tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/cape-verde-31725/articlesCape Verde – The Conversation2024-02-02T10:37:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220642024-02-02T10:37:41Z2024-02-02T10:37:41ZCape Verde is the third African country to eliminate malaria: here’s how<p>Cape Verde has been certified <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/12-01-2024-who-certifies-cabo-verde-as-malaria-free--marking-a-historic-milestone-in-the-fight-against-malaria">malaria-free</a> by the World Health Organization. </p>
<p>The archipelago to the west of Senegal consists of 10 islands, and has a population of over <a href="https://datacommons.org/place/country/CPV?utm_medium=explore&mprop=count&popt=Person&hl=en">500,000 people</a>. It is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/12-01-2024-who-certifies-cabo-verde-as-malaria-free--marking-a-historic-milestone-in-the-fight-against-malaria">third</a> country in Africa to be declared malaria-free, after Mauritius (in 1973) and Algeria (in 2019). </p>
<p>This brings the total of <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/global-malaria-programme/elimination/countries-and-territories-certified-malaria-free-by-who">malaria-free countries</a> to 43 worldwide. </p>
<p>Achieving malaria-free certification is no simple feat. As specialists in malaria prevention and control, we explain Cape Verde’s long journey to eliminating the disease that killed over 600,000 people worldwide in <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria">2022</a>. </p>
<h2>How Cape Verde achieved its goal</h2>
<p>Malaria, endemic since settlement of the previously uninhabited islands in the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cabo-verde/">15th century</a>, affected all 10 islands before 1950. </p>
<p>During the <a href="https://malariajournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12936-020-03455-7">1940s</a>, malaria posed a serious health threat. Severe epidemics resulted in over 10,000 cases and 200 deaths annually until targeted interventions were implemented.</p>
<p>The country was close to eliminating malaria <a href="https://www.africanconstituency.org/cape-verde-rising-to-the-challenge-of-malaria-eradication-by-2030/">twice</a> but these gains were not sustained. </p>
<p>Indoor residual spraying with <a href="https://mesamalaria.org/resource/eliminating-malaria-case-study-2-moving-towards-sustainable-elimination-cape-verde/">DDT</a> was done on each island until transmission ended nationwide in 1967. The residual effect of the insecticide helped kill mosquitoes over a longer period. Larviciding, the use of chemicals to target mosquito larvae at breeding sites, and active case detection were also undertaken.</p>
<p>The indoor residual spraying campaigns were stopped in 1969. The result was a <a href="https://mesamalaria.org/resource/eliminating-malaria-case-study-2-moving-towards-sustainable-elimination-cape-verde/">recurrence</a> of local transmission on Santiago island in 1973, followed by a large epidemic in 1977. </p>
<p>The second attempt to eliminate malaria started in 1978, and resulted in transmission interruption in 1983. Case numbers were maintained at <a href="https://mesamalaria.org/resource/eliminating-malaria-case-study-2-moving-towards-sustainable-elimination-cape-verde/">low levels from 1989</a>, confining malaria to Santiago and Boa Vista islands. But by <a href="https://mesamalaria.org/resource/eliminating-malaria-case-study-2-moving-towards-sustainable-elimination-cape-verde/">2006</a>, rising cases threatened tourism.</p>
<p>A political decision was made to boost nationwide elimination efforts. This led to a change in the country’s national health policy <a href="https://malariajournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12936-018-2376-4#:%7E:text=From%20January%202010%20to%20December%202016%2C%2041%25%20(129%2F,5).&text=The%20island%20of%20Santiago%20has%20the%20highest%20number%20of%20cases">in 2007</a>. </p>
<p>The focus was on expanded diagnosis, early and effective treatment, and management of all cases.</p>
<p>Cape Verde was on track to eliminate malaria, but in 2017 recorded its “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/cabo-verde/cape-verde-hit-worst-malaria-outbreak-decades">worst malaria outbreak</a>” since 1991 with <a href="https://targetmalaria.org/latest/news/introducing-target-malaria-cabo-verde/">423 cases</a>. </p>
<p>The outbreak prompted a strategy adjustment. A <a href="https://targetmalaria.org/latest/news/introducing-target-malaria-cabo-verde">refocusing</a> on vector control, targeting affected neighbourhoods and malaria infection-prone communities, prevented increases in cases. Transmission was successfully interrupted for four years. </p>
<h2>Process to get certified malaria free</h2>
<p>The WHO reported 249 million malaria cases and 619,000 malaria-related deaths globally <a href="https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2023-spreadview.pdf?sfvrsn=bb24c9f0_4">in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>The African region accounted for 94% of all cases and 96% of all deaths. </p>
<p>Achieving malaria-free status highlights a nation’s determination and commitment. Countries must meet the WHO’s stringent criteria to reach this goal. Firstly, there must be <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/global-malaria-programme/elimination/certification-process#:%7E:text=WHO%20grants%20this%20certification%20when,that%20can%20prevent%20re%2Destablishment">zero indigenous</a> (locally) transmitted cases of malaria for at least three consecutive years. </p>
