuni/">complicity with the Mafia</a>.</p>
<p>This aspect of Berlusconi’s persona, which still contains grey areas, is reflected in the character of Giulio Moneta, an enigmatic businessman and neighbour of the protagonist, who appears from his high balcony but in reality, serves the interests of the underworld. Arrested by the police at the end of the film, he says, handcuffed, that he is one of those “moving the country forward” – a defence strategy typical of Berlusconi and his defence lawyers.</p>
<h2>Historical perspective</h2>
<p>The strength of Berlusconi’s depiction also lies in its historical perspective. Tapping into a range of images, Sorrentino helps viewers understand that Berlusconi’s triumph was made possible by the decline of the two major ideologies that shaped Italy’s 20th-century history: socialism (and its derivative, Marxism), and Catholicism.</p>
<p>The decline of Marxism is depicted in a scene that is at once solemn and grotesque, in which a famous body artist, her pubic area dyed red to reveal the sickle and hammer crest, comes crashing headlong into a Roman aqueduct. Through this spectacular, bloody performance, she represents the dead end to which the Soviet interpretation of Marxist thought has led.</p>
<p>At the same time, the protagonist is confronted with religion on a daily basis in the city of Rome, from the myriad of religious figures he sees in the streets or from his balcony, to the monuments dotted around the Eternal City. Yet Jep Gambardella’s view of religion, imbued with nostalgia and strangeness, is typical of a secularised society in which religion no longer plays the primary role of organising authority.</p>
<p>The idea that Berlusconi could flourish in an ideological vacuum created by the decline of these two great ideologies is expressed in the transition from the first to the second sequence of the film. <em>La Grande Bellezza</em> opens with a stroll on Mount Janiculum, offering a series of images that alternatively evoke socialism – i.e., the statue of Garibaldi on horseback, or the busts of Garibaldi supporters on display in a public garden – and Christianity. We are taken to the fountain “Acqua Paola”, commissioned by Pope Paul V in 1608, while the film’s first shot shows the cannon shot at midday from Janiculum Hill in Rome, a practice initiated by Pope Pius IX in 1948 to allow the Roman bells to ring in unison.</p>
<p>The transition to the second sequence, that of the nightclub, is a guest’s hysterical scream filmed in close-up. It acts as a cry of distress to express the transition from strong but bygone ideologies to the ideology of seemingly carefree, narcissistic enjoyment.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534809/original/file-20230629-15-5oudti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The cry of</span>
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<p><em>La Grande Bellezza</em>, which began filming in August 2012, is imbued with a pungent whiff of decadence that harks back to the end of Berlusconi’s political reign. Beset by sex scandals and Italy’s dramatic finances – “on the brink of a precipice” is how the business newspaper <em>Il Sole 24 ore</em> put it a few days earlier – the <em>Cavaliere</em> stepped down as prime minister on 12 November 2011. In the last part of the film, the protagonist can indeed be seen staring in silence at the capsized hull of the <em>Costa Concordia</em>, the cruise ship that sank on 12 January 2012.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabrice De Poli ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The Oscar-winning film sketches out the broad themes of Berluconist hedonism, all against the backdrop of the decline of ideologies that shaped 20th-century Italy.Fabrice De Poli, enseignant-chercheur en Etudes Italiennes (poésie, prose et cinéma de l'Italie - XIX-XXème s.), Université Savoie Mont BlancLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2075912023-06-13T12:56:21Z2023-06-13T12:56:21ZSilvio Berlusconi had a complex relationship with US presidents: Friend to one, shunned by another<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531504/original/file-20230613-15-3b421j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C122%2C2048%2C1321&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Things looking up for the Bush-Berlusconi relationship.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-george-w-bush-and-italian-prime-minister-silvio-news-photo/119806434?adppopup=true">Philippe Desmazes/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the administration of Geroge W. Bush needed an ally to help sell its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">proposed invasion of Iraq</a> to a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/">skeptical European audience</a>, Silvio Berlusconi stepped forward.</p>
<p>It wasn’t that the Italian prime minister was particularly concerned over the threat of Saddam Hussein’s <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313">imagined</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/">weapons of mass destruction</a> to his country, or the region – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/31/italy.usa">he wasn’t</a>. But it was a chance for the former businessman to burnish his credentials as an international statesman and to draw the U.S. closer into Italy’s orbit.</p>
<p>Indeed, strengthening U.S.-Italian relations was the key driver of Berlusconi’s foreign policy, as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=BEzB1hYAAAAJ&hl=en">I learned</a> while interviewing Berlusconi government officials for my 2011 book “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Americas-Allies-War-Kosovo-Afghanistan/dp/0230614825">America’s Allies and War</a>.” The fact that Berlusconi couldn’t repeat the trick some years later when Barack Obama came to power was in large part entirely of his own making – he reportedly never recovered in the eyes of Obama from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama">comments widely seen as racist</a>. Eventually, Berlusconi would again fall in line with Washington’s interventionist foreign policy – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">this time in Libya</a> – but by then the damage had been done. Fair to say, the legacy in regards to U.S.-Italian relationship left by Berlusconi – who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/former-italian-pm-silvio-berlusconi-has-died-italian-media-2023-06-12/">died on June 12, 2023,</a> at 86 – is mixed, a tale of two halves.</p>
<h2>A friend in need</h2>
<p>Italy never had the “<a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/us-uk-special-relationship">special relationship</a>” that the U.K still claims to possess in regards to Washington. Nor did it have the clout of post-war France and Germany, whose economies were more central to the well-being of the European Union. Moreover, Italy’s political instability – it is currently on its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/21/italy-is-set-for-its-68th-government-in-76-years-why-such-a-high-turnover">69th goverment since 1945</a> at a rate of one every 13 months or so – makes it more difficult to establish lasting bilateral political relationships.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, by the time Berlusconi came to power for a second time in 2001 – following a one-year stint as prime minister between 1994 and 1995 – Italy had gone some way to ingratiating itself with successive U.S. administrations. In 1990, Italy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-64980565">supported President George H.W. Bush’s military operation</a> in the Persian Gulf, joining a coalition of 39 countries opposing Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and sending fighter jets to support the subsequent aerial bombing campaign.</p>
<p>Then in 1999, Italian jets participated in airstrikes and Italian bases served as the main launching site for U.S. and NATO jets during the alliance’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/kosovo/">military operations in Kosovo</a>.</p>
<p>But the war in Iraq was different. By fall of 2002, George W. Bush had <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/04/this-day-in-politics-sept-4-2002-805725">made it clear</a> that he intended to invade. But by then, the U.S. had lost some of the near-unanimous international support that it was afforded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Europe was divided. The public was <a href="https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/185298">very much against invasion</a>. But governments had to weigh political consequences at home, with the benefits of supporting the world’s largest economy.</p>
<p>Outside of the U.K, Berlusconi was Bush’s biggest European ally. Shrugging off <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/world/threats-and-responses-italy-florence-wary-as-opponents-of-war-stage-a-huge-march.html">massive street protests in Italian cities</a>, the opposition of many within the Italian parliament and public opinion that put support for the invasion <a href="https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_140583_smxx.pdf">as low as 22%</a>, Berlusconi went to bat for Bush’s war. </p>
<p>Unlike the U.K. – and to a lesser extent Australia and Poland – Italy did not directly participate in the invasion itself. But by April of 2003, Italy agreed to <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/italy-and-the-new-iraq-the-many-dimensions-of-a-successful-partnership-121530">send a contingent of 3,000 troops</a> to help stabilize Iraq. Explaining his rationale to the New York Times in 2003, Berlusconi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/05/world/berlusconi-urges-support-for-us-on-iraq.html">said it was “absolutely unthinkable</a>” to decline Bush’s request for an Italian military presence given how the U.S. had come to Europe’s aid after World War II.</p>
<p>Even sending that peace mission was controversial in Italy, especially after 17 Italian soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/12/international/middleeast/at-least-26-killed-in-a-bombing-of-an-italian.html">were killed in a November 2003 attack</a>. in Iraq. Indeed, with elections around the corner, in 2005 Berlosconi announced <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7337476">Italian troops would withdraw</a> from the war-torn country.</p>
<h2>Surplus to US requirements</h2>
<p>Sticking his neck out for Bush’s war won Berlusconi friends in Washington. During the Bush’s administration, the Italian prime minister <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/italy">visited the U.S. on 11 occasions</a> and was invited to <a href="https://www.upi.com/News_Photos/view/upi/4da5ea3a0de9b336906cb83e3c71663a/ITALIAN-PRIME-MINISTER-BERLUSCONI-ADDRESSES-JOINT-SESSION-OF-CONGRESS/">address both houses of Congress</a> – a rarity for overseas leaders.</p>
<p>The deployment of Italian troops both in Iraq and also Afghanistan – where some 4,000 Italians were sent <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">and 48 died</a> – helped stabilize the U.S.-Italian ties.</p>
<p>It wasn’t a one-way relationship. In return for military support, Berlusconi benefited from his elevated role in trans-Atlantic relations, being able to sell himself as a major international player at home. And remaining friendly with the world’s biggest economy is also prudent for a country <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/business/italy-economy.html">prone to economic instability</a>.</p>
<p>So while he was ejected from office in Italy in 2006, he departed with a legacy of building up Italy’s standing with leaders in the U.S.</p>
<p>And then came the Obama years. Berlusconi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/15/italy1">returned to power in 2008</a>, the same year that Obama was elected to his first term in office. But even before Obama could be sworn in, the Italian prime minister had soured the relationship, referring to the U.S. president elect as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama">young, handsome and tanned</a>.”</p>
<p>It may have been meant as a compliment, but it certainly came across as at best off-key, at worst racist.</p>
<p>Such eyebrow-raising remarks were, of course, not uncommon for Berlusconi, who gained a reputation for <a href="https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/silvio-berlusconis-most-controversial-distasteful-101700715.html">saying at times outrageous things</a>. But the incident didn’t bode well for bilateral relations.</p>
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<span class="caption">President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-meets-with-italian-prime-minister-news-photo/88501434?adppopup=true">Win McNamee/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Conversations I have had with officials in Obama’s White House and State Department and others in Washington suggest that it wasn’t primarily about Berlusconi’s comments; there was a feeling that by the late 2000s he wasn’t reliable and had little to offer.</p>
<p>There was, however, one last U.S.-led foreign intervention that the aging Italian prime minister could play a role in. In 2011 a coalition of NATO countries were entrusted to implement a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm">U.N.-sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya</a>, amid claims of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/18/muammar-gaddafi-war-crimes-files">civilian attacks by Moammar Gaddafi’s regime</a>. Berlusconi – mindful of Italy receiving a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-libya/gaddafi-hails-italy-for-overcoming-colonial-past-idUSTRE5593OO20090610">quarter of its oil from Libya</a> and reliant on the country to implement a deal aimed at preventing African immigrants arriving on Italian shores – resisted.</p>
<p>But after Obama threw his wholesale support behind NATO’s intervention, Berlusconi acquiesced and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13188951">joined Italy’s allies in the military coalition</a>. To Berlusconi, not being aligned with the U.S. was one thing; opposing Washington’s wishes entirely was a step too far.</p>
<h2>A precursor of the populist premier</h2>
<p>Much comment has been made over the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/berlusconi-italy-trump-president/587014/">similarities between Berlusconi and another U.S. president</a>: Donald J. Trump. No doubt, the pair share commonalities – businessmen whose forays into politics were marked by right-wing populism and many, many scandals.</p>
<p>But Berlusconi’s legacy as an Italian leader on trans-Atlantic relations is best seen through the lens of Trump’s two predecessors. And it is a very mixed legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Davidson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former Italian prime minister died on June 12, 2023, at the age of 86. Throughout his terms in office he cultivated closer ties with the US – with mixed results.Jason Davidson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Mary WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036012023-06-12T10:59:05Z2023-06-12T10:59:05ZSilvio Berlusconi: the property developer who became a media tycoon – and Italy’s most flamboyant prime minister<p>Silvio Berlusconi, who has died at the age of 86, was born into a middle-class family in Milan, a city heavily affected by the second world war. He attended a private school belonging to a religious order, and eventually graduated with distinction in law in 1961, specialising in advertising contracts, an area that would of course prove extremely useful in his later careers.</p>
<p>As Berlusconi came of age, Italy was entering its postwar economic “miracle”. And immediately after his graduation, he started a series of successful entrepreneurial initiatives in a booming construction industry.</p>
<p>In his early 30s, Berlusconi conceived of a revolutionary and visionary project, the construction of a residential area in the northern outskirts of Milan called <a href="https://www.archilovers.com/projects/19955/milano-2.html">Milano 2</a>. The idea was to offer high standard, spacious homes in new areas on the outskirts of the city that contrasted with an increasingly crowded and polluted metropolis.</p>
<p>The project was ahead of its time in marketing “exclusive” property to a growing middle class looking to escape the inner city but remain close by. It proved a significant success, which quickly propelled Edilnord (Berlusconi’s construction company) into the big leagues and enabled it to diversify under the umbrella of a financial holding company, Fininvest.</p>
<p>By the 1980s, Berlusconi had received the Order of Merit of Labor and the informal nickname “Il Cavaliere” (the Knight) for his entrepreneurship.</p>
<h2>Building an empire</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, as video broadcasting was being commercialised for the first time in Italy in the mid-1970s (having previously been a state monopoly), Berlusconi started investing in TV.</p>
<p>He set up a media company that transmitted three channels across Italy (Canale 5, Italia 1 and Rete 4). All this was supported by the company’s aggressive advertising arm, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1081180x96001001007?casa_token=Vv9z3UMWpNkAAAAA:Rfax3PVP1iWs3VgbIPsYmXEP3W5oxs7tv8FsjcjH5Jndjeq8Wtkw-LMYNJjKCMn9yjDUe79Swfo">Publitalia</a>. </p>
<p>Berlusconi’s media empire (complemented by the acquisition in 1984 of Arnoldo Mondadori, the most important publishing house in the country) became the sole real competitor of RAI, the state-owned television company. Berlusconi’s personal ability to attract the most popular TV stars of the time certainly helped, as did personal connections in the government. </p>
<p>This made him a pervasive figure in Italian society, but his popularity skyrocketed in the mid-1980s when a highly valuable jewel was added to his crown: <a href="https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/32459016/berlusconi_brand_cosentino_doyle-libre.pdf?1391104221=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DSilvio_Berlusconi_One_Man_Brand.pdf&Expires=1681304350&Signature=QO2mn516F4H7-6DztxorL-i4cFEXA5wkJ3K-HEsIdoZ0OwodR9xLVVrUTBdQrvYXmsLnQDYlGcKRif5Ub4knzpL3381pMT9i5KzCGK8zepxRl912dShRUdU5W2fAl2NtLdY4j%7EZcrMi4lkGOSNgLlMreKxS-BfMZx2LATxeFipd5HB74FOMA0ho2Ixi702Fi060IHGXO6Z%7ET8SFQBPyz8bMVw%7EFB1B1ddEqZRVTEEYI%7EhAK8vao0zSP%7ESBdZ9FGKFtSfx8qCaPOaP%7EoONT7s1fxcEAm4G08sGmIzwtXJ1GLwPsS7bDA9p7ced9wbE36synoeCMUxwffFdsuUz9hoSw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA">AC Milan football club</a>. This was already a highly strategic move given Italy’s national obsession with the game, but Berlusconi quickly set about turning Milan from a domestic team into an international brand. </p>
<p>In the 15 years that followed the successful project of Milano 2, Berlusconi had built a business empire that spanned construction, banking and insurance, TV and advertising, publishing, sport and even supermarkets. In just a couple of decades, Berlusconi had transformed Fininvest into Italy’s eighth largest company by turnover.</p>
<h2>From outsider to prime minister</h2>
<p>Despite this remarkable success – and his notorious business skill – Berlusconi was neither immediately nor eagerly welcomed into the drawing rooms of the country’s entrepreneurial elite, who tended to consider him at best a useful upstart. This is perhaps partially what drove an already individualistic character to seek a new level of primacy.</p>
<p>At the beginning of the 1990s, Berlusconi turned himself into a “political entrepreneur”. At the time, the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28117/chapter-abstract/212268180?redirectedFrom=fulltext">“Tangentopoli”</a> scandal had exposed deeply entrenched corruption among national and regional politicians. </p>
<p>Individual politicians and entire political parties were brought down by the revelations and the old party system was turned on its head, leaving an institutional vacuum. Berlusconi stepped in to fill that vacuum by creating a new political party practically overnight, leveraging his personal entrepreneurial prestige and the communication power of his media empire. </p>
<p>Having crafted a (sometimes precarious) <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380500310600">alliance</a> with two different partners on the right and far right, Berlusconi was elected prime minister for the first time in 1994. It was the beginning of a lengthy spell in power as head of coalitions and alliances of the right. In the end, he was prime minister three times: from 1994 to 1995, 2001 to 2006 and 2008 to 2011.</p>
<p>Berlusconi was recognised as a charismatic politician and the electoral campaigns that put him in government were inevitably centered on him personally. However, he was less convincing as a statesman. He lacked a long-term vision for Italy both in terms of statecraft and economic development. </p>
<p>In his two decades in power, Italy’s GDP remained in line with the rest of Europe but the country’s competitiveness, measured in terms of export, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43039816">declined consistently</a>. This was mirrored by a generous rise in public spending – despite the neoliberal leanings of Berlusconi’s governments.</p>
<p>Berlusconi’s politics always came down to personal relationships over institutions. This style as worsened by a persistent conflict of interest between his role as prime minister of the country and de facto monarch of a business empire largely built on commercial TV and advertising. </p>
<p>He acted no differently as a politician than he did in his entrepreneurial life, running his governments with incredible energy but with an extremely low propensity for delegation. </p>
<p>But while Berlusconi was able to slot his eldest sons Marina and Piersilvio into top jobs in his business empire, he hasn’t been able to find an equally charismatic successor for his political project.</p>
<h2>All is forgiven, again and again</h2>
<p>Italians gave the flamboyant Berlusconi a pass for many antics, particularly his sometimes <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64653128">unconventional behaviour</a> in his private life. He probably got more lenience from the public than he deserved, and certainly much more than the judicial system was willing to extend him, as was clear from his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/silvio-berlusconi-community-service-sentence-tax-fraud">conviction</a> for tax fraud. </p>
<p>While he fought off other legal cases over allegations of sex with a minor, others were convicted of <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/silvio-berlusconi/11994528/Italian-businessman-and-glamour-model-convicted-of-recruiting-prostitutes-for-Berlusconis-parties.html">recruiting prostitutes for Berlusconi’s parties</a>.</p>
<p>Even now, after his death, it is difficult to land on a definitive view of Berlusconi and his role in Italy’s recent history. His own life story is certainly emblematic of a country endowed with many gifts – a creative place capable of sudden and unexpected revival. </p>
<p>But he could equally be said to represent Italy in a negative way too, unfortunately too often incapable of producing a vision of the future based on anything other than individual egoistic interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Colli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite his serving three separate terms in office, it’s still difficult to decide on a definitive view of the late Italian prime minister.Andrea Colli, Full Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1931362022-11-02T19:51:34Z2022-11-02T19:51:34ZThe fox in the chicken coop: how the far right is playing the European Parliament<p>Several countries in the European Union are currently governed by far-right political parties. In Hungary, <em>Fidesz</em> under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">progressively dismantling</a> the country’s constitutional protections of the rule of law and democratic institutions. Poland under its ruling Law and Justice party has shown <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-fines-poland-1-million-per-day-over-judicial-reforms/a-59635269">equally worrying trends</a>. Most recently, Giorgia Meloni and the Brothers of Italy party just won the Italian general elections in September 2022 and have formed a governing coalition with Matteo Salvini’s far-right <em>Lega</em> and Silvio Berlusconi’s <em>Forza Italia</em>. In Sweden, the newly elected minority government depends on support from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/14/swedish-parties-agree-coalition-with-backing-of-far-right">far-right Sweden Democrats</a>. </p>
<p>While far-right parties have been present in Europe for some time, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/sep/26/giorgia-meloni-won-big-italy-many-obstacles">liberal democratic parties still do not know how to respond to their presence</a>.</p>
<p>The European Parliament is a suitable place to observe the dilemmas that arise for mainstream politicians regarding the far-right. Particularly when the latter are elected democratically to office and form part of a democratic institution such as a supranational parliament. As the only directly elected body of the European Union (EU), the European Parliament hosts <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/698880/EPRS_BRI(2022)698880_EN.pdf">705 elected members from 206 national political parties</a>. Most of them gather in different political groups according to similar ideologies. The far right spreads widely across different political groups, underlining the degree to which they have become part of the system.</p>
<h2>Right at the core</h2>
<p>In 2015, Marine Le Pen and her <em>Rassemblement National</em> managed to create her own far-right political group and partnered with Matteo Salvini and his <em>Lega</em>. Today they are called the Identity and Democracy (ID) group and form the fifth-biggest political group (out of seven). Other like-minded parties include Germany’s Alternative for Germany, the Freedom Party of Austria, Belgium’s Flemish Interest, and the Danish People’s Party. Although they have been rather passive actors in the European Parliament’s committees, they have influence at the highest level. In the Conference of Presidents, each political group has one vote no matter their size. If bigger groups such as the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats do not reach a consensus, occasionally they may need far-right support to reach a majority.</p>
