tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/africa-agenda-2063-22936/articlesAfrica Agenda 2063 – The Conversation2023-11-10T09:18:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172012023-11-10T09:18:21Z2023-11-10T09:18:21ZVisa-free travel for Africans: why Kenya and Rwanda have taken a step in the right direction<p>President William Ruto of Kenya recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67254349">announced</a> that Kenya’s borders would be open to visitors from the entirety of Africa, with no visas required, by the end of 2023. He said</p>
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<p>When people cannot travel, business people cannot travel, entrepreneurs cannot travel, we all become net losers.</p>
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<p>A few days later, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-visa-africans-actfa-africa-09edb93691babd5e0cebd2e131fd7ecb">followed suit</a>, saying all Africans would be able to enter Rwanda without visas.</p>
<p>Neither Kenya nor Rwanda will be the first. By the end of 2022, <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-visa-openness-report-2022#page=38">Benin, The Gambia and Seychelles</a> had already implemented a system of visa-free access for all Africans. Perhaps more will follow soon. Some regions, some sub-regional groups and some bilateral arrangements have also resulted in visa-free access and even passport-free access in certain cases. </p>
<p>Within the broader East African Community, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya <a href="https://immigration.go.ug/services/interstate-pass">allow</a> cross border travel without passports. Botswana and Namibia recently <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15940-botswana-and-namibia-concluded-an-agreement-on-the-movement-of-persons.html">signed</a> a similar agreement. </p>
<p>Despite this progress, by the end of 2022 <a href="https://www.visaopenness.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/VOI%E2%80%932022_final2_9dec22.pdf#page=12">only 27%</a> of African routes allowed Africans to travel visa-free. </p>
<p>Actions such as those of Kenya and Rwanda take the African Union’s agenda further. Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges. It is one of the flagship projects of the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/flagship-projects">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>But even if all African countries no longer required visas from Africans, this would not necessarily give the visitors a right to apply for jobs, establish a business or build a home in the receiving country. The 2018 African Union Free Movement of Persons protocol <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">aims</a> for full free movement, through three phases – entry, residence and establishment. This includes full economic rights, including employment. It has not been widely ratified, however. </p>
<p><a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">Our new study of migration trends</a> underscores the potential contributions of migration to economic development in the countries of origin and destination. This is realised through the transfer of skills, knowledge and remittances. The study also shows that intra-African migration is firmly rooted in geographical, social and economic ties. Movement is predominantly within regions, and moderately between them.</p>
<h2>Free trade and movement of people</h2>
<p>African Union policies support freer intracontinental trade, investment and movement of people to promote the continent’s economic, social and political development. The continent has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">made progress</a> on the aspects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement that deal with trade and investment. There hasn’t been much progress on the free movement of people. And yet the success of the trade agreement requires freer movement of people.</p>
<p>This interdependence between trade and free movement of people was the focus of the recent <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20231031/8th-pan-african-forum-migration-pafom8-kicks">Pan-African Forum on Migration</a> held in Gaborone, the Botswana capital. The forum brings together African Union member states, the continent’s regional economic communities, UN agencies and intergovernmental organisations <a href="https://www.iom.int/pan-african-forum-migration-pafom">to deliberate on migration and human mobility issues</a> in Africa. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">Free movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work</a>
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<p>The conference noted that most African countries had failed to ratify the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement of Persons protocol</a>. At the same time, there was evidence of improvements in policies and practices at national, bilateral and multilateral levels that facilitate the freer movement of Africans.</p>
<p>Apart from recent announcements by Rwanda and Kenya, other instances would be a growing number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">reciprocal</a> arrangements between countries.</p>
<h2>Regional migration a norm</h2>
<p>The history of African statehood, with strong social ties across national boundaries, makes regional mobility a norm rather than an exception. This can be seen from the migration routes, mostly found within the same regions and which proceed in both directions. </p>
<p>For example, Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire is the largest migrant route in the continent and within the Economic Community of West Africa (<a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states">Ecowas</a>) – the economic bloc of 15 west African states. Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso is equally popular. This trend is ubiquitous throughout the continent, except within the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a> region, where most migrant routes tend to lead to South Africa.</p>
<p>Among the major regional economic communities, Ecowas has the most intense regional migration. It is followed by the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community. By contrast, Ecowas has the least inter-regional migration while the East African Community has the most.</p>
<p>Variations in development across Africa mean that some countries experience contrasting patterns, particularly in extra-continental migration. While most African migrants migrate to and from other parts of the continent, in middle income countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria extra-continental emigration is greater.</p>
<p>Immigration and emigration are generally <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">low in low income countries</a> and higher in middle income countries. In rich countries, people tend not to emigrate. The relatively low level of migration in Africa follows this pattern.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=11">14% of total world emigrants</a> come from Africa. The average migrant density, or percentage of migrants living on the continent, is 1.89% compared to a global average of <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">3.6%</a> where Europe and North America are at 12% and 16% respectively. African migration is thus not only comparatively low compared with the global averages, but characteristically depicts low income.</p>
<p>High income countries tend to have more immigrants than emigrants. The converse is true for low income regions. Africa as a whole has more emigrants than immigrants, confirming the link between migration and development. </p>
<h2>Legal restrictions matter little</h2>
<p>Much migration in Africa is impervious to legal constrictions or definitions of national boundaries, and even to logistical constraints. Government dictates succeed in making much of this migration irregular but fail to stop it. Though regional integration and liberalisation of migration rules are helpful, they do not yet solve this challenge.</p>
<p>The main migrant sending country to Kenya is Somalia, despite not being in the same regional economic community. And despite efforts by the government of Kenya to deter Somali migrants to Kenya. The main destination country for Nigerian emigrants in Africa is Cameroon, even though it does not belong to Ecowas.</p>
<p>While African migration governance reforms are making <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">considerable progress</a> it will still be a while till they catch up and are able to deal fairly and rationally with the reality of migration patterns in Africa.</p>
<p><em>Michael Mutava of the New South Institute authored the report on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute where he supervised some of the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p>Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877052022-08-11T14:53:46Z2022-08-11T14:53:46ZNot yet uhuru: the African Union has had a few successes but remains weak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477122/original/file-20220802-19-k8vu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the African Union Summit held in Malabo, Capital of Equatorial Guinea, on 27 May 2022 to address worsening humanitarian crises in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) was born in the South African port city of Durban <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">in 2002</a>. Under its first chair,<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki</a>, African leaders seemed determined to abandon the grandiose plans of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU had been established <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">in 1963</a> to promote African unity and liberation. Other aims included: to protect the territorial integrity of its member states, promote non-alignment, and advance the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">peaceful settlement of disputes</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union, for its part, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">was established</a> to achieve an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa which would be led by its own citizens and play a dynamic role in global politics. Unlike the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">OAU Charter</a>, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000</a> allowed for interference in the internal affairs of its members to stem instability, halt egregious human rights abuses and sanction military coups d’état.</p>
<p>Military regimes in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/2/25/togo-suspended-from-au">Togo</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-coup-idUSL855802420080809">Mauritania</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/20/african-union-suspends-madagascar">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20100219-african-union-suspends-niger-thousands-celebrate-coup">Niger</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/sudan-suspended-african-union#:%7E:text=On%20the%206th%20of%20June,exit%20from%20its%20current%20crisis.">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-suspends-guinea-after-military-coup/a-59144311">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/4/17/guinea-bissau-suspended-from-african-union">Guinea-Bissau</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/african-union-suspends-mali-participation-all-activities">Mali</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-2022-01-31/">Burkina Faso</a> were thus suspended from the AU. The continental body launched praiseworthy military stabilisation missions into <a href="https://issafrica.org/chapter-4-the-african-union-mission-in-burundi">Burundi</a> (2003), <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201231-un-african-union-peacekeeping-mission-in-sudan-s-darfur-ends">Darfur</a> (2007) and <a href="https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/amisom/">Somalia</a> (2007). However despite this progress, autocrats continued to rig electoral outcomes. </p>
<p>As the AU <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">turned 20 in July 2022</a>, it had achieved a few successes. But it remains a weak organisation embarking on sporadic bouts of illusory reforms. This is due to financial and capacity constraints. And too much decision-making power resides with its omnipotent heads of state which has denied the organisation the ability to take decisions, and act more effectively on behalf of its members.</p>
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<h2>Institutional sclerosis</h2>
<p>The Addis Ababa-based <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> – its implementing arm – is led by an <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of Heads of State</a>, with an Executive Council of foreign ministers and a Permanent Representatives Committee of ambassadors. The ambassadors work with specialised development, governance, parliamentary and judicial organs. The AU Commission has, however, struggled to establish its independence to take initiatives on behalf of its 55 member states in fulfilment of its mandate. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">2007 audit report</a> led by the Nigerian scholar-technocrat <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/tribute-my-mentor-professor-adebayo-adedeji">Adebayo Adedeji</a> revealed how the AU Commission headed by <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/professor-alpha-oumar-konare/">Malian Alpha Konaré</a> (2003-2008) misunderstood its mandates and authority levels, and failed to coordinate overlapping tasks. Some of these problems still persist.</p>
<p>Under the French-influenced Gabonese <a href="http://jeanping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CV-Jean-Ping-VGB.pdf">Jean Ping</a> (2008-2012), the commission’s annual budget had reached <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/01/27/short-of-cash-and-teeth">$260 million by 2011</a>. Only 40% of this sum was actually paid by members. The European Union, China and the United States mostly funded the rest. This posed the risk that AU institutional priorities could be set by its donors.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">AU Assembly</a> of heads of state has often failed to adhere to the principle of subsidiarity: taking decisions at the lowest practical level, as the European Union – the world’s only genuinely supranational regional organisation – does. </p>
<p>The AU also conducts most of its business through unanimity, making it difficult to reach quick decisions.</p>
<p>While the AU Commission has some impressive staff, it also has much “dead wood” inherited from the OAU era. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-union-needs-a-more-robust-response-to-conflict-in-cameroon-132449">African Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon</a>
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<p>The AU’s 2003 plan to set up an <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> by 2010 was <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/african-union-says-progressing-to-military-force-by-end-2015/">postponed until 2015</a>. In December 2020, the organisation simply declared the force to be fully operational, despite the fantasy involved in such a statement. The deadline for “Silencing the Guns” (ending armed conflicts) <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2021.1995222#:%7E:text=The%20Africa%20Union's%20Agenda%202063,all%20illegal%20weapons%20in%20Africa.">by 2020</a>“ was casually pushed back a decade.</p>
<h2>Illusory reforms</h2>
<p>As chair of the AU Commission (2012-2016), former South African foreign minister <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma </a> complained that over 97% of the continental body’s programmes were <a href="https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/Dec/27467/budget_challenge_for_dlamini_zuma_at_au.aspx">funded by external donors</a>. In 2013, $155 million of the $278 million annual budget (56%) was still <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/6158/african-union-its-never-too-late-to-avoid-war-dlamini-zuma/">provided by foreign partners</a>. But Dlamini-Zuma failed to reduce this dependence during her four-year tenure. AU leaders refused to back efforts to find alternative sources of funding, such as customs duties and <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/885/Assembly%20AU%2018%20%28XIX%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">taxes on flights and hotel stays</a>. </p>
<p>Among the more quixotic ideas of the Dlamini-Zuma-driven 50-year development vision, <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">"Agenda 2063”</a> includes increasing intra-African trade from 12% to 50% by 2045, ending armed conflicts by 2020 ](https://au.int/en/flagships/silencing-guns-2020) and eradicating poverty in two decades.</p>
<p>Under the Francophile Chadian chair, <a href="https://au.int/en/biography-he-moussa-faki-mahamat">Moussa Faki Mahamat</a>, since 2017, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">report</a> chaired by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Kagame">Rwandan president Paul Kagame</a> on reforming the AU seemed rushed and lacked substance, and its laundry list of recommendations on institutional reforms were on a level of vacuity as to be of no real utility. </p>
<p>These were physicians proposing half-baked cures to ills that had not been properly diagnosed. All the 2017 report’s “key findings” had been more coherently outlined in <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">Adedeji’s report</a> a decade earlier, the recommendations of which still have not been implemented. </p>
<p>Another disappointment has been the 2018 <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> which seeks to facilitate trade, build infrastructure, establish a common market and ensure the free movement of people. But outside West and Eastern Africa, the free movement of people <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement">remains a pipe dream</a>.</p>
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<p>Most African governments are security-obsessed and hostile to intra-African migration. There is also a lack of convergence of African economies. Many compete to export raw materials rather than exchange diverse goods.</p>
<p>Road, rail, and port infrastructure remains poor. Rules of origin – which define where goods are made – are often restrictive, and non-tariff barriers are widespread. If integration has not worked at the national and sub-regional levels, transferring all these problems to the continental level will certainly not integrate Africa. </p>
<h2>Need for realism</h2>
<p>The 15-member <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">AU Peace and Security Council</a> has contributed substantively to peacemaking efforts across Africa, and coordinated closely with the United Nations.</p>
<p>But other AU organs have performed less well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nepad.org/publication/nepad-brief">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> clearly lacks the resources and capacity as a development agency to uplift the continent. The <a href="https://au.int/en/aprm#:%7E:text=APRM%20is%20a%20voluntary%20arrangement,economic%20growth%20and%20sustainable%20development">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, which identifies governance challenges in 41 countries, is toothless.</p>
<p>The Pan-African Parliament remains a <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">“talking shop”</a>. The <a href="https://au.int/en/about/ecosocc">Economic, Social and Cultural Council</a> has failed to provide genuine civil society participation in the AU’s institutions. The idea of the African Diaspora in the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe as a <a href="http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/six-regions-african-union">sixth African sub-region</a>, along with the five continental ones, is largely devoid of substance.</p>
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<p>The AU must thus adopt more realistic and less illusory mandates. Its approach should be based on an accurate assessment of financial and logistical realities. </p>
<p>More positively, AU members had contributed <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220630/african-union-peace-fund-board-trustees-convene-meeting-review-progress">$295 million</a> to their <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">revised Peace Fund</a> by June 2022, complementing a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-20-much-accomplished-more-challenges-ahead/">$650 million 2022 budget </a>. African leaders must now strengthen the institutions they have created.</p>
<p>They must also establish one effective economic body in each sub-region that can promote socio-economic development and provide jobs for the continent’s youthful population.</p>
<p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations. This is not yet uhuru (freedom).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations.Adekeye Adebajo, Professor and Senior research fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1806362022-04-18T13:04:22Z2022-04-18T13:04:22ZAfrica has ambitious goals for 2063: plans for outer space hold the key to success<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456841/original/file-20220407-24-lqc06y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">High speed trains like this one in Casablanca, Morocco, will benefit from satellite communication support.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Duffour/Andia/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a> is the African Union’s long-term framework for socio-economic development, regional integration and the preservation of history and culture. </p>
