tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/tutsi-23225/articlesTutsi – The Conversation2024-01-30T10:09:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177022024-01-30T10:09:59Z2024-01-30T10:09:59ZBurundi’s quota for women in politics has had mixed results, but that’s no reason to scrap it<p>Since 2005, Burundi has <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">set quotas</a> to ensure that the country’s three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa), as well as women, are represented in its parliament, central government and municipal administrations. Its constitution states that women should make up at least <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">30% of these institutions</a>. </p>
<p>The senate, Burundi’s highest chamber of parliament, recently started a <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/review-constitutionalized-ethnic-quotas-burundi-turning-point">process of evaluating</a> ethnic quotas in political institutions. This <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/burundi--ethnic-quota-system-under-senate-evaluation/7210281.html">process</a> is expected to lead to recommendations on whether quotas should continue to be used. Regrettably, the evaluation lacks methodological rigour and transparency.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=hAOjiu8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researchers</a> with a focus on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=9Gwdmm8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">gender representation</a> in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/search?q=Stef%20Vandeginste">politics</a>, we believe this is a missed opportunity. Gender and ethnic quotas have been adopted in Burundi as a forward-looking solution to sustainable peace. A decision about removing them should be based on whether they have met (or can meet) their goals. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/00020397231203021">recent paper</a>, we examined whether gender quotas foster Burundian women’s political representation. </p>
<p>We drew on data covering the period between October 2001 and June 2020 to determine three things:</p>
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<li><p>whether Burundian political actors abide by the gender quotas</p></li>
<li><p>the relative importance of ministerial portfolios allocated to women </p></li>
<li><p>whether these gender quotas have had an effect on government positions where they aren’t mandated. </p></li>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-representation-ethnicity-trumps-gender-in-burundi-and-rwanda-104146">Political representation: ethnicity trumps gender in Burundi and Rwanda</a>
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<p>We found that gender quotas have gradually resulted in women being assigned to prominent ministerial portfolios. The impact of this, however, has been mixed. </p>
<p>Women have remained confined to typically “feminine”, care-giving ministerial portfolios, such as health and education, over nearly two decades. They have been excluded from portfolios such as defence, security and foreign affairs. Their representation as senior advisers to the president or as CEOs of parastatals has remained marginal. </p>
<p>Our research illustrates that embedding gender quotas in the constitution can fast-track representation. But it doesn’t necessarily spiral beyond the targeted positions and institutions. This implies that any policy targeting an increase in women’s representation needs to take into account the broader political setting. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13537113.2022.2047248">formal mechanisms</a> to enforce gender quotas in government and parliament in Burundi are in place, they are absent in other important and sought-after positions, such as parastatal CEO or provincial governor.</p>
<h2>Meeting the gender quota</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have been consistently respected in Burundi since 2005. </p>
<p>The country has one of the highest shares of women in parliament. It ranks <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf#page=18">41st</a> out of 145 countries in the 2023 global political empowerment metric. </p>
<p>This is mostly because gender quotas are compatible with clientelistic politics. Most women positions are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=4">allocated</a> to people related to key regime figures. This has led to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021">increasing assignment</a> of women to key portfolios like justice, health and education. </p>
<p>In theory, one might <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CBA8C55CF243B6364C5DCE5D0D0AAAC6/S1743923X15000434a.pdf/div-class-title-rules-of-ministerial-recruitment-div.pdf">expect</a> that gender quotas would affect both the supply and demand side of women political elites, triggering an upsurge in women’s representation. </p>
<p>Burundi’s cabinet ministers, of whom 30% are women, nominate individuals to head departments under their jurisdiction. The pool of qualified candidates for such positions has increased as more women take on political responsibilities. Ideally, this should facilitate the nomination of women, even when there are no quotas.</p>
<p>But the gender quotas in Burundi have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundian-women-want-greater-say-running-country">fallen short</a> of spilling over into quota-free positions. Women are still under-represented as senior advisers to the president, permanent secretaries in ministries or CEOs of parastatals.</p>
<p>Our interviews with political elites and women civil society activists revealed two ways women are sidelined.</p>
<p>First, women are not fully embedded in the formal and informal structures that decide who to appoint where and when. </p>
<p>For instance, women are not in the ruling party’s main decision-making body, <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004355910/B9789004355910_031.xml">Conseil des Sage</a> (council of the wise). They are also not part of the ruling party’s Cercle des Généraux (circle of generals). This is a group of former army and police generals who enjoy a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2017.1381819">de facto veto right</a> to any important decisions. Equally important, women aren’t appointed as provincial and municipal party executive secretaries. These are the career brokers and connectors between grassroots ruling party structures, the party’s leadership and the president.</p>
<p>Second, the ruling party has increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">relied on coercion</a> to maintain its dominance in politics since 2005. It relies heavily on hardliners, most of whom are former combatants in Imbonerakure, the party’s youth league, or Abahumure, party veterans. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">paramilitary power configuration</a> that has prevailed in Burundi since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Nkurunziza">ruling party’s accession to power</a>, the ability to wage violence has become a valued “skill set”. This is a comparative disadvantage for women, leading to their under-representation in appointed positions where gender quotas don’t apply.</p>
<h2>Opportunistic use of quotas</h2>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=11">Our research found</a> that women made important gains in high-value ministerial positions, in cabinet positions and in provincial governor positions in the 2015-2020 legislature. Their representation in high-visibility ministries increased, growing their political role. </p>
<p>On the surface of it, it may appear to be due to the gender quota policy. However, this would have taken a longer time to produce the desired effects. In our view, the 2015-2020 legislature resulted from a <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=hrbregionalcoverage-spring2016#page=2">chaotic and contested electoral process</a> in 2015 that was marred by massive human rights violations. </p>
<p>This election prompted key donors, such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government">European Union</a>, to withdraw support to the government. We see what resulted as an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2CB1F142F6235323B08B506601376DE9/S0017257X2200032Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-appointment-of-women-to-authoritarian-cabinets-in-africa-div.pdf">opportunistic use</a> of gender quotas as a window dressing strategy. It was an effort to sanitise a regime that had become an international pariah. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have the potential to increase women’s representation in decision-making positions. However, to lead to sustainable change, governments need to take into account informal political practices. These include the role played by multiple layers of clientelistic networks in accessing key political positions. Women’s integration in political parties’ formal and informal structures would better level the playing field.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any state policy looking to increase women’s representation must take into account formal and informal political practices.Reginas Ndayiragije, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpPetra Meier, Professor of Politics, University of AntwerpStef Vandeginste, Associate Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115392023-08-28T14:43:12Z2023-08-28T14:43:12ZDRC: rising Twirwaneho rebel group highlights the unending volatility of the country’s east<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543291/original/file-20230817-43619-bs2zp0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier guards a camp in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in January 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">three-decade conflict in the eastern region</a> of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to the proliferation of <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">hundreds of armed groups</a>. With the violence appearing to take an <a href="https://blog.kivusecurity.org/why-violence-in-the-south-kivu-highlands-is-not-ethnic-and-other-misconceptions-about-the-crisis/">ethnic slant</a>, several groups have emerged claiming to be protecting their communities from attacks. One such group is the Twirwaneho, which has <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf#page=13">become more active</a> since 2019. Christopher P. Davey, who has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=TYPO3qoAAAAJ&hl=en">extensively studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC, explains how the Twirwaneho’s claim of communal self-defence highlights the fractured nature of Congolese politics.</em></p>
<h2>What is the conflict in the DRC all about?</h2>
<p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been a theatre of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">increasingly violent conflict</a> since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">Rwandan genocide of 1994</a> pushed over a million refugees across the common border. Rwanda’s efforts to capture those responsible for the genocide sparked two wars in <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">two wars</a>. Violence, driven by armed groups, has been persistent since. </p>
<p>Central to Congo’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa, the underrepresented social and economic groups in the eastern region, and external parties. Added to this mix are transnational armed groups, foreign militaries, the <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/monuscos-2022-mandate-streamlined-but-missing-key-protection-language/">UN peacekeeping mission</a> and Congolese state actors like the military. </p>
<p>This has resulted in the world’s <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-refugee-crisis-explained/">longest-standing refugee crisis</a>. It has also led to the proliferation and fragmentation of <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CRG-Armed-Groups-in-the-Congo.pdf#page=5">dozens of armed groups</a> in the eastern region. </p>
<p>One of these groups is the Twirwaneho, a <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf#page=6">Banyamulenge</a> – or South Kivu-based Congolese Tutsi – self-defence/armed group. </p>
<p>This group is important to understand because its rising profile demonstrates the <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.com/jason-k-stearns-the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name-the-unending-conflict-in-the-congo-princeton-up-2022">unending nature of Congo’s war</a>.</p>
<h2>Who are the Twirwaneho?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">Banyamulenge</a> are a minority group in South Kivu, eastern DRC, who have faced <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">attacks based on their ethnicity</a>. Formed in the early 2010s, Twirwaneho (meaning “let’s defend ourselves” in the Banyamulenge language) is a contemporary response by mutinying national army officers to continued conflict and local self-defence needs within the Banyamulenge community. </p>
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<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government</a>
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<p>The overlap between <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/self-defence">self-defence and armed groups</a> is not unique to the DRC. <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/aop/article-10.1163-24680966-bja10012/article-10.1163-24680966-bja10012.xml">My research</a> on the history of Banyamulenge soldiers shows that the <a href="https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedGroups">gumino</a> (“let’s stay here”) self-defence tradition was part the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s international campaign in the late 1980s. It was used to raise funds and recruit for the <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/52/Rwandan+Civil+War+%281990+-+1994%29">Rwandan civil war</a> (1990-1994). </p>
<p>This led to a generation of fighters <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886260519900281">trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Front</a> who got into the ranks of various armed groups across both Congo wars. </p>
<p>These groups include Twirwaneho. Its leader is Michel “<a href="https://blog.kivusecurity.org/tag/makanika-2/">Makanika</a>” Rukunda, who was once in the Congolese national army before he mutinied in 2019. He transformed Twirwaneho militias into a militarily coordinated, and internationally represented and funded, fighting force. But he is also accused of human rights violations that have placed him on the European Union <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.190.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A190I%3ATOC">sanctions list</a>. </p>
<p>The Twirwaneho’s direct role in national politics is minimal. However, the group has become a symbol of defiance for both the community it claims to defend and those who <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">see Tutsis as foreign invaders</a>. Also, a <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A7ae8352e-191d-39b0-858d-496fa13a25b2">report</a> from the UN group of experts on the DRC hints towards collaboration between Twirwaneho and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Rwanda-supported M23</a>.</p>
<h2>Is the group keeping the peace or fuelling conflict?</h2>
<p>The Twirwaneho <a href="https://twitter.com/twirwaneho/status/1664342022675746817/photo/1">claim</a> that neighbouring armed groups and the national army make up a coalition launching counterattacks on Banyamulenge villages. This is in reprisal for Twirwaneho operations against the military and <a href="https://chimpreports.com/burundi-army-fights-red-tabara-rebels-in-drc/">other armed groups</a> and connected populations. </p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/6/2/article-p107_2.xml">My research</a> shows that the Twirwaneho are related to, but distinct within, an array of armed groups in DRC engaged in a complex political, economic and at times existential struggle. </p>
<p>During Nairobi fieldwork, to understand more about the international side of the movement I met three young former rebels who had fled the Twirwaneho. They joined the group after their schools closed following increased local conflict. Graduating from students to soldiers, they fought this anti-Twirwaneho coalition. Echoing his community’s sentiment, one former Twirwaneho officer told me they are “not an armed group”. He emphasised this point: </p>
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<p>… I was seeing myself as a civilian who decided to come and protect my community.</p>
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<p>Inherent in the Twirwaneho’s fight are claims of stopping a Tutsi genocide in the DRC, also made by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23</a>. However, increased fighting across North and South Kivu has <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A7ae8352e-191d-39b0-858d-496fa13a25b2">exacerbated violence against all civilians</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s behind the group’s rising profile?</h2>
<p>Makanika as the emerging leader of the group has instilled discipline and “patriotism”. In my fieldwork I heard consistent claims of insufficient promotion and pay for Banyamulenge soldiers in the national army and persecution of their people. These claims became reasons for joining, along with a narrowing of options for traditional <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/6/2/article-p107_2.xml">livelihoods</a>. </p>
<p>As command centred under Makanika, his diaspora reputation grew. Many Banyamulenge in the US and African Great Lakes region credit him with preserving the community. Young Banyamulenge men have left families and careers to join the Twirwaneho. The group recruits school children, pressures community members to join and draws on existing self-defence groups. </p>
<p>Coordinated by the <a href="https://twitter.com/MahoroMpa">Mahoro Peace Association</a>, the Banyamulenge diaspora has contributed <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1238442/accusations-of-funding-militias-in-south-kivu.html">hundreds of thousands</a> of US dollars to displaced families in <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">South Kivu</a>. This is not an <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57e92e4d4.pdf">uncommon practice</a> across other groups in the country. </p>
<p>The peace association <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1238442/accusations-of-funding-militias-in-south-kivu.html">asserts</a> it does not actively raise money for Twirwaneho, but its leadership advocates for fighting to reclaim the homeland. This implicitly encourages support. </p>
<p>Many Banyamulenge do not consider any funds sent as support for an armed group. Rather, it is seen as mobilisation for the survival of the community. </p>
<h2>What’s the end game?</h2>
<p>What the Twirwaneho want is a complex question. Their <a href="https://twitter.com/twirwaneho">social media</a> posts broadcast goals of Banyamulenge peace and security in Congo. Yet, violence in the DRC is <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-violence-has-many-causes-the-uns-narrow-focus-on-ethnicity-wont-help-end-conflict-208774">not a simple ethnic conflict</a>. Although many Banyamulenge support the group, they are divided on how its goals are to be accomplished.</p>
<p>It is easy to see how a diaspora is willing to support the survival of their community. However, armed groups typically result in continued violence and military competition: rebels fight for material gains that do not translate into increased security for civilians.</p>
<p><em>This piece was written in collaboration with researchers at the <a href="https://gecshceruki.org/">Conflict and Human Security Research Group</a> (GEC-SH/CERUKI).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey is affiliated with Clark University and Education for Global Peace, and works for Binghamton University SUNY.</span></em></p>Central to the DRC’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa and underrepresented groups in the eastern region.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048342023-06-21T14:58:31Z2023-06-21T14:58:31ZRwanda: Paul Kagame is a dictator who clings to power but it’s not just for his own gain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524433/original/file-20230504-25-9wocho.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame at a commemoration of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in April 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mariam Kone/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">recently said</a> he was looking forward to his retirement after 23 years in power. Speaking to the press in April 2023, he claimed he “may join journalism in my old age” – a somewhat surprising choice, given the poor <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">state of the freedom of the press</a> in Rwanda.</p>
<p>But the chances that Kagame will actually step down seem rather small. After a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-politics-idUKKBN0U209D20151219">controversial referendum</a> in 2015, Rwandans voted to extend presidential term limits, allowing Kagame to rule potentially until 2034. More recently, Kagame was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230404-paul-kagame-re-elected-as-head-of-rpf">re-elected to head the ruling party</a> – the Rwandan Patriotic Front – for another five years. And last year he suggested that he might <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OBIiz0PJgQ">run for president again</a> in Rwanda’s 2024 elections. He said:</p>
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<p>I would consider running for another 20 years. I have no problem with that. Elections are about people choosing.</p>
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<p>While the 65-year-old leader seems to be open to the idea of retirement, he continues to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">feel duty-bound</a> to serve his country, saying:</p>
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<p>We have been having this discussion within our (ruling) party since 2010 but circumstances, challenges and the history of Rwanda tend to dictate certain things.</p>
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<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> suggests Kagame is not only acting out of self-interest. For the past decade, I have studied dictators – broadly defined as leaders who <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26798255?casa_token=H1VtUP6OXN4AAAAA%3ACN4ZMpqRQLjTVWADVkXNAy7DkihYbR37keo8XMMpN6KUdqpLTa1nJyH40iUKhIp-ZKKCl_xcF_PWJnL83ej-Sf_QMuCsg95AIYSyk3X67O8ptoy1N_AH">cannot be removed through elections</a>, or where political opposition doesn’t operate on a level playing field. I have tried to <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289/289">nuance the assumption</a> that all dictators are <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">power hungry</a>. Some dictators are. But often their motives to rule their countries are more complex.</p>
<p>In my view, this is the case with Kagame. While staying in power is necessary to attaining his vision for Rwanda, it isn’t a goal in itself. Kagame’s end goal seems to be a safe and prosperous Rwanda, but not one that’s meant to benefit all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>Although it’s prohibited by law to differentiate among Hutu and Tutsi, ethnic differences <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">still matter in Rwanda</a> – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/rhetorical-legacies-of-leadership-projections-of-benevolent-leadership-in-pre-and-postgenocide-rwanda/916F556DD2CFAB34AEF40A509E4D9229">favouring</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">Tutsi refugees</a> who were driven out of their country in pre-1994 episodes of genocidal violence. Former refugees like Kagame.</p>
<p>Kagame is indeed a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">dictator</a> who <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">restricts</a> serious political opposition, independent media and civil society. But he doesn’t rule only for the sake of being in power. I argue that he’s motivated by more than innate self-interest, which is likely to make him more <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">persevering</a> in the pursuit of his goals.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s Rwanda</h2>
<p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Kagame’s own life story. Following a genocidal killing spree that began in 1959 and targeted his ethnic community, the Tutsi, Kagame and his family <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/56058176?queryString=waugh%20kagame&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false">were forced to flee to Uganda</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">Life as a refugee</a> was difficult. Kagame was confronted with discrimination and became politically conscious as he grew older. This culminated in his role as the leader of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a>, which fought in Rwanda’s civil war in 1990, and eventually to end the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Throughout his ascent to Rwanda’s highest office in 2000, Kagame has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">pragmatic and ruthless</a>. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rwanda-progress-or-powder-keg/">invasion of Rwanda from Uganda</a> in 1990 sparked a civil war. Kagame was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Stephen-Kinzer-Thousand-Rwandas-5-2-2008/dp/B00HTKBBR0">realistic</a> about what his forces were able to do and was <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">more open to the eventual peace talks</a> than many others in his ranks were. </p>
<p>Yet, when mediation failed and the 1994 genocide needed to be ended, Kagame didn’t shy away from <a href="https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/gsi.12.2.03">perpetrating mass atrocities</a> to <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">attain this end</a>. After he got into power, his <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4876.htm">ruthless tactics</a> targeted anyone he believed to be an enemy at home and abroad <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/586476/summary?casa_token=fIZfzS2BSB0AAAAA:e79DaDyhEhWY5BqB4gCoA-JyMoDKnyGaFnrdv2tyHkX-ugS8M9lCzRfu5M7CRfhKic3IeK3iU6k">in the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-kagame-could-be-president-of-rwanda-until-2035-whats-behind-his-staying-power-204051">Paul Kagame could be president of Rwanda until 2035 - what's behind his staying power</a>
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<p>Kagame is also idealistic. He has consistently worked towards the same goal, against all odds, for most of his adult life. He sees the end as justifying the means – whether this entails sacrificing innocent lives to save others during the genocide, or sacrificing freedom for prosperity in post-genocide Rwanda. But for Kagame, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">idealism</a> goes hand in hand with pragmatism: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you are driven by the ideal, but you are able to recognise and work with reality, then managing this reality will help you to embrace it and get there. So, the marathon is the long journey we take towards development, it is reality. But we are driven by an ideal, and this ideal allows us to sprint forward; it motivates us; it helps us to achieve our goals and manage reality.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kagame has <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/828735733?queryString=rwanda%20crisafulli%20redmond&stickyFacetsChecked=false&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&format=Book&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_printbook&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_digital&changedFacet=format">received</a> credit for the manner in which Rwanda prospered after the genocide into a clean, modern country with a growing economy. </p>
<p>These achievements are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">impressive</a> in many respects. But as various <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">studies</a> have <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">shown</a>, this growth hasn’t benefited all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>This is because the president’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018900">allegiance</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">lies with</a> his fellow Tutsi.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s mission</h2>
<p>In my view, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">Kagame’s goal</a> is to create a home for the Tutsi population that was chased out of Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>The president launched a project of social engineering where, on the surface, ethnicity <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/714811956?lang=nl&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&queryString=remaking%20rwanda&stickyFacetsChecked=false">no longer matters</a> and the economy is thriving due to extensive modernisation. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">ethnicity continues to matter</a>. An example of this is that, for nearly 10 years, the Tutsi have come to be recognised as the only genocide survivors in the country. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">2014</a>, Kagame officially renamed the genocide “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">How Rwanda's annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity</a>
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<p>The name change suggests that only the Tutsi are victimised. Consequently, the Hutu are perceived as either <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">culpable bystanders or perpetrators</a>. It obscures the fact that moderate Hutus were targeted as well in 1994. </p>
<p>In addition, some scholars have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Chronicles-African-Region-French/dp/9057187574">questioned the extent of Rwanda’s economic progress</a>. An Ansoms, a professor in development studies, states that the country’s apparent modernisation hides “<a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">the true extent of poverty and inequality in the countryside</a>”. </p>
<p>For as long as Kagame believes he hasn’t <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">fulfilled his goal</a> of creating a prosperous and stable Rwanda that can be home to former Tutsi refugees like himself, he will continue to seek power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maartje Weerdesteijn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Paul Kagame’s own life story.Maartje Weerdesteijn, Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2074232023-06-12T14:51:41Z2023-06-12T14:51:41ZRwanda genocide accused Félicien Kabuga is ruled unfit to stand trial: this will further erode trust in international justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531219/original/file-20230610-107201-wj7ibu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65826274">concluded</a> a two-year court hearing on Félicien Kabuga. Kabuga is accused of crimes against humanity during the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. The court ruled that he was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/07/africa/felicien-kabuga-trial-incapable-intl/index.html">not mentally fit for trial</a>.</em> </p>
<p><em>The court proposed that the tribunal judges find an “alternative procedure that resembles a trial as closely as possible, but without the possibility of a conviction”. What this “alternative procedure” will look like is still not fully known. Rwanda’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Olivier Nduhungirehe, <a href="https://twitter.com/onduhungirehe/status/1666435782435905538">has suggested</a> a court case would still occur, but without Kabuga. Questions will be raised about how this falls within international legal procedures. Jonathan Beloff, who has <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/jonathan-r-beloff-phd">researched post-genocide Rwanda</a>, explores the implications of the tribunal’s decision for genocide victims.</em></p>
<h2>Who is Félicien Kabuga?</h2>
<p>Kabuga, who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-rwanda-kabuga-idUSKBN22W1L9">claims to be 90</a>, was a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/The-humble-social-man-who-grew-to-be-rich-and-influential-/1433218-1459342-91ulchz/index.html">successful businessman</a> before and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. </p>
<p>He gained considerable wealth from tea production during the presidency of Juvénal Habyarimana between 1973 and 1994. </p>
<p>In 1997, Kabuga was accused by the <a href="https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-38">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> of seven criminal charges. These included providing funds to <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/11/ex-militia-says-felicien-kabuga-supplied-ak47-rifles-to-commit-genocide/">import weapons</a> used to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">kill an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus</a> over 100 days in 1994.</p>
