tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/aerial-defence-5793/articlesAerial defence – The Conversation2018-09-27T09:57:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1039512018-09-27T09:57:30Z2018-09-27T09:57:30ZWorld War II bombing raids in London and Berlin struck the edge of space, our new study reveals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238188/original/file-20180926-48634-18wcjrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2968%2C2416&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Unleashing hell.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/b17-bomber-during-first-big-raid-251930686?src=euhsbZtAgSPa6Ln_G9E1Gg-1-0">Everett Historical/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The bombing campaigns of World War Two left an indelible mark on the world’s towns and cities and in the memories of the people who survived them. <a href="https://www.ann-geophys.net/36/1243/2018/">In a new study</a>, we found that the most destructive war in history also made its mark in our atmosphere.</p>
<p>In an age when long-term monitoring of the environment is increasingly important, scientists are turning to historical datasets for clues in solving present-day science puzzles. </p>
<p>One such dataset is the unique record of the Earth’s ionosphere – the electrified region of the Earth’s upper atmosphere, which was painstakingly recorded from 1933 onwards at the Radio Research Station near Slough. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238178/original/file-20180926-48644-kr4t0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Radio Research Station at Ditton Park, Slough.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The UK Solar System Data Centre</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Scientists at the RRS were monitoring the ionosphere as it was then vital for long-distance radio communications. Shortwave radio is reflected by the ionosphere and allows the signal to be transmitted long distances over the horizon.</p>
<p>They had noted that the density of the ionosphere was extremely variable and had set up the monitoring station in order to look for patterns in this variability. Much of this is due to changes in solar activity. </p>
<p>The ionosphere is created when x-rays and extreme ultraviolet light from the sun are absorbed by our atmosphere, electrifying it. We now know, thanks to a <a href="https://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov/">fleet of spacecraft monitoring the sun</a>, that not all of this variability can be explained by solar activity. Attention is increasingly turning to sources from the lower atmosphere and the ground.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238175/original/file-20180926-48647-1mht3ig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The ionosphere, ranging from 60km to 350km above the Earth’s surface, is sensitive to events below.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/near-space-photography-22km-above-ground-166207994?src=y8z_uMrbDMzk2SNuslcojQ-1-10">IM_photo/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But where to find ground events capable of leaving a signature at the edge of space? The answer lies in the past. World War Two witnessed an explosive arms race, which culminated, in its most extreme form, in the atomic bomb.</p>
<p>But most destructive energy still came from conventional weapons. Allied aircraft dropped over 2.75m tons of TNT, the equivalent of 185 Hiroshimas.</p>
<p>The RAF’s four-engined Lancaster bomber with its 11-ton payload could deliver more explosive energy than any other aircraft in World War II. The American Liberator could carry six tons, the Luftwaffe’s Heinkel 111 four. </p>
<p>Individual British bombs also grew more deadly. In 1944, two six-ton “Tallboys” capsized the German Tirpitz battleship, and the 11-ton <a href="http://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/s,tallboy.html">“Grand Slam” could start landslides</a>. Such seismic events were, of course, few and far between. Most of Bomber Command’s effort was targeted not at specific installations, <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/raf-bomber-command-during-the-second-world-war">but whole cities</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/YuKyYn0B0dQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A newsreel from 1944, announcing the sinking of the Tirpitz. ZenosWarbirds/YouTube.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Here, too, the scale of ordnance was devastating. The RAF and US Air Force dropped 42,500 tons of high explosive on Berlin alone, plus 26,000 tons of incendiary bombs. </p>
<p>So-called “blockbuster” bombs – two, four or even six-ton barrels of boosted TNT – fused to explode a few hundred feet up, would blow off roof tiles and shatter windows within 500 metres.</p>
<p>Direct hits pulverised whole apartment blocks. Aircraft flying a mile above the blasts could have parts blown off and the pressure wave could even collapse the lungs of those caught within it. </p>
<p>Subsequent incendiaries would then penetrate structures, designed to set off a firestorm. This only fully succeeded twice – in <a href="http://ww2today.com/4th-august-1943-the-horror-of-hamburg-resounds-around-germany">Hamburg in August 1943</a> and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/02/remembering-dresden-70-years-after-the-firebombing/385445/">Dresden in February 1945</a> – when tens of thousands perished. </p>
<p>The strategic bombing war documents numerous other area bombing raids, each of which involved hundreds of aircraft and up to 2,000 tons of high explosive.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=955&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=955&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=955&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1200&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1200&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238310/original/file-20180927-72336-1mq9hbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1200&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A US survey on the bombing campaign against Germany. Current findings have doubled these casualty estimates.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (1947), p. 8. US Government Print Office</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How the Blitz helped modern science</h2>
<p>The German authorities’ punctilious recording of the times and payloads of raids, coupled with RAF Bomber Command mission logs, made it possible to construct a database of possible ground events which might have produced shockwaves capable of being detected in the ionosphere.</p>
<p>Ionospheric records from the Radio Research Station are now archived by the UK Solar System Data Centre at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, UK. The record shown below is for 08:30 on September 8, 1940, the morning after the start of the London Blitz when 700 tons were dropped by the Luftwaffe.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/238312/original/file-20180927-48665-5npas1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Disturbances in the ionosphere recorded during The Blitz.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UK Solar System Data Centre</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By combining data from 152 major bombing raids, it was possible to determine that the ionosphere was weakened, albeit only slightly, by these events. </p>
<p>While the exact details will require careful modelling, one suggestion is that, as the shockwaves travelled upwards through an ever-thinning atmosphere, the amplitude of these waves grew until they broke and, like waves crashing against a beach, deposited their energy high in the atmosphere as heat. </p>
<p>This change in temperature would have altered the chemical equilibrium in the upper atmosphere for a few hours, enhancing the loss of ionisation and weakening the ionosphere. While these events will have had no lasting effect in the ionosphere, a typical “blockbuster” bomb was equivalent to the energy in a lightning strike. </p>
<p>So, armed with an understanding of how much energy is required to perturb the ionosphere, we can now turn our attention to modern ionospheric data and the influence of natural phenomena such as thunderstorms, volcanoes and earthquakes.</p>