<p>The agenda has <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/flagship-projects">15 flagship projects</a>. These have been identified as necessary for meeting the continent’s aspirations. They are wide-ranging and include constructing a network of high-speed trains; ending violence and creating continental financial institutions. </p>
<p>But, in my view, the core of Agenda 2063 is the <a href="https://www.nepad.org/agenda-2063/flagship-project/african-outer-space-programme">Africa outer space programme</a>. It has direct or indirect impacts on the other flagship programmes. The outer space programme seeks to enable Africa to obtain maximum benefits from space science, technology and applications. It focuses on Earth observation, meteorology, satellite communication, satellite navigation and astronomy.</p>
<p>Outer space therefore needs the attention of the African Union (AU). However, at the executive council’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/41584-EX_CL_Dec_1143-1167_XL_E.pdf">40th session</a> in February 2022, no reference was made to outer space. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/41583-Assembly_AU_Dec_813-838_XXXV_E.pdf">AU Assembly</a> subsequently referred to it once, when it adopted the organogram and salaries of the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/statute-african-space-agency">African Space Agency</a>. </p>
<p>I believe the African outer space programme is a means to meet the ends of other flagship programmes in Agenda 2063. It needs more attention from the AU.</p>
<h2>Impacts of space on flagship projects</h2>
<p>A number of examples illustrate this.</p>
<p>For example, the aim of the <a href="http://afcac.org/en/images/Documentation/yd_eng.pdf">Single African Air Transport Market</a> is to connect major cities in Africa and create a unified air transport market in Africa. It rests on the safety and security of the continent’s space and airports. That requires satellites for all stages of flight, weather information, communication and in-flight services.</p>
<p>Similarly, the purpose of the integrated high-speed train network is to connect all African capitals and commercial centres by rail. This would ease the movement of goods and people across Africa. Satellites would provide the information the train network needs – location, navigation, weather and communication.</p>
<p>The envisaged pan-African virtual and e-University, a project run from Yaoundé, Cameroon, serves as the open, distance and e-learning arm of the <a href="https://pau-au.africa/">Pan African University</a>. This requires communication satellites for Internet access by students and their programme facilitators. </p>
<p>Pan-African e-network and <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/29560-treaty-0048_-_african_union_convention_on_cyber_security_and_personal_data_protection_e.pdf">cybersecurity</a> projects also require communication satellites. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-case-for-nigeria-and-south-africa-to-cooperate-on-outer-space-activities-174635">There's a case for Nigeria and South Africa to cooperate on outer space activities</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Other projects like the Great Museum of Africa and the Encyclopaedia Africana could also use the power of the Internet to increase global visibility and accessibility.</p>
<p>Another of the flagship projects, the African commodities strategy, also requires communication satellites. These are necessary for the real-time transfer of information about prices of commodities and processed products from around the world. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://afcfta.au.int/en">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> secretariat in Accra, Ghana, needs communication satellites to maintain the <a href="https://ato.africa/en">African trade observatory</a>, share information on trade and tariffs, and for its payment and settlement system.</p>
<p><a href="https://au.int/en/visa-free-africa">The African passport</a> was initiated to eliminate restrictions to the free movement of Africans to any part of Africa. It, too, needs communication satellites to transmit information about travellers.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hydroreview.com/hydro-projects/grand-inga-hydropower-project/#gref">The Grand Inga Dam project</a> is expected to generate over 40,000 megawatts of electric power to boost current supplies across the continent. The operation of dams relies on weather information from meteorological satellites. Earth observation satellites are also needed for monitoring rivers and plains.</p>
<p>Agenda 2063 also contains plans to establish financial institutions that will harmonise financial and monetary policies, mobilise resources and promote trade. The <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/34911-doc-au_financial_institutions_web-en.pdf">financial institutions</a> are the <a href="https://au.int/en/ea/epr/aufi">African Central Bank</a>, with headquarters in Nigeria; the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-investment-bank">African Investment Bank</a>, based in Libya; the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-establishment-african-monetary-fund">African Monetary Fund</a>, based in Cameroon; and the Pan-African Stock Exchange. </p>
<p>Financial institutions rely on navigation satellites for their exact timing applications. They also need satellites for communication and online services.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nanosatellite-launch-is-a-big-step-forward-for-african-space-science-175069">Nanosatellite launch is a big step forward for African space science</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A less obvious area of application for outer space is in the “<a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/news/2020/Jan/contributing-to-silencing-the-guns-in-west-africa--towards-2030.html">Silencing the Guns</a>” project. This aims to end all violent conflicts and wars in Africa. Peace is an essential condition for industry and prosperity. The outer space programme can contribute via communication satellites for early warning systems and earth observation satellites to monitor crime-prone areas. They can also be used to <a href="https://geospatial.com/the-geospatial-convergence-how-geospatial-data-is-utilized-to-fight-illegal-arms-trade-and-enforce-embargos/">track the movement of illicit weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Satellites can also be used to monitor land borders and seaports, in line with the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/85-au-border-programme-aubp">AU border programme</a>. And, like other military organisations, the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> needs satellites for its operations.</p>
<h2>What the AU can do</h2>
<p>All these applications mean that Africa needs its own space infrastructure – and policies to protect it.</p>
<p>It also calls for investments. Most of the satellite systems and sub-systems developed in Africa are exported to countries in Europe and the Middle East because African governments don’t patronise the developers. The <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en">African Development Bank</a> should invest in the development of Africa’s space industry. This is expected to be worth more than <a href="https://africanews.space/african-space-industry-revenue-to-surpass-usd-10-24-billion-by-2024-despite-covid-19-setback/">US$10 billion</a> by 2024. </p>
<p>The AU Assembly should act on important concerns urgently. First, the African Space Agency should be converted from an organ into a specialised agency of the AU. This would create room for independence, quick and informed decision-making, focus, innovation and international cooperation. </p>
<p>The AU should also decide the future of two space application programmes currently funded by the EU. The first of these is <a href="https://www.eu4oceanobs.eu/gmes-and-africa/">Global Monitoring of the Environment and Security (GMES) and Africa</a>. This is aimed at developing infrastructure so that Earth Observation data, among other things, can be better used. </p>
<p>The second, <a href="https://sn.linkedin.com/company/satnavafricajpo?trk=similar-pages">Satnav Africa</a>, champions the development of satellite navigation in Africa. Both programmes are scheduled to end soon. The programme management offices can be absorbed into the African Space Agency as specialised technical offices. This would ensure that Africa continues to benefit from these programmes.</p>
<p>Another issue is the commencement of the <a href="https://pau-au.africa/institutes/pauss">Pan-African University Institute for Space Science</a>, which is supposed to supply the manpower needed for the African Space Agency. Given the stalemate in negotiations with South Africa, which was given the hosting rights, the AU should consider re-assigning the hosting to a willing and capable country in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Etim Offiong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s outer space programme can help the continent meet its other flagship goals.Etim Offiong, Scientific Officer, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1479212020-11-01T07:58:13Z2020-11-01T07:58:13ZStudy sheds light on what it takes for women to succeed – or not – in science in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366393/original/file-20201029-15-3v73dc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women have a huge amount to contribute to science and research, if the right support systems are in place.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Women are <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/gender-ratio#:%7E:text=The%20sex%20ratio%20%E2%80%93%20the%20share,expectancy%20for%20women%20and%20men">49.6%</a> of the world’s population. An estimated 70% of the health and social care workforce are women; they deliver care to <a href="https://ufmsecretariat.org/woco-women-frontline-covid/">around 5 billion people</a>. Women are also at the front-line of the battle against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/covid-19">COVID-19 pandemic</a> – as health care givers, researchers, scientists and policymakers.</p>
<p>There is a well recognised gender disparity in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. This prompted the Alliance for <a href="https://www.aasciences.africa/aesa">Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa</a>) to <a href="https://www.aasciences.africa/publications/factors-which-contribute-or-inhibit-women-science-technology-engineering-and">conduct a study</a> on factors contributing to or inhibiting women’s careers in these key fields in Africa.</p>
<p>The study highlighted the numerous factors that contribute to or hinder women’s success in these fields. It also explored how these reinforce each other. Understanding what these factors are, and how they operate, is vital to devising the multi-pronged approach that’s necessary for tackling these challenges.</p>
<p>This is the first review of its kind that gives an African perspective of the challenges that women in these fields face. They are by no <a href="https://theconversation.com/men-get-most-of-the-research-funding-its-a-serious-problem-for-women-and-science-85469">means unique to Africa</a>. What we do find significant is the stronger influence in Africa of role models, mentoring and family support in moving women along the trajectory of a career in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. </p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p>Our study targeted research institutions within Africa’s <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/recs">eight regional economic communities</a> recognised by the <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">African Union</a>. Particular focus was placed on institutions that the African Academy of Sciences works with and their networks with other programmes that support women in research. Respondents included women working in or studying science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Policy experts in Africa were also included. </p>
<p>Over 1200 emails were sent out to several institutions and 415 women scientists registered for the online survey. Of these, 396 (95.4%) completed the questionnaire that identified factors contributing to or inhibiting women’s careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics in Africa. It specifically identified the challenges and opportunities that respondents face or have faced in their own careers. A face-to-face validation workshop was held with a subset of women scientists. </p>
<p>The study showed that women’s success in these key fields was influenced by individual, family, societal and work environment factors. These included personal capabilities and academic preparation. Access to funding and having women role models also emerged as factors. Patriarchal attitudes at a macro level were most significant. For women already working in these areas, the work environment and recruitment process, promotion and gender relations were major influences. Policies to address the gender gap were reported to exist but rarely implemented.</p>
<h2>Findings</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.aasciences.africa/publications/factors-which-contribute-or-inhibit-women-science-technology-engineering-and">study</a> found that seeing other women working in these fields was a significant factor in influencing their choice to be in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Girls from families with women professionals were motivated to follow their lead. Other successful women scientists also acted as role models for younger women.</p>
<p>We found that 78% of women had family support, 7% of families were not supportive, and only 2.4% were highly negative. This suggests that personal capability or lack of family support do not inhibit women’s success in these fields. </p>
<p>Over two thirds of all respondents agreed that patriarchal attitudes are significant. Discrimination against women in securing decision making positions, hegemonic masculinity perpetuated by socio-cultural values and beliefs affect women’s ability to succeed. So too do organisational perceptions of gender inequality among both men and women.</p>
<p>Nearly 80% reported that women faced obstacles in the work environment that men did not, and that 63% percent constantly needed to prove themselves to be as capable as men. </p>
<p>Policies to address the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics do exist. But, they are rarely implemented and where they are, many reflect society’s <a href="https://www.intechopen.com/books/contemporary-leadership-challenges/leadership-and-gender-differences-are-men-and-women-leading-in-the-same-way-">undervaluing of women in the workplace</a>. </p>
<p>Implementation of these policies should be supported by laws to ensure proper representation. Achieving parity (50:50 ratio of female to male) is important to balance and increase the numbers of women while promoting equity. This refers to fairness of treatment for women and men and also takes into consideration the different gender needs, obligations and opportunities.</p>
<p>The findings were also that recruitment and promotion practices and gender relations at work play a great role in determining women’s success. Even though 90% of the respondents agreed that they were recruited on merit, only about 57% said they were sufficiently rewarded, based on their qualifications. They also had fewer career opportunities than men. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>A gendered lens is certainly important in achieving the <a href="https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html">Sustainable Development Goals</a> of ending poverty, protecting the planet and ensuring peace and prosperity for all by 2030. It’s just as important in achieving the African Union’s agenda of having peace and prosperity on the continent <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">by 2063</a>. The African Academy of Sciences has a vision to transform African lives through science. Our study highlights the importance of role modelling in growing the visibility and expert voice of women in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. None of these objectives can be achieved if women, who are half the population, are left out. </p>
<p>Although it may take a while to change societal factors that affect the ability of African women to succeed in these fields, and to have their voices heard, such a change will not happen without deliberate intervention. Efforts such as this, that increase the awareness about scientific analyses by women and the visibility of women in these fields, are to be encouraged. A concerted effort to enable “the podium” equitably would be a first step towards reaping the benefit of that, much needed, diversity of perspectives. </p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.aasciences.africa/aesa">AESA</a> is a partnership of the <a href="https://www.aasciences.africa/">African Academy of Sciences</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/en/nepad">African Union Development Agency</a>. The study was supported by <a href="https://www.iavi.org/">IAVI</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147921/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Reasons why women’s voices are ignored in science reporting range from socio-cultural influences that inform gender norms, to perceptions of leadership and political power structures.Allen Muyaama Mukhwana, Research Systems Manager, African Academy of SciencesJudy Omumbo, Senior Programme Manager, Postdoctoral Programmes, African Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076752018-12-02T09:44:27Z2018-12-02T09:44:27ZTaking Africa’s democratic temperature as a dozen countries prepare for polls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247701/original/file-20181128-32180-15epy30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elections, and observer processes are a big priority in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/6124051652/in/photolist-akancs-8mSagA-an1fUo-cL6KV5-Thx7Mf-9Z4FLs-8mRHm3-fjNXKj-6pqC1Q-7TECcV-7TECci-bU3m84-6h8Vwe-bo9sEL-6pqDGN-eF6DxB-4RuJch-9JG8Yy-52Tnxd-6he2Fj-ayfYsU-5m3orW-9JDiYp-yUF2J3-8muuvR-8mP4va-5kY7Ma-aGQLMe-eFKQnc-aDbz5M-8qKc2R-7TECbM-9JDkWM-9FMELA-6pkkLf-nekXcc-9XzUDt-mhtT8X-5HdCsH-eF5XEp-6hfvuc-6j6JjX-9vQJrY-p7MRfr-aWdBRB-7THSNG-6hfQfP-fa865-9p5LqF-dni4cx">UN Photo/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than a <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2019.php">dozen national elections</a> will be held across Africa next year. All 55 members of the African Union (AU) are obligated to hold regular and ostensibly democratic elections. They must also invite teams of AU election observers to publicly monitor, assess and <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">report the results</a>. </p>
<p>Is all this electoral activity helping to entrench democracy as the foundation for national and regional security, development and integration? Or have elections become the means for demagogues to grab power – or, more typically, for powerful elites and authoritarian rulers to entrench themselves? </p>
<p>Democratic theory prescribes credible elections as a necessary, but insufficient means, to consolidate real democracy. Real democracy typically abets peace and security. National circumstances vary. But three additional conditions are also vital. They are freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and an independent nonpartisan judiciary to resolve disputes and ensure the rule of law predominates. </p>
<p>Most deadly conflicts in Africa occur within – not between – <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf">sovereign states</a>. Recognising this, the AU has made observing and assessing democratic elections an <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/guide-elections/">integral part</a> of its operations. This often happens alongside observers from regional economic communities.</p>
<p>As observations improve, so do opportunities to gauge whether electoral violence and other severe human rights abuses threaten regional peace and security. </p>
<p>In mid-November, there were three important developments at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. These promise to improve Africa’s long-term prospects for collective self-reliance and democratic peace. And this will happen regionally, nationally and locally. </p>
<p>The first was a streamlining of the continental body’s operations. The second was a move to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of member countries. The third was a renewed commitment to improve the depth, duration, and diligence of African election observation missions. </p>
<h2>Three Changes</h2>
<p>President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has been the chair of the AU this year. He has driven a set of administrative and financial reforms to improve its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35132-doc-ext-assembly-2xiannex_-_administrative_reform_roadmap_e.pdf">efficiency and effectiveness</a>.</p>
<p>Headline reforms include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reducing the number of AU Commission portfolios, </p></li>
<li><p>Introducing merit-based hiring and promotion procedures, and </p></li>