<p>He was also accused of <a href="https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-38">funding</a> a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354894105_The_Role_of_Radio-Television_Libre_Des_Mille_Collines_in_The_Rwandan_Genocide_An_Analysis_From_The_Theoretical_Perspectives_of_Intergroup_Threat_and_Aggression">radio station</a> that broadcasted anti-Tutsi messages. </p>
<p>Kabuga fled Rwanda during the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Rwandan%20Patriotic%20Front%20ended,April%20and%20ended%20in%20July.">operation</a> to end the genocide.</p>
<p>He was named among <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">93 suspected leaders</a> of the genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. However, he remained in hiding in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/5/24/the-risky-business-of-tracking-rwandan-fugitive-felicien-kabuga">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/lindamelvern/status/1666390119203450880">Switzerland</a> and later France. </p>
<p>In May 2020, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-rwanda-kabuga/rwandan-genocide-fugitive-kabuga-due-before-french-court-idUSKBN22V1FY">French authorities arrested him at his Paris home</a>. Kabuga has, however, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwandan-felicien-kabuga-calls-genocide-charges-lies/a-53590828">denied</a> the charges against him. </p>
<h2>What happened after his arrest in France?</h2>
<p>The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals at The Hague gained custody of Kabuga shortly after his arrest. His alleged crimes fell under its jurisdiction. The Hague-based court took over from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, whose mandate ended <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Prosecution in Rwanda was never a realistic option – Kabuga was wanted by an international court, which holds legal precedence over Rwanda’s judicial demands.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-will-want-felicien-kabuga-tried-at-home-why-this-wont-happen-139010">Rwandans will want Félicien Kabuga tried at home. Why this won't happen</a>
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<p>Additionally, international human rights groups, such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/25/law-and-reality/progress-judicial-reform-rwanda">Human Rights Watch</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/013/2007/en/">Amnesty International</a>, have questioned the credibility of Rwanda’s judicial system, often claiming unfair practices and political interference. This has affected the Rwandan government in extradition applications for other genocide perpetrators. Nevertheless, Rwanda’s National Public Prosecution Authority committed to assisting the international tribunal in Kabuga’s prosecution.</p>
<p>The central focus of Kabuga’s case at the tribunal was his ability to participate in the hearings meaningfully. By the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-genocide-kabuga-trial-dementia-f49f92513ef7f6ecbdefb993e4a86e23">time of his arrest</a>, he had suffered physical deterioration from old age and <a href="https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-dementia/what-is-dementia">dementia</a>. Dementia covers a range of conditions that include a loss of memory, problem-solving and language skills.</p>
<p>Kabuga’s lawyers argued that he was unfit for trial because of these medical conditions. Since his arrest, he has been held by The Hague-based court. </p>
<p>Rwandan genocide survivor organisations, such as Ibuka, have <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/113158-kabuga-trial-for-rwandans-the-old-man-is-still-hiding.html">previously protested</a> against any hindrance to what they perceive as necessary justice. But Kabuga’s lawyers’ arguments on their client’s mental well-being convinced the judges. </p>
<h2>What are the implications of this judgement for Rwandans?</h2>
<p>The recent court decision on Kabuga’s inability to fruitfully participate in any trial reinforces what <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/8129/news/crime/un-court-decision-on-kabuga-trial-disappointing---activists">some Rwandans expected as a failure of the international system and justice</a>. </p>
<p>Shortly after his arrest, some Rwandans <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/2/who-should-try-rwandan-genocide-suspect-felicien-kabuga">expressed scepticism</a> about Kabuga’s trial that would be in Europe rather than Kigali. They say those suspected of participating in <a href="https://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/cnlg-and-ibuka-call-out-uk-judiciary/">Rwanda’s genocide must be prosecuted in the country</a> where the crime occurred. As the Ibuka executive secretary <a href="https://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/cnlg-and-ibuka-call-out-uk-judiciary/">once put it</a>:</p>
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<p>Rwanda has all it requires to deliver standard justice. </p>
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<p>Some Rwandans have also <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26893864?seq=1">questioned</a> the effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20200528-debate-who-is-f%C3%A9licien-kabuga-rwandan-genocide-kingpin-arrested-in-france">claiming</a> it sought to make up for the international community’s inaction during the genocide rather than provide justice for the victims.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rusesabagina-vs-rwanda-how-kagame-wields-soft-power-to-get-his-way-with-the-west-202963">Rusesabagina vs Rwanda: how Kagame wields soft power to get his way with the west</a>
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<p>This tribunal cost nearly <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">US$1 billion</a>, and convicted 61 out of 93 Rwandan perpetrators from 1995 to 2012. In contrast, Rwanda’s domestic judicial and reconciliation system, <a href="https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new/">gacaca</a>, prosecuted an estimated one million people for various crimes and offences during the genocide at a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12281#:%7E:text=Clark%20notes%20that%20the%20Gacaca,%2C%20%26%20Gasanabo%2C%202016">much lower cost</a> between 2002 and 2012. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Aftermath#ref1111323">Gacaca courts</a> were presided over by local leaders. They gave the accused opportunities to admit guilt and reconcile with victims. </p>
<p>This latest international court ruling on Kabuga will <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-challenges-icc-role-as-court-marks-fifteen-years/1703692.html">reinforce the belief</a> that the international community has abandoned Rwandans who seek meaningful justice. The decision, particularly in light of the fact that <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/6482/news/kwibuka/29-years-after-genocide-over-1000-suspects-still-at-large">genocide suspects are still at large in other countries</a>, is likely to erode Rwandan trust in international courts’ capabilities to properly prosecute suspects and deliver justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Kabuga’s release raises questions about the international community’s commitment to delivering justice for genocide victims.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2027852023-03-30T09:57:33Z2023-03-30T09:57:33ZRwanda: Paul Rusesabagina’s release and apology – a master stroke by Kagame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518163/original/file-20230329-16-lfc7wl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina receives the Medal of Freedom from US President George W Bush in 2005.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mark Wilson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s ministry of justice recently announced the <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/03/indulto-Ruanda-24-mar-2023.pdf">pardon and release</a> of Paul Rusesabagina from jail. Rusesabagina was involved in events portrayed in the 2004 Hollywood film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395169/">Hotel Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>In September 2021, Rusesabagina was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/25/hotel-rwanda-hero-admits-forming-armed-group-behind-attacks">sentenced</a> to 25 years in jail over his ties to groups opposed to Rwandan president Paul Kagame. His release followed intense diplomatic talks between Washington and Kigali, and was <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/28/freed-hotel-rwanda-hero-arrives-in-qatar//">negotiated by Qatar</a>. </p>
<p>While Rusesabagina’s release may be celebrated by his supporters in the west, it’s a bit more complicated within and for Rwanda. His pardon needs to be understood within the greater context of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Foreign-Policy-in-Post-Genocide-Rwanda-Elite-Perceptions-of-Global-Engagement/Beloff/p/book/9780367436452">Rwandan foreign policy</a>, whose primary objectives are state security, reduction of foreign aid reliance and economic diplomacy.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s arrest illustrated the Rwandan government’s determination to neutralise threats it sees to its national security. His subsequent release provides important narrating elements for both domestic and foreign audiences. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/03/indulto-Ruanda-24-mar-2023.pdf#page=4">official request</a> for pardon from Kagame, Rusesabagina <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/25/hotel-rwanda-hero-admits-forming-armed-group-behind-attacks">admitted</a> to working with anti-Rwanda groups and took responsibility for their actions. This legitimises Kigali’s move to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hotel-rwanda-hero-arrested-terror-charges-say-police-n1238904">arrest</a> him. It also provides the government with ammunition to combat future criticisms of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/10/rwanda-rusesabagina-was-forcibly-disappeared">human rights abuses over the arrest</a>. </p>
<p>But perhaps more importantly, Rusesabagina’s release portrays Kagame as a pragmatist on the international stage – one willing to negotiate once a security threat is neutralised. </p>
<p>The pardon also helps restore the close ties Rwanda and the US have historically enjoyed. Senior US political leaders, including secretary of state <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">Antony Blinken</a>, had censured Rwanda over the arrest.</p>
<p>Domestically, the government has said Rusesabagina’s release fits within its truth and reconciliation process following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">1994 genocide against the Tutsi</a>. </p>
<h2>Who is Rusesabagina?</h2>
<p>In Hotel Rwanda, Rusesabagina (played by Don Cheadle) is depicted as being the primary person to save the lives of 1,268 people hiding inside Hotel Des Mille Collines during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Over the course of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">100 days</a>, more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed.</p>
<p>However, the Hollywood narrative has been <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">challenged by genocide survivors</a> who say it misrepresented facts. Instead, they say, Rusesabagina ran the hotel as a personal profit-making venture. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hotel-rwanda-a-film-that-proved-to-be-a-double-edged-sword-for-kigali-192253">Hotel Rwanda: a film that proved to be a double-edged sword for Kigali</a>
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<p>Rusesabagina left Rwanda in 1996, and eventually became a US resident and Belgian citizen. Following the film’s release, he received several humanitarian awards, including the <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/11/images/20051109-2_p110905pm-0363jpg-515h.html">US Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005</a>. He used his newfound platform to promote his political ambitions and ideology. </p>
<p>The Rwandan government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58624691">accused Rusesabagina</a> of terrorism over his funding of the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change, which has the National Liberation Front and PDR-Ihumure military wings. These groups have called for a change of government in Rwanda and a return to ethnic divisions.</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/YolandeMakolo/status/1639740480291307521">Kigali</a> viewed this as harmful to the country’s post-genocide social development under the <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1480&context=gsp"><em>Ndi Umunyarwanda</em></a> (I am Rwandan) ideology. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZegIcDyowo">aired a call for armed resistance against Kagame</a>, and soon after, National Liberation Front militants attacked Rwanda. In June and December 2018, the group carried out two attacks in southwestern Rwanda. Nine civilians <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/180402/News/victims-of-mrcd-fln-attacks-in-southern-rwanda">died</a>. </p>
<p>These attacks sparked a harsh response from the Rwandan government, which issued an arrest warrant against Rusesabagina. He was captured on 27 August 2020, and subsequently tried and convicted. His 25-year jail term was effectively a life sentence – he is 68. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s arrest put Kagame on a collision course with Washington. The Rwandan government had arrested an American resident, and the move was seen as an attempt to silence a critic. US secretary of state Blinken and senator Robert Menendez, who chairs the senate’s foreign relations committee, were among high-profile political leaders who <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-senator-questions-aid-to-rwanda-over-human-rights-role-in-congo-/6674174.html">demanded</a> Rusesabagina’s release. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s family petitioned the Belgian and American governments to intervene. Hollywood actors started a “<a href="https://paulr.org/">Free Rusesabagina</a>” clothing campaign. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other rights groups <a href="https://paulr.org/timeline-2/">added their voices</a>. </p>
<h2>Why pardon Rusesabagina?</h2>
<p>Rusesabagina’s release followed his <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/03/indulto-Ruanda-24-mar-2023.pdf#page=4">request for pardon</a> from Kagame on 14 October 2022. In his letter, he acknowledged that violence is not the solution for Rwanda’s post-genocide development. </p>
<p>More importantly, he agreed to respect Rwanda’s current political system with Kagame as its leader, saying:</p>
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<p>Moving forward, I know you will focus on securing a peaceful future for all Rwandans.</p>
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<p>He also said he wouldn’t dive into Rwandan politics again, and would instead “spend the remainder of my days in the United States in quiet reflection”. The pardon can be interpreted as effectively silencing Rusesabagina. </p>
<p>Rwanda’s Minister of Justice said Rusesabagina would still have to <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/6108/news/law/rusesabagina-clemency-will-not-affect-reparations-justice-ministry">pay reparations</a> to victims of the 2018 attacks. The <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/189531/News/victims-of-fln-attacks-awarded-rwf400-million-in-compensation">courts awarded</a> them 412 million Rwandan francs (US$374,000). </p>
<h2>Who wins?</h2>
<p>Rusesabagina’s release is still shrouded in mystery, with few details released. So far, the Rwandan government has said the Qatari government negotiated his release, not the US. </p>
<p>Despite Kigali <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2023/03/rusesabagina-pardon-rwanda-did-not-yield-to-pressure-deputy-govt-spokesperson/">denying US pressure</a>, the release does benefit the Rwanda-US relationship. Washington can say, whether officially or informally, it helped free a US resident and took a hard stance against its African ally. For Rwanda, it illustrates <a href="https://twitter.com/PressSecRwanda/status/1639282783112556544?s=20">the government’s willingness</a> to constructively engage with its most important global ally. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">The US and Rwanda: how the relationship has evolved since the 1994 genocide</a>
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<p>Rusesabagina’s release eases tensions with US political leaders, including Blinken, who privately discussed Rusesabagina’s release with Kagame during an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">August 2022 visit to Rwanda</a>. The pardon also effectively removes a lightning rod that US politicians and activists have used to criticise Rwanda’s human rights record.</p>
<p>It also benefits the Rwandan government at home. Forgiveness is a central tenet of the country’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/02/59162/">gacaca</a>” judicial system. This traditional form of justice pursued reconciliation outcomes rather than punishment after the genocide. It was used to try <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-how-to-deal-with-a-million-genocide-suspects-38642#:%7E:text=In%20total%2C%20an%20estimated%20one,such%20as%20looting%20or%20theft">one million suspects</a>. Rusesabagina’s pardon reinforces the importance of forgiveness for those who confess their crimes.</p>
<p>Finally, by publicly disclosing Rusesabagina’s pardon request, the government has illustrated to both Rwandans and foreign nations how even harsh critics can change tune and support Kagame. This helps reinforce the government’s narrative that Kagame is the best leader for national development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan R Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (Project Reference: AH/W001217/1). </span></em></p>Rusesabagina’s release portrays Rwanda’s president as a pragmatist – one willing to negotiate once a security threat is neutralised.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010992023-03-13T12:24:32Z2023-03-13T12:24:32ZThe Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513396/original/file-20230303-18-fisnxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Banyamulenge community members at the funeral of one of their own in eastern DRC.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Banyamulenge are a minority ethnic group in South Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In December 2022, the UN adviser on the prevention of genocide raised concerns about attacks against the community based on “<a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">ethnicity or perceived allegiance with neighbouring countries</a>”. The Banyamulenge have <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">long been viewed</a> as not being Congolese. The government, however, has often dismissed claims that the community is facing targeted attacks <a href="https://www.politico.cd/encontinu/2022/11/24/pretendus-discours-de-haine-en-rdc-une-fiction-qui-ressemble-aux-discours-segregationnistes-portes-par-le-rwanda-patrick-muyaya.html/121636/">as fiction</a>. Delphin R Ntanyoma, who has <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">extensively researched</a> the Banyamulenge, explains why they are facing persecution.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Banyamulenge and how has their status changed over time?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge live in eastern DRC in South Kivu province. They are mostly seen as affiliated to the Tutsi of the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">African Great Lakes region</a>, and they speak a language close to Kirundi (Burundi) and Kinyarwanda (Rwanda). The Banyamulenge settled in South Kivu between the 16th and 18th centuries, having come from what are today Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. They are largely cattle keepers. </p>
<p>They mostly occupy the southern part of South Kivu province: the Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira territories. In the 1960s and 1970s, some Banyamulenge moved to Katanga in the DRC’s southern region. The region has rich pastures for cattle herding and is close to the large cities of Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi, providing business opportunities. However, in 1998, nearly 20,000 Banyamulenge were forced to flee Katanga after they were <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_10298.html">attacked for being “foreigners”</a>. </p>
<p>Since 1984, the DRC has not organised a <a href="https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/DRC-census-working-paper-fina-online.pdf">general census</a>. The historian <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/nl/title/banyamulenge-qui-sont-ils-dou-viennent-ils-quel-role-ont-ils-joue-et-pourquoi-dans-le-processus-de-la-liberation-du-zaire/oclc/42719868">Joseph Mutambo</a> estimated the group had around 400,000 people in 1997. There are no clear estimates today, but it’s safe to assume that they have grown in number. </p>
<p>Colonial history in the Great Lakes region has categorised local communities into <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">“native” and “immigrants”</a>. Farmers are seen as native, while cattle herders are largely perceived as immigrants, foreigners and invaders. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">Why history matters in understanding conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo</a>
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<p>Based on these assumptions, the Banyamulenge have been viewed as foreigners and were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Africa-04.htm">denied citizenship in the 1980s</a>. A decade later, the Congolese state <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/drc-banyamulenge-seeking-political-solution-tensions">sought to expel them</a> after a parliamentary resolution to send back all Rwandan and Burundian descendants. </p>
<p>This added to the perception that the Banyamulenge were “invaders”. I have researched the drivers of violence in South and North Kivu for six years, with a focus on the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">Banyamulenge situation</a>. It’s clear that much of the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/14687968211009895">violence targeting them</a> revolves around the misconception that they are <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">strangers in their own country</a>. </p>
<h2>Who’s who on the list of their political adversaries?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge’s political adversaries range from local politicians to armed groups and militias. Most of the politicians who rally their constituents against the Banyamulenge are from neighbouring ethnic communities. These include the Babembe, Bafuliro, Banyindu and Bavira. Members of these ethnic communities consider themselves “native”. Political figures outside South Kivu have also spread the idea that the Banyamulenge are outsiders. </p>
<p>Those who take issue with the Banyamulenge claim to be protecting their country from “invaders”. This has led to armed mobilisations and the use of local militias, like the MaiMai and Biloze-Bishambuke. These militias have vowed to <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-warning-the-vulnerability-of-banyamulenge-invaders">expel the Banyamulenge or eliminate them</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Since 2017, Burundian rebel groups like Red-Tabara and Forces Nationales de Liberation have joined local militias in attacks against the Banyamulenge. The Red-Tabara’s involvement raised questions about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-rwanda-un-idUSKCN0VD04K">Rwanda’s role</a> after UN reports claimed that the country had supported the rebel group with logistical and training skills. </p>
<h2>How are the Banyamulenge targeted?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge have been targeted by Congolese security services and local militias in major attacks <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_brf2287.html">in 1996</a>, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/27798/drc-belgium-pursues-case-against-ex-minister-icj">1998</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">2004</a>. </p>
<p>A new wave of violence against the group <a href="https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/province-sud-kivu-un-champ-de-bataille-multidimensionnel-meconnu">began in 2017</a>, and has since led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and the destruction of <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/rapport-sur-les-attaques-anti-banyamulenge-en-rd-congo">hundreds of villages</a>. That year was marked by <a href="https://theconversation.com/2017-the-year-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-would-like-to-forget-88170">intensifying conflict in the DRC</a> over election delays. </p>
<p>The looting of Banyamulenge-owned cattle has been a constant occurrence <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26309798">since the 1960s</a>. Cattle constitute a major source of income and livelihood, and looting has worked as a strategy to impoverish the community and jeopardise their future. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">Burundi's Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict</a>
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<p>Due to the widespread destruction of villages, the remaining Banyamulenge in South Kivu live in small localities like Minembwe, Murambya/Bijombo, Mikenge and Bibokoboko. They continue to face <a href="https://kivutimes.com/minembwe-attaque-des-mai-mai-biloze-bishambuke-ilunga-et-yakutumba-plusieurs-villages-sous-le-feu-la-societe-civile-alerte-les-autorites/">regular and coordinated attacks</a>, which have prevented the community from accessing pastures and farmland beyond a two-kilometre radius. </p>
<p>Armed militias in South Kivu have <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">prevented and constrained</a> humanitarian organisations from getting aid into Banyamulenge settlements. </p>
<p>Hate speech has played a major role in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">fuelling violence</a> against the community. Twitter, Facebook, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG2YPRq3Uqw">YouTube</a> and other social media platforms have thousands of posts and videos that claim the Banyamulenge are not Congolese citizens and shouldn’t be in the country. </p>
<p>Such dehumanising and hateful speech feeds the minds and hearts of young people, mainly men, who consider attacks against the Banyamulenge a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5253c0784.html">“noble” cause</a>. <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/democratic-republic-of-congo-rising-concern-banyamulenge">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/hate-speech-and-genocide-in-minembwe-d-r-congo">activists</a> have called for greater attention to be paid to these attacks.</p>
<h2>Who’s behind the attacks?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge are targeted because they are viewed as “foreigners”. For decades, local armed groups and militias have mobilised to get rid of those perceived as invaders. This ideology is transmitted across generations. </p>
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<p>In addition, the Congolese national army has played a role in enabling attacks against the Banyamulenge by <a href="https://twitter.com/KivuSecurity/status/1304083139334156289">providing ammunition to militias</a> or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXYdu8U7At0">opening breaches when rebels attack civilians</a>. Huge destruction has taken place in areas where the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/10/28/eastern-Congo-Kivu-conflict-regional-tensions">Congolese army is present</a> but didn’t intervene. </p>
<p>There are three possible reasons for the army’s general inaction. First, some military commanders and soldiers may believe the narrative that the Banyamulenge are not Congolese. Second, some military commanders create chaos and conflict pocket zones to serve one or more protagonists in the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">Great Lakes region</a>. Third, violence allows military commanders to access operational funds – and looted cattle can be turned into money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Banyamulenge have been viewed as strangers in their own country – the violence targeting them revolves around this misconception.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922532022-11-07T13:50:13Z2022-11-07T13:50:13ZHotel Rwanda: a film that proved to be a double-edged sword for Kigali<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491348/original/file-20221024-25-fvcj8m.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina at the Supreme Court in Kigali, Rwanda, in February 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Paul Rusesabagina is perhaps one of the world’s best <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/world/africa/rwanda-paul-rusesabagina.html">known</a> Rwandans. His actions during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi were made famous in the 2004 Hollywood film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395169/">Hotel Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>The film was inspired by what happened inside Hotel des Mille Collines in the capital, Kigali. Here, 1,268 Rwandans, both Tutsis and Hutus, were saved from genocidal forces waiting beyond its walls.</p>
<p>The film depicts Rusesabagina – who <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rusesabagina-i-am-not-rwandan-try-me-as-a-belgian-2486428">left Rwanda</a> in 1996 – as a hero who saved these lives. Following the film’s release, Rusesabagina received several humanitarian awards, including the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/presidential-medal-of-freedom-9-11-05/6/">US Presidential Medal of Freedom</a> in 2005 from former president George W Bush. He eventually became a US resident and Belgian citizen.</p>
<p>On 27 August 2020, however, Rwandan officials arrested Rusesabagina. Human Rights Watch accused the Rwandan government of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/10/rwanda-rusesabagina-was-forcibly-disappeared">intentionally misleading</a> him into a flight to Kigali. </p>
<p>The government accused Rusesabagina of supporting anti-Rwanda groups. He was charged with terrorism, arson, kidnapping and murder over two <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-security-idUSKCN1S61AG">attacks</a> in 2018 that killed nine Rwandans. On 20 September 2021, Rusesabagina was convicted of these charges. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>Since his conviction, Rwanda has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-rejects-calls-to-release-rusesabagina-3911342">rebuffed</a> growing international pressure for Rusesabagina’s release. </p>
<p>In August 2022, during a visit to Kigali, US secretary of state Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">urged the government</a> to release Rusesabagina. In Hollywood, actors and actresses have highlighted the issue through a “Free Rusesabagina” clothing campaign.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">The US and Rwanda: how the relationship has evolved since the 1994 genocide</a>
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<p>In my most recent <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">research paper</a>, I focused on the Rusesabagina case. Based on interviews with Rwandans, I conclude that Hollywood’s interpretation of historical events significantly differs from those who lived in the hotel during the genocide. </p>
<p>Hotel Rwanda is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/17/hotel-rwanda-hollywood-ending">double-edged sword</a> for the country. </p>
<p>On one hand, it introduced the horrific <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a> to a world that knew little of what had happened in the small African nation. Over 100 days between 6 April and 19 July, Rwanda witnessed the deaths of up to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the film’s historical inaccuracies <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-08-17/now-jailed-for-terrorism-one-time-hotel-rwanda-hero-has-become-point-of-u-s-contention-with-rwanda">built up</a> Rusesabagina’s profile. Based on what I found during the course of the interviews I did, I argue that he used his fame to promote his version of Rwandan history and his <a href="https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/African-hero-now-living-in-S-A-will-run-for-6791393.php">desire for political power</a>. My research findings echo those of others, including <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hotel-Rwanda-Tutsi-genocide-Hollywood-ebook/dp/B008FXI9EI">Rwandan academics</a>, who have explored the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Inside-Hotel-Rwanda-Surprising-Matters-ebook/dp/B00APDFXF4">mismatch</a> in narratives. </p>
