tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/african-governments-20364/articlesAfrican governments – The Conversation2020-05-03T09:29:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1375322020-05-03T09:29:27Z2020-05-03T09:29:27ZA novel idea: integrating urban and rural safety nets in Africa during the pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331404/original/file-20200429-51461-lmykwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Markets in Africa's cities are central to the food chain. But many had to close because of COVID-19 measures. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In countries across Africa, the public health restrictions imposed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic have thrown many people out of work. Cities face the risk of widespread hunger, with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-ensure-poor-people-in-africas-cities-can-still-get-food-during-lockdowns-136297">collapse of urban incomes and disruptions in food supply chains</a>. And where there are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52426040">government-run relief programs</a>, many have only reached a fraction of the people who have lost their incomes.</p>
<p>Most African countries are experiencing rapid urbanisation. But this trend can temporarily slow <a href="https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/zimbabwe/zimbabweans-circle-back-rural-areas-opportunities-cities-dry/">or even reverse</a> during <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925652">civil war</a> or <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/africa-agriculture-underestimated-safety-net">economic crisis</a>. This is due to the fact that in crisis, as food prices rise and incomes fall, many people turn to farming to support themselves. Migration to rural areas to access agricultural land thus provides an important type of <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/49706877/Oduro_Formal_and_Informal_Social_Protection_in_Africa.pdf">informal safety net</a>.</p>
<p>Yet one of the unique challenges of this crisis is that restrictions on movement in and out of cities are being used to curb transmissions. For example, countries such as <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/national/coronavirus-lockdown-in-accra-and-kumasi-comes-into-force/">Ghana</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/covid-19-kenya-bans-travel-nairobi-areas-200406163601579.html">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/nigeria-extends-coronavirus-lockdown-key-cities-weeks-200413185335045.html">Nigeria</a> have prohibited people from leaving major cities, effectively cutting off many from the informal social safety net during this time of crisis.</p>
<p>Most African governments are struggling to provide adequate relief to jobless people. Not only COVID-19 but also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/21/global-hunger-could-be-next-big-impact-of-coronavirus-pandemic">hunger</a> are real risks to public health. Therefore, it is imperative to develop containment strategies that further ensure people do not go hungry.</p>
<p>Many African governments lack the financial and administrative capacity to launch new large-scale formal safety net programs. But they may still be able to run smaller programs which help people safely migrate back to more food-secure rural areas, simultaneously reducing the risk of transmission.</p>
<p>What might a safe rural migration program look like?</p>
<p>The basic idea is straightforward: help urban residents cover the costs of returning to stay with their extended families in the countryside, provide sanitary supplies to reduce the risk of infection in transit, and scale up health system surveillance to catch and contain potential rural outbreaks early.</p>
<p>It is important to note that this solution will not work for all urban residents, nor indeed for all African countries. However, in some places and if done properly, it could at least take some of the pressure off surviving in urban areas, and make it more likely that the people who remain can receive other targeted support.</p>
<h2>What a safe programme would entail</h2>
<p>There are a number of important considerations for the design of a safe rural migration program. </p>
<p>First, the safe rural migration approach is only appropriate for countries which already have adequate food stocks in rural areas. It will be difficult for governments to intervene to scale up food production for returnees if it is not already sufficient. And encouraging people to migrate to areas which are likely to be affected by drought, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jan/24/food-prices-shot-up-floods-spark-a-scramble-for-survival-in-east-africa">floods</a>, or <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2020/0410/A-different-plague-Africa-battles-next-big-wave-of-locusts">locusts</a>, will only make it more difficult to provide assistance to them later if their harvest fails.</p>
<p>Second, people should also only be encouraged to consider migrating if they have an extended family support network already available in a rural area. This way, the extended family can help to provide housing and access to farmland for new returnees. If people travel to a rural area without a place to stay or access to land, this could create a new rural poverty crisis. </p>