<li><p>Reducing dependence on foreign donors. This has been achieved by revising the scale of member state contributions and penalties for nonpayment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The key structural reform will be combining the portfolios of Political Affairs and Peace and Security. This makes sense strategically. It will ensure that the lion’s share of AU resources supports both urgent peacemaking needs and creates conditions conducive to developing politically capable states. Failures on either front could jeopardise the AU’s strategic plan for the <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">socio-economic transformation of the continent</a>.</p>
<p>Two other developments complement these shifts.</p>
<p>One is the Assembly’s decision to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181118/11th-extraordinary-summit-summary-key-decisions">key governance areas on the continent</a>. This promises substantial improvements in the role and functioning of the <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. The mechanism was established in 2003. It aims to encourage member states to critically and regularly assess their progress in governance and socio-economic development. </p>
<p>After much initial excitement, the mechanism devolved into a largely technical and widely ignored exercise. Its governing Forum of Heads of State sought to infuse it with greater political clout and relevance in 2016. It mandated its new director, Professor Eddy Maloka, to produce an Africa-wide comparative assessment of governance challenges facing AU member states. </p>
<p>This will be presented to the next regular AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/The-key-outcomes-of-the-African-Union-Summit/434750-4648608-sdx3oaz/index.html">February 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The final change involves beefing up election monitoring. Ten years ago the AU entered into a formal partnership with the <a href="https://eisa.org.za/">Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</a>. The parties agreed on 16 November to seek ways to extend and improve the partnership. </p>
<p>The institute is based in Johannesburg. It boasts an all-African staff from more than a dozen nations. It has helped AU missions on several fronts. This has included the training and application of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a common set of observation principles and democratic election standards, and </p></li>
<li><p>more comprehensive, rapid and technologically advanced tools and training of AU observers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The partnership has also helped the AU to acquire a leadership role among domestic and international election observer groups pursuing greater electoral transparency and accountability. This is true even within Africa’s most troubled states. </p>
<h2>Is democracy dying?</h2>
<p>These efforts would seem to run counter to the question “Is Democracy Dying?”, which has become a preoccupation in the era of US President Donald Trump. African politics, too, are vulnerable to demagoguery, debauchery and divisiveness. More notable is the proliferation of progressive forces at all levels of African politics. They are exposing and combating corruption and other egregious abuses of power. </p>
<p>Progress is slow, erratic, and dangerous for democracy advocates and activists to pursue. Yet in a year when <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018">Freedom House’s latest global survey</a> concludes democracy is in decline, Africa may well be bucking the trend. </p>
<p>The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s 2018 <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/">Index of African Governance</a> found that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance on our continent, on average, is slowly improving … approximately three out of four African citizens live in a country where governance has improved over the last ten years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite Africa’s many problems, it continues to sustain a wide variety of democratic experiments. Extensive surveys by <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the non-partisan research network, show the majority of Africa’s citizens still prefer democracy to the alternative. This is a reality the African Union increasingly recognises and is attempting to support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau serves on the EISA Board without compensation and in that capacity was a member of the team that met with AU officials on 16 November 2018. </span></em></p>Surveys shows that the majority of Africans prefer democracy, despite its flaws, to the alternatives.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1047002018-10-15T09:59:47Z2018-10-15T09:59:47ZTies between African countries and China are complex. Understanding this matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240247/original/file-20181011-154549-1lowuqa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo and China's President Xi Jinping at the 2018 summit in Beijing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Andy Wong (Pool)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The complex relationship between Africa and China has become even more complicated this year. Initially, 2018 was set to reaffirm the bond through the latest Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit held in Beijing in <a href="http://africachinareporting.co.za/2018/09/highlights-from-focac-2018/">September</a>. The summit delivered its usual pageant of African leaders, side deals, and the announcement of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-africa/chinas-xi-offers-another-60-billion-to-africa-but-says-no-to-vanity-projects-idUSKCN1LJ0C4">USD$60 billion</a> financing package. The year also saw the recurrence of misgivings about the relationship.</p>
<p>The most explicit theme of this conversation was debt. Donald Trump’s US administration added fuel to smouldering anxiety, and China found itself having to defend its lending to Africa – at home and globally. At the same time, African governments are battling rumours that they are about to hand over state assets to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/09/13/zambia-denies-offering-power-utility-as-collateral-for-china-loan">the Chinese</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-africas-debt-to-china-is-complicated">debt debate</a> is flawed – not least for underestimating Western contributions to African debt. Nevertheless, it is revealing. In particular, the debate reflects an anxiety that has haunted relations between China and the continent since the beginning of this century: the massive power gap between China and individual African countries. </p>
<h2>Power imbalances</h2>
<p>The constant rhetoric of win-win cooperation between China and Africa has never adequately answered the simple structural question at the heart of the relationship. That is: how is an economy the size of Benin’s or Togo’s, for example, supposed to meaningfully engage with the Chinese behemoth? It’s a bit like trying to speed up your bicycle by grabbing on to a passing jumbo jet. It can take you to the next level, or it can simply rip off your arms.</p>
<p>The fundamental economic and power imbalance between China and African countries has led to the relationship being criticised as <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/05/08/behind-the-goodwill-aid-china-s-neo-colonialism-in-africa/">neocolonial</a>. The truth, however, is that African governments exercise more agency than they are given credit for. This includes frequently playing China and traditional Western development partners off against one another. </p>
<p>The word “agency” is key here: to what extent is Africa able to freely make its own decisions and drive the best deals with China?</p>
<p>Our new <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/research/in-the-drivers-seat-african-agency-and-chinese-power/">research</a> focused on this issue. We looked at two emerging areas shaping African agency in relation to China. These are reforms to the African Union (AU) and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI). The initiative involves a massive infrastructure rollout aimed at linking China to Europe and beyond. The aim is to set up a zone of shared development that encompasses <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer">Central and Western Asia and Africa</a>.</p>
<h2>The AU and the Belt and Road initiative</h2>
<p>The AU has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-african-unions-planned-overhaul-may-affect-its-ties-with-china-73160">proposed</a> a set of reforms to streamline African negotiations at events like the FOCAC under the auspices of the continental body. This could be seen as a step towards the frequently repeated goal of Africa negotiating collectively with China. But, in fact, we show that it faces significant resistance from within the continent. This comes both from powerful states worried about losing control of their bilateral relationships with China, and from smaller states worried about being excluded.</p>
<p>China’s BRI reveals other aspects of African agency. It’s structured by numerous bilateral agreements, but is also subject to regional as well as local pressures. The way the initiative’s projects have been pulled into national debates involving opposition politics shows that the range of actors constituting African agency is potentially much wider than national governments.</p>
<p>We argue that before African agency can be maximised, this aspect of relations between China and particular African governments needs to be taken into account. Thinking about the issue has so far fixated on the role of national governments, to the exclusion of other actors. The biggest include regional economic communities such as <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">Nepad</a> and the AU. The smaller ones comprise opposition parties, civil society, local businesses and communities. All contribute to and constitute African agency. </p>
<p>What is this agency, how does it work and how can it be strengthened? </p>
<h2>Understanding African agency</h2>
<p>We identified three key areas where African agency can be located.</p>
<p>Firstly, African agency is expressed in the frameworks and documents that govern bodies like the forum. For example, in the early days arrangements paid relatively little attention to the issue of industrialisation. That changed after the formal adoption in 2015 of the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> – its blueprint for Africa’s sustainable development. <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/focac-2015-consolidating-china-africa-relations/">The forum held that year</a> saw an uptick in how many times the issue was mentioned. </p>
<p>By 2016, African industrialisation had become a key initiative of <a href="http://www.g20chn.org/English/Documents/">China’s presidency</a> of the G20. Beijing directed an unprecedented level of G20 attention to the continent. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.focac.org/eng/">2018</a>, the Beijing summit ended with fewer declarations of intent relating to industrialisation. Instead, it had become integrated into the continental and bilateral planning processes. In particular, it features regularly in discussions on development financing. Likewise the word “training” was mentioned over 40 times and in virtually every section of the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1593683.shtml">Beijing Action Plan</a>.</p>
<p>This suggests there is a shift from declarations of intent to more specific engagement towards industrialisation. This doesn’t necessarily guarantee the success of Africa’s industrialisation. But it shows that China responds to African agenda-setting.</p>
<p>Secondly, African agency is diffused across various levels and among various actors. Any analysis of African agency has to consider the complex interactions between continental bodies like the AU, regional economic blocs, national governments, civil society, business, and local communities. Each plays a role in shaping African decision making in relation to China. Partnerships that cut across the state-business-civil society divide are as important as state led initiatives in articulating policy initiatives in relation to China.</p>
<p>Thirdly, it’s important to think of the changing terms of agency as African governments face growing debt burdens via such initiatives as the BRI. For instance, rumours that the Zambian government offered its national electricity supplier as <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1391111/zambia-china-debt-crisis-tests-china-in-africa-relationship/">collateral</a> in exchange for a new tranche of Chinese loans have reportedly caused political division at home. </p>
<p>Critics have focused on debt as diminishing African agency. What they’ve ignored are the significant financial and reputational risks to China. </p>
<h2>Maximising African agency</h2>
<p>As Africa becomes more involved in global initiatives, and as it moves towards greater continental integration via AU reforms and the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/continents-free-trade-deal-a-game-changer-for-africa-15795779">Continental Free Trade Agreement</a>, the need increases to think harder and more creatively about what African agency means. It isn’t enough to simply reiterate the call for Africa to negotiate collectively with China – not least because this disregards the complex interactions between African governments. </p>
<p>Rather, it’s time for more comprehensive thinking about how African agency manifests across actors and geographic scales. Only once we have a firmer handle on this can we move towards maximising it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104700/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu-Shan is affiliated with the Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP), Department of Journalism, University of Witwatersrand</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Alden is affiliated as a senior research associate with the South African Institute of International Relations </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cobus van Staden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Not enough credit is given to the agency African governments have in their dealings with China.Yu-Shan Wu, Foreign policy researcher and doctoral candidate, University of the WitwatersrandChris Alden, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceCobus van Staden, Senior Researcher: China Africa, South African Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1045832018-10-08T15:19:36Z2018-10-08T15:19:36ZCameroon presidential poll underscores the need for term limits<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239730/original/file-20181008-72113-1boj9nv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroonian President Paul Biya votes in the presidential elections in the capital Yaounde. He has been in power for 36 years.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The official results of Cameroon’s October 7, 2018 presidential election are due <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/cameroon-votes-as-separatists-pose-a-threat-biya-win-likely/2018/10/07/e11be120-ca01-11e8-9c0f-2ffaf6d422aa_story.html?amp;utm_term=.4cc85477087a&noredirect=on&utm_term=.28d02b799133">in two weeks</a>. But they’re not expected to yield any surprises. Paul Biya (85), who became president in 1982, is almost certain to retain power for a <a href="https://fr.euronews.com/2018/10/05/cameroun-paul-biya-brigue-un-septieme-mandat">seventh term</a>. If he wins and stays in power until 2025 – the end of his next term – he would have run the country for a whopping 43 years. His overextended rule has been marked by <a href="https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/cameroon/">corruption</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/cameroons-presidential-election-will-the-votes-count/">patronage politics</a>, and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43469758">largely absent president</a>.</p>
<p>The election has taken place amid a great deal of uncertainty and insecurity. Municipal and legislative elections were postponed by a year because of <a href="https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-postpones-legislative-municipal-elections/">too volatile a space</a>, though government cited more technical reasons. Only senatorial elections were held in <a href="https://democracychronicles.org/presidential-elections-in-cameroon/">March 2018</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-separatists/anglophone-cameroons-separatist-conflict-gets-bloodier-idUSKCN1IX4RS">biggest tensions</a> have been between the English-speaking – which represent <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/cameroon-population/">20% of the population</a> – and French-speaking parts of the country. After the presidential polls opened on Sunday, <a href="https://www.whig.com/article/20181007/AP/310079953">violent confrontations</a> broke out in English speaking regions of the North West and the South West. Almost no polling took place in these regions following calls by separatists for a lockdown (stay at home), which would mean in effect that no people would leave their houses to vote.</p>
<p>Biya is almost certain to return to power given the government’s well-oiled election machine and its use of the security sector to manage dissent. Elections over the past 10 years have been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/10/world/africa/cameroon-elections/index.html">marred by accusations of fraud</a>. These elections will be no different.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Biya’s credibility and legitimacy are increasingly being tarnished. And there is growing support for alternative candidates.</p>
<p>The election is a reminder of the importance of defined term limits for presidents. Although Cameroon’s <a href="http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Cameroon.pdf">1996 Constitution</a> limited presidential mandates to two seven-year terms, Biya’s party repealed the term limits in 2008 so that he could extend his stay.</p>
<h2>The main contenders</h2>
<p>This year’s election has pitted Biya against <a href="http://www.crtv.cm/2018/08/liste-des-candidats-a-lelection-presidentielle-2018/">eight opposition candidates</a>. The major contenders are Joshua Osih of the <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/24/cameroon-s-main-opposition-sdf-elects-49-year-old-candidate-to-face-biya/">Social Democratic Front</a>; Maurice Kamto of the <a href="https://www.mrcparty.org/">Cameroon Renaissance Movement</a>; Cabral Libii Li Ngue candidate for <a href="https://www.lebledparle.com/actu/politique/1104138-cameroun-le-parti-univers-de-nkou-mvondo-investi-cabral-libii-comme-son-candidat-a-l-election-presidentielle">Univers party</a>, and <a href="https://akeremuna2018.com/profile/">Akere Tabeng Muna</a> of the <a href="https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/2018-presidential-election-akere-muna-kicks-off-campaign-with-convention-in-yaounde/">Popular Front for Development</a>.</p>
<p>The Social Democratic Front has become a household name in Cameroon since its inception in 1990 and its candidate, Osih, is popular.</p>
<p>For his part, Kamto who heads up the Cameroon Renaissance Movement was a former minister in Biya’s regime. He <a href="http://www.crtv.cm/2018/09/maurice-kamto-presidential-candidate-for-mrc-party/">resigned from government</a> in 2011 to form his own political party. He draws his support from the western region and the urban middle class.</p>
<p>Cabral is a young university lecturer who has been outspoken in his criticism of the regime and has captured the imagination of young Cameroonians. Muna is the son of the former vice president and an international jurist. He aligned with Kamto two days before the election.</p>
<p>Kamto and Cabral attracted large crowds at their rallies. But they are unlikely to gain a majority of votes given that the state’s machinery is stacked against them.</p>
<h2>The issues</h2>
<p>Three major issues dominated the run up to the elections: political transition, the economy, and security.</p>
<p>After 36 years as president, the opposition and other observers view Biya’s exit as long overdue. But he is unlikely to step down as has been the case of other African leaders who have overstayed their terms. And the opposition forces are not yet strong enough to force a change in leadership.</p>
<p>Cameroon is central Africa’s largest economy, producing oil, gas, timber, and cocoa. Nevertheless, it faces a range of major economic challenges. These include <a href="https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/cameroon/cameroon_economy.html">stagnant per capita income, inequitable distribution of income</a>, <a href="https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/cameroon/">corruption</a>, nepotism and a <a href="https://www.businessincameroon.com/companies/1307-7263-in-cameroon-the-informal-sector-weighs-as-much-in-gdp-as-in-south-africa-and-mauritius-but-less-than-in-nigeria">large informal economy</a>. It also has substantial debt, constituting<a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/government-debt-to-gdp"> 35% of its GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Of all the issues affecting the election, security is the biggest. For nearly two years there have been protests in the North West and South West against what Anglophones describe as general marginalisation as well as the “Frenchification” of their courts and schools. The protests have been met with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/biya-must-stop-the-killings-in-cameroon-and-lead-the-search-for-peace-100026">brutal crackdown</a> which in turn triggered an armed pro-independence insurgency.</p>
