tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/anc-conference-47008/articlesANC conference – The Conversation2022-12-15T14:46:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1966732022-12-15T14:46:13Z2022-12-15T14:46:13ZIs South Africa better off with or without Cyril Ramaphosa?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501305/original/file-20221215-17-13xluz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C57%2C974%2C621&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Cyril Ramaphosa came to the helm of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC) <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-is-cyril-ramaphosa-a-profile-of-the-new-leader-of-south-africa-89456">in 2017</a> on an anti-corruption, or anti-state capture, platform. The ANC’s 54th elective conference gave him a mandate of renewing the party, and simultaneously reversing the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture</a> phenomenon that had characterised much of the country 10 years under his predecessor Jacob Zuma. </p>
<p>But, now, he himself has been caught up in controversy over the theft of thousands of American dollars allegedly kept in contravention of foreign exchange rules at his <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-scandal-looks-set-to-intensify-the-ancs-slide-ushering-in-a-new-era-of-politics-185719">Phala Phala farm</a> in Limpopo in 2020. He also allegedly failed to properly report the theft to the police.</p>
<p>This sparked an attempt to have him impeached for allegedly violating the country’s constitution. But, the ANC’s overwhelming majority in parliament saw the impeachment motion being <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/drama-defiance-retraction-mps-back-ramaphosa-against-impeachment-20221213">defeated</a>.</p>
<p>This has led to many to ask whether the country would be better off with or without Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>This is not an easy question. But it is one that has been on the minds of many in the country since the eruption <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-06-01-arthur-fraser-lays-criminal-charges-against-ramaphosa-says-he-stole-4m/">in June</a> of the Phala Phala scandal.</p>
<p>Given that South Africa runs a party political system at a national level, Ramaphosa emerges through the organisational culture of the governing ANC. The party, specifically its successive leadership after the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">2007 Polokwane conference</a>, has presided over the weakening of state institutions and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-in-south-africa-how-the-rot-set-in-and-how-the-project-was-rumbled-176481">general collapse of state capacity</a>.</p>
<p>These have had eroded social cohesion in South African society as seen by accelerated levels of <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">inequality</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/xenophobia-is-on-the-rise-in-south-africa-scholars-weigh-in-on-the-migrant-question-181288">xenophobia</a> and ethnic chauvinism. To ask, therefore, whether South Africa would better off with or without Ramaphosa is to also ask whether the country would be better off without the ANC.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-in-crisis-south-africas-governing-party-is-fighting-to-stay-relevant-5-essential-reads-196580">ANC in crisis: South Africa's governing party is fighting to stay relevant - 5 essential reads</a>
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<p>For a period the ANC <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/sou1994results1.htm">represented</a> the aspirations of many black people in reversing the political and economic design of colonialism and apartheid. To this extent, it can be said to have encompassed the South African nation. But it has become too inward-looking, at the expense of the development aspirations of the nation <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">it claims to lead</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly Ramaphosa straddles these transitions of the ANC. At the beginning of the democratic dispensation in 1994, as a trade unionist, he was an important architect of the country’s constitutional framework. But, now as president of both the party and the republic, he’s embroiled in a scandal over his private business interests. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">The ANC insists it's still a political vanguard: this is what ails democracy in South Africa</a>
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<p>Its an untenable position to be in given the anti-corruption ticket that catapulted him to the helm of the party. </p>
<p>I’ve been researching and observing the ANC and its governance performance over 15 years. My view on these questions is that given the organisational culture that comes with the ANC, and its impact on both government and on South African society, the country would indeed be better off without Ramaphosa. This is regardless of his <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/12/02/ramaphosa-s-ability-to-fight-corruption-now-questionable-corruption-watch">anti-corruption campaign</a> which has, in any case, been <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-president-cyril-ramaphosas-credibility-has-been-dented-putting-his-reform-agenda-in-jeopardy-189802">weakened by Phala Phala</a>. </p>
<h2>Of Phala Phala and the ANC</h2>
<p>Given that the Phala Phala matter weakens his anti-corruption campaign, the party can either save the president, as it did when it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-parliament-debate-ramaphosa-farmgate-report-2022-12-13/">voted this week against tabling</a> the report of the parliamentary panel on Phala Phala for discussion. Or, it can hang him out to dry, thus beginning a series of events that weakens the electoral fortunes of the party altogether. </p>
<p>The decision to save him is, of course, premised on the idea that the South African “nation” is inseparable from the ANC. And that equally, the ANC is inseparable from the state. These assumptions increasingly don’t hold true in the country. Voters, especially in urban South Africa, are <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2022-07-29-if-the-anc-becomes-a-rural-party-it-will-be-the-end-of-the-anc-makwetla/">diversifying their votes</a>.</p>
<p>I agree with the Director of the New South Institute, Ivor Chipkin when <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-12-04-phala-phala-is-not-a-crisis-for-south-africa-it-is-a-crisis-for-cyril-ramaphosa-and-the-anc/">he says:</a>.</p>
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<p>the ANC is not the nation…the party is not the state {and} institution matter more than individuals.</p>
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<p>It has become increasingly clear that the country needs to start thinking of life without the ANC in charge. And that coalitions, albeit unstable in the immediate run, might be desirable to avoid the cliff edge that South Africa stands on.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>I think that the ANC will continue to be a strong political force in the foreseeable future, even though it has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/world/africa/south-africa-election.html">weakened in successive election</a> at local, provincial and national level. </p>
<p>There are now real prospects that the party will poll just above 50% needed to form a national government in 2024. This puts the prospect of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-stable-national-coalition-government-in-south-africa-possible-but-only-if-elites-put-countrys-interests-first-193828">national coalition government</a> within view. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">Can the ANC survive the end of South Africa's heroic epoch?</a>
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<p>The ANC should now show leadership by providing the necessary architecture – including new laws and regulations – to manage coalitions so that they can serve the country well. </p>
<p>This would complement the recent amendment of the Electoral Act enabling independent candidates to run for elections at national and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/cabinet-approves-law-to-allow-independent-candidates-to-contest-as-mps-and-mpls-f8f496d7-39c0-4733-8f71-dfaea11c2a8f">provincial level</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, this possibility is not without its weakness: legislative access or easier entry for independent candidates to contest elections is a zero-sum game for the ANC. But the development of South Africa requires, not the renewal of the ANC, but the enablement of coalitions. </p>
<p>Coalitions are a necessary part of diversifying South Africa’s political culture. This is not about bringing contestation for its own sake, but to find a party political culture that aligns with the country’s constitutional framework. </p>
<p>The future of South Africa hangs in the balance. The country can either continue on its current downward spiral, with a <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/598212/young-people-plan-to-leave-south-africa-as-brain-drain-concerns-grow/">growing brain drain</a>, or it can change direction to upward development trajectory. </p>
<p>Either way, this is about much more than the ANC. </p>
<p>Too much time has been spent discussing the societal spill overs from the party’s organisational and <a href="https://theconversation.com/vacuum-of-ideas-at-anc-policy-conference-bodes-ill-for-south-africas-governing-party-188259">intellectual problems</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196673/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has become increasingly clear that the country needs to start thinking of life without Ramaphosa - and the ANC - in charge.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/996212018-07-12T14:45:50Z2018-07-12T14:45:50ZANC won’t fix internal strife unless it addresses root causes of discontent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227392/original/file-20180712-27030-12221dc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC members show their support for party leader and president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brenton Geech/EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), is in crisis less than a year before a general election expected to be held in mid-2019. If it wants to end the crisis, it may have to do something about which it talks a great deal, but does little – trust its members.</p>
<p>The ANC has been in crisis for years, as its own <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/54th-Conf-Organisational-Report.pdf">documents confirm</a>. Its regional and provincial leadership elections are almost routinely challenged as losers claim the winners broke the rules. Often the challenges centre on claims that the process in which branches send delegates to conferences was flawed.</p>
<p>It was this crisis which ensured that the ANC could choose leaders last December only because the contesting factions made a deal to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-deal-with-provincial-strongmen-is-haunting-south-africas-ruling-party-96666">share positions</a>. Without that bargain, the losers would have cried foul. There was no guarantee that the conference would continue – and every certainty that, if it did, the outcome would be tested in court.</p>
<p>The deal kept the ANC afloat, but did nothing to ensure that anyone in the governing party trusts its processes or that there’s a structure in the ANC with enough credibility to settle disputes and convince the losers, or those who fear they will lose, that the processes are fair.</p>
<p>This crisis could grow as the ANC <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-kzn-almost-ready-to-hold-its-provincial-conference-jessie-duarte-20180711">chooses candidates</a> for its 2019 election lists. Much is at stake. Who is chosen will decide which faction dominates in national and provincial parliaments. And, because economic opportunities in the market are limited, winning a place on the list which gets you a seat can, for many, be a ticket into the middle class. </p>
<p>So a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-05-22-thousands-attend-kzn-anc-protest-rally-over-political-killings/">heated contest</a> seems certain and the ANC’s current performance makes it likely that losers will claim they were done down. Since <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/editorials/2017-12-13-editorial-anc-needs-to-watch-the-polls/">voting trends </a>(in local by-elections which give a sense of who voters are supporting) suggest that the ANC will win next year’s election comfortably, the battle to choose candidates may be far more damaging to it than the election.</p>