<p>It isn’t feasible for governments to independently verify whether people will have a place to stay in a rural area if they’d like to migrate. But one way to handle this issue is to have the government provide only small subsidies to cover the cost of a one-way bus ticket. This will encourage people to travel only if they believe they can find a place to stay at the other end.</p>
<p>This subsidised-ticket approach has recently been studied <a href="https://www.theigc.org/impact/no-lean-season-migration-escape-seasonal-famine/">in Bangladesh</a>, albeit to encourage urban migration rather than rural, and before the pandemic began. </p>
<h2>Reducing public health risks in rural areas</h2>
<p>A safe migration program must also consider the potential trade-off between reducing food insecurity in cities, and increasing the risk of the virus in rural areas. This is a difficult decision. </p>
<p>There is currently no easy way to compare the known risk of hunger in cities like Nairobi, where over <a href="https://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/2020PGY_CovidKenyaKAPStudyResultsBriefRound2.pdf">60% of residents in poor neighbourhoods</a> report that they are already going hungry, to the potentially high risk of COVID-19 outbreaks in rural areas.</p>
<p>There are major factors to consider if an infected but asymptomatic person does travel back to a rural area. In particular, access to sanitation and healthcare tends to be worse in rural areas, which could result in more rapid transmissions. It’s important for governments to take steps to minimise the risk of transmission. The surest approach would be requiring everyone who wished to travel to pass a COVID-19 test before departure. </p>
<p>However, given that African countries have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/africa-needs-15-million-coronavirus-test-kits/a-53208002">struggled to scale up testing</a> even for frontline health workers, it is unlikely that a mass testing program for rural returnees could be organised quickly enough.</p>
<p>A second-best strategy would be to organise safe travel for the returnees. At an individual level, this would involve providing them with masks and hand sanitiser. </p>
<p>From a public transport perspective, it would ensure regular disinfection of selected transport modes and collection points, as well as arranging transport on buses, rather than lower capacity vehicles, that would allow adequate ventilation and two meters of distance between each passenger. Governments could also offer to temporarily cover some of the costs of bus companies running at half capacity. </p>
<p>People wishing to return to rural areas should also be provided with information about the risks of transmission and the importance of handwashing and phyisical distancing. </p>
<h2>Scaling up rural health surveillance</h2>
<p>The recent Ebola epidemics in West Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo have <a href="https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/centres/health-humanitarian-crises-centre/news/102976">offered many lessons</a> about containing outbreaks in rural areas. Building on local knowledge, for example, they have helped develop <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/03/30/preparing-for-covid-19-in-africa/">realistic strategies for patient isolation</a>. This needs to be a key component in a policy on safe migration, as all returnees should strongly be encouraged to self-isolate for 14 days after their trip. </p>
<p>Furthermore, ensuring that new outbreaks of COVID-19 are identified and contained quickly will be a further important part of any safe rural migration plan. To do this, healthcare workers must <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/context-matters-fighting-ebola-lessons-west-africa-drc">build trust with local communities</a> so that they can carry out proper surveillance on the spread of the disease. These types of surveillance and support can build on <a href="https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/African2mCHW_en.pdf">community health worker systems</a> which already exist in many rural areas. </p>
<p>Safe rural migration programmes will not be an adequate substitute for formal social protection, or for support to both urban and rural food systems. Furthermore, given the potential health risks, any migration plan should be piloted on a small scale first. Governments should make sure to collect regular data on food security and public health in the participating rural areas, in order to make sure that the program is working effectively. </p>
<p>But there are no simple solutions for the COVID-19 pandemic. Time is of the essence – to contain new infections, and to prevent people from going hungry. This is just one idea that could buy some African governments time, in the absence of an effective vaccine, to begin developing more formalised support programmes, while importantly also keeping people from going hungry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137532/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas is affiliated with the International Growth Centre. The views represented here are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IGC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Strohm does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Safe rural migration programmes are not a substitute for formal social protection. But they could buy governments some time.Astrid R.N. Haas, Policy Director, International Growth CentreRachel Strohm, Co-Founder & Board ChairLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/695172016-11-29T09:48:26Z2016-11-29T09:48:26ZA new centre of power through mass mobilisation is needed in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/147900/original/image-20161129-10975-ppguyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demands to recall South African President Jacob Zuma reached a climax at the governing ANC's national executive meeting.