tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/whatsapp-8373/articlesWhatsApp – The Conversation2024-03-20T04:06:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262192024-03-20T04:06:40Z2024-03-20T04:06:40ZTerrorist content lurks all over the internet – regulating only 6 major platforms won’t be nearly enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583026/original/file-20240320-17-wn83c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C241%2C2619%2C1761&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/burning-car-unrest-antigovernment-crime-581564755">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s eSafety commissioner <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-19/social-media-esafety-commissioner-terrorist-violent-extremist/103603518">has sent legal notices</a> to Google, Meta, Telegram, WhatsApp, Reddit and X (formerly Twitter) asking them to show what they’re doing to protect Australians from online extremism. The six companies <a href="https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/media-releases/tech-companies-grilled-on-how-they-are-tackling-terror-and-violent-extremism">have 49 days to respond</a>.</p>
<p>The notice comes at a time when governments are increasingly cracking down on major tech companies to address online harms like <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-fined-x-australia-over-child-sex-abuse-material-concerns-how-severe-is-the-issue-and-what-happens-now-215696">child sexual abuse material</a> or <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mark-zuckerberg-apologizes-parents-victims-online-exploitation-senate-hearing/">bullying</a>.</p>
<p>Combating online extremism presents unique challenges different from other content moderation problems. Regulators wanting to establish effective and meaningful change must take into account what research has shown us about extremism and terrorism.</p>
<h2>Extremists are everywhere</h2>
<p>Online extremism and terrorism have been pressing concerns for some time. A stand-out example was the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack on two mosques in Aotearoa New Zealand, which was live streamed on Facebook. It led to the <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-and-france-seek-end-use-social-media-acts-terrorism">“Christchurch Call” to action</a>, aimed at countering extremism through collaborations between countries and tech companies.</p>
<p>But despite such efforts, <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1458-2.html">extremists still use online platforms</a> for networking and coordination, recruitment and radicalisation, knowledge transfer, financing and mobilisation to action.</p>
<p>In fact, extremists use the same online infrastructure as everyday users: marketplaces, dating platforms, gaming sites, music streaming sites and social networks. Therefore, all regulation to counter extremism needs to consider the rights of regular users, as well.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-attacks-5-years-on-terrorists-online-history-gives-clues-to-preventing-future-atrocities-225273">Christchurch attacks 5 years on: terrorist’s online history gives clues to preventing future atrocities</a>
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<h2>The rise of ‘swarmcasting’</h2>
<p>Tech companies have responded with initiatives like the <a href="https://gifct.org/membership">Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism</a>. It shares information on terrorist online content among its members (such as Facebook, Microsoft, YouTube, X and others) so they can take it down on their platforms. These approaches aim to <a href="https://gifct.org/hsdb/">automatically identify and remove</a> terrorist or extremist content.</p>
<p>However, a moderation policy focused on individual pieces of content on individual platforms fails to capture much of what’s out there.</p>
<p>Terrorist groups commonly use a <a href="https://static.rusi.org/20190716_grntt_paper_06.pdf">“swarmcasting” multiplatform approach</a>, leveraging 700 platforms or more to distribute their content.</p>
<p>Swarmcasting involves using “beacons” on major platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Telegram to direct people to locations with terrorist material. This beacon can be a hyperlink to a blog post on a website like Wordpress or Tumblr that then contains further links to the content, perhaps hosted on Google Drive, JustPaste.It, BitChute and other places where users can download it.</p>
<p>So, while extremist content may be flagged and removed from social media, it remains accessible online thanks to swarmcasting. </p>
<h2>Putting up filters isn’t enough</h2>
<p>The process of identifying and removing extremist content is far from simple. For example, at a recent US Supreme Court hearing over internet regulations, <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/podcasts/the-netchoice-cases-reach-the-supreme-court/">a lawyer argued</a> platforms could moderate terrorist content by simply removing anything that mentioned “al Qaeda”.</p>
<p>However, internationally recognised terrorist organisations, their members and supporters do not solely distribute policy-violating extremist content. Some may be discussing non-terrorist activities, such as those who engage in humanitarian efforts.</p>
<p>Other times their content is borderline (awful but lawful), such as misogynistic dog whistles, or even “hidden” <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/isj.12454">in a different format</a>, such as memes.</p>
<p>Accordingly, platforms can’t always cite policy violations and are compelled to use other methods to counter such content. They report using various content moderation techniques such as redirecting users, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/google-to-expand-misinformation-prebunking-initiative-in-europe">pre-bunking misinformation</a>, promoting counterspeech and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-57697779">offering warnings</a>, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-shadowbanning-how-do-i-know-if-it-has-happened-to-me-and-what-can-i-do-about-it-192735">implementing shadow bans</a>. Despite these efforts, online extremism continues to persist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disinformation-threatens-global-elections-heres-how-to-fight-back-223392">Disinformation threatens global elections – here's how to fight back</a>
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<h2>What is extremism, anyway?</h2>
<p>All these problems are further compounded by the fact we lack a <a href="https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html">commonly accepted definition</a> for terrorism or extremism. All definitions currently in place are contentious.</p>
<p>Academics attempt to seek clarity by using <a href="https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3809">relativistic definitions</a>, such as</p>
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<p>extremism itself is context-dependent in the sense that it is an inherently relative term that describes a deviation from something that is (more) ‘ordinary’, ‘mainstream’ or ‘normal’. </p>
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<p>However, what is something we can accept as a universal normal? Democracy is not the global norm, nor are equal rights. Not even our understanding of <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2016/09/14/are-human-rights-really-universal-inalienable-and-indivisible/">central tenets of human rights</a> is globally established.</p>
<h2>What should regulators do, then?</h2>
<p>As the eSafety commissioner attempts to shed light on how major platforms counter terrorism, we offer several recommendations for the commissioner to consider.</p>
<p>1. Extremists rely on more than just the major platforms to disseminate information. This highlights the importance of expanding the current inquiries beyond just the major tech players.</p>
<p>2. Regulators need to consider the differences between platforms that resist compliance, those that comply halfheartedly, and those that struggle to comply, such as small content storage providers. Each type of platform <a href="https://ksp.techagainstterrorism.org/">requires different regulatory approaches</a> or assistance. </p>
<p>3. Future regulations should encourage platforms to transparently collaborate with academia. The global research community is well positioned <a href="https://gifct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GIFCT-TaxonomyReport-2021.pdf">to address these challenges</a>, such as by developing actionable definitions of extremism and novel countermeasures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marten Risius is the recipient of an Australian Research Council Australian Discovery Early Career Award funded by the Australian Government. Marten Risius has received project funding from the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Karanasios has received funding from Emergency Management Victoria, Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, and the International Telecommunications Union. Stan is a Distinguished Member of the Association for Information Systems.</span></em></p>Online extremism is a unique challenge – terrorists use methods that can’t be captured by standard content moderation. So, what can we do about it?Marten Risius, Senior Lecturer in Business Information Systems, The University of QueenslandStan Karanasios, Associate Professor, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245202024-02-29T00:30:44Z2024-02-29T00:30:44ZAustralian writers festivals are engulfed in controversy over the war in Gaza. How can they uphold their duty to public debate?<p>A string of controversies are engulfing Melbourne Writers’ Festival, the Perth Festival’s Writers’ Weekend, the Sydney Opera House’s All About Women and Adelaide Writers Week. There’s a high-profile resignation, calls to cancel speakers and allegations of the spread of “historically untrue” facts and of normalising violence. </p>
<p>All, in one way or another, have been generated by divisions over the war in Gaza.</p>
<p>Writers’ festivals are in a fraught position. They navigate the frontier between social media’s echo chambers of outrage and the traditional public square’s conventions, where restraint, reason and tolerance in the face of opposing views are the basis for civilised debate.</p>
<p>How is it all playing out, and what are the consequences for the public exchange of ideas?</p>
<h2>‘Historically untrue’?</h2>
<p>At <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-%20festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">Melbourne Writers Festival</a>, the deputy chair of the board, Dr Leslie Reti, has resigned over a poetry session that will involve Aboriginal and Palestinian poets reading their work.</p>
<p>The session is guest-curated by Koori-Lebanese writer Mykaela Saunders. It is based on the proposition Aboriginal and Palestinian people have a shared experience of having been colonised, becoming victims of atrocities by the colonising power. </p>
<p>Melbourne Writers Festival artistic director Michaela McGuire has confirmed the dispute is centred on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2024/feb/27/melbourne-writers-festival-deputy-chair-resigns-aboriginal-palestinian-solidarity-poetry-event-gaza-conflict">a line of program copy that reads</a>:</p>
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<p>Aboriginal and Palestinian solidarity has a long history, a relationship that is more vital than ever in the movement to resist colonialism and speak out against atrocities.</p>
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<p>This is a historically contentious proposition. Dr Reti, a retired Jewish clinician, said he respected McGuire’s curatorial independence, but described the material in the draft program as “historically untrue and deeply offensive”.</p>
<p>Prominent Aboriginal scholar Professor Marcia Langton, of the University of Melbourne, has also rejected proposed similarity between the experience of Aboriginal and Palestinian people, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">saying</a>, “there is very little comparable in our respective situations, other than our humanity”.</p>
<p>Saunders was one of 132 Indigenous activists, artists and intellectuals who signed <a href="https://therednation.org/statement-of-indigenous-solidarity-with-palestine/">a petition released on October 27 last year</a> that claimed: “The past two weeks of horrific violence in Gaza resulted from 75 years of Israeli settler colonial dispossession”. </p>
<p>McGuire has defended her decision not to change the copy for Saunders’ event, titled Let it Bring Hope, saying “I completely support the right to self-determined programming”. </p>
<p>She <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/melbourne-mornings/melbourne-writers-festival-split-over-war-in-gaza/103512224">told ABC Radio on Monday</a>: “This entire event is about Aboriginal and Palestinian solidarity. It’s not for or about anyone who doesn’t subscribe to that, and so it doesn’t make any sense to not mention that in the event copy.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">Last year</a>, the Melbourne Writers Festival board decided “while writers should be free to express their views, the festival should not take a public position on the war”.</p>
<p>The Age <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-%20festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">reported on Monday</a> that Fiona Menzies, the festival’s interim chief executive, also resigned over the festival’s program. But Alice Hill, chair of the board, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2024/feb/27/melbourne-writers-festival-deputy-chair-resigns-aboriginal-palestinian-solidarity-poetry-event-gaza-conflict">told the Guardian</a> that Menzies had resigned “for personal reasons, and would continue her relationship with the festival in a consultancy capacity”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-palestinian-authors-award-ceremony-has-been-cancelled-at-frankfurt-book-fair-this-sends-the-wrong-signals-at-the-wrong-time-215712">A Palestinian author's award ceremony has been cancelled at Frankfurt Book Fair. This sends the wrong signals at the wrong time</a>
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<h2>Normalising violence?</h2>
<p>In Perth, the argument was over the inclusion of Jewish singer-songwriter Deborah Conway in the opening night of the Perth Festival’s Writers’ Weekend last week. In <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/radionational-breakfast/israel-gaza-arts-protests-deborah-conway/103231158">an interview on ABC Radio National</a>, she had questioned whether Palestinian children killed by the Israeli Defence Forces were really children. (“It depends on what you really call kids.”)</p>
<p>Conway contextualised her remarks to me this week, saying: </p>
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<p>I was trying to tell listeners, in the cut and thrust of a live interview situation, that when Hamas put guns in the hands of their adolescent sons to point at the enemy, Hamas steals their childhood, turns them into fighters & then turns them into casualty figures. It’s unbearably cruel. I wasn’t talking about babies or little children, nor was I defining what I think to be a child, it goes without saying that the deaths of innocents are always tragic.</p>
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<p>In an <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfUvUWq0GLIbhstqVzFMsxguiWjawr__aTI-CeKuZQoZUfJng/viewform">open letter to the festival</a>, more than 500 writers and arts workers said that by including Conway, the festival was putting safety at risk and giving a platform to someone whose comments on the radio “seek to normalise the ongoing genocide enacted by the state of Israel against the Palestinian people”.</p>
<p>This provoked a response from Dr Nick Dyrenfurth, executive director of the John Curtin Research Centre, a left-of-centre think tank, in which he said Conway’s “crime of being Jewish” was the reason <a href="https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/festival-slammed-for-promoting-%20deborah-conway-after-palestine-comments,18359">this attempt was being made to “deplatform” her</a>.</p>
<p>In Sydney, a petition protesting against the appointment of the feminist author Clementine Ford as a co-curator of the Opera House’s <a href="https://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/all-about-women">All About Women</a> festival has garnered about 6,700 signatures since it was started on 6 February. Ford has programmed three events at the festival.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/petition-against-%20opera-house-appearance/">petition alleges</a> Ford’s public communications since the attacks by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023 have made “a direct and harmful” contribution to the “hateful climate” that has developed in Australia since those attacks, exemplified by a <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/australian-jews-suffer-738-per-cent-spike-in-antisemitic-abuse/news-story/33ed1f60ff568d31ce399b325bbc03a2">738% increase</a> in anti-Semitic incidents, as recorded by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry.</p>
<p>Ford has not called for violence against Jewish people.</p>
<p>The MP for the Sydney seat of Vaucluse in the New South Wales Parliament, Kellie Sloane, and some Jewish community leaders have raised their concerns about Ford’s curatorship, following her involvement in <a href="https://theconversation.com/doxing-or-in-the-public-interest-free-speech-cancelling-and-the-ethics-of-the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-group-leak-223323">the alleged “doxing”</a> of about 600 Jewish writers, artists and academics. This involved the social media sharing of personal details, including names and professions, leaked from a WhatsApp group, without their consent.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/doxing-or-in-the-public-interest-free-speech-cancelling-and-the-ethics-of-the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-group-leak-223323">Doxing or in the public interest? Free speech, 'cancelling' and the ethics of the Jewish creatives' WhatsApp group leak</a>
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<p>The president of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Daniel Aghion, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/political-and-jewish-leaders-raise-clementine-ford-%20curatorship-red-flag-after-creatives-doxxing/news-story/aae6e8abdd09fb3393711c3c3c9bb544">was reported as saying</a> it was “baffling” someone who had caused this kind of harm should be appearing at one of Australia’s “most prestigious forums”.</p>
<p>Some Jewish leaders, including Anti-Defamation Commission chairman, Dr Dvir Abramovich, want Ford <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/jewish-leaders-have-called-for-clementine-ford-to-be-banned-%20from-adelaide-writers-week/news-story/8252b039c71c87c80afae3fe012d03f9%20So%20far,%20none%20of%20the%20protests%20have%20resulted%20in%20any%20of%20these%20people%20being%20banned.">banned from the Adelaide Festival’s Writers’ Week</a>, which starts this weekend, on 2 March.</p>
<p>Louise Adler, director of Adelaide Writers Week, <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/entertainment/adelaide-festival/adelaide-writers-week-2024-festival-hit-with-new-backlash-as-organisers-strongly-defend-program/news-story/c56fcae109190ffa206c55119d756b59">resisted calls to remove Ford</a> from the program, saying “I chose Clementine Ford because of her writing on contemporary Australian sexual politics and about her current book about marriage, which I thought was interesting.” She called her views on “other issues” on social media “immaterial”.</p>
<p>South Australian Premier Peter Malinauskas <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/jewish-leaders-have-called-for-clementine-ford-to-be-banned-from-adelaide-writers-week/news-story/8252b039c71c87c80afae3fe012d03f9">declined to get involved</a>, saying he would not be a “premier that engages in censorship at arts festivals”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/are-calls-to-cancel-two-palestinian-writers-from-adelaide-writers-week-justified-200165">Are calls to cancel two Palestinian writers from Adelaide Writers' Week justified?</a>
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<h2>Freedom of speech challenged</h2>
<p>Each of these cases presents a challenge to freedom of speech, for different reasons and in different ways.</p>
<p>Writers’ festivals are opportunities for the public to see and hear from people who are presumed to have thought deeply about complex issues, and who have written about them. They are also forums for the writers themselves to challenge and be challenged on their points of view.</p>
<p>In a world conditioned by the emotive views and intolerant habits of social media, where those who hold opposing views are often seen as irredeemable and even illegitimate, it requires a demanding intellectual effort to adjust to the world of the public square.</p>
<p>There, by convention, opposing views are tolerated, even respected, and questions are decided by reasoned argument based on evidence – rather than emotive, sometimes insulting, rhetoric.</p>
<p>The current debates around these festivals show our society is a fair way from making this adjustment.</p>
<p>In the Melbourne case, the problem arises because of a contestable claim in the draft program that “Aboriginal and Palestinian solidarity has a long history, a relationship that is more vital than ever in the movement to resist colonialism and speak out against atrocities”.</p>
<p>Whether or not there is a long history of solidarity between Aboriginal and Palestinian people – which Professor Langton, for one, rejects – might be debated. But the wording of the draft program presents the debate as already decided in the affirmative. That might represent the view of curator Mykaela Saunders and some other First Nations people, but clearly not all of them.</p>
<p>In the Perth case, Conway’s statement questioning whether the children killed by the Israel Defence Forces are really children is, for the most part, demonstrably false, as we see nightly on the television news. This does harm. A falsehood pollutes the community’s information pool. </p>
<p>In the Sydney and Adelaide cases, Ford’s participation in the Whatsapp leak is likewise harmful. The leak violated people’s privacy and put people’s safety at risk. The harm principle sets the boundary at which the individual’s right of free speech gives way to the larger public interest in harm prevention.</p>
<p>The case in principle against Ford is particularly strong because of the obvious harm caused by the public dissemination of people’s private information. The fact that she is not programmed to speak about the war in Gaza at her events – she is speaking about her anti-marriage book in both <a href="https://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/all-about-women/play-the-girl">Sydney</a> and <a href="https://www.adelaidefestival.com.au/events/2024-writers-week/i-do-i-don-t/">Adelaide</a> – makes no difference to this point of principle. In practice, however, banning her would risk making her into a martyr. </p>
<p>None of these festivals have responded to public pressure to change their programs, speakers or even the wording of their copy. Better still, rather than banning speakers or changing programs, festivals could arrange to include challenges on these controversial actions and words. For example, someone in Ford’s position could be invited to make the case for the WhatsApp leak and be challenged on its violation of privacy principles.</p>
<p>That way, the festivals would do their job of promoting debate. A festival where the outcome is a foregone conclusion, or where the openmindedness of the organisers is in question, is just another echo chamber.</p>
<p>Against that, there is the question of public safety, which has been raised by those who wanted Conway banned in Perth and Ford in Adelaide. The exact threat to public safety is not spelt out, but the debate shows we urgently need to learn to better negotiate this frontier between social media and the world of flesh and blood.</p>
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<p><em>This article has been amended to clarify the context of Deborah Conway’s remarks during her earlier radio interview.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Writers festivals navigate the fraught frontier between social media’s echo chambers of outrage and the civilised public debate of the public square. What’s the way forward in this heated atmosphere?Denis Muller, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235462024-02-15T02:32:37Z2024-02-15T02:32:37ZThe government wants to criminalise doxing. It may not work to stamp out bad behaviour online<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575741/original/file-20240214-26-jtev2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C9%2C6510%2C4337&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/12/albanese-government-to-propose-legislation-to-crack-down-on-doxing">announced</a> the government was seeking to strengthen laws to combat doxing. Its ongoing review into Australian privacy law will now be expanded to include doxing, as will other laws covering hate crime and hate speech. </p>
<p>Doxing (sometimes doxxing) is shorthand for “document drop” and is the act of publishing identifying material about someone publicly, without their consent. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1757200478457266258"}"></div></p>
<p>Doxing someone can lead to real-life harms, potentially including job loss, violence against the person, their family members and pets, and serious mental health issues.</p>
<p>What any legislation from that review will look like is hard to say at this point. But how has it worked internationally, and would it work here?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/doxing-or-in-the-public-interest-free-speech-cancelling-and-the-ethics-of-the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-group-leak-223323">Doxing or in the public interest? Free speech, 'cancelling' and the ethics of the Jewish creatives' WhatsApp group leak</a>
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<h2>What are other countries doing?</h2>
<p>New laws around doxing came into effect in <a href="https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2023/07/12/use-of-personal-data-for-the-objective-of-harassment-to-become-criminal-offence">The Netherlands</a> at the start of the year. This makes it illegal for Dutch citizens to obtain and share other people’s personal information without their permission and then use it to harass or target them. </p>
<p>Dutch conspiracy theorist Huig Plug was <a href="https://nltimes.nl/2024/02/02/conspiracy-theorist-huig-plug-arrested-doxxing-prosecution-office-staffer">arrested</a> earlier this month under the new legislation for allegedly doxing a member of the public prosecutor’s staff.</p>
<p>In the United States, laws like this are state-based. <a href="https://www.simmrinlawgroup.com/california-penal-code-section-653-2/">California</a> has a special part of its law around so-called “indirect cyber harassment”, which is defined essentially as doxing. </p>
<p>In both of these examples, the doxer has to have intent to harm. They are posting the information because they want someone to, say, lose their job or be opened up to harassment. </p>
<p>The Dutch law goes slightly further in that it is also an offence to make someone’s job harder, as opposed to causing them to lose their job completely. The Dutch laws also carry harsher punishments for doxing people such police, lawyers and politicians. </p>
<p>From a legal perspective, showing intent to do someone harm can actually be a harder bar to pass than people might think. So, if Australian law follows this pattern, it could be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that being doxed has caused them genuine harm.</p>
<h2>Not a new problem</h2>
<p>Doxing isn’t a new phenomenon and there have been some high-profile doxing cases over the past few years. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-doxing-and-how-can-you-protect-yourself-223428">What is doxing, and how can you protect yourself?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One of the most famous global events was the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/organizational-doxing-ashley-madison-hack/403900/">Ashley Madison</a> data breach in 2015, which resulted in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/28/what-happened-after-ashley-madison-was-hacked">job losses and suicides</a>. The current discussion, however, hinges around the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/hundreds-of-jewish-creatives-have-names-details-taken-in-leak-published-online-20240208-p5f3if.html">sharing of information</a> from a private WhatsApp group of 600 people and in the context of the ongoing war in Gaza.</p>
<p>We’ve seen the hasty introduction of legislation in these types of circumstances in the past, most notably the Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material Act, which legal scholars <a href="https://theconversation.com/livestreaming-terror-is-abhorrent-but-is-more-rushed-legislation-the-answer-114620">criticised</a> at the time for a lack of detail and it’s rushed introduction to parliament.</p>
<p>We saw similar concerns when the Morrison government introduced anti-trolling laws in 2021. I wrote at the time the law <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-governments-planned-anti-troll-laws-wont-help-most-victims-of-online-trolling-172743">wouldn’t help victims that much</a>, partly because it was practically impossible to police.</p>
<p>While the current discussion into changes in the law around doxing are happening, it’s worth revisiting some of these issues.</p>
<h2>How can we police the internet?</h2>
<p>The first thing to note is that it’s really hard to police what happens on the internet. There are several reasons for this.</p>
<p>The main one is that the internet is what we call inter-jurisdictional. There’s a mess of different laws around the world, and no real way to use them if you’re in a different country. This means if someone in The Netherlands doxes you in Australia, you can’t sue them under their laws, because you aren’t a citizen there. You also can’t do anything under Australia’s laws, because the perpetrator is not a citizen here. In short, to make this work, we would need global cooperation akin to Interpol.</p>
<p>The second reason is because Australian laws apply only to people currently in the country, there are many ways to get around them online. People can use anonymous accounts and virtual private networks (VPNs) to hide and make it hard to trace exactly who the culprit is and where they are.</p>
<p>The third comes down to the definition of what’s considered “public”. For example, a lot of doxing is done in smaller private groups with the express purpose of that community attacking specific people. That private information is still being shared without the consent or knowledge of the victims. In fact, as the journalist Ginger Gorman <a href="https://www.amazon.com.au/Troll-Hunting-Ginger-Gorman-ebook/dp/B07MC4C851">notes</a> this is the type of behaviour that “predatory trolls” often engage in.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trolling-and-doxxing-graduate-students-sharing-their-research-online-speak-out-about-hate-210874">Trolling and doxxing: Graduate students sharing their research online speak out about hate</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Finally, do we really need these laws when existing ones already cover many of the behaviours associated with doxing?</p>