<p>On top of this <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/anglophone-crisis-looms-cameroon-presidential-election-181004081327023.html">Cameroon has been challenged</a> by the violence of Boko-Haram in the North, the instability of the Central Africa Republic in the East and the separatist movement in the South. Clashes with the separatists have already left <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Amnesty-says-scores-killed-in-Cameroon-violence/4552902-4767086-f6kq23z/index.html">400 people dead</a> and 20 000 displaced as refugees in neighbouring Nigeria.</p>
<h2>Implications for African politics</h2>
<p>Some commentators have pointed to the problem of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/choiceless-democracy/">“choiceless democracies”</a> in Africa. Leading economist <a href="https://prabook.com/web/thandika.mkandawire/497006">Thandika Mkandawire</a> <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200804171247.html">has noted that</a> “African leaders exhibit a wide array of unethical ways when it comes to capturing, retention, and exercising of political power, the long-term result being the tendency by a people denied the right to a free choice of their leaders to write electoral lists in blood.”</p>
<p>This is once again playing out in Cameroon. The country has a president who has captured the state to the detriment of many of his people. And people increasingly see violence as the only means through which they can have their voices heard and their needs taken into account.</p>
<p>Across Africa pessimism is replacing the mood of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-africa-the-ebbs-and-flows-over-six-decades-42011">1990s</a> when multi-party democracy was on the rise. Old tendencies of authoritarian leaders remaining in power beyond their term, corruption and the pillaging of public resources persist. These in turn is leading to a rise in conflict.</p>
<p>The African Union (AU) and regional intergovernmental institutions seem unable to hold leaders like Biya to account. This despite the AU’s proclamations of <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/silencing-the-guns-by-2020-ambitious-but-essential">“silencing the guns”</a> in Africa by 2020, and creating an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">by 2063</a>. All Africans need to take a principled stand on presidential term limits as it is impacting on the development, peace and security of the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriel Ngah Kiven is a University of Johannesburg GES Scholar</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Paul Biya’s credibility and legitimacy are increasingly being tarnished, amid growing support for opposition candidates.Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilGabriel Ngah Kiven, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/885812017-12-06T13:35:21Z2017-12-06T13:35:21ZEngineering research in Africa is growing but it’s still a patchy picture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197773/original/file-20171205-22967-swwkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Engineering can greatly bolster any country's development and growth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s vast land mass and rich natural and mineral resources make it strategically important and an increasingly significant <a href="https://na.unep.net/atlas/africa/downloads/chapters/Africa_Atlas_English_Intro.pdf">global player</a>. It is also a dynamic young continent: about 60% of its residents are aged <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34188248">below 25</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union is trying to harness this enormous potential through its <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>, which includes elevating Africa through improved education and application of science and technology in development. </p>
<p>Engineering is an important branch of science and technology. It has a significant impact on the overall development of any nation, region or continent. It is, as Professor Calestous Juma <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Engineering-is-the-engine-that-will-power-Africa-s-growth-/440808-2309528-pq151w/index.html">has written</a>, an engine to power growth – especially in Africa.</p>
<p>The World Bank predicts that Africa needs to spend about <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Engineering-is-the-engine-that-will-power-Africa-s-growth-/440808-2309528-pq151w/index.html">USD$93 billion per year</a> in the coming years to improve its infrastructure. Part of this investment must be in world class engineering education and research.</p>
<p>Given the discipline’s importance, I wanted to understand how Africa is performing in terms of engineering research. How much are the continent’s researchers contributing to new ideas and thinking around engineering? To find out, I <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20421338.2017.1341732">searched, downloaded and analysed</a> scholarly publication data from academic publisher Elsevier’s citation and abstracting service, <a href="https://www.scopus.com/">Scopus</a>®. It’s a huge index of articles, covering 22,800 journals belonging to more than 5,000 international publishers across disciplines. </p>
<p>I also examined how many times articles from Africa were being cited, which is crucial to map the relevance and impact of any research. For instance, one of the criteria for winning a <a href="http://www.lindau-nobel.org/blog-on-fundamental-science/">Nobel Prize</a> in science is how frequently a researcher’s work has been cited.</p>
<p>The data I analysed shows that scholarly research output in terms of journal articles, conference papers and so on in engineering fields from Africa has increased over the past two decades. The number remains small in comparison to other, more developed continents and countries. But the continent’s contribution to global thinking and understanding about engineering is growing, and this should be celebrated.</p>
<h2>Analysing data</h2>
<p>My analysis reveals that Africa has recorded a tremendous growth in its output of academic engineering research over the past 20 years. In total, 75,157 scholarly articles about engineering subjects emerged from Africa between 1996 and 2016. About 1,500 of these were published in the first seven years under review. In the past three years, about 9,000 engineering articles from Africa were published annually. That’s a significant percentage increase.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Africa’s engineering research output over 20 years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php">Scimago</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The problem is that African countries’ outputs are not uniform. South Africa leads the pack, with 22,156 articles over 20 years. This puts it at 41st in the world for output in engineering research. It is followed by Algeria (16,617 articles) and Tunisia (14,805 articles). Some countries have barely contributed to engineering research: Cape Verde produced only nine articles in 20 years; the Central African Republic just seven and Somalia only six.</p>
<p>The continent is also not producing nearly as much engineering research as others and other regions.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Africa’s engineering research output is still lower than other continents and regions, but its growth over 20 years has been encouraging.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scimago</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also wanted to know how often African researchers’ work was being cited by others. This is a good way to understand the impact a piece of research has, and is called citation analysis. It counts the number of times an author’s article is cited in other scholarly works. And <a href="https://medium.com/@write4research/why-are-citations-important-in-research-writing-97fb6d854b47">citations are important</a> because they reveal that a piece of research is being used by others.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20421338.2017.1341732">The results</a> are encouraging. The average citation for academic engineering papers from Africa is 5.48 per paper. This is almost equal to the performance of papers from Asia, and is well above the average citations received by papers from Eastern Europe. This suggests that African engineering research is influencing others’ thinking and contributing to global knowledge about the discipline.</p>
<p>So how can Africa improve its engineering research output, especially with an eye to meeting the goals of Agenda 2063? Collaboration will be crucial.</p>
<h2>Collaborative work</h2>
<p>South Africa does well with collaboration. Articles from the country tend to involve more than one research organisation or institution. Co-authored articles are common. Its researchers work with others on the continent and with global partners. Countries in North Africa, however, are less active when it comes to collaboration. </p>
<p>Africa-Africa collaboration, involving institutions and individuals across the continent, needs to be strengthened. This is because only African countries can truly understand the continent’s pressing needs, and develop appropriate solutions. Countries like South Africa that perform well collaboratively can offer support and advice to others. </p>
<p>It may also be time to set up an exclusively African citation database. Even Scopus®, the world’s largest indexing and abstracting database, offers very limited coverage of African science. By developing a resource that focuses only on African engineering research, the continent will be able to get a more complete, clear picture of its output and respond accordingly. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa is creating an <a href="http://africancitationindex.org/">African Citation database</a>, but it will be some time before this is a fully fledged searchable database.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Swapan Kumar Patra receives funding from National Research Foundation, Republic of South Africa, Post doctoral research fellowship, through Tshwane University of Technology</span></em></p>Africa has recorded a tremendous growth in its output of academic engineering research over the past 20 years. Greater collaboration can increase this growth even more.Swapan Kumar Patra, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/881852017-12-04T12:06:22Z2017-12-04T12:06:22ZThe EU-Africa summit is now the AU-EU summit. Why the upgrade matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197543/original/file-20171204-4062-c4kuwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of the AU Alpha Conde, European Council President Donald Tusk (L) and President of the EU Jean-Claude Juncker.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Luc Gnago</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African and European heads of government gathered last week in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, for their <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/#">5th summit</a> since 2000. For the first time, the African Union (AU) rather than “Africa”, officially appears as the European Union’s partner. While plenty has been discussed about <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/#">youth, migration, security and governance</a> less is being said about the shift from an EU-Africa to an AU-EU summit. </p>
<p>Is this just a case of semantics? After all, the AU has been the key organiser of these triennial summits since they started in 2000. Or are there larger implications? We think there are. </p>
<p>The AU-EU summit coincided with the January 2017 report on the reform of the African Union prepared by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. The report recommends rationalising “Africa’s” many international <a href="https://au.int/en/continent-and-country-partnerships">partnerships</a> by having the continental body <a href="https://au.int/en/au-reform">take the lead</a>. This means that the previous, current and future AU chairpersons, plus the AU Commission chairperson and the chairperson of the Regional Economic Communities, would represent the AU, rather than all its member states.</p>
<p>Despite some <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-17-iss-today-with-au-reforms-a-new-african-renaissance-is-possible/#.WiDS5lWWYdU">misgivings</a> at the July 2017 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Kagame’s proposed reforms were well received. The AU and its member states have committed to a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33272-doc-au_reform_implementation_report_july_2017_final_v2.pdf">timetable of reform implementation</a>, heralding a potential new era for the AU.</p>
<p>The transformation of the EU-Africa summit series into the EU-AU summit in Abidjan is more than just a change of name. It reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor that is becoming difficult to circumvent when engaging Africa. But there’s still a risk that the recognition remains confined to ceremonial purposes, as long as key challenges such as funding and mandate are not resolved.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>The first summit in Cairo in 2000 was intended as a meeting of the EU and the AU’s forbearer, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). But, the EU insisted on the inclusion of Morocco – the only African country not a member of the OAU and the exclusion of the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a full member of the OAU.</p>
<p>Only after last minute shuttle diplomacy was the cancellation of the summit averted. The compromise solution was to call the event the <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-00-901_en.htm">“Africa-Europe Summit Under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU”</a>. </p>
<p>The idea of “Africa” as the EU’s interlocutor was set.</p>
<p>This way of seeing Africa had repercussions for the relationship. Although the EU had targeted the AU as its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/communication-commission-european-parliament-and-council-cairo-lisbon-eu-africa-strategic_en">principle partner</a> by 2007, the AU’s organisational growing pains and less clear jurisdiction in external relations meant that it was exposed to the whims of its member states. </p>
<p>This was the case before the 2nd summit in Lisbon in 2007, when after months of AU-driven negotiation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, several AU member states voiced strong misgivings about it. Their objections on issues such as the restitution of stolen cultural artefacts, while crucial, were outside of the EU’s jurisdiction and threatened to scuttle the AU’s own good work.</p>
<p>The 2010 summit in Tripoli was overshadowed by the outsized personality of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who stole headlines insisting that the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11139345">EU pay him</a> to limit migration to Europe. Lost was the fact that the AU was endeavouring to upturn decades of EU driven agenda setting in the EU-ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Group of States) relationship.</p>
<h2>The upgrade</h2>
<p>In theory the AU’s new status in EU-Africa summits has the potential to substantially contribute to the AU’s cohesion, recognition and identity. But whether this upgrade will actually materialise or whether the summit only offers a ceremonial appearance of the AU’s standing will depend on four crucial factors. </p>
<p>Firstly, the AU still needs to be based on a <a href="http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN98-Apiko-Aggad-November-2017.pdf">sustainable financial mechanism</a>. So far, it depends heavily on development aid for its activities. </p>
<p>Secondly, member states need to provide the AU with an authoritative mandate to negotiate on their behalf. While it is becoming a stronger institution, it still heavily depends on compromises between heads of states.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the AU has to compete for the EU’s attention with other existing partnerships with Africa. Plans are already underway for the it to play a more prominent role in the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/acp-eu-partnership-after-2020_en">ACP</a>. This would underline the central role of the AU for all interregional arrangements. </p>
<p>Fourthly, other international partners such as China will need to recognise AU’s central role in their <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">summits with Africa</a>. So far, China is focusing on bilateral relations and there are few signs of the direct relationship China-AU receiving a substantial upgrade.</p>
<p>The transformation of the EU-Africa summit series into the EU-AU summit in Abidjan is more than just a change of name. It reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor that is becoming difficult to circumvent when engaging Africa. Yet, there is a risk that the recognition is confined to ceremonial purposes, as long as key challenges such as funding and mandate are not resolved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis receives funding from the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet activities. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Kotsopoulos receives funding from the Erasmus+ programme's Jean Monnet Activities.</span></em></p>The transformation of the EU-Africa summit series into the EU-AU summit is more than just a change of name. It reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor.Frank Mattheis, Senior Researcher in Global Studies, University of PretoriaJohn Kotsopoulos, Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874492017-11-23T14:23:03Z2017-11-23T14:23:03ZToothless Pan-African Parliament could have meaningful powers. Here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195557/original/file-20171121-18528-1e0w0q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guests and delegates attend the opening of the Pan African Parliament's second sitting in Midrand, Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Pan-African Parliament was established by the African Union in 2004. Since then it has not passed a single law. That’s because it’s based on a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">Protocol</a> that gives it only an advisory role. The parliament can gather information and discuss it, but can’t make binding regulations to change anything. </p>
<p>Its limited <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">“consultative and advisory powers”</a> hamper the African Union’s ability to achieve a prosperous and peaceful Africa as envisioned in its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/3657-file-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>Is there any point, then, in having this parliament? </p>
<p>The 2001 Protocol envisaged that a conference would be organised to “review the operation and effectiveness” of the protocol five years after the establishment of the Parliament, which was 2009. This provision gave rise to the view that such a conference would explore the possibility of granting the Parliament <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99267/PAPER181.pdf">meaningful legislative powers</a>. But no such review has been carried out so far. </p>
<p>Instead, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government replaced the old Protocol with the new <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2014 PAP Protocol</a>. Nothing much changed. The new Protocol gave the Pan African Parliament powers to submit <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">“draft model laws to the Assembly … for its consideration and approval”</a>.</p>
<p>This still falls way short of meaningful lawmaking powers. By letting things remain as they were, African leaders are showing that the Parliament will remain a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-19-iss-today-does-africa-really-want-a-continental-parliament/#.WglkaluCyUk">nominal platform</a>. It is unlikely to become an effective organ with the mandate to pass the kind of laws that will advance African integration and development.</p>
<p>Denying the continental Parliament reasonable legislative powers <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617709489">undermines its legitimacy</a> and raises <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-19-iss-today-does-africa-really-want-a-continental-parliament/#.WglkaluCyUk">concerns about its relevance</a>. </p>
<h2>New thinking needed</h2>
<p>Yet there is important work that it could be doing. The Pan African Parliament could be advancing <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/3657-file-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf">Agenda 2063 programmes</a>. The agenda outlines seven goals, to be achieved over the next 50 years, that are central to achieving political and economic development in Africa. These include promoting peace and security, good governance, youth development and gender equity.</p>
<p>A Pan African Parliament with real legislative powers could lead the harmonisation of standards and policies across the continent. It could oversee African Union organs such as the Commission, and national parliaments.</p>
<p>This would require a new way of thinking. Some member states or regional parliaments may want to work directly with the Pan African Parliament to draft continental legislation. Indeed, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2014 Protocol</a> recognises this kind of arrangement. The challenge would be to make it work in practice. </p>
<p>First of all, the political will would be required to make the Pan African Parliament a true legislative assembly. The AU member states are unlikely to transfer power to it all at the same time. </p>
