tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/brazilian-politics-40721/articlesBrazilian politics – The Conversation2022-09-27T12:27:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1908722022-09-27T12:27:36Z2022-09-27T12:27:36ZBrazil’s election goes beyond a battle between left and right – democracy is also on the ballot<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486339/original/file-20220923-15103-2lru93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C2%2C1466%2C994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Winds of change in Brazil, or an ill breeze?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-by-flags-of-presidential-candidates-luiz-inacio-news-photo/1243393711?adppopup=true">Gustavo Minas/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two very different Brazils could emerge after voters go the polls to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62981625">elect a president</a> on Oct. 2, 2022.</p>
<p>In one scenario, Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/15/brazil-bolsonaro-threatens-democratic-rule">current president</a>, will manage to stay in power – by either winning the vote or <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-institutions-ready-confront-bolsonaro-if-he-contests-election-result-2022-09-19/">illegally ignoring it</a> – and continue to push the country down an authoritarian road.</p>
<p>Alternately, the country will begin the process of rebuilding its democratic institutions, which have been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2021-11-01/democracy-dying-brazil">undermined during Bolsonaro’s four years</a> in power. That project will be the task of a broad center-left coalition led by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/18/lula-presidential-return-brazil-polls-banish-bolsonaro">former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</a> of the Workers Party.</p>
<p>As experts on <a href="https://liberalarts.du.edu/about/people/rafael-r-ioris">Brazilian politics</a> and <a href="https://www.bu.edu/history/profile/jeffrey-w-rubin/">modern Latin American history</a>, we have studied Brazil from the ground up. Seen from afar, the dynamics playing out in the Brazilian election are a clear example of the broader crisis of liberal democracy, with <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule">right-wing authoritarians in ascent globally</a>. But the high-stakes choice confronting Brazilians in this election has also been shaped by complicated social and political experiences unique to Brazil.</p>
<h2>Whatever happened to the ‘pink tide’?</h2>
<p>In the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil led a regionwide “<a href="https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-8-venezuela/moments-in-venezuelan-history/the-pink-tide-in-latin-america/">pink tide</a>” in which Latin America, governed largely by leftist presidents, experienced unprecedented levels of inclusive growth through democratic politics. Lula’s economic and welfare policies, for example, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2017/07/16/537509429/the-next-step-for-brazils-lula">brought 30 million people out of poverty</a> and provided lower-income, mostly nonwhite Brazilians with new opportunities for upward mobility.</p>
<p>After 2012, however, as Brazil’s economy slowed, traditional elites mobilized in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-rousseff-protests-idUSKBN0MB0WJ20150316">order to resist</a> this progressive path. Their efforts gained ground with an explosive corruption scandal, called “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/03/09/what-did-lava-jato-brazils-anti-corruption-investigation-achieve">Lava Jato</a>,” or “Car Wash.” Though politicians across the spectrum were implicated, the operation targeted the Workers Party in particular and generated widespread anger toward the party.</p>
<p>Subsequent anti-left sentiment, led by <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/americas/brazil-protests-favelas/index.html">privileged groups</a> and deftly managed through social media campaigns, grew to include <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/americas/brazil-protests-favelas/index.html">voters across</a> the economic and political spectrum. This provided a perfect opening for Bolsonaro, a former military captain and undistinguished congressman, to seize right-wing momentum. Building on the deepened polarization generated by the <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/international-tribunal-declares-impeachment-of-brazils-dilma-rousseff-an-illegitimate-coup/">illegitimate impeachment of Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff</a>, Bolsonaro rebranded himself as an outsider poised to overturn a corrupt political establishment.</p>
<p>Bolsonaro, much like Donald Trump in the U.S. two years earlier, won 2018 elections by combining masterful spectacle with derogatory language. Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric was explicitly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/brazilian-women-against-jair-bolosonaro-misogynist-far-right-candidate">sexist</a>, <a href="http://monitoracism.eu/the-rise-of-bolsorano/">anti-Black</a> and <a href="https://www.glaad.org/blog/president-trump-normalizes-dangerous-anti-lgbtq-record-brazilian-president-jair-bolsonaro">anti-LGBTQ</a>. His victory was also tied to the fact that Lula, the front-runner then as now, was arrested on trumped-up charges and prevented from competing. </p>
<h2>Repositioning Lula</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/08/lula-brazil-released-prison-supreme-court-ruling">overturning of Lula’s corruption conviction</a> in 2021 repositioned him as the most viable opposition candidate for the presidency, and he has <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/brazil-2022">consistently led Bolsonaro</a> in the polls.</p>
<p>And while Lula is running as a leftist, he is perhaps more accurately seen in this election as the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/what-to-know-about-bolsonaro-lula-showdown-in-brazil/2022/07/29/31dc208c-0ef7-11ed-88e8-c58dc3dbaee2_story.html">best chance to steer the country back</a> to democratic norms.</p>
<p>As president, Bolsonaro has flaunted his authoritarian bent. He has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/30/brazil-bolsonaro-regime-military-dictatorship">praised Brazil’s 1964-1985 dictatorship</a>, cultivated <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-for-the-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd-11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html">nostalgia for military rule</a> – while filling his cabinet with retired and active-duty generals – and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/mil-dias-bolsonaro-grave-crisis-derechos-humanos-brasil/">disparaged human rights</a>, especially of minorities. Throughout his term in office, Bolsonaro has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/20/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-deforestation-term-intl-latam/index.html">actively promoted the destruction of the Amazon forest</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/brazils-indigenous-communities-resist-bolsonaro/a-51909742">portrayed indigenous peoples</a> <a href="https://inthesetimes.com/article/amazon-brazil-jair-bolsonaro-environmental-ngo">and environmental groups</a> as working against the interests of the nation.</p>
<p>He has also consistently attacked the country’s democratic institutions, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/jair-bolsonaro-steve-bannon-brazil-75b73b17e47867e0670db8711f149ce2">particularly Brazil’s Supreme Court</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, Bolsonaro has made serious policy missteps that have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolsonaros-support-hits-fresh-low-ahead-brazil-2022-vote-poll-shows-2021-09-16/">dented his popularity</a>, such as his egregious <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/brazilian-senate-recommends-charging-bolsonaro-mismanagement-covid-19-pandemic">mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis</a> and the rolling back of popular economic and social policies that improved the lives of ordinary Brazilians. </p>
<p>Around a third of Brazilians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/lula-leads-bolsonaro-by-14-points-ahead-brazil-vote-datafolha-poll-2022-09-22/">continue to support Bolsonaro’s bid</a> for reelection. But the erosion in his polling numbers has opened the path for some moderate conservatives to join ranks with Lula to try to prevent Bolsonaro’s reelection.</p>
<h2>Nostalgia for dictatorship … and traditional values</h2>
<p>Despite party labels, this election is more complex than a conventional left-right optic would suggest. </p>
<p>Both sides of the political spectrum have become deeply embedded in Brazilian society in crosscutting ways that span religion, race, gender and sexuality, and class.</p>
<p>For example, some lower-income voters who benefited from Lula’s policies <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/01/bolsonaro-brazil-president-for-poor/">support Bolsonaro today</a>, often out of outrage over past corruption scandals and the current economic precarity they themselves face. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/10/the-brazilian-nostalgia-for-dictatorship">nostalgia for a military dictatorship</a> that most citizens never experienced influences some voters, particularly conservative ones. </p>
<p>Brazilians are also experiencing a period of social change marked by the advance of LGBTQ and women’s rights. While embraced by many, some Brazilians feel <a href="https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10125857">uncomfortable with new roles for women and with the queer identities</a> increasingly prevalent among the younger generation. Spurred on by evangelical and charismatic Catholic movements, this distress has sparked longing for “traditional” values in family and community life, and has seen some Brazilians call for a return to dictatorship, claiming that life was more orderly and less violent then. </p>
<h2>And after the election?</h2>
<p>So where does this leave things going into the Oct. 2 election? </p>
<p>So far, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-23/lula-s-support-puts-first-round-win-back-in-play-datafolha-says">Lula stands far ahead in the polls</a>. Strategically choosing a centrist and past presidential candidate as his running mate, Lula has combined progressive commitments with promises to steer a mainstream economic course. In short, he is appealing both to the left and the center.</p>
<p>In turn, Bolsonaro has studied and weaponized Trump’s playbook, saying that he will accept defeat in the upcoming election <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-bolsonaro-says-may-not-accept-2022-election-under-current-voting-system-2021-07-07/">only if he himself judges that they were fairly held</a>. Many Brazilians worry that by attacking the results before polling day, Bolsonaro is preparing the way to try to stay in power illegally. There is also <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/americas/brazil-independence-day-demonstrations-latam-intl-cmd/index.html">concern over how the Brazilian military might react</a> should Bolsonaro refuse to accept the election results. </p>
<p>More than just the future of Brazil is at stake in these elections. The current <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/pink-tide-south-america-politics-economy/">return of the left across Latin America</a> has renewed hopes that gains in cutting poverty, which took off 20 years ago, will resume. So far this year, leftists Gabriel Boric and Gustavo Petro have won elections in Chile and Colombia, respectively. Brazil now seems likely to join this group, swinging the region’s ideological pendulum to the left in an <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/lula-brazil-bolosnaro-amorim/">apparent revival of the “pink tide</a>.”</p>
<p>But a Lula victory would do more than tip the left-right balance in Latin America. What links Lula, Boric and Petro is their commitment to progressive agendas and their willingness to negotiate in democratic contexts. Were Lula to win and take office in Brazil, the policies of these leaders could <a href="https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/#">complement those of President Joe Biden</a> in a hemisphere-wide effort to strengthen democracy. </p>
<p>The alternative – a Bolsonaro win, or worse, a coup – would dash these hopes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey W. Rubin received funding from the MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Mellon-LASA grants, the Open Society Foundations, the American Philosophical Society, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafael R. Ioris received funding from the National Research Council of Brazil, the Research Agency of the State of Sao Paulo, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, and the Rockfeller Archive. </span></em></p>Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is ahead in the polls. But will his authoritarian rival, incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro, accept the result if he loses?Jeffrey W. Rubin, Associate Professor of History, Boston UniversityRafael R. Ioris, Professor of Modern Latin America History, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1628672021-06-17T11:29:20Z2021-06-17T11:29:20ZBrazil: inside Jair Bolsonaro’s militarised democracy – podcast<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, we look at just how politicised Brazil’s military has become since President Jair Bolsonaro took office in 2019. And we speak to a zooarchaeologist studying animal bones from 700-year-old trash in Spain to learn about people left out of history. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/60cb0e202dc225001a70bebc?cover=true" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay" width="100%" height="110"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Jair Bolsonaro is openly nostalgic for the era of Brazil’s military dictatorship, which ended in 1985. Since the former army captain was elected president in 2018, he’s maintained a close relationship with the armed forces – but in recent months it’s not always been straightforward. With Brazil heading towards presidential elections in 2022, and Bolsonaro <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-bolsonaro-idUSKBN2B9317">slumping in the polls</a>, some of those military officers who’ve tasted political power may be assessing their options. </p>
<p>We speak to two experts to understand the history of relations between the military and politics in Brazil – and what’s at stake. </p>
<p>Maud Chirio, lecturer in history at Université Gustave Eiffel in Paris, is a specialist in Brazil’s military dictatorship and the recent growth of extreme right ideologies within the military. She believes Brazil’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic, that has left more than <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/brazil">490,000 people dead by mid-June</a>, could cause some high ranking military officers to distance themselves from Bolsonaro. While some believe he can – and should – be re-elected, and that he’s the best guardian of their interests, she tells us “some military do not want to sink with Bolsonaro’s ship”. </p>
<p>Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho is director of King’s Brazil Institute at King’s College London, and served as a lieutenant in the army technical corps during Lula’s presidency in the early 2000s. He explains that despite the legacy of the military dictatorship, many Brazilians still have a positive view of the armed forces and so Bolsonaro’s military background helped him get elected. Yet De Carvalho says Bolsonaro appears not to fully understand the role of the military in a civilian democracy. “Sometimes the president talks about the military almost as his praetorian guard that he can use to do whatever he wants.” </p>
<p>De Carvalho thinks part of the longer-term solution is to reduce Brazil’s dependence on the military for tasks that should be left to civilian authorities. He tells us that when there is a change of minister, it’s common for Brazilians to wonder what the military thinks about it. “That’s a question we should never ask.”</p>
<p>And in our second story (24m20s), we travel back to 12th century Islamic Iberia with the help of zooarchaeologist Marcos García García, a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of York in the UK. He’s part of a project examining household garbage at Cercadilla, an archaeological dig outside Córdoba in Spain. Garcia explains what studying this ancient waste is revealing about the people who lived there – including <a href="https://revistaselectronicas.ujaen.es/index.php/ATM/article/view/5797">evidence of pork</a>. This suggests that there were Christians living in Islamic Al-Andalus, contrary to the previous historical consensus that Christian communities had disappeared by this point. </p>