<p>Many in the global north, whose primary knowledge of Rwanda consists of the film, were swayed to Rusesabagina’s rather than Rwandans’ expression of their history, goals and desires. This narrative was driven to a large extent by human rights groups, which have been highly critical of the country’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/rwanda">human rights record</a>. </p>
<h2>Differing narratives</h2>
<p>Between 2008 and 2018, more than 100 Hotel des Mille Collines survivors discussed with me their historical experiences and belief that Rusesabagina was not the reason they were still alive. I conducted most of these interviews at the hotel and the Kigali Genocide Memorial, which houses the remains of more than 250,000 genocide victims. My research also used existing networks within the Rwandan government and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>Survivors who were at the hotel <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">said</a> Rusesabagina ran the hotel as a personal profit-making venture. </p>
<p>If one could not pay him, one would face expulsion from the hotel’s grounds, which meant certain death. One survivor said:</p>
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<p>If you could pay, you would stay in a room. If you couldn’t pay for a room, you could pay to stay in a hallway. If you couldn’t pay that, you could pay to stay by the pool. If you couldn’t pay that, he (Rusesabagina) would demand you to leave. </p>
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<p>One hotel worker told me this:</p>
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<p>He (Rusesabagina) didn’t care about any of us (workers). I begged him to let them (my family) stay as I was working there (at the hotel) for a long time. He didn’t care and demanded I pay him money or he would throw them out to be killed.</p>
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<p>Several other <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/survivors-rusesabagina-was-no-hero-hotel-rwanda-film--1934890">survivor stories</a> suggest a different narrative from the one in the film. In Hotel Rwanda, Rusesabagina is depicted as collecting money only to pay off genocide perpetrators. </p>
<h2>Rusesabagina during the genocide</h2>
<p>Prior to the genocide, Rusesabagina worked at the neighbouring Hotel des Diplomates. He took over the management of Hotel des Mille Collines after discovering that its European manager, Bik Cornelis, had been evacuated. One former hotel worker told me:</p>
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<p>…a few days into the killings, Rusesabagina walked in one day and saw that the old manager (Cornelis) was taken with the other Europeans. He called (the hotel owners) and told them to … only work with him. They had no idea what was going on and probably hadn’t talked to Cornelis yet, so they agreed.</p>
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<p>While the film credits Rusesabagina with creating an oasis during the conflict, he’s not the reason the hotel – one of the few areas offering refuge at the time – survived attacks from those behind the genocide. </p>
<p>Not depicted in the film are the seven to 10 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) soldiers who were constantly positioned in front of the facility. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Shake-Hands-Devil-Failure-Humanity/dp/0786715103">book</a>, Roméo Dallaire, a former commander of this UN mission, says he stationed troops at the hotel’s only entrance as a symbolic indication that it was under the UN’s protection. Dallaire has <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/archive/ca/entry/romeo-dallaire-senator-slams-hotel-rwanda-film-as-revisionist_n_1174607">spoken out</a> against Hotel Rwanda as historical revisionism.</p>
<p>Further, the Interahamwe, the primary Hutu death squads responsible for the
genocidal killings, had been directed to stay outside the walls of the hotel. They allowed people to run into it, but would threaten or kill those who tried to leave. </p>
<p>One former Interahamwe who had been stationed about 20 metres from the hotel’s entrance told me that he received instructions from his regional commander to “just stay put by the hotel and to allow the Tutsis and others to have access”. The hotel was also used for prisoner exchanges “and it would be the final spot for us to cleanse (murder the Tutsis) once we beat the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)”.</p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, took control of the country in July, ending the genocide. The horrors of the 100-day period led to Rwanda’s focus on forming a new single ethnic identity: “Rwandan”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Rwanda has rebuffed international pressure to release Paul Rusesabagina, a man made famous by Hollywood.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913512022-10-02T08:41:52Z2022-10-02T08:41:52ZBurundi’s Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486859/original/file-20220927-18-9tkhfy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Men hold up protest signs in front of the coffins of DRC refugees killed in August 2004 in Gatumba, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in violence. Millions of people have been killed and an <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-the-drc/">estimated 5.6 million</a> others displaced by civil wars, local feuds and cross-border conflicts. The neighbouring countries of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been locked into this ongoing cycle, too.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">The First Congo War</a> began in 1996, with a coalition of the DRC’s neighbours supporting a rebel group that toppled the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Laurent Kabila was installed as head of state in 1997. A year later, however, a bloodier war began amid violent jostling for power and influence.</p>
<p>In December 2002, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/17/congo">peace deal</a> was signed. The DRC got a national army and new constitution. Democratic elections were held in 2006, the country’s first in more than 40 years. </p>
<p>But the violence soon resumed. Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory proved difficult. Since then, the Congo has received tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and hosts one of the largest <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">United Nations peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>Various studies have fronted several reasons for the persistence of war in the Congo. These include <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congos-peace-miracle-or-mirage">flaws</a> in the 2002 peace deal, a Congolese elite that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">benefits from the chaos</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africa/2010-drc-mapping-report">ethnic intolerance</a>. </p>
<p>The events that have shaped the DRC mean different things to different actors. The fact that sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country has over <a href="https://minorityrights.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">250 ethnic groups</a> gives a sense of the complexity of its plight.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chris-Davey-9/research">My research</a> adds to debate on the factors driving the violence. I focused on the narratives of Banyamulenge soldiers. The Banyamulenge are a sub-group of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group, and originally come from the province of South Kivu in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>They are an important constituency to consider because their experiences offer a window into past and current Congolese conflicts. </p>
<p>They illustrate how violence in the Congo multiplies across borders, blurs the lines between victim and perpetrator, and is used to win a place in government rather than to overthrow it. </p>
<p>From my research, I believe that to stop the cycle of violence, the DRC and its regional allies need a new status quo that doesn’t reward rebellion but decreases its appeal. Politics that facilitates peaceful livelihoods is essential.</p>
<h2>Tracing the pattern</h2>
<p>In August 2004, 166 members of the <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">Congolese Banyamulenge community</a> were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">killed in Gatumba</a>, a small town in Burundi near its border with DRC. They were at a UN-protected refugee camp. </p>
<p>The killings were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3564358.stm">perpetrated</a> by a group of armed rebels, many of them from the Forces for National Liberation, a Burundian Hutu militia group. The group claimed their Banyamulenge victims were planning a new war in the Congo.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">spoke to</a> survivors of the 2004 massacre. Most felt that the attack wasn’t a one-off event, but part of a pattern of mobilising anti-Tutsi violence. </p>
<p>This began before Gatumba and persists into the present day. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">archive of Gatumba survivor accounts</a> that I was involved in curating attests to this ongoing persecution and the wider dysfunctions of the region. These include the lack of robust democracy or transparent governance, and high levels of insecurity. </p>
<p>Like most participants in Congolese conflicts, the rebels and refugees involved in the Gatumba massacre regularly crossed the DRC’s border. The Banyamulenge refugees fled to Burundi to escape turmoil in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drcsouth-kivu-jun-2004-situation-report-and-recommendations">South Kivu in 2004</a>. The Forces for National Liberation moved between DRC and Burundi to recruit, fight and cooperate with armed groups in both countries. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">How DRC's colonial legacy forged a nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict</a>
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<p>The DRC’s borders are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/103/412/359/81797?redirectedFrom=fulltext">porous</a>, with the central government too weak to control its eastern region or its boundaries. DRC borders nine countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.</p>
<p>These porous borders have allowed armed groups – like the Ugandan <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2011.542297">Allied Democratic Front</a> and Congolese-Tutsi <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">March 23 Movement</a> – to use the DRC as a base and battlefield, connecting civil conflicts across borders.</p>
<h2>Beyond ethnic conflict</h2>
<p>Gatumba was a border refugee camp. Hutu rebels found an easy target in Banyamulenge refugees, whom they associated with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/11/congo.rorycarroll">Tutsi rebels</a> behind the violence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation deployed religious-flavoured anti-Tutsi rhetoric to motivate their political base. But there’s rarely a straight line between politics and ethnicity. The Hutu rebels <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971605100202">were in political competition</a> against other Hutu-labelled militias and parties. </p>
<p>Contemporary rebel groups, too, act in multiple directions as they destabilise border areas, displacing and killing civilians. </p>
<p>The March 23 Movement, for instance, provides anti-Tutsi fodder for extremist politicians across the DRC. These politicians benefit from promoting <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">discrimination and hate speech</a>, and fuelling <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">protests</a> against the UN mission. The movement’s use of force has <a href="https://chrispdavey.blogspot.com/2022/06/m23-memory-remains.html">hardened lines</a> between Tutsis and other Congolese. </p>
<h2>Illegal violence to legitimate power</h2>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation, like other rebel groups, committed atrocities to improve its bargaining position in peace talks. </p>
<p>By 2004, other Burundian rebels had cut a peace deal with the Burundi government to become politicians and army officers. The Forces for National Liberation was marginalised. It, therefore, stopped trying to overthrow the state and focused on killing civilians, hoping to use the threat of terrorism to negotiate its way into power. It worked. </p>
<p>Agathon Rwasa, the leader of the Forces for National Liberation, signed a deal. He now leads <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-kenya-burundi-agathon-rwasa-b10afc3bb09daf8e4b87782b057fb56d">Burundi’s opposition party</a> in parliament and has not gone to trial for any crimes.</p>
<p>This elevation of a guerrilla into government is not unique to Burundi. </p>
<p>Rebel groups in the DRC typically aren’t looking to overthrow the state. Instead, they’re <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/98/3/873/6581695?redirectedFrom=fulltext">using rebellion</a> to prove themselves a threat. They then sue for <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/recycling-rebels-demobilization-congo">limited peace</a> and an improved position either in DRC or in neighbouring countries like Burundi or Uganda. </p>
<p>As one Gatumba survivor observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the reward for killing people is a promotion in our country. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s been 18 years since the Gatumba massacre. Groups like the <a href="https://www.gatumbasurvivors.org/">Banyamulenge Gatumba Refugee Survivors Foundation</a> are <a href="https://www.wishtv.com/news/hundreds-gather-for-18th-anniversary-of-the-gatumba-massacre/">working internationally</a> to pursue accountability and justice. Yet, addressing their own community’s past and current involvement in DRC’s multi-directional violence is largely taboo. </p>
<p>Until a broader sense of the past is more widely shared among Congolese groups, rebels will flit across borders, civilians will be both victims and perpetrators, and groups will purchase political power with demonstrations of violent disruption.</p>
<p>Interstate collaboration between the DRC and Burundi governments for justice in Gatumba would be a first step towards building a future without impunity.</p>
<p><em>Ezra Schrader, a research assistant at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies with the Gatumba Survivors Project, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey works for Clark University.</span></em></p>Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is used to win a place in government, not to overthrow it. And it keeps working.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884052022-08-09T07:06:15Z2022-08-09T07:06:15ZRwanda and DRC’s turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478120/original/file-20220808-1331-j07zmx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Félix Tshisekedi (left) and Rwanda President Paul Kagame in Kigali in 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Habimana Thierry/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) make for very unhappy neighbours. Both sides claim the other is set on bringing down their government, and violating past agreements and international norms. </p>
<p>Rwanda accuses the DRC of working with the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) or FDLR. The rebel group’s stated aim is to overthrow the Rwandan government. </p>
<p>For its part, the DRC accuses Rwanda of violating its sovereignty by supporting the Mouvement du 23 Mars (March 23 Movement, M23). The rebel group, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20UN%2C%20there,these%20armed%20groups%20as%20terrorists.">along with multiple others</a>, is active in the DRC. </p>
<p>A recent United Nations report supports Kinshasa’s contention. A group of experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">detailed its accusations</a> in a 131-page report. Kigali, however, dismissed the findings as “false allegations”.</p>
<p>Rwanda is a country of 13 million people and occupies 26,000 square kilometres. DRC, on the other hand, has 90 million people and covers a territory of 2.3 million square kilometres. The DRC lies to the west of Rwanda. The two countries share a border of about 217 kilometres.</p>
<iframe title="Rwanda and DRC" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-rFkmp" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/rFkmp/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Tensions between the two nations date back to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda when an estimated <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1462352042000225958">one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed</a>. Many of the perpetrators of the violence fled to the DRC, at the time called Zaire. The post-genocide Rwandan government launched military operations in a bid to force the perpetrators back home to face justice.</p>
<p>Rwanda believes the DRC continues to provide refuge for those behind the 1994 attack. </p>
<p>The two countries have gone through two major wars and multiple skirmishes. They have also had periods of stability and trade growth. The latest tensions, however, are <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-dr-congo-tension-threatening-regional-integration-3837838">cause for concern</a>. They risk destabilising the Eastern Africa region, disrupting trade routes and allowing for the establishment of opportunistic militia groups.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">The UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence</a>
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<p>The issue is on <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/">US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s agenda</a> as he tours three African nations in August 2022. He will meet with Congolese and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">Rwandan leaders</a> to negotiate for a peaceful resolution to the current conflict.</p>
<p>But, based on a decade of research into relations between the two countries, I do not believe Blinken’s visit will to lead to any significant reduction in tensions. The most recent events are not new. Both nations hold old suspicions of each other.</p>
<h2>How it started</h2>
<p>Since the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government has kept a close eye on DRC. While 4 July is marked in Rwanda as the day the genocide ended, it was a temporary pause. </p>
<p>After two years of inaction from the then Zaire president Mobutu Sese Seko, Rwanda went after those it believed were behind the attacks and were hiding in Zaire. It carried out military operations that triggered the <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">First Congo War (1996-1997)</a>. </p>
<p>This war had two objectives. The first was to disband the refugee camps that were hosting the remnants of the genocide perpetrators. An estimated two million refugees were forced back into Rwanda. </p>
<p>The second objective was the removal of Mobutu on the grounds that he was providing a haven for genocide actors. The Zairian dictator was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/world/mobutu-gives-up-leaving-kinshasa-and-ceding-power.html">removed from power</a> in May 1997.</p>
<p>Within nine months, the war was over. With Rwanda’s support, <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-mobutu-to-kabila-the-drc-is-paying-a-heavy-price-for-autocrats-at-its-helm-79455">Laurent Kabila</a> and his Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, AFDL) took over power.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">What M23's on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC's precarious search for peace</a>
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<p>But a much bloodier Second Congo War (1998-2003) soon followed. This was catalysed by two events. First, the dismissal of the Congolese defence minister James Kabarebe, who was Rwandan and largely responsible for conducting the First Congo War. Second, Congo’s support for the remnant genocide forces, Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALiR).</p>
<p>The Second Congo War dragged on for five years. It led to the deaths of millions of people. This was as a result of the actual fighting, and an increase in disease and malnutrition.</p>
<p>The lack of a quick resolution to the war resulted in various parts of the DRC being run by either militia groups or the governments of neighbouring countries. Even allies during the start of the war, such as Uganda and Rwanda, <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/41712-drc-victims-of-kisangani-s-six-day-war-urge-tshisekedi-to-act.html">fought against each other</a>.</p>
<p>Eventually, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/secretary-general-hails-pretoria-agreement-political-milestone-peace">2002 Pretoria agreement</a> led to the withdrawal of the Rwandan military from Congolese territory. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Rwanda continues to contend that Congo supports genocide remnants, now operating as the FDLR. </p>
<p>For its part, DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting Congolese rebel groups, such as the Congrès National pour la Défense du People (National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP) and the M23.</p>
<h2>Divisions in Kigali</h2>
<p>The Rwandan government is divided on the future of relations with its giant neighbour. </p>
<p>One group of policy leaders perceives the DRC as a continual threat to Rwandan security. They view the Congolese military as being ineffective in combating forces stationed in the DRC that are expressly against the Rwandan government, such as the FDLR. </p>
<p>This group often dominates public policy decisions in Rwanda’s foreign relations with the DRC. </p>
<p>But there’s a second group that focuses on the economic opportunities of closer Rwandan-Congolese relations. They believe that Rwandan development should focus on the export of domestically produced goods to the Congolese market of 90 million potential customers. Many within this group believe that the economic benefits outweigh the security concerns, which they argue have decreased in recent years.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 election, which saw Félix Tshisekedi become Congolese president, relations between Rwanda and the DRC <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/18/opinion-rwanda-and-the-drc-converging-at-last/">improved</a>. This included increased trade activity between the two nations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedis-victory-in-the-drc-is-historic-but-controversial-109673">Tshisekedi’s victory in the DRC is historic -- but controversial</a>
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<p>It seemed for a while that the beliefs of Rwandans who wanted rapprochement with Kinshasa had the upper hand, hinting at a positive future for the two nations. </p>
<p>But in recent months, these hopes have been dashed. Once more, the dominant narratives involve allegations of DRC collaborating with the FDLR, and Rwanda with M23.</p>
<p>The two countries are likely to continue experiencing periods of stability and tension. Another major conflict, like the Congo wars, is unlikely, but the continual tensions prevent trade integration that would boost development and peace between the two nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).</span></em></p>Rwanda believes DRC continues to provide refuge for those behind the 1994 genocide.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862442022-08-02T14:05:56Z2022-08-02T14:05:56ZHow Rwanda’s annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473875/original/file-20220713-9357-jjdkei.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A billboard highlights Rwanda's 100-day commemoration of the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry Falise/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each year, Rwandans at home and in the diaspora remember those <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">killed in the 1994 genocide</a>. This is not a single-day event. Kwibuka (“to remember” in the local Kinyarwanda language) consists of 100 days of official commemoration. It’s characterised by explicit acknowledgement and public discussions of ethnic identity.</p>
<p>But there’s a puzzling contradiction of state policy at play during Kwibuka. </p>
<p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">ethnic non-recognition</a>. There are no Hutus or Tutsis; only Rwandans. The aim is to achieve national homogeneity in a country that was torn apart by ethnic genocide. </p>
<p>The policy is strictly enforced, but relaxes during the 100 days of Kwibuka. </p>
<p>This has led to seemingly opposed practices: legally erasing identity groups because of their link to conflict, contrasted against three months of saturated reminders in the form of public speeches, memorial programming, burials and commemorative signage.</p>
<p>In 2014, 20 years on, the genocide was officially renamed from the Rwandan genocide to “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. This decision was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12000.doc.htm">2018</a>. </p>
<p>The change marked a distinct shift from an inclusive naming. It also centred Tutsi people as the sole targets of genocidal violence. This, despite Rwanda and the international community historically acknowledging that moderate Hutus were victimised, too. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-rwanda-genocide-commemorations-are-infused-with-political-and-diplomatic-agendas-160283">In Rwanda, genocide commemorations are infused with political and diplomatic agendas</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-postconflict-rwanda/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59">My research</a> pinpointed four anomalies that were not present during the rest of the year but emerged during Kwibuka:</p>
<ul>
<li>a perceived increase in violence towards survivors</li>
<li>an increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology and denial</li>
<li>widespread youth involvement in identity rhetoric</li>
<li>a reported increase in prisoner confessions. </li>
</ul>
<p>These anomalies highlight how Kwibuka exacerbates social tensions. My research was done five years ago, but the <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rib-warns-against-genocide-ideology-ahead-kwibuka27">anomalies</a> I observed <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/04/kwibuka-28-killed-and-dumped-in-river-rubyiro-remembered-for-the-first-time/">persist</a>.</p>
<h2>Studying state-led commemoration</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59/S0022278X19000259a.pdf/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-post-conflict-rwanda.pdf">my research</a>, I examined the rhetoric coming from the Rwandan state on the 1994 genocide. I also observed nine commemoration events to see how attendees reacted to and spoke about Kwibuka.</p>
<p>I additionally conducted interviews to help me understand the differences between the commemoration period and the rest of the year. </p>
<p>I was curious to follow what effect this sudden shift from ethnic non-recognition to recognition might have on people. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the country’s leading political party, has “<a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2020/08/07/the-chilling-tale-of-mass-surveillance-and-spying-in-rwanda/">positioned itself</a> as the only guarantor of peace, security and development”, as Rwandan lawyer Louis Gitinywa writes. </p>
<p>My research shows this message is reinforced through commemoration programming. This commonly emphasises that only the ruling party and current political leadership stand between ordinary Rwandans and a reemergence of genocidal violence. </p>
<p>The ethnic non-recognition policy is linked to Rwandan laws against “genocide ideology” and <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ac5c4302.pdf">“sectarianism”</a>. The government claims that such laws keep Rwandans safe. However, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/005/2010/en/">critics</a> point out their chilling effect on legitimate political opposition and dissent. I was at times told that simply asking questions about genocide commemoration and ethnicity could be seen as being at odds with the law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/commonwealth-leaders-gather-in-rwanda-as-uk-refugee-plan-focuses-attention-on-human-rights-185328">Commonwealth leaders gather in Rwanda as UK refugee plan focuses attention on human rights</a>
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<h2>Anomalies</h2>
<p>I discovered four anomalies that are only present during the commemoration period. </p>
<p>First, there is heightened sensitivity across the country. Survivors told me they were worried about violence against them and their property. This is not baseless. National radio and television stations report threats against survivors throughout Kwibuka. These include their livestock being tortured, property destroyed and bones mailed to memorial sites.</p>
<p>The second anomaly is the emergence of “survivor youth” and their engagement with ethnic rhetoric. Among my interviewees, “survivor” was synonymous with “Tutsi”. </p>
<p>This self-claimed identity held even among young people who have spent most of their lives in a country with an ethnic non-recognition policy. Notably, my youth interviewees identified themselves by ethnicity unprompted, and when asked if they knew any non-Tutsi who would refer to themselves as “survivors”, they all said no or were unsure.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=2">National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide</a> shared data with me on accusations and convictions related to genocide denial and ideology during Kwibuka. It showed that many of these cases involved people born well after 1994. This happened despite the state’s insistence that the next generation is free of the old biases or violent inclinations that drove the genocide.</p>
<p>The third anomaly is the increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology, denial and sectarianism. My interview data was consistent with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/call-unity-kwibuka27-activities-draw-closer">statistics</a> from the Rwanda Investigation Board showing that such accusations and convictions are concentrated during Kwibuka. It’s not clear why, but heightened sensitivity and the fear rhetoric promoted by the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the 100 days may be among the reasons.</p>
<p>Finally, Kwibuka always marks an increase in confessions from imprisoned génocidaires. This relates directly to an <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/genocide-over-18000-victims-exhumed-kigali-mass-graves">increase</a> in bodies of genocide victims being discovered. Confessions are made each year, even though authorities say incentives for prisoners who share information ended some time ago.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ateliers/2019-v14-n2-ateliers05462/1071136ar/">argued</a> that this continual discovery of bodies merits further attention. Exhumation and reburial can lead to <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/publications/promoting-reconciliation-through-exhuming-and-identifying-victims-1994-rwandan-0/">closure</a> for families and communities, and is an important part of commemoration. However, a claim that prisoners confess because they are “moved by the spirit of Kwibuka” is at odds with documented <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/10/we-will-force-you-confess/torture-and-unlawful-military-detention-rwanda">coercion and human rights violations</a> in Rwandan prisons.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-discuss-how-best-to-commemorate-genocide-94452">Rwandans discuss how best to commemorate genocide</a>
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<h2>Memory without exclusion</h2>
<p>My research in no way aims to promote covering up history. But there is a difference between teaching history and stoking historical social divisions. The exclusionary “us versus them” form of nationalism that emerges during Kwibuka may threaten Rwanda’s precarious peace. </p>
