tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/yemen-6632/articlesYemen – The Conversation2024-03-04T13:37:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
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<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215202024-02-07T17:35:23Z2024-02-07T17:35:23ZHow Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy<p>It took the US several days <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">to respond</a> to the January 28 attack on its military base in Jordan that killed three of its service personnel. But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.</p>
<p>The US strikes were carefully calibrated to avoid <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/austin-vows-all-necessary-actions-after-us-troop-deaths-2024-01-29/">escalation</a>. The five days between the attack on the Tower 22 US base in Jordan and the US airstrikes on February 2 gave Iran and its proxies time to move people and high-value assets. </p>
<p>This retaliation wasn’t about body counts, it was about US president Joe Biden showing Iran – and the American electorate – that it doesn’t do to mess with the US. It was a classic shot across the bows.</p>
<p>But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphic showing Middle East and the varioujs armed groups operating there on behalf of Iran" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s network of armed groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Council for Foreign Relations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s foreign policy over nearly five decades since the 1979 revolution has had <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321#">several key objectives</a>. It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security. </p>
<p>It has worked to boost the fortunes of Shia groups in the region, working directly against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni proxies, as seen in the conflict in Yemen. And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.</p>
<h2>Quds Force</h2>
<p>The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs. According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. </p>
<p>Quds was led by General Qasem Soleimani, who had oversight of Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria as well as wielding a significant amount of influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on January 3 2020. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by his longtime deputy <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-new-quds-force-leader-has-a-long-history-with-afghanistan/30379354.html">Ismail Qaani</a>, who had gained extensive experience in organising and supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>In 2021, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">estimated that</a> the IRGC had established 82 fighting units in Syria with up to 70,000 fighters. Many of these have been recruited since 2011 to help the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad combat insurgents there.</p>
<p>Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">Khalil Zahedi</a>, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi. Working through regional subordinates, he controls a number of armed groups, including Liwa al-Quds, Lebanese Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Baqir and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.</p>
<p>Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria. It also aims to create the conditions for a possible encirclement of Israel by occupying strategic position around the Golan heights.</p>
<h2>Iraq</h2>
<p>In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">umbrella organisation</a> called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or <em>Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī</em>. The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia. The PMF was founded in 2014 when Iraq’s Shia religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf">issued a fatwa</a> calling on Iraqis to defend their country after the Iraqi army collapsed and Islamic State took the northern province of Mosul. </p>
<p>In 2018 the PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces as an auxiliary force. As a result its wages are paid by the Iraqi military, but the Iranian government lacks proper command and control over the PMF. The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll. It also performed well in Iraq’s 2023 regional elections and is now believed to wield considerable control in both the Iraqi parliament and the country’s supreme court. </p>
<p>Its military forces are now believed to be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/">active in Kurdistan</a> as part of an overall strategy to force the US to withdraw from the region.</p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>North of Israel’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah has been conducting military operations against Israel for many years and since October 7 clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israel Defence Forces have become <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2024">almost daily occurences</a>.</p>
<p>Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was trained and equipped by Iran, which continues to provide practically all of its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies">financial and military resources</a>. In its <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">1985 manifesto</a>, it vowed to expel western powers from Lebanon, called for the destruction of Israel state and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader.</p>
<p>In 2021 Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that the organisation has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000 trained fighters</a>, but estimates as to its actual strength vary considerably.</p>
<p>While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">doing Iran’s business</a> rather than looking after Lebanese interests.</p>
<h2>Major headache for the west</h2>
<p>As can be seen with the recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea (the Houthis are armed and trained by Iran as part of a civil war against the Sunni national government backed by Saudi Arabia), dealing with Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East is a serious challenge. </p>
<p>Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise. And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran funds a large network of armed groups across the Middle East as part of its ambition to replace the US as regional power.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229062024-02-07T17:30:32Z2024-02-07T17:30:32ZWith airstrikes on Houthi rebels, are the US and UK playing fast and loose with international law?<p>The US and UK have over the past few weeks carried out a number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-houthis-four-things-you-will-want-to-know-about-the-yemeni-militia-targeted-by-uk-and-us-military-strikes-221040">joint military strikes</a> on Houthi targets in Yemen. The strikes have been in response to attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels on both commercial and state vessels in the Red Sea since conflict broke out in Gaza on October 7 2023. </p>
<p>The US and UK have justified their strikes by invoking the right of self-defence, as enshrined in <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">article 51 of the United Nations’ charter</a>. The same right is also found within <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law">customary international law</a>. </p>
<p>Together, the two sources provide that the right exists “if an armed attack occurs” against a state and that any action taken should be both <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/necessity-and-proportionality-and-the-right-of-self-defence-in-international-law-9780198863403?cc=us&lang=en&.">“necessary” and “proportionate”</a></p>
<p>On the face of it, this justification might seem relatively straightforward. But the reality is that the justification advanced by these states is far from clear and the applicable law not settled.</p>
<p>The Houthis are in control of much of Yemen. But they don’t (yet, at least) represent the legally recognised government. While there is today much support for the argument that armed attacks that permit a state to act in self-defence can be perpetrated by non-state groups such as the Houthis, this is not a settled position. </p>
<p>Many states, commentators and even the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">International Court of Justice</a> still require that such attacks be perpetrated by states or at least be attributable to a state through its effective control over attacks by non-state armed groups. </p>
<p>Whether Iran had this level of control over these particular attacks <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-with-a-tanking-economy-and-an-election-in-weeks-the-islamic-republic-tries-to-rally-support-by-acting-tough-221660">is not clear</a>. But in any case, the US and UK response took place on the territory of Yemen, not Iran.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-with-a-tanking-economy-and-an-election-in-weeks-the-islamic-republic-tries-to-rally-support-by-acting-tough-221660">Iran: with a tanking economy and an election in weeks, the Islamic Republic tries to rally support by acting tough</a>
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<p>The US and UK both invoked Houthi attacks on their naval warships to justify <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67954799">self-defence</a>. And, in principle, attacks on these types of targets can give rise to this right. Yet the number of attacks on naval vessels were relatively small in relation to the overall number of attacks launched by the Houthi rebels. </p>
<p>There are also question marks over whether the Houthi attacks were of sufficient gravity to justify an argument of self-defence. Indeed, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/22/beyond-gaza-how-yemens-houthis-gain-from-attacking-red-sea-ships">reported damage</a> was relatively small and no deaths have been reported. </p>
<p>While the International Court of Justice has held that self-defence is reserved for responses to attacks which are of a particular <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/24/1/235/438278">“scale and effects”</a>, some scholars and states – including the US – do not believe that such a threshold exists, or should exist. But there is a theory that even if a single attack does not reach the required gravity threshold for an armed attack, several smaller attacks might be taken together in gauging whether that threshold has been met.</p>
<p>Yet this so-called <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/one-piece-time-accumulation-events-doctrine-and-bloody-nose-debate-north-korea">“accumulation of events theory”</a> is something that has only been given tentative support by the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">International Court of Justice</a> and is rarely expressly invoked by states. It arguably remains – at present at least – just a theory.</p>
<h2>Threat to global trade</h2>
<p>The majority of the Houthi attacks have <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/09/houthi-militias-launch-biggest-attack-to-date-on-merchant-vessels-in-red-sea.html">occurred against commercial or merchant vessels</a>. The right of self defence would arguably be available to a state to protect those vessels sailing under its flag. But even then, the majority of commercial vessels struck by the Houthis have not been sailing under the flag of either the US and UK. </p>
<p>Whether these states have the right to act in <a href="https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/cglc/GLC_Collective_SelfDefense.pdf">“collective self-defence”</a> of the states whose flagged vessels have been struck is not entirely clear. But in any case, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20531702.2017.1325992">request for such assistance</a> would need to have been made by these states. And there’s no evidence that such a request was formally made.</p>
<p>A significant and problematic aspect to the justification advanced by the US and UK was that they were acting to protect the “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68064422">free flow of commerce”</a>. National governments don’t have the unilateral right to resort to military force in self-defence to protect commercial interests – either their own or more generally – or simply to enforce international law. </p>
<p>Confusing the issue here is that the day before the first wave of military action by the US and UK on January 11 2024, the UN security council seemingly provided its blessing to this aspect of the justification in <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15561.doc.htm">resolution 2722 (2024)</a>. Among other things, this noted the rights of states to defend their vessels from attacks that undermine navigational freedoms.</p>
<p>Adding to the muddle here is the question of why the security council appeared to provide such a vague and open endorsement of the right of self-defence in this context – rather than authorising the states concerned to take military action, which the council is entitled to do to under <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">chapter VII of the UN charter</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, we are not privy to any behind-the-scenes discussions between members of the security council. Yet, while the acting states will no doubt prefer the greater flexibility that operating under the right of self-defence appears to provide, it arguably would have been in the interests of other member states to have instead authorised the action within a more regulated mandate. </p>
<p>There is already a great deal of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20531702.2022.2029022">concern</a> regarding the use and abuse of the right of self-defence by the United States and its vague limitations. So for the security council to seemingly give the nod to an invocation of the right in this way to protect broader interests could set a precedent that may have unforeseen circumstances. </p>
<p>The simple fact that the US and UK felt the need to legally justify their actions has to be welcomed. But picking the justifications apart reveals their somewhat muddled nature – and that the acting states were testing the limits of this branch of international law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Henderson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen has been justified by the US and UK as being in ‘self defence’.Christian Henderson, Professor of International Law, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227682024-02-05T14:23:35Z2024-02-05T14:23:35ZMiddle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained<p>US airstrikes on Iran-backed armed groups <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2024">on February 2</a> have been anticipated for some time. Since the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, US forces in the Middle East have been targeted more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html">150 times</a>. These attacks, mainly on US bases in Iraq and Syria caused minimal damage thanks to US air defence capabilities.</p>
<p>The Biden administration had responded with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/us/politics/us-militias-tipping-point.html">modest strikes</a> on the militias’ weapons storage and training sites. But a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-troops-killed-jordan-american-service-members-syria/">drone attack</a> on January 28 on Tower 22, a US base on the Jordanian-Syrian border, killed three soldiers and wounded dozens of others. </p>
<p>The deaths represented an unofficial red line for many in Washington, and <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&oq=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l3j33i671l4.10890j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:%7E:text=Political%20pressure%20builds,political%2Dpressure%2Dbuil...">political pressure</a> mounted fast on President Biden to respond more forcefully against the armed groups – or even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-28/biden-faces-pressure-to-confront-iran-after-us-troops-killed">against Iran</a> itself.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Officials</a> said the air strikes targeted command-and-control sites, intelligence centres and drone storage facilities in Iraq and Syria affiliated with the militias and also with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Quds Force</a>, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">also stated</a> that the US would continue strikes at times and places of their choosing.</p>
<p>Though more widespread than previous strikes, the response was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news">carefully calibrated</a> to avoid stoking a broader war. Furthermore, the US signalled its intentions days in advance, giving the groups and their advisers time to move to minimise casualties.</p>
<h2>Militant groups targeted</h2>
<p>There are about <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-backed-groups-iraq-militias-middle-east/">40 militant groups</a> in the region backed by Iran. These include high-profile groups such as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas</a>, which carried out the October 7 attack in Israel as well as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which has been engaged in cross-border fire with Israel on the Lebanon border since October. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">Houthi rebels</a> in Yemen have faced separate <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68159939">US and UK strikes</a> in response to their targeting of commercial ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>But many other, smaller groups operate as well. Responsibility for the lethal drone strike was claimed by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/jordan-drone-strike-who-are-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-and-what-is-tower-22">Islamic Resistance of Iraq</a>, a loose network of Iran-backed militias including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/islamic-resistance-in-iraq-israel-hamas/">Kataib Hezbollah</a>, which fought against coalition forces during the Iraq war. These and other militias have continued to target US troops who remain in the region to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attacks on US bases in Middle East by armed groups." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Map showing the location and number of attacks on US bases in the Middle East since October 7.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/world/middleeast/iran-militias-israel.html">provides</a> a mix of training, intelligence, funding and weapons to groups within its self-described “axis of resistance”. But Tehran <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/01/iran-proxies-intel-houthis-00139099">does not fully control</a> the militias, who operate with varying degrees of autonomy, and who might be better seen as affiliates than proxies.</p>
<h2>US political choices</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has been walking a tightrope in the Middle East. On the one hand, the administration’s primary aim for the past four months has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war in the aftermath of the Hamas attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. At the same time, the US has sought to deter adversaries who have been using increasing degrees of armed force against US personnel (and, in the case of the Red Sea, against international commercial vessels).</p>
<p>The challenge has been in determining a response that is forceful enough to deter further attacks, but not so devastating as to provoke a fully fledged war.</p>
<p>With the election year, Biden is also facing <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">additional scrutiny</a> from home on his foreign policy decisions. Donald Trump has long sought to make Biden <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">look weak</a> on Iran, while many Democrats have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67959375">critical</a> of the president’s use of airstrikes, as well as his approach to the war in Gaza. The calibrated airstrikes of the weekend will probably attract further <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/27/biden-houthi-rebels-strike-congress">criticism</a> from both sides – for going too far or not far enough.</p>
<h2>Gaza conflict</h2>
<p>There’s no guarantee that a ceasefire (temporary or permanent) would bring a stop to attacks on US troops in Iraq and Syria, or to Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. But it’s undeniable that the crisis in Gaza has emboldened armed groups around the region, who have repeatedly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wT2NTbZ7Q2w">used the war to justify</a> their actions.</p>
<p>The US, Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/us/politics/hostage-deal-cease-fire-hamas-gaza.html">negotiate a deal</a> that would see a halt of military operations in Gaza in return for a phased release of hostages. While clearly crucial for the <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1r11o1b9t">hostages</a> and their families and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67920784/page/2">civilian population of Gaza</a>, the deal could also be the key to defusing other tensions in the region, at least temporarily. </p>
<p>While the deal is far from a final <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/hamas-signals-that-wide-gaps-remain-on-reaching-a-cease-fire-agreement?smid=url-share">agreement</a>, the nature of the US strikes was probably calibrated in part to avoid disrupting the process.</p>
<h2>Preventing regional war</h2>
<p>Iran, as well as Iraq and Syria, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/syria-and-iraq-are-angered-by-us-strikes-warning-they-could-deepen-regional-turmoil?smid=url-share">have denounced</a> the strikes, and accused the US of aggression. But Iran has not indicated it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">plans to retaliate</a>. This suggests that Tehran – like Washington – is still keen to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-us-war.html#:%7E:text=After%20Iran%2Daligned%20militants%20killed,awaiting%20President%20Biden's%20promised%20response.">avoid</a> a head-to-head conflict with the US. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, while Kataib Hezbollah has announced it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/31/kataib-hezbollah-says-it-suspends-attacks-on-us-forces">will halt</a> attacks on US troops, other armed groups have said that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">this</a> is not the end, and they will continue to strike against the US presence in the region.</p>
<p>For the Biden administration, the aim of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war is still the right objective, even – perhaps especially – in the face of rising tensions. A policy of careful calibration, coupled with meaningful negotiations to halt the war in Gaza, may not be as politically enticing as flexing US military might – but it’s the approach that is most in line with the longer-term interests of the US and the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Biden administration has calibrated its strikes so as not to provoke a wider armed conflict in the region.Julie M Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations; Deputy Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217222024-01-30T17:55:16Z2024-01-30T17:55:16ZIran has so far resisted direct involvement in the Gaza war, but is that changing?<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-has-so-far-resisted-direct-involvement-in-the-gaza-war-but-is-that-changing" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Iran has tried to keep the war in Gaza at arm’s length by providing support for Hamas <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/04/1222880864/after-striking-throughout-the-middle-east-irans-proxies-now-become-the-targets">through armed groups it backs in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamic Republic has indicated it wants neither to get directly involved in the fighting nor see the conflict escalate across the region. But as illustrated by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/29/politics/biden-jordan-attack-response-options/index.html">the recent drone attack by pro-Iranian militias in Jordan that killed three American soldiers</a>, the violence is spreading. Tehran may not be able to sustain its strategy much longer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">Tehran’s support for Hamas dates back to the 1990s</a>, though the two have never been a perfect ideological match. Hamas comes from the Sunni sect of Islam, identifying more closely with the Muslim Brotherhood than it does with Shi’a Iran. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Is Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes</a>
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<p>Relations broke down during the Syrian civil war as <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Tehran backed Bashar al-Assad’s regime</a> and Hamas sympathized with the Sunni opposition. However, when the fighting ebbed, the two mended fences and Hamas rejoined the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/irans-axis-of-resistance-is-a-potent-coalition-but-a-risky-strategy">Axis of Resistance</a>, a group of state and non-state entities centred in Iran that oppose Israel and the American presence in the region. </p>
<p>As part of the alliance, Hamas reportedly receives military equipment, training and somewhere <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">between $70</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">$350 million per year</a>, depending on the source.</p>
<h2>Important role</h2>
<p>Iran does not appear to have been involved in the planning or execution of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Indeed, United States intelligence reported Tehran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/initial-us-intelligence-shows-hamas-attack-surprised-iranian-leaders-ny-times-2023-10-11/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Oct%2011%20(Reuters),U.S.%20sources%20said%20on%20Wednesday.">was surprised</a> by events. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, as the Gaza war continues, Iran is playing an important role. Tehran provides Hamas with rhetorical support and indirect military backing through the other members of the Axis of Resistance. While not tilting the balance of power in Gaza, this has signalled to the West and Israel that the campaign against Hamas will have a cost, particularly if it escalates. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">There have been almost daily</a> skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense Forces on the Lebanese border. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have launched more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-strikes-targets-iraq-after-us-forces-wounded-officials-2024-01-23/">150 attacks</a> against American military installations, and the pro-Iranian Houthis in Yemen have launched ballistic missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
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<p>Nevertheless, Tehran’s message that it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">does not intend to get directly involved</a> in the fighting has been relayed directly to Hamas by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/is-saudi-arabia-relaying-us-messages-to-iran">and to the U.S. privately through intermediaries</a>.</p>
<p>Tehran’s stance is evident in the particular way military force has been employed. Hezbollah’s attacks have been limited in size and restricted to the area around the Lebanese border — significant enough to indicate support for Hamas, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">but not threatening enough</a> to justify Israel opening a second front. </p>
<p>Similarly in Iraq, the attacks have been relatively small. The strike against the Al-Asad air base in Iraq was <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">described by the Pentagon</a> as one of the largest yet, but the result was some damage to non-critical facilities and no fatalities. The U.S. retaliated with strikes of its own, but repeated the same mantra as Tehran; it did not want the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">fighting to escalate.</a> </p>
<h2>Houthis active</h2>
<p>The most active of Iran’s proxies has been, surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">Houthis in Yemen, who say that they will blockade the Red Sea until the Israelis cease military operations in Gaza</a>. By some estimates, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2024/01/28/most-surveyed-companies-are-vulnerable-to-another-supply-chain-crisis/?sh=5c94fd391bd1">90 per cent of container shipping has been diverted</a>, leading to higher prices and fractured supply lines. </p>
<p>Their attacks on shipping have provoked a series of missile and airstrikes from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-helped-plan-but-didnt-have-assets-to-participate-in-u-s-u-k-strikes-against-houthis">with Canada playing a supporting role</a>. </p>
<p>While provocative, the risk for Tehran in this area is far less than it would be on the Lebanese border, where Israel would likely respond with a ground invasion.</p>
<p>A major conflict between Hezbollah and Israel <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">would be devastating</a> and unpredictable. It would put Iran’s main regional ally in jeopardy and could create conditions that would prompt Washington to attack Iran directly.</p>
<p>There’s little chance, however, of a ground invasion in Yemen, where the airstrikes appear <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/saudi-arabias-balancing-act-amid-strikes-yemens-houthis">to be bolstering</a> the popularity of the Houthi leadership.</p>
<h2>On the sidelines</h2>
<p>It’s not difficult to understand why Tehran has chosen to straddle the fence between supporting Hamas and standing on the sidelines. </p>
<p>If Iran was to remain passive while Gaza is flattened by Israel, it would lose credibility. This would cost Tehran in terms of regional influence and undermine an alliance network essential to its ability to deter the U.S. and Israel. </p>
<p>A certain degree of conflict is also in Iran’s interest. Popular support for the Axis of Resistance has increased across the region, and the trend toward Israeli-Arab normalization is on hold for the foreseeable future. At the same time, though, Iran potentially has a lot to lose.</p>
