tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/tunisia-1772/articles
Tunisia – The Conversation
2024-03-03T19:19:28Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/222271
2024-03-03T19:19:28Z
2024-03-03T19:19:28Z
A truly international slate: your guide to the 2024 Oscar nominees for best documentary
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576918/original/file-20240221-25-6pl1z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C0%2C1899%2C1077&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Four Daughters/Chrysaor</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year, all the Oscar nominees for best documentary feature come from outside of the United States.</p>
<p>The dominance of international nonfiction films has some in Hollywood <a href="https://variety.com/2024/film/awards/fallout-oscar-documentary-nominations-what-they-might-mean-1235893537/#recipient_hashed=3ad4e98c3cac7f2c645b6bac3586de7521f9197676a1edf451f657e41c477054&recipient_salt=4247ebf97bb9d70b2f648c8d0451a948ed150d7f26df27c533462a62f041b28a">concerned</a>. The North American market has become saturated with true crime and celebrity-powered offerings – often to the detriment of makers of rigourous investigations, riveting real-life stories or innovative artistic expressions. </p>
<p><a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781666927665/Crafting-Contemporary-Documentaries-and-Docuseries-for-Global-Screens-Docu-mania">My research</a> finds, with courage and persistence, documentary filmmakers outside established centres of power draw attention to global problems at the local level. This year’s nominees demonstrate how the industry has shifted from safe topics for English-speaking viewers. This is good news for audiences who want to see depictions from more of the world in which we live.</p>
<p>Here is your guide to the 2024 nominees for best documentary feature.</p>
<h2>Bobi Wine: The People’s President</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine: The People’s President charts the journey of Ugandan musician Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (stage name Bobi Wine) from humble roots in a Kampalan slum to contesting the corrupt rule of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/yoweri-museveni-ageing-uganda-president-rides-on-the-memory-of-his-past-heroics-212709">inexorable Yoweri Museveni</a> as a presidential candidate in 2021. </p>
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<p>The first crossroad comes as Museveni changes the country’s constitution to allow him to rule until his death, which Wine and his supporters oppose. On concocted charges, police arrest and torture the popstar-turned-politician. But Wine has the hearts of young voters, as well as his wife Barbie, who adds a personal insight to this fight for freedom. </p>
<p>Although it contains confronting material, Moses Bwayo and Christopher Sharp’s film is the most accessible of the nominees. The documentary features an uplifting <a href="https://www.masterclass.com/articles/afrobeat-music-guide">Afrobeat</a> soundtrack, and includes astonishing sequences of “people power” at rallies and in protest against state-sanctioned interference to Wine’s campaign.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Bobi Wine has shaken up Ugandan politics: four things worth knowing about him</a>
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<h2>The Eternal Memory</h2>
<p>Maite Alberdi’s portrait of patience and love, The Eternal Memory, has a strong chance at this year’s awards. The film won <a href="https://deadline.com/2023/02/the-eternal-memory-berlin-film-festival-premiere-director-maite-alberdi-interview-news-1235267596/">a top prize</a> at the 2023 Sundance Film Festival and this is Alberdi’s second Oscar nomination for best documentary, after The Mole Agent in 2021. </p>
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<p>Journalist Augusto Góngora witnessed many momentous events of Chilean history but his memories are being ravaged by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-causes-alzheimers-disease-what-we-know-dont-know-and-suspect-75847">Alzheimer’s disease</a>. His wife of many years, Paulina Urrutia, attempts to stimulate her husband’s confused mind.</p>
<p>Archival footage of Góngora’s reports during the military overthrow of the democratic socialist government in 1973 intersperse this tender documentary. His efforts to record the violence of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-pinochets-chile-100659">Pinochet regime</a> serve as a warning against forgetfulness, and the lyrical tone and steady pace of The Eternal Memory remind the viewer that time passes quickly, so seize the day.</p>
<h2>Four Daughters</h2>
<p>Filmmaker Kaouther Ben Hania tells the heartrending story of a Tunisian family affected by Islamic radicalisation. The documentary blends fact and fiction by casting actors to play the roles of two absent daughters, Ghofrane and Rahma. </p>
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<p>Since the 2011 uprising that ousted <a href="https://theconversation.com/ben-ali-the-tunisian-autocrat-who-laid-the-foundations-for-his-demise-124786">autocratic former President Ben Ali</a>, Tunisia has experienced poverty and violence, leading many young people to go to nearby countries to enlist as jihadists. </p>
<p>We watch as mother Olfa Hamrouni meets her surrogate daughters, played by Ichrak Matar and Nour Karoui. Together with the remaining girls, Eya and Tayssir, they reenact scenes from their lives together. Another actor, Hend Sabry, is on standby to take Olfa’s place for parts that are “too difficult” to play as herself. </p>
<p>Four Daughters examines themes of generational loss for women in the Arab world, but not without moments of resilience and humour. Ben Hania’s therapeutic approach to working with her participants challenges practitioners who deploy exploitative modes of documentary production.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ben-ali-the-tunisian-autocrat-who-laid-the-foundations-for-his-demise-124786">Ben Ali: the Tunisian autocrat who laid the foundations for his demise</a>
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<h2>To Kill a Tiger</h2>
<p>Indian-born Canadian filmmaker Nisha Pahuja’s stunningly shot and scored documentary deals with the gang rape of a 13-year-old girl during a wedding party in Jharkhand in eastern India. </p>
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<p>Rice farmer Ranjit seeks justice for his eldest daughter Kiran through the court system: a rare course of action in rural India. Activists from the Srijan Foundation join Ranjit’s quest, hoping to garner a crucial conviction for the crime and to end entrenched prejudices that lead most <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-62830634">gender-based violence in India</a> to go unreported. </p>
<p>Pressure and threats mount as Pahuja and her crew capture an all-or-nothing battle. To Kill A Tiger has several unforgettable scenes – and the glimmer of hope on the horizon.</p>
<h2>20 Days in Mariupol</h2>
<p>Predicted as <a href="https://screenrant.com/oscars-2024-predictions-nominees-best-picture-actor-actress-director/#best-documentary-feature">the favourite to win</a> in a tight race, Pulitzer-prize winning journalist Mstyslav Chernov’s observational-style account of the Russian invasion of the Ukrainian port city Mariupol makes for tense viewing. When Russian troops surround the city, the bombarded citizens and journalists are left without utilities and unable to escape.</p>
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<p>This film follows an <a href="https://www.macfound.org/press/perspectives/the-powerful-intersection-of-documentary-and-journalism-at-the-local-level">investigative journalism approach</a>. Chernov sends dispatches to his editors of ordinary people during extraordinary times, and the resulting news items become punctuation points in the film.</p>
<p>Chernov’s camera goes on to tape several atrocities that are terrible yet crucial to witness, making the account an apt recipient of recognition. The bravery to point the camera in the face of oncoming danger is remarkable, and the documentary greatly benefits from a tight assembly by editor Michelle Mizner, who also produced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phoebe Hart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
This year, all the Oscar nominees for best documentary feature come from outside of the United States.
Phoebe Hart, Associate Professor, Film Screen & Animation, Queensland University of Technology
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/218951
2023-12-20T16:05:44Z
2023-12-20T16:05:44Z
People love to vote in a new democracy – and then they rapidly lose interest
<p>Poland’s recent election has been hailed as a great triumph of democracy in <a href="https://v-dem.net/documents/30/V-dem_democracyreport2023_highres.pdf">a global environment of democratic backsliding</a>. It brought to power a coalition of pro-democratic forces led by <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-government-election-donald-tusk-mateusz-morawiecki-andrzej-duda/">Donald Tusk</a>, the former president of the European Council. </p>
<p>This election was also considered a historical landmark because it saw Poland record <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/huge-turnout-poland-decisive-elections/story?id=104004666#:%7E:text=Nearly%252074%2525%2520of%2520voters%2520turned%2520out%2520to%2520polling%2520stations%2520on%2520Sunday.&text=From%25207%2520a.m.%2520onward%2520Sunday,ballots%2520needed%2520to%2520be%2520printed.">its highest voter turnout since 1919</a>. Participation was even higher than the election that cemented the fall of Communism, paving the way for democracy in the first place.</p>
<p>Yet this election seems to be an outlier. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">Patterns of voter turnout</a> over several decades have shown <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">a systematic and consistent</a> decline. And this decline is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/does-democratic-consolidation-lead-to-a-decline-in-voter-turnout-global-evidence-since-1939/9A234A962871A9580C8A32D62FB6B717">much more accelerated in new democracies</a>, such as those that have transitioned away from communism following the end of the USSR. </p>
<p>This pattern is puzzling. We might expect enthusiasm for democratic transitions to boost voter turnout. Citizens who have ached to exert their democratic rights during a long period of political repression might naturally head out to the polls in their droves. </p>
<p>In the immediate term, this is the case. The euphoria and enthusiasm of the democratic transition can lead to higher turnout in a new democracy’s first election after transition. </p>
<p>I’ve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">examined electoral turnout</a> in 1,086 elections across 100 countries between 1946 and 2015 and found that turnout in the first election after a democratic transition is about three percentage points higher than other elections (in new and established democracies).</p>
<p>But the high turnout rate in the first election is a short-term phenomenon. The rate of participation in new democracies drops consistently as more elections are held.</p>
<p>Tunisia is a prime example. The turnout in its first parliamentary free election in 2011 after the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tunisia-can-bounce-back-authoritarianism-proper-support">fall of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a> was over 90%. But once the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">complicated realities of building democracy set in</a>, turnout tumbled dramatically. </p>
<p>Wrangling over institutional design and the redistribution of political power and resources meant that excitement dissipated and was replaced by <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/11/12/tunisia-a-failed-democratic-experiment/">disappointment with democracy.</a> Tunisians lost their faith in the ability of political actors to keep democracy alive. Participation declined sharply in this period. In <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/low-voter-turnout-in-tunisian-elections-casts-doubt-on-future-parliaments-legitimacy">the most recent election</a> in 2023, turnout barely reached 11%.</p>
<h2>Rapid disillusionment</h2>
<p>The plummet in voter turnout that new democracies experience could be explained by voters rapidly becoming disillusioned with the reality of democracy. That’s not to say they’d return to the undemocratic systems of their past but that they don’t feel enthusiastic enough to go to the polling station on election day.</p>
<p>In the first election after the transition to democracy, also referred to as the founding election, a country’s electoral politics naturally focuses on <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6207585/Book_Elections_in_Estonia_1990_1992_Transitional_and_Founding">pitting opponents and supporters</a> of the former autocracy against those who wanted to overthrow it. But that soon evolves into something more mundane – regular electoral politics in which parties compete over voters based on <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414006293857">partisanship, ideology or policy preferences</a>. </p>
<p>In other words, the binary choice between autocracy and democracy excites voters, while the choices of regular electoral politics may increase apathy among voters. More simply, <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/publications/uwp_41_final.pdf">voters in new democracies may not be used (yet)</a> to the complicated reality of elections in democracy.</p>
<h2>Young revolutionaries become active voters</h2>
<p>The evidence suggests that the way in which a country transitions to democracy <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-dissent-to-democracy-9780190097318?cc=us&lang=en&">plays a part</a> in the political attitudes and behaviours of its citizens. Transitions driven by <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/why-civil-resistance-works/9780231156837">non-violent, mass mobilisation</a> have the potential to socialise people into developing more pro-democratic attitudes. This is perhaps because citizens are made aware of their power to influence politics via participation and therefore become active participants in politics afterwards.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140231194922">My research</a>, which used survey data to capture electoral turnout among 1.2 million respondents from 85 democracies between 1982 and 2015, shows that this is a more powerful force among people who experience the transition to democracy during <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137941300084X">their formative years</a>. </p>
<p>Those who transition to democracy between the ages of 15 and 29 are two percentage points more likely to turn out to vote later in life compared to those who experienced the transition outside their formative years, or voters from established democracies that never experienced a transition. People who experienced a transition to democracy after they turned 30 were less likely to turn out to vote in new democracies.</p>
<p>The transition may have socialised the first cohort into being more pro-democratic because younger people are more likely to participate in protests – and experience the violent consequences of doing so. They are also more receptive to unorthodox ideas that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357881">challenge old forms of power</a>.</p>
<p>The different experiences of the older cohort may suggest the socialising effect of democratic transitions may not be able to fully replace <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414019858958?journalCode=cpsa">the socialisation experience of living under autocracy</a>. Being socialised in an environment in which political participation is discouraged and strictly regulated by the government <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/publications/uwp_41_final.pdf">creates habits of disengagement from politics</a> that may not be fully reversed by the excitement of experiencing a democratic transition. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">The global decline in voter turnout</a>, particularly in new democracies, is a worrying sign for the health of democracy. These findings suggest that countering this trend means encouraging people to see participating in democracy as being as important – and exciting – as overthrowing a dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roman Gabriel Olar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Voting patterns over decades show how hard it is to maintain enthusiasm for democracy.
Roman Gabriel Olar, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Dublin City University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213220
2023-09-11T06:40:21Z
2023-09-11T06:40:21Z
Morocco’s earthquake wasn’t unexpected – building codes must plan for them
<p><em>More than 2,000 people <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66759069">died</a> when a powerful magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck Morocco on 8 September. The epicentre was in the High Atlas Mountains, 71km (44 miles) south-west of Marrakesh. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked José A. Peláez, a professor in geophysics who has carried out <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306004500_Energetic_and_spatial_characterization_of_seismicity_in_the_Algeria-Morocco_region?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">research</a> on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327542846_Comparative_stochastic_modeling_of_the_Al_Hoceima_Morocco_aftershock_sequences_in_1994_Mw_60_2004_Mw_64_and_2016_Mw_63?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">seismic activity</a> in Morocco, about what led to this situation.</em></p>
<h2>What geological factors contributed to this earthquake?</h2>
<p>The Earth’s surface is constituted of several <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/plate-tectonics">tectonic plates</a>, large segments of the planet’s outer layer, which move against each other. This movement is responsible for various geological phenomena, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and the formation of mountains and ocean basins.</p>
<p>The tectonic activity in Morocco primarily involves the convergence of the Eurasian and the Nubian (African) plates. The Eurasian Plate pushing against the Nubian Plate is what led to the formation of the Atlas Mountains, which run through Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The mountains are where the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/10/africa/morocco-earthquake-moulay-brahim-survivors-hnk-intl/index.html">epicentre</a> of this recent earthquake was. </p>
<p>Currently, the collisions between the plates are causing a shortening of the Atlas Mountains, explaining the area’s seismicity. We know this because of data from GPS measurements, which show that they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104846">moving about 1 millimetre</a> closer to each other every year. </p>
<p>This shortening and compression is causing what are known as <a href="https://earthhow.com/types-of-faults/#:%7E:text=Reverse%20faults%20occur%20when%20one,move%20horizontally%20past%20each%20other.">faults</a>, huge friction between plates. These faults are the likely cause of this earthquake. Scientists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0040-1951(02)00368-2">think</a> that these faults have been active for a long time, going back a few million years.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104846">as pointed out</a> by various researchers, the High Atlas Mountains have a unique geological feature where the Earth’s outermost and hard layer, called the lithosphere, is thinner than usual, combined with an unusual rise of the mantle. All these features could have influenced the occurrence of this high magnitude earthquake.</p>
<h2>What is Morocco’s history of earthquakes?</h2>
<p>Seismic activity and its phenomena, like earthquakes, are not unusual in Morocco. </p>
<p>Over the last thousand years, earthquakes affecting Morocco have tended to take place mainly in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/gssrl.78.6.614">two areas</a>. Offshore, along the Azores-Gibraltar transform fault and the Alboran Sea, and another one onshore, along the Rif mountains in northern Morocco and the Tell Atlas mountain range in north-western Algeria. Earthquakes along the Atlas Belt are smaller in number, but not unusual.</p>
<p>The most significant, recent earthquakes affecting Morocco <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/app12178744">were in</a> 1994, 2004 and 2016, with magnitudes ranging between 6.0 and 6.3. These occurred in the most seismically active region in Morocco and also in the western Mediterranean region. </p>
<p>A bit further back in history, there was the devastating Agadir earthquake in February 1960, with a magnitude of 6.3. It was located around the boundary between the western High Atlas and the Anti Atlas, to the south. Available data indicates that between 12,000 and 15,000 people died due to this event. In addition, near the location of the recent event, there was another earthquake in 1955, with an estimated magnitude of about 5.8.</p>
<p>Even further back, prior to the establishment of seismometers, several significant events were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/gssrl.78.6.614">recorded</a> in Morocco. Among them were the 1624 Fès earthquake, with an estimated magnitude of 6.7, and the 1731 Agadir earthquake, with a magnitude of 6.4. </p>
<h2>Could it have been predicted?</h2>
<p>Earthquakes cannot be predicted, even with the current knowledge in seismology. In fact, many researchers think that it will not be possible to do so in the future either. What seismologists can do is establish the areas in which earthquakes are most likely to occur, even establish the probability of their occurrence and its uncertainty.</p>
<p>This is that we call a long-term prediction, carried out from specific seismic hazard studies in the region. They are based on knowledge of past seismicity in the area, both historical and instrumental, and on the existence and knowledge of active tectonic structures (faults) that could generate earthquakes. The greater the knowledge that one has on these two topics – seismicity and active faults in the region – the more knowledge one will have about the future seismicity that may occur in the area, and the less the uncertainty will be.</p>
<p>Seismic hazard studies also include the study of near-surface soil conditions and the characteristics of buildings. This helps to assess the possible damage from these potential earthquakes.</p>
<h2>What can be done to lessen the impact of future earthquakes in Morocco?</h2>
<p>The best tool we have to mitigate the impact of earthquakes is to conduct reliable seismic hazard studies. The results of these must then be implemented into national building codes. This way engineers can incorporate seismic safety into building designs.</p>
<p>Building codes need to take into account several factors, including the characteristics of the soil, the way seismic waves move and how the soil can amplify its movement during an earthquake. Also the expected shaking of the ground, which influences the behaviour and damage of buildings. These factors vary from one city to another, and in some cases from one district to another.</p>
<p>Seismologists know that earthquakes do not kill people – buildings do. Buildings with lack of regulation and lack of structural support are potential killers in high seismic hazard areas. Building codes must therefore be mandatory, and should be updated periodically. As more is learned about earthquake geology and the impact of earthquakes on buildings, building codes should be updated regularly. This is the best way to protect ourselves against these catastrophic phenomena. Territorial planners and rulers must know this and take it into account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>José A. Peláez Montilla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Earthquakes cannot be predicted; the best tools to mitigate the impact are seismic hazard studies.
José A. Peláez Montilla, Professor of Geophysics, Universidad de Jaén
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209609
2023-09-03T07:45:37Z
2023-09-03T07:45:37Z
Africa’s vast underground water resources are under pressure from climate change - how to manage them
<p>All countries have a variety of water resources – some are on the surface, like rivers, and some are beneath the ground. This groundwater provides <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2023/06/13/groundwater-the-hidden-wealth-of-nations">almost 50%</a> of all global domestic use and <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099145503202323072/p178601171e7ffac1ea0714b5e187c0122449517b07d">43%</a> of all the water used for agriculture.</p>
<p>Groundwater is stored in aquifers, which come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They can be accessed in several ways, but mostly by drilling wells. Not all groundwater is useful to us – it depends on whether it’s fresh or mixed with salt and on how deep it is, as this will affect how easy it is to tap into. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-aquifers-hold-more-than-20-times-the-water-stored-in-the-continents-lakes-but-they-arent-the-answer-to-water-scarcity-201704">Africa’s aquifers hold more than 20 times the water stored in the continent's lakes, but they aren’t the answer to water scarcity</a>
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<p>In Africa, groundwater is very important. It supports <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2023/06/13/groundwater-the-hidden-wealth-of-nations">almost 100%</a> of household and agricultural activities in rural areas. And, because it’s underground it’s protected from evaporation, a crucial resource in a warming climate.</p>
<p>These facts and figures are in a recent World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/publication/the-hidden-wealth-of-nations-groundwater-in-times-of-climate-change">report</a> which unpacks issues facing groundwater in times of climate change. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=m6uqRGMAAAAJ&hl=th">groundwater scientist</a> focusing on its sustainable use, I’ve picked out some of the key issues when it comes to managing groundwater from the report. It’s vital that African countries address these as pressure <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/state-of-climate-africa-highlights-water-stress-and-hazards">increases</a> on the continent’s water resources, through growing populations, development and changing weather patterns. </p>
<h2>Key issues</h2>
<p><strong>Ownership of groundwater</strong></p>
<p>Figuring out ownership of groundwater is important for the management of this finite resource. Without a clear understanding of ownership, conflict can happen.</p>
<p>In some countries groundwater is owned by the landowner, in others by the government. Generally, it’s being poorly managed <a href="https://publications.iwmi.org/pdf/H048386.pdf">across the continent</a>. In many cases, boreholes used to extract groundwater <a href="https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1094769/Perceptions_of_trends_in_the_development_of_private_boreholes_for_household_water_consumption.pdf">aren’t</a> even being registered. </p>
<p>South Africa has used laws and policies to <a href="http://ward2forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NWAguide.pdf">transfer</a> the ownership of resources to the government. But this has led to issues around red tape and licensing permits, which determine how water is allocated.</p>
<p>The success of permit systems depends on a thorough understanding of the resources, property owners’ compliance with granted user rights, and the enforcement of this regulation. This is particularly problematic in the developing world, according to the World Bank report. </p>
<p>A possible solution is decentralised management, as seen by the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/harvesting-water-and-harnessing-cooperation-qanat-systems-middle-east-and-asia">Qanat system</a> in the Middle East. The system consists of a network of underground canals that transport water from aquifers in highlands to the surface at lower levels using gravity. It is normally managed by the community and financed collectively. These historical pieces of infrastructure have been abandoned in recent times, but could solve many of the water shortage issues in the semi-arid to arid areas of Africa.</p>
<p><strong>Recharging aquifers</strong></p>
<p>Groundwater in aquifers is finite, but it <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/12/7/1846">can be recharged</a> with surface water or treated wastewater. The process also sometimes helps in the removal of harmful chemicals because the aquifer’s material can act like a very large filter. </p>
<p>The World Bank report highlights <a href="https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/managed-aquifer-recharge#:%7E:text=Managed%20aquifer%20recharge%20(MAR)%2C,water%20supplies%20may%20be%20low.">managed aquifer recharge</a> as a technique which can be used to recharge aquifers. Water is either injected through a well or seeps into the ground through infiltration ponds, man-made or natural depressions in the ground which allows water to soak into the earth.</p>
<p>Countries in <a href="https://gw-project.org/books/managed-aquifer-recharge-southern-africa/">southern Africa</a> have practised this for the past 40 years. </p>
<p>Aquifers can also be recharged <a href="https://unepdhi.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/05/WEB_UNEP-DHI_NBS-PRIMER-2018-2.pdf">naturally</a> when rainwater infiltrates deep into the ground. This can be encouraged through afforestation, agricultural terraces and the prevention of land clearing. These practices allow permeable surfaces to dominate the landscape, stabilise the soil through plant growth, and slow the flow of water.</p>
<p><strong>Monitoring aquifers</strong></p>
<p>Monitoring aquifers is vital to know how much water is left in them. Unfortunately many African countries have poor monitoring networks and infrastructure in place. The number of monitoring points in certain countries is <a href="https://www.un-igrac.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Kukuric%20and%20van%20Vliet%2C%202008.pdf">also dwindling</a>, owing to financial constraints. </p>
<p>Satellite data can be used for monitoring. One example is the <a href="https://grace.jpl.nasa.gov/data/data-analysis-tool/">GRACE (Gravity, Recovery and Climate Experiment)</a> twin satellites which have provided insights into subsurface water storage over the past 20 years. This means that the changes in aquifer volumes can be monitored, but only at a very large scale. It’s necessary to know what’s happening on the ground. Localised monitoring networks are needed, with data loggers at multiple wells.</p>
<p><strong>Effective policies</strong></p>
<p>Policies and incentives play a major role in the use of groundwater. They influence the cost of energy and abstraction and the overall accounting of groundwater resources and environmental impact. </p>
<p>In an African context, good policies are missing in places. There are, however, some community practices which help to protect the resource, like the Qanat system. These types of systems should be encouraged and replicated. </p>
<p><strong>Groundwater dependent ecosystems</strong></p>
<p>Groundwater dependent ecosystems, such as wetlands, play a <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/fs_7_livelihoods_en_v5_2.pdf">critical role</a> for many livelihoods in Africa and need to be more effectively managed. These ecosystems use groundwater to support plant and animal life and ecosystem services, such as fresh water and clean air, throughout the year. </p>
<p>But they’re exposed to major risks because they’re often close to semi-arid and arid areas. This is particularly true in the Sahel region. Groundwater dependent ecosystems are often close to border crossings and transport routes. Human activities, such as over-pumping, could adversely affect how they function and lead to a loss of biodiversity. </p>
<p>The conservation of these water bodies is of the utmost importance for the preservation of water resources and livelihoods. Policies which protect them – like the <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/">Ramsar convention</a> – must be properly enforced. Governments could should also consider creating protected areas around some of these ecosystems. </p>
<h2>Managing resources</h2>
<p>It’s imperative that governments better monitor our water resources. Coupled with good practical solutions, such as managing pump rates, this will sustain groundwater resources for many years to come. </p>
<p>The monitoring network on our continent is unfortunately limited or non-existent in certain countries. In some, like South Africa, the network is slowly diminishing. This is unfortunate as the ability to measure allows better management of groundwater resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaathier Mahed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Better monitoring of groundwater is important for sustainable management.