<p>One solution may lie in the fact that the commemoration period is highly mutable. It adapts and changes every year. This means it’s possible to have more inclusive events that favour a <a href="https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/agaciro-vernacular-memory-and-the-politics-of-memory-in-postgenocide-rwanda(2e914106-f314-4a45-a6f2-7927a68d2be6).html">balance</a> between official narratives and ordinary people’s memories.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gretchen Baldwin received funding for this research from the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4) in 2017. She is currently a Researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. </span></em></p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of ethnic non-recognition. However, for 100 days in a year, it centres ethnicity in the country’s psyche.Gretchen Baldwin, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868442022-08-01T13:55:11Z2022-08-01T13:55:11ZBurundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474611/original/file-20220718-72671-x6b330.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sorting newly picked coffee beans.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry BrŽsillon-GODONG/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi, which marked 60 years of independence on 1 July 2022, ranks as the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/256547/the-20-countries-with-the-lowest-gdp-per-capita/">poorest country on the planet</a> in terms of GDP per capita. This must be understood in the light of a <a href="https://recherche-afriquedesgrandslacs.pantheonsorbonne.fr/activites-et-programmes/burundi-recherche-son-histoire">history punctuated by political upheavals</a>. Until 1996, the country lived to the rhythm of <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/burundi-1962-present/">coups</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.html">massacres</a> and political <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-military-behind-1993-assassination-president">assassinations</a> – before plunging into a long civil war. </p>
<p>Peace was eventually restored in 2005. However, the country returned to authoritarian governance in 2015. Since then, the UN has noted progress but continues to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100092">denounce</a> the political violence that plagues the country. </p>
<p>How did Burundi come to this? Why is change so slow to arrive?</p>
<p>I have studied the politics and economies around the Great Lakes region for more than 40 years – including the links between governance and poverty. The countries that form the region are Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. , Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. It’s my view that the end of the Belgian and British colonial empires <a href="https://www.persee.fr/issue/tiers_0040-7356_1986_num_27_106">upset</a> the political, economic and social frameworks of the two nations formed out of the former <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ruanda-Urundi">Ruanda-Urundi</a> colonial entity. </p>
<p>Present-day Rwanda and Burundi served as reservoirs of labour for the exploitation of the wealth of the vast agricultural and mining areas of the Belgian Congo to the west and the British colonies in the east. Refocused within their borders following independence in the 1962, they were reduced to small, overcrowded and landlocked micro-states.</p>
<p>Burundi is a country familiar with <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_0040-7356_1991_num_32_127_4651">various military regimes since independence</a>. These regimes have succeeded in appropriating state resources while ordinary citizens – mostly rural farmers – have borne the brunt of the civil war.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-gone-wrong-in-burundis-search-for-stability-54014">Explainer: what’s gone wrong in Burundi’s search for stability</a>
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<p>The divide that has emerged between military elites and “people of the hills” – as rural farmers are commonly referred to – runs deeper than ethnic and regional differences. The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state. But most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation, including at the grassroots levels where party delegates, often peasants, do as directed. </p>
<p>The state has imposed itself as the exclusive economic operator. Civil servants and party cadres programme and direct investments. Ordinary people are for the most part powerless.</p>
<h2>Nkurunziza’s missed opportunity</h2>
<p>Following the gradual return of peace nearly 20 years ago, Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president in 2005. Drawn from the majority Hutu ethnic group, Nkurunziza ended 25 years of pro-Tutsi military regimes. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422339#metadata_info_tab_contents">minority Tutsi make up 14% of the population and the Hutu 85%</a>. In the next five years, the president and his party – the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/post-nkurunziza-total-supremacy-cndd-fdd">went about consolidating power</a>.</p>
<p>Hopes for stability were stronger at the next election in 2010. For the first time in the country’s history, voters were called upon to vote at the normal end of an electoral cycle. CNDD-FDD secured another mandate thanks to a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/burundi-ruling-party-wins-parliamentary-elections-99322559/155447.html">divided opposition</a> and the charismatic personality of the incumbent president, who enjoyed massive support from rural populations. </p>
<p>A party that had managed to reconcile ethnic divisions and to <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Burundi-CNDD-FDD-1994-2004.pdf">integrate</a> the armed forces with former rebels now had a resounding national mandate.</p>
<p>Unchallenged, Nkurunziza concentrated power in his hands under a de facto one-party state. A youth militia loyal to his party kept an eye on dissent among local populations and neutralised any organised opposition. But the mood soured quickly when Nkurunziza <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">sought a “third term”</a> in the 2015 elections, contrary to the constitution.</p>
<p>A popular protest was immediate and strengthened despite the mobilisation of the police. Within weeks a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/14/burundi-violence-coup-protests-bujumbura-president-pierre-nkurunziza">failed military coup</a> laid bare the fractures within the armed forces. A <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/26/april-2015-june-2020-chronology-repression-media-and-civil-society-burundi">violent repression</a> followed in which freedom of expression and independent media were crushed. </p>
<p>In July 2015, after elections “<a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2015/07/315472-burundi-lonu-estime-que-lenvironnement-general-netait-pas-propice-des-elections">neither free nor credible</a>” according to the UN, the CNDD-FDD exceeded the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza’s victory was Burundi’s loss. Amid the repression of opponents, the country’s economy slowed down, foreign capital took flight and infrastructure crumbled. There was looting of public resources and a sharp reduction in social benefits. </p>
<p>At the end of his third term, the leaders of the CNDD-FDD party were happy to see the back of the <a href="https://gl-news.com/news/burundi-to-pay-530-thousand-dollars-to-the-president-who-leaves-office/">“eternal supreme leader”</a> who had become a liability. </p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nkurunziza-left-a-troubling-legacy-burundis-new-leader-has-much-to-mend-140972">Nkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi's new leader has much to mend</a>
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<h2>The electoral rescue of 2020</h2>
<p>Burundi’s GDP had been <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Burundi-report-v2.pdf">battered badly</a> during the civil war, which ended in 2005. It was on the rise for ten years from 2005 to 2014. Following the Nkurunziza-instigated political crisis in 2015 the economy dipped sharply again. Ranked second poorest country in the world in 2013 and 2014, it fell to the poorest in 2015 and has remained there ever since. The UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">Human Development Index</a>, which measures longevity, education and inequality, also attests to this deterioration. Burundi was ranked 180th in 2015, falling to 185th in 2019 and 2020.</p>
<p>Thus, in almost all socio-economic measures, Burundi’s performance is among the lowest on the planet thanks mainly to conflict and <a href="https://iwacu.global.ssl.fastly.net/une-annee-du-president-ndayishimiye-un-bilan-economique-indolent/">elite corruption</a>. </p>
<p>The failed coup of May 2015 upset a delicate balance in which the army – including former rebels – and the police were jointly managed. Pro-Nkurunziza <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/coup-d-etat-au-burundi-32942">elements</a> in the army who crushed the coup sensed an opportunity for <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">self-enrichment</a> to match the fortunes of their senior Tutsi colleagues and graduates of military schools. </p>
<p>Hitherto contained or concealed, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">this “financial catch-up”</a> was transformed into an open competition for personal enrichment commensurate with each person’s powers.</p>
<p>In May 2020, General Evariste Ndayishimiye, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">a wise and withdrawn man</a>, became the new president. Nkurunziza died shortly afterwards officially from COVID-19, a disease whose danger he had always underestimated. Burundi, on the other hand, continues to suffer the effects of Nkurunziza’s political legacy. </p>
<h2>Struggle between elites</h2>
<p>Having experienced since independence all forms of divisions that can be exploited by authoritarian regimes, the “people of the hills” now know that their lot is the result of struggles between elites for the capture of national resources.</p>
<p>Only the re-appropriation of the state, to make it legitimate once more in the eyes of the population, could free resources for their purposes. This implies that peasants emancipate themselves from <a href="https://iwacu42.global.ssl.fastly.net/quand-le-ministre-ndirakobuca-prend-la-grosse-seringue/">co-opted administrative and economic bureaucracies</a> which have appropriated power and wealth by force, first for the benefit of a Tutsi and then of a Hutu elite. Burundians need to impose themselves through free and credible elections as self-organised citizens responsible for the future of a democratic country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state, yet most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854322022-07-27T14:48:43Z2022-07-27T14:48:43ZHow conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476301/original/file-20220727-13-rou5w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier from the armed forces of the DRC on foot patrol in the village of Manzalaho near Beni.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34958903">one of the deadliest the world has ever witnessed</a>. One report estimates the death toll at <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/irc-study-shows-congos-neglected-crisis-leaves-54-million-dead">5.4 million</a> while <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/review-halves-congo-war-toll-20100120">a more conservative count</a> puts it at one million dead. Much of the conflict is centred in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, which lie on the DRC’s eastern border. The provinces border on Uganda in the north-east, Rwanda and Burundi to the east and Tanzania towards the south-east. </p>
<p>Different scholars have attributed the recurrent conflict to <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene">ethnicity</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006793">nationality</a>. In recent years much of the focus has been on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-way-that-minerals-are-mined-affects-conflict-in-eastern-congo-120833">illegal exploitation</a> of Congolese natural resources. However, this does not explain the prevalence of the other two drivers of the conflict. </p>
<p>For this reason, I set out to rethink the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu as part of my <a href="http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/6641">PhD research</a>. I sought to establish whether the conflict can be considered as a political struggle between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese. I also sought to investigate the contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. </p>
<p>Most scholarly works identify a conflict in North Kivu that dominated headlines in 1993 as the starting point of violence in the region. But based on my <a href="http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/6641">research</a>, I have concluded that the conflict is two distinct conflicts that became intertwined over one-and-a-half centuries. The first is a much older conflict which started during colonialism and has as its source a local struggle for belonging.</p>
<p>The second is relatively new, and is a regional contest for survival between the Hutu and Tutsi elites. </p>
<h2>The two conflicts</h2>
<p>The first conflict is rooted in Belgian and German colonialism in present-day DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. Based on a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/179896">racist notion popular among African colonists at the time</a>, the two colonial administrations gave <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691102801/when-victims-become-killers">privileged status</a> to some of the local population based on ethnicity. This explains how the Tutsi became the intermediate rulers for German and Belgian colonial powers in Ruanda-Urundi, the colony that gave birth at independence to Rwanda and Burundi. </p>
<p>In addition, when Belgium became the sole colonial power following Germany’s exit in 1917, Tutsi overlords were brought into <a href="http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/6641">North Kivu</a> as rulers over the Hutu-dominated Banyarwanda. The aim was to recreate the system in Ruanda-Urundi where the Hutu were deployed on menial jobs and hard labour under the watch of Tutsi overlords holding a brief for Belgian colonisers. </p>
<p>Since the 20th century Banyarwanda (or “those from Rwanda”) was the common identity for Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese in eastern DRC. As the latest arrivals from Ruanda-Urundi, the Tutsi transplanted in the 1930s were also considered Banyarwanda by the indigenous Congolese – primarily the Hunde, Nyanga and Nande. </p>
<p>It became clear after the second world war that colonial powers would not be able to hang on to their colonies. The African elites who instigated the independence struggles needed the support of the rural masses. This is the point at which the postcolonial contest over who had a right to belong began to shape the politics in the Great Lakes region. </p>
<p>Ethnic groups which claimed to have belonged to the region first – or the autochthones – branded others as foreigners even though they had lived in the region before Belgian and German colonialism. These so-called foreigners had to leave and return to where they came from.</p>
<h2>Struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites</h2>
<p>The second conflict is postcolonial. As Belgium left the scene, Ruanda-Urundi was split into Rwanda and Burundi. In Burundi, the Tutsi maintained their control over the postcolonial state. However, in Rwanda, the Hutu gained control after a period of ethnic conflict between the majority Hutu and the Tutsi. The so-called <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780691193830-008/html?lang=en">Social Revolution</a> lasted between 1959 and 1962.</p>
<p>Many Tutsi in Rwanda were subjected to violence, fleeing to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Burundi and DRC to escape death. This sparked the start of an inter-regional conflict of survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Subsequent events of political violence (from 1972 to the present) resulted in wave after wave of refugee migration between Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. </p>
<p>The result is that ethnicity, nationality, allegiance, place of origin and current place of residence are not neatly separated; the question of who “belongs” where cannot be solved. But people continually try to do so through violence.</p>
<p>The subsequent events of political violence in Rwanda and Burundi resulted in a contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Power changed between these two ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi. Up to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the Hutu were in control of the Rwandan state and the Tutsi of the Burundian state.</p>
<p>However, after 1994 the Tutsi took control of the Rwandan state and the Hutu of the Burundian state.</p>
<h2>‘Foreigner’ is a complex word</h2>
<p>The consequences of years of conflict are twofold. </p>
<p>First, it has created two levels to being considered a “foreigner” in the Great Lakes. The first level is nationality. I found that the Banyarwanda and Barundi identities must be perceived as references to particular nationalities. For example, Banyarwanda must be seen as a reference to Rwandan nationality and Barundi to Burundian nationality. </p>
<p>Therefore, in the Kivus, the Banyarwanda and Barundi identities evoke a politics of belonging. </p>
<p>In the 1970s, Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese of Tutsi origin rejected the Banyarwanda identity and opted for the Banyamulenge identity. In response, Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese of Hutu origin also rejected the Banyarwanda identity and opted for the Banyabwisha identity. </p>
<p>Both these identities make them indigenous to Congo and evoke a counterclaim of belonging to the DRC. </p>
<p>At the second level is the notion that the Tutsi are not from the Great Lakes region. But this is not true. </p>
<p>The first level is restricted to the DRC, and the second level is regional. However, this complex regional politics of belonging is playing itself out in the eastern DRC, and it was here that it became intertwined after some time.</p>
<p>Will there be an end to the violence? It is possible if the geographical scope of the conflict is broadened to include all neighbouring countries and if the focus is a negotiated settlement followed by a period of reconciliation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Cloete does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Violence in the DRC can be brought to an end if the geographical scope of the conflict is broadened to include all neighbouring countries.Jacob Cloete, Manager, Zone Learning, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825202022-05-22T12:36:21Z2022-05-22T12:36:21ZWhat M23’s on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC’s precarious search for peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462773/original/file-20220512-16-na032.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A peacekeeper protects civilians who fled violent clashes between the army and the ex-rebels of the "M23" in eastern DRC in January 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Glody Murhabazi/AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since March 2022, fighting has escalated in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between the army and the rebel group <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2014.942207?journalCode=rsaj20">March 23 Movement</a>, more widely known as M23. The group allegedly attacked army positions near the border with Uganda and Rwanda. In addition, a UN helicopter crashed in the combat zone leaving eight peacekeepers dead. </p>
<p>These events made headlines worldwide and <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-03-29/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-scroll-down-for-french">led to a reaction</a> from the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.</p>
<p>The uptick in fighting between M23 and government troops in fact started in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/renewed-fighting-flares-in-eastern-congo/a-59789397">late 2021</a>. Moreover, it is only one of several ongoing armed confrontations in eastern DRC. The <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Inside-the-ADF-Rebellion-14Nov18.pdf">Allied Democratic Force</a>, an insurgent Islamist group with Ugandan roots, continues to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/at-least-20-civilians-killed-in-attack-in-eastern-congo-report">massacre people</a> despite ongoing joint Uganda-DRC operations. Another is the proxy war in the <a href="https://www.gicnetwork.be/mayhem-in-the-mountains/">highlands of Uvira and Fizi</a>, not far from Burundi. And in Ituri at the northeastern tip of the DRC, different armed groups including the CODECO factions continue to <a href="https://www.gicnetwork.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/GIC_Violence-and-Instability-in-Ituri.pdf">wreak havoc</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, the clashes in March 2022 were the most serious in 10 years between the Congolese army and the M23. This raises important questions about timing and context, which we explore in this article. </p>
<p>Both of us have researched <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/contesting-authority">conflict dynamics</a> in eastern Congo for many years. This includes the role of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2014.910384">armed groups in society</a>, the interplay of <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2022/01/03/report-rebels-doctors-and-merchants-of-violence-how-the-fight-against-ebola-became-part-of-the-conflict-in-eastern-drc/">armed mobilisation with a recent Ebola outbreak</a>, and the overall <a href="https://kivusecurity.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/reports/39/2021%20KST%20report%20EN.pdf">fragmentation of belligerents</a>.</p>
<p>As part of this research, we have also analysed the development of the M23 since its early beginnings in 2012 until today. In our view, it is likely that the group’s upsurge in activities since late 2021 is a reaction to Kinshasa’s attempts to end insecurity in the east. The M23 may feel threatened while at the same time seeking to strengthen its position in the event of any negotiations. </p>
<h2>Security a priority</h2>
<p>President Félix Tshisekedi has made security in eastern Congo one of his main priorities. He has tried different strategies to accomplish this. These include <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/now-the-east-african-community-tackles-the-eastern-drcs-rebels">negotiations</a> with armed groups, a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/dr-congo-strategy-for-former-combatants-led-by-government/">demobilisation and disarmament</a> programme and declaring a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210501-dr-congo-declares-a-state-of-siege-over-worsening-violence-in-east">state of siege</a> in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. </p>
<p>But, as <a href="https://www.gicnetwork.be/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/10_GIC_It-Takes-More-Than-Two-to-Tango_WEB-2.pdf">recent research highlights</a>, this combination of tactics have rarely worked well in the past. </p>
<p>It is therefore unlikely that the current flurry of initiatives will end the M23 and other rebellions for good, as long as the underlying historical issues fuelling violence remain unaddressed.</p>
<h2>The rise of M23</h2>
<p>Formed in April 2012, the M23 has always been perched at the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23">intersection between local, national, and regional power dynamics</a>, where it partakes in different struggles for control over territory, people and resources. These struggles are linked to the security concerns of <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/stable-instability">different political and cross-border military networks</a>, which rassemble both state and non-state actors.</p>
<p>The M23 rapidly shot to international notoriety when it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2012/11/23/m23-fighters-capture-goma-in-the-dr-congo">occupied the city of Goma</a>, capital North Kivu province, for 10 days in November 2012. This followed eight months of intense fighting in Rutshuru area of North Kivu province. </p>
<p>These events were a massive embarrassment to the international community which had invested billions of dollars in peace and statebuilding in the DRC, especially through its <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">UN peacekeeping mission</a>. But the mission was reduced to <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2012-dec-22-la-fg-un-congo-20121223-story.html">bystanders</a> as the M23 marched into Goma. </p>
<p>While the rebels withdrew after strong international pressure, they continued to control key strategic sites, such as the Bunagana border post to Uganda. These provided them with significant income from taxation.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the group’s ability to challenge the Congolese government and the UN became its undoing.</p>
<p>In 2013, a new component to the UN peacekeeping mission was charged with dismantling eastern DRC’s armed groups. It was called the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). It was composed of regional armies and made the M23 its first and prime target. Internal tensions also triggered a split inside the M23, leaving the group weakened <a href="https://apnews.com/article/41f50e43c95e4bf89439f5a07f561028">exiled in Uganda and Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>After its defeat, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/congo-signs-peace-deal-with-m23-rebels-in-nairobi/a-17292474">M23 signed a peace deal with the government</a> in December 2013 in which it agreed to demobilise its fighters and transform itself into a political party. </p>
<p>However, led by commander Sultani Makenga, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/rdc-les-autorites-rwandaises-refutent-les-accusations-de-soutien-aux-attaques-rebelles-du">parts of the group returned to the DRC already in late 2016</a>. This was a predictable outcome as the peace deals failed to address the conflicts underlying issues. </p>
<h2>History of rebellion</h2>
<p>An important feature of the genealogy of armed groups to which the M23 belongs is that they have been led mainly by Tutsi commanders from North Kivu. Historically, these commanders have entertained close ties with the Rwandan military. In the early 1990s, as reported to one of us in multiple interviews, several joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front in its struggle to overthrow the extremist Hutu regime in Rwanda, which carried out the genocide in Rwanda.</p>
<p>A major driving force of rebellions such as the M23 has been the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23">insecure position of the Tutsi community in North Kivu</a> due to a complex combination of interconnected causes. The first is the divide and rule policies of the colonial state (1885-1960) and the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997). In the 1990s, the Mobutu regime fuelled longstanding conflicts between Kinyarwanda-speaking populations, both Hutu and Tutsi, and other communities in eastern Congo by denying the latter citizenship rights of the latter, <a href="https://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/mamdani.kivu.pdf">which sparked violent conflicts in the east</a>.</p>
<p>Second is the political propaganda that falsely label all Kinyarwanda-speakers in eastern DRC as “immigrants” rather than “citizens” despite the fact that several Kinyarwanda-speaking communities have been in DRC <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/livre-banyarwanda_et_banyamulenge_violences_ethniques_et_gestion_de_l_identitaire_au_kiwu_jean_claude_willame-9782738447098-10986.html">since long before colonisation</a>. </p>
<p>It also has not helped that the Tutsi have been involved in several foreign-backed rebellions, in particular the RCD-Goma during 1998–2003.</p>
<p>Finally, members of the Tutsi economic élite have bought large tracts of land in a context where many peasants have become victims of land-grabbing by local élites. </p>
<p>All these factors have produced widespread resentment of the Tutsi, and Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in general. Conversely, the Tutsi from North Kivu, deplore the failure of the Congolese state to respect and protect them as citizens. This has led many Kinyarwanda-speakers to support successive rebellions as a means to seek protection against armed groups hostile to them.</p>
<h2>What the future may hold</h2>
<p>After the first clashes in March and April this year, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebel-group-declares-unilateral-ceasefire-eastern-congo-2022-04-01/">the M23 declared multiple unilateral ceasefires</a>. It also announced it was willing to lay down its arms for good. Then in April it promised to withdraw from the areas it had occupied after the fighting in late March and asked for a <a href="https://twitter.com/HeritierBarak/status/1513080458149511169">dialogue with the Congolese government</a>. </p>
<p>These declarations happened at the onset of yet another round of talks between armed groups and the Congolese government in Nairobi under the aegis of <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/2022/04/28/president-kenyatta-urges-stakeholders-to-nurture-peace-in-dr-congo/">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta</a>. The Congolese government framed these talks as the last chance for armed groups to surrender. Accompanied by this threat was an <a href="https://english.news.cn/20220422/732a9fadcaed4bdc907056e8da2fdfdc/c.html">announcement of yet another regional force</a> to be set up to fight armed groups. </p>
<p>But, fighting subsequently broke out again between the Congolese army and M23 units. Both sides accused each other of instigating the clashes. As result, the main faction of the M23, led by Sultani Makenga, was <a href="https://medafricatimes.com/26532-drc-in-nairobi-peace-consultations-continue-without-the-m23-branch-known-as-makenga.html">ejected</a> from the Nairobi talks.</p>
<p>On a broader regional level, the M23’s return coincides with <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/200378/drc-time-is-running-out-for-tshisekedi-says-researcher-christoph-vogel/">several significant developments</a>. These include negotiations leading to the DRC joining the East African Community and Uganda’s military intervention north of the M23’s area operation to combat the Allied Democratic Front. </p>
<p>Moreover, after half a decade of frictions marked by border closures, bilateral relations between Rwanda and Uganda seem to rapidly improving. This is in spite of geopolitical rivalry and competition over trade and infrastructure projects in eastern DRC. </p>
<p>On the ground in North Kivu, other Congolese armed groups have recently declared a new ad-hoc <a href="https://twitter.com/PierreBoisselet/status/1524078548109213696?s=20&t=N0bzCk-ZQ3jiz2s_7bVGMA">coalition</a>, allegedly brokered by Congolese army officials. This is aimed at fighting the M23.</p>
<p>Thus, the M23 rebellion finds itself in the tiny but highly strategic border triangle between eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, and at the centre of fast-paced and interlaced local and regional security and diplomatic developments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kasper Hoffmann receives funding from the Danish International Development Agency and the Social and Economic Research Council of the United Kingdom. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Vogel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent clashes put eastern Congo’s M23 into the headlines again, but many other security problems persist in the area as diplomats struggle to tackle the underlying causes.Kasper Hoffmann, Adjunct assistant professor, University of CopenhagenChristoph Vogel, Research Director of the Insecure Livelihoods Project, Ghent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1669942021-08-31T19:30:46Z2021-08-31T19:30:46ZLe conflit tue l’éducation : l’expérience rwandaise montre comment le temps perdu peut être rattrapé<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418461/original/file-20210830-23-wpnmrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C668%2C446&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Un mineur étranger non accompagné suit des cours dispensés par un volontaire dans un parc à Toulouse, en France, en octobre 2017.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Les situations humanitaires, en particulier les conflits violents prolongés,constituent de sérieux obstacles à l'accès à l'éducation. C'est pourquoi, depuis 30 ans, les professionnels de l'aide plaident pour <a href="https://inee.org/system/files/resources/Background_note_thematic_debate_EiE.doc">« l'éducation dans les situations d'urgence »</a>. L'idée est d’<a href="https://inee.org/system/files/resources/Background_note_thematic_debate_EiE.doc">essayer de garantir</a> « le droit à l'éducation dans les situations d'urgence et de reconstruction après un conflit».</p>
<p>Mais assurer l’éducation dans les situations d’urgence associées à des conflits violents est un défi considérable à relever. À titre d’exemple, au Rwanda, l’enseignement <a href="http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/publication/never-again-educational-reconstruction-rwanda">s'est rapidement dégradé</a> lorsque la guerre civile de 1990 a éclaté. La scolarité s’est complètement arrêtée en avril 1994, puis a <a href="http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/publication/never-again-educational-reconstruction-rwanda">repris</a> en septembre 1994.