<p>And Nick Lehr, arts and culture editor at The Conversation in the US, tells us about a new series of articles on <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/trans-youth-2021-102529">transgender young people</a> (34m15s). To go alongside it, The Conversation has put together an email newsletter course to help shed light on the issues that transgender young people and their families face. Anyone of any age, gender or sexuality that is interested in learning about the latest research on transgender youth can <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/transgender-youth-77/">sign up here</a> to receive the mini-course in the form of four emails over about a week. </p>
<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Mau Loseto. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a>. or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>News clips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcaMUX0FnPk">Journalismo TV</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PccBZ-yVvQ0">France</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkfdbpCYvHU">2</a><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lxhuo7Jt3AE">4</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAQZvlaNF4s">Al Jazeera</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAQZvlaNF4s">English</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG5zfZLG8XI">TRT News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjNilKUvBDo">CNN</a> News, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5VOuJK7Aag">VICE</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNyIMUc5nSA">CGTN News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7S6BawcbbaM">The Guardian</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H9ajzCq2lMk">BBC News</a>. </p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus, what the study of 700-year old garbage is revealing about who lived in Islamic Andalusia. Listen to episode 20 of The Conversation Weekly.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1473792020-10-02T16:50:47Z2020-10-02T16:50:47ZDonald Trump gets coronavirus: what catching COVID-19 meant for Boris Johnson and Jair Bolsonaro<p><em>Donald Trump and his wife Melania <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-has-covid-19-how-might-this-affect-his-chances-of-re-election-147361">have tested positive for COVID-19</a> and are now in quarantine, throwing the US 2020 election campaign into disarray. The American president’s infection with coronavirus follows those of the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, and Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro. While Johnson was seriously ill and spent two weeks in hospital in April, Bolsonaro had a milder case of the disease in July. The Conversation asked two experts on British and Brazilian politics to assess what impact catching COVID-19 had on the two leaders.</em> </p>
<h2>Boris Johnson</h2>
<p><strong>Matthew Flinders, Professor of Politics and Founding Director of the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, University of Sheffield</strong></p>
<p>Timing is everything in politics. A crisis can turn into a triumph, and a hero into a zero in the blink of an eye. With the presidential election just a month away, some insight into the consequences for Donald Trump of testing positive for COVID-19 might be gained from Boris Johnson’s brush with the virus.</p>
<p>First and foremost, it’s possible that in the short-term at least Trump might enjoy an upturn in his polling as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/586592?seq=1">“rally around the flag”</a> effect sees the public uniting around the office of president in a period of uncertainty. It’s unclear whether Trump’s illness will register with the public psyche with quite the same impact as an institutional crisis, natural disaster or war. </p>
<p>But if Johnson’s experience is anything to go by (and that is a very big if) then a “Trump tick” is possible. As data from YouGov demonstrates, Johnson’s move to intensive care in April seemed to provide some salve to his detractors and <a href="https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/1311977426923261952?s=20">his personal approval ratings spiked</a>. But a surge in support for the government itself had actually begun <a href="https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/1311958523912294401?s=20">a few days before</a> Johnson announced he had tested positive. </p>
<p>The second insight is that if the “Boris bounce” is anything to go by then an uptick for Trump in the polls will be short-lived. The rallying effect could slip into something of a dramatic downturn as the public begins to wonder if their leader is up to the job, or may even be hampered by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-why-are-some-people-experiencing-long-term-fatigue-141405">nagging fatigue of “long COVID”</a>. This seems to have occurred with Johnson, as even those around him concede that he appears to have lost his bounce. </p>
<p>Johnson’s very sudden and dramatic decline from the virus might make Trump’s team think twice about the current “business as usual” approach from within the confines of the White House. </p>
<p>The third insight is that it might, just might, make Trump a slightly humbler character. Trump has responded to the pandemic in a fairly relaxed manner, bordering on dismissive contempt. His comments about <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52407177">injecting bleach</a> as a potential cure were symptomatic of a president who seemed out of touch, and to some out of his mind. </p>
<p>At least in the short-term, Johnson emerged from his illness with a <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8563833/Boris-Johnson-launches-Governments-new-anti-obesity-drive.html">new found zeal for keeping fit and losing weight</a>. The site of the prime minister doing <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/boris-johnson-press-ups-mail-sunday-putin-coronavirus-a9589691.html">press-ups in his office</a> was matched by a flotilla of new government-backed healthy eating and exercise campaigns. </p>
<p>But overall, Johnson has not really bounced back from having COVID-19, and neither have his approval ratings or the <a href="https://www.kantar.com/inspiration/politics/public-approval-and-trust-in-government-falls-in-g7-and-plummets-in-uk/">British public’s confidence</a> in his government’s ability to manage the pandemic. Politically, however, there is much less at stake for Johnson than Trump, with the next UK election not due until 2024. </p>
<h2>Jair Bolsonaro</h2>
<p><strong>Anthony Pereira, Professor in the King’s Brazil Institute and Department of International Development, King’s College London</strong></p>
<p>The news of Donald Trump’s positive test for COVID-19 is being closely watched in Brazil. When Jair Bolsonaro tested positive in July, it entrenched views of Brazil’s controversial president. For Bolsonaro himself, as well as his diehard base of about one-third of the Brazilian electorate, it confirmed what he had always said, that he would not be severely affected by <a href="https://jc.ne10.uol.com.br/politica/2020/07/11953165-gripezinha--historico-de-atleta-e-aglomeracoes--a-cronologia-de-bolsonaro-ate-contrair-o-coronavirus.html">what he called a “little flu”</a>, because of his past experience as an athlete. </p>
<p>For those Brazilians who abhorred the president’s attitude towards COVID-19, including his insistence that only the elderly and infirm should participate in the lockdowns, and his <a href="https://time.com/5816243/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-coronavirus-governors/">attacks on governors</a> who imposed broader measures, Bolsonaro’s positive test confirmed what they already felt: that Bolsonaro was ignoring science and common sense. Many felt that it was entirely predictable, given his penchant for mingling with supporters without a mask, that he would catch the disease.</p>
<p>It appears Bolsonaro had a mild case of coronavirus, though <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-coronavirus-mould-lungs-brazil-president-a9648366.html">he did say</a> after emerging from 20 days of self-isolation that he had “mould on his lungs”. </p>
<p>Since July, Bolsonaro has gone through something of a transformation. He has largely stopped attacking other branches of government, including the Supreme Court and the Congress. Perhaps more crucially, he also consented to <a href="https://www.jornaldocomercio.com/_conteudo/economia/2020/06/745677-auxilio-emergencial-sera-pago-por-mais-dois-meses.html">paying an emergency income supplement</a> to the poor of $R600 (about £90) per month. The income support now reaches 65 million beneficiaries, or more than 30% of the population of roughly 210 million people. The Bolsonaro administration has proposed to continue it – at half of its previous value – through to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-idUSKBN25S53W">the end of December</a>.</p>
<p>This support may have played a role, although not the only role, in a significant improvement in the president’s approval ratings. In a <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-brazil-politics-poll/poll-shows-jump-in-approval-for-brazils-bolsonaro-amid-pandemic-idUKKCN26F37C">CNI/Ibope poll</a> of 2,000 voters conducted on September 17-20, Bolsonaro received an approval rating of 40%, the highest since his presidency began in January 2019. So perhaps the lesson to draw from this is that there is political life after getting coronavirus, at least for Bolsonaro. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Brazil will hold municipal elections on November 15 and 29 – but Bolsonaro currently has no political party. He fell out with other leaders of the Social Liberal Party, the organisation with which he campaigned for the presidency in 2018, and left the party in November 2019. His attempt to create a new party was unsuccessful. The municipal elections therefore could see the coming to power of critics of his administration in some of Brazil’s major cities. This makes November a decisive month for the Trump-Bolsonaro alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Pereira has received research funding from the British Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council. He is a member of the council of the Brazilian Chamber of Commerce of Great Britain and also a senior fellow at Canning House. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Flinders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How did the British prime minister and Brazilian president’s brush with COVID-19 affect them politically?Matthew Flinders, Founding Director of the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, University of SheffieldAnthony Pereira, Professor in the King’s Brazil Institute and Department of International Development, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257412019-10-28T12:46:17Z2019-10-28T12:46:17ZA year after Jair Bolsonaro’s election, why he’s not solely to blame for Brazil’s toxic politics<p>A year ago, on October 28, 2018, Jair Bolsonaro <a href="https://theconversation.com/jair-bolsonaro-has-won-so-whats-next-for-brazil-105893">was elected president of Brazil</a> in an election that was as polarising as it was surprising. Since taking office in January 2019, his presidency has followed the path <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/03/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-first-six-months-right-dismayed">feared by many of his critics</a>. </p>
<p>Bolsonaro’s government has been erratic, unable to build support, and rather than working across congress to pass legislation, the Brazilian leader has tended to antagonise his critics and play to his ultra-conservative, right-wing support base. </p>
<p>Bolsonaro has no doubt fanned the flames of Brazil’s political, social, and cultural tensions. He faced a considerable backlash within Brazil for his response to <a href="https://theconversation.com/amazon-fires-jair-bolsonaro-faces-mounting-political-backlash-in-brazil-even-from-his-allies-122512">fires in the Amazon</a>, and has been criticised for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/12/bolsonaro-son-eduardo-us-ambassador-diplomats-response">his nepotism</a> and historic photos taken with high-profile <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/03/jair-bolsonaro-photo-marielle-franco-murder-accused">criminal suspects</a>. Ongoing instances of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47473582">misogyny, homophobia, and racism</a> – not to mention <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics/president-bolsonaro-shocks-with-brazil-golden-shower-tweet-idUSKCN1QN24X">bizarre activity on Twitter</a> – have contributed to further political and social polarisation. </p>
<p>Still, as we argue in our recent book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Understanding-Contemporary-Brazil-1st-Edition/Garmany-Pereira/p/book/9781138039339">Understanding Contemporary Brazil</a>, Bolsonaro is not necessarily the cause of Brazil’s political polarisation, but rather a symptom of more deep-seated democratic problems. </p>
<p>Polarisation has long contributed to political fragmentation in Brazil’s congress, which currently has 30 political parties. This imposes high costs in terms of time and resources on any president who wants to fulfil his or her agenda. Brazil also remains a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/10/31/brazil-2/">socially conservative country</a>, prone to instances of sexism, racism, and indifference to protecting human rights. These factors lie at the structural and cultural roots of the current political polarisation in Brazil, and recently they have started bubbling to the surface.</p>
<h2>Conditions for victory</h2>
<p>So, if these issues were latent in Brazil for decades, what explains their recent emergence, bringing about the election of a right-wing extremist like Bolsonaro?</p>
<p>First, it’s worth remembering that if former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva were not in prison, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/11/lula-brazil-presidential-election-candidate-gives-up-race">it’s likely he would have won the election</a>. And, second, despite widespread anger at Lula’s Workers’ Party over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/29/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-left-far-right-change">political corruption</a> – a factor crucial for <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/elections-brazil-far-right-gates-power">explaining the election result</a> – Bolsonaro is not all that popular in Brazil. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/55-dos-brasileiros-nao-confiam-em-bolsonaro-diz-pesquisa-ibope/">most recent polls</a>, only 31% of Brazilians think he is doing a good job, and 55% “do not trust” the president. All this suggests that what might really be growing in Brazil is frustration with politics more generally, including anger against the political system. </p>
<p>Related to this are a host of reasons for why voters opted for Bolsonaro during the election. Brazil’s growing evangelical population <a href="https://newint.org/features/2018/11/06/did-brazil%E2%80%99s-evangelicals-put-jair-bolsonaro-office">generally favour Bolsonaro</a> for being socially conservative. Connected to this are millions of people who fear rising levels of violent crime, and are drawn to Bolsonaro for his hardline rhetoric. Some researchers <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2018/10/brazil-election-bolsonaro-evangelicals-security">argue</a> this helps to explain why surprising numbers of low-income urban residents voted for him. </p>
<p>Another reason for Bolsonaro’s victory was the issue of poor economic prospects and frustration felt by working and middle-class Brazilians. Many have grown tired of unfulfilled promises, whether from the left or right, and are increasingly drawn to polarising extremes, even <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/brazil-heading-military-dictatorship-181003112927172.html">a return of a military dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>Social media has also been a sea change in the way people <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html">communicate in Brazil</a>, as it has around the world, leaving people less dependent on traditional media gatekeepers. In a move that would have been impossible only a few years ago, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-election.html">Bolsonaro’s campaign</a> was waged largely through Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter. Still, some have argued that this <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-proving-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476">also skewed the election</a> in his favour through the spread of misinformation.</p>