<p>The Polish Law and Justice party also lead their political group, known as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). It is the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-public/hemicycle/index.htm?lang=en&loc=str">fourth-strongest force in the European Parliament</a>, and also the Sweden Democrats, the Brothers of Italy, and Spain’s <em>Vox</em> are part of this group. In contrast, the Hungarian <em>Fidesz</em> was part of the biggest political group, the Christian Democrats (until 2021 known as the European People’s Party, EPP). Orbán was long shielded by powerful politicians such as former German chancellor Angela Merkel and former European Council president Donald Tusk. <em>Fidesz</em> left the EPP in early 2021 when internal pressure over the rule of law concerns in Hungary grew too strong to justify their membership. Today, its members do not belong to any political group in the European Parliament, depriving them of political power and visibility.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Seating chart of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France (17 October 2022).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-public/hemicycle/index.htm?lang=en&loc=str">europarl.europa.eu</a></span>
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<p>Using their political group status, far-right parties have gained not just visiblity and power, they’ve also reaped <a href="https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/01/14/enf-new-right-wing-force-european-parliament-and-how-deal-it">significant financial benefits</a>. In 2017, Marine Le Pen was accused of hiring <a href="https://euobserver.com/eu-political/136944">“fake assistants”</a>, and in April of this year she and other members of her party were charged with misusing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/17/eu-anti-fraud-body-accuses-marine-le-pen-france-election">620,000 euros of EU funds</a>. In January, Morten Messerschmidt of the Danish People’s Party was convicted of using EU funds for <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/danish-mp-convicted-of-eu-funds-fraud-elected-to-head-far-right-party/">political campaigning</a>. Using European resources, many far-right political parties have thus been able to grow and expand their influence at home while simultaneously attacking the EU project.</p>
<h2>Friends and foes</h2>
<p>The traditional political groups in the European Parliament, including the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Greens have long had an <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/the-brief-the-costs-of-a-cordon-sanitaire/">informal agreement</a> known as the <em>cordon sanitaire</em> that blocks members of the far right from obtaining key positions in Parliament.</p>
<p>In addition, the Social Democrats and the Greens each adopted internal policies of non-cooperation with the far right. The Social Democrats formally do not cooperate with Marine Le Pen’s Identity and Democracy Group, and while the Greens have a similar policy, it’s a bit looser – members can vote in favour of legislative proposals put forward by the far-right Identity and Democracy group if the content is deemed to be technical in nature. The Greens also leave the definition of who belongs to the far right rather open. Members can choose if they wish to boycott cooperation with certain political parties from other political groups, such as the Law and Justice or Brothers of Italy from the Europe of Conservatives and Reformists group. The <em>cordon sanitaire</em> is thus porous and context-dependent.</p>
<p>In addition, because the Christian Democrats successfully shielded Fidesz from any political pressure, it was long spared from <em>cordon sanitaire</em> measures. This changed in September 2018, when the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340_EN.html">European Parliament launched a formal sanctions procedure</a>, known as Article 7 TEU, for concerns over Hungary’s democratic backsliding. Even most of the Christian Democrats voted in favour of the resolution thanks to the leadership of Judith Sargentini from the Greens, who led the negotiations at the time. After the EPP changed its internal rules to allow for the expulsion of an entire party, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/epp-suspension-rules-fidesz-european-parliament-viktor-orban-hungary/">Fidesz chose to leave</a> in early 2021.</p>
<p>These examples demonstrate the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the far right in the European Parliament. They also shed light on the circumstances under which mainstream parties – despite their convictions – can choose to <a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/european-union-and-far-right-letting-wolf-fold">support the far right</a>.</p>
<h2>Business as usual continues</h2>
<p>Following the victory of the Brothers of Italy at home, not much has changed in the European Parliament. Within the Christian Democrats, there have been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/call-boot-berlusconi-party-forza-italia-eu-parliament-epp-back-meloni-brothers-italy/">calls to ban <em>Forza Italia</em></a> from the EPP group should they continue to support Meloni, but this has yet to happen. Manfred Weber, head of the EPP, supported <em>Forza Italia</em> during the Italy’s election, and while he was <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-weber-wegen-wahlkampfhilfe-fuer-berlusconi-in-der-kritik-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-220909-99-693826">strongly criticised</a>, it’s another example of how traditional parties can directly or indirectly support and sustain far-right parties.</p>
<p>There have been speculations about a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/brothers-of-italy-mep-no-way-for-ecr-and-id-to-merge-in-one-group/">possible merger</a> between Law and Justice’s ECR and Le Pen’s and Salvini’s ID group. The ECR also hosts the Brothers of Italy, while the ID is home to Italy’s <em>Lega</em>. In terms of numerical power, a merger would change the political game in the European Parliament – combined, they would become the third-largest force behind the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Yet a merger is unlikely to happen given their <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/brothers-of-italy-mep-no-way-for-ecr-and-id-to-merge-in-one-group/">differing stances</a> regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The ECR supports sanctions against Russia, most of the ID has been against them. On one issue the Brothers of Italy and the <em>Lega</em> do agree: both <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italys-meloni-backs-orban-says-hungary-is-democratic/">voted against</a> a resolution in the European Parliament declaring that Hungary no longer constitutes a democracy.</p>
<p>An additional complication is that the electoral cycle of the European Parliament is not aligned with national elections. Even if Meloni won at the national level, it does not change the numerical representation of the Brothers of Italy in the European Parliament, and the next EU elections do not take place until May 2024. A bigger influence might be felt in the Council, where <em>Fidesz</em> and Law and Justice have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60400112">successfully blocking</a> several important decisions, such as the EU budget, due to their veto rights.</p>
<p>The far right has become an intrinsic part of EU politics. Of even more concern is their deep political entanglement with liberal democratic political parties, which renders the whole story even more complex.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christin Tonne is an affiliated researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre On Democracy at the Geneva Graduate Institute (IHEID). The article is based on the research she conducted for her doctoral dissertation. She currently receives funding from the IHEID for a follow-up pilot project on democratic defenses against the far right in the EU institutions.</span></em></p>How political parties such as Fidesz, Brothers of Italy, and the National Rally form part of the European Parliament.Christin Tonne, Research associate at the Albert Hirschman Centre On Democracy, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/921982022-10-13T07:02:46Z2022-10-13T07:02:46ZItaly’s election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right<p>Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the populist radical right party Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), may have emerged as the victor in Italy’s recent elections, but she did so at the head of a delicately balanced coalition of parties – one that included Matteo Salvini, the man once spoken of in the same terms as Meloni herself.</p>
<p>Before Brothers of Italy’s meteoric rise, it was Salvini who was seen as the populist right-wing threat in Italy. Now he finds himself playing second fiddle to Meloni.</p>
<p>Salvini’s League (Lega) teamed up with Brothers of Italy in a pre-election alliance that came with the promise of being part of a government led by the radical right. But the deal came at a cost. The relationship between the two allies has evolved into a zero-sum game, with Brothers of Italy taking electoral support from the League.</p>
<p>Brothers of Italy won 26% of the national vote in the September election — a share that dwarfs the results of its two coalition partners combined. Salvini’s League took 8.8% and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (the third partner in the alliance) took 8.1%.</p>
<p>This was a stunning reversal of fortunes given that in the previous election in 2018, Brothers of Italy won just 4.4% of the vote. That year the League took 17.4% and Forza Italia 14%.</p>
<h2>Decimated in the north</h2>
<p>A pressing concern for Salvini is the extent to which Brothers of Italy has eaten into the League’s historical strongholds in the north of Italy. The League was once called the Northern League, precisely because it sought to represent these areas specifically. It was established in 1991 by uniting several regional parties and movements and for most of its history its key goal was regional autonomy for the north of Italy. It is only in the past ten years that the party has tried to expand into the south. Along with this expansion came a pivot towards nationalist campaign tactics and more radical anti-immigration rhetoric.</p>
<p>Despite this history as a northern party, Brothers of Italy has overtaken the League in the whole of the north – and by a large margin.</p>
<p><strong>Election results in the Northern regions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A table showing Brothers of Italy outperformed the League across the northern regions of Italy" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reversal of fortunes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2022/09/26/risultati-camera-lanalisi-dettagliata-di-liste-e-coalizioni-per-regioni-e-zone-geopolitiche/">Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Lombardy, support for the League dropped by 15 percentage points between the 2018 and 2022 elections. In Veneto, it fell by 18.3 percentage points. </p>
<p>For voters, the two parties are now virtually indistinguishable in terms of ideology and policy, which has made it easier for the former to cannibalise the other. The League – and Salvini – are confronting an existential threat.</p>
<p><strong>Percentage-point losses and gains between the 2018 and 2022 elections</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing how votes have passed from the League to Brothers of Italy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The migration of right-wing votes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2022/09/26/risultati-camera-lanalisi-dettagliata-di-liste-e-coalizioni-per-regioni-e-zone-geopolitiche/">Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>We can’t all be outsiders</h2>
<p>There is an important lesson here for populist radical-right parties more generally. By dropping regionalism and trying to “go national” Salvini has implicitly invited the (large) constituency of right-wing voters who embrace radical ideas about migration and law and order to choose between his party and Meloni’s on the basis of credibility, since there is no longer anything to distinguish them in terms of ideology. In this comparison, the League is on the back foot, having taken part in multiple governments in recent years and, at many points, compromising with other parties. Brothers of Italy can therefore assume the role of disruptive outsider and appeal to voters who are discontent with the status quo. </p>
<p>Apparently recognising Salvini’s weakness in this respect, Brothers of Italy’s election campaign framed Meloni as the only untested alternative on offer – the only candidate of the right untainted by compromise with the left.</p>
<p>Their wrangling is a case study in a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/varieties-of-populist-parties-and-party-systems-in-europe-from-stateoftheart-to-the-application-of-a-novel-classification-scheme-to-66-parties-in-33-countries/7CB95AE2CA7274D5F4716EC11708ACD8">new phase for Europe’s radical right</a>. These parties are largely thought of as the “challengers” to the traditional mainstream but their electoral successes have pushed them into government. Now, they compete not just against the traditional establishment but also among themselves for the control of the executive.</p>
<p>This is the first time that a western European country is likely to be run by a populist radical-right party that also needs to share government with another populist radical-right competitor. Given that multiple similar parties operate elsewhere, too, similar scenarios potentially lie ahead in countries such as Denmark, France and the Netherlands.</p>
<p>Tensions of this kind create a very interesting dynamic for government. Meloni needs Salvini as a junior partner in her coalition but it is inevitable that the arrangement will be beset by infighting. Indeed, Salvini’s political future practically depends on his ability to make it so. It is logical to expect that Salvini will try to fight back against Meloni’s new dominance by keeping <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380500310600">one foot in and one foot out</a> of government. He will seek to hold positions of power but will agitate from within. We might expect him, for example, to loudly criticise the government for not cutting taxes sufficiently (a key theme for League voters), being too worried about the country’s deficit, or too subservient to the “diktats” of the European Commission.</p>
<p>We might even expect him to fight future campaigns on the idea that he was unwilling to compromise in this government. It’s a new iteration of a familiar problem – what happens to parties that wish to be seen as outsiders once they are included in coalition governments? Only this time, all the outsiders are on the inside.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92198/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniele Albertazzi has received funding from AHRC, British Academy, ESRC and the Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mattia Zulianello has received funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>For the first time, two populist radical-right partners are teaming up to form a government. So who is the outsider now?Daniele Albertazzi, Professor of Politics and Co-Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe, University of SurreyMattia Zulianello, Assistant Professor in Political Science, University of TriesteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1912782022-09-27T08:51:42Z2022-09-27T08:51:42ZGiorgia Meloni’s win in Italy proves even a seemingly successful government can fall victim to populism<p>In a historic win, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy took 26% of the national vote in Italy’s latest election – the first time a far-right party will take the lead in government since the second world war. Meloni will become prime minister at the head of a coalition – although the make up of that government is yet to be decided.</p>
<p>While this outcome was expected, it is still astonishing. In the 2018 elections, Meloni’s party took a mere 4.3% of the vote. But her fortunes rapidly changed. By February 2021, when former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi was forming a national unity government, 16.5% of the voting public was already saying they intended to vote for Brothers of Italy – the only major political party not supporting Draghi. Although respected internationally, Draghi’s government was perceived by many Italians as being the ultimate expression of the power held by the world’s financial elites. Meloni voiced this populist concern on many occasions, and her strategy has paid off. </p>
<p>When the Draghi government <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">fell apart</a> in July 2022, after barely a year and half in office, Brothers of Italy had reached 25% while the League was down from 25% to 12.4%. </p>
<p>By staying outside of the coalition, Meloni gave herself the opportunity to freely criticise the government and present her party as the only true opposition. More than a nostalgic vote for a distant fascist past, the Italian electorate’s support for Meloni reflects a discontent with the current economic and social situation. </p>
<p>Distance from the Draghi government also paid off for the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/08/26/understanding-the-populism-of-the-five-star-movement-and-its-continuity-with-the-past/">Five Star Movement</a>. The populist party currently led by Giuseppe Conte was floundering on 10% in July 2022 (having polled as high as 33% in 2018) but has rebuilt to somewhere more like 15%. During the electoral campaign, the Five Star Movement revived some popular policy measures, such as a guaranteed “citizen’s income”, which Draghi had criticised. They made a particularly strong showing in the south, thanks to policies of this kind.</p>
<p>Parties that explicitly or implicitly (in the League’s case) opposed the Draghi government together took more than 50% of the vote while parties running on the “Draghi agenda” (Azione) or pledging their support to the Draghi government (the Democratic Party and More Europe) reached less than 30%. </p>
<p>The revolt against Draghi’s government is all the more interesting since he was not pushing for austerity measures but rather drafting reforms and investment measures financed by the EU. The populist narrative of protecting the ordinary people from the financial elite still proved a successful tactic.</p>
<h2>What a Meloni government will look like</h2>
<p>Meloni is Italy’s first female prime minister. With the exception of Scandinavia, most other female prime ministers in Europe have also come from right-wing parties. This is somewhat ironic, given how it is often parties of the left who pride themselves on advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment. Ironically, the Brothers of Italy’s victory led to the replacement of a 75-year-old man belonging the establishment (Draghi) with a 45-year-old woman (Meloni). </p>
<p>Nevertheless, forming a government will not be easy for Meloni. While the electoral results established her as the clear head of the coalition, a lack of expertise and experience will make populating ministerial posts a challenge. The highest level expert advisers in Italy are more commonly associated with moderate political parties, so finding people will be less easy for an insurgent party like Brothers of Italy. Who to put in charge of foreign affairs and economics are particularly pressing questions. Former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi has already offered his support. </p>
<p>Meloni will have a chance to take a hardline approach on domestic policy and will certainly endeavour to be tougher on migration and on social rights, as her electorate appears to be demanding. But she will struggle to do much by way of radical economic change. The Draghi government already drafted a detailed plan of reforms and investments that will have to be carried out in order to secure EU financing. Although the Brothers of Italy is a statist, corporatist and nationalist party which tends to mistrust globalisation, Meloni can’t afford to put too much distance between herself and the European Union. </p>
<p>She may follow the style of many Italian politicians before her by double dealing. There’s an old saying that Italian politicians hold two press conferences in Brussels: one on the top floor for business and EU partners, and another in the basement, for the public who blames Brussels for any reform measure.</p>
<p>And given the complex international landscape, Meloni will find foreign policy just as difficult to manage. </p>
<p>On campaign posters, Meloni asked Italians “<em>Pronti?</em>” (ready?) – the same question Draghi posed to members of the Italian parliament about his reform plans before it all fell apart. While her election has been received as a radical shift, the new prime minister would be wise to not overestimate how ready people are for change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Galasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy’s next prime minister promises a lot on the campaign trail but the reality of government will prove a shock.Vincenzo Galasso, Professor of Economics, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1906552022-09-26T06:04:27Z2022-09-26T06:04:27ZWhat will its first far-right leader since WWII mean for Italy?<p>“Una vittoria storica” – a historic victory. That’s how the website of one of Italy’s major newspapers, the <a href="https://www.corriere.it/">Corriere della Sera</a>, reacted to the <a href="https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2022/09/25/-centre-right-ahead-in-opinio-rai-exit-poll-with-41-45-_75e4546a-fce5-4bc3-8863-8999d2974a3a.html">exit polls</a> released after voting closed in Italy’s general election on Sunday night.</p>
<p>With a predicted vote share of between 40-45%, the right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni looks on course to secure at least 230 of the 400 seats in the Lower House, giving it a clear majority.</p>
<p>Meloni’s party, Brothers of Italy, was the big winner on the right, with various agencies estimating it at around 25% of the vote. This was more than the combined total of her two main allies, as Matteo Salvini’s League was tipped to receive approximately 8-9%, with former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia just below that.</p>
<p>In just four years, Brothers of Italy has gone from minor to major player on the right. In 2018, they took 4.4% compared to the League’s 17.4% and Forza Italia’s 14%. And, if we look further back, Italy’s right-wing coalition has moved from having been dominated for over 20 years by a centre-right populist party (Forza Italia), to being dominated now by a far-right populist one (Brothers of Italy).</p>
<p>Brothers of Italy’s victory represents several firsts. Italy will have its first woman prime minister. And both Italy and Western Europe will have their first far-right majority government since the fall of Mussolini and the end of the Second World War.</p>
<h2>Who is Giorgia Meloni?</h2>
<p>Meloni’s trajectory owes much to that history. Beginning as an activist of the post-fascist Italian Social Movement in the Roman working-class district of Garbatella in the early 1990s, Meloni rose to prominence in a political milieu that didn’t deny its heritage.</p>
<p>She stated in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuoXr-zjqas&ab_channel=INAPolitique">interview</a> with French TV in 1996 that Mussolini was a “good politician” and “all that he did, he did for Italy”.</p>
<p>While Meloni <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=da4OO5mLZv0&ab_channel=GuardianNews">now says</a> Italy has consigned fascism to history, vestiges of her party’s political roots remain. For example, the <a href="https://citynews-romatoday.stgy.ovh/%7Emedia/original-hi/67277628313202/fdisim-2.jpg">flame</a> in the party’s symbol is taken from the post-fascist Italian Social Movement, and there have been recent instances of its politicians and supporters <a href="https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2021/12/31/napoli-dirigenti-e-militanti-di-fratelli-ditalia-in-posa-mentre-fanno-il-saluto-romano/6442006/">performing fascist salutes</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-meloni-and-the-return-of-fascism-how-italy-got-here-190866">Giorgia Meloni and the return of fascism: how Italy got here</a>
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<p>Meloni and her party’s success can be traced back to Berlusconi’s entry into politics in 1994. His centre-right Forza Italia movement legitimised two smaller radical right parties (the northern regionalist League and the National Alliance) by bringing them into a coalition that easily won that year’s general election.</p>
<p>The coalition that will soon take power almost 30 years later contains the same three ingredients, but their internal balances have now drastically changed.</p>
<p>While some commentators focus on the continuity the new government will represent, there’s a historic change here. The pendulum on the right has shifted from Berlusconi’s centre-right populist governments with a far-right edge in the 1990s and 2000s, to Meloni’s far-right populist government with a centre-right edge in 2022.</p>
<h2>What do these results mean for Italian politics?</h2>
<p>Within the overall success of the right, there are winners and losers. Meloni is obviously the former, and Salvini is the latter.</p>
<p>Salvini is the politician who, having revitalised his party between 2013 and 2019, has now overseen a huge fall in its support from <a href="https://twitter.com/duncanmcdonnell/status/1574170616084643840/photo/1">over 35%</a> in the polls in July 2019 to under 10% today. Only the lack of an obvious successor may save Salvini from losing his party’s leadership.</p>
<p>For the main party on the Left, the Democratic Party, it’s yet another bad day. Having dropped to under 20% in the 2018 general election, they look unlikely to do much better than that this time. Their failure to find a campaign narrative beyond “stop the far right” and to create a broader coalition underlined the strategic ineptitude that has long undermined the Italian left.</p>
<p>Another “first” of this election is the turnout, which has <a href="https://thewest.com.au/politics/low-turnout-as-italy-elects-new-parliament-c-8354488">slipped below two-thirds</a> for the first time in Italian post-war history, declining from 73% in 2018 to 64% in 2022. This speaks to the image of a country in which large swathes of the population, especially in the South, are disillusioned with decades of politicians who have promised the earth and delivered little.</p>
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<p>In economic and foreign policy terms, Italy may not change much in the short-term. Meloni will be keen to show Italian and international elites that she’s a responsible leader. Powerful domestic interest groups, such as the employers’ federation “Confindustria”, must be kept onside. As must the European Union which supports Italy through its post-COVID recovery plan.</p>