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a> has long argued that the elected president of the party should also be the executive head of the country to avoid creating <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-27-anc-debates-two-centres-of-power">two centres of power</a>. Otherwise the centre of power in the party would inevitably be at odds with that of the president of the country. </p>
<p>But the idea that by taking this route it would avoid conflict has come to nought. Jacob Zuma is president of the party as well as the country. But the ANC and the government, the executive in particular, <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-27-zuma-to-launch-fight-back-as-anc-nec-present-motion-for-the-president-to-step-down">are at war</a>. </p>
<p>Senior members of the national executive committee of the ANC tabled a motion for Zuma <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/motion-for-zuma-to-step-down-tabled-at-anc-nec-meeting-reports">to step down</a>, echoing similar calls by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/anc-icons-demand-jacob-zuma-resignation-vote-161109132942397.html">party stalwarts</a>. It is now evident that South Africa has two centres of political power. </p>
<p>One can speculate as to who holds the reins within the ANC and is increasingly at odds with the presidency. What is clear is that all is not well in the party structures. </p>
<p>Because of this my contention is that South Africa needs a third centre of power. The country needs a mass democratic movement to confront the mismanagement that will otherwise beset it. </p>
<p>To an extent South Africa has been down this road before, to great effect. In the 1980s leaders such as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cheryl-carolus">Cheryl Carolus</a> and Reverend <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/reverend-allan-aubrey-boesak">Allan Boasak</a> were instrumental in creating the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a> which rallied diverse people around a single purpose: co-ordinated mass action to oppose the apartheid regime. This time such a movement will need to focus on enhancing good governance to ensure socio-economic development. </p>
<p>This should draw together a host of players ranging from not-for-profit organisations to religious bodies and active citizens who want to save the country.</p>
<h2>Business is powerful, but not organised</h2>
<p>The business community has held a significant amount of sway over the direction the country has taken since democracy <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/business/2016/11/15/government-and-business---where-did-it-all-go-wrong">in 1994</a>. At its core, the policy regime of the last two decades has been a <em>de facto</em> settlement by way of compromise between political elites and big capital.</p>
<p>Organised labour, through the guise of its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/kids/tripartite-alliance">alliance partnership</a> with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, has served to cement this corporatist pact between the <a href="http://unbc.arcabc.ca/islandora/object/unbc%3A6679/datastream/PDF/view">private and public sectors</a>. So while the business sector remains an influential actor on the national scene, the lack of unity and coordinated effort by business has neutralised its capacity to steer the state.</p>
<p>The country’s business sector is led by two main bodies; <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/busa-warns-eskom-on-nuclear-plans-2093258">Business Unity South Africa</a> and <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/blsa-appoints-mabuza-as-chair-as-it-unveils-new-leaders-2016-10-21/rep_id:4136">Business Leadership South Africa</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://cajnewsafrica.com/2016/11/25/exclusive-council-fears-lack-of-sa-transformation-could-spark-turmoil/">Contending voices</a> such as those of the Black Business Council and upstart Progressive Professionals Forum are eroding <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/05/some-relief-for-eskom-as-2-organisations-show-it-support">the voice of business</a>. The latter groupings are breakaway factions of <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2011-09-12-black-business-council-wrong-step-in-the-right-direction/">organised business</a> who favour a more aggressive <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/bbc-calls-for-radical-economic-transformation/">transformation</a> agenda and stronger alignment with President Zuma’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHKaIvMZqKg">administration</a>. </p>