<p>This serendipitous connection between data sets from two apparently separate disciplines suggests that answers can be found in the least expected places.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Major has previously received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Scott has previously received funding from NERC. </span></em></p>Scientists studying the atmosphere found help in an unlikely place – the aerial bombing campaigns of World War Two.Patrick Major, Professor of Modern History, University of ReadingChris Scott, Professor of Space and Atmospheric Physics, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/947712018-04-19T11:23:04Z2018-04-19T11:23:04ZCould the US win World War III without using nuclear weapons?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215562/original/file-20180419-163975-ucyzm5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/launch-flight-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-over-796516828?src=iVt1MFsH-vME7zeNSCRhRw-1-2">Denis_kh via Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the US, Russia and China test each other’s patience and strategic focus, speculation about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-could-sleepwalk-into-a-doomsday-war-with-russia-its-time-to-wake-up-59936">chances of a world war</a> has hit a new high. But many of the people seriously engaged in this weighty discussion often get it wrong. </p>
<p>When it comes to estimating military capability, the Western media is principally concerned with the weapons capabilities of weaker states – and it rarely pays much attention to the colossal capability of the US, which still accounts for most of the world’s defence spending. </p>
<p>Any sensible discussion of what a hypothetical World War III might look like needs to begin with the sheer size and force of America’s military assets. For all that China and Russia are arming up on various measures, US commanders have the power to dominate escalating crises and <a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273">counter opposing forces</a> before they can be used. </p>
<p>Take missile warfare alone. The US Navy already has 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Navy and Air Force are currently taking delivery of <a href="https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/agm-158-jassm-lockheeds-family-of-stealthy-cruise-missiles-014343/">5,000 JASSM conventional cruise missiles</a> with ranges from 200-600 miles. Barely visible to radar, these are designed to destroy “hardened” targets such as nuclear missile silos. Russia and China, by contrast, have nothing of equivalent quantity or quality with which to threaten the US mainland.</p>
<p>The same holds true when it comes to maritime forces. While much is made of Russia’s two frigates and smaller <a href="http://www.interfax.ru/world/607973">vessels</a> stationed off the Syrian coast, France alone has 20 warships and an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/french-aircraft-carrier-isil-syria-151122164642999.html">aircraft carrier</a> in the Mediterranean – and US standing forces in the area include six destroyers equipped with scores of cruise missiles and anti-missile systems. At the other end of Europe, the Russian military is threatening the small Baltic states, but it is rarely noted that the Russian Baltic fleet is the same size as Denmark’s and half the size of Germany’s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s aggressively expansionist behaviour in the South China Sea is reported alongside stories of its first aircraft carrier and long-range ballistic missiles. But for all that the Chinese navy is large and growing, according to the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/about-s-us">International Institute for Strategic Studies</a>, it’s still only numerically equivalent to the combined fleets of Japan and Taiwan, while the US boasts <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/does-the-us-navy-have-10-or-19-aircraft-carriers/">19 aircraft carriers</a> worldwide if its marine assault ships are included.</p>
<p>But overhanging all this, of course, is the nuclear factor. </p>
<h2>Out of the sky</h2>
<p>The US, Russia and China are all nuclear-armed; Vladimir Putin recently unveiled a new fleet of nuclear-capable missiles which he <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43239331">described</a> as “invincible in the face of all existing and future systems”, and some have suggested that China may be <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/is-china-abandoning-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/">moving away from its no-first-use policy</a>. This is all undeniably disturbing. While it has long been assumed that the threat of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent to any war between the major powers, it’s also possible that the world may simply have been <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclearUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf">riding its luck</a>. But once again, the US’s non-nuclear capabilities are all too often overlooked.</p>
<p>US leaders may in fact believe they can <a href="https://www.rbth.com/news/2015/10/12/foreign_ministry_us_prompt_global_strike_concept_impedes_nuclear_disarma_50004.html">remove Russia’s nuclear deterrent</a> with an overwhelming conventional attack backed up by missile defences. This ability was cultivated under the Prompt Global Strike programme, which was initiated before 9/11 and continued during the Obama years. Organised through the US Air Force’s <a href="http://www.afgsc.af.mil/Units/">Global Strike Command</a>, it is to use conventional weapons to attack anywhere on Earth in under 60 minutes.</p>
<p>This is not to say the task would be small. In order to destroy Russia’s nuclear missiles before they can be launched, the US military would need to first blind Russian radar and command and communications to incoming attack, probably using both physical and cyber attacks. It would then have to destroy some 200 fixed and 200 mobile missiles on land, a dozen Russian missile submarines, and Russian bombers. It would then need to shoot down any missiles that could still be fired. </p>
<p>Russia is not well positioned to survive such an attack. Its early warning radars, both satellite and land-based, are <a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-satellite-nuclear-warning-system-down-until-november-47799">decaying</a> and will be hard to replace. At the same time, the US has and is developing a range of technologies to carry out anti-satellite and radar missions, and it has been using them for years. (All the way back in 1985, it <a href="https://www.livescience.com/4832-satellite-22-years.html">shot down a satellite</a> with an F15 jet fighter.) That said, the West is very dependent on satellites too, and Russia and China continue to develop their own anti-satellite systems.</p>
<h2>The air war</h2>
<p>Russia’s bomber aircraft date back to the Soviet era, so despite the alarm they provoke when they <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/russian-bombers-taunt-uk-again-fly-781741">nudge at Western countries’ airspace</a>, they pose no major threat in themselves. Were the Russian and US planes to face each other, the Russians would find themselves under attack from <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/how-su-35s-and-f-22s-compare-2016-4?r=US&IR=T/#f-22-specs-1">planes they couldn’t see</a> and that are any way out of their range.</p>
<p>US and British submarine crews <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-06/hunt-full-spectrum-asw">claim a perfect record</a> in constantly shadowing Soviet submarines as they left their bases throughout the Cold War. Since then, Russian forces have declined and US anti-submarine warfare has been revived, raising the prospect that Russian submarines could be taken out before they could even launch their missiles.</p>
<p>The core of the Russia’s nuclear forces consists of land-based missiles, some fixed in silos, others mobile on rail and road. The silo-based missiles can now be targeted by several types of missiles, carried by US planes <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-building-fleet-shadow-bombers-invisible-radar-716452">almost invisible to radar</a>; all are designed to destroy targets protected by deep concrete and steel bunkers. But a problem for US war planners is that it might take hours too long for their missile-carrying planes to reach these targets – hence the need to act in minutes.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215569/original/file-20180419-163962-zefyi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US’s B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/fairford-gloucestershire-uk-july-16th-2017-692470852?src=_Ec_B4qhqz_7XYFk5S9cEw-1-0">AMMHPhotography via Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One apparently simple solution to attacking targets very quickly is to fit quick nuclear ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads. In 2010, Robert Gates, then serving as secretary of defence under Barack Obama, said that the US <a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2010/04/12/gates-says-u-s-has-conventionally-armed-icbms">had this capability</a>. Intercontinental ballistic missiles take just 30 minutes to fly between the continental US’s Midwest and Siberia; if launched from well-positioned submarines, the Navy’s Tridents can be even quicker, with a launch-to-target time of under ten minutes.</p>