<p>But much could change for the far-right’s “enemies of the people”: ethnic, religious and sexual minorities; immigrants; and those judges, intellectuals, and journalists who dare to criticise the new regime.</p>
<p>Things will also change for those far-right Italians who, as Meloni <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2022/09/21/video/meloni_e_lambiguita_della_frase_ricorrente_ai_suoi_comizi_sogno_una_nazione_in_cui_nessuno_debba_abbassare_la_testa_per_c-9091284/">recently put it</a>, have had to “keep their head down for so many years and not say what they believed”. So, while the Brothers of Italy’s conservation of the post-fascist flame may be more smoke than fire for some groups, for others it will be incendiary.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-meloni-the-political-provocateur-set-to-become-italys-first-far-right-leader-since-mussolini-190116">Giorgia Meloni – the political provocateur set to become Italy's first far-right leader since Mussolini</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Duncan McDonnell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sofia Ammassari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy will have its first woman prime minister. And both Italy and Western Europe will have their first far-right majority government since the fall of Mussolini and the end of the Second World War.Sofia Ammassari, PhD researcher, Griffith UniversityDuncan McDonnell, Professor of Politics, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1908572022-09-20T12:42:23Z2022-09-20T12:42:23ZItaly election: why Giorgia Meloni’s far-right Brothers of Italy party is almost guaranteed to win<p>When Italy last held an election in 2018, the Fratelli d’Italia – Brothers of Italy – were minnows, taking a mere 4.4% of the vote. Now, ahead of the 2022 vote on September 25, opinion polls suggest the far-right group is on course for a historic victory that would make them the largest party in Italy. </p>
<p>If this comes to pass, the Brothers of Italy would enter government at the head of a three-party coalition (already agreed with Matteo Salvini’s the League and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia). Party leader Giorgia Meloni would be prime minister. </p>
<p>This is significant because Brothers of Italy’s historic lineage traces back to the neo-fascists of the post-war period. Indeed, its very symbol (a tricoloured flame) is the same as that of its predecessor, the National Alliance, and of its predecessor, the Italian Social Movement – which was founded by veterans of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing how the Brothers of Italy have massively increased their support in recent years." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Rise of the Brothers of Italy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.istitutopiepoli.it/">Istituto Piepoli</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>The result of this election is already considered a foregone conclusion. That is not just because the margin of difference in polling is so great, but also because the parties of the centre and left have failed to construct a pre-electoral coalition.</p>
<p>In Italy, this is a form of political suicide. The <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/italys-odd-turn-to-the-right/">electoral system</a> – part majoritarian and part proportional – favours those parties which make pre-electoral pacts and form large coalitions. Yet, the Democrats rejected a pact with the Five Star Movement because of its role in bringing down the government of <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">Mario Draghi</a>. </p>
<p>The centrist <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/italys-renzi-creates-third-pole-with-centrist-ally-ahead-of-elections/2659198">“third pole”</a> created by two smaller parties then rejected the Democrats because they were flirting with the Green Left. This fragmentation means not just that the right-wing coalition is unsurpassable but that it could, with over 40% of the vote, secure more than two-thirds of the seats in the Italian parliament.</p>
<h2>Alarm bells ringing</h2>
<p>A majority of that size would enable the government to amend the constitution and introduce a directly elected presidency – an idea on which all three parties in the coalition seem to agree. When a politician of the far right like Meloni speaks of replacing parliamentary democracy with a “democracy of the people”, it sends a shiver down the spines of many Italians. </p>
<p>Fears of a return to the fascism of the past may nevertheless be overstated. A detailed look at any policy area (European integration, migration, the energy crisis, Ukraine) reveals significant differences between the three parties of the right. It is not at all clear that they are capable of producing coherent government, let alone see through on a radical constitutional overhaul.</p>
<p>The positions adopted by the Brothers of Italy also often seem incompatible, if not contradictory with each other. This is because Meloni is speaking to two audiences. One needs reassuring that she will not be too extreme if elected. The other comprises party members, militants and sympathisers who need to hear about ideologically motivated changes to come, and who are more interested in the tone and big picture than the details.</p>
<h2>Europe and Russia</h2>
<p>Meloni’s position on Europe is another cause for concern. Although she declares herself to be committed to the EU, she also wants to review various financial arrangements with the bloc. And the other parties in her coalition are well known for their eurosceptism. Their programme (“For Italy”) says it wants <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-italian-elections-and-the-threat-to-european-integration/">a more political and less bureaucratic EU</a>, and there is concern as to what this might mean.</p>
<p>A Meloni-led government also brings potential ramifications for the sanctions on Russia and the arming of Ukraine. Both Europe and Moscow are wondering if the election outcome might see a change in the Italian government’s position that undermines Europe’s united front. For all Meloni’s apparent commitment to the European position, <a href="https://www.politicanews.it/quotidiani/la-repubblica-la-destra-si-divide-su-putin-84142">Salvini</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-accept-vladimir-putin-demands-italy-silvio-berlusconi-tells-europe-1708918">Berlusconi</a> are sceptics, if not outright opponents. </p>
<p>The American National Security Council recently <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/09/15/news/soldi_russia_italia_documento_usa-365703569/?ref=RHTP-BH-I365694626-P1-S1-T1">revealed</a> evidence that Russia secretly channels funds to a large network of (as yet unnamed) parties (including Italian ones), in order to disrupt democratic processes and garner support for Moscow. This has fuelled suspicions that the parties of the right may all be involved.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Italy finds itself in a significantly deteriorating economic scenario and is especially exposed to the Russian gas crisis. The IMF has estimated that an embargo on Russian gas would see an <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2022/07/19/how-a-russian-natural-gas-cutoff-could-weigh-on-europes-economies/">economic contraction in Italy</a> of over 5% – higher than all other EU nations but Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia. </p>
<p>The country will also be affected by the European Central Bank’s decision to scale back its stimulus programme by raising interest rates and stopping the purchase of national bonds. Small wonder that investors have been selling off Italian bonds and hedge fund investors have been betting <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5cef309f-9daf-4337-bdc6-f6b2ef8ffe02">against them on a mammoth scale</a>. The markets, in short, are worried, although they are, as it were, building in expectations of a right-wing victory, which may therefore offset a dramatic post-election fall.</p>
<h2>Deja vu?</h2>
<p>It should be noted that Italy has been in a similar political position before. There were widespread fears ahead of the 2018 general election about what would happen if the populists came to power – and, sure enough, they did. The Five Star Movement, with an extraordinary 32.7% of the vote, formed a government with Salvini’s League. Yet, the government proved to be hopelessly divided (some would say incompetent) and collapsed a year later. On today’s opinion polling evidence, Five Star is now a relatively minor political force.</p>
<p>True, what makes 2022 different is that this will be the first time the heirs of neo-fascism have come to power. But it should not be forgotten that Italy’s political system is difficult to monopolise, and even more difficult to reform. In short, the jury on the threat represented by Meloni is still out.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin J Bull does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the opposition all but giving up, a party with origins in post-war fascism is poised to form a government.Martin J Bull, Professor of Politics, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884922022-09-18T12:49:45Z2022-09-18T12:49:45ZAs a divided Italy heads to the polls, a sharp right turn is likely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484350/original/file-20220913-4673-x6jhb6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4141%2C2758&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From left, Silvio Berlusconi, Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini address a rally in Rome in 2019. Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy) party, with neo-fascist roots, has been rising rapidly in popularity ahead of Italy's Sept. 25 parliamentary elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Italians will soon vote in national elections and the country will have <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/01/31/why-does-italy-go-through-so-many-governments">its 70th government since the founding</a> of the republic in 1946. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://politpro.eu/en/italy">polling on voting intentions</a> point to a significant victory for the right-wing coalition with Giorgia Meloni’s party, Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), at the helm. These results could usher in the country’s first female prime minister, but questions remain about how far right she will govern, how long support will last and how she’ll respond to European and international pressures.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with grey-ish hair and wearing a suit smiles and waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Italian Premier Mario Draghi waves to lawmakers at the end of his address to parliament in Rome in July 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini, File)</span></span>
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<p>Italy is notorious for its political fragmentation and governmental instability, often struggling to reach a full year with the same cabinet in power. </p>
<p>Shrewd political manoeuvring has led to the rise and fall of many coalitions and technocratic governments over the past few decades, including the recent national unity government of Mario Draghi, the former head of the European Central Bank, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">collapsed in July 2022</a>.</p>
<h2>Hung parliament</h2>
<p>This election is significant because it’s the first held since 2018, when the anti-establishment Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star movement) and Lega (the League) won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-berlusconi">most seats in a hung parliament</a> and found a governing compromise with non-politically aligned leader Giuseppe Conte, who served until January 2021. </p>
<p>Draghi was then appointed prime minister by President Sergio Mattarella, with support of all major parties — except the Brothers of Italy — to stabilize the government during recovery efforts from the COVID-19 pandemic, including overseeing critical <a href="https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/draghis-plan-to-cut-italian-red-tape-clears-hurdle-for-eu-aid">European Union financial support to Italy</a>.</p>
<p>This campaign also appears to be Meloni’s to lose, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-right-heads-clear-election-victory-final-polls-indicate-2022-09-09/">as her support has grown from four per cent in 2018 to 25 per cent today</a>. Along with her right-wing coalition partners Matteo Salvini (the League) and Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia), they are approaching 50 per cent and are forecast to win potentially large majorities in both Italy’s Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. </p>
<p>The centre-left coalition made up of the Democratic Party and other small parties, with less than 30 per cent support, have opted not to partner with the Five-star movement and risk being banished to opposition benches for years.</p>
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<img alt="A blonde woman speaks into a microphone and points upwards. A sign that says Meloni is seen behind her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Giorgia Meloni addresses a campaign rally in Ancona, Italy, in August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Domenico Stinellis)</span></span>
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<h2>Towards a right-wing victory?</h2>
<p>Meloni has been in politics for a while, joining the post-Mussolini era neo-fascist party, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), as a youth. </p>
<p>By 2008 at age 31, she became <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62659183">Italy’s youngest ever minister</a>, managing the Youth and Sport portfolio in Berlusconi’s government. In 2012, she founded <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220906/political-cheat-sheet-understanding-the-brothers-of-italy/">Fratelli d'Italia</a>, and since then has grown the party by conjuring up the former rhetoric and populist policy positions of both the MSI and Berlusconi’s former right-wing partner, the National Alliance.</p>
<p>Brimming with confidence from recent polling results, Meloni is projecting a “ready to govern” attitude in the final stretch of the campaign. </p>
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<p>Her party has surpassed the traditional right parties of Forza Italia and even the League. </p>
<p>The largest vote winner in the coalition generally becomes prime minister in Italy, and Meloni knows this. She has tried to assuage concerns about some of her radical proposals and anti-European Union rhetoric by claiming she’ll govern for all Italians <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/69f8e007-bb07-4342-8dd0-b7e99a6582af">in support of the EU and NATO</a> alliances, but with a much different tone than previous governments.</p>
<h2>Meloni’s Italian-style populism</h2>
<p>Like her populist predecessors across Europe, Meloni has honed in on soaring cost of living, demographic crises, pandemic fatigue, migration and economic malaise with typical promises about returning power to the people from the elites, securing the border and reviving the economy by lowering taxes and regulations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62726468">Promises include</a> renegotiating Italy’s massive EU COVID-19 recovery plan, changing the constitution to elect the Italian president by popular vote, erecting a naval blockade of migrants from Libya and integrating fewer Muslims. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-once-overwhelmed-by-covid-19-turns-to-a-health-pass-and-stricter-measures-to-contain-virus-165457">Italy – once overwhelmed by COVID-19 – turns to a health pass and stricter measures to contain virus</a>
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<p>All of this is premised on returning the cultural values of the “traditional” Italian family, which means rolling back the clock on LGBTQ+ rights and even a pledge to ban <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/brothers-of-italy-calls-open-season-on-peppa-pigfdi-lgbt/"><em>Peppa Pig</em> episodes</a> over the use of same-sex couples in the animated kids show.</p>
<p>As she pursues these policies and cozies up to allies like France’s Marie Le Pen and Hungary’s Viktor Orban, observers are worried about Italy’s rightward drift.</p>
<p>Yet whether her main coalition partners, Salvini and Berlusconi — two powerful men with their own large followings — will support Meloni as prime minister for many years is in question. While the parties share some libertarian economic views and traditional cultural outlooks, their differences are significant. </p>
<p>The League under Salvini has worked for years <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13597566.2018.1512977">to broaden its appeal</a> to the rest of Italy and <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2018/10/how-italy-s-separatist-northern-league-went-national">shed its northern, separatist moniker</a> (it was formerly called Lega Nord) by focusing on migrants and the EU as scapegoats for Italy’s woes.</p>
<p>But it appears Meloni poached a good number of right-wing and disenchanted voters who temporarily sided with the Five-star and the League in 2018 with her similar but more forceful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/aug/14/georgia-meloni-no-fascist-evokes-grim-memories-italys-past">populist promises.</a></p>
<h2>Berlusconi as king-maker</h2>
<p>Enter Berlusconi. He was pushed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/berlusconi-poised-to-step-down/2011/11/12/gIQAMJuZFN_story.html">to resign in 2011</a> during the sovereign debt crisis in favour of technocrat Mario Monti and <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/06/24/195185941/silvio-berlusconi-found-guilty-in-sex-for-hire-case">was convicted</a> on a number of charges related to prostitution and tax fraud. </p>
<p>He completed community service and was banned from Parliament, but this ban was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italian-court-lifts-ban-on-berlusconi-running-for-office-paper-forza-italia/">lifted by a judge</a> in 2018. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A balding man in a dark suit smiles and waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi waves to reporters as he arrives at the Chamber of Deputies to meet Mario Draghi in Rome in February 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alessandra Tarantino)</span></span>
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<p>He may be poised to be the kingmaker of the coalition. Running as a more responsible, pro-EU statesman and centrist than his partners, he could have a large say in the direction of governance and policy if the election results are tight, and could threaten to remove his support at a moment’s notice.</p>
<p>This might mean that Meloni’s governing style and hard-right promises will be moderated by her centrist partner. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more important moderating influences will lie within the EU and the international community. Italy has been an important NATO and EU member.</p>
<p>The highly indebted government is also reliant on <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/italys-meloni-on-collision-course-with-brussels-over-eu-recovery-plan/">EU recovery funds and financial markets</a>, so any radical fiscal moves or egregious violations of human rights on the migration front will likely be countered by international and EU pressure. </p>
<p>Time will tell how far right Italy will drift in the coming year and what will happen if it does, and there’s little doubt other far-right parties in France, the Netherlands and Germany will be taking notes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julian Campisi receives funding from SSHRC and the University of Toronto.</span></em></p>Italians will vote soon. A likely victory for the far-right Brothers of Italy could take the country down an uncharted path.Julian Campisi, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876482022-07-26T11:03:09Z2022-07-26T11:03:09ZItalian government collapse: the political chess moves behind Mario Draghi’s resignation<p>Political instability in Italy is nothing new – the country has had 67 governments in less than 75 years. Its politicians are often shortsighted, moved by special interests and career concerns, rather than by the common good. This is what’s behind the collapse of the most recent government – the prime minister, Mario Draghi, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italian-pm-draghi-meets-president-expected-resign-2022-07-21/">resigned</a> after failing to secure the support of his unity coalition.</p>
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<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>To some, sending Draghi packing may appear irrational – his 17-month-old government was backed by all but one of the country’s main political parties. A period of inflation and a war on Europe’s eastern border doesn’t seem an ideal time for political instability. But this development is hardly irrational, or surprising. </p>
<p>The current Italian parliament was elected in 2018. Its first government was led by a coalition of the two parties that received the most votes – the Five Star Movement and the League. The former is a relatively new populist movement, co-founded by comedian Beppe Grillo. Cashing in on social discontent, the party won support in the south of Italy by running on a combination of anti-elite messaging and promises to increase public spending. The League is an established right-wing populist party with most of its political constituency in the north. </p>
<p>These two parties had a similar stance on some key issues: anti-immigration, pro-early retirement and the establishment of a basic income. They joined forces to appoint Giuseppe Conte, an unelected professor of law, as prime minister.</p>
<p>This populist coalition broke down in summer 2019 when the League opted out and was replaced by the centre-left Democratic Party. The new government was <a href="https://theconversation.com/giuseppe-conte-how-italys-prime-minister-survived-the-collapse-of-his-own-government-122809">still led by Conte</a>, but now held his position thanks to the support of the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party. But this government was brought down during the pandemic in February 2021 and was replaced by a national unity government led by <a href="https://theconversation.com/mario-draghi-is-italys-addiction-to-technocratic-leaders-a-cause-for-concern-155336">Mario Draghi</a>, an independent and former president of the European Central Bank. This government was supported by all major parties, with the exception of the far-right Brothers of Italy.</p>
<p>There are two other factors contributing to the current political climate. First, the parliament that came out of the 2018 election was substantially different from previous ones. The Five Star Movement obtained one-third of the overall seats, bringing to parliament many MPs with little or no political experience and from low-income jobs. The selection of these political amateurs as candidates was done through a private online platform. </p>
<p>Second, the first Conte government passed a constitutional law, later confirmed by a referendum in September 2020, reducing the number of members in the Italian parliament from 630 to 400 in the lower house and from 315 to 200 in the senate. With the next political election, initially scheduled for 2023, the parliament will <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54244025">shrink by one-third</a>. This has exacerbated each MP’s individual career concerns.</p>
<h2>Political movement and government collapse</h2>
<p>With elections scheduled for March 2023 at the latest, some parties have started to reposition themselves towards their electorate. After nearly four and a half years in parliament, MPs have also secured their parliamentary pension rights and may therefore be prepared to take more political risks. </p>
<p>Conte, having established himself as leader of the Five Star Movement, was the first to make a move. He criticised Draghi’s government for being shy on social measures and presented him with a series of policy requests – essentially an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f5fd0ed1-254e-4dee-8959-783a1d3883b4">ultimatum for the government</a> to have the continued support of the Five Star Movement.</p>
<p>Faced with internal division and declining support in the polls, Conte was clearly trying to mobilise the Movement’s base supporters. He did not expect this to be a risky move, as Draghi’s government held a large majority in the parliament. </p>
<p>Draghi refused to accept an ultimatum and resigned, despite having a majority in the parliament. The Italian president, Sergio Mattarella, refused his resignation, sending him back to the senate for a confidence vote, which coalition partners decided to boycott. Draghi <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/20/1112599869/italy-prime-minister-draghi-coalition-unravels">won the vote</a>, but lost enough support from his coalition to make his resignation inevitable. This time the president accepted and dissolved the parliament.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, parties firmly to the right of the political spectrum have also been repositioning ahead of the next election. Conte’s ultimatum gave the League (led by Matteo Salvini) and the more moderate Forza Italia (led by Silvio Berlusconi) an unexpected opportunity to drop their support for the government. </p>
<p>Salvini and Berlusconi are now expected to join their parties together for a snap election, which, following the collapse of Draghi’s government, will take place on September 25. Given recent polling trends, they are believed to have a better shot at coming on top against the far-right Brothers of Italy in an early election, rather than next spring. The Brothers of Italy was the only party not in Draghi’s coalition, and has been rising in the polls at the expense of the other two right-wing parties.</p>