<p>Iran has grown into a formidable military power, but its military, nuclear and economic infrastructure remain vulnerable to U.S.-Israeli military strikes. </p>
<p>The regime may also be politically vulnerable at home. <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/iranians-differ-widely-with-their-leaders-over-the-war-between-israel-and-hamas/">It is unlikely</a> the Iranian public would support a war to liberate Palestine, and given the recent anti-hijab protests and several years of simmering domestic unrest, it can no longer be taken for granted that U.S. military strikes would cause Iranians to rally around the flag.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-protesters-are-making-demands-in-charters-and-bills-of-rights-201543">Iranian protesters are making demands in charters and bills of rights</a>
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<h2>Maintaining the balance</h2>
<p>Iran’s strategy is designed to strike a balance between these two concerns, but there are a number of things that could go wrong. </p>
<p>For one, Iran cannot control how its opponents respond. In Syria, Israel raised the stakes by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/world/middleeast/iran-military-official-israel-syria.html">assassinating a high ranking member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard thought to be involved in arms transfers to Hezbollah</a>. </p>
<p>Compelled to reply directly, Iran was only able to avoid a confrontation with Israel <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-ballistic-missiles-rock-iraqi-kurdistan">by striking targets in Iraq it claimed were associated with the Israeli Mossad</a>.</p>
<p>Even within the Axis of Resistance, the lines of command and control are imprecise. Iran’s allies have their own agendas and their own ideas about how much force to use. </p>
<p>The recent drone attack in Jordan is a case in point. Although the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a loose group of pro-Iranian militias — has claimed responsibility, the U.S. is holding Iran accountable. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-jordan-attack-iran-1.7098603">still seems reluctant to target Iran directly</a>, but the attack has ratcheted tensions up significantly. </p>
<p>It is also possible that Iran’s leadership will simply overplay its hand, particularly in the Red Sea. At a certain point, the West may lose patience with bombing Iran’s proxies and target the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Devine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran prefers to engage Israel through its proxies, but the risk of escalation makes this a dangerous strategy.James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212222024-01-25T01:54:28Z2024-01-25T01:54:28ZThe US is getting embroiled in yet another Middle East conflict. It should increase pressure on Israel instead<p>The United States is once again enmeshing itself in a rapidly escalating and unpredictable conflict in the Middle East with no clear off ramps. </p>
<p>On numerous occasions in the past two weeks, the US and UK (in a lesser role) have struck <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-01-17/us-houthi-rebels-yemen-red-sea-strikes-shipping/103335220">Yemeni Houthi militants</a> who have been targeting <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/red-sea-crisis-us-military-missile-strikes-houthis-yemen-gulf-of-aden">shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden</a> in protest at Israeli actions in the current Gaza war. </p>
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<p>The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (or “supporters of God”), are a militia group that has been at war with the Saudis and the central Yemeni government for most of the last decade. The group emerged in the 1990s from the indigenous Zaydi Shi'a sect of northern Yemen, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-yemens-houthis-are-getting-involved-in-the-israel-hamas-war-and-how-it-could-disrupt-global-shipping-219220">motivated by grievances</a> about their community’s second-class status in Yemeni society. </p>
<p>They gained particular prominence in the wake of the Arab Spring, which weakened the already-fragile Yemeni state and provided them with an opportunity to seize the majority of the country before the Saudi-led intervention in 2015 attempted to push them back.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-strikes-will-only-embolden-the-houthis-not-stop-their-attacks-on-ships-in-the-red-sea-221588">Why US strikes will only embolden the Houthis, not stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea</a>
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<p>In recent months, the Houthis have positioned themselves as an external champion for the besieged Palestinian population, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna133909">declaring</a>:</p>
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<p>We will continue to prevent Israeli ships or those heading to the occupied Palestinian ports until the aggression and siege on Gaza stops.</p>
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<p>It is clear the Houthis’ broader goal is to create <a href="https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-yemen-houthis-attack-ships-f67d941c260528ac40315ecab4c34ca3">uncertainty and risk in global trade</a>. Disrupting business as usual in this way ensures the ongoing war is felt globally, making it impossible for the major players to ignore or downplay, <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-189696/">as has been the case in the past</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml">depressing</a> <a href="https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/cambodia">history</a> of <a href="https://time.com/6322574/cultural-genocide-armenia-nagorno-karabakh-essay/">genocides</a>, <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-turkey-s-aggression-in-syria-and-iraq">massacres</a> and episodes of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/16/ethiopias-invisible-ethnic-cleansing">ethnic cleansing</a> shows us that human rights violations on their own rarely motivate serious collective action. However, hit the international community where it hurts – in the wallet – and it is far more likely to pay attention and seek a negotiated resolution. </p>
<p>In essence, through economic warfare, the Houthis are seeking to elevate a moral crisis to a level that can’t be ignored.</p>
<h2>Why the US is intervening</h2>
<p>At a tactical level, the US reprisals against the Houthis are predictable and make sense. As the pre-eminent global naval power and <a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-u-s-freedom-of-navigation-program/">guarantor of freedom of navigation</a>, the US has long sought to ensure the free flow of oceanic trade. </p>
<p>Indeed, it has gained much experience protecting shipping in the region against a variety of <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/praying-mantis.html">state</a> and <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm">non-state</a> threats during times of international crisis and instability over the years. </p>
<p>As such, the US sees itself as obligated to respond against Houthi militancy threatening global shipping. To do anything else would be seen as abdicating its fundamental function in the liberal economic order, creating even further risk and uncertainty and threatening economic prosperity.</p>
<p>But as much as the US would like portray itself as an impartial force for stability in its response to the Houthi attacks, its overt commitment to <a href="https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2023/10/12/blinken-israel-hamas-war">effectively unlimited, no-strings-attached support</a> for Israel’s war in Gaza has only emboldened the Israeli Defence Forces in their actions.</p>
<p>Such support goes far beyond running <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-vote-delayed-demand-gaza-humanitarian-ceasefire-2023-12-08/">diplomatic cover for Israel</a> in the United Nations. According to a Bloomberg News report, the Pentagon is actively <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-14/pentagon-is-quietly-sending-israel-ammunition-laser-guided-missiles">restocking the munitions</a> Israel is using against Palestinians in the war. </p>
<p>Given the Houthis’ stated aims, one cannot separate Gaza from the Red Sea. The latter cannot be truly addressed without resolving the former, and a major component of resolving the war requires far stronger US pressure on Israel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-do-israel-and-hamas-get-their-weapons-220762">Where do Israel and Hamas get their weapons?</a>
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<h2>Why US pressure on Israel would have more impact</h2>
<p>In this regard, <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/11/biden-administration-powerlessness-israel-gaza-war-military-aid-media">US claims it is powerless to rein in Israel</a> seem far from convincing when one examines the power dynamics between the two countries. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/sub-imperial-power-paperback-softback">middle power</a> in the wider US-centric liberal international order, Israel certainly exercises more autonomy and agency than a simple client state. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/13/world/reagan-demands-end-to-attacks-in-a-blunt-telephone-call-to-begin.html">history has shown us</a> assertive US presidents are more than capable of reining in the excesses of Tel Aviv in short order. </p>
<p>What is lacking at this moment is not influence, but willpower, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/i-am-zionist-how-joe-bidens-lifelong-bond-with-israel-shapes-war-policy-2023-10-21/#:%7E:text=FORGED%20OVER%20DECADES,a%20Jewish%20homeland%20in%201948.">especially on the part of the current president, Joe Biden</a>. Biden has a demonstrated history of exceptional support for Israel beyond that of his own party. This <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden-s-blind-spot-for-israel-could-prove-costly-20240118-p5eyc3">includes</a> in his former role as vice president under Barack Obama.</p>
<p>For their part, the Houthis are <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/01/12/the-houthis-have-survived-worse-than-americas-and-britains-strikes">battle-hardened by nearly a decade of war with the Saudis</a>. They have made something of an art of withstanding precision strikes using <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations-yemen">US-made munitions and guided by US-supplied intelligence</a>. </p>
<p>As such, it is unlikely the current US strikes will halt the Houthis’ attacks on shipping vessels. The Houthis are also highly likely to continue to evolve their own tactics to account for US weapon superiority. Given this, they have significant incentive to escalate their attacks in defiance of US actions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-strikes-will-only-embolden-the-houthis-not-stop-their-attacks-on-ships-in-the-red-sea-221588">Why US strikes will only embolden the Houthis, not stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea</a>
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<p>The Gaza war has already claimed the lives of more than 25,000 Palestinians – primarily civilians. The bombing has been <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/middle-east/israel-s-war-in-gaza-is-among-the-most-destructive-in-history-experts-say-20231222-p5et8k">more destructive</a> in its first 100 days than the razing of the Syrian city of Aleppo by the Assad regime from 2012–16, according to experts in mapping wartime damage.</p>
<p>As the conflict continues unabated and outrage continues to grow, it is likely the Houthis or other militant actors or even states will ramp up efforts to intervene, especially through unconventional methods. </p>
<p>In such a context, the US and UK strikes against the Houthis increasingly risk producing unintended consequences and <a href="https://web.mit.edu/17.423/www/Archive98/handouts/spiral.html">spiralling out of control</a> towards an even more complex and broader regional crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Rich receives funding from the US State Department for work around preventing violent extremism available at <a href="https://www.curtincern.com/educational-resources">https://www.curtincern.com/educational-resources</a></span></em></p>The US and UK strikes on the Houthis will have limited impact on the group’s Red Sea attacks – and could cause Middle East tensions to spiral out of control.Ben Rich, Senior Lecturer in History and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213922024-01-22T16:59:46Z2024-01-22T16:59:46ZWestern strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The United States and the United Kingdom <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">are launching ongoing missile and drone strikes</a> against the Yemeni armed group Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. A faction in the ongoing Yemen civil war, the Houthis had been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/world/middleeast/houthi-hijack-ship-galaxy-leader.html">attacking ships</a> in the Red Sea in the months preceding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">U.S.-British strikes.</a></p>
<p>These kinds of strikes, however, don’t dissuade the Houthis, a predominately Shia minority group in Yemen. They’re continuing <a href="https://time.com/6563864/us-strikes-houthis-yemen-red-sea/">to attack ships in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Continuing to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, furthermore, will undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Middle East. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">The Houthis have said</a> they’re attacking ships affiliated with Israel in response to Israel’s ground invasion and blockade of the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>With the U.S. reputation in the region already in tatters amid mass opposition to Israel’s attack on Gaza, these strikes are creating unintended consequences.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s civil war</h2>
<p>The Yemen civil war is one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It officially started in 2014 when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668">Houthis seized the capital of Sana'a</a>, but multiple entities have become involved since then.</p>
<p>Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict and subsequent blockade <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-fuel-intl/index.html">helped create ongoing famine and food insecurity</a> in Yemen.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Yemen’s civil war, the Houthis have received Iranian support. For both ideological and geopolitical reasons, Iran has helped the Houthis in their efforts to seize the country. While Iran has continually denied claims that it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/21/iran-giving-houthis-significant-and-lethal-support-us-envoy">provides military aid</a> to the Houthis, most <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/12/22/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#iran-has-helped-the-houthi-militia-target-ships-us-intelligence-says">outside observers</a> agree that it has done so in the past and continues to now.</p>
<p>The Houthis are invaluable partners to Iran because of their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This narrow channel is responsible for a significant portion of the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/bab-al-mandan-red-sea-suez-shipping-crisis-houthis-gaza">world’s cargo</a> <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073">and oil</a> shipping. While most vessels can avoid the region by sailing around Africa, this detour <a href="https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/">increases costs</a> for shipowners and, by extension, consumers.</p>
<p>The Houthis, either acting in their own interests or for Iran, escalated their attacks against ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Outside of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09">one cargo ship</a> the Houthi seized in November, however, their attacks have been <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/first-images-released-houthi-damage-153119479.html">largely unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<h2>More time needed for anti-piracy efforts</h2>
<p>Piracy in maritime shipping is not a new phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv21r3j8m">and has been a persistent scourge throughout human history</a>. In contemporary history, however, multilateral efforts to combat piracy have been largely successful in limiting its impact. </p>
<p>Multinational efforts off the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">coast of Somalia</a> and in the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/">Malacca Strait</a> in southeast Asia significantly reduced the piracy threat in those regions.</p>
<p>Given the past success of such measures, American Defense Secretary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220216698/pentagon-announces-new-international-maritime-protection-force-for-the-red-sea">Lloyd Austin’s announcement in late December</a> of an international maritime task force was both practical and had the potential to solve the issue. The problem, however, is that such efforts take time to succeed. The U.S. didn’t give the initiative the time it needed.</p>
<p>U.S.-led strikes against the Houthis in Yemen only stood a chance of success if neighbouring states, most notably Saudi Arabia, combined the American air presence with a ground threat. Saudi Arabia, however, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/">won’t get involved</a> as it seeks to extricate itself from Yemen.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-13/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-on-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say">anger towards</a> Israelis in the region, as well as the Houthi’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/how-houthi-anger-with-israel-is-reshaping-the-middle-east-conflict?ref=mc.news">avowed goal</a> to strike Israel, countering the Houthi would be politically dangerous for Riyadh’s government.</p>
<p>The Houthis know the Americans lack regional allies and therefore they’ve not been deterred, but emboldened. In the aftermath of the U.S.-U.K. strikes, Houthis have vowed to continue <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-red-sea-houthis-1.7083030">to target ships</a> in the Red Sea and are making good on the threat.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has even been forced to admit that the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/us-again-targets-yemen-s-huthis-in-new-strikes-9cac37d1">ongoing airstrikes</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/18/politics/biden-houthi-strikes/index.html">are not having the desired effect</a> of deterring the Houthis, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/us-launches-fresh-strikes-on-yemens-houthi-as-conflict-escalates">but says they’re necessary to protect merchant and military vessels</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback in the broader region</h2>
<p>International norms and laws are effective so long as everyone adheres to them. Norms and laws, furthermore, are most vulnerable immediately after a state has breached them, which the U.S. did when it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-says-us-british-attacks-on-yemen-a-clear-violation-of-the-countrys-sovereignty/ar-AA1mQIsa">violated Yemen’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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<p>Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the strikes against the Houthis.</p>
<p>Because the Houthis are a key partner of Iran, Tehran’s government apparently believed it had to take action in case their credibility became compromised. Iran <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-strikes-targets-in-northern-iraq-and-syria-as-regional-tensions-escalate/ar-AA1n1xOP">conducted strikes</a> against targets in Iraq and Syria. Iran claims the strikes in Iraq were against an Israeli spy installation. </p>
<p>While these events <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/iran-claims-it-has-attacked-an-israeli-spy-base-in-kurdistan">would have been troubling in their own right in terms of the impact on regional stability</a>, Iran followed up these strikes with ones in Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-iran-strike.html">Pakistan retaliated</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465">both Iran</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pakistan-conducts-strikes-in-iran-retaliating-for-earlier-hit-by-tehran/ar-AA1n9O2J">and Pakistan</a> are emphasizing that they’re not targeting the other country, but rather <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/paistan-cnucstrike-in-iran-in-retaliation-to-drone-and-missile-strikes-hits-baloch-separatist-groups/ar-AA1n9AwW">non-state militants</a>.</p>
<p>That said, Iran’s strike against Pakistan occurs as the country is <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/01/imran-khan-loses-his-battle-with-pakistans-army">politically vulnerable</a> in the aftermath of the army’s takedown of Prime Minister Imran Khan. With the Pakistani military unable to appear weak as the country faces crucial elections next month, the potential for events to escalate are very real.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the goal of nearly everyone involved, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/us-israel.html">particularly the U.S.</a>, has been to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. Recent events are compromising this goal, including <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-blames-israel-for-strike-that-killed-four-senior-military-officials-in-syria-as-mid-east-conflict-spirals/ar-BB1gZPbm">strikes by Israel in Syria</a> and an Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/01/21/us-troops-iraq-getting-evaluated-traumatic-brain-injuries-after-iran-backed-militia-attack.html">missile-and-rocket</a> attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.</p>
<p>By abandoning the focus on building a maritime coalition force and instead resorting to air strikes, the U.S. and its allies may have inadvertently created the situation they sought to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the West has aimed to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. But strikes on the Houthis in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. may ensure it will.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215882024-01-22T03:06:05Z2024-01-22T03:06:05ZWhy US strikes will only embolden the Houthis, not stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea<p>As the Houthi militant group in Yemen ramps up its attacks on vessels in the Red Sea – ostensibly in response to what it calls Israel’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/19/houthi-shipping-red-sea-oil-alliance/">genocidal crimes</a>” in Gaza – the US and UK have responded with multiple <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-carries-new-airstrike-houthis-yemen/story?id=106414037">military strikes</a> in the last week. The US has also re-listed the group as a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-redesignates-houthis-terrorist-group-means/story?id=106451725">global terrorist organisation</a>.</p>
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<p>The hope is these strikes will pressure the Iran-aligned Houthis to back down. It won’t, however. Short of a complete halt to Israel’s war in Gaza and a 180-degree shift in Western support for Israel’s approach, there is little that will dissuade the Houthis to change course in the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>There are three main reasons for this, none of which are principally about Iran’s regional strategy.</p>
<h2>The group has already survived years of airstrikes</h2>
<p>The first, and most obvious, reason is the Houthi movement, whose political wing is known as <a href="https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system_0.pdf">Ansar Allah</a>, has already withstood years of airstrikes in its war with a Saudi-led and Western-backed coalition from 2015–2022. </p>
<p>Prior to this, the Houthis fought six wars against the central Yemeni government from 2004–2010. Guerrilla warfare is not new to them, and harassing ships off their coast does not require sophisticated weapons.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/torture-slow-motion-economic-blockade-yemen-and-its-grave-humanitarian-consequences">blockade</a> that accompanied much of the recent war (which is currently in a shaky truce) also helped the Houthis to finetune their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2022.2148557">weapon smuggling networks</a> from Iran, as well as their own <a href="https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/evolution-of-uavs-employed-by-houthi-forces-in-yemen/">domestic</a> <a href="https://www.conflictarm.com/perspectives/iranian-technology-transfers-to-yemen/">weapon production</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, airstrikes alone are unlikely to deliver a knockout blow to their military capacity and will almost certainly increase their appetite for a fight.</p>
<p>That is because they can – for the first time – more strongly frame their actions in the context of fighting against the US and Israel, per their <a href="https://waleedmahdi.com/echoes-of-a-scream/">slogan</a>: “God is Great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-yemens-houthis-are-getting-involved-in-the-israel-hamas-war-and-how-it-could-disrupt-global-shipping-219220">Why Yemen's Houthis are getting involved in the Israel-Hamas war and how it could disrupt global shipping</a>
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<h2>With dissent rising, the Houthis have found ‘quasi-legitimacy’</h2>
<p>The second reason they are unlikely to be deterred is more important, but less understood, because it is about Yemen’s domestic politics. </p>
<p>The Houthis currently control much of Yemen, including the capital Sana'a, which accounts for around 70% of the population. The people in these regions have been subjected to years of acute and structural violence by the Houthis. This includes: </p>
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<li><p>the forced disappearances of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/15/yemen-houthis-disappear-political-opponent">political opponents</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/yemen-houthis-forcibly-disappear-bahais">religious minorities</a> </p></li>
<li><p>the extrajudicial killings of <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/poisoned-yemeni-journalist-was-investigating-houthi-owned-companies">journalists</a> and executions of civilians, including <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58630071">minors</a> </p></li>
<li><p>the recruitment of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/02/yemen-huthi-forces-recruiting-child-soldiers-for-front-line-combat/">child soldiers</a> </p></li>
<li><p>withholding public sector <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/dilemma-public-sector-salary-payments-yemen">salaries</a> since 2016 </p></li>
<li><p>the laying of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/22/yemen-houthi-landmines-kill-civilians-block-aid">landmines</a> in populated areas, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2023/06/21/1183192685/yemeni-civil-war-frontline-photos">sniper attacks</a> on civilians and the use of <a href="https://www.saferworld-global.org/multimedia/a-city-under-siege-the-realities-of-yemenas-war-in-taiz">siege warfare</a> </p></li>
<li><p>the systematic <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/final-report-panel-experts-yemen-established-pursuant-security-council-resolution-2140-2014s2023130-enar">extortion</a> of businesses and implementation of a <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628">caste-based</a> taxation system</p></li>
<li><p>the implementation of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/yemen-huthis-suffocating-women-with-requirement-for-male-guardians/">male guardianship</a> rules for women </p></li>
<li><p>and the weaponisation of <a href="https://www.mwatana.org/reports-en/starvation-makers-e">food</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/11/death-more-merciful-life/houthi-and-yemeni-government-violations-right-water">water</a>, including the diversion of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/02/aid-officials-aware-for-months-of-widespread-food-aid-theft-in-yemen">food aid</a> for private enrichment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>It is important to note the Saudi-led coalition and internationally recognised Yemeni government have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2022/aug/25/yemen-war-victims-stories-they-robbed-me-of-my-children">also</a> been accused of committing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/18/yemen-latest-round-saudi-uae-led-attacks-targets-civilians">war crimes</a> and grave human rights <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/yemen/report-yemen/">violations</a> in Yemen, including the <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2018/10/Strategies-of-Coalition-in-Yemen-War-Final-20181005-1.pdf">ruthless bombardment</a> of civilians and civilian infrastructure. </p>
<p>At least <a href="https://acleddata.com/middle-east/yemen/">150,000</a> people are estimated to have died violently in the war that began in 2015, though the challenges with collecting such <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/reports/humanitarian-aid/15353">data</a> are considerable. This also does not include the many more thousands that have died from <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/yemen-acute-hunger-unprecedented-levels-funding-dries">preventable starvation</a> and disease. </p>
<p>The behaviour of the Houthis in power has made them deeply unpopular. Dissent is dangerous due to the sophisticated <a href="https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system_0.pdf">system</a> of repression and neighbourhood <a href="https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/07/07/feature-02">surveillance</a> the Houthis have imposed in the areas they control. But Yemenis began taking to the street in protest last year anyway in <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2275026/middle-east">Ibb</a> and the besieged city of <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2338366/middle-east">Ta’izz</a>.</p>
<p>Then on September 26, just before Hamas’ assault on southern Israel and Israel’s bombardment of Gaza, Yemenis defied the authorities in large numbers. </p>