<h2>Millions excluded</h2>
<p>Part of the reason for the crisis is the ANC’s failure to tackle the exclusion of millions from the mainstream economy. Because it has not engaged key economic interests in negotiations on opening up the economy, politics for many of its members is not about public service or status but about looking for resources. </p>
<p>Even if it plans to address this urgently – and there is no sign it does – the problem will take years to fix. So its elections will remain, at least in part, a battle to make it in the economy and there will be huge incentives to break the rules. This means that it will remain in crisis unless it looks at its own organisational problems.</p>
<p>It has recognised these problems – it excels at identifying its woes and discussing them openly. But, although it has debated remedies and set up teams to deal with them, its willingness to say what is wrong is not matched by an ability to put it right.</p>
<p>This is because the problems are deep rooted. But it is also because the ANC has done little or nothing to fix the structures where the problem starts – its branches. The more than 3 000 branches are the core element of ANC decision-making. They nominate candidates for office and choose most of the delegates at conferences who vote for leaders. They are also meant to be the units in which ANC members discuss policy. But ANC documents and other sources report constant claims that branches are constituted, or operate, in ways which are irregular. </p>
<h2>Broken branches</h2>
<p>The ANC routinely insists that the branches are all-important. And it does try sometimes to put out fires at branch level. But it has never begun a concerted effort to ensure that the branches really are where power lies and where members can express themselves openly. </p>
<p>ANC leaders would hotly deny this. It is an article of faith within the organisation that the leaders are simply servants of the members in the branches. But many branch members complain about being ignored, bullied into supporting factions or generally being treated like useful weapons in the battles between elites.</p>
<p>Making sure branches wield real power and allow members a say is difficult –because so many are excluded from the economy, some do join branches in the hope of attaching themselves to politicians who will steer resources their way. But it is not impossible. Many members belong to branches because they care about the ANC and the country. Many are unhappy with vote-buying and corruption and would fight it if they were taken seriously.</p>
<p>It is also essential. The only way to fix the ANC is to make sure that the branches have power to fend off those who would buy or bully them and to hold to account leaders who look after themselves, not citizens.</p>
<h2>Holding leaders to account</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most common refrain in this country is that we need “leadership”. But leaders do what the people want only if the people are strong enough to make sure they do. That is as true for the ANC as for the country.</p>
<p>If it wants elections that are about who has most support, not who is better at rigging branches and pushing them around, it has no option but to make sure that its branches really do call the shots.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The problem with South Africa’s governing ANC, is that to many of its members, politics is not about public service but about resources.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/977892018-06-12T14:24:21Z2018-06-12T14:24:21ZRamaphoria in South Africa: just a honeymoon, or the start of true love?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222198/original/file-20180607-137312-22d1j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The public liking towards South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has benefited the ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As 2017 drew to a close South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), had reached <a href="http://citizensurveys.net/sa-citizens-survey/">the nadir</a> of its popularity with voters. The decline was driven by public hostility towards <a href="https://theconversation.com/survey-shows-zuma-and-ancs-mutual-dance-to-the-bottom-92126">Jacob Zuma</a>, then president of both the party and the country.</p>
<p>The good ship ANC wasn’t quite sinking, but it was seriously listing. Then Cyril Ramaphosa became the party and the state’s new leader – and attention turned to whether he could steer the ANC into calmer waters.</p>
<p>The results of our new <a href="http://citizensurveys.net/sa-citizens-survey/">South African Citizens Survey fieldwork</a> – conducted in March 2018 – suggest Ramaphosa has done well so far. Compared to the 23% of all citizens aged 18 and over who said they approved of Zuma’s performance in January and February, almost two-thirds (68%) approved of Ramaphosa’s performance.</p>
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<p>Ramaphosa’s rise in popularity has also helped the ANC. The proportion of people who held a positive image of the party rose from 42% (in November 2017) to 68%. </p>
<p>Such a sharp reversal might simply be chalked up to the usual <a href="https://presidential-power.com/?p=7692">“honeymoon phenomenon</a> historically observed by public opinion polls around the world with new presidents. Even if he’d done nothing at all, Ramaphosa stood to benefit from any comparison with his deeply unpopular predecessor.</p>
<p>But, far from doing nothing, Ramaphosa has acted swiftly in several areas since he took the oath of office <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-15-the-oath-is-sealed-ramaphosa-is-officially-the-president-of-south-africa/">on February 15</a>. These surely account for a large part of the the good feelings in which he now basks. </p>
<h2>Ramaphoria at work</h2>
<p>The population’s elation about Ramaphosa, tagged as <a href="https://www.fanews.co.za/article/investments/8/economy/1021/south-africa-ramaphoria-and-the-global-backdrop/24085">Ramaphoria</a>, didn’t just begin when he inherited the mantle of high office. His popularity had already begun to rise in mid-2017 (see Figure 1) when his campaign to lead the ANC <a href="http://ramaphosa.org.za/cyril-ramaphosa-website-siyavuma-anc-2017-campaign/">swung into high gear</a>.</p>
<p>During the April to June 2017 polling period, Ramaphosa and his main competitor for party leader, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, enjoyed equal levels of (un)popularity among the electorate. Their favourability ratings were just 34% and 31%, respectively. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s numbers increased to 47% during the October-December fieldwork, on the eve of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">ANC National Conference</a> in December. They kept on climbing in the new year, to 60% in the January - March 2018 survey. Importantly, positive views of Ramapahosa rose sharply across all age and racial groups, and in all nine provinces. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222548/original/file-20180611-191974-1d7jdlb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>There are at least two different ways to explain this upward trend. One account would focus on the widely cited explanation for Ramaphosa’s ascendance to the ANC presidency. That was his ability to strike bargains with other party power brokers who then delivered their provincial delegations on <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2017-12-21-analysis-how-cyril-ramaphosa-won-the-anc-sort-of/">the day of the key vote</a>, making him ANC president. By extension, this logic would also presume that these power brokers were able to shift mass opinion among their respective constituencies.</p>
<p>But such a view would fail to explain why the largest increases in Ramaphosa’s favourability since mid-2017 occurred in the Free State and North West, two of the provinces run by members of the so-called <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/19/the-rise-of-the-premier-league-and-their-failed-bid-to-install-ndz_a_23310554/">Premier League</a> of pro-Zuma provincial leaders.</p>
<p>That’s where a second account comes in. This would focus on Ramaphosa’s very conscious attempt to court public opinion directly and to reacquaint himself with average voters. Indeed, Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-10-00-on-the-hustings-with-cr17">"CR17” campaign</a> for the party presidency was organised, well-staffed, and built around a widely publicised speaking tour that projected his image as a leader.</p>
<h2>The change factor</h2>
<p>Just as important was what Ramaphosa said: particularly, his decision to frame his candidacy as a departure from the “normal politics” of the ANC under Zuma. He ran as a <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/18/how-he-won-nenegate-convinced-cr17-to-mobilise_a_23310334/">“change” candidate</a> committed to clean government. </p>
<p>He launched this arm of his campaign in April 2017 at the late South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-speech-by-cyril-ramaphosa-at-chris-hani-memorial-lecture-20170423">memorial lecture</a> with a sharp attack on Zuma and the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/3-arrested-in-hawks-gupta-raids-20180214">Guptas</a>, Zuma’s friends who are accused of have <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">captured the South African state</a>. </p>
<p>Given the sourness of the public mood at that time, an attack on the sitting president was not an especially daring act. As of April 2017, 70% of South Africans surveyed said Zuma should resign his position as State President.</p>
<p>But it surely was an exercise in courage to make this speech in a forum of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/kids/tripartite-alliance">ANC-led tripartite governing alliance</a> – and to say it as a deputy president who could be easily fired by a president who had already <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-17-zuma-announces-cabinet-reshuffle/">sacked senior cabinet ministers</a>.</p>
<p>Our data suggests that voters had been waiting for a clear signal that Ramaphosa was not a core part of the Zuma network. Voter ratings of Ramaphosa only began to move upward after that speech. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, until that point Ramaphosa had enjoyed only slightly higher ratings among voters who wanted Zuma to stay in office, compared to those who wanted Zuma to resign. </p>
<p>After his speech at the Hani memorial his popularity rose sharply among the majority of South Africans who wanted Zuma to go.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222549/original/file-20180611-191959-1ldvbhf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<h2>Towards a lasting relationship</h2>
<p>The Ramaphosa campaign correctly read the mood of the electorate in 2017 and strategically positioned itself accordingly. It was this crucial decision, as much as any ephemeral “honeymoon” effect, that accounts for the good feelings in which the president now basks. </p>
<p>If he can maintain the focus on clean government, and show that he is committed to fixing the sins of the Zuma years, chances are that the current levels of Ramaphoria" might be more than just a brief honeymoon, but the “beginning of a <a href="https://www.scpr.org/blogs/offramp/2013/07/01/14145/casablanca-a-beautiful-relationship-that-starts-at/">beautiful relationship</a>” with South Africans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Mattes is Professor of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Honorary Professor at the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa at the University of Cape Town, co-founder and Senior Adviser to Afrobarometer, and has previously worked as a consultant to Citizen Surveys. He receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation,</span></em></p>President Cyril Ramaphosa’s popularity has improved the favourability of the governing ANC among South Africans.Robert Mattes, Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909552018-02-07T14:41:32Z2018-02-07T14:41:32ZSouth Africa’s future hinges on Ramaphosa’s strategic skills<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205323/original/file-20180207-74509-d1kson.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deputy President of South Africa and leader of the country's governing party, the ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s 2018 State of the Nation address by the president of South Africa has been <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/07/curiosity-confusion-and-comedy-after-sona-postponed">postponed</a>. This unprecedented step makes it clear that the country is seeing the final days of Jacob Zuma as president although it may take a day or a week or two before things are finalised.</p>