<h2>Decline already begun</h2>
<p>Alongside the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/04/social-media-detox-facebook-twitter-august">aggressive and angry language</a> that has radicalised political expression on social media, recent political change and campaign tactics also help to explain Brazil’s growing political polarisation. The election of Bolsonaro in 2018 was hardly the <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-democracy-is-on-the-ropes-and-now-a-dreaded-election-begins-102283">beginning of Brazil’s democratic decline</a>. </p>
<p>Political and judicial figures of various persuasions have engaged in increasingly lowball tactics since at least 2014. Federal judge, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/release-tapped-phone-calls-lula-rousseff-deepens-brazil-chaos">Sergio Moro</a>, was recently at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-crumbling-political-culture-laid-bare-as-impartiality-of-operation-car-wash-judge-questioned-118723">centre of a scandal</a> in which he was alleged to have co-ordinated with prosecutors despite being the leading judge in an anti-corruption operation in the country. </p>
<p>It was in this political context that Bolsonaro launched his election campaign, where tactics that were unthinkable only a few years beforehand were now commonplace. Quite bluntly, Bolsonaro’s victory would have been impossible prior to 2018, and was facilitated, in large part, by changing relations between members of the elite, as well as Brazil’s current socio-political context.</p>
<p>While Bolsonaro’s presidency is no doubt unprecedented, there is no need to give him more credit than he deserves. Whether for his election victory, or the acrimonious political climate Brazil now faces, Bolsonaro is only one factor among many.</p>
<p>This is not to say his actions are insignificant, or that people should ignore the problematic things he says – but Bolsonaro should not be fetishised when trying to understand Brazil today. A host of social and political factors produced the polarised landscape Brazil now faces, and if attention is diverted overwhelmingly to Bolsonaro, these issues are likely to go overlooked.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Garmany has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), the British Academy/Leverhulme Foundation (UK), the Newton Fund/FAPESP (Brazil), the National Science Foundation (USA), Andrew W. Mellon/ACLS (USA), and the Tinker Foundation (USA). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Pereira has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) of the UK, the British Academy (UK), the Fulbright-Hays and Fulbright programmes in the US, and the Andrew W. Mellon and McArthur Foundation, also in the US. </span></em></p>A host of political and social factors have created Brazil’s polarised political climate.Jeff Garmany, Senior Lecturer in Latin American Studies, The University of MelbourneAnthony Pereira, Director, King's Brazil Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093122019-01-04T16:31:40Z2019-01-04T16:31:40ZJohn of God: my encounter with Brazil’s accused faith healer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252467/original/file-20190104-32136-4za75y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Encounters with 'the Entity'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Premack</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>His eyes were very big and very blue, the colour of cornflowers. They were neither kind nor unkind, and seemed somehow apart from the rest of his puffy face and sagging body. He looked into my eyes, and when I did not look away, he looked deeper and said, so quickly I nearly missed it, “<em>Volta na tarde</em>”. Come back this afternoon.</p>
<p>I felt special. I had watched the people ahead of me in line approach and be sent away with scribbled prescriptions for <a href="https://www.healthline.com/health/anxiety/calming-effects-of-passionflower">passiflora – a herbal medicine</a>. I returned after lunch, and I watched him scrape a man’s eyeball with a scalpel and I fainted. </p>
<p>When I came to, the soft-voiced people looking after me told me I’d had a “spiritual surgery”. They took my money to buy me my own course of passionflower pills, then sent me back to my <em>pousada</em> (guesthouse) to rest.</p>
<p>I can’t help but wonder now, what if I hadn’t fainted? What if I’d passed in front of him again, and what if he’d invited me for a private consultation, and what if I’d said yes?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252466/original/file-20190104-32154-noenmx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Blessed’ crystals for sale in Abadiânia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Premack</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>#MeToo catches up with João de Deus</h2>
<p>João Teixeira de Faria, popularly known as João de Deus, or John of God, is the most famous medium in Brazil. He inherited his title from his mentor – <a href="http://bostonreview.net/world/laura-premack-dead-man-talking-brazil-spiritism">the beloved philanthropist Chico Xavier</a> – and garnered attention from dozens of celebrities and politicians, including <a href="https://nypost.com/2018/12/09/spiritual-healer-featured-on-oprah-accused-of-sexual-abuse/">Oprah Winfrey</a>. </p>
<p>Over the past four weeks, more than 600 women have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46497426">accused Teixeira of sexual assault</a>. Their ages at the time of the alleged assaults, which took place from the 1980s through October 2018, range from nine to 67. Though Teixeira has <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/brazilian-spiritual-healer-john-god-indicted-rape-accused/story?id=60019325">denied the allegations</a>, all recount him inviting them for private consultations, turning them to face away from him, and then performing sexual acts as part of their “cure”. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252427/original/file-20190103-32136-1smxkpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John of God’s followers arrive in Brazil from around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Premack</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Presently, Teixeira is being investigated for rape, sexual violation through fraud and illegal possession of arms. So far, <a href="https://g1.globo.com/go/goias/noticia/2019/01/02/joao-de-deus-passa-mal-na-cadeia-e-e-levado-para-hospital-diz-dgap.ghtml">he has been charged</a> with two counts of rape and two counts of statutory rape.</p>
<p>In past encounters with the international press, he was treated as a <a href="http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2010/12/23/john-of-god-faith-healer/">unique New Age healer</a> something encouraged by his team of <a href="https://www.heathercumming.com/">savvy advisors</a>.</p>
<p>However, despite this international reputation, Teixeira actually inhabits a very central, even ordinary, place in <a href="http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935420.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935420-e-50">the Brazilian religious landscape</a>, shaped over centuries by Afro-Brazilian, indigenous, European, and (more recently) North American currents. He is a “spiritual surgeon” – a role at the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/SPIRITS_WITH_SCALPELS.html?id=7i_kA9Jn314C&redir_esc=y">intersection of folk Catholicism and Brazilian Spiritism</a>.</p>
<h2>An economy of abuse</h2>
<p>Teixeria’s “spiritual hospital” in the small town of Abadiânia, halfway between the major cities of Brasília and Goiânia, is called the Casa de Dom Inácio de Loyola after Saint Ignatius who founded the Jesuits, one of the 37 spirits Teixeira claims to incorporate into his body during trances. A benefactor secured land for him there in 1979, and the small town of 19,000 <a href="https://30porcento.com.br/livro/9788574982250-Jo%C3%A3o-de-Deus:-Vida-e-Medi%C3%BAnidade">now receives 10,000 visitors a month</a>, most of them foreigners.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252423/original/file-20190103-32142-1u5qaga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Virgin Mary icon on a bed of crystals overlooks the cash register in the Casa’s bookstore.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Premack</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The John of God economy here is extensive. There are the bottles of blessed water, the passionflower pills, <a href="http://www.friendsofthecasa.info/?page=group-travel-europe">the guided tours</a>, the <em>pousadas</em> to house visitors, the cafes to feed them, the shops selling the requisite white clothes, the mineral and jewellery shops and the bookshops selling videos, biographies, photographs, crystals and icons. </p>
<p>Then there’s the money from his <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/John_of_God.html?id=HpoxTWQmckQC&redir_esc=y">regular international tours</a>. As a result, many people make their living off the work of John of God.</p>
<h2>Money and power in Bolsonaro’s Brazil</h2>
<p>Now that Brazil has sworn in a president who campaigned on his support for Brazilian evangelicals and the slogan “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/10/29/18037728/bolsonaro-brazil-election-guide">God above everyone</a>”, there’s the temptation to connect the crowning of Bolsonaro with the fall of John of God. </p>
<p>It is possible to find an intersection between the John of God economy and Brazilian evangelicalism. While evangelicals are firmly against spiritual power that comes from anywhere other than Jesus or his Holy Spirit, they do share Teixeira’s evident comfort with <a href="https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/9/1/15951874/prosperity-gospel-explained-why-joel-osteen-believes-prayer-can-make-you-rich-trump">the symbiotic relationship between wealth and faith</a>.</p>
<p>But the same could be said for all of the major religions shaping Brazil. Whether in Catholic traditions of paying for funeral masses or Afro-Brazilian customs of cooking extravagant feasts for the gods, money and faith have historically sat side by side. </p>
<p>The real story here has nothing do with with Bolsonaro or evangelicals, and it is not about just another sex-crazed cult leader either. It is an older and more universal one, with as many similarities to the Catholic Church as to any cult – the story of the exploitation of women of faith by a man enabled by a large network of people dependent on him for money and power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252468/original/file-20190104-32121-p998pe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Teixeira’s image and reputation supports a lucrative business.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Premack</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The women Teixeria is alleged to have assaulted were not uniquely gullible or vulnerable. Most of them believed he could help them, but their belief does not make them outliers – healing through contact with the spirit world is <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/brazil-s-invisible-spirits">a mainstream position in Brazil</a>. Even the sceptical, like me, can be lulled into credulity by the John of God machine. They tell you to be open, to allow the Entity to read your energy and recognise what you need.</p>
<p>Even if you think it’s nonsense, there may still a part of you that says “what if?” Imagine hearing a ghost story, late on a moonless night, in a candlelit cabin with creaky floors. It’s that frame of mind. I can imagine that if I had been invited for a one-on-one consultation, I would have accepted. Even suspecting the whole thing was a hoax, what’s the worst that could happen?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Premack does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John of God, the Brazilian spiritual leader accused of sexual assault, exploited women with a network of people dependent on him for money and power.Laura Premack, Lecturer in Global Religion and Politics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1049692018-10-22T15:20:01Z2018-10-22T15:20:01ZBrazil: #elenão and the vibrant women’s movement rallying against far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241530/original/file-20181021-105776-xbyapc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women protest Bolsonaro in Brasília, Brazil.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/brasilia-distrito-federalbrazil-september-29-group-1199637451?src=0nkkgquogl7RJJz-gEFbVQ-2-5">Arthur S Costa/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Brazilian presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro is well known for his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-bolsonaro-factbox/factbox-far-right-brazilian-candidate-thrives-on-controversy-idUSKCN1II2T3">inflammatory statements</a>. He has publicly made <a href="https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/geral/noticia/2014/12/Jair-Bolsonaro-repete-que-nao-estupra-Maria-do-Rosario-porque-ela-nao-merece-4659789.html">misogynistic</a>, <a href="https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/bolsonaro-prefiro-filho-morto-em-acidente-a-um-homossexual,cf89cc00a90ea310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html">homophobic</a>, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdhUGgkdKFY">racist comments</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-45774849">He also</a> supports torture, and wants to reinstate the death penalty. A far-right member of the Social Liberal Party (PSL), Bolsonaro is <a href="http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2018/10/1983421-bolsonaro-59-mantem-vantagem-sobre-haddad-41.shtml">currently leading the polls</a>.</p>
<p>But there is vibrant opposition and resistance to his popularity. Movements have sprung up to ensure he never gets into office, one of which is Mulheres Unidas Contra Bolsonaro!!! (Women United Against Bolsonaro!!!). Restricted to those who identify as women, although solidarity from men is welcomed, this organisation – which uses a secret, closed Facebook group as its headquarters – has more than 3.86m members. </p>
<p>The group is aligned with the #elenão (#nothim) movement, which calls on Brazilian voters to cast their vote in the forthcoming presidential election based on morals, not politics. The movement has been criticised as being nothing more than a hashtag, or a “<a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/09/26/ele-nao-trump-bolsonaro/">war of memes</a>”. Yet #elenão, along with the related #elenunca (#neverhim) and #elejamais (also #neverhim) is active on all social networks, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOjvz3hfBQw">visible on the streets</a>, and heard frequently as a chant, by people declaring their opposition to Bolsonaro. Among the group, there is firm belief that the movement directly helped prevent an outright win for Bolsonaro in the first round of presidential voting. </p>
<p>All this, even as the #elenão movement and its followers have been subject to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/11/brazil-election-violence-bolsonaro-haddad">backlash of violence</a> from <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Brazil-Woman-Wearing-NotHim-T-Shirt-Attacked-by-Bolsonaro-Supporters-20181010-0022.html">pro-Bolsonaro</a> <a href="https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/10/17/politica/1539775546_709713.html">supporters</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/uOjvz3hfBQw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Since the <a href="https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/apuracao/presidente.ghtml">first vote</a> on October 7 2018, the election has become ever more divisive in Brazil. Many Brazilians I have spoken with are facing surprising divisions within their own families and social circles, leading them to ponder how Bolsonaro has such a strong support base. His supporters include evangelical Christians, Catholics, the wealthy, men, and people identifying as white. But he also <a href="https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/ibope-bolsonaro-lidera-entre-mulheres-negros-e-em-quatro-regioes/">tops the polls</a> among women, and people identifying as black/brown. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241540/original/file-20181021-105748-16j3vyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazilian presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/brazilian-presidential-candidate-jair-bolsonaro-during-1173987337?src=vMilySMAIhJJZDYqgKnpuw-1-3">Antonio Scorza/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, only the top two candidates remain <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-democracy-is-on-the-ropes-and-now-a-dreaded-election-begins-102283">in the presidential race</a>. Due to go head-to-head in a second round of voting on October 28, Fernando Haddad, of the leftist Workers Party has been left standing against Bolsonaro. Initially the #elenão movement focused on “anyone but Bolsonaro”, showing no united support for any other specific candidate, and canvassing for other specific candidates was also forbidden. After the first vote results, however, many #elenão movement members regretfully announced they would vote for Bolsonaro in the second round – mostly due to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2bbbaa04-cae7-11e8-9fe5-24ad351828ab">discontent</a> with the Workers Party’s previous performance while in power.</p>