Entretemps, le génocide des Tutsis avait pris fin. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/591302?journalCode=cer">Environ 75 %</a> des enseignants du primaire et du secondaire avaient été tués, avaient fui ou étaient en prison. Bien qu'il n'existe pas de données précises sur les enfants non scolarisés pendant cette situation d'urgence, le taux net de scolarisation est passé de 61 % en 1992 à 75 % en 2002. </p>
<p>J'ai effectué des <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057925.2021.1886908?needAccess=true">recherches</a> sur les répercussions du conflit violent rwandais sur l'éducation, avant et après le génocide de 1994. </p>
<p>Ces <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057925.2021.1886908?needAccess=true">recherches ont consisté</a> en 23 entretiens sous forme de récits biographiques avec des Rwandais et d'anciens réfugiés congolais et ougandais qui avaient été contraints de quitter l'école. Ces entretiens m'ont permis d'établir que certains apprenants avaient, depuis lors, su saisir leur deuxième chance d’étudier. Je me suis également rendu compte que beaucoup d'entre eux avaient abandonné l’école bien avant 1994, du fait de la discrimination fondée sur l'ethnie, la région et la religion.</p>
<p>Les situations d'urgence peuvent durer des années et entraîner des retard en matière d'éducation. Ainsi, les gouvernements, les acteurs humanitaires et les organismes d'aide doivent planifier et se préparer à saisir les opportunités de seconde chance en matière d'éducation formelle. D’après mes recherches, cette dernière doit être accessible, flexible et inclusive. </p>
<h2>Les récits</h2>
<p>Il y avait huit femmes et 15 hommes parmi les personnes interrogées. Celles-ci avaient toutes 16 ans au plus, lorsqu'il leur a fallu quitter l'école et avaient 52 ans lorsqu'elles ont saisi l'occasion d'étudier de nouveau. Quinze d’entre elles ont réussi à terminer leurs études secondaires, et 13 sont allées à l'université. </p>
<p>Je leur ai demandé de décrire leurs parcours scolaires longs et complexes et les circonstances, ainsi que la manière dont elles ont poursuivi leur scolarité de la deuxième chance à l'âge adulte. </p>
<p>Ces personnes m’ont expliqué comment, bien avant 1994, les élèves issus de familles tutsis, des régions du sud et de la communauté musulmane, ne pouvaient pas accéder au secondaire <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6033169/From_Classrooms_to_Conflict_in_Rwanda">en raison</a> de la discrimination. Lorsque le conflit s'est intensifié dans les années 1990, les cohortes d'élèves n'ayant pas pu poursuivre leurs études ont augmenté, parce que les écoles étaient fermées ou à cause de la pauvreté ou de la perte de leurs parents.<br>
Les apprenants adultes ont déclaré qu'ils avaient dû relever divers défis pour achever leur parcours scolaire de la deuxième chance. </p>
<p>Ils ont dû, par exemple, jongler entre leur apprentissage et d'autres responsabilités, comme le travail et s'occuper des enfants. Certains ont dû faire face à la stigmatisation liée au fait de suivre des cours de l'enseignement primaire alors qu'ils étaient « vieux », et ont fait l'objet de moqueries.</p>
<p>Pour les anciens réfugiés rwandais provenant d'Ouganda, la difficulté consistait à fournir l’homologation (certificat) de leurs études antérieures leur permettant de reprendre les études au niveau approprié. </p>
<p>La langue a, par ailleurs, constitué un obstacle pour certains. L’enseignement en anglais uniquement a été introduit à partir du <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/rje/article/view/117147/106745">CE2 en 2008</a> au Rwanda. Cela a affecté les Rwandais qui avaient auparavant étudié en français au Rwanda ou en République démocratique du Congo.</p>
<h2>Valeur de l'éducation</h2>
<p>Néanmoins, l’éducation avait énormément de valeur pour eux. Ils ne la considéraient pas uniquement comme un moyen d'acquérir des qualifications et des compétences pour trouver un emploi, ni comme un investissement. De nombreux apprenants voulaient simplement apprendre des choses qu'ils ignoraient. Pour certains, l'apprentissage représentait une distraction par rapport aux expériences et souvenirs violents.</p>
<p>Plus de la moitié des apprenants souhaitaient pouvoir aider leur famille et être utiles à la société. Ils pensaient être une honte et un fardeau pour les autres et ne pas pouvoir s'intégrer dans la société sans éducation. Selon eux, l'éducation était nécessaire pour ouvrir et développer leur esprit. </p>
<p>De plus, les apprenants avaient besoin de guérir les plaies du passé pour reprendre une vie normale. Pour bon nombre d'entre eux, retourner à l'école était le point de départ de leur vie. </p>
<h2>Ce qui a pu aider</h2>
<p>Mes conclusions font ressortir un certain nombre d'idées qui peuvent contribuer à étayer la façon de concevoir des interventions en matière d'éducation en situation d'urgence.</p>
<p>Premièrement, le rôle des gouvernements peut être primordial. Dans le cas du Rwanda, le gouvernement s'est engagé à réformer le secteur de l'éducation et il a, par exemple, mis fin aux <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1947-94172016000300011">politiques discriminatoires</a> et a aboli les frais de scolarité. </p>
<p>Le gouvernement a, en outre, offert la possibilité d’étudier en lançant un <a href="http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/docs/EDPRS/Key%20Analytical%20Studies/Sectoral%20Studies/Education_Catch%20Up_Programme_2005.pdf">« programme de rattrapage »</a> et un programme de <a href="https://reb.rw/main-menu/services/application-requirements-for-alevel-private-candidates-registration-for-national-examination/">candidats libres</a>. </p>
<p>Le programme de rattrapage était un <a href="http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/docs/EDPRS/Key%20Analytical%20Studies/Sectoral%20Studies/Education_Catch%20Up_Programme_2005.pdf">programme d'apprentissage accéléré</a> proposant un enseignement condensé du primaire à un grand nombre d'enfants et d'adolescents qui avaient raté l’école, dans les années 1990. Il a pris fin en 2015.</p>
<p>Le programme des <a href="https://reb.rw/main-menu/services/application-requirements-for-alevel-private-candidates-registration-for-national-examination/">candidats libres</a>, qui est toujours en vigueur, permet aux intéressés de passer des examens équivalents au baccalauréat sans s'inscrire dans une école secondaire. Bon nombre d’adultes qui n'avaient pas pu achever le cycle de l'enseignement secondaire par le passé ont pu suivre des cours du soir, à titre privé, pour se préparer aux examens de niveau Bac. </p>
<p>Ces programmes offraient aux apprenants adultes l'accès à l'éducation formelle et la flexibilité nécessaire pour y parvenir. Ils ont joué un rôle crucial dans des parcours scolaires longs, complexes et ponctués de nombreux abandons et reprises. </p>
<p>Il est possible d'améliorer cette situation. Il suffirait, par exemple, de valider l'apprentissage antérieur pour ceux qui n'ont pas de certificat. Et puis un soutien linguistique faciliterait les transitions entre les systèmes éducatifs. </p>
<p>Mais c’est un bon début et une source d'enseignements pour d'autres responsables politiques désireux d'offrir aux gens une seconde chance d'accéder à l'éducation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166994/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miho Taka a reçu un financement de l'Institut de recherche de l'Agence japonaise de coopération internationale (JICA) dans le cadre du projet de recherche intitulé : «Obtenir une seconde chance : Éducation pendant et après les conflits». </span></em></p>Les gouvernements et les organismes devraient se préparer à saisir les opportunités de seconde chance dans l’éducation formelle pour éviter les retards créés par des situations d’urgence très longuesMiho Taka, Assistant Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583142021-05-16T07:52:05Z2021-05-16T07:52:05ZConflict kills education: Rwandan experiences show how lost years can be recovered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394028/original/file-20210408-19-jbai99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An unaccompanied foreign minor does lessons provided by a volunteer in a park in Toulouse, France, October 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alain Pitton/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Humanitarian situations, especially protracted violent conflicts, are a serious barrier to accessing education. This is why, for 30 years, aid practitioners have been advocating for <a href="https://inee.org/system/files/resources/Background_note_thematic_debate_EiE.doc">“Education in Emergencies”</a>. The idea is to <a href="https://inee.org/system/files/resources/Background_note_thematic_debate_EiE.doc">try to ensure</a> “the right to education in emergencies and post-conflict reconstruction”.</p>
<p>But violent conflicts pose significant challenges to deliver education in emergencies. For instance, in Rwanda, schooling <a href="http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/publication/never-again-educational-reconstruction-rwanda">rapidly deteriorated</a> when the 1990 civil war began. Schooling came to a complete stop in April 1994 and <a href="http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/publication/never-again-educational-reconstruction-rwanda">reopened</a> again in September 1994.
By this time the genocide against the Tutsi had ended. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/591302?journalCode=cer">About 75%</a> of the primary and secondary teachers had been killed, had fled or were in prison. While there is no accurate data on out-of-school children during this emergency, net enrolment increased from <a href="http://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/publication/never-again-educational-reconstruction-rwanda">just</a> 61% in 1992 to 75% in 2002. </p>
<p>I conducted <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057925.2021.1886908?needAccess=true">research</a> on the impact on education of the violent conflict in Rwanda in the lead up to, and the years after, the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057925.2021.1886908?needAccess=true">research involved</a> 23 life story interviews with Rwandans and former refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda who had been forced out of school. From these, I established that some learners had since managed to achieve their second chance at education. I also realised that many of them had lost education a lot earlier than 1994 due to discrimination based on ethnicity, region and religion.</p>
<p>Emergency situations can last for years and create a backlog of education. This means that governments, humanitarian actors and aid agencies need to plan and prepare second chance opportunities for formal education. My research shows that this needs to be accessible, flexible and inclusive. </p>
<h2>The stories</h2>
<p>The interviewees included eight women and 15 men. They were all 16 years old, or younger, when they were forced to leave school and were up to 52 years of age by the time they tried for another chance at education. Fifteen of the interviewees managed to complete their secondary schooling, and 13 of them went on to university. </p>
<p>I asked them to describe their long, complex educational journeys and circumstances and how they pursued their second chance education as adults. </p>
<p>They explained how, even before 1994, students from Tutsi families, the southern regions and Muslim community weren’t able to progress to secondary education <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6033169/From_Classrooms_to_Conflict_in_Rwanda">due to</a> discrimination. When conflict intensified in the 1990s, more student cohorts couldn’t continue learning because schools closed, or because of poverty or the loss of their parents. </p>
<p>The adult learners said they faced various challenges in completing their second chance education. </p>
<p>For instance, they had to juggle their learning with other responsibilities, such as work and children. Some faced the stigma attached to studying for primary education when they were “old” and were mocked.</p>
<p>For former Rwandan refugees from Uganda, there was an issue of providing the accreditation of learning (certificate) from their previous education to restart education at an appropriate level. </p>
<p>Language also posed a challenge for some. English was introduced as the only medium of instruction for <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/rje/article/view/117147/106745">grade 4 and above in 2008</a> in Rwanda. This affected Rwandans who had previously studied in French in Rwanda or in the Democratic Republic of Congo.</p>
<h2>Value of education</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, the value of achieving the education was huge to them. Education wasn’t just about receiving qualifications and skills to secure a job, or as an investment. Many learners simply wanted to learn things that they did not know before. For some, learning provided a distraction from the violent experiences and memories.</p>
<p>Over half of the learners wanted to become able to help their families and be useful in society. They felt they would be a shame and burden on others and might not fit into society without an education. In their view, education was necessary to open and develop their minds. </p>
<p>What’s more, the learners needed to heal from the past to move on with their lives. For many of them, going back to school was a starting point of their life. </p>
<h2>What helped</h2>
<p>My findings point to a number of insights that can help inform how to design interventions for education in emergencies.</p>
<p>First, the role of governments can be critical. In the case of Rwanda, the government committed to reforming the education sector and, for example, abolished <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1947-94172016000300011">discriminatory policies</a> and school fees. </p>
<p>The government also provided opportunities for education by initiating a <a href="http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/docs/EDPRS/Key%20Analytical%20Studies/Sectoral%20Studies/Education_Catch%20Up_Programme_2005.pdf">“Catch-up Programme”</a> and a <a href="https://reb.rw/main-menu/services/application-requirements-for-alevel-private-candidates-registration-for-national-examination/">Private Candidate</a> programme. </p>
<p>The Catch-up Programme was an <a href="http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/docs/EDPRS/Key%20Analytical%20Studies/Sectoral%20Studies/Education_Catch%20Up_Programme_2005.pdf">accelerated learning programme</a> which provided condensed primary education to a large number of children and adolescents who had missed their education in the 1990s. It ended in 2015.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://reb.rw/main-menu/services/application-requirements-for-alevel-private-candidates-registration-for-national-examination/">Private Candidate (candidat libre)</a>, which is still running, allows individuals to take the A-level exams without enrolling in secondary school. Many adults who had not been able to complete secondary education in the past could study at private classes in the evenings to prepare for the A-level exams.</p>
<p>These schemes offered access and flexibility for adult learners to gain a formal education. They were crucial in educational journeys that were long, complex and punctuated by numerous dropouts and restarts. </p>
<p>There are ways this can be improved. For instance, accreditation of previous learning for those without certificates should be given. And language support would aid transitions between education systems. </p>
<p>But this is a good start and provides lessons for other policymakers looking to provide people with a second chance at gaining an education.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miho Taka received funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute under the ‘Obtaining a Second Chance Education during and after Conflict’ research project. </span></em></p>Governments and agencies should prepare second chance opportunities for formal education as emergency situations may last for several years and create a backlog of education.Miho Taka, Assistant Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1590862021-05-14T12:46:19Z2021-05-14T12:46:19ZWhy genocide survivors can offer a way to heal from the trauma of the pandemic year<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400129/original/file-20210511-20-buga1p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C5%2C3493%2C2297&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A gathering of women survivors at a Solace Ministries meeting, near Kigali, Rwanda, in 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Donald E. Miller</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The pandemic has been a period of acute trauma at many levels. More than <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/">3 million</a> people have died globally from COVID-19, including over 600,000 in the United States. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18020601">Doctors and nurses</a> have experienced a moral crisis, feeling that perhaps they could have done more in spite of the tremendous demands on their time and resources. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240146">Families separated from loved ones</a>, even those in their dying moments, are dealing with their own trauma. </p>
<p>It is a <a href="https://medicine.umich.edu/dept/psychiatry/michigan-psychiatry-resources-covid-19/specific-mental-health-conditions/posttraumatic-stress-disorder-during-covid-19">collective trauma</a> – one suffered by the young and old, and shared in common around the globe.</p>
<p>I have spent much of my <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1003537">academic career studying genocide</a>, most recently the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in which at least 800,000 minority ethnic Tutsis were killed by armed militias within just 100 days. At one level, genocide and the pandemic have little in common other than the loss of life that occurs on a terrifying scale. But they both require a process of healing and recovery after the trauma ends.</p>
<p>The pandemic has traumatized people to a lesser degree but may also affect many well into the future. In interviews that I have done with survivors of the <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520343788/becoming-human-again">genocide in Rwanda</a>, as well as elderly <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520219564/survivors">Armenian survivors</a> of the 1915 genocide in Turkey, it has been clear that their trauma lingered for decades. </p>
<p>Looking at such extreme cases of genocide-related trauma can shed light on the experience of loss, isolation and fear that <a href="https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/post-covid-stress-disorder-emerging-consequence-global-pandemic">many people have experienced during the pandemic</a>. The healing process of genocide survivors may offer lessons for post-pandemic recovery.</p>
<h2>Survivor trauma</h2>
<p>The growing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20838">body of research</a> on trauma and the pandemic suggests that these experiences parallel, even if to a reduced degree, some of the characteristics I have observed among genocide survivors. They have shown many of the classic <a href="https://psychotherapyacademy.org/pe-trauma-training-ptsd/understanding-dsm-5-criteria-for-ptsd-a-disorder-of-extinction/">symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome</a>, or PTSD. These include flashbacks of violence; nightmares; alterations in moods and emotions, such as being unable to remember events; difficulty concentrating, irrational guilt; and diminished interest in social interaction. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Members of a survivors group of the Rwandan genocide gather for a meeting on trauma recovery at a place near Kigali." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398728/original/file-20210504-24-hoxv8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of one of the 60 communities of Solace Ministries at their gathering place near Kigali.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Donald E. Miller</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of the genocide survivors I’ve interviewed were unable to express positive emotions, including love and affection. They sometimes had dramatic swings in emotion from rage to withdrawal, as well as reckless behaviors including drug and alcohol use. During the genocide, survivors told me, they felt hopeless, disoriented, confused and unable to believe in the goodness of life.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520343788/becoming-human-again">my book on the genocide in Rwanda</a>, I argue that survivor trauma is in part a result of the collapse of the moral structures that make sense out of life. In Rwanda, half of all the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/african-history/christianity-and-genocide-rwanda?format=PB">killings occurred in churches</a> where Tutsis had fled for safety. They were killed by members of the Hutu Power militia, or sometimes by neighbors who had been influenced by government propaganda. </p>
<p>Survivors said they cried out during the genocide, “Where is God?” Neighbors had turned against neighbor, and they felt a sense of hopelessness in feeling that God had not intervened. There was a crisis of trust.</p>
<p>When the genocide ended in mid-July 1994, the <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/?q=scott%20strauss">major institutions</a> of society were gone. There were very few jobs, many survivors were homeless and <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820338910/stuck/">family networks</a> had been destroyed. Many Tutsi survivors I have spoken with expressed an extreme need to heal the rupture that had occurred in their moral sensibilities, the fracture in their sense of community and their personal sense of identity. </p>
<h2>The healing process</h2>
<p>On my first trip to Rwanda, I met a survivor named <a href="https://crcc.usc.edu/jean-gakwandi-rwanda-ministry-brings-genocide-survivors-hope/">Jean Gakwandi</a>, who invited me to Solace Ministries. Gakwandi established this organization shortly after the genocide. It is headquartered in Kigali and has 60 communities of survivors around the country. </p>
<p>Gakwandi said that at first, survivors who had witnessed their children and spouses being killed could only cry, so he wept with them. He saw that his role was to listen to their stories, comfort them and offer words of hope. As Solace Ministries evolved, the focal point of its weekly meetings – which often last three to four hours – became the opportunity for survivors to stand and testify about their experiences, followed by singing, dancing and warm embraces.<br>
At these gatherings, healing occurred in the context of community. It became a place where one was accepted and could develop a narrative about what happened during the genocide. Members became a surrogate family of widows and orphans who could share and shoulder each other’s burdens. </p>
<p>Solace Ministries developed programs to assist survivors with food, housing, education and medical care. But fundamentally, survivors needed to restore their sense of dignity as human beings, and that involved processing the traumatic events that they experienced. Forgiving perpetrators, if it occurred, happened at the end point of the healing process. </p>
<p>It was at Solace that I videotaped interviews with 100 survivors: orphans and widows of men killed in the genocide. A psychologist colleague, <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/labs/meyerowitz/meyerowitz-faculty-display.cfm">Beth Meyerowitz</a>, also conducted surveys with widows at Solace Ministries, as well as with members of an orphan association of households headed by children. These surveys indicated extremely high levels of trauma. </p>
<p>But at Solace Ministries in particular, many survivors said that they had learned how to manage their trauma. In their words, they had “become human again” as they were able to tell their stories to, and be accepted by, a group of fellow survivors. They found new meaning in the context of a faith community.</p>
<h2>The pandemic and trauma</h2>
<p>The acute trauma of the Rwandan genocide is quite different from the deaths that occur in a pandemic. <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300197396/rwanda">What happened in 1994</a> was a deliberate, hate-filled attempt, orchestrated by a small elite, to eliminate the Tutsi population. But there are parallels, I argue, in terms of the trauma experienced by pandemic survivors, and perhaps even in their healing process. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman and a man mourn for a family member who died from the COVID-19 in Kathmandu, Nepal" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400133/original/file-20210511-16-eis95t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The pandemic will leave behind a considerable amount of trauma.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/april-30-2021-a-woman-cries-as-she-mourns-for-her-family-news-photo/1232643523?adppopup=true">Sulav Shrestha/Xinhua via Getty</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Symptoms of <a href="https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/special/tra-covid-19">pandemic trauma</a> include increased levels of anxiety, fear, depression and suicidal thoughts, even in people who were not on the front lines of medical intervention or did not experience the death of a family member or friend. </p>
<p>Parents have communicated <a href="https://childmind.org/article/anxiety-and-coping-with-coronavirus/">fear to children</a>, while isolation from others has turned people inward. The “unknowns” of the virus, including its <a href="https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/nih-launches-new-initiative-study-long-covid">long-term impacts</a>, have instilled fear. </p>
<p>In the U.S., there are indications that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2020.113312">medical professionals</a> are experiencing heightened levels of trauma-related symptoms, as is the general public. Future research may find the same phenomenon in <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3131843/what-its-not-have-covid-19-india-how-second-wave">India</a>, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7527181/">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://www.medpagetoday.com/infectiousdisease/covid19/91255">other places</a> where there have been large outbreaks of the virus.</p>
<p>[<em>3 media outlets, 1 religion newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-3-in-1">Get stories from The Conversation, AP and RNS.</a>]</p>
<p>In my work on the Rwanda genocide, I draw on the research of <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/?s=judith+herman">Judith Herman</a>, who wrote a seminal book called “<a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/judith-lewis-herman/trauma-and-recovery/9780465061716/">Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence – From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror</a>.” She believes there are three elements involved in the healing process: Survivors need to reach a place of safety, reconstruct the trauma narrative and restore the connection between individual and community. </p>
<p>These three steps have relevance to healing from the trauma of a pandemic:</p>
<p>First, one needs to feel safe. This feeling of safety is occurring for many in the U.S. as an increasing number of pandemic survivors become <a href="https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/whats-safe-after-your-covid19-vaccine">vaccinated</a>.</p>
<p>Secondly, individuals needs to <a href="https://theconversation.com/7-science-based-strategies-to-cope-with-coronavirus-anxiety-133207">reconstruct their own trauma story</a> and integrate it into their larger life narrative. This accounts for the need of people to talk about the pandemic and their experience of it. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the connection between individual and community must be restored, so that the individual can once again experience trusting relationships with others. This connection was especially important in the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/human-rights/gacaca-courts-post-genocide-justice-and-reconciliation-rwanda-justice-without-lawyers?format=PB">divide between Tutsi and Hutu neighbors</a> after the genocide and explains the role of Solace Ministries in creating a social structure in which survivors could once again experience their own humanity. Similarly, pandemic survivors are <a href="https://www.aarp.org/health/conditions-treatments/info-2021/hugging-after-covid-vaccine.html">learning to hug again</a> as they come out of their self-imposed quarantines. </p>