<p>From 2001, the US Navy prepared to fit its Trident missiles with either inert solid warheads – accurate to within ten metres – or vast splinter/shrapnel weapons. Critics have argued that this would leave a potential enemy unable to tell whether they were under nuclear or conventional attack, meaning they would have to assume the worst. According to US Congressional <a href="https://news.usni.org/2017/02/09/document-report-congress-u-s-prompt-global-strike-ballistic-missiles">researchers</a>, the development work came close to completion, but apparently ceased in 2013. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the US has continued to develop other technologies across its armed services to attack targets around the world in under an hour – foremost among them hypersonic missiles, which could return to Earth at up to ten times the speed of sound, with China and Russia trying to keep up.</p>
<h2>Missile envy</h2>
<p>The remainder of Russia’s nuclear force consists of missiles transported by rail. An article on Kremlin-sponsored news outlet <a href="https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201708301056919137-barguzin-nuke-trains/">Sputnik</a> described how these missile rail cars would be so hard to find that Prompt Global Strike might not be as effective as the US would like – but taken at face value, the article implies that the rest of the Russian nuclear arsenal is in fact relatively vulnerable.</p>
<p>Starting with the “<a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,400021,00.html">Scud hunt</a>” of the First Gulf War, the US military has spent years <a href="http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/JointDoctrine-CounteringAirandMissileThreats.pdf">improving</a> its proficiency at targeting mobile ground-based missiles. Those skills now use remote sensors to attack small ground targets at short notice in the myriad counter-insurgency operations it’s pursued since 2001.</p>
<p>If the “sword” of Prompt Global Strike doesn’t stop the launch of all Russian missiles, then the US could use the “shield” of its own missile defences. These it deployed after it <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_aug02">walked out of a treaty with Russia</a> banning such weapons in 2002. </p>
<p>While some of these post-2002 missile defence systems have been called <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-limits-of-u-s-missile-defense/">ineffective</a>, the US Navy has a more effective system called Aegis, which one former head of the Pentagon’s missile defence programs claims can <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/09/united-states-navy-north-korea-intercontintal-ballistic-missiles-defense-aegis/">shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles</a>. Some 300 Aegis anti-ballistic missiles now equip 40 US warships; in 2008, one destroyed a satellite as it fell out of orbit. </p>
<h2>War mentality</h2>
<p>In advance of the Iraq war, various governments and onlookers cautioned the US and UK about the potential for unforeseen consequences, but the two governments were driven by a mindset impervious to criticism and misgivings. And despite all the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq disaster, there’s an ample risk today that a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/security-masculinity-nuclear-weapons.html">similarly gung-ho attitude</a> could take hold.</p>
<p>Foreign casualties generally have little impact on domestic US politics. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who died under first <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/hard-look-iraq-sanctions/">sanctions</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/fudged-statistics-on-the-iraq-war-death-toll-are-still-circulating-today-93975">war</a> did not negatively impact presidents Clinton or George W. Bush. Neither might the prospect of similar casualties in Iran or North Korea or other states, especially if “humanitarian” precision weapons are used.</p>
<p>But more than that, an opinion poll run by Stanford University’s <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2017/08/08/americans-weigh-nuclear-war/">Scott Sagan</a> found that the US public would not oppose the preemptive use of even nuclear weapons provided that the US itself was not affected. And nuclear Trident offers that temptation.</p>
<p>The control of major conventional weapons as well as WMD needs urgent attention from international civil society, media and political parties. There is still time to galvanise behind the Nobel-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/nuclear-annihilation-one-tantrum-away-nobel-peace-prize-winner-warns">nuclear ban treaty</a>, and to revive and globalise the decaying arms control agenda of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/arms-control">Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</a>, which played a vital part in bringing the Cold War to a largely peaceful end.</p>
<p>Like the Kaiser in 1914, perhaps Trump or one of his successors will express dismay when faced with the reality a major US offensive unleashes. But unlike the Kaiser, who saw his empire first defeated and then dismembered, perhaps a 21st-century US president might get away with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Plesch receives funding from The Joseph Rowntree Trust. He/ is affiliated with SOAS University of London, <a href="http://www.scrapweapons.com">www.scrapweapons.com</a> and ican.org. </span></em></p>To understand how a new world war might play out, it’s important to remember just how powerful the US really is.Dan Plesch, Director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/738322017-03-02T19:07:23Z2017-03-02T19:07:23ZAustralia gets its first public display of the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter<p>The Australian public will get its first chance to see the country’s new Joint Strike Fighter (<a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/joint-strike-fighter-10110">JSF</a>) when two Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighters <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-27/joint-strike-fighters-f35-land-in-australia/8308498">fly at Avalon air show</a> in Victoria this weekend.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/f-35s-to-make-australian-debut-at-the-avalon-airshow">AU-1 and AU-2 aircraft</a> were the first two Australian F-35s to roll off the Lockheed Martin assembly line in Fort Worth, Texas, in July 2014. In December that year, both aircraft were flown to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona to join an international pilot training pool. </p>
<p>The Australian government approved the purchase of 14 F-35A fighters in November 2009, and a second tranche of 58 aircraft in April 2014, equipping three squadrons. A further tranche of 28 aircraft, bringing the total up to 100 aircraft for a fourth squadron, has yet to be decided on.</p>
<p>But there have been several questions raised about the JSF’s effectiveness and readiness to be used operationally.</p>
<h2>Is the JSF ready yet?</h2>
<p>Lockheed Martin is developing <a href="https://www.f35.com/about/variants">three versions</a> of the Joint Strike Fighter: the F-35A for conventional takeoff and landing; the F-35B for short takeoff/vertical landing; and the F-35C for aircraft carriers.</p>
<p>The F-35B “jump jet” variant <a href="http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/611657/us-marines%20-corps-declares-the-f-35b-operational/">achieved what is known as Initial Operational Capability</a> (IOC) on July 31, 2015. </p>
<p>For the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), IOC is the basic level of operational readiness, when “<a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Capability/?RAAF-/kFUpPVag5Pqj5gUIp0CxtwJlFabWz0O">one or more subsets of the capability</a>” can be deployed on operations. This means that it can go to war and perform some combat missions, but some things still need to be developed.</p>
<p>For the RAAF, Final Operational Capability (FOC) is when the “entire capability” can be deployed on operations and is fully ready for war.</p>