<p>This erosion is laid bare by the fact that business only mobilised and <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/banks-showed-zuma-his-limits-1960890">reacted</a> once international markets had punished the president and the country after <a href="http://nenegate.biznews.com">Nenegate</a>. This was the scandalous expulsion of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015. Zuma’s appointment of a new finance minister has historically been handled with due care for the management of business confidence and <a href="http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2015/12/10/zuma-fires-finance-minister-nene-rand-crashes-to-record-r1538us">perceptions</a>, but BLSA and BUSA groupings were caught entirely unaware of the <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00040315.html">impending change</a>. </p>
<h2>Two centres, no progress</h2>
<p>The implication of a split in the political centre of power is that South Africa’s national development project will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-can-expect-zero-growth-its-problems-are-largely-homemade-62943">gridlocked</a>. Except for a handful of localised multi-stakeholder projects, such as those driven by Premier David Makhura’s <a href="http://www.southafrica.info/about/government/mega-projects-080415.htm#.WDwuxncy9E5">Gauteng government on a local level</a>, very little will be achieved between the social partners of government, business and labour under these conditions. </p>
<p>It also means that these two centres will drive different agendas. The party will be steering towards immediate political imperatives such as securing votes in the 2019 national and provincial elections. On the other hand, the increasingly isolated, defensive and desperate executive is likely to close ranks and attempt to <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/11/20/how-zuma-s-securocrats-are-closing-down-the-public-space">use the security cluster</a> with increasing vigour as a weapon against its opponents.</p>
<h2>New centre of power</h2>
<p>What remains to be done by those who continue to hold a vision of a democratic, progressive and increasingly equitable society?</p>
<p>Their task is to construct from civil society a <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/politics/2016/11/24/zuma-rattled-save-south-africa-campaigns-potential-says-section27s-heywood/">new centre of power</a> – people power, citizen power, built on the power of just claims, energised by the power of righteous indignation. After all, the power of a society rests in its people and only then in its <a href="http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPol_democSocPwrAnal.html">institutions</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa again needs a mass democratic movement. The main actors in such a force for common good will inevitably have to include <a href="https://theconversation.com/dangerous-echoes-of-the-past-as-church-and-state-move-closer-in-south-africa-65985">churches, mosques and temples</a>. These civil society groups enjoy a shared representation of the vast majority of citizens, with around 81% of the population self-identifying as Christians, many of whom regularly participate in faith community practices. This force will also have to include trade unions and community organisations, NGOs and rights activists. </p>
<p>There are early signs of the emergence of just such a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-06-05-i-am-the-third-force/">third force for good</a> in the likes of the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-25-save-south-africa-whose-protest-is-it-anyway">SaveSA movement</a>, the Socio-Economic Future of South Africa convened by the <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-02-18-a-return-to-civil-action-clergy-to-spearhead-new-movement-to-tackle-crises-in-south-africa/">Archbishop of Cape Town</a>, and the public call to prayer for a change in national leadership by <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/opinion-prayer-a-weapon-to-fight-injustice-2087156">Reverend Moss Ntlha</a>. </p>
<p>For a project of mass mobilisation to succeed, South Africans who have been deeply loyal to their liberation movement masters will have to take back their agency and right of refusal. ANC membership would need to become a choice and not a <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/06/10/anc-has-been-reduced-to-a-shady-network-of-patronage-and-corruption-maimane">birthmark for privilege</a>. Liberation credentials will again have to be hard earned. But this time liberation will mean holding one’s friends in high office and those in the boardrooms to account.</p>
<p>South Africa now has two centres of power. It needs a third if it is to navigate the polar risks of <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/11/25/zuma-turns-to-high-court-to-review-state-capture-report">state capture</a> and <a href="http://www.mistra.org.za/Library/ConferencePaper/Documents/South%20Africa's%20Developmental%20Capacity.pdf">state incapacity</a> and forge a path to inclusive prosperity. Is the country’s labour movement awake to this reality? If the clergy have come to this conviction, can the men, women and young people who do not benefit from the country’s system of patronage be mobilised to shoulder this task?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marius Oosthuizen has previously received funding from faith-based Foundations such as the Maclellan Foundation, agencies such as the British High Commission and a variety of research grants. He is affiliated with SEFSA, the Socio-Economic Future of South Africa, a civil society dialogue initiative to secure the future of South Africa.