<p>These three elements, in my view, will be relevant as survivors of COVID-19 attempt to deal with their residual fears and anxieties, as well as deeper trauma. The very deprivation of community, the isolation from extended family and friends, and memories of lost loved ones provide prisms for thinking deeply about what’s really important. As the pandemic winds down and people venture outside, the opportunity exists to value life in new ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donald E Miller receives funding from the Templeton Religion Trust and the John Templeton Foundation. </span></em></p>A scholar of the Rwandan genocide argues that while a genocide and a pandemic are very different, the experiences of Rwanda’s survivors may provide lessons on how to heal from pandemic trauma.Donald E Miller, Professor of Religion at the University of Southern California and Director of Strategic Initiatives at the Center for Religion and Civic Culture, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1602832021-05-05T14:56:14Z2021-05-05T14:56:14ZIn Rwanda, genocide commemorations are infused with political and diplomatic agendas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398888/original/file-20210505-17-eehaii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's presidential couple at the 2021 genocide commemoration. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SIMON WOHLFAHRT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Created in 2003, the <a href="https://cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=2&L=20">National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide</a> is responsible for Rwanda’s genocide remembrance policy. It is a programme that has, over time, influenced all aspects of politics across all sectors.</p>
<p>Each year, on 7 April, themed memorial events are organised by the commission, in close collaboration with the president. </p>
<p>This article addresses the period following the 20th anniversary of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Civil-War">Rwandan Civil War</a> and its <a href="https://news.trust.org/item/20140402113037-u315s/">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>What follows is a review of the commemorations from 2014 to the present – and a view on the challenges ahead.</p>
<h2>2014 - 2019: internationalising the remembrance</h2>
<p>In 2014 Rwanda entered the final phase of its genocide remembrance public policy, the “second internationalisation” phase. The aim was to urge recognition and commemoration of the Rwandan genocide as an ethical obligation across the world.</p>
<p>This gave rise to commemorations in Kigali in 2014 that were considered particularly offensive, <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20140406-france-boycott-rwanda-genocide-commemoration">especially by the French government</a>. On the morning of the event, the French ambassador’s accreditation was withdrawn. The day culminated in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9otQUZtd3Y">accusatory speech</a> by Rwandan president Paul Kagame at a ceremony attended by the <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-04-07/remarks-commemoration-20th-anniversary-rwandan-genocide-english-and">UN Secretary General</a> and foreign heads of state.</p>
<p>With widespread international genocide commemorations in 2017, Rwanda submitted a draft <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N17/439/57/PDF/N1743957.pdf">resolution</a> to the United Nations General Assembly to rename the day. On 26 January 2018, the assembly adopted a decision – without vote – for the “International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda” to become the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12000.doc.htm">“International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda”</a>. This decision was highly criticised, given the new name excludes victims from other ethnic groups.</p>
<p>In 2019, the 25th anniversary commemorations consecrated the international community’s recognition of its responsibility towards the genocide and unwillingness to try to stop it. Official ceremonies were characterised by remorse from many countries.</p>
<p>Even France, usually in the crosshairs, was spared. A few months prior, a French court had <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/32489/rwanda-genocide-paris-drops-investigation-into-attack-of-plane-carrying-habyarimana/">dismissed</a> a case against prominent Rwandans for the 6 April 1994 attack on Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane. This sparked the genocide. </p>
<p>A long-running dispute between France and the new Rwandan regime was resolved. But even as the investigation was being closed in 2017, Rwanda enlisted a prestigious US law firm to explore bringing France before international courts for complicity in genocide.</p>
<p>In a 2019 declaration, French president Emmanuel Macron highlighted his desire to “break with the way in which France had understood and taught the Tutsi genocide”. He made 7 April a French national <a href="https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/questions/detail/15/QE/28557">day of commemoration</a> and a commission was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/macron-orders-probe-into-frances-role-in-rwanda-genocide/a-48227839">set up</a> “to examine all French archives relating to Rwanda between 1990 and 1994”. A French court also dismissed a case against French officers involved in <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/14/assessment_of_opration_turquoise_113440.html">Operation Turquoise</a> in Rwanda. </p>
<p>This indicated an educational approach towards French sovereign institutions, who were invited to recognise the “errors” of the past. </p>
<h2>2020: the return of controversial commemorations</h2>
<p>The 2020 anniversary was particularly complicated for Rwanda. On top of COVID-19 restrictions and on the eve of commemorations, the UN secretary general António Guterres and UN General Assembly president Volkan Bozkir unexpectedly questioned the new title. </p>
<p>Guterres <a href="https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/commemorations-2020-sg-message.shtml">specified</a> that among the one million people murdered in the genocide, “the victims were overwhelmingly Tutsi, but also included Hutu and others who opposed the genocide”.</p>
<p>The following day, 7 April, Kagame’s <a href="https://youtu.be/-8WZlmZ_pUY">short public declaration</a> took note of the statements. It was addressed to “all Rwandans”, speaking of “what happened to our country and what we learned”. It didn’t specifically mention the “genocide against the Tutsi”.</p>
<p>Such a transgression of the official wording drew such criticism from survivor organisations that Kagame eventually backtracked.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-8WZlmZ_pUY?wmode=transparent&start=45" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">President Kagame’s 7 April address in 2020.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rwanda’s draft resolution required a formal vote to be passed in the UN General Assembly. During debates, the <a href="https://d2v9ipibika81v.cloudfront.net/uploads/sites/296/4.20.2020-Letter-to-GA-President.pdf">US</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/04/UK-EOP-on-Rwandan-genocide-resolution-20-April.pdf">UK</a> <a href="https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-position-on-the-un-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-rwandan-genocide/">denounced</a> the rewriting of history implied by this wording. Following Rwandan pressure, the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/101/35/PDF/N2010135.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> was nevertheless passed.</p>
<p>Rwanda <a href="https://www.undocs.org/en/A/74/830">lamented</a> the US and UK positions, saying they “bring ambiguity that feeds the resurgent genocide denial movement” in the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/">Great Lakes Region</a>.</p>
<p>All objectives of the active commemoration policy promoted by the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide have therefore been formally achieved. The “genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda” is now recognised and commemorated internationally as an ethical obligation. So is the genocide remembrance policy, now divorced from its historical context.</p>
<p>By dissociating the genocide from actions undertaken by the two politico-military blocs during the 1990–94 war, Rwanda’s official version has ended the debates that characterise the historical work relating to this region since independence. </p>
<p>It’s no longer a matter of rebuilding, using factual <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2019.1709611">research</a> to provide depth. It is about criminalising those who dare to disagree, citing various genocide denial laws.</p>
<h2>2021: Rwanda’s other fights</h2>
<p>In 2021, two major events provided the backdrop to commemorations. On 26 March, a <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/279186_0.pdf">report</a> on French archives relating to the genocide was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210326-france-braces-for-historians-report-over-rwanda-genocide-failings">published</a>. It was followed by the announcement that Macron would likely travel to Rwanda. In Kigali, everything pointed towards the commemorations capitalising on these advances.</p>
<p>They were indeed capitalised on, but Kagame’s long <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/kwibuka27-address-president-paul-kagame">speech</a> consisted mainly of justifying the authorities’ resolutions. He denounced countries that have not tried genocidal perpetrators living on their soil and refused to extradite them to Rwanda. “It’s the same people who question the use of ‘Genocide against Tutsi’,” he said. “But the problem of definitions started way back in 1994, of just simply naming what it was.”</p>
<p>The accusations are surprising, given that Kigali is preparing to host a <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/chogm">meeting of the Commonwealth</a> in June. Rwanda’s membership goes beyond the fact that part of the population speaks English. It’s mainly based on adhering to the Commonwealth Charter values, including human rights.</p>
<p>Rwanda’s human rights violations have been denounced by major Anglo-Saxon human rights organisations <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021">Human Rights Watch</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/3202/2021/en/">Amnesty International</a>. In rebuttal, Kagame has quoted the French archive report, that then French president François Mitterrand “knew that a genocide against Tutsi was being planned by their allies in Rwanda”. The French report in fact provides strong critique of France’s role supporting the Habyarimana regime between 1990 and 1994, but stops short of stating France was complicit in the genocide.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people in the dark, lit by candles that they hold." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AKigali vigil during the 25th commemoration of the genocide.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the most important part was yet to come. On 19 April, Rwandan authorities finally revealed their own “investigative <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/france-enabled-1994-rwanda-genocide-report-says">report</a>” on France’s role in the genocide. This was updated in light of the French report’s conclusions, but was much harsher. According to Rwanda’s foreign affairs minister, French political leaders “enabled a foreseeable genocide”. </p>
<p>The report states France did not participate in the genocide and “the French government is not complicit. But it’s a question of law and the Rwandan government will not bring this question before a court.” In this way, the foundations for a “healthy relationship” have been laid, contingent on an official apology, which “would be a step in the right direction to rebuild trust”.</p>
<h2>2022: challenges ahead</h2>
<p>It seems next year’s commemorations will involve a wealth of events. It’s worth mentioning two other international commemorations concerning Rwanda in 2022. The first will be held on 1 July, the anniversary shared by “warring brothers” Rwanda and Burundi, celebrating 60 years of independence.</p>
<p>In Rwanda, 1 July is just a bank holiday and the regime will probably continue to mainly celebrate 4 July, the date that they took Kigali in 1994. In Burundi, it’s the opposite. Authorities intend to give strong meaning to 1 July, remembering both independence and the 50th anniversary of the genocide against the Hutu in 1972. Giving recognition to this <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.html">“hidden” genocide</a> will be at the heart of commemorations.</p>
<p>The various massacres and genocides in 1959–61, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1973, 1993–94 and 2015 remain profoundly fixed in the memories of both <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-and-rwanda-a-rivalry-that-lies-at-the-heart-of-great-lakes-crises-63795">Burundians and Rwandans</a>. The “Tutsi” domination of Burundi and “Hutu” domination of Rwanda (now reversed after two civil wars) have established the political authoritarianism of the military regimes. The debate sparked about commemorating one group of victims over the other will endure in various forms.</p>
<p>For the vast majority of Burundians, 50 years after the 1972 genocide and a return to peace, it is high time to honour the memory of all victims of national divisions. Debates established by Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission alongside the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/03/20/burundi-s-truth-and-reconcilliation-commission-presents-new-findings//">current work</a> of exhuming and registering genocide victims, have allowed for liberating moments of expression for Hutu and Tutsi populations. </p>
<p>This could finally pave the way for the writing of a plural, shared, national history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor at University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne., André Guichaoua is affiliated with UMR "Développement et Sociétés". FMSH, Member of International Scientific Committee of ANR Program "Exit from Violence"</span></em></p>A survey of the commemorations since 2014 reveals the politicking behind the writing of history and Rwanda’s place in the world.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1454602020-09-02T14:44:47Z2020-09-02T14:44:47ZPaul Rusesabagina’s arrest shows there’s no space for critical voices in Rwanda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356015/original/file-20200902-22-13tr736.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina, chairman of the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change political party. </span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>Paul Rusesabagina, who saved hundreds of Rwandans during the genocide by sheltering them in the hotel he managed - and saw his story made into the Hollywood film, ‘Hotel Rwanda’ - <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/31/africa/rwanda-genocide-paul-rusesabagina-arrest/index.html">has been</a> arrested by Rwandan authorities who allege “terror related offences”.</em></p>
<p><em>In an interview with Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa, political scientist Timothy Longman - an authority on the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath - provides insights into who Rusesabagina is and the build up to his arrest.</em></p>
<p><strong>Who is Paul Rusesabagina and what role did he play during the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda?</strong></p>
<p>In the early 1990s, Rusesabagina was the manager of a hotel in Rwanda’s capital, the Hôtel des Diplomats. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486">Within hours</a> of the plane crash that killed Rwanda’s president Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, the president’s supporters spread throughout Kigali killing opposition politicians, civil society activists, and members of the Tutsi ethnic minority. </p>
<p>Many targeted people sought refuge in the country’s most prestigious hotel, the Hôtel des Mille Collines. With the hotel’s manager out of Kigali, Rusesabagina stepped in to manage the situation at the Mille Collines. Rusesabagina, a member of the Hutu majority, succeeded in keeping death squads out of the hotel. Ultimately <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4700721">over</a> 1,000 people were safely evacuated.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the genocide of the Tutsi, Rusesabagina was recognised for saving Tutsi lives. His story became the basis of the 2004 movie, Hotel Rwanda, with Don Cheadle portraying him. In 2006, he published an autobiography, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/298143/an-ordinary-man-by-paul-rusesabagina-with-tom-zoellner">An Ordinary Man</a>. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina went on to become one of the best known Rwandans in the world. He travelled and spoke internationally, and received awards for his humanitarian work. </p>
<p>He eventually faced a backlash, however, as some survivors <a href="https://groups.google.com/g/igihuha/c/5apIo9TcQ6k?pli=1">argued</a> that he exaggerated his heroism. They also questioned his motives during the genocide, and criticised him for profiting from their suffering through self-promotion.</p>
<p><strong>Why was Rusesabagina arrested?</strong></p>
<p>After the genocide, Rusesabagina returned to his position as manager of Hôtel des Diplomats. I met him there in 1995 and heard from others, including several survivors from Mille Collines, the story of his saving people. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina was a political moderate, a Hutu married to a Tutsi. But through personal conversations, he told me he was increasingly troubled by what he saw as growing authoritarianism and anti-Hutu ethnic chauvinism of the post-genocide regime. In 1995, the Rwandan government <a href="https://anzacday.org.au/witness-to-genocide-a-personal-account-of-the-1995-kibeho-massacre">used violence</a> to close camps for displaced people. And in 1996, Rwandan troops <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/zaire2/zaire0397web.pdf">bombed</a> Rwandan refugee camps across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then known as Zaire) and drove refugees back into Rwanda.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina left Rwanda in 1996 and received asylum in Belgium. But he felt threatened there and moved his family to Texas, where they settled.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-genocide-film/hotel-rwanda-hero-in-bitter-controversy-idUSL0420968620070404">tremendous friction</a> between Rusesabagina and Paul Kagame’s government.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/298143/an-ordinary-man-by-paul-rusesabagina-with-tom-zoellner">autobiography</a> published strong criticisms of the post-genocide government. As a result the regime, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), began a concerted <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2006/05/10/smearing-a-hero-span-classbankheadsad-revisionism-over-hotel-rwandaspan/63b20dbb-fab6-4569-9558-a0be2a8b6eaa/">smear campaign</a>, attacking his reputation. </p>
<p>Survivors from the Mille Collines <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-genocide-film/hotel-rwanda-hero-in-bitter-controversy-idUSL0420968620070404">began to challenge</a> his actions during the genocide more forcefully. For example they questioned why he charged room fees to people staying at the hotel during the genocide. The survivor’s group Ibuka <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-des-sciences-sociales-2006-3-page-525.htm">claimed that</a> he was lying about his role in saving people and should be arrested, and Kagame even <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116528240652840686">publicly argued</a> that Rusesabagina’s claims to heroism were false.</p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre&no=26115">harsh criticism</a>, Rusesabagina become increasingly harsh in his own condemnation of Kagame and the post-genocide government. </p>
<p>He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-rusesabagina/hotel-rwanda-hero-fears-new-hutu-tutsi-killings-idUSL1192073920070111">spoke regularly</a> about Hutu killed by the RPF, and his positions seemed to become more extreme. He even argued that there had been a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.3.2.129#metadata_info_tab_contents">“genocide against Hutu intellectuals”</a>, a position that resembles the double genocide theory <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3176203?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">widely rejected</a> by scholars. </p>
<p>In recent years while living in Texas, he publicly supported opposition groups, like the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change (MRCD), which <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fnn0lAkUAnk">he co-founded</a>. His arrest <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53972924">stems from accusations</a> that he has supported the Front for National Liberation (FLN), said to be the armed wing of the MRCD, and RUD-Uranana, an armed group that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-security/rwanda-detains-rebel-leader-from-group-behind-deadly-attacks-minister-idUSKCN1S61AG">launched</a> a deadly attack on Rwanda in 2018. </p>
<p><strong>What is the significance of his arrest for Rwandan opposition? And what does political opposition in Rwanda look like today?</strong></p>
<p>The details of Rusesabagina’s detention remain murky. </p>
<p>His arrest was announced in Kigali, but he appears to have been arrested outside Rwanda. His family have claimed that he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/01/hotel-rwanda-activist-paul-rusesabagina-kidnapped-from-dubai">kidnapped</a> in Dubai, but we don’t know yet whether he was detained by authorities in the United Arab Emirates on an international warrant and then turned over to Rwandan authorities or captured by Rwandan agents.</p>
<p>Many observers of Rwandan politics are suspicious of the charges against Rusesabagina, because the RPF regime has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/memory-and-justice-in-postgenocide-rwanda/B210063216D7C6BFC5038D5563834815">a record</a> of using prosecution to intimidate opponents. </p>
<p>As I’ve written in my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/memory-and-justice-in-postgenocide-rwanda/B210063216D7C6BFC5038D5563834815">“Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda”</a>, the major challengers to President Kagame in each presidential election have been arrested and tried on trumped up charges. Former President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2002 and opposition party leader Victoire Ingabire in 2010 were tried on the vaguely defined crime of “divisionism” and imprisoned. Both later had their sentences commuted by President Kagame. </p>
<p>In 2017, businesswoman Diane Rwigara – a genocide survivor and women’s rights activist who attempted to stand as an independent candidate in the 2017 Rwandan presidential election – was charged with corruption. She was eventually <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/rwanda-opposition-activist-diane-rwigara-released-bail-181005174901472.html">acquitted</a> on appeal, but only after spending a year in jail and having all of her family’s assets seized and auctioned off by the state. </p>
<p>The regime has also sought the extradition of critics living abroad and in some cases has kidnapped and repatriated opponents. For instance, former RPF official turned Kagame critic Patrick Karageye <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26752838">was assassinated</a> in South Africa in 2014, while his associate Kayumba Nyamwasa survived <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28981317">at least</a> two assassination attempts.</p>
<p>We cannot know for certain whether Rusesabagina provided material support to armed groups and supported terrorism, as he is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/paul-rusesabagina-of-hotel-rwanda-fame-arrested-on-terrorism-charges/2020/08/31/24e6d5ca-eb7c-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html">accused</a> of. </p>
<p>From my perspective, the tragedy of his story is that someone who took heroic actions to protect the lives of others became more radical because of unrelenting attacks on his character. </p>
<p>Sadly, in a political environment as polarised as Rwanda’s, there is no room for moderates and no space for critical voices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145460/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy P Longman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a political environment as polarised as Rwanda’s, there is no room for moderates and no space for critical voices.Timothy P Longman, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1453742020-09-02T13:50:42Z2020-09-02T13:50:42ZDid machete imports to Rwanda prove that the genocide against the Tutsi was planned?<p>Félicien Kabuga, a Rwandan businessman who was recently arrested for his involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, is <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/kabuga-could-be-transferred-arusha-year">set to</a> stand trial. </p>
<p>His trial brings to the fore the argument that the Rwandan genocide was planned against the Tutsi community because it is <a href="https://www.chronicles.rw/2020/02/28/how-581-tons-of-machetes-were-purchased-for-genocide/">widely reported</a> that, in the months leading up to the genocide, 581 tonnes of machetes were imported by supporters of the Habyarimana regime. Kabuga is accused of using his companies to import the vast quantities of machetes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-les-enjeux-du-proces-de-felicien-kabuga-144987">Rwanda : les enjeux du procès de Félicien Kabuga</a>
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</em>
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<p>This narrative and infamous machete statistic has become accepted as part of history because of a <a href="https://archives.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO403E.html">report</a> by Belgian economist Pierre Galand and Canadian Economy Professor Michel Chossudovsky. They were part of a 1996 mission to identify the role of international financial institutions, donors and creditors in relation to the genocide.</p>
<p>However, the data used for that report displays a number of inconsistencies and internal errors. This, in conjunction with other aspects, pokes a significant hole in the report’s conclusions.</p>
<h2>Issues in the Galand-Chossudovsky report</h2>
<p>The report states that its sources are the Ministries of Planning and Finance, the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) and the World Bank. Using that information, the authors recreated the import flows by product type and year. </p>
<p>The report presented to Rwandan authorities in 1996, publicised their findings that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to BNR data, huge quantities of machetes were imported as of 1992 from China…[and that] between 1992 and 1994, 581,000 kg of machetes were imported. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.francegenocidetutsi.org/UsageDetteExtGalandChossudovskyAnnexes.pdf">Appendices</a> to the report mostly consist of summary tables created by the authors. </p>
<p>One of these is the “Summary table 1991/1994 - Importers” (hereafter called the “Importers” table), which lists 18 importers and dozens of commercial operations. It covers the period between 1991 and 1994.</p>
<p>Strangely, no purchases were recorded in 1991 and 1992, and very few for 1994. Eleven entries for “billhooks and machetes”, ordered by ten importers, do come to a total of 581 tonnes. The biggest importer was La Trouvaille (a trader), with 288 tonnes (50% of the net weight), followed by Félicien Kabuga with 96 tonnes (16%).</p>
<p>Based on these statistics, the authors drew a link between machete imports and genocidal intent. They wrote that “there was an enormous amount of imports in 1993” and that “the year 1993 was of key importance in the intensive preparation efforts for the genocide”. It’s important to note that the report didn’t compare this figure to machete imports in previous years.</p>
<h2>Not reliable</h2>
<p>Yet the data used for the analysis is not reliable. For example, the “Importers” table lists 17 operations for “shovels and spades” for between 2 and 2.5 million FRW (between about US$15,000 and US$19,000) per 10 tonnes. But one of the 1993 imports of 108 tonnes is billed at 2.45 million FRW (about US$19,000) – that is, ten times cheaper than the others. It seems highly likely that there is a typographical error in the table. These errors skew totals and the conclusions that are drawn from them. </p>
<p>What’s more, as we mentioned earlier, there are no entries in the 1991 and 1992 columns. The authors write that, in these two years, “no machetes or other agricultural supplies were imported”. It seems extremely unlikely that, for a period of 18 months, not a single piece of farm equipment was imported into Rwanda. </p>
<p>In addition, there are gaps in the information presented. For instance, the authors mention imports in the second half of 1992, which do not appear in the summary table. And the missing import flows for several years in the summaries mean that any unusual operations cannot be identified. </p>
<p>Without this information, it is difficult to hypothesise about the planning of the genocide.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the “Importers” table is contradicted by a table titled “Definitive imports by price heading 1991/1994. Summary table” (hereafter called the “Definitive” table). This table features a list of imports over four years with their net weight (in kilograms) and value (in Rwandan francs). It gives a total of 366 tonnes of machetes imported from 1991 to 1994, that is, 215 tonnes less than the “accepted” total. </p>
<p>How can we account for that difference? </p>