<p>However, the United States Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (<a href="http://www.dote.osd.mil/">DOT&E</a>), Michael Gilmore, was critical of the US test. He <a href="http://www.pogoarchives.org/straus/2015-9-1-DoD-FOIA-ocr.pdf">said in a 2015 memo</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The event was not an operational test, though, in either a formal or an informal sense of the term. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>With regard to the software “<a href="https://www.f35.com/about/life-cycle/software">block</a>”, an incremental approach to software development, Gilmore said in the memo:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] it did not – and could not – demonstrate that the Block 2B F-35B is operationally effective or suitable for use in any type of limited combat operation, or that it is ready for real-world operational deployments.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, it showed that a number of maintenance and reliability problems that he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] are likely to present significant near-term challenges for the Marine Corps, given the present state of maturity of the F-35B aircraft.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Further details on the progress and deficiencies of the aircraft can be found in the <a href="http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/pdf/dod/2016f35jsf.pdf">DOT&E evaluation of the F-35 for the 2016 financial year</a>.</p>
<h2>The Australian aircraft</h2>
<p>The F-35A variant, which Australia is buying, <a href="http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/885496/air-force-declares-the-f-35a-combat-ready.aspx">achieved IOC with the US Air Force</a> (USAF) on August 2, 2016, but the aircraft was also <a href="http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapons/2016/f-35-may-never-be-ready-for-combat.html">criticised for its deficiencies</a>.</p>
<p>The US-led F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has been unfazed by the DOT&E reports, issuing <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/jpo-public-response-statement-dote-2016-annual-report-on-the-f-35">a statement in January</a> this year that said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] F-35 flight test program, as well as the F-35 fleet users, made significant progress in maturing and proving the capability of the aircraft during 2016. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The JPO statement detailed a number of areas of such progress and noted that the development program was more than 90% complete. But it also recognised that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] there are known deficiencies that must be corrected and there remains the potential for future findings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The RAAF hopes that the F-35A will begin entering service in July 2019 to <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/OurStructure/Air/JointStrikeFighterDivision/">achieve IOC in November 2020</a>, with <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/68300/avalon-2017-f-35-makes-australian-debut">FOC slated for 2023</a>. </p>
<h2>Seeing the stealth</h2>
<p>One of the key capabilities of the F-35A is its stealth, the ability to avoid enemy detection. But military technology is a dynamic process, and no advantage lasts for ever, as counter-measures are invariably developed, and stealth is no exception.</p>
<p>In September 2016 there were reports that a Chinese military company had announced it had developed <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2021235/end-stealth-new-chinese-radar-capable-detecting-invisible-targets-100km">a new form of radar</a> able to detect stealth planes 100km away. But this so-called “quantum radar” is far from being ready for operation, <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/did-china-just-make-all-stealth-fighters-think-the-f-22-f-35-19608">if it even exists outside a laboratory</a>.</p>
<p>As well as the Chinese, <a href="http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/02/more-technical-details-about-chinas.html">researchers in the US, UK and Canada</a> have been working on developing a “quantum radar” for a number of years, <a href="http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=7,375,802.PN.&OS=PN/7,375,802&RS=PN/7,375,802">including F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin</a>.</p>
<p>There are <a href="http://aviationweek.com/technology/new-radars-irst-strengthen-stealth-detection-claims">other ways of detecting stealth aircraft</a>, which are more technologically mature than quantum radar, such as low frequency radar and infrared search and track.</p>
<p>But the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, an independent research body on looking at Australia’s defence and security polices, <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/JointStikeFighter/%7E/media/Committees/fadt_ctte/JointStikeFighter/report.pdf">argues</a> that stealth is about more than a low radar cross section:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>LO (low observability) technology also means minimising the probability of intercept of its electronic emissions while at the same time enhancing networking capabilities and situational awareness to give a pilot decision superiority. Stealth is not about preventing detection; it’s about ensuring access. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A 5th generation air force</h2>
<p>The Australian defence force sees the F-35A as more than just a replacement older aircraft. According to Air Vice Marshal Chris Deeble, Australia’s JSF Program Manager, the “JSF is a catalyst for change” in the future of the air force.</p>
<p>The RAAF’s <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/plan-jericho/?RAAF-CrI57877JHUU/bo9YoJ64qWYIO7G/14Q">Plan Jericho</a> intends to use the introduction of the JSF to transform the Australian air force “into a fifth-generation air force”. By <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/Fifth-Generation-Explained/?RAAF-whY8eFJkE4+5GBF5e9dj+IO+IHd42mda">fifth-generation</a> the RAAF means one that is fully networked with aircraft just part of that network.</p>
<p>Lockheed Martin <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/JointStikeFighter/%7E/media/Committees/fadt_ctte/JointStikeFighter/report.pdf">told an Australian Senate committee</a> that the F-35 was designed to be a “key net-enabling node in a system of systems, gathering and transmitting data across the defence network”. </p>
<p>While Australia must still wait before its F-35 aircraft become operational, the USAF is looking to send small F-35A units to Europe and the Asia Pacific this year. It’s also hoping to deploy the <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/articles/air-force-anticipates-f-35-deployment-to-middle-east-in-not-too-distant-future">F-35A to fight the Islamic State group</a> in the Middle East in the not too distant future.</p>
<p>So if you want to take a look at the aircraft that’s at the centre of such attention then head to the Avalon airshow, between Melbourne and Geelong, this week, March 3 to 5. The two F-35As are <a href="https://www.airshow.com.au/airshow2017/PUBLIC/program/sunday-program.asp">due to fly out on Sunday</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was amended at the request of the author to remove an incorrect reference to the cost of Australia’s first two F35s. A more accurate report on the initial costs is available <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-21/australias-joint-strike-fighter-purchase-unaffected-by-canada/6874660">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new Joint Strike Fighter will make its first appearance before an Australian crowd this weekend. But how close to being operational is the new fighter aircraft?Steven L. Jones, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/408972015-05-27T04:27:12Z2015-05-27T04:27:12ZAustralia can have ballistic missile defence – doesn’t mean we should<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82906/original/image-20150526-24745-17qkh4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Should Australia seek a ballistic missile defence capability, like that of the United States?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Department of Defense</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One capability that could yet again be <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2013/December/Ballistic_missile_defence_and_Australia">contemplated</a> in the lead-up to Australia’s next <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/">defence white paper</a>, and the planned 10-year defence capability plan that will follow, is <a href="http://www.mda.mil/system/system.html">ballistic missile defence</a>. </p>
<p>It would not be difficult for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence. It is currently manufacturing three Hobart-class destroyers – the first of which has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-23/crowds-gather-for-launch-of-air-warfare-destroyer-hmas-hobart/6491948">just been launched</a> and is scheduled to be <a href="http://www.ausawd.com/library/AWD%20Big%20Picture_0.pdf">operational in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>These vessels will be equipped with the <a href="http://www.ausawd.com/content.aspx?p=63">Aegis combat system</a>, which can be retroactively upgraded to incorporate ballistic missile defence capabilities. So, should Australia seek ballistic missile defence? What are the costs and benefits involved?</p>