Gaathier Mahed, Senior lecturer, Nelson Mandela University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/207150
2023-06-25T11:11:29Z
2023-06-25T11:11:29Z
Children’s movement affects health and development but research is lacking in Africa: here’s why
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531373/original/file-20230612-220077-jzsxfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children’s health and development depend on how much time they spend doing physical activity, being sedentary and sleeping.</p>
<p>Research on movement behaviours in children is essential. It helps us to understand what influences these behaviours, and their contribution to health and development. </p>
<p>Most <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/10/e049267">evidence</a> on movement behaviours comes from high-income countries. Here children have different lifestyles, environments and cultures from those in low- and middle-income countries. For example, children in African countries face different challenges in achieving healthy levels of physical activity and sleep. Safety, transport, infrastructure, culture, climate, nutrition, and different levels and types of screen time exposure may all present challenges. </p>
<p>Africa, as a continent, contributes less than <a href="https://www.elsevier.com/connect/africa-generates-less-than-1-of-the-worlds-research-data-analytics-can-change-that">1% of research</a> worldwide. This means over <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/">16%</a> of the world’s population has been excluded from the research. </p>
<p>The international <a href="https://sunrise-study.com/#about">SUNRISE study</a>, which we are part of, aims to bridge this gap. It conducts studies on movement behaviour in collaboration with researchers in several African countries, including Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, where we are based. We bring a collective expertise across disciplines such as public health, physiotherapy and child development. </p>
<p>SUNRISE findings so far show that the proportion of children in low- and middle-income countries meeting recommendations for movement behaviours is low, compared to high-income countries. This highlights the need for research and intervention in Africa. </p>
<p>But since the beginning of this study we have faced a wide range of challenges. In each country, the target number of children for the study is around 1,000. Researching their movement behaviour requires technology.</p>
<p>The challenges include access to devices to track movement, the lack of awareness of such tools and what they do, difficulty in securing funds, and institutional challenges. </p>
<p>Solutions include local collaboration, reducing financial barriers, developing new low-cost devices, and using contextually relevant methods. The following sections describe the challenges and possible solutions in detail.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p><strong>Access to devices</strong></p>
<p>Accelerometers are a type of digital wearable device, similar to Fitbits and smart watches. But they measure movement more accurately than commercially available devices. This is why they are more commonly used in research. These devices are generally more expensive because they are “research-grade”, and upwards of US$250 each (before software and delivery). This is a major challenge for those of us working in African countries, as at least 50 devices would be needed to conduct large scale studies like SUNRISE. There is no local manufacturer or distributor of accelerometer devices. Researchers need a legal licence to import or export them. </p>
<p>The SUNRISE study is able to loan devices. But exorbitant customs and shipping charges for moving this equipment to and between African countries makes sharing difficult – even when it’s only for research. This leads to unnecessary costs and delays, which means Africa gets left behind in this scientific field. </p>
<p><strong>Lack of awareness about the benefits of accelerometers</strong></p>
<p>These devices are often novel in African settings. Some parents and caregivers in our study areas have been sceptical about using them. For example, caregivers have asked whether the devices attract lightning, or whether they have some physical effect on the body. This may lead to another challenge in recruiting sufficient participants for the study. And data collection can take a long time when the shortage of devices is added to the time to get local buy-in. </p>
<p><strong>Difficulty in securing funds</strong></p>
<p>SUNRISE study researchers in Africa battle to get funding. They rely on highly competitive international funding, which seldom prioritises movement behaviour research in young children. It costs a lot to attend conferences internationally and to publish research in reputable academic journals. Open access journal fees can even exceed the monthly salary of a research assistant in an African country. </p>
<p><strong>Institutional challenges</strong></p>
<p>Within African research institutions, another challenge is how to build capacity. Few research institutes focus on movement behaviours in Africa. Accelerometer data is often complex to manage, and needs trained staff. High-income countries typically have access to support staff and students who can assist with this. This is not the case in many African countries. So it is difficult to conduct high-quality research and translate it into policy and practice. </p>
<h2>Possible solutions</h2>
<p>A possible solution is to collaborate with local partners and stakeholders to identify the most appropriate devices for each context and population. </p>
<p>All stakeholders, including local government and non-government organisations, ought to remove barriers so that the researchers can focus on the quality of evidence to inform policy and practice that is anchored to the local context. </p>
<p>Establishing some type of research equipment hub in Africa would go some way to help. But even moving equipment within Africa is not easy. Governments should consider waiving import and export charges for research equipment. The development of low-cost devices that can be produced and used efficiently in Africa is the best way forward. </p>
<p>Researchers in Africa could also examine other new data collection methods that are customised to the local context. Qualitative research (interviews and focus groups) can provide valuable insights into the factors that influence movement behaviours in different contexts. These insights are vital for the development of measurement tools and interventions that are culturally appropriate and effective. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>There are many other pressing needs in Africa. But the contribution of movement behaviours to population health and development is significant, particularly as there is growing evidence of the global economic costs of physical <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2822%2900482-X">inactivity</a>. We need local research on these behaviours, starting in the early years, when patterns of behaviour are established. </p>
<p>Without addressing barriers to robust research, researchers in this region will continue to lag behind in this field. </p>
<p>This means that we lose opportunities to learn how to promote movement behaviours that support health and development, thus setting children on the best path for life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Draper receives or has received funding from the British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the South African Medical Research Council, the Jacobs Foundation, and the European Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Okely receives funding from NHMRC, Research Council of Norway, World Health Organization, and UNICEF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoko Oluwayomi receives funding from ISBNPA-PIONEER PROGRAM SCHOLARSHIP 2022</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chalchisa Abdeta receives funding through HDR Scholarship from the University of Wollongong, Australia.</span></em></p>
Africa contributes less than 1% of research worldwide on movement behaviours in children. This means that research on movement behaviours has largely excluded over 16% of the world’s population.
Catherine Draper, Associate Professor at MRC/Wits Developmental Pathways for Health Research Unit, University of the Witwatersrand
Anthony Okely, Distinguished Professor of Public Health, University of Wollongong
Aoko Oluwayomi, PhD Candidate (Exercise Physiology), University of Lagos
Chalchisa Abdeta, PhD candidate, University of Wollongong
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/204788
2023-05-10T15:56:58Z
2023-05-10T15:56:58Z
For Tunisia’s muzzled media, Arab Spring is now a distant memory
<p>“Every afternoon before I leave the office, I turn off my phone and remove the SIM card. I don’t want to authorities to track my whereabouts.” Ayman (anonymised for protection) is one of Tunisia’s most prominent media profiles, and among the dwindling number of journalists who dare to criticise the authorities. Now he expects to be arrested any day. His boss was arrested and interrogated in February.</p>
<p>This is a far cry from the heady days after the fall of the country’s autocrat, Zinedine Ben Ali (1987-2011), when Tunisia’s media sector was revolutionised along with the rest of society. Like in Egypt, the 2011 Arab Spring resulted in the fall of a severely authoritarian regime. Until the fall of Ben Ali Tunisia was a veritable police state. Then, in a very short amount of time, Tunisians managed to set up new and democratic institutions, including a functioning parliament, an accountable presidency and independent courts.</p>
<p>The revolution also sowed the seeds of new and independent media outlets – radio, television and digital newspapers. The state television and radio company, al-Wataniyya, was redesigned to be a public broadcaster along the lines of BBC. The Journalists’ Syndicate proved to be an efficient protector of journalists’ professional rights vis-à-vis the authorities. Tunisians soon got used to critical news coverage and raucous political debates on prime-time TV. Now, all these gains are threatened and ordinary people do not even seem to mind much. What happened?</p>
<h2>The dark side of free media</h2>
<p>Since 2015, we have been studying media-politics relations in Tunisia as part of a research project on <a href="https://www.nupi.no/en/projects-centers/journalism-in-struggles-for-democracy-media-and-polarization-in-the-middle-east">journalism in struggles for democracy</a>. Over the last seven years, we have conducted 53 in-depth interviews and two focus group interviews with Tunisian journalists, activists and politicians. The aim of our interviews was to understand how journalists deal with media instrumentalisation and what political role they play in hybrid settings fluctuating between autocracy and democracy. Our last visit was in March 2023, one and a half years after President Kays Saïed abruptly suspended parliament.</p>
<p>But let us first rewind to 2011, when Tunisia went from a police state where the media was part of Ben Ali’s propaganda system to a suddenly free (and initially chaotic) media environment. The reshaping of the media scene took place in a context of political turmoil: <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-journalism-in-the-grey-zone.html">a hybrid political situation</a> of continuously contested democratisation in which political and business elites were eager to exploit the media for their own purposes. A textbook example of this was the behaviour of Nabil Karoui, a businessman who built his wealth on audiovisual production, digital media, and urban advertising and is CEO of the public relations firm Karoui & Karoui World. As the owner of Tunisia’s most popular TV channels, Nessma, he personally influenced its editorial policies while acting as communication advisor for ex-<a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-essebsi-the-late-maestro-of-tunisian-politics-122403">President Beji Caid Essebsi</a> (2014-2019). Karoui also appeared in the documentary series <em>Khalil Tunis</em>, devoted to covering the activities of a charity he had set up to fight poverty – at the same time as he founded his own party and his presidential ambitions became ever clearer. While Karoui was a particularly blatant example of media instrumentalisation, many other politicians, media owners and public figures were involved in murky intrigues and deals.</p>
<p>Hard-working journalists in newspapers, radio and television saw the big gain from the revolution – free media – melt away before their eyes, as squabbling politicians and commentators for hire alienated the Tunisian populace from both politics and the news media.</p>
<h2>Populism vs. journalism: President Kais Saïed and the media</h2>
<p>Enter the presidential election of September 2019, which featured two dyed-in-the-wool populists as frontrunners. Both of them represented a danger to free and critical media, but in very different ways. Nabil Karoui, whom we have already mentioned, was a charismatic media magnate who used his own TV channel to manipulate the political climate. The Conservative Kais al-Saïed, who <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191014-conservative-kais-saied-elected-president-of-tunisia-with-72-71-percent-of-vote">won the election with 72,71% votes</a>, was a former university lecturer in law who preferred to avoid the news media altogether. Saïed was nicknamed “Robocop” on account of his mechanic style of talking in interviews. His campaign relied not on media, but on grassroots activists going from door to door and arranging public meetings across Tunisia.</p>
<p>Saïed treats the media with the same contempt as he has shown toward political parties and parliamentarism. Journalists we spoke with in March said that the public broadcasting company has been reduced to a propaganda outlet. Saïed avoids relating to the private media, and prefers communicating with the public through announcements on Facebook, a very important communication platform in Tunisia. When the media contact the president’s office for statements on current affairs they receive no reply. It was telling that when a new and tame parliament opened on 13 March, no journalists from independent or foreign media were allowed inside the building so as to prevent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/13/press-banned-from-opening-session-of-new-tunisian-parliament-kais-saied">“disorder”</a>.</p>
<h2>The decline of journalism and the relativization of truth</h2>
<p>The president’s antipathy toward the media goes hand in hand with his intolerance of criticism and predilection for conspiracy theories. His widely reported, racist <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-presidents-offensive-statements-targeted-black-migrants-with-widespread-fallout-201593">rant against sub-Saharan Africans</a> in February is only the tip of the iceberg. Several opposition leaders have been imprisoned since March, accused of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/tunisia-president-saied-must-immediately-stop-his-political-witch-hunt/">“conspiring to undermine the state”</a>. Noureddine Boutar, the head of Tunisia’s main independent radio channel, Mosaïque, was arrested in February on charges of <a href="https://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/actualite-national-tunisie/1137635/detention-de-boutar-la-ligne-editoriale-de-mosaique-fm-derange">‘attacking the highest symbol of the state and exacerbating tensions in the country’</a>. Journalists we met in March told us that they are accused of spreading fear among the public (now a punishable crime) when they simply report facts about Tunisia’s many economic and social problems.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525426/original/file-20230510-11912-8f7uo1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Since rising to power in 2019, President Saied has increasingly zapped Tunisia’s freedom of speech.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tunisia-3433_-_Want_to_buy_a_TV......_%287847360164%29.jpg">Dennis Jarvis/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are still strong journalistic voices who speak out against the attacks on liberty of speech. When we interviewed officials at the Journalists’ Syndicate, they took it for granted that they were being surveilled, but they were as defiant as ever, having participated in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/5/tunisian-opposition-defies-protest-ban-with-rally">march for freedom</a> a couple of days before we met them.</p>
<p>However, the bigger picture is gloomy. Political content has all but disappeared from the previously intensely political TV channels. Journalists who want to do political reporting have difficulties earning a living from it. Moreover, Saïed seems to have succeeded in convincing substantial parts of the population that the news media are part of the corrupt elites and not to be trusted. As a result, people get their news from rumours on Facebook. As one media scholar told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I had problems convincing my own family that Saïed’s wildly exaggerated claims about the number of sub-Saharan African immigrants were necessarily absurd, because there are no epistemological authorities anymore. Announcements and rumours on Facebook have replaced fact-checked news as a source of information.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The dearth of sober, critical journalism does nothing to reduce the intense polarisation in Tunisian politics between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tunisia-politics-idCAKBN2RA05Z">the president, the Islamists, and the reactionary Free Constitutional Party</a>. They all have it in for journalists. Each camp constructs its own reality and viciously attacks those who challenge the relativisation of truth based on <a href="https://inkyfada.com/en/">objective and critical reporting</a>. We should not forget that Tunisian journalists can look to the <a href="https://rsf.org/en/classement/2022/americas">United States</a>, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/classement/2022/europe-central-asia">several European countries</a> and <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/russia">Russia</a> for parallels to their own situation. Sadly, that does not help them much. Critical, fact-based journalism is under threat in many purportedly free and pluralistic societies, and Tunisia is presently one of the hotspots.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Høigilt a reçu des financements de Conseil de recherche de Norvège. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kjetil Selvik a reçu des financements du Conseil norvégien de la recherche </span></em></p>
Freedom of expression was the one remaining gain of Tunisia’s 2011 revolution, but it is now severely threatened by a populist president.
Jacob Høigilt, Professor of Arab studies, University of Oslo
Kjetil Selvik, Research Professor in political science, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/202979
2023-04-03T13:57:28Z
2023-04-03T13:57:28Z
Mass protests in Kenya have a long and rich history – but have been hijacked by the elites
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518491/original/file-20230330-20-zjju3k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters face off with an anti-riot police officer in Nairobi, Kenya, in March 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga and his coalition party, Azimio la Umoja-One Kenya, recently called for <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/292123/kenya-raila-announces-anti-ruto-protests-with-major-demo-in-nairobi/">mass protests across the country</a>. Odinga and his team have questioned the legitimacy of President William Ruto’s win in the country’s August 2022 election, and taken issue with the rising cost of living. The Conversation Africa’s Kagure Gacheche spoke with Westen K Shilaho, a senior researcher on African politics, who explores the evolution of political protests in Kenya.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What does the law say about political protest?</h2>
<p>The right to protest is enshrined in the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/203-37-assembly-demonstration-picketing-and-petition#:%7E:text=Assembly%2C%20demonstration%2C%20picketing%20and%20petition,-Chapter%20Four%20%2D%20The&text=Every%20person%20has%20the%20right,present%20petitions%20to%20public%20authorities.">constitution of Kenya under Article 37</a>. It states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person has the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to present petitions to public authorities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The right to protest is also affirmed by international instruments to which Kenya is a signatory. These include the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human and People’s Rights</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>. </p>
<p>However, successive Kenyan governments have repeatedly criminalised the right to protest. As a result, the police consistently react with <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/au-calls-for-calm-restraint-in-kenya-4175774">brute force against protesters</a>. </p>
<h2>What led to the latest wave of protests in Kenya?</h2>
<p>Kenya held general elections on 9 August 2022, and <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/nJbSsSKxMj.pdf">William Ruto was declared president</a>. The opposition contested the election results and <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/raila-contests-presidential-election-results-supreme-court-3922660">filed a petition</a> before the supreme court, which <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenyan-court-to-rule-on-disputed-presidential-election-/6731434.html">unanimously dismissed the petition</a> for lack of evidence. </p>
<p>Raila Odinga, the losing presidential contestant, rejected this ruling and has refused to recognise Ruto’s win. He has taken the dispute to the court of public opinion – the streets. He has made three main demands: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>that the electoral agency’s servers be opened to prove that he won the 2022 election</p></li>
<li><p>that Ruto halts <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/25-kenyans-seek-to-replace-chebukati-as-iebc-chair-895-eye-commissioner-jobs-4177314">reconstitution of Kenya’s electoral body</a> </p></li>
<li><p>that the government lowers the cost of living.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Protests began on 15 August 2022 when the presidential election results were declared. <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/national/article/2001453334/bitter-end-chebukati-attacked-as-chaos-mar-bomas-briefing">Hoodlums assaulted</a> the electoral agency’s chairperson and other officials. They are yet to be held to account for these attacks.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-body-choosing-kenyas-election-commission-is-being-overhauled-how-this-could-strengthen-democracy-198798">The body choosing Kenya's election commission is being overhauled – how this could strengthen democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>After a six-month lull, these protests recently spilled over onto the streets. The opposition called for demonstrations <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/raila-odinga-calls-for-boycott-of-safaricom-kcb-4167328">twice a week</a> from 20 March until the government accedes to its demands. </p>
<p>Ruto and his supporters <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2023/03/president-ruto-dismisses-raila-call-for-resignation-halt-of-iebc-recruitment/">have been scornful</a> of the opposition’s demands, saying they have no basis in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/president-ruto-dismisses-raila-s-azimio-protests-as-sabotage--4103666">law, morality or logic</a>. Ruto dismissed the protests as <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-03-19-i-will-not-allow-you-to-terrorise-kenyans-ruto-tells-raila/">acts of economic terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>After two weeks of <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/30/violent-clashes-as-kenya-opposition-stages-third-day-of-protests/">violence</a> – where at least three people died, several others injured and property vandalised – Ruto extended an olive branch to the opposition and asked them to <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/eyes-on-raila-as-ruto-asks-opposition-to-call-off-protests-4182346">call off the protests</a>. He suggested that the issue of the reconstitution of the electoral body could be revisited. </p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-04-02-my-door-is-open-for-talks-call-off-protests-ruto-tells-raila/">the opposition suspended the protests</a>. </p>
<p>Ruto has previously said he would not be <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/anxiety-as-ruto-raila-harden-stance-over-protests-4172706">blackmailed into a power-sharing arrangement</a> with the opposition. If not checked, power-sharing arrangements – or “<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyatta-raila-pact-will-only-herald-real-change-if-promises-are-followed-by-action-96148">handshake</a>” in Kenya’s political parlance – could become the country’s default arrangement after elections. This would be to the detriment of democratic tenets. </p>
<h2>What is the history of political protests in Kenya?</h2>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenyas-constitutional-duels-are-all-about-power-struggles-among-the-elite-147471">political history</a> is marked by mass protests that date back to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/180739">colonial period</a> and continued into independence. </p>
<p>Amid police crackdowns, Kenyans protested against <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000096439/witness-recalls-the-1969-kisumu-massacre-that-marked-jomo-kenyatta-s-visit">political assassinations</a> and autocracy during the tenures of the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, and his successor, Daniel Moi. </p>
<p>Through a <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Constitution/HistoryoftheConstitutionofKenya/Acts/1982/ActNo.7of1982.pdf">constitutional amendment</a>, Moi turned Kenya into a one-party state in 1982, which heightened political tensions. Later that year, Kenyans protested in Nairobi in support of an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001380803/inside-secret-coup-attempt-that-killed-240-in-city-crossfire">attempted coup against Moi</a> as opposition politicians and civil society sought a return to political pluralism. </p>
<p>Countrywide protests were held in <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/07/07/saba-saba-and-the-evolution-of-citizen-power">1990</a>. This agitation, coupled with pressure from civil society, religious groups and western donors, forced Moi to accede to <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1204/04041.html">multiparty politics in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>In 1992, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/news/article/2001261426/bare-breasted-crusade-when-mothers-of-political-prisoners-stripped-at-uhuru-park">mothers of political prisoners</a> held an 11-month hunger strike in Nairobi to demand the release of their sons. </p>
<p>Protests against presidential results in 2007 led to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">horrific crackdown</a>. More than 1,100 people were killed, <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov">several of them extrajudicially</a> by the police. Odinga had disputed Mwai Kibaki’s win. Protests and summary executions also followed the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/17/kenya-riot-police-election-protest">2013</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">2017</a> announcements of presidential election results.</p>
<p>Protests are important. They can influence a government or a body of authority to respond to popular interests and injustice. Through protests, a government can be forced to address service delivery concerns, corruption, labour disputes, extrajudicial and summary executions and education matters, and to abandon dictatorial tendencies. In some countries, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring">Tunisia, Egypt and Libya</a>, protests collapsed regimes. </p>
<p>As I discuss in my book, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322174201_Political_Power_and_Tribalism_in_Kenya">Political Power and Tribalism in Kenya</a>, political protests in the country have become insular, sectarian, tribal, unashamedly personality driven and elitist. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">Kenya’s history of political violence: colonialism, vigilantes and militias</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>My research found that the political elite have used protests for self-preservation and to pursue their interests. Protests have become about getting opposing political personalities to come to an agreement so that election losers don’t lose all the benefits of being in power – but such agreements stifle healthy debate.</p>
<p>Elections must produce winners and losers among the contestants. The citizenry should be the only constant winners. Their concerns must be met regardless of who ascends to power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Political protests in Kenya have become insular, sectarian, tribal and unashamedly personality driven.
Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/201593
2023-03-16T12:22:40Z
2023-03-16T12:22:40Z
Tunisia: President’s offensive statements targeted black migrants - with widespread fallout
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514908/original/file-20230313-20-ic1z6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of Tunisia, Kais Saied (R) meets Guinea-Bissau's President Umaro Sissoco Embalo in Tunis on 8 March 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tunisian Presidency / Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Presidence.tn/posts/pfbid02gkXqJK8EByDtaRHhJQeSmEBMhHutAcGa3az5V3NEFzr9Rdsqm11qsmusGA53zra4l">statement</a> by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kais-Saied">Tunisian President Kais Saied</a> that “urgent measures” were needed “against illegal immigration of nationals from sub-Saharan Africa” which were causing “violence and crime” set off a nation-wide violent backlash against migrants. </p>
<p>The statement, which followed a national security meeting, and the subsequent backlash against migrants, were followed by international condemnation, including from within Africa.</p>
<p>Estimates of migrants in Tunisia vary, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisias-president-is-targeting-migrants-to-divert-attention-from-serious-domestic-problems-a-classic-tactic-201404#:%7E:text=Immigrants%20in%20Tunisia%20account%20for,These%20basic%20figures%20are%20important.">21,000</a> formally documented migrants, to <a href="http://www.ins.tn/publication/rapport-de-lenquete-nationale-sur-la-migration-internationale-tunisia-hims">59,000</a>, including <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/tunisia.html">9,000</a> registered refugees and asylum-seekers. </p>
<p>The president noted in his inflammatory statement that the “incessant flow” and “hordes of illegal migrants” were aimed at changing the demographics of the country “threatening its Arabic and Islamic character”. </p>
<p>The offensive statement – and consequent reprisals – are deeply shocking and have already had repercussions. In Tunisia, where anti-immigrant sentiment is on the rise, far-right groups have been <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-ghost-people-and-populism-from-above-the-kais-saied-case/">bolstered</a> in their aggressive stance towards immigrants. Thousands of immigrants have fled. Those that remain face attacks on their <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/tunisia-and-libya-un-experts-condemn-collective-expulsion-and-deplorable">dignity</a>.</p>
<p>Tunisia has been condemned by the African community, the strongest measure being taken by the African Union. It <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/6/african-union-cancels-tunisia-meeting-after-migrant-attacks">cancelled</a> its meeting scheduled for Tunis, the Tunisian capital. Four West African countries - Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast - either evacuated their citizens or called for caution. </p>
<p>There have also been <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/03/354346/calls-for-boycotting-tunisian-products-intensify-in-african-countries">calls</a> by sub-Saharan African countries for a boycott of Tunisian products. Tunisian civil society groups, human rights activists, and artists also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/26/tunisian-civil-society-groups-denounce-anti-migrant-rhetoric//">condemned</a> the attacks on migrants.</p>
<p>This is yet another outcome of the migration policies imposed by the European Union on Tunisia. It also adds to a gradual isolation and alienation of the country from its neighbours on the continent in a time of political and socio-economic crisis. </p>
<p>Within Tunisia, the recent attacks on migrants contribute to further polarisation within the different factions of the society, especially between NGOs mobilising against anti-migrant racism and the perpetual spread and appeal of populist and conspiracy-theory parties.</p>
<h2>Anti-migrant violence</h2>
<p>The migrants and refugees in the country come from different parts of the world, including Syria. But most are from countries in sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa in particular. Reasons for their stay <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisias-president-is-targeting-migrants-to-divert-attention-from-serious-domestic-problems-a-classic-tactic-201404">vary</a> but include study, work and for many the transit onward to Europe when the opportunity arises.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/39955/refugees-demand-evacuation-from-tunisia">Racist incidents</a> against sub-Saharan refugees and migrants and <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20230304-discours-antimigrants-en-tunisie-une-fa%C3%A7on-de-faire-oublier-les-probl%C3%A8mes-du-pays">hate speech</a> are not new in Tunisia. Nevertheless, what followed this particularly inflammatory speech by President Saied was a large scale “security” campaign of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/3/sub-saharan-africans-recount-tunisia-hell-amid-crackdown">random and arbitrary arrests</a> by the security forces of hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants. They have been detained in illegal centres. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/tunisia/2023/03/02/african-migrants-in-tunisia-plead-for-help-amid-rise-in-racially-motivated-attacks/">systematic and racist violence</a> has affected a range of men, women, children and even infants from immigrant families. It included physical attacks, migrants being fired from their jobs, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2023-03-02-african-migrants-evicted-and-fired-amid-crackdown-in-tunisia/">kicked out</a> of their accommodation and even schools and daycare centres. </p>
<p>Fear was widespread and hundreds of migrants <a href="https://meshkal.org/black-people-attacked-evicted-in-tunisia-after-presidents-racist-stat/">camped</a> in front of the <a href="https://www.iom.int/">International Organisation for Migration</a> and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/">United Nations High Commission for Refugees</a> offices in the cold, seeking protection. </p>
<p>Online anti-migrant discussion and hate speech have risen recently. The far-right Tunisian Nationalist Party grew from a few thousand subscribers in January to more than <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/02/23/in-tunisia-president-kais-saied-claims-sub-saharan-migrants-threaten-country-s-identity_6016898_124.html">50,000</a> by the end of February, alarming in the speed that the appeal to this party took on. </p>
<p>Even prior to the statement by the president, the group had succeeded in raising more than <a href="https://nawaat.org/2023/02/14/parti-nationaliste-tunisien-racisme-autorise-par-letat/">a million signatures</a> in a petition to expel undocumented sub-Saharan migrants. This shows his populist attempt to respond to an already widely spread xenophobic sentiment. </p>
<p>The anti-migrant violence comes in an overall context of failure to deal with the deep economic and social crises in Tunisia. These have worsened since Saied’s authoritarian <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/07/26/kais-saieds-power-grab-in-tunisia/">power grab</a> on the 25 July 2021. </p>
<p>This has not only involved a frequent link to conspiracy theories in public narratives, but has also created an environment of <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/10/11/food-shortages-and-rising-food-prices-hit-tunisia/">high unemployment</a>, amid shortages in basic products and soaring food prices. </p>
<p>Tunisian society has been polarised. Fear and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/tunisia-hate-speech-black-africans-social-media">hate speech</a> have spread online, and there has been an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/tunisia-forces-arrest-senior-opposition-figure-as-crackdown-escalates">increasing crackdown</a> on civil society and political opposition. </p>
<h2>Scapegoating</h2>
<p>The anti-migrant backlash is politically useful in this environment: scapegoating migrants can divert from the continuous failure to address many of these domestic issues, as seen in other contexts such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15562948.2021.2007318">South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Migrants are constructed as “a burden” to an already poor infrastructure and economy, a danger to the public, and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Presidence.tn/posts/pfbid02gkXqJK8EByDtaRHhJQeSmEBMhHutAcGa3az5V3NEFzr9Rdsqm11qsmusGA53zra4l">pawns of foreign funded parties</a> in Tunisia to colonise it again. The statement and crackdown on migrants is aimed at gaining more popularity, especially after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/18/low-voter-turnout-clear-message-to-saied-democratic-bloc-leader">low elections</a> turn out in 2022.</p>
<h2>Reactions</h2>
<p>Dozens of civil society groups, human rights activists and artists signed a <a href="https://ltdh.tn/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85/?fbclid=IwAR3bBFnDiFmz5NSk6oyFTfiW5mhGh6uBDRO_HY572RUi1f_ioHqrQaisThM">collective statement</a> calling for a rally against Saied’s comments and the aftermath it caused. Hundreds of people have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/what-you-need-to-know-about-tunisia-anti-racism-protests">protested</a> on the streets, chanting “Down with fascism, Tunisia is an African country.” </p>
<p>Countries within the region were quick to respond. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/3/sub-saharan-africans-recount-tunisia-hell-amid-crackdown">Guinea </a> was the first to repatriate around 50 of their nationals for their own safety and dignity. Mali flew home around three times as many a few days later. </p>
<p>Cote d’Ivoire also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-64813850">offered</a> to fly back their own citizens. The Burkina Faso ambassador in Tunis expressed his solidarity in this “difficult situation”. There have been <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/03/354346/calls-for-boycotting-tunisian-products-intensify-in-african-countries">calls</a> to boycott Tunisian products, especially in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mali. </p>
<p>The African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230224/chairperson-african-union-commission-strongly-condemns-racial-statements">released a statement</a> a day after the offensive remarks. It strongly criticised Tunisia and urged it to avoid “racialised hate speech”. A previously planned AU meeting in Tunis for mid-March was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/6/african-union-cancels-tunisia-meeting-after-migrant-attacks">cancelled</a>. </p>
<p>These responses remind us of the reaction in 2017 to the release of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html">CNN footage</a> of African migrants and refugees being auctioned off in slave markets in Libya. A major outrage unfolded across the continent and reactions included Burkina Faso <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burkina-libya-idUKKBN1DK2IC">recalling</a> its ambassador to Libya. </p>
<p>Countries including Nigeria <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/research-papers/2019-research-papers/the-political-economy-of-migration-governance-in-nigeria-14227/">airlifted</a> thousands of their citizens out of Libya. </p>
<p>Governments have been reluctant to accept returns from Europe. But attitudes towards <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/policy-papers/policy-briefs/challenges-in-eu-african-migration-cooperation-west-african-perspectives-on-forced-return-14152/">returns from the region</a> are different.</p>
<p>It is difficult to know what the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/11/tunisian-foreign-policy-under-kais-saied-pub-88770">foreign policy aims</a> are of Tunisia under Saied. </p>
<p>On 8 March, <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/02/27/umaro-embalo-officially-becomes-president-in-guinea-bissau/">President Cissoko Emballo</a> from Guinea Bissau visited Tunisia, also in his role as chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States. During the visit, Saied backtracked from his insidious remarks, arguing his statement was misinterpreted. Not only were members of his family married to “Africans” and he had friends who were “Africans”, but in response to President Emballo, he conceded “I am indeed [<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/09/tunisian-president-denies-racism-accusation-after-migrant-crackdown/">African</a>], and a proud African”. </p>
<p>A range of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-migrants-racism-africa-eu-saied-2733a73f42816094fe55be4a4868f806">new measures</a> were quickly announced including a hotline to report human rights violations, psychological assistant for migrants and a waiver of fees for residency permit violations if migrants agree to return to their country of origin. </p>
<p>But the state-sponsored violence has <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/tunisia-presidents-racist-speech-violence-against-black-africans/">continued</a>. </p>
<h2>The fallout</h2>
<p>For countries and people in the region, this is just another dimension of the unpopular <a href="https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7">externalisation policies</a> imposed on them by the European Union. The goal is reduce migration to Europe.</p>
<p>Making Tunisia unlivable for sub-Saharan migrants plays into the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/233150241700500103">deterrence</a> strategy being pursued by the European Union. But the attacks are likely to affect Tunisia’s standing on the continent. Diplomatic relations will be adversely affected by the racist attacks.</p>
<p>Civil society groups are already <a href="https://journalismecitoyens-org.over-blog.com/2023/03/racisme-un-groupe-de-travail-exige-la-suspension-de-la-tunisie-de-l-union-africaine.html">demanding</a> the suspension of Tunisia from the African Union. </p>
<p>The outlook for individual migrants is bleak. They will continue living in an atmosphere of fear and danger. And for the wider Tunisian population the xenophobic attacks will only create more division at a time when soaring living costs and multiple international and domestic crises make solidarity - including on the continent - essential. </p>
<p>Tunisia needs allies to overcome these multiple crisis. Increasing isolation will not help. </p>
<p><em>Nermin Abbassi, a graduate student of political sciences at the University of Cologne and research assistant contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
In Tunisia, scapegoating migrants diverts from the continuous failure of government to solve deep economic and social crisis.
Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/201404
2023-03-08T14:04:20Z
2023-03-08T14:04:20Z
Tunisia’s president is targeting migrants to divert attention from serious domestic problems – a classic tactic
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514176/original/file-20230308-20-wrt3cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands in Tunis protest soaring prices, corruption and denounced recent comments by the Tunisian president against sub-Saharan migrants.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mohamed Messara </span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Tunisia’s president Kais Saied recently called for urgent measures against illegal immigration of sub-Saharan African nationals. He <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/tunisian-president-rejects-racism-accusation-after-migrant-crackdown/6991188.html#:%7E:text=During%20a%20statement%20on%20February,more%20African%20and%20less%20Arab.">said</a> they were a source of “violence, crime and unacceptable acts”. His comments were condemned by the international community and the World Bank <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230306-world-bank-halts-future-tunisia-engagement-after-president-s-anti-migrant-remarks">paused talks</a> over its future engagement with Tunisia. They also led to widespread protests in Tunisia while hundreds of migrants fled the country.</em></p>
<p><em>Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Jean-Pierre Cassarino, an expert on international migration in the Maghreb and Africa region, to shed light on migration to Tunisia and what might be behind the president’s comments.</em> </p>
<h2>What is the history of sub-Saharan migration to Tunisia. How many migrants are there?</h2>
<p>Sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia come <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/49e479ca0.pdf">primarily</a> from western Africa. Immigrants in Tunisia account for 0.5% of the national population. Official, documented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa number around 21,000 persons out of a total immigrant population of around 58,000 according to a <a href="http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Rapport%20de%20l%27enqu%C3%AAte%20nationale%20sur%20la%20migration%20internationale%20Tunisia-HIMS.pdf">recent study</a>. </p>
<p>These basic figures are important. They show that immigrants make up a very small number of foreigners compared with the national population.</p>
<p>There are different types of sub-Saharan migrants. Many students from west Africa come to Tunisia because they obtained a scholarship or wish to continue their training in Tunisian universities. There are <a href="https://www.ticad8.tn/content/14/etudier-en-tunisie?locale=fr">several bilateral university agreements</a> between Tunisia and various west African countries. </p>
<p>Other migrants come to Tunisia for labour, or because they are en route to Europe. However, for these, there are no precise statistical data as they are irregular. To give an idea of a figure though, in 2021, <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Human-smuggling-and-trafficking-ecosystems-TUNISIA.pdf">at least 23,328</a> irregular migrants were intercepted by Tunisian authorities trying to get to Europe.</p>
<p>Note that a migrant from sub–Saharan Africa can come with a regular status and <a href="https://www.valigiablu.it/tunisia-razzismo-saied-subsahariani/?fbclid=IwAR2leMvGbbpDlp1WPXb-J0v7PX7zMoLT2o5ljbBFoGqgpGGdWY1Ta5lEboQ">may become irregular</a>. Irregularity is far from being a choice in Tunisia. There is a lot of administrative paperwork and bureaucracy that lengthen the procedure for getting a regular status in Tunisia. Procedures are so cumbersome that migrants - such as students - find themselves in a legal limbo when they need to extend their stay.</p>
<h2>What are the country’s current policies towards migrants like?</h2>
<p>Let me be clear and concise: it is selectively discriminatory. Tunisia is quite open with European immigrants and very restrictive with non-EU citizens. </p>
<p>The bottom line is that Tunisia’s approach to migration and migrants’ rights oscillates between the need to comply with international standards and the necessity to maximise the benefits of its citizens living abroad – such as remittances or the transfer of skills acquired abroad. This means it needs to try and keep its migration policies quite open. At the same time it wants to act as a credible player in the fight against irregular migration in its interactions with the EU and its member states. This means that Tunisia needs to show it can cooperate with the EU and its member states as well as control its own borders.</p>
<h2>Are there social and political factors behind the president’s comments?</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tunesien/15275.pdf">law against racism</a> was adopted in Tunisia in 2018. It was an important step in defending the rights of Tunisians who identify as black, as well as the country’s migrants.</p>
<p>It is quite staggering to hear a political leader using such statements publicly. </p>
<p>When it comes to social tensions migration has been used in many countries as a means to discipline public opinion while scapegoating foreigners. One example of this is in <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/migrants-scapegoated-in-south-africa-as-inequality-and-unemployment-surge/">South Africa</a> where migrants were scapegoated as inequality and unemployment surged. Another is in the US where business cycle downturns <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120899747810440043">led to</a> blaming Latino migrants.</p>
<p>The common denominators include rising domestic unemployment (especially youth unemployment), public deficits, the crisis of the welfare state and of the economy, and, last but not least, social tensions. This is true in Tunisia too. </p>
<p>The link between the conditions of labour migrants and native workers’ rights is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/26660">well documented</a> by scholars <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long-history-blaming-immigrants-times-sickness-180976053/">across disciplines</a>.</p>
<p>Tunisia is behaving like many other countries confronted by social, political and economic challenges. Public opinion needs radical positions regardless of their responsiveness to the malaise of a society. Our recent history abounds with examples, even the worst we could ever imagine. It is much easier to refuse to come to terms with what is really happening. This is a kind of escape from reality.
Making the public believe that the containment of foreigners’ rights will somehow protect citizens from the containment of their own social and economic rights is a classic political strategy used by many leaders. Of course, there are variations across countries. </p>
<p>Tunisia’s economy <a href="https://www.mei.edu/events/tunisias-economic-crisis-possible-paths-forward">is in crisis</a>: state finances are on the brink of bankruptcy and there are shortages of key goods. President Saied has also been <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-the-complex-issues-behind-the-presidential-power-grab-165698">seizing more power</a> and recently had a massive <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64632878">crackdown</a> on critics that accuse him of trying to install a new dictatorship in the country.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/5-xenophobic-myths-about-immigrants-in-south-africa-debunked-by-researchers-191194">5 xenophobic myths about immigrants in South Africa debunked by researchers</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Clearly, the anti-immigrant rhetoric in Tunisia is profoundly problematic but it is not exceptional. It is not specific to Tunisia. That being said, this same rhetoric is paradoxical because Tunisia is predominantly an emigration country with a large diaspora living in various countries. Tunisians are confronted with similar discriminatory and nationalist discourses abroad. I wonder how a country can credibly protect its own citizens living abroad against discrimination and racism when similar facts are glaringly happening at home.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, I am afraid that more restrictive provisions will be adopted in the near future. When I refer to escape from reality I mean that it is easier for a government (and a part of its constituencies) to place blame elsewhere than to come to terms with what is really happening.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Pierre Cassarino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Tunisia is behaving like many other countries confronted by social, political and economic challenges - it’s blaming migrants as a ploy to divert attention.
Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Visiting professor, College of Europe
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/193083
2022-11-09T14:12:46Z
2022-11-09T14:12:46Z
Tunisia’s once-vibrant democracy is on its deathbed: but it can be saved
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493623/original/file-20221105-19-1a7j3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators protest in Tunisia's capital Tunis in 2021 against President Kais Saied's steps to tighten his grip on power.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fethi Belaid/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the lessons the 21st century is bringing home is that the winners of elections can gradually <a href="https://www.amazon.com/How-Democracies-Die-Steven-Levitsky/dp/1524762938">kill democracies</a>. Healthy democracies have institutional checks and balances which act as a restraint on elected governments. The key institutions include parliament and independent judicial systems. </p>
<p>But when power gradually concentrates in the executive, it disturbs this delicate balance. There is a growing trend of autocrats using the rules – constitutional formalities – to cover up their power grabs. Taking power “constitutionally” makes it look as if they are doing things in the interests of citizens. It makes it harder to challenge the autocrat. I’ve used the <a href="http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/12/towards-a-concept-of-constitutional-authoritarianism-the-venezuelan-experience/">expression</a> “constitutional authoritarian populism” to describe such regimes. </p>
<p>Venezuela could be considered a poster child of how a presidency can concentrate power. It has achieved this through emergency decrees, constitutional modification processes, and rulings by constitutional courts. All these measures have been accompanied by populist rhetoric. </p>
<p>Tunisia is the most recent example of the trend. The 2011 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring">revolution</a> paved the way for a democratic transition in Tunisia. A new constitution in 2014 then instituted a system of checks and balances, with power-sharing agreements between the legislative and the executive. Tunisia was considered a remarkable example of democratic transition in the aftermath of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-arab-spring-changed-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-forever-161394">Arab Spring</a>, avoiding the fate of Egypt. </p>
<p>It wasn’t an instant fix for the country’s problems. People’s mistrust in the government lingered. When President Kais Saied was elected in 2019, it was on the promise of restoring that trust and increasing accountability. Instead the former constitutional law professor went on to dismantle the checks and balances system. </p>
<p>On 24 July 2021, Saied dismissed the prime minister and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/30/world/africa/tunisia-president-dissolve-parliament.html">suspended</a> parliament for 30 days (blocking access to the parliament building with tanks). Based on decrees, he also assumed the legislative function. Amid social unrest, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/07/26/kais-saieds-power-grab-in-tunisia/">Saied said</a> those measures were adopted </p>
<blockquote>
<p>until social peace returns to Tunisia and until we save the state.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tunisia’s democratic backslide shows why it is necessary to adopt a human rights perspective to interpret constitutional decisions. And that is what the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights did. It <a href="https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/public/633/48f/dcc/63348fdcc9449943680203.pdf">ruled</a> on 22 September 2022 that the decisions adopted by Saied violated human rights. The court ordered that the presidential decrees be repealed to restore the supremacy of the constitution.</p>
<p>A human rights approach is the best antidote to constitutional authoritarian populism. Because autocrats will manipulate the law to justify authoritarian measures, it is necessary to go back to the classical legal tradition and recall that an unjust law cannot be deemed <a href="https://scholarworks.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=suurj">binding</a>.</p>
<h2>Constitutional pretence</h2>
<p>President Saied invoked the constitution to adopt authoritarian measures based on the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/07/26/kais-saieds-power-grab-in-tunisia/">extraordinary powers</a> vested in the presidency by the 2014 constitution. </p>
<p>The exceptional powers enjoyed by the president are intended to be used to protect the constitution in extraordinary circumstances. They were not designed to dismantle the constitutional order – as Saied <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/27/tunisia-presidents-seizure-powers-threatens-rights">did</a> when he dismissed the prime minister and suspended the parliament. In practical terms, the extraordinary powers abolished the 2014 constitution, concentrating power in the presidency. </p>
<p>But those authoritarian measures were justified as a means of protecting the people from the alleged <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/27/1020998605/tunisias-nascent-democracy-is-in-crisis-but-trouble-has-been-brewing-for-a-decad">inefficiency</a> of the prime minister. Saied drafted a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/07/06/tunisias-new-constitution-will-only-worsen-its-political-crisis/">new constitution</a> and tried to make it look like a popular decision by holding a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220726-tunisia-constitutional-referendum-marked-by-low-turnout-as-opposition-boycotts">referendum</a> on 25 July 2022. </p>
<p>In my view, the referendum was rigged. It was conducted in <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=3354">violation</a> of basic electoral integrity conditions. These include particularly the lack of an independent electoral management body.</p>
<p>The authoritarian measures have continued with the modification of the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saieds-new-rules-tunisias-elections">electoral rules</a>. It won’t be possible to hold free and fair elections using these rules.</p>
<p>Saied has masked his authoritarian measures with a constitutional veneer to avoid challenges, mainly from the international community. Piercing this constitutional veil reveals the authoritarian essence of the measures adopted since 2021.</p>
<h2>Masters of legality</h2>
<p>Why do modern authoritarians love constitutional formalities? This is not a novelty. As the German political philosopher <a href="https://files.libertyfund.org/files/676/Rommen_0017.pdf">Heinrich Rommen</a> observed, modern dictators “are masters of legality”. More recently, the Venezuelan journalist and writer Moisés Naím has referred to the “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Revenge-Power-Autocrats-Reinventing-Politics/dp/1250279208">pseudo-law</a>” to describe how autocrats like to hide behind legal formalities.</p>
<p>Several reasons explain why autocrats are masters of constitutionality. First, constitutions are not only legal institutions but also <a href="https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=143377">instruments</a> that can bring legitimacy. Using them as a veneer could protect the autocrat’s legitimacy. And the veneer makes it easier for autocrats to say they are protecting “the people”.</p>
<p>The second reason is more legal. When authoritarian measures have a veneer of constitutionality, there’s not much the international community can do. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/principle-of-nonintervention/7EE9EC769A3F2CEE10E3DEE1CB30E274">non-intervention principle protects domestic disputes</a>.</p>
<p>Tunisia’s democracy can be saved. But the first step is to put human rights at the centre, following the ruling of the African Court.</p>
<h2>The human rights perspective</h2>
<p>As the African Charter <a href="https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49">recalls</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Therefore, any measure adopted through constitutional formalities that violate human rights is, in essence, unconstitutional. Following the painful experiences of the second world war, the German doctrine explained why constitutional provisions could be <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43668170">unconstitutional</a>, for instance, if they denied human dignity.</p>
<p>Similarly, the new constitution approved by President Saied is unconstitutional and cannot overrule the 2014 constitution. Also, any election conducted under the current conditions – including the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202112140252.html">announced</a> parliamentary election for December 2022 – should not be deemed free and fair.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>José Ignacio Hernández G. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Tunisia’s democratic backslide demonstrates how autocrats can use constitutional cover to entrench authoritarianism.
José Ignacio Hernández G., Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Kennedy School
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/187359
2022-09-07T20:07:15Z
2022-09-07T20:07:15Z
My pilgrimage to the site of Paul Klee’s Hammamet with Its Mosque
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478872/original/file-20220812-19-q1zead.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3884%2C3989&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Klee (1879–1940), Hammamet with Its Mosque, 1914.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Metropolitan Museum of Art/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In this new series, our writers introduce us to a favourite painting.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>For almost as long as I can remember I have loved the pictures of Paul Klee (1879-1940). When I was growing up my parents owned a strange little lithograph by him called <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/483139">Phantom Perspective</a>. It shows a wafer-thin man lying asleep in a dormitory of inflowing straight lines. </p>
<p>Like one of the curious fish in Klee’s child-like visual aquaria, I was hooked.</p>
<p>It was on his famous trip to Tunisia in April 1914 that Klee painted Hammamet with Its Mosque, now owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. </p>
<p>Travelling down the east coast of the Maghrebian nation with two artist pals, August Macke and Louis Moilliet, the trio used lightweight watercolour kits and sketching blocks to record their impressions. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1312&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1312&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479580/original/file-20220817-20-wtiwro.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1312&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An old postcard capturing the town of Hammamet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tunis, St. Germain, Hammamet and the holy city of Kairouan became the sites of their collaborative visual enterprise.</p>
<p>Klee had recently been in Paris to visit <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Delaunay">Robert Delaunay</a>, the artist who converted Picasso’s and Braque’s austere version of Cubism into a lyrical interplay of coloured squares and triangles.</p>
<p>Klee adapted this language in all his Tunisian works, and it was in Kairouan, in a café at the end of a day’s painting the domes of the city, that he declared in a moment of ecstasy: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Colour and I are one. I am a painter!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hammamet with Its Mosque, as solid in its composition of diagonals within squares as its substance is evanescent, proves him right.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-questions-not-to-ask-about-art-and-four-to-ask-instead-29830">Three questions not to ask about art – and four to ask instead</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>‘The city is magnificent’</h2>
<p>Hammamet was a small fishing port – the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadrumetum">Hadrumetum</a> of Carthaginian times – whose walled medina and inner fortress or Casbah still exist today. I spent three days there in 2014 on an aesthetic pilgrimage. </p>
<p>I was armed with maps from the Baedeker guidebook the German-speaking trio had used, postcards of the town dating from 1905, and the <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/208833.The_Diaries_of_Paul_Klee_1898_1918">delightful diaries</a> in which Klee wrote: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The city is magnificent, right by the sea, full of bends and sharp corners.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hammamet’s medieval mosque, with its square minaret, crenellated muezzin’s gallery, and flagstaff at 45 degrees, is depicted in Klee’s watercolour with surprising accuracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478874/original/file-20220812-23-yzxy6u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The mosque in Hammamet today.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">E.Selmaj via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My eyes told me as much, as did the vintage postcards. But one building was missing: Klee’s right-hand tower with its wine-coloured windows. There was nothing in today’s cleaned-up Casbah that corresponded to it. </p>
<p>And why, I asked myself, did the painter embellish the foreground of buff and pink triangles with star-shaped forms and green stripes?</p>
<p>My general thesis, in contrast to scholars who saw Klee as an abstractionist who used free invention in making his coloured pictorial tapestries, was that Klee (and Macke) used “real” elements from the observed world to fuel their plastic inventions – savvy combinations of the observed, the supposed and the superposed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482427/original/file-20220902-13-4yd8b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A postcard of the Minaret of the Great Mosque of Hammamet, c 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Archives of the planet’</h2>
<p>Through a painstaking sifting of photographic evidence, I learned that from around 1910 until Tunisian Independence in 1956, Hammamet’s Kasbah was surmounted by a two (and then three) storey blockhouse called the “<em>poste optique</em>”, or optical station. </p>
<p>Since 1881 Tunisia had been a French Protectorate. With war looming, the French army set up a flashing optical telegraph using towers with a clear line of sight up and down the coast. </p>
<p>Hammamet’s new <em>poste optique</em> was photographed by a visiting French officer, a Lieutenant Klipfel, in 1910.</p>
<p>But this account of Klee’s image was incomplete because the minaret and the <em>poste optique</em> stood over 100 metres apart. Did Klee bring the two towers together artificially, using a painter’s creative license? That would hardly be unusual, landscape painters having done as much, from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_Lorrain">Claude Lorrain</a> in the 17th century.</p>
<p>A chance discovery at the Musée Albert Kahn, outside Paris, provided the explanation. </p>
<p>Albert Kahn was a wealthy French philanthropist who from 1909-1931 sent photographers to 50 countries around the world to form the “Archives of the Planet”, using the new technologies of colour photography and film.</p>
<p>Kahn’s most prolific <em>opérateur</em> was Frédéric Gadmer, who on April 26 1931 visited Hammamet and took three colour photographs – two from the beach, and the other beyond the crumbling walls of the medina. This last view brought together the minaret in the centre and the <em>poste optique</em> well behind it. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479578/original/file-20220817-20-83b85l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Frédéric Gadmer’s photograph of the minaret and buildings of the Kasbah.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Archives de la Planète - Collection Albert Kahn</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the foreground is flowering ground-cover and a few low-lying gravestones: the start of the Hammamet’s sandy Marine Cemetery which still stands today. </p>
<p>Painter and photographer had found the same motif – the floral and the ancient with a spice of modern – in their rambles around Hammamet.</p>
<h2>Pre-war avant-garde painting</h2>
<p>This snippet of art-historical research convinced Michael Baumgartner, former curator of the Paul Klee Foundation, that Klee was more concerned than we knew with the architectural substance of this culture which he so admired. </p>
<p>Indeed from this perfectly-balanced, whimsical sketch – which he cut up at home, gluing the bottom red strip to the top and providing a handwritten title and date – Klee derived a series of three increasingly grand compositions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=989&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=989&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482429/original/file-20220902-13-brcler.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=989&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Paul Klee (1879–1940), On a Motif from Hammamet, 1914.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kunstmuseum Basel</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These were Motif from Hammamet, Abstraction of a Motif from Hammamet and On a Motif from Hammamet. </p>
<p>The four of them together comprise one of the great moments of pre-war avant-garde painting.</p>
<p>As a child I admired Klee, who was himself one of the first modern artists to admire child art. The apparent simplicity of Hammamet with Its Mosque, this little picture with a monumental impact, belies a complex history of cross-cultural encounter.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jacques-louis-davids-the-lictors-bringing-to-brutus-the-bodies-of-his-dead-sons-is-a-gruesome-and-compelling-painting-186745">Jacques-Louis David's The Lictors Bringing to Brutus the Bodies of his Dead Sons is a gruesome and compelling painting</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187359/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Benjamin receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>
Hammamet with Its Mosque, a little picture with a monumental impact, belies a complex history of cross-cultural encounter.
Roger Benjamin, Professor in Art History, University of Sydney
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188026
2022-08-11T15:25:13Z
2022-08-11T15:25:13Z
Bourguiba did a lot for Tunisian women. But was he their emancipator?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478707/original/file-20220811-14-y4negy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators gather in support of women's rights and equal justice in Tunis in June 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yassine Mahjoub/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tunisia’s <a href="https://publicholidays.africa/tunisia/womens-day/">National Women’s Day</a> is often associated with <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Habib-Bourguiba">Habib Bourguiba</a>, the country’s first president, who pursued the policy of state feminism. Bourguiba ruled the country for 30 years after its independence from France in 1957. In 1987 he was ousted in a coup d’etat by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zine-al-Abidine-Ben-Ali">Zine El Abedine Ben Ali</a>. Bourguiba’s state feminist policies earned him the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-44617-8_10#:%7E:text=Habib%20Bourguiba%20made%20the%20best,%E2%80%9Cliberator%20of%20Tunisian%20woman%E2%80%9D.">moniker</a> of the emancipator and liberator of Tunisian women. </p>
<p>But was he really their emancipator? </p>
<p>Like most Tunisian women, I grew up thinking this idea was true because this was the message the Tunisian educational system and media had communicated. When I started researching the history of the Tunisian feminist movement, however, I discovered that the reality was much more complex.</p>
<h2>Bourguiba’s state feminism</h2>
<p>State feminism refers to the government’s adoption of policies that foster women’s rights and improve women’s lives. Bourguiba was the <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/27/state-feminism-and-the-islamist-secularist-binary-womens-rights-in-tunisia/">pioneer of state feminism</a> in Tunisia. He used his powers to pass reforms that vastly improved women’s legal status. </p>
<p>These reforms were imposed from the top down and promoted women’s rights in a number of areas. </p>
<p>A few months after the country’s independence from France, Bourguiba instated the Personal Status Code. This granted women unprecedented liberties and social autonomy. It eliminated men’s practice of immediate divorce and provided equal divorce rights for women and men. Women’s consent became required for marriage. The <a href="https://www.judicaelleirakoze.org/patreon-post-state-feminism-in-tunisia/">right of a guardian</a> to marry off a woman without her permission was abolished. Polygamy was also outlawed. </p>
<p>As a result of these changes, the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-44617-8_10#:%7E:text=Habib%20Bourguiba%20made%20the%20best,%E2%80%9Cliberator%20of%20Tunisian%20woman%E2%80%9D.">labels</a> “the father of feminism” and “Tunisian women’s liberator” were given to Bourguiba. The labels reflected the paternalistic and patriarchal aspect of the Bourguibist feminist policies. They also mirrored the state’s monopolisation of the feminist cause. </p>
<p>In reality, Bourguiba deliberately marginalised Tunisia’s autonomous feminism. Different women’s unions appeared in the pre-independence period. Yet, after independence, Bourguiba opposed, <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-nouvelles-questions-feministes-2014-2-page-4.htm">marginalised and dissolved</a> them. He outlawed their activities in the name of “national unity” and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1391770">replaced</a> them with the National Union of Tunisian Women in 1958. </p>
<p>The result, according to Tunisian researcher Chouaib Elhajjaji, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/chouaib-el-hajjaji/feminism-in-tunisia-brutal-hijacking-elitism-and-exclusion">was that</a> he killed the grassroots movement and turned it into a government sponsored one.</p>
<p>Bourguiba co-opted women’s rights by linking the National Union of Tunisian Women to his <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Constitutional-Rally">Socialist Destourian Party</a>. He transformed the Women’s Union into a tool for his state feminism. </p>
<p>The result was an ambiguous policy. It <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/clio/286?amp%3Bid=286&lang=en">presented</a> itself as freeing and modernising, while maintaining a level of conservatism. This is what <a href="https://journals.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/feministdissent/article/view/292">explains</a> Bourguiba’s reinforcement of women’s traditional roles as wives, mothers and guardians of Islamic tradition in his speeches, despite his revolutionary ideas.</p>
<p>Co-opting women’s rights served his nationalist agenda, but not the feminist cause. The women’s union could not criticise the state’s gender politics. </p>
<p>My reading at Tunisia’s National Archives allowed me to notice the constant praise of Bourguiba in the publications of the Tunisian Women’s Union, particularly its journal Femme (Woman). The journal refers to Bourguiba repeatedly as the emancipator of Tunisian women. Indeed, the fact that he appointed the union’s first president, <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/20200308-radhia-haddad-pr%C3%A9sidente-femmes">Radhia Haddad</a>, reflects his hegemony over this female organisation.</p>
<p>Haddad herself would later <a href="https://journals.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/feministdissent/article/view/292">criticise</a> the lack of freedom of expression and association. Other feminist activists, like Amal Ben Aba and <a href="https://nawaat.org/2013/04/24/zeineb-turki-du-parti-al-jomhouri-la-priorite-est-de-realiser-une-paix-sociale">Zeineb Cherni</a>, also joined in denouncing <a href="https://journals.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/feministdissent/article/view/292">the state’s hold on feminism</a>. The state cracked down on them.</p>
<p>This created a need for an independent form of activism capable of acting outside the state agenda. As a result, an <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-nouvelles-questions-feministes-2014-2-page-4.htm">autonomous feminist movement</a> emerged in Tunisia in the 1980s. </p>
<h2>Independent feminism</h2>
<p>The independent groups signalled their divergence from the government’s official “feminist” structures. They allied themselves with opposition parties because they saw a link between the fight against sexism and the fight against authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Tunisian feminists chose to qualify their activism as “autonomous” to <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-nouvelles-questions-feministes-2014-2-page-4.htm">differentiate</a> it from the state’s approach.</p>
<p>For instance, in 1987, the <a href="http://alraidajournal.com/index.php/ALRJ/article/view/1323">Tahar Haddad cultural club</a> was founded as part of the push for independent voices. Its growth was challenged by Bourguiba’s decision that only his women’s union could operate. This hindered the actual <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1391770">political representation </a> of the autonomous women’s movement. </p>
<p>The Tunisian independent feminist movement wanted to end the patronage of Bourguiba over women’s rights. Activist Sana Ben Achour illustrates this in her <a href="https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/as/2018-v42-n1-as03619/1045124ar/">comment</a> on the determination of the independent feminists who founded the Tahar Haddad Club to achieve their goals in spite of Bourguiba:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our relationship {with the National Union of Tunisian Women} was conflictual because the Tunisian feminist movement was born out of the will to break with tutelage, more particularly with the father figure, the figure of Bourguiba … We no longer wanted to hear the discourse, which made Bourguiba know what was best for us, women.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ben Achour throws light on the important problem of Bourguiba’s appropriation of achievements made in the women’s rights arena. This centralises the father cult. It also erases the role that Tunisian women’s rights activists played in advancing women’s rights. The most notorious example of this erasure is the Personal Status Code, which was celebrated as Bourguiba’s achievement. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/chouaib-el-hajjaji/feminism-in-tunisia-brutal-hijacking-elitism-and-exclusion">Elhajjaji</a> explains, this has resulted in</p>
<blockquote>
<p>ignoring the female activists who fought for these laws. School history books rarely mention names such as <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-683">Bchira Ben Mrad</a>, Radhia Haddad and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/feminism-in-tunisia-brutal-hijacking-elitism-and-exclusion/">Manoubia Ouertani</a>, but instead, it’s Bourguiba who is celebrated as the women’s ‘saviour’ and ‘liberator.’ </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/state-feminism-in-tunisia-reading-between-lines/">Amira Mhadhbi</a>, who exposes the oppressive aspect of Bourguiba’s state feminism, illustrates this further:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>President Bourguiba was declared the ‘liberator of Tunisian women.’ … This initiated a culture of political patriarchy. By effectively outlawing other forms of political leadership, Bourguiba stalled the women’s movement in its broader fight for autonomy from male authority.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The evidence presented so far reflects the limitations of Bourguiba’s state feminism. It is undeniable that the state feminist policies he pursued have benefited Tunisian women and girls in multiple areas. But, if independent feminists were deliberately marginalised by this male figure, then can we continue to call him the emancipator of Tunisian women?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jyhene Kebsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Former president Bourguiba’s standing as father of Tunisian feminism has come under scrutiny.