<p>Secondly a country must show that it has the ability to prevent reintroduction of disease transmission. </p>
<p>Only then may countries <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/global-malaria-programme/elimination/certification-process">request certification</a> from the WHO, working with regional offices to develop a certification plan and timeline. </p>
<p>If a country fails, it can reapply after three years. </p>
<p>To maintain malaria-free status, countries must continue to prevent transmission and submit annual reports to the WHO. </p>
<h2>Predictions for the next countries to take the leap</h2>
<p>The WHO’s <a href="https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2023-spreadview.pdf?sfvrsn=bb24c9f0_4">E-2025 initiative</a> focuses on 25 countries targeting elimination by 2025.</p>
<p>Belize achieved elimination in 2023. Malaysia reported zero local transmission for the fifth consecutive year, while Timor-Leste and Saudi Arabia achieved two consecutive years without local transmission (2021 and 2022). If maintained, they may be declared malaria-free soon. For the first time, both Bhutan and Suriname reported zero indigenous cases in 2022. </p>
<p>In the Africa region, several countries reported <a href="https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2023-spreadview.pdf?sfvrsn=bb24c9f0_4">significant reductions</a> in indigenous transmission in 2022. These included Botswana (43.5%), Eswatini (57.6%) and South Africa (31.3%). The Comoros saw a doubling in cases in the same year. São Tomé and Principe noted a 46% increase. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/malaria/world-malaria-reports/world-malaria-report-2023-spreadview.pdf?sfvrsn=bb24c9f0_4">country efforts</a>, extreme climate events and cross-border movement may have an impact on transmission or recurrence. </p>
<p>Attaining certification holds importance, and Cape Verde’s success will drive positive development in the country. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/cabo-verde-tourism#:%7E:text=Tourism%20is%20a%20primary%20driver,Cabo%20Verde's%20foreign%20direct%20investment.">Tourism</a> plays an important role in the country’s economy. It accounted for a substantial share of the country’s GDP pre-COVID (24%), formal employment (10%), and the majority of foreign investment. Malaria-free status can potentially draw more visitors to the country.</p>
<p>The infrastructure established for malaria elimination has bolstered the country’s health system. This can be beneficial against other mosquito-borne diseases such as <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2023-DON498">dengue fever</a>, which also affects tourism. </p>
<p>A country’s “personal” milestone can help drive global malaria elimination efforts. Cape Verde’s achievement is a call to action for the malaria community to not give up. We must push harder to end malaria for good.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222064/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Malaria in Africa accounts for 96% of deaths worldwide. Cape Verde became only the third country in Africa to be declared malaria free this year. This is how they did it.Tiaan de Jager, Dean: Faculty of Health Sciences and Director: UP Institute for Sustainable Malaria Control, University of PretoriaTaneshka Kruger, UP ISMC: Project Manager and Coordinator, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219532024-01-29T19:11:13Z2024-01-29T19:11:13ZAfcon 2023: Africa’s diaspora footballers are boosting the continent’s game – but they are also creating challenges<p>The Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) is approaching its conclusion in Ivory Coast and speculation is rife about which team will be the ultimate winner. It could be one of the continent’s footballing heavyweights such as Morocco or Senegal. Alternatively, a relative minnow like Angola or Cape Verde may emerge as the unexpected victor.</p>
<p>Last time out, at the 2021 edition in Algeria, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/feb/06/senegal-egypt-africa-cup-of-nations-final-match-report">Senegal captain</a> Kalidou Koulibaly lifted the trophy. Before that, Algeria’s 2019 triumph in Egypt saw Riyad Mahrez become the victorious captain. Significantly, neither player was born in Africa and there is a distinct possibility that the winning captain of this year’s tournament will also have been born elsewhere.</p>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/sports/the-allure-of-the-diaspora-at-afcon-2024-4491490#:%7E:text=2%20hours%20ago-,The%20number%20of%20Diaspora%20players%20in%20the%202024%20AFCON%20is,in%20the%20tournament%20this%20year">630 players</a> who were registered to play by teams competing in the 2023 edition, 200 weren’t born in Africa. The non-African country with the most players at the tournament is France, with 104. Second is Spain with 24, then England with 15. Even players born in Ireland and Saudi Arabia are competing in this year’s tournament. </p>