<h2>Arguments for acquisition</h2>
<p>One of the arguments for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence is to protect against a possible attack from North Korea. While the North Korean nuclear program is concerning, and it does – in theory – possess ballistic missiles capable of reaching Australian territory, the Aegis system is incapable of providing the defence required. </p>
<p>The only missiles capable of <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/ballistic-missile-defence-how-soon,-how-significant,-and-what-should-australias-policy-be/SI71_BMD.pdf">reaching Australia</a> are those with intercontinental range, which reach altitudes of more than 1000km, and re-enter the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. This is well beyond the reach of Aegis. </p>
<p>Another argument for Australian ballistic missile defence is the protection of its forces and allies in the region. This is the exact role the Aegis system was designed for. In this scenario, the central consideration is not whether Australia would directly benefit from ballistic missile defence, but instead if other countries would – and how much they would value this contribution. </p>
<p>However, Australia can only offer a limited numbers of vessels. This means that the acquisition of additional ballistic missile defence capabilities amounts to little more than tokenism. And given the lack of vessels, and the need for them to also fulfil the air defence role they were initially conceived for, they would be able to provide defence against only the most limited of ballistic missile attacks. </p>
<p>This weakness is even more acute when it is considered that the ballistic missile defence interceptors are unable to be <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/ballistic-missile-defence-how-soon,-how-significant,-and-what-should-australias-policy-be/SI71_BMD.pdf">reloaded at sea</a>. Vessels are required to return to port to reload.</p>
<h2>Costs of acquisition</h2>
<p>There are significant costs for Australia if it chooses to equip the Hobart class with ballistic missile defence. </p>
<p>The first cost is financial. The unit cost of an SM-6, the most advanced air defence missile currently produced, is approximately <a href="https://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Defense/Standard-Missile.html">US$3 million per missile</a>. However, the SM-3 interceptor required for ballistic missile defence would cost an estimated <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2013/December/Ballistic_missile_defence_and_Australia">US$20-$24 million per missile</a> for the most recent model.</p>
<p>The system would need to be thoroughly tested before becoming operational. This is an expensive proposition – a single test of the Aegis system conducted by the US in 2012 cost approximately <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2013/December/Ballistic_missile_defence_and_Australia">US$112 million</a>.</p>
<p>The other cost that must be accounted for is the decrease in air defence capability offered by the Hobart class if equipped with ballistic missile defence. The payload of air defence missiles will have to be decreased to account for the ballistic missile defence interceptors. The adequacy of the Hobart class to carry out its original mission will be somewhat compromised, while providing no meaningful benefit to Australia’s security in return.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Spanish F100 Destroyer will be the basis for the Hobart Class.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Horatio J. Kookaburra/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Strategic implications</h2>
<p>There are also the strategic implications to consider in addition to the costs. The most acute implication for Australia is how acquiring ballistic missile defence will affect its relationship with China. </p>
<p>One of the advantages of Australian ballistic missile defence is the increased capability Australia can offer the US. But China will undoubtedly view this as a negative development. </p>
<p>China is already wary of encirclement as a result of the US <a href="http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific/">rebalance to the region</a>, and is also concerned about US ballistic missile defence capabilities – particularly Aegis. An Australian capability may well increase China’s concerns, or indicate that Australia is “choosing” between its relationship with China and its relationship with the US.</p>
<p>The other strategic implication that must be considered is the reduction in the effectiveness of China’s nuclear deterrence due to the proliferation of missile defences in the region. This is made more acute when it is considered that China heavily relies on short-range theatre ballistic missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>In order to maintain the relevance of its deterrent, China may adopt a more aggressive nuclear policy or drastically increase the size of its nuclear arsenal to overwhelm missile defences – or both. This would increase the security threat in the Asia-Pacific. It may pressure other states that feel threatened by an increased Chinese nuclear arsenal to contemplate nuclear weapons of their own. </p>
<p>Alternately, it may push them to further invest in ballistic missile defence. This could lead to a constant cycle of security competition within the region.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the argument for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence does not stack up. Not only will the financial costs drain money away from other programs that may provide the defence force with greater capabilities, it will also decrease the intended capabilities of the Hobart class, while offering little benefit in return.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40897/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ultimately, the argument for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence does not stack up.James Dwyer, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Relations Program, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/275952014-06-05T04:39:52Z2014-06-05T04:39:52ZJump jet strike fighters for Australia would come at a cost<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50297/original/hcrb72nj-1401927081.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could the jump version of the Joint Strike Fighter be heading for Australia?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/6310298566/in/set-72157625859980836#">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/jump-jets-on-navys-agenda-as-tony-abbott-orders-air-strike-rethink-20140603-39gl0.html">officers confirmed</a> during <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2014_06_02_2526.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/0000%22">Senate estimates</a> this week that Prime Minister Tony Abbott had ordered Defence to examine options for Australia to acquire the jump jet version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.</p>
<p>To accommodate the jump jet’s short take-off and vertical landing ability. Defence was also asked to look at options to convert the Navy’s two amphibious assault ships, the <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd">Canberra-class</a> Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD), into “aircraft carriers”.</p>
<p>Were it to go ahead, the decision is much more than acquiring a slightly different version of the JSF aircraft. It would represent a major change in Australia’s power projection capabilities, force structure and the nation’s defence posture.</p>
<p>It would allow Australia to project force in a new way with the aircraft able to operate far from Australia’s shores on Australian or allied ships or forward bases. It would require a change in the ADF structure to be able to use and protect the new capabilities, and it would change the way Australia – and our neighbours – think we would use the new capabilities in pursuit of national interests.</p>
<p>But it would also be more expense on top of what is already a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">very expensive project</a>, and represent a trade-off in capabilities.</p>
<p>The Abbott government <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/04/23/prime-minister-and-minister-for-defence-joint-media-release-f-35-joint-strike-fighters-to-transform-australias-air-combat-capability/">recently committed</a> A$12.4 billion for an extra 58 JSF to add to the 14 already ordered.</p>
<p>The task for Defence is to weigh the complicated costs and benefits of acquiring jump jets, not just in terms of strategic value and capabilities, but additional acquisition and sustainment costs.</p>