<p>The vast majority of member states have a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-19-iss-today-does-africa-really-want-a-continental-parliament/#.WglkaluCyUk">lukewarm disposition</a> towards African integration and are not likely to support a stronger continental parliament. These include Egypt, Angola and Botswana. Even among the more democratic member states, such as Botswana, South Africa and Ghana, national interests may come first.</p>
<h2>Taking action</h2>
<p>Practically speaking, the AU will need to explore the possibility of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09744053.2016.1186870?scroll=top&needAccess=true">a flexible or differentiated approach</a> to transferring powers to the Pan African Parliament. This rests on the willingness of member states to deepen African integration at a quicker pace. Others may choose to join later. This would be a pragmatic way to strengthen the Parliament’s powers.</p>
<p>The AU will have to identify member states and regional parliaments that are prepared to work directly with the Pan African Parliament and then map out the areas in which <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617709489">legislative powers could be shared</a>. </p>
<p>The Parliament would then develop model bills to guide willing national or regional parliaments so that every bill proposed would align with continental objectives. In the EU, on which the African Union is modelled, for example, national parliaments have the powers to review proposed legislation and comment on policies to be adopted by the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/relnatparl/en/about/subsidiarity.html">European Parliament</a>. </p>
<p>The final step would be to encourage direct elections to the Pan African Parliament. These could be carried out at the same time as general elections in the member states. In the EU, members of the European Parliament are <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en">directly elected</a>. Similarly in South America, the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) regional body allows for direct election of <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/mercosur-parliament">parliamentary representatives</a>. </p>
<p>Similar to the <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/mercosur-parliament">situation in Mercosur</a>, the AU could at the initial phase allow countries to synchronise the election of Pan-African Parliament members with national or local elections and later provide a uniform timetable for all participating member states. </p>
<p>Participating states would need to provide the AU with electoral schedules, and then allow it to work with their respective electoral management bodies to facilitate the regional poll. Direct elections organised in this manner would enhance awareness of the Pan African Parliament and its activities.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The rhetoric on the need to have a stronger continental Parliament has to be matched with actions. While some member states may be willing and ready to transfer legislative powers to the continental body, others may not. </p>
<p>Its legitimacy ultimately depends on its ability to make laws. The AU will have to invest more time and resources in bringing willing member states to the table. Otherwise the union might as well disband the Parliament and spend its budget elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babatunde Fagbayibo receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. </span></em></p>The limited “consultative and advisory powers” of the Pan African Parliament hamper the African Union’s ability to achieve a prosperous and peaceful Africa as envisioned in its Agenda 2063.Babatunde Fagbayibo, Associate Professor of International Law, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/786272017-06-18T09:22:46Z2017-06-18T09:22:46ZAfrica’s got plans for a Great Green Wall: why the idea needs a rethink<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173386/original/file-20170612-10220-1jrelzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">By the end of the 1990s, the idea of encroaching deserts had become difficult to defend.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IFRC/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s Great Green Wall, or more formally <a href="http://www.greatgreenwallinitiative.org/">The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative</a>, is the intriguing but misleading name of an enormously ambitious and worthwhile initiative to improve life and resilience in the drylands that surround the Sahara. </p>
<p>The idea of a Great Green Wall has come a long way since its inception. Its origin goes back to colonial times. In 1927, the French colonial forester Louis Lavauden <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-16014-1_8">coined the word desertification</a> to suggest that deserts are spreading due to deforestation, overgrazing and arid land degradation. In 1952 the English forester Richard St. Barbe Baker suggested that a <a href="https://wilmetteinstitute.org/the-man-of-the-trees-and-the-great-green-wall-a-bahais-environmental-legacy-for-the-ages/">“green front”</a> in the form of a 50km wide barrier of trees be erected to contain the spreading desert.</p>
<p>Droughts in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel from the 1970s onwards gave wings to the idea, and in 2007 the African Union approved the Great Green Wall Initiative. Many perceived it as a plan to build an almost 8,000km long, 15km wide, wall of trees across the African continent – from Senegal in the west to Djibouti in the east. </p>
<p>This plan faced a great deal of criticism. It led to a clearer vision being endorsed under the same name five years later when the African Ministerial Conference on Environment adopted a <a href="http://www.greatgreenwallinitiative.org/sites/default/files/publications/harmonized_strategy_GGWSSI-EN_.pdf">harmonised regional strategy</a>.</p>
<p>Can the vision ever come to fruition? </p>
<p>Only if there’s a ten-fold (at least) increase in pace so that the progress on the ground becomes consistent with lofty political ambitions. Sadly, the wall suffers from a major mismatch between ambition and effort. But that’s not to say it should be ditched. </p>
<h2>Why did the vision change?</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.csf-desertification.eu/combating-desertification/item/the-african-great-green-wall-project">Critics argue</a> that a desert is a healthy, natural ecosystem that shouldn’t be thought of as a disease. Nor, they argue, is it spreading like a disease. In fact, by the end of the 1990s, the idea of encroaching deserts had become <a href="https://www.iied.org/end-desertification">difficult to defend</a> against scientific evidence that climate variability was to blame. </p>
<p>Critics <a href="http://www.csf-desertification.eu/combating-desertification/item/the-african-great-green-wall-project">have also pointed out</a> that the vision of a barrier is counter-productive to the development objective as it draws attention to the perimeter of the land rather than to the land itself. To boost food security and support local communities it is better to focus on the wide field rather than its narrow edge. The development objective is important – an <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/11/great-green-wall-initiative-offers-unique-opportunity-to-combat-climate-change-in-africa-un-agency/">estimated 232 million</a> people live in the general area of the Great Green Wall. </p>
<p>This led to the clarified vision keeping the wall in name, but it has been bent almost beyond recognition.</p>
<p>The wall is no longer seen as a narrow band of trees along the southern edge of the Sahara. The vision is now to surround the Sahara with a wide belt of vegetation – trees and bushes greening and protecting an agricultural landscape. The new vision engages all the countries surrounding it, including Algeria and others in North Africa, not just the 11 original sub-Saharan countries of the Sahel.</p>
<p>Thus, the Great Green Wall is no longer a wall. Nor is it great – not yet anyway.</p>
<h2>Unrealistic ambitions</h2>
<p>A simple analysis gives a clear indication of how difficult it will be to realise the Great Green Wall within agreed timelines. </p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/11/great-green-wall-initiative-offers-unique-opportunity-to-combat-climate-change-in-africa-un-agency/">analysis</a> by the Food and Agriculture Organisation suggests that 128 million hectares have a tree cover below the “better half” of comparable landscapes in the two aridity zones that straddle the 400 mm rainfall line around the Sahara. </p>
<p>If one assumes that half of this (65 million hectares, or 8% of the total area in these aridity zones) needs intervention, and that the United Nations’ <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/">2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development</a> sets the target date for completion, then the Great Green Wall initiative should be treating an average of 5 million hectares per year (10 million hectares is the ambition to bring all lands up to the level of the better half). A less ambitious target date would be set by the African Union’s <a href="http://www.au.int/web/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> but even then an average treatment of 2 million hectares per year would be needed. </p>
<p>The actual intervention area is not known but is likely to be far less, no more than 200,000 hectares per year and probably less. At this pace, a century is an optimistic prediction of the time it will take to complete the Wall.</p>
<p>A massive increase in speed –- at least ten-fold –- is required if the Wall is to become great in our lifetime. More resources will clearly be needed but a ten-fold increase is unlikely. What to do?</p>
<h2>Re-greening options</h2>
<p>Many people assume that the wall can only be built only by planting trees. But tree planting is not always needed. Some of the less dry lands can be treated by techniques that rely on the capacity of the land to regreen itself – its ecological memory. </p>
<p>Floods and animals move seeds to places where they can sprout and root systems of former trees are sometimes capable of producing new shoots. Sprouting roots could live as the roots are already established – unlike newly planted seedlings. These could rapidly re-green a landscape, reducing the need for tree planting, as long as farmers protect them from fire and cattle. </p>
<p>This technique – known as farmer-managed natural regeneration – has proven to produce <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/btp.12390/full">good results at low cost</a> in areas where the ecological memory is sufficient for sprouts to come up by themselves and where farmers have the right to use the trees once they get big. The potential to <a href="https://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/scaling-regreening-six-steps-success.pdf">scale it up</a> is significant.</p>
<p>But farmer-managed natural regeneration will not work everywhere. Other methods are needed too, such as digging half-moons (to capture water) and planting seedlings. Doing a better job of applying the right method to the right place may be the quickest and most feasible way to speed the making of the Great Green Wall.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lars Laestadius is affiliated as a consultant with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation. </span></em></p>Africa’s great green wall suffers from a major mismatch between ambition and effort. But that’s not to say it should be ditched altogether.Lars Laestadius, Adjunct Lecturer, Swedish University of Agricultural SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/720112017-02-08T15:36:46Z2017-02-08T15:36:46ZAfrica faces a new threat to democracy: the ‘constitutional coup’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155465/original/image-20170203-14016-19wo10n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against President Joseph Kabila. The poster reads: "Kabila must leave without any conditions".
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Francois Lenoir</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conventional wisdom tells us that good political societies are built on the principles of constitutionalism. This entails upholding the <a href="http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405136532_chunk_g978140513653223">rule of law</a> and <a href="http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vile-constitutionalism-and-the-separation-of-powers">separation of powers</a>. This is to ensure an <a href="http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_3064">even distribution of power</a> where a society is “<a href="https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/constitutionalism-good-governance-a-dangerous-law-essays.php">built on principles of law, not men</a>”.</p>
<p>In the 1990s many African states <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265493847_Constitutional_Reforms_and_Constitutionalism_in_Africa_Reflections_on_Some_Current_Challenges_and_Future_Prospects">reinvented their constitutions</a> to build good political societies. They moved away from one-party authoritarian states to embrace a constitutional political order and representative democracy. They also enacted two-term presidential limits. This was, as Charles Fombad <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">tells us</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a clear recognition of the need for radical changes … In some cases, it meant a total break with a dreadful past … but in most cases it meant recognising that a constitutional framework built around the one party system that had bred authoritarian and dictatorial rule was a recipe for political instability and economic decline.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the limitations on presidential terms have not entirely quashed a culture of entitlement to rule. Glimpses of this culture persist.</p>
<p>This is evident in what is now referred to as the “<a href="http://presidential-power.com/?p=4874">third term tragedy</a>” or the “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/heres-how-african-leaders-stage-constitutional-coups-they-tweak-the-constitution-to-stay-in-power/">constitutional coup</a>”. This is when African presidents extend their tenure in office, effectively becoming “president for life”, changing constitutions to do so. Increasingly, this is met with civic resistance.</p>
<p>Burundi, Rwanda, the Congo and Burkina Faso are examples of where this has happened.</p>
<h2>Roots of constitutionalism</h2>
<p>Constitutionalism found its roots in <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">social contract theory</a>, which was penned by <a href="http://fee.org/articles/john-locke-natural-rights-to-life-liberty-and-property/">John Locke</a> among others. </p>
<p>The basic argument is that humans have inalienable and natural rights to life, freedom and estate. And for us to exercise these rights, we create a political society of consent where constitutional principles reign supreme. Thus, as <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">Manzoor Elahi</a> reminds us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to Locke, the purpose of the government and law is to uphold and protect the natural rights of men. So long as the government fulfils this purpose, the laws given by it are valid and binding, but when it ceases to fulfil it, then the laws would not have validity and the government can be thrown out of power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This interpretation of the purpose of government also informs the <a href="http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf">principles of good governance</a>. These are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness, and respecting the rule of law. The social contract between those who govern and those who are governed is founded on this <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx">rights-based approach</a> to governance. This means that leaders govern at the pleasure of the people, and do not rule with sovereign license at the cost of constitutional rules. The well-being and rights of the people must be the central concern of those who govern.</p>
<p>Good governance entails playing by the rules. It requires accepting <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">electoral defeat</a> if the people willed it so. </p>
<h2>Cases of constitutional coups</h2>
<p>There have been some classic examples of “constitutional coups” in recent years. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/index.php/2014-10-22-15-44-06/alc-newsletters/sept2015-issue/385-the-new-assault-on-presidential-term-limits-in-africa-focus-on-burundi">Burundi</a>, where President Pierre Nkurunziza’s machinations for a third term in 2015 led to political instability and a <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/burundi-army-chief-says-coup-attempt-failed-327288">failed military coup</a>. He subsequently emerged victorious in an election marred by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">violence and intimidation</a> in 2015. </p></li>
<li><p>Congo: In 2015, President Denis Sassou Nguesso claimed that the people <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/congo-brazzaville-opposition-to-protest-president-third-term-bid/2976658.html">wanted him</a> to extend his 32-year stay in power and announced a referendum to change the constitution to allow him to contest the election. This was met with mass protest, with people proclaiming that the “<a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0RS0LK20150928">Congo does not belong to Nguesso</a>”. In 2016 he won <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/congo-president-denis-sassou-nguesso-wins-election-160324040212900.html">at the polls</a> amid tight security measures and a communications black out. </p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-03-an-undignified-exit-the-fall-of-burkina-fasos-compaore">Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré</a> was forced to flee following widespread protests against his bid to extend his 27-year rule in 2014.</p></li>
<li><p>Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes">President Paul Kagame</a> will run for a third term this year. This after the constitutional was amended to allow him another term, following a referendum to that effect. He may be in power until <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">2034</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In 2015 West African states took a progressive step with a proposal to ban “constitutional coups” by limiting presidents to only two terms. But the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">idea was abandoned</a> as some states in the region did not support it. This happened despite the fact that research shows Africa’s citizens largely <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno30.pdf">support limiting presidential terms</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union (AU) committed to a <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-zumas-african-way-is-at-odds-with-the-african-unions-vision-57589">democratic social contract</a> with <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">Agenda 2063</a>. There is a formal promise to abide by the will of the people and to respect the rule of law. The problem rather, as <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">Charles Fombad concludes</a>, is that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In many countries, the problems were not caused by the absence of constitutions. Rather it was the ease with which African leaders had rendered constitutions dysfunctional by regularly ignoring their provisions or amending them when it suited their convenience.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some highlight the lack of effective opposition in Africa. But the problem also relates to views about governance and the rules. It seems the rules are made to the broken.</p>
<p>The AU has to be commended for taking a firm stance against regime change through <a href="https://www.files/ethz.ch/isn/105906/P197.pdf">military coup</a>. It has suspended countries for “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-military-coup-150919073352770.html">unconstitutional regime change</a>”. But it has not been as effective in its opposition to dealing with the problem of extended presidential terms. This could be due to the <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/presidential-term-limits-a-new-african-foreign-policy-challenge">sovereignty principle</a>, which makes African states reluctant to interfere in others’ affairs.</p>
<p>But the problem of leaders clinging to power is only one manifestation of a lack of respect for constitutional rules in Africa. Others include the fact that opposition political parties are often <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/10/rwanda-end-attacks-opposition-parties">harassed</a> and their leaders <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-uganda-opposition-leader-under-house-arrest-amid-tensions-2016-2">locked up</a>. They are also painted as illegitimate proxies for harmful <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-06-icg-confrontation-in-zimbabwe-turns-increasingly-violent/#.WIia6rF7GqA">foreign “third forces”</a> seeking regime change.</p>
<h2>Gambia shows democracy advancing, but…</h2>
<p>Many have applauded the Economic Community of West Africa <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">(Ecowas)</a> for the role it played ensuring a peaceful transition after the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38271480">Gambian election</a>. </p>