</span></em></p>There are early signs of the emergence of a third force for good in South Africa in the likes of the Save SA movement and Socio-Economic Future of South Africa convened by the Archbishop of Cape Town.Marius Oosthuizen, Full time faculty, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/571622016-04-03T10:46:33Z2016-04-03T10:46:33ZAfrican governments aren’t taxing the rich. Why they should<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117162/original/image-20160401-6809-atbu9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One of the ways that super-rich individuals in Africa are evading tax is through keeping their money in offshore accounts. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/goya/6178994684/in/photolist-aq1XR7-8WiSGw-9fyWEk-aFc5Qs-aFc7Fw-aF8cHF-7nPTnu-7nNZTs-7nTT3y-apYiW2-dGgHEc-aFc7Hy-7nQues-7nK6bP-7nKvk6-7nPFaf-7nQoUy-7nQDoq-7nLJEn-8NBkpx-7nLGZr-7nQ4UR-7nJDwT-7nLPpk-7nQFZj-7nQ4iR-7zCdEX-7nPmmd-7nPvpE-7nM51i-7nLF6g-7nQTuY-7nKmZ2-7nPShE-7nLB8z-7zG4HW-7zGoxA-9fypfM-7nPkBh-99aoKQ-7zG2ML-997gjK-8WiQKS-aF8hYi-aFc4RE-7nQqcq-8WfM2c-8WiQPJ-8WfP9x-aq1Viu">Goya Bauwens/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A great deal of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/02/tax-dodging-big-companies-costs-poor-countries-billions-dollars">attention</a> has been paid to the obstacles African governments face in effectively taxing the profits of transnational corporations. African governments are frequently <a href="http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2015/07/oecd-tells-south-africa-widen-its-tax-base">urged</a> to widen their tax bases by <a href="http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/theme/public-resource-mobilisation-and-aid/policy-options/deepening-the-tax-base/">reducing tax incentives</a> for foreign investors. But what about Africa’s rich? Some Africans are very rich, and in many cases they are <a href="http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/Africa-tax-and-inequality-report-Feb2014.pdf">not paying their fair share</a> of taxes. </p>
<p>The number of super rich on the continent is growing fast. According to <a href="http://www.nw-wealth.com">New World Wealth</a>, the number of high-net-worth individuals (people with assets over $1 million) in Africa rose at twice the pace of the rest of the world in the past 15 years. Its <a href="http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160315005977/en/Africa-Wealth-Report-2016---Research-Markets">2016 Africa Wealth Report</a> states there are about 165,000 high-net-worth individuals in Africa, with combined wealth of $860 billion. More <a href="http://content.knightfrank.com/research/83/documents/en/wealth-report-2015-2716.pdf"><em>ultra</em> high-net-worth individuals </a> (with $30 million or more in assets) were created in Africa since 2003 than in any other region of the world. According to <a href="http://www.wealthinsight.com/WealthInsightIntelligenceCenter/">Wealth Insight</a>, there are 1,932 in Africa.</p>
<p>But it is challenging for African governments to tax the wealthy.</p>
<h2>Why collection is so hard</h2>
<p>One of the reasons is the challenge of taxing income in economies that are highly informal. In Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, personal income taxes make up about a quarter of all tax revenue collected. In Africa, they only make up about <a href="http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=967113064118006116123097006110025122030015030047000031018017067096021078028002013106026119119003010032035018085030018105006042069011032046030119013124000102007006029021064024087086020011085002006068005002121073116003101088101001025114086022118088&EXT=pdf">a tenth</a> on average, and as little as 4% in countries like Uganda and Rwanda. This is primarily – <a href="http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=967113064118006116123097006110025122030015030047000031018017067096021078028002013106026119119003010032035018085030018105006042069011032046030119013124000102007006029021064024087086020011085002006068005002121073116003101088101001025114086022118088&EXT=pdf">up to 95%</a> – collected from employees of formal businesses through the pay-as-you-earn system. Self-employed professionals generally evade taxes and formal employees often engage in informal business on the side. </p>
<p>This informality contributes to African tax administrations lacking information on which citizens are high-net-worth individuals. In Kenya, only 100 high-net-worth individuals of a likely <a href="http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/Africa-tax-and-inequality-report-Feb2014.pdf">40,000</a> are registered with the tax authority. In South Africa, up to 114,000 high-net-worth individuals are unregistered, costing the government about <a href="http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/Africa-tax-and-inequality-report-Feb2014.pdf">$10.9 billion</a> in tax revenue.</p>