<h2>Three choices</h2>
<p>There are three main variants of the F-35:</p>
<ol>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35a-ctol-variant.html">F-35A</a> Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variant will be used by air forces, including the US Air Force, and is the version intended for the <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/F-35A-Lightning-II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">RAAF</a></li>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> is the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) or jump jet variant, which will be used by the US Marines and the Royal Navy</li>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html">F-35C</a>, designated a CV variant (a US Navy designation for fixed wing carrier aviation) or Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) variant, is the naval variant for use on aircraft carriers.</li>
</ol>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-35A, F-35B and F-35C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lockheed Martin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some of the broad strategic issues involved involved with the F-35B proposal have been outlined by Bond University’s expert in international relations, Malcom Davis, in a <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35b-jsf-for-the-adf-a-viable-option-in-the-2015-white-paper-part-1/">couple</a> of <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35b-jsf-for-the-adf-a-viable-option-in-the-2015-white-paper-part-2/">posts</a> on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s blog.</p>
<p>But there a range of other issues which greatly complicate the issue and will need to be considered.</p>
<h2>Reduced weapons capacity</h2>
<p>The F-35B STOVL variant has a <a href="http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/">reduced range and payload</a> because the jump jet propulsion system takes up space that would otherwise be used for fuel. </p>
<p>All three F-35 variants have two internal weapons bays, each of which can carry two air-to-air missiles, or one air-to-air missile and one air-to-surface missile or bomb. It can also carry weapons on pylons under its wings, but this greatly reduces its stealth characteristics. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-35B Lightning II weapons stations.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the F-35B will still be able to carry the same air-to-air missiles as the F-35A in the internal bays, the capacity for air-to-surface missiles is reduced from 2,500lbs to 1,500lbs (1,130kg to 680kg).</p>
<p>This would be a problem for Australia as the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (<a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/jassm.html">JASSM</a>), which reached Final Operational Capability (FOC) with the RAAF <a href="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australia-chooses-jassm-missiles-on-f18s-for-longrange-strike-updated-01966/">last week</a>, weighs around 2,250lbs (1,020kg).</p>
<p>While new stand-off missiles Australia is interesting in purchasing such as the Joint Strike Missile (<a href="http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/Selected-topics/kampfly-til-forsvaret/Joint-Strike-Missile-JSM---A-Considerably-Strengtened-Norwegian-Threshold-Against-War-and-Conflict.html?id=760245">JSM</a>) Norway is developing for its F-35As weigh only around 900lbs (408kg), it still <a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2014/07/norway-joint-strike-missile/">cannot fit</a> in the F-35Bs internal weapons bays.</p>
<h2>Where to take off and land a jump jet?</h2>
<p>Another issue requiring serious consideration is that the temperature and force of the STOVL propulsion system limits where the F-35B can take off and land.</p>
<p>The ADF would require additional resources to support the STOVL variant beyond that of the CTOL version. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZD-J1KksHUQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">F-35B – taking STOVL to a new level.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2011, defence writer Bill Sweetman highlighted the “basing flexibility” issue, <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/new-threat-f-35-joint-strike-fighter">noting</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[US] Navy construction specifications continue to warn that the F-35B will impose temperatures as high as 1700F (926C) (several hundred degrees higher than a Harrier exhaust) on vertical-landing pads, with a transonic exhaust velocity.</p>
<p>This is enough to cause standard concrete to “spall” – that is, shed surface flakes in a near-explosive manner – with a 50% chance of damage on the first landing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition, Sweetman writes that the US Office of Naval Research had a program to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] develop a cooling system for the decks of LHD- and LHA-class ships that will carry F-35Bs, reflecting concerns that thermal expansion and contraction and consequent buckling will cause fatigue and premature failure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For the UK at least, these issues are still under consideration and yet to be finalised. Writing last week, Sweetman <a href="http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-f-35b-vertical-landings-doubt-uk">noted</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] there are no plans for the F-35B to perform [vertical landings] in the UK, because the program staff has not finished testing the matting that is needed to protect the runway from exhaust heat. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Issues for Australia</h2>
<p>These are just two of the myriad of issues the ADF will have to consider but they are indicative of the complexity of defence procurement decision making.</p>
<p>The danger is, that like the <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/27/1023864632200.html">2002 decision</a> to acquire the F-35 and effectively cancel the competition, political imperatives will short-circuit a rigorous assessment process.</p>
<p>Rather than simply representing a simple purchase of additional capabilities, acquiring F-35Bs represents a trade-off in capabilities and certainly additional costs. Defence will be calculating an estimate of the extra costs in the coming months, and will depend on precisely what Defence wants to do with the aircraft and ships.</p>
<p>The key question is whether the balance of the capability trade-off offer is of strategic benefit to Australia, and whether this benefit is worth the additional financial costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p>Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) officers confirmed during Senate estimates this week that Prime Minister Tony Abbott had ordered Defence to examine options for Australia to acquire the jump jet version…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259112014-04-28T06:56:27Z2014-04-28T06:56:27ZThe Joint Strike Fighter: is it the right aircraft for Australia?<p>The Australian Government’s <a href="https://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2013/09/02/coalitions-policy-stronger-defence">mission</a> to upgrade the defence force fleet of ageing aircraft with the <a href="http://www.jsf.mil/">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> has been controversial since it began more than a decade ago.</p>
<p>Australia formally began looking for options to replace its <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/FA-18AB_Hornet/?RAAF-9SSttIt/E93/3lV4LgVxgxc0y4P09YW2">F/A-18</a> and <a href="http://www.raafamberleyheritage.gov.au/f-111.aspx">F-111</a> aircraft in May 1999 with the creation of project AIR 6000 – <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/about/domains/nacc.cfm">New Air Combat Capability</a>.</p>
<p>Phase 2, a Project Definition Study, was to commence in the 2002/03 financial year with a final decision expected around 2005/06.</p>
<p>But when Australia signed up to the System Development and Demonstration phase of the JSF program in June 2002, then-Defence Minister Robert Hill effectively <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/27/1023864632200.html">ended the selection process</a> for Australia’s new combat aircraft.</p>
<p>At that stage the primary contenders included the European Eurofighter <a href="http://www.eurofighter.com/">Typhoon</a>, the French Dassault <a href="http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/rafale/introduction/">Rafale</a> and the Swedish Saab <a href="http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Gripen-Fighter-System/">Gripen</a>.</p>