<p>In response, the group refocused its methods, to actively campaign for Haddad, adding the hashtag #haddadsim to the group’s activity. Members are now announcing hourly how many votes they have converted for Haddad. But what kind of role might this movement play in the election? How likely is it to achieve its goal and prevent a Bolsonaro victory against the odds? </p>
<h2>Changing voters’ minds</h2>
<p>The main factors that generally <a href="http://www.wwnorton.com/college/polisci/campaignsandelections/ch/12/outline.aspx">influence voter choice</a> are, from strongest to weakest: party identification, the economic performance of the sitting government, social identity, policy issues, and the personality of the candidate. This perhaps explains why there is support for Bolsonaro, to the extent that women who were actively against him are now opting to vote for him.</p>
<p>There is widespread anger towards and distrust of Haddad’s Workers Party, not helped by President Dilma Rousseff’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/4/13/11416578/brazil-petrobras-rousseff-impeachment">2016 impeachment</a>, along with President Michel Temer’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/28/brazil-corruption-unions-strike-michel-temer-austerity">deeply unpopular austerity measures</a>. So, as candidate personality has a much weaker influence on vote choice, despite Bolsonaro’s controversial remarks, voters still support him. They choose his party as an alternative to the PT, rather than vote against him based on his homophobic, misogynistic or racist comments. In other words, voters may be morally opposed to Bolsonaro, but support him from a political perspective.</p>
<p>So if politics has a stronger influence than morals on a person’s voting behaviour, can #elenão succeed? <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature11421">Studies show</a> that political mobilisation messages, originating and occurring predominantly online, do work – but only to an extent. They affect voter behaviour by encouraging information seeking, and influencing political self-expression among voters with a weaker party identity. However, they are most effective in influencing friends, family members, and friends of friends within a group member’s social media circle. The influence is stronger between those that have offline relationships and face-to-face contact, even though it is the online activism and solidarity that is credited with initiating this social influence. </p>
<p>This is visible in the #elenão movement from members of the the Facebook group’s regular reports of converting votes, which I have tracked as far outweighing the initial members pledging to vote for Bolsonaro in the second round. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241529/original/file-20181021-105776-bwwa0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists march in Rio de Janeiro.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hands-feminist-activists-march-women-against-1195896610?src=0nkkgquogl7RJJz-gEFbVQ-1-12">Alexandre S. R. Horta/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Every online post from a group member or supporter of how they have converted undecided or – for even more kudos – previous Bolsonaro supporters further encourages other women to share information and try to convert even just a single vote each. This could push Haddad to victory in the final vote. There is speculation that the final election result may hinge <a href="https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/rejeicao-de-bolsonaro-entre-as-mulheres-pode-atrapalhar-2o-turno/">on the women’s vote</a>, as women <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/brazilian_voter_demographics.pdf">make up 52% of the Brazilian electorate</a>. Unfortunately, this is a slim glimmer of hope. It is a tall order to convert enough votes to see Haddad emerge victorious. Bolsonaro <a href="https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticia/2018/10/18/datafolha-para-presidente-votos-validos-bolsonaro-59-haddad-41.ghtml">still leads the polls</a> by 59% to 41%, and is predicted to win in the second and final round of voting. </p>
<p>But whether it succeeds with its primary mission or not, this multi-million member transnational Brazilian women’s movement is extraordinary and nuanced, and has created a meeting point and planning headquarters for antifascist activism. There are plans to carry on as a solidarity and advocacy group, continuing to fight against the growing Brazilian alt-right that Bolsonaro’s campaign has revealed, regardless of the election outcome. </p>
<p>The slogan “not him” may need to be replaced after the election, but the sentiment and political agency that these women have harnessed is unlikely to go anywhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Selina O'Doherty does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Women are fighting to tip the Brazilian election by using morals over politics.Selina O'Doherty, Lecturer in International Development, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/985732018-10-11T13:07:32Z2018-10-11T13:07:32ZBrazil faces two very different economic models in Bolsonaro and Haddad<p>Brazil’s far-right candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, has won the first round of the country’s recent presidential elections. The former military captain won 46% of the vote, making him the favourite to become Brazil’s next president when the second round of voting takes place on October 28. He is up against Fernando Haddad of the Workers’ Party (PT), which was in power from 2003-16, but has been mired in high-profile <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-massive-petrobras-corruption-scandal-is-upending-brazilian-politics-43939">corruption scandals</a>.</p>
<p>The rise of Bolsonaro marks an extreme shift for Brazilian politics. A great deal of focus has been on his controversial anti-establishment rhetoric and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/06/homophobic-mismogynist-racist-brazil-jair-bolsonaro">monstrous opinions</a>. As well as having <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-can-its-poorest-region-call-a-halt-to-jair-bolsonaros-dangerous-politics-104380">potentially dangerous politics</a>, a Bolsonaro presidency would mark a significant shift for Brazil’s economy, too.</p>
<p>Much of Brazil’s recent history has been marked by a state-led economic strategy known as <a href="http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ecos/v21nspe/v21nspea04">social-developmentalism</a>. This is, broadly-speaking, Haddad and the PT’s approach. It is focused on the potential of Brazil’s internal market, demand for natural resources, and developing internal demand through investment in infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Mixed results</h2>
<p>It cannot be said that the 13 years of PT government followed strict social-developmentalist rules. But it gave great importance to both public investment (federal investment grew by around 10.6% per year) and internal demand (via income distribution and raising the real minimum wage, which grew almost 5% per year). It was a period of relative steady growth (3.3% per year) <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=XppWDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=valsa+brasileira+carvalho+laura&hl=pt-BR&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjqy4rt6vzdAhVNzoUKHRueA5gQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=valsa%20brasileira%20carvalho%20laura&f=false">and decreasing poverty</a>. </p>
<p>But stability collapsed in no small part thanks to a <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201601_focus01.en.pdf?64a2cdbd9c4a9c254445668338164746">plummet in global commodity prices</a> in 2011, which hurt Brazilian exports. And this was coupled with the high-profile investigation into systemic cases of government corruption. Much of it involved political bribery run by construction companies, the same ones that were a key part of PT’s economic strategy.</p>
<p>Without the international growing demand for Brazilian natural resources and a limited investment in infrastructure, the PT’s social-developmentalist strategy collapsed. The economy followed closely and in 2015-16 Brazil’s GDP <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html">declined by 7%</a>. The failure of public services was made evident by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-would-be-no-shame-in-brazil-ditching-the-olympics-26204">numerous problems</a> with putting on the 2014 football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. </p>
<p>This all helped to create an atmosphere of discontentment, which was channelled to PT’s last president, Dilma Rousseff. Bolsonaro has been extremely skilled in attacking PT and putting himself forward as the solution to Brazil’s woes. But rather than investing in public infrastructure projects, it is likely that he will open the country up to privatisation and there is no guarantee it will help the majority of people.</p>
<h2>Extreme economic liberalism</h2>
<p>Bolsonaro seems to favour a much more neoliberal approach to running the Brazilian economy. There is scant detail of his economic plans in his <a href="http://divulgacandcontas.tse.jus.br/candidaturas/oficial/2018/BR/BR/2022802018/280000614517/proposta_1534284632231.pdf">manifesto</a> (a requirement of presidential candidates in Brazil). In fact, Bolsonaro <a href="https://latinamericanpost.com/23485-brazil-what-would-happen-to-the-economy-with-paulo-guedes-as-minister">has confessed</a> to being ignorant of economic matters.</p>
<p>Instead, he has deferred to the economist Paulo Guedes, who is now <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2018/10/procuradoria-investiga-guru-de-bolsonaro-sob-suspeita-de-fraude.shtml">under investigation</a> for fraud in businesses with state pension funds. He is a graduate of the Chicago school, which is renowned for emphasising the power of the free market. </p>
<p>Guedes’ <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/02/o-governo-e-muito-grande-bebe-muito-combustivel-diz-economista-de-bolsonaro.shtml">interviews</a> suggest that he embraces an extreme degree of liberalism never seen before in Brazil. This includes maintaining and reinforcing the extensive cuts in public spending promoted by current president Michel Temer, privatisation of all state-owned companies and an unfair, non-progressive taxation scheme where almost everyone would pay the same level of tax – even though the bottom 10% spend a third of their income in tax <a href="https://www.oxfam.org.br/a-distancia-que-nos-une">while the top 10% spend only a fifth</a>. </p>
<p>Bolsonaro’s combination of social conservatism with extreme economic liberalism has even made it to the front page of the pro-free market <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/09/20/jair-bolsonaro-latin-americas-latest-menace">Economist newspaper</a>, which characterised Bolsonaro as a populist menace to Latin America.</p>
<p>While <a href="http://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/article/view/47299">I have my reservations</a> over the social-developmentalist approach, it is irrefutable that it has managed to combine economic growth and stability, while reducing poverty. This was, however, in the context of favourable commodity prices.</p>
<p>But the competing strategy espoused by Bolsonaro seems to focus solely on a type of economic growth that does not necessarily mean socioeconomic development. The 1970s Chilean model of economic growth, which Guedes has praised, contributed to <a href="http://decompressinghistory.com/post/pinochet/">increasing social inequality</a> there. This is a pivotal issue for Brazil, which must be addressed by the next government’s economic strategy: the <a href="https://www.oxfam.org.br/sites/default/files/arquivos/relatorio_a_distancia_que_nos_une_en.pdf">six richest Brazilians own as much as the poorest 100m</a>.</p>
<p>If addressing Brazil’s great economic recession, rising crime and a 12% unemployment rate does not sound complicated enough, the country also needs a plan for rebuilding social cohesion. Recent years have left Brazil polarised. Respectful and democratic debates have been few and far between – from family WhatsApp groups to the higher judicial bodies. Bolsonaro seems to be taking advantage of this polarisation (the <a href="https://www.nexojornal.com.br/interativo/2018/10/10/Central-de-pesquisas-2%C2%BA-turno-a-evolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o-da-disputa-presidencial">latest poll</a> gave him 49% compared to Haddad’s 36%). This leaves Haddad with a serious challenge ahead of polling day on October 28.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98573/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arthur Gomes Moreira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As well as having dangerous social and political consequences, a Bolsonaro presidency would mark a massive shift for Brazil’s economy, too.Arthur Gomes Moreira, Doctoral Researcher at SPRU, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1043802018-10-08T13:50:42Z2018-10-08T13:50:42ZBrazil: can its poorest region call a halt to Jair Bolsonaro’s dangerous politics?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239704/original/file-20181008-72113-i2dw7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bolsonaro: a vote for fascism?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/elections-photos/general-elections-in-brazil-photos-54684769">EPA Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As was widely predicted, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-45780176">Jair Bolsonaro</a>, the far-right candidate of the Social Liberal Party, won the first round of the Brazilian presidential election, with just over 46% of the vote. But because he didn’t win a clear majority, he must now face Fernando Haddad of the left-wing Workers’ Party (who won 29% of the vote) in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/oct/08/brazil-election-2018-polls-close-after-chaotic-and-unpredictable-campaign-live">second round on October 28</a>.</p>
<p>Despite being branded a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/06/homophobic-mismogynist-racist-brazil-jair-bolsonaro">racist, homophobic and misogynist fascist</a> by his opponents, Bolsonaro is now the favourite to become Brazil’s next president. But support for him is inconsistent throughout the country – with resistance concentrated in Brazil’s poor north-east. In fact, of the ten states that didn’t return a majority for Bolsonaro, <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/eleicoes/2018/apuracao/1turno/brasil/">nine are located there</a>.</p>
<p>Certainly Bolsonaro’s track record makes for some shocking reading. He <a href="http://time.com/3630922/brazil-politics-congresswoman-rape-comments/">reportedly</a> said to a female congresswoman, publicly, that he would not sexually assault her because <a href="https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/pela-terceira-vez-bolsonaro-e-condenado-a-indenizar-maria-do-rosario">she was not worthy of him</a>. He has also stated that it is better to have a <a href="https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/bolsonaro-prefiro-filho-morto-em-acidente-a-um-homossexual,cf89cc00a90ea310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html">dead son than a gay one</a> and that gay people were not <a href="https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-36475717">beaten enough as children</a>.</p>