<p>What’s important is that Zuma isn’t allowed to detract from the momentum that newly elected ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa has started to build. This has included a successful trip to Davos where he unequivocally pulled the carpet from under the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/we-have-excess-power-and-no-money-ramaphosa-on-nuclear-plan-12934073">nuclear power programme</a> favoured by Zuma.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has been working diligently to corral Zuma’s remaining freedom of action. Zuma was finally persuaded to establish a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/state-capture-commission-must-investigate-all-state-corruption-focus-on-guptas-20180125">commission of enquiry into state capture</a> and Ramaphosa started restoring credibility to the management of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1789190/new-eskom-ceo-and-board-chair-appointed-koko-and-singh-others-to-be-removed-says-presidency/">state owned enterprises</a>. </p>
<p>The momentum built by Ramaphosa seems sufficient to avoid the most pressing concern, the spectre of a <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/moodys-now-places-sa-inc-on-downgrade-review-20171129">downgrade</a> of South Africa’s long term local currency debt rating by the rating agency Moody’s. Such a step would trigger South Africa being excluded from <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/sa-faces-many-economic-headwinds-12486144">Citi’s World Governance Bond Index</a>. RMB Morgan Stanley projects a potential <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/sa-faces-many-economic-headwinds-12486144">outflow of US $5 billion</a> if this happened.</p>
<p>But his freedom of action is severely constrained by his narrow victory during the ANC’s leadership elections and the divisions within the party’s top leadership. The party has no choice but to design an early exit strategy for Zuma, or suffer significant political damage during the 2019 elections.</p>
<p>A downgrade would constrain growth and severely affect the ANC’s 2019 election prospects. Ramaphosa needs his own mandate, which only the 2019 national elections can deliver. </p>
<h2>Economic growth</h2>
<p>In November last year Ramaphosa outlined an economic plan aimed at <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/">generating jobs and economic growth and tackling inequality</a>. The plan set a growth target of 3% for 2018, rising to 5% by 2023. </p>
<p>For its part the Reserve Bank has forecast the economy will grow by a measly 1.4% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. The International Monetary Fund is even more pessimistic, forecasting growth of 1.1% for this year. </p>
<p>Nothing is more important for South Africa – and Ramaphosa as the country’s incoming president – than growth and translating that growth into employment creation. That, in turn, requires foreign and domestic investment, which is only possible with policy certainty and rapid movement to a new leadership. It also requires a positive partnership with the private sector.</p>
<p>Assuming Zuma’s exit is imminent, serious consideration needs to be given to the team that Ramaphosa must put in place to help him achieve the economic turnaround he envisages. This brings us to the need for a cabinet reshuffle, including the appointment of a credible minister of finance. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>South Africa has a cabinet which is double the size required. A few ministers, such as Rob Davies at trade and industry and Naledi Pandor in science and technology, have established their credibility. But a large number of the current cabinet shouldn’t be considered for inclusion under a Ramaphosa administration. </p>
<p>The most important post is the minister of finance. Given the fact that former finance minister Nhlanhla Nene seems to have moved on, it is likely that either Pravin Gordhan or his then deputy Mcebesi Jonas will be invited back.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa needs to turns his narrow victory into a positive outcome. And he must convince non-voting ANC supporters who abandoned the ANC under Zuma to return to the fold of the governing party in 2019. </p>
<p>It will also depend on legal processes – such as the various probes into corruption and state capture – to strip out the internal contradictions within the top leadership of the ANC.</p>
<p>Long term voting trends indicate declining support for the ANC and as things stand, a divided ANC remains a plump target for opposition parties. It could see support decline from its current 62% nationally by around 10 percentage points in 2019 if that trend is not reversed. The impact of these developments were set out in a recent book <a href="http://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/fate-of-the-nation-detail?Itemid=6">Fate of the Nation</a> that included political and economic scenarios to 2034.</p>
<p>A more positive party future requires the ANC to rapidly rediscover its unity although this seems unlikely in the short term. And here is the nub – as much as the traditionalist faction is associated with corruption and state capture, it also represents a strong ideological current that could still derail the party and even lead to it splintering. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has been dealt a weak hand but he has proven to be a consummate strategist. The next few days and weeks will be crucial and are likely to determine South Africa’s future for several years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jakkie Cilliers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Jacob Zuma shouldn’t be allowed to detract from the momentum that Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president of the ruling ANC, has started to build.Jakkie Cilliers, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/896602018-01-04T13:16:20Z2018-01-04T13:16:20ZTo lead South Africa, Ramaphosa must balance populism and pragmatism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200779/original/file-20180104-26163-1w66w78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, newly elected president of South Africa's governing ANC, during his maiden address.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Maiden speeches are tricky. They only come once. The one delivered in South Africa by newly-elected president of the African National Congress (ANC) Cyril Ramaphosa required extraordinary ingenuity. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa had to knit together multiple dynamics into a coherent whole. He managed to do this, delivering a <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/news/politics/read-ramaphosas-full-maiden-speech-as-anc-president/">speech</a> which largely resonated with the delegates. His maiden address to the party, at the end of its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54 National Conference</a>, was shaped by the context of a narrow victory following a fierce and highly polarised contest in a factionalised organisation. A necessary aspect of his leadership was therefore to unite the ANC for a new beginning in a way that didn’t rock the boat. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s maiden speech showed he might indeed be the leader South Africa has been waiting for. Its power lay in its simplicity and ordinariness. Measured, but forthright, he touched on many policies that were approved by the conference. These included a raft of resolutions that tried to give meaning to the goal of achieving <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-odd-meaning-of-radical-economic-transformation-in-south-africa-73003">“radical socio-economic transformation”</a>. Two policy initiatives in particular set the cat among the pigeons: <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/Special-Report/ANC_Conference/anc-decides-on-expropriation-of-land-without-compensation-20171221">land redistribution </a> without compensation and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-20-anc-conference-wants-swift-implementation-of-free-education/">fee-free higher education</a>. </p>
<p>These are policy extremes with far-reaching implications for the economy, and that could easily create distress. They require exceptional leadership, a sense of ingenuity and dexterity, both at party and state levels – lest recklessness sully policy intentions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa struck the right note as he thanked delegates for electing him. But the real test of his leadership will lie in how he walks the tightrope between populism and pragmatism, and his ability to make his incongruous leadership team share his vision and approach.</p>
<h2>Corruption</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa did not shy away from the elephant in the room – corruption. But will he be able to take decisive action given the permutations of the motley crew of the ANC’s top leaderhip team as well as those chosen to serve on its national executive committee? These two outcomes may in fact have made his presidential victory Pyrrhic. </p>
<p>The power dynamics in the national executive committee – the party’s highest decision making body between national conferences – will come to the fore as soon as Ramaphosa moves to act against those implicated in a report – called <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">State of Capture</a> – produced by Thuli Madonsela, the country’s former public protector.</p>
<p>The trickiest issue will be what to do about Jacob Zuma who remains president of the country even though his term as ANC president has ended. This means that South Africa faces a gridlock as the two “centres of power” – Ramaphosa as head of the ANC and Zuma as head of the country – vie for power.</p>
<p>There are many in the country who want the ANC to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-21-anc-stalwarts-call-on-partys-new-leadership-to-recall-jacob-zuma/">“recall”</a> Zuma as president of the republic. There are a number of understandable reasons for this, over above the two-centres of power problem. </p>
<p>Chief among them relate to various court judgements against him. One of the latest was a decision by the North Gauteng High Court to dismiss his application for the review of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">State of Capture Report</a>. It also ordered Zuma to comply with the remedial action set out in the report. </p>
<p>Zuma is appealing the court’s decision. This runs against the wishes of the ANC conference which called for Zuma to institute a judicial commission of inquiry, as recommended by the public protector. </p>
<p>How the ANC deals with this will determine whether Ramaphosa meant what he said when he <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/news/politics/read-ramaphosas-full-maiden-speech-as-anc-president/">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The people of South Africa want action. They do not want words.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Land and fee-free higher education</h2>
<p>On policy issues, the speech tried to moderate populism with a semblance of pragmatism. A caveat that the ANC’s new policy on land reform shouldn’t compromise food security and destroy financial markets, and that its implications on property rights should be adroitly managed, exemplifies this. </p>
<p>In politics, populism is as important as pragmatism. As American anthroposopher Joel Wendt put it, populism is <a href="http://ipwebdev.com/hermit/pgplt.html">“rooted in the people”</a>, and therefore gives legitimacy to a political system. It is sustained by pragmatism, especially at the level of policy implementation. </p>
<p>It appears that, as his speech showed, Ramaphosa’s leadership of the ANC’s newly-found radicalism is going to be that of <a href="http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4152&content=flr">pragmatic populism</a> – the ability to manage expectations generated by populist policy posturing to recapture waning electoral support, with extraordinary care not to destroy the sources of revenue necessary to sustain the state.</p>
<p>But this will be a huge challenge, particularly when it comes to delivering on the promise of fee-free higher education. At issue is the haste with which Zuma announced the new policy on the eve of the ANC’s elective conference, sparking suspicion that it was intended to influence the outcome of the race for the presidency in favour of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, his anointed candidate. </p>
<p>Zuma’s announcement sent the higher education sector into a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-12-19-zumas-fee-free-education-does-not-tackle-fees-must-fall/">tailspin</a> and caught the National Treasury <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-13-top-treasury-official-quits-in-row-over-free-tertiary-education/">off-guard </a> as no discussions had been had about how to fund it. </p>