<p>The biggest of these are found in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A04868/2022-11-10/text/2">federal criminal code</a>, a piece of legislation that deals with the use of telecommunications for crimes. It outlines the “use a carrier service” to threaten, harass or menace someone. This includes “hoax threats”. Penalties for these behaviours range from five to ten years in jail. There’s similar wording in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2021A00076/latest/text">Online Safety Act</a>.</p>
<p>While it’s great to see the government working to reform and strengthen existing legislation, I’m not convinced that these types of laws will have much impact given the complexity of policing online behaviours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223546/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Beckett receives funding from the Australian Research Council, through the Discovery grants scheme for work on online hostility in Australia. </span></em></p>Anthony Albanese has flagged a crack-down on people’s personal details being shared online without consent. But like so much of the internet, it’s hard to police.Jennifer Beckett, Lecturer in Media and Communications, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2233232024-02-14T00:53:07Z2024-02-14T00:53:07ZDoxing or in the public interest? Free speech, ‘cancelling’ and the ethics of the Jewish creatives’ WhatsApp group leak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575250/original/file-20240213-20-7r8ddf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=69%2C23%2C5106%2C3414&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nap1/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent release of a leaked transcript of a private WhatsApp group for Jewish writers, artists, musicians and academics has stirred a controversy that has led to <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/hundreds-of-jewish-creatives-have-names-details-taken-in-leak-published-online-20240208-p5f3if.html">threats of violence</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/09/josh-burns-jewish-whatsapp-group-channel-publication-israel-palestine-clementine-ford#:%7E:text=The%20publishing%20of%20a%20Jewish,MP%20Josh%20Burns%20has%20said">a family in hiding</a>, and the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-13/federal-government-to-criminalise-doxxing/103458052">fast-tracking</a> of new federal legislation to criminalise doxing. </p>
<p>The WhatsApp group in question, administered by writer Lee Kofman, was formed to give Jewish creative people a private and supportive space to connect, in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attacks and Israel’s war in Gaza. Not all members knew they had been added to the group at first, and many didn’t participate in the conversations that resulted in the leak.</p>
<p>Last week, a transcript from the group chat was leaked and uploaded onto social media by pro-Palestinians, including the writer Clementine Ford. <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/hundreds-of-jewish-creatives-have-names-details-taken-in-leak-published-online-20240208-p5f3if.html">The leak included</a> a spreadsheet with links to social media accounts and “a separate file with a photo gallery of more than 100 Jewish people”.</p>
<p>This week, a joint statement from “First Nations, Palestinian, Lebanese and anti-Zionist Jewish activist collectives, community leaders, artists” and those who said they had been “targeted” by particular chat members <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/C3MIOyySAfM/?hl=en&img_index=1">argued</a> the WhatsApp transcript</p>
<blockquote>
<p>clearly demonstrates collective actions taken by zionists to contact employers, funding bodies, publishers and journalists to censure anyone deemed to be a threat to the zionist narrative.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The leak gives rise to a complex tangle of contemporary ethical issues, including concerns with privacy, doxing, free speech and “cancelling”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575254/original/file-20240213-18-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Writer and feminist Clementine Ford was targeted by some group members for her pro-Palestinian views.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Allen & Unwin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-what-is-zionism-a-history-of-the-political-movement-that-created-israel-as-we-know-it-217788">Israel-Hamas war: What is Zionism? A history of the political movement that created Israel as we know it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Privacy and public interest</h2>
<p>The WhatsApp group was a private one, where group members would have had a reasonable expectation their conversation would not be made public.</p>
<p>Everyone needs a <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">place</a> to let off steam, to make conjectures and speculations, and to speak in an unguarded way among trusted people. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">Violating people’s privacy</a> (especially through leaking information onto the forever-searchable internet) is always a moral cost. </p>
<p>But sometimes that cost must be paid, particularly if the exposure is in the public interest. Whistleblowers, for example, often justifiably release confidential information.</p>
<p>It could be argued that revealing the WhatsApp group’s activities <em>was</em> in the public interest. Pro-Palestinian writers and editors worried they were being targeted for their public statements in a way that imperilled their livelihoods, or were concerned about a similar risk to others. There is evidence this threat was real.</p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/hundreds-of-jewish-creatives-have-names-details-taken-in-leak-published-online-20240208-p5f3if.html">targeted</a> pro-Palestinian figures was the broadcaster Antoinette Lattouf, who was fired, and has filed an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/dec/22/antoinette-lattouf-files-unlawful-termination-claim-over-losing-abc-radio-role-after-israel-gaza-social-media-posts">unlawful termination claim</a> against the ABC. </p>
<p>There was also <a href="https://independentaustralia.net/business/business-display/pro-palestinian-supporters-under-attack-in-australia,18296">a collective effort to target</a> vocally <a href="https://overland.org.au/2023/11/to-let-suffering-speak-a-response-to-our-critics/">pro-Palestinian</a> literary journal Overland, and its co-editors Jonathan Dunk and <a href="https://twitter.com/evelynaraluen/status/1753977179346776211">Evelyn Araluen</a>. Some within the Whatsapp group called for complaints to be made to Deakin University, where Araluen and Dunk are employed as academics, and also to Creative Victoria, which funds Overland.</p>
<p>And <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/09/josh-burns-jewish-whatsapp-group-channel-publication-israel-palestine-clementine-ford">the Guardian reported</a> that others in the group encouraged members to contact the publisher of Ford, a vocal pro-Palestinian, and target others in the media, over their coverage of Israel and Palestine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-what-else-should-i-lose-to-survive-the-young-writers-living-and-dying-in-gaza-219806">Friday essay: 'what else should I lose to survive?' The young writers living – and dying – in Gaza</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The ethics of doxing</h2>
<p>“<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-doxing-and-how-can-you-protect-yourself-223428">Doxing</a>” refers to the public release (usually onto the internet) of identifiable information about a person. It is usually done without the person’s consent, and aims to expose or punish them in some way. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/C3MIOyySAfM/?hl=en&img_index=1">statement</a> from those behind the release asserted no links had been made to members’ addresses, phone numbers or emails, which were all deliberately redacted. This is important. </p>
<p>“<a href="https://doi.org/https:/doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9406-0.">Targeted doxing</a>” – where information on a person’s physical location or address is released – is particularly sinister. However, the release of people’s identities is still <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9406-0">a form of doxing</a> and a serious moral concern. Evidence of the group’s activities that were in the public interest could arguably have been provided without naming names. The public gained little from knowing exactly who was in the almost 600-strong group. </p>
<p>Worse still, only some in the group were active in the actions against pro-Palestinians that prompted the leak, but this made no difference to whose identities were shared. This creates additional ethical concerns, with the risk innocent parties are being inappropriately punished or harassed for the actions committed by other group members. </p>
<p>Identifying individuals came at a real cost. Predictably, some parties <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">did attach</a> information about names, occupations, social media profiles, and even pictures to the leaked transcript. </p>
<p>Tragically, threats of violence were later made, even to people’s <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">children</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-doxing-and-how-can-you-protect-yourself-223428">What is doxing, and how can you protect yourself?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What was the WhatsApp group doing?</h2>
<p>The WhatsApp group conversations were wide-ranging, and some members made <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">statements</a> many might find offensive or upsetting.</p>
<p>One part of the group’s activities involved organised <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/09/josh-burns-jewish-whatsapp-group-channel-publication-israel-palestine-clementine-ford#:%7E:text=The%20publishing%20of%20a%20Jewish,MP%20Josh%20Burns%20has%20said">letter-writing</a>, including to the employers or publishers of writers or journalists they felt crossed the line into anti-Semitism.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575246/original/file-20240213-24-wlrtzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One aspect of the WhatsApp group’s activities was letter-writing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">BigTunaOnline/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On its face, such communications are clearly legitimate, and a part of democratic life. Letters can be used to raise awareness of ethical concerns, to share information and ideas, and to persuade.</p>
<p>But letters can also do other things, and an innocuous practice can sometimes gradually progress into more fraught territory. Rather than persuading, letters can pressure others, perhaps threatening their organisations with public shaming. They can also try to get people to act in ways that are morally concerning — such as having someone sacked for their political views.</p>
<p>One member <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">had offered in the group chat</a> to “do a deep dive” into the social media posts of Nadine Chemali, a freelance writer and occasional SBS contributor who describes herself as avidly pro-Jew but anti-Israel, to see if there was anything there that might breach her contract with SBS. (This deep dive wasn’t done.)</p>
<p>While certainly legal, such practices are ethically concerning because they deliberately and systematically create workplace challenges for individuals and organisations that put forward controversial views.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/10-books-to-help-you-understand-israel-and-palestine-recommended-by-experts-217783">10 books to help you understand Israel and Palestine, recommended by experts</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Should artists be protected?</h2>
<p>Before the story broke in the media, but after extracts from the group chat began circulating on social media, the Australian Society of Authors Board published a <a href="https://www.asauthors.org.au/news/asa-board-letter-to-members/">letter</a> noting its “growing concern” that artists and authors in Australia were facing repercussions for expressing their political positions publicly or in their work. </p>
<p>The society stated its commitment to freedom of speech (within the limits set by law) and its opposition to attempts to silence or intimidate authors.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575247/original/file-20240213-28-jhf7np.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Australian Society of Authors stated its commitment to free speech.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/red-pen-taped-x-on-wooden-2274678701">Pla2na/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We might try to frame the underlying moral principle at work as a principle of political tolerance. People should not suffer workplace repercussions, discrimination or be pushed out of their livelihood on the basis of their political views (and still less on the basis of their religion or race).</p>
<p>Simple, right? Not quite.</p>
<p>The society also opposed attempts to intimidate or silence people through hate speech, explicitly noting antisemitism, and anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab rhetoric. </p>
<p>This hints at a different, also relevant, moral principle – preventing harm. Hate speech, racism and bigotry, and harmful disinformation or stereotyping, should be stopped, and speakers should face the consequences of their wrongdoing.</p>
<p>There are cases where these principles of tolerance and harm-prevention can be sensibly aligned. For example, many people would agree that no one should be pushed out of their job because they support a mainstream political party — but that people should face social and professional repercussions if they hurl around racist slurs. </p>
<p>However, it’s tempting to interpret harm prevention beyond this bare minimum. After all, surely it’s a good thing to prevent the spread of misinformation, harmful stereotypes and hateful speech — and to stand up against wrongdoing more generally. </p>
<p>This is where the two principles begin to directly conflict. What we perceive as dangerous misinformation or harmful speech (like antisemitism or Islamophobia) will inevitably be coloured by our cultural, political and moral worldviews. </p>
<p>In other words, many will agree in principle that we should tolerate those who think differently. But it is precisely those who think differently who will disagree with us about what counts as harmful or wrongful speech.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-rai-gaita-and-the-moral-power-of-conversation-217670">Friday essay: Rai Gaita and the moral power of conversation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Ethical worries</h2>
<p>Punishing, undermining and silencing others on the basis of our political beliefs gives rise to two potential ethical worries (both arise with respect to the modern phenomenon of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-cancel-culture-silencing-open-debate-there-are-risks-to-shutting-down-opinions-we-disagree-with-142377">cancel culture</a>”).</p>
<p>The first is <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">hypocrisy</a>. Each side declares: “<em>We</em> are a support group nobly taking a stand against harmful bigotry and hate. <em>You</em> are a lynch mob maliciously plotting to silence others, dox them, and destroy their careers.”</p>
<p>If we think it’s okay for people like us to get others sacked for speech we find shocking and awful, we have to accept that it’s okay for <em>others</em> to get us (and those who think like us) sacked for speech they find shocking and awful. </p>
<p>But few are willing to accept that. This seems a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24220050">clear failure</a> of moral consistency.</p>
<p>The other problem is tit-for-tat conflict escalation. If you punish me (with public shaming or getting me fired) for saying something you think is harmful, (that I don’t see as harmful), I will inevitably see your act as a wrongful violation of the principle of political tolerance. Now, I have reason to push back against you – to no longer tolerate <em>your</em> speech.</p>
<p>We can see this escalation playing out in this case. One of the initial concerns behind forming the group was the worry about <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/this-isn-t-advocacy-social-posts-on-distant-conflict-tear-at-close-community-20240208-p5f3h6.html">rising intolerance</a> towards Jewish people – including unfairly having their careers jeopardised. </p>
<p>But their letter-writing campaigns made pro-Palestinian creatives fear <em>their</em> careers were unfairly jeopardised.</p>
<p>This could make some of them feel justified in revealing details of members of the WhatsApp group (not just those who participated in these conversations or activities) and sharing the group’s private messages. Tragically, some isolated individuals – not necessarily connected to the pro-Palestinians – felt justified in going further, even to threats of violence. </p>
<p>Ultimately, tolerance is not easy — especially with respect to others with different political and moral worldviews. </p>
<p>But it’s hard to see a viable solution to conflicts like these, other than all sides accepting others must be broadly entitled to speak, write and create in ways that seem right to them – without threats of cancellation, firing, privacy-breaches, or doxing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh Breakey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A private group chat of Jewish creatives was leaked because some were organising against pro-Palestinians. Was it ethical to do so?Hugh Breakey, Deputy Director, Institute for Ethics, Governance & Law. President, Australian Association for Professional & Applied Ethics., Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158352023-11-01T14:38:22Z2023-11-01T14:38:22ZMultimedia is key to distance education: I built a model South African universities can use<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555235/original/file-20231023-19-xen6rv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Open distance institutions need a comprehensive framework for multimedia teaching and learning.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Moyo Studio</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Distance education first appeared in the United States <a href="http://members.aect.org/edtech/ed1/13/13-02.html#:%7E:text=Distance%20education%20is%20not%20a,learner%20were%20at%20different%20locations">in the 1800s</a>. At the time, students received the relevant material through the post and then returned it to the institution.</p>
<p>Scholars in the field say that distance education is now in its “<a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC88840">fifth generation</a>”. This means that, like so much else in the world, knowledge is delivered via the internet. Students want to be able to access learning materials at a time and place that’s convenient to them. Flexibility is key.</p>
<p>The increasingly important role of multimedia in higher education was <a href="http://www.internationalpolicybrief.org/images/2021/MAY/IJORMSSE/ARTICLE12.pdf">emphasised during the COVID pandemic</a>. Universities that previously held in-person classes switched to digital, remote learning. Even though open distance universities were hypothetically better equipped for the switch, since their model meant they already used technology and digital tools, many were more comfortable with a blended learning approach (some in-person teaching and some remote teaching). </p>
<p>It is now nearly four years since COVID was <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020">declared a global pandemic</a>. Much of society, and much of higher education, has returned to “normal”. </p>
<p>But it’s important that higher education institutions don’t waste the lessons learned during the height of the pandemic about the powerful role that multimedia can play in learning and teaching. This is especially the case for open distance education since it offers a way to improve access to higher education for people from diverse societies and backgrounds.</p>
<p>So, for <a href="https://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/30121">my PhD</a> in education, I set out to develop a post-pandemic multimedia framework for teaching and learning in open distance institutions in South Africa. </p>
<p>The study identified a number of challenges that might keep the country’s open distance institutions from adopting such a framework. One is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0736585311000888?casa_token=iXu3p79IS4YAAAAA:WrR1dNfFVwv6fsTxxZzKjDHUBfVjCEegoJUvCaiU3YVLvQrs6JNw_vJ2p2jIjCaBmMbAxDSHHg">insufficient</a> <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2022-11-10-south-africa-must-bridge-digital-divide-to-best-benefit-from-4ir/#:%7E:text=A%20survey%20by%20Statistics%20South,or%20radio%20and%20television%20broadcasts.">access</a> by both students and institutions, though mostly students, to information and communication technology infrastructure such as capable networks, cloud infrastructure, and the relevant hardware and software tools. </p>
<p>Institutions also need to regularly update their software and ensure that their staff are constantly learning new skills as technologies change. Crucially, institutional websites must be zero-rated – service providers should not charge for access and use of specific internet pages. It also emerged from my research that lecturers found WhatsApp to be a powerful tool for learning and teaching.</p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p>The majority of students in the country’s higher education institutions are enrolled through the contact mode. But 370,891 (34.5% of all students) are <a href="https://www.dhet.gov.za/DHET%20Statistics%20Publication/Statistics%20on%20Post-School%20Education%20and%20Training%20in%20South%20Africa%202019.pdf#page=17">pursuing their education through distance learning</a>.</p>
<p>To conduct the study, I engaged with 15 participants from three selected support departments (four deans, eight lecturers from four selected colleges, and three support staff participants) at an open distance higher learning institution in South Africa.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/remote-teaching-in-nigeria-and-south-africa-got-a-covid-wake-up-call-how-to-capitalise-on-it-204044">Remote teaching in Nigeria and South Africa got a COVID wake-up call -- how to capitalise on it</a>
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<p>I handed out questionnaires and conducted interviews with these participants. I wanted to know what their skill levels were regarding multimedia technologies and how they used those technologies during the pandemic. I also analysed relevant institutional documents.</p>
<p>One participant emphasised that not only were multimedia solutions made available to staff, but academics were trained to use these. The institution’s multimedia centre, they said, also equipped some staff with “audiovisual tools of the trade such as podcast equipment”.</p>
<p>Several participants emphasised how valuable WhatsApp had been as a platform, particularly for “fast communication” with students. It was also, they said, a good way to build relationships with students. One told me that Facebook was their go-to platform for general communication but that “for module-related content, WhatsApp was the main platform we used”.</p>
<h2>What comes next</h2>
<p>Based on the results of my study, I propose that collaborative leadership is needed to ensure there are proper frameworks for multimedia as teaching and learning tools at open distance institutions. This can serve as a guide to institutions for incorporating multimedia; it helps to organise the structuring of video content, audio, graphics and text in a manner that enhances teaching. </p>
<p>The South African government (particularly the department of higher education and training), individual researchers, educational institutions and the private sector all have a role to play.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/online-teaching-and-learning-is-not-just-for-pandemics-and-it-can-help-solve-old-problems-169650">Online teaching and learning is not just for pandemics and it can help solve old problems</a>
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<p>The government, for instance, should recruit and engage mobile network service providers to install fibre and internet connectivity, even in the country’s rural areas. This will broaden access. Integrating solar systems into electricity supply, especially but not limited to these areas, is also important.</p>
<p>Watching and downloading videos requires a great deal of data. So, zero-rating all websites related to education is another way to create access. In this way students can access all the resources they need, not just static, text-based modules.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Khanyisile Yanela Twabu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Institutions mustn’t waste the lessons learned during the height of the pandemic about the powerful role that multimedia can play in learning and teaching.Khanyisile Yanela Twabu, Acting Deputy Director in the Directorate: Academy Applied Technology and Innovation (AATI) under Information Communications Technology Department, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2072112023-08-29T01:06:49Z2023-08-29T01:06:49ZTo stop hoaxes on WhatsApp, Line and Telegram, fact-checking must go beyond social media<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543924/original/file-20230822-27-ztla0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C39%2C6597%2C4375&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/extreme-close-female-finger-using-digital-1027541557">Bits And Splits/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of our #FightHoax2024 series.</em></p>
<p>Ahead of Indonesia’s 2024 general election, fact checks in Indonesia are expected to save the public from misinformation.</p>
<p>Media organisations and activists in Indonesia still heavily <a href="https://time.com/5567287/social-media-indonesia-elections-kawal-pemilu/">focus on social media</a> for fact-checking activities to eradicate misinformation.</p>
<p>This is understandable, given social media is still <a href="https://weblama.amsi.or.id/download/research-report-fact-check-audience-in-indonesia-2022/">the platform used the most</a> by the public to access fact-check contents and to clarify any news they see. Not to mention that <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2022-06/Digital_News-Report_2022.pdf">most mobile phone users (68%)</a> in Indonesia turn to social media to access information.</p>
<p>Yet we seem to almost forget that our personal conversations can also contribute to the spread of false information.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1253240/indonesia-leading-android-social-media-apps-by-monthly-hours-used/">A report</a> by the Indonesian Anti-Slander Society (MAFINDO) on the spread of misinformation in Indonesia has placed WhatsApp – currently the <a href="https://www.statista.com/forecasts/1144489/whatsapp-users-in-indonesia">most popular communication app</a> in the country – as a platform for spreading <a href="https://www.mafindo.or.id/blog/2022/03/07/when-politics-and-religion-become-disaster-an-annual-mapping-of-hoax-in-indonesia/">misinformation</a>.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://weblama.amsi.or.id/download/research-report-fact-check-audience-in-indonesia-2022/">latest research</a>, which I conducted with my research team from the Digital Journalism Department at the Multimedia Nusantara University (UMN) in Indonesia, shows people rarely refer to messaging apps as their main source for finding facts.</p>
<p>Maybe it is the time for Indonesian press and fact-check communities to intensify their fact-checking dissemination strategy by targeting instant messaging apps, like Whatsapp, Line and Telegram.</p>
<h2>Misinformation in personal messaging apps</h2>
<p>The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism’s <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf">Digital News Report 2021</a> shows that the people of Global South, including Indonesia, considers WhatsApp a medium for spreading misinformation.</p>
<p>This means our instant messaging activities are not really safe from hoaxes.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530507/original/file-20230607-15-jn50bw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fact check platform (AMSI, 2022, reproduced with permission)</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, from total of 1,596 respondents from <a href="https://weblama.amsi.or.id/download/research-report-fact-check-audience-in-indonesia-2022/">our research</a>, only 379 of them use messaging apps – WhatsApp, Telegram, Line – to seek fact-check contents. </p>
<p>The majority of respondents (1,335) still prefer to access fact-check content via social media. Other platforms they prefer to use are news websites (769), search engines (731) and television (388).</p>
<p>We argue that personalised fact-checking –- through WhatsApp or other messaging apps –- is important to complement existing fact-checking strategies targeting social media.</p>
<h2>What can fact-check communities do?</h2>
<p>To begin with, journalists can integrate the fact-check contents they publish on social media or news websites with messaging services, especially WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Integration with messaging apps will increase engagement with audiences and, at the same time, expand the distribution of fact checks to combat misinformation.</p>
<p>Press institutions and fact-checkers can also use chat features to engage audiences. <a href="https://wa.me/6285921600500">MAFINDO</a> and Indonesia media organisation <a href="https://wa.me/6281315777057">Tempo</a> have done this. Both organisations collaborate with Whatsapp to integrate fact-checks using a chatbot technology.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Tempo’s chatbot for fact-checking activities.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The chatbots will work or respond only after receiving messages from the users. Through this feature, all users can choose to read fact-check articles or report suspicious information.</p>
<p>Tempo and MAFINDO’s chatbots are a good first step. </p>
<p>However, both are a passive technology, because they only receive fact-checking messages from readers and then respond accordingly by sending the same fact-check articles for all users. In addition, only users who have the numbers of the two chatbots can access this technology.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lA7yu2_RcZQ?wmode=transparent&start=14" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">MAFINDO’s chatbot for fact-checking activities.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Based on the evidence I’ve seen , I believe we need to strengthen this approach with two strategies: <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21670811.2019.1655462">push notifications</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0020025516322617">personalisation</a>.</p>