<p>In a country with a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/04/brazil-violence-election-jair-bolosonaro-fernando-haddad">soaring murder rate</a> and an alarming reputation for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/brazil-police-abuse-unabated">police brutality</a> – particularly <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/brazil-police-killings-of-black-youths-continue-25-years-after-the-candelaria-massacre/">against young black men</a> – his proposed solutions to the violence are <a href="https://www.otempo.com.br/capa/pol%C3%ADtica/bolsonaro-o-cidad%C3%A3o-armado-%C3%A9-a-primeira-linha-de-defesa-de-um-pa%C3%ADs-1.1060490">more guns</a>, giving the police free rein to <a href="https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2017/12/14/bolsonaro-diz-que-quer-dar-carta-branca-para-pm-matar-em-servico.htm">shoot without repercussion</a>, and reducing the age a child can be tried <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/08/no-interior-de-sp-bolsonaro-diz-que-a-principio-participara-de-debates.shtml">as an adult to 14</a> (from 18).</p>
<p>He is a former captain in the Brazilian military and presenter Stephen Fry recently stated that Bolsonaro’s fantasy militarism made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/26/stephen-fry-jair-bolsonaro-brazil-election-out-there-interview">his interview with him</a> “one of the most chilling confrontations” he has ever had. Bolsonaro even dedicated his vote to impeach Dilma Rousseff to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-34546418">Colonel Brilhante Ustra</a>, who was charged with human rights abuses for torturing activists during Brazil’s military dictatorship. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dilma-rousseff-two-views-of-democracy-and-the-battle-for-brazils-future-63668">Dilma Rousseff, two views of democracy, and the battle for Brazil's future</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While some have equated Bolsonaro to Donald Trump or Silvi Berlusconi, the lingering spectre of Brazil’s military dictatorship of 1964 to 1985 makes his potential election even more ominous. The dictatorship ended only 33 years ago and fear of, or eagerness for, its return colour political debates across the country. Those supporting the return of a dictatorship crave a renewed sense of order and an end to criminal violence – often believing that Bolsonaro can provide them. But many others, particularly LGBTQI people and poor people of colour, have a very real reason to fear for their physical and social well-being in the current political climate. </p>
<h2>Can the poor stop him?</h2>
<p>If Bolsonaro is to be stopped, Brazil’s poorest, most disdained region will play a large part in it. As the map <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/eleicoes/2018/apuracao/1turno/brasil/">here</a> shows, there is only one state outside the north-east – Pará – where the majority of votes did not go to Bolsonaro. The north-eastern states, however, all voted for Fernando Haddad, of the Worker’s Party, or the centre-left candidate, Ciro Gomes. </p>
<p>This is not a new trend. In 2014, the majority of Brazil’s north-east voted for Worker’s Party candidate Rousseff in the presidential election (which she went on to win), with some states in the region giving her <a href="http://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2014/blog/eleicao-em-numeros/post/dilma-vence-em-15-estados-aecio-em-12-e-no-df.html">nearly 80% of the vote</a>. This led to heated debates on social media under the hashtag <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/essesnordestinos">#EssesNordestinos</a> (or #ThoseNortheasterners), used by both sides.</p>
<p>Those opposed to Rousseff accused north-easterners of being too uneducated to make sound political decisions, while her supporters heralded the region’s intellectual and cultural contributions. Similar online disputes have taken place this year – with an extra helping of fake news.</p>
<p>One <a href="http://www.e-farsas.com/flavio-bolsonaro-posou-usando-camiseta-com-dizeres-contra-os-nordestinos.html">fake photo circulated on Facebook</a>, for example, showed Flávio Bolsonaro (Jair Bolsonaro’s son, who was elected to the Senate to represent Rio de Janeiro yesterday) wearing a t-shirt with a message stamped across the front telling north-eastern migrants to “go home because Rio is no place for donkeys”. Who altered the image is unclear, but it serves the double purpose of recruiting the support of those with anti-northeastern sentiments while encouraging north-easterners to vote. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a poster that said that voting for Bolsonaro would put north-easterners “in their place”, also circulated online, with some suspecting it was an intentional campaign to arouse the north-east’s <a href="https://polibiobraga.blogspot.com/2018/04/cartazes-injuriosos-contra-bolsonaro.html">anti-Bolsonaro sentiments</a>. Since the vote, posts have circulated on Facebook lauding the north-east for potentially saving the nation and encouraging people to report abusive posts about the region’s inhabitants.</p>
<p>These examples reveal how the north-east (with its leftist political leanings) has become central to Brazilian politics. In the forthcoming run-off election, the north-east will doubtless vote for Haddad and the Worker’s Party – the party of former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, himself from the region. And so, a <a href="http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2017-12/ibge-brasil-tem-14-de-sua-populacao-vivendo-na-linha-de-pobreza">region long derided</a> for holding the country back because to its poverty, <a href="https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas-novoportal/multidominio/condicoes-de-vida-desigualdade-e-pobreza/17374-indicadores-sociais-minimos.html?=&t=resultados">low literacy rates and lack of industrialisation</a> is now Brazil’s last bastion against a fascist presidential candidate who celebrates the military dictatorship.</p>
<p>But there is a feeling of history repeating itself as well. In the early 1960s, the north-east was the focus of former US president John F Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress aid agreement with Brazil, not only because it was poor, but also because the US wanted to stem its reputation for political rebellion and its election of communist and socialist politicians <a href="https://celsofurtado.phl-net.com.br/artigos_scf/Vandeck_Santiago.pdf">in the region</a>. Indeed, the 1964 right-wing military coup was, in part, a response to the leftist clout of the northeast.</p>
<p>Something similar could happen today. Bolsonaro has already stated that he will accept <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/09/nao-aceito-resultado-diferente-da-minha-eleicao-afirma-bolsonaro.shtml">no other result than his election</a> while <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwLg13hSkRk">Vladimir Safatle</a>, a renowned professor from the University of São Paulo, has warned that “there is a military coup in process in Brazil now”. The north-eastern vote might save Brazil from Bolsonaro as an elected president, but whether the north-east can save Brazilian democracy – and prevent a return to the dark days of dictatorship – remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104380/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Courtney J. Campbell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brazil could see a return to the dark days of the military dictatorship.Courtney J. Campbell, Lecturer in Latin American History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1022832018-08-30T13:42:59Z2018-08-30T13:42:59ZBrazil’s democracy is on the ropes – and now a dreaded election begins<p>This year’s Brazilian election is entering a decisive phase. With official television advertising beginning on August 31, voters will be bombarded by electoral messages for 50 minutes every evening, forcing them to think about their options for president, governor, and members of congress and the state legislatures from now until October 4. And the choices are far from easy.</p>
<p>The most popular presidential candidate, former president <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/05/world/americas/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-fast-facts/index.html">Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva </a>, is serving prison time on corruption charges and unlikely to be allowed to run; the next most popular candidate, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/19/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-presidential-candidate-trump-parallels">Jair Bolsonaro</a>, has been compared to none other than Donald Trump, a comparison he seems almost to embrace. Observers worry that he could not only finish in the top two in the first round of the election on October 7, but even win the runoff three weeks later to capture the presidency.</p>
<p>But disturbing as Bolsonaro might be, he is not the root cause of Brazil’s democratic atrophy. His emergence owes a lot to the disastrous developments of the last few years, and is indicative of a deepening democratic crisis.</p>
<p>In their book, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/commentisfree/2018/jan/21/this-is-how-democracies-die">How Democracies Die</a>, the political scientists Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue that democracies depend on informal rules of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. Mutual toleration ensures that candidates and other political actors recognise each other as legitimate rivals, not existential threats; institutional forbearance is restraint from using one’s full legal or organisational prerogatives so as not to endanger the system, respecting the spirit as well as the letter of the law. And like other beleaguered democracies, Brazil has seen both of these dwindling in recent years.</p>
<p>One example that sticks out is the behaviour of the losing candidate in the last presidential election, Aécio Neves. After the incumbent president, Dilma Rousseff, won <a href="https://theconversation.com/victorious-rousseff-must-now-pull-together-a-deeply-divided-brazil-33032">a narrow victory</a> in the second round runoff, Neves refused to accept the result; through his party, the PSDB (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy), he demanded that the Supreme Electoral Court conduct an audit of the vote count. The court found no fraud, and a year later, Neves’ own party reached the same conclusion – but a dangerous precedent had been set.</p>
<h2>The slippery slope</h2>
<p>A year or so later, the opposition set about impeaching Rousseff. In a series of manoeuvres that were legally permissible but of dubious legitimacy, the opposition impeached the president on the grounds that she had <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-brazilian-president-dilma-rousseffs-real-crime-59363">violated the law in administering the federal budget</a>, even though she only did what many others in similar positions had done.</p>
<p>Decided in August of 2016 by a vote in the senate and upheld by the president of the Supreme Court, Rousseff’s ultimate <a href="https://theconversation.com/dilma-rousseff-two-views-of-democracy-and-the-battle-for-brazils-future-63668">impeachment and removal from office</a> looked like a punishment for her economic incompetence and loss of a congressional majority, with the budgetary malfeasance a mere pretext. Her successor was her own vice-president, Michel Temer – a man who has gone on to become <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/26/michel-temer-brazils-unpopular-president-avoids-corruption-trial">one of the most unpopular presidents in recent Brazilian history</a>.</p>
<p>But it’s not just elected representatives who’ve shown a lack of toleration and forbearance. The so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history">Operation Car Wash</a>, a massive anti-corruption investigation that uncovered a large-scale kickback scheme in the state-owned oil company Petrobras, has empowered a new set of judges, prosecutors, and police investigators, some of whom are overstepping the bounds of their authority in their zeal to root out corruption.</p>
<p>Back in March 2016, Sergio Moro, the federal judge who eventually convicted Lula of corruption in 2017, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/release-tapped-phone-calls-lula-rousseff-deepens-brazil-chaos">released a phone conversation</a> between Rousseff and Lula that had been recorded after the warrant authorizing the wiretap had expired. And in July 2018, when an appeals court judge ordered that Lula be released (a ruling that was quickly overturned) Judge Moro <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/brazil-appeals-court-orders-president-lula-release-180708162958434.html">insisted that the decision was incorrect</a>, despite having no authority to rule on the matter. He may not have violated the letter of the law, but he has behaved more like a partisan politician than an impartial adjudicator of legal cases.</p>
<p>Still, the Workers’ Party also shares the blame for this democratic decline. When campaigning for the presidency, Dilma Rousseff worked hard to frighten poor voters into thinking that her opposition would take away their benefits if she lost; once elected, her government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/14/brazil-taxes-spending-cuts-recession-economy">imposed austerity measures</a>.</p>
<p>More than that, the Workers’ Party has not attempted to distance itself from the systematic corruption that appears to have taken place under its administration from 2003 to 2016, and it has taken no serious steps to repair and renew itself as a political force after an abject few years.</p>
<p>The upshot is the most wide open (and perhaps the most dreaded) presidential contest in Brazil since 1989.</p>
<h2>In the running</h2>
<p>With Lula almost certainly ruled out, the most likely Workers’ Party candidate is current vice-presidential candidate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/06/brazil-workers-party-backup-jailed-presidential-candidate">Fernando Haddad</a>, a former minister of education and mayor of São Paulo. The Workers’ Party will have to introduce Haddad to an electorate that doesn’t know him well, and convince them that he’s Lula’s preferred candidate. The PSDB, meanwhile, is represented by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-psdb/brazils-psdb-picks-sao-paulo-gov-alckmin-to-lead-it-into-2018-race-idUSKBN1E30NA">Geraldo Alckmin</a>, former governor of São Paulo and head of the broadest multi-party coalition in the race. He will have to distance himself from the unpopular Temer and present his administrative experience and lack of charisma as assets rather than liabilities.</p>
<p>Running outside the three major parties (the third being the PMDB of President Temer), former environment minister and senator <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-brazil-election-marinasilva/brazil-environmentalist-marina-silva-to-run-for-president-in-2018-idUKKBN1DW0NX">Marina Silva</a> will try to convince voters that she is not only honest but can get things done, while <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-gomes/brazil-presidential-contender-gomes-would-reverse-privatizations-idUSKCN1GS2IL">Ciro Gomes</a>, former governor of Ceará and minister of national integration, will try to reassure voters that he has the temperament to govern.</p>
<p>And then there’s Bolsonaro. A former army captain, he’s a polarising figure: nostalgic for the dictatorship of 1964-85, an advocate of police violence, and hostile to Afro-Brazilians, women and gays. Were he to win, the decline of tolerance and forbearance in Brazilian politics might well accelerate dramatically.</p>
<p>Still, because a presidential candidate must win a majority of the valid votes, forcing first-round winners with less than a majority into a second round runoff, Bolsonaro’s ultimate victory looks less probable. And unlike Donald Trump, Bolsonaro doesn’t have an effective party machine backing him to help get out the vote. But even if Brazil is spared a Bolsonaro presidency, few people will celebrate.</p>
<p>The new government will find itself in a fiscal and political straightjacket, forced to deal with the same old party leaders in Congress and a disgruntled, polarised population. Any new president will inevitably begin to disappoint the electorate as soon as he or she is inaugurated on January 1 2019; their best hope may be to simply try to muddle through.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Pereira has received funding from the Economic and Social Research (ESRC) of the UK and FAPESP, the research council of the state of Sao Paulo.