<p>Fee-free higher education is a poisoned chalice for Ramaphosa. It is already being used by opposition parties for <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/higher-education-minister-mkhize-slams-malema">political opportunism</a> on campuses. And uncertainties about its administration are likely to be blown out of proportion to spark disruptions. </p>
<p>Zuma’s hasty pronouncement on this politically charged and emotive issue is going to be the first test of Ramaphosa’s mastery of the art of managing the confluence between populism and pragmatism, not as binary opposites, but as elements of the same policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding previously from the National Research Foundation. He is affiliated to the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM). He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Free university education and land redistribution without compensation have far-reaching implications for South Africa’s economy, and requires exceptional leadership.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894562017-12-20T12:59:23Z2017-12-20T12:59:23ZWho is Cyril Ramaphosa? A profile of the new leader of South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200161/original/file-20171220-4997-jb39at.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa moments before winning.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Cornell Tukiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has a new president – <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/cyril-ramaphosa-to-shake-up-cabinet-13315934">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. But who is he?</p>
<p><a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/biography-a-memoir/cyril-ramaphosa-revised-detail">Ramaphosa</a> cuts a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/ramaphosas-first-address-as-anc-president-read-the-full-speech-20171221">fitting figure</a> to take over government, stabilise the economy, and secure the constitutional architecture that he helped create at the end of apartheid. </p>
<p>But to expect more would be expecting too much. He is unlikely to veer far from the traditional economic path chosen by the ANC. </p>
<p>There are some important features we can draw on to make some conjectures about the man.</p>
<h2>The early days</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa was born in Johannesburg, the industrial heartland of South Africa, on <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">November 17, 1952</a>. The second of three children, his father was a policeman. He grew up in Soweto where he attended primary and high school. He later went to Mphaphuli High School in Sibasa, Limpopo, were he was elected <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201712040357.html">head of the Student Christian Movement</a> soon after his arrival, attesting to his Christian beliefs. </p>
<p>He studied law at the then University of the North (Turfloop), where he became active in the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-student-organisation-saso">South African Students Organisation</a>, which was aligned to <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/definition-black-consciousness-bantu-stephen-biko-december-1971-south-africa">black consciousness ideology</a> espoused by Steve Biko. He became active in the University Student Christian Movement, which was steeped in the <a href="http://www.hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/article/view/3176/html">liberation black theology</a> of the black consciousness movement.</p>
<p>After graduating with a degree in law, Ramaphosa continued his political activism through the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/black-people%E2%80%99s-convention-bpc">Black People’s Convention</a>, for which he was jailed for six months. He went on to serve articles and joined the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/council-unions-south-africa-cusa-formed">Council of Trade Unions of South Africa</a> which was to form the <a href="http://num.org.za/">National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)</a> with Ramaphosa as its first secretary general. He helped built the NUM into the largest trade union in the country, serving as its secretary general for just over 10 years.</p>
<h2>Business and politics</h2>
<p>His prominence and public stature grew even more when he was elected secretary general of the ANC in 1991. He went on to play a key role during South Africa’s transition, becoming one of the key architects of the country’s constitutional democracy.</p>
<p>Under the auspices of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">(Codesa)</a>, he became the ANC’s lead negotiator during negotiations on a post-apartheid arrangement. </p>
<p>Following this, <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/conversation-on-the-constitution">he</a> led the ANC team in drawing up a new constitution for the country. It is now considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20170320/281870118256239">world</a>. </p>
<p>In 1994 Ramaphosa lost the contest to become <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-11-11-how-ramaphosa-nearly-became-nelson-mandelas-deputy/">President Nelson Mandela’s deputy</a>. Having Thabo Mbeki appointed instead was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/20/cyril-ramaphosa-return-nelson-mandela">blow</a>, but persuaded by Mandela, Ramaphosa went into business. </p>
<p>For the next two decades Ramaphosa put his energies into building a large investment holding company <a href="http://www.phembani.com/index.php/history-of-shanduka/">Shanduka</a> with interests in sectors ranging from mining to fast foods. The success of the group confirmed his reputation as a skilled dealmaker and negotiator. </p>
<p>During this 20-year period in business, Ramaphosa established deep links in the private sector in South Africa. </p>
<p>This set him at odds with sections of the ANC which believe that the post-apartheid arrangements delivered political power, but not economic freedom. These voices have become louder under President Jacob Zuma’s presidency with called for <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/251821/so-what-exactly-is-radical-economic-transformation">radical economic transformation</a> and action to tackle <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">white monopoly capital</a>.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa will have his work cut out for him as he tries to accommodate these demands by driving a more inclusive social compact in the country while simultaneously trying to manage rampant corruption in the private and public sectors.</p>
<h2>Road to presidency</h2>
<p>Even during his years in business Ramaphosa remained close to the ANC, serving as a member of the national disciplinary committee. </p>
<p>But he made his major comeback onto the political scene at the ANC’s 2012 elective conference in Mangaung, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ramaphosa-new-anc-deputy-president-1442300">Bloemfontein</a> where he was elected deputy president of the ANC, and later of the country. </p>
<p>Two years prior to this Ramaphosa became deputy chairman of the state-run <a href="https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/governance/developmentnews/ramaphosa-unpacks-the-ndp">National Planning Commission</a>. He presided over its <a href="http://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/Pages/Diagnostic-Report.aspx">diagnostic report,</a> which set out the problems facing the country in clear terms. A plan was drawn up to provide answers to the challenges identified in report. Known as the <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a>, it was tabled as a blue print for the type of society South Africa could become. </p>
<p>The plan showed Ramaphosa’s strengths as an architect of social compacts. </p>
<p>Since its tabling the plan has been left to gather dust. But it remains a point of reference, and serves as a counterpoint to calls for radical economic transformation.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa is likely to emphasise stability – in government and the ANC. Given his history he is likely to want to stabilise the economy rather than to pursue radical interventions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has a personal interest to secure a stabilising social compact akin to the one he negotiated in 1994 given developments that have left the country economically and socially weaker. These have included allegations that parts of the state have been taken over by corrupt civil servants and some private sector interests, high levels of unemployment and increasingly fractious public debates. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly during his campaign trail he moulded his image on the sanctity of the rule of law and on the dictum that social stability hinges on respect of the rule of law. </p>
<p>The big question mark over Ramaphosa is how effective he will be. Although he’s been the deputy president of the ANC and of the country for five years, some believe that his influence has been minimal and that he has not been able to imprint his leadership on the party – or the country. </p>
<p>Will he be able to impose his will on those he now leads? Ramaphosa will be presiding over officials who have big personalities and have enjoyed long periods of political power. They are used to leading, not following.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi received funding from the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p>Cyril Ramaphosa is likely to emphasise stability - in government and the ANC. Given his history he is likely to want to stabilise the economy rather than pursue radical interventions.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/892482017-12-18T17:03:17Z2017-12-18T17:03:17ZThe ANC has a new leader: but South Africa remains on a political precipice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199756/original/file-20171218-27554-19f1lki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president of South Africa's governing party, the ANC, and potentially the country's future president. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rumours that President Jacob Zuma has instructed the South African National Defence Force to draw up plans for implementing a <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1756940/sa-presidency-rejects-reports-of-state-of-emergency-regulations-draft/">state of emergency</a> may or may not be true. Nonetheless they are evidence of South Africa’s febrile political atmosphere.</p>
<p>But any assumption that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/anc-conference/anc54-breaking-ramaphosa-elected-anc-president-12453127">the election</a> of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> as the new leader of the African National Congress (ANC), after winning the race against Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, will place South Africa on an even keel are misplaced. Indeed, the drama may only be beginning.</p>
<p>It’s useful to look back to 2007 when President Thabo Mbeki unwisely ran for a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/i-asked-mbeki-to-stand-for-a-third-term-to-stop-zuma-kasrils-20171108">third term as ANC leader</a>. His unpopularity among large segments of the party provided the platform for his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-sweeps-to-resounding-victory-20071218">defeat by Zuma</a> at Polokwane. Within a few months the National Executive Committee of the ANC latched onto an <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAKZHC/2008/71.html">excuse</a> to ask Mbeki to <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/thabo-mbeki-resigns-south-africa%E2%80%99s-second-democratic-president">stand down as president of the country</a> before the end of his term of office. Being committed to the traditions of party loyalty he complied, resigning as president some eight months before the Constitution required him to do so.</p>
<p>The question this raises is whether South Africa should now expect a repeat performance following the election of a new leader of the ANC. Will this lead to a party instruction to Zuma to stand down as president of the country? And if it does, will he do what Mbeki did and meekly resign?</p>
<p>There’s a big difference between the two scenarios: Mbeki had no reason to fear the consequences of leaving office. Zuma, on the other hand, has numerous reasons to cling to power. This is what makes him, and the immediate future, dangerous for South Africa, and suggests the country faces instability.</p>
<h2>Why Zuma won’t go</h2>