<p>Push notifications use technology to automatically deliver notifications and digital content to audiences. Personalisation is an effort to map audience preferences or characteristics that can then be used as a basis to send relevant content or notifications.</p>
<h2>Personalised push notifications</h2>
<p>News media companies and fact-check communities could start by <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003099260-5/selling-news-audiences-qualitative-inquiry-emerging-logics-algorithmic-news-personalization-european-quality-news-media-bal%C3%A1zs-bod%C3%B3">mapping their audience database</a>, based on gender, occupation or location, as well as people’s reading time online.</p>
<p>Fact-check consumption patterns are closely related to audience characteristics. So, media companies could create databases to map different audiences’ interests in fact-checking different topics. </p>
<p>After mapping their audience, the press company could send notifications on fact-check content using the personalisation and push notification strategies. </p>
<p>It means newsrooms would send notifications via WhatsApp to the relevant audiences. “Relevant” means that the notification contains a number of fact-checking content on topics liked by that audience.</p>
<p>However, we should note that push notification strategy could make errors at times. For instance, media organisations could distribute content that is irrelevant to that audience’s interests, and at the wrong time. These <a href="https://blogs.brighton.ac.uk/sm657/2016/05/09/the-ups-and-downs-of-push-notifications-on-apps/">unguided push notifications</a> could be very annoying to some audiences.</p>
<p>Therefore, personalisation and push notifications need to be present simultaneously. I call it “personalisation-based push notifications”. This would ensure users only receive content relevant to their interests.</p>
<h2>Consent and privacy protections</h2>
<p>But before starting any audience mapping work, media organisations should first secure consent from their users by asking them to opt in or out of having their data included.</p>
<p>Media companies must also guarantee that any personalised fact-checking databases or notifications would protect their audience’s personal data.</p>
<p>To avoid privacy breaches, news organisations and fact checkers need to invest in creating subscription systems using reliable technology.</p>
<p>This strategy would require investments in human resources and technology. If we could successfully implement it, our digital fortress against misinformation and misinformation will be strengthened. </p>
<p>It would be better if users could easily interact via chat with different newsrooms to ask for fact-checks about any issues they are interested in. </p>
<p>With this, more Indonesians could go from potentially spreading false information to their family and friends through personal chats, to helping share more factual, better quality information ahead of future elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207211/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Research on the fact-checking audience in 2021 supported by the Indonesian Cyber Media Association (AMSI).</span></em></p>Most fact-checking focuses on social media, yet misinformation can also spread quickly through messaging apps like Whatsapp. Personalised push notifications – sent directly to your phone – could help.F.X. Lilik Dwi Mardjianto, PhD Candidate at the News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra. Researcher in journalism, Universitas Multimedia NusantaraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2081322023-06-26T16:14:14Z2023-06-26T16:14:14ZFake news: EU targets political social media ads with tough new regulation proposal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533551/original/file-20230622-21-ni00zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C169%2C3062%2C2258&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/collection-icons-related-politic-including-like-2300374271">Shutterstock/icongeek26</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout Europe, strict rules govern how traditional media operates during elections. Often that means imposing a period of silence so that voters can <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">reflect on their choices without undue influence</a>. In France, for example, no polls are allowed to be published on the day of an election.</p>
<p>There are, however, very few laws governing what social media companies do in relation to elections. This is a problem now that political parties campaign on these platforms as a matter of course. </p>
<p>So this year, the European Commission intends to <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0731">introduce regulations</a> for political adverts that will apply across the countries of the EU. </p>
<p>To understand why such action is being considered, we can look to recent concerning practices during election cycles in the UK and US.</p>
<p>As more people consume their news <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220824-1">online</a>, and as advertising revenues move online, social media poses a greater threat to fair and transparent elections. </p>
<p>The largest social media networks are for-profit companies. They offer marketing services to other businesses wanting to direct advertising towards network users who are a good match for their products. </p>
<p>To facilitate this, social media companies gather and store behavioural data on our activities – what we click on, what makes us hit the like button, the comments we leave. </p>
<p>Knowing these things for each person gives these companies a detailed understanding of its users. That’s ideal for identifying which user segments will be most receptive to a certain message or ad. </p>
<h2>The user marketplace</h2>
<p>Social media companies generally use an in-house artificial intelligence bidding system, operating in real-time, for each page that is presented to a user. Businesses compete for customer access by signalling how much they are willing to pay to place an ad and the algorithm chooses what will appear on the page, and where.</p>
<p>This inventive model was originally conceived by Google and has radically changed the world of marketing. Because the basis of the model lies in gathering each person’s behavioural activities on the platforms for marketing purposes, it has been described as <a href="https://hbr.org/podcast/2019/06/surveillance-capitalism">surveillance capitalism</a>.</p>
<p>All this is significant enough when we are being marketed products, but using such information in the context of <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00787-w">election campaigning</a> is even more questionable.</p>
<p>A new level of AI, surveillance and business cooperation was achieved when Facebook began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170701141827/https:/politics.fb.com/ad-campaigns/">providing services</a> to companies involved in political campaigning. Of particular concern were activities around the use of targeting custom audiences in the 2016 Brexit referendum and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump">US presidential election of the same year</a>. </p>
<p>To this day, it is unclear how these activities affected those votes, but we know companies worked together to gather voter information and perform their own behavioural analytics for the segments of interest using, among other things, efficient computer-generated personality judgments based on inappropriately harvested Facebook profiles. Persuasive materials were then delivered at specific times to the users by Facebook.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/Fake_news_evidence/Ads-supplied-by-Facebook-to-the-DCMS-Committee.pdf">Enlightening information</a> provided to a British parliamentary inquiry by Facebook shows that many of the large number of ads about Brexit sent to users were misleading and employed <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-send-350m-week-brussels">debatable half-truths</a>.</p>
<p>In the US, the Federal Trades Commission imposed an extraordinary US$5 billion (€4.6 billion) fine on Facebook <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3109_facebook_complaint_filed_7-24-19.pdf">for misleading users</a> and allowing profiles to be shared with business app developers.</p>
<p>In 2018, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg <a href="https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104712037900071">said</a>: “I’ve been working to understand exactly what happened and how to make sure this doesn’t happen again. The good news is that the most important actions to prevent this from happening again today we have already taken years ago. But we also made mistakes, there’s more to do, and we need to step up and do it.”</p>
<p>However, the EU is clearly not content with a pledge from Facebook not to let this happen again and plans to take a more heavy handed approach than it had in the past. </p>
<p>My own work in this area argues that such business projects as election influencing using advanced AI with behavioural analytics can be considered as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-96448-5_28">artificial people at work</a> and should be <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331656417_Artificial_Intelligence_in_Politics_Establishing_Ethics">regulated in the same way</a> as any human seeking to influence elections would be.</p>
<h2>The European approach</h2>
<p>There is currently no usable, shared definition of a political advertisement. The EU, therefore, needs to provide a definition that does not infringe on freedom of expression but enables the market to be properly regulated. </p>
<p>With this in mind, we can expect the law to make reference to there being a link between payment and the use or creation of a post. That will help separate ads from personal opinions shared on social media.</p>
<p>Once a political ad has been identified, legislation will require it to be clearly labelled as relating to a specific election or referendum. The name of the sponsor will have to be clear as well as the amount spent on the ad.</p>
<p>A key issue with the US and UK scandals was that amplification techniques had been used to position political ads on Facebook where they could be most effective. </p>
<p>This meant using potentially sensitive information about a person, such as ethnic origin, psychological profiling, religious beliefs or sexual orientation to sort them into groups to be targeted. This will not be allowed in EU countries, unless people give their explicit permission. </p>
<p>In the past, political ads have been delivered to individuals in their own private spaces, and so have not been open to public examination. The new European legislation will aim to put all political ads in an open repository, where they will be open to public scrutiny and regulation.</p>
<p>The European Commission wants to see these regulations come into force before the European elections of 2024. Getting the regulations exactly right will be challenging, and the Commission is in the final stages of discussion on the matter. Regulation of political ads will come in some form or another, making it more possible to hold social media companies to account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Kane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New laws aim to give the public access to a repository containing every political ad sent out through social media.Tom Kane, Senior Lecturer in Business Analytics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2073402023-06-09T09:20:42Z2023-06-09T09:20:42ZThe UK government does have a legal case for withholding WhatsApp messages from the COVID inquiry – but here’s why it will probably lose in court anyway<p>The UK government has decided to challenge, via a judicial review, <a href="https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/ruling-in-respect-of-a-s21-notice-issued-to-the-cabinet-office-dated-22-may-2023/">a ruling on document disclosure</a> by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heather_Hallett,_Baroness_Hallett">Baroness Hallett,</a> the chair of the public <a href="https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/">inquiry</a> which is looking into the way the COVID-19 pandemic was handled.</p>
<p>Hallett wants the “entire contents” of specified document classes, including WhatsApp messages, diaries and notebooks of Boris Johnson, the then prime minister, and an adviser named Henry Cook, to be disclosed to the inquiry. The government is resisting this request. </p>
<p>Its resistance is widely seen, even by a <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/government-lose-covid-inquiry-legal-challenge-george-freeman-cabinet-office-b1085116.html">government minister</a>, as unlikely to convince at judicial review but this case is both more complex and more important than it seems. Resolving the question of whether these documents must be handed over to the inquiry could set an important precedent. That said, the government is still likely to lose the case, although litigation is always hard to predict.</p>
<p><a href="https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/ruling-in-respect-of-a-s21-notice-issued-to-the-cabinet-office-dated-22-may-2023/">Hallett’s reasoning</a> is that such documents may be “potentially relevant”, even if at first sight they appear to be irrelevant. A WhatsApp message might, for example, reveal that a government minister was focusing on something other than COVID at a time when that should have been their sole concern. This is a pertinent issue since one criticism of the Johnson administration was that it was slow to take the threat of the pandemic seriously. </p>
<p>The problem is that the law <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/12/section/21">states</a> that an inquiry can only call for documents that “relate to a matter in question at the inquiry”.
But the reason why Hallett is insisting that she has the right to see everything is because the chair decides what is relevant.</p>
<p>Matters were not helped by the government recently deciding to release some documents to the inquiry to show that it was only redacting “unambiguously irrelevant” material. In her ruling, Baroness Hallett pointed out that some of it was, in her opinion, indeed relevant because it concerned <a href="https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/ruling-in-respect-of-a-s21-notice-issued-to-the-cabinet-office-dated-22-may-2023/">“the enforcement of COVID regulations by the Metropolitan Police”</a>. She described this as <a href="https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/ruling-in-respect-of-a-s21-notice-issued-to-the-cabinet-office-dated-22-may-2023/">“not a promising start”</a>. She also said that <a href="https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/ruling-in-respect-of-a-s21-notice-issued-to-the-cabinet-office-dated-22-may-2023/">“the relevance of at least some of these passages may not have been apparent to the Cabinet Office and its advisers”</a> to bolster her claim that it is for her to decide what she needs to see.</p>
<h2>What is the government arguing?</h2>
<p>The government’s response makes the reasonable point that, by definition, if all the WhatsApp documents must be released then that must, inevitably, include many irrelevant documents. Genuinely irrelevant documents cannot, by definition, “relate to a matter in question at the inquiry” and so would not fall within the statutory powers of the chair.</p>
<p>Even if some of the documents thought to be “unambiguously irrelevant” may turn out to be relevant later as new issues emerge, that still means that the chair is insisting on the release of many documents that even the chair must admit are not relevant.</p>
<p>Further complexity is being added to the mix because of the issue as to whether the Prime Minister and others were wrongly focused on other policy issues in early 2020 at the expense of the looming pandemic. The government confronts that issue head-on. It claims that the inquiry could simply make targeted requests for documents such as WhatsApp messages sent within particular dates rather than making a blanket document request.</p>
<h2>The key question: ‘irrationality’</h2>
<p>Why then are the government’s chances still so slim, despite these manifestly reasonable arguments? There is a simple answer. The bar the government must clear to have the chair’s decision quashed is extremely high. It must show that Baroness Hallett acted “irrationally”. This is not an appeal.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A portrait photo of Baroness Hallett." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530833/original/file-20230608-15-h1i25h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Baroness Hallett is leading the public inquiry on the UK’s Covid response.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baroness_Hallett.jpg">Wikipedia/UK Parliament</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Normally, the bar is set so high because judges are very reluctant to interfere in the discretionary decisions of public bodies, including primary decision-makers such as Hallett. This is a separation of powers issue, as a matter of constitutional law.</p>
<p>The test for “irrationality” itself is expressed in different ways. One version is that the decision can only be quashed if it is <a href="https://www.studocu.com/en-gb/document/university-college-london/public-law/extract-from-fenwick-et-al-on-wednesbury-irrationality-and-proportionality/46288444">“so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”</a>. A slightly milder version of the test states that the decision must be <a href="https://dro.dur.ac.uk/30189/">“within the range of reasonable responses open to the decision-maker”</a>. If human rights are at stake, then the courts will apply additional <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141104.pdf">“anxious scrutiny”</a>. The government is claiming some privacy rights of advisers and officials are in play in this case, which could therefore bring the anxious scrutiny test into the picture.</p>
<p>Even so, the government has its work cut out to demonstrate that Baroness Hallett acted irrationally, particularly as she has provided some superficially plausible reasons for her request. Irrationality and unreasonableness, in the end, turn on reasons so the question is whether the court thinks that she has satisfied the test or not. Nonetheless, her insistence on seeing documents that are clearly irrelevant means the courts will face a difficult dilemma.</p>
<p>If the decision is quashed, Baroness Hallett might regard such a defeat as a significant blow to her authority. The government is clearly concerned about the potential precedent set by the chair’s demands. The stage is thus set for a far more nuanced and difficult hearing than is being acknowledged by many commentators.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Craig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Baroness Hallett says she should be the one to decide which government messages are relevant to her inquiry, but is she right?Robert Craig, Lecturer in Law, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2019952023-03-21T13:05:03Z2023-03-21T13:05:03ZMatt Hancock leaks: why WhatsApp is a terrible place to conduct important political conversations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516424/original/file-20230320-2144-92xg5v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C35%2C7904%2C5214&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-image-male-hands-using-smartphone-594829253">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The leak of more than 100,000 WhatsApp messages exchanged between former health secretary Matt Hancock and his contacts has finally exposed the central role the messaging app has come to play in official government business. </p>
<p>A selection of the messages published by The Telegraph – a newspaper with an anti-lockdown stance – shows Hancock apparently <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/matt-hancock-considering-all-options-after-allegations-he-rejected-covid-testing-advice-for-care-homes-12822618">dismissing advice on testing in care homes</a> and wanting to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-64848106">“frighten the pants off everyone”</a> to ensure compliance with lockdown rules.</p>
<p>The tone of the leaked messages suggests that the politicians involved had not anticipated public scrutiny. Critical political decisions are made in a style that appears flippant, which has been hurtful to many people who suffered during the difficult period of lockdowns. The politicians engage in insults, rivalries, sycophancy and jokes and use what has been described as a <a href="https://www.audible.co.uk/pd/Hancocks-humiliation-and-the-end-for-Johnson-Podcast/B0BXRLYBV5">“matey, testosterone-driven”</a> tone. This might reflect on the people involved in the exchanges, but it also prompts us to wonder whether WhatsApp is really the right place for political interaction. </p>
<p>Technologies such as WhatsApp do not determine behaviour. People always have choices as to how they use a particular technology. But these choices are influenced by social factors. We tend to use technologies in the same ways as people around us. We develop habits that become hard to break. </p>
<h2>Trivial and conversational</h2>
<p>Our perception of WhatsApp – no doubt shared by politicians – is shaped not so much by the technology itself but by our habitual use of it for immediate, informal, intimate conversation. </p>
<p>Like all digitally mediated communication, WhatsApp carries some of the features associated with writing and some of the features associated with speech. The messages are undeniably written and, like written words, can be stored and leaked, as Hancock found.</p>
<p>At the same time, however, in our everyday interactions, many of us treat WhatsApp messages as ephemeral, private and inconsequential, like much of our speech. Although the written medium affords planning and editing, we often dash messages off without giving them much thought. Sometimes we are rushed off our feet and send messages in a five-minute break between meetings. Other times we are messaging close friends and family and it feels natural to write in an informal and intimate way. </p>
<p>Some WhatsApp groups even demand flippancy and humour. Other messages deal with the mundane details of life – asking a friend for a lift, telling a partner you are on your way home – and are short and to the point. Many of the things we might once have done by talking to someone, we now also do through written messages. </p>
<p>This blurring of the lines between speaking and writing can have worrying implications for those who try to use WhatsApp to discuss more weighty issues. Politicians have always informally spoken to each other about important political topics, of course. However, we do not expect to see consequential issues being debated in WhatsApp messages in the same way as we would chat about what was for dinner or who should put the bins out.</p>
<p>Mobile technologies also muddle the distinction between work and home. They enable people to check in on family and friends while at work and to liaise with colleagues from home. The challenge for politicians – and others who use their private phones for work purposes – is to effectively maintain workplace conventions, standards and registers while using the same platform for jokey banter. It has become normal to conduct multiple conversations by WhatsApp at once, so that the tone of one conversation bleeds into the other. In Hancock’s case, important political discussions are jumbled up with what appears to be banter and rivalry between friends, at times containing informal expressions and typos.</p>
<p>Part of our difficulty in maintaining this balance is the fact that our phones also blur the boundaries between offline and online. There was a time in the 1980s and 1990s when people had to make a concerted effort to get online. They had to go to their personal computer, plug in the modem, and wait to connect. At that time, there was a sharp disjuncture between “being online” and “being offline”.</p>
<h2>Rarely the focus of our attention</h2>
<p>We might argue that government <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-57642791">oversight policies around communications</a> and security still operate on the basis of this outdated set up. But, in reality, the distinction between offline and online has gone. We now carry our phones around with us, share what we are doing online and send messages while commuting, at a party, or in a meeting. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.open.edu/openlearn/languages/linguistics/messaging-apps-paying-attention-and-timing-it-right">My own research</a> based on UK-based adults aged from their 30s to 70s suggests that most WhatsApp messages are sent while people are doing something else. Not only that but most people I spoke to were keen to emphasise that they prioritise the people they are with over incoming messages, ignoring them until they can steal a quick moment to respond. Some people engage in what is popularly know as “phadmin” – putting aside time when they check their their phone and respond to multiple WhatsApp conversations in one go. Some put their phone on silent so they are not distracted. Some switch to voice notes so as to continue messaging while engaged in activities that require both hands (such as cooking dinner). Generally speaking, for adults over 30 at least, WhatsApp is not something that warrants undivided attention.</p>
<p>This is, of course, one of the huge attractions of mobile messaging – unlike an in-person conversation or a voice call, we do not have to give it our full attention. This no doubt makes WhatsApp <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/whatsapp-panic-stalks-westminster-after-mass-leak-of-private-messages-matt-hancock/">a crucial tool</a> for busy politicians making real-time decisions in fast-paced unfolding situations. But they may not be giving the political decision-making process their full attention.</p>
<p>WhatsApp does not inevitably lead to bad decisions, but politicians should take the platform more seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Tagg received funding from the British Academy for some of the research informing this article. </span></em></p>Leaks of thousands of messages show government officials making light of lockdowns and joking about frightening the public.Caroline Tagg, Lecturer in Applied Linguistics and English Language, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942572022-11-17T14:19:39Z2022-11-17T14:19:39ZSocial media campaigns can be effective – if offline action is also taken. A case study from Ghana<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494819/original/file-20221111-18-fkr2kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's protest culture has grown along with the spread of social media</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dieu-Donné Gameli/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana has about six million social media users out of a population of <a href="https://census2021.statsghana.gov.gh/">31 million</a>. WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube are the three dominant social media platforms, while Instagram and Twitter are gradually gaining popularity. </p>
<p>Most users are young, educated and in the middle class or above. Men outnumber women online. </p>
<p>Ghanaian political parties have used social media largely to complement their traditional communication channels. This was particularly true in the 2012, 2016 and 2020 general elections. </p>
<p>But a new trend is emerging – the use of social media for online activism. This was evident in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/14/occupy-flagstaff-house-wake-up-call-for-ghanas-democracy">#OccupyFlagstaffHouse</a> and <a href="https://citifmonline.com/2014/07/red-friday-protest-against-govt-begins-today/">#RedFriday</a> 2014 campaigns. </p>
<p>The #OccupyFlagstaffHouse campaign was the first to be launched on Facebook and Twitter, on 28 June 2014. It was started by regular citizens engaging online. Within four days, it led to a demonstration at the Efua Sutherland Children’s Park in Ghana’s capital and picketing at Flagstaff House, Ghana’s presidential palace and seat of government. </p>
<p>Ten days after the #OccupyFlagstaffHouse demonstration, the organisers launched “The Red Campaign” (#RedFriday), aimed at compelling the government to address the issues raised in the first demonstration. The campaign encouraged Ghanaians to wear red on Fridays to indicate solidarity with the campaign, and to post photos and videos of themselves on Facebook and Twitter using the hashtags #RedFriday and #OccupyFlagstaffHouse.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14791420.2022.2130950">research paper</a>, I set out to highlight the synergy between social movement theory and social media critical discourse studies.</p>
<p>I conclude from my findings that the leaders of Occupy Ghana did some work in the physical world that enhanced their online campaign. I, therefore, argue that social media campaigns and digital activism can be fruitful if they are followed up by practical offline actions. The absence of action on the streets can result in people supporting a cause by performing simple measures without being truly engaged or devoted to making a change. This has been termed “slacktivism” in the literature.</p>
<h2>A digital warpath</h2>
<p>I based the study on <a href="https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/socialtheory/n278.xml#:%7E:text=Social%20movement%20theory%20attempts%20to,mobilization%2C%20and%20political%20process%20theories.">social movement theory</a>, which delineates how and why people mobilise themselves for sociopolitical action, as well as the effect of such action.</p>
<p>The data for this study comprised tweets produced by and interactions involving the OccupyGhana Official Twitter account before, during, and after the #OccupyFlagstaffHouse and #RedFriday campaigns. </p>
<p>The name of the Twitter handle is @occupyGh. The sample spanned 12 months of activity, from 28 June 2014 to 30 June 2015.</p>
<p>The analysis showed three mechanisms used in the tweets to promote the objectives of the protesters and put pressure on the government to tackle the issues responsible for the debilitating economic situation. </p>
<p>Specifically, the tweets performed a dual function of social activism in the form of promoting critical awareness and preparing the ground for an offline demonstration.</p>
<p><strong>Constructing the Ghanaian government as insensitive.</strong> The tweeters represented the Ghanaian government as an uncaring administration that showed little-to-no concern for the plight of Ghanaians. Tweets that expressed this constituted about 37% of the entire dataset:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>TWT 31. The government has been slow to respond to our #OccupyFlagstaffHouse petition. The cedi hasn’t fared better. The economy isn’t better.