<p>It is also hard for African governments to tax the rich because they hide their wealth using the offshore financial system. Gabriel Zucman, from the London School of Economics, <a href="http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/Zucman2014JEP.pdf">estimates that 30%</a> of all African financial wealth is held offshore, amounting to about $500 billion. This means African governments are losing out on roughly $15 billion in taxes from individuals annually, and this does not take into account non-financial wealth. In 2015, <a href="http://www.icij.org/project/swiss-leaks/explore-swiss-leaks-data">Swiss Leaks</a> revealed that HSBC Switzerland alone held more than $6.5 billion for clients from sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<h2>Uganda as a case study</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="http://www.ictd.ac/index.php/ju-download/2-working-papers/98-boosting-revenue-collection-through-taxing-high-net-worth-individuals-the-case-of-uganda">study</a> undertaken by the Uganda Revenue Authority with support from the <a href="http://www.ictd.ac/">International Centre for Tax and Development</a>, revealed the extent to which the political and economic elite evade taxation in Uganda. </p>
<p>The researchers examined lawyers from top commercial law firms and found that out of a group of 60, only 12 had paid personal income tax in 2012, and only 13 did the following year. The team also investigated individuals who paid large import duties. They found that although 12 people paid more than $180,000 in customs duties in 2014, none of them had paid personal income tax.</p>
<p>The researchers also investigated the links between government officials, business and tax compliance. Looking at a group of 71 high-ranking government officials owning large business assets (like hotels, schools and media houses), they found that only one had ever paid personal income tax between 2011 and 2014. Further, the companies the officials were associated with were largely non-compliant, with 47 out of 56 not paying any corporate income tax in 2013.</p>
<h2>Political challenges</h2>
<p>Increasing tax compliance among the wealthy is challenging because economic elites have great political influence. They are also often members of the political elite. In <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Treasury-scraps-5pc-capital-gains-tax/-/539546/2748696/-/14d15g9z/-/index.html">Kenya</a>, for example, the government tried to implement a capital gains tax on the sale of property and shares, but was forced to scrap it due to resistance from business.</p>
<p>Uganda tried to introduce a system requiring income tax clearance from people buying land valued over $18,000 in <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/-/689364/1210404/-/12srd61z/-/index.html">2011</a>. This was also stopped due to political pressure.</p>
<p>Still, great progress is possible. Spurred by the results of the study mentioned above, the Uganda Revenue Authority established a high-net-worth individual unit in September. The new unit has been a significant success, raising an impressive <a href="http://www.ictd.ac/bringing-uganda-s-rich-into-the-tax-net">$3.3 million</a> in revenue by February.</p>
<p>Although enforcing tax compliance among the rich can generate significant additional revenue, what is at stake is much greater. The injustice of those with the most money not contributing to the public purse erodes the legitimacy of the whole system, leading those with less to feel even less willing to comply. As Ugandan researcher Ronald Waiswa said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you let the big crocodiles swim freely, the small fish will follow.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57162/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rhiannon McCluskey works for the International Centre for Tax and Development, a non-profit research organisation funded by DFID and NORAD. </span></em></p>The number of super-rich individuals in Africa is growing, but they are not paying their fair share of taxes. African governments are losing out on roughly US$15 billion in taxes annually.Rhiannon McCluskey, Researcher Officer, International Centre for Tax and Development Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/474012015-09-16T04:24:36Z2015-09-16T04:24:36ZClosing the research gap between Africa and the rest of the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94885/original/image-20150915-29616-1jh7jt6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">University of Cape Town scientists work in the Drug Discovery and Development Centre. More needs to be done to keep Africa's scientists on home ground.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A large gap remains in research capacity between Africa and the rest of the world in all scientific disciplines. Addressing the challenges, especially, in the physical sciences, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) sector remains a a major hurdle.</p>
<p>In Africa itself, <a href="http://www.elsevier.com/research-intelligence/research-initiatives/world-bank-2014">research</a> is mostly dominated by five nations: Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa. It is no surprise that four countries - Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria - are also leading in terms of GDP.</p>