<p>By withdrawing their support, Salvini and Berlusconi managed to send Draghi’s government home, and send Italy into its first summertime electoral campaign. Current polls predict a right-wing coalition government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/italy-summer-snap-elections-far-right-brothers-of-italy-giorgia-meloni">led by Giorgia Meloni</a> – potentially the first female prime minister in Italian history. In all relevant issues, from economics to social policy to foreign relations, such a government would be a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-valdimir-putin-italy/">major change</a> from the liberal, market-oriented, Nato-centric view of the Draghi government. Not quite the scenario Conte had in mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Galasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest political chaos in Italy is the result of a series of political manoeuvres by varying parties.Vincenzo Galasso, Professor of Economics, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532762021-01-19T13:10:14Z2021-01-19T13:10:14ZTrump sees power as private property – a habit shared by autocrats throughout the ages<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379102/original/file-20210116-23-1j0yfa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C11%2C3673%2C2372&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lord of all he surveys?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-stands-on-the-white-house-balcony-news-photo/1229299863?adppopup=true">Nicholas Kamm/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Shortly before crowds of his supporters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html">stormed the Capitol</a> on Jan. 6, Donald Trump implored them to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/trump-speech-capitol.html">take back our country</a>.” His words echoed a long history of authoritarians who have attempted to privatize power and turn it into personal property.</p>
<p>Taking back what is yours would not, by this logic, be trespassing, terrorism or treason. Instead, it is merely setting things right. By inciting a predominantly white crowd to lay siege to an institution that was ratifying what they had been <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-12-06/donald-trump-election-fraud-lies-psychology">told was a “stolen” election</a>, Trump was trying to preserve his presidency as if it were private property – his to keep, or give away.</p>
<h2>Turning power into property</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/nicola/bio">scholars</a> of <a href="https://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/42780580/Zur_Person">comparative authoritarianism</a>, we have come to learn that this is nothing new. History offers plenty of egregious examples of autocrats who treated their office and powers as their private property. Louis XIV, king of France, <a href="http://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719062353.001.0001">did not know how to distinguish between himself and the state</a>. According to the legend, the “Sun King” <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/286184">said that he was the state</a> or, modified in property terms, that the state belonged to him.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=753&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=753&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=753&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=946&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=946&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379103/original/file-20210116-17-1belcjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=946&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sun King in all his pomp.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/louis-xiv-king-of-france-in-royal-costume-oil-on-canvas-by-news-photo/526886762?adppopup=true">Corbis Historical via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Whether autocrats come to office by chance of birth, are elected or usurp the leadership of the state, they almost habitually succumb to the temptation to regard their position not as a temporary loan, but as capital they can dispose like landlords. The way autocrats deal with tenure, succession and state assets reveals how they treat political power as private property.</p>
<p>Once elected, fairly or after manipulation, autocrats tend to wrench power from a legitimate government and, if necessary, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/new-authoritarianism/607045/">remove the time limits</a> on their term of office.</p>
<p>In the case of <a href="https://theconversation.com/statesman-strongman-philosopher-autocrat-chinas-xi-is-a-man-who-contains-multitudes-92962">China’s Xi Jinping</a>, this was achieved through <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/china-removes-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely">cosmetic constitutional changes</a> handled by compliant party cadres. Referendums, marred by intimidation and violence, had the same result of extending the tenures of <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6276009">Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus</a>, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/09/algeria.election/index.html">Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/world/americas/16venez.html">Hugo Chávez in Venezuela</a>.</p>
<p>Brazen despots, such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/world/asia/uzbekistan-islam-karimov-obituary.html">Uzbekistan’s former leader Islam Karimov</a>, simply <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/karimov-uzbekistans-perpetual-president/">disregard a constitutional term limit</a>. Vladimir Putin sidestepped it by first setting up a stooge, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/dmitry-medvedev-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-robin-to-putins-batman">Dmitry Medvedev</a>, before faking a fresh start after manipulating the constitution. </p>
<p>When it comes to Trump, he dealt with the looming end of his term of power through denial. The lost election forced him to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ap-fact-check-trump-conclusively-lost-bbb9d8c808021ed65d91aee003a7bc64">deny it happened</a>, instead <a href="https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2021/jan/07/donald-trump/trump-clings-fantasy-landslide-victory-egging-supp/">claiming a landslide victory</a>. Against all evidence, Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-voting-rules-insight/as-trump-pushes-baseless-fraud-claims-republicans-pledge-tougher-voting-rules-idUSKBN28V1DN">decried what he claimed was electoral fraud</a>, insisted on <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/trump-campaign-asks-another-georgia-recount-n1248538">repeated recounts</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/trump-s-election-fight-includes-over-30-lawsuits-it-s-n1248289">filed a flurry of lawsuits</a> without merit.</p>
<p>But even <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/11/945617913/supreme-court-shuts-door-on-trump-election-prospects">Trump-appointed Supreme Court justices</a> could not defend his claims to what he believed to be his own: the presidency. Trump’s last call to manufacture facts that supported his denial went out to Georgia’s secretary of state to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/us/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-georgia.html">find over 11,780 votes</a>.</p>
<h2>Inheritance of power</h2>
<p>Following the example of hereditary monarchies, autocrats have a penchant for <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032321719862175?journalCode=psxa">controlling the transfer of political office</a> as property. Acting as if they “own” the power justifies the selection and anointing of an heir. It also ensures the tacit amnesty of any crime they may have committed by putting in place someone likely to absolve them and the gentle continuity of authoritarian rule to continue their legacy. </p>
<p>Hardcore versions of this include the <a href="http://doi.org/10.4324/9781315455532">Kim dynasty in North Korea</a> and the <a href="https://www.meforum.org/517/does-bashar-al-assad-rule-syria">Assad family clan in Syria</a>, in which the authoritarians guarantee continuity through their offspring. Elsewhere, it is wives – for instance <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3173094">Eva Perón in Argentina</a> and <a href="http://www.ateneo.edu/ateneopress/product/conjugal-dictatorship-ferdinand-and-imelda-marcos">Imelda Marcos in the Philippines</a>, who became powerful national figures utilizing the base of support that their spouses had amassed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and his son Kim Jong Un attend a massive military parade to mark the 65th anniversary of the communist nation's ruling Workers' Party in Pyongyang, North Korea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379104/original/file-20210116-21-1pj5o23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean leadership is a family affair.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NorthKoreaKimSuccessionQuestions/403d9a3c6043452cb26ca0691be66b6a/photo?Query=Kim%20Jong%20Un%20Kim%20Jong-Il&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=593&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Vincent Yu, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile for others it is friends, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-chavez-maduro/venezuelas-maduro-from-bus-driver-to-chavezs-successor-idUSBRE9250PO20130306">Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela</a>, who was a Chavez loyalist, or personal physicians, such as the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598608419948">murderous François “Papa Doc” Duvalier in Haiti</a>, who become confidants to ruling strongman leaders and then heirs to the throne.</p>
<p>Under Soviet-style communism, the party first takes the place of power as the legitimate heir to ensure unbroken continuity. </p>
<p>Succession tends to be more difficult where reasonably reliable elections carry the risk of expropriating the holder of power. </p>
<p>Trump may have intended to eliminate this risk by combining denial of the results with court action, the spread of false narratives and the incitement to insurrection of his followers.</p>
<h2>Appropriation of public property</h2>
<p>Political authoritarianism pays off, history has shown, especially for those who <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/dictators-and-dictatorships-9781441173966/">ruthlessly commercialize their position of power</a>. They assume that by virtue of their office they are entitled to the assets of the state, or rather society, for private use. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Authoritarian leaders have tended to disdain generating a regular income, so their hidden balance sheets <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/14020-money-laundering-for-21st-century-authoritarianism">read much like those of operational networks of organized crime</a> specializing in theft, embezzlement, fraud and bribery. Latter-day autocrats conceal, as best they can, the sources of their wealth or refuse to pay taxes. Hitler had his tax debt waved in 1935 and then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/08/archives/hitler-revealed-as-a-tax-dodger-used-several-ruses-while-chancellor.html#:%7E:text=Through%20all%20the%20years%20before,was%20declared%20exempt%20from%20taxes.">declared that paying taxes was incompatible</a> with the political office of the Führer. Putin’s declared income <a href="https://qz.com/1594989/vladimir-putins-financial-disclosure-claims-little-wealth/">compares to that of a mid-level Russian bureaucrat</a>, while in reality, by conservative estimate, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/31/financier-bill-browder-says-vladimir-putin-is-worth-200-billion.html">his assets amount to over US$200 billion</a>. It has remained unclear until today how former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi increased his already considerable wealth during his four terms. He was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/world/europe/berlusconi-convicted-and-sentenced-in-tax-fraud.html">convicted of tax evasion</a> and balance-sheet fraud. Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet spread his and his family’s ill-gotten liquid assets <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/general-pinochet-hid-15m-in-us-banks-1.423929">in over 100 accounts</a> in the U.S. alone.</p>
<p>Trump broke with the practice of presidential candidates and presidents by persistently refusing to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/politics/trump-taxes.html">disclose his tax returns</a>, a refusal his lawyers justified before the Supreme Court on the grounds of “<a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/20/trump-tax-returns-judge-rejects-efforts-block-manhattan-subpoena/5616510002/">irreparable harm</a>.” Trump also took advantage of his office to <a href="https://www.gq.com/story/trump-kids-profit-presidency">enrich family members</a> by providing them with business opportunities. At a cost to U.S. taxpayers, the Trump company <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/secret-service-spending-bedminster/2020/09/17/9e11e1c2-f6a0-11ea-be57-d00bb9bc632d_story.html">charged the Secret Service</a> for rooms at Trump properties. The entrepreneur-entertainer has seemingly glorified in the monetary benefits of his presidency with notions that he embodies “the Great” America.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether U.S. democracy will have the strength to expropriate ex-President Trump, take away from him the perks – honor, trust and profit – of the presidency and teach whoever may follow the difference between private and public property.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153276/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In claiming the election was “stolen” from him and using the office of the president to the benefit of his family, Trump dips into the authoritarian playbook to convert power into property.Fernanda G Nicola, Professor of Law, American UniversityGünter Frankenberg, Professor of Public Law, Legal Philosophy and Comparative Law, Goethe University Frankfurt am MainLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1409082020-07-09T15:26:42Z2020-07-09T15:26:42ZStaying in grace: Why some people are immune from scandal – until they’re not<p>Scandals are violent shocks to social systems in which public figures may <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0001839213497011">“fall from grace.”</a> Societies have long been captivated by scandals embroiling powerful people – film producer <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672">Harvey Weinstein</a> and financier <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/10/jeffrey-epstein-dead-prison-report-latest">Jeffrey Epstein</a> come easily to mind, as does American actor Johnny Depp, whose libel case against a UK tabloid has attracted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/jul/07/johnny-depps-barrister-tells-court-amber-heard-invented-abuse-claims-libel-case">significant attention</a>. Politicians also populate this list, including failed Paris mayoral candidate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/14/paris-mayoral-candidate-benjamin-griveaux-sex-video-scandal">Benjamin Griveaux</a>, former US senator <a href="https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/special-reports/larry-craig/article40685838.html">Larry Craig</a> and Silvio Berlusconi, now member of the European Parliment despite an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-berlusconi-ruby/factbox-sex-starlets-and-sleaze-berlusconis-rubygate-idUSTRE71E5S720110215">endless list of scandals</a>. </p>
<p>Yet not all scandalous acts result in a scandal or produce the same consequences. How can we explain the fact that some prominent figures seem able to resist the consequences of their own behavior, and to be seemingly immune from scandals?</p>
<h2>Two schools of thought</h2>
<p>The traditional view on scandals in social science, the “objectivist” perspective, holds that there is a direct, linear relationship between the severity of behavior in question and its social consequences. To casual observers as well, scandals are usually perceived as naturally resulting from severe transgressions: “Where there is smoke, there is fire.”</p>
<p>In contrast, a more recent “constructivist” perspective sees scandals as social-cultural events driven in large part by media reporting (see the work of <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Political+Scandal%3A+Power+and+Visability+in+the+Media+Age-p-9780745625492">John B. Thompson</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/fr/academic/subjects/sociology/sociology-general-interest/scandal-moral-disturbances-society-politics-and-art?format=HB&isbn=9780521895897">Ari Adut</a> and <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Scandal+and+Silence%3A+Media+Responses+to+Presidential+Misconduct-p-9780745660523">Robert Entman</a>). Here, misconduct is neither necessary nor sufficient for a scandal to occur: some scandals result from rumors, while much bad behavior never gets activated into scandal. It is not the act itself, therefore, but rather the media that distinguishes transgressions that remain private from those that make a stir.</p>
<p>As the <a href="https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/2010-11/Journalism/index7f0d.html?page_id=16">fourth estate</a>, the media publicize salient behavior, activating public opinion and disapproval. Media attention problematizes the behavior in question, pressuring other institutions to react. Media coverage also ensures that the reputations of scandal protagonists are assailed, leading to potential stigmatization. In sum, one could say “no media, no scandal.”</p>
<h2>Bad behavior and social consequences</h2>
<p>Why then do some seem immune from scandal? We take a constructivist perspective on what drives media reporting and the consequences of this attention. We outline five factors that influence how scandals get activated, which in turn explains why some figures fall from grace while others remain untouched.</p>
<p>First, the media are more likely to create a scandal when transgressions disrupt established norms. When public figures who hold themselves up as paragons of morality are revealed to violate the social order they purport to uphold, a scandal is sure to follow. In 2007, conservative US senator <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/08/27/craig.arrest/">Larry Craig</a> was arrested for lewd conduct in a Minneapolis airport bathroom. He subsequently pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and resigned. It was not his behavior <em>per se</em>, but the inconsistencies with social rules he openly supported that the media problematized. Even figures whose appeal lies in their ability to flout norms – like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controversies_surrounding_Silvio_Berlusconi">Silvio Berlusconi</a> – will find themselves enmeshed in scandal when they broach norms that affect their supporters personally and negatively.</p>
<p>Second, media coverage of wrongdoing only activates a scandal when it speaks to powerful and interested social groups. Audiences are not homogeneous: what is an egregiously offensive to some is unremarkable to others. Those who operate at the intersection of multiple, diverse interest groups may seem immune from scandal because only some constituencies find a particular behavior objectionable. A scandal is only likely to emerge if the most powerful audiences are willing to act upon the transgression. </p>
<p>Consider a political figure, like presumptive Democratic presidential nominee <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/10/1/20891510/hunter-biden-burisma-ukraine-shokin">Joe Biden</a>, who was accused by conservative politicians and media outlets of securing seats on the boards of international firms for his son Hunter. However, the intelligence community, Democratic party, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-theres-still-no-biden-ukraine-scandal/2020/05/22/628ce78e-9c5d-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html">mainstream media</a> and especially voters did not agree, and the issue fizzled.</p>
<p>Heinz-Christian Strache, Austria’s one-time vice-chancellor and head of the Freedom Party (FPÖ), did not receive similar support in May 2019 when a video was released of him proposing to offer government contracts to the supposed niece of a Russian oligarch. In the ensuing corruption scandal, he <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48335316">forced to resign</a>, new elections were held and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/austrian-elections-exit-polls-collapse-far-right-support-sebastian-kurz-victory">support for the far-right FPÖ collapsed</a>.</p>
<h2>Media status counts</h2>
<p>Third, the relative status and credibility of a media outlet also impact attempts to publicize scandalous behavior. The media not only publicize transgressions but also shape scandal narratives. Attempts to delegitimize the media (for example, by calling them “fake news”) may help transgressors reduce the impact of their wrongdoing. Both <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vqpzk-qGxMU">Donald Trump</a> and <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/2009/10/sezioni/politica/giustizia-13/conf-berlusconi/conf-berlusconi.html">Silvio Berlusconi</a> regularly attack the media (an irony in Berlusconi’s case, given his media-driven fortune). </p>
<p>Not all outlets enjoy equal reach or credibility: scandals typically emerge from the most prestigious outlets (think the <em>New York Times</em>, <em>Le Monde</em> , or <em>Corriere della Sera</em>). While public shaming is common practice on <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/16/living/feat-public-shaming-ronson/index.html">social media</a>, it typically damages individual reputations without rising to the level of scandal unless picked up by more prestigious outlets. </p>
<p>This may be changing given shifting news consumption patterns. On social media it’s easier to target different groups with specific information, as proved by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html">Cambridge Analytica scandal</a>. Even when a scandal erupts, the balkanization of the media implies that different groups may receive contrasting framings, reducing the impact of the scandal on the transgressor.</p>
<p>Fourth, whether the media are attentive to a transgressor, and whether that transgression leads to scandal, is in part a function of who the transgressors are. Some public figures are protected from scandals by the halo effect that emanates from previously held public opinion – a strong reputation, high status or celebrity can immunize transgressors from what would normally be negative outcomes that might stem from discreditable behavior. When audiences are emotionally attached to, preoccupied with, or revere a public figure – as pop music fans were of Michael Jackson during his lifetime, for example – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jun/07/margo-jefferson-on-michael-jackson">positive feelings prevent them from rationally evaluating evidence</a>. By choosing to overlook questionable actions, they are able to avoid engaging in the difficult sensemaking process that would force them to challenge their prior feelings.</p>
<p>Finally, both the media and the public are subject to scandal fatigue when too many scandals appear one after another. Cultural sociologist <a href="https://www.gacbe.ac.in/images/E%20books/Blackwell%20Companion%20to%20the%20Sociology%20of%20Culture.pdf#page=381">Mark Jacobs</a> (2005) has theorized about a “system of scandals”, whereby the over-reporting of scandal by the media can potentially normalize it. As Jacobs writes, “scandals germinate in fields of secrecy and corruption”, but too many scandals can exhaust audiences and their moral appetite for punishing potential wrongdoers. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2017/nov/30/donald-trump-sexual-misconduct-allegations-full-list">current US president comes notably to mind</a>.</p>
<h2>Some stumble, others walk away</h2>
<p>The fact remains that some public figures are able to resist creating a scandal better than others. Political figures have status, authority and legitimacy that can protect them, but also visibility that can pull them down. Corporate leaders answer to a different set of stakeholders but the activation and fallout from corporate scandals are similar to those in politics, as shown by the differing treatment of business leaders in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-blog/2016/jan/31/libor-trial-traders-wall-street-toxic-employees">LIBOR scandal</a>.</p>
<p>The constructivist perspective provides some explanation by exploring how the interaction of the media with multiple audiences can construct scandals. Over time, conditions may change: audiences may withdraw their support; societal norms evolve under the influence of previous scandals; the credibility, reputation, and status of public figures and organizations change. The process of scandal construction is constantly in flux, and that too helps explains why some individuals are immune from scandals, until they are not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140908/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Scandals are violent shocks to social systems, yet not all questionable behaviour produces scandal. How can we explain that some figures escape the consequences of their own behavior while others don’t?Marco Clemente, Associate professor of CSR, IÉSEG School of ManagementJo-Ellen Pozner, Assistant Professor, Management and Entrepreneurship, Santa Clara UniversityTim Hannigan, Assistant Professor, Organization Theory and Entrepreneurship, University of AlbertaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001652018-07-23T20:06:41Z2018-07-23T20:06:41ZWhy the world should be worried about the rise of strongman politics<p>Back in 2016, The Financial Times’ Gideon Rachman advanced the view in a commentary for <a href="http://www.theworldin.com/article/10504/macho-men">The Economist</a> that the “strongman” style of leadership was gravitating from East to West, and growing stronger. “Across the world – from Russia to China and from India to Egypt – macho leadership is back in fashion,” Rachman wrote.</p>
<p>In light of subsequent developments around the world, he understated the “macho” phenomenon, driven by rising populism and growing mistrust of democratic systems.</p>
<p>That commentary was published before Donald Trump prevailed in the US presidential election and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/537921/">turned upside-down</a> assumptions about how an American president might behave.</p>
<p>Whether we like it or not, the most powerful country in the world – until now, an exemplar of Western liberal democracies and global stabiliser in times of stress – is ruled by an autocrat who pays little attention to democratic norms.</p>