I am a member of the Council of the Brazilian Chamber of Commerce of Great Britain. </span></em></p>A dejected public and a crowded, unpopular field of candidates make for an unhappy election.Anthony Pereira, Director, King's Brazil Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/908892018-02-05T13:36:42Z2018-02-05T13:36:42ZBrazil’s institutions are working, but its political party system is a disaster<p>When Brazil’s former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, had his conviction for bribery and money laundering <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/24/brazilian-court-upholds-corruption-conviction-for-ex-president-lula">upheld</a> this January, it once again forced Brazil to ask whether its government institutions are working, especially the judiciary. But while many on the left still <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-brazil-politics-analysis/brazils-left-sticks-by-wounded-lula-no-plan-b-idUKKBN1FE2LE">decry Lula’s conviction</a> as a thinly veiled “coup” against anti-neoliberal leaders, there is a growing consensus that due process has been thoroughly (if not always competently) observed. </p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/29/brazil-faces-a-big-elections-next-year-and-investors-are-strapping-in-now.html">2018 general elections</a> loom, the integrity of government institutions and the rule of law – exhaustively examined following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dilma-rousseff-two-views-of-democracy-and-the-battle-for-brazils-future-63668">impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff</a> in 2016 – is a no longer Brazil’s primary concern. Instead, recent developments have exposed the chronic weakness of another institution in the Brazilian political playing field, one that is ultimately essential to the functioning of a dynamic and competitive system: the political party. </p>
<p>Puzzlingly, Lula still commands remarkable support among the members of his Worker’s Party (PT), and across much of the left. It’s understandable that Lula might still enjoy the support of a large portion of the working class, especially in his native north-east, where the effects of his enormously successful social policies were most pronounced. Then there is the fact that despite all that’s transpired, Lula still captures <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2018/02/01/brazil-lula-leads-presidential-election-poll-despite-corruption-conviction">around 34%</a> in the polls for this year’s presidential elections. The old Brazilian political adage “they steal, but they get things done” might be as relevant as ever.</p>
<p>It is also not impossible that some PT members still support Lula simply because they are implicated in the fraudulent activities for which party bosses have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/21/ex-treasurer-workers-party-sentenced-prison-petrobras-corruption-scandal">jailed</a>. But it’s less clear why several PT luminaries who are otherwise untainted, such as former senator <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/maquiavel/a-carta-de-eduardo-suplicy-a-donald-trump/">Eduardo Suplicy</a>, remain staunchly faithful to a leader convicted of corruption. One might expect, instead, some kind of mea culpa, an organised intra-party renewal process, or even an outright leadership battle.</p>
<p>Furthermore, despite a slight decline in numbers, the PT has managed to preserve its roughly 1.5m members, the second-largest formal party base in the country. It seems strange that the membership are apparently unwilling to either pressure the party to ditch its main spokesman, or leave the party altogether. </p>
<p>Are the PT’s internal audit mechanisms not functioning? Is power too concentrated at the top, leaving members alienated? Lately, the PT’s only real demonstrations of systematic unison have been the rallies in support of candidate Lula. And if Lula is barred from running – not yet a sure thing – those could soon be over.</p>
<p>Still, the PT is far from the only party with serious problems.</p>
<h2>Machiavellian moves</h2>
<p>The conservative Social Liberal Party (PSL) is tackling the fallout from a high-profile new member, <a href="https://qz.com/1003000/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-has-a-donald-trump-and-his-chances-at-the-presidency-are-looking-better-every-day/">Jair Bolsonaro</a>. A former army captain and congressman currently serving his seventh term in the national Chamber of Deputies, Bolsonaro is the leading right-wing contender for 2018, currently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-energy-drink-bolsomito">running second</a> in the polls after Lula. An advocate of torture and defender of the old military dictatorship, Bolsonaro has also demonstrated a limited understanding of the basic functions of government and the economy.</p>
<p>In the wake of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/21/brazil-police-crowds-rio-protest">2013 protests across Brazil</a>, the PSL “incubated” what it called a “startup” movement within its ranks. Named Livres (Free), it is composed of young intellectuals and activists. They share a zealous devotion to the Austrian School of economics, and eagerly circulate YouTube videos of free market godfather <a href="http://nakedkeynesianism.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/milton-friedman-on-economic-development.html">Milton Friedman</a>. The plan was to endow PSL with intellectual substance and improve its internal machinery; in exchange, PSL would provide the legally-required party name for Livres members to run for office. </p>
<p>The pact came to a crashing halt when PSL president Luciano Bivar suddenly announced that Bolsonaro would be the PSL’s candidate for the presidency. In an honorable but bold move that might cost it the chance to be in government next year, Livres immediately <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/blog-do-fucs/com-chegada-de-bolsonaro-livres-anuncia-saida-do-psl/">announced its departure</a>, battered copies of <a href="https://mises.org/library/road-serfdom-0">“The Road to Serfdom”</a> and all, from the PSL’s menagerie.</p>
<p>Bolsonaro, meanwhile, has left behind the Progressive Party, under whose auspices he was most recently elected to office. This was in fact the tenth party with which he has identified. Indeed, were it not for Livres and its extraordinarily consistent posture, his latest leap would hardly have raised eyebrows.</p>
<h2>Party organisation</h2>
<p>So why are these parties all doing so badly? The classic diagnosis of Brazilian political parties is that they are structurally feeble and unresponsive to both their militant bases and society in general. Organisational unity only seems to come together around election time; for the most part, parties in general have informal or ineffectual governance structures, where personal relations – and personalities – tend to matter more than procedural rigour.</p>
<p>The historical reasons for this remain relevant today. As in much of Latin America, parties in Brazil are often mere vehicles for patronage. They are a device for facilitating negotiations between regional and economic interests and the government, all in the guise of democracy.</p>
<p>The PT’s history is particularly instructive. It was originally a product of the 1970s New Left, uniting factory workers and intellectuals against the right-wing military government – and at first, it seemed like a promising change. But socioeconomic forces eventually prevailed, and the party ended up reproducing the shortcomings of the wider system. It’s so far too early to tell, but the recent decline in membership may indicate that the PT is headed for the same fate as most of the other parties represented in Congress: small, devoid of ideas, guided by personalities rather than principles, and bankrolled by shady special interests.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/brazils-new-political-movements">new movements like Livres</a> will manage to change Brazilian politics and reverse the chronically low levels of trust in political parties and politicians in general. What’s clear is that something has to give. A recent attempt at <a href="http://www.emia.org/news/story/5505">overhauling electoral laws</a> aimed to reduce the number of registered parties from 35 to a more manageable 10, but at best, that was a self-serving tweak by legislators. To properly fight corruption and renew the political class, parties need to be transformed from the inside out.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felipe Krause has received funding for his PhD from the Federal Government of Brazil. The views expressed in this article are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Brazilian government.</span></em></p>Can South America’s biggest democracy run properly with a broken, corrupt political class seemingly unable to reform?Felipe Krause, PhD Candidate in Politics and International Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907942018-01-29T11:30:42Z2018-01-29T11:30:42ZPresidential corruption verdict shows just how flawed Brazil’s justice system is<p>On Jan. 24, a Brazilian appeals court <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/brazil-on-edge-as-appeals-decision-nears-in-ex-president-lula-corruption-case/2018/01/24/e34ecccc-ff9b-11e7-86b9-8908743c79dd_story.html">upheld a criminal conviction against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</a>, rocking Brazil’s already <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-crisis-is-a-graduation-dilemma-and-theres-no-easy-way-out-77849">turbulent</a> political scene. The verdict, which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/12/brazil-president-lula-convicted-corruption">confirms a 2017 ruling</a> against the wildly popular Workers’ Party leader on corruption charges, could carry a prison sentence of up to 10 years. </p>
<p>It may also make Lula <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-brazils-clean-record-law">ineligible to run</a> in Brazil’s October presidential election. The 72-year-old is currently his party’s nominee and a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/it-s-jail-or-the-presidency-for-lula-as-key-brazil-ruling-looms">favorite to win the race</a>.</p>
<p>Lula’s lawyer has <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-brazil-lula-sentence-20180124-htmlstory.html">deemed</a> the appeals court verdict “a legal farce masquerading as justice.” Many Lula supporters agree, saying the ruling amounts to a preemptive presidential coup by the right wing.</p>
<p>His opponents, on the other hand, call the ruling a major victory against political corruption.</p>
<p>It’s a complicated case, but in my analysis, neither side has it quite right. As a Brazilian constitutional law professor and <a href="http://direitosp.fgv.br/supremoempauta">Supreme Court researcher</a>, I see Lula’s trials as a marquee example of Brazil’s flawed and inconsistent justice system. It confirms that Brazilian judges are on a moral quest to “cleanse” politics – and they’re willing to bend the law to do it. </p>
<h2>Brazil behind Lula</h2>
<p>The Jan. 24 verdict has upended Brazilian politics. That’s because Lula is not simply a former president convicted of corruption. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203589/original/file-20180126-100902-17ti9q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lula for president?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/Gbhkk3">Agência Brasil Fotografias/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Lula left office in 2010 after two four-year terms with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-lula-poll/brazils-lula-to-leave-with-record-high-popularity-idUSTRE6BF4O620101216">an 80-percent approval rating</a>. In 2009, Barack Obama called him “<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/brazils-lula-most-popular-politician-earth-79355">the most popular politician on Earth</a>. </p>
<p>Eight years later, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/it-s-jail-or-the-presidency-for-lula-as-key-brazil-ruling-looms">polls show Lula leading by 18 points over his closest rival</a> in the 2018 presidential race, despite <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption-lula-idUSKBN14421S">multiple recent indictments on graft charges</a>.</p>
<p>The loyalty derives largely from the Lula administration’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/17/brazil-bolsa-familia-decade-anniversary-poverty-relief">success in markedly decreasing hunger and poverty in Brazil</a>. As president Lula launched the Bolsa Família program, which gave cash to millions of poor families. He also created tuition incentives helped working-class students go to college and improved access to electricity. </p>
<p>Recently, though, reputation has been tarnished somewhat. Since 2012, the Supreme Court has convicted <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-lula/brazils-supreme-court-convicts-lula-aides-of-corruption-idUSBRE8981ID20121010">four Lula allies</a> for orchestrating a sustained bribery scheme called ”<a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-14">Mensalão</a>.“ The cabinet members and ministers paid members of congress 30,000 reais – roughly US$10,000 – each month in exchange for legislative support on key issues. </p>
<p>Lula was never charged in the Mensalão, and he claims <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21568722-historic-trial-those-guilty-legislative-votes-cash-scheme-draws-close">he knew nothing</a> about it. </p>
<h2>The justice system against Lula?</h2>
<p>He was not able to escape <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-massive-petrobras-corruption-scandal-is-upending-brazilian-politics-43939">Operation Car Wash</a>, a massive corruption investigation lead by the popular judge <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/world/americas/judge-sergio-moro-brazil-anti-corruption.html">Sérgio Moro</a>. Indeed, it was Moro who in 2017 convicted Lula of graft for receiving a free penthouse apartment from a construction company, OAS, which had benefited from <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-39194395">illegal government contracts during Lula’s administration</a>.</p>
<p>The Jan. 24 appeals court ruling upheld that conviction unanimously. A three-judge panel found the former president guilty <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/01/24/lula-brazil-corruption-conviction-car-wash/">on several grounds</a>, and bolstered some charges largely unsubstantiated in the original ruling. </p>
<p>Mainly, they found that early in his administration Lula had used his political power to influence the board and leadership of Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company. In 2003 and 2004, Petrobras went on to make <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/3/18/11260924/petrobras-brazil">numerous illegal infrastructure development</a> contracts, with OAS and other firms. </p>
<p>The appellate judges determined that there was no need to prove how, specifically, Lula helped OAS, since it’s reasonable to believe that a sitting president would have known about and endorsed his subordinates’ illegal contracts scheme. </p>
<p>The judges also agreed that Lula and his wife, Marisa Letícia Lula da Silva, had shown suspicious interest in an apartment owned by OAS. Though they never purchased it or even lived there, the couple suggested specific renovations to the space. Those projects were completed. </p>
<p>Essentially, Brazilian courts have now twice found Lula guilty of corrupt dealings with OAS beyond any reasonable doubt. In legal terms, though, the shaky evidence shows only that something fishy was going on with that OAS apartment. For many Brazilians, "fishy” seems insufficient to disqualify a presidential front-runner. </p>
<p>The decision looks more dubious considering that Brazil’s current president, Michel Temer, dodged criminal prosecution for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/americas/brazil-michel-temer-corruption.html">a September 2017 indictment</a> after his chief of staff was caught leaving a business lunch <a href="http://en.mercopress.com/2017/05/24/temer-running-out-of-special-aides-to-corruption-arrests-one-even-returned-a-bag-with-hush-money">with a briefcase full of hush money</a> allegedly meant for Temer. </p>
<h2>Brazil’s flawed judiciary</h2>
<p>That still doesn’t prove that Lula’s prosecution is political. Frankly, the Brazilian judiciary is prone to inconsistencies and to ignoring the due process of law. </p>
<p>Brazil has the world’s <a href="http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All">third highest prison population</a>, with some 660,000 incarcerated people. Around <a href="http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/brazil">35 percent of them have not yet been tried</a>, and the vast majority of prisoners are poor, young black men facing lengthy sentences for charges that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/05/justice-poor-brazil-170511102159339.html">white defendants almost never see</a>.</p>