<p>A World Bank <a href="http://www.elsevier.com/research-intelligence/research-initiatives/world-bank-2014">report</a> examined the research enterprise in Africa over a decade from 2003 to 2012, comparing it to that of Malaysia and Vietnam. These two countries had a comparable research base to the sub-Saharan Africa regions at the beginning of the period of analysis.</p>
<p>During 2003-12, all three sub Saharan African regions had doubled their yearly research output and had greatly increased both the quantity and quality of research. Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global research has increased from 0.44% to 0.72% during the decade examined.</p>
<p>But a wide gap in research capacity still exists between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. The region accounts for less than 1% of the world’s research output while being home to 12% of the global population.</p>
<p>It is time to tackle mediocrity in science and technology to forge the next generation of partnerships that can deliver results and lasting outcomes. Improving higher education is key to making Africa a knowledge driven continent.</p>
<h2>STEM should be a strategic priority</h2>
<p>Sub-Saharan Africa’s output growth has been driven by advances in health sciences research with around a 4% annual growth rate, making up 45% of all research.</p>
<p>Clearly, for sub-Saharan African countries, renewed attention to STEM should become a strategic priority. Research in the physical sciences and STEM makes up only 29% of all research.</p>
<p>By contrast, STEM makes up the largest share of Malaysia and Vietnam’s total output with an average of 68%.</p>
<p>Currently, sub-Saharan Africa relies on overseas collaboration and visiting academics for its research output. This must change.</p>
<p>There is very little regional collaboration among African countries. This too must change.</p>
<p>And greater public support is needed so that the fruits of research and collaboration can help advance sustainable development on the African continent.</p>
<h2>Governments must step up to the plate</h2>
<p>If Africa is to grasp the science and technology revolution, governments should take the lead in policy formulation. </p>
<p>They should focus on programmes to mobilise science and technology for sustainable development.</p>
<p>This goal becomes crucial since the continent unfortunately remains far from the target set by the <a href="http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2007/africa-aims-scientific-revolution">Lagos Plan of Action</a> and African Union 2007 initiative calling on African countries to allocate 1% of their GDP to science.</p>
<p>Only Tunisia and South Africa have met or are on track for meeting that target.</p>
<p>With the combined GDP of Africa coming close to US$ 2.6 trillion, the amount that could potentially be allocated for science is US$200 billion.</p>
<p>African countries can no longer depend only on external financiers to fund basic and strategic research on the continent. African governments as well as the private sector should make the firm commitment to invest in science, technology and innovation, particularly if the continent wants to participate actively in the global knowledge economy and cultivate local capacity, including the full participation of women.</p>
<h2>Africa must keep its scientists at home</h2>
<p>The continent’s collective challenge is to reduce the brain drain, promote circulation and accelerate brain gain. About one-third of qualified scientists and engineers born and trained in developing countries have <a href="http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/09/26/000456286_20140926094154/Rendered/PDF/910160WP0P126900disclose09026020140.pdf%20Pg55">moved</a> to industrialised countries. </p>
<p>High-level research network, adequate infrastructure facilities and a better integration of basic science and technology within public and private sectors on the continent would contribute to attracting Africans back to their home countries.</p>
<p>And the next generation of partnerships that can deliver results and lasting outcomes needs to be forged, because science is a social enterprise and thrives on collaboration.</p>
<p>Such movement would also help to attract African scientists from around the world to work on the continent and address its challenges.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from a speech by the president of Mauritius, Professor Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, at the <a href="http://www.aasciences.org/attachments/article/418/AESA%20Press%20Releaase.pdf">launch</a> of the Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa (AESA) in Nairobi, Kenya on September 10.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47401/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ameenah Gurib-Fakim received funding from the European Union for research work carried out when she was an academic researcher. She was sworn in as the 6th and first female President of the Republic of Mauritius on June 5th 2015.</span></em></p>If the continent is to grasp the science and technology revolution, then governments should take the lead in both policy formulation and implementation.Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, Associate of the Unesco-Unisa Africa Chair in Nanoscience and Nanotechnology, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.