<p>In protests in the capital city of Sana'a, they celebrated the anniversary of the 1962 revolution that ousted the country’s leader, the Zaydi Imam, Mohammed al-Badr – and with him, the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362540450_The_Religious-Political_Ideology_of_Houthis'_Rebellion_in_Yemen_Theoretical_Perspective_of_the_Divine_Right_to_Rule">kinship-based</a> autocracy that <a href="https://www.leidenarabichumanitiesblog.nl/articles/a-stray-bullet-from-the-seventh-century-hit-yemen-anti-zaydi-polemics-and-the-politics-of-genealogy-in-al-ghobaris-al-qab%25C4%25ABlah-al-h%25C4%2581shimiyyah">many Yemenis</a> claim the Houthis <a href="https://www.commonspace.eu/analysis/analysis-origins-houthi-supremacist-ideology">seek</a> to <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/june-2022/18144">reinstate</a>. </p>
<p>Seeing this (rightly) as a demonstration against them, the Houthis were shaken. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/yemen-wave-of-arrests-by-huthi-de-facto-authorities-following-demonstrations/">Amnesty International</a> reported they responded with an “alarming wave of arrests” and “a draconian show of force.”</p>
<p>Against a background of rising dissent at home, the Houthis’ actions and Western retaliation have given the group the gift of “<a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/21726">quasi-legitimacy</a>,” according to Yemeni analysts. The US-led strikes also give credence to the Houthis’ demands that critics “<a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/21726">shut their mouths</a>.” </p>
<p>And just as important, the US strikes can boost the Houthis’ military recruitment efforts. And this could help them attempt to seize the government-held oil wells in <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84588">Marib</a> again, which the group needs to become economically sustainable.</p>
<h2>Anger is rising against the West across the region</h2>
<p>The third reason the Houthis are unlikely to be deterred by airstrikes or a terrorist designation is that their actions articulate the wider region’s fury at Israel’s war in Gaza, which has so far claimed the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/gazas-death-toll-just-passed-25-000-for-the-survivors-hunger-is-the-biggest-threat/kjx1e3r65">lives of 25,000 Palestinians</a>, and the decades of Western support for Israel’s policies in occupied Gaza and the West Bank.</p>
<p>They have also tapped into profound grievances about the West’s policies more generally and its record of reinforcing unpopular regimes in the face of popular action for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/17/betrayed-by-their-leaders-failed-by-the-west-arabs-still-want-democracy/">change</a>. This includes the selling of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429317873-46/violence-david-wearing">weapons</a> and bestowing of political legitimacy to authoritarian regimes in exchange for what the West considers “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/2981/chapter-abstract/143677536?redirectedFrom=fulltext">stability</a>” in the world order. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-houthis-four-things-you-will-want-to-know-about-the-yemeni-militia-targeted-by-uk-and-us-military-strikes-221040">The Houthis: four things you will want to know about the Yemeni militia targeted by UK and US military strikes</a>
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<p>Yemenis are, however, keenly aware that the Houthis’ rise and expansion was enabled by this same external push for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/10/us-backs-yemen-immunity-for-saleh">stability</a>, which came at the expense of Yemenis’ ability to determine <a href="https://merip.org/2014/12/the-breakdown-of-the-gcc-initiative/">local solutions</a> to <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/yemens-peace-process-hodeida-agreement-never-was">local problems</a>.</p>
<p>By centring the defence of Palestinians in their actions, the Houthis have found a way to discredit their domestic opponents – something that has largely eluded them for 20 years. This will make them even harder to dislodge from power and will likely consign ordinary Yemenis to further violence at their hands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah G. Phillips receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies (Yemen).</span></em></p>The Houthis have found legitimacy through their actions, which will make them even harder to dislodge from power.Sarah G. Phillips, Professor of Global Conflict and Development at The University of Sydney; Non-Resident Fellow at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211372024-01-15T17:30:08Z2024-01-15T17:30:08ZIran’s increased belligerence and nuclear ambitions show why the west needs a more robust policy of deterrence<p>Numerous attempts by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-houthis-four-things-you-will-want-to-know-about-the-yemeni-militia-targeted-by-uk-and-us-military-strikes-221040">Houthi rebels</a> to attack and disrupt cargo shipping in the Red Sea have been met by airstrikes by the UK and US on Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen – including the capital Sana'a. The intervention represents a <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">significant level of escalation</a> in the Middle East and is indicative of just how volatile the region has become.</p>
<p>While the Houthis claim their attacks are in retaliation for Israel’s war against Hamas, it’s actually more complicated. Iran’s <a href="https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/">backing of the Houthis</a> looks like part of a plan by Tehran to draw the west into a protracted Middle Eastern conflict in order to sow regional discord and further its plans for hegemony.</p>
<p>Over the recent years, Iran has consistently demonstrated its disruptive ability. It has done this despite the best efforts of the west (and Israel) to deter its aggression and contain its influence. The latest episode is another sign of how badly the west has failed in this. </p>
<p>A succession of tough sanctions packages and targeted drone strikes on Iranian commanders has not prevented Tehran from pursuing its foreign policy ends, despite ongoing domestic unrest which <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">some analysts predicted</a> might unsettle or even topple Iran’s clerical regime. </p>
<p>As well as funding and training the Houthis in their campaign to control Yemen and disrupt Red Sea trade, reports suggest Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proven to be highly competent in coordinating Hamas and Hezbollah in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25">their attacks on Israel</a>. It has also been a key ally for Russia during its war in Ukraine, providing a supply of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-iranian-kamikaze-drones-can-inflict-serious-damage-but-will-not-be-a-gamechanger-192754">Shahed drones</a> which have helped Vladimir Putin maintain pressure on Kyiv with regular barrages of attacks on power infrastructure over the two years of the conflict.</p>
<h2>Revisionist state</h2>
<p>In short, Iran is a <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-iran-toward-axis-revisionism-amid-war-gaza">revisionist state</a> – it wants to change the regional order – and its belligerent behaviour is likely to continue. Now the larger (and recurring) problem the west must address is how to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear capability. This would undoubtedly embolden the regime’s actions. A nuclear-armed Iran would arguably represent the greatest threat to Israel’s national security and the international liberal order.</p>
<p>Barak Obama’s administration assumed that Iranian hostility could be mitigated by providing economic incentives in return for assurances that uranium enrichment levels would be curtailed by Tehran. This culminated in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">nuclear deal</a> signed in 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – plus Germany) and the European Union. </p>
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<p>That deal is all but extinct. Donald Trump signalled its death knell when he <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-backs-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what-96317">withdrew the US from the agreement</a> in 2018. Efforts by the Biden administration to resurrect the agreement have yet to bear fruit. At present this would appear to be a long way off, given the collapse in relations between Iran and the west.</p>
<h2>Empire, Islam and revolution</h2>
<p>In any case, the whole approach did not appreciate the internal social structures driving Iranian foreign policy. The country’s behaviour is shaped <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-history-foreign-policy/">by its history</a> and identity as a former imperial power. This is something Britain and west should pay attention to. </p>
<p>Much of Iran’s national identity constitutes a mixture of revolutionary fervour, Shia Islam and a form of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2016.1159541?needAccess=true">nationalism</a> focused around Iran’s pre-Islamic history, notably the Persian empire during the Achaemenid dynasty (550-330 BC). </p>
<p>Meanwhile, power resides with individuals – such as supreme leader Ali Khamenei – who were influential in Iran’s revolutionary period (1979). This was a time in which religiously guided militant action was the primary course of action to redress political grievances.</p>
<p>As a former imperial power and a country that experienced revolution, Iran presumes that it has the natural right to intervene in other country’s affairs. Tehran’s <a href="https://opencanada.org/iranian-interventionism-in-a-changing-middle-east/">interventionist stance</a> is guided by a religious sense of duty. It takes on the role as protector and provider of honour for the <a href="https://gulfif.org/iranian-identity-warfare-the-making-of-the-shia-brotherhood/">Shia Islamic world</a>, which has in part driven its <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/israel-iran-saudi-arabia-battle-for-supremacy-in-the-middle-east/">competitive rivalry with Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<p>Conversely, Iran’s foreign policy discourse is informed by its view of the west as inherently <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10669920500280623?needAccess=true">devious and imperialist</a>. This national narrative, as a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/895acb5a-3c50-11ea-a01a-bae547046735">state under perennial attack from the west</a>, selectively draws on its experience of imperial clashes with the Russian empire in the 19th century and with Britain and US over the <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-coup-timeline.html?scp=1&sq=mossadegh%2520coup&st=cse">1953 coup d’etat</a> which toppled the elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, to restore the Shah. The coup is thought to have fostered the conditions for the 1979 revolution.</p>
<p>I believe these two factors are the primary drivers of Iranian belligerence and adventurism. The country’s resilience in the face of western sanctions – in part now eased by trade with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-russia-iran-trade-corridor/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-09/why-the-us-can-t-stop-iran-s-lucrative-oil-trade-with-china">China</a> – should remind us that Iran is not a state which will easily abandon its regional ambitions. Even though UK defence secretary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67967372">Grant Shapps</a> has asked Iran to control its proxies, it will not suddenly stop funding terrorism in the Middle East because Britain asks it to.</p>
<h2>No nukes</h2>
<p>If Iran was to acquire a nuclear capability, that does not mean that it would use it. But it would stiffen Tehran’s resolve to continue its current dangerous behaviour. It would fundamentally disrupt the balance of power in the region and could lead to a spiralling arms race with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>So the UK’s main foreign policy in the Middle East must be to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal. Until now, Britain has been averse to deploying coercive measures to deter Iran. The current situation calls for this posture to be revisited. I would argue the UK’s strategy towards Iran should be unambiguous, with clear red lines. </p>
<p>Building coalitions with regional partners will be key to this. The current UK government understandably does not want to escalate tensions and it may want to pursue a risk-free policy in the region. But, increasingly, that option may no longer be available.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Soodavar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s role in the recent conflict between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah shows how badly western containment policy has failed.Ben Soodavar, Researcher, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209512024-01-13T10:20:36Z2024-01-13T10:20:36ZRed Sea crisis: expert unpacks Houthi attacks and other security threats<p><em><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67938290">Recent attacks</a> on commercial vessels by Houthi militia in the Red Sea have put the vital shipping region in the spotlight. The Yemen-based rebels <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67932725">claim to be</a> targeting Israeli-linked vessels, in protest at Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. The UN Security Council recently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/11/middleeast/un-security-council-houthi-attacks-resolution-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20UN%20resolution%20condemned%20some,the%20commercial%20vessel%2C%20Galaxy%20Leader.">passed a resolution</a> demanding an immediate end to the Houthi attacks, while the US and UK <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/us-and-uk-launch-strikes-against-houthi-rebels-in-yemen#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20Britain,of%20conflict%20in%20the%20region.">have launched a series of strikes on Yemen against the rebels</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Burak Şakir Şeker, who <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371719209_Security_Environment_of_The_Red_Sea">has studied security issues in the Red Sea</a>, shares his insights on the global importance of the region, the security issues that exist and how these must be addressed.</em></p>
<h2>Why is the Red Sea such an important international area?</h2>
<p>The Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen, in the Middle East, and Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, is one of the world’s busiest oil transit points and is of great importance for the Red Sea. It’s a historically important trade transit route. Its proximity to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf reduces shipping distances and facilitates trade. About <a href="https://dg.dryadglobal.com/red-sea">33,000</a> merchant ships pass through the strait every year. </p>
<p>Because of its strategic importance, one of the greatest consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a significant increase in the cost of global trade and global energy transportation. </p>
<p>For example, an oil tanker leaving the Gulf would reach the port of London, 12,000km away, <a href="http://ports.com/sea-route/port-of-al-kuwayt,kuwait/port-of-londonderry,united-kingdom/">in 14 days</a> (at a speed of 22 knots) via the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. But if that route is not available the tanker would have to go around the southern tip of Africa – a 24-day journey covering 20,900km.</p>
<p>The Red Sea’s strategic importance also makes it an important geopolitical area. Countries have <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/sipripp54_0.pdf">military bases</a> here and intervene to protect oil and merchant shipping. These include military bases of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, the US, Italy, France, and Japan. </p>
<p>The Red Sea is therefore an area where complex global relations can play out. For instance, Israel’s attempt to control the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israels-sinai-dilemma">Sinai Peninsula</a>, one of the key supply routes for the Palestinian resistance, threatens the safety of merchant shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>The Red Sea is also a security hotspot, drawing in countries that sit on either side of it, such as Yemen and Eritrea, as well as countries much further afield, such as the US and China.</p>
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<h2>Who are the Houthi militia? Why are they carrying out attacks?</h2>
<p>Because of the fragility, or lack, of central government in Somalia and Yemen, non-state armed groups are becoming more active. Examples include the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep55423.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Abcad3b49f36a2209db265e84b98ac4c1&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">Houthi</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26297008.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A3e7f38c4d0743bfab84eaf4812fbb476&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">al-Hirak</a> in Yemen and Somalia’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351270.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A01204b47bdbe5fe2c9d545df0a79f99c&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">al-Shabaab</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26297736.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Abbab4fe5bcd7187fc0621ba043188061&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Ansar al-Sharia</a>. </p>
<p>The Houthi militia, also known as Ansar Allah, is a rebel group based in Yemen. Originating from the Zaidi Shia Muslim minority, they rose to prominence in the early 2000s, opposing Yemen’s central government. The group’s name comes from its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. </p>
<p>The Houthis aim to establish a Zaidi Shia-led government in Yemen. They’ve been involved in armed conflicts with the Yemeni government supported by Saudi-UAE coalition, including the Yemeni Civil War. They’re also backed by Iran. This is not to say the Houthi are a monolithic entity with a single common agenda; they are a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep40553.7.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A11e66397f6320c7d5b8b91336cd2da4e&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">complex and volatile</a> coalition. </p>
<p>The Houthis are, currently, the Red Sea basine’s most pressing security danger. </p>
<p>Houthi soldiers have hounded, assaulted and taken control of many boats <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26470495.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A6f6473f21a1081338473ca7920a79e32&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">since 2016</a>. Their earliest techniques, such as rocket-propelled grenades, were not very sophisticated, but their strategies <a href="https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/pdf/haugstvedt-and-jacobsen.pdf">have evolved</a> to be more hazardous and successful. They have employed mines, drones and anti-ship missiles. The biggest casualty of their attacks are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep38651.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A3e9f92532ab00045060bdcd43edb1719&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Saudi</a> ships and ports. </p>
<p>The Houthi have weakened Yemen and exposed the country to foreign intervention. For instance, in 2015, the United States supported <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible">Saudi Arabia’s intervention</a> to prevent the Houthis from invading all of Yemen. </p>
<h2>What are the other major security challenges facing the region?</h2>
<p>The biggest are the ongoing wars and tensions between and within each country. These include disputes over the affiliation of the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/red-sea-old-new-arena-interest/">Red Sea islands</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12602.6.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aeb6117d282db2402cdac046b5860ef76&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">border disputes</a>, <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/gray-zones-in-the-middle-east">territorial claims</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21365.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A7eada516b25619aa413ec7fb9a0242df&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">conflicting economic interests</a>, ideological differences and ethnic divisions. Examples of these include the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26165.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A86d529deede5c526ae8633abe7a04d2a&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Yemen-Saudi Arabia War</a> and tensions between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt over the <a href="https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI_Insight-2005.pdf">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</a>.</p>
<p>Regional crises – such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7864/j.ctt1657tv8.6.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ae52070930a6b2a2dc6bc03266e0cbb15&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Arab Spring</a>, the <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2031280/is-there-a-path-out-of-the-yemen-conflict-why-it-matters/">Yemen crisis</a>, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/blockade-of-port-sudan-whats-behind-it-and-what-can-end-it-169264">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17358.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A943c3408b7774a356da3014f58599b3b&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Qatar</a> blockades – also have a direct impact on the balance of power in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Another major, escalating security problem is that the Red Sea is being <a href="https://www.coursehero.com/file/140125832/IPI-Rpt-Humanitarian-Crisis-in-Yemenpdf/">used by </a>smugglers smuggling – goods as well as people. They have used the proceeds to finance civil wars and terrorist activities in the region. </p>
<p>Due to its transit point and proximity to conflict zones, the Red Sea is one of the areas with the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep25263.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Afc8929cfe214b2980f81a00ec1842cb7&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">highest concentrations</a> of arms and <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1251">human traffickers</a>. </p>
<p>The growing power of the illegal sector has <a href="https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2015.pdf">adversely</a> affected regional stability. It has paved the way for the formation of many <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/hoa_pb_april_2019_1.pdf">organised crime groups</a>. It has also claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.</p>
<h2>What must be done to better secure the Red Sea area?</h2>
<p>For a number of years, the main security issue in the wider region was Somali piracy. A major coordinated naval operation, involving key international actors, helped to address the threat and shows what can be achieved. </p>
<p>This suggests that the first approach to this regional crisis should be regional cooperation.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In 2020 the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1612471">Red Sea Council (AKA Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden)</a> was established by Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan with the aim of maintaining security and stability in the Red Sea. It was to consult and coordinate efforts to combat dangers, while not being a military group. </p>
<p>The Red Sea Council is meant to be a new regional instrument. However, the council <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202401020375.html">hasn’t been able</a> to prevent the militarisation of the Red Sea corridor – one of its mandates. This is due of a lack of support from the international community and<br>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-abiy-takes-a-page-from-russia-china-in-asserting-the-right-to-restore-historical-claim-to-strategic-waters-216237">historical tensions</a> over territorial issues. </p>
<p>It’s also <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/senior_study_group_on_peace_and_security_in_the_red_sea_arena-report.pdf#page=34">mainly dominated</a> by Saudi Arabia, based on its economic power and political authority. And so it could in fact work to limit the ability of Ethiopia, Qatar and Turkey, along with Iran, to move freely in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Ultimately, increased coordination and collaboration between adversaries and allies with shared interests are necessary to ensure the safety and security of the Red Sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Burak Şakir Şeker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One of the biggest consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a significant increase in the cost of global trade.Burak Şakir Şeker, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210062024-01-12T18:57:11Z2024-01-12T18:57:11ZUS-UK airstrikes risk strengthening Houthi rebels’ position in Yemen and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569063/original/file-20240112-29-67u6k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C15%2C5276%2C3382&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Houthi supporters rally in Yemen following U.S.-U.K. airstrikes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S.- and U.K.-led <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/us/politics/us-houthi-missile-strikes.html">strikes on the rebel Houthi group</a> in Yemen represent a dramatic new turn in the Middle East conflict – one that could have implications throughout the region.</p>
<p>The attacks of Jan. 11, 2024, hit around 60 targets at 16 sites, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-biden-retaliation-attacks-0804b93372cd5e874a0dd03513fe36a2">according to the U.S. Air Force’s Mideast command</a>, including in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, the main port of Hodeida and Saada, the birthplace of the Houthis in the country’s northwest.</p>
<p>The military action follows weeks of warning by the U.S. to the Houthis, ordering them to stop attacking commercial ships in the strategic strait of Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. The Houthis – an armed militia backed by Iran that controls most of northern Yemen following a bitter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">near-decadelong civil war</a> – have also <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-houthi-attacks-affect-both-the-israel-hamas-conflict-and-yemens-own-civil-war-and-could-put-pressure-on-us-saudi-arabia-216852">launched missiles and drones toward Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">expert on Yemeni politics</a>, I believe the U.S. attacks on the Houthis will have wide implications – not only for the Houthis and Yemen’s civil war, but also for the broader region where America maintains key allies. In short, the Houthis stand to gain politically from these U.S.-U.K. attacks as they support a narrative that the group has been cultivating: that they are freedom fighters fighting Western imperialism in the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>For Houthis, a new purpose</h2>
<p>The Israel-Gaza conflict has reinvigorated the Houthis – giving them a raison d'etre at a time when their status at home was diminishing.</p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants</a> in Israel, the Houthis’ long conflict with Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover">government ousted by the Houthis</a> at the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2014, had quieted after an April 2022 cease-fire drastically reduced fighting.</p>
<p>Houthi missile strikes on Saudi cities ceased, and there were hopes that a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">truce could bring about a permanent end</a> to Yemen’s brutal conflict.</p>
<p>With fewer external threats, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/yemens-civilians-besieged-on-all-sides/">domestic troubles</a> that <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1925121/extreme-poverty-threatens-yemenis-living-under-houthi-rule">surfaced in Houthi-controlled areas</a> – poverty, unpaid government salaries, crumbling infrastructure – led to growing disquiet over Houthi governance. Public support for the Houthis slowly eroded without an outside aggressor to blame; Houthi leaders could no longer justify the hardships in Yemen as a required sacrifice to resist foreign powers, namely Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israels-military-campaign-in-gaza-is-among-the-most-destructive-in-history-experts-say">Israel’s attacks in Gaza</a> have provided renewed purpose for Houthis. <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/houthis-involvement-in-gaza-war-a-tactical-move/">Aligning with the Palestinian cause</a> has allowed Houthis to reassert their relevance and has reenergized their fighters and leadership.</p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/yemens-houthis-say-they-fired-ballistic-missiles-towards-israel">firing missiles toward Israel</a>, the Houthis have portrayed themselves as the lone force in the Arab Peninsula standing up to Israel, unlike regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The militia is presenting to Yemenis and others in the region a different face than Arab governments that have, to date, been unwilling to take strong action against Israel.</p>
<p>In particular, Houthis are contrasting their worldview with that of Saudi Arabia, which prior to the October Hamas attack had been <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-israel-normalization-still-table">looking to normalize ties</a> with Israel.</p>
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<h2>Houthi’s PR machine</h2>