Jyhene Kebsi, Lecturer in Gender Studies, Macquarie University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/179927
2022-07-15T12:18:33Z
2022-07-15T12:18:33Z
Young people in the Middle East struggle to see a promising future
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474159/original/file-20220714-35540-d5rtyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2835%2C1888&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mahdi Shaban, a Palestinian living in Gaza, paid for his master's degree with earnings from digging graves.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mahdi-shaban-who-completed-his-masters-degree-with-earnings-news-photo/1241050988">Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Middle East’s population is growing <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">almost twice as fast</a> as the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default">world overall</a>, and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">one-third of its people</a> are under the age of 15.</p>
<p>As Joe Biden takes his first trip to the region as president, he plans to focus on the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/13/biden-visit-saudi-arabia-mbs-israel-palestinians">prospects for peaceful international relations</a>. A key factor often overlooked is the Middle East’s lack of opportunities for young people.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has spent almost 20 years studying <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=GaXIwTYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">conflict, migration and youth in the Middle East</a>, I believe their frustration could ultimately lead to an international crisis way beyond the borders of the region. </p>
<h2>A rapidly changing situation</h2>
<p>The region encompassing the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena">Middle East and North Africa</a> is diverse economically, geographically, historically, politically and socially, and often fraught with tension. <a href="https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2021/04/24/learning-long-term-consequences-armed-conflict/">Most of the major</a> armed conflicts in the last decade have occurred there – apart, obviously, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/conflict-trends-middle-east-1989-2019">Since the pro-democracy protests and uprisings of the Arab Spring</a> in 2010, the region has experienced some sort of <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">significant conflict</a> in eight of its 21 countries: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. </p>
<p>In addition, the region’s population is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZQ">growing at a much faster rate</a> than the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">global average</a> – and has been since the World Bank began keeping records in 1961. Its people now number <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZQ">over 450 million</a>, up from 300 million in 2001.</p>
<h2>Widespread youth unemployment</h2>
<p>The region’s young workers – those from ages 15 to 24 – already struggle with the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ">highest unemployment rates</a> in the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/269640/youth-unemployment-rate-in-selected-world-regions/">world</a>, averaging 25%. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ&most_recent_value_desc=true">Thirteen</a> countries in the region have a youth unemployment rate of at least 20%, with the rate above 50% in Libya, above 40% in Jordan and Palestine, and above 30% in Algeria and Tunisia. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">more young workers</a> are on the way.</p>
<p>The World Bank estimates that to provide employment for those currently out of a job and those who will soon be seeking work, Middle Eastern and North African nations need to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2018/11/13/fixing-the-education-crisis-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">create more than 300 million new jobs</a> by 2050. This number is almost <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm">twice</a> as many jobs as are currently in the U.S.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man makes a coffee at a machine in the back of a small vehicle, while another man waits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Karrar Alaa, a 20-something Iraqi, could not find work, so he started his own small traveling coffee business in Basra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/iraqi-karrar-alaa-aged-26-sells-coffee-by-his-travelling-news-photo/977556546">Haidar Mohammed Ali/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Economic struggles</h2>
<p>The struggle of high youth unemployment in the region is not a new challenge. Local and international governments and organizations have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">tried for years</a> to create more opportunities for young people, but with little success.</p>
<p>In many Middle Eastern nations, regulations and laws about hiring and firing workers <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discourage employers from creating new jobs</a> when times are good, for fear they’ll have to keep those people employed when times get worse again. Other rules <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discriminate against young women</a> seeking work. Education and training programs <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">don’t always line up</a> with the jobs that are available. </p>
<p>In many countries, the government is the one of the largest employers. In Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, government jobs are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/vc061312">almost one-third</a> of all employment. In Egypt, government work accounts for 70% of nonagricultural jobs. In most countries, government jobs pay about 20% less than private industry, but in the Middle East, government jobs pay about 30% more on average. This means people will often just wait for a public sector job instead of taking available private sector jobs. </p>
<p>Even those young people who manage to get jobs say they often are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">searching for several years</a> before landing work. During this time, they rely on financial support from their families. This causes them to experience what has been called “<a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1087433">prolonged adolescence</a>,” in which they are unable to develop financial and social independence, such as moving out and getting married, until their 20s or even their 30s.</p>
<h2>Other compounding challenges</h2>
<p>The region faces other obstacles that make it even harder for governments to tackle youth unemployment.</p>
<p>In addition to <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">internal conflict</a>, the International Monetary Fund reports that several of the region’s countries – including Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia – are facing a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2022/04/25/regional-economic-outlook-april-2022-middle-east-central-asia">slow economic recovery from the pandemic</a>, inflation in the costs of basic commodities such as energy and food, and financial and debt obligations needed to stabilize the economy.</p>
<p>Several countries across the region – including Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen – have <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/finding-the-balance-population-and-water-scarcity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">less water than their populations need</a>.</p>
<p>There are other <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/publication/environmental-challenges-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-paper">environmental concerns</a>, such as pollution, agriculture land scarcity and <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/49d6211b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/49d6211b-en">poor public infrastructure</a>, which hinder sustainable economic growth. </p>
<p>The crisis in Ukraine threatens food supplies. More than one-third of Egyptians’ diets are based on wheat, but <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">85% of Egypt’s wheat</a> comes from Russia and Ukraine. Supplies have been reduced, and <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">prices are expected to rise</a> on bread and other wheat-based staple foods.</p>
<p>All these problems have contributed to varying degrees of lack of public confidence in the economies in the region. For instance, <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/">in a nationally representative survey</a>, 78% of Iraqis describe the economic situation in their country to be either bad or very bad. In Yemen, that proportion is 68%.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-a-serious-threat-to-egypt-the-worlds-largest-wheat-importer-179242">Russia-Ukraine crisis poses a serious threat to Egypt – the world’s largest wheat importer</a>
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<h2>Potential effects</h2>
<p>Often the way to <a href="https://www.pesnetwork.eu/2019/09/05/lmb3-educational-attainment/">improve young people’s prospects</a> is education. But in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, university-educated young people have a <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm">higher unemployment rate</a> than their less-educated peers because most of the available opportunities are for low-skill jobs.</p>
<p>Rather than bringing <a href="https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/data-on-display/education-matters.htm">higher earnings</a>, education for Middle Eastern young people <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2019/09/youth-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">can deliver frustration</a>.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise, then, that vast numbers of young people – <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/covid-19-survey/#data_sets">at least one-fourth</a> of young Egyptians, Iraqis and Yemenis, and more than <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2022/04/what-lebanese-citizens-think-about-migration/">60% of Lebanese youth</a> – are looking to emigrate, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/libya-new-evidence-shows-refugees-and-migrants-trapped-in-horrific-cycle-of-abuses/">often to Europe</a>.</p>
<p>All these forces at work in the Middle East – economic pressures, political conflict and water shortages – have the potential to spread international tension, refugees seeking safety and opportunity, or even disease. The challenges facing Middle Eastern nations are all made more difficult by the lack of faith their young people have in the prospect of a fulfilling future at home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georges Naufal is a research fellow at the IZA Institute of Labor Economics and Economic Research Forum.
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Political and economic forces across the Middle East and North Africa combine to mean well-educated young people spend years looking for work, which delays their independence and adulthood.
Georges Naufal, Associate Research Scientist, Public Policy Research Institute, Texas A&M University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/185014
2022-06-20T14:28:41Z
2022-06-20T14:28:41Z
Africa’s smaller cities are usually overlooked: they shouldn’t be
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469181/original/file-20220616-24-ilh27c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Long prices in Ghana's Cape Coast have been soaring.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Cristina Aldehuela / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Often when one thinks or writes about urbanisation in Africa, mega-cities or primary cities like Lagos, Nairobi, Addis Ababa or Kampala, come to mind. Little, however, is written about places like Gabés in Tunisia, Touba-Mbacké in Senegal, or Ibadan in Nigeria. Yet these are just three of an <a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/book/dynamics-systems-secondary-cities-africa">estimated 885 secondary</a>, or intermediary, cities in Africa that already account for over <a href="https://www.oecd.org/development/africa-s-urbanisation-dynamics-2020-b6bccb81-en.htm">40% of the continent’s urban population</a>. Their share is very likely to grow over time.</p>
<p>These cities have a critical role to play in Africa’s overall urbanisation trajectory. They have a number of advantages.</p>
<p>Firstly, they’re located closer to rural populations, they provide an important market for agricultural goods. This means that they provide a crucial link to ensuring more balanced economic growth for a country. </p>
<p>Secondly, their location also enables people to make the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural work more easily. And more generally they make the move from living in the countryside to a more urban existence easier. </p>
<p>There is in fact <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeewdevel/v_3a63_3ay_3a2014_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a43-58.htm">global evidence from developing countries</a>, that demonstrates that for a given level of urban population growth, these intermediary cities are in fact overall better in driving poverty reduction than the primary cities are.</p>
<p>A further major advantage that intermediary cities have, is that many still have most of their growth trajectory to come. And, unlike many primary cities struggling under the weight of large populations, investment in infrastructure in intermediary cities can happen in advance of settlement. </p>
<p>If this is done, it helps avoid the substantial financial, political, and social costs of retrofitting. But this requires substantial upfront financing. Yet raising this upfront finance together with the revenue to repay it, is a challenge. </p>
<h2>Where the money is going to come from</h2>
<p>Many of the options available to intermediary cities when it comes to generating local revenues, are the same as available to all cities. </p>
<p>The first is administrative reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the collection of taxes and fees.</p>
<p>Such reforms include updating taxpayer rolls or streamlining payment systems. The benefit of these types of reforms is that they usually lie squarely in the city’s remit. And a city doesn’t necessarily need to get approvals from other levels of government. </p>
<p>In addition, the reforms can result in substantial increases in revenue for cites far off from achieving optimal efficiency. </p>
<p>But there’s a major drawback. Increasing revenue from these types of administrative reforms is finite based on efficiency being achieved.</p>
<p>Cities can also focus on reforms to change the composition of what they can collect. This includes the types of taxes and fees, their rates and from whom they should be collecting them. Reforms like this usually require changes to laws and regulations. This makes them longer and more onerous to implement.</p>
<p>Both administrative and policy reforms can be supported by improvements in technology. For example, to improve tax collection several secondary cities in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329937685_Practices_in_Institutionalizing_GIS_for_Revenue_Mobilization_The_Case_of_Secondary_Cities_in_Tanzania">Tanzania introduced GIS mapping</a> to help identify and map all the properties in their remit. Despite some challenges in implementation, <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/223/Working%20Papers/ict-and-revenue-collection-in-tanzania.-mccluskey-et-al.zp166260.pdf">cities like Arusha</a>, still managed to increase their annual revenue from property tax collection accordingly. </p>
<p><a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2021/06/Case%20Studies_web_0.pdf">Mzuzu, in Malawi</a>, also used technology to support a policy reform for their property tax valuation system. This change required various characteristics of the property to be captured. This was done digitally. The result was a 7-fold increase in revenue in the space of five years. </p>
<p>This showed that technology can have an important role to play to support reform processes when the availability and integration of data are improved. </p>
<p>But technology can’t replace the need for the underpinning reforms to happen.</p>
<h2>Opportunities</h2>
<p>There are also some opportunities particularly pertinent for intermediary cities. This is particularly true around land value capture.</p>
<p>One of the most important assets for all cities is the land that they are located on. For some cities, land can make up <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FINAL-Asset-and-Debt-Management-for-Cities_Working-Paper-062118.pdf">90% of their total asset base</a> The urbanisation process results in an increasing scarcity of land as people and businesses begin to locate in cities. </p>
<p>Together with the public investments made on the land to improve productivity and liveability, these two forces drive up its value. <a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/book/dynamics-systems-secondary-cities-africa">Cape Coast in Ghana</a>, for example, has land values of up to US$200,000 per hectare, with prices rising over 50% per annum. This is not uncommon for many intermediary cities.</p>
<p>This means that intermediary cities, particularly those still at the relative outset of their urbanisation process, should put in place mechanisms that can capture this increased value and then use the revenues from this to reinvest into the cities. </p>
<p>One way for these cities to capture the value of land, is through proper planning of urban expansion. Changing or adopting new land-use management plans, and the resultant impact on land values, can provide a major source of revenue for a city. </p>
<p>In four Ethiopian intermediary cities where this has been done – <a href="https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/programs/urban-expansion">Adama Bahir Dar, Hawassa and Mekelle</a> – an estimated US$77 million of leases have already been sold. This is money that can then be reinvested to service the land, as well as provide for further infrastructure in the expansion areas.</p>
<p>Another major opportunity is to harness the potential of remittance payments. Research of the impact of remittances on secondary cities in Africa, is still scarce. Nevertheless <a href="http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/iadbremit/orozco04.pdf">evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean</a> shows that the majority of these flow into secondary cities and towns. </p>
<p>A study looking at remittance flows to eight secondary cities in Latin America and the Caribbean showed that certain cities with large numbers of international migrants could receive up to as <a href="http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/iadbremit/orozco04.pdf">much as 20%</a> of the total remittance flows for that country. </p>
<p>The same study shows that most of these remittances are spent by households on education, health, housing and insurance.</p>
<p>A similar, smaller study conducted in <a href="https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/106785/2/02whole.pdf">Gondar, Ethiopia</a> shows that about one third of households received remittances monthly, usually reflecting their sole source of income. In these cases, remittances were overwhelmingly used to support housing investments, businesses, and education. </p>
<p>To tap into remittances as a source finance, cities must have structures in place that allow for the absorption of the funds, as well as their utilisation in the overall economy</p>
<p>In the near term, intergovernmental fiscal flows will remain a significant portion of intermediary city budgets. This means that finding ways to support national governments to improve and stabilise these flows will be key in supporting investments to happen in advance of settlement.</p>
<p>At the same time, it is critical that the dependence on these intergovernmental fiscal flows is reduced by looking at ways to increase intermediary cities own revenue generation. This is key to ensuring the overall longer-term sustainability for these intermediary cities and in particular their infrastructure and public services, and as such unlocking the urban dividend for the whole country from the urbanisation process.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on the chapter “Funding and and Financing Secondary Cities” from the Cities Alliance book “<a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/book/dynamics-systems-secondary-cities-africa">The Dynamics of Systems of Secondary Cities in Africa: Urbanisation, Migration and Development</a>”.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Intermediary cities have a vital role to play in the economies of African countries.
Astrid R.N. Haas, Fellow, Infrastructure Institute, School of Cities, University of Toronto
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/177252
2022-02-16T15:13:57Z
2022-02-16T15:13:57Z
Africa is beset with coups and conflicts: how the trend can be reversed
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446741/original/file-20220216-27-wyyu7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands of people have fled inter-ethnic clashes in northern Cameroon.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by DJIMET WICHE/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the evening of 15 February 2022, <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/djibouti-guelleh-arrests-army-and-police-chief-over-a-coup-plot/">reports emerged</a> that key police and military officials in Djibouti were put under house arrest, reportedly amid fears of a coup d’état. </p>
<p>This was the latest in the string of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">successful and attempted coups</a> in Africa – from Mali to Madagascar and Guinea to the Central African Republic (CAR).</p>
<p>The popularity of some of the coups, combined with the perceived inability of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to stem the tide of democratic reversals and insecurity, has generated a crisis that calls for a fundamental rethinking of the values, role, mandate, capacity and resources of these institutions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">Why West Africa has had so many coups and how to prevent more</a>
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<p>The Djibouti incident came barely 10 days after an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-summit-tackles-coups-covid-tigray/a-60686782">AU Heads of State and Government Summit meeting</a>. In its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-condemns-wave-of-military-coups/a-60678794">final communique</a> it lamented the “wave” of coups and pervasive insecurity across the continent.</p>
<p>Since its last in-person summit in early 2020 (they met virtually in 2021) there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">successful military coups</a> in Mali <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/28/another-coup-mali-heres-what-you-need-know/">(twice)</a>, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, and attempted coups in Madagascar, CAR, Niger, Guinea Bissau, and possibly in Djibouti. </p>
<p>The continent also witnessed <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-faces-a-new-threat-to-democracy-the-constitutional-coup-72011">constitutional coups</a> where incumbents manipulated the constitutional framework to extend their terms. This happened in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-election-idUSKBN21E39O">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/9/ivory-coast-president-ouattaras-disputed-third-term-confirmed">Cote d’Ivoire</a> (2020). In <a href="https://dawnmena.org/saieds-textbook-self-coup-in-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> the incumbent president governs through decrees, without any institutional checks on his power. </p>
<p>Africa has also seen new and expanding conflicts. Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, has been embroiled in a spiral of <a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">the largest and deadliest conflict in recent African memory</a>. The AU appointed a <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">special envoy for the Horn of Africa</a> and engaged in ‘quiet diplomacy’, but this is yet to bear any fruit.</p>
<p>In the Sahel, the zone of insecurity – arising from insurgencies and Islamic jihadists – has expanded. It has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/1/61e137ac4/decade-sahel-conflict-leaves-25-million-people-displaced.html">entrapped and killed thousands, displaced millions, and caused tremendous suffering</a>. In the process the legitimacy and capacity of nascent democratic regimes has been undermined.</p>
<p>And in northern Mozambique, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/violence-ripples-in-islamist-hit-mozambique-as-insurgency-evolves-20211210">a rebellion</a> rooted in government neglect and sense of dispossession metamorphosed into an Islamist insurgency. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced and the country’s security forces have been overwhelmed.</p>
<p>Enduring instability in South Sudan, Libya and Somalia have made little progress. Here too the AU has largely been on the sidelines, despite its military presence in Somalia.</p>
<p>Each of these occurrences has a unique context. Nevertheless, they are broadly linked to a democratic deficit and governments’ inability to deliver either freedom or peace and development. These failure of nominally elected governments has denied leaders – as well as the democratic system – a vanguard popular constituency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-faces-a-new-threat-to-democracy-the-constitutional-coup-72011">Africa faces a new threat to democracy: the 'constitutional coup'</a>
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<p>On top of this, the COVID-19 pandemic has decimated the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/economic-recovery-covid-19-prospects-sub-saharan-africa">economic gains of the last decade</a>. This has left behind an avalanche of unemployed youth, and worsened the public debt burden of virtually all countries. In turn this has deprived incumbents of economic rents they could deploy to appease the public and co-opt and silence key civilian and military officials.</p>
<p>The structural conditions that have made the coups and insecurity in the various countries possible obtain in a large majority of African countries. Moreover, the successes and apparent popularity of some of the coups have set a precedent that may inspire copycats.</p>
<p>But, an impoverished, insecure and coup-prone Africa is not inevitable. In fact, the continent continues to witness the resilience of democracy in Malawi and Zambia, among other countries. </p>
<p>Addressing the ailments and setting on a path to peace, freedom and sustainable development requires two key things. Firstly, a mental paradigm shift. Secondly, bold moves to accelerate the continent’s economic, security and political integration. </p>
<h2>From rejection to introspection</h2>
<p>Both the AU and ECOWAS have rejected the military coups. The AU has suspended four countries in a year, the highest since its formation in 2002. For its part ECOWAS is operating without 20% of its membership. Three of its 15 member states suspended. In addition it’s imposed crippling sanctions on Mali following a second coup and failure to agree an acceptable transition timeline.</p>
<p>But the AU hasn’t been wholly consistent. For example, it didn’t suspend Chad after an effective military takeover in the country. Instead, it put preconditions for a relatively quick transition, national dialogue and exclusion of transition leaders from standing for election.</p>
<p>It has remained largely silent on Tunisia too despite anti-democratic developments there.</p>
<p>ECOWAS has been acting according to the books on military coups. Nevertheless it failed to publicly criticise the constitutional coups in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. </p>
<p>These inconsistencies have bred accusations of hypocrisy. Some have gone as far as accusing the two institutions of merely serving as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/the-african-unions-hypocrisy-undermines-its-credibility/">protection for their club of incumbents</a>. </p>
<p>If the AU and ECOWAS want to be taken seriously, they must look inwards and stand up for constitutional democracy, regardless of the perpetrators – whether incumbents or men in military fatigue.</p>
<p>And here, they have an opportunity to redeem themselves through some quick wins. </p>
<p>Current presidents of Senegal (Macky Sall) and Benin (Patrice Salon) are serving their second and last terms. Nevertheless, there are concerns that they are resorting to democratically questionable manoeuvres. And that they may even be considering a constitutional manoeuvre to stay in power.</p>
<p>The AU and ECOWAS should proactively engage these leaders and secure public commitments that they will step down after the end of their terms, and continue the nascent legacy of their countries in peaceful alternation of power.</p>
<h2>From crisis to opportunity?</h2>
<p>The sense of crisis must spur the AU and ECOWAS into action. The ECOWAS Heads of State and Government have tasked the ECOWAS Commission to expedite the process of reviewing the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx">Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance</a>. This is a chance to strengthen ECOWAS’ capacity to respond to incumbent constitutional and electoral manipulations. This could include re-tabling the region-wide two term limit on presidents that it abandoned in 2015.</p>
<p>The AU should similarly enhance its capabilities to check unconstitutional changes of government as well as the undemocratic exercise and retention of power.</p>
<p>And it should accelerate its institutional reform drive. Notably, it must work towards boosting the <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">Peace Fund</a>. A well-supported fund would allow the AU to prevent political instability from degenerating into large scale conflict and insurgency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-want-consensual-democracy-why-is-that-reality-so-hard-to-accept-164010">Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?</a>
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</em>
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<p>The experiences of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/b178-winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north">coordinated responses</a> to the insurgency in northern Mozambique, involving soldiers from the Southern African Development Community and Rwandan forces, could provide an important prototype. This must include measures to address the root causes of governance deficit, exclusion and wanton exploitation of natural resources.</p>
<p>In the long term, the AU, ECOWAS and other regional economic communities should strengthen security and economic integration. This would go some way to ensuring that nascent democracies deliver freedom as well as stability and a steady improvement of peoples’ economic fortunes.</p>
<p>Getting the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2022/key-pillars-mostly%C2%A0-place-%C2%A0speed-%C2%A0africas%C2%A0free-trade-2022">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> into gear and the protocol on free movement of people implemented is critical.</p>
<p>Regional organisations should also boost their anti-corruption mechanisms and address problems of mismanagement of resources.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the primary responsibility for stability, prosperity and freedom lies at the national level. But if African leaders desire the protection of the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional communities, they must strengthen these institutions.</p>
<p>The ambitious mandate and expectations of these institutions must be matched with perquisite tools, power and resources. Incumbent safety may lie in sharing power: horizontally by addressing the curse of winner-takes-all politics at the domestic level through inclusion of the opposition in governance; and vertically by empowering regional and sub-regional organisations. </p>
<p>Africans must, of course, be the masters of their destiny. But external partners such as the United Nations, US and China should support efforts to enhance the continent’s stability and economic progress.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by any of the institutions he is affiliated with.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Advisor in the Constitution Building Programme of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and Vice President (East Africa), African Network of Constitutional Lawyers.</span></em></p>
The failures of nominally elected governments has denied leaders - as well as the democratic system - a vanguard popular constituency.
Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer, University of Pretoria
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/176037
2022-01-31T13:51:24Z
2022-01-31T13:51:24Z
Snowfall in the Sahara desert: an unusual weather phenomenon
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443434/original/file-20220131-117572-tk68h8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Snowfall in the Sahara desert.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">derdour rachid/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Snowfall in a hot desert may seem a contradiction but snow has been recorded <a href="https://www.livescience.com/sahara-desert-ice-beautiful-photos.html">several times</a> in the Sahara Desert over the last decades, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60045153">most recently</a> in January 2022. Thus, snowfall may be unusual but is not unprecedented in the region. </p>
<p>In order for snow to form, two distinctive weather properties are needed: cold temperatures and moist air. The presence of snow reflects a special combination of air circulation in the atmosphere and the nature of the land surface upon which the snow falls.</p>
<p>Although the Sahara commonly experiences very high temperatures (more than 50°C), low temperatures are also recorded (in particular at night) because of the bare land surface and the cloudless skies. A maximum cold of -14°C was recorded in Algeria in January 2005 during the northern hemisphere winter. </p>
<p>The Sahara is the world’s largest hot desert. It <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">spans across</a> 11 countries in northern Africa: Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Western Sahara, Sudan and Tunisia. It is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Red Sea on the east, the Mediterranean Sea on the north and the Sahel Savannah on the south. </p>
<p>Winter air circulation patterns draw cool, moist air towards the northern Sahara from the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This results in higher winter precipitation along the Saharan fringe in this season. </p>
<p>Over higher ground – such as the Atlas Mountains of Morocco and Algeria – rising air can cool, condense, and if the air is cold enough its moisture can freeze to form snow crystals and then, eventually, a blanket of snowfall. If the land surface is also cold, snow can persist and not immediately melt away. </p>
<p>It is under these weather conditions, and in these mountainous areas, that snow in the Sahara can occasionally be found.</p>
<h2>Saharan rainfall and snowfall</h2>
<p>The Sahara’s centre is hyperarid, receiving less than 100 mm of rainfall per year, but it also has water bodies on three of its four sides. Wet air comes into the region from the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean, by low-pressure cyclones in the northern Sahara during winter, and monsoon rains in the southern Sahara during summer. The peripheries of the desert are therefore wetter than its centre. This means that snow is more likely to form at the periphery of the desert.</p>
<p>The Atlas Mountains in particular act as a snowtrap because of their proximity to the Atlantic and elevation. The Algerian town of Aïn Séfra received snow in the northern hemisphere winters of 1979, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2021 and 2022. This <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/91556/a-dusting-of-white-in-the-sahara">latter event</a> was just a light dusting, transforming the sand dunes with a thin white coat, whereas in 2018 for example up to 30 cm of snow fell in higher elevation areas. Several ski resorts are found in the Atlas Mountains (mainly with machine-made snow however) as <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/77156/snow-in-the-atlas-mountains-of-morocco">evidence shows</a> that snow falls relatively frequently here.</p>
<h2>The Sahara and climate change</h2>
<p>Is snow in the Sahara becoming more or less common? The short answer is that we don’t yet know. This is in part because of the lack of data on past events, but also because climate modelling effort has not focused on the Sahara, an area of low population.</p>
<p>A key property of the Sahara is its size (9 million km2) and remoteness. This means that satellite remote sensing methods rather than field observations are now used to map the timing, amount and distribution of rainfall and snowfall. But this only extends to the last few decades: there is <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/89302/rare-snow-in-the-african-desert">very little evidence</a> for snowfall patterns prior to satellite records becoming available in the 1970s. </p>
<p>So Saharan snowfall historically may be more common than we think. It would be interesting to use anthropological evidence and oral histories to explore this possibility.</p>
<p>Globally, however, climate change is leading to more unpredictable weather patterns. In the Sahara, this may mean increased variability of rainfall along its wetter Sahelian fringe and along the Atlantic and Mediterranean seaboards (including in the Atlas Mountains). </p>
<p>Snow events are likely to continue –- and may become more variable in timing and quantity –- if colder conditions over the mountains persist.</p>
<p>Although snow patterns are uncertain, this is not the main challenge that the Sahara faces under climate change. It’s <a href="https://earth.org/data_visualization/the-past-present-and-future-of-the-sahara-desert/">predicted</a> that the landward side of the mountains will become drier and the centre of the Sahara will remain dry and become even hotter. Increased dryness and unsustainable pumping and pollution of groundwater aquifers means that there is less water available for its agriculture and growing cities. </p>
<p>Over recent decades, the Sahara itself has also <a href="https://earth.org/data_visualization/the-past-present-and-future-of-the-sahara-desert/">been getting bigger</a> because of the southern Sahel becoming drier and turning to desert, and this is likely to continue in future decades.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: There’s no profile picture of the author of this article at their request.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasper Knight does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
In order for snow to form, two distinctive weather properties are needed: cold temperatures and moist air. The Sahara can tick these boxes.
Jasper Knight, Professor of Physical Geography, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165698
2021-08-06T14:52:40Z
2021-08-06T14:52:40Z
Tunisia: the complex issues behind the presidential power-grab
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414813/original/file-20210805-19-vrockg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C2005%2C1499&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisian president Kais Saied has dismissed the prime minister and taken power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Presidency of Tunisia handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years on from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-after-a-decade-of-conflict-the-same-old-problems-remain-154314">Arab uprisings</a>, Tunisia has often been presented as a rare success story. Elsewhere Egypt sank into an army dictatorship, Syria, Libya and Yemen into bloody civil war. In other countries, meanwhile, such as Bahrain, the protests were put down with ferocity and the old regimes dug in against change.</p>
<p>In Tunisia, the protests toppled the corrupt regime of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12196679">Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali</a>. An interim government called elections and parties previously banned, such as the Islamist Ennahda, were allowed to campaign and take their place in the political mainstream. A new constitution was written and the country appeared to be on a road to democracy. </p>
<p>So, there was widespread international consternation when, on the evening of July 25, Tunisian president, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/tunisia-kais-saied-displayed-authoritarian-streak">Kais Saied</a> – an independent politician and former law professor – dismissed the prime minister, Hichem Mechichi, froze the activities of the parliament and revoked the immunity of parliamentarians. To give himself cover, he invoked <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/north-africa/2021/07/27/What-is-article-80-and-how-did-Tunisia-s-president-use-it-to-back-his-decisions-">Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution</a> that allows for the president to take emergency measures in situations of imminent danger.</p>
<p>Many people I’ve been speaking to have been wondering whether what seemed like a positive transition towards democracy is under threat. On the other hand, some foreign policy analysts speculated that maybe Tunisians “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210727195740/https:/foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/27/saied-coup-tunisia-might-not-want-democracy/">never wanted democracy</a>”.</p>
<p>Both positions represent a simplistic view of political developments in Tunisia over the past ten years. What’s happening now is not a sudden diversion of an otherwise linear democratic transition. Nor can we infer from current events that Tunisian democracy has been “doomed to fail” all along.</p>
<p>Economist Branko Milanovic complained on Twitter that political scientists “(…) after ten years of praising democracy in Tunisia, (…) suddenly have nothing to say.”</p>
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<p>It’s complicated. What has been praised by observers over the past ten years – and what Tunisians have been proud of – is interwoven with issues that have drawn criticism from both observers and protesters within Tunisia.</p>
<p>The decade has been marked by political and social struggles, both in and outside of political institutions. Divisions are not clear cut. Tunisia has managed to organise a peaceful handover of power and three free and fair elections for both presidency and parliament, which were followed by often tortuous negotiations around the formation of a government based on the results. The country also started dealing with its repressive past through an ambitious <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2021.1882756">transitional justice process</a>.</p>
<p>But actually finishing the 2014 constitution proved problematic. To overcome a deadlock in the process of writing the constitution, a conflict-resolution mechanism was established: the 2013 National Dialogue. This mechanism was internationally praised and four Tunisian civil society organisations <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/tndq/facts/">won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize</a> for its “for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia”.</p>
<p>This forum included members of parties represented in the National Constituent Assembly, but each party had the same number of participants, rather than representation being based on their strength in the Assembly. Outside parliament, participating politicians negotiated compromises on the broader lines of political conflict, to bring the constitutional process back on track. It also led to a rapprochement between the Ennahda party and Nidaa Tounes, a party that included many members of the “old regime”.</p>
<p>While finishing of the constitution was a milestone in Tunisia’s democratic development, several of the people I interviewed at the time mentioned that the conflict-resolution mechanism paved the way for political decisions being taken through deals made between elites. Since it led to a reconciliation of adversarial political factions, there was not much interest in dismantling “the system” – structures in politics, economy and the justice sector that had enabled repressive rule – at a deeper level.</p>
<p>My research involved interviewing politicians from different parties, representatives of civil society organisations, international organisations, and NGOs. Especially civil society representatives frequently remarked that with the departure of Ben Ali, only the “head of the corrupt regime” had left the country, while the deeper structures were still in place.</p>
<p>Political deal-making became the order of the day and the push for transitional justice and accountability became less important. People told me that badly needed reforms of the justice and security sector were only pursued on a superficial level and not systematically. The revolution had paved the way for some previously excluded actors to get into positions of political power – <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190670757.001.0001/oso-9780190670757">Ennahda</a>, for example, whose members had been persecuted, has been either the strongest or second strongest party in parliament.</p>
<p>But, instead of working towards dismantling repressive structures, working towards an even more inclusive political system, and reforming institutions, Ennahda made deals with politicians from the “old regime” and staffed institutions with <a href="https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-tunisian-exception-success-and-limits-of-consensus-french.pdf">their own people</a>. This merely perpetuated the impression of a nepotistic and corrupt political class. In addition, police violence <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2021/0707/Why-police-violence-proves-a-stubborn-problem-for-democratic-Tunisia">remains a problem</a>, emphasising the need for further structural reforms. </p>
<p>In the same vein, Ennahda’s on-again, off-again support for transitional justice was perceived as an attempt to steer financial benefits through reparations towards its own constituents. </p>
<p>Against <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2e7de0c4-d9ad-4150-a163-05795cd91584">the background</a> of a poorly performing economy and a catastrophic pandemic situation, the party’s recent demands for €3 billion (£2.5 billion) in reparations caused <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/tunisians-decry-coup-while-presidents-supporters-claim-second-revolution">public outrage</a> at the end of July 2021. The protests that followed were cited by Saied as a reason to take over power. </p>
<p>The failure to establish a Constitutional Court – which was supposed to be set up by 2015 – shows the limits of this deal-making logic. Parliament has been unable to agree on the nomination of judges. Under the constitution is is supposed to be the Constitutional Court’s role to decide on ending the emergency situation. </p>
<p>So it remains unclear when and how things will return back to “normal functioning of state institutions and services” as Article 80 dictates. But it is clear that it is not only necessary to appoint a new government to ensure democracy in Tunisia, but to work towards reforms of repressive structures, social justice and accountability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariam Salehi is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Marburg and a guest researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. She received funding from the German Ministry of Education and Research.
</span></em></p>
Viewing Tunisia as an Arab Spring success story was always too simplistic.
Mariam Salehi, Visiting Researcher of Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/161394
2021-05-26T19:02:43Z
2021-05-26T19:02:43Z
How the Arab Spring changed the Middle East and North Africa forever
<p>Ten years after people rose up against their leaders in country after country around the Middle East and North Africa, from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, what can we say about how society, politics and religion have changed in the region?</p>
<p>To put it mildly, the social, cultural, religious, political and strategic events that history will remember as the “Arab Spring” sent a shockwave across an entire region. Today, the legacy of this chain of events is contested and to an extent still uncertain, but one thing is clear: the conditions for engaging in politics in these countries have shifted completely.</p>
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<p><strong>Lire cet article en français:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/revolutions-arabes-an-x-des-societes-a-jamais-transformees-161029">“Révolutions arabes, an X: des sociétés à jamais transformées”</a></p>
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<p>It’s true that in many places, like Egypt, we’ve seen a return to some form of the authoritarianism that reigned before the people asserted their right to take part in politics at the beginning of the 2010s. But social powers are the forces that write the definitive version of history, and these have seemingly been disrupted forever.</p>
<p>Citizens now know that ruling power is fragile; it can be shaky; it does not last forever. In 2021, the question is no longer whether it’s possible to topple a regime, or at least make it grant concessions, but rather what the cost-benefit analysis is for a process of political change. What price are people prepared to pay to see their situation improve?</p>
<h2>The power of protest</h2>
<p>The most obvious change has been the redefinition of political space in Arab societies. This has been shown again and again in the years since 2011, from the recent protests in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210309-protesters-in-lebanon-block-roads-over-worsening-poverty">Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212">Iraq</a>, to the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/end-line-algerias-hirak-movement">Hirak movement</a> in Algeria.</p>
<p>Across North Africa and the Middle East, protests and demonstrations of public anger are no longer simply seen as signs of a challenge toward authorities, but rather as the potential forewarning of an uprising, or even a revolution.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/iKGpBJHzbkI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<p>Each social crisis opens the floodgates for real and uninhibited challenges to the regimes in power. Even <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200921-protests-against-sisis-rule-break-out-across-egypt/">Egypt</a>, which in 2013 saw a return to authoritarianism that would make previous regimes in other Arab countries pale in comparison, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200929-even-egyptians-in-rural-areas-are-protesting-again/">is not exempt</a>. Activists and groups have learned how to speak out against the government, often at <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/egypt-no-end-escalating-repression">great personal risk</a>. A majority of citizens are now reasoning based on the hypothesis that the players currently holding power can be removed.</p>
<h2>Secularism v religion</h2>
<p>Across the region, the social and political spheres have become more secular, as both a cause and a consequence of the Arab Spring. The push for democratisation both fed into and was fed by the belief in egalitarian citizenship. Regimes, feeling challenged, encouraged sectarian attitudes and divisions, hoping to transform a vertical conflict (between society and authority) into a series of horizontal disputes (Sunnites against Shiites, Muslims against Copts, Arabs against Kurds, and so on).</p>
<p>In other words, by changing the original narrative, which was mainly secular and drew on political and social progress as a foundation, certain regimes placed their survival above that of their country’s unity. Syria is a <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/sectarianizing-faith-safeguarding-authoritarianism-in-syria">textbook example of this</a>.</p>
<p>While a number of religious groups, Islamists among them, took the side of popular uprisings during the Arab Spring, it is nevertheless difficult to give a definitive judgement on the role of specific religious groups, both at the time and since. It would be hard to compare Tunisia’s <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/09/05/ennahda-s-uneasy-exit-from-political-islam-pub-79789">Ennahda</a>, for example, with Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, given how widely communication, strategies, and even long-term goals vary from one group to another.</p>
<p>This is partly because the Arab Spring uprisings were not religious by nature; they were never built on the necessity of defending religious traditions, and even less so a threatened Muslim identity. Nor was the Islamist narrative the engine for these changes. Religious figures and movements jumped on the bandwagon, but they never managed to control the direction of these wide-reaching movements.</p>
<p>However, in burgeoning democracies, starting with Tunisia, the power distribution phase gave way to other laws, specifically those regarding the ability to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210458?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">siphon off votes</a>. Islamist groups were clearly masters of this game, boosted by their claimed capital of moral and political purity and long-established abilities to mobilise people.</p>
<p>And so over the past ten years we have seen the subject of religion take centre stage, as social revolutions, in becoming constitutional and partisan, had a duty to tackle the question at the same time as Islamist parties were integrating themselves into national political scenes in transition. Right now, the key takeaway is undeniably the rupturing of the Islamist landscape.</p>
<h2>The rise of jihadism</h2>
<p>Though jihadism has been an important part of the political and religious landscape in Arab countries and elsewhere for several decades, this phenomenon was indirectly strengthened by the uprisings in the early 2010s.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/jihadism-arab-world-after-2011-explaining-its-expansion">rise of jihadism over the past ten years</a> is connected to the fact that parts of these societies, particularly the youth, saw the Arab Spring uprisings from two related perspectives. On one hand, it was clear that the revolutions were not going to bear fruit immediately. On the other, they were no longer exclusively rooted in the present time and in their country’s society as it had always been. Another utopia existed, and jihadism competed with that promised by revolution.</p>
<p>As a result, certain countries such as Syria, which is still gripped by civil war and a serious sovereignty crisis, became echo chambers for Arab tensions, or even laboratories for new kinds of violent, radical movements to spread, as illustrated by Islamic State’s caliphate in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Smoke rises from buildings in the Islamic State’s former caliphate in Syria’s eastern Deir Ezzor province near the Iraqi border, a day after the group was declared defeated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Islamic State’s former caliphate in eastern Syria, a day after the group was declared defeated by the Syrian Democratic Forces.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guiseppe Cacace/AFP</span></span>
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<p>The undeniable politico-religious violence that has arisen since 2011, driven by jihadi movements, is also social and generational. Jihadism attests to the fact that the political realities in the regions are currently at an unprecedented crossroads, between the shift away from traditional religion, the plight of governments, and the many social, economic and psychological tensions weighing on entire populations desperate to see their hopes come to pass.</p>
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<p><em>This article is published as part of <a href="https://www.ipev-fmsh.org/fr/transition-from-violence-lessons-from-the-mena-region/">IPEV Live: Transition from Violence, Lessons from the MENA</a>, a series of eight live conversations held every Tuesday from May 18 to June 29, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed-Ali Adraoui ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
In the ten years since the Arab Spring, the countries affected have transformed completely. Here’s how.
Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Chercheur, London School of Economics & Membre du Panel international sur la sortie de la violence, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (FMSH)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/158855
2021-04-20T14:36:25Z
2021-04-20T14:36:25Z
The history of protest songs in Tunisia and their link to popular culture
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395492/original/file-20210416-21-1nj4ws6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AnnHirna/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Music genres such as rap have become the primary artistic means for expressing the discontent and aspirations of a new generation of activists in Tunisia. But the heritage of protest songs from decades before is still held in the collective memory of young leftists. </p>
<p>From the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s, during the regime of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Habib-Bourguiba">Habib Bourguiba</a>, the protest song in Tunisia developed as a countercultural music scene. This is a period characterised by economic instability and waves of protest and political contestation. </p>
<p>The protest song was the product of the cultural work of Tunisian leftist parties and organisations, which were particularly active in the student movement and influential among grassroot unionists. </p>
<p>Why was such a popular art form important for the cultural work of the Tunisian left? In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13530194.2021.1885845">my research</a> I argue that leftist activists found in popular culture – and in songs in particular – a powerful tool. It could raise awareness among young people, galvanise activists and spread socialist revolutionary ideas. These songs become a link in the longer chain of resistant cultural practices in the country.</p>
<h2>Art and politics</h2>
<p>In Tunisia, the protest song is called <em>al-ughniya al-multazima</em> in Arabic, or <em>chanson engagée</em> in French. Both literally mean “committed song” and put an emphasis on the political and social aim of this genre. Art, in this case music and poetry, was a vehicle to convey a message. </p>
<p>In the 1970s and 1980s protest song groups formed and artists were increasingly visible. Among the pioneers of this genre there were the songwriter <a href="https://www.marocafrik.com/english/Death-of-the-famous-Tunisian-composer-and-performer-of-the-60-s-and-80-s-Hedi-Guella_a989.html">Hédi Guella</a> and the group Imazighen. They performed on university campuses and at unionist venues, animating political gatherings and events. They exhibited in cultural centres and some participated in important cultural festivals. Their songs were rarely broadcast on TV or radio, but tape recordings circulated widely among activists and students. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Al-Bahth al-Musiqi performing the song Ilayka Fi Beyrut.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The songs were mostly typical of the Arabic musical tradition, created on instruments such as the <a href="https://www.arabinstruments.com/the-oud-instrument">oud</a>, the <a href="http://www.mideastweb.org/culture/ney.htm">nay</a> and the <a href="https://salamuzik.com/blogs/news/all-about-darbuka-instrument">darbuka</a>.</p>
<p>Their political and cultural framework distinguishes these songs from previous popular chants of protest (for example against colonialism) as well as from patriotic songs (praising the nationalist regime). </p>
<h2>A new popular culture</h2>
<p>The 1970s and 1980s protest songs were expression of a counterculture that was at odds with the ideology propagated by the regime of Bourguiba, who died in 1987. </p>
<p>Bourguiba had come to power in 1956 as the leader of the nationalist movement against French colonialism. Educated, middle-class and rather Western-oriented, he promoted a modernist and reformist ideology. In the last two decades of his regime, he was losing consensus among the population at large and among the new cultural and intellectual elite. </p>
<p>The Tunisian radical left was increasingly influenced by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/mar/16/onward-march-maoism-julia-lovell">Maoism</a> and <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/arab-nationalism">Arab Nationalism</a>. They recognised that a connection with the working class would be impossible without an appreciation of the Arab-Muslim identity of the Tunisian people. </p>
<p>The left engaged in cultural work for the creation of a new national-popular culture. This needed to be rooted in the people’s culture but also be an expression of a progressive and socialist ideology. Marxist theorists such as <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095903245">Antonio Gramsci</a> had become influential. His ideas on cultural work, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/hegemony">hegemony</a> (the dominance of one group over another) and common sense had penetrated the Arab intellectual world. </p>
<p>Songs were one of the most efficient tools for implementing this project. They were easy to propagate with the new and cheap technology of audio cassette. Concerts were organised on a small budget, attracting hundreds of people.</p>
<h2>The oasis and the mine</h2>
<p>Among the many interpreters of the protest song in Tunisia, two popular singing groups stand out.</p>
<p>Al-Bahth al-Musiqi (The Musical Research Group) hailed from the southern Mediterranean city of Gabes, which lies beside an oasis and has, since the 1970s, hosted a massive chemical industry complex. Awlad al-Manajim (The Children of the Mines) were from Moulares, a village near Gafsa, situated in a phosphate mining basin. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Awlad al-Manajim performing the song Ya Damus.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both groups, still active in Tunisia today, were born from places where industrialisation and the exploitation of natural resources deeply transformed the once rural environment. This industry would ultimately impoverish and harm the resident population. </p>
<p>The members of al-Bahth al-Musiqi were university students active in the student movement. The members of Awlad al-Manajim were workers who supported the workers’ struggles in their hometown. </p>
<p>Both groups were cherished by leftist activists and unionists for their performances and for the strong revolutionary message of their songs. </p>
<p>Both groups created a popular yet revolutionary cultural product. To do so they drew from modern Arabic poetry, for example singing poems by <a href="https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poets/mahmoud-darwish">Mahmoud Darwish</a> supporting the Palestinian people. But in particular they drew on themes and styles typical of Tunisian folklore and vernacular poetry. They responded in an original manner to the need to create a new, popular, socialist culture for the masses. </p>
<p>They took inspiration from other Arab experiences. Composer and singer <a href="https://www.marcelkhalife.com">Marcel Khalife</a> (Lebanon), experimental musical group <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/03/126067/nass-el-ghiwane-story-of-a-moroccan-legend/">Nass el-Ghiwane</a> (Morocco) and especially the duo of musician <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03064228508533890">Sheikh Imam</a> and vernacular poet <a href="https://theculturetrip.com/africa/egypt/articles/ahmed-fouad-negm-the-revolutionary-egyptian-poet-of-the-people/">Ahmed Fouad Negm</a> (Egypt). This musical production represented a new, revolutionary and genuinely popular culture.</p>
<p>Hence, al-Bahth al-Musiqi produced songs like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvWgFucwOhI&list=PLYR2xnkzhGPuboyeNkH9WkUtO2X7FWrFA&index=24"><em>Hela Hela Ya Matar</em></a> (Come Down O Rain), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjRgTkKDqkg&list=PLYR2xnkzhGPuboyeNkH9WkUtO2X7FWrFA&index=23&t=10s"><em>Nekhlat Wad el-Bey</em></a> (The Palm Tree of Wad El Bey) or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV9nccC9Gmk&list=PLYR2xnkzhGPuboyeNkH9WkUtO2X7FWrFA&index=21"><em>Bsisa</em></a> (a traditional southern dish). These juxtapose rural imagery with national symbolism and revolutionary slogans. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Al-Bahth al-Musiqi performing the song Bsisa.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Similarly, Awlad al-Manajim’s repertoire includes local songs about the harshness of life in the mining region, like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQDXgclMGvg&t=58s"><em>Ya Damus</em></a> (The Tunnel), and songs calling for workers’ solidarity and Arab unity against imperialism, like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_m1bSpHxz0"><em>Nashid el-Sha'b</em></a> (The Hymn of the People).</p>
<h2>A heritage of resistance</h2>
<p>The popular protest song scene in Tunisia declined with the rise of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ben-ali-the-tunisian-autocrat-who-laid-the-foundations-for-his-demise-124786">Ben Ali dictatorship</a> in the 1990s. But it never disappeared. After the 2011 revolution forced Ben Ali from power, some of the old singing groups reunited and claimed their space in the newly democratised cultural scene. </p>
<p>In Tunisia today, protest music takes many forms, from rap to electro. However, the old protest songs are still chanted at political gatherings, commemorations and festivals. </p>
<p>Despite being scarcely documented and studied, the Tunisian protest song of the 1970s and 1980s is an integral part of a resistant collective memory. It is loaded with emotional and political meaning for a generation of political activists and unionists. </p>
<p>The study of this experience may offer a new perspective on Tunisia’s cultural and political life under authoritarianism. It sheds light on the continuing and constant presence of dissent and revolutionary culture in the country – one that paved the way for the events that, in 2011, eventually overthrew dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158855/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessia Carnevale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The 1970s and 1980s saw a new genre of popular protest - its spirit would be felt even in 2011 when protests toppled a dictator.