<h2>Spread of authoritarianism</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/07/17/629862434/transcript-obamas-speech-at-the-2018-nelson-mandela-annual-lecture">lecture</a> delivered just a day after Trump <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-putin-fallout-inside-the-white-houses-tumultuous-week-of-walk-backs/2018/07/20/7cfdfc34-8c3d-11e8-8b20-60521f27434e_story.html?utm_term=.6b188f47094d">appeared to take</a> Russian President Vladimir Putin’s side over America’s intelligence agencies on the issue of Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, Barack Obama drew attention to the new authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Without referring directly to Trump, Obama issued his most pointed criticism yet of the nativist and populist policies adopted by his successor on issues like immigration, protectionism and climate change.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The politics of fear and resentment … is now on the move. It’s on the move at a pace that would have seemed unimaginable just a few years ago. I am not being alarmist, I’m simply stating the facts. Look around – strongman politics are on the ascendant.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Trump, therefore, is not an aberration. He is part of a strengthening authoritarian trend more or less across the globe.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-growing-mistrust-in-democracy-is-causing-extremism-and-strongman-politics-to-flourish-98621">A growing mistrust in democracy is causing extremism and strongman politics to flourish</a>
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<p>In the Middle East, the Arab Spring has given way to the entrenchment of dictatorships in places like Syria, where Bashar al-Assad <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10202544/Face-the-truth-about-President-Bashar-al-Assad-hes-not-going.html">has reasserted</a> his grip on power with Russian and Iranian help, and in Egypt, where strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi continues to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/egypt-jailed-journalists-numbers-180502195324128.html">curtail press freedom</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-election-season-kicks-off-rivals-to-egypts-leader-are-sidelined-1515431555">incarcerate political rivals</a>.</p>
<p>In Europe, the <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/147102/opportunistic-rise-europes-far-right">rise of an authoritarian right</a> in places like Hungary, Austria and now Italy are part of this trend. In Italy, the bombastic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/italy-elections-as-left-splinters-berlusconi-waits-in-wings">Silvio Berlusconi</a> proved to be a forerunner of what is happening now.</p>
<p>In China, Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html">“new era”</a> is another example of a strongman overriding democratic constraints, with term limits on his leadership having recently been removed.</p>
<p>In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte is using his war on drugs for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/opinion/dutertes-descent-into-authoritarianism.html">broader authoritarian purposes</a> in the manner of a mob boss.</p>
<p>In Thailand, the army <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-thailand-actually-hold-election">shows little inclination</a> to yield power it seized in a military coup in 2014, even if there was public clamour for a return to civilian rule (which there is not).</p>
<p>In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is continuing to strengthen his hold on the country, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">expanding the powers of the presidency</a> and locking up political rivals and journalistic critics. As a result, Turkey’s secular and political foundations are being undermined.</p>
<p>In Brazil, 40% of those <a href="https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2015/03/25/nearly-half-of-brazilians-support-coup-if-corruption-is-high-lapop/">polled by Vanderbilt University</a> a few years back said they would support a military coup to bring order to their country, riven by crime and corruption.</p>
<p>And in Saudi Arabia, a young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/princes-top-officials-remain-jailed-saudi-arabia-report-180705160815801.html">has detained</a> the country’s leading businessmen and extorted billions from them in return for their freedom. This took place without censure from the West.</p>
<h2>The death of truth</h2>
<p>Genuine liberal democrats are in retreat as a populist tide laps at their doors.</p>
<p>In Britain, Theresa May <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-does-theresa-may-cling-to-power-heres-the-secret-to-her-success-96302">is hanging on to power</a> by a thread against a revanchist threat from the right.</p>
<p>In France, Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/23/macrons-centrism-is-coming-apart-at-the-seams/">is battling</a> to transform his welfare-burdened country against fierce resistance from left and right.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/post-truth-politics-and-why-the-antidote-isnt-simply-fact-checking-and-truth-87364">Post-truth politics and why the antidote isn't simply 'fact-checking' and truth</a>
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<p>In Germany, Angela Merkel, the most admirable of Western liberal democratic leaders, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-07-08/angela-merkels-migrant-problem/9953192">is just holding on</a> against anti-immigration forces on the right.</p>
<p>In Australia, Malcolm Turnbull and Bill Shorten, the leaders of the established centre-right and centre-left parties, are similarly under pressure from <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-39111317">nativist forces on the far right</a>.</p>
<p>What Australia and these other countries lack is a Trump, but anything is possible in an emerging strongman era, including the improbable – such as the emergence of a reality TV star as leader of the free world.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/are-we-losing-faith-democracy">Lowy Institute opinion survey</a> only 52% of younger Australians aged 18-29 years believed that democracy was preferable to other alternative forms of government.</p>
<p>In all of this, truth in particular is among the casualties. All politicians bend the truth to a certain extent, but there is no recent example in a Western democracy of a political leader who lies as persistently as Trump.</p>
<p>Like the character Willy Loman in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, Trump lives in his own make-believe reality TV world where facts, it seems, are immaterial.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-putin-and-the-new-international-order-71269">Trump, Putin and the new international order</a>
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</em>
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<p>Inconvenient information can be dismissed as <a href="https://variety.com/2018/politics/news/trump-north-korea-media-1202844311/">“fake news”</a>. Those who persist in reporting such inconvenient truths are portrayed as “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/21/opinions/both-parties-should-unite-around-freedom-press-weinberg/index.html">enemies of the people</a>”.</p>
<p>This is the sort of rhetoric that resides in totalitarian states, where the media are expected to function as an arm of a dictatorship or, failing that, journalists are simply disappeared. In Putin’s Russia, journalist critics of the regime <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/04/21/604497554/why-do-russian-journalists-keep-falling">do so at their peril</a>.</p>
<p>In his lecture in South Africa, Obama dwelled at length on the corruption of political discourse in the modern era, including a basic disrespect for the facts.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>People just make stuff up. They just make stuff up. We see it in the growth of state-sponsored propaganda. We see it in internet fabrications. We see it in the blurring of lines between news and entertainment. We see the utter loss of shame among political leaders where they’re caught in a lie and they just double down and they lie some more. It used to be that if you caught them lying they’d be like, ‘Oh man.’ Now they just keep on lying.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the digital era, it had been assumed technology would make it easier to hold political leaders to account. But, in some respects, the reverse is proving to be the case, as Ian Bremmer, author of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Us-vs-Them-Failure-Globalism/dp/0525533184">Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism</a>, wrote in a <a href="http://time.com/5264170/the-strongmen-era-is-here-heres-what-it-means-for-you/">recent contribution</a> to Time. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A decade ago, it appeared that a revolution in information and communications technologies would empower the individual at the expense of the state. Western leaders believed social networks would create ‘people power’, enabling political upheavals like the Arab Spring. But the world’s autocrats drew a different lesson. They saw an opportunity for government to try to become the dominant player in how information is shared and how the state can use data to tighten political control.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his conclusion, Bremmer has this sobering observation: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Perhaps the most worrying element of the strongman’s rise is the message it sends. The systems that powered the Cold War’s winners now look much less appealing than they did a generation ago. Why emulate the US or European political systems, with all the checks and balances that prevent even the most determined leaders from taking on chronic problems, when one determined leader can offer a credible shortcut to greater security and national pride? As long as that rings true, the greatest threat may be the strongmen yet to come.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ideals of liberal democracies are under threat – and not just in the US and Russia.Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/940442018-03-27T14:41:40Z2018-03-27T14:41:40ZWhy the election of a black senator won’t make a dent on racism in Italy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212178/original/file-20180327-109179-wgqbxl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Legal senator Tony Chike Iwobi casts his ballot to elect the speaker of the Italian Senate.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alessandro di Meo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-elections-black-senator-elect-lega-nord-anti-immigration-party-toni-iwobi-brescia-lombardy-a8243736.html">recent election</a> of Nigerian-born Mr Anthony (Tony) Chike Iwobi as a Senator at the Italian Parliament of the far-right, Populist Party of the Ligue (La Lega), has brought into sharp relief the question of racism and xenophobia in the country.</p>
<p>Iwobi is not only the first Senator of African origin to have been elected in Italy. He’s also the first person from sub-Saharan Africa to have been elected to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-elections-black-senator-elect-lega-nord-anti-immigration-party-toni-iwobi-brescia-lombardy-a8243736.html">represent a far-right party</a>, la Lega (The League) led by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/matteo-salvini-the-italian-far-right-leader-stepping-out-of-berlusconis-shadow">Matteo Salvini</a>.</p>
<p>But his election is unlikely to lead to less racism and xenophobia in the country nor will it bring any respite for migrants in the country. This is for two reasons: racism and xenophobia have become more entrenched in Italy, and neither Iwobi’s party, nor the senator himself, are sympathetic towards migrants.</p>
<p>In recent years both Italians and outside observers have become increasingly concerned <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/21/everyday-intolerance/racist-and-xenophobic-violence-italy">about the rise of xenophobia in the country</a>. Italian anti-racism groups and international human rights institutions have greater and greater intolerance. </p>
<p>The momentum picked up over the past year. Xenophobia spread, <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-italy-fake-news-helps-populists-and-far-right-triumph-92271">fuelled by fake news</a> which targeted Italian political personalities seen to hold more liberal views. </p>
<p>In February 2018, just weeks before the election of Iwobi, Amnesty International declared that Italy was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>steeped in hatred, racism and xenophobia, and unjustified fear of the other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It added that 50% of discriminatory, racist, and hate speech came from the League leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/matteo-salvini-the-italian-far-right-leader-stepping-out-of-berlusconis-shadow">Salvini</a> himself.</p>
<p>Migrants in Italy are increasingly seen as a threat to society. The centre-right coalition, which attracted the highest percentage of votes in the recent elections, focused its campaign on the slogan “Italians first”. The leader of the coalition Silvio Berlusconi even declared that “migrants are a social bomb.”</p>
<p>Iwobi is likely to be part of the problem, rather than part of campaign to end racism and xenophobia in the country. This is because his views towards migrants aren’t very sympathetic. As he <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/82fpx9/the_first_black_senator_of_italy_was_elected_with/">put it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are two types of immigration: regular immigration, which is welcome, and illegal immigration, which is a crime everywhere except in Italy. Why import new poor people without being able to guarantee them a future?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And at a conference in Abuja in 2015, he <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/got-europe-student-visa-warned-nigerians-libya-meet-iwobi-first-black-italian-senator">said</a> he would not want to discourage his people from travelling but “he would rather advise them to stay at home where it is more secure.” </p>
<p>This is a peculiar assertion given that in 2017 the World Economic Forum <a href="http://reports.weforum.org/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness-report-2017/ranking/#series=TTCI.A.02">ranked Nigeria</a> the fifth most dangerous country in the world.</p>
<h2>Rise of xenophobia</h2>
<p>In 1985, the number of foreign-born people in Italy holding a residence permit was estimated at about 423,000. <a href="https://www.istat.it/en/files/2017/10/Infographic-Non-EU-citizens-in-Italy.-Years-2016-2017.pdf">Between 2016-2017</a> the total number of non EU-citizens had risen to <a href="https://www.istat.it/en/files/2017/10/Infographic-Non-EU-citizens-in-Italy.-Years-2016-2017.pdf">3,714,137</a>. Most were from Morocco (454,817).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/italys-southern-exposure">new flows of migrants</a> have created tensions. But racism and xenophobia have been on the rise for over a decade.</p>
<p>In 2008, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern about <a href="http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/co/CERD-C-ITA-CO-15.pdf">hate speech</a> in the country. This included comments by politicians, negative attitudes and stereotypes directed at foreigners and the minority Roma people as well as their ill-treatment <a href="http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/co/CERD-C-ITA-CO-15.pdf">by law enforcement officers</a> during camp raids. The committee urged Italy to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>take resolute action to counter any tendency, especially from politicians, to target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile people on the basis of race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin or to use racist propaganda for political purposes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two years later <a href="http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2010/11032010.pdf">Navi Pillay</a>, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed her “considerable concern at the authorities’ policy of treating migrants and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-roma-19402">the Roma as</a>, above all, a security problem rather than one of social inclusion.” She expressed </p>
<blockquote>
<p>alarm at the often extraordinarily negative portrayal of both migrants and Roma in some parts of the media, and by some politicians and other authorities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In March 2011, Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/21/everyday-intolerance/racist-and-xenophobic-violence-italy">published a report</a> entitled “Everyday Intolerance: Racist and Xenophobic Violence in Italy”. The report pointed to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>worrying signs exist that increasing diversity has led to increasing intolerance, with some resorting to or choosing violence to express racist or xenophobic sentiments.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The current reality for African immigrants is that it’s become increasingly difficult to become a legal migrant. <a href="http://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-to-know-about-italys-plan-for-immigration/">Forced returns</a> have been accelerated. This is true even to countries with dictatorships such as Sudan, or where there are systematic violations of human rights such as Libya. </p>
<p>And migrants have been made more vulnerable. There’s been a reduction in the <a href="http://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-to-know-about-italys-plan-for-immigration/">jurisdictional guarantees</a> for asylum-seekers and appeals for rejected claims are increasingly being denied.</p>
<h2>False stereotypes</h2>
<p>One of the false stereotypes about migrants in Italy is that they want to remain in the country. In fact, a study done by the <a href="https://www.iom.int/">International Migration Organisation</a>, in 2016 found that migrants arriving in Italy didn’t have any destination in mind. </p>
<p>In addition, according to a recent report of <a href="https://www.msf.org.za/stories-news/press-releases/italy-migrants-and-refugees-margins-society">Medecins sand Frontieres</a>, Italy doesn’t have adequate reception policies for migrants. About 10,000 are living in inhumane conditions in informal settlements with limited access to basic services.</p>
<p>Yet in September 2017 the previous government presented its first official plan for the integration of migrants. This included objectives such as teaching new arrivals Italian. In addition, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-elections-2018-migrants-berlusconi-italians-first-refugees-deportation-coalition-a8216721.html">the government committed</a> to promoting training and apprenticeship schemes for migrants. </p>
<p>But, in this climate, the situation for migrants in Italy doesn’t seem rosy – at least for now and the imminent future. </p>
<p>Italy still doesn’t have a government given the fractured outcome of the elections. But, giving that the centre-right, anti-immigrant coalition (including the Ligue) got the highest number of votes, it’s likely that the new government will be headed by a centre-right leader whose ideas will not favour integrating African migrants. </p>
<p>A recent banner, portrayed at a school, where a debate on the integration of migrants was to be held in 2017 portrayed the climate surrounding African migrants in Italy:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Non ci sono negri italiani (There are no black Italians).</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy’s first black senator, and the party he represents, won’t be advancing the fight against xenophobia.Cristiano d'Orsi, Research Fellow and Lecturer at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/928612018-03-05T13:09:36Z2018-03-05T13:09:36ZItaly election: what we know so far about who could form a government<p>Italy has been a populist stronghold for two and a half decades – that is since 1994, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/silvio-berlusconi-what-to-expect-from-the-comeback-king-in-italys-election-92457">Silvio Berlusconi</a> created his Forza Italia (FI) party. His goal was allegedly to “save” the Italian people from being governed by “Communists” after the collapse of centrist parties under the weight of anti-corruption investigations. Having won the election in the same year, Berlusconi then led a short-lived coalition government, with the support of the extreme-right party the Social Movement and the regionalist populist Lega Nord.</p>
<p>Fast forward 24 years to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43272700">2018 election</a>, and not only is Berlusconi still FI’s leader (and indeed owner), but, together with a renewed Lega, he has again managed to assemble an electoral coalition that could end up in government.</p>
<p>However, this time there is an important twist: yet another populist political actor was born in the meantime and now happens to be the largest single party of all: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement (M5s)</a>. Having entered the Italian political scene less than ten years ago as an anti-establishment force, this group has struck a chord with an electorate weighted down by the economic crisis and fed up with the corruption of mainstream parties. In this election the party has attracted just below one third of the votes by standing alone.</p>
<h2>Rising stars</h2>
<p>A first analysis of the electoral outcome should start with the <a href="http://elezioni.interno.gov.it/camera/scrutini/20180304/scrutiniCI">undisputed winner</a> – that is M5s. There is no denying it has achieved an amazing result, especially given that its performance in leading local administrations in recent years, particularly the city of Rome, has been far from impressive.</p>
<p>Having gained around 32% of the national vote, M5s has confirmed its position as the most successful new party in the history of Western Europe (going from 0 to 25% between 2009 and 2013, and having grown of a further 7% in the following five years). As such, the Italian president, Sergio Mattarella, might well feel compelled to give it a chance to form a government before exploring the alternatives.</p>
<p>However, it is not obvious at this stage who could work with Beppe Grillo’s party to lead the country. A solution will probably turn out to be to reach an agreement with the Democratic Party (PD). But that’s the very party that M5s has long identified as the source of the country’s ills. This would be a complete reversal of the position taken by M5s after the 2013 election, when it refused to even consider such a possibility and went into opposition, forcing the PD to govern with FI.</p>
<p>The difference between then and now, however, is considerable. Back then, the PD-led coalition had emerged from the election with 29% of the vote – the largest share. M5s took 25%. Moreover, this coalition had a much larger number of seats than M5s, due to the electoral law in force at the time. This time round, the PD suffered a crushing defeat (its vote has gone down from 25% in 2013 to 18%) and would be forced into a supporting role if it went in to partnership with the dominant M5S. It’s unclear why the Democrats would want to swallow such a bitter pill. While not impossible (after all, the centre-left has a great ability to shoot itself in the foot), I regard such a solution as very unlikely. It would be tantamount to committing political suicide.</p>
<h2>A right-wing alliance</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the right wing alliance – made up of Berlusconi’s FI, Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, is by far the largest coalition. However, the Lega has overcome FI for the first time with an astonishing 17% of the vote (vs FI’s 14%).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208879/original/file-20180305-65525-y0ef7n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Feeling good: Matteo Salvini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is very significant since the agreement between the two was that whichever of them came on top would have a right to put forward the prime minister. If the right eventually manages to gain the support of enough MPs to create a government, therefore, Salvini would have to lead it.</p>
<p>Salvini’s radicalism and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d9b7a876-1d48-11e8-956a-43db76e69936">harsh rhetoric</a> (particularly on immigration) makes it less likely that anyone would want to give the right wing coalition this opportunity (and in any case, it is not clear at this stage where such extra MPs would come from). But having brought the party from 4% in 2013 to 17% today (the best result ever achieved by the party, and by far) Salvini’s position within the Lega is now unassailable.</p>
<h2>Who governs?</h2>
<p>With the right-wing alliance unlikely to have enough seats to govern on its own and voters so obviously fed up with mainstream parties, it now looks at least possible that, despite their differences, the Lega and M5s may want to explore the possibility of governing together. This would be very difficult for the Lega, as the party would need to ditch its well tested alliance with FI, one that has served it well during many years.</p>
<p>Such a move would be further complicated by the fact that the two right-wing allies (and their minor ally, Brothers of Italy) have fielded coalition candidates together, since, under the new electoral law, one third of the seats are selected from single-member districts (SMDs) according to a plurality rule. It is true that each of the candidates came from one of these parties and, ultimately, is loyal to them, however they have received the support of all right-wing voters. If the Lega ignored this and agreed to join M5s in government, Berlusconi would accuse them of betraying the electorate.</p>
<p>In the end, what we are left with while we still wait for the final results to be confirmed is the certainty that populism continues to dominate Italian politics. Everything else is a question mark.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniele Albertazzi has received funding from AHRC, The Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy</span></em></p>The Five Star Movement is the biggest party, but forming a government is going to be difficult. Will a right-wing coalition prevail?Daniele Albertazzi, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/922712018-03-05T05:37:55Z2018-03-05T05:37:55ZIn Italy, fake news helps populists and far-right triumph<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208841/original/file-20180305-65525-bmae1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Silvio Berlusconi, left, arrives to vote as a bare-breasted woman protests in background</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Luca Bruno</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Although there were no outright winners in Italy’s parliamentary election on March 4, there were two clear losers – the European Union and immigrants.</p>