<p>The Moroccan national team has the largest number of diaspora players. Eighteen of its squad members were born outside of Morocco, with only nine born in the country. Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo have 17 and 16 diaspora squad members, respectively.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Africa showing the contribution of non-African countries to this year's Afcon." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The birthplaces of the African diaspora playing at 2023 Africa Cup of Nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Widdop</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The phenomenon seems to be on the rise and has allowed some African teams (and several with very limited footballing history) to rise up the footballing ranks in recent years. But some people argue that diasporas are undermining the progression of African football, principally by engendering a culture of complacency.</p>
<h2>Bolstering their ranks</h2>
<p>The fact that African teams are increasingly relying on players born elsewhere is not a surprise. After all, there’s an <a href="https://football-observatory.com/Inflation-in-the-football-players-transfer-market">intense talent battle</a> taking place in world football. This often involves the <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/international-athletes-world-cup-nationality">naturalisation of individuals</a> who find themselves playing for one national team even though they may already have played for another, and the <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/fifa-world-cup-2022/2022/12/07/every-moroccan-is-moroccan-regraguis-fight-to-include-foreign-born-players-vindicated/">targeted recruitment</a> of players in countries around the world.</p>
<p>However, the case of Africa is particularly distinctive. It’s a reflection of both the continent’s <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2019/02/20/diaspora-diaries-and-football-politics/">colonial past and its global diasporas</a>. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/12/leicester-city-riyad-mahrez-father-dream-algeria-world-cup">Mahrez was born</a> in Paris to parents of Algerian and Moroccan origin. The French capital is home to 331,000 Algerians and 254,000 Moroccans. <a href="https://onefootball.com/en/news/chelsea-defender-koulibaly-explains-choosing-senegal-over-france-35927795">Koulibaly</a> was also born in France to parents originally from Senegal. Figures suggest there are more than 100,000 Senegalese in France.</p>
<p>But this is not just a story about France. Nigeria’s <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/02/09/no-regrets-choosing-nigeria-over-england-lookman/">Ademola Lookman</a> was born in London, Ghana’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/africa/62549049">Iñaki Williams</a> comes from Bilbao in Spain, and Morocco’s <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/01/16/the-political-dimension-of-moroccos-success-in-the-world-cup/#:%7E:text=Similarly%2C%20Sofian%20Amrabat%20is%20known,from%20them%20and%20preferred%20Morocco.">Sofyan Amrabat and Hakim Ziyech</a> are of Dutch origin. </p>
<p>Self-identity and family dynamics are a couple of reasons why players choose to play for teams from the birthplaces of their parents rather than their own. In 2022, Ziyech <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/sport/soccer/2022/12/10/hakim-ziyech-a-magician-at-the-heart-of-moroccan-love-story/">explained it thus</a>: “Choosing one’s national team is not done with the brain but with the heart. I have always felt Moroccan even though I was born in the Netherlands. Lots of people will never understand.” </p>
<p>Williams has <a href="https://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/inaki-williams-made-right-choice-ghana-over-spain/blt005c8219a89b044e">spoken</a> of his grandparents’ influence, claiming that a decision is “easier when you see the [Ghanaian] people and your family support you to be a Black Star”. Such instances reveal a multidimensional sense of place. </p>
<p>Yet cynics argue that other such players are simply not good enough to play for the European nations in which they were born or in which they have been naturalised. For instance, former Arsenal starlet <a href="https://www.completesports.com/ex-everton-star-ball-iwobi-not-good-enough-to-play-for-toffees/">Alex Iwobi</a> has gone from being a potential future England star to a sometimes criticised Fulham midfielder and Nigerian international.</p>
<h2>But at what cost?</h2>
<p>Others express concerns about how diasporas are undermining African football. One concern is that bringing talent in from Europe and elsewhere is simply a fast-track strategy to success that is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/09/11/is-africas-football-talent-finally-coming-back-home-football-planet/">eroding the long-term health</a> of football across the continent.</p>
<p>Even so, the approach seems to be working. At the Qatar World Cup in 2022, Morocco became the <a href="https://theconversation.com/morocco-at-the-2022-world-cup-6-forces-behind-a-history-making-performance-196359">first African nation</a> to reach the tournament’s semi-final stage. This has helped the country become the current highest-ranked team in Africa and the 13th-best team worldwide. </p>
<p>Senegal is also in the world’s top 20, while <a href="https://www.3addedminutes.com/international/cape-verde-mauritania-fairytale-afcon-match-stories-behind-it-4493235">Cape Verde’s</a> recent performance shows that even Africa’s traditionally less successful footballing nations can prosper. Cape Verde, a string of ten islands in the Atlantic Ocean with a population smaller than the city of Bristol, just finished top of a tough group, including Egypt and Ghana at the 2023 Afcon.</p>