<p>The U.S. and U.K. strikes were, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/">the governments of both countries say</a>, in retaliation for persistent attacks by Houthis on international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and followed attempts at a diplomatic solution. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3643830/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-coalition-strikes-in-ho/">aim is to</a> “disrupt and degrade the Houthis’ capabilities,” according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A blurry picture shows an aircraft at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.K. military aircraft takes off en route to Yemen on Jan. 11, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">UK Ministry of Defence via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But regardless of the intent or the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/how-the-us-uk-bombing-of-yemen-might-help-the-houthis">damage caused to the Houthis militarily</a>, the Western strikes may play into the group’s narrative, reinforcing the claim that they are fighting oppressive foreign enemies attacking Yemen. And this will only bolster the Houthis’ image among supporters.</p>
<p>Already, the Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control behind their actions since October 2023. </p>
<p>Dramatic <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-houthi-rebel-attacks-in-the-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping">seaborne raids</a> and the taking hostage of ships’ crews have generated viral footage that taps into Northern Yemeni nationalism. Turning a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940">captured vessel into a public attraction</a> attracted more attention domestically. </p>
<p>Following the U.S.-U.K. strikes on Houthi targets, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree has said the group would <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/yemen-houthi-general-says-attacks-will-not-pass-without-punishment-13046755">expand its attacks in the Red Sea</a>, saying any coalition attack on Yemen will prompt strikes on all shipping through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects to the Arabian Sea at the southern end of the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Weaponizing Palestinian sympathies</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have successfully managed to align the Palestinian cause with that of their own. Appeals through mosques in Yemen and cellphone text campaigns have raised donations for the Houthis by invoking Gaza’s plight. </p>
<p>The U.S.-U.K strikes may backfire for another reason, too: They evoke memories of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/30-years-after-our-endless-wars-in-the-middle-east-began-still-no-end-in-sight/">Western military interventions</a> in the Muslim and Arab world. </p>
<p>The Houthis will no doubt exploit this. </p>
<p>When U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin initially <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/19/us-announces-10-nation-force-to-counter-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea">announced the formation of a 10-country coalition</a> to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on Dec. 18, 2023, there were concerns over the lack of regional representation. Among countries in the Middle East and Muslim world, only Bahrain – home to the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet</a> – joined.</p>
<p>The absence of key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti – where the U.S. has its only military base in Africa – raised <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-12-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/under-irans-auspices-houthis-turn-red-sea-to-an-independent-strategic-threat-zone/0000018c-7452-d48b-a5ec-745308440000">further doubts among observers</a> about the coalition’s ability to effectively counter the Houthis.</p>
<p>Muslim-majority countries were no doubt hesitant to support the coalition because of the sensitivity of the Palestinian cause, which by then the Houthis had successfully aligned themselves with.</p>
<p>But the lack of regional support leaves the U.S. and its coalition allies in a challenging position. Rather than being seen as protectors of maritime security, the U.S. – rather than the Houthis – are vulnerable to being framed in the region as the aggressor and escalating party. </p>
<p>This perception could damage U.S. credibility in the area and potentially serve as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap">al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</a> and similar groups.</p>
<p>The U.S.’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/history-us-support-israel-runs-deep-growing-chorus/story?id=104957109">military and diplomatic support for Israel</a> throughout the current conflict also plays into skepticism in the region over the true objectives of the anti-Houthi missile strikes.</p>
<h2>Reigniting civil war?</h2>
<p>The Houthis’ renewed vigor and Western strikes on the group also have implications for Yemen’s civil war itself.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/moment-truth-yemens-truce">the truce between</a> the two main protagonists in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the Houthis – fighting between the Houthis and other groups in Yemen, such as the Southern Transitional Council, the Yemen Transitional Government and the National Resistance, has reached a deadlock. </p>
<p>Each group controls different parts of Yemen, and all seem to have accepted this deadlock. </p>
<p>But the U.S.-U.K. strikes put Houthi opponents in a difficult position. They will be hesitant to openly support Western intervention in Yemen or blame the Houthis for supporting Palestinans. There remains widespread sympathy for Gazans in Yemen – something that could give Houthis an opportunity to gain support in areas not under their control.</p>
<p>The Yemeni Transitional Government <a href="https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/25465/">issued a statement</a> following the U.S.-U.K. strikes that shows the predicament facing Houthi rivals. While blaming the Houthis’ “terrorist attacks” for “dragging the country into a military confrontation,” they also clearly reaffirmed support for Palestinians against “brutal Israeli aggression.”</p>
<p>While Houthi rivals will likely continue this balancing act, the Houthis face no such constraints – they can freely exploit the attacks to rally more support and gain a strategic advantage over their local rivals.</p>
<p>An emboldened Houthi group might also be less likely to accept the current status quo in Yemen and seize the moment to push for more control – potentially reigniting a civil war that had looked to be on the wane.</p>
<p>The Houthis thrive on foreign aggression to consolidate their power. Without this external conflict as a justification, the shortcomings of the Houthis’ political management become apparent, undermining their governance. During the civil war, Houthis were able to portray themselves as the defender of Yemen against Saudi influence. Now they can add U.S. and U.K. interference to the mix.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The raid follows warnings from Washington to cease attacks in the Red Sea − but it could serve to strengthen rebels and reignite civil war.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210402024-01-12T17:58:14Z2024-01-12T17:58:14ZThe Houthis: four things you will want to know about the Yemeni militia targeted by UK and US military strikes<p>The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (or “supporters of God”), are a violent militia group that currently exercise de facto control over much of northern Yemen. Formed in the 1990s, the group was named after its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, and they follow the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam which represents <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/understanding-houthi-motives-complicated-essential-yemen-future">20-30% of Yemen’s population</a>. </p>
<p>The group’s leadership has been drawn from the Houthi tribe, which is part of one of the three major tribal confederations in Yemen: the Hashid, the Madhaj and the Bakil. The Houthis are part of the Bakil confederation, the largest tribal <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/yemen-s-tribes-and-tribal-confederations.html#:%7E:text=The%20Bakil%20is%20the%20most,to%20Islam%20in%20622%20BC.">group in Yemen</a>. As the UK and US launch <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/11/politics/us-strikes-houthis-yemen/index.html">military strikes</a> on the Yemeni group, after a spate of attacks by the Iran-backed militia on Red Sea shipping, here’s four things that you need to know about them.</p>
<h2>1. Why did the Houthis form?</h2>
<p>In order to understand the rise of the Houthis, it’s first important to lay out the turbulent history of Yemen. Yemen has struggled to build a unified and effective state and has been plagued by weak institutions, weak nationalism, insurgency and secessionism since its formation in 1990. The area that comprises Yemen today was split <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/yemen#:%7E:text=British%20authorities%20left%20southern%20Yemen,Republic%20of%20Yemen%20in%201990.">into two territories, north and south</a> from the 19th century to 1990. After the collapse of the Ottoman empire, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep23345.6.pdf">North Yemen became independent in 1918</a>. The south of Yemen was under British control until 1967. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen <a href="https://yemen.un.org/en/about/about-the-un">(South Yemen)</a> was independent from 1967 to 1990. The two were unified in 1990. </p>
<p>Tribal identities remain strong, particularly in the north, and many different groups have held power. The Zaydi Shiites have fought for control of the territory that we now know as Yemen for thousands of years, with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">some success</a>, and under the Houthis, control parts of northern Yemen.</p>
<p>If we fast forward to the modern era, Yemen has faced constant conflict and state failure. The north was ruled by former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh (a dictator who is part of another tribal group), since 1978, who then took over as president of a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/yemen-saleh-dead/547385/">newly unified Yemen</a> in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/yemen-saleh-dead/547385/">1990 </a>. Saleh’s relatives controlled core parts of the army and economy – and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/25/un-says-ex-yemen-president-saleh-stole-up-to-60bn">corruption was rife</a>. </p>
<p>Tensions arose over the vast majority of Yemen’s resources flowing to Sana'a, the capital of north Yemen, and in particular to Saleh’s Sanhan clan, which is a part of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/40815">Hashid federation</a>. Though the central government managed to keep the country together (Saleh notably claimed that ruling Yemen was like “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/yemen-saleh-dead/547385/">dancing over the heads </a> of snakes”) after the south attempted to secede in 1994, there were many groups that held grievances against the Saleh-led government. </p>
<p>The most notable group to challenge the central government in Yemen were the Houthis. In addition to enduring decades of political marginalisation, neglect, economic exclusion and sometimes terror by the central government, the Houthis were concerned by rising Saudi influence in the country — and with the growing power of <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">Salafism and Wahhabism</a> (seen as imported Saudi religious doctrines) in particular.</p>
<p>But the tipping point for the Houthi movement was likely the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Influenced by the success of Lebanon-based militants Hezbollah in repelling western forces, the Houthis drew inspiration and gained support from the Lebanese-based group, as well as Iran — though their officials <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/12/who-are-the-houthis-iran-backed-group-thrust-into-global-spotlight.html#:%7E:text=U.S.%20and%20U.K.%20strikes%20thrust%20Iran%2Dbacked%20group%20into%20the%20global%20spotlight,-Published%20Fri%2C%20Jan&text=U.S.%20and%20U.K.%20forces%20have,ships%20in%20the%20Red%20Sea">deny their connection</a>.</p>
<h2>2. How did the Houthis gain power?</h2>
<p>To address the growing power of the Houthis, Saleh launched a military campaign in 2003, with the help of Saudi Arabia. Though Saleh’s forces managed to kill Houthi leader, Hussein al-Houthi in 2004, the Houthis often bested Saleh and the Saudi army in spite of billions of dollars <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">spent by the latter</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, the Houthis proved to be a formidable force for the Saudis to contest with, daring to cross into Saudi Arabia in 2009, and forcing the kingdom to deploy its army to address the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">growing Houthi threat</a>. </p>
<p>Since the Yemeni revolution erupted in 2011, the Houthis fought to oust Saleh from power, only to later join forces <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/5/11/yemens-saleh-declares-alliance-with-houthis">with Saleh in 2015</a>. When their alliance crumbled, it was the Houthis who had the upper hand, with the rebel group <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-in-fresh-fighting">killing Saleh</a> in December 2017. </p>
<p>The Houthis have also been a major force in the ongoing Yemeni civil war (which began in 2014), which has caused an estimated <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">377,000 deaths</a>, many of them civilians. Though it is the government in the south that is internationally recognised, the Houthis have taken over much of northern Yemen, since they stormed Sana'a in 2014. They control the key port of Hudeidah, which generates up to US$1 billion (£784,000,000) in revenues for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/10/britain-warns-severe-consequences-houthi-attack-red-sea-repelled">the Houthi government</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Yemen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569081/original/file-20240112-19-2mcjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A map of Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-yemen-on-world-map-2316757833">Matthew Nichols1/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. What is their regional influence?</h2>
<p>Today, the Houthis have an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/12/yemen-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-what-attacking-us-uk-airstrikes-red-sea-crisis">estimated 20,000 fighters</a>. Since the death of al-Houthi, the movement has been primarily led by his brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who has stated that he will not hesitate to attack <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/jan/11/we-will-not-hesitate-american-attack-will-lead-to-greater-response-says-houthi-leader-video">the US and its allies</a>.</p>
<p>Since the war started in Gaza in October, the Houthis have tried to capitalise on the conflict to raise their international profile, and as a show of power that could gain them more negotiating influence. Claiming to be in solidarity with the Palestinian people, the Houthis initiated a series of attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea, the narrow end of which is overlooked by Yemen. The most brazen attack took place on November 19 2023, when militants used a helicopter to abduct the crew of a car carrier that was linked to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/12/yemen-houthi-rebels-who-are-they-what-attacking-us-uk-airstrikes-red-sea-crisis">an Israeli businessman</a>.</p>
<h2>4. Do they control Red Sea access?</h2>
<p>Though most of the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea have not been successful, they have forced thousands of ships to bypass the route and divert around South Africa—adding <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-red-sea-attacks-on-cargo-ships-could-disrupt-deliveries-and-push-up-prices-a-logistics-expert-explains-220110">significant costs and time</a>.</p>
<p>In retaliation for the dozens of attacks on the Red Sea, the US and the UK have responded with their largest attack against the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/13/us-enters-yemen-war-bombing-houthis-who-launched-missiles-at-navy-ship">Houthis since 2016 </a>, when the US struck three Houthi missile sites with cruise missiles after the Houthis fired on the US navy and commercial vessels. This called a temporary halt to Houthi attacks. But now, with the Houthis confident that they have been victorious against the Saudis and the west in Yemen, the rebels seem more eager than ever to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-11/houthi-leader-vows-big-response-to-any-us-military-assault">take on the US head on</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Houthis have taken over much of northern Yemen, since they stormed the capital, Sanaa in 2014.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207872024-01-10T14:43:45Z2024-01-10T14:43:45ZHouthi rebel Red Sea attacks and the threat of escalation and supply chain chaos are a major headache – and not just for the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568616/original/file-20240110-29-ygje5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C1200%2C790&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Show of strength: an image released by the UK ministry of defence, of the Royal Navy responding to the Houthi attack.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Owen Cooban/Ministry of Defence</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US and UK warships have repelled a mass drone attack launched by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/10/britain-warns-severe-consequences-houthi-attack-red-sea-repelled">Yemeni Houthis rebels</a> in the Red Sea. The incident, which reportedly involved a barrage of 20 rockets, drones and cruise missiles, was the largest concerted attack to be launched by the Iran-backed rebels. The UK defence secretary, Grant Shapps, called the attacks “unacceptable” and said that the consequences for the Houthis will be “severe”.</p>
<p>The UN security council will consider a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/09/un-yemen-houthis-shipping-red-sea-resolution-attacks/8972606a-af71-11ee-9a32-5c9e6aa28b3b_story.html">resolution</a> proposed by the US that condemns the Houthi attacks and demands they cease immediately.</p>
<p>The US has assembled a multinational naval task force to respond to the threat to Red Sea shipping. But, so far, these efforts have had limited effects and – in an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/politics/middle-east-war-disaster-can-still-be-avoided/index.html">increasingly volatile Middle East</a> – options are running out.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/17/us-to-announce-expanded-protection-force-for-red-sea-shipping">Operation Prosperity Guardian</a>, as the task force is called, has not yet managed to deter Houthis nor to sufficiently limit the number of attacks to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/business/maersk-red-sea-shipping-suspended/index.html">restore confidence</a> in the Red Sea route within the shipping sector. The rebels have not hesitated to innovate and diversify their attack methods to continue putting pressure on trading nations. For instance, in addition to aerial drones and missiles they have recently used <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/01/05/red-sea-war-trade-disruption-drone-boat-explosion/">maritime drones</a>.</p>
<h2>Asymmetrical threat</h2>
<p>The threat posed by the Houthis is a classic case of <a href="https://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html">asymmetrical warfare</a>. With limited means, they have enough leverage to disrupt the global economy. Freedom of navigation and the stability of global maritime supply chains are crucial for liberal economies that are highly dependent on the free flow of goods at sea.</p>
<p>This is in no way limited to western nations. The Red Sea accounts for <a href="https://www.navylookout.com/should-hms-queen-elizabeth-be-deployed-to-the-red-sea-region/">about 15%</a> of global sea traffic. Even landlocked countries and those located far away from the Red Sea depend on distant maritime supply chains for their imports and exports.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the top of the Red Sea region with Bab al Mandab Strait in focus, December 3, 2023." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strategic nightmare: Houthi rebels in Yemen can threaten the safety of shipping heading to or from the Suez canal, imperilling global supply chains.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/red-sea-region-bab-al-mandab-2399808119">Below the Sky/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is why Houthi attacks have a disproportionate impact. The rising insurance premiums and the costs of rerouting ships via the Cape of Good Hope will slowly but steadily trickle down to businesses and consumers all over the world. This shift might have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/03/what-is-the-red-sea-crisis-and-what-does-it-mean-for-global-trade">enduring long-term impacts</a> on the global economy.</p>
<p>To counter such an asymmetric threat, defending commercial shipping rather than preventing and deterring attacks is not proving efficient. The naval response, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-12-19/can-us-led-naval-force-protect-ships-oil-in-red-sea-persian-gulf?leadSource=uverify%20wall">costly</a> for participating nations. Given the cost of surface-to-air missiles used by western navies to destroy much cheaper Houthi drones, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/20/middleeast/us-destroyers-houthi-drones-red-sea-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">the cost-benefit ratio</a> is negative, although this does not account for the cost of a ship and its cargo.</p>
<p>But deterring Houthi attacks is equally arduous because <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-led-taskforce-deploys-in-red-sea-as-middle-east-crisis-threatens-to-escalate-beyond-gaza-220164">politically motivated combatants</a> are willing to engage in deadly combat and are not afraid of military or political escalation in the region.</p>
<h2>No good option on the table</h2>
<p>Recent efforts by the US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, have been directed at <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/07/politics/blinken-israel-middle-east-tensions/index.html">containing the war</a> in Gaza and preventing it to spread to the whole region. But the patience of the US, the UK and others is running out, and there is a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/saudi-arabia-ready-to-back-us-air-strikes-on-houthi-rebels-jmpj26mm0">growing consensus</a> around the need to strike Houthi positions on land.</p>
<p>The UK’s chancellor of the exchequer, <a href="https://twitter.com/BBCr4today/status/1743548099937636531">Jeremy Hunt</a>, acknowledged that these attacks “may have an impact”. He said the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67900935">rebels have been warned</a> “that there will be consequences and we will not just sit back and accept that because it’s so vital for global trade”. This is no exaggeration.</p>
<p>His remarks followed a pledge from Shapps, that the UK “won’t hesitate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/31/britain-considering-airstrikes-on-houthi-rebels-after-red-sea-attacks">to take further action</a> to deter threats to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea”.</p>
<p>Depending on their political mandate, the rules of engagement of navies operating in the Red Sea can be adapted, for instance, to include the targeting of hostile naval assets at sea or even ashore. But there is a big difference between shooting down incoming missiles or destroying small vessels that target civilian traffic at sea and striking Houthi positions on land. In the current geopolitical context, this is a decision to take with due consideration.</p>
<p>Indeed, airstrikes entail further risks of regional escalation, for instance, drawing other countries in the region, such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/us/politics/iran-us-israel-conflict.html">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/saudi-arabia-ready-to-back-us-air-strikes-on-houthi-rebels-jmpj26mm0">Saudi Arabia</a>, into the conflict. Houthis and their backers might even be content for the war in Gaza to further escalate. Elsewhere, Putin’s Russia will <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">also benefit</a> from any scenario in which western attention and resources would be drawn away from Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">Israel-Gaza conflict: an opportunity for Putin while the world is distracted</a>
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<p>Yet if the Houthi threat is not dealt with – and if commercial shipping must divert from the Red Sea for a prolonged period – then the cumulative impacts on the global economy will be detrimental to most nations, in the west and beyond.</p>
<p>Interestingly, instability in the Red Sea is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/china-benefiting-middle-east-strife/32766139.html">neither in China’s interest</a> nor in the interests of any other non-western large trading nations because their economies are strongly and undeniably dependent on the global maritime supply chain.</p>
<p>In Washington, London and other major capitals, finding the right balance between defence and coercion will be key to securing peace in the Middle East while protecting the global maritime supply chain. Time is running out for both.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Iran-backed Houthi rebels have the power to significantly destabilise global trade by endangering maritime activity in the Red Sea.Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201642023-12-20T11:45:57Z2023-12-20T11:45:57ZUS-led taskforce deploys in Red Sea as Middle East crisis threatens to escalate beyond Gaza<p>The US is reportedly <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-joins-us-taskforce-as-houthis-attack-more-ships-in-red-sea-nzwr8mfmm">considering strikes</a> against Houthi rebels in Yemen that have been menacing commercial ships in the Red Sea since the conflict began in Gaza. The Pentagon has a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-19/us-weighs-whether-to-attack-houthis-beyond-defensive-task-force">range of options for missile attacks</a> on Houthi positions and has moved the Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group into position off the coast of Yemen.</p>
<p>Since November 2023, the Iran-backed Houthis have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-red-sea-crisis-explained-houthis-austin-israel-gaza-iran-shipping-suez-drones-yemen-task-forse-153-red-sea/">conducted several attacks</a> on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Their attacks have increased navigation risks in the region and affected risk perception in the maritime sector. The economic and geopolitical implications are felt much beyond the coast of Yemen.</p>
<p>The world economy is strongly dependent on the global maritime supply chain. About <a href="https://unctad.org/topic/transport-and-trade-logistics/review-of-maritime-transport">80% of international trade</a> by volume is transported by sea. This figure rises to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/623085988fa8f56c2614da97/board-of-trade-paper-maritime-trade-embracing-the-ocean.pdf">95% for the UK</a>. From mobile phones to clothes and from coffee to sugar, the manufactured items we use and the food we consume on a daily basis have been, at least in part, transported by sea.</p>
<h2>Supply chain vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>It does not take much to disrupt the global maritime supply chain. For instance, a simple accident that blocked the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56559073">Suez Canal for six days in 2021</a> or the shortage of labour in Chinese ports during the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/covid-19-impact-on-global-shipping-and-chinas-economy/">COVID pandemic</a> have been enough to negatively affect maritime supply chains and the global economy.</p>
<p>Intentional disruptions of the maritime supply chain by pirates or terrorists pose a challenge that goes beyond simple logistics.</p>
<p>Attacks on civilian shipping directly affect insurance premiums and deter operators from transiting through certain areas for financial and security reasons. The private maritime sector is <a href="https://assets.lloyds.com/media/35d9c95b-4e90-4be1-88a0-c05534c28ad1/Lloyds_shifting_powers_emerging_risk_report_v6.pdf">not immune to geopolitics</a>, and higher insurance premiums or the cost of rerouting ships eventually trickle down to consumers.</p>
<p>Piracy is a for-profit criminal activity that has disrupted maritime trade for decades, especially in eastern and western Africa. States have devoted <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/PiracyArmedRobberydefault.aspx">substantial resources</a> to deter and combat pirates, both at sea (for example deploying a <a href="https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/">naval task force</a> to patrol shipping lanes) and on land to address the underlying <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-pirates-attack-geospatial-evidence/#:%7E:text=Lawlessness%20and%20weak%20governance%20create,encroachment%20by%20industrial%20fishing%20fleets.">socioeconomic causes</a> of piracy.</p>
<p>Politically motivated groups, including terrorist organisations, pose a different type of threat. Their primary objective is not to make money but to increase the visibility of their organisation, or to exercise leverage on other political actors at the regional or global level.</p>
<p>This is achieved by conducting attacks that increase risk and risk perception in a given area, disrupt maritime supply chains, and have disproportionate impacts on the geopolitical situation.</p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>The Houthis are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/who-are-yemens-houthis-why-are-they-attacking-red-sea-ships-2023-12-19/">politically motivated</a>. Their attacks aim to have an impact on the war in Gaza. Their location along a major sea lane of communication in the Red Sea gives them an asymmetrical advantage when it comes to attacking commercial shipping.</p>
<p>Major shipping companies and operators, from Maersk to BP, have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67748605">paused operations</a> in the Red Sea. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67758126">Oil prices</a> are expected to rise. Consequently, Houthis’ attacks affect commerce and the economy much beyond the Red Sea. But options to address the threat are limited.</p>