<p>No one party or coalition won a majority and negotiations to form a new government are likely to last several weeks. But results have shown a dramatic increase in the number of votes for the populist Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle) and far-right party the League (La Lega).</p>
<p>Five Star – which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/opinion/from-sicily-a-voice-of-discontent-to-scare-all-italy.html">one commentator</a> described as a party with a “rightist façade over a leftist basement and anarchic roof” – is poised to be the biggest party with more than 30 percent of the vote. The League, an anti-immigrant party in former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition, soared to its best result ever with over 18 percent of the vote.</p>
<p>These results will alarm European observers given the anti-EU positions of both these groups. Nationalist French politician Marine Le Pen <a href="https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/970424528995266560">tweeted</a> as the votes came in that it was a “bad night” for the EU.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"970424528995266560"}"></div></p>
<p>I research how <a href="https://scholar.google.co.jp/citations?user=fkFHJ3gAAAAJ&hl=en">citizens in different countries use online tools</a>, particularly search engines, to access election information. One thing is clear to me: The rise of these populist and far-right parties was supported by dramatic shifts in the information diet of Italian voters. </p>
<h2>Cutting out traditional media</h2>
<p><a href="https://filippotrevisan.net/2018/03/01/new-book-chapter-mapping-the-search-agenda-election-case-studies-from-italy-the-uk-and-the-u-s/">A study I co-authored</a> shortly after the Italian election in 2013 showed that even then voters were keen on alternative online information sources. In particular, voters searching the internet for information about the Five Star Movement were more likely to look specifically for the party’s official website and online streaming channel instead of traditional media sites. </p>
<p>These <a href="http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5237/4157">trends</a>, combined with Italians’ <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Report%202017%20web_0.pdf?utm_source=digitalnewsreport.org&utm_medium=referral">low levels of trust in media organizations</a>, have made Italy fertile ground for spreading misinformation and propaganda online. </p>
<p>In the last five years, online alternative media platforms and their audience have grown exponentially in Italy. At the end of 2017, BuzzFeed <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/one-of-the-biggest-alternative-media-networks-in-italy-is?utm_term=.qlGOVlpRk#.mu5yLXRWM">exposed</a> several popular Italian websites and Facebook pages that posed as news organizations but trafficked in misinformation with a focus on anti-immigration content. These outlets had several million social media followers. That is substantially more than Italian newspapers and political leaders who <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/elezioni2018/2018/02/19/news/twitter_follower_leader_politici_umani_attivi_inattivi_fake-189182576/#gallery-slider=189170913">typically attract modest numbers of followers</a>. For example, Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni has only 410,000 Twitter followers. Compare that to U.S. President Donald Trump with more than 48 million.</p>
<p>The appetite for this type of content increased as immigration became the central theme of the 2018 election campaign. In the lead up to the elections, Five Star’s leader Luigi Di Maio described organizations involved in migrant rescue operations as acting as “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2018/01/30/quando-luigi-di-maio-disse-che-le-ong-sono-taxi-del-mare-la-polemica-con-saviano_a_23347869/">sea taxis</a>,” implicitly accusing them of ferrying illegal migrants across the Mediterranean to generate more business for themselves. Meanwhile, the League’s leader Matteo Salvini campaigned on an <a href="http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/articoli/Salvini-come-Trump-Lo-slogan-prima-gli-italiani-bec239ea-66ec-4fc7-9f01-44dbfe6160b4.html?refresh_ce">“Italians First”</a> platform reminiscent of Donald Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">“America First”</a> mantra. In February, a neo-Nazi and former local candidate for the League went on a racially motivated shooting spree that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/03/driver-opens-fire-african-migrants-italian-city-macerata">wounded six African migrants</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208848/original/file-20180305-65547-17yqbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">League party leader, Matteo Salvini, exits a voting booth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Antonio Calanni</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The specter of Russian meddling</h2>
<p>International experts and Italian government officials also pointed at Russian attempts to influence the Italian vote. </p>
<p>Last month, the <a href="http://www.lastampa.it/2018/02/17/esteri/lastampa-in-english/how-russian-twitter-accounts-are-trying-to-influence-the-italian-vote-3lK1heJxAe71xmjXPsvrXO/pagina.html">Italian daily La Stampa</a> identified several prolific Twitter accounts suspected as being used for Russian propaganda operations in Italy. In <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-kremlin-s-trojan-horses-2-0">a report published last fall</a>, the Atlantic Council, an American think tank, documented extensive links between Russian figures and both the Five Star Movement and the League. </p>
<p>Both these parties have pro-Russia policies. For example, their leaders have often spoken out against EU-sanctions on Russia. They have also expressed ambiguity towards NATO. Both candidates have received space on Kremlin-backed media such as the television network RT and news agency Sputnik. In addition, popular news websites controlled by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/europe/italy-election-davide-casaleggio-five-star.html">the PR agency in charge of Five Star’s election campaign</a> have posted content espousing Kremlin propaganda.</p>
<h2>A broken media system</h2>
<p>The problem is not simply that misinformation is readily available online, but also that a large proportion of Italians <a href="http://www.lastampa.it/2018/02/05/italia/politica/le-fake-news-rischiano-di-condizionare-il-voto-tre-italiani-su-dieci-ci-credono-8CRt10HpIVq6drx5kiButI/pagina.html">find this content credible</a>.</p>
<p>In Italy, the line between politics and journalism is often blurred. Many journalists have made the transition to politicians and vice versa. Most recently, a top editor at La Repubblica - Italy’s most read newspaper - resigned to <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2018/01/26/news/tommaso_cerno_candidato-187327651/">stand in the election as a Democratic Party candidate</a>. The word “lottizzazione” – literally, “the division of land into plots” – is used to describe how control over various public TV and radio channels are divided by powerful political parties. </p>
<p>The commercial broadcasting sector isn’t much better. Ownership is concentrated in just a few hands, most notably those of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.</p>
<p>Berlusconi has for years sought to delegitimize the press outside of his media empire. He has called out journalists critical of his tenure as prime minister. Infamously, <a href="http://www.lastampa.it/2008/04/18/esteri/gaffe-di-berlusconi-che-mima-il-mitra-putin-s-mi-piaccioni-le-belle-donne-HjmvgV2CFmAdtSuVTMlc1M/pagina.html">he mimed shooting a machine gun</a> at a journalist during a press conference with Vladimir Putin in 2008.</p>
<p>Grillo has adopted similar rhetoric. He <a href="http://video.corriere.it/beppe-grillo-contro-giornalisti-vi-mangerei-il-gusto-vomitarvi/be9643fc-9d2f-11e7-bc32-abadbc125b15">relentlessly attacks journalists</a> as establishment crooks and encourages Five Star supporters to distrust Italian media.</p>
<h2>Restoring trust in journalism</h2>
<p>As Italian parties begin negotiations over who will be the next prime minister, these factors have created the conditions for online misinformation to continue to thrive. Both Facebook and the Italian police <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/19/in-the-war-against-election-meddling-italy-takes-the-lead/?utm_term=.198f86e71046">are experimenting</a> with systems to eradicate bots and report purveyors of fake news. I believe these complex measures can help. However, long-term efforts to restore trust in journalism among Italian audiences are also essential.</p>
<p>This will involve strengthening media literacy skills, boosting the independence of the public broadcasting sector, and possibly reorganizing media ownership so that it is not as tightly concentrated. Without this ambitious set of measures, online misinformation and propaganda are unlikely to go out of fashion in Italy anytime soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filippo Trevisan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Together, two parties with a tough stance on immigration and the EU – the Five Star Movement and the League – received nearly 50 percent of the vote.Filippo Trevisan, Assistant Professor, American University School of CommunicationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/924572018-02-27T11:56:54Z2018-02-27T11:56:54ZSilvio Berlusconi: what to expect from the comeback king in Italy’s election<p>When he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/08/silvio-berlusconi-to-resign-italy">booted out of office</a> in 2011, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/silvio-berlusconi-1142">Silvio Berlusconi’s</a> political career appeared to enter a new, and seemingly final, phase. He was occupied less frequently in setting the political agenda than in reacting to agendas set by others. He was already elderly and support for his Forza Italia (FI) dwindled as the “anti-establishment” mantle was assumed by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement</a> (M5s). Then, at the end of 2013, he was expelled from the Senate and banned from holding public office following a conviction for tax fraud.</p>
<p>Resigned to the fringes, Berlusconi’s role as the driving force in Italian politics was, until the end of 2016, assumed by the centre-left Democratic Party (PD) leader Matteo Renzi, with his constitutional reform agenda. But since then, his fortunes appear to have revived somewhat. So, with an <a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-election-how-populist-five-star-movement-is-wrecking-government-hopes-for-the-mainstream-92141">election</a> coming, is he about to make a political comeback?</p>
<p>On the one hand, support for his party remains well below the levels seen in the past. Before the pre-election ban on the publication of poll results kicked in, it stood at 16.1%, which means Berlusconi continues to have to vie with the 44-year-old <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-election-league/league-leader-pledges-to-put-italians-first-as-election-campaign-intensifies-idUSKCN1G80O2">Matteo Salvini</a> for leadership of the centre right. Salvini has succeeded in transforming the Northern League from a regional-autonomy party into a national populist force.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the rivalry between the two has become less arduous in recent months as polling results have seen Berlusconi’s party’s numbers slowly rise and place him, once again, in front of the League.</p>
<p>Whatever the outcome of this election, Berlusconi cannot assume the role of prime minister because of his conviction. However, there is even a question mark over that because the law banning him from office applies to offences he committed before it was introduced in 2012. Berlusconi has appealed to the European Court of Human Rights arguing that the ruling contradicts the Italian Constitution, which provides that “no punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of a law in force at the time the offence was committed”. He also claims it contravenes a similar provision in the European Convention on Human Rights.</p>
<h2>The elder statesman</h2>
<p>The prospects of Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition emerging with an overall majority in this election look slim indeed. Given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-election-how-populist-five-star-movement-is-wrecking-government-hopes-for-the-mainstream-92141">electoral system</a>, which distributes a third of the seats according to a first-past-the-post system, and given the showing of the M5s as a significant “third force”, the smart money is on none of the three main contenders emerging as an outright victor.</p>
<p>That said, Berlusconi has had a good campaign. He is clearly aware that, though he may no longer be at the centre of Italian politics, he might still act as kingmaker. Attempting to appeal to moderate voters put off by Salvini’s stridency, he has sought to project the image of a wise elder statesman who has turned his back on his flamboyant past. He has made pronouncements designed to reassure Brussels and the international financial markets.</p>
<p>It’s a far cry from the past. In 2002 he <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1744848.stm">lost his foreign minister</a> thanks to his attempts to capitalise on the initial stirrings of popular resentment about austerity, immigration and security, and to channel it in the direction of Brussels. But the transformation should not surprise – Berlusconi is a salesman, after all; campaigning is the activity at which he excels.</p>
<p>His coalition, as an electioneering entity, works very well. Its three main components each appeal to different varieties of more-or-less right-wing sentiment. So if he appeals to moderates, and Salvini to those with far-right, anti-immigrant views, his third ally, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/09/giorgia-meloni-brothers-of-italy-party-friendly-face-surging-far-right">Giorgia Meloni</a> and her Brothers of Italy, appeals to those for whom being on the right means a feeling of affinity with the ideals of national pride never entirely relinquished by the heirs of Mussolini. If the specific profile of each party potentially drives away voters, then the presence of one of the other two serves to reassure them and keep them on side.</p>
<p>And the barely hidden rivalry of the three putative allies has helped Berlusconi to keep his options open when it comes to the inter-party negotiations that will be needed to form a government after the election. If neither M5s, which is without allies, nor the centre left, which is hopelessly divided, have realistic prospects of forming the next government, then the only alternative will be a more-or-less grand coalition. As things currently stand, the most viable option for that appears to be one based on an arrangement between Forza Italia and the Democratic Party.</p>
<p>So as he continues to compete for an overall majority, Berlusconi is aware that in the event of failure, he might abandon his more extreme partners for an arrangement that would still place him close to the centre of power. Love him or loath him, then, his reputation as one of Europe’s most remarkable politicians of recent decades remains fully deserved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Newell is a member of the UK Political Studies Association, the Universities and Colleges Union and the Labour Party. </span></em></p>He’s barred from public office but this former prime minister isn’t going to be held back by the small matter of a conviction for tax evasion.James Newell, Professor of Politics, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/921412018-02-23T13:28:40Z2018-02-23T13:28:40ZItaly election: how populist Five Star Movement is wrecking government hopes for the mainstream<p>Italy faces an election on March 4 – and, after a long decade of austerity and economic difficulties, a strong possibility of further political paralysis. Neither the centre-left, the centre-right, or the populists are likely to command a majority in parliament. Establishing a functioning government won’t be easy, and its make-up will depend on which parties are prepared to put aside their differences and form an alliance.</p>
<p>The populist <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement</a> (M5S) exploded onto the electoral scene in the 2013 general election, arresting the see-saw alternation between centre-left and centre-right majority governments that had been tentatively established in the 1990s. The vote produced a hung parliament, forcing the two traditional parties to work together in a centrist “grand coalition” to keep M5S out of office.</p>
<p>Now, M5S, <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-an-election-in-italy-next-year-and-m5s-has-some-familiar-problems-85492">despite recent allegations of corruption</a>, is even stronger. It’s likely to emerge from this election as the <a href="https://www.termometropolitico.it/1289058_sondaggi-elettorali-demopolis-6.html">largest party</a>. But it looks unlikely to secure enough of a majority to govern alone and it continues to refuse to form coalitions with other parties.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=134&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=134&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=168&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=168&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207275/original/file-20180221-132650-25c0wy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=168&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Statistics from the February 16 Demos opinion poll, organised by party and political spectrum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A collapse in support of the two pivotal parties of the centre-left and centre-right means that neither look likely to be able to form a government either. The Democratic Party under former prime minister Matteo Renzi has sunk from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_general_election,_2013">25% of the vote</a> in 2013 (and an astounding 40.8% of the vote in the 2014 European elections) to 21.9% in polls today. Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, on the centre right, has collapsed from 21.5% in 2013 to 16.3% today. Both parties are suffering from <a href="https://theconversation.com/matteo-renzi-just-killed-off-italys-centre-left-73492">splits and fragmentation</a>, which have weakened the coalitions they lead.</p>
<h2>A new system</h2>
<p>Faced with this decline, it’s not surprising that, in 2017, Renzi and Berlusconi brought the combined parliamentary strength of their parties together to pass an electoral reform that seemed designed to offset M5S’s electoral popularity by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/20/italian-pm-renzi-electoral-reform-m5s">limiting its seat gains</a>.</p>
<p>The new electoral system (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_electoral_law_of_2017">the rosatellum</a> – after Ettore Rosato, the Democratic leader in the Chamber of Deputies who first proposed the new law) is a “mixed” system (part “first-past-the-post” and part proportional). It favours those parties willing to ally together behind single candidates to prevent splitting their vote. It also gives an advantage to those parties that are territorially concentrated, such as the Democratic Party (in the central regions) and the Northern League (in the north). M5S, which opposed the electoral reform, has no natural coalition allies and does not yet have a strong presence at local or regional levels.</p>
<p>This electoral engineering will nevertheless come at a cost. It increases the likelihood that none of the parties or coalitions will reach the 40% threshold of the vote that is likely to be necessary to secure a parliamentary majority. This has resulted in a feverish election campaign, dominated – not by debates about policies – but by speculation over possible post-election coalitions. Even an anti-establishment M5S-Northern League alliance is being touted as a possibility.</p>
<p>All of this matters not just to Italy but to Europe. A decade after the eurozone crisis began, the Italian economy is still in recovery. Its sheer size and significance to the eurozone remains a concern to the European Union, which has demanded greater fiscal discipline and reforms to encourage growth and improve productivity. That needs effective government – and one supportive of the EU.</p>
<p>Yet, there is a rising tide of eurosceptism in Italy, fuelled by M5S and years of perceived EU-imposed austerity. Forza Italia, the Northern League and M5S have all toyed with the idea of withdrawing Italy from the euro, meaning only the Democratic Party has unequivocal pro-euro credentials. Yet, even under prime ministers from that party (Matteo Renzi, Paolo Gentiloni), the Italy-EU relationship has become testy and fractious. Governments have become less willing to be the “good European” if it is seen to involve imposing more austerity on an unwilling population.</p>
<p>Overall, the state of play makes for a potent mix. The 2013 parliamentary and presidential elections produced a “perfect storm” and Italy ended up, for some time, without a prime minister, government or president. This time, fortunately, the president is not up for election – and it will be his responsibility to appoint a prime minister capable of governing with a parliamentary majority. The road ahead is however still fraught with uncertainty.</p>
<p>The new electoral system increases the importance of post-election manoeuvring by the parties, and will determine whether a repeat grand coalition government is needed (and possible) to keep out the extremes, or whether Italy will take a step into the unknown with some kind of anti-EU populist governing alliance. Europe will be watching closely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin J Bull does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy’s political future hangs in the balance – will it see another chaotic grand coalition, or take an anti-EU populist step into the unknown?Martin J Bull, Professor of Politics, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911542018-02-21T10:50:34Z2018-02-21T10:50:34ZTeflon tycoons and sticky-taped kits as club unravels – but you won’t read about it in Jakarta<p>The rollercoaster fortunes of the Brisbane Roar football team mirror those of the Indonesian conglomerate that owns the three-time Australian championship club.</p>
<p>The previous two years the club was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/aug/27/brisbane-roar-told-to-address-financial-problems-or-lose-a-league-licence">in a financial shambles</a> and players were not being paid on time. </p>
<p>In late January, the Roar lost an Asian Football Confederation playoff to Philippines premiers Ceres Negro. The match was played in front of a dismally small home crowd and – in what one British media outlet described as a “<a href="https://www.thescottishsun.co.uk/sport/football/2149717/rangers-craig-moore-brisbane-roar-strip-tape-kit-row-director-of-football-sacked/">bizarre kit row</a>” – the club’s director of football was sacked after being blamed for numbers peeling off players’ jerseys during the match. </p>
<p>Lately, “<a href="https://theworldgame.sbs.com.au/article/2018/01/16/craig-moore-quits-embattled-brisbane-roar-0">embattled</a>” is the word most frequently used in the Australian media to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/sport/soccer/brisbane-roar/ex-socceroo-craig-moore-quits-embattled-brisbane-roar-20180116-p4yyji.html">describe the club</a>. The Courier Mail reported that the Bakrie Group <a href="http://www.couriermail.com.au/sport/football/a-league/teams/brisbane/brisbane-roar-are-at-rock-bottom-and-the-clubs-owners-arent-budging-so-where-now-for-the-former-pride-of-the-aleague/news-story/961bda22aa41b19ae8c8276f56489986?nk=d7a2408233ac4845b20e28fdc1561566-1517904584">wasn’t budging</a> when it came to selling the club, knocking back offers perceived as too low.</p>
<p>Rappler – the independent, Philippines-based media outlet the Duterte government is trying to shut down – reported <a href="https://www.rappler.com/sports/by-sport/football/194398-bowing-ceres-negros-aussies-call-brisbane-roar-laughing-stock">the kit fiasco</a>, adding that the Roar had underestimated the recent champions of the Philippine Football League. </p>
<p>I’m writing this from Jakarta, and you’d think “jersey gate” would have featured in the local press given the Roar’s Indonesian ownership. But there hasn’t been a peep about it. </p>
<p>To understand why, take a look at where the Roar fits into the Bakrie Group’s assets and where it fits into Indonesia’s corporate and media landscape.</p>
<h2>A concentration of elite interests</h2>
<p>Twenty years since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime, Indonesia’s thriving media landscape is concentrated in the hands of conglomerates (of which the Bakrie group is the <a href="https://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/corporate-rulers-what-are-indonesia-s-biggest-conglomerates/item7085?">tenth largest</a> by market capitalisation).</p>
<hr>
<p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/media-oligarchy-and-the-shaping-of-news-in-indonesia-89094">Media oligarchy and the shaping of news in Indonesia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>These conglomerates control the country’s ten national TV stations and more than 1,000 print and online outlets as a route to power and influence. Broadcast, print and online outlets are frequently aligned to a political party or entity. This is reminiscent of then Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s media stakes existing alongside his building interests and one-time ownership of AC Milan. </p>
<p>Coincidentally, Indonesian media mogul Eric Thohir is the current chairman (and minority stakeholder) of AC Milan’s crosstown rival, Inter Milan. Thohir’s Mahaka group includes major commercial broadcaster Gen FM and popular Islamic newspaper and portal Republika. </p>
<p>In the same vein as Thohir and Surya Paloh – the politically active owner of Metro TV – the Bakrie brothers have conflated media ownership (including the popular station TV One), business and political influence. </p>
<p>Stakes in sporting clubs are side gigs for these guys.</p>