<p>After President Yahya Jammeh rejected his loss, citing “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">foreign interference</a>”, it looked like a replay of a now all-too-familiar script, wherein a leader clings on to power against the popular will. </p>
<p>But regional leaders had other ideas. With a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-yahya-jammeh-final-deadline-step-170120044922953.html">not-so gentle push</a> from them, Jammeh eventually <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/jammeh-arrives-banjul-airport-stepping-170121210246506.html">accepted the electoral outcome</a> and vacated the plush presidential chair.</p>
<p>Yes, we may see the Gambian story as an <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/gambia-election-result-sign-democracy-advancing-africa-528532?rm=eu">advancement for democracy</a> in Africa. And yes, there are many lessons the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can learn from Ecowas in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">dealing decisively with despots</a>. </p>
<p>But the temporary Gambian crisis also points to a deeper governance problem in Africa: leadership attitudes towards “governance”. Many African leaders have yet to appreciate that constitutional rules matter. And while military coups are increasingly “<a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/why-are-military-coups-going-out-of-fashion-in-africa">out of fashion</a>”, people on the continent need to pay attention to the “softer” methods used to entrench the “president-for-life syndrome” which threaten the continent’s democratic gains.</p>
<p>More importantly, given a commitment to good governance through <a href="http://au.int/en2/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>, African leaders must do more than show respect for the rules. They must also realise that they need to govern – not rule – at the pleasure of the people. </p>
<p>This would speak to building a culture of accountability and good governance through a change in mindset – instead of seeing their job as ruling the people leaders would see their role as governing the people. It would also entail vacating political office when your time is up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from NRF and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung</span></em></p>Attempts to deepen democracy in Africa by limiting presidential terms to two have not entirely quashed a culture of entitlement to rule. Glimpses of it persist, much against citizens’ wishes.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Senior Research Specialist in Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/710192017-01-24T17:17:14Z2017-01-24T17:17:14ZIt’s time South Africa tuned into Africa’s views about its role on the continent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152095/original/image-20170109-3627-pk1cb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's opinion of its role in Africa is at odds with perceptions on the continent.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has variously styled itself as a “bridge” between the North, the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0715.html">global South and Africa</a> as well as a <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/21556300">“gateway”</a> into the continent. It also sees itself as a spokesperson for Africa, given its membership of the alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa <a href="http://brics2016.gov.in/content/innerpage/about-usphp.php">BRICS</a> and the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/0/what-is-the-g20-and-how-does-it-work/">G20</a>. </p>
<p>It has declared its commitment to the continent’s Africa agenda, the African Union’s ambitious development plans characterised as <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/annual-meetings-2014/the-next-50-years-%E2%80%9Cthe-africa-we-want%E2%80%9D/">“Agenda 2063 - The Africa We Want”</a>.</p>
<p>But how do Africans beyond South Africa’s borders view the country? What are the perceptions of the country’s role on the continent? Are these aligned with the way in which the country perceives its role and influence on the continent?</p>
<p>In a recent round of interviews with senior African Union officials and observers of continental politics in Addis Ababa, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16770932">headquarters of the African Union</a>, we asked people about their views on South Africa’s African policy and actions. The agreement was that the interviews would be dealt with as unattributed quotes. This enabled us to solicit a range of frank opinions and observations to inform a research project on the implementation of South Africa’s <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-za/dv/3_african_agen/3_african_agenda.pdf">“African Agenda”</a>. </p>
<p>We were struck by the fact that the interviewees all raised similar issues and concerns. What was also striking was the extent to which these perceptions were at odds with South Africa’s self-declared role on the continent, as well as the impact it believes it’s had in furthering development and raising the continent’s international profile. </p>
<p>There’s a marked difference between how South Africans as people and as a government see themselves and how the rest of the continent perceives them. Our discussions in Addis Ababa highlighted a number of recurring themes that shaped these views.</p>
<h2>Failed expectations</h2>
<p>Interviewees persistently raised the issue of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-link-between-public-violence-and-xenophobia-in-south-africa-61686">xenophobia </a>in South Africa. A sense of disbelief and continuing incredulity pervaded discussions. </p>
<p>A number noted that after the outbreak of violence in 2015 the South African government initially refused to recognise that the attacks were against foreigners. The problem was compounded when South African political leaders explained the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-06-08-sa-government-reiterates-its-crime-not-xenophobia/#.WHTROWWO69s">xenophobic attacks as criminal acts</a> when it was clear that they were targeted at non-South Africans.</p>
<p>It finally did respond, but only after the joint criticism of several African ambassadors in Pretoria and unprecedented protest action in <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sa-apologises-for-xenophobia-shame-1846914">several African countries</a>. </p>
<p>Several interviewees mentioned that there have also been large-scale attacks on foreigners in 2008.</p>
<p>The views expressed were that attacks against foreigners proved that South Africans didn’t view themselves as part of the continent. And, as one of the interviewees commented, the government had not educated South Africans to understand how much the continent had contributed and sacrificed to end apartheid:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They (the South Africans) are not really African – they are their own Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Double speak</h2>
<p>A deeper problem articulated by those we talked to is of a growing lack of trust in South Africa’s bona fides. The country claims to represent the continent in BRICS and the G20. But there’s a sense that very little benefit accrues to the rest of the continent. </p>
<p>The dominant view is that South Africa does not use these platforms to create or promote opportunities for wider African involvement. Rather, its own economic interests always enjoy priority. This, despite South Africa’s rhetoric of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/you-know-ubuntu-as-an-operating-system-mandela-knew-it-as-his-lifes-mission/?utm_term=.4322634c997c"><em>ubuntu</em></a> (human kindness) and the African Agenda. </p>
<p>According to some of those we interviewed the trend of promoting its own interests has become particularly obvious during the era of President Jacob Zuma. </p>
<p>Related to this was the perception that South Africa behaved in a contradictory way when it came to the African Union (AU) and the UN Security Council. Several interviewees pointed out that in 2011 South Africa was against intervention in Libya and supported an <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/">African solution to the crisis</a>. Yet in the Security Council it <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/07/south-africa%E2%80%99s-about-turn-on-libya-is-speaking-with-the-aubric-majority-defending-the-indefensible/">voted for Resolution 1973</a> which authorised NATO intervention. This led to Muammar Gaddafi being toppled and the subsequent <a href="http://fpif.org/four-years-after-gaddafi-libya-is-a-failed-state/">collapse of the Libyan state</a> which unleashed an era of unrest and instability in the Sahel.</p>
<p>As one interviewee put it: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>South Africa has two platforms for projecting power. One is the AU and one is the UN and at times these roles are contradictory.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Paternalism</h2>
<p>A third issue mentioned by all the interviewees was South Africa’s conduct within the AU, and the extent to which it projected a kind of “big brother, big bully” approach. </p>
<p>There is still strong resentment about the way South Africa ran its <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271669908_Rethinking_and_reforming_the_African_Union_Commission_elections">campaign to get Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma elected</a> as chairperson of the AU. One interviewee explained how South Africa regularly berated other countries, particularly smaller Francophone states, for their “colonial mentality”, implying that their support for then presiding chairperson Jean Ping for a second term was tied up with their servility to France. </p>
<p>There was also a sense of South Africa undermining the continental position on the development of an <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a>. Instead, the country is insisting that a rapid response capability should be developed - the so-called <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-insights/the-african-capacity-for-immediate-response-to-crisis-advice-for-african-policymakers">African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</a>.</p>
<h2>Leading through listening</h2>
<p>Of course, from a South African perspective, most of these allegations could be denied and explained through “hard facts and figures”. During its <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-insights/south-african-foreign-policy-and-the-un-security-council-assessing-its-impact-on-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture">second term</a> as an elected member of the Security Council from 2011 to 2012, South Africa prioritised African security issues. </p>
<p>The country has invested in promoting peace and stability in war-torn countries such as Burundi, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It’s considered by some observers to contribute more than the UN-required 0.7 per cent of GDP annually to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2012.744638?scroll=top&needAccess=true">development aid on the continent</a>.</p>
<p>But that’s not the point. In the diplomatic world perceptions matter as much as facts in the formulation of policy responses and the constraints on success. </p>
<p>The failure of policymakers to try and understand the perceptions of those at the receiving end of their policies can come at a cost. It can also frustrate well-intended policies and even lead to deep resentment and tension between countries. </p>
<p>It may do South Africans, whether ordinary citizens or foreign policy officials, well to ask themselves how others see them – and why. And the country’s policymakers would benefit from trying to understand how their actions are perceived by others.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asnake Kefale is affiliated with the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Alden is affiliated with the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Pretoria and the South African Institute of International Affairs. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxi Schoeman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa considers itself to be playing a key role in promoting the ‘African Agenda’ in continental and world affairs. But perceptions in the rest of Africa tell a different story.Maxi Schoeman, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of PretoriaAsnake Kefale, Assistant Professor, Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa UniversityChris Alden, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637772016-08-17T19:00:57Z2016-08-17T19:00:57ZThe US election: what’s at stake for Africa’s quest to deepen democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133844/original/image-20160811-20932-m7g8jd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump during a campaign rally in Sunrise, Florida.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Eric Thayer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When my students ask about the implications for Africa under the direction of Donald J. Trump or <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/hillary-clinton-9251306">Hillary Rodham Clinton</a>, I have two reactions. </p>
<p>The first, and easy one, is that there has been enough opportunity to weigh the candidates’ arguments and interactions ahead of <a href="http://www.uspresidentialelectionnews.com/whos-running-for-president-in-2016/">the election</a>. </p>
<p>But the more immediate question is what their campaigns tell us about the strengths and weaknesses of the US democratic experiment that might hold lessons for democracy in Africa.</p>
<p>Trump’s strongest supporters are Americans who prefer strong men over strong institutions. Trump is tribal. He is no democrat. He promises authoritarian leadership to an angry majority of Republican Party members. They fear a loss of status; they resent globalisation and immigration. They’re scared of terrorists and want a more assertive America dominated by white Christian males. <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/">“Make America great again!”</a> </p>
<p>Trump’s demagogic genius has been to circumvent the Republican elite and appeal directly to the party’s alienated majority. He has gained support from both only on the basis of their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/21/hatred-for-hillary-clinton-republican-party-unifier">shared hatred of Clinton</a>.</p>
<p>Clinton won <a href="http://www.qz.com/747223/how-the-democrats-near-perfect-convention-put-the-republicans-to-shame">the Democratic nomination</a> on a completely different ticket. It included a celebration of American diversity and concessions to a progressive faction demanding greater economic justice.</p>
<p>Africans have bitter experiences with demagoguery, authoritarianism and foreign exploitation. After all they live on the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-diverse-countries/">most ethnically diverse and fractious continent</a>. </p>
<p>Achieving greater freedom and equality for all identity groups has long been African democrats’ primary goal. By contrast, American democrats have traditionally been preoccupied with individual rights.</p>
<p>Today on both continents democrats are testing variations of these ideals. These are experiences they might usefully share. </p>
<h2>Democratic experiments</h2>
<p>Democracy is best defined as a political experiment whose sole aim is to keep the experiment running. And a constitution limits and shares power among all parties to the agreement. </p>
<p>America’s 1789 constitutional bargain excluded many. Most notably it excluded women and most egregiously African slaves in what today would be deemed a crime against humanity. How America’s two major parties have dealt with excluded identity groups’ demands has defined their priorities since the 19th century. </p>
<p>In the 1960s the Democratic Party lost a large faction when it passed civil rights legislation. Virtually all the white segregationists who controlled the bloc of southern states quickly turned Republican (and remain so). The effect was to further hinder the centuries-long struggle by African Americans for full and equal voting rights. </p>
<p>In this election Democrats are more determined than ever to advance equal rights for all groups, however self-identified, within constitutionally acceptable limits.</p>
<p>America’s <a href="http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h701.html">Democratic Party</a> is now perhaps the world’s most diverse political party. And like most other voters the world over, Democrats cast ballots primarily according to their <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10671.html">self-ascribed identities</a>. They do so with an agreed party platform of supportive policies. </p>
<p>There were striking visual differences between the two US national conventions. Republican delegates were nearly all white. By contrast the Democrats could be mistaken for a meeting of the United Nations, although with more women and fewer suits.</p>
<p>This same loose coalition of Hispanic, Asian, and African-Americans, plus the young and the well-educated, gave Obama his two terms in the White House. Demographically they are America’s <a href="https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf">emerging majority</a>. Lately they started acquiring proportional representation appropriate for equal standing in America’s evolving version of democracy. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Order-Decay-Industrial-Globalization/dp/1491584874">Lasting political reform will be possible</a> only if a more pluralistic majority gains greater control over America’s national institutions. For 227 years the Constitution has ensured disproportionate power for small states. This has helped perpetuate the domination of descendents of a founding group of Europeans. </p>
<h2>Implications for Africa</h2>
<p>The African Union is very different from the US. But it has adopted a long-term vision, <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/">Agenda 2063</a>, that envisions pan-African integration by democratic means. </p>
<p>More immediately and substantially, the African Union’s Constitutive <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf">Act of 2002</a> enshrines a consensus that supports democratic development in all 54 African states. The African Charter for Democracy, <a href="http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">Elections and Governance</a> commits all member states to hold periodic credible elections and invite AU observation. </p>
<p>States will no doubt invoke traditional rights of sovereign equality to impede Pan-African integration. This is analogous to the persistent claims of America’s 50 states <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/">against encroachment of federal authority</a>.</p>
<p>Africa’s approach to democracy differs from America’s in another important way. It focuses more on ensuring <a href="http://www.queries-feps.eu/what-horizontal-inequalities-are-and-why-they-matter/">“horizontal equality”</a> among diverse cultural and ethnic groups, rather than among individual, or “vertical” rights. </p>
<p>Highlighting this distinction helps clarify the historic nature of America’s 2016 presidential election. Democrats are seeking greater <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/opinion/hillary-and-the-horizontals.html">horizontal equality</a>. For Republicans the focus is on the unfettered rights of individuals. Take the issue of gun ownership. </p>
<p>Lately African commitments to democratic governance, nationally and regionally, appear to be faltering. Leadership provided by South Africa in founding the AU and advancing an <a href="http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/1998/tm1998/tm980813.pdf">African Renaissance</a> is missing. No new champions have emerged. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Foa%26Mounk-27-3.pdf">Authoritarianism is reviving</a> under <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-africas-1990s-poster-boys-use-security-fears-to-roll-back-democracy-61307">leaders more like</a> Vladimir Putin than Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton.</p>
<p>Africa’s democrats therefore have a special stake in the outcome of the US election.</p>
<h2>Democratic lessons for Africa</h2>
<p>A win for the Democrats on November 8 would affirm the maturing of American democracy in several ways that are relevant to Africa’s democratic development.</p>
<p>The most obvious gain would be greater gender equality, with the election of America’s first woman president. </p>
<p>A Republican defeat would also mark another “post-colonial” turn for America. A turn away from the historic domination of one identity group and towards democratic pluralism based on greater equality among several identity groups.</p>
<p>African Americans will be prominent among these identity groups. They are likely to be even more influential under Clinton. They are playing a role as crucial to Clinton’s nomination as angry whites are to Trump’s. Recent polling shows Trump’s support from black Americans <a href="http://fivethirtyeight.com">to be less than 1%</a>.</p>
<p>With Clinton’s victory increasingly likely, the AU should consider new ways to strengthen ties with leading African-Americans. They are, after all, the the richest and most influential segment of Africa’s global diaspora, <a href="http://auads-nl.org/au-sixth-region/">the so-called sixth region of the African Union</a>. </p>