<p>Politically motivated groups are more difficult to deter than pirates, because they are often willing to die for their cause. They are not looking for a ransom or bounty, but are trying to destroy or damage ships and disrupt shipping, so deploying vessel protection detachments or private security companies personnel onboard will have minimal or no effect.</p>
<h2>Military response</h2>
<p>Failing to deter Houthis from attacking commercial shipping, the second-best option is to increase naval presence to patrol the Red Sea. But this is not without political risks, since a further militarisation of the crisis might be used by the Houthis and others to <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/a-precarious-moment-for-yemens-truce.html">inflame the geopolitical situation</a> in Yemen and in the whole region.</p>
<p>As part of what it has called “Operation Prosperity Guardian”, the US has assembled an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/attacks-red-sea-navy-mission-missiles-286d51bfd65e741e839e185f0f4a455b">international naval task force</a> – including UK naval assets – which will have capabilities to intercept missiles and defend commercial shipping in case of an attack. </p>
<p>But, with a limited number of warships to patrol a large area and with early warning time for missile attacks limited due to the proximity of Yemen, it will be difficult to successfully defend against absolutely all attacks and prevent any damage from occurring.</p>
<p>That said, the symbolic value of such a task force is important. The task force’s success will be evaluated based on its ability in the short-term to <a href="https://www.imscsentinel.com/news/merchant-shipping-reassurance">add to existing mechanisms</a> to reassure insurers, operators and global markets that the route is safe enough for shipping operations, without risking military escalation in an extremely turbulent region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A US-led naval taskforce has deployed in the Red Sea and is considering strikes on rebel positions in Yemen.Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192202023-12-06T05:58:58Z2023-12-06T05:58:58ZWhy Yemen’s Houthis are getting involved in the Israel-Hamas war and how it could disrupt global shipping<p>In recent days, three Israeli-linked commercial vessels were <a href="https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1731424734829773090">targeted</a> by ballistic missiles and drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, marking a clear escalation in maritime attacks in the critical Bab el Mandab strait between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. </p>
<p>The Houthis have claimed responsibility for two of the attacks, as well as an earlier <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/20/yemen-houthi-rebels-seize-cargo-ship-galaxy-leader-red-sea-israel">hijacking of a Japanese-operated cargo ship by helicopter</a> last month. </p>
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<p>On Sunday, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree reemphasised that all Israeli-affiliated vessels travelling along the Yemeni coast would be fair game if Israel does not cease its attacks on Gaza, which have claimed the lives of at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/03/israel-hamas-war-live-israeli-attacks-on-gaza-continue-overnight-macron-warns-israels-plan-to-eliminate-hamas-risks-decade-of-war?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-656d0f678f081cf41dfd25b1">15,500 Palestinians</a> since October 7. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Who are Yemen's Houthis?</a>
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<h2>Who are the Houthis?</h2>
<p>The Iranian-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, are insurgents that control most of Yemen’s north, including the nation’s capital, Sana'a. </p>
<p>The group emerged in the 1990s as a political-religious revivalist movement out of the Zaydi sect from Yemen’s northern highlands, namely the ancient city of Saada. The movement’s broad motivations emerged from longstanding grievances that left many Zaydis feeling like second-class citizens within the wider Yemeni social and political order.</p>
<p>Many in the Houthi leadership received religious education in Iran before returning to Yemen in the early 2000s and becoming more politically active. The Houthis are not mere Iranian “proxies”, however. Attempts to portray them as such tend to overemphasise this connection and ignore the indigenous nature and causes of the movement and its ideology. </p>
<p>The group engaged in ongoing struggles against the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/5/yemen-who-was-ali-abdullah-saleh">Ali Abdullah Saleh-led</a> Yemeni government throughout the 2000s, ultimately contributing to its collapse following the 2011 Arab revolts. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-may-finally-be-returning-to-yemen-but-can-a-fractured-nation-be-put-back-together-203668">Peace may finally be returning to Yemen, but can a fractured nation be put back together?</a>
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<p>Following the Arab Spring and increasing chaos in Yemen, the Houthis gained significant momentum. In 2014, they were able to oust the Saudi-backed transitional government and seize power over much of Yemen, rapidly blitzing into the country’s south – a move that shocked international onlookers in its brazenness and efficacy. </p>
<p>In response, a Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition launched a <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/9518">military intervention</a>, which they believed would rapidly overwhelm the insurgents with their technological superiority. </p>
<p>The operation went awry, however. Thanks to their own tenacity, along with increasing support from Iran, the Houthis were able to bog down the coalition forces into a bloody stalemate. This brought untold misery to the wider Yemeni population, but allowed the Houthis to hold onto power over much of the country’s north. A series of backchannel negotiations led to a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/catching-back-channel-peace-talks-yemen">halt in the fighting in 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Although peace talks officially commenced in April, Yemen remains in a state of precarious peace. Because this is such a critical time for the Houthis, it begs the question: why are they risking their hard-won gains over a conflict thousands of kilometres away that doesn’t directly involve them? </p>
<h2>Why Israel?</h2>
<p>The Houthis are part of the so-called “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/11/15/what-is-irans-axis-of-resistance">axis of resistance</a>”, an alliance of proxy militant and insurgent groups that Iran has built throughout the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>Within this wider context, Israel has attempted to implicate Iran in Red Sea attacks, but Tehran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-denies-involvement-red-sea-ship-seizure-by-yemens-houthis-2023-11-20/">denies it</a>. </p>
<p>To interpret the Houthi attacks on Israel as solely an extension of Iran’s wider geopolitical manoeuvring would be overlooking a crucial Houthi political strategy. The group’s support of the Palestinians is also a way of garnering domestic and regional support for its own position in Yemen. </p>
<p>While many countries in the region have <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-behind-new-israel-uae-peace-deal">sought a detente with Israel</a> in recent years, it’s clear that support for the Palestinians remains high among the wider Arab population. As such, the Houthis clearly see an opportunity to step into the vacuum and generate positive public opinion for their cause. </p>
<p>This not only strengthens the Houthis’ authority at home, but is also critical to reinforcing the legitimacy of the Houthis as Yemen’s governing authority in the eyes of the international community.</p>
<h2>Why is the Bab el Mandab Strait important?</h2>
<p>Yemen has always been at the centre of regional geopolitics due to its strategic location on the Bab el Mandab Strait, also known as the “Gate of Tears,” which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean beyond. </p>
<p>Because vessels need to traverse the 30-kilometre-wide strait to travel between Europe and Asia (via the Suez Canal), it serves a pivotal role in global trade and energy security. Oil and natural gas shipments pass through the strait from the Middle East to Europe and North America. </p>
<p>Historically, the strait is no stranger to conflict. In 1973, for instance, Egypt <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jan-feb-2023/19711">blockaded</a> the strait to prevent ships from reaching Israel during the <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-october-1973-war/">October war</a>. </p>
<p>The Houthis are aware of how critical this waterway is. And its attacks on the vessels, which may seem to be a nuisance for now, could potentially cause larger problems for Israel and its allies. </p>
<p>For Israel, diverting its shipments to Asia around the southern tip of Africa – instead of through the Red Sea – would significantly increase shipping costs and transit times.</p>
<p>Any disruption to this trading route would have serious global economic costs, as well. Global maritime insurance companies are already <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/120323-multiple-attacks-reported-on-shipping-by-houthi-drones-and-missiles-in-red-sea">hiking their prices</a> and limiting their coverage of high-risk shipping as a direct result of the Houthi attacks.</p>
<p>The Houthi threat also serves to ratchet up the wider tensions in the region, potentially changing the calculus of the US and Israel, who might become more cautious in their actions as a result.</p>
<p>For the Houthis, these provocations are ultimately low cost and high return. Given the insurgent, battle-hardened and dispersed nature of the group, for example, it would be difficult for Israel or its allies to try to respond to the attacks. So, as long as the war in Gaza drags on, the Houthis will likely continue to play a disruptive role and look for new ways to create uncertainty and risk in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Houthis are not mere Iranian proxies in the war. Their support for the Palestinians is also aimed at garnering domestic and international support for the group’s position in Yemen.Leena Adel, PhD Candidate, Political Science and International Relations, Curtin UniversityBen Rich, Senior Lecturer in History and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188482023-12-05T13:12:52Z2023-12-05T13:12:52ZSocotra archipelago: why the Emiratis have set their sights on the Arab world’s Garden of Eden<p>Days into COP28 in Dubai, one little-known archipelago has come into sharp relief: Socotra. Composed of four small Yemeni islands, Socotra has been in the sights of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ever since the civil war in Yemen erupted in September 2014. The UAE has been part of the Saudi-led coalition – backed logistically by the United States – against the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels since March 2015, but Socotra has been spared by the civil war and Houthis thus far.</p>
<h2>One of the world’s most biodiverse islands</h2>
<p>Known for its unique and abundant wildlife, Socotra was believed to be the original location of the Garden of Eden. The archipelago is listed as a <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1263/">Unesco World Heritage site</a> to protect what is considered one of the world’s most biodiverse and distinctive islands. Naturalists and environmentalists estimate that 37% of 825 plant species 90% of its reptiles and 95% of its land snails exist nowhere else in the world.</p>
<p>The archipelago is increasingly in the UAE’s sights because of its strategic location between the navigable waterways of the Gulf, Africa and Asia. It’s a potential linchpin for shipping, logistics and military defence or projection, and could allow the UAE to advance their geostrategic goals while countering those of competitors and adversaries. The Emirates are also thought to be eyeing Socotra for its touristic development potential and this would represent a sure threat to the archipelago’s biodiversity. But how real are these scenarios?</p>
<h2>Old Emirati ties</h2>
<p>It would be easy to frame UAE’s influence in Socotra in terms of “intrusion”. Such a narrative, however, glosses over the Socotrans’ and Emiratis’ historic ties, which long predate the war. In the late 1950s, before the oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi, some Emiratis – especially traders from Ajman – migrated to the island while, conversely, many Socotrans settled in the sheikhdoms in the ‘60s for work.</p>
<p>Currently, about 30% of Socotra’s population live in the UAE, above all north of Dubai in <a href="https://gulfstateanalytics.com/socotra-denying-rivals-of-refuge/">Ajman emirate</a>. The UAE has strengthened its economic, military and cultural influence in the archipelago, all while Socotra Island underwent deep social change following its special conservation status decreed in 2000 by the United Nations. Known as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260871562_Soqotra's_Conservation_Zoning_Plan_in_the_marine_realm_Achievements_limitations_and_the_way_forward">Soqotra’s Conservation Zoning Plan</a>, the new binding environmental regime effectively turned the island into a <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cy/1766">national park and placed it under the international supervision</a>. The Arab Spring also spread to its capital in 2011, inspiring locals to rise against <a href="https://merip.org/2012/05/revolution-in-socotra/">Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh</a>. The Emiratis took advantage of this period of instability to weave patronage networks.</p>
<p>The Emirati presence has therefore accelerated the politicisation and militarisation of Socotra. Nevertheless, Socotra is still being studied mostly through the lenses of environmentalists and anthropologists, rather than of political scientists and security experts. This makes it difficult to obtain reliable information on the archipelago’s political and military make-up.</p>
<h2>From isolation to political awareness</h2>
<p>In Socotra’s history, the issue of being ruled from the outside has always been a powerful <em>topos</em>, probably due to its geographical remoteness. The 2011 Yemeni uprising encouraged debate about autonomy among islanders and, later, the rise of the Emirati presence in the archipelago has boosted fears of foreign interference.</p>
<p>In 2011-12, protests in Hadiboh, the island’s largest town – remarkably recounted by the anthropologist <a href="https://merip.org/2012/05/revolution-in-socotra/">Nathalie Peutz</a> – echoed the slogans heard in the Yemeni cities of Sana’a and Taiz calling for political reform and the end of the regime and its corruption. <a href="https://merip.org/2012/05/revolution-in-socotra/">Internet access has since been on the rise</a>, with locals shifting into two camps: those claiming for a Socotran governorate, and those demanding autonomy from the central government. Little by little, political awareness took root. Competing councils opposed official authorities, perceived as corrupt and inefficient: these councils mirrored the party politics’ divisions of the mainland. In 2013, Socotra became a governorate on its own, since it was previously under the administrative authority of Hadhramawt (Eastern Yemen) and, before, the Southern port city of Aden.</p>
<p>Then the archipelago was struck by a series of cyclones, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/fourth-uae-aid-ship-reaches-socotra-1.50668">Chapala</a> and <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/death-toll-climbs-as-cyclone-megh-batters-yemen-1.36283">Megh</a> in 2015 and <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/uae-sends-aid-to-help-socotra-recover-from-cyclone-mekunu-1.738573">Mekunu in 2018</a>, wreaking havoc on the island’s infrastructure and nature. In response, the Emiratis rebuilt mosques, created a water network and established the Shaykh Zayed City with education and <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/uae-s-role-in-yemen-s-socotra-essential-for-development-and-reconstruction-says-sheikh-hamdan-1.7289">health facilities</a>. They also rebuilt the port of Hadiboh and the airport. </p>
<p>The pattern wasn’t new: in the Southern regions of Yemen, the UAE had already established considerable influence in the port cities of Mokha, Aden and Mukalla, operating and expanding infrastructures. By doing so, the Emiratis capitalised on patronage ties with Southern groups and militias, mostly linked to the <a href="https://www.yemenpolicy.org/institutional-prerequisites-for-the-stc-coup-in-aden-and-perspectives-on-the-jeddah-deal-2/">pro-secessionist and UAE-backed</a> Southern Transitional Council (STC). Reconstruction in Socotra has intertwined with commercial and tourism-oriented initiatives, with weekly flights now linking <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/37c1ce68-ea4e-4c97-978e-531c11bbbfb6">Abu Dhabi to Hadiboh</a>.</p>
<h2>Emirati and Saudi boots</h2>
<p>The deployment of Emirati troops and armoured vehicles in Socotra in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20180506-uae-says-military-presence-yemens-socotra-distorted">2018</a> was a watershed moment for the island. Deployment occurred without coordination with local authorities, still loyal to the internationally recognised government. <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/uae-deploys-to-yemen-island-to-protect-residents-1.727456">According to Emirati officials</a>, the UAE sent troops to “support [Socotra’s residents], in stability, health care, education, and living conditions”. <a href="https://acleddata.com/2019/05/31/yemens-fractured-south-socotra-and-mahrah/">Many locals</a>, especially from Muslim Brotherhood’s sympathisers opposed to the UAE, protested, urging for their removal. Seeking to resolve the situation, Socotra’s authorities arranged for the mediation of Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh-brokered compromise resulted into the Emirati withdrawal of most forces and equipment from the island.</p>
<p>But in coordination with the local governor, Saudi Arabia sent soldiers to Socotra on a <a href="https://apnews.com/8b09a56849ee432890f488a019f61cc7/config/newrelic/prod">“training and support mission”</a> for Yemeni forces and to operate the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-military-withdraws-yemens-socotra-under-saudi-deal">port and airport</a>. Moreover, the Saudi agreement included comprehensive <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-military-withdraws-yemens-socotra-under-saudi-deal">“development and relief”</a> for Socotra, revealing that the kingdom had its own <a href="https://www.spa.gov.sa/w689247">development projects</a>. Because of local divisions and foreign interference, the mainland tussle between Yemen’ pro-government forces (backed by Saudi Arabia) and the STC (supported by the UAE and secessionist interests) reached the island.</p>
<p>Since 2019, the STC increased its presence on the island, with fighters mostly coming <a href="https://orientxxi.info/magazine/yemen-the-socotra-archipelago-threatened-by-the-civil-war,4988">from Aden and the Southwest</a>. According to other sources, however, locals are trained by the UAE in Aden and then deployed in Socotra as part of the Emirati-backed and pro-STC <a href="https://acleddata.com/2019/05/31/yemens-fractured-south-socotra-and-mahrah/">“Security Belt Forces”</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Video of Eva zu Beck, a travel influencer." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562477/original/file-20231129-15-yrse3g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In recent years, Socotra has become an increasingly popular destination for tourists. Above, a screenshot of a video of Eva zu Beck, a travel ‘influencer’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screenshot</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>UAE flags fluttering at check points</h2>
<p>In 2020, after Socotra’s governor opposed the establishment of a local pro-Emirati elite force, the STC finally took control of the island, prompting Saudi forces to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-saudi-forces-abandon-security-points-in-socotra/1831978">quickly withdraw</a>. A <em>de facto</em> coup by the STC, it allowed the Emiratis to indirectly control the island, with the wages of Socotran civil servants reportedly <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210607-yemen-s-socotra-isolated-island-at-strategic-crossroads">paid by the UAE</a>, and a unit of the local Coast Guard <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/socotra-coast-guard-battalion-defects-uae-backed-southern-separatists">pledging its allegiance</a>. An AFP report from 2021 also describes that “the STC’s banners are dwarfed by far larger UAE flags fluttering at police checkpoints”, while newly erected communication masts <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210607-yemen-s-socotra-isolated-island-at-strategic-crossroads">link phones directly to UAE networks</a> rather than Yemen.</p>
<p>Much indicates that the island has undergone extensive militarisation. In April 2019, reports emerged that the UAE was building a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/socotra-yemen-civil-war-uae-saudi-arabia-occupation-military-emirates-a8360441.html">military base on the island</a>, close to the rebuilt <a href="https://acleddata.com/2019/05/31/yemens-fractured-south-socotra-and-mahrah/andmanagedbytheSTC">Hawlaf port</a>.</p>
<p>In 2020, <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80827">Ahmed Nagi</a>, one of the few political researchers able to visit Socotra recently, wrote “the island has become a regional football”. For analysts working abroad, information mainly comes from UAE media outlets <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/2021/07/31/uae-has-pledged-110-million-in-humanitarian-aid-to-socotra-since-2015/">aligned with the government</a>, or from media linked to <a href="https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/01/02/673875/UAE-establishing-second-military-airport-on-Yemen%E2%80%99s-strategic-Socotra-Island,-report-says">UAE’s regional rivals</a>. As long as reliable information on political and military issues in Socotra remains scarce, analysts continue to have a hard time assessing the impact of “development” and “foreign intervention” on the region’s Garden of Eden.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleonora Ardemagni ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Long a well-kept secret, the archipelago of Socotra is one of the most biodiverse on earth. But the Emirates have other plans for its main island, with which it has long cultivated ties.Eleonora Ardemagni, Teaching Assistant ("New Conflicts") Catholic University of Milan, Senior Associate Research Fellow at ISPI, and Adjunct Professor at ASERI ("Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Security Implications"), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore - Catholic University of MilanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168522023-11-01T23:51:23Z2023-11-01T23:51:23ZHow Houthi attacks affect both the Israel-Hamas conflict and Yemen’s own civil war – and could put pressure on US, Saudi Arabia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557170/original/file-20231101-23-25znxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C78%2C3494%2C2243&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A poster of rebel leader Abdul-Malek al-Houthi is held aloft during anti-Israel protests in Yemen.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yemens-houthi-supporters-hold-banners-and-flags-as-they-news-photo/1745360875?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Yemen’s Houthi movement <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-houthis-iran-34eab8bc1d3cf3606d874166fef2f018">launched missiles and drones at Israel</a> on Oct. 31, 2023 – provoking fears of a dangerous escalation of the Middle East conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>With the militia – which <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">controls part of the Arabian Peninsula state</a> – vowing further attacks, Israel countered by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-deploys-missile-boats-red-sea-regional-tensions-surge-2023-11-01/">sending missile boats</a> to the Red Sea. They join <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/10/30/uss-bataan-uss-carter-hall-will-linger-in-red-sea">U.S. warships already deployed</a> in the area.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">Mahad Darar</a>, a Yemeni politics expert at Colorado State University, to explain what is behind the Houthis’ involvement in the war – and how it could risk not only widening the conflict but reigniting hostilities in Yemen itself.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Houthis?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Houthi group</a>, also known as Ansar Allah, is an armed militia of the Zaydi Shia sect in Yemen. They ousted Yemen’s transitional government led by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in a 2014 coup and have since been engaged in a bloody civil war with the ousted administration, which is backed by Saudi Arabia. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-envoy-visits-gulf-help-expand-yemen-truce-launch-peace-process-state-dept-2023-08-14/">truce has stemmed fighting</a> in the country, with the Houthis currently in control of most of northern Yemen.</p>
<p><iframe id="P6Wxe" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/P6Wxe/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Why did the Houthis attack Israel?</h2>
<p>In the first analysis, one can argue that the Houthis are part of a broader regional alliance with Iran. As such, the attack on Israel can be seen as showcasing both the Houthis’ – and Iran’s – military capabilities to both local and regional audiences. Indeed, some analysts argue that the reason <a href="https://www.state.gov/illegal-iranian-flow-of-weapons-to-yemen/">Tehran supplied the Houthis with long-range missiles</a> was so it could <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-771066">pose a threat to both Israel</a> and also Tehran’s rival in the region: Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>However, although it may seem that the Houthis are acting as an Iranian proxy, the main reason the militia launched the attack could be to gain domestic support. Houthi leadership may be trying to present the group as the dominant force in Yemen willing to challenge Israel – a country that is <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-726753">generally unpopular in the Arab world</a>.</p>
<p>This approach helps the Houthis outmaneuver local rivals and unite the Yemeni public behind the cause of Palestinian liberation. It also allows the militia to carve out a unique stance in the region, setting them apart from Arab governments that have so far been unwilling to take strong action against Israel – such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-after-israel-gaza-conflict-says-it-does-not-mix-trade-with-politics-2023-10-10/">severing ties</a> in the case of more Israel-friendly states, such as United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and others. </p>
<p>In particular, the Houthis will want to present a different face to the Arab world than Saudi Arabia, which had been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-israel-saudi-arabia-normalization-hamas-246213034afa75e4dff27e71362a1979">looking to normalize ties with Israel</a>. Saudi Arabia, it should be added, is the main backer of the internationally recognized Yemeni government – one of the Houthis’ main opponents in the civil war.</p>
<p>It is also important to note that there appears to be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/25/uae-egypt-lebanon-leaders-israel-hamas-war/">growing popular discontent in Arab countries</a> over the perceived weak stance of their governments toward Israel. But due to the authoritarian nature of many of these regimes, public opinion has little influence on policy.</p>
<p>This does not, of course, change the fact that the Houthis themselves <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/02/06/the-houthi-model-of-government">run a theocratic regime</a> with no democratic values.</p>
<p>Plus, launching a missile or a couple of drones is relatively cheap for the Houthis, especially considering the benefits they might gain from the action.</p>
<h2>How could the Houthi attack affect the Israel-Hamas conflict?</h2>
<p>Some analysts have suggested that an attack by the Houthis heightens the chances of overwhelming Israel’s defense systems, if it forms part of a
<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-warns-israel-of-axis-response-as-fears-grow-of-regional-war-/7309548.html">coordinated effort</a> involving
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>But this idea falls short for two reasons:</p>
<p>First, the Houthis likely have fewer <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/">ballistic missiles than Hezbollah</a> and Hamas and realistically stand little chance of inflicting much damage on Israel. Moreover, they will be mindful of keeping these missiles for their own use in the ongoing civil war in Yemen – which poses a more immediate threat to the group than Israel does.</p>
<p>The threat from the Houthis toward Israel is far smaller than both Hezbollah and Hamas, whose fighters can cross a land border to enter Israel.</p>
<p>Second, the imprecision of the Houthi missiles means that any attack also poses a risk to countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, as these projectiles could land in their territories and cause damage. In fact, drones reportedly launched by the Houthis have already caused explosions after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosion-heard-egyptian-red-sea-town-near-israeli-border-witness-2023-10-27/">erroneously crashing in Egypt</a>.</p>
<h2>Could the Houthi attack affect US thinking on the conflict?</h2>
<p>There is a scenario in which the Houthi attacks may benefit Israel. The strike plays into a narrative that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-warns-multi-front-war-far-more-likely-for-israel-than-limited-conflicts/">Israel is facing a multi-front war</a> sponsored by Iran, potentially escalating tensions between Iran and both Israel and the United States.</p>
<p>And this could bolster the arguments of <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/us-iran-war-bad-idea-why">hawks within the U.S. foreign policy establishment</a> who are pushing the U.S. toward a more confrontational stance against Iran. </p>