<h2>A business of survivalists</h2>
<p>The Bakrie Group’s main activities are in mining property and construction. It became embroiled in Indonesia’s worst ever environmental disaster in 2009, when mud started to spew in Sidoarjo, East Java, burying villages and displacing around 40,000 people. Nearly a decade later the the mud is still flowing (though at a much reduced rate). <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-mud-volcano-has-been-erupting-for-ten-years-and-scientists-are-still-undecided-what-caused-it-80827">Scientists are still debating the cause</a>, with one side arguing it was caused by mining exploration by a part-Bakrie-owned company and another believing it was due to an earthquake several days prior. </p>
<p>In the lead-up to Aburizal Bakrie’s tilt at the presidency in 2014, the company paid compensation to the villagers, although the Indonesian human rights commission <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/bakrie-indonesia-nat-rothschild">argued</a> it wasn’t nearly enough.</p>
<p>Aburizal’s failed presidential bid was another flash point in the family’s long-standing involvement in Indonesian politics. There is a close connection with Golkar, the party of former dictator Suharto. Aburizal left the business world in 2004 to become co-ordinating minister for the people’s welfare, departing the ministerial cabinet in 2009. </p>
<p>Foreign business magazines describe the Bakrie family in survival-like terms. The group has “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bd0804d4-1473-11e2-8ef2-00144feabdc0">always bounced back</a>” from its financial rollercoaster rides, according to the Financial Times. The Economist christened Aburizal Bakrie the “<a href="http://www.economist.com/node/15278524">teflon tycoon</a>”.</p>
<h2>Future trends and learnt lessons</h2>
<p>In a nutshell, the current trend for conglomerates in Indonesia is to move into media and digital companies. In presentations to participants of the Australian Consortium of In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS) journalism practicum program which I ran here in 2018, speakers including former Jakarta Post editor Endy Bayuni and Tempo.co editor in chief Wahyu Dhyatmika referred to a trend among conglomerates to focus on media and digital news sites.</p>
<p>The conglomerate that owns the Roar is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eadd10ea-9784-11e2-b7ef-00144feabdc0">not in a great financial state</a>, and it wants to offload assets like the club it has spectacularly mismanaged so far. </p>
<p>When the Bakrie Group became the first foreign owner of an Australian football side, my colleague and I at the ABC <a href="http://m.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/bakrie-group-secures-100-per-cent-of-brisbane-roar">questioned</a> the league about how much it had looked into this corporation’s background. To the best of my knowledge, we were the only journalists in Australia to do so. </p>
<p>Perhaps the league and Australian sports journalists should have asked more questions when a problematic, controversial Indonesian conglomerate bought the Roar, whose sloppy kits are the least of the Bakrie Group’s many problems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nasya Bahfen received funding from the ARC in 2012-2016.</span></em></p>The Brisbane Roar’s woes are the least of the Bakrie Group’s concerns, writes Nasya Bahfen.Nasya Bahfen, Senior Lecturer in the School of Media, Film and Journalism, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/854922017-10-11T11:00:12Z2017-10-11T11:00:12ZThere’s an election in Italy next year – and M5S has some familiar problems<p>Those in charge of auditing Rome have said that the budget should <a href="http://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/17_settembre_29/roma-revisori-oref-bocciano-bilancio-campidoglio-2dfb762c-a50a-11e7-ac7b-c4dea2ad0535.shtml">not be approved</a> as it does not “truthfully and correctly” reflect the municipality’s financial situation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Patrizio Cinque, the mayor of Bagheria, a town in Sicily, is <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2017/09/20/indagato-il-sindaco-m5s-di-bagheria-patrizio-cinque_a_23216208/">under investigation</a> for abuse of office and omission of official acts.</p>
<p>Both Cinque and the Rome administration come from the populist movement M5S, which came to prominence pledging to fight the corruption that has dogged Italian public life for so long. </p>
<p>But hardly a week has gone by since the mayoral elections of June 2016 – when the M5S gained control of several cities across Italy – without one scandal or another casting doubt on the reputation of M5S-run local administrations. Is the anti-establishment, anti-corruption movement founded by <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=bepe+grillo&oq=bepe+grillo&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.3164j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">Beppe Grillo</a>, a comedian, becoming a bit too similar to the “traditional” parties it attacks? If so, does it risk losing the support of the people who have flocked to it in recent years?</p>
<h2>A skeleton in every closet</h2>
<p>Italy’s recent history would suggest that this is a distinct possibility. It’s widely believed that the governing Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party would not have collapsed as quickly as they did at the beginning of the 1990s were it not for corruption scandals. A series of investigations had a serious impact on public opinion at the time. </p>
<p>Since its inception, the M5S has exploited (and, in turn, fuelled) public anger towards the country’s “profiteering” political class. But now the tables seem to be turning and there is a question mark over whether it retains credibility as an anti-corruption party today.</p>
<p>The M5S has recently changed the rules on who can run to become prime minister so that even <a href="http://www.beppegrillo.it/m/2017/09/il_candidato_premier_del_movimento_5_stelle_le_regole.html">would-be candidates</a> who are under investigation for wrongdoing can stand. </p>
<p>This change has enabled the selection of Luigi Di Maio – the current vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies – to become the M5S candidate for PM in next year’s election. This despite the fact that he is under investigation for defamation. </p>
<p>Whatever the seriousness of the allegations made against Di Maio, it just doesn’t look good that the rules have been bent to allow him to stand. It looks even worse considering he was the candidate favoured by the party’s founder, Beppe Grillo.</p>
<p>The party that could have benefited from the M5S’s troubles is the Lega Nord (Northern League – LN), which started attacking the political class “of Rome” many years before the M5S even came into existence. Pity, however, that the LN is embroiled in a quagmire of legal proceedings of its own.</p>
<p>Following an investigation that started back in 2013, its founder and former leader, Umberto Bossi, as well as his children, were given prison sentences for <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-bossi/founder-of-italys-northern-league-found-guilty-in-fraud-case-idUKKBN19V1WI?il=0">misappropriating party funds</a>. The party’s accounts have now been <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-northernleague/italys-northern-league-criticizes-magistrates-after-bank-accounts-frozen-idUSKCN1BP2UP">frozen</a>, too.</p>
<p>In the meantime, neither of Italy’s other main parties – Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and Matteo Renzi’s Partito Democratico (Democratic Party – PD) – can reinvent themselves as a credible “corruption bashing” force. They’ve received their fair share of attention from investigating magistrates in recent years. Indeed, Berlusconi is still barred from parliament, let alone from governing, having been found guilty of bribery as recently as 2015.</p>
<h2>Better the devil you know</h2>
<p>Where does this leave the Italian electorate? It has clearly been deprived of any credible political actors that can put forward those “anti-corruption” discourses that tend to have resonance in the country. And yet there has been no sign that these recent events are having any noticeable impact on the way people are inclined to vote. In fact, the polls have hardly moved for years, with the respective electoral support of the left (i.e. the PD), the right (i.e. FI + LN) and the M5S remaining remarkably stable. </p>
<p>In 2013 each party or “block” attracted around <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/static/speciale/2013/elezioni/camera/riepilogo_nazionale.html">25% of the vote</a>. Now, four years later, each appears to have increased its support slightly, attracting about <a href="http://www.termometropolitico.it/1269538_sondaggi-elettorali-emg-pd-forza-italia.html">27% to 28% of the vote</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike in the 1990s, Italian voters seem to have been “immunised” against political misconduct. Or, perhaps, it is just that anti-corruption voters have nowhere to go now, so they are forced to stay put.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, what is certain is that a general election is coming next spring at the latest. Whether one of the main parties or blocks will be able to govern without some sort of unnatural “grand” coalition becoming a necessity may well depend on the mechanics of whatever <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/paolo-gentiloni-italy-electoral-law-puts-government-at-risk-this-one-and-the-next/">electoral law</a> is adopted (a crucial question that parties are debating right now). And there is no guarantee that the matter will be resolved any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniele Albertazzi has received funding from AHRC, British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust</span></em></p>With corruption scandals dogging practically every party, it’s difficult to see how the electorate can have faith in their representatives. And yet, they keep voting for them.Daniele Albertazzi, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/790872017-06-11T08:39:15Z2017-06-11T08:39:15ZFanon on soccer: radically anti-capitalist, anti-commercial and anti-bourgeois<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172917/original/file-20170608-32325-jzuw33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Alexis Sanchez celebrates Arsenal beating Chelsea in the 2017 FA Cup final.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Sibley/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like a lot of kids the great Martinican/Algerian revolutionary <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/jan/13/biography.peterlennon">Frantz Fanon</a> loved playing soccer as a youngster. Returning to Martinique in 1945 after fighting in Europe and North Africa in World War II, Fanon continued to play soccer on a local team.</p>
<p>Soccer was always part of Fanon’s life. Nearly a decade after the war, he attempted to create a therapeutic community at Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in Algeria. He organised a soccer team in the institution and arranged for matches with other teams in the community. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wretched-Earth-Frantz-Fanon/dp/0802141323">“The Wretched of the Earth”</a>, perhaps Fanon’s most famous book which was written in 1961, he reflects on the anti-colonial struggles in Africa and warns of upcoming challenges. The book was prescient and still remains relevant. But Fanon’s remarks on sport, which come in the central chapter “Pitfalls of National Consciousness”, have been little discussed.</p>
<p>Fanon writes,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The youth of Africa should not be oriented toward the stadiums but toward the fields, the fields and the schools. The stadium is not an urban showpiece but a rural space that is cleared, worked, and offered to the nation. The capitalist notion of sports is fundamentally different from that which should exist in an underdeveloped country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The context and framing of Fanon’s remarks is important. Remember, this was a period of epochal transformation. The end of formal colonial rule marked by independence. </p>
<p>Imagine the possibility of building solidarity and sociality in the midst of such turmoil? The idea that all are equal and the future is possible only together was one of Fanon’s guiding principles.</p>
<h2>Four billion followers</h2>
<p>One can only imagine what Fanon would have made of soccer today, especially that it has become so incredibly popular and so driven by money.</p>
<p>Soccer has <a href="http://www.totalsportek.com/most-popular-sports/">four billion followers</a> worldwide. According to the sport’s controlling body, FIFA, 270 million people (4% of the world’s population) are <a href="http://www.fifa.com/media/news/y=2007/m=5/news=fifa-big-count-2006-270-million-people-active-football-529882.html">actively involved</a> in the game. </p>
<p>Where it comes to professional soccer, obscene amounts of money are made. English Premier League team, Manchester United, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2017/06/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-soccer-teams-2017/#5cbceee177ea">rated</a> as the most valuable team in the world, is worth $3.69 billion. </p>
<p>In the pyramid of global soccer, with its players owned and managed by agents, third parties, management companies and so on, local football leagues are often very small cogs in hierarchical system. In Europe the <a href="https://www.premierleague.com/">English Premier League</a>, Spain’s <a href="http://kwese.espn.com/football/league/_/name/esp.1">La Liga</a>, the <a href="http://kwese.espn.com/search/results?q=Bundesliga#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=Bundesliga&gsc.page=1">Bundesliga</a> in Germany, followed by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/italian-serie-a">Serie A</a> and <a href="http://www.ligue1.com/">Ligue 1</a>, in Italy and France respectively, vie for the best players. </p>
<p>The European war of the clubs is played out in the highly mediated Champions League. Fans support clubs which use all sorts of illegal and semi-legal means to extract players from the global South often through systems that mirrors the move from periphery to semi-periphery to centre (from Brazil to Portugal to Spain, or from West Africa to France and England and so on). </p>
<p>Everyone is aware of the transfer sagas. They include the valuations of humans, with <a href="http://www.foxsports.com/soccer/gallery/most-expensive-soccer-transfers-all-time-cristiano-ronaldo-gareth-bale-neymar-luis-suarez-072516">transfer fees </a>having already exceeded $110 million for some top players (and likely to go even higher now with transfer season open again), the scouting for young talent, the clubs’ rhetoric of “war chests”, the endless TV sport shows speculation about signings, and the school yard banter “we’ve got …” and “you’ve got f… all”.</p>
<h2>Laying of wreaths</h2>
<p>The culture industry was wonderfully reproduced at Wembley Stadium in May when Arsenal <a href="http://www.wembleystadium.com/Events/2017/FA-Cup-Final/Emirates-FA-Cup-Final">won</a> the FA Cup, beating Chelsea 2-1. The event was introduced not only by the national anthem, standard fare at these things, but also a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/may/26/manchester-attack-fa-cup-premiership-finals-minute-silence">minute’s silence</a> for the victims of the bombing in Manchester, the laying of wreaths, black armbands, and “I love MCR” signs which were shown multiple times on TV. </p>
<p>The mythology of nation is recreated in this “traditional” sporting event as an act of nostalgia and modernity. Here, globally networked, televised for a fee based international viewership, is “England”.</p>
<p>After they won Arsenal played The Clash’s 1979 punk-rock anthem, <a href="http://www.songfacts.com/detail.php?id=2527">“London Calling”</a>, to celebrate the “Emirates Cup” win at Wembley. The iconic English cup, branded as the oldest association football competition in the world, is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/apr/28/fa-cup-sponsorship-emirates">now named after an airline</a>.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Clash’s ‘London Calling’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One element of Premiership football is its international cast of star players. Only a minority of English players play in the “Premier League” – the most branded, most watched league in the world. <a href="http://www.arsenal.com/emirates-stadium/get-to...-emirates-stadium">The Emirates</a> (Arsenal’s branded stadium), whose name also evokes the shining lights of Abu Dhabi neoliberal turbo-capitalism and the super-rich, was opened by the royal right-winger Prince Phillip. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/sepp-blatter">Sepp Blatter</a>, formerly the head-crook at the sports controlling body FIFA, ranked the Queen of England as having more football knowledge than former Italian Prime Minister, AC Milan owner and fraudster, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11981754">Silvio Berlusconi</a>. </p>
<p>All in all, these are the types of nasty people who own the clubs and run a game. Everyone is aware of this hyper-capitalist story but the outrage is usually directed elsewhere. Fans want rich owners and often turn a blind eye to how they’ve got these riches.</p>
<p>It is all about money, of course. </p>
<p>Sport is also bigger than politics; people talk and argue about sports minutiae all the time. It is a space where ordinary people are allowed to be passionate and knowledgeable. Politics is elitist, technocratic and its discourse is typically opaque. Soccer — very often couched in masculine terms — is populist. </p>
<h2>Challenging the alienation</h2>
<p>Soccer is a social game, a team game. And we can imagine how Fanon considered it therapeutic with everything centred on his “patients” taking charge from creating the pitch and fielding a team, to finding “opponents” and developing schedules. All this was part of the social therapy that Fanon envisaged would help break down institutional hierarchies in the psychiatric hospital and foster social relations and challenging the alienation that was part of the institution.</p>
<p>When Fanon writes of sport “expanding minds” and the task of “humanising” he is concerned with a mental and psychological liberation, namely freeing the mind from the nervous conditions induced by colonialism and war and the unthinkingly reproduction that Europe be looked to for models. </p>
<p>Fanon here sounds a bit schoolmasterly telling the youth what they should do. But the larger question in these days of corporate global football dominated by European leagues and its teams, with each a “brand” most likely owned by multinational capital, is how can this model possibly be followed in the global south?</p>
<p>Fanon answer is unequivocal:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Comrade, the European game is finally over.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Instead,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The African politician should not be concerned with producing professional sportspeople, but conscious individuals who also practice sports. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But today, one would be hard pressed to find an African politician who would advocate this perspective. Politics is a dirty and corrupt game for personal game. The pragmatic African politician dismisses Fanon’s notions as Utopian. They are not concerned with social transformation but adaption to becoming cogs in the machine of global capital by any means. </p>
<p>What can we make of Fanon’s notion of what sport could be? </p>
<p>He offers a wholly different conception and imagination of sport, decolonisation, and the nation. </p>
<p>Can we imagine a different notion of sport? Not necessarily non-competitive but competitive in a different way: A decolonised notion that is radically anti-capitalist, radically anti-commercial and anti-bourgeois. This is what Fanon is asking us to think about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nigel Gibson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>World soccer is the story of hyper-capitalism. What would fan and revolutionary thinker Frantz Fanon have thought about the state of the sport?Nigel Gibson, Associate Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies, Emerson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/700982016-12-16T09:20:33Z2016-12-16T09:20:33ZItaly’s new prime minister can’t shake off the stench of a stitch-up<p>Only days after its prime minister resigned over a lost referendum, Italy found itself with a new government and a new prime minister, Paolo Gentiloni. But however smooth the transition was, the turbulent circumstances that led up to it are far from resolved.</p>
<p>The referendum rejected Matteo Renzi’s proposal to rewrite approximately a third of the constitution and recalibrate the dysfunctional relationship between the chamber of deputies and the senate. It was a risky move – and by polling day, it became a referendum on him and his administration, with populist opposition parties the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement</a> (M5S) and the <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-effettosalvini/">Northern League</a> seizing their chance to rail against the establishment.</p>
<p>Thanks to Italy’s weak economic situation, this all drew unprecedented international attention, with European elites especially worried about the potential political and economic shock that a No vote might trigger. But when that vote came, the sky didn’t fall in. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/markets-are-muted-after-italy-referendum-but-instability-simmers-under-the-surface-69922">markets</a> had clearly pre-adjusted in anticipation; minus a temporary fall in the value of the euro, they seemed ready to give Italy time to sort itself out. And so it did. </p>
<p>Renzi kept his promise and resigned immediately. The president, Sergio Mattarella, knew that calling fresh elections was not an option: while the constitutional reform was rejected, the new electoral law for the Chamber of Deputies is already in place, meaning Italy now has two different electoral systems for two chambers with identical powers. Without further electoral reforms, different parties or coalitions could end up majorities in each chamber, virtually guaranteeing legislative gridlock.</p>
<p>Mattarella spent two days in hectic discussions with delegations from all 26 political parties and groupings. Renzi’s Democratic Party did its bit by helping Mattarella identify who would secure the party’s support, and once a clear consensus emerged, Mattarella gave Paolo Gentiloni a mandate; he moved quickly to choose his ministers, who were sworn in on December 9.</p>
<p>By Italian standards at least, this was a remarkably swift transition between governments – at only 17 minutes, Gentiloni even broke the record for the
shortest-ever confidence speech – but it comes with a strong dose of irony and déjà-vu. The referendum may have issued a verdict on Renzi and his government, but what has been installed instead appears to be little more than a refitted version of what Italy apparently rejected.</p>
<h2>Same as the old boss</h2>
<p>Gentiloni is no outsider. He was a member of the Democratic Party’s founding committee in 2007, supported Renzi’s successful leadership bid in 2013, and served as his minister of foreign affairs. His government’s majority is almost identical to Renzi’s, and his cabinet almost a carbon copy, with all but five ministers held over. Even Maria Elena Boschi, who was responsible for getting the failed proposal through parliament and who had promised to resign in the event of a No vote, was not just kept on but promoted. </p>
<p>Gentiloni’s goals are much the same as Renzi’s: electoral reform, sorting out the crisis in Italy’s banks, relief measures to the Italian earthquake zone and securing agreement with the unions on a new public workers’ contract. In his confidence speech, he explicitly embraced the Renzi government’s record and claimed continuity with it. Renzi himself remains leader of the Democratic Party; he has already made it clear that far from retiring, he wants to lead the party into the next election campaign with a view to winning and then continuing his programme of reform.</p>
<p>So while Gentiloni can claim to be a stabilising force in a time of crisis, he’s also viewed as a player in an establishment stitch-up. The transition protects the government from the blow dealt to Renzi, and gives him and his troops time to regroup. As far as the anti-establishment is concerned, it’s almost as if the Yes vote won after all. It’s not lost on them that Gentiloni is now the fourth prime minister in a row to have been appointed without a clear electoral victory; the last leader with that sort of legitimacy was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/02/italy.thefarright">Silvio Berlusconi</a> when he was returned to power in May 2008.</p>
<p>Small wonder then that this government has already drawn as much opprobrium as any other in the history of the Italian Republic. The opposition parties took the unprecedented measure of boycotting the parliamentary confidence debate, expressing their views in the piazza and online. Gentiloni was left to speak to a half-empty chamber. Many view the new government as little more than a device to keep the anti-establishment parties out of power – but their chance can’t be far off. </p>
<p>On his blog, M5S leader Beppe Grillo <a href="http://www.beppegrillo.it/2016/12/questo_governo_e_stato_sfiduciato_da_20_milioni_di_italiani.html">declared</a>: “This government has received a vote of no confidence from 20m Italians.” And while it has not been formally acknowledged, politicians and party spokesmen have made it clear that this government’s lifespan will match the time it takes to pass a new electoral law. </p>
<p>Once that’s done, the pressure on Gentiloni to resign and allow fresh elections will be overwhelming. In the end, he’ll most likely go down in history as just the latest steward of a short-lived interim government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin J Bull does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Paolo Gentiloni’s government is barely distinct from his predecessor’s, and its mandate is desperately thin.Martin J Bull, Professor of Politics, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698982016-12-06T01:22:55Z2016-12-06T01:22:55ZWhat’s next for Italy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148590/original/image-20161205-19388-1yr2r7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Italians voted "No" by a convincing margin in the referendum on constitutional change.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>A referendum is not (and should not be comparable to) a general election; they are two different kinds of electoral instruments. The former asks the people to express their opinion on one or more issues (usually by means of a yes or no option). The latter instead allows them to choose which leader or political party should govern the country. </p>