<p>The government’s decision was a surprise to nearly everyone, including JSF manufacturer Lockheed Martin, rival manufacturers and the Pentagon. While many other nations had joined the JSF program in 2002, Australia was the only one to end their selection process at that time. </p>
<p>Now Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s pledged to spend <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">A$12 billion</a> on a further 58 aircraft to bring the total to to 72.</p>
<p>The JSF has an impressive list of capabilities and weapons including:</p>
<ul>
<li>low observable stealth</li>
<li>integrated sensors, information and weapons systems</li>
<li>powerful and comprehensive integrated sensor package for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions</li>
<li>advanced electronic warfare capabilities</li>
<li>a 25mm GAU-22 internal gun</li>
<li>four internal and six external weapon stations which can carry a combination of air-to-air, air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, and precision guided bombs.</li>
</ul>
<p>But whether the JSF is the right aircraft for Australia has been continuously questioned. The government and Australian Defence Force maintain it is the right aircraft because it provides Australia with a <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/delivery-of-the-first-australian-made-f-35-jsf-vertical-tail">technological edge</a> in our region. But this only raises further questions.</p>
<h2>An edge over whom?</h2>
<p>Two defence white papers from 2000 and 2009 recognised that the conventional military threat to Australia is relatively low, with the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009 white paper</a> stating:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is a broad consensus that the present strategic environment is relatively benign.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of the countries in our region, Indonesia has a growing military capability, and has had serious political tensions with Australia over many decades.</p>
<p>Over the past decade Indonesia has acquired advanced Russian Sukhoi <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/su27sk/">Su-27</a> and <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/su30mk/">Su-30</a> fighters. Its plans to acquire more have led to concerns regarding Australia’s air superiority capabilities.</p>
<p>While these aircraft are superior to Australia’s F/A-18 Hornets in many ways they have not been considered a major threat to Australia because of the standards of training and doctrine for Indonesian pilots, and levels of aircraft readiness.</p>
<p>Indonesia is currently in the process of significantly <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/moving-beyond-ambitions-indonesias-military-modernisation/Strategy_Moving_beyond_ambitions.pdf%20its%20military">expanding and modernising</a>, but it remains largely ill-equipped and ill-prepared for modern military operations.</p>
<p>Analysts such as <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-a-stronger-indonesian-military-is-good-for-australia-but-is-still-a-long-way-off/">Ben Schreer</a> and <a href="http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/node/34">Alan Stephens</a> have suggested that Indonesia’s military modernisation offers opportunities for increasing Australia’s security.</p>
<h2>A technological edge in what timeframe?</h2>
<p>The JSF does offer significant technological advantages at the moment and probably out to at least 2020. But Australia and the US plan on operating the JSF until 2050 and it is here that a capability edge becomes more uncertain.</p>
<p>While the JSF was designed to be upgradeable – and regular software upgrades are a major part of the ongoing sustainment of the aircraft – future improvements will be limited by the hardware and the physical characteristics of the aircraft.</p>
<p>Although some broad technological developments fundamentally change the nature of warfare (such as with the invention of gunpowder or the aircraft) smaller incremental changes generally only provide short-term advantages with counter-measures developed over time, and developing increasing quickly in the 21st century.</p>
<p>Also, technology itself does not always provide advantages. During the Vietnam War, early US F-4 Phantoms lacked guns as air-to-air missiles were considered the best way of destroying enemy aircraft, limiting their dominance over technologically inferior, but more agile and gun armed North Vietnamese MiG fighters.</p>
<p>The argument here is not that the days of dogfighting are back, but rather to point out that there are historical precedents that illustrate the limitations to technological advantages.</p>
<p>While the JSF is less manoeuvrable than less advanced aircraft, probably making it less capable within visual range, it’s argued that this is not relevant as stealth and advanced missiles will allow JSFs to take down enemy aircraft well before they enter visual range.</p>
<p>Australia has paid a large premium for <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/tony-abbott-to-approve-australias-biggest-ever-military-purchase-of-stealth-fighter-jets/story-fncynjr2-1226851684344">radar stealth</a> in the JSF but it is not a permanent solution. A US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter was <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-26-serb-stealth_x.htm">shot down</a> in 1999 by an innovative Serbian commander who modified his obsolescent anti-aircraft missile battery.</p>
<p>In 2012 the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathon Greenert, explored the <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course">limitations of stealth</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The rapid expansion of computing power also ushers in new sensors and methods that will make stealth and its advantages increasingly difficult to maintain […] It is time to consider shifting our focus from platforms that rely solely on stealth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Israel’s air force also believes any stealth protection of the JSF will be good for only <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/israel-us-agree-450-million-f-35-ew-work">five to 10 years</a>.</p>
<h2>For what purpose?</h2>
<p>In defending the JSF against Russian and Chinese competitors, Prime Minister Abbott <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-04-23/joint-press-conference-canberra">said</a> that in the judgement of the US and the other Western powers it was a “very, very effective aircraft”.</p>
<p>How the US plans to use the latest <a href="http://www.fighterworld.com.au/az-of-fighter-aircraft/five-generations-of-jets">fifth-generation fighters</a> such as the JSF sheds light on Australia’s strategic thinking in acquiring them.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR871.pdf">Rand report</a> noted the importance of any fifth-generation aircraft to operate in hostile environments featuring integrated air defence system that include advanced surface to air missile systems, jamming and other electronic attack modes.</p>
<p>Senior US generals have also <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66911">indicated</a> the importance of allowing the US to strike any target in the world at any time.</p>
<p>To operate successfully in a contemporary hostile environment, older technology strike aircraft would need the support of a range of defensive and offensive electronic warfare aircraft, as well as other aircraft to suppress enemy air defences.</p>
<p>But the JSF can perform <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">all of these roles</a> in the one aircraft. </p>
<p>China’s military modernisation and strategic developments are designed to deter a US attack, and the JSF is a key component in overcoming Chinese defences.</p>
<h2>What other options are there?</h2>
<p>The suitability of other options depends on evaluating and prioritising a range of factors, including price and cost effectiveness, timeframes, the strategic environment, operational needs and capabilities available.</p>
<p>As well as the European aircraft mentioned previously, Australia’s current F/A-18F Super Hornets possess many advanced technologies. There is also a range of aircraft that would fit in the fifth-generation category currently being developed in China, Russia, Japan, India and Turkey.</p>
<p>While not all of these will ultimately be produced, the future is likely to see a range of technologically advanced aircraft made available to customers in Australia’s region. The suitability of the JSF for Australia in the long term will, to some degree, be dependent on the capability of these aircraft.</p>
<p>The JSF may well be a safe bet for Australia. It has its problems and does not meet the expectations of a decade ago, but it provides some certainty, at least in the short term.</p>