<p>We have two hypotheses: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>The figure is inflated as not all listed machetes actually made it to Rwanda. The “Importers” table lists businesses with an import licence, which does not necessarily mean that the operation was completed. If operations were planned but not brought to completion they should be subtracted from the 581 tonnes of machetes. The “Definitive” table appears to feature only finalised commercial operations, giving a better idea of the actual imports during that period. For machetes as well as other products, it shows a relatively stable import market between 1991 and 1994.</p></li>
<li><p>Hidden military imports were counted as agricultural tools. The report specifies that “many so-called non-military imports were actually disguised military imports”. For instance, machetes purchased as agricultural supplies. But a choice must be made: the same commercial transaction cannot be both a <em>hidden</em> purchase of military equipment and a <em>declared</em> purchase of machetes, whether in preparation for the genocide or not. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>As well as the Galand-Chossudovsky report, other documents relating to machete imports are available. This allows us to test the reliability of the “Importers” table.</p>
<h2>Other documents</h2>
<p>One of these documents is a file from a Kenyan transporter who delivered about 26 tonnes of machetes to Félicien Kabuga. This was published in <a href="https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/rwanda/Aucun-Temoin-ne-doit-survivre-Le">a report</a> by Alison Desforges for the International Federation for Human Rights. The operation does not appear in the “Importers” table, though there are two import licences for 48 tonnes in Kabuga’s name.</p>
<p>Another document describes a delivery of 19,200 machetes in 1992 which was flown from Tianjin to Kigali, via Kenya. These were ordered by importer Tatien Kayijuka. With an <a href="https://www.knivesandtools.fr/fr/ct/machettes-et-coupe-coupe.htm">average weight</a> of 600g per machete, these 19,200 machetes would have weighed around 11.52 tonnes. </p>
<p>Because the “Importers” table didn’t show any imports in 1992, two scenarios are possible:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>There is a transaction of 11.52 tonnes of machetes in 1993. So perhaps it was listed in 1993. </p></li>
<li><p>There were two separate transactions, meaning Kayijuka imported machetes as part of yearly routine commercial activity. In this case, the “Importers” table is inaccurate in not reporting imports in 1992. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>These documented imports weaken the credibility of the “Importers” table used by the authors of the report. But, they support the data in the “Definitive” table, which shows regular and almost identical imports between 1992 and 1993. </p>
<p>The machete data used in the Galand-Chossudovsky report is, therefore, incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable.</p>
<p>Furthermore, with the statements that “the year 1993 was of key importance in the intensive preparation efforts for the genocide” and that “nearly all Rwandan economic operators imported machetes in 1993”, the authors infer a plan that is not backed up by the data. Given that the described increase of machete imports remains unproven, and nothing in the report indicates the intent of planning the genocide, the report’s conclusion misuses the evidence.</p>
<p><em>This article was written in collaboration with Roland Tissot, a member of the <a href="http://www.fmsh.fr/fr/recherche/24279">Platform on Violence and Exiting Violence at Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Translated from French by Rosie Marsland for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en">Fast ForWord</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Witness-expert at the ICTR Prosecutor's Office (1996-2010) and other national courts</span></em></p>Between 1992 and 1994, the former regime is said to have imported 581 tonnes of machetes into Rwanda. This figure appears to establish that the genocide was planned. But is this number accurate?André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1409722020-06-18T08:50:52Z2020-06-18T08:50:52ZNkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi’s new leader has much to mend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342633/original/file-20200618-41234-152e7l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi's president-elect Evariste Ndayishimiye signs a condolence book for Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Photo by Evrard Ngendakumana/Xinhua via Getty) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pierre Nkurunziza, who presided over Burundi’s destiny for 15 years, died in June at the age of 55. He died three weeks after the election of his successor, after which he’d been bestowed with the title of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics/outgoing-burundi-president-nkurunziza-famed-for-soccer-and-violence-dies-idUSKBN23G24H">“supreme guide of patriotism”</a>. </p>
<p>The cost of Nkurunziza’s re-election in 2015 for an unlawful third – and final – term is well-known. It brought oppressive laws, brutal repression, arbitrary arrests and huge groups of refugees fleeing overseas. The GDP per person fell to the world’s lowest, overseas investment collapsed, the country was marginalised both regionally and internationally. Ethnic rhetoric underpinned political mobilisation that feeds on the pervasive confrontation with the Rwandan model. </p>
<p>His death means that his successor, Évariste Ndayishimiye, faces a great challenge. It’s a challenge that he is not prepared for, given the pressing demands that result from the country’s deteriorated political, economic and social situation. </p>
<p>Initial decisions by a president usually define the rest of their term. A good place for Ndayishimiye to start would be the immediate release of journalists and various observers condemned for simply doing their job. That is, providing information and monitoring the electoral process. </p>
<p>He would thus show that he is willing to entertain questions on the functioning of institutions, even the abuses of his peers. Hopefully, he might even be willing to deal with the corruption of some of his colleagues. </p>
<p>But above all, at the end of an election that was not dominated by ethnic contestation, he could be the first president likely to put an end to all forms of partisanship that could encourage or revive this cleavage. </p>
<p>It’s a deep and troubling legacy that he’s been bequeathed.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza’s rise to power was hardly auspicious. </p>
<p>In 1993, after 30 years of military rule led by ethnic minority Tutsi officers, Burundi held its first democratic elections. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was elected president in July, but was assassinated three months later during an attempted military coup. The country convulsed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/heurs-et-malheurs-du-modele-burundais-53279">decade of violence and wars</a>.</p>
<p>Painstaking negotiations facilitated by former South African president Nelson Mandela culminated in the Arusha Accords in August 2000. But the conflict dragged on for five more years, before a ceasefire eventually took effect and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundin%C3%A9gociations-la-pr%C3%A9sidence-de-la-transition-pose-probl%C3%A8me-%C3%A0-la-veille-du">the means of political transition</a> and the future constitutional framework were defined.</p>
<p>In 2003, the National Defence Force, which had been leading the country since 1966 after overturning the monarchy and proclaiming a republic, merged with the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the main arm of the pro-Hutu armed rebellion led by Nkurunziza. CNDD-FDD became a political party.</p>
<p>In 2005, a new constitution was adopted by referendum. The general elections followed in which CNDD-FDD candidates won nearly all seats by a landslide. These elected representatives carried Nkurunziza to the head of state. Nkurunziza quickly ingratiated himself with the population through <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/bilan-des-r%C3%A9formes-sociales-de-l%C3%A8re-nkurunziza-au-burundi/a-53431355">reforms</a> that aimed to meet urgent social demands such as healthcare and education. </p>
<p>However, the true power was still in the hands of a small council of the main officers who had organised the guerrilla movement and led the civil war. </p>
<p>At the same time, the party strengthened its position in all municipalities. Bit by bit, CNDD-FDD members took charge of all the social and economic activities for rural populations. <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/459791/politique/burundi-milliers-de-jeunes-imbonerakure-defilent-bujumbura/">Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the party</a>, became operational during the 2010 electoral campaign.</p>
<p>Five years later, the CNDD-FDD <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/155301/politique/large-victoire-du-cndd-fdd-aux-l-gislatives/">overwhelmingly won the 2010 municipal, presidential and legislative elections</a>. As the only candidate in the presidential election, due to boycotts from the opposition parties, Nkurunziza won <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20100630-reelection-surprise-president-nkurunziza-tete-burundi">with a substantial majority</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/report/2010/11/23/des-portes-qui-se-ferment/reduction-de-lespace-democratique-au-burundi">Thus began the slide into an authoritarian regime</a>. The main reason for this comes from the fact that during the 2010 elections, Nkurunziza’s party found itself in a position of strength that even they did not expect. The turmoil and division among the disordered opposition powers gave them free rein.</p>
<p>From then on, “civil society” organisations became the main areas of debate and mobilisation for political, economic and societal issues. </p>
<p>CNDD-FDD leaders were openly intent on taking control of civil society organisations. But this proved impossible in the run-up to the commemorations of the <a href="https://bdiagnews.com/economie/burundi-preparatifs-des-50-ans-dindependance-2/">50th anniversary of independence, in July 2012</a>, which thrust Burundi into the international spotlight. This required that authorities display an atmosphere of apparent political openness and relative national consensus.</p>
<p>The media and civil society organisations thrived like never before and were credited with the success of the public events organised for the occasion. Freedom of expression went far beyond the political issues at hand, and shows explicitly discussed the daily experience and aspirations of citizens. Debates on poverty, healthcare and unemployment were fair game.</p>
<p>All these endeavours found a large audience <a href="http://umr-developpement-societes.univ-paris1.fr/menu-haut/recherche/projets-de-recherche/afrique-des-grands-lacs/">in the country and beyond</a>. But this Burundian exceptionalism didn’t survive the president’s decision to aggressively end it for his own convenience.</p>
<h2>A third term at any cost</h2>
<p>There were mass demonstrations when Nkurunziza announced his candidature for a third term in <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/251198/politique/presidentielle-burundi-scrutin-calme-libre-credible-inclusif-selon-lonu/">2015</a>. This was a direct challenge to the constitution, which allows for a maximum of two terms. An attempted military rebellion was quickly snuffed out and the country found itself facing an insurmountable political impasse. </p>
<p>The president and generals <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/archive/burundi-des-poids-lourds-du-r%C3%A9gime-limog%C3%A9s/97191">Adolphe Nshyirimana and Guillaume Bunyoni</a> opted for <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2015-1-page-169.htm">heavy-handed tactics</a>. These included neutralising opposition parties, arresting and exiling CNDD-FDD dissidents and destroying independent radio stations. </p>
<p>The grim outcome forced CNDD-FDD leaders to push out a president who was also increasingly facing regional and international isolation. A new constitution, adopted in 2018, eliminated the main gains from the Arusha Accords in terms of democratic representation of all parties. The institutions in charge of truth-telling and laying down justice (the press, the courts, the electoral monitoring body) were brought into line. </p>
<p>After guaranteeing the outgoing president a sumptuous pension, the “most neutral” candidate, General <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">Évariste Ndayishimiye</a>, became the new president in a contested election. His victory in the presidential election in May was <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/20200525-burundi-%C3%A9variste-ndayishimiye-d%C3%A9clar%C3%A9-vainqueur-de-l-%C3%A9lection-pr%C3%A9sidentielle">made official</a> only a few days before Nkurunziza’s death.</p>
<p>The maturity of the opposition, the firm <a href="https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/elections-2020-le-bilan-alarmant-des-eveques-catholiques/">position of the Catholic Church</a> on these results and, above all, a common fear, prevented a new crisis.</p>
<p>Whether Burundi can chart a different course under Ndayishimiye is unclear. Burundians must be hoping that it does.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Rosie Marsland for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en">Fast ForWord</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sudden death of Burundi’s former president, Pierre Nkurunziza, marks the end of a long reign, characterised by violent political crises.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1161352019-05-16T19:59:18Z2019-05-16T19:59:18ZRwanda and Sri Lanka: A tale of two genocides<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274801/original/file-20190516-69174-1jtoosb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=125%2C0%2C2026%2C1566&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Tamil man who was paralyzed by shelling during the final weeks of the conflict in Mullivaikkal in 2009 is seen in this 2018 photo in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Priya Tharmaseelan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Rwandan <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">genocide</a> and the 10th year since the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka. While the 1994 <a href="https://undocs.org/A/RES/58/234">Rwandan genocide</a> has become part of the world’s collective memory, the 2009 Tamil genocide has not.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/mayor-toronto-marks-may-18-tamil-genocide-remembrance-day">Mullivaikkal Genocide Remembrance Day</a> on May 18, named after the village that was the site of cataclysmic violence, is a day to remember those who died in the Sri Lankan conflict. Mullivaikkal commemoration events have been taking place around the world this month.</p>
<p>However, 10 years and a series of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24371&LangID=E">United Nations reports</a> and <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G19/065/61/PDF/G1906561.pdf?OpenElement">resolutions</a> have made little progress toward truth, accountability or reparations for the survivors of atrocity crimes in Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of the recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/world/asia/sri-lanka-easter-bombing-attacks.html">Easter Sunday bombings</a>, the spectre of ethnic violence has resurfaced.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lanka-has-a-history-of-conflict-but-the-recent-attacks-appear-different-115815">Sri Lanka has a history of conflict, but the recent attacks appear different</a>
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<p>The Rwandan genocide offers important lessons for Sri Lanka.</p>
<h2>Tutsis slaughtered</h2>
<p>An estimated 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutu were killed in just <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/5590646/rwandan-genocide-anniversary">100 days</a> in 1994. Thousands more were subjected to sexual violence and tortured in a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/oped-25-years-after-rwanda-genocide-politics-of-demonization-as-dangerous-as-ever/">systematic campaign</a> by the Hutu ethnic majority.</p>
<p>Fifteen years later, another slaughter unfolded — this time in northern Sri Lanka. The protracted civil war between the national government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was coming to a catastrophic end. The goal of an independent state for the minority Tamils was slipping away.</p>
<p>Throughout the conflict, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2008/country-chapters/sri-lanka">both sides</a> failed to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. Unlawful killings and enforced disappearances carried out by the Sri Lankan security forces were <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa370192007en.pdf">daily occurrences</a>. The LTTE was condemned for its suicide bombings and forcible recruitment of child soldiers.</p>
<p>For most of the 2000s, the LTTE was operating as a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcis/proscription/submissions/sub35.pdf.">de facto state</a> in the north and east. By early 2009, military losses had gradually crushed the LTTE’s civil administration of these areas. </p>
<p>The LTTE and an estimated <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankas-dead-and-missing-need-accounting">330,000</a> Tamil civilians were trapped in a small piece of land on the northeast coast in the Mullaithivu District. The government ordered the UN to evacuate their last few international workers from the region while international media were excluded and local journalists <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/sri-lanka-witness-war-crimes">silenced</a>.</p>
<h2>Carnage unfolded</h2>
<p>Transatlantic cellphone photos and a few video clips had begun circulating with images of the unfolding carnage. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/08/sri-lanka-repeated-shelling-hospitals-evidence-war-crimes">Hospitals</a> on the front lines were systematically <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/War%20Crimes%20In%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf">shelled</a>, as were food distribution lines and even Red Cross ships attempting to evacuate <a href="https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf">the wounded</a>. </p>
<p>Within a few months, a brutal siege of the officially declared “safe zone” and the indiscriminate shelling of Tamil civilians concentrated there brought the war to an end. The Sri Lankan government celebrated its successful “humanitarian rescue operation.” In fact, it was genocide.</p>
<p>By August 2009, Britain’s Channel 4 News was broadcasting <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/sri-lanka-execution-video-new-war-crimes-claims">gruesome footage</a> of summary executions and rape perpetrated by Sri Lankan soldiers. Dozens of surrendering Tamils, including senior Tiger political leaders and their families, had been <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger">shot dead</a> by soldiers as they walked out of the safe zone hoisting white flags.</p>
<p>In 2012, the UN Secretary General estimated <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankas-dead-and-missing-need-accounting">that 40,000</a> civilians were killed over the final five months of the conflict. The exact number, as in many conflict situations, remains contested and is likely higher.</p>
<p>Once the conflict ended, hundreds of thousands of Tamils were interned in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/26/sri-lanka-tamil-tigers-camps">squalid camps</a> in the northern Vanni region. Even today, thousands of Tamils <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/sri-lanka">remain displaced</a> in their own country.</p>
<h2>‘War without witness’</h2>
<p>If the Rwandan genocide was a genocide foretold, yet no action was ever taken by the international community, then the Tamil genocide was <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/11/04/sri_lankas_hidden_genocide.html">deliberately hidden</a> and dubbed the “<a href="https://www.journalism.co.uk/news-commentary/frances-harrison-sri-lanka-journalists-failed-to-tell-the-story-of-war-crimes/s6/a549285/">war without witness</a>.”</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/sri_lanka_press_release15april09.pdf">both cases</a>, the UN and the European Union had <a href="https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/08/Why-the-U.S.-Government-Failed-to-Anticipate-the-Rwandan-Genocide-27hp2at.pdf">direct warnings</a> but opted against <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/">taking action</a>. The international community’s inertia <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201-rwanda/39240.html">in Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf">Sri Lanka</a> has been acknowledged as “grave failures.”</p>
<p>The establishment of an <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf">international criminal tribunal</a> was an explicit attempt to grapple with Rwanda’s past. Convictions were secured <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases">in the cases</a> of 61 “ringleaders.” A <a href="https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1241&context=bjil">groundbreaking decision</a> on sexual violence as an act of genocide was among its many rulings. Local “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/02/59162/?utm_term=.3a1cca04ea70">gacaca courts</a>” conducted some two million trials. A <a href="http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=69">truth commission</a> continues efforts to promote reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples. </p>
<p>While highly imperfect, these <a href="https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice">transitional justice</a> mechanisms have generated a record of what really happened and why it happened.</p>
<p>In contrast, Sri Lanka has repeatedly reneged on pledges to investigate and prosecute war-time atrocity crimes. Abductions, torture in custody and <a href="http://www.fhr.org.za/files/5514/0015/7674/An_Unfinished_war-_Sexual_violence-YS.pdf">sexual violence</a> remain rampant amid a long history of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/sri-lanka/report-sri-lanka/">failed promises</a>.</p>
<h2>Occupied land not returned</h2>
<p>The harassment of Tamil activists as well as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48257299">targeted violence</a> against the Muslim community <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/sri-lanka-authorities-must-protect-muslims-against-violence/">continue</a>. Commitments to <a href="http://adayaalam.org/mapping-militarisation-in-mullaitivu/">demilitarize</a> and return occupied land are unfulfilled. Weak state structures, the lack of an independent judiciary and a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/02/06/long-read-why-has-sri-lankas-transitional-justice-process-failed-to-deliver/">culture of impunity</a> remain significant <a href="https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/2479/Risk%20Assessment%20Sri%20Lanka%20September%202018%20FINAL.pdf">obstacles</a>.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-commonwealth-must-take-action-against-sri-lankan-war-crimes-3473">Why the Commonwealth must take action against Sri Lankan war crimes</a>
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<p>As Harvard University scholar <a href="https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10589/Minow">Martha Minow</a> suggests, the relentless repetition of atrocity requires a pathway between “too much forgetting” and “too much memory,” between vengeance and forgiveness. In Sri Lanka today, memory and memorialization are radical counterpoints to official state narratives that resist accounting for the past.</p>
<p>Holocaust survivor Primo Levi once said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It happened; therefore, it can happen again… it can happen everywhere.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So long as impunity and the failure to address the root causes of atrocity crimes continue in Sri Lanka, lasting peace will remain elusive. Acknowledging the past must be a precondition to meaningful reconciliation.</p>
<p>A poem in Cheran’s anthology <a href="https://www.arcpublications.co.uk/books/cheran-in-a-time-of-burning-488"><em>In a Time of Burning</em></a> evokes the challenge of closure in the wake of mass violence:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“there is neither sea nor wind</p>
<p>for us to dissolve the ashes</p>
<p>proclaim an end</p>
<p>and close our eyes.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sharry Aiken is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Queen's University. She is a recipient of research and conference funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. She is a co-researcher with the Canadian Partnership for International Justice, former president of the Canadian Council for Refugees, and past co-chair of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Centre for International Justice. She is also an Advisory Council member of the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheran Rudhramoorthy is a recipient of research funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the International Development Research Centre. </span></em></p>This spring marks the 25th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the 10th year since the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka. The world knows what happened in Rwanda. What about Sri Lanka?Sharry Aiken, Associate Professor of Law, Queen's University, OntarioCheran Rudhramoorthy, Associate Professor, University of WindsorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1145122019-04-01T12:52:25Z2019-04-01T12:52:25ZDebate continues about the media’s role in driving Rwanda’s genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266532/original/file-20190329-70986-1nyct8d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inside the Genocide Memorial Church in Karongi-Kibuye - Western Rwanda. 11,000 people were killed here during the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Choral_Group_Rehearses_inside_Genocide_Memorial_Church_-_Karongi-Kibuye_-_Western_Rwanda_-_01.jpg">Adam Jones/WikiMedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twenty-five years ago, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093238">Rwandan</a> government launched a meticulously planned <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486">genocide</a> against its Tutsi minority. It killed approximately 800 000 people in 100 days. </p>
<p>We can’t reflect on the history of the 1994 genocide without considering the critical role the media played in both inciting and prolonging the violence. </p>
<p>In the summer of 1993 the government, ruled by the pro-Hutu National Revolutionary Movement for Development, engaged in a peace process with the mostly-Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. They negotiated an end to the civil war and the repatriation of Tutsi exiles. At the same time, however, the Movement was also preparing for genocide. </p>
<p>The youth wing of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development established the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-03.htm">Interahamwe</a>. This paramilitary group would eventually lead attacks on Tutsi civilians. Hardliners from the party also launched <a href="http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Radio_T%C3%A9l%C3%A9vision_Libre_des_Mille_Collines">Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines</a> (RTLM - French for “Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television”). It was a radio station that disseminated hate propaganda and prepared its listeners for the coming violence. The broadcaster provided a popular platform for ideas already circulating in <a href="http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Category:KANGURA"><em>Kangura</em></a>, an extremist magazine founded in 1990. </p>
<p>In its early broadcasts, the station used Radio Rwanda’s transmission equipment. The new broadcaster developed lively, informal and accessible programming that targeted ordinary citizens. Unlike Radio Rwanda, it played popular music from neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). This was particularly appealing to younger listeners. </p>
<p>In the weeks prior to the April 1994 genocide the station ramped up its anti-Tutsi, pro-Hutu propaganda. Broadcasters used increasingly dehumanising language to speak about the Tutsi minority. This mobilised ordinary Hutu citizens against the Tutsi. Historian Alison Des Forges <a href="https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/media-and-rwanda-genocide">wrote</a> that, once the genocide was underway, government leaders used the station to promote violence. It also gave specific directions for carrying out the killings.</p>
<p>A quarter of a century on, media scholars, historians and journalists are still debating the precise role of RTLM in the genocide. Did radio broadcasts directly incite violence? Or did they simply amplify the fear and genocidal ideology that was already circulating throughout the Hutu population? </p>
<h2>Media effects</h2>