<p>Yet the line between the two is often blurred. Especially when the people are asked to vote on particularly controversial issues, and after a hard-fought campaign, it is not uncommon for the outcome of a referendum to be interpreted as a de facto vote of confidence for or against the incumbent government. It happened last June with Brexit in the UK, and it has happened now in Italy.</p>
<p>On Sunday, over 19 million Italians, about 59% of the voters, rejected <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-italys-referendum-trigger-the-next-crisis-69849">a controversial package</a> of constitutional reforms supported by the incumbent government. The “Yes” camp did much worse than expected, barely breaking over 40%. It received 7 million fewer votes than the “No” supporters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Italy: Green (Yes victory) Dark (No victory); Orange (even)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The turnout was over 65%, 10 points down on the 2013 general election, but more than enough to make the vote legitimate.</p>
<p>The people have spoken, loud and clear. So must the government resign?</p>
<p>For Prime Minister Matteo Renzi the answer to the question seemed clear. As promised, soon after the outcome of the referendum was announced, he resigned. Standing before the press, “with a lump in his throat” because, as he admitted, “we are not robots”, he took full responsibility for the unequivocal defeat.</p>
<p>Renzi’s strategic mistake, his insistence during the whole campaign on making the result personal, has effectively reduced the possibility of the current government staying on to almost nil.</p>
<p>The crisis is officially open. What comes now is difficult to say.</p>
<h2>Three scenarios</h2>
<p>There are three possible scenarios, all involving Italian President Sergio Mattarella. The constitution grants him the power to do one of the following: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>ask Renzi to stay on, with a new mandate;</p></li>
<li><p>appoint a new prime minister who needs then to secure a majority in the parliament to carry on until the current term ends (January 2018);</p></li>
<li><p>dissolve the parliament and call for a general election (to be held in a few months, most likely between February and April).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The most unlikely scenario is a second mandate for Renzi. Though he has now agreed to stay on a little longer until the new budget is approved, his resignation is final. It would make little sense for him to carry on without a full electoral mandate. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Sergio Mattarella.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second scenario, however, as I hinted in <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-italys-referendum-trigger-the-next-crisis-69849">my last article</a>, would not surprise anyone. The only problem might be to agree on the choice of the new prime minister. At the moment, there seems to be no one with enough credibility and bipartisan support to be able to govern for the next 16 months, let alone pass some much-needed reforms.</p>
<p>Someone from the existing coalition might be the easiest choice (though not the most popular). Among the favourites are Pier Carlo Padoan (the incumbent minister for economy), Graziano Delrio (minister for infrastructure), Piero Grasso (Senate president), or even Laura Boldrini (president of the Chamber of Deputies) – though it is unlikely, the moment might be right for Italy’s first woman prime minister.</p>
<p>The third scenario is for Mattarella to call the election, one year ahead of time. But facing an election with the current electoral law is a gamble not many in the parliament would want to take. Though the current parliament approved the new law in 2015, it was mostly the product of Renzi’s government and many MPs still think it needs to be amended or, worse, replaced with a brand new one. Or the existing law might be the harbinger of disaster at the next election.</p>
<h2>Who will win the next election?</h2>
<p>Before the referendum result, voting intention polls showed the Five Star Movement and Renzi’s Democratic Party locked in a virtual tie, more or less, at 30%. While, the centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi lagged few percentage points behind. Some polls indicated the Five Star as favourite, others the Democratic Party.</p>
<p>In any case, none of the existing forces seems strong enough to reach the 40% threshold needed to win under the new electoral law. This means the two parties with the most votes will face off in a second round. Second rounds are never easy to predict; the results often depend on how the supporters of the excluded parties vote. And with the new law the winner takes it all.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Beppe Grillo wants you.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Facebook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the moment, many in the establishment fear that the populist appeal of the Five Star Movement makes it the most likely winner. Since it <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-internet-politics-comes-of-age-67521">reached 25% at the last general election</a>, the movement’s electoral results (and the polls) have been rather consistent. Last May <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">it captured two major cities</a>, Rome and Turin (along with 17 others).</p>
<p>With Renzi’s aura fading, the Democratic Party is potentially without a winning leader and might need some time to recover. Should Renzi remain as party leader or should the party find someone else? It is not an easy choice to make right before an election. Change will send the wrong signal to the electorate: the party is in disarray.</p>
<p>On the other hand, to stay with Renzi will mean the party doesn’t listen. Either way, going to the ballot next February with the current law and in the current climate might mean a political debacle for the party, which attracted 40% of the vote at the last European elections only two years ago.</p>
<p>The centre-right is not in better shape. Elections will certainly represent a gamble for Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party, not long ago <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">the leading force in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Despite unceremoniously stepping down from government in 2011 and then being <a href="https://theconversation.com/enough-of-the-failed-fable-of-the-martyr-silvio-berlusconi-20885">barred from running for office by law in 2012</a>, Berlusconi is still very much an active and influential player in Italian politics. However, his many troubles with the law, his failing health and his age (he recently turned 80) have all taken a toll on his charismatic leadership.</p>
<p>The controversial entrepreneur’s political demise has sent the shaky remains of its past coalition into a frenzy (especially now, after Renzi’s resignation and the possibility of a new election in the air). Leadership is up for grabs, but it is far from clear who the chosen one will be.</p>
<p>The new leader could be a woman, but will most likely be a man. After more than two decades of <em>Berlusconismo</em> (with its unapologetic defence of male chauvinism), it is unlikely that the centre-right is ready to respect a woman enough to appoint her as a leader – unless of course the woman is very close to Berlusconi.</p>
<p>For a very short time this year, Berlusconi’s eldest daughter, Marina, seemed poised to take the reins of Forza Italia. Still, the idea never really took root. Marina Berlusconi seems much more at ease with running the family’s large business empire than following her father’s political endeavour.</p>
<p>On the other hand, within Forza Italia’s ranks (let alone within its wider, wobbly coalition), there seems to be no viable successor to the flamboyant leader with the winning smile who defined Italian politics for so long. The situation, however, is no longer as static as it might have appeared a few months ago.</p>
<p>Matteo Salvini, the provocative leader of the right-wing Northern League and one of the strongest advocates for new elections after Renzi’s resignation, has recently <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-vote-idUSKBN1370JR">put forward his candidacy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Matteo Salvini and his campaign to leave the euro.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Facebook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2016/11/09/salvini-hails-trump-election-as-revenge-of-the-people-3_e5b17b7b-819f-481c-808c-92fe742baa81.html">Inspired by Donald Trump’s victory</a> in the United States and a fervent admirer of Marine Le Pen in France, Salvini thinks Italy is ready to finally shift decidedly towards the right and elect a leader with strong (some would say extreme) views on immigration, the European Union and the economy. However, with the Northern League polling at just over 12%, Salvini will need the full support of the centre-right if he wants to have any chance to become Italy’s next prime minister.</p>
<p>Though this is not an unthinkable scenario, it is unlikely. Stirred by the success of right-wing populists across Europe and the US, the centre-right might eventually decide to bet on a leader like Salvini. But this would be a complete change of direction, which might ultimately alienate the larger part of the centre-right electorate. The Catholic and middle-class voters will likely migrate towards the more moderate Democratic Party.</p>
<p>Salvini’s greatest strength is also his ultimate weakness: he is not Berlusconi. He is not charming. He doesn’t have a winning smile. He is not a great salesman. The media don’t love him as much as they loved Berlusconi. </p>
<p>And Salvini’s policies, especially on immigration, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/26/donald-trump-gets-my-backing-says-italys-matteo-salvini">not unlike Trump’s</a>: they are truly borderline, if not wholly, racist. Italy’s permanence in the EU would certainly be <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-referendum-salvini-idUSKBN13Q4JA">at risk with someone like Salvini</a> at the helm.</p>
<p>Ironically, as I pointed out in my <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-italys-referendum-trigger-the-next-crisis-69849">previous article</a>, the ideal candidate for the centre-right would be another Matteo, as in Matteo Renzi. Unfortunately for Berlusconi and his coalition, Renzi has chosen the opposite side, the Democratic Party. </p>
<p>But as Renzi might soon resign from his party as well, perhaps Berlusconi will be wise to approach him. It might well be in the realm of fantasy politics, but Renzi might be willing to listen and become the leader of a strong and wider centre. After all, for over two years <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-a-country-stuck-in-the-centre-in-2016-68717">he has governed the country</a>, also thanks to Berlusconi and with some of the entrepreneur’s former allies.</p>
<h2>The unlikely prime minister</h2>
<p>Before anything is decided, however, President Mattarella must consult with all forces in parliament. At the end of the consultations, the result might be an election, a known name as prime minister, or a true surprise.</p>
<p>The surprising name pulled from the hat might be that of Luigi di Maio (Laura Boldrini’s deputy in the lower house). Di Maio is the most popular representative of the Five Star Movement (after its founder, Beppe Grillo).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Luigi Di Maio votes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Facebook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The choice of Di Maio might be quite tempting for all parties involved. It would finally give the chance to the movement to govern, to pass some important reforms and, most importantly for the other parties, to avoid the spectre of elections for the time being. The Five Star Movement, in fact, along with the right-wing Northern League, is among the loudest voices calling for new elections.</p>
<p>Though the choice of Di Maio is not that unlikely, the possibility that he (or for that matter, anyone else from the movement) actually becomes prime minister is rather thin. This would be a risky proposition to accept without a true majority. As things stand at the moment, Grillo would most likely reject the offer. He would consider the compromise with the establishment a strategic mistake, as he did in 2013 when he turned down the offer from Pierluigi Bersani, then Democratic Party secretary, who was in desperate need of an ally to govern.</p>
<p>If a temporary solution cannot be found and an election is called, under the current electoral law, the election might lead to political bloodshed. In a climate of widespread discontent with the country’s political establishment, the new law and its proportional mechanism that gives the winner an automatic majority in parliament, most of the parties in the current government coalition might be erased from the electoral map. Though that might provide some sweet schadenfreude to many disgruntled voters, it might eventually cost Italy dearly. </p>
<p>The ultimate winners of the coming electoral melee are likely to be untested populist forces with a strong anti-European sentiment and some more questionable political ideas. When <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">something similar last happened</a>, Italy ended up with two decades of Berlusconi. The ride was far from fun and the bruises are still there for everyone to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
In a climate of widespread discontent with Italy’s political establishment, a new election might wipe out most of the parties in the current government coalition.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/699172016-12-05T14:27:59Z2016-12-05T14:27:59ZA damning defeat for Matteo Renzi but Italy’s referendum is not a populist triumph<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148611/original/image-20161205-19379-sduhbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Renzi resigns.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Alessandro Di Meo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi has carried out his promise to resign after losing a referendum on his country’s constitution. This brings an end to a tenure that lasted just 1,000 days.</p>
<p>In a moving speech, Renzi said: “I have lost … I take full responsibility for this result.” His decision marked a break from the post-war norm in Italian politics. Renzi was actually seeing through on his promise. “This time, when you lose you step down,” he said. “You do not carry on as though nothing has happened.” </p>
<p>The 65.5% Italians who voted in this referendum not only rejected the proposed constitutional change, they completely annihilated it. An enormous 59.1% voted No and 40.9% voted Yes, siding with Renzi. Only three regions voted Yes: Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and South Tyrol – two of which are traditional strongholds of Renzi’s party.</p>
<p>The decisiveness of the result has completely shocked the nation. While a No vote was always a possibility, the margin was expected to be close. Back in April, the Yes camp was seen to have an advantage.</p>
<p>In the end, the No supporters seemed to have come from a far wider coalition of voters than expected – including people from the left and even senior figures in Renzi’s <a href="http://www.firstonline.info/News/2016/11/11/referendum-e-pd-i-pretesti-di-dalema-e-bersani-e-lombra-della-scissione/MV8yMDE2LTExLTExX0ZPTA">own party</a>. Indeed, they were so broadly spread across the political spectrum that it has been said there were no winners in this referendum. No single political party can claim the victory. If a winner were to be declared, it would surely be political participation – even Italian democracy – given the extraordinarily high turnout.</p>
<h2>Why No?</h2>
<p>But while many have sought to portray the Italian referendum as the latest battle in the war between populists and the establishment, that would be an oversimplification of what has happened to Renzi.</p>
<p>Yes, this was an anti-establishment vote, but it was not necessarily an expression of populism. The No vote was intrinsically linked to Renzi – it was not a sign of support for any of his rivals, but a rejection for what he stands for.</p>
<p>The trouble was, Renzi was <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/world/europe/a-berlusconi-reminder-as-italy-faces-another-unelected-premier.html">never actually elected by the people</a> to the job of prime minister. He ousted former prime minister and PD politician Enrico Letta in February 2014 after he lost the support of his governing coalition. Consequently, the people have never really had a chance to vote – or not – for Renzi.</p>
<p>During his short time running the country, Renzi has achieved many important things and put Italy back on the right road. But he has not tackled many of the more urgent questions and issues (such as electoral reform). </p>
<p>Renzi wanted to change Italy but turned this vote into a plebiscite on him and his way of governing. And this, according to political scientist <a href="http://video.repubblica.it/dossier/referendum-costituzionale/diamanti--il-pd-ormai-e-il-partito-di-renzi-ma-proprio-per-questo-ha-perso-il-referendum/261586/261913?ref=HREC1-3">Ilvo Diamanti</a>, was his mistake. By personalising the referendum, Renzi alienated potential supporters of his reform. He made it look like he was playing with the Italian constitution and clearly Italians were wary of changing the rules of the political game. As the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710816-country-needs-far-reaching-reforms-just-not-ones-offer-why-italy-should-vote-no">Economist recently pointed</a> out, Renzi’s proposed reforms could create “an elected strongman” – a worrying prospect for a country that produced Benito Mussolini and Silvio Berlusconi. </p>
<p>Renzi has also governed in a way that started to bother many – not only those who make up the various opposition parties, such as the Northern League and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement</a>, but also those in his own party. His use of Twitter and his cavalier manner have made him look like a dynamic force on the European stage – a leader who wants to get Italy out of a hole – but at home, his tactics have backfired. For Italian voters, Renzi’s media persona is all too reminiscent of former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi.</p>
<p>The result of the referendum may have been decisive, but the fallout is a major unknown. It will now be up to president Sergio Mattarella to guide the country through this delicate post-Renzi moment.</p>
<p>The markets’ initial worries have so far proved unfounded and this referendum result must not be analysed as part of a wave of populism but rather as a wave of anti-establishment sentiment in Italy. Although it is clear that this Italian result will not help to solve the turmoil in Europe, the referendum – and the Italian political situation in general – are not necessarily the latest example of populist triumph.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felia Allum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This was a vote against the prime minister – not a show of support for his rivals.Felia Allum, Senior Lecturer in Italian and Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/699192016-12-05T13:34:52Z2016-12-05T13:34:52ZItaly’s ‘no’ vote lights another fire under the European Union<p>How to interpret the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/04/matteo-renzis-future-in-the-balance-amid-high-turnout-in-italy-referendum">outcome</a> of the Italian referendum? Matteo Renzi’s government is clearly the loser – and the prime minister announced his widely expected resignation as soon as the result was in. </p>
<p>The proposed constitutional reform would have given much more power to Renzi by taking it away from the Italian Senate. It was part of a wider package of <a href="http://www.governo.it/approfondimento/1000-giorni-di-governo-renzi/6160">political reforms</a> pushed by his government which can be summed up as the idea that Italy needed to be “unlocked”. The constitutional changes were presented as consolidating this new trajectory, together with a new <a href="https://www.quora.com/Italy-What-is-the-Italicum">electoral law</a> designed to underpin the reformed constitution. The referendum confirmed that 59.1% of voters had other ideas. </p>
<p>Renzi’s government was initially wildly popular but lost support as it became clearer over nearly three years in power that the material conditions of large sections of the population were not progressing but stagnating or, in some cases, getting worse. </p>
<p>Constitutional matters in Italy have traditionally been kept separate from ordinary politics, but not on this occasion. Because the government drafted and submitted the reform proposals rather than the parliament, and Renzi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/17/matteo-renzi-repeats-vow-quit-italian-pm-loses-referendum">said</a> that he would resign if he lost, it became a vote on the government’s policies – and of course its leader. </p>
<h2>Winners and losers</h2>
<p>For weeks, the prospect of a defeat for the government has been framed as another reaction against the establishment – hardly surprising in the context of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/president">Trump</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887">Brexit</a> and other populist movements toppling centrists around the world. </p>
<p>Such a reading might be supported by a quick look at some of the components behind the No campaign. The <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-effettosalvini/">Northern League</a> and Beppe Grillo’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement</a> represent two rather different types of right-wing politics that are prone to frame their messages in a populist way – albeit Five Star is the only one that fully fits the anti-establishment archetype seen in other countries. Yet while the government was clearly the political subject behind the proposed constitutional reform, there was no overarching narrative behind the No campaign. </p>
<p>It was an aggregation of different political and social actors, from mainstream right-wing parties to trade unions and civil society associations. They did not form a coalition or attempt to coordinate their efforts, and for obvious reasons they represented very different parts of society. Revealingly, no new movement, political subject or leader emerged out of the contest. </p>
<p>You also need to look at the <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/static/speciale/2016/referendum/costituzionale/mondo.html">distribution</a> of the vote. As in other countries, we can probably point to a disenfranchised group – though it’s less about class in Italy. We don’t have definitive data on how age affected the voting, but <a href="http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/media/I-giovani-e-il-Sud-hanno-bocciato-la-riforma-di-Renzi-la-prima-analisi-dei-risultati-del-referendum-0ebc5b75-8d09-4456-be52-7b52c954d41c.html#foto-2">surveys</a> ahead of the vote indicated that the over 65s were the only group backing Yes; while support for No was strongest among the under 35s. </p>
<p>Given that youth unemployment in Italy is <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/italy/youth-unemployment-rate">dramatically high</a> and the material conditions of younger people are deteriorating, the clear message is that Renzi’s reform package was not seen as addressing this group’s problems. </p>
<p>On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the division between centre and periphery, urban and rural areas, which played a major role both in Brexit and in the election of Trump, does not explain what has happened in Italy. On the contrary, the No vote seems to have prevailed almost everywhere except in the regions of Tuscany and Emilia Romagna, the historic strongholds of Renzi’s Democratic Party. In many ways, then, this was a traditional rejection of an unpopular government. </p>
<h2>Italy and the EU</h2>
<p>The most likely immediate scenario following Renzi’s resignation is that a new government will be formed, led by the Democratic Party under a new leader. It will presumably approve the new electoral law and enact some of the bills behind Renzi’s political programme, and could in theory hold power until the current parliamentary term ends in February 2018. </p>
<p>It might well be that this new government will make anti-EU feeling even stronger. The likes of the Five Star Movement have understood how to capitalise on the growing tendency in this previously pro-European country to blame the EU for austerity and society’s ills. Of course, their chances of winning the next general election depends on how the next government reforms the electoral laws: ironically, the changes that Renzi was proposing would have favoured the Five Star Movement. No one, at this stage, can predict what the next electoral reform will look like. </p>
<p>From this vantage point, however, there is certainly a good chance that Italy is heading for a similar protectionist shift of the kind that looks likely to happen in the US next year. Some financial analysts <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/04/renzi-battle-survival-italians-go-polls-vote-seen-referendum/">are already</a> seeing the vote as the first step towards an Italian departure from the eurozone. </p>
<p>So while it is too simple to say that events in Italy exactly fit those in other countries, the outcome might well end up comparable. As if the EU did not have enough to worry about with Brexit, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-marine-le-pen-could-become-the-next-french-president-68765">Le Pen</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/geert-wilders-trial-throws-netherlands-divisions-in-sharp-relief">Wilders</a> and so on, this is one more crisis that it really could do without.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marco Goldoni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The revolt that brought down Matteo Renzi is no carbon copy of Trump et al, but that won’t be of much comfort to Brussels.Marco Goldoni, Senior Lecturer, Law, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.