<p>In other words, there is a punitive streak among Brazilian prosecutors and judges. Historically, though, <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1806-64452007000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en">the judiciary has gone easy</a> on rich defendants with the best defense attorneys money could buy. </p>
<p>In a way, what Lula’s verdict shows is that the judiciary’s instinct to punish – normally reserved for pickpocketers and low-level drug dealers – has now been unleashed on some of Brazil’s most powerful people. The contrast with Temer’s lack of prosecution is another example of unequal treatment under the law. </p>
<h2>Moralizing judges</h2>
<p>When the Mensalão scandal exposed Brazil’s pervasive corruption, many citizens came to see the judiciary as the last democratic bastion in a mostly rotten republic. In doing so, they ignored its many flaws. </p>
<p>Worse still, it seems that judges like Moro and others, too, believe the idea that the criminal justice system alone can clean up politics. </p>
<p>And since the wheels of <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/05/359830235/brazil-the-land-of-many-lawyers-and-very-slow-justice">justice turn slowly in Brazil</a> – where cases can take up to 12 years to conclude – judges as high as the Supreme Court have found ad hoc, unprecedented ways to rebuke politicians they believe to be corrupt. </p>
<p>They have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-lula/brazil-supreme-court-justice-upholds-barring-of-lula-from-post-idUSKCN0WO2MH">barred ministers</a> <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Brazil-New-Labor-Minister-Banned-For-Not-Paying-Chauffeurs-20180110-0035.html">from taking office</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/05/speaker-of-brazils-lower-house-eduardo-cunha-suspended">suspended congressmen</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36211526">imprisoned senators</a> and <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2017/09/1922148-brazils-supreme-court-suspends-aecio-neves-from-senate-and-orders-house-arrest-at-night.shtml">even put legislators under house arrest</a> – often without clear constitutional grounds or legal precedent for doing so. At bottom, the work of a judge is to apply established law or, when creating a new precedent, to do so with clear new rules.</p>
<p>These judicial interventions have unduly influenced Brazilian politics. So far, the Workers’ Party has seen more prosecution than other major parties, though <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/15/brazil-corruption-investigation-list-politicians-michel-temer">that seems to be changing</a>.</p>
<p>All of this has increased the popular perception that Brazil’s court system is just as politicized as politics itself. As a result, confidence in the judiciary has been <a href="https://portal.fgv.br/en/news/2017-confidence-brazilian-justice-index-public-confidence-institutions-drops">dropping steadily for years</a>. </p>
<p>Lula’s lost appeal is the perfect distillation of what ails the Brazilian legal system. It is one part judicial activism in the name of anti-corruption, one part judicial disregard for legal precedents and due process. With the good intention of “fixing” politics, Brazil’s judges may be breaking the rule of law. </p>
<p>What they are not doing, I would argue, is staging a partisan judicial coup against the Workers’ Party.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Lula’s case will be again appealed and eventually decided by a higher court. That process could take many months. In the meantime, an electoral court must determine whether to let Lula run for president in October. </p>
<p>To do so, Brazilian judges will again find themselves deciding a profoundly political question: Would Lula’s candidacy strengthen or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/world/americas/brazil-presidential-electionluiz-inacio-lula-da-silva.html">subvert Brazilian democracy</a>?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rubens Glezer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An appeals court ruling against popular Brazilian ex-president Lula has hotly divided Brazil. A legal scholar argues that this is a case of activist judges taking their anti-graft crusade too far.Rubens Glezer, Constitutional Law Professor, Fundação Getulio VargasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812802017-09-11T10:08:50Z2017-09-11T10:08:50ZAs corruption scandals spread, Brazil struggles to uphold the rule of law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185283/original/file-20170908-32284-gpkao5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Can Brazil's judges really hold powerful feet to the fire?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASupremo_Tribunal_Federal_-_Brazil's_Supreme_Court_(3492208700).jpg">Ricαrdo from Fortaleza/CE, Brasil, via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the current president Michel Temer under suspicion and two former presidents, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and his successor Dilma Rousseff, now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption/brazil-former-presidents-lula-and-rousseff-charged-in-corruption-case-idUSKCN1BH013">facing fresh corruption charges</a>, Brazil’s political crisis is very much still underway. Although widely anticipated by the press and the public, the cases against Brazil’s most recent presidents have nevertheless left the country shocked – not just because of the allegations themselves, but because of the way the accused have been treated by the judiciary.</p>
<p>In Lula’s first trial, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-lula-evolved-from-brazils-top-politician-to-its-most-notable-convict-81008">resulted in his July 2017 conviction</a> for corruption and money laundering, even those who thought him dubious found the evidence presented by public prosecutors rather thin. In Temer’s case, it was the opposite; despite overwhelming evidence of illegal donations to his 2014 election campaign – when he ran in coalition with the now-impeached Rousseff – he was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/brazil-court-dismisses-corruption-michel-temer-170610042027642.html">acquitted by four-to-three</a> on technical grounds often overlooked in previous cases.</p>
<p>This was a serious blow to the credibility of the whole court system. As Oscar Vilhena, a leading human rights lawyer and dean of FGV Law School in Sao Paulo, <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/oscarvilhenavieira/2017/06/1891813-julgamento-da-chapa-dilma-temer-deve-reduzir-a-confianca-no-judiciario.shtml">wrote in the Brazilian daily Folha</a>, “the legitimacy crisis that has devastated our political system seems now to have nested in one of the instances of the judiciary”. Other commentators were even more blunt; in the same newspaper, columnist Marcelo Coelho <a href="http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/marcelocoelho/2017/06/1892764-nao-so-o-tse-mas-todos-os-lados-saem-do-julgamento-de-temer-sob-suspeita.shtml">declared himself</a> “utterly deflated” by the decision, arguing that it is not only the politicians but “the whole society that is now in a genuine process of demoralisation”. </p>
<p>Lula’s conviction elicited more divided opinion, but also further tarnished the judiciary’s reputation as the only dependable pillar of Brazil’s democratic system. For the country to complete its meandering journey towards robust democracy and the rule of law, which began with the end of military rule in the mid-1980s, the judiciary must reform itself just as urgently as any other institution.</p>
<p>Until recent developments, the widespread feeling was that the judiciary was somehow morally superior to Brazil’s other national institutions, and its judges much less prone than politicians to sink to inadequate, anti-republican behaviour. The current <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2017/jun/12/operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history-podcast">Lava Jato</a> (Operation Car Wash), a colossal probe into corruption at the giant state oil company Petrobras helps to reinforce such stereotypes. It pitches <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazils-new-hero-is-a-nerdy-judge-who-is-tough-on-official-corruption/2015/12/23/54287604-7bf1-11e5-bfb6-65300a5ff562_story.html?utm_term=.79aa65eb2026">heroic and honest judges</a> against corrupt and abject politicians and businessmen.</p>
<p>As one renowned lawyer put it after Temer’s absolution, with perhaps a little <a href="http://www.valor.com.br/politica/4997946/eventual-absolvicao-da-chapa-desacredita-o-judiciario-diz-carvalhosa">hyperbole</a>: “The judiciary was above all suspicion until that decision.” But anyone familiar with the Brazilian judicial system should know these were always oversimplifications.</p>
<p>There are far too many aspects in the operation of the Brazilian judiciary in need of reform to be addressed in a single article. They range from absurd privileges such as the infamous two months of annual paid holidays enjoyed by judges and public prosecutors (twice as long of that of any other worker) and a <a href="http://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/06/juizes-estaduais-e-promotores-eles-ganham-23-vezes-mais-do-que-voce.html">string of benefits</a> including housing, education and food aid on the top of their already generous salaries, the highest among public servants. Misconduct is met with <a href="http://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/10/07/politica/1475794566_642340.html">inadequate punishment</a>; the highest administrative sanction currently available is compulsory retirement with full salary. </p>
<h2>Justice still pending</h2>
<p>But the crucial issue highlighted in these recent decisions is that of the impartiality of judges. The electoral tribunal that decided the case in favour of president Temer was a textbook example of what should not take place in a democracy that respects the rule of law. Two of the seven judges on the tribunal were <a href="https://jota.info/artigos/quem-sao-e-como-sao-escolhidos-os-ministros-do-tse-07042017">nominated to the court by Temer himself</a> only a couple of months before they both voted to acquit him. </p>
<p>The most controversial vote in favour of Temer came from justice Gilmar Mendes, known during the Lula and Rousseff presidencies as “leader of the opposition” due to his frequent attacks on their party, which he <a href="http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2015/10/150921_perfil_gilmar_ms_ab">once called</a> a “syndicate of thieves”.</p>
<p>Similar aspersions of political bias have been cast on some members of Operation Car Wash, most prominently against Sergio Moro and his conduct in Lula’s prosecution and conviction. It does not help that both Moro and Mendes seem untroubled about mixing with politicians of other parties, some of whom are <a href="http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,temer-e-gilmar-mendes-discutem-quadro-politico-em-jantar-no-jaburu,70001637801">implicated in corruption investigations</a> that they may, or will inevitably later judge.</p>
<p>None of this is definitive proof that some Brazilian judges are politically biased, but no democratic system can rely solely on the goodwill of its officials. As the wise old aphorism goes, “not only must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81280/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz receives funding from The Newton Fund, British Council. </span></em></p>Brazil’s political and business elites are consumed by scandal, but the courts are hardly squeaky clean.Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Reader in Transnational Law, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/810082017-07-20T01:49:39Z2017-07-20T01:49:39ZHow Lula evolved from Brazil’s top politician to its most notable convict<p>Brazilians watched along with the rest of the world as one of the country’s leading federal judges ruled that <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-brazil-politics-polls-idUKKBN17W0KD">its most popular political figure</a> is a criminal. </p>
<p>On July 12, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazils-new-hero-is-a-nerdy-judge-who-is-tough-on-official-corruption/2015/12/23/54287604-7bf1-11e5-bfb6-65300a5ff562_story.html?utm_term=.09ae2628acf9">Sergio Moro</a>, the federal judge leading Brazil’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history">massive “car wash” investigation</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/world/americas/brazil-lula-da-silva-corruption.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Famericas&action=click&contentCollection=americas&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=search&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sectionfront&_r=0">convicted</a> former two-term President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10841416">Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva</a> of corruption and sentenced him to nine and a half years in prison. </p>
<p>My academic engagement with <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/brazil-2153">Brazil</a> began in the late 1970s, well before Lula – as he’s commonly known – finally won the presidency in 2002 after three tries. Over these four decades, I witnessed his remarkable rise and now his devastating fall, and met him three times. </p>
<p>Given that Lula is practically synonymous with brand Brazil, I believe his conviction confirms the total bankruptcy of Brazilian politics and raises serious doubts about the future of Latin America’s largest country. </p>
<h2>Lula’s rise</h2>
<p>Lula’s improbable emergence from the poverty of the Northeast and slums of Sao Paulo to the highest office in the land <a href="http://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-Ka-M/Lula-da-Silva-Luiz-In-cio.html">is well-documented</a>.</p>
<p>As a young political scientist focused on Latin America, I first became aware of Lula the union organizer and political activist in the industrial suburbs of Sao Paulo during the country’s harsh military dictatorship (1964 to 1985). On three occasions our paths crossed. </p>
<p>The first came in the halls of Congress in the late 1980s when he served as a deputy following Brazil’s return to civilian rule. I initially dismissed Lula as a being too far on the leftist fringe to become a serious national player. But he defied skeptics like me and rapidly rose to prominence, where he remains today. </p>
<p>In 1989, in Brazil’s <a href="http://countrystudies.us/brazil/101.htm">first democratic election</a> since 1960, Lula made his first bid for the presidency. Although he lost, he made a much stronger showing than predicted. The campaign rallies I observed were large and impassioned.</p>
<p>Throughout the 1990s, Lula and his socialist Workers’ Party (PT) strengthened their hold on politics. The party increased its representation in Congress as well as at the state and local level. Lula ran again in the 1994 and 1998 presidential elections. Again, he fared well but lost. </p>
<p>Eventually Lula and the PT leadership saw the need to broaden their base beyond blue collar workers, urban slum dwellers and the rural poor if they were to win power and govern. This meant moderating their hard left image.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178926/original/file-20170719-13593-1oxzvz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lula was branded a hard-core leftist in his early days. In 1995, he met with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Agencia Estado, Ed Ferreira</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moving to the center</h2>
<p>I witnessed the beginning of this effort in the 1994 campaign. </p>
<p>A respected public figure – who was not a PT militant but saw Lula’s potential – set up a trip for the candidate and his advisers to Washington and New York. The goal was to assure political and business leaders that he would not upset U.S.-Brazil relations if elected. </p>
<p>I was invited to sit in on a meeting of the delegation with two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to attend a reception where one of the hosts was Lincoln Gordon, ambassador to Brazil during the <a href="http://nacla.org/news/2014/4/1/remembering-brazils-military-coup-50-years-later">1964 military coup</a>. In the minds of many Brazilians, Gordon <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/21/AR2009122103466.html">represented Washington’s support</a> for the armed takeover and would not have expected Lula to meet with him.</p>