<p>On the flip side, any perceived threat from the Houthis gives Iran more of a negotiation card in the wider context of regional disputes such as over Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran will be keen to position itself as a country with an array of proxies, capable of wreaking havoc in the region should it wish. </p>
<h2>Could the attack be Iran’s bidding?</h2>
<p>Houthi actions <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/">primarily serve their own interests</a> rather than those of Iran. </p>
<p>And unlike Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Syria – which have <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/attacks-us-forces-iraq-syria-american-airstrikes/#:%7E:text=U.S.%20troops%20have%20been%20attacked,proxies%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria.">recently attacked U.S. troops</a> – the Houthis have not targeted U.S. forces in the region. If the Houthis were truly in the same basket as other Iranian proxies, I believe they would have targeted the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/">nearest U.S. stationed base</a>, which is Djibouti. </p>
<p>But Houthi leadership will be mindful that such an attack would not only be unpopular among the Yemeni population but also would potentially come at a high cost to themselves.</p>
<p>Unlike Hezbollah and Hamas, which are focused on resisting Israeli occupation, the Houthis are <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">primarily concerned with local issues</a> within Yemen. Historically, members of the Zaydi Shia sect have managed Yemen’s issues without foreign support, going back hundreds of years <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">before they were overthrown in 1962</a>.</p>
<p>That said, the Houthis haven’t shied away from appearing aligned with Iran of late, mainly because they rely heavily on Iranian supplies of weapons.</p>
<h2>What could this mean for the Yemen civil war?</h2>
<p>Negotiations between Houthis, Saudis and the Saudi-led coalition backing the Yemeni government forces <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-23/yemen-s-fragile-truce-needs-more-than-talks-to-survive">are at a delicate point</a>.</p>
<p>Recently, it was reported that the Houthis <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-30/saudi-arabia-clashes-with-yemen-s-houthis-rebels-putting-kingdom-on-high-alert?embedded-checkout=true">killed four Saudi soldiers</a> just days after Saudi Arabia <a href="https://allarab.news/saudi-arabia-shoots-down-houthi-missile-from-yemen-heading-towards-israel/#:%7E:text=The%20Wall%20Street%20Journal%20reported,intercepted%205%20missiles%20towards%20Israel.">shot down a missile</a> from the Houthis that was headed for Israel. </p>
<p>In the latest Houthi attack, the missiles passed through Saudi territory uninterrupted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-houthis-iran-34eab8bc1d3cf3606d874166fef2f018">before being shot down by Israel</a>. It is unclear whether this is an indication that the Saudis heeded the Houthis’ warning, which is potentially why they didn’t shoot down the latest missiles. To know more about the true state of Saudi-Houthi negotiations, there needs to be greater evidence, such as increased clashes between the Saudis and Houthis, or even a direct attack by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>But if Houthi missile attacks escalate in the coming days, it could put Saudi Arabia in a difficult spot. At that point, the Saudis would face a difficult choice. They could allow the Houthis’ missiles to continue passing through their land or they could try to shoot them down. But that would risk jeopardizing diplomatic efforts with both the Houthis and Iran. And that, I feel, seems very unlikely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Missiles from rebel Yemeni groups risk widening the Middle East conflict. But the motivation behind the attacks could be more about self-interest.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096522023-08-03T12:22:20Z2023-08-03T12:22:20ZHeadlines and front lines: How US news coverage of wars in Yemen and Ukraine reveals a bias in recording civilian harm<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539048/original/file-20230724-27-ct2t0q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. has provided Ukraine more than $75 billion in military and other aid to support its war efforts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-and-ukrainian-president-volodomyr-news-photo/1534873306">Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>War entails suffering. How and how often that suffering is reported on in the U.S., however, is not evenhanded.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemen-understanding-the-conflict-98296">Saudi-led intervention in Yemen</a> in March 2015 and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-invades-ukraine-5-essential-reads-from-experts-177815">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a> in February 2022. The media attention afforded to the crises reveals biases that relate less to the human consequences of the conflicts than to the United States’ role and relationship with the warring parties involved.</p>
<p>In Yemen, the <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/03/19/who-is-arming-the-yemen-war-an-update/">U.S. is arming</a> and <a href="https://quincyinst.org/report/the-yemen-war-in-numbers-saudi-escalation-and-u-s-complicity/">supporting the Saudi-led coalition</a>, whose airstrikes and blockades have caused immense human suffering. Meanwhile in Eastern Europe, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/russia-ukraine-war-us-arms-package">U.S. is arming</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/politics/russia-generals-killed-ukraine.html">aiding Ukraine’s efforts</a> by helping to counter missile strikes that have targeted civilian infrastructure and to retake occupied territories where <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russia-bucha-killings-war-crimes-genocide/629470/">horrific killings</a> have taken place.</p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tQr7IA0AAAAJ&hl=en">genocide and other mass atrocities</a>, as well as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=es&user=CNHYRTIAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">international security</a>, we compared New York Times headlines that span approximately seven and a half years of the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the first nine months of the conflict in Ukraine. </p>
<p>We paid particular attention to headlines on civilian casualties, food security and provision of arms. We chose The New York Times <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/272790/circulation-of-the-biggest-daily-newspapers-in-the-us/">because of its popularity</a> and reputation as a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/239784/credibility-of-major-news-organizations-in-the-us/">credible and influential source</a> on international news, with an <a href="https://www.nytco.com/journalism/journalists-on-the-ground/#:%7E:text=Our%201%2C700%20journalists%20report%20from,and%20celebrations%20of%20human%20achievement.">extensive network</a> of global reporters and over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/pulitzer-winners-new-york-times">130 Pulitzer Prizes</a>. </p>
<p>Purposefully, our analysis focused solely on headlines. While the full stories may bring greater context to the reporting, headlines are particularly important for three reasons: They frame the story in a way that <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/headlines-change-way-think">affects how it is read and remembered</a>; reflect <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2022.2138946">the publication’s ideological stance on an issue</a>; and, for many news consumers, are the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/19/americans-read-headlines-and-not-much-else/">only part of the story that is read</a> at all.</p>
<p>Our research shows extensive biases in both the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2228715">scale and tone of coverage</a>. These biases lead to reporting that highlights or downplays human suffering in the two conflicts in a way that seemingly coincides with U.S. foreign policy objectives.</p>
<h2>Ukraine in spotlight</h2>
<p>War in Ukraine is clearly seen as more newsworthy to U.S. readers. This double standard may have less to do with the actual events than that the victims are white and “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/western-media-coverage-ukraine-russia-invasion-criticism">relatively European</a>,” as one CBS News correspondent put it. </p>
<p>Our broad search of New York Times headlines concerning the overall civilian impact of the two conflicts yielded 546 stories on Yemen between March 26, 2015, and Nov. 30, 2022. Headlines on Ukraine passed that mark in under three months and then doubled it within nine months.</p>
<p>Front-page stories on Ukraine have been commonplace ever since the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-biden.html">Russian invasion</a> began in February 2022. In comparison, front-page stories on Yemen have been rare and, in some cases, as with coverage on food security in the country, came more than three years after the coalition initiated blockades that led to the crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters wrap themselves in a Ukrainian flag and hold signs that say 'Fight like Ukrainian' and 'Russia is a terrorist state'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in New York City call for more U.S. aid to Ukraine to help defeat Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-gathered-on-union-square-in-support-of-ukraine-news-photo/1381627299">Lev Radin/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first front-page article with explicit focus on the hunger crisis was published on June 14, 2018, with the headline “Saudi-Led Attack Deepens the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis.” By this point, 14 million Yemenis were already facing “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/11/bachelet-urges-states-power-and-influence-end-starvation-killing-civilians?LangID=E&NewsID=23855">catastrophic food insecurity</a>,” according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. </p>
<h2>More context on Ukraine</h2>
<p>When we analyzed headlines on Yemen and Ukraine, we classified them as either “episodic,” meaning focused on specific events, or “thematic,” meaning more contextual. An example of an episodic headline is “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/world/middleeast/apparent-saudi-strike-kills-at-least-nine-in-yemeni-family.html">Apparent Saudi Strike Kills at Least Nine in Yemeni Family</a>.” An example of a thematic headline is “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/27/world/russia-ukraine-war">Ferocious Russian Attacks Spur Accusations of Genocide in Ukraine</a>.”</p>
<p>New York Times headlines on Yemen were mostly focused on events, accounting for 64% of all headlines. In contrast, headlines on Ukraine involved a greater emphasis on context, accounting for 73% of total articles. The reason this is important is that by focusing more on either episodic or contextualized stories, newspapers are able to lead readers to different interpretations.</p>
<p>The largely episodic headlines on Yemen may give the impression that the harm reported is incidental, rather than symptomatic of the coalition’s violence. Meanwhile, contextual articles on Ukraine trace the broader implications of the conflict and reflect stories of continual Russian responsibility and accountability.</p>
<h2>Differences in assigning blame</h2>
<p>Accountability in coverage is also vastly different. We found 50 headlines on Yemen that reported on specific attacks carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. Of them, 18 – just 36% – attributed responsibility to Saudi Arabia or the coalition. An egregious example that omits responsibility is this headline from April 24, 2018: “Yemen Strike Hits Wedding and Kills More Than 20.” A reader could easily interpret that as meaning that Yemen rebels were behind the attack rather than the Saudis – as was the case.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine a Russian strike on a wedding in Ukraine headlined as “Ukraine Strike Hits Wedding and Kills More Than 20.”</p>
<p>Over the period we looked at, there were 54 headlines on specific attacks in Ukraine – 50 of which reported on Russian attacks, with the remaining four reporting on Ukrainian attacks. Here, of the 50 headlines about Russian attacks, 44 of them – or 88% – explicitly attributed responsibility to Russia. Meanwhile, none of the four headlines on Ukrainian attacks attributed responsibility to Ukraine. This shows the selectivity of responsibility attribution – clear in Ukraine when covering Russia’s actions, but often obscured when it comes to the Saudi-led coalition’s attacks in Yemen.</p>
<p>Furthermore, a June 2017 headline portrays the coalition as concerned about the destruction it has caused: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-arms-training-yemen.html">Saudis Move to Address Civilian Toll in Yemen</a>.” Compare this to how Russia’s attempts to address civilians are categorically dismissed: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/russian-civilian-attacks-ukraine.html">Russia’s Explanations for Attacking Civilians Wither Under Scrutiny</a>.”</p>
<h2>A tale of two humanitarian crises</h2>
<p>Both invasions have led to situations of food insecurity – in Yemen creating a <a href="https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/25f57d2bbfa54e41ae3fc1e5c4216f0b/download/?_ga=2.41222050.1090321873.1690389264-401591055.1690389264">national risk of famine</a>, and in Ukraine compromising <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/war-ukraine-global-food-shortage/31872861.html">global grain supply</a>. However, the way the news stories speak about hunger in both countries has little in common. </p>
<p>Russian actions blocking grain exports and destroying crops and agricultural infrastructure are portrayed as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/europe/russia-ukraine-food-supply.html">deliberate and weaponized</a>: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/mariupol-ukraine-russia-war-food-water.html">How Russia Is Using Ukrainians’ Hunger as a Weapon of War</a>.”</p>
<p>In contrast, the Saudi-led coalition’s blockade, despite being the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians">primary driver</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-are-starving-yemenis-to-death-mbs-khashoggi-famine-yemen-blockade-houthis/">of the famine</a> and even <a href="https://www.omct.org/site-resources/files/Torture-in-slow-motion_September-2022.pdf">equated to torture</a> by the World Organisation Against Torture, was rarely afforded this intent. In fact, coverage of the hunger crisis often did not mention the coalition at all, such as in this March 31, 2021, headline: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-war.html#:%7E:text=Six%20years%20into%20a%20war,vulnerable%20to%20disease%20and%20starvation">Famine Stalks Yemen, as War Drags on and Foreign Aid Wanes</a>.” </p>
<p>Out of 73 stories broadly about food security in Yemen, only four unequivocally attributed rising starvation to the actions of the coalition and condemned their role. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Mother holds her baby who receives medical treatment" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A child suffering from malnutrition receives treatment at a hospital in Sanaa, Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/child-suffering-from-malnutrition-is-being-treated-with-news-photo/1258305665">Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moral outrage vs. neutrality</h2>
<p>Headlines on Ukraine tend to invoke moral judgments, we found, compared with a more neutral tone on Yemen. Russia is portrayed as a violent, relentless and merciless villain: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/world/europe/ukraine-russia-putin.html">Russian Forces Pound Civilians …</a>” and “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-biden.html">Russia Batters Ukraine …</a>.” In turn, Ukrainians are presented as heroes who are fighting for the survival of their nation, and they are humanized in their suffering: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/world/europe/ukraine-family-perebyinis-kyiv.html">They Died by a Bridge in Ukraine. This Is Their Story</a>.”</p>
<p>This moral positioning on the conflict in Ukraine is not necessarily a problem. After all, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/public-editor/the-truth-about-false-balance.html">falsely equating</a> Ukraine’s actions with those of Russia fails to account for Russian aggression, which initiated the armed conflict, as well as Russia’s routine targeting of civilian sites. </p>
<p>However, it is noteworthy that New York Times headlines on Yemen fail to employ similarly condemnatory narratives toward the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. This is despite reports produced by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/2291/2015/en/">human rights</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/30/targeting-saada/unlawful-coalition-airstrikes-saada-city-yemen">organizations</a>, <a href="https://yemendataproject.org/">conflict</a> <a href="https://acleddata.com/middle-east/yemen/">trackers</a>, and <a href="https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/39/43">international and regional experts</a> that have blamed the coalition for the vast majority of civilian suffering. </p>
<p>As a consequence, Yemeni civilians become forgotten victims, unworthy of attention and obscured by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-war.html#:%7E:text=Six%20years%20into%20a%20war,vulnerable%20to%20disease%20and%20starvation">opaque numbers</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/world/middleeast/yemen-doctors-without-borders-hospital-bombing.html#:%7E:text=Bombing%20of%20Doctors%20Without%20Borders%20Hospital%20in%20Yemen%20Kills%20at%20Least%2015,-Give%20this%20article&text=SANA%2C%20Yemen%20%E2%80%94%20At%20least%2015,and%20local%20health%20ministry%20officials.">detached language</a> on the consequences of coalition violence, and narratives of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-biden.html#:%7E:text=War%20in%20Yemen.-,Ending%20the%20War%20Is%20Harder.,bombs%20are%20no%20longer%20used.">inevitability of war</a>. These editorial decisions obscure the role of the U.S. in Yemeni suffering – even if they do not reflect the underlying intent behind the reporting. </p>
<h2>Journalism of deference</h2>
<p>In both the Yemen and Ukraine conflicts, the U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars – more than <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">US$75 billion</a> in humanitarian, financial and military assistance to Ukraine and over <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105988">$54 billion</a> in military support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2015 and 2021 alone.</p>
<p>What’s different is that the U.S. is essentially on opposite sides in these conflicts when it comes to its relationship to those inflicting the most civilian casualties. Washington officials have made open and direct declarations about the inhumanity of atrocities in Ukraine while <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/07/us/politics/saudi-yemen-war-us-weapons.html">avoiding inquiry and condemnation</a> of those in Yemen. Our research suggests that such messaging may be supported by the news media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An analysis of over 1,000 headlines shows key differences in how US media portray the aggressors and victims in the two conflicts.Esther Brito Ruiz, Adjunct Instructor, American University School of International ServiceJeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077172023-06-23T12:27:51Z2023-06-23T12:27:51ZThere is no legal reason the US can’t supply cluster bombs to Ukraine – but that doesn’t justify Biden’s decision to do so<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533480/original/file-20230622-5172-r9f59p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C25%2C4214%2C2799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The remains of a rocket that carried cluster munitions found in a Ukrainian field.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-remains-of-a-rocket-that-carried-cluster-munitions-news-photo/1258233929?adppopup=true">Alice Martins/For The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Biden administration announced on July 7, 2023, that it would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cluster-munitions-ukraine-expected-fridays-800m-aid-package-2023-07-07/">send cluster bombs to Ukraine</a> – a deeply controversial move given the munition is prohibited by more than 120 countries because of risks to civilian populations.</p>
<p>The U.S. has been here before. It <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/29/politics/saudi-arabia-us-cluster-bombs-on-civilians/index.html">provided Saudi Arabia with cluster munitions</a> – which <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/what-is-a-cluster-bomb.aspx">contain bomblets that can scatter</a> across a wide area, often not exploding until later – during the kingdom’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44466574">military intervention in Yemen</a>.</p>
<p>Washington <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/exclusive-white-house-blocks-transfer-of-cluster-bombs-to-saudi-arabia/">suspended sales of cluster bombs to the Saudis</a> in 2016 following mounting concern over the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/yemen-children-among-civilians-killed-and-maimed-in-cluster-bomb-minefields/">toll they were taking on civilian lives</a>. But the U.S. is still <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/03/09/coalition-calls-us-swiftly-ratify-global-treaty-banning-cluster-bombs">holding out from joining</a> an <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/home.aspx">international ban on cluster bombs</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">scholar of the law of war</a>, I know that cluster bombs highlight a reality about the use and regulation of weapons, even those that can cause widespread civilian suffering: These munitions are not in themselves illegal, but their usage can be. Furthermore, the decision by the U.S. to provide Ukraine with cluster bombs could weaken the argument against others’ doing likewise. And that, in turn, could increase the chances of cluster bombs’ being deployed illegally.</p>
<h2>Effective or indiscriminate?</h2>
<p>Cluster munitions have been <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/cluster-munitions-factsheet-230710.htm#:%7E:text=Cluster%20munitions%20were%20first%20used,to%20kill%20or%20injure%20combatants.">part of nations’ arsenals since World War II</a>. Delivered by air or ground artillery, they have been used by the <a href="https://asiasociety.org/northern-california/legacies-war-laos">United States in Laos and Vietnam</a> during the Vietnam War, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/8/13/life-among-israeli-cluster-bombs-in-lebanon#:%7E:text=Four%20million%20cluster%20munitions%20were,spread%20across%2015.23%20square%20kilometres.">Israel in southern Lebanon</a>, <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/use-of-cluster-bombs/a-timeline-of-cluster-bomb-use.aspx">the U.S. and U.K. in Iraq</a>, Russia and Syria <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/28/russia/syria-widespread-new-cluster-munition-use">in the ongoing Syrian civil war</a>, and the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/06/yemen-saudis-using-us-cluster-munitions">Saudis in Yemen</a>. And now they are being <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">deployed in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="v689T" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/v689T/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>If deployed responsibly, they can be an effective military tool. Because they can spread hundreds of bomblets across a wide area, they can prove a potent weapon against concentrations of enemy troops and their weapons on a battlefield. In 2017, a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-POLICY-ON-CLUSTER-MUNITIONS-OSD071415-17.pdf">U.S. Department of Defense memo</a> said cluster munitions provided a “necessary capability” when confronted with “massed formation of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise location are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets.” And on June 22, 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1671935568664559632">it was reported</a> that the Department of Defense has concluded that cluster bombs would be useful if deployed against “dug-in” Russian positions in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-POLICY-ON-CLUSTER-MUNITIONS-OSD071415-17.pdf">the Department of Defense argued</a> that in some limited circumstances cluster bombs can be less destructive to civilians. In Vietnam, the U.S. sanctioned the use of cluster bombs – over more powerful bombs – to disrupt transport links and enemy positions while <a href="https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/nat-sec/Vietnam/Linebacker-and-the-Law-of-War.html">minimizing the risk of destroying nearby dikes</a>, which would have flooded rice fields and caused widespread suffering to villagers.</p>
<p>Still, their use has always been controversial. The problem is that not all the bomblets explode on impact. Many remain on the ground, unexploded until they are later disturbed – and that increases the chances of civilians’ being maimed or killed. Their use in urban settings is particularly problematic, as they cannot be directed at a specific military target and are just as likely to strike civilians and their homes.</p>
<h2>Cluster bombs under international law</h2>
<p>Concern over the risk to civilian harm led in 2008 to a <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/2008-convention-cluster-munitions#:%7E:text=The%20Convention%20on%20Cluster%20Munitions,international%20treaty%20prohibiting%20these%20weapons.">Convention on Cluster Munitions</a>, which bans their use, production or sale by member states.</p>
<p>But as of 2023, the convention is legally binding for only the 123 states that are signatories – and Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. are not among them. Nor can they – or any of the other countries yet to sign up to the convention – be compelled to join the ban.</p>
<p>As such, there is no legal reason that Ukraine or Russia cannot deploy cluster bombs in the current conflict – as <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">both have done</a> since the invasion of February 2022. Nor is there any legal reason the Biden administration can’t sell the munitions to Ukraine.</p>
<p>But there are laws that set out how cluster bombs can be used, and how they must not.</p>
<p>The relevant part of international humanitarian law here is 1977’s <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977">Additional Protocol I</a> to the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a>, which both Ukraine and Russia have ratified. The additional protocol sets out rules the warring parties must observe to limit harm to civilians. Acknowledging that civilian deaths are an inevitable part of war, <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-51">Article 51 of Additional Protocol I</a> prohibits “indiscrimate” attacks. Such attacks include those employing a weapon that cannot be directed at a specific military target or of such a nature to strike military targets and civilians and civilian objects without distinction.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-57">Article 57 of the additional protocol</a> stresses that attacking armies have a duty of care to spare civilian populations. This includes taking “all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack.”</p>
<p>Neither article specifies any weapons deemed off-limits. Rather, it is how the weapons are used that determines whether the attack constitutes an indiscriminate one and hence a crime under international law.</p>
<h2>More than an ‘optical’ risk?</h2>
<p>Even if cluster bombs are not inherently indiscriminate – a claim that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/06/anyone-can-die-at-any-time-kharkiv/">advocates of an international ban</a> put forward – their use in urban settings greatly increases the chance of civilian harm. In 2021, <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348668/CMM2022_PPT.pdf">97% of cluster bomb casualties were civilians</a>, two-thirds of whom were children. And the experience of cluster bomb use in Syria and Yemen shows that it can be difficult to hold governments to account.</p>
<p>Which is why Ukraine’s request for U.S. cluster munitions has led to concerns. The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">Cluster Munitions Monitor</a>, which logs international use of the bombs, found that as of August 2022, Ukraine was the only active conflict zone where cluster bombs were being deployed – with Russia using the weapon “extensively” since its invasion, and Ukraine also deploying cluster bombs on a handful of occasions.</p>
<p>Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-seeks-us-cluster-bombs-adapt-drone-use-lawmakers-2023-03-06/">reportedly sought some of the United States’ stockpile</a> of Cold War-era MK-20 cluster bombs to drop on Russian positions via drones. The White House had previously <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/biden-administration-ukraine-cluster-munitions-00073316">aired “concern</a>” over the transfer.</p>
<p>In announcing the decision to send U.S.-made cluster bombs to Ukraine, Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cluster-munitions-ukraine-expected-fridays-800m-aid-package-2023-07-07/">noted that</a> “cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance,” adding: “This is why we’ve deferred the decision for as long as we could.”</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s earlier hesitancy was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/biden-administration-ukraine-cluster-munitions-00073316">reportedly over the “optics</a>” of selling cluster bombs and that it may introducing a wedge between the U.S. and other NATO countries over the weapon’s use. </p>
<p>Certainly, there would be very little legal risk under international law of providing cluster bombs to Ukraine – or any other nation – even if that country were to use the weapon illegally.</p>
<p>There is no case I know of in which a state has been found legally responsible for providing weapons to another that flagrantly misuses them – there is no equivalent to efforts in the U.S. seeking to hold gun manufacturers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/can-us-gunmakers-be-liable-mass-shooting-2022-05-25/">legally responsible for mass shootings</a>, or state “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dram_shop_rule">dram shop laws</a>” that hold the suppliers of alcohol culpable for the actions of an inebriated driver.</p>