<p>It is not out of the question that Zuma may say to himself, and to South Africa, that he is not going anywhere. He is losing <a href="https://theconversation.com/dramatic-night-in-south-africa-leaves-president-hanging-on-by-a-thread-57180">court case</a> after <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21732538-judges-keep-finding-against-south-africas-embattled-president-jacob-zuma-loses-two">court case</a>, and judicial decisions are increasingly narrowing his legal capacity to block official and independent investigations into the extent of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/State-Capture">state capture</a> by business interests close to him.</p>
<p>With every passing day, the prospects of his finding himself in the dock, <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-783-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">facing 783 charges</a>, including of corruption and racketeering, also increase. </p>
<p>Zuma will have every constitutional right to defy an ANC instruction to stand down as state president until his term expires following the next <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/newsmaker-2019-elections-results-will-be-credible-20171015-2">general election in 2019</a>, and the new parliament’s election of a new president. In terms of the <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2002/b16.pdf">South African Constitution</a>, his term of office will be brought to an early end only if parliament passes a vote of no confidence in his presidency, or votes that, for one reason or another, he is unfit for office.</p>
<p>But today’s ANC is so divided that it cannot be assumed that a majority of ANC MPs would <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-happening-inside-the-anc-not-parliament-is-key-to-why-zuma-prevails-82399">back a motion of no confidence</a>, even following the election of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201712040357.html">Ramaphosa</a> as the party’s new leader. </p>
<p>In other words, there is a very real prospect that South Africa will see itself ruled for at least another 18 months or so by what is termed <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-27-anc-debates-two-centres-of-power">“two centres of power”</a>, with the authority and the legitimacy of the party (formally backing Ramaphosa) vying against that of the state (headed by Zuma).</p>
<h2>Throwing caution to the wind</h2>
<p>As if that is not a sufficient condition for political instability, we may expect that Zuma will continue to use his executive power to erect defences against his future prosecution. He will reckon to leave office only with guarantees of immunity. Until he gets them, Zuma will defy all blandishments to go. And if he does not get what he wants, he may throw caution to the wind and go for broke.</p>
<p>Hence, perhaps, the possibility that he is prepared to invoke a state of emergency.</p>
<p>The grounds for Zuma imposing a state of emergency would be specious, summoned up to defend his interests and those backing him. They would be likely to infer <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-mounts-on-south-africas-jacob-zuma-he-blames-an-old-enemy-western-intelligence-agencies-69599">foreign interference</a> in affairs of state, alongside suggestions that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/zuma-again-denounces-the-monopoly-of-white-economic-power-11988619">white monopoly capital</a>, whites as a whole as well as nefarious others were conspiring to prevent much needed <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-12-15-know-your-candidate-dlamini-zuma-beats-the-ret-drum/">radical economic transformation</a>. Present constitutional arrangements would be declared <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africans-should-be-worried-by-anc-talk-of-a-colour-revolution-87019">counter-revolutionary</a> and those defending them doing so only to protect their material interests. </p>
<p>After a matter of time, such justifications would probably be declared unconstitutional by the judiciary. It is then that there would be a confrontation between raw power and the Constitution. If such a situation should arise, we cannot be sure which would be the winner.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s army</h2>
<p>It is remarkable how little the searchlight that has focused on state capture has rested on the Defence Force. Much attention has been given to how the executive has effectively co-opted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-emails-ramaphosas-hypocrisy-on-spying-by-the-south-african-state-83605">intelligence</a> and <a href="http://www.ngopulse.org/article/2016/09/29/political-interference-weakening-rule-law-sa">prosecutorial service</a>, as well has how the top ranks of the police have been selected for political rather than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/africa/south-africa-police-commissioner-under-investigation-is-suspended.html">operational reasons</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to have been assumed that South Africa’s military is simply sitting in the background, observing political events from afar. But is it? Where would its loyalties lie in the event of a major constitutional crisis? </p>
<p>The danger of the present situation is that South Africa might be about to find out.</p>
<p>Were the military to throw its weight behind Zuma the country would be in no-man’s land. Of course, there would be a massive popular reaction, with the further danger that the president himself would summon his popular cohorts to <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-military-veterans-and-the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-76118">“defend the revolution”</a>. </p>
<p>And South Africans should not assume that Zuma would be politically isolated. Those who backed Dlamini-Zuma did so to defend their present positions and capacity to use office for personal gain. If they were to rise up, the army would then be elevated to the status of defender of civil order.</p>
<p>What is certain is that in such a wholly uncertain situation the economy would spiral downwards quickly. Capital would take flight at a faster rate than ever before, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10658">employment</a> would collapse even further, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334">poverty</a> would become even further entrenched. </p>
<h2>Reasons to be hopeful</h2>
<p>Is all this too extreme a scenario? Hopefully yes. There are numerous good reasons why such a fate will be averted. </p>
<p>Zuma’s control over the ANC is waning, as is his control over various state institutions, notably the National Prosecuting Authority. And the country has a checks and balances in place: there is a vigorous civil society, the judiciary has proved the Constitution’s main defence and trade unions and business remain influential. </p>
<p>Even so, it remains the case that what transpires now that the ANC’s national conference is over will determine the fate and future of our democracy. South Africa is approaching rough waters, and a Jacob Zuma facing an inglorious and humiliating end to his presidency will be a Jacob Zuma at his most dangerous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa’s ruling ANC has a new leader - Cyril Ramaphosa. But this doesn’t mean that the country is out of the woods. Political instability remains a real possibility.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893172017-12-18T13:15:42Z2017-12-18T13:15:42ZVintage Zuma delivers a vengeful swansong, devoid of any responsibility<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199689/original/file-20171218-27607-1xxomej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Jacob Zuma sings before his opening address at the 54th National Conference of the governing ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The hope was that in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-16-in-full--president-jacob-zumas-final-speech-as-anc-president/">opening</a> the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54th National Conference</a> of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma would rise to the occasion, seize the moment of his last address as party president with honesty and leave something worthy of history. For posterity to cherish.</p>
<p>It sounded as though he was taking the bull by the horns when he referred to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/jackson-mthembu-ending-slate-politics-cant-happen-like-instant-coffee-20151108">slate politics</a> as the function of ANC factionalism, which he acknowledged had fractured the governing party, including corrupting its systems and processes. Slate politics are the reason for internecine contests for leadership positions in the ANC, which, as he correctly pointed out, rob the ANC of good leadership.</p>
<p>But, in the end, his narcissistic streak shaped his swansong. It was largely couched in aspirational rather than diagnostic terms. For a political report of a leader whose 10-year tenure was coming to an end, it left much to be desired. </p>
<p>He claimed that he was leaving behind a stronger ANC, a statement he could only make if he’s suffering from delusions of grandeur, or because he’s indulging in self-gratification. Which ever it was, it exposed the dishonesty of the <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/anc-political-report-by-outgoing-president-jacob-zuma/">political report</a> he subsequently delivered, which was cluttered with rhetorical ploys and lacked a coherent theme for the august event. In truth, the divisions in the ANC are at their worst under him. So is its governing <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">Tripartite Alliance</a> - with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-communist-party-strips-the-anc-of-its-multi-class-ruling-party-status-88647">South African Communist Party</a> and labour federation <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-banned-from-speaking-at-cosatu-events-9300206">Cosatu</a> - that it leads.</p>
<h2>An attack on democracy</h2>
<p>Zuma missed the purpose of a valedictory address – to guide the future in the wake of leadership changes. Instead, he became vengeful, taking issue with what he termed ill-discipline in the organisation. Here he was referring to members who <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/just-in-anc-free-state-pec-several-branches-barred-from-attending-elective-conference-20171215">take the ANC to court</a> for violating its own constitution and processes. He suggested that they should be dismissed from the organisation immediately. </p>
<p>This is a strange way of dealing with issues, particularly for a president in a constitutional democracy who spent <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">half of his life</a> selflessly fighting for a more just system of organising society. The idea that someone’s membership of an organisation be immediately terminated when they take it to court to protect their rights is at variance with the principle of the supremacy of the constitution. </p>
<p>Zuma’s suggestion violates the right to external recourse for those aggrieved by internal organisational processes. That it’s even entertained by some in the leadership of the ANC demonstrates the extent of the crisis under Zuma. This is because ideas such as these pose a danger to the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/what-anc">foundational values</a> - of unity, non-racialism, non-sexism and democracy - as well as to the future of democracy in the country. That is because the ANC, despite its waning electoral performance, remains <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-has-remained-dominant-despite-shifts-in-support-base-63285">politically dominant</a>. Thus, what happens inside it ultimately affects the running of the country, hence it’s imperative <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-countrys-constitutional-court-can-consolidate-and-deepen-democracy-54184">internal party democracy</a> be entrenched in the ANC.</p>
<p>Had Zuma looked objectively and honestly into what led some members to take the ANC to court, his report would have perhaps managed to get to the core of the morass.</p>
<h2>Factional till the end</h2>
<p>Zuma also squandered the last opportunity he had to remove himself from petty factional politics of the ANC and assert himself as a unifier and a statesman. This was his chance to echo the voice of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/oliver-reginald-kaizana-tambo">Oliver Tambo</a>, the revered leader of the ANC who is attributed with holding the organisation together during its turbulent years as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">banned organisation</a>. </p>