<p>Predicting Australia’s strategic needs for the next 35 years is a daunting exercise, but the financial cost burden of acquiring and sustaining the JSF may reduce Australia’s strategic flexibility to change its force structure in the coming decades.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from UNSW.</span></em></p>The Australian Government’s mission to upgrade the defence force fleet of ageing aircraft with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been controversial since it began more than a decade ago. Australia formally…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/148192013-06-04T20:45:57Z2013-06-04T20:45:57ZFrom ‘telegraph poles’ to Russian missiles: Syria’s air defence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24835/original/ncn65wqx-1370219902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The deployment of the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems (pictured) to Syria has caused tensions to rise among Western powers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">LuchezarS.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the civil war in Syria continues, several states are now decrying the potential deployment of the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. </p>
<p>Described as a move to cool <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10085156/Syria-Russia-to-send-anti-aircraft-missiles-to-stop-Western-hotheads.html">“hothead”</a> pro-interventionists in the Western camp, Moscow’s gambit is aimed at deterring outside military action against the Assad regime. </p>
<p>But will the deployment be a “game-changer” in the ongoing conflict? In the short term, it will impact upon Israel’s capacity to launch strikes against Syrian targets. In the medium-to-long term, it will pose a challenge to any efforts at imposing a no-fly zone over Syrian airspace.</p>
<h2>Historical context</h2>
<p>Russian-manufactured SAMs have long posed a considerable risk for Western pilots. In 1960, an American U2 spyplane was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir2/u2incidentandparissummitrev1.shtml">shot down</a> near the Ural Mountains by the S-300’s venerable elder, the S-75 “Divina”. </p>
<p>Two years later, a <a href="http://www.history.com/news/the-cuban-missile-crisis-pilot-whose-death-may-have-saved-millions">similar incident</a> during the Cuban Missile Crisis pushed the Cold War to boiling point before Russia and the US wisely reigned themselves in. In 1972, as the US stepped up its <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/linebacker-2.htm">strategic bombing</a> of North Vietnam, the S-75 again proved its metal, carving out a fearsome toll of American aircraft over Hanoi.</p>
<p>During this same period, the Israelis began to experience the impact of Soviet SAMs. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) lost its characteristic edge in the face of a <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/going-to-war-in-denial-a-look-back-at-yom-kippur-1.467737">mass deployment of such systems</a> in the hands of Egyptian and Syrian opposition. </p>
<p>Where the IAF had assumed it would be facing the Egyptian and Syrian air forces in a fight it had historically succeeded at, it instead found itself dodging relentless waves of <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/editions/5305/5305.pdf">“flying telegraph poles”</a> that resulted in considerable losses. </p>
<p>The post-Vietnam war period saw the US and Israel coming to terms with the threat posed by the current generation of Soviet SAMs. The IAF’s <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2002/June%202002/0602bekaa.aspx">success</a> in June 1982 in the Bekaa Valley against massed Syrian air defence batteries signalled the Israeli remastering of the skies over the Levant. </p>
<p>While Russian airpower may have lagged behind during this period, a new generation of surface-to-air missiles emerged during the late 1970s. These missiles were designed specifically to counter the threat of Western air dominance. Systems produced during this period included the 9k37 “Buk”, the man-portable 9k38 “Igla” and the corn-silo-sized S-300. </p>
<p>Beyond their initial development, much time and effort was also invested in keeping these platforms capable of responding to developing threats. As the S-300 system further evolved, it was to gain ranges of up to 200 kilometres and a sophisticated guidance system, capable of defeating many of the countermeasures mounted on western aircraft like those found in the arsenals of Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<h2>Syrian context</h2>
<p>The integration of such a system into the Syrian regime arsenal would pose a major question mark over the current balance of power in the region. The Syrian air defence network is extensive, but according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it is largely composed of <a href="http://csis.org/publication/syrias-uncertain-air-defense-capabilities">antiquated Cold War relics</a>. </p>
<p>Although they were able to <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/03/224145.html">shoot down</a> a vintage Turkish F4 reconnaissance aircraft in June 2012, Ba’athist air defences have thus far proven <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/05/israel-air-strike-syria-security">completely incapable</a> of responding to the standoff munitions the IAF have been employing against them from Lebanese airspace.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24849/original/jp2zkdnx-1370223735.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli soldiers performing military training operations in the centre of Golan Heights, during an Israeli military exercise near the Israeli-Syrian border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Abir Sultan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The S-300 can potentially change all this. Although the system remains untested in battle, its purported capacity to down Western aircraft has clearly shaken Israel. Such consternation have culminated in unprecedented threats out of Jerusalem to <a href="http://news.msn.com/world/israel-warns-russia-against-giving-syria-missiles">strike Russian-flagged transports</a> in the region. This is a move with ramifications that are difficult to predict and could be extremely destabilising for the region’s security balance. </p>
<p>The system has long been controversial in the Middle East. A similar level of consternation emerged over a potential deal between Russia and Iran in 2010 that <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323728204578514913064415692.html">ultimately collapsed</a> under pressure from Israel and the US. Where the Iran deal was primarily aimed at a long-term deterrence strategy, however, the deployment of the system in Syria will have immediate implications. </p>
<p>The controversy surrounding the potential deployment of the system may also be playing a part in the recently emboldened regime rhetoric regarding Israel. Ominous statements from <a href="http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Assad-threatens-Israel-over-future-air-raids-and-attacks-on-Golan-Heights-28070.html">Assad himself earlier this week</a> have implied reprisals in the Golan for future Israeli strikes. </p>
<p>The reality of such threats remains remote. Even with the potential removal of Israel airpower, the IDF remains generations ahead of its Syrian counterpart and Assad is not likely to be that interested in wasting his heavy equipment to open a front against a foe he has no chance of besting. </p>
<p>For its part, the IDF has shown little desire to <a href="http://rt.com/news/israel-fires-shots-syria-560/">escalate</a> its <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/21/syria-israel-exchange-fire-golan-heights">low-intensity scraps</a> with the Syrian Armed Forces across the Area of Separation, much to the relief of UN peacekeepers stationed in the area. For now, at least, containment seems to override incursion.</p>
<p>Although the S-300 doesn’t make further Israeli <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/30/us-syria-crisis-israel-s300-analysis-idUSBRE94T0IZ20130530">strikes against Syria impossible</a>, the potential of losses will give Jerusalem cause for thought. </p>
<p>Whether such reconsideration would result in a more cautious approach to the Syria dilemma - or result in attempts at reproducing the successes of 1982 - remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/14819/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Rich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the civil war in Syria continues, several states are now decrying the potential deployment of the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Described as a move to cool “hothead” pro-interventionists…Ben Rich, Teaching assistant/PhD Scholar, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.