<p>On another occasion five years later, a Lula adviser approached me during a trip to Brazil and asked if a delegation of institutional investors I was accompanying would be interested in meeting his boss, who was dining at the same Brasilia restaurant. To me, this was another instance of reassuring foreign investors they could continue to make money in Brazil. </p>
<p>These and many other examples of outreach to the center proved decisive to Lula’s eventual victory in 2002. His “<a href="http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/01/06/hello-2014-time-for-a-new-letter-to-the-brazilian-people/">Letter to the Brazilian People</a>” promised that his government would pursue market-friendly economic policies. This pledge neutralized business opposition and calmed the middle class. He also promised to root our corruption from politics.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178927/original/file-20170719-13534-6tacde.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lula celebrates with his wife after finally winning the presidency in 2002.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Dario Lopez-Mills</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lula’s pledges</h2>
<p>Because of the widely perceived failure of Brazil to realize its potential, Brazil <a href="http://www.nasdaq.com/article/the-global-guru-the-country-of-the-future-cm362793">was branded as</a> “the country of the future … and always will be.”</p>
<p>President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had a mandate to lead Brazil into the future by integrating the dispossessed 40 percent of the population into the nation while working with the private sector to grow the economy and strengthen the rule of law. </p>
<p>In an <a href="http://www.latam.ufl.edu/research--training/la-business-environment/publications/">annual assessment</a> of the Latin American business environment, published from 1999 to 2014, I chronicled Lula’s considerable accomplishments in fulfilling two-thirds of his promises: His government coupled redistributive social programs with pro-growth measures, and as a result the economy boomed, poverty declined and life got better for all Brazilians. </p>
<p>Achievements at home won Lula and Brazil <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9781403918529_6">recognition and respect abroad</a>. Brazil’s reward for becoming a “serious country” under Lula was hosting the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Lula finished his second term as “<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/brazils-lula-most-popular-politician-earth-79355">the most popular politician on Earth</a>.” </p>
<p>But it was his failure to address his last promise, to clean up politics and to strengthen the rule of law, that appeared to be his undoing.</p>
<h2>Lula’s fall</h2>
<p>While in office, Lula managed to deflect charges of corruption – even though <a href="http://americasquarterly.org/content/lulas-sentencing-should-be-sober-moment-all-brazilians?utm_source=AQ%27s+Week+in+Review&qutm_campaign=a7043eccf8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_07_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6a33e16b5d-a7043eccf8-26052141">there was a congressional vote-buying scandal</a> and key members of the government were forced to resign to fight criminal charges. </p>
<p>The car wash (lava jato) investigation, which has focused on corruption involving the national oil company, Petrobras, <a href="http://americasquarterly.org/content/lulas-sentencing-should-be-sober-moment-all-brazilians?utm_source=AQ%27s+Week+in+Review&utm_campaign=a7043eccf8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_07_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6a33e16b5d-a7043eccf8-26052141">has already taken down</a> many once-“untouchables” in politics and business, such as former Speaker of the House Edardo Cunha and construction mogul Marcelo Odebrecht.</p>
<p>And it has now laid bare the full extent to which Lula and PT leaders engaged in politics as usual. They now join the rogues’ gallery of those under investigation, convicted or in prison. Its ranks <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-tide-against-corruption-swells-78024">include President Michele Temer</a> and the presidential runner-up to Dilma Rousseff in 2014, Sen. Aecio Neves. </p>
<p>So far, more than 200 lawmakers, former presidents, Cabinet officials and businessmen <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/brazil-operation-car-wash-involves-billions-in-bribes-scores-of-politicians/">have been convicted</a> of corruption as a result of the car wash investigation. With Lula joining their ranks, it shows clearly that Brazil’s current political class has lost all credibility. </p>
<p>Rousseff, for her part, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-brazilian-president-dilma-rousseffs-real-crime-59363">was impeached last year</a>, but it was not for corruption.</p>
<h2>Brazil without Lula</h2>
<p>Lula is not going quietly. </p>
<p>He <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-left-rallies-around-convicted-ex-president-lula-da-silva-1499952282">proclaims his innocence</a>, claiming the charges against him are politically motivated. And he says he will run for president in the 2018 election – a contest in which he <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-brazil-politics-polls-idUKKBN17W0KD">remains the favorite</a> in the most recent polls – and is <a href="http://americasquarterly.org/content/brazils-lula-its-not-over-yet?utm_source=AQ%27s+Week+in+Review&utm_campaign=a7043eccf8-a&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6a33e16b5d-a7043eccf8-26052141">campaigning</a> while his conviction is appealed. </p>
<p>Even should his conviction be reversed, however, I believe that after three-plus decades as the commanding figure of Brazilian politics, the Lula era is over. He <a href="http://americasquarterly.org/content/brazils-lula-its-not-over-yet?utm_source=AQ%27s+Week+in+Review&utm_campaign=a7043eccf8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_07_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6a33e16b5d-a7043eccf8-26052141">faces other criminal charges</a>. And although still popular, his negatives are rising. <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-06-26/poll-shows-lula-and-silva-tied-in-2018-brazil-presidential-vote">One recent poll</a> shows 46 percent of those surveyed would vote against Lula.</p>
<p>So where does that leave Brazil? How much of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-plunges-once-more-into-political-crisis-jeopardizing-economic-recovery-78023">good he accomplished</a> will survive is uncertain, as is who will replace him to lead Brazil into the future.</p>
<p>Brazilians can only hope that it is someone who shares Lula’s commitment to social justice and economic partnership with the private sector, yet unlike him has a genuine commitment to strengthening rule of law. The one thing we know for sure is this person will not come from the bankrupt political class. </p>
<p>One person who fits that bill in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazils-new-hero-is-a-nerdy-judge-who-is-tough-on-official-corruption/2015/12/23/54287604-7bf1-11e5-bfb6-65300a5ff562_story.html?utm_term=.09ae2628acf9">view of an increasing number of Brazilians</a> is Judge Sergio Moto, whose integrity they see as unimpeachable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terry L. McCoy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Now that a judge has convicted Luiz Inacio da Silva of corruption and sentenced him him to almost a decade in prison, what’s next for the country that loves him?Terry L. McCoy, Professor Emeritus of Latin American Studies and Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/809792017-07-13T14:24:11Z2017-07-13T14:24:11ZLula’s conviction proves Brazil is strong enough to reform itself<p>After Dilma Rousseff was <a href="https://theconversation.com/dilma-rousseff-two-views-of-democracy-and-the-battle-for-brazils-future-63668">ousted as president</a> in August 2016, Brazil’s pro-impeachment camp confidently proclaimed that “the institutions are working”. Rousseff was accused of disguising shortfalls in the government’s accounts – though some fretted that it was a <a href="http://www.brinknews.com/ouster-of-brazilian-president-opens-governance-crisis/">weak basis</a> for ousting a leader in a presidential system, the impeachment process was procedurally rigorous.</p>
<p>But only a few weeks into the tenure of Rousseff’s substitute, Michel Temer, her camp enjoyed something resembling revenge. Corruption allegations against supporters of Temer’s government quickly emerged, leading to the replacement of five ministers in the first six months. Rousseff’s defenders didn’t miss a beat: “The institutions are working!” they declared, with the irony turned up to full. Not that they admitted any wrongdoing on their side; rather, they were denouncing the corrupt politicians who had posed as guardians of the constitution while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/12/dilma-rousseff-brazil-president-impeached-senate-vote">voting to impeach Rousseff</a>.</p>
<p>And so it continues. Former president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who orchestrated Rousseff’s election in 2010, has now been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/12/brazil-president-lula-convicted-corruption">sentenced to almost a decade in prison</a> for corruption and money laundering. He can still appeal the decision, but his chances of avoiding prison time are slim. What does all this say about judicial institutions and the future of politics in Brazil?</p>
<p>First, a recap on the ongoing corruption scandal. “Operation Car Wash” is a colossal investigation into a kickback scheme centred around <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/business/international/effects-of-petrobras-scandal-leave-brazilians-lamenting-a-lost-dream.html">Petrobras</a>, the national oil company. The scheme was organised by government-appointed managers in the firm, who colluded with a cartel of contractors. Bogus bidding rounds led to massive over-invoicing, with part of the money returning to the fraudulent managers. Much of this cash was apparently <a href="http://en.mercopress.com/2014/10/20/dilma-admits-petrobras-funds-were-illegally-diverted-to-finance-political-parties">siphoned off</a> to the secret coffers of political parties, including Lula and Rousseff’s then-ruling Workers’ Party (PT).</p>
<p>Since 2014, the operation has <a href="http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/resultados/a-lava-jato-em-numeros">produced 157 convictions</a>, and issued more than 1,500 years of prison sentences. Of the roughly £9 billion prosecutors are trying to recoup, about £180m have already been recovered from offshore accounts. Billions of reais in fines are being paid by <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption-usa-idUSKBN14A1QE">just two giant companies</a>, Odebrecht and its affiliate Braskem.</p>
<p>Yet, while Operation Car Wash is extraordinary in its proportions, it’s not entirely novel. In fact, the structures needed to support such a colossal investigation have been under construction for a long time. </p>
<h2>Built to last</h2>
<p>Brazil’s anti-corruption mechanisms have been incrementally improving ever since the return to democracy in the late 1980s. The country boasts a highly professional civil service, including increasingly well-funded and trained public prosecutors, supported by the equally competent Federal Police. It also benefits from a vibrant and demanding civil society, as well as fierce competition among political parties. This is far from an unhealthy system, and the independence and strengthening of anti-corruption institutions is a testament to how far Brazil has come since democracy was reinstated.</p>
<p>Still, when it comes to the political implications of the crackdown, Brazilians are divided. The traditional centre-right is mostly reassured that the country’s institutions are functioning as intended, at least to the extent that corrupt politicians are being prosecuted. It helps that the focus is specifically on Petrobras, a state-controlled company that economic liberals consider not only corrupt but also highly inefficient. </p>
<p>But predictably, they’re less enthusiastic about accusations levelled against politicians from the now-ruling centre-right; they’d rather press on with the Temer government’s planned reforms, which they see as a chance to return to the liberalising project of the Cardoso presidency (1994-2002), and as essential for future solvency.</p>
<p>The mainstream left, on the other hand, is highly suspicious of Car Wash, which it regards as a partisan effort to undo the progress on welfare policy since the PT came to power in 2003. However, this is also in part a panicky reaction to the effective destruction of the PT’s preeminent position.</p>
<p>Despite improvements in the functioning of the state, Brazilian political parties are not, in themselves, the strongest of institutions. They depend heavily on charismatic leadership, rather than robust internal procedures to elect party candidates and leaders. The downfall of Lula will therefore drastically weaken the PT, which has so far not signalled any serious internal effort to renew its leadership or distance itself from past mistakes.</p>
<h2>Work to be done</h2>
<p>A growing contingent of young Brazilians are demanding neither more nor less government, but better governance. This is directed at all those in power across the political spectrum, a culmination of earlier demands from both the left and right. </p>
<p>The issue that all parties now face is that it has become politically inconceivable to drastically alter the country’s current macroeconomic model, or to scale back robust investments in welfare, the forces that created Brazil’s young, informed and aspirational middle class. That group is broadening and solidifying – and its attention is duly turning to both the quality of service provision and the conduct of national leaders.</p>
<p>The lead Car Wash prosecutor, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225013/lead-prosecutor-brings-ghandi-like-attitude-to-brazils-corruption-scandal">Deltan Dallagnol</a>, personifies this new Brazilian mindset: a fervent Baptist wielding a degree from Harvard Law School, he is 37 years old and has no time for traditional Brazilian patronage systems, whether in everyday life or in the upper echelons of politics.</p>
<p>But while this might look like a deadlock between the status quo and the future, in fact, it’s typical of the way the country works. Political scientists <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PACmgwrYeRMC&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=brazil+policy+accretion+substitution&source=bl&ots=Nk-I9XheBU&sig=9Du2PM7mFsnYu_Escnz_X5-EP3E&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiLzJbhhYbVAhXLIcAKHS0eBP0Q6AEILDAA#v=onepage&q=brazil%20policy%20accretion%20substitution&f=false">argue</a> that in Brazil, policy changes “through accretion, rather than substitution” – that reforms aren’t contested, overturned and replaced with others, but simply layered on top of each other. So while the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13563460500494933?src=recsys&journalCode=cnpe20">liberal macroeconomic orthodoxy</a> entrenched in the 1990s remains in place, so does the <a href="https://nacla.org/article/introduction-lula%E2%80%99s-legacy-brazil">wealth redistribution</a> project that came to fruition in the 2000s. The country has now reached another juncture, one where systemic corruption and inefficiency are no longer tolerated. </p>
<p>The Car Wash metaphor is highly apt: Brazilian leaders are being compelled to clean up their act and reform the system that has protected them for years. It remains to be seen just how long the myriad investigations will take, and whether they will be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazil-federal-police-shut-down-car-wash-graft-task-force/2017/07/06/5f063374-6289-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_story.html?utm_term=.15ddc959db93">constrained by politics</a> – there’s no knowing how much the fallout could damage the economy or whether the political system will be properly reformed, especially when it comes to campaign finance. </p>
<p>Most crucially of all, the archaic and undemocratic internal structures of Brazil’s umpteen political parties must be challenged and dramatically upgraded. Only once these things are achieved will a desperately needed new generation of national leaders start to emerge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felipe Krause's PhD is supported by a bursary from the Federal Government of Brazil. </span></em></p>As a former president goes down for nine-and-a-half years, Brazil’s judicial structures are weathering the political crisis well.Felipe Krause, PhD Candidate in Politics and International Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.