<p>The likes of former Cameroon goalkeeper <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/sports/article/2022/11/25/world-cup-2022-the-problem-with-african-football-is-the-leaders_6005649_9.html">Joseph-Antoine Bell</a> remain less positive about such achievements. Bell claims that diaspora players make the job of African football’s leaders, managers and coaches too easy, which is engendering a culture of complacency. He also thinks it demotivates players born, brought up and living in Africa.</p>
<p>Though the practice of <a href="https://www.versus.uk.com/articles/diaspora-fc-why-its-time-for-this-generation-to-go-back-to-their-motherlands">diasporic talent recruitment</a> appears to be increasing (the effect of <a href="https://sports-chair.essec.edu/resources/research-reports/sport-and-national-eligibility-criteria-in-the-era-of-globalization">globalisation</a> must also be acknowledged as an influence), there are still some countries that rely more on players born and brought up domestically - Namibia and South Africa are examples of this.</p>
<p>Bell would no doubt approve, having previously called for Africa to develop its own solutions to talent identification and development. The problem is, this takes time, money and patience – precious commodities in football generally, not just in Africa.</p>
<p>Whatever happens when the tournament’s final game is staged at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-cup-of-nations-showcases-the-continents-finest-footballers-and-chinas-economic-clout-220313">Alassane Ouattara Stadium</a> in Abidjan, it will be a proud moment for and a big celebration of African football. However, the birthplace of the captain who eventually lifts the trophy will probably fuel further debate about the importance of African football’s diasporas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Around one-third of the players that have been called up to the 2023 Africa Cup of Nations were born outside of Africa.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy, SKEMA Business SchoolPaul Widdop, Associate Professor, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071502023-06-25T11:11:29Z2023-06-25T11:11:29ZChildren’s movement affects health and development but research is lacking in Africa: here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531373/original/file-20230612-220077-jzsxfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children’s health and development depend on how much time they spend doing physical activity, being sedentary and sleeping.</p>
<p>Research on movement behaviours in children is essential. It helps us to understand what influences these behaviours, and their contribution to health and development. </p>
<p>Most <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/10/e049267">evidence</a> on movement behaviours comes from high-income countries. Here children have different lifestyles, environments and cultures from those in low- and middle-income countries. For example, children in African countries face different challenges in achieving healthy levels of physical activity and sleep. Safety, transport, infrastructure, culture, climate, nutrition, and different levels and types of screen time exposure may all present challenges. </p>
<p>Africa, as a continent, contributes less than <a href="https://www.elsevier.com/connect/africa-generates-less-than-1-of-the-worlds-research-data-analytics-can-change-that">1% of research</a> worldwide. This means over <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/">16%</a> of the world’s population has been excluded from the research. </p>
<p>The international <a href="https://sunrise-study.com/#about">SUNRISE study</a>, which we are part of, aims to bridge this gap. It conducts studies on movement behaviour in collaboration with researchers in several African countries, including Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, where we are based. We bring a collective expertise across disciplines such as public health, physiotherapy and child development. </p>
<p>SUNRISE findings so far show that the proportion of children in low- and middle-income countries meeting recommendations for movement behaviours is low, compared to high-income countries. This highlights the need for research and intervention in Africa. </p>
<p>But since the beginning of this study we have faced a wide range of challenges. In each country, the target number of children for the study is around 1,000. Researching their movement behaviour requires technology.</p>
<p>The challenges include access to devices to track movement, the lack of awareness of such tools and what they do, difficulty in securing funds, and institutional challenges. </p>
<p>Solutions include local collaboration, reducing financial barriers, developing new low-cost devices, and using contextually relevant methods. The following sections describe the challenges and possible solutions in detail.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p><strong>Access to devices</strong></p>
<p>Accelerometers are a type of digital wearable device, similar to Fitbits and smart watches. But they measure movement more accurately than commercially available devices. This is why they are more commonly used in research. These devices are generally more expensive because they are “research-grade”, and upwards of US$250 each (