Alessia Carnevale, PhD candidate, Sapienza University of Rome
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/155143
2021-03-01T14:28:34Z
2021-03-01T14:28:34Z
Why Tunisians are still out on the streets – a decade after the ‘Dignity Revolution’
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383767/original/file-20210211-23-eowkth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisian demonstrators gather during a protest in Tunis, Tunisia on February 06, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yassine Gaidi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been 10 years since nation-wide protests in Tunisia <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49752876">led to</a> the ousting of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his regime. Ben Ali led Tunisia for 23 years. Tunisia’s “Dignity Revolution” marked <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/14/arab-spring-autocrats-the-dead-the-ousted-and-those-who-survived">the first time</a> a long-standing Arab autocrat was removed by a mass uprising. </p>
<p>The protests were driven by unemployment, food inflation, corruption, lack of political freedom and poor living conditions in the country. </p>
<p>But too little has changed. Protests continued to escalate <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2018/01/12/anti-austerity-protests-in-tunisia-s-capital">after the imposition of a state of emergency in 2015</a>, purportedly in response to escalating terrorism. This year, just days before the 10th anniversary of the Dignity Revolution, the government <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/tunisia-enters-new-lockdown-muted-anniversary-uprising">suddenly announced</a> a lockdown and curfew. Undeterred, people <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/05/tunisia-police-use-violent-tactics-quash-protests">still</a> protested, and continue to do so.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2018.1482124?journalCode=fmed20">Research</a> on Tunisia’s <a href="https://www.kpsrl.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/Transitional%20justice%20in%20Tunisia%20-%20Policy%20brief.pdf">transition of power</a> and the country’s <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">post-uprising trajectory</a> show that the grievances behind recent protests are the same as those that led to the Revolution. </p>
<p>Then as now, people protested for their socio-economic rights and to achieve a measure of social justice, as well as to have their political voice heard. Successive governments have increased <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/tunisia-protests/">repression of civil-political rights</a>. And corruption –- which exploits ordinary people but benefits the wealthy and influential –- remains rampant. Rather than pursuing the ‘goals of the revolution’, the government rediscovered bad old habits, ignoring, or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ct_mQ_SYJec">delegitimising dissent</a>.</p>
<p>Our research has <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">also found</a> that worsening economic conditions, and increasing inequality, aren’t consequences of the Revolution but were produced by austerity measures. These were introduced by the government at the behest of the European Union and international financial institutions. </p>
<h2>Roots of disaffection</h2>
<p>Through our research, we’ve seen that Tunisians want a <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">social democracy</a> that delivers both socio-economic and civil-political rights. For Tunisians, social justice and socio-economic rights <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B00E257UPM/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">are integral</a> parts of democracy and cannot be treated as mere outcomes. </p>
<p>In interviews, we’ve heard how people express frustration that the demands of 2011 were never met. And call for “another, real revolution.”</p>
<p>Public opinion surveys since 2011 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/13510347.2019.1566903?needAccess=true">consistently show</a> Tunisians want a responsive government. They want it to provide decent public services and economic security, an end to corruption, democratic government, and social and political rights.</p>
<p>Instead – according to the Arab Barometer, a central resource for quantitative research on the Middle East – <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/">two-thirds of Tunisians</a> think politicians are not concerned about people’s needs. Trust in politicians, political parties, or government is extremely low. And fewer than 10% are satisfied with the government overall. They are mostly dissatisfied with the government’s job-creation record, its performance in reducing inequalities, and its fight against inflation. </p>
<p>Moreover, roughly 90% think that government is corrupt, that <a href="%E2%80%98influence%E2%80%99"><em>wasta</em></a> is necessary to find a job, and that government officials provide <em>wasta</em> <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/">to help their relatives</a>. </p>
<h2>Signed, sealed, but not delivered</h2>
<p>Economic grievances drove the Dignity Revolution, and have been an issue ever since. The government has failed to <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">deliver economic growth, debt reduction, trade or employment</a>. Unemployment remains high, the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3020728">transition from school to employment</a> is increasingly difficult and jobs have become more precarious.</p>
<p>In addition to this, in its most recent economic assessment, the World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/economic-update-october-2020">highlighted</a> a lack of investment, low private-sector productivity and exports below pre-revolution. </p>
<p>The government isn’t solely responsible for the failure to deliver on deep socio-economic reform. Our research suggests that <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">international financial institutions and Western governments are also complicit</a>. They have encouraged –- sometimes pushed -– Tunisia to <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">adopt neo-liberal economic policies</a> in exchange for aid and trade. <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew060216a">For instance</a>, structural reforms to public institutions and state-owned companies, reducing energy subsidies, and devaluation of the Tunisian dinar in line with the market-based exchange rate.</p>
<p>These policies <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030338824">reduce state expenditure</a>, which means the government cannot improve social services or income support.</p>
<h2>‘Tried-and-failed’ policies</h2>
<p>Whatever policymakers think they are doing, it has not worked. Nor has it dented popular dissatisfaction. The Tunisian government, the EU and international financial institutions need to rethink ‘tried and failed’ policies. They must adopt measures that meet people’s demands for dignity, employment, and an end to corruption.</p>
<p>The government could, for example, invest in infrastructure -– especially in the interior –- to create employment and attract both foreign and local investment. A progressive tax structure would redistribute wealth, increase internal demand, and send people a symbolically important signal. As would protection for the unemployed and a concerted fight against corruption.</p>
<p>For its part, the European Union could allow Tunisia greater access to its agricultural internal market, where Tunisian produce has a competitive advantage. They could also mitigate loan repayment conditions or indeed press for reforms making work more –- not less –- rewarding and secure. </p>
<p>This is explains why the transition is viewed as a failure. And why, just as they did 10 years ago Tunisians are calling for “<em>isqaat an-nizaam</em>”: the end not just of a particular autocrat’s rule but of an entire system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 320214. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the EU for the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saerom Han does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Since the revolution, Tunisians’ call for “bread, freedom and social justice” have fallen on deaf ears.
Saerom Han, Honorary Research Fellow, University of Aberdeen
Andrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Aberdeen
Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of Aberdeen
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/154314
2021-02-10T13:34:25Z
2021-02-10T13:34:25Z
Arab Spring: after a decade of conflict, the same old problems remain
<p>As the popular refrain of “<em>ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam</em>” rang out across the Middle East in the early months of 2011, the nature of political life and relations between rulers and ruled began to fragment. The chant – which roughly translates as “the people want the fall of the regime” – became the slogan of the Arab uprisings, a wave of protests in states across the region. </p>
<p>The uprisings highlighted the fractious nature of political life and relations between the people and their governments, resulting in the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-27/arab-spring-showed-autocracy-is-anything-but-stable">toppling of authoritarian rulers</a> in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. </p>
<p>But these were limited victories – and protesters elsewhere were not as successful. Over the course of the following ten years, close to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/29/the-guardian-view-on-the-arab-spring-a-decade-on-a-haunting-legacy">1 million people have been killed</a> and more than 10 million displaced from their homes. The protests revealed a profound political crisis that continues to resonate across the region. And in most cases, the issues that provoked the protests – economic inertia, a lack of political accountability, rampant corruption and a growing gap between rich and poor – continue today. </p>
<h2>It begins</h2>
<p>Triggered by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/16/he-ruined-us-10-years-on-tunisians-curse-man-who-sparked-arab-spring">self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi</a>, a Tunisian street vendor, the protest movements emerged from longstanding frustration at the economic conditions facing many across the region, fuelled by endemic corruption. With a burgeoning youth population facing serious obstacles to employment, the opulent wealth of those in power and unwillingness to offer even token reforms meant that latent frustrations erupted in protests from Tunis to Muscat. </p>
<p>The responses of regimes varied across the region, ranging from <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/oman-ten-years-after-the-arab-spring-the-evolution-of-state-society-relations/">token reforms in Oman</a>, which involved the removal of unpopular ministers, and economic incentives designed to engender support in the other Gulf states, to more draconian strategies deployed elsewhere. This included the use of emergency powers, detention, torture, the closing down of space for political engagement, citizenship revocation and death. In Syria, Libya and Yemen, the violent repression that followed protests culminated in the onset of devastating conflict that continues today.</p>
<p>Developments in Tunisia and Egypt initially offered hope to many following the toppling of the authoritarian regimes of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zine-al-Abidine-Ben-Ali">Ben Ali</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51630142">Hosni Mubarak</a>. But in Egypt, the coup d’etat that toppled Mubarak’s successor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/mohamed-morsi-death-of-egypts-former-president-shows-deep-state-was-always-going-to-triumph-119031">Mohamed Morsi</a> – the country’s first democratically elected president – reflected broader regional trends of regimes using mechanisms of control to prevent the emergence of protest movements, seemingly crushing the dreams of protesters in the process. </p>
<h2>Divide and rule</h2>
<p>One of the most common strategies was the manipulation of sectarian strife, which saw regimes capitalise on social divisions for their own ends – a form of “divide and conquer”. The repercussions of such processes were devastating. The increased divisions within – and between – states may have arisen from sectarian differences but were manipulated by political self-interest by elites seeking to secure their position in the face of a range of serious challenges. </p>
<p>In Syria, members of violent Sunni Islamist groups who were in jail <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war">were released</a> by Bashar al-Assad in an attempt to frame the struggle against the Arab Spring protesters as a fight against Islamic extremism. Similarly, in Bahrain, the government sought to frame protesters as “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12753727">fifth columnists</a>”, doing the bidding of Iran – albeit with very little evidence to support such claims. </p>
<p>In pursuit of this, key regime officials <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mei/mei/2019/00000073/00000001/art00003;jsessionid=al44536h19ffu.x-ic-live-02">spoke of</a> nefarious Iranian involvement supporting protesters by providing arms and training. After Bahrain’s protest movement was defeated, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/king-of-bahrain-says-subversive-external-plot-has-been-foiled-1.600506">King Hamad declared</a> that an “external plot” had been foiled, with a clear nod to Iran. </p>
<p>In the years that followed, acts of protest became more isolated as regimes cracked down on oppositions. In Bahrain this involved the revocation of citizenship from <a href="https://salam-dhr.org/?p=3967">990 Bahraini nationals</a> while elsewhere – in other Gulf states and Egypt – it resulted in increasingly draconian terrorism laws designed to prevent both violent extremism and challenges to regime power. In the years after the protests, the spectre of war in Syria loomed large – an example regularly used by those in power across the Gulf to <a href="https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526126474/9781526126474.00013.xml">caution against demands for democracy</a>. </p>
<p>The years after the uprisings were largely shaped by this broader struggle for survival and efforts to reassert sovereign power in the face of shifting national and international pressures. At the same time, many of the structural factors that had caused the protests of 2011 remained unresolved. </p>
<p>This unwillingness to address underlying social, economic and political factors is hardly surprising. It reflects decades in which such grievances have remained unresolved, prompting often violent confrontations between rulers and ruled over the nature of the state and its resources. </p>
<h2>Crisis and collapse</h2>
<p>Moments of unrest punctured the region across the 20th century – leaving aside interstate conflict – predominantly emerging from the ability of rulers to address underlying grievances around social, economic and political issues. Processes of <em><a href="https://www.fekr-magazine.com/articles/what-is-neoliberalism-and-infitah">infitah</a></em> (economic liberalisation) took place as part of a broader global move towards neoliberal agendas during the 1980s. </p>
<p>But across the Arab world rising birth rates, institutional weakness and bureaucratic ineptitude left a gloomy picture of unbalanced development and systematic exclusion. This was often exacerbated by regimes becoming extractors rather than distributors – leaders and their coteries taking out money from state resources for personal needs and desires – leading to widespread failures of governance. By 2004, a UN report titled Towards Freedom in the Arab World referred to the Arab “state” as a “<a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/arab-human-development-report-2004">black hole</a>”. </p>
<p>The economic crisis of 2008 had a dramatic impact on the Middle East. At the height of the crisis, Saudi Arabia lost a range of contracts <a href="https://gfintegrity.org/report/2011-global-report-illicit-financial-flows-from-the-developing-world-over-the-decade-ending-2009/">worth US$958 billion</a> (£693 billion) while the UAE lost US$354 billion in contracts. </p>
<p>Estimates of a further US$247.5 billion in capital flight from the Middle East only exacerbated these challenges. The impact on people was devastating. By 2011, the situation was dire: 41% of people across the Middle East were <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_2014_Arab_Opinion_Index_In_Brief.aspx">living in need</a>. </p>
<p>Underpinning this was the loss to economies across the region caused by the endemic corruption, which some estimates put at <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/arab-human-development-report-2016-youth-and-prospects-human-development-changing-reality">around US$1 trillion</a> in the five decades leading up to the Arab uprisings. </p>
<h2>Unhappy ending?</h2>
<p>It was hardly surprising that having faced neglect, repression and corruption over the course of the 20th century <a href="https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526126474/9781526126474.00009.xml">people turned to groups</a> such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Fatah, Hezbollah and Hamas. Many of these groups, as well as political and sometimes paramilitary activities, engaged in huge social welfare programmes and accrued a great deal of popular support as a result. </p>
<p>Over the years that followed, structural grievances that had triggered the protests in 2011 once again rose to the surface. But this time they were played out across an increasingly divided region beset by sectarian schisms and geopolitical rivalries, frustration with political elites, and – most recently – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-middle-east-and-north-africa-and-covid-19-gearing-up-for-the-long-haul/">exacerbated by COVID-19</a>. </p>
<p>By 2015, 53% of the region’s population <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_2014_Arab_Opinion_Index_In_Brief.aspx">required financial support</a> from non-state actors. In Lebanon and Iraq, protesters <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/19/heres-what-protests-lebanon-iraq-are-really-about/">took to the streets in 2019</a> articulating their frustration at the status quo. It is hardly surprising that widespread anger has resulted in further instances of protest across the past decade, driven by anger at many of the same issues. Understanding the roots of the protest movement and their evolution are essential in gaining awareness of the region’s trajectory into a new decade and under a new US administration.</p>
<p>The root causes of the protests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/arab-spring-10-year-anniversary-lost-decade/">remain unaddressed</a> – and the situation may have even deteriorated as economic crises are worsened by the pandemic. While turning towards authoritarianism has given regimes additional measures to regulate life, until these deeper political issues have been addressed, latent frustrations will result in intermittent acts of protest and broader processes of repression.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Simon Mabon is a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>
The underlying issues of inequality, corruption and poverty are still dogging the region, ten years after the protests.
Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/141418
2020-07-06T15:12:55Z
2020-07-06T15:12:55Z
Idir: how a song from the village took Algerian music to the world
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345014/original/file-20200701-159789-11ksg68.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Wolff-Patrick/WireImage/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the 1990s I had the good fortune to meet with the late Algerian singing star <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-poetic-power-of-idir-the-artist-who-took-algerian-music-to-the-world-138125">Idir</a> (Hamid Cheriet 1949-2020).
We chatted for several hours in a café outside the Berber Cultural Association in Paris. I was doing <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1045722042000308246">research</a> on what by then was called New Kabyle Song (<em>la nouvelle chanson Kabyle</em>). </p>
<p>Kabyles are one of North Africa’s indigenous <a href="https://www.nationalia.info/profile/5/amazigh">Amazigh</a> or Berber populations. Today, Imazighen constitute North Africa’s largest minority, identified by their language and vibrant cultural traditions. </p>
<p>Idir is widely recognised as among the originators of this new musical genre. He <a href="https://bit.ly/31x1fht">told me</a> that he was inspired by the songs that he grew up hearing his grandmother sing while she was weaving, churning butter, rocking a child to sleep, or praising a new bridegroom.</p>
<p>Idir cloaked these songs in western harmonies, arranged them for guitar and other contemporary instruments, and brought them to audiences across North Africa and Europe. His hit song <em>A Vava Inouva</em> (Oh My Father) had launched his international career in 1973, one that would see seven major recordings. </p>
<p>What propelled Idir – who in the early 1970s was an Algerian geology student with little musical training – to worldwide acclaim? To find out I went back to his roots.</p>
<h2>Back to the village</h2>
<p>I followed Idir’s songs back to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kabylie">his home</a> village At Lahcène (At Yenni) in the Djurdjura mountains. Working with older women singers, I sought to understand how Idir had reconstituted their songs for wider audiences: what he had retained and what he had transformed? </p>
<p>I also spoke at length with the poet with whom Idir collaborated in the early years, Mohamed Benhamadouche (better known as <a href="https://bit.ly/2VuZrlt">Ben Mohamed</a>). Ben, too, was inspired by a recording of traditional songs that an old woman in his village had made for him. We <a href="https://bit.ly/2VINpVF">worked through</a> the songs line by line and word by word. </p>
<p>And I asked Idir and Ben to tell me about what had inspired them to work with village women’s songs in the first place. What were the ideological and cultural <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2020/03/algerias-forgotten-revolutionary-history">atmospheres</a> in which the two artists were working in the late 1960s and early 1970s? </p>
<h2>Cultural pathways</h2>
<p>In my <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Berber_Culture_on_the_World_Stage.html?id=By1aJGHz8rwC&redir_esc=y">larger work</a>, I locate Idir’s music at the confluence of various “branching interconnections” or branchements, a term <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/1528">introduced</a> by anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle. This describes the way that cultural products emerge out of a web of interconnected pathways or cultural landscapes. </p>
<p>The song <em>A Vava Inouva</em> – inspired by a traditional story about a young girl trying to save her father from danger – carved out a new juncture at the intersection of several pathways. These included worldwide movements of decolonisation, revalorizations of cultural heritage, and new technologies like the cassette tape. Idir also sought recognition of his Tamazight language and Amazigh culture, in opposition to Algeria’s dominant Arabo-Islamic ideological orientation. </p>
<p>These pathways came together in <em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDY30v6wSzQ">A Vava Inouva</a></em>. It turned out that Idir’s return to the village was inspired by what he saw happening in the <a href="http://www.arjunappadurai.org/articles/Appadurai_Disjuncture_and_Difference_in_the_Global_Cultural_Economy.pdf">world</a>. </p>
<h2>Out in the world</h2>
<p>Idir and Ben Mohamed were strongly inspired by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-west-toasted-men-on-the-moon-algeria-held-a-party-to-a-post-imperial-world-120614">First Pan-African Cultural Festival</a>, held in 1969 in Algiers. Here they witnessed dynamic <a href="https://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/30/performing-global-african-culture-and-citizenship">cultural performances</a> from troupes across Africa and heard talks from leading postcolonial luminaries like <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/news/joseph_ki_zerbo_the_humanist_the_historian_the_intellectu/">Joseph Ki-Zerbo</a> and <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/depestre-rene-1926">René Depestre</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-west-toasted-men-on-the-moon-algeria-held-a-party-to-a-post-imperial-world-120614">As the West toasted men on the moon, Algeria held a party to a post-imperial world</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Around this time, Ben Mohamed attended a presentation by French ethnographer Jean Duvignaud, who had written a <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Change_at_Shebika.html?id=PyRoAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">book</a> and made a documentary about the village of Shebika in neighbouring Tunisia. (The documentary would inspire a feature <a href="https://www.berlinale.de/en/archive-2020/programme/detail/202012196.html">film</a> by Jean-Louis Bertucelli.) </p>
<p>Seeing their traditions represented in print and on film gave Shebikans a new way to view themselves: whereas they had formerly denigrated their traditional culture, now they saw its value. </p>
<p>How could Idir and Ben Mohamed show their own traditional practices through a new lens? Music was Idir’s answer. By setting traditional Kabyle songs into a contemporary musical language, he gave them new life, propelling songs that had been sung only by women in Kabyle villages into far wider circulatory and mediated pathways. Idir’s songs would also set the stage for the more politicised music that would accompany the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/berber-spring">Berber Cultural Movement</a> of the 1980s. </p>
<h2>Soundtrack to a modern Algeria</h2>
<p><em>A Vava Inouva</em> is built around the sung refrain of a story that grandmothers had long told throughout Kabylia. Idir set the well-known refrain between new verses penned by Ben Mohamed. In typical village scenes the grandmother spins her tale, surrounded by family members engaged in their own activities, snow falling softly outside.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345572/original/file-20200703-21-us58ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1993 photo of the village At Lahcéne in the Djurdjura Mountains of the Kabyle region of northwestern Algeria, where Idir was born.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jane E Goodman/Indiana University Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When the song hit the Algerian airwaves, it was electrifying: a friend reported seeing people walking backwards down an escalator to hear it playing over a store’s ground-floor speakers. </p>
<p>It was also the first Algerian song to play on French national radio, in 1975, coinciding with the first visit of a French president (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) to Algeria since Algerian independence in 1962. From there, the song took off, reportedly selling some 200,000 copies by 1978. It would be translated into over a dozen languages and taken up by groups around the world.</p>
<p>In Algeria, Idir’s songs gave Kabyles a sense that their culture counted: that Amazigh customs and traditions were not backward or outmoded but could form a part of a modern Algerian nation. The songs helped lay the foundation for the widespread revalorisation of this heritage in later decades. At the same time, they created a sense of rootedness and a feeling of home for the many Algerians living in the diaspora. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-poetic-power-of-idir-the-artist-who-took-algerian-music-to-the-world-138125">The poetic power of Idir, the artist who took Algerian music to the world</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>I was in the audience when Idir closed his 1993 concert at the Olympia Theatre in Paris with <em>A Vava Inouva</em>. He was joined on stage by more than a dozen Kabyle singers. Passing the mike from one to the next, each sang a single line of the song as the crowd roared. </p>
<p>On the city bus, after another Idir concert in Paris in the mid-1990s, the entire busload of Algerian concertgoers too young to have heard Idir in the 1970s started belting out the song’s chorus. By then, Idir’s music had itself become a sign of collective heritage to which all could lay claim.</p>
<p><em>To read more about Algerian culture by the author, visit her website <a href="https://janegoodman.us">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane E. Goodman received funding for this project from the Fulbright Institute for International Education, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Institute for Maghrib Studies. </span></em></p>
Idir’s songs gave Kabyles a sense that their culture counted: that their customs and traditions could form a part of a modern Algerian nation.