<p>But he blew it by making a point of graciously thanking three senior members of the ANC who are leaders of the factions behind <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-03-anc-leadership-race-dlamini-zuma-supporters-in-battle-to-secure-the-final-prize-the-eastern-cape/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s presidential campaign</a>. These were the ANC Women’s League President <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/the-judiciary-carries-itself-as-if-its-being-lobbied-ancwl-president-20171209">Bathabile Dlamini</a>, ANC Youth’s League <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-16-maine-accuses-judges-of-seeking-to-influence-outcome-of-anc-conference/">Collen Maine</a>, and ANC military veterans leader <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-16-mkmva-boss-launches-scathing-attack-on-judiciary">Kebby Maphatsoe</a>.</p>
<p>On top of this, his political report lacked the valedictory message of hope for the future. It tinkered at the edges, and largely misrepresented the reality about the state of the ANC. Instead, he fanned the flames of revenge, particularly against those who have consistently tried to hold him accountable. </p>
<p>He made references to corruption, but deflected attention from his alleged implication in it. He set out to create the impression that South Africans are outraged only about corruption in the public sector, not what’s happening in the private sector. A veiled retort to those who have questioned his moral credentials and ethical leadership was that: if you don’t talk about corruption in the private sector, you shouldn’t talk about it in the public sector.</p>
<p>And rather than denouncing slate politics and factionalism, he stuck to lamenting their existence. I believe that the only reason he mentioned them at all was because they have led to splinter groups that have affected the ANC <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/news/read-its-been-an-honor-zumas-full-speech">“quantitatively and qualitatively”</a> . If slate politics hadn’t led to the current malaise, I doubt he would have made any reference to organisational maladies, which have in fact been spawned and sustained by his leadership over the past 10 years.</p>
<p>Zuma has bequeathed the ANC (and the country) a highly divided party, one that is factionalised and a threat to its own existence. Even when history gave him the opportunity to apologise for the mess his leadership has left the country in, the vintage Zuma didn’t want to take responsibility. </p>
<p>It is now left to those picking up the baton to take on the challenging task of returning the ANC to its foundational values of selflessness and service and its stature as a leader of society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from the National Research Foundation(NRF) for his post-graduate studies. He is a member of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM). He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Zuma’s last address to South Africa’s governing party, the ANC, as its president, betrayed his strange way of dealing with issues. He came across as delusional and self-indulgent.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/888202017-12-14T08:09:58Z2017-12-14T08:09:58ZSouth Africa needs electoral reform, but president’s powers need watching<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198518/original/file-20171211-27693-1jk3w15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa. There are renewed calls for citizens to directly elect their president and other representatives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Sumaya Hisham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within a short time, the 4000 odd delegates to South Africa’s governing African National Congress’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54th National Conference</a> will elect a new party leader. In turn – save death, disaster or unlikely electoral defeat – a parliament stuffed with an ANC majority will at some point elect that leader as the new <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-anc-presidential-elections-trump-south-africas-constitution-78553">President of South Africa</a>. The expectation is that this will be <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nkosazana-clarice-dlamini-zuma">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> or <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00057409.html">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. But, if the ANC elects a pig, the ANC parliamentary majority will vote for the pig.</p>
<p>Although it is by no means unusual for parliaments to elect countries’ political leaders, there is widespread complaint in South Africa that it is the small ANC elite which attends the conference that effectively selects the next president of the country. This, it is said by many, is undemocratic. </p>
<p>Two main reasons are cited. First, ANC electoral procedures are deeply corrupted by money <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mantashe-warns-anc-delegates-against-selling-their-votes-20171126">changing hands</a>, personal ambition and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/armed-guards-for-anc-factions-20171107">factionalism</a>. Second, it should be the people, not the party, which should be charged with electing the country’s leader.</p>
<p>It is therefore of considerable interest that, rather than emanating from civil society or another political party, the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/12/04/anc-gauteng-proposes-expansion-of-party-leadership">proposal</a> has been made by the ANC’s Gauteng provincial conference that consideration should be given to ordinary voters voting directly for presidents, premiers and mayors. This is of particular interest given that Gauteng is one of the ANC’s most powerful provinces, and at the same time, one which is often at odds with the party’s current leadership.</p>
<p>The proposal that the state president, provincial premiers and mayors be directly elected is a most welcome one, as there is much need to consider the quality of South Africa’s democracy, and to encourage public participation in decision-making. However, direct election of such offices simultaneously holds its risks.</p>
<h2>The electoral reform debate</h2>
<p>The debate about electoral reform in post-1994 South Africa has largely focused on the system used to elect MPs and their counterparts in the country’s nine provinces. The standard argument for a change was captured succinctly by ANC dissident and Umkhonto we Sizwe veteran <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-13-when-will-we-wake-up-and-reform-our-crooked-electoral-system/">Omry Makgoale</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When will we wake up and reform our crooked electoral system? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The argument is that the list proportional representation system results in the election of MPs who are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-20-sas-electoral-system-fails-the-people">accountable to party bosses</a> rather than voters. Such an outcome is rendered more certain by the fact that <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">South Africa’s constitution</a> lays down that MPs or provincial legislature representatives who leave or are ejected from their parties lose their seat in the relevant legislature, plus the handy salary that goes with it. To continue with the animalistic referencing, parties’ elected representatives become sheep, devoid of any capacity for independence.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential hopeful Nkosazana Dlamini-ZumaChairperson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Francois Lenoir</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such critiques often suggest (very sensibly) that the electoral system should become a mixed one which combines proportionality of outcomes with the direct election of representatives from constituencies. This was recommended in 2002 by the <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">Van Zyl Slabbert Commission</a> on electoral reform. But there has been relatively little debate about whether the President and premiers should be directly elected.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">survey</a> conducted on behalf of the Van Zyl Slabbert Commission indicated that 63% of respondents would have liked to vote for the president directly. This level of preference was pretty much the same across all racial groups. Given the disastrous nature of the Zuma presidency, it is very possible that the preference for direct election would be considerably higher if the issue was put to survey respondents today.</p>
<h2>Virtue of direction election</h2>
<p>The virtue of the direct election of key political leaders is said to be that it renders them directly accountable to voters rather than to their political parties. On the face of it, it is an attractive argument, and it is one which could usefully introduce more diversity into the South African political system.</p>
<p>If they wanted to maximise their vote, parties would have to look at the qualities of their candidates, and ask themselves whether they would appeal to the electorate as a whole. (On this reckoning, it is a dead cert that Cyril Ramaphosa would streak home and dry, rather than, as under the ANC’s present system, running neck and neck with his chief rival, whose popular appeal is that of a wet fish). This would mean that candidates would end up openly campaigning for the leadership, dispensing with the ANC’s absurd pretence that individuals should not demonstrate political ambition. </p>
<p>There is also the possibility that voters would elect a president from a party other than the one which enjoys a majority in the National Assembly. </p>
<p>Would direct election of the president, premiers and mayors be a good idea? And, if so, what system should be adopted?</p>
<p>The second question is easily answered. To avoid the election of a president who gains less than 50% of a popular vote but more than any other candidate, provision would wisely be made for a second round of a presidential election in which the top two candidates engage in a run off.</p>
<h2>A good idea?</h2>
<p>So would direction elections be a good idea? </p>
<p>Parliamentary systems work well because they devolve the election of prime ministers to the legislature. On the continent, countries that inherited a parliamentary system from Britain subsequently opted for elective presidencies. </p>
<p>The results are not unambiguously encouraging. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Kenya and Zambia, for instance, the direct election of presidents may have weakened the link between legislatures and executives. This has allowed executives to trample over legislatures, and for leaders to claim a legitimacy separate from that of their party. Presidents from <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2161868.stm">Daniel Arap Moi</a> through to <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2014/0210/Kenya-slides-toward-authoritarianism">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> in Kenya and from <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/africa/20chiluba.html">Frederick Chiluba</a> through to <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">Edgar Lungu</a> in Zambia have all proved exceedingly authoritarian.</p>
<p>It follows that changing the South African system to allow for direct election would require the country to look carefully at how a directly elected president should be rendered accountable to parliament. Would the change enhance the accountability of the government by empowering MPs, or would it render them increasingly irrelevant?</p>
<h2>Dangers of an all-powerful president</h2>
<p>It is also worth recalling that there is now much greater awareness about how much power is concentrated in the Presidency, in a way, it would seem, that the makers of the country’s constitution did not intend. Under Zuma, the presidency has a direct say in far too much, such as the right to appoint the head of a National Prosecuting Authority which might have the responsibility of calling him to legal account. </p>
<p>South Africans need to be wary of any change in the system which ends up making the President less – rather than more – accountable.</p>
<p>In any case, while there can be very good reasons for reforming an electoral system, this will not automatically result in better governance. Form can rarely trump substance. Robert Mugabe only “won” the Zimbabwean presidency in 2008 through his army and police terrorising the opposition and effectively forcing his rival, Morgan Tsvangirai, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2175377/Zimbabwe-Morgan-Tsvangirai-withdraws-from-poll-citing-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror.html">to withdraw</a>.</p>