<p>Yet one of the things that worried people in Congress regarding the sale of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia was that the Saudis’ <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/07/yemen-coalition-drops-cluster-bombs-capital">consistently indiscriminate use of those weapons</a> in Yemen could be seen at home and abroad as making the U.S. complicit in those violations.</p>
<p>I would argue that it became difficult for Washington to continue to supply the Saudis on moral ground. But still, there was and is presently no clear-cut legal obligation for the U.S. to stop supplying other nations with cluster bombs.</p>
<p>In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will deliberately use U.S.-supplied cluster munitions to target civilians and their environs. </p>
<p>And Ukraine provided “written assurances that it is going to use these in a very careful way,” Sullivan said in announcing the transfer.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, providing Ukraine with cluster weapons could serve to destigmatize them and runs counter to international efforts to end their use. And that, in turn, could encourage – or excuse – their use by other states that may be less responsible.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story was updated on July 7, 2023, in light of the Biden administration’s decision to supply Ukraine with cluster bombs.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US administration said that it had received ‘written assurances’ from Ukraine that it would use cluster bombs carefully. Nonetheless, the munition will provide an additional risk to civilians.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047242023-05-05T12:13:03Z2023-05-05T12:13:03ZCan China broker peace in Yemen – and further Beijing’s Middle East strategy in the process?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524428/original/file-20230504-17-av4fuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5742%2C3837&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Houthi fighter patrols an area during Yemen's civil war.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fighter-of-the-houthi-group-stands-while-patrolling-at-al-news-photo/1409540631?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After nearly a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">decade of grinding conflict</a>, Yemen looks to be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/11/progress-on-yemen-peace-talks-despite-prisoner-swap-delay">inching toward a peace deal</a>.</p>
<p>Talks between the Houthi movement controlling much of the country’s north and Saudi Arabia, the regional power backing an anti-Houthi coalition in the war, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-houthi-peace-talks-yemens-sanaa-conclude-with-further-rounds-planned-2023-04-14">are ongoing</a> and being <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">encouraged by international observers</a>.</p>
<p>On May 1, 2023, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-lenderkings-travel-to-the-gulf-4/">U.S. announced that it had sent</a> Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking to the Persian Gulf to “advance ongoing efforts to secure a new agreement and launch a comprehensive peace process.”</p>
<p>But the U.S. has far less of a role in steering negotiations than <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/04/07/yemen-war-ceasefire-china-saudi-arabia-iran/">Washington’s great global rival: China</a>. The recent breakthrough in Yemen has been undergirded by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia</a>, facilitated by Beijing in March 2023.</p>
<p>As an academic who specializes in <a href="https://polisci.colostate.edu/faculty-and-staff/mmahad/">U.S. and Chinese strategic engagement</a> across eastern Africa and the Middle East, I appreciate that the diplomatic breakthrough brokered by Beijing has implications for the region. It has the potential to reduce rivalries and strengthen stability in Yemen, along with other countries prone to sectarian violence, including Lebanon and Iraq.</p>
<p>But it has also led to speculation over China’s emergence as a major regional player in the Middle East. The development not only <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/15/world/us-saudi-china-relations-intl/index.html">challenges the United States’</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/world/asia/china-saudi-arabia-iran-us.html">long-established dominance</a> in the Gulf, but it also raises questions about Beijing’s strategic agenda and motives.</p>
<h2>Fragmentation and regional dynamics</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/the-broader-context-behind-chinas-mediation-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi-Iran breakthrough</a> might contribute to a lasting peace in Yemen.</p>
<p>But given the role that the rivalry between the regional powers has had in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks.html">fueling the fighting</a>, international observers have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1135477">expressed optimism</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">disintegration of Yemen</a> began with the collapse of its central government in 2011 after the Arab Spring uprising. In 2014, the Houthi group, a Shiite militia backed by Iran, took control of the capital, Sanaa, and forced transitional President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee to Aden. Hadi’s government struggled to establish itself in Aden and eventually relocated to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he resigned in 2022.</p>
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<p>Viewing the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia">Houthis as an Iranian proxy</a>, Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni conflict, backing those loyal to Hadi and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">bombarding Houthi areas from the air</a>. These <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/23/un-yemen-recovery-possible-in-one-generation-if-war-stops-now">Saudi-led attacks</a> contributed to a massive humanitarian crisis. The conflict has resulted in the <a href="https://yemen.un.org/en/176632-yemenunct-annual-report-2021">deaths of at least 377,000 Yemenis</a>, the United Nations projected in 2021, many through indirect causes such as starvation and disease. It has also led to widespread displacement of civilian populations and the breakdown of infrastructure.</p>
<p>The country remains fragmented, with militias controlling separate territories and no functional central government.</p>
<h2>China’s path through Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>So where does China come in? Beijing has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/">no formal diplomatic, economic or political ties</a> with any the numerous militias that currently govern parts of the country. But before 2014, China had a healthy trading and economic relationship with Yemen. According to the World Bank, in 2013 China was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=CN">Yemen’s second-largest trading partner</a> after Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Since 2014, trade between China and Yemen persisted, albeit in a mostly informal manner. Data from the international trade-tracking Observatory of Economic Complexity indicates that <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/yem">China imported US$411 million worth of products</a>, mainly crude oil but also copper, from Yemen in 2021. What remains unclear is which rebel factions have received revenue through the trade. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China has maintained formal <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/china-and-yemens-forgotten-war">diplomatic and economic ties</a> with Iran, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – each of which back militias involved in Yemen’s war. In fact, China has been intensifying its economic and political connections with all three regional powers. </p>
<p>In recent years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-china/xis-visit-to-uae-highlights-chinas-rising-interest-in-middle-east-idUSKBN1KA26K">visited both the UAE</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/08/1141202088/xi-jinping-saudi-arabia-china">Saudi Arabia</a> to underscore Beijing’s growing role as a partner in the region. Xi also <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230216_11025776.html">recently hosted Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi</a> during a state visit to China.</p>
<h2>What’s to gain from peace?</h2>
<p>This expanding relationship with key players in the Yemeni conflict puts China in a unique position as a potential peace broker. Yet uniting the three regional powers around a common peace plan has to date proved difficult.</p>
<p>The UAE can influence Yemeni factions it has provided military and financial support to, including the “<a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b728d5ba.html">Security Belt” forces</a> affiliated with the transitional government. However, the Emiratis’ goals may differ from those seeking a unified, independent Yemen. Since the conflict broke out, the UAE has displayed a tendency to undermine Yemen’s territorial integrity through, for example, taking <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/28/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-consolidating-strategic-positions-in-yemens-east-and-islands/">control of some Yemeni islands, such as Socotra</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Iran may be reluctant to accept any peace agreement that would diminish its influence in Yemen. Tehran’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">relationship with the Houthis</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/the-limits-of-irans-influence-on-yemens-houthi-rebels">has not been as consistently</a> solid as some outside observers suggest, but ties have <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/houthis-and-iran-a-war-time-alliance-121951">grown as a result of the conflict</a>. Should hostilities cease, the Houthis’ military dependence on Iran would decrease, diminishing Iran’s leverage.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, of the three, stands to gain the most from peace in Yemen. Cessation of conflict would likely halt <a href="https://apnews.com/article/4338ea6186ebefcd752c2c6e8f45d7a3">Houthi attacks</a> on the kingdom, save the Saudis money and resources dedicated to the Yemeni war, and potentially restore an international reputation tarnished by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">alleged war crimes in the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>To broker peace in Yemen, China would presumably need to concentrate efforts on working with the Saudis. </p>
<p>The Chinese-backed rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran could be a first step to this end. Although no direct mention of Yemen is made in the language of the agreement, it <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202303/t20230311_11039241.html">does talk of</a> both sides’ support for “the non-interference in internal affairs of states” and “keenness to exert all efforts towards enhancing regional and international peace and security.”</p>
<p>And since that agreement in March, there has been progress toward peace in Yemen. A Saudi delegation led by the kingdom’s ambassador to Yemen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-omani-delegations-arrive-sanaa-hold-talks-with-houthi-leader-2023-04-09/">held talks with Houthi leaders in Sanaa</a> on April 9. The talks were the first direct negotiations between the two sides on Yemeni soil since the war began in 2015.</p>
<h2>The thinking in Beijing</h2>
<p>But why is China invested in what happens in an ongoing conflict far from its borders – especially when it is already consumed with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-military-taiwan-us-7549c646a377f1f199d2cda983573279">perceived strategic and military threats</a> closer to home?</p>
<p>The argument that a cessation of hostilities in Yemen would <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/">grant China economic benefits</a> by <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/bab-al-mandab.htm">providing access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait</a> – a key strategic channel on the Arabian peninsula for commerce and trade, with an estimated 4% of global oil supply passing through it – ignores some critical factors, I believe. Rebuilding a war-shattered Yemen and establishing a stable government may take time – and the investment required to do so might outweigh short-term economic gains.</p>
<p>Moreover, China already has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3">a military base in Djibouti</a>, giving it access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait even without peace in Yemen.</p>
<p>It could be that China is seeking to be seen as a global peacemaker as part of a strategy that has been referred to as “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/02/olympics-china-uyghurs-genocide-boycott/">diplomatic whitewashing</a>” – that is, making friends overseas and playing the “nice guy” to distract from China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037">treatment of its Uyghur minority</a> at home and Xi’s increasingly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/20/world/asia/xi-china-us.html">confrontational posture on Taiwan</a> and the South China Sea.</p>
<p>But it also fits a wider geopolitical trend. The counterbalance to China’s growing role in the Middle East is the declining influence of the United States in the region.</p>
<p>Priorities in Washington have shifted to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">strategic concerns in East Asia</a> <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/why-the-united-states-must-stay-the-course-on-ukraine/">and Ukraine</a>, leading to a diplomatic opportunity for China – one Beijing is seemingly keen to exploit.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia have cooled, in part due to the Yemeni war. And Washington has had <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-iran/">no formal diplomatic relations with Iran</a> for decades.</p>
<p>As a neutral player, China can engage with Tehran and Riyadh in a way the U.S. simply cannot. That was evident in China’s role in the rapprochement, and it could be the case in resolving Yemen’s war.</p>
<p>For China, it provides opportunities for another diplomatic success from which it could emerge as a reliable partner in a changing geopolitical landscape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204724/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Yemen’s brutal civil war has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. But a recent Beijing-brokered rapprochement between two regional powers could unlock a path to peace.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043912023-04-25T13:10:57Z2023-04-25T13:10:57ZOmar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522631/original/file-20230424-1289-n7envf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese in Khartoum protest the 2021 military coup that blocked a transition to civilian rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1956 the Sudanese have lived through <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/26044/sudan-coup-timeline/">35 coups, attempted coups and coup plots</a> – more than any other African country. When the 2019 uprising against long-time dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">Omar al-Bashir</a> created a military-civilian transitional government, the Sudanese hoped that their country would <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-can-avoid-past-mistakes-by-drawing-lessons-from-its-history-115470">transition to democratic rule</a>. </p>
<p>But their hopes were dashed in October 2021 when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">led a coup</a> against his civilian counterparts in the transitional government. </p>
<p>In the latest round of conflict that began on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">15 April 2023</a>, civil war looms as the security actors who benefited from Bashir’s downfall battle for supremacy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.ncl.ac.uk/hca/people/profile/willowberridge.html">studied Sudanese politics</a> for 15 years, and this latest round of conflict is the worst in the country’s recent history. And the legacy of Bashir’s rule is central to this calamity.</p>
<p>Bashir <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2021.1882385">bent government institutions</a> to serve his regime. He chose conflict over compromise in dealing with politically marginalised groups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/20-years-since-war-began-in-sudans-darfur-suffering-continues">Darfur</a>, in Sudan’s west, and in the south. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">used force</a> to hold on to power. This fuelled <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Bashir-repression-in-Sudan/4552902-5158960-eifsgw/index.html">his support</a> of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was used to check regional rebels and the army. </p>
<p>Bashir’s legacy has continued to play out today. His former allies have mobilised to block the transition to civilian rule. This had been promised to the Sudanese people under a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/return-civilian-rule-sudan#:%7E:text=The%20Sudanese%20military%20and%20a,in%20an%20October%202021%20coup.">framework agreement</a> signed in December 2022 by the military and a coalition of civilian actors.</p>
<p>In my view, Burhan’s fear of civilian attempts to rein in military privileges led him to preserve key elements of the Bashir system. This is playing a divisive role in the current conflict.</p>
<h2>The ideology of Islamism</h2>
<p>Part of Bashir’s legacy has to do with Islamist politics. It’s this legacy that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a> and who heads the paramilitary force, sought to exploit to his favour when he labelled Burhan a “<a href="https://twitter.com/GeneralDagllo/status/1647887773011959809">radical Islamist</a>”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1647887773011959809"}"></div></p>
<p>This characterisation was designed to <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-turmoil-why-hemeti-taking-aim-radical-islamists">appeal to Western powers</a>. But it’s inaccurate. To understand why, one has to understand the ideological trajectory of the Bashir regime.</p>
<p>When Bashir staged the coup in 1989, he was acting as a representative of a cell in a military carefully cultivated by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-National-Front">National Islamic Front</a>. The political party co-ordinated the coup with Bashir. </p>
<p>The National Islamic Front was led by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">Hasan al-Turabi</a>, who had run Sudan’s Islamic Movement since the 1960s. He had grown frustrated at his failure to introduce his version of Muslim law (Sharia), through parliamentary means. </p>
<p>Soon after the coup, Bashir and Turabi initiated a process of <em>tamkeen</em> (empowerment). This policy, the legacy of which still remains, enabled them to give <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7062-sudans-popular-uprising-and-the-demise-of-islamism">adherents of Islamism</a> and security bosses willing to ally with them control over almost every part of public life in Sudan.</p>
<p>Formally, Bashir installed an independent, technocratic government. In practice, however, power lay with a military-Islamist coalition that ran the country behind the scenes. </p>
<p>Throughout the 1990s, Bashir set about ruthlessly purging Sudan’s independent civil society organisations and political parties. By the end of the decade, he’d fallen out with Turabi. </p>
<p>He ejected Turabi from the government in 1999 and co-opted selected representatives of the opposition into his regime in the decades that followed. Bashir maintained the military-Islamist coalition as the basis of his National Congress Party. This kept the edifice built through tamkeen in place.</p>
<h2>Making amends</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, the Sudanese government hosted <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">radical Islamists</a> who sought to export revolution abroad and topple neighbouring regimes deemed to be Western proxies. However, after the split with Turabi in 1999, the Bashir regime attempted to <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-sudans-genocidal-regime-a-cia-favorite">repair its international image</a> by distancing itself from such militant groups. It also began to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>In the later Bashir period, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-sudan-idUSKCN0SC0E120151018">Sudanese government supported</a> the Saudi-Emirati coalition against the militant Islamist Houthis in Yemen. <a href="https://www.sudanakhbar.com/488615">Burhan oversaw this deployment</a>. </p>
<p>When he emerged as the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190413-veteran-soldier-burhan-becomes-sudans-new-ruler">transitional military leader</a> in 2019, Burhan benefited from the perception that he was a professional soldier more than an Islamist. </p>
<p>His principal interests are aligned with the military’s core interests: maintaining its privileged social and political status, as well as its numerous business enterprises. Burhan made the <a href="https://3ayin.com/en/ncp-returns/">political calculation</a> in 2021 that National Congress Party-era security bosses and bureaucrats were his best allies in the battle to both prevent civilians challenging the military’s grip on the economy, and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces emerging as an alternative power centre. After taking over power, he co-opted these former security bosses into government.</p>
<p>The Islamism of the Bashir-era stooges Burhan has been returning to government is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sudans-unfinished-democracy/">defined by</a> three elements. These are socially conservative authoritarian politics, including the <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/outrage-in-sudan-as-new-force-reminiscent-of-public-order-police-is-installed">return of morality policing</a>; a hostility to the Sudanese left; and corruption.</p>
<p>While these leaders are mostly not the “radical Islamists” the West fears, for many Sudanese, their ongoing commitment to a narrowly defined Arab-Islamic identity is divisive.</p>
<h2>A difficult dismantling</h2>
<p>After he seized power in 1989, Bashir insisted that his coup was a conventional military movement designed to return order to public life. Bashir, who has been in jail since April 2019, still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">maintains</a> that line. The military that overthrew him has been reading the same script.</p>
<p>Four months after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">the military</a> had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/20/sudans-military-removes-al-bashir-all-the-latest-updates#:%7E:text=Sudan's%20President%20Omar%20al,a%20maximum%20of%20two%20years.">removed Bashir</a>, it signed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/4/what-does-sudans-constitutional-declaration-say">constitutional declaration</a> with the main civilian coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change.</p>
<p>This led to the formation of a joint military-civilian transitional government. The government established an Empowerment Removal Committee to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-anti-corruption-team-continues-purging-remnants-of-old-regime">dismantle the network</a> of parastatal charities, media enterprises and banks that had enabled Bashir and his allies to maintain their grip on Sudan. </p>
<p>But Burhan’s October 2021 coup disrupted this. The committee was pushed aside and most of its prominent members <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/lawyers-question-legal-grounds-of-erc-arrests">arrested</a>.</p>
<p>But even before this coup, dismantling Bashir’s regime was an enormous challenge. </p>
<p>The media is a case in point. In the Bashir period, the media was controlled by nominally independent proprietors. In practice, they were National Congress Party cronies, thriving off the party’s domination of the Sudanese economy. </p>
<p>The notorious al-Intibaha newspaper, for instance, is known for its hostile rhetoric towards the South Sudanese. It continued to act as a platform for Bashir’s warmongering uncle, al-Tayyib Mustafa, even after Mustafa was <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2315281/bashir%E2%80%99s-uncle-arrested-over-threat-violence-topple-transitional-govt">arrested</a> for posing a threat to the transitional government.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.sudaress.com/kushnews/286365">Mustafa’s death in 2021</a>, the paper retained his style. A <a href="https://alintibaha.net/online/162998/">piece</a> published shortly before the April 2023 outbreak of conflict characterised the civilians in the 2019-2021 transitional government as dual nationals serving foreign interests. It attacked efforts to curtail the security services’ powers.</p>
<p>Bashir may have fallen in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of his regime’s infrastructure. The remnants of this continue to undermine democratic transition in Sudan, with ultimately disastrous consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>My research on Islamist politics in Sudan (for my book on Hasan al-Turabi) was funded by a British academy small grant. I have also recently been a fellow at the World Peace Foundation (2020-2022).</span></em></p>Omar al-Bashir fell in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of the authoritarian infrastructure of his regime.Willow Berridge, Lecturer in History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036682023-04-19T20:10:30Z2023-04-19T20:10:30ZPeace may finally be returning to Yemen, but can a fractured nation be put back together?<p>Last month, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa-saudi-arabia-iran-china/how-beijing-helped-riyadh-and-tehran-reach-detente">China brokered a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a>, a landmark deal that restored full diplomatic ties between the two bitter rivals. </p>
<p>There was hope the detente could also bring an end to one of the world’s longest-running – and virtually forgotten – proxy wars in Yemen, as well. </p>
<p>Indeed, peace talks have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-houthi-peace-talks-yemens-sanaa-conclude-with-further-rounds-planned-2023-04-14/">begun</a> to end the eight years of a brutal conflict between a Saudi-led coalition of nine regional countries and the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. The war has created what is often referred to as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/15/dozens-of-yemeni-rebels-fly-from-saudi-arabia-in-prisoner-swap">exchange of hundreds of prisoners</a> between the adversaries this past week and promising discussions of a permanent ceasefire and the lifting of the Saudi-led blockade of Yemen, however, the path towards peace remains incredibly shaky.</p>
<p>Even more uncertain is whether Yemen can ever recover once the hostilities end.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521500/original/file-20230418-14-iczhu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Houthi prisoners arrive at the Sana'a airport last week after being released by Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hani Mohammed/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Yemen in pieces</h2>
<p>On my trip to Yemen last July, I (Leena) was stopped by militias at over 40 checkpoints between the southern city of Aden and the capital, Sana'a. My driver, a doctor before the war, briefed me ahead of each stop regarding the background and affiliates of the checkpoint officers. The brief would change rapidly throughout the 12-hour drive!</p>
<p>On the ground, it was evident the humanitarian crisis had impacted every part of the country and robbed Yemenis of any meaningful prospects. This proxy war, riddled with foreign interests and fuelled by regional and local competition, has left Yemen a fractured nation. </p>
<p>Multiple armed groups are vying for influence all over the country. In 2014, Houthi rebels drove Yemen’s internationally recognised government into exile and assumed control over Sana'a. Months later, the Saudi-led coalition – backed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and France – launched a military intervention to try to restore the government to power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/senate-vote-could-end-us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-111952">Senate vote could end US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Houthis have since tried to hold onto their gains in northern Yemen, while occasionally <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/25/houthis-escalate-attacks-saudi-arabia-strike-oil-facility/">launching strikes</a> inside Saudi Arabia itself. </p>
<p>In the south, the United Arab Emirates is backing the two secessionist movements – the Southern Transitional Council and the Giant Brigades – and <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/06/14/what-the-uae-takeover-of-yemens-islands-really-means/">militarising two Yemeni islands</a> off the southern coast. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1505435495601430528"}"></div></p>
<p>Saudi Arabia and Oman, meanwhile, have vested interests in the Mahra region in eastern Yemen and are meddling with tribal politics. And Yemen’s largest Islamist political party, known as al-Islah, controls the Marib province northeast of the capital and parts of two other regions, Taiz and Hadramawt. </p>
<p>The division in the country appears in other ways, too. The currency used in the south differs from the one in Sana'a. In Aden, the secessionist flag is visible at every turn. In the north, I caught the image of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">Iranian General Qassem Soleimani</a>, who was assassinated by the US three years ago, hanging in one of the main streets of Sana'a. </p>