<p>Should Trump win the election the main lesson for Africa’s democrats would be that no democracy, however old and institutionally strong, is ever secure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Achieving greater freedom and equality for all identity groups is African democrats’ primary goal. By contrast, American democrats have traditionally been preoccupied with individual rights.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/583122016-06-01T15:00:24Z2016-06-01T15:00:24ZHow to turn Africa from a “borrowed continent” to a global powerhouse<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124571/original/image-20160531-1955-kibisp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa must rise by becoming self-reliant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Army Africa/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Although it’s problematic to generalise about a large, diverse place it’s fair to say that Africa is <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf">fast emerging</a> as a consumer continent. It is populated by “Afropolitans”, who are sometimes also referred to as <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20160429165418809">Pan-Africanists</a>. These are young, urban, well educated people. They are willing to spend money on luxury goods.</p>
<p>However, these people are a <a href="http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP167-Africas-Middle-Class-Plenty-Extreme-Poverty-October-2014.pdf">relatively small middle class</a> in a sea of poverty. They are unlikely to drive a classical “trickle down” improvement to Africa’s general economic picture.</p>
<p>It’s also worth noting that not much of what these young consumers <a href="https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles-Publications/General-Industries-Publications/Documents/Fast-moving%20Consumer%20Goods%20in%20Africa.pdf">covet</a> is actually being produced on the continent. I would argue that Africa should be called the “borrowed continent” rather than a consumer continent. Its <a href="http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/africa-must-reduce-its-dependency-on-raw-material-exports-and-imports-14957/">raw materials</a> are exported, refined elsewhere and generate big profits for other countries. Researchers come, conduct their work and run their experiments. Then they leave again to write it all up.</p>
<p>How did people’s high hopes during the era of independence lead to this? And can those high hopes ever be resurrected? Can Africa discard the mantle of “borrowed continent”?</p>
<h2>A history of control</h2>
<p>To understand the situation that Africa finds itself in now, it’s worth looking back into the continent’s history.</p>
<p>Most countries started to gain independence from colonial powers during the 1960s and 1970s. At this time there were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1351625.stm">two primary blocs</a> on the continent: <a href="http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/idep/unpan003885.pdf">the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups</a>. </p>
<p>The Monrovia group envisaged a continent whose controlling power remained with Western governments. Development would come through the exchange of resources with the western world, trading Africa’s vast mineral resources and agricultural produce.</p>
<p>The Casablanca group, meanwhile, envisaged a self-reliant continent that would be capable of governing itself through intra-continental trade. This continent would integrate socio-economic cultural values among all countries.</p>
<p>Although the two had different missions, they upheld a singular vision – the idea of a united Africa. Over time these aspirations were swept under the carpet and in May 1963 a partially unified body emerged: the Organisation of African Unity. This was relaunched as the African Union in 2001, at which time it adopted grandiose plans to improve governance in its member states through a process of peer review and monitoring. These plans haven’t been seriously implemented. Instead, the relative pluralism and openness witnessed during the late 1990s and early 2000s is being eroded by a new wave of authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Ordinary Africans have not enjoyed much of the oneness imagined by this “union”. Much of the blame for this lies with western powers that remain embedded on the continent. African leaders have also compromised notions of unity through grievous maladministration and systemic oppression of their own people. And so Africa remains little more than a test site for new scientific experiments and a place from which raw materials can be extracted. This is known as <a href="http://cult320sp15.cwillse.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Nkrumah-1965.pdf">neo-colonialism</a>. </p>
<p>Today the neo-colonialists are more likely to come from <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/30/recolonizing-africa-a-modern-chinese-story.html">the East</a> than the West. Against this backdrop, how can Africa shift its role from borrower to creator and producer?</p>
<p>The answers lie with integrating the continent’s people, tapping into existing indigenous knowledge and focusing on capacity development. Technology is key to all of this work.</p>
<h2>Technology a great leveller and limiter</h2>
<p>Technology can reform how people interact – think of cheap communication services like mobile phone and social media apps. It can be used to establish free, open, world class research facilities like physical and applied science laboratories and engineering installations. In these spaces, Africans can create their own products and services. Technology also has the power to reform governance by, for instance, offering online government services.</p>
<p>Digital copying and sharing cost next to nothing, which means that classical scarcity-based economic theory becomes less applicable. Also, when all but a country’s poorest people have the means of recording, sharing and publishing – in the form of a smartphone, tablet or laptop – classical methods of social control begin to fail.</p>
<p>On one hand, the classical path to industrialisation seems more distant than ever. Manufacturing is ever more automated worldwide. So much so, that some people are turning away from demanding job creation and protection to demanding basic income grants to alleviate mass unemployment. But on the other hand, the globalised economy is seeding its own destruction. High energy use is leading to climate change and its unnatural disasters. A growing global population is leading to conflict over resources.</p>
<p>It seems possible that rapid social change must not only aim for decentralisation, but use decentralisation as its method.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, the technology that brainwashes us for mass consumption can also help us to grapple with local survival and dignity. For instance, there’s a need to hybridise universal scientific knowledge with local indigenous wisdom, as well as local biodiversity – including traditional crops. This process mustn’t be propagated by wasteful bureaucratic agencies but by grassroots movements that are empowered by cheap instant communication and locally produced energy.</p>
<h2>Working collectively</h2>
<p>Of course technology does not come without risks or dangers. It’s important that ordinary people and their governments are well prepared to use technology effectively. In this, as in all endeavours related to turning Africa from borrowed continent to creator, it’s crucial that countries on the continent identify their weaknesses and strengths. This will help when setting and working towards common goals. There’s already a template countries can use for this work: the <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/sites/default/files/agenda2063_popular_version_05092014_EN.pdf">AU 2063 Agenda</a>, whose call for seamless borders in Africa resonates to the new world. </p>
<p>Although the countries in the continent remain <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Africa_Visa_Openness_Report_2016.pdf">largely closed off</a>, some – such as <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2016/05/29/african-holders-diplomatic-official-passports-exempted-namibian-visas/">Namibia</a>, <a href="https://migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=112">Rwanda</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35773851">Ghana</a>) – are gradually opening their arms to accept other government officials and ordinary Africans using a “no visa” or visa on arrival policy.</p>
<p>All of these developments also progressively create a mental shift for Africans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Adeyeye Oshin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa has been called a “consumer continent” by many, but in reality much of what its people consume is produced elsewhere. Technology is key to Africa becoming a self-reliant producer of goods.Michael Adeyeye Oshin, EM Fellow, Université de MontpellierLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/594892016-05-18T15:38:54Z2016-05-18T15:38:54ZPeace and prosperity continue to elude Africa five decades on<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123048/original/image-20160518-13464-d2927e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African leaders meet at the African Union Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2015.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To mark the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity, its successor the <a href="http://au.int/">African Union</a> (AU) signed a <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/sites/default/files/50th%20Anniversary%20Solemn%20DECLARATION%20En.pdf">solemn declaration</a> in 2013 to end strife on the continent and to work for peace and prosperity.</p>
<p>The declaration’s noble goals were to rid Africa of violent conflicts, wars, human rights violations and humanitarian disasters, and to prevent genocide. More ambitiously, leaders pledged not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and to end wars on the continent by 2020. </p>
<p>The declaration is part of the AU’s <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents/50th-anniversary-solemn-declaration">Agenda 2063</a> vision, titled “<a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents/50th-anniversary-solemn-declaration">The Africa We Want</a>”. This envisions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The framework builds on, and sets to speed up, the implementation of past and existing initiatives for growth and sustainable development. These include the <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/14129">Lagos Plan of Action</a> for the Economic Development of Africa, adopted in Nigeria in 1980, and the <a href="http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/nepad.pdf">New Partnership</a> for Africa’s Development, adopted in Lusaka in 2001.</p>
<p>The agenda for the next 50 years has been organised around shorter-term action plans. Following the 2013 declaration, work started in earnest to produce the Agenda 2063 “Framework Document: <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents/agenda-2063-framework-document-ar-en-fr-po">The Africa We Want</a>”. And in <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents/agenda-2063-first-ten-year-implementation-plan-2014-2023-september-2015">September 2015</a> the implementation plan for the first ten years (2014-2023) was published. </p>
<p>One of the flagship projects and initiatives is “<a href="http://peaceau.org/uploads/arusha-au-high-level-retreat-report-web.pdf">Silencing the Guns by 2020</a>”. This signals the aspiration for a peaceful and secure Africa as the most urgent priority. </p>
<p>If the AU does not prevent, resolve and eliminate all the destructive conflicts that continue to flare up on its watch, “the Africa we want” – of unity, peace and prosperity – will remain an elusive grand ambition. </p>
<h2>A Herculean task</h2>
<p>Silencing the guns by 2020 will require a Herculean effort on the part of the <a href="http://peaceau.org/en/">AU Peace and Security Council</a>. The council’s remit is to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. It is also responsible for maintaining peace and security. </p>
<p>Putting an end to bloody conflicts will also place the <a href="http://peaceau.org/en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa">African Peace and Security Architecture</a> under considerable strain. Some of its pivotal parts remain under construction. The architecture comprises the Peace and Security Council and other vital institutions such as the Continental Early <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28-continental-early-warning">Warning System</a>. </p>
<p>The AU has an unenviable task ahead. The scourge of terrorism threatens to cripple the already fragile Somali state, as the <a href="https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html">Al-Shabaab</a> onslaught continues. Considerable gains have been made by the <a href="http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/310763/PB_AMISOM_WEB.pdf">AU Mission in Somalia</a> against the terrorist group. Nevertheless the threat of further attacks remains omnipresent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123055/original/image-20160518-13464-1du0hin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">African Union Mission in Somalia peacekeepers from Burundi on the outskirts of Mogadishu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Feisal Omar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Nigeria Boko Haram continues with its brutal suicide bombing attacks, its weapon of choice being innocent women and <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53949#.VzwxGZF97IU">young girls</a>.</p>
<p>Several other African states, such as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sexual-violence-a-weapon-of-war-in-eastern-congo-for-more-than-20-years-54975">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/04/burundi-year-turmoil-160424102559138.html">Burundi</a>, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-spiritual-father-would-weep-at-the-state-of-his-country-45605">South Sudan</a>, remain restive, repeatedly teetering on the precipice of renewed conflict and violence. </p>
<p>A further grave concern is the dearth of political tolerance apparent in the domestic politics of several AU member states. This is despite the 2007 adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and <a href="http://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">Governance</a>. The pivotal document only came into force in 2012 and some states have not yet <a href="http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-sl-african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf">signed it</a>. </p>
<p>Political intolerance, as witnessed prominently in several countries as far afield as Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda, has created an environment in which political debate and dissent are being smothered. This undoubtedly sows the seeds for future conflict. </p>
<p>Another source of instability crying out for attention on the continent is the tendency among such leaders as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni to cling to power <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-old-mens-club-out-of-touch-with-continents-suave-burgeoning-youth-48618">in perpetuity</a>. These “presidents for life” have had a detrimental and devastating effect on many African states since independence.</p>
<h2>From intention to proactive intervention</h2>
<p>To genuinely achieve Agenda 2063’s noble objectives, the AU should invest in proactive prevention of conflict as opposed to reactive intervention. This is considerably more difficult to achieve. </p>
<p>In particular, the slow progress in putting into full operation the <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/african-standby-force-how-the-au-can-get-it-right">African Standby Force</a> has hampered the continent’s efforts to tackle violent conflicts more decisively.</p>
<p>The AU Peace and Security Council needs to do more than just issue strongly-worded communiques condemning errant member states. These need to be reinforced with genuine punitive action and credible consequences. Swift, consistent and concrete action is required in all instances. The AU has an exemplary record in acting against unconstitutional <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-statement-of-the-432nd-meeting-on-unconstitutional-changes-of-governments-and-popular-uprisings-in-africa">changes of government</a>, which includes automatic suspension from the activities of the Union until constitutional order is <a href="http://home.uni-leipzig.de/%7Egchuman/fileadmin/media/publikationen/Working_Paper_Series/RAL_WP_9_Engel_web_101207.pdf">restored</a>. </p>
<p>An equally strong response is required against incumbent governments that fail to protect their citizens against mass atrocity crimes committed within AU member states. In this regard the AU has been reluctant to fully invoke its <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/burundi-nkurunziza-african-union-maprobu/">Article 4(h)</a>, which explicitly makes provision for</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf">crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The article appears to be the most potent instrument available to the continental body in its <a href="http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act">Constitutive Act</a>, and one that should be used more frequently in dire humanitarian emergencies. But it remains inconceivable that it will be invoked anytime soon to justify military action against a sovereign government within the AU, reducing it to a paper tiger.</p>
<p>There is also no shortage of examples where the AU has been undermined in asserting its authority at critical times in the peace and security debate. If it is to maintain any credibility, it should avoid having this salient function and role usurped by foreign actors, as happened during the <a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/793/libya">crisis in Libya in 2011</a>. Today, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/04/burundi-year-turmoil-160424102559138.html">Burundi</a> provides an ideal opportunity for the AU to redeem itself. </p>
<p>By 2063 the AU should be acting as the sole guarantor of peace and security in Africa. Getting Africa to speak with one voice as well as to act in unison in this critical realm will be crucial. </p>
<p>The deadline the continent has set itself to achieve unity, peace and prosperity is still a considerable time away. But we are only four years away from the deadline it set for silencing the guns – 2020. And turmoil, insecurity and instability are still evident in far too many African states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerrie Swart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020 will require a Herculean effort on the part of the AU Peace and Security Council, whose remit is to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.Gerrie Swart, Lecturer: African Politics and Political Conflict in the Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also the Founding Editor of the ‘Journal of African Union Studies’, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/559572016-04-12T14:03:52Z2016-04-12T14:03:52ZHow Africa can close its continent-wide science funding gap<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118347/original/image-20160412-15858-trhqf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Investment in science and innovation is needed to help build Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kate Holt/Africa Practice/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The idea that Africa’s development depends critically on science, technology and innovation is embodied in the African Union’s <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/vision">Agenda 2063</a>. This document emphasises economies that are led by innovation and driven by knowledge. But the continent has some serious work to do if it’s to create such economies.</p>
<p>It starts at a disadvantage: Africa is home to 15% of the world’s population and 5% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) but <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">accounts</a> for just 1.3% of the globe’s investment in research and development (R&D). It also holds <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">only 0.1%</a> of the world’s patents, which leads us to question how effectively the existing research and development investment is being used.</p>
<p>The good news is that there are grounds for optimism. And those grounds will only grow if African governments – as well as the continent’s private sector – ramp up their scientific investment in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Coherent strategies</h2>
<p>There are increasing signs of coherence in developing scientific strategies across the continent. The first comprehensive attempt involved the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) coming together in 2003 to initiate a series of consultations. These resulted in Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated <a href="http://www.nepad.org/humancapitaldevelopment/knowledge/doc/2395/africa%E2%80%99s-science-technology-consolidated-plan-action">Plan of Action</a> (2005–2014). </p>
<p>The plan was criticised on a number of grounds, especially for not being adequately linked with other pan-African initiatives, but it recorded <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">some real successes</a>. Between 2007 and 2013 total investment in African R&D grew by about 54%, albeit from a low starting point. At the same time the continent’s output of scientific publications rose by 60%, compared with growth in Europe over the same period of just 14%. </p>