<p>It will take more than a piecemeal change to South Africa’s constitution to improve it’s democracy. South Africans should be careful what they wish for, as they can never be quite sure what they will get.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88820/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Changing the South African system to allow for direct election would require the country to look carefully at how a directly elected president should be held accountable to parliament.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/888922017-12-10T11:26:21Z2017-12-10T11:26:21ZWhy talk of unity in South Africa’s ANC is disingenuous, and dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198317/original/file-20171208-27705-12qlydt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are calls for unity in the ANC an attempt to prevent Cyril Ramaphosa from cleaning out the stables if he wins the presidency.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is gripped by anxiety laced with anticipation as the much anticipated African National Congress (ANC) 54th <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-leadership-race-will-go-down-to-the-wire-heres-why-88667">elective conference</a> draws closer. All the country’s nine provinces have consolidated their leadership preferences for the ANC’s presidential race from the branches. But the question about who will emerge victorious remains difficult to answer as a neck and neck scenario emerges. </p>
<p>The conference has very important implications for the country’s future: the president of the ANC becomes the president of South Africa. Whoever leads the ANC determines the kind of leader the country will get, and what policy trajectory will be taken.</p>
<p>President Jacob Zuma has been the president of the ANC and the country for almost a decade now. His tenure has been marked by successive controversies, some of which led to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-jacob-zuma-is-fast-running-out-of-political-lives-80009">attempts to oust him</a>. All were foiled. He’s presided over the ANC’s declining <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/opinion/2017/12/04/justice-malala-zuma-unity-bad-joke/">electoral prospects</a>, South Africa’s downgrading by <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-25-global-credit-ratings-agency-has-downgraded-south-africa-to-junk-status">international rating agencies</a>, and allegations that he manoeuvred his allies into positions that allowed them to manipulate state tenders and even <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/how-jacob-zuma-conquered-the-anc-20171027">government appointments</a>. </p>
<p>In a few days, he will not be the president of the ANC any more. So, who is likely to succeed him? The frontrunners are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-03-00-ramaphosa-takes-an-early-lead-as-anc-branches-cast-their-vote">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-11-29-dlamini-zuma-endorsed-by-free-state-in-anc-leadership-race/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>. </p>
<p>The Premier of Mpumalanga, David Mabuza has thrown a spanner in the works. He has called for a vote for <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mabuza-sheds-light-on-unity-mystery-20171201">“unity”</a>, suggesting that no particular candidate should be backed unless they agree on a unity ticket. </p>
<p>Mabuza’s call makes predictions about the conference impossible because the province he leads commands the party’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-06-mpumalanga-now-second-biggest-voting-bloc-in-anc/">second biggest membership</a> after <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-26-anc-leadership-race-kwazulu-natal-a-province-waiting-to-exhale/#.WiqoyFWWbIU">KwaZulu-Natal</a>.</p>
<p>I believe that the “unity” narrative feigns a solution to what is not a problem, but a manifestation of it. “Consensus leadership” – which the “unity” narrative wants to be the outcome of the elective conference – fudges internal organisational democracy. The absurdity is that if it was allowed, it could mutate into a political system where people’s choice doesn’t matter, while leadership is simply imposed. This is where and how dictatorship starts.</p>
<h2>More about power elites sharing the spoils</h2>
<p>Branches in Mpumalanga <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-12-01-anc-delegates-vote-with-their-abstentions-for-unity-in-mpumalanga/">have already voted</a>. The tally shows that 223 supported the “unity” approach which under the ANC’s electoral process these will be considered abstentions. </p>
<p>But Mabuza’s stunt to cajole for a non-contest doesn’t make him a kingmaker, or show that he’s mastered the art of brinksmanship. If anything, the ploy has weakened his position in the presidential race because the province he leads isn’t unanimously behind this particular manoeuvre. </p>
<p>In any case, what exactly is the “unity” that Mabuza says he’s vehemently pursuing? Is it really about uniting the ANC? Why doesn’t it rhyme with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-15-is-zweli-mkhize-ancs-plan-b-if-dlamini-zumas-campaign-collapses/">Zweli Mkhize’s campaign</a> – he’s one of the other presidential hopefuls – framed around the same concept? How does it relate to the ANC’s <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/2001/eye-needle.htm">Through the Eye of the Needle</a> report, where the attributes of the leadership of the party are defined? </p>
<p>Why does it appeal largely to those who perfected the politics of the slate which determines their positions in the party and state, those with a cloud hanging over their heads? How is it to, anyway, play itself out in the presidential race? Is it to take the form of horse-trading? If so, how does it differ from Zuma’s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/deshnee-subramany/president-jacob-zumas-opening-address-at-ancs-5th-national-pol_a_23009668/">remarks</a> at the end of the ANC’s 5th policy conference, that whoever loses the race for the presidency of the party should automatically become the deputy president? </p>
<p>Aren’t these all inventions of the same logic, essentially seeking power-sharing deals, which are about the political elites trying to accommodate each other in the leadership positions? The unity narrative is a facade. If anything, it institutionalises the very phenomenon it seeks to expunge from the ANC: slate politics.</p>
<p>Contest for the leadership positions is part of the democratic process. It only becomes a problem when sullied by slates, which are the function of factionalism. </p>
<h2>Unity issue misses the point</h2>
<p>Talk about “unity” and “consensus leadership” misses the point. It’s deflecting attention from the fact that the ANC is atrophying. The contest for the leadership of the ANC is in fact about proximity to state resources, not restoring its foundational value. As Senator William Marcy <a href="http://www.bartleby.com/73/1314.html">put it</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>To the victor belong the spoils. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/ramaphosa-criticises-abuse-of-resources">talks tough</a> against this. He doesn’t mince words. During his campaign he has consistently critiqued the status quo and unambiguously taken a stand against corruption. This is a good start for the ANC’s redemption. He insists that a commission of inquiry into state capture should be established, as recommended in the public protector’s report. This implicates Zuma and the coterie that makes up his oligarchy. It’s a move that’s ruffled feathers and unsettled those who have been shielded from being pursued for allegedly bagging ill-gotten gains from the state. </p>
<p>What’s disturbing is that the “unity” narrative could easily be a ploy to preempt Ramaphosa’s presidency, contriving to ensure that if he succeeds he will be entrapped in the consensus leadership arrangements. This would emasculate his vigour in pursuing those alleged to have looted the state.</p>
<p>Another possibility is that it’s being used to co-opt those with a sense of ethics into the company of those who are ethically compromised so that they could all look the same. </p>
<p>However, the questions around the call for “unity” are answered, it’s important to remember that when the ethical edifice collapses, society becomes the victim of the leadership of scoundrels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88892/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule receives funding from National Research Foundation for my postgraduate studies. I am a member of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM), including being a chief editor of its journal.</span></em></p>The ANC’s elective conference has very important implications for South Africa’s future. Whoever leads determines the kind of leader the country will get, and what policy trajectory will be taken.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/886672017-12-06T07:35:13Z2017-12-06T07:35:13ZThe ANC leadership race will go down to the wire: here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197828/original/file-20171205-22989-1mfx9qu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Jacob Zuma, with presidential contenders Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The suspense is tangible as the African National Congress (ANC) – South Africa’s former liberation movement that’s turned into a tired governing party – approaches its fiercely contested <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">2017 elective conference</a>. </p>
<p>By December 5, the party’s branches had largely spoken, and its provincial structures had consolidated the branch delegates’ voting preferences. The lay of the land seemed clear. Yet, on close dissection it’s evident that <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focus-areas/black-holes">developments</a> could still subvert what appeared to be definitive trends in branch nominations.</p>
<p>Less than two weeks prior to <a href="http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-nomination-process-2017-10-02">ballots being cast</a> at the <a href="http://www.jhblive.com/Places-in-Johannesburg/outdoor-activities/nasrec-expo-centre/5552">Nasrec Expo Centre</a> in Johannesburg, the contest is closer than both the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/52nd-national-conference-polokwane">Polokwane race of 2007</a>, (when Jacob Zuma beat Thabo Mbeki) and <a href="http://www.actsa.org/newsroom/2012/12/anc-mangaung-conference-election-results/">2012 in Mangaung</a> (when Zuma beat then deputy Kgalema Motlanthe).</p>
<p>The branch nominations have confirmed that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-anc/south-africas-ramaphosa-gets-most-nominations-ahead-of-anc-leadership-vote-idUSKBN1DY2LD">two leading 2017 candidates</a> for the ANC presidency are <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nkosazana-clarice-dlamini-zuma">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>. While Ramaphosa <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-04-ramaphosa-emerges-as-frontrunner-in-anc-presidential-race?utm_source=Mail+%26+Guardian&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily+newsletter&utm_term=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2017-12-04-ramaphosa-emerges-as-frontrunner-in-anc-presidential-race">has a lead</a>, the intricacies of the election process caution against early celebrations: there are black holes that could still devour the advantages he appears to have.</p>
<h2>The voting</h2>
<p>The voters at the ANC conferences comprise roughly of 90% delegates from <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/constitution-anc">ANC branches</a> across the nine provinces. Provinces had been allocated a total of 4,731 delegates (proportionately in terms of membership figures). The rest of the about 5,240 <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-14-anc-leadership-will-be-decided-by-5240-delegates/">voting delegates</a> come from the ANC’s national executive committee and top six officials (roughly 90 in total). The nine provincial executive committees (27 each, thus 243), the women’s, youth and veterans’ leagues <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/04/ancs-leagues-will-each-send-60-delegates-to-conference-reveals-mantashe_a_23296292/">(60 each, thus 180)</a>.</p>
<p>The number of branches endorsing Ramaphosa by the evening of December 4 were 1,860 and Dlamini-Zuma 1,333. A total of 3,193 for both candidates, or around 2,000 fewer than the total number of conference voters. </p>
<p>Given that the race will go down to the wire, and that a few hundred ballots in either direction could make a world of difference to the ANC and South Africa, this analysis dissects eight black holes that account for the approximately 2,000 “discrepancy”.</p>
<h2>Uncertainties</h2>