<p>Second only to the devastating humanitarian crisis, Yemen’s fragmentation is arguably the most detrimental outcome of this war – and the most glaring obstacle to any real solutions to end the crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521504/original/file-20230418-20-g103gl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People run after an explosion at the airport in Aden in 2020 shortly after a plane carrying the newly formed cabinet landed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">Yemen's Houthis – and why they're not simply a proxy of Iran</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Saudi foreign policy moderation</h2>
<p>For the Saudis, the peace process appears to be part of a wider trend of foreign policy moderation as the kingdom seeks to retreat from nearly a decade of gaffes, miscalculations and destructive forays abroad. </p>
<p>Since the kingdom’s inception in 1932, Saudi diplomacy and security policy have been typified by caution and a desire to maintain the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Saudi-Arabias-foreign-policy-on-Iran-and-the-proxy-war-in-Syra.pdf">status quo of a regional balance of power</a>. </p>
<p>In this, Riyadh never sought overt domination of the region. It focused its efforts to thwart those who did, such as Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Iraq under Saddam Hussein and post-revolutionary Iran. Importantly, the Saudis also aimed to avoid direct confrontations, instead utilising their petro wealth and diplomatic influence and alliances when dealing with rivals.</p>
<p>The kingdom’s first six monarchs adhered to this approach. But things took a dramatic turn with the ascension of King Salman and the elevation of his heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to key positions in Saudi government in 2015. </p>
<p>Known for his <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/">disdain for tradition and self-assured confidence</a>, bin Salman quickly set about defining a new, aggressive foreign policy for the kingdom that eschewed the lessons of the past.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521506/original/file-20230418-15-9nxbf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman welcoming Chinese President Xi Jinping in Riyadh in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bandar Al-Jaloud/Saudi Royal Court Handout/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Among other things, this included imposing a blockade on Qatar and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/">only just stopping short of outright invasion</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qahtani-played-central-role-interrogation-lebanese-prime-minister-un">abducting</a> the prime minister of Lebanon, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/26/jamal-khashoggi-mohammed-bin-salman-us-report">assassinating</a> journalist Jamal Khashoggi and pursuing a <a href="http://cgsrs.org/publications/44">provocative</a> approach to its regional rival, Iran. </p>
<p>Under this new muscular foreign policy, the 2015 invasion of Yemen – Saudi Arabia’s first-ever major military operation abroad – was intended to be a brief operation that would demonstrate the military and technological prowess of a dynamic and capable kingdom.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-too-soon-to-herald-the-dawn-of-a-new-middle-east-it-all-depends-what-the-saudis-do-next-146153">Is it too soon to herald the 'dawn of a new Middle East'? It all depends what the Saudis do next</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Instead, the invasion quickly devolved into a protracted and wasteful quagmire. It has cost the country immensely <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/saudi-arabias-yemeni-quagmire">in terms of lives, resources and reputation</a>. At the same time, it <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis#:%7E:text=The%20UN%20Development%20Program%20estimates,almost%2060%20percent%20of%20deaths.">inflicted endless amounts of misery and human suffering</a> on the Yemeni people. </p>
<p>Eight years on, Riyadh is edging back to a less confrontational posture in the region. After the detente with Iran, resolving the Yemen war would be another important step towards resuming a more “normal” approach to Saudi foreign policy. </p>
<h2>What next for the Yemeni people?</h2>
<p>After eight years of bombs, missiles, destruction and hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, it is the Yemeni people who have lost the most in this war. </p>
<p>Houthi and Saudi officials may claim work on a political solution is under way, but whether this will have a serious and much-needed humanitarian component remains a big question. For the people of Yemen, the journey to peace will be gruelling as they navigate the broken nation left behind.</p>
<p>If the goal is to ensure lasting peace, the Saudis must honour the requests of the Yemeni negotiators, starting with a permanent ceasefire and lifting the blockade. </p>
<p>It is also imperative the currently exclusive Houthi-Saudi peace talks open up to include leaders from all factions nationwide. A realistic plan for transitional and restorative justice is necessary to address the more pressing humanitarian issues. This requires all parties to be present in discussions.</p>
<p>Finally, peace talks must remain Yemeni-led to eventually pave the path for a Yemeni-led and UN-supported political transition that allows Yemenis to determine the future of their nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203668/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After eight years of bombs, missiles, destruction and hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, it is the Yemeni people who have lost the most in this war.Leena Adel, PhD Candidate, Political Science and International Relations, Curtin UniversityBen Rich, Senior lecturer in History and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992652023-02-08T19:51:12Z2023-02-08T19:51:12ZCorruption and war: two scourges that feed off each other<p>In the world championship of corruption, the competition is fierce. The NGO Transparency International has just published its list of countries according to the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb">level of perceived corruption</a>.</p>
<p>The gold medal in the competition for the most corrupt country has just been awarded to Somalia, followed by South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Libya, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and North Korea.</p>
<h2>How do you measure corruption in a country?</h2>
<p>Since its inception in 1995, the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated">Corruption Perceptions Index</a> (CPI) has become the world’s leading indicator of public sector corruption.</p>
<p>It ranks 180 countries and territories as more or less corrupt, using data from 13 external sources, including the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, private consulting and risk management firms, think tanks and others.</p>
<p>The scores given – on a scale ranging from zero (0 = high corruption) to one hundred (100 = no corruption), depending on the degree of perceived corruption in the public sector – reflect the opinions of experts and business figures.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 shows perceived levels of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When corruption eats away at the state…</h2>
<p>Holding the unenviable title of the most corrupt country on the planet since 2007, Somalia has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747730701695729">something in common</a> with its “challengers” that explain their high level of corruption. What are the reasons for the link between increased corruption and the multiplication of conflicts?</p>
<p>The first is that highly corrupt societies are characterised by a great weakness of the state. As the most corrupt country, Somalia has almost no state. Over the past 30 years, it has experienced catastrophic famines, failed international interventions, refugee flows, deaths by the hundreds of thousands, and endless corruption, leading to a continued lack of even rudimentary state services and institutions.</p>
<p>Thus Somali law enforcement forces serve only to terrorise the population and enrich themselves and serve their warlord. Somalis live in an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240500329379">environment of pervasive predation, threats and deprivation</a>. Another example is <a href="http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.522">Syria</a>, in which corruption and the civil war have challenged the functioning of the judicial system, a jungle where those who corrupt the judges win the most.</p>
<h2>Decaying public institutions</h2>
<p>Second, corruption leads to a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2">loss of trust in public institutions</a>, which leads to near-permanent violence. Corruption deteriorates the democratic system in an endless cycle: impoverished citizens receive money to vote for the tyrant in power; electoral commissions are bought and become masquerades to proclaim plebiscites for despots hated by their people; and independent candidates in power are threatened and even sometimes murdered…</p>
<p>For example, South Sudan is a democratic nightmare with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-sudan">permanent violations of human rights</a> – arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, torture and murder. Venezuela, one of the five most corrupt countries in the world, such crimes have infiltrated all levels of the state and corruption has effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-corruption-kill-democracy-110637">killed the country’s democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Another reason is that corruption fuels war is the lack of press freedom. A tyrannical political system nourished by corruption further reinforces its authoritarianism by destroying press freedom. For example, without any media capable of thwarting his power, Vladimir Putin strengthened his hold on Russia and made it impossible to challenge his country’s territorial ambitions such as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2019.1625279">2014 annexation of Crimea</a> and the <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD281.pdf#page=2">2022 attack on Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>As for Yemen, a particularly corrupt territory with very little press freedom, the NGO Reporters Without Borders <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/yemen">says</a>: “The Yemeni media are polarised by the war’s different protagonists and, to avoid reprisals, have no choice but to toe the line of whoever controls the area where they are located”. As a result, Yemen has been ravaged by war since 2014, fuelled by corruption and an authoritarian press.</p>
<p>The final reason for the link between corruption and war is the importance of <a href="http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I4-P240.pdf">economic inequalities and the weakness of economic development</a>.</p>
<h2>Rising inequality</h2>
<p>In a country where corruption reigns, a small minority monopolises national wealth, especially since <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1056492615579081">corruption is the use of its personal power for private interests against the collective interest</a>. When social injustice reigns, tensions develop and civil wars can break out. South Sudan has been portrayed as a kleptocracy, a governmental system in which the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/113/452/347/78186">ruling class appropriates public resources for its own benefit</a> at the expense of public welfare.</p>
<p>In the end, the vicious circle has set in: corruption leads to permanent tensions, and then violent conflicts, and then crimes and wars. As the latest Transparency International report shows, highly corrupt countries are all economically, politically and socially unstable territories that are gradually being destroyed by incessant wars. Over the course of the conflicts, all the institutions of governance have been destroyed.</p>
<p>Insecurity encourages the people to engage in trafficking. In the absence of national watchdog agencies, a feeling of total impunity sets in and corruption becomes systemic. The spread of corruption then makes it a social norm, leading populations of the most affected countries to eventually regard it as the only way to survive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertrand Venard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>A review of Transparency International’s recently released global corruption ranking confirms that corruption fuels war, and vice versa.Bertrand Venard, Professeur / Professor, AudenciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948262022-12-02T13:03:04Z2022-12-02T13:03:04ZCorruption in South Africa: new book lifts the lid on who profits - and their corporate enablers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496463/original/file-20221121-26-3p10v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The new <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-unaccountables/">book</a> The Unaccountables: The Powerful Politicians and Corporations who Profit from Impunity is welcome for the way it contextualises corruption. It shows how politicians and bureaucrats could not implement corruption without their corporate and professional enablers – the accountants, auditors and advocates who make it all possible.</p>
<p>The book is the result of a decade of research by <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/">Open Secrets</a> and other NGOs. It is edited by Michael Marchant, Mamello Mosiana, Ra’eesa Pather and Hennie van Vuuren (a blend of investigative journalists and activists) and has 11 named contributors. Analytically, it covers four overlapping issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>crimes such as stealing public funds and evading tax </p></li>
<li><p>culpable negligence by professionals such as auditors </p></li>
<li><p>serial failure by regulatory authorities </p></li>
<li><p>moral and political issues such as inequality and corporate tax avoidance.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Corporate corruption</h2>
<p>Readers who are diligent in taking in the daily media will remember most of the high profile cases summarised in this book. But not all. It reveals that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-deaths-of-144-mentally-ill-patients-and-south-africas-constitutional-democracy-91433">Life Esidemeni tragedy</a>, in which 144 patients died after being placed in inadequate facilities run by NGOs in 2015, had one apartheid precedent. During the 1960s the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">National Party</a> regime outsourced the psychiatric care of 11,000 patients (9,000 of them black) to the British company Intrinsic Investments: 207 died (p.50). </p>
<p>The book fills some gaps in media reports. These tend to focus on those who are despised by the plutocratic, wealthy establishment – the ruling African National Congress politicians and their cronies. The media are comparatively reluctant to cover crimes committed by fellow denizens of their plutocratic stratosphere, such as auditors, accountants and advocates. For example, global media coverage of Hong Kong focuses on Chinese repression of freedom of expression – but overlooks its role as a tax shelter and corporate secrecy hideout for front companies and money laundering:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a long-running failure to hold the powerful and wealthy to account for the crimes that they profit from. Economic crimes and corruption are committed by a small band of the powerful, but they pose fundamental threats to democracy and social justice. They result in the looting of public funds, the destruction of democratic institutions, and ultimately … the human rights of millions of people. (p.12)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fear of those with money to bring defamation litigation, or who decide on corporate advertising spending in the media, aggravates this situation.</p>
<p>This book is structured around apartheid profiteers, war profiteers, state capture profiteers, welfare profiteers, failing auditors, conspiring consultants, and bad lawyers.</p>
<p>The authors note how over 500 global corporations negotiated, thanks to their tax accountants, with Luxembourg, a tax haven, paying only 1% tax on their profits (p.254). They seem to have missed the case of Ireland, where such tax is one thousandth of 1% on profits. Such tax shelters pervade the west, especially <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries">Commonwealth countries</a>.</p>
<p>The book calls for action to end such tax avoidance. But it does not spell out what it would entail. It would require the South African government to negotiate an international coalition to campaign through the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the African Union, to find enough allies to mitigate such a global power structure – class power in its purest form.</p>
<p>US president Joe Biden’s proposal that globally, corporate tax should have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/biden-offers-drop-corporate-tax-hike-proposal-source-2021-06-03/">a floor of 15%</a> provides a good start for such campaigns.</p>
<h2>Regulation failure</h2>
<p>This book gives welcome attention to a long-neglected problem in South Africa. That is the serial failure of regulatory authorities to hold companies or professionals to account. One instance too recent for this book to cover is that the minerals and energy minister, Gwede Mantashe, has fired from the National Nuclear Regulator a civil society representative, on the grounds that he is <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/eskom/mantashe-fires-anti-nuclear-activist-from-regulatory-board-20220225">anti-nuclear</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Book cover with the words 'The Unaccountable' over images of several punidentifiable men walking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since the minister’s portfolio and performance contract require him to promote nuclear power, it is a conflict of interests for him to interfere in the regulator of nuclear safety. The regulator should fall under the environmental affairs department, as in other countries. This is a topical example of the abuse of power, and defanging a regulatory authority.</p>
<p>The book underscores that the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) refuses to name and shame. It abuses secrecy to protect the names and reputations of auditors guilty of conspiring with their corporate clients to conceal the truth (p.272):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the IRBA’s desire to protect its members overshadows its responsibility. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since at least the first world war, pacifists have denounced the military-industrial complex as the merchants of death. The <a href="https://www.gov.za/national-conventional-arms-control-committee-ncacc-statement-south-african-arms-sales-regulation">National Conventional Arms Control Committee</a> is supposed to oversee South African exports of armaments and munitions. This is to ensure the country does not violate international treaties. It is not known to have refused any permits to export armaments to countries at war, even when they indiscriminately bomb civilians, as in Yemen.</p>
<p>The authors call for its statutory framework to be drastically toughened up.</p>
<h2>Apartheid profiteers</h2>
<p>The historical chapter of the book, on apartheid profiteers, holds no surprises. Of course, <a href="https://www.sanlam.co.za/Pages/default.aspx?gclid=Cj0KCQiA4OybBhCzARIsAIcfn9m5OBZxhgPlZPIjzU68Z0C7CSAqA8Eqkui60NBY7q8qkcX4Hw3vu_UaAlITEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds">Sanlam</a>, the insurance giant, and <a href="https://www.naspers.com/">Naspers</a>, the media behemoth, were always part of the Afrikaner nationalist movement, led by the secretive <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Afrikaner-Broederbond">Broederbond</a>. Of course, individual Afrikaner businessmen donated to the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">Nasionale Party</a>, which formalised apartheid in 1948, as did the military-industrial complex. All those companies manufacturing armaments had only one monopoly buyer – the South African Defence Force:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a significant portion of the business elite kept the taps open to the party at the height of domestic repression and foreign wars (p.25). </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The authors do a thorough job of exposing all the Swiss, Belgian and Luxembourg bankers who comprised the sanction-busting front companies. It exposes the late <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">Mobutu Sese Seko</a> of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) for providing false end user certificates to enable <a href="https://www.armscor.co.za/">Armscor</a>, the apartheid-era state arms procurement company, to smuggle in weaponry (p.42).</p>
<p>The book revisits the controversial <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">1999 arms deal</a>. It explains how bribes were described in corporate paperwork as consultancy fees. The arms deal was the first opportunity of the post-apartheid military to buy big-ticket weapons after a quarter-century of arms sanctions, which the post-apartheid military lacked the budget to maintain in service. </p>
<p>Since then, the amount wasted in the arms deal has been dwarfed by the billions spent by <a href="https://www.transnet.net/Pages/Home.aspx">Transnet</a>, the rail, ports and pipelines parastatal, on corrupt locomotive contracts. The same for <a href="https://www.prasa.com/">Prasa</a>, the passenger rail parastatal, and <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/">Eskom</a>, the power utility, contracts.</p>
<p>Overall, it is a book that should be on the bookshelf of every thinking South African.</p>
<p><em>Updated to clear confusion created by the absence of an index in the advance proof sent to the author.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The new book is structured around apartheid profiteers, war profiteers, state capture profiteers, welfare profiteers, failing auditors, conspiring consultants and bad lawyers.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1911592022-10-12T14:07:02Z2022-10-12T14:07:02ZSomalia: Puntland state port is getting a revamp - this is key to its future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486144/original/file-20220922-9184-qhdxbu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bosaso has become a major export hub since security improved in Somalia's Puntland region.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-taken-on-november-18-2013-shows-bosaso-harbor-news-photo/450358003?adppopup=true">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The port city of Bosaso, located at the north-eastern corner of Somalia, provides a striking example of the interlinkage between security and infrastructure. The city benefited from the civil war that ravaged the southern parts of Somalia in the 1990s and 2000s. It developed into a booming trade centre. But increased violence in Bosaso has negatively affected international trade in the last decade. Security improvements and the recovery of other ports in Somalia and Somaliland have provided alternatives.</p>
<p>In July 2022, the Emirates-based Dubai Ports World (DP World), a global operator of ports and logistics, returned to Bosaso. The company had signed a <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/01/13/bossaso-port-optimising-port-activities-and-transforming-circulations/">concession agreement</a> with the government in Puntland, a federal member state of Somalia, in 2017. But the plans to modernise the port were never realised. </p>
<p>DP World’s <a href="https://puntlandpost.net/2022/02/21/puntland-renegotiates-dp-world-concession-to-manage-bosaso-port/">return</a> has instigated optimism across the city, though numerous challenges still lie ahead.</p>
<p>Our research project is <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org/">studying</a> the Horn of Africa’s emerging port infrastructures and their impact on the everyday lives of people in cities. </p>
<p>Bosaso’s efforts to remain economically relevant will have implications for the relative independence that Puntland has achieved from the federal government in Mogadishu. An upgraded port could bolster citizens’ trust in the semi-autonomous government.</p>
<h2>A lifeline for Puntland</h2>
<p>The port of Bosaso is located on the Red Sea. Its development was tied to the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in the 1980s. Siad Barre, the military dictator who ruled the country from 1969 to 1991, rehabilitated a highway between Bosaso and central Somalia, and <a href="https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01044642">allowed Bosaso to operate the port duty-free</a>. This was to appease his opponents in the north-east and to economically harm rising opposition in the north-west (now Somaliland). </p>
<p>Trading activities and property investments in Bosaso increased significantly after the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Bosaso City <a href="https://securityonthemove.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/SOTM-Research-Brief-BOSAASO.pdf">grew considerably</a> in the early 1990s when it evolved into a prime destination for people who fled from violence in the southern parts of Somalia. </p>
<p>Among the immigrants were former political and business elites with clan affiliations to the north-east. Others were from the politically marginalised and harassed clans and minority groups of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>The closeness and historic shipping links between Bosaso and Yemen additionally pulled people to the city. Younger people looking for an option to escape poverty and a life full of risks moved to Bosaso to embark on Tahriib, the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/going-tahriib">undocumented and dangerous migration</a> across the Red Sea to the Gulf states and from there, if possible, further to Europe.</p>
<p>During the early 1990s, Bosaso had the only relatively safe port in Somalia. It became a major trade hub for livestock exports and consumer goods imports. This integrated Bosaso into an international trade network and linked the port to central Somalia and eastern Ethiopia. </p>
<p>New livestock quarantine stations were established, financed by Saudi Arabia and managed by a highly skilled labour force (mainly from Egypt). This was to avoid economically damaging <a href="https://sominvest.gov.so/livestock-trade-in-the-djibouti-somali-and-ethiopian-borderlands-2010/">livestock bans</a> from Saudi Arabia on the basis of animal health. </p>
<p>Income from the flourishing seaport supported the establishment of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in 1998. </p>
<h2>Port in decline</h2>
<p>But Bosaso is currently struggling to maintain its economic relevance. This has political implications for the relative independence that Puntland has achieved from the Somali federal government. </p>
<p>International trade activities have been declining during the last decade. Since 2015, the war in Yemen has interrupted established trade routes. Additionally, the city has faced threats from Islamist insurgents, prominently Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. </p>
<p>The concession agreement with DP World’s subsidiary P&O Ports in 2017 added further layers of insecurity. Local groups criticised the “sell-out” of the port to a foreign country, while business groups feared that a rise in port fees would have a negative impact on local trade. </p>
<p>Disputes among the Puntland leadership, and disagreements between Puntland and P&O Ports, delayed the planned modernisation. P&O eventually left Bosaso in 2019 after <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47114779">its port manager</a> was killed by gunmen, an attack for which al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. </p>
<p>These developments stood in contrast to security improvements in southern Somalia. These were visible in the reopening of Mogadishu’s seaport, which has been managed by <a href="https://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1.1+Somalia+Port+of+Mogadishu">a Turkish company</a> since 2014. Competition increased further with the DP World-driven modernisation of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/waiting-for-ethiopia-berbera-port-upgrade-raises-somalilands-hopes-for-trade-188949">port in Berbera</a> in Somaliland. </p>
<p>Bosaso is not able to compete with the much larger multi-purpose ports in Berbera and Mogadishu. The two ports are fitted with container terminals and furnished with modern equipment. Bosaso, instead, has had a <a href="https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/1275207/DIIS_WP_2017_13.pdf">crucial position</a> in a more informal overseas trade. </p>
<p>The ongoing transformation of global supply chains, with circulation increasingly relying on cranes and containers, detaches Bosaso from important trade networks. For example, containerised ports import goods directly from producing countries like China, while Bosaso relies on transshipment through intermediary ports in Yemen, Oman or elsewhere.</p>
<p>These developments have political implications. Many Bosaso residents attribute the port’s decline to leadership failure. A port official explained in an interview in August 2022: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The port has been neglected by all Puntland leaders. There was no investment provided to the port since 1991. The port is about to be relegated to irrelevance. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>At a crossroads</h2>
<p>The modernisation of the port is critical for Puntland. An upgraded port will ensure Puntland keeps a significant position within the fragmented political landscape of Somalia. It will also prevent traders from looking for alternative outlets. </p>
<p>Multiple challenges, among them security considerations, lie ahead. The relations between Puntland and the government in Mogadishu, as well as disagreements within the Puntland leadership, are crucial. In short, Bosaso is at a crossroads and faces a defining moment for its political and economic future.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim, a research consultant in the <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/staff/">port infrastructure project</a>, is a lead contributor and conducted most of the research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. The research is part of the project: Port Infrastructure, International Politics, and Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa, <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a></span></em></p>A modern port raises Puntland’s stake within the fragmented political landscape of Somalia and prevents traders from seeking alternatives.Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham UniversityMay Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.