<p>Its successor, the <a href="http://au.int/en/newsevents/27635/african-union-heads-state-and-government-adopt-science-technology-and-innovation">Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa</a>, was launched by the African Union in 2014. It is a ten-year strategic plan and has been widely bought into by national governments.</p>
<p>Another cause for optimism is a whole set of new initiatives to support the development of a research culture in Africa. For instance, the World Bank has partnered with national governments to create <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/15/world-bank-centers-excellence-science-technology-education-africa">centres of excellence</a> across the continent in many disciplines. The bank is also involved in an initiative to train <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/paset">10,000 new PhDs</a> in applied science, engineering and technology. </p>
<p>In 2015 the African Academy of Sciences and NEPAD, together with a group of international partners, launched the <a href="http://aasciences.ac.ke/programmes/easa/alliance-for-accelerating-excellence-in-science-in-africa-aesa/">Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa</a>. This is a new platform to develop and fund major initiatives in science across the continent. The alliance’s establishment has been welcomed by the African Union’s heads of state.</p>
<p>These new developments are exciting. But it is also important to be realistic about what more is required. African science needs billions – not millions – of dollars in investment. If the continent wants to achieve even the <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">world average</a> for the number of researchers per head of population, it will need to rapidly train one million new PhDs.</p>
<p>There will need to be investment in infrastructure and career development, both at universities and other research organisations. To achieve this the continent will need to invest another US$2 billion in R&D each year. </p>
<h2>Where will the money come from?</h2>
<p>For the most part, it will be up to countries themselves to invest this money, rather than international partners – though such partners’ contributions will remain essential for targeted and catalytic effects.</p>
<p>Some countries are beginning to take up the baton. Between 2009 and 2013 Ethiopia increased its investment in R&D by <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">more than 150%</a>. In 2013 Kenya incorporated a commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on R&D in a new <a href="https://ipkenya.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/kenya-enacts-new-law-on-science-technology-and-innovation/">Science, Technology and Innovation Act</a>. The heads of state of <a href="http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Scientific-agenda-of-Mauritius-and-Africa-crucial-in-advancing-socioeconomic-growth,-says-President-of-the-Republic.aspx">Mauritius</a>, <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/03/09/senegal-hosts-first-edition-of-next-einstein-forum/">Rwanda and Senegal</a> have all made strong commitments to a future that’s led by science.</p>
<p>Governments are not, of course, the only potential source of funding. </p>
<p>In the most successful science-led economies globally a substantial proportion – sometimes the majority – of funding comes from the private sector. In South Africa and Namibia <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">up to 30%</a> of investment in R&D comes from business. Elsewhere in Africa there is practically no such investment. </p>
<p>The other important source of funding globally but untapped in Africa is philanthropy. At the beginning of 2016 there were <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2016/03/01/the-african-billionaires-2016/#48bacdae2a5a">24 African billionaires</a>, with assets totalling more than $100 billion. This raises the question of whether there will ever be an African equivalent of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which focuses on funding scientific research and innovation.</p>
<h2>The money is there</h2>
<p>Whatever the potential spread of funding, there is no doubt that the prime driver has to be African governments investing in their own future.</p>
<p>In 2007 African leaders committed to invest 1% of GDP in R&D. Starting from a low base, actual investment had <a href="http://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report">reached 0.45%</a> in 2013. Africa’s estimated GDP is <a href="http://www.lemauricien.com/article/india-africa-summit-2015">$2.4 trillion</a>. Simply achieving the 1% already committed to would release an additional $12 billion a year for science. By 2050, on current estimates, this would rise to $300 billion dollars a year compared with today’s approximately $20 billion. </p>
<p>The money is there. The challenge is to make sure that it is invested in science innovation and technology for Africa’s development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55957/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Marsh receives funding from The Wellcome Trust and Medical Research Council UK in the form of research grants. He is affiliated with The African Academy of Sciences and the University of Oxford</span></em></p>Successful economies are led by innovation and driven by knowledge. For Africa to advance, it needs to make more substantial investments in its research and development sector.Kevin Marsh, Professor of Tropical Medicine, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/575892016-04-11T15:15:43Z2016-04-11T15:15:43ZWhy Zuma’s ‘African way’ is at odds with the African Union’s vision<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118178/original/image-20160411-21986-1uvo07j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Heads of state at an African Union session in Addis Ababa. They have signed up to a plan that envisages strengthening institutions and governance.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Solan Kolli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans are mobilising against what they see as an inherently corrupt <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2016/04/07/calls-grow-for-zuma-to-resign-or-be-recalled">president</a>. The <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/opinion/international/jacob-zuma-must-go.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FZuma%2C%20Jacob%20G.&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection">international community</a> has also joined in the clarion call for his resignation. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/can-we-blame-you-now-president-zuma">Corruption</a>, <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-03-23-state-capture-going-gets-tough-for-zuma-and-the-guptas/#.Vwde2zarcIY">state capture,</a> and scandal lie at the core of demands for President Jacob Zuma to go. The dominant narrative is that he has acted in only his <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-10-under-zuma-the-anc-has-finally-lost-it">self-interest</a> with little regard for the country. </p>
<p>Yet Zuma <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-04-05-scandal-ridden-zuma-survives-impeachment-motion">survived</a> another impeachment motion in parliament with <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-04-06-why-anc-mps-rejected-the-zuma-impeachment-motion">full support</a> from the governing <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/index.php">African National Congress</a>, the party he leads.</p>
<p>In the midst of the mounting pressure, Zuma has urged that African problems be dealt with <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/04/08/Before-turning-to-the-court-we-should-solve-things-Africa-way">“in an African way”</a>. He told supporters:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ll be very happy that we solve the African problems in the African way because if we solve them only legally they become too complicated. Law looks at one side only, they don’t look at any other thing … They [the courts] deal with cold facts and I was complaining [about] that, but they’re dealing with warm bodies. That’s the contradiction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, what exactly is the African way? </p>
<p>A cursory glance at the African Union’s Agenda 2063 shows the importance of institutions underpinned by principles of <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo63.pdf">accountability</a> and <a href="http://www.coe.int./t/dgap/localdemocracy/Strategy_Innovation/12principles_en.asp">good governance</a>. This entails transformed institutions and a new way of governance, accountable to the people.</p>
<p>Indeed, the African Union <a href="http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf">stresses that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>we recognise that a prosperous, integrated, an united Africa, based on good governance, democracy, social inclusion, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law are the necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict-free continent. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This recognition stems from having “learned from our past”. As a result there is a pledge to “take into account the lessons” as Africa embarks on Agenda 2063.</p>
<h2>Africa’s seven aspirations</h2>
<p>By signing up to Agenda 2063, African countries – including South Africa – commit to advancing socio-political and socio-economic transformation. The agenda captures seven aspirations of the African people:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development;</p></li>
<li><p>An integrated continent, politically united. It should be based on the ideals of the Pan-Africanism and the vision of the African Renaissance;</p>
<ul>
<li> An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law;</li>
<li>A peaceful and secure Africa;</li>
<li>An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics;</li>
</ul></li>
<li><p>An Africa where development is people-driven, unleashing the potential of the its women and youth; and </p>
<ul>
<li>Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul>
<h2>Civil society demanding accountability</h2>
<p>As civic pressure mounts for him to resign, Zuma’s stance of dealing with African problems in an African way cements notions that constitutional principles of good governance and accountability don’t always apply to African presidents. Or, if they do apply, they only do so in certain instances.</p>
<p>Growing civic mobilisation against Zuma demonstrates the opposite. It shows that Africans will move to hold leaders accountable when they act improperly or undermine their constitutional obligations.</p>
<p>There have been numerous instances of this happening across the continent. We have seen large scale <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-05-11-from-burkina-to-burundi-jobless-young-africans-rise-against-corruption-and-failed-rule">mobilisation of young Africans</a> against presidents-for-life, corruption and stalled development. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-rise-of-civil-society-groups-in-africa/">Black Monday Movement</a> mourns the loss of billions through corruption in Uganda. Using rhythm and rhyme <a href="http://www.clashmusic.com/features/enough-is-enough-the-rap-revolution-of-senegal">Senegal’s hip hop movement</a>, in concert with political parties and other social movements, successfully blocked a presidential third term. They mobilised people when former president Abdoulaye Wade lost touch with Senegalese aspirations.</p>
<h2>Undermining South Africa’s leadership</h2>
<p>Agenda 2063 commits African leaders to pursue a people-centred and transformational leadership. It demands that leaders be held accountable for failure to abide by constitutional limitations on power or for corrupt activities. It recognises that leaders who act with impunity when breaking the law become a liability to the continent’s aspirations. </p>
<p>If the ANC ignores the calls for Zuma’s resignation it may undermine South Africa’s leadership on the continent. It creates the idea that, if South Africa’s president can undermine the constitution with impunity, accountability and good governance may be ignored for personal political goals. </p>
<p>It raises questions on what basis South Africa will be able to condemn similar behaviour of other African countries. More importantly, it limits South Africa’s moral capital to advance the vision of Agenda 2063.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57589/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the NRF and the Konrad-Audenauer Stiftung</span></em></p>If the governing ANC ignores the calls for Zuma’s resignation,it may undermine South Africa’s leadership on the continent. It creates the idea that he can undermine the constitution with impunity.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Associate Professor of Political Science, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/509342015-11-26T07:32:16Z2015-11-26T07:32:16ZChina-Africa summit: what to look for beyond the hype and hypocrisy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103300/original/image-20151126-28303-can2xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's choice of South Africa to host the China-Africa summit underscores the special relationship between the two countries.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Petar Kujundzic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing’s selection of South Africa to host the China-Africa heads of state <a href="http://au.int/en/partnerships/africa_china">summit</a> may indicate Chinese President Xi Jinping’s personal commitment to the continent. This is the first time the summit is being held at this level in Africa.</p>
<p>It may also show his desire to reassure Africa that, despite recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-economic-slowdown-threatens-african-progress-49544">sharp declines</a> in China’s trade and investment, the Chinese view is that this partnership is of long-term importance. And perhaps it signals China’s deepening special relationship with South Africa.</p>
<p>So, what are we to expect?</p>
<p>The Chinese government supports regional and sub-regional integration in Africa for many practical reasons. These relate to the scale and viability of its investments and the need to overcome the bewildering complexity of working with 54 sovereign states.</p>
<p>Xi might be open to a more robust political dialogue on issues of African democracy, elections and good governance for two other related reasons:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>to advance peace and security; and</p></li>
<li><p>to develop more politically capable states.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>For his part, South African President Jacob Zuma is likely to avoid drawing attention to the significance of holding <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys_1/">the summit</a> in a democracy. This won’t be out of a sense of false modesty but rather a misplaced respect for the several ageing African autocrats in attendance. </p>
<p>It will also be in deference to his Chinese friends, from whom Zuma is reportedly seeking major funding for several <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/zuma-china">grand national projects</a>.</p>
<h2>Deciphering the platitudes</h2>
<p>The only formal work for the leaders will be to endorse the latest version of a familiar triennial <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t954620.htm">action plan</a>. This will cover joint economic, development and cultural initiatives.</p>
<p>The only drama is likely to be the media speculation about the size of the new loan package Xi is expected to announce. China made a <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/01/foresight-africa/china-africa-cooperation-sun.pdf?la=en">US$20 billion</a> commitment to the continent in 2012, augmented by another $10 billion a year later.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, we should listen carefully to the pro-democracy comments leaders offer as the preferred political foundation for pan-African integration and Sino-African co-operation. From these we should try to discern new political realities beneath the hypocrisy and hype.</p>
<p>China has always been an outspoken advocate of African unity. And Xi is expected to reiterate commitment to Africa’s Agenda 2063 for:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He is also likely to repeat China’s support for <a href="http://www.au.int/">African Union</a> commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s vision for a United States of Africa. The vision, which has been endorsed by all member states, has as a central goal: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and rule of law. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Xi invokes similar terms when he speaks of China <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-21">becoming</a>, by the middle of the century:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, and culturally advanced.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such promises may not matter to millions of socially active Chinese citizens, who have taken part in the more than 200,000 annual <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=EQEVAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=Public+Protests+in+China,+200+000&source=bl&ots=UDlAgTJTRo&sig=uS0ZXFfu2sxIINrxON844V4paXY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiB6sPyw6vJAhVCyRQKHXDfCaMQ6AEIJzAC#v=onepage&q=Public%20Protests%20in%20China%2C%20200%20000&f=false">public protests</a>. The protests are often as severely suppressed as anti-government demonstrations in African countries.</p>
<h2>The right to intervene</h2>
<p>African countries have granted the African Union unprecedented <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/">powers</a> for a regional or international organisation: the right to intervene in any of its members for humanitarian and human rights reasons. </p>
<p>China continues to declare its strict adherence to non-interference. But it is showing a willingness to support African preventive intervention and more assertive peace enforcement. This is especially since two dramatic events:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>its costly 2011 <a href="http://worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/03/6181345-china-organizes-hasty-retreat-from-libya">emergency evacuation</a> of nearly 36,000 Chinese oil workers from Libya; and</p></li>
<li><p>last year’s forced abandonment of its huge investments in <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55056">South Sudan</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The African Union’s <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf">Constitutive Act</a> also endorses an approach to political capacity-building in Africa that strongly favours civic over ethnic nationalism. </p>
<p>Africa, after all, is the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-diverse-countries/">most ethnically diverse</a> and conflict-prone region in the world. It is also plagued by complex emergencies and costly multilateral peacekeeping operations. </p>
<p>China appears to be quite different. More than 90% of its people are ethnic Han. But there are also more than 55 ethnic minorities. Many of these are seeking greater <a href="http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-ethnic-tensions-rise-china">self-determination</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union’s unanimously adopted <a href="http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">African Charter</a> on democracy, elections and governance came into effect in 2012. It is a far more progressive and ambitious attempt to advance pan-African civic nationalism than has ever been undertaken in China. And it is an experiment that even a few Chinese diplomats and scholars I have spoken to think might someday hold lessons for political reform in China.</p>
<p>China ostensibly shares the African Union’s commitment to civic nationalism, but ignores its own constitutional <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm">provisions</a> for the protection of basic human rights and civil liberties. These include freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly. Virtually all African states have founding documents with similar provisions. But, unlike China, they hold regular national elections, albeit of varying degrees of integrity.</p>
<p>Democratic elections are a necessary, if limited, condition for peacefully and legally accommodating factional domestic conflict. This is a step China may not be prepared to take domestically. But it has begun deploying election observation missions in Africa. I met one when leading an <a href="http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/observed.html">observation</a> team to the 2013 Madagascar elections. Democratic elections were a key milestone in the <a href="http://www.sadc.int/files/2613/8675/7746/Launch_Statement_Round_TWO_Madagascar_09-12-2013docx.pdf">Southern African Development Community’s</a> “road map” to help secure a peaceful transition and prevent further deadly conflict.</p>
<p>China is the world’s most economically successful authoritarian government. It will continue favouring like-minded authoritarian regimes, notably non-resource-rich Ethiopia and Rwanda.</p>
<p>But it also shows surprising interest in, and support for, a variety of African democratic experiments. Listening to Xi, and watching how he and his subordinates respond to democratic developments in Africa, may be more indicative of the endurance of the partnership than fluctuations in trade and investment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Africa-China summit will provide an opportunity to get a feel for how Chinese President Xi Jinping is responding to democratic developments in Africa.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.