<p>At the core, the uncertainties that make up the eight black holes are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The scores released by the ANC’s Provincial General Councils have a “margin of error”. This is because the scores are of branches and not individual delegates. But big branches send more than one delegate and are given more weighting in the voting. This can substantially change the balance between leading candidates come the election. </p></li>
<li><p>Mpumalanga province brings its own black box of 223 “unity” votes. The biggest bloc of branches refused to endorse a particular candidate and entered ‘unity’ on nomination forms, following the instruction of provincial leader DD Mabuza. These votes can therefore go to either leading candidate should the delegates cast their vote rather than waste it.</p></li>
<li><p>A further uncertainty comes in the exact number of branches that have missed the deadline for their branch general meetings. The deadline for convening these was a week ago. Missing the deadline means they have missed the opportunity to be represented at the conference. The ANC in an interview with the author estimated that between 95-98% made the target date. Exclusions will lower the number of delegates.</p></li>
<li><p>A number of branches are caught up in disputes. Challenges centre on the lack of legality of the branch general meetings, some of which have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-anc/south-africas-ramaphosa-gets-most-nominations-ahead-of-anc-leadership-vote-idUSKBN1DY2LD">chaotic</a>. Some battled to reach quorums (50% of members had to be present), or they faked quorums. In other instances officials disappeared with meeting materials and memberships lists, attendance registers were signed off-site, or bickering and fist-fights ruled. These branch delegates could still make it into the voting booths at the conference if the ANC task teams resolve the disputes.</p></li>
<li><p>A number of branches and provincial structures have taken their disputes <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-10-02-how-courts-hands-are-full-with-anc-disputes/">to court</a>. Prominent cases are in KwaZulu-Natal, Free State and the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/30/analysis-stephen-grootes-road-to-anc-conference-may-be-ruined-by-dispute-and-confusion">Eastern Cape</a>. The national conference does not ultimately depend on the provincial structures, but provincial leaders may have influenced their branch-based underlings substantially, or have covered up irregularities that affected whom the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-10-11-more-anc-legal-woes">branches nominated</a>. Disputes at the time of conference could exclude some <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-18-00-concourt-ancs-free-state-decision-irregular">from voting</a>, or having their votes counted.</p></li>
<li><p>The ballots of individual delegates are secret and it’s therefore uncertain to what extent branch nominations will convert into matching votes. Prior conference outcomes show that the branch or provincial counts tended to hold: delegates are inclined to vote according to their mandates. But, political times have changed. Beyond the scrutiny of the superiors and away from branch commissars, delegates might vote according to <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1637193/anc-delegates-must-vote-with-their-conscience-at-december-elective-conference-says-mchunu/">“conscience”</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Hand-in-hand with individual discretion in the voting act is the practice of <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mantashe-warns-anc-delegates-against-selling-their-votes-20171126">“brown envelopes”</a>, or bribes. Speculation is that the bribes could be enormously persuasive, going into six-figure rewards for the right vote. </p></li>
<li><p>The final big uncertainty comes <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/04/ancs-leagues-will-each-send-60-delegates-to-conference-reveals-mantashe_a_23296292/">via the three leagues</a> - for women, youth and veterans - and the ANC’s executive structures. The large block of around 90 NEC and top-six votes, for example, could split relatively equally between the big candidates. It is this block that has kept Zuma in power through a series of votes in the National Executive Committee, and interventions in parliamentary votes. But, they could by now see that the writing is on the wall given that Zuma will cede his position as head of the party in two weeks time, and his post as head of state in 2019.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Hard to call</h2>
<p>The battle lines are drawn and the result is close. Exact calculations will remain impossible; the result is likely to be known by 17 or 18 December. In the interim, all South Africans can do is rely on circumstantial evidence, including signs of confidence or panic in the ranks of the candidates. They can also try and plug the black holes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Booysen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The race for the presidency of South Africa’s governing ANC will go down to the wire. Exact calculations for the frontrunners are impossible and the result is likely to be known by 17 or 18 December.Susan Booysen, Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/884042017-12-05T08:54:13Z2017-12-05T08:54:13ZSnags that could cast doubt on ANC’s choice of new leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197139/original/file-20171130-30919-kk4cjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's governing African National Congress has begun the process of choosing its leaders.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) holds its highly contested national elective conference for its top six leaders, between <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/splash/index">December 16 – 20</a>. The conference will, among other things, mark the end of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma’s</a> <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ancs-nec-must-quit-20161023-2">controversial decade-long tenure</a> as party president. It will also bring to an end a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-11-18-its-gloves-off-in-the-anc-leadership-race-after-ndz-snubs-cyrils-overture/">bruising contest</a> to replace him. The top two contenders are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-03-00-ramaphosa-takes-an-early-lead-as-anc-branches-cast-their-vote">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-11-29-dlamini-zuma-endorsed-by-free-state-in-anc-leadership-race/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>. The Conversation Africa’s Politics and Society Editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked Keith Gottschalk about the process.</em> </p>
<p><strong>Why does the conference matter?</strong></p>
<p>The elective conference is important for the party as well as the country. This is because the person chosen to lead the party has, since 1994, gone on to become president of the country – an outcome dictated by the fact that the parliament elects the next president and the ANC has a large majority in parliament. The outcome is therefore watched very closely by both South Africans who support the ANC and those who don’t.</p>
<p><strong>How does the ANC choose its top leaders?</strong></p>
<p>The ANC’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/docs/NEC-Nomination-Process.pdf">election process</a> is full of extraordinary contradictions. It has built into it some of the most stringent checks and balances of any party in the world. On paper, the process could not be more fair. In practice either incompetence or manipulation causes much anger.</p>
<p>The party holds an elective conference every five years. According to the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/constitution-anc">ANC rules</a>, 90% of the delegates to the conference must be from party branches. Each branch in good standing is entitled to send one delegate, and if a branch has more than 250 delegates it is allowed to send one extra delegate per 250 extra members.</p>
<p>The additional 10% of delegates is made up of representatives from each provincial executive, delegates representing the women, youth and veterans leagues as well as members of the party’s National Executive Committee who attend in an ex officio capacity. </p>
<p>Before the conference ANC members are required to take part in a specially convened annual general meeting of their branch. There are over 2 000 branches in good standing. To be able to vote at this special AGM members have to have their ANC membership card as well as their South African national identity document.</p>
<p><strong>What checks and balances are in place to make sure the process is fair?</strong></p>
<p>Voting at the branch AGMs is monitored by trusted veterans chosen by the Provincial Executive Committee who are deployed to monitor the process. </p>
<p>Voting usually takes place by show of hands, but may be done by secret ballot. The team monitoring the process must take a picture of results of voting recorded on paper using their cellphones and send the image to the party’s national headquarters at <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/contacts">Luthuli House</a>, in Johannesburg. This is to prevent ballot results being tampered with.</p>
<p><strong>What are the flaws in the system?</strong></p>
<p>I believe the process is fair. But it would be fairer if there was a direct one-member-one-vote system instead of branch totals. </p>
<p>The flaws in the system relate to the extent to which rigging can take place. This can happen by wealthy politicians setting up ghost branches. Provincial executive committees also sometimes try to manipulate the outcome of the branch AGMs. This can happen through manipulating who <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/kzn-anc-rebels-lash-out-at-leaders-20171106">gets chosen to represent the branch</a> as a delegate to the national conference.</p>
<p>But the biggest opening to possible fraud is through using the issuing of ANC membership cards to “gatekeep” – stopping people from being able to vote in branches, or even from attending the conference. Membership cards, and being included on the membership list compiled by Luthuli House, national HQ (as opposed to lists kept by one’s own branch and provincial office) matter because they give individuals the right to vote at their branches, as well as at the conference if they’re chosen to go as a delegate.</p>
<p>During the last few conferences there were accusations that the Zuma faction of the ANC deliberately used the fact that renewals and new cards can take a very long time to issue to keep certain people from attending (and voting). </p>
<p>The issuing of cards is a mess. New members complain bitterly about waiting inordinately long periods - sometimes up to 21 months - to get their membership cards. Renewals can also take forever. The renewal of the late ANC former cabinet minister Kader Asmal’s membership card reached his widow five years after he died.</p>
<p>Sometimes, some members in good standing suddenly discover that their names have been removed from the membership register. The most high profile of these cases was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/zweli-mkhizes-name-not-on-branch-voters-roll-11891535">Zweli Mkhize</a>, the party’s treasurer and one of its top six leaders. </p>
<p>Five years ago an example of gatekeeping hit one branch’s delegate when he arrived at the national conference at Mangaung. He was told he was not a member in good standing. He was in fact an ANC Member of the Provincial Legislature. Only after votes were cast which saw Jacob Zuma re-emerge as party president was it conceded that he was actually a member in good standing.</p>
<p>Another potential flaw is that delegates who are mandated by their branch to vote for one particular candidate are persuaded – for example by being bribed when they get to the conference – to vote for someone else. </p>
<p>Voting at the conference is by secret ballot. The assumption is that branch delegates will behave with integrity and vote for the person their branch mandated them to vote for. </p>
<p>But even if they do accept a bribe, those reportedly offering <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-23-cyril-ramaphosa-leads-but-foul-play-may-snatch-victory">the bribe</a> have no way of knowing if the delegate actually did change his or her vote.</p>
<p>South Africans, especially ANC voters, will be watching closely for any signs of rigging, bribing branch delegates to switch their votes, and other manipulations. If all is free and fair the process certainly equals, for example, the degree of democracy in UK and US parties choosing their leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The ANC’s elective conference is important for the party and South Africa. This is because the person chosen to lead the governing party since 1994, has gone on to become president.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.