<p>Most early scholarship about the genocide views RTLM as a lethal influence. In 2001, researcher, war correspondent and diplomat Samantha Power <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/">suggested</a> that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>killers often carried a machete in one hand and a transistor radio in the other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The refusal of international actors like the US and the UN Security Council to use radio jamming technology to stop RTLM’s broadcasts is another flash-point for discussion. It reflects the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257">general failure</a> of the international community to intervene and stop the genocide. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00100">More recent studies</a> question the primacy of radio broadcasts in directly motivating the killers’ actions. These scholars see radio as an extension of years of state propaganda which was disseminated through schools, churches, and other government institutions. </p>
<p>In a detailed empirical study published in 2007, social scientist <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100622570">Scott Straus</a> found that only 15% of perpetrators cited radio broadcasts as a key influence in their decision to kill Tutsi. Face-to-face intimidation and communication between peers appeared to have a stronger influence. Radio broadcasts were a secondary factor. </p>
<h2>Enduring debate</h2>
<p>The enduring debate about the role of media was central to a <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/cases/ictr-99-52">case</a> before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The tribunal was tasked with prosecuting high level perpetrators and the masterminds of the genocide. The defendants in what was known as the Media Case included RTLM co-founder Ferdinand Nahimana, its executive Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and <em>Kangura</em> founder and editor, Hassan Ngeze. </p>
<p>In 2003, all three were <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/three-media-leaders-convicted-genocide">convicted</a> of genocide, incitement to commit genocide, and persecution using radio broadcasts and newspaper articles as a crime against humanity. The conviction for committing genocide was overturned on appeal, but much of the original ruling was retained. </p>
<p>The Media Case was precedent-setting. It held media executives accountable for inciting genocide, regardless of other factors that may have influenced the perpetrators. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/prosecutor-v-nahimana-barayagwiza-and-ngeze-case-no-ictr-9952a/FBD07F6AB3AD4108BCED83978DF1A9B0">Legal scholars suggest</a> that the judgement will have a significant impact on future cases of incitement to genocide. </p>
<h2>International response</h2>
<p>We may never definitively settle the “media effects” debate – that is, did radio and other media directly incite violence, or were they a secondary driver?</p>
<p>But the establishment of RTLM in 1993 was undoubtedly a clear warning sign to the world. In a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf">2000 report</a>, the Organisation of African Unity suggested that silencing RTLM during the genocide would have had limited impact. The international community should have moved to address the hate propaganda before the killing started. It should have recognised the broadcasts as an essential part of the preparation for the genocide. </p>
<p>One mechanism for countering RTLM’s hate propaganda could have come from the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, which was deployed by the Security Council in 1993 to oversee the peace process. However, due to typical delays, the Mission’s radio broadcast equipment was never shipped to Rwanda. The absence of an effective communication tool left the UN without the means to produce counter broadcasts. It could also not provide airtime for the voices of moderate Hutu leaders. </p>
<h2>Lessons remain</h2>
<p>Although many years have passed, the Rwandan genocide still has much to teach us about the centrality of media in cases of state violence. An analysis of media opens up important discussions about genocide prevention, the regulation of hate speech, and the appropriate forms of international intervention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Grzyb receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). </span></em></p>Although many years have passed, the Rwandan genocide still has much to teach us about the centrality of media in cases of state violence.Amanda Grzyb, Associate Professor and Faculty Scholar of Media and Information Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1049952018-10-29T14:19:54Z2018-10-29T14:19:54ZA look back in history provides fresh insights into Rwanda today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242684/original/file-20181029-76396-1io2j2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Except during the relatively brief period of colonial rule, Rwanda was, and is, a violent society.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Olivier Matthys</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At first sight, three fundamental ruptures occurred in modern Rwandan history: colonisation, starting at the end of the 19th century; the revolution of 1959-1961 followed by independence in 1962; and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a> followed by the seizure of power by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.</p>
<p>Of course, these are breaks with the past. But I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1462985">argue</a> that there are also striking continuities spanning the entire period, from the mid-19th century to the 2010s. These include the concentration of power, intra-regime conflict, the salience of ethnicity, and the nature of the state. </p>
<p>Another characteristic – the pervasiveness of the military institution and of military ethics – disappeared during colonial days and the first two republics. But it resurfaced from 1994 onwards, resuming continuity after a century-long interval.</p>
<p>This longue durée view is very illuminating. It offers a better understanding of crucial characteristics of governance in Rwanda today, at home and in the region. </p>
<h2>Concentration of power</h2>
<p>A first continuity throughout the four periods (precolonial, colonial, post-revolution and post-genocide) is the concentration of power. The precolonial kingdom became increasingly centralised, particularly from the latter part of the 18th century. </p>
<p>In a structure like a pyramid, regional authorities were dependents of the mwami (king). Below them were hill chiefs who tightly controlled the population. </p>
<p>Authoritarian centralisation continued in colonial days in two ways. On the one hand, indirect rule reinforced and stabilised the power of the court and the chiefs. On the other, the Belgian administration was authoritarian and, like the indigenous one, ignored principles like the separation of powers and the rule of law. </p>
<p>The elective principle and checks and balances were introduced less than two years before independence. It’s therefore not surprising that, in Rwanda as elsewhere in Africa, the new political elites continued colonial modes of governance. In this respect, there is not much of a break between colonial rule, the de facto single-party first republic, the de jure single-party second republic and de facto single-party regime in post-genocide Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Internal strife</h2>
<p>Intra-regime conflict is a second continuity. Internal strife within the royal court and among ruling elites was common in precolonial days. Most successions to the throne were contested and led to bitter and often violent infighting, and even to civil war. Regime infighting resumed after independence. The gradual narrowing of the ruling party’s power base through the elimination of important constituencies eventually led to the downfall of the first republic. </p>
<p>A similar phenomenon occurred under the second republic. A number of regime leaders were arrested in 1980. Fearing a similar fate, others fled the country. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front has also fallen prey to intense struggle. This pitted factions against each other from the first days of the invasion. This evolution became more pronounced after 2000 and took a radical turn in 2010 when four leading figures who fled published a <a href="http://rwandatekaiteka.over-blog.com/article-declaration-on-rwanda-by-gerald-gahima-general-kayumba-nyamwasa-colonel-patrick-karegeya-dr-theogene-rudasingwa-56727400.html">long diatribe</a> against the regime. </p>
<h2>Ethnicity</h2>
<p>A third major continuity is the importance of ethnicity, although it has had different political implications depending on the period. </p>
<p>Political ethnicity emerged clearly in the 19th century. The distinction between ethnic groups that earlier referred to political positions and economic and military occupations became institutionalised. </p>
<p>From the 1870s, the awareness of ethnic distinction spread all over the country and led to several revolts. The 1897 insurrection showed that the population was conscious of a great divide between the <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/2909.htm">two ethnic groups</a>. </p>
<p>Colonial rule further institutionalised and rigidified ethnicity. Belgium first entrenched Tutsi rule. However, in the 1950s it switched sides when democratisation and independence came to the fore. </p>
<p>Although there were underlying social, political and economic grievances, the revolution of 1959-1961 took place under an almost exclusively ethnic banner. On assuming power, the Rwandan Patriotic Front set out to pursue a policy of de-ethnicisation. But the denial of ethnicity is an essential element of the hegemonic strategies of the party-dominated elite. The claim that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">“there are no Hutu or Tutsi, we are all Rwandans now”</a> allows them to hide a Tutsi ethnocracy. </p>
<p>The regime’s narrative merely reflects the public transcript. But the hidden transcript – that of oppressed Hutu and Tutsi – is <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5148.htm">very different</a>. </p>
<h2>The state</h2>
<p>A fourth strong continuity lies in the nature of the state which, unlike in much of Africa, is strong and well internalised by citizens. </p>
<p>Rwanda is not a colonial creation, and an ancient state tradition plays an undeniable role in the maintenance of an efficient pyramid-like structure. The Rwandan Leviathan is highly centralised and hierarchical – it reaches every inch of the territory and every citizen. </p>
<p>Echoing the situation in earlier days, a mere two years after the extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the state had been rebuilt, and Rwanda was again administered from top to bottom. Before – as after the genocide – the regimes displayed a strong belief in managing, monitoring, controlling, and mobilising the population. Both showed a strong belief in using the state in projects of economic and social engineering implemented under the stewardship of forward-looking and enlightened leaders.</p>
<p>A final determining continuity is the pervasiveness of the military institution and of warrior ethics and values. What is particularly striking is the re-emergence of this in 1994, after it had virtually disappeared during colonial days and the two Hutu republics. After that century-long gap, it reappeared almost seamlessly. Beyond the army as an institution, military values are disseminated throughout the entire society by the widespread use of means like <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/PurdekovaMaking">ingando and itorero (re-)education practices</a>. </p>
<h2>History as a reference point</h2>
<p>Clearly the continuities outweigh the ruptures. Except during the relatively brief period of colonial rule, Rwanda was, and is, a violent society. Throughout the entire period, central political power has been almost absolute. In today’s Rwanda, constant references to history, whether factually true or not, are used as a tool of legitimation. The idealised glorification of the precolonial era supports the political objectives and strategies of the current rulers. </p>
<p>Rwanda’s history matters in a concrete way. Hence efforts by the Rwandan Patriotic Front to impose and tightly police its narrative. The problem is that the public and the hidden transcripts often don’t tally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Throughout the entire period, central political power has been almost absolute.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/949252018-04-25T13:06:39Z2018-04-25T13:06:39ZRwanda can’t achieve reconciliation without fixing its democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215027/original/file-20180416-587-ss3tux.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's Genocide Memorial burial site.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ahmed Jallanzo/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This month Rwanda marks 24 years since the <a href="http://thefactfile.org/rwandan-genocide-facts/">genocide</a> that left almost one million people dead. Healing is paramount in a society that’s not quite moved beyond the horrors of 1994. To ensure the past isn’t repeated, Rwanda needs to work towards meaningful political representation for all the country’s ethnic groups.</p>
<p>There is a model that other countries have adopted that could help it do this. It has been shown that <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572786.001.0001/acprof-9780199572786-chapter-5">consensus democracy</a> is the best political mechanism to eradicate violent competition for power.</p>
<p>This kind of democracy – which is based on a power sharing model of government – has proven to be effective in the <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm">United States</a>, <a href="https://miliux.wordpress.com/dutch-consensus-democracy/">The Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://nl.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?hspart=adk&hsimp=yhs-adk_sbyhp&p=consensus+democracy+in+switzerland&param2=e3c5f38c-dfa6-4846-90f0-5d008e68eb9f&param3=email_1.3%7ENL%7Eappfocus94&param4=bing-bb9%7EChrome%7Econsensus+democracy+in+switzerland%7E036BF5C38C06692EE0397501EA8B0530&param1=20180327&type=">Switzerland</a>. It also worked in <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">South Africa</a> during the country’s transition to democracy. </p>
<p>The challenge facing Rwanda is that it’s an <a href="http://rwandaises.com/2011/07/rwanda-briefing-by-general-kayumba-nyamwasa-col-patrick-karegeya/">autocratic regime</a>. The democratic space in the country has shrunk dramatically. Independent thinkers and alternative voices have been <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/letters/truly-hostile-environment/2009939.article">silenced </a>. President Paul Kagame has walked in the footsteps of his predecessors by <a href="https://kellogg.nd.edu/content/political-governance-post-genocide-rwanda-filip-reyntjens">concentrating power</a> in the hands of a tiny political and military elite.</p>
<p>Should Rwanda continue <a href="https://medium.com/@dhimbara/power-addiction-and-the-rwandan-tragedy-65fff19d6c1b">this legacy</a>, Kagame could be violently replaced by another autocrat. Experience has shown that a change of guard without deep structural transformation is not sustainable. </p>
<p>What is the way forward from here? We believe consensus democracy holds the answers.</p>
<h2>Genesis of a genocide</h2>
<p>To understand how Rwanda has reached this point, it’s important to explore the country’s history. </p>
<p>The intensity and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2015.1028206?src=recsys">destructive scale of the genocide</a> in 1994 were unprecedented. But the underlying <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title1">dynamics of ethnic violence</a> started in the late <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title6">1950s</a> when Rwanda was struggling to achieve independence from Belgium and <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title6">to establish a democratic republic. </a></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title8">First Republic</a> led by President <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/gregoire-kayibanda/">Grégoire Kayibanda</a> and his Republican Democratic Movement – also known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Party-for-Hutu-Emancipation">MDR-Parmehutu</a> – was established in 1962 to heal the wounds left by colonialism and the Tutsi monarchy. The monarchy had been <a href="https://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/the-hutu-jacobin-revolution-1959/">overthrown in 1961</a> by a Hutu elite which was backed by the <a href="http://education.seattlepi.com/impact-did-belgian-presence-rwanda-spark-further-conflict-5558.html">Belgian administration</a>. </p>
<p>The overthrow forced the monarch, his followers, and many ordinary Tutsis into exile. In the face of threats posed by <a href="http://www.olny.nl/RWANDA/Archives/Dossier_Premiere_Republique/C_Nkurunziza_Republique_Inyenzi_Divisions.html">exiled Tutsi insurgents</a>, President Kayibanda <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050902972956?journalCode=rjea20&">consolidated his power</a>, making Rwanda a Hutu republic, not a motherland for all its sons and daughters. Tutsis were executed or forced into exile. Those who remained became second class citizens. </p>
<p>The MDR-Parmehutu regime used the Tutsi insurgency <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994">as a pretext to silence all its political rivals</a>. It killed some of their leaders and co-opted others. By 1965, Rwanda had become a <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Rwandan+general+election,+1965&item_type=topic">one-party state</a>. </p>
<p>It came as no surprise, then, that at the end of Kayibanda’s term in 1973 his associates called for constitutional change <a href="http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve?codeEve=601">to allow him seek a third term in office</a>. </p>
<p>But rather than focus on a power struggle that was simmering among the Hutu elites, the regime sponsored another wave of violence against the Tutsi. This scapegoating strategy proved counter productive and paved the way for a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title9">coup d’état in July 1973</a>. The coup ended with the death of Kayibanda and his close aides. Many other key figures of the First Republic were imprisoned and held under harsh conditions. </p>
<p>The coup leader, Major General <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juvenal-Habyarimana">Juvénal Habyarimana</a>, took over and vowed to build the Second Republic around the triple goal of <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title9">“peace, unity, and development”</a>. For many years, he succeeded at maintaining relative stability and economic development, becoming the darling of the donor community. Rwanda was hailed as a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233151232_Development_Ideology_the_Peasantry_and_Genocide_Rwanda_Represented_in_Habyarimana's_Speeches">model of African development</a>.”</p>
<p>But Habyarimana failed to tackle two vital challenges: the ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi, and the Tutsi refugee problem. </p>
<p>The unresolved refugee problem paved the way for the 1990-1994 war, which pitted the Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the Hutu-dominated government. The war also paved the way for the assassination of the president himself on April 6, 1994. This triggered the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, from which Kagame’s RPF emerged as the new ruling force. </p>
<p>Like its predecessors, Kagame’s RPF put forth <a href="http://gsdrc.org/document-library/supporting-the-post-genocide-transition-in-rwanda-the-role-of-the-international-community/">impressive objectives</a>, including reconciliation and national unity, good governance, and resolution of the refugee problem. </p>
<p>But the regime soon proved to be yet another <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31027704_Rwanda_ten_years_on_From_genocide_to_dictatorship">dictatorship</a>. It has been widely reported that Kagame’s regime is responsible for <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/38/un-mapping-report-documenting-serious-crimes-democratic-republic-congo">war crimes and crimes against humanity</a> and serious <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Front-Line-Rwanda-Disappearances-Intimidation/dp/095478832X">human rights violations</a> against both the Hutu and the Tutsi. The regime operates on a <em>de facto</em> single-party system that’s increasingly <a href="https://politicalmatter.org/2015/09/02/rwanda-inc-paul-kagames-odyssey-from-rebellion-to-tyranny-by-dr-noel-twagiramungu/">intolerant of dissenters</a>. </p>
<h2>Consensus as a path to reconciliation</h2>
<p>Consensus democracy in Rwanda would be characterised by free and fair elections, political accountability, rigorous check-and-balance mechanisms and concerted power-sharing arrangements. This model would entail the representation of all ethnic groups in every branch of government including in strategic cabinet departments and top security services.</p>
<p>Without these guarantees, extremists from each community will continue to have unfettered access to hijack the political system by harking back to past grievances and amplifying legitimate fears.</p>
<p>Consensus democracy could lay the foundation for healing by creating a sense of physical and emotional security within Rwanda’s two main ethnic communities. This would put an end to the historical cycle of vengeful violence.</p>
<p>It may seem unlikely at this stage to convince Kagame and his supporters that this is the way to go. As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/27/rwanda-freedom-of-speech">American journalist Stephen Kinzer once wrote</a>, Kagame, who seemed to have “the chance to enter history as one of the greatest modern African leaders”, could also be remembered as another failed African big man.</p>
<p>It’s high time Rwanda and its true friends heeded the call for collective healing through consensus democracy. Such a move would mark the beginning of a new journey that frees the energy and resources necessary to build a Rwanda that is reconciled, democratic and prosperous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Rwanda marks the 24th anniversary of the 1994 genocide, much more needs to be done to unite the country.Noel Twagiramungu, Visiting Assistant Professor, UMass LowellJoseph Sebarenzi, Ph.D., Visiting Professor, SIT Graduate InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/944522018-04-06T15:36:55Z2018-04-06T15:36:55ZRwandans discuss how best to commemorate genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213577/original/file-20180406-125161-11q39dr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A memorial to the victims of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in Kigali. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda is commemorating the 24th anniversary of the 1994 Tutsi genocide. This claimed the lives of between 800,000 and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus <a href="http://unictr.unmict.org/en/genocide">over 100 days</a>.</p>
<p>This is a good time to reflect on the history of policy and practice of memory, justice, and recovery in the country over the past 24 years. Two questions are especially pertinent: how have Rwandans engaged in various forms of memory after genocide? How have these processes been meaningful?</p>
<p>From a series of nearly <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/chgspapers/9/">60 interviews</a> conducted in the country since 2015, I have learned from a diversity of perspectives about memory and justice. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that genocide memory in Rwanda is diverse and dynamic. The interviewees’ often offered surprising and unexpected perspectives. These could not have been assumed from reading secondary reports or by observing the commemorations from a distance. </p>
<p>For example many people – including genocide survivors and former perpetrators – have a more holistic concept of justice than punishing perpetrators. And there is a huge desire for spaces for dialogue about how memories of genocide emerge impact everyday life. These spaces would bring together survivors, perpetrators, returnees, and ordinary citizens. There is also a great desire for knowledge about how to use these memories to seek justice, validation, and promote coexistence, especially for future generations.</p>
<h2>What we learnt</h2>
<p>I interviewed genocide survivors, former perpetrators and ordinary citizens who were neither targeted for genocide but who did not take part in killing. Officials engaged in memory processes in Rwanda were also interviewed.</p>
<p>The commemoration ceremonies take place over 100 days, known as the Kwibuka period, beginning on April 7 each year. During this period Rwandans visit village, district, or national memorial sites known as <em>urwibutso</em> where genocide victims are buried. There they hold memorial ceremonies which include listening to survivor testimonies and representatives from survivors’ organisations. Local and national leaders relate the history of the genocide, and sometimes perpetrators give testimonies. </p>
<p>Bodies of victims are still being found to this day, in pits or on farms. These bodies are reburied in communal memorial sites during the <em><a href="http://kwibuka.rw/">kwibuka</a></em> period. Sometimes <em><a href="https://rwandanights.wordpress.com/2012/04/29/icyunamo/">icyunamo</a></em> (time of mourning) is observed. This is the cultural practice of informal mourning that takes place throughout the night, usually around a fire. </p>
<p>Regardless of the programme of <em>kwibuka</em>, each process ideally pays respect to genocide victims and works to bring Rwandans together. </p>
<p>But not all acts of memory are necessarily guided by the intention of achieving peace and justice, unity and reconciliation. Some of this is because of individual differences in perspective and resilience. Simply put, some people cope better with the harms that they suffered for various reasons, among them faith, education and economic gains since the genocide.</p>
<p>Some individuals do not feel particularly connected to the memorial sites. Yet they still attend the ceremonies. This can cause conflicts of memory, especially when what is being remembered differs according to an individuals’s experience of the genocidal process. So it is important to ask Rwandans how urwibutso and kwibuka have or have not led to senses of justice, and what aspects of these processes are meaningful.</p>
<h2>Local cultures of memory</h2>
<p>It is also important to go back into the culture of Rwanda to inform the process of reflecting on and remembering the genocide. That serves to ensure that these processes are salient to Rwandans themselves, regardless of their backgrounds.</p>
<p>Achieving these goals is not an easy process. For example, proximity matters, as genocide survivors, genocidaires, returnees, and others still live together in close contact, in local communities and villages in Rwanda. </p>
<p>In addition, the genocide took place during a time of a <a href="https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Rwandan_Civil_War.html">civil war (1 October 1990-4 July 1994)</a> and it was planned by a government that had abandoned its people. The government coerced many to participate in the killings. It used years of deliberate propaganda, hate speech and dehumanisation tactics to indoctrinate others into <a href="https://blogs.library.duke.edu/rubenstein/2013/05/10/radio-in-the-rwandan-genocide/">hate ideology</a>.</p>
<p>Many of the survivors were born of so-called mixed marriages, with one Hutu and one Tutsi parent. This reality challenges the binary nature of victimisation and perpetration of genocide in Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Meaning making and memorialisation</h2>
<p>The interviews raise further questions: what are Rwandans empowered by and what do they find meaningful about memorial sites and <em>kwibuka</em>, in order to sustain these processes over time?</p>
<p>For example, the research shows that, although some survivors feel validated when former perpetrators join them at commemoration ceremonies, others fear that requiring former genocidaires to attend when they still don’t accept their guilt might result in a backlash.</p>
<p>Some individuals attend <em>kwibuka</em> to support their neighbours but do not consider it their “own story.” Others consider it to be one of the most significant and emotional days of their lives each year. Some embrace <em>kwibuka</em> as a chance to remember their loved ones among the comfort of friends and neighbours. Yet, others fear it, because of the retraumatisation, grief, depression, and anger they might feel. </p>
<p>These are some examples of the diverse perspectives of <em>kwibuka</em>, all of which are valid and coexist in the same physical and emotional space every April in Rwanda.</p>
<p><em>Eric Ndushabandi, Director, Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace, Rwanda, co-authored this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samantha Lakin consults with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace. She receives funding from Fulbright-IIE. She is affiliated with the Fulbright Association and SURF. </span></em></p>The genocide memory in Rwanda is diverse and dynamic.Samantha Lakin, PhD Candidate, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies; Fulbright Scholar, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.