Jane E. Goodman, Associate professor, Indiana University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/138856
2020-05-19T10:21:03Z
2020-05-19T10:21:03Z
‘I feel that all the doors have been closed’: lockdowns are making life even harder for migrant survivors of sexual violence
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335792/original/file-20200518-83397-1lgwigq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C32%2C5422%2C3604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">For some survivors of sexual violence, the lockdown has brought on more trauma. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Drazen Zigic via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Coronavirus lockdowns are making the recovery of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence who have been forced to flee their homes even harder, according to our <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/iris/2020/sgbv-covid-19.pdf">new research</a>.</p>
<p>Following a request by <a href="https://www.refugeewomenconnect.org.uk/">Refugee Women Connect</a>, an NGO working with forced migrant survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, we undertook 97 interviews in the UK, Tunisia, Turkey, Sweden and Australia between April 14 and 28. The work builds on an <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/superdiversity-institute/sereda/index.aspx">ongoing research project</a> we’re conducting with refugee survivors of sexual violence and the service providers which support them. </p>
<p>Forced migrants, many of whom <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.12325">live in crowded, sometimes makeshift accommodation</a> with poor access to food, sanitary items and healthcare, are at particular risk during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Those who are also survivors of sexual violence told us how some of the lockdown restrictions are exacerbating their existing vulnerabilities, leaving them at heightened risk of psycho-social problems, destitution and even further abuse.</p>
<h2>At risk of more violence</h2>
<p>In Tunisia and Turkey, we heard that only certain groups of forced migrants, for example those with refugee status, could access support and this was inadequate to cover their basic needs. We heard how work in the informal economy for those with no access to social welfare had dried up, often leaving survivors without any income. </p>
<p>Many women survivors previously relied heavily on NGOs for material and social support. But with face-to-face NGO services stopping or moving online, many of the women we interviewed lacked the basic digital resources necessary to maintain their social connections and make contact with service providers.</p>
<p>One Syrian woman living in Ankara, who is a survivor of both domestic violence and war and now lives alone with her two daughters in unfurnished accommodation, told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whenever I contact the charities, they tell me it is difficult to help me amid this crisis. I am just waiting for this to end so that they can help me. I feel that all the doors have been closed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The precarious position many survivors of sexual violence are in has also increased their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation during the crisis. Some NGOs that we spoke to as part of the research feared that women would have little choice but to remain in abusive relationships during the pandemic. </p>
<p>In Tunisia, some NGOs told us that unaccompanied adolescent girls had been forced into prostitution during the lockdown. In the UK, trafficked women feared that they would be contacted by their former traffickers, aware that they were desperate for resources. Some NGOs were concerned that the numbers at risk of trafficking would increase.</p>
<p>One Nigerian woman, who is an asylum seeker living in the UK, told us COVID-19 meant she’d become scared of the people around her. She said she was “sometimes worried the traffickers will get my number and make more threats”. </p>
<p>Opportunities to escape domestic violence, which <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jocn.15296">other</a> <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m1712">studies</a> show has increased during lockdown, were also reduced for the survivors. Unable to access support from NGOs or public services, with sheltered housing closed or unavailable to many forced migrants, women told us they stayed put. In Turkey, some perpetrators of sexual violence and domestic violence were <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/coronavirus-turkey-sex-offenders-prison-domestic-abuse-a9429151.html">released from prison</a>, which increased women’s levels of risk and anxiety.</p>
<h2>Flashbacks and mental stress</h2>
<p>Another grave concern for women and the NGOs supporting them was the increased risk to survivors’ mental health. Forced migrant women can suffer multiple traumas, and often experience sexual or gender-based violence at multiple points in their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.05.003">refugee journey</a>. </p>
<p>Women were unable to continue with treatment for physical injuries, but the greatest harm came from a combination of isolation and the suspension of mental health therapies. For some, the loss of freedom reminded them of their own previous imprisonment, while others said they spent a lot of time “overthinking” past experiences and having flashbacks. </p>
<p>Others had begun to gently rebuild their lives after losing trust in humanity, through therapeutic relations with a support worker or by participating in self-help networks. Some women felt they were slipping backwards with the loss of access to these lifelines. One Eritrean woman living in Tunisia with irregular migrant status said she can no longer think about her future:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I now hate my life, I feel as if I were in a jail…the corona came to destroy everything…everything became so hard for us, as if we were frozen inside a refrigerator.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hopelessness was reinforced by the suspension of some asylum cases in the UK, residence applications in Turkey and resettlement programmes in Tunisia. Many of our interviewees found themselves stuck in legal limbo with no idea when they would emerge. Some <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/changes-to-home-office-asylum-resettlement-policy-and-practice-in-response-to-covid-19/">asylum processes</a> have now shifted to remote working. However, without support for survivors from NGOs and social networks, the process of disclosing sensitive information about sexual abuse and torture could risk reopening the trauma.</p>
<p>As well as access to free medical services, survivors urgently require cash to cover food and hygiene costs and access to digital devices. Our findings highlight the grim reality for these women and the need for urgent action to ensure that they survive the crisis and can move on with their lives without encountering further harm. </p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.samaritans.org/how-we-can-help-you/contact-us">Click here</a>, if you would like to contact the Samaritans.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenny Phillimore receives funding from
Europe and Global Challenges Fund - riksbankens jubileumsfond, Wellcome Trust and Volkswagen Foundation
Economic and Social Research Council IAA Fund.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandra Pertek receives funding from the University of Birmingham and Economi and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>
New research with survivors of sexual violence who have been forced to migrate reveals difficulties of COVID-19 lockdowns.
Jenny Phillimore, Director of the Institute for Research into Superdiversity (IRiS), University of Birmingham
Sandra Pertek, Doctoral Researcher, University of Birmingham
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/132430
2020-03-18T14:53:19Z
2020-03-18T14:53:19Z
Why investors can feel confident doing business in Tunisia
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319659/original/file-20200310-61070-clgxb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C1000%2C479&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Despite the 2015 terrorist attack in Sousse, Tunisia, shown in this photo, the north African country remains a relatively safe country for investors compared to some of its neighbours.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Investors regularly seek to identify opportunities in emerging markets, where <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/12/mapping-frontier-economies">potential risks and rewards are often not well understood</a>. </p>
<p>Only a few countries in emerging markets provide an attractive business environment with low-cost access to export destinations across several continents. In these lesser-known markets, the main challenge in evaluating risks is <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/video/2020/03/06/why-companies-like-microsoft-and-google-are-betting-big-on-africa.html">that they are frequently exaggerated</a> and highly idiosyncratic. Prior biases and a lack of information about a country can distort reality, magnifying the perception of risk.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319213/original/file-20200308-118890-hl15tr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tunisia’s location with projected geographic proximity to three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google maps with illustrations by Svetlana Lukoyanova</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14107241">Tunisia</a> may be <a href="http://www.investintunisia.tn/En/competitive-economy_11_19">one of the locations</a> that offers good investment opportunities. </p>
<p>Yet the northern African country is often overlooked by companies seeking access to multiple markets in Europe, Africa and Asia because of perceived <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2016/06/23/trends-in-global-restrictions-on-religion/#rise-in-religion-related-terrorist-activity">high-security risks in the region</a>. </p>
<p>To uncover risks in the Tunisian business landscape, <a href="https://www.ibinmena.com/">we interviewed business managers</a> across 15 industries and six cities on the Mediterranean coastline.</p>
<h2>Former police state</h2>
<p>Tunisia remained <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S179381201350003X">politically closed as a police state</a> prior to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/tunisia-timeline-jasmine-revolution">the 2011 Jasmine Revolution</a> that ended the Ben Ali dictatorship. Bordering Algeria and Libya, Tunisia is often seen in the same light as other countries in <a href="https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups">Middle East and North African region, known as MENA</a>, which are reputed to be some of the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/08/27/as-mena-states-grow-increasingly-repressive-businesses-should-lead-reform/">most repressive</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2019">volatile</a> in the world. </p>
<p><a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518616">A media predilection for sensationalized and tragic stories</a> ensures that dramatic events become the most widely known facts about the country. That has made it difficult for some investors to overlook or forget <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/tunisia-beach-hotel-attack-leaves-38-dead-36-wounded-1.3128737">the 2015 attack that targeted tourists and killed 38 people</a>, the deadliest non-state terrorist attack in Tunisian history. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, outsiders tend to perceive Tunisia’s risks as comparable to those of its neighbours, especially <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190423-escalating-fighting-in-libya-capital-threatens-tunisia/">the civil war-ridden Libya that poses security risks to Tunisia</a>. However, the perceptions of those actually conducting business in Tunisia are drastically different. For them, Tunisia is a low-risk business environment, despite <a href="https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/tunisia_poll_june_2017.pdf">increased political uncertainty</a> and some political violence episodes since the revolution. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319185/original/file-20200308-167285-12i2xsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Violence against civilians in Tunisia in relation to other MENA countries, 2000-2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data with authors' figures</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These insiders generally agree that overall security in Tunisia has substantially increased since 2015, and political violence risks are low. The outsiders’ assessment glosses over the reality that Tunisia <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/development-tunisias-domestic-counter-terrorism-finance-capability/">does better than its neighbours on effective counter-terrorism measures</a>, and there’s also a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/mepo.12403">relatively low level of religious extremism</a> in <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/tunisian-civil-society-s-unmistakable-role-in-keeping-the-peace/">Tunisian society</a>.</p>
<h2>Arab Spring uprisings mostly succeeded</h2>
<p>Politically, too, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/2019-10-15/tunisia-model">Tunisia is an exception in the MENA region</a> — it remains the only country where the Arab Spring uprisings have not failed. </p>
<p>And, while the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/20/how-new-governments-deal-with-old-elites-matters-more-than-you-might-expect/">democratic transition</a> is <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/current-situation-tunisia">incomplete</a>, the main characteristics of liberal democracy — the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/24/quiet-revolution-tunisian-military-after-ben-ali-pub-62780">de-politicization of the military</a>, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2020">rule of law, respect for human rights, freedom of speech</a>, <a href="https://mk0rofifiqa2w3u89nud.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/The-State-of-Civic-Freedoms-in-MENA-FINAL.pdf?_ga=2.118452873.1438988700.1583621305-1847174004.1583621305">freedom of association</a> — are the characteristics of <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2020/democracy-index-2019/">today’s Tunisia and among the most pronounced in emerging markets</a>.</p>
<p>The majority of respondents in our study, in fact, relished their new freedom to discuss politics and social issues in public and private spheres, without the need to whisper or check their surroundings for spies.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/90cyeB6WGcw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisia in 2020, Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of Tunisia (FIPA-Tunisia)</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Our field work indicates that despite its location, security and safety are among the least concerning business risks in Tunisia. Another important finding was that the impact of significant political events (the 2011 revolution and the 2015 terrorist attacks) varied across companies depending on how and where a company operated. </p>
<p>During and immediately after the revolution, some companies, including those in <a href="http://www.investintunisia.tn/En/presentation_128_276">the textile sector</a>, lost foreign clients: “A lot of brands would not allow operators to come to Tunisia to see the production process, do quality control,” citing security concerns, one respondent told us.</p>
<p>However, other companies, for example those in <a href="http://www.investintunisia.tn/En/presentation_128_641">the automotive sector</a>, “worked with no problem,” said another.</p>
<p>The biggest nuisance for one respondent was the garbage piling up for a couple of weeks until the new government organized pick-ups. </p>
<p>One of our respondents also quipped: “Revolution and terrorism do not reduce the demand for men’s underwear.” </p>
<p>Still, in the five years after the revolution, security measures lagged, culminating in the 2015 terrorist attacks in Sousse.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-was-attacked-for-its-success-not-its-challenges-39159">Tunisia was attacked for its success, not its challenges</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2018.09.002">Tunisia’s tourism industry suffered the most</a>, as the attacks targeted tourists who tend to choose travel destinations based on perceptions of safety. </p>
<p>A Tunisian hotel manager noted that the foreign tourists in his hotel, 85 to 90 per cent of the hotel’s business, left immediately after the attack. The hotel remained empty until the tourist season began for Tunisians after Ramadan. </p>
<h2>Security upgrades</h2>
<p>Since then, Tunisian hotels have been required <a href="https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/recovery-road-smart-policy-increased-security-and-focus-new-segments">to upgrade their security</a> to meet new national and international standards. In contrast to the tourism industry, these attacks had less of an impact on <a href="http://www.investintunisia.tn/En/presentation_128_185">manufacturers</a> and <a href="http://www.investintunisia.tn/En/presentation_128_80">agricultural producers</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/tunisia-turns-a-corner-against-the-jihadist-movement">Since 2015, Tunisia has successfully eased security and safety concerns</a> due to a combination of the government’s immediate responses to security threats, its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1538971">new long-term security policy</a>, security intergovernmental partnerships as well as the short-lived nature of politically disruptive events. By the summer of 2019, the managers we interviewed were almost unanimous in their feelings of safety.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, it’s not all rosy. There have been suicide attacks <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5437148/suicide-bomb-attacks-tunisia-capital/">targeting security forces in Tunis</a>, the most recent one <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/world/europe/us-embassy-tunisia-bomber.html">near the United States embassy</a>. That shows threats may be significantly reduced but they haven’t been eliminated entirely in Tunisia, <a href="http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/terrorism-index/">a trend similar to other countries</a>. </p>
<p>But the respondents to our study still have a valid point about safety: “Definitely, Tunisia is much better security-wise than Mexico. Terrorism is not a problem today.” </p>
<p>In contrast to Mexico, our respondents’ companies have never needed security guards for transportation in Tunisia, even during the revolution, and they reported that security expenses at their operations have always been low.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatiana Vashchiko and other co-authors of this article receive funding from SSHRC. The five co-authors of this article were awarded a three-year partnership development grant (PDG) by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada in March 2018 to establish an international academic partnership in Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreea Mihalache-O'Keef receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada; the Maurice L. Mednick Memorial Fund of the Virginia Foundation for Independent Colleges. She is a volunteer member of the Board of Directors of the not-for-profit group Breastfeeding Rights, Education, Advocacy, and Support Team (BREAST), Roanoke, VA.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:anne.kleffner@haskayne.ucalgary.ca">anne.kleffner@haskayne.ucalgary.ca</a> received funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:ekarakoc@binghamton.edu">ekarakoc@binghamton.edu</a> received funding from SSHRC of Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:martin.halek@haskayne.ucalgary.ca">martin.halek@haskayne.ucalgary.ca</a> received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada</span></em></p>
Those who conduct business in Tunisia consider it a low-risk security environment compared to some of its neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East.
Tatiana Vashchilko, Assistant Professor, International Business and Strategic Management, University of Calgary
Andreea S. Mihalache-O'Keef, Associate Professor, Geo-politics, Roanoke College
Anne E. Kleffner, Professor, Risk Management and Insurance, University of Calgary
Ekrem Karakoç, Associate Professor, Comparative Politics, Binghamton University, State University of New York
Martin Halek, Associate Professor, Risk Management and Insurance, University of Calgary
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/130899
2020-02-17T13:07:42Z
2020-02-17T13:07:42Z
Africa’s growing lead battery industry is causing extensive contamination
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314726/original/file-20200211-146674-1i9yu18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Serious lead poisoning cases are a growing problem on the continent. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GeetyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa is facing a serious lead poisoning problem. In Senegal, for example, researchers <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2897224/">linked the deaths</a> of children from processing lead waste to supply a lead battery recycling plant in a poor suburb of Dakar. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/woman-risking-her-life-save-village-lead-poisoning">Kenya</a>, the legacy of a shutdown lead-recycling plant is causing major health problems for people living in the neighbourhood. And in <a href="https://businessday.ng/businessday-investigation/businessday-investigation-f/article/dying-in-instalments-how-lead-battery-recyclers-are-poisoning-nigerians-part-i/">Nigeria</a> an investigation by journalists showed how lead battery recycling facilities were poisoning workers and the people living in the area. </p>
<p>The problem is growing along with the market for <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/259447/9789241512855-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">lead batteries</a>. This is due to lack of regulation and investment in environmentally sound battery recycling plants. Most facilities in Africa are small. They weren’t built with adequate pollution controls to prevent disasters and ongoing contamination.</p>
<p>The production of lead batteries is <a href="https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/africa-lead-acid-battery-market.html">growing rapidly</a> in Africa as the market for lead batteries expands. <a href="https://www.ila-lead.org/lead-facts/lead-uses--statistics">Global lead output</a> continues to grow, with about 85% production going to make batteries.</p>
<p>We conducted a study around lead battery recycling plants in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Tunisia. Our results <a href="http://www.okinternational.org/docs/Lead%20Soil%207%20Countries%202018.pdf">showed</a> significant lead contamination around 15 licensed battery recycling plants. This shows that informal sector recycling is not the only source of lead pollution.</p>
<p>Other <a href="http://www.okinternational.org/docs/Gottesfeld%20JOEH%202011%20final.pdf">studies</a> have also reported excessive emissions from lead acid battery manufacturing and recycling plants in low and middle-income countries. </p>
<p>Our findings contribute to the growing body of research in documenting lead contamination around licensed recycling plants across Africa. This underscores the need for urgent action. This should include putting in place regulatory systems. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314727/original/file-20200211-146674-1giotfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A typical lead battery recycling plant without adequate pollution controls.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Occupational Knowledge International</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Growing problem</h2>
<p>At the 15 facilities we tested, 85% of the soil sampled from inside and outside the plants exceeded 80 parts per million (ppm). This is the health hazard level used in <a href="https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crnr/leadchhsl091709.pdf">California</a>. Piles of used battery cases and waste slag (residues) were responsible for some of the soil contamination. But excessive airborne emissions are the largest source. </p>
<p>This extensive soil lead contamination is a significant source of human exposure across the region. We found that these hazardous sites are often adjacent to residential areas, agricultural and grazing lands. </p>
<p>In recent years, the <a href="http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11183/K1607167_UNEPEA2_RES7E.pdf?Sequence=1&isAllowed=y">United Nations Environment Assembly</a> has begun to recognise the growing threat of lead battery recycling to public health and the environment. In <a href="http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11183/K1607167_UNEPEA2_RES7E.pdf?Sequence=1&isAllowed=y">2016</a>, it passed a resolution noting the lack of adequate infrastructure needed to recycle the rapidly growing number of used lead-acid batteries. It noted that there was a “need to further reduce releases, emissions and exposures”.</p>
<p>Despite this call and the urgent need for continued intervention, there’s been minimal effort by African governments.</p>
<p>Unlike electronic waste, lead battery recycling is a profitable enterprise that can be safely done without any subsidies. Countries such as <a href="http://www.okinternational.org/docs/China%20Lead%20Battery%20Report%20IPE%20English%20Revised.pdf">China</a> have enforced minimum size requirements for recycling facilities to ensure that adequate emission control technology can be cost effective. </p>
<p>In the US and Europe effective take-back schemes ensure that lead batteries are collected back at the end of their useful life. These measures are key to ensuring that used batteries go to regulated facilities and aren’t diverted to the informal sector.</p>
<h2>What is needed</h2>
<p>Our research points to the need for regional and national level action across the continent. This should include the establishment of comprehensive industry-specific regulations. </p>
<p>There must be performance requirements in place for stack emissions, ambient air levels, minimum production capacity for new and existing recycling plants and occupational exposure limits for airborne emissions and blood lead levels.</p>
<p>There’s also a need to attract investment to build efficient facilities with proper emission control technology. Along with these measures, governments should put strategies that should require manufacturers and distributors to take back used batteries in order to consolidate this hazardous waste stream. </p>
<p>Without formal collection systems there’s no financial incentive for battery recycling companies to invest in suitable infrastructure as they are competing against the informal sector. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.okinternational.org/docs/Lead%20Soil%207%20Countries%202018.pdf">our study</a> shows, land use restrictions in most countries on the continent have been ineffective in separating hazardous recycling plants from residential areas. This has resulted in harm to human health. </p>
<p>The industry needs to be more transparent. Battery makers and recyclers should report emissions and alert the public about soil lead contamination. </p>
<p>The remediation of contaminated soils under these circumstance is complex and costly. The regulatory system should ensure that financial resources are available for the anticipated cost of remediation following plant closure.</p>
<p>Comprehensive awareness programmes about the associated health impacts are critical to the communities since most contaminated sites only come to light after reported deaths or cases of severe lead poisoning are identified. </p>
<p><em>Perry Gottesfeld, the Executive Director of Occupational Knowledge International, was a co-author of the research and also contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130899/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Faridah Hussein Were consults for UN Environment where she receives funding to enhance environmentally sound management of used lead acid battery activities. </span></em></p>
Unregulated and hazardous lead acid battery manufacturing and recycling plants are often adjacent to residential areas, agricultural and grazing lands.
Faridah Hussein Were, Lecturer, Department of Chemistry, University of Nairobi
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.