TWT 36. The reason this government is not getting citizen support is that they deny what the real effects of their lack of ideas is on the masses.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In these tweets, the protesters, via a referential strategy realised by noun phrases such as “the government”, “this government”, “our government” and “they”, explicitly identify the entity they consider to be responsible for their predicament.</p>
<p><strong>Representing Ghanaians as the suffering masses.</strong> Positioning themselves as the voice of the people, the protesters construct Ghanaians as a people suffering due to poor leadership, bad governance and mismanagement of the economy. These constituted approximately 39% of the tweets analysed.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>TWT 247. #RedFriday because we are all living under increasingly harsh conditions and with IMF, we are likely to have worsened living conditions.
TWT 248. #RedFriday because workers face rapidly declining real wages due to the depreciation of the currency and increasing inflation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Using expressions such as “dire economic conditions”, “worsened living conditions”, “increasingly harsh conditions” and “declining wages”, the tweeters frame the people of Ghana as victims of an irresponsible government; hence the need to “remind our president that he promised us a better Ghana”.</p>
<p><strong>Exploiting stance for sociopolitical objectives.</strong> Stance is a term that refers to “the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message”. It gives an indication of how writers present themselves and communicate their opinions and commitment. Stance enables writers to position themselves in relation to others and to “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461445605050365">stamp their personal authority onto their arguments or step back and disguise their involvement</a>”. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>TWT 73. #RedFriday demands @JDMahama should make prudent economic and social
policies that would make the standard of living better for Ghanaians.
TWT 74. #RedFriday demands Government should manage the exchange rate and save the #Ghana Cedi from the current free fall to prevent price hikes.
TWT 117. What do we want from all this? That we will hand to our children a Ghana better than we inherited from our fathers. #redFriday</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of stance in the form of “evidentiality”, “affect” and “presence”
helped the protesters project their positions and underline their advocacy and civic engagement commitments to persuade the masses to support the goals of the protest.</p>
<h2>Proof</h2>
<p>The Occupy Ghana pressure group was founded in 2014 as a result of the #OccupyFlagstaffHouse and #RedFriday campaigns. It continues to play a pivotal role in national discussions. Its leaders and members make regular media appearances, and it has built alliances and partnerships with other civil society organisations, think tanks and political pressure groups to analyse and review public policies and initiatives. </p>
<p>The movement is an example of how social media campaigns and digital activism can be fruitful if they are followed up by practical and strategic offline actions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Nartey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Digital activism can be fruitful if it is followed up by practical and strategic offline actions.Mark Nartey, Lecturer, English Language and Linguistics, University of the West of EnglandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880202022-08-01T13:53:44Z2022-08-01T13:53:44ZThe role of media in a Kenyan election: what you should know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476903/original/file-20220801-62374-oyl9td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Traditionally, political debates have been shaped by mainstream media. Kenya’s mainstream media, however, remain strongly wedded to factional ethnic and class interests. This has undermined their capacity to facilitate fair and open debate, most evidently during elections.</p>
<p>Social media platforms have exploited this trust deficit, acting as important alternative sites for political deliberation. But they have also become powerful tools for disinformation and misinformation.</p>
<p>Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in digital space. Through these platforms, politicians can engage directly with voters, which is especially important for independent candidates, who may not have the backing of a major party.</p>
<p>Reflecting the growth in the power of the internet, many governments have moved to regulate it – or even shut it down. Ethiopia, Cameroon, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan and Zimbabwe have all used internet shutdowns to try to limit free expression. </p>
<p>Kenya, which will hold a hotly contested election on 9 August 2022, has yet to order an internet shutdown. The government has <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/08/kenya-says-social-media-wont-be-blocked-after-warning-to-facebook/">issued assurances</a> that it will not do so. </p>
<p>Kenya’s media landscape is an important field of research and analysis – highlighted in this selection of previously published articles.</p>
<h2>Media risk and reward</h2>
<p>As Kenya heads towards elections, concerns about the outbreak of electoral violence tend to rise. Research has explored the question of how, when and why political elites encourage ordinary citizens to engage in violent conflict.</p>
<p>Newspapers, television, radio, and online platforms can inform perceptions of what’s at stake in elections. Media narratives, in other words, can offer an early sign of the risk of violence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-message-to-violence-what-to-watch-for-in-the-media-ahead-of-kenyas-elections-177459">From message to violence: what to watch for in the media ahead of Kenya's elections</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There is no evidence that disinformation and misinformation practices can on their own influence the outcome of elections. Still, they pose a danger to democratic processes.</p>
<p>In politically charged environments, such as Kenya’s, they have the capacity to exploit long-held divisions with the potential to trigger violence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-is-being-misused-in-kenyas-political-arena-why-its-hard-to-stop-it-177586">Social media is being misused in Kenya's political arena. Why it's hard to stop it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>African political parties are spending huge sums hiring consultants with expertise in digital campaigning and even manipulation of social media content. It is evident that those with political power and money can easily hire automated systems, like bots, to influence the flow of political content across social media. They can also distort information.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/algorithms-bots-and-elections-in-africa-how-social-media-influences-political-choices-179121">Algorithms, bots and elections in Africa: how social media influences political choices</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Social media has the potential to allow for more direct communication between politicians and citizens. But an analysis of candidates’ tweets in the 2017 election does not suggest that Twitter democratised political discourse in Kenya. While candidates in the upcoming election will continue to expand their reach and visibility through social media, Twitter may not yet replace patronage networks and traditional campaigning.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/twitter-in-kenyas-last-poll-a-great-way-to-reach-voters-but-not-a-game-changer-175739">Twitter in Kenya's last poll: a great way to reach voters, but not a game-changer</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Value of TV debate</h2>
<p>Political debates have become part of the election calendar. Their stated intention is to give citizens the information they need to decide whom to elect. But debates are held at the end of an election season. They cannot replace the electorate’s need for the granular, mundane, day-to-day information about candidates and what they stand for.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-debates-in-kenya-are-they-useful-or-empty-media-spectacles-183262">Political debates in Kenya: are they useful or empty media spectacles?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp are reframing democracy and the way citizens engage and organise in the digital space.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1838722022-05-26T17:12:14Z2022-05-26T17:12:14ZPartygate: how the Sue Gray report revealed the age of ‘government by WhatsApp’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465548/original/file-20220526-12-w3wrth.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C10%2C1437%2C951&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Post your sandwich requests in the group chat, lads. And see you at wine time Friday. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1078404/2022-05-25_FINAL_FINDINGS_OF_SECOND_PERMANENT_SECRETARY_INTO_ALLEGED_GATHERINGS.pdf">UK government </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the striking things about civil servant Sue Gray’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/findings-of-the-second-permanent-secretarys-investigation-into-alleged-gatherings-on-government-premises-during-covid-restrictions">report on lockdown parties at 10 Downing Street</a> – aside from the alcohol consumption, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/boris-johnson-cabinet-office-covid-chapel-windsor-b2087212.html">vomiting and karaoke singing</a> – was the presence of multiple WhatsApp transcripts. </p>
<p>Exchanges between staff showed them planning parties and openly admitting that they knew what they were doing wasn’t right. In one exchange that will surely become emblematic of the whole debacle, Martin Reynolds, a close aide to prime minister Boris Johnson at the time, speaks of having “got away” with a party during lockdown without the press catching wind of it. </p>
<p>Another message from a different member of staff is equally damning:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Drinks this eve is a lovely idea so I’ve shared with the E & V team who are in the office. Just to flag that the press conference will probably be finishing around that time, so helpful if people can be mindful of that as speakers and cameras are leaving, not walking around waving bottles of wine etc.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Inquiries into wrongdoing by government have long made extensive use of official records – but traditionally they were paper-based. Histories written years later have then made use of the “weeded” files in <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/">the National Archives</a> to reconstruct those same events. These are often littered with redactions masking sensitive material.</p>
<p>Gray’s report turns this practice on it head. Private messages between those at the heart of Number 10 became the basis of her evidence. These messages showed an unvarnished take on what was said within Number 10, rather than the sanitised script of an official minute. And these messages are potentially more useful to us in understanding the dynamics between those who govern our lives – as well as how they make decisions about official matters. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A WhatsApp exchange discussing a party during lockdown." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=253&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=253&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465540/original/file-20220526-26-wus4y1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=253&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A WhatsApp exchange showing Downing Street staff debating how to hold a party in lockdown.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1078404/2022-05-25_FINAL_FINDINGS_OF_SECOND_PERMANENT_SECRETARY_INTO_ALLEGED_GATHERINGS.pdf">Uk Government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If important conversations are happening over rapid messaging and group chats – as the Gray report suggests – then that places an additional importance on being able to capture and record them. And let’s be clear, we now understand that party planning, in the context of partygate, is indeed a very serious matter. It’s also clear that WhatsApp is being used for other business in government too. </p>
<p>The prime minister’s former adviser, Dominic Cummings, produced a flurry of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jun/16/cummings-texts-show-boris-johnson-calling-matt-hancock-totally-hopeless">WhatsApp messages</a> after his departure from government that demonstrated the fluid dynamics of the official response to Covid that was played out on this app.</p>
<p>Other <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexwickham/a-senior-minister-says-the-conservatives-have-been-taken">ministers and backbenchers</a> have provided a steady stream of WhatsApp message screengrabs that show flavours of behind-the-scenes debates, and the importance of being in one group over another. The <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/nadine-dorries-kicked-off-tory-mps-whatsapp-group-after-defending-hero-boris-johnson-12499621">culture secretary, Nadine Dorries</a>, was said to have been ejected from the European Research Group’s WhatsApp group for having defended the prime minister too readily. WhatsApp messaging has replaced tea-room gossip as the common language of Westminster life.</p>
<h2>Where is the transparency?</h2>
<p>Digital archive trails (although many of the partygate protagonists did not realise this was what they were creating) have been with us since the inquiries into the Iraq War. At a seminar held at defence thinktank <a href="https://rusi.org/">RUSI</a> after the publication of the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61171/wmdreview.pdf">Butler Inquiry in 2004</a>, a defence intelligence official said he routinely printed off all his email traffic “for the next inquiry”. </p>
<p>I suspect he was a rare case that understood before many others that email traffic would replace official memos as the currency of judicial and parliamentary investigations. Would the officials involved in partygate have been so free and easy with their words had they considered their texts as official memoranda? It seems unlikely. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A screenshot of Sue Gray's report." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=134&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=134&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=168&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=168&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465544/original/file-20220526-26-tlxn6w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=168&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A selection of WhatsApp messages are reproduced in Sue Gray’s report.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1078404/2022-05-25_FINAL_FINDINGS_OF_SECOND_PERMANENT_SECRETARY_INTO_ALLEGED_GATHERINGS.pdf">Uk Government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A huge part of the problem with WhatsApp being used for important business is how easy it is to delete your records, and how the end-to-end encryption that means only the sending and receiving accounts can access the messages is used to avoid scrutiny. In the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2022/mar/22/uk-ministers-accused-of-government-by-whatsapp-in-court">High Court in March 2022</a>, privacy campaigners accused the government of “governing via WhatsApp” and complained that democratic accountability was being undermined by the practice. </p>
<p>They said decisions were being made via personal WhatsApp message strings, some of which auto-deleted after only seven days. The <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/whatsapp-government">Institute for Government</a> has subsequently recommended that WhatsApp should not be used to make detailed decisions in government. Where it is used, messages should be retained “for the long term”. </p>
<h2>Delete, delete, delete!</h2>
<p>The rules around the use of WhatsApp in government are not particularly vague – the presumption is against its use. What are vague are the rules around ensuring messages are <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/crucial-government-decisions-made-over-messaging-services-deleted-in-many-instances-high-court-hears-12572913">appropriately captured for official records and stored</a>.</p>
<p>One of the lessons of partygate is that an unequal system is emerging from this grey area. Relatively junior people have seen there messages being made public. In other cases, more senior people have escaped <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/boris-johnson-offers-humble-apology-and-blames-new-phone-for-failing-to-release-messages-to-downing-street-flat-probe-12510076">full scrutiny</a> merely by virtue of remembering to clear their messaging history – or at least claiming that their messages magically disappeared. </p>
<p>On the other hand, it’s easy to take a screenshot and leak an exchange to the media. Officials have become trapped by the need to use these informal networks to get on and even get ahead, but run the risk of their real, unfiltered selves being exposed to the public. This was very rarely the case prior to the advent of WhatsApp, when emails and memos were clearly marked with a security classification to remind the sender of the discoverability of the message.</p>
<p>The transition to a digital era of government is illuminated by Sue Gray’s report. The culture of politics exists in closed message groups and the business of government is increasingly conducted via these channels. If there is to continue to be meaningful oversight over government these messages will need to be archived and be discoverable to future investigators. This also means that officials will need to return to writing messages with sober caution and with an eye on how their future discovery with be treated by the public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert M. Dover does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The report on lockdown parties at Number 10 relied heavily on WhatsApp transcripts to show wrongdoing.Robert M. Dover, Professor of Intelligence and National Security, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1821192022-05-03T03:12:29Z2022-05-03T03:12:29ZHow can we stop fake election news spreading in migrant communities?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460699/original/file-20220502-22-e9jzvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2984%2C1983&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Concerns about fake news and misinformation spreading on social media among Chinese communities are once again emerging, as they were during the <a href="https://qz.com/1614329/fake-news-on-wechat-focuses-on-the-left-in-australia-election/">2019 election</a> campaign.</p>
<p>There have been allegations against both major parties in recent weeks. The ABC reported a group of Liberal Party supporters systematically spread fake news about <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-23/liberal-party-wechat-troll-spreading-lies-about-critics/101003472">prominent Labor supporters</a> in the Chinese community via WeChat.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1517616788829503488"}"></div></p>
<p>At the same time, a local Labor branch in Queensland is accused of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-22/irt-hidden-campaign-labor-facebook-pages/101008912">spreading a conspiracy meme</a> against Gladys Liu, the incumbent Liberal candidate of the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/federal/2022/guide/chis">ultra-marginal Victorian seat of Chisholm</a> and the first ethnic Chinese woman to serve in the House of Representatives.</p>
<p>Liu’s supporters are also not free from controversy. Some were accused of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-18/liberal-supporters-spreading-fake-news-in-hidden-chat-rooms/11121194">spreading misinformation</a> in Chinese communities during the last federal election.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1517442734382260224"}"></div></p>
<p>Drawing on my research on Chinese language media and Chinese communities in Australia, here are are some ways we can tackle fake news in non-English speaking communities.</p>
<h2>Fake news and CALD Australians</h2>
<p>Fake news is often <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-disinformation-could-disrupt-the-australian-election-177629">systematically arranged</a> by interest groups (such as political organisations) to achieve certain goals. This contradicts the popular assumption it’s fragmented or emerges spontaneously.</p>
<p>While every section of the society is subjected to fake news, culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities are often more vulnerable to misinformation. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-disinformation-could-disrupt-the-australian-election-177629">Here's how disinformation could disrupt the Australian election</a>
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<hr>
<p>It is <a href="https://www.artshub.com.au/news/opinions-analysis/australian-news-outlets-fail-migrant-communities-heres-what-needs-to-happen-261338-2368918/">widely acknowledged</a> mainstream media outlets don’t do a good job of <a href="https://www.meaa.org/mediaroom/australian-media-must-do-better-on-diversity/">representing</a> or communicating with CALD communities. </p>
<p>We know CALD communities often seek online and informal sources for information – as they did during COVID. </p>
<h2>The information gap</h2>
<p>Poor English skills can also make it hard for some non-English speakers to <a href="https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-culture-and-communication/our-research/research-projects/engaging-older-chinese-australians">access credible authority sources directly</a>.</p>
<p>Even when media outlets translate certain articles, they can <a href="https://humanities.org.au/power-of-the-humanities/fighting-covid-19-its-time-to-break-down-the-language-barriers/">lack the nuance to convey critical details</a>. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-culture-and-communication/our-research/research-projects/engaging-older-chinese-australians">as yet unpublished</a> <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/communicating-covid-19-to-our-older-culturally-diverse-australians">research</a> suggests many Chinese Australians who cannot understand English haven’t been accessing public health messages from government or health authorities during the COVID pandemic. </p>
<p>Instead, they <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07481187.2020.1815101?journalCode=udst20">tend to rely on community leaders</a>, friends and family members to make sense of important public messaging, via apps like <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/communicating-covid-19-to-our-older-culturally-diverse-australians">WhatsApp and WeChat</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1112572654483980288"}"></div></p>
<p>This aligns with <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-do-chinese-australian-voters-trust-for-their-political-news-on-wechat-113927">previous findings</a> that Chinese Australians trust political news on Chinese platforms <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-social-media-platform-wechat-could-be-a-key-battleground-in-the-federal-election-113925">such as WeChat</a> not because of the platform itself, but because of the people from the similar cultural and linguistic communities they share the platform with.</p>
<h2>My research</h2>
<p>In my as yet unpublished research, only two of 31 older Chinese Australians I interviewed read English mainstream Australians news daily. The vast majority obtained most of their news about COVID from instant messenger groups, social media platforms such as WeChat, and from sources outside Australia. </p>
<p>None of the participants were aware of the Chinese language version of ABC news. Only around half of the interviewees knew about the SBS Mandarin and Cantonese services, but none were aware of their social media accounts and smartphone apps. </p>
<p>The participants’ feedback shows the failure of mainstream media to engage non-English speaking CALD Australians. This can create a breeding ground for the spread of misinformation, which can potentially <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-disinformation-could-disrupt-the-australian-election-177629">distort voters’ decisions</a> and influence election outcomes.</p>
<h2>What can we do?</h2>
<p>There are several things governments should do in collaboration with communities to help CALD Australians gain direct access to credible news and to become more aware of misinformation.</p>
<p><strong>Promote the ABC and SBS</strong></p>
<p>Both federal and state governments should promote ABC and SBS in-language news, such as SBS Mandarin, especially during important public conversations such as pandemic management and elections.</p>
<p>A good example is SBS’s COVID <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/language/coronavirus#mod-block_module-2-target">myth buster portal</a>, which is available in more than 60 languages. This collates culturally appropriate news and information to help CALD communities stay informed about COVID, and serves as a good model for other important topics and events such as an election.</p>
<p>Promoting the ABC and SBS requires a strategic approach. Instead of governments running a mass campaign, which can be costly and ineffective, a better approach would be to co-develop resources and information with the language teams of the respective services. These resources can then be promoted to community leaders for them to disseminate to their communities.</p>
<p>More resources and training should be devoted to support journalists’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-media-has-been-too-white-for-too-long-this-is-how-to-bring-more-diversity-to-newsrooms-141602">cultural literacy</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Digital literacy training</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://beconnected.esafety.gov.au/">Federal</a> and <a href="https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-04/210415%20-%20New%20Digital%20Literacy%20Program%20To%20Support%20CALD%20Victorians.pdf?utm_source=miragenews&utm_medium=miragenews&utm_campaign=news">state</a> governments do fund digital literacy initiatives, such as <a href="https://beconnected.esafety.gov.au/">BeConnected</a>.</p>
<p>But typically these don’t have specific resources and training to support CALD communities. </p>
<p>They’re often too general and lack systematic programs to help CALD Australians learn how to download, operate, and access credible news and information and to improve their political literacy.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-social-media-platform-wechat-could-be-a-key-battleground-in-the-federal-election-113925">Chinese social media platform WeChat could be a key battleground in the federal election</a>
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<p>Tackling fake news in CALD communities requires partnerships between governments, community groups and media organisations.</p>
<p>There should be a particular focus on digital literacy of community leaders. </p>
<p>And more resources should be devoted to improve journalists’ cultural competence in communicating with CALD Australians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wilfred Yang Wang is affiliated with the Centre for Holistic Health, Victorian Multicultural Commission and Knox City Council's Multicultural Advisory Committee on voluntary basis. </span></em></p>Concerns about misinformation spreading among Chinese communities are once again prominent, as they were during the 2019 election campaign.Wilfred Yang Wang, Lecturer in Media & Communications Studies, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1791212022-03-30T13:28:08Z2022-03-30T13:28:08ZAlgorithms, bots and elections in Africa: how social media influences political choices<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452825/original/file-20220317-23-1up3n81.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Social media provides spaces for participation -- but also for misinformation.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Omar Marques/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rise in the use of smartphones and an <a href="https://www.statista.com/topics/779/mobile-internet/">increased adoption</a> of mobile internet in Africa are fundamentally altering the media ecology for election campaigns. </p>
<p>As mobile phones become <a href="https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/blog/the-state-of-mobile-internet-connectivity-in-sub-saharan-africa/">commonplace</a>, even in Africa’s poorest countries, the uptake of social media has become ubiquitous. Applications like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp and blogs form an integral part of today’s political communication landscape in much of the continent. </p>
<p>These platforms are becoming a dominant factor in electoral processes, playing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics-121577">tremendous role</a> in the creation, dissemination and consumption of political content. </p>
<p>Their influence and embedded power over political content invites further scrutiny, which informed <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-30553-6_2">my research</a>.
Is the rise in social media uptake in the continent a game changer in political communications? And if it is, does social media influence political campaigns? </p>
<p>To answer these questions, I considered the interplay between elements in the infrastructure of social media and human agency. </p>
<p>The infrastructure refers to the architecture that makes up social media systems. Even though the infrastructure is not immediately visible, it plays a critical role in the (re)production and dissemination of information. </p>
<p>Human agency entails the choices human beings make when they interact with social media systems.</p>
<p>I found that there are three main ways that political campaigns are influenced via social media: through algorithms, bots and the people who use them.</p>
<h2>The power of algorithms</h2>
<p>Imbued in social media platforms, with the exception of WhatsApp, is a system of software, codes and algorithms that manage, interpret and disseminate large quantities of information across social media networks. </p>
<p>The power of the algorithm is in its ability to search, sort, rank, prioritise and recommend the content consumed by users. The system, therefore, influences the choices we make. </p>
<p>Algorithms watch your behaviour when you interact with certain content in the platform, make assumptions and predictions on your preferences, and then recommend similar content in your feed. </p>
<p>For instance, if you constantly interact with posts – by liking, replying or sharing – from certain individuals, you are likely to see more posts from them. If you have shown interest in watching videos from a political outfit, you are likely to get more videos from them. </p>
<p>Which items are promoted and why? We may never know why the algorithms are coded (by programmers) in such a way as to rank certain items, individuals or political parties higher. What we know is that these algorithms influence what people see or don’t see.</p>
<p>They have the power to amplify and marginalise certain content and, like human gatekeepers in traditional mass media, determine what information users are exposed to. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-social-media-and-fake-news-are-battering-traditional-media-in-kenya-82920">How social media and fake news are battering traditional media in Kenya</a>
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<p>For example, Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm determines what is shown on a user’s Top News by displaying only a subset of stories by one’s friends. These are derived from a set of factors, such as the type of content (links, videos or photos) and the frequency and types of interactions with these friends (like tags or comments). </p>
<p>Similarly, Twitter algorithms display ranked tweets. That is, first they rank them and then display what they think is most relevant to the user.</p>
<p>These algorithms are not neutral. They encode political choices, influencing the information seen by users. When a user opens his or her social media account, he or she will be met by algorithm-filtered and recommended content, based on prior activities and interactions on the platform. </p>
<p>People are then likely to share visible information on non-algorithm-based applications like WhatsApp and Messenger, as well as in mainstream media. </p>
<h2>Bots and deepfakes</h2>
<p>Social bots can also be deployed to manipulate public opinion and influence votes. They mimic and potentially manipulate humans and their behaviour on social networks. They run automatically to produce messages, post online and interact with users through likes, comments and follows (fake accounts). </p>
<p>Even more worrisome is the rise of deepfakes. This involves the use of artificial intelligence to fabricate images and videos by replacing the face or voice of someone, usually a public figure, with someone else’s in a way that makes the content look authentic. </p>
<p>The intention is often to mislead the audience and make them believe that the targeted public figure said something (often controversial or provocative). </p>
<p>As noted by Portland Communications, a strategic communications consultancy, in their report, <a href="https://portland-communications.com/publications/how-africa-tweets-2018/">How Africa Tweets</a>, Twitter bots account for more than 20% of influencers in countries like Lesotho and Kenya. </p>
<p>One of the surprising findings in the report was the limited influence of politicians on the conversation. </p>
<h2>Human element</h2>
<p>African political parties are spending huge sums hiring consultancy companies with expertise in digital campaigning and even manipulation of social media content. </p>
<p>International consultancy firms like the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/03/cambridge-analytica-closing-what-happened-trump-brexit">now defunct Cambridge Analytica (CA)</a> have been accused of attempting to influence digital campaigns in Africa and in other parts of the world. CA worked on several campaigns in Russia, the UK, USA and Kenya. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/20/how-cambridge-analytica-poisoned-kenyas-democracy/">Kenya</a>, it emerged that President Uhuru Kenyatta had hired CA ahead of the 2013 elections. CA’s activities sparked global outcry when it became known, culminating in its collapse. </p>
<p>It is evident that those with political power and money can easily hire automated systems, like bots, to influence the flow of political content across social media. They can also <a href="https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c">distort information</a>. </p>
<p>The role of non-human actors should be worrying to anyone keen on democratic processes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-is-being-misused-in-kenyas-political-arena-why-its-hard-to-stop-it-177586">Social media is being misused in Kenya's political arena. Why it's hard to stop it</a>
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<p>There are indications that social media algorithms and bots are slowly changing the dynamics of elections in Africa. This is seen in the number of political parties hiring a new breed of communicators, such as social media managers.</p>
<p>The interplay between media and politics is central to any understanding of political campaigns, given their role as conduits of political information, persuasion and discussion. Social media provides spaces for participation – but also for misinformation and disinformation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin N Ndlela does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The system behind apps like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp isn’t neutral. It encodes political communication, influencing what users see.Martin N Ndlela, Professor of Communication, Inland Norway University of Applied SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1744802022-02-03T14:25:26Z2022-02-03T14:25:26ZHow a neighbourhood watch WhatsApp group shaped fears in a Cape Town suburb<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443996/original/file-20220202-25-b3uyyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Trust in state institutions to protect citizens is a prerequisite for sharing social spaces. This trust is corrupted in South Africa, where there are <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7208/9780226425078/html">persistent anxieties</a> that crime and violence are out of control.</p>
<p>Despite considerable <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14484">public</a> spending on the police and security sector, the country has an enormous <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/08/south-africa-insecurity-sees-rapid-growth-of-private-security-sector/">private</a> security economy, as well as volunteer-based organisations for social protection like <a href="https://www.capetown.gov.za/Family%20and%20home/safety-in-the-home/community-policing/neighbourhood-watch">neighbourhood watch groups</a>.</p>
<p>Decisions over access to public spaces, who is welcome, valued and protected – whose lives matter – is, of course, a global question. And it’s <a href="https://www.ruhabenjamin.com/race-after-technology">become apparent</a> in recent years that social media, with its ubiquitous hashtags, opaque algorithms and content moderation practices, can equally firm social divides. </p>
<p>My research on a neighbourhood watch group in <a href="https://theculturetrip.com/africa/south-africa/articles/the-top-things-to-see-and-do-in-observatory-cape-town/">Observatory</a>, a relatively affluent suburb of Cape Town, investigated what relationships of trust and distrust look like in this context.</p>
<p>The neighbourhood watch group had recently been revived. It had been established to decrease a feeling of vulnerability to crime through monthly strategy meetings and neighbourhood patrols.</p>
<p>It turned out, though, that patrols often took place in the form of ‘couch patrolling’ (making observations from the living room window and following social media communication). It also quickly became evident that commonplace technologies like <a href="https://www.whatsapp.com">WhatsApp</a>, integrated into surveillance routines, played a notable part in shaping encounters in the suburb. </p>
<p>The main question I posed in my study, which is now the subject of a <a href="https://www.langaa-rpcig.net/cultivating-suspicion-an-ethnography/">book</a>, <em>Cultivating Suspicion: An Ethnography</em>, was how suspicion transpires in the neighbourhood watch. I describe how desires to feel safe as a group, recountings of the same crime stories, and internalised fears become entangled in everyday surveillance practices.</p>
<p>Social fears are important to consider not just in South African cities, which were the scene of forced removals of the unwanted and supposedly dangerous during the segregationist <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> regime. But also for other urban spaces around the globe where gaping social divisions leap to the eye.</p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p>Nestled beneath the iconic Table Mountain, Observatory is a residential area close to the city centre and the freeway, with a busy strip of cafes, bars and restaurants. Here one meets longtime residents, national and international students of the nearby university, tourists, workers and others coming in and out of the suburb daily.</p>
<p>Affectionately shortened to ‘Obs’, Observatory is usually described as bohemian and somehow different. Its liberal image is also owed to the ‘grey area’ status it had during apartheid, with different race groups <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1474474009105052">mixing in public spaces</a> despite the country’s laws. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A view of a street with shops and quaint, old-fashioned houses, a mountain towering in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444008/original/file-20220202-15-g6l06p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Observatory, Cape Town.</span>
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<p>Despite private security in the area, a supplement to the police force and financed by property owners, the neighbourhood watch group was considered necessary for reducing crime. Already a resident, I announced my interest as a researcher and joined the group in the hopes of learning what motivates its members. As an anthropologist, I wanted to know more about the dynamics of this suburb and how crime anxieties manifest. I began with the question of what people were looking for on patrols – who was considered suspicious?</p>
<p>I spent a year researching the fear of crime in Observatory. Attending meetings, joining patrols, listening to stories, interviewing key persons such as the manager of the private security staff, and occasionally accompanying the police on their drives, I could observe how fear became part of everyday practice.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>The membership form explained that foot patrols were to be the main purpose of the neighbourhood watch. But few of the quickly growing members actually attended these. Most simply attended monthly meetings to voice their concerns.</p>
<p>For the most part, these members settled into ‘couch patrolling’. This involved watching the neighbourhood less formally, for instance from their house windows or on their way to the shop. They also followed the content of the active neighbourhood watch social media channels. In addition to WhatsApp groups (linked to police and private security), information was also shared via <a href="https://about.facebook.com/company-info/">Facebook</a> and email. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-cctv-surveillance-poses-a-threat-to-privacy-in-south-africa-97418">How CCTV surveillance poses a threat to privacy in South Africa</a>
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<p>But what was the information shared in these groups? What were people looking for when patrolling physically or making sense of what they found on these social media channels? Who was the suspect that may be picked up by the police as a result of local surveillance practices?</p>
<p>My findings show that the neighbourhood watch group as a collective would spread suspicion in certain directions – not least of all through the use of social media apps. Images of ‘suspects’ that were circulated and recycled via different avenues (WhatsApp, Facebook, email and anecdotes) typically fell within the racial categories ‘Black’ and ‘Coloured’ and were marked by poverty.</p>
<p>Snapshots would capture people caught in the act of doing something that was judged as suspicious, although suspicious behaviour did not always amount to an actual crime. I would regularly wake up to rough descriptions of people on the WhatsApp groups, which included substitutes for racial terms such as Charlie (for Coloured), Bravo (for Black), and Whiskey (for White), with Charlie by far the most commonly used.</p>
<p>As some neighbourhood watch members criticised, these desriptions of ‘suspects’ were often not accompanied by an explanation as to why they were being flagged as being ‘up to no good’. </p>
<p>The answer I received to my question of what people are looking for on patrol was usually described as a gut feeling. Lively intellectual debates in meetings and digital chats did not change the fact that what kept resurfacing via the different platforms as descriptions of suspects was becoming concrete. </p>
<p>Suspected criminals were formed into an image of a suspect that was commonly male, dark-skinned, marked by meagre resources, and, understandably, avoiding exposure to the public eye.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Surveillance has rightfully become associated with innovative digital tools and is considered an issue of larger power structures. Yet, there are all kinds of less obvious and yet very problematic technologies at play that should not be overlooked – such as everyday surveillance using just our own bodies and cellphones.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover showing the title and author - Cultivating Suspicion: An Ethnography by Leah Davina Junck - and an illustration of an aerial view of a suburban area, colourised." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=827&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=827&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=827&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1039&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1039&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444031/original/file-20220202-27-lz2fgj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1039&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Langaa RPCIG</span></span>
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<p>Strategies developed by the neighbourhood watch group in Observatory to feel more in charge in what they felt was an out-of-control crime situation also meant maintaining a firm distinction between oneself and ‘the other’. Consequently, monitoring the suburb had a deep impact on what kinds of relationships became possible and whose humanity (namely the residents’) was prioritised over the needs of others (the declared suspects).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leah Davina Junck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The study showed couch patrolling was more common than foot patrols - with social media influencing fears and suspicions.Leah Davina Junck, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1734172021-12-20T13:15:06Z2021-12-20T13:15:06ZFacebook became Meta – and the company’s dangerous behavior came into sharp focus in 2021: 4 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438279/original/file-20211217-23365-1bmrls4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5290%2C3547&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Facebook renamed itself Meta in 2021, but the year was more notable for revelations about the company's bad behavior.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreak-ReturntoOffice/8669bf4970514cc780bfcdc6c17fa6f2/photo">AP Photo/Tony Avelar</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Meta, née Facebook, had a rough year in 2021, in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/10/business/cnn-poll-facebook/index.html">public opinion</a> if not <a href="https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2021/Facebook-Reports-Third-Quarter-2021-Results/default.aspx">financially</a>. Revelations from whistleblower Frances Haugen, first detailed in a Wall Street Journal <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039">investigative series</a> and then presented in <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?515042-1/whistleblower-frances-haugen-calls-congress-regulate-facebook">congressional testimony</a>, show that the company was aware of the harm it was causing.</p>
<p>Growing concerns about misinformation, emotional manipulation and psychological harm came to a head this year when Haugen released internal company documents showing that the company’s own research confirmed the societal and individual harm its Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp platforms cause.</p>
<p>The Conversation gathered four articles from our archives that delve into research that explains Meta’s problematic behavior. </p>
<h2>1. Addicted to engagement</h2>
<p>At the root of Meta’s harmfulness is its set of algorithms, the rules the company uses to choose what content you see. The algorithms are designed to boost the company’s profits, but they also allow misinformation to thrive.</p>
<p>The algorithms work by increasing engagement – in other words, by provoking a response from the company’s users. Indiana University’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=f_kGJwkAAAAJ&hl=en">Filippo Menczer</a>, who studies the spread of information and misinformation in social networks, explains that engagement plays into people’s tendency to favor posts that seem popular. “When social media tells people an item is going viral, <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen-testified-that-the-companys-algorithms-are-dangerous-heres-how-they-can-manipulate-you-169420">their cognitive biases kick in</a> and translate into the irresistible urge to pay attention to it and share it,” he wrote.</p>
<p>One result is that low-quality information that gets an initial boost can garner more attention than it otherwise deserves. Worse, this dynamic can be gamed by people aiming to spread misinformation.</p>
<p>“People aiming to manipulate the information market have created fake accounts, like trolls and social bots, and organized fake networks,” Menczer wrote. “They have flooded the network to create the appearance that a conspiracy theory or a political candidate is popular, tricking both platform algorithms and people’s cognitive biases at once.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen-testified-that-the-companys-algorithms-are-dangerous-heres-how-they-can-manipulate-you-169420">Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen testified that the company's algorithms are dangerous – here's how they can manipulate you</a>
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<h2>2. Kneecapping teen girls’ self-esteem</h2>
<p>Some of the most disturbing revelations concern the harm Meta’s Instagram social media platform causes adolescents, particularly teen girls. University of Kentucky psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tuYEhtgAAAAJ&hl=en">Christia Spears Brown</a> explains that Instagram can lead teens to objectify themselves by focusing on how their bodies appear to others. It also can lead them to make unrealistic comparisons of themselves with celebrities and filtered and retouched images of their peers.</p>
<p>Even when teens know the comparisons are unrealistic, they end up feeling worse about themselves. “Even in studies in which participants knew the photos they were shown on Instagram were retouched and reshaped, <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-has-known-for-a-year-and-a-half-that-instagram-is-bad-for-teens-despite-claiming-otherwise-here-are-the-harms-researchers-have-been-documenting-for-years-168043">adolescent girls still felt worse about their bodies after viewing them</a>,” she wrote.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">“The choices being made inside of Facebook are disastrous for our children,” whistleblower Frances Haugen told Congress.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The problem is widespread because Instagram is where teens tend to hang out online. “Teens are more likely to log on to Instagram than any other social media site. It is a ubiquitous part of adolescent life,” Brown writes. “Yet studies consistently show that the more often teens use Instagram, the worse their overall well-being, self-esteem, life satisfaction, mood and body image.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/states-sue-meta-for-knowingly-hurting-teens-with-facebook-and-instagram-here-are-the-harms-researchers-have-documented-168043">States sue Meta for knowingly hurting teens with Facebook and Instagram − here are the harms researchers have documented</a>
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<h2>3. Fudging the numbers on harm</h2>
<p>Meta has, not surprisingly, pushed back against claims of harm despite the revelations in the leaked internal documents. The company has provided research that shows that <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2021/09/what-the-wall-street-journal-got-wrong/">its platforms do not cause harm</a> in the way many researchers describe, and claims that the overall picture from all research on harm is unclear.</p>
<p>University of Washington computational social scientist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Y5000VQAAAAJ&hl=en">Joseph Bak-Coleman</a> explains that Meta’s research can be both accurate and misleading. The explanation lies in averages. Meta’s studies look at effects on the average user. Given that Meta’s social media platforms have billions of users, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-thousands-of-vulnerable-people-harmed-by-facebook-and-instagram-are-lost-in-metas-average-user-data-172119">harm to many thousands of people can be lost</a> when all of the users’ experiences are averaged together.</p>
<p>“The inability of this type of research to capture the smaller but still significant numbers of people at risk – the tail of the distribution – is made worse by the need to measure a range of human experiences in discrete increments,” he wrote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-thousands-of-vulnerable-people-harmed-by-facebook-and-instagram-are-lost-in-metas-average-user-data-172119">The thousands of vulnerable people harmed by Facebook and Instagram are lost in Meta's 'average user' data</a>
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<h2>4. Hiding the numbers on misinformation</h2>
<p>Just as evidence of emotional and psychological harm can be lost in averages, evidence of the spread of misinformation can be lost without the context of another type of math: fractions. Despite substantial efforts to track misinformation on social media, it’s impossible to know the scope of the problem without knowing the number of overall posts social media users see each day. And that’s information Meta doesn’t make available to researchers.</p>
<p>The overall number of posts is the denominator to the misinformation numerator in the fraction that tells you how bad the misinformation problem is, explains UMass Amherst’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1lvJXKQAAAAJ&hl=en">Ethan Zuckerman</a>, who studies social and civic media.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The denominator problem is compounded by the distribution problem, which is the need to figure out where misinformation is concentrated. “Simply counting instances of misinformation found on a social media platform <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-has-a-misinformation-problem-and-is-blocking-access-to-data-about-how-much-there-is-and-who-is-affected-164838">leaves two key questions unanswered</a>: How likely are users to encounter misinformation, and are certain users especially likely to be affected by misinformation?” he wrote.</p>
<p>This lack of information isn’t unique to Meta. “No social media platform makes it possible for researchers to accurately calculate how prominent a particular piece of content is across its platform,” Zuckerman wrote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-has-a-misinformation-problem-and-is-blocking-access-to-data-about-how-much-there-is-and-who-is-affected-164838">Facebook has a misinformation problem, and is blocking access to data about how much there is and who is affected</a>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Meta felt the heat in 2021 as whistleblower revelations, congressional ire and demands for data knocked the company back on its heels. Here’s a look at research into the problems Meta poses for society.Eric Smalley, Science + Technology EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692442021-10-06T12:31:19Z2021-10-06T12:31:19ZFacebook’s scandals and outage test users’ frenemy relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/424620/original/file-20211005-21-e6oftv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C7951%2C5261&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How do you feel about Facebook?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/relationship-difficulties-bad-news-royalty-free-image/1292581709">Enes Evren/E+ via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Facebook was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/facebook-instagram-down-thousands-users-downdetectorcom-2021-10-04/">down for most of the day</a> on Oct. 4, 2021, did you miss it, were you relieved or some of both? Social scientists have compiled an <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817695745">expansive body of research</a> that shows how people have come to develop a love-hate relationship with the social media giant with nearly 3 billion users.</p>
<p>Many users have felt their relationship with the platform devolve into a messy codependence, mired by ambiguity and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/trust-facebook-has-dropped-51-percent-cambridge-analytica-scandal-n867011">mistrust</a>. For others, reliance on the platform is taken for granted, if occasionally <a href="https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-social-media-usage">appreciated in moments of pandemic isolation</a>. </p>
<p>And then there are the revelations that the company has been lying about <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353">applying its rules differently to important people</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-has-known-for-a-year-and-a-half-that-instagram-is-bad-for-teens-despite-claiming-otherwise-here-are-the-harms-researchers-have-been-documenting-for-years-168043">knowingly harming teen girls</a> and having a big <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-vaccinated-11631880296">vaccine misinformation problem</a>. Adding insult to injury, Facebook <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/why-facebook-instagram-whatsapp-went-down-outage/">locked its keys in its car</a> and didn’t show up for over five hours. In short, Facebook is a hot mess.</p>
<p>All this leads to an extremely high-maintenance relationship, leaving users to wonder whether they should just move on with healthier friends. But it wasn’t always like this. </p>
<p><iframe id="uM7TJ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uM7TJ/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Friendly beginnings</h2>
<p>At its launch, Facebook was one of the most authentic social networking partners. Existing online networks, like MySpace, had <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/myspace-yes-facebook-kills-our-traffic-but-at-least-we-make-money-nws">influential parent companies</a> that chaperoned their platforms, pestering users with ads and gimmicks. But Facebook promised something different: a genuine connection. It was an unexploited social space to live your best life – well before anyone <a href="https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Hashbrag">hashbragged</a> it. </p>
<p>Still today, a friendship with Facebook comes with plenty of perks. Most importantly, it is the friend who brings everyone together. Participating in this community is shown to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00367.x">strengthen relationships</a> between close friends and casual acquaintances. Individuals can bond over community causes, shared identities and amusing videos. Facebook has been credited for helping organize coalitions that <a href="https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss1/art11/">took down dictators</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/health/the-ice-bucket-challenge-helped-scientists-discover-a-new-gene-tied-to-als.html">raised millions of dollars to fight disease</a>.</p>
<p>Adding to Facebook’s popularity, it lets users carefully curate a public image, <a href="http://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2009.0411">emphasizing the best parts of their lives</a>. The site has become a central source not only for information about one another, but also the world. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/01/12/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-in-2020/">Over half of U.S. Facebook users report regularly consuming news on the platform</a>.</p>
<p>Academics friended Facebook, too. I led a study revealing that it is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817695745">the most researched subject</a> in the field of information and communication technology since 2005. This focus has led to advances in understanding <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2014.09.004">online interactions</a>, <a href="http://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2009.0226">digital activism</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00367.x">human psychology</a>. </p>
<h2>Undermining trust</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255860/original/file-20190128-108370-nl4qrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Facebook vacuums up users’ data.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/orangec-cartoon-vacuums-bits-isolated-on-80203072">Alexander Limbach/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>But Facebook’s stunning success has <a href="http://time.com/5505441/mark-zuckerberg-mentor-facebook-downfall/">come at the expense</a> of the privacy of its virtual friends. Its “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/">we sell ads</a>” business model <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facts-about-facebook-11548374613">may sound benign</a>, but the platform <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-wsj.html">collects more data and information</a> about users than they may consciously <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/17/how-to-find-out-what-facebook-knows-about-me.html">know about themselves</a>. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-cambridge-analyticas-facebook-targeting-model-really-worked-according-to-the-person-who-built-it-94078">sharing users’ data</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-wsj.html">enabling disinformation campaigns</a> and election interference, Facebook has revealed its allegiances – and they don’t involve protecting users. Carelessness, or what increasingly looks like intentional abuse, of user data has made it <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-quit-facebook-but-dont-trust-it-either-93776">difficult to trust the platform</a> with people’s most intimate relationships.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the company continues to change what information people see on its platform, which has consequences. Research finds that users can be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1320040111">emotionally manipulated</a> by changes to Facebook’s algorithm. This has made the public more <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0159641">politically polarized</a> and <a href="http://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016630255">less likely to share minority views</a> – implications that may derail democracy. </p>
<p>Algorithms that foster day-to-day social comparison have also taken a toll on mental health. Recent research convincingly shows that Facebook use <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0069841">dampens individuals’ happiness</a> – both immediately and over the long term. Using Facebook has been linked to depression and so many other negative psychological outcomes that it inspired a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.02.009">summary report</a> of 56 studies on the topic.</p>
<h2>Frenemies for now</h2>
<p>Despite widespread <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/why-deletefacebook-is-one-thing-left-and-right-agree-on-2021-7">calls to #DeleteFacebook</a>, most users have maintained their profiles and found themselves disrupted by its most recent outage. Why? Because abstaining from Facebook means giving up a network that has social currency and value. The site boasted <a href="https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2021/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2020-Results/default.aspx">2.8 billion active users</a> at the end of 2020, more than a third of the global population. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/06/house-antitrust-committee-facebook-monopoly-buys-kills-competitors.html">As members of Congress have pointed out</a>, Facebook has few market competitors, meaning it serves as a primary, if not the only, way for large groups to connect. It holds users together (or sometimes hostage) by maintaining relationships with all their friends. </p>
<p>For those who prefer Instagram or WhatsApp, know that Facebook owns those too, and is working to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/technology/facebook-instagram-whatsapp-messenger.html">consolidate the technology behind them</a>. These platforms also went down yesterday. Even people with the willpower to de-friend Facebook will <a href="https://gizmodo.com/i-cut-facebook-out-of-my-life-surprisingly-i-missed-i-1830565456">still find their data swept up</a> in content that others add to the platform and its affiliates. It’s nearly impossible to escape Facebook’s orbit. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, recapturing the public’s trust will require significant changes. Options for unaltered news feeds, transparent advertising, and user control of data and metadata would be good places to start. But currently, it’s unclear whether Facebook will make these changes to salvage its billions of friendships. </p>
<p>In the meantime, most of Facebook’s friends are <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/americans-are-changing-their-relationship-with-facebook/">updating their privacy settings</a> and just trying to coexist.</p>
<p><em>This is an update of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-facebook-went-from-friend-to-frenemy-110130">article originally published on Jan. 30, 2019</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Stoycheff has received grant funding from WhatsApp, but it has not influenced the information in this article.</span></em></p>Facebook users no longer see the site as a confidant. They’re struggling with how to deal with a messy codependence – and whether to just break up and move on with healthier friends.Elizabeth Stoycheff, Associate Professor of Communication, Wayne State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1627252021-06-21T18:03:06Z2021-06-21T18:03:06ZPrivate messages contribute to the spread of COVID-19 conspiracies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407461/original/file-20210621-35190-1rltdtt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C13%2C4493%2C2775&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Private messaging apps allow information to spread in an unchecked manner.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 global pandemic has been accompanied by misinformation about the virus, its origins and how it spreads. </p>
<p>One in seven Canadians <a href="https://www.cybersecurepolicy.ca/private-messages-public-harms">thinks there is some truth</a> to the claim that <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2020/04/19/bill-gates-is-now-a-target-of-covid-19-coronavirus-conspiracy-theories/">Bill Gates is using the coronavirus to push a vaccine with a microchip capable of tracking people</a>. Those who believe this and other COVID-19 conspiracy theories are <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/july-2020/who-believes-in-covid-19-conspiracies-and-why-it-matters/">much more likely to get their news</a> from social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter. </p>
<p>In extreme cases, conspiracy thinking spurred by online disinformation can result in hate-fuelled violence, as we saw in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/12/us/capitol-mob-timeline.html">the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol</a>, <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quebec-city-mosque-shooting">the Québec City mosque shooting</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/what-is-an-incel-toronto-van-attack-explainer-alek-minassian-1.4633893">the Toronto van attack</a> and <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2020/07/11/accused-in-rideau-hall-gun-incident-has-long-history-of-being-drawn-to-conspiracy-websites.html">the incident in 2020 where an armed man crashed his truck through the gates of Rideau Hall</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-are-dangerous-heres-how-to-stop-them-spreading-136564">Coronavirus conspiracy theories are dangerous – here's how to stop them spreading</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Moderate content</h2>
<p>These and other events have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-01107-z">placed pressure on social media platforms to label, remove and slow the spread of harmful, publicly viewable content</a>. As a result of implemented responses to the spread of misinformation, Donald Trump was <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/trump-deplatforming-distraction-0/">deplatformed during the final weeks of his presidency</a>. </p>
<p>These discussions on content moderation have mainly centred around platforms where content is generally open and accessible to view, comment on and share. But what’s happening in those online spaces that aren’t open for all to see? It’s much harder to say. And perhaps not surprisingly, conspiracy theories are spreading on private messaging apps, like WhatsApp, Telegram, Messenger and WeChat, to spread harm.</p>
<p>By leveraging large groups of users and long chains of forwarded messages, false information <a href="https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Comprova-Full-Report-Final.pdf?x79527">can still go viral</a> on private platforms. </p>
<p>White nationalists and other extremist groups are trying to <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2019/08/telegram-white-nationalists-el-paso-shooting-facebook.html">use messaging apps to organize</a>, and malicious hackers are using private messages <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-phishing-how-to-protect-yourself-from-scam-emails-and-more/">to conduct cybercrime</a>. False stories spreading on messaging apps have also led to real-world violence, as happened <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4333499/india-whatsapp-lynchings-child-kidnappers-fake-news/">in India</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/technology/coronavirus-5g-uk.html">the United Kingdom</a>.</p>
<h2>Trust and private communication</h2>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://www.cybersecurepolicy.ca/private-messages-public-harms">survey of 2,500 Canadian residents in March 2021</a> and found that they’re increasingly using private messaging platforms to get their news. </p>
<p>Overall, 21 per cent said that they rely on private messages for news — up from 11 per cent in 2019. We also found that people who regularly receive their news through messaging apps are more likely to believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories, including the false claim that vaccines include microchips.</p>
<p>There is a level of intimacy in private messaging apps that’s different from news viewed on social media feeds or other platforms, with content shared directly by people we often know and trust. A majority of Canadians reported that they had a similar level of trust in the news they receive on private messaging apps as they do in the news from TV or news websites.</p>
<p>Our research also uncovered a uniquely Canadian phenomenon. As a multicultural society with many newcomers, the Canadian private messaging landscape is remarkably diverse. For example, people who have arrived in Canada in the last 10 years were more than twice as likely to use WhatsApp. Similarly, newcomers from China were five times more likely to use WeChat. </p>
<p>We also found that half of Canadians receive messages that they suspect are false at least a few times per month, and that one in four receive messages with hate speech at least monthly. These rates were <a href="https://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/en/news-a-events/media-releases/item/27349-poll-demonstrates-support-for-strong-social-media-regulations-to-prevent-online-hate-and-racism">higher among people of colour</a>. Because different apps provide different ways of spreading and mitigating harmful content, each requires a tailored strategy. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A graph showing the self-reported frequency of receiving harmful private messages" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406789/original/file-20210616-23-cpqmpe.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A graph showing the self-reported frequency of receiving harmful private messages in a representative survey of Canadian residents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Cybersecure Policy Exchange, Ryerson University)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mitigating harm</h2>
<p>Platforms and governments around the world are grappling with the tension between mitigating online harms and protecting the democratic values of free expression and privacy, particularly among more private modes of communication. This tension is only exacerbated by some platforms’ use of <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/whatsapp-india-traceability-encryption/">privacy-preserving end-to-end encryption that ensures only the sender and receiver can read the messages</a>.</p>
<p>Some messaging apps have been experimenting with how to reduce the spread of harmful materials, including the introduction of limits on group sizes and on the number of times a message can be forwarded. WhatsApp is now testing a feature that <a href="https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/fake-news-new-feature-in-whatsapp-will-allow-google-search-check-authenticity-of-messages/1903625/">nudges users to verify the source of highly forwarded messages by linking to a Google search of the message content</a>. Some experts are also <a href="https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/whatsapp-doesnt-have-to-break-encryption-to-beat-fake-news.php">advancing the idea</a> of adding warning labels to false news shared in messages — a concept that a majority (54 per cent) of Canadians supported when we described the idea.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Infographic showing WhatsApp, WeChat, Signal, Viber, Facebook Messenger and Telegram's use by Canadians" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406797/original/file-20210616-13-183hpkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some examples of private messaging app features that could reduce harms, such as group size or message forwarding limits.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Cybersecure Policy Exchange, Ryerson University)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, there is certainly more that governments can do in this quickly moving area. More transparency is required from messaging platforms about how they’re responding to user reports of harmful material and what approaches they’re using to stall the spread of these messages. Governments can also support digital literacy efforts and invest in research about harms through private messaging in Canada.</p>
<p>As Canadians shift to more private modes of communication, policy needs to keep up to maintain a vibrant and cohesive democracy in Canada while protecting free expression and privacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Andrey received funding from the Government of Canada through the Privy Council Office’s Democratic Institutions Secretariat and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for this research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Rand received funding from the Government of Canada through the Privy Council Office’s Democratic Institutions Secretariat and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for this research.</span></em></p>Canadians are increasingly turning to private messaging apps where COVID-19 misinformation and conspiracy theories spread in an unregulated manner.Sam Andrey, Director of Policy & Research, Ryerson Leadership Lab, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityAlex Rand, Research Assistant on Technology, Cybersecurity & Democracy, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1612122021-06-21T14:50:59Z2021-06-21T14:50:59ZSmartphones and contact-tracing: balancing care and surveillance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405102/original/file-20210608-23-peprbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=264%2C441%2C4965%2C2567&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/senior-woman-using-her-phone-park-1402195619">Shutterstock/Rawpixel.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The astonishing <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/203734/global-smartphone-penetration-per-capita-since-2005/#:%7E:text=Smartphone%20penetration%20worldwide%20as%20share%20of%20global%20population%202016%2D2020&text=Global%20smartphone%20penetration%20rate%20is,global%20population%20of%207.8%20billion.">rise</a> of smartphones in everyday life has created many solutions (GPS maps, internet browsing and messaging, to name just a few). But they have also brought new moral dilemmas. One issue in particular stands out in the wake of the pandemic – the fine line between care and surveillance.</p>
<p>We highlighted this tension in an <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/products/171335">extensive project</a> which examined the use and consequences of smartphones around the world. The study was made up of 11 researchers who each spent 16 months in nine countries. Our research revealed how smartphones have demonstrably increased the human capacity for care. For example, in helping people look after frail and elderly parents. </p>
<p>Smartphones become <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01459740.2018.1532424">especially prominent</a> when those parents live at a distance – or, indeed, in lockdown. <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/products/171335">We found</a> the ability to send frequent messages (what in Japan are called “little bits of nothing”) was perhaps more important than their content. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graphic illustrating the moral dilemmas around smartphone use." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406488/original/file-20210615-3862-absy5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">How moral issues arise from smartphone use.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Miller</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>The project also found that the way social media allows the visual to complement oral and textual forms of conversation has become a significant element in the expression of care. For example, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20594364211008044">we discovered</a> that the use of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-10-billion-japanese-app-bringing-candy-crush-tactics-to-messaging-29354">stickers</a>” (stickers, like emojis, are illustrations that represent emotions or actions) within LINE in Japan and WeChat in China helped to convey both concern and humour more effectively. </p>
<h2>The Big Brother dilemma</h2>
<p>But at the same time, there has been increasing concern over the way smartphones <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-surveillance-capitalism-and-how-does-it-shape-our-economy-119158">facilitate surveillance</a>, both by governments and by corporations – what American social pyschologist <a href="https://shoshanazuboff.com/book/shoshana/">Shoshana Zuboff</a> calls <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/oct/04/shoshana-zuboff-surveillance-capitalism-assault-human-automomy-digital-privacy">“surveillance capitalism”</a>.</p>
<p>In Ireland, <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/collections/anthropology/products/171340">our study</a> focused on surveillance as part of family relations, particularly when the children of frail parents were monitoring their actions. The parents had concerns about their autonomy, dignity and privacy. </p>
<p>Similarly, many parents consider monitoring their children’s smartphones’s as an integral and responsible part of their care. But the children mostly experience this as surveillance. We concluded that at every level, from intimate family relations, right up to the relationship with the state, the ability of smartphones to simultaneously increase both care and surveillance was leading to new moral dilemmas.</p>
<p>The eruption of a global pandemic in 2020 underlined the importance of smartphones as an instrument of care due to the conditions imposed by lockdowns and sheilding. The impossibility of physical contact increased the significance of digital communication, especially for low-income populations. </p>
<p>For example, in Kampala, where <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/products/171335">we found</a> that mobile and smartphones were the only means of contact, if people possessed neither landlines nor computers. As one village elder commented “life’s easier now with phones”, noting how he could inform his family about problems and request their assistance.</p>
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<p>The parallel increase in the capacity for surveillance became equally apparent when it was realised that smartphones could play a crucial role in curbing the spread of the virus through the development of <a href="https://theconversation.com/contact-tracing-apps-apple-dictating-policies-to-nations-wont-help-its-eu-anti-trust-probe-141304">contact-tracing</a> apps. These apps allowed authorities to know about – and then constrain – the movement of people who had been in contact with anyone who tested positive for COVID-19.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/contact-tracing-apps-theres-no-evidence-theyre-helping-stop-covid-19-148397">Contact-tracing apps: there's no evidence they're helping stop COVID-19</a>
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<p>Smartphone apps developed for this purpose have been deployed in many countries across the world. But the response to their development has been mixed. At one end of the spectrum are countries such as South Korea. Here, the technology was primarily perceived as an <a href="https://anthrocovid.com/3-2/contributions-from-south-korea/">instrument of care</a>. The intrusion of the state into people’s private lives was generally accepted as far less important than the potential for saving lives. The government’s adoption of a robust approach involving multiple digital technologies is considered to have been a significant factor in its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/jdmp_00048_1">success</a> in the subsequent election.</p>
<p>By contrast, in many other countries, the deployment of these technologies has led to considerable concern about the way they <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0928-y">extend surveillance</a> and intrusion into personal privacy. There is, for example, evidence that Republican-leaning states in the US were less willing to download such an app as compared to others, because of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2021.106718">political ideology</a> which centred on individual privacy rights in opposition to what was viewed as an intrusive state. </p>
<p>This has had implications for the technology itself. Some of these countries have tended to favour the Apple/Google version, that has more inbuilt privacy protection than, for example, the app originally f<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53095336">avoured by the UK</a> government, which provided more data to the epidemiologists. Each country chose its own path in this balance between <a href="https://www.jmir.org/2021/3/e25726/">privacy and effectiveness</a>.</p>
<p>The evidence shows that the development of a smartphone technology aimed at curbing the spread of a pandemic across the globe by no means ensures a homogeneous response. This is because the technology has exposed this fine line between care and surveillance. </p>
<p>Where one population may prioritise individual privacy, another will be far more concerned with collective welfare. So an understanding of wider cultural values will be crucial to the ongoing deployment of this technology across the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Miller receives funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 740472).</span></em></p>A wider understanding of cultural values will be crucial to the successful implementation of contact-tracing technology across the world.Daniel Miller, Professor of Anthropology, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1607302021-05-13T13:53:53Z2021-05-13T13:53:53ZWhatsApp’s controversial privacy update may be banned in the EU – but the app’s sights are fixed on India<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400544/original/file-20210513-22-kl4znr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The May 15 deadline for users to accept WhatsApp's new privacy policy has also been extended by 'several weeks'. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/december-11-2019-this-photo-illustration-1598694583">rafapress/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The roll out of WhatsApp’s new privacy policy, which critics warn will lead to more data sharing with its parent company Facebook, received a blow on May 13 after German regulators <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2021/05/13/controversial-whatsapp-policy-banned-in-germany-and-the-eu-may-be-next-14573752/">temporarily banned</a> the update. The regulators are now said to be seeking an EU-wide ban by presenting their case to the European Data Protection Board.</p>
<p>WhatsApp users will have noticed a recent intensification of <a href="https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/security-and-privacy/what-happens-when-our-terms-and-privacy-policy-updates-take-effect/?lang=en">pop-ups</a> nudging them to agree to the app’s <a href="https://www.ghacks.net/2021/01/07/whatsapp-makes-data-sharing-with-facebook-mandatory/">new terms of service</a>. The cliff-edge deadline for users to accept these new terms – with WhatsApp announcing that those who failed to do so would <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/whatsapp-app-terms-lose-features-b1845440.html">lose functionality</a> on the app – had been set for Saturday, May 15. That deadline was recently moved forward by “<a href="https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/security-and-privacy/what-happens-when-our-terms-and-privacy-policy-updates-take-effect/?lang=en">several weeks</a>”.</p>
<p>This extension comes after WhatsApp was forced to scrap its initial <a href="https://www.gizbot.com/apps/news/whatsapp-extends-deadline-to-accept-new-terms-of-service-to-may-15-072118.html">February deadline</a> in response to a global backlash against the Facebook subsidiary’s take-it-or-leave-it policy change. Since then, WhatsApp has sought to <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/whatsapp-privacy-policy-explained-7149191/">reassure users</a> that its commitment to end-to-end encryption and user privacy is as strong as ever. </p>
<p>But while the German ban will be a blow to WhatsApp’s ambitions to monetise the app, the messaging platform may ultimately have its sights fixed elsewhere. WhatsApp’s largest market is India, with over <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/26/whatsapp-india-users-400-million/">400 million users</a>. That’s more than three times as many users as the app’s second-largest market, Brazil, which has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-whatsapp-brazil-payments/facebooks-whatsapp-brings-digital-payment-to-users-in-brazil-idUKKBN23M1MS?edition-redirect=uk">120 million users</a>. </p>
<p>That means the messaging app’s privacy changes – built around the introduction of WhatsApp Business – are expected to be particularly lucrative in India, where WhatsApp recently took out <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/whatsapp-respects-your-privacy-full-page-newspaper-ads-amid-row-2351692#:%7E:text=%2522WhatsApp%2520cannot%2520see%2520your%2520private,you%252C%2522%2520the%2520ad%2520said.">front-page adverts</a> in all the country’s daily newspapers in an attempt to placate disgruntled users. WhatsApp’s continuing resolve to pursue changes to its terms, despite widespread opposition, is best understood by looking at the opportunity for growth big tech firms see in India’s blossoming, less-regulated digital economy.</p>
<h2>Explaining WhatsApp’s changes</h2>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/19/facebook-buys-whatsapp-16bn-deal">acquiring WhatsApp</a> for US$19 billion (£13.5 billion) in 2014, Facebook has been exploring how to monetise the app. Determined not to introduce third-party banner ads, the company launched <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/whatsapp-business-2018-1?op=1&r=US&IR=T">WhatsApp Business and Business API</a> in 2018 to facilitate instant chat and payments between users and businesses, with the latter paying WhatsApp for access to the platform’s users. </p>
<p>The new terms and conditions are a crucial step in this move to make money from WhatsApp, because users who agree to them will consent to their information being shared between WhatsApp Business and other Facebook products. <a href="https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/security-and-privacy/what-happens-when-our-terms-and-privacy-policy-updates-take-effect/?lang=en">According to WhatsApp</a>, only those who use WhatsApp Business will be affected by its new terms.</p>
<p>Still, when WhatsApp’s privacy update was first announced, the <a href="https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/SM01of2021_0.pdf">Competition Commission of India</a> called for an <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/competition-commission-of-india-orders-probe-into-whatsapp-s-new-privacy-policy-101616594816949.html">investigation</a>, condemning the update’s compulsory nature. The commission also criticised WhatsApp and Facebook’s abuse of their network effect within the Indian market, which in practice means users have limited choice to change platforms. </p>
<p>A complaint was also filed with the <a href="https://lawbeat.in/sites/default/files/Chaitanya%20Rohilla%20Writ%20Petition%20(1)_watermark.pdf">Delhi High Court</a> confronting the “clear attack on users’ personal data” which “has put a Damocles sword upon its users”, ultimately for Facebook’s gain. The next date for the court hearing is <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/privacy-row-delhi-high-court-seeks-cci-stand-on-facebook-whatsapp-appeals-101620284508421.html">May 21 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Like users in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jan/24/whatsapp-loses-millions-of-users-after-terms-update">the UK and Europe</a>, Indian citizens also protested the changes by downloading alternative messaging platforms, such as Signal and Telegram, in <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/whatsapps-privacy-policy-pushes-users-to-rivals/articleshow/80178485.cms">record-breaking numbers</a>. </p>
<p>But unlike Europeans, who enjoy the protection of EU privacy laws and <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2021/05/13/controversial-whatsapp-policy-banned-in-germany-and-the-eu-may-be-next-14573752/">assertive regulators</a> prepared to ban the update altogether, Indian users are protected by fewer privacy laws. India’s <a href="https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-personal-data-protection-bill-2019">Personal Data Protection Bill</a> has not yet been implemented, leaving WhatsApp with a diminishing window of opportunity to monetise the data of its Indian users. </p>
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<img alt="An Indian man checking his phone in an airport" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400515/original/file-20210513-14-jk61sk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">India’s soaring smartphone connectivity means it’s a tempting market for big tech firms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/matured-indian-male-airport-517186345">wong yu liang/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Privacy in India</h2>
<p>For India’s citizens, protests against WhatsApp’s privacy policy are informed by distrust in big tech and the Indian government. Their discontent is wrapped up in ongoing concerns about the limits of privacy on WhatsApp, and a wider understanding that the government is willing to sacrifice access and privacy for control and security.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/india-farmers-protests-internet-shutdown-highlights-modis-record-of-stifling-digital-dissent-154287">India farmers' protests: internet shutdown highlights Modi's record of stifling digital dissent</a>
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<p>Despite the messaging platform’s “<a href="https://www.brandinginasia.com/whatsapp-launches-its-between-you-campaign-in-india-emphasizing-privacy/">#ItsBetweenYou’</a>” campaign in India, which emphasised WhatsApp’s commitment to privacy, the platform feels less than private when the government targets its critics for <a href="https://www.thequint.com/news/india/government-clients-used-pegasus-spyware-on-people-nso-group-whatsapp-case#read-more">surveillance on the app</a>, when <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/leaks-whatsapp-rumours-add-to-quarantine-blues/articleshow/74854472.cms">private health data</a> is shared on neighbourhood WhatsApp groups during the pandemic and when police routinely <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20201012-how-private-are-your-whatsapp-chats-1727605-2020-10-03">seize smartphones</a> to access their WhatsApp chat histories. </p>
<p>This sense of encroachment on privacy has been further heightened by the Indian government’s expediting of its new <a href="https://time.com/5946092/india-internet-rules-impact/">internet regulations</a>, which will force platforms to hand over user information to law enforcement upon request.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-builds-on-indias-narendra-modi-is-his-government-trying-to-silence-its-critics-159799">As pressure builds on India's Narendra Modi, is his government trying to silence its critics?</a>
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<p>Critics argue that such moves are tantamount to “<a href="https://time.com/5946092/india-internet-rules-impact/">digital authoritarianism</a>” and that, while India’s forthcoming data protection laws may offer greater digital privacy, they may also enable further government misuse of citizens’ data – as we have <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/who-benefits-chinas-cybersecurity-laws">seen in China</a>. </p>
<h2>WhatsApp’s resolve</h2>
<p>Against this backdrop of weak privacy protections, Facebook bought a 9.99% stake in <a href="https://debugger.medium.com/what-is-jio-and-why-are-techs-biggest-players-suddenly-obsessed-with-it-231ea2d407e4">Jio Platforms</a> for US$5.7 billion in April 2020. The telecommunications company, a subsidiary of Reliance Industries, runs the JioMart and JioMoney platforms - strategically important for Facebook’s expansion into India.</p>
<p>Then, in November 2020, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlypage/2020/11/06/whatsapp-payments-goes-live-in-india-after-facebook-gets-nod-of-approval/?sh=49eb5c98b2b2">WhatsApp Payments received government approval</a> after two years of regulatory pushback and protectionism – opening the door for WhatsApp to compete in India’s payments market. </p>
<p>This carefully orchestrated double move not only integrates WhatsApp and <a href="https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/payments/learn-more-about-participating-countries">WhatsApp Payments</a> with India’s increasingly dominant <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/news/ecommerce/2021/reliance-folding-jiomart-into-whatsapp-for-one-stop-shopping/">e-commerce platform JioMart</a> – it also provides Facebook with a valuable ally in India’s wealthiest businessman, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/mukesh-ambani/">Mukesh Ambani</a>.</p>
<p>Ambani previously warned Modi about the threat of “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2841e327-12e7-4e82-95b1-5da63b6a111c">data colonialisation</a>” as foreign tech companies turn to India’s huge market as their next source of growth. Now he appears to have paved the way for US-based Facebook to enjoy the spoils, via WhatsApp Business and its new terms and conditions.</p>
<p>Since WhatsApp is regarded as a “<a href="https://www.qmul.ac.uk/geog/research/research-projects/socialmedia">bare necessity</a>” in everyday life, most of its users will eventually accept the new privacy policy in the absence of regulations to ban it. But as WhatsApp pivots its product from <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/whatsapp-update-encryption-end-end-messages-security-government-privacy-a6970101.html">protecting democratic life</a> through free speech to <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebooks-pivot-is-less-about-privacy-and-more-about-profits-113144">generating profit</a> from its new business platform, the data of Indian citizens is likely the primary target.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philippa Williams has received funding in the past from WhatsApp. WhatsApp does not have editorial oversight of our research or publications. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lipika Kamra has received funding in the past from WhatsApp. WhatsApp does not have editorial oversight of our research or publications.</span></em></p>Accessing India’s digital consumers is seen as the key to future growth for big tech companies like Facebook.Philippa Williams, Reader in Human Geography, Queen Mary University of LondonLipika Kamra, Associate Professor in Politics and Anthropology, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597882021-05-02T08:42:39Z2021-05-02T08:42:39ZRestricting digital media is a gamble for African leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398229/original/file-20210502-23-99qjxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 pushed much of the world into the digital realm for everything from schooling and work to religious worship and dating. At the same time, many governments were turning data connections off. Full or partial shutdowns of the internet and social media are increasingly common parts of the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism">“digital authoritarian”</a> toolkit. </p>
<p>Many leaders seem threatened by the way digital media make it possible to share information and organise. <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/">Research</a> shows that 2020 saw 156 full or partial shutdowns of the internet or social media like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. South Asia accounts for almost three quarters of these shutdowns, with India leading the way. </p>
<p>Africa was the next most affected region, with 20 shutdowns affecting 12 countries. Disruptions lasted from as short as a day or less, in Burundi, Egypt, and Togo, to nearly 90 days in parts of Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/09/ethiopia-communications-shutdown-takes-heavy-toll">Oromia Region</a>. A recent blockage of social media in <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1582696/chad-has-blocked-whatsapp-facebook-twitter-for-a-year/">Chad</a> lasted for more than a year. </p>
<p>And 2021 has already seen shutdowns in <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/niger-election-internet-blackout/">Niger</a>, <a href="https://iafrikan.com/2021/03/08/senegal-social-media-and-internet-shutdown/">Senegal</a> and <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/social-media-and-messaging-platforms-restricted-in-uganda-ahead-of-general-election-XB7aaO87">Uganda</a>.</p>
<p>Governments have given varying justifications for these moves. These include: combating hate speech and fake news in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/4/chad-slows-down-internet-to-curb-hate-speech-on-social-media">Chad</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/africas-online-hate-speech-laws-sound-alarm-over-press-freedom/a-52488748">Ethiopia</a>, suppressing violence in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/13/end-mass-protests-sudan-has-cut-off-internet-access-nationwide-heres-why/">Sudan</a>, and preventing exam cheating in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/world/africa/algeria-exams-cheating-internet.html">Algeria</a> and <a href="https://smex.org/noexamshutdown-4-mena-countries-shut-down-the-internet-so-far-to-fight-cheating/">Sudan</a>. Disruptions in <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/social-media-restricted-in-mali-amid-protests-against-president-QyKpdX8D">Mali</a> in 2020 coincided with anti-government protests, while shutdowns were timed around elections in <a href="https://cpj.org/2020/05/burundi-blocks-social-media-access-during-presiden/">Burundi</a>, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/une-promesse-non-tenue-de-keepiton-la-guinee-coupe-lacces-a-internet-et-bloque-les-medias-sociaux-le-jour-du-referendum/">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/tanzania-votes-government-forces-telcos-escalate-censorship/">Tanzania</a>, and <a href="https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1220118227126312960?s=20">Togo</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shutting-down-the-internet-doesnt-work-but-governments-keep-doing-it-111642">Shutting down the internet doesn't work -- but governments keep doing it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In some cases, official reasoning has shifted over time. When Uganda shut down digital media surrounding its January 2021 elections, foreign affairs minister Sam Kutesa initially <a href="https://pctechmag.com/2021/01/facebook-and-twitter-shut-down-to-ensure-equity/">said</a> the move was retaliation for Facebook’s and Twitter’s actions against government accounts. Investigations had alleged the government was behind <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/social-media-disinformation-campaign-targets-ugandan-presidential-election-b259dbbb1aa8">“coordinated inauthentic behaviour”</a> using fake accounts to spread disinformation and intimidate the opposition. After the election, however, Kutesa <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/internet-shutdown-prevented-violence-minister-kutesa/">said</a> the move was “a necessary step to stop the vitriolic language and incitement to violence.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-election-museveni-social-media-ban-caps-violent-campaign-153338">Uganda election: Museveni social media ban caps violent campaign</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Views on digital media limits</h2>
<p>Online commentary usually harshly criticises these shutdowns. But these posts aren’t necessarily representative of general public opinion in affected countries. </p>
<p>To get a sense of broader opinion on these issues, we <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ad410-promise_and_peril-africas_changing_media_landscape-afrobarometer_dispatch-1dec20.pdf">analysed</a> data from Afrobarometer. This is an independent African research network that conducted nationally representative surveys in 18 countries in 2019/20. About 27,000 Africans participated in these surveys. </p>
<p>A larger share of respondents supported access to digital media. When given a choice between two statements, 48% agreed that “unrestricted access to the internet and social media helps people to be more informed and active citizens, and should be protected”. Only 36% agreed that “information shared on the internet and social media is dividing (our country), so access should be regulated by the government”. </p>
<p>Majorities in 10 countries supported unrestricted access. Support was highest in Cabo Verde (64%), Gabon (63%), Côte d’Ivoire (63%) and Nigeria (61%). Majorities supported regulation in only three countries: Mali (53%), Ethiopia (53%) and Tunisia (59%). </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-internet-shutdowns-have-affected-the-lives-of-millions-of-ethiopians-134054">How internet shutdowns have affected the lives of millions of Ethiopians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Guarding freedoms</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, regular users of digital media were more supportive of freedoms. Of the 37% of respondents who reported using some form of digital media for their news at least a few times a week, 62% favoured unrestricted access. Only 35% favoured regulations. </p>
<p>Over half (54%) of respondents reported never using digital media for news in the last month. Those non-users were more divided, with 37% favouring regulations and 39% favouring unrestricted access. A quarter (24%) of non-users did not share an opinion or could not choose between the positions.</p>
<p>Factors like age, residence and education also made a difference. The groups more likely to use digital media were also more supportive of unrestricted access. The youngest respondents (18-25) were almost twice as likely to oppose restrictions than the oldest respondents (over 60) were (56% vs 30%). Urban residents favoured unrestricted access more than rural residents (56% vs 43%). And those with post-secondary education were much more favourable towards unrestricted access than those without formal education (60% vs 34%). Men were only slightly more supportive of unrestricted digital media than women (50% vs. 47%).</p>
<p>Perhaps surprisingly, support for unrestricted digital media does not fall neatly along political lines. Even among those who said they trusted their president “somewhat” or “a lot”, 45% still supported unrestricted digital media, versus 39% who favoured restrictions. Those who said they only trusted their national leader “a little” or “not at all” were even more supportive of open digital media: 53% supported unrestricted access and 34% supported regulations.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-are-concerned-about-ills-of-social-media-but-oppose-government-restrictions-137653">Africans are concerned about ills of social media but oppose government restrictions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Cost of shutdowns</h2>
<p>Restricting digital media is a gamble for African leaders. On the one hand, many governments are embracing digital media shutdowns, particularly around elections and protests, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1595781241">limit threats</a>. They argue such moves are necessary to halt “the dissemination of messages inciting hate and division”, as a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/4/chad-slows-down-internet-to-curb-hate-speech-on-social-media">Chadian government spokesperson</a> put it. In some cases, like Ethiopia and Mali, populations seem generally supportive of governments’ restrictions. </p>
<p>But commerce, education and social communication are increasingly online. <a href="https://techpoint.africa/2021/02/26/sub-saharan-africa-internet-shutdown-loses/">One analysis</a> found that digital media restrictions cost African economies some $237 million in 2020. And using Afrobarometer data from 16 countries, we find that the share of Africans who regularly get news from digital media almost doubled, from 22% to 38%, between 2014 and 2019.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868">Internet shutdowns in Africa threaten democracy and development</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>If African populations are sceptical now of limits on digital media, that opposition might grow as more enter the digital space for commerce, work, education, entertainment and social communications. Shutdowns will generate not only higher economic costs, but likely greater public outrage as well.</p>
<p><em>Joseph Koné, a research associate and finance officer at Centre de Recherche et de Formation sur le Développement Intégré (CREFDI), the Afrobarometer National Partner in Ivory Coast, was co-author of the research on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Digital media shutdowns in Africa will lead to higher economic costs and greater public outrage.Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1558442021-03-15T18:45:22Z2021-03-15T18:45:22ZPlanned social media regulations set a dangerous precedent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389132/original/file-20210311-15-1v49uyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=65%2C58%2C2324%2C1058&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Canada is poised to pass laws aimed at social media companies and harmful online content. Is it the right approach?
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photos)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the federal government prepares <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-federal-officials-revising-plan-to-regulate-social-media-in-light-of/">to introduce legislation to regulate content on social media</a>, Canadians have reason to be concerned about the effectiveness of its approach and the poor example we are about to set for countries that don’t share our commitment to human rights.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Heritage Minister Steven Guilbeault speaks with a row of Canadian flags behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389127/original/file-20210311-13-bvukfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Heritage Minister Steven Guilbeault holds a news conference in Ottawa in November 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Heritage Minister Steven Guilbeault <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-federal-officials-revising-plan-to-regulate-social-media-in-light-of/">has hinted in recent weeks that Canada’s forthcoming legislation will be modelled after Germany’s NetzDG law</a>. The law allows for social media companies to be fined up to 50 million euros for failing to remove <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40444354">what the legislation calls “obviously illegal” content</a> from their sites within 24 hours of being notified.</p>
<p>The details of the government’s approach remain unknown since no meaningful public consultations were held about the development or drafting of this legislation. What we do know about the upcoming bill should concern all Canadians for at least two reasons.</p>
<h2>‘Lawful but awful’</h2>
<p>The first is that it won’t be effective in dealing with the bulk of the harmful content we find on the internet today. </p>
<p>Social media companies are not perfect at removing content that violates Canadian law, such as child sexual exploitation material or terrorist propaganda, but they’ve improved considerably in recent years. Where they struggle, however, is in dealing with “<a href="https://www.marketplace.org/2020/09/28/internet-lability-law-section-230-social-media-twitter-facebook-congress-trump/">lawful but awful</a>” content that is legal under the laws of most democracies, including Canada’s, but is known to create real-world harm.</p>
<p>Consider the vast amounts of pandemic-related misinformation on YouTube and Facebook, or the casually racist or misogynistic memes that populate many Instagram feeds. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/stop-outsourcing-the-regulation-of-hate-speech-to-social-media-114276">Stop outsourcing the regulation of hate speech to social media</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The broad protections that Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide for the right to free expression makes it difficult for governments to ban such content outright, or to even restrict the expression of such harmful and distasteful ideas in public spaces. Correspondingly, a new law that seeks to penalize technology companies for failing to promptly remove illegal material will only scratch the surface of the problems with harmful content online.</p>
<p>More troubling, however, is the example that the forthcoming legislation will set for countries that don’t share our respect for human rights. </p>
<p>Authoritarian governments around the world are adopting social media laws that are similar to the one set to be unveiled here in Canada. Those laws impose draconian penalties on social media companies that fail to take down content that is illegal under national laws. </p>
<p>The problem, however, is that the laws in many authoritarian countries criminalize forms of expression that are protected under international human rights law, from voices dissenting against the regime in power to the cultural and religious expression of minority communities.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/pakistan-unlawful-online-content-rules/">Pakistan provides a stark example</a> of this trend. Last year, the country enacted a law strikingly similar to what Ottawa is considering, but in the context of a legal system where <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-blasphemy-idUSKBN25Z29L">blasphemy can be punished by death</a> and where it’s a crime to violate “religious, cultural or ethnic sensibilities.” </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Polish President Andrzej Duda speaks during a news briefing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389129/original/file-20210311-23-1kkb1yl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Polish President Andrzej Duda speaks during a news briefing while on a visit to Ukraine in October 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Valentyn Ogirenko/Pool via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Poland, the increasingly authoritarian government of Andrzej Duda also introduced <a href="https://richard-wingfield.medium.com/poland-draft-law-on-the-protection-of-freedom-of-speech-on-online-social-networking-sites-ce8815d3f85c">similar legislation in parliament last month</a>, while Victor Orban’s administration in Hungary <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-media-regulations-idUSKBN29N1BV">is also reported to be considering legislating a similar measure</a>.</p>
<h2>Internet at risk</h2>
<p>Canadians should be concerned about the enactment of such laws in faraway places not only because we value human rights, but because this type of legislation puts the future of a global internet at risk. </p>
<p>As governments seek to regulate the online sphere according to their own peculiar national laws — regardless of whether those laws comply with international human rights standards — there is a risk that the internet will splinter into a series of national networks. That has profound implications for all of us.</p>
<p>Against this bleak international backdrop, Canada needs to think carefully about our approach to regulating online harm. Rather than going it alone by seeking to enforce laws aimed at social media companies, Canada should work with other rights-respecting democracies to develop a multilateral approach to addressing harmful online content. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bouquets of flowers piled up at a memorial" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389130/original/file-20210311-23-n0ks7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this March 2019 photo, flowers lie at a memorial near a mosque for victims in the mass shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand. The killer had posted a 74-page manifesto online before gunning down 50 Muslims at two mosques.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vincent Yu)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is precisely what was done to deal with terrorist and violent extremist content online following the 2019 Christchurch massacre, when a coalition of governments led by New Zealand and France worked with industry and civil society stakeholders to devise the <a href="https://www.christchurchcall.com">Christchurch Call to Action</a>.</p>
<p>A multilateral approach grounded in the shared language of human rights can help keep the internet free and open while moderating its worst excesses. It will also deny authoritarians around the world of the argument that what’s good for Canada is good for them too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vivek Krishnamurthy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada needs to think carefully about our approach to regulating online harm. Rather than going it alone and taking aim at social media companies, Canada should work with other democracies.Vivek Krishnamurthy, Samuelson-Glushko Professor of Law and Director of CIPPIC, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1521902021-02-08T19:07:01Z2021-02-08T19:07:01ZWe allowed Facebook to grow big by worrying about the wrong thing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382689/original/file-20210205-16-a1t566.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=207%2C330%2C2368%2C1170&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AlexandraPopova/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia and the United States have been waving through takeovers because the targets are small, something that’s usually good practice.</p>
<p>Under <a href="https://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/legislation/provisions/2010cca50.html">Australian</a> law takeovers are normally permitted unless they would </p>
<blockquote>
<p>have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Under <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/merge">US</a> law they are normally permitted unless their effect </p>
<blockquote>
<p>may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It means the key question authorities in both countries ask before approving a takeover is whether it is big enough to take out a substantial competitor.</p>
<p>While in most industries that’s usually the right question, it’s the wrong question when it comes to digital platforms, as Facebook’s readily-approved takeovers of Instagram and WhatsApp is making clear.</p>
<h2>Instagram, WhatsApp ‘too small to matter’</h2>
<p>They were waved through because when Facebook acquired <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2012/04/09/technology/facebook_acquires_instagram/index.htm">Instagram in 2012</a> and <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2014/02/facebook-to-acquire-whatsapp/">WhatsApp in 2014</a> each was small. Instagram reportedly had only <a href="https://time.com/4299297/instagram-facebook-revenue/">13</a> full-time employees, WhatsApp <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-bought-for-19-billion-what-do-its-employees-get-23496">55</a>.</p>
<p>Now, well after the events, the US Federal Trade Commission in cooperation with the attorneys of 46 states is <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization">suing Facebook</a>, alleging it has been illegally maintaining its social networking monopoly through a years-long course of anticompetitive conduct.</p>
<p>Identified as part of Facebook’s strategy are its 2012 acquisition of Instagram and its 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp. The Commission says the conduct </p>
<blockquote>
<p>harms competition, leaves consumers with few choices for personal social networking and deprives advertisers of the benefits of competition</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is seeking a permanent injunction that could, among other things, require Facebook to divest assets including Instagram and WhatsApp and require it to give notice and seek prior approval for future acquisitions.</p>
<h2>No longer as small</h2>
<p>Why didn’t the Commission act earlier?</p>
<p>It’s because at the times of the acquisitions it was impossible for it to know whether Instagram or WhatsApp would ever have been in any position to offer Facebook much competition.</p>
<p>A 2019 <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_7985.html">independent review</a> of merger decisions by the UK Office of Fair Trade confirms this, noting that back in 2012 Facebook faced much stronger competitors in photo-sharing than Instagram and that photo apps weren’t attractive to advertisers.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-is-merging-messenger-and-instagram-chat-features-its-for-zuckerbergs-benefit-not-yours-147261">Facebook is merging Messenger and Instagram chat features. It's for Zuckerberg's benefit, not yours</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The authorities would have found it hard to convince a court that taking over Instagram would have substantially lessened competition.</p>
<p>Yet it did, hugely, and not because Instagram was necessarily the best target.</p>
<h2>Network effects empower the acquired</h2>
<p>Platforms such as Facebook and Google gain their market power from so-called “network effects” and the accumulation of consumer data. </p>
<p>A network effect is the benefit a network gets from having people already on it. A network that your friends aren’t on isn’t particularly attractive.</p>
<p>And the more people that join, the more data the network amasses to target ads for advertisers.</p>
<p>Looked at through the lens of network effects, the key to the successes of Instagram and WhatsApp was that they were bought by Facebook. It gave them access to a vast network of existing users and their data.</p>
<p>The importance of this is illustrated by the WhatsApp takeover. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1217&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1217&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382700/original/file-20210205-24-rupp11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1217&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">WhatsApp wasn’t to link data with Facebook.</span>
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<p>In Europe the authorities allowed the takeover only after Facebook informed them that it would be “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1369">unable to establish reliable automated matching between Facebook users’ accounts and WhatsApp users’ accounts</a>”. </p>
<p>Unfortunately this statement was incorrect, and the European Commission believes Facebook knew it at the time.</p>
<p>In 2017 after the WhatsApp and Facebook data was indeed linked, the Commission fined Facebook <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1369">€110 million</a> for providing incorrect or misleading information</p>
<p>The problem wasn’t that Facebook acquired WhatsApp in particular. </p>
<p>It was that once it had acquired it (or any such platform), it was able to ensure it had access to the network and data needed to dominate its part of the market.</p>
<p>In other words, a Facebook acquisition of any proven start-up in any related field would have been likely to substantially lessen competition and should have been illegal.</p>
<h2>Courts and regulators are missing what matters</h2>
<p>This truth requires a change of mindset by both competition authorities and the courts. Both deal with the specifics of the target rather than the potential for the acquirer to supercharge the target and prevent any rival emerging to challenge it.</p>
<p>It means that to protect competition, dominant digital platforms should be prevented from acquiring any business in certain markets, even if there is plenty of competition in those markets and there’s nothing special about the targets.</p>
<p>Put bluntly, in some markets, whoever Facebook acquires will smother competition and the only way to stop that happening is to stop Facebook acquiring anyone.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-is-tilting-the-political-playing-field-more-than-ever-and-its-no-accident-148314">Facebook is tilting the political playing field more than ever, and it's no accident</a>
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<p>This needn’t mean a blanket ban on dominant platforms acquiring firms, but it will mean the range of firms they can acquire will be severely wound back.</p>
<p>Of course, there’s nothing to stop them developing their own platforms in adjacent areas, although history has shown that even dominant platforms have a hard time developing, rather than buying, the necessary technology. </p>
<p>Google had to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Alphabet">buy</a> Android, YouTube and Quickoffice.</p>
<h2>Proposed changes the wrong ones</h2>
<p>It also means Australia’s Competition and Consumer Commission is missing the mark in its drive to expand the reasons it can use for rejecting mergers.</p>
<p>The final report of its <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report%20-executive%20summary.pdf">digital platforms inquiry</a> asks for the power to reject mergers because of the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal of a potential competitor and the nature and significance of assets acquired. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=184&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=184&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=184&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=231&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=231&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382698/original/file-20210205-24-gg9lrx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=231&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>The requests focus on the target rather than what the acquirer can do for it.</p>
<p>What needs to be made clear is that a merger can be anticompetitive even if the target is not uniquely placed, either in terms of its ability to grow or its assets. </p>
<p>In the digital world an acquirer can substantially lessen competition simply by transforming the market it buys into. The target needn’t be the point.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152190/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen King is a Commissioner with the Productivity Commission. The views expressed in this article are his alone and should not be attributed to the Commission.</span></em></p>What made Facebook grow big wasn’t what its targets would have been without it, it was what they were able to do with it.Stephen King, Adjunct professor, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464682021-01-25T21:59:02Z2021-01-25T21:59:02ZIn refugee camps, access to internet supports research during the coronavirus pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379858/original/file-20210121-17-9wmrnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C6221%2C4147&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In refugee camps, access to the internet means being able to connect to family, information and resources.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the world is in an unexpected moment of global uncertainty and change. Countries, cities and communities worldwide are moving through rotating economic lockdowns and stay-at-home orders. At this time, the divides and potential benefits of digital technology are ever more apparent.</p>
<p>Qualitative research that involves working directly with remote communities is always difficult to undertake, and even more so right now. Digital research tools like mobile phones and tablets, which are wireless and connected to the internet, make it possible. </p>
<p>Using mobile phones, our team is working with community-based researchers in the Dzaleka Refugee Camp in Malawi to explore how refugees in Dzaleka use, teach and learn technology.</p>
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<p>Remote data collection methods were built into our research design prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. We wanted to minimize the impact of international research partnerships on local communities, including the challenges related to research travel into camps. </p>
<p>The presence of outsider researchers can be costly and add to the workload of community partners. There are also health and safety concerns for everyone involved when conducting research in areas of conflict and crisis. In these ways, our project was designed to focus on digital data collection before the pandemic made physical travel difficult.</p>
<h2>Gathering data</h2>
<p>Technologies including <a href="https://profuturo.education/en/noticias/educacion-en-emergencias-nuestro-modelo-de-refugiados/">initiatives that distribute iPads to those who need them</a>, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/malawi/unhcr-launches-yetu-community-radio-dzaleka-refugee-camp">community radio programs</a>, <a href="https://nextbillion.net/refugees-entrepreneur-clean-energy-vulnerable-communities/">solar power systems</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64697-4_5">e-commerce</a> are increasingly prevalent in Dzaleka, as they are in many camps. Humanitarian aid organizations, private sector philanthropic groups and governments are all looking for technology solutions to support refugees. </p>
<p>There is a gap in research related to how people teach and learn with available technology in refugee camps, particularly from a community-based perspective. Our project explores how refugee communities teach, learn, troubleshoot, problem solve, adopt and adapt available technologies in ways that support their lives and aspirations.</p>
<p>Community researchers are compiling audio recorded field notes, making illustrations, taking pictures and videos and capturing sound recordings of individuals and the environment using technology in the camp. All of this data, along with audio recorded interviews, will be used to create <a href="https://www.learninglandscapes.ca/index.php/learnland/article/view/Commentary-Portraiture-Methodology-Blending-Art-and-Science/760">descriptive multimedia portraits</a>. These portraits will show how people in Dzaleka use technology.</p>
<p>Using video conferencing tools like Zoom, we are building relationships with our community researcher colleagues. We are exchanging data and information using instant messenger chat groups and sharing files using cloud services. We are establishing a shared agreement in testing remote data collection systems to support community-engaged, collaborative work.</p>
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<h2>Technology in refugee camps</h2>
<p>According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are currently <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html">26 million refugees</a> worldwide. <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/camps/">Ten per cent</a> of these individuals live in formal camps managed by the UNHCR. The UNHCR supports efforts to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/connectivity-for-refugees/">keep refugee communities connected</a> to the internet. </p>
<p>Camps are often geographically and socially isolated places. They typically lack material and technological infrastructure. And yet different types of technology continue to infiltrate their borders. This reality makes technology education and understanding local teaching and learning practices important work. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/pandemic-border/covid-19-can-technology-become-tool-oppression-and-surveillance/">Technology in forced migration</a> is widespread. This includes the collection of biometric data such as <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2016/05/18/eye-spy-biometric-aid-system-trials-jordan">retinal eye scanners</a> to buy groceries in camps and <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/02/05/un-palantir-deal-data-mining-protection-concerns-wfp">big data analytics</a> related to food security. Technology enters refugee camps as health initiatives, legal processes related to migration and <a href="https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/DMM/IBM/updated/05technology_in_support_of_fr_info_sheet.pdf">family reunification</a>, <a href="https://inee.org/resources/landscape-review-education-conflict-and-crisis-how-can-technology-make-difference">education</a>, communication and <a href="https://www.refugeesrespond.org/dadaabwikimedia/index.php?title=Game_Culture_Analysis">leisure</a>. </p>
<p>In refugee camps, <a href="https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Importance-of-mobile-for-refugees_a-landscape-of-new-services-and-approaches.pdf">mobile phones are the prevalent technology</a> in the hands of community members. <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/5770d43c4.pdf">Phones connect people</a> in the camps with each other, with family and friends globally, and to important information online and through social networks. </p>
<h2>Research in fragile settings</h2>
<p>Understanding how local communities build and share knowledge about how to use tools, ranging from computers to apps on mobile phones and radios, is important for community self-reliance. Strengthening technology access and education through research can establish more consistent and autonomous <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2016.1259877">pathways to information</a> for people living in refugee camps. </p>
<p>Our research will contribute to better decision-making about technology and education in camps. The study will inform what types of technology are relevant for community use. Study outcomes will also be used to show what types of local curriculum design and pedagogy can support the successful deployment of those tools. </p>
<p>Research findings from this study will also be used to refine collaborative digital data collection methods in camps. It is our goal to create meaningful contributions to the practice of digital and remote research. And we are working towards positive social change for, by and with community members as partners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Arvisais has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture and Public Safety Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cansu Ekmekcioglu, Laurie Decarpentrie, and Negin Dahya do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>During the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, research in places like refugee camps can continue through mobile devices connected to the internet.Negin Dahya, Assistant Professor, Communication, Culture, Information and Technology, University of TorontoCansu Ekmekcioglu, PhD Student, Information Science, University of TorontoLaurie Decarpentrie, Doctorante, Département de psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Olivier Arvisais, Professeur, Département de didactique, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1472612020-10-01T20:05:45Z2020-10-01T20:05:45ZFacebook is merging Messenger and Instagram chat features. It’s for Zuckerberg’s benefit, not yours<p>Facebook Messenger and Instagram’s direct messaging services will be integrated into one system, Facebook has <a href="https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/say-hi-to-messenger-introducing-new-messaging-features-for-instagram">announced</a>. </p>
<p>The merge will allow shared messaging across both platforms, as well as video calls and the use of a range of tools drawn from both platforms. It’s currently being rolled out across countries on an opt-in basis, but hasn’t yet reached Australia.</p>
<p>Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/">announced</a> plans in March last year to integrate Messenger, Instagram Direct and WhatsApp into a unified messaging experience. </p>
<p>At the crux of this was the goal to administer end-to-end encryption across the whole messaging “ecosystem”. </p>
<p>Ostensibly, this was part of Facebook’s renewed focus on privacy, in the wake of several highly publicised scandals. Most notable was its poor data protection that allowed political consulting firm <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election">Cambridge Analytica</a> to steal data from 87 million Facebook accounts and use it to target users with political ads ahead of the 2016 US presidential election.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/new-messaging-features-for-instagram/">statement</a> released yesterday on the new merge, Instagram CEO Adam Mosseri and Messenger vice president Stan Chudnovsky wrote:</p>
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<p>… one out of three people sometimes find it difficult to remember where to find a certain conversation thread. With this update, it will be even easier to stay connected without thinking about which app to use to reach your friends and family.</p>
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<p>While that may seem harmless, it’s likely Facebook is actually attempting to make its apps inseparable, ahead of a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-15/ftc-said-to-prepare-possible-antitrust-lawsuit-against-facebook">potential anti-trust lawsuit</a> in the US that may try to see the company sell Instagram and WhatsApp. </p>
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<h2>Together, with Facebook, 24/7</h2>
<p>The Messenger/Instagram Direct merge will <a href="https://mashable.com/article/facebook-messenger-instagram/">extend to</a> features rolled out during the pandemic, such as the “<a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/introducing-watch-together-on-messenger/">Watch Together</a>” tool for Messenger. As the name suggests, this lets users watch videos together in real time. Now, both Messenger and Instagram users will be able to use it, regardless of which app they’re on.</p>
<p>With the integration, new privacy challenges emerge. Facebook has <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/privacy-matters-cross-app-communication/">already acknowledged</a> this. And these challenges will present despite Facebook’s overarching privacy policy applying to every app in its app “family”. </p>
<p>For example, in the new merged messaging ecosystem, a user you previously blocked on Messenger won’t automatically be blocked on Instagram. Thus, the blocked person will be able to <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/privacy-matters-cross-app-communication/">once again contact you</a>. This could open doors to a plethora of unexpected online abuse.</p>
<h2>Why this is good for Mark Zuckerberg</h2>
<p>This first step – and Facebook’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/">full roadmap</a> for the encrypted integration of WhatsApp, Instagram Direct and Messenger – has three clear outcomes.</p>
<p>Firstly, end-to-end encryption means Facebook will have <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1207081/download">complete deniability</a> for anything that travels across its messaging tools. </p>
<p>It won’t be able to “see” the messages. While this might be good from a user privacy perspective, it also means anything from bullying, to <a href="https://milwaukeenns.org/2014/05/21/special-report-diploma-mill-scams-continue-to-plague-milwaukees-adult-students/">scams</a>, to illegal drug sales, to <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-ednc/pr/jacksonville-man-sentenced-child-pornography-case">paedophilia</a> can’t be policed if it happens via these tools. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebooks-push-for-end-to-end-encryption-is-good-news-for-user-privacy-as-well-as-terrorists-and-paedophiles-128782">Facebook's push for end-to-end encryption is good news for user privacy, as well as terrorists and paedophiles</a>
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<p>This would stop Facebook being blamed for hurtful or illegal uses of its services. As far as moderating the platform goes, Facebook would effectively become “invisible” (not to mention moderation is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2056305120948186">expensive and complicated</a>). </p>
<p>This is all great news for Mark Zuckerberg, especially as Facebook stares down the barrel of <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/29/21335706/antitrust-hearing-highlights-facebook-google-amazon-apple-congress-testimony">potential anti-trust litigation</a>.</p>
<p>Secondly, once the apps are merged, functionally they will no longer be separate platforms. They will still <em>exist</em> as separate apps with some separate features, but the vast amount of personal data underpinning them will live in one giant, shared database. </p>
<p>Deeper data integration will let Facebook know users more intimately. Moreover, it will be able to leverage this new insight to target users with more advertising and expand further.</p>
<p>Finally, and perhaps most concerning, is that by integrating its apps Facebook could legitimately respond to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-preparing-possible-antitrust-suit-against-facebook-11600211840">anti-trust lawsuits</a> by saying it can’t separate Instagram or WhatsApp from the main Facebook platform – because they’re the same thing now. </p>
<p>And if they can’t be separated, there’s no way Facebook could sell Instagram or WhatsApp, even if it wanted to. </p>
<h2>100 billion messages a day</h2>
<p>The messaging traffic across Facebook’s platforms <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/new-messaging-features-for-instagram/">is vast</a>, with more than 100 billion messages sent daily. And this has <a href="https://www.warc.com/newsandopinion/news/pandemic-lifts-social-media-use-but-for-how-long/43552">only</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html">increased</a> during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>With the sheer size of its user database, Facebook continues to either purchase, or squash, its competition. Concerns about the company being a monopoly aren’t without merit. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/4/17816572/tim-wu-facebook-regulation-interview-curse-of-bigness-antitrust">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/9/18538106/facebook-co-founder-chris-hughes-breakup-regulation-ftc-us-government">founding Facebook employees</a> have called to have the company split up – and for Instagram and Whatsapp to become separate again.</p>
<p>Just a few months ago, Facebook released its Instagram-housed tool <a href="https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/introducing-instagram-reels-announcement">Reels</a> which bears a striking resemblance to TikTok, another social app sweeping the globe. </p>
<p>It seems this is just another example of Facebook trying to use the sheer size of its network to stifle growing competition, aided (perhaps unwittingly) by Donald Trump’s anti-China sentiment.</p>
<p>If competition is important to encouraging innovation and diversity, then the newest development from Facebook discourages both these things. It further entrenches Facebook and its services into the lives of consumers, making it harder to pull away. And this certainly isn’t far from monopolistic behaviour.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-tiktok-deal-explained-who-is-oracle-why-walmart-and-what-does-it-mean-for-our-data-146566">Trump's TikTok deal explained: who is Oracle? Why Walmart? And what does it mean for our data?</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tama Leaver receives funding from Australian Research Council (ARC); he is currently a Chief Investigator in the ARC Centre of Excellence for the Digital Child.</span></em></p>Having an end-to-end encrypted messaging ‘ecosystem’ is a great way for Facebook to evade the full wrath of the law. It has come at a convenient time, too.Tama Leaver, Associate Professor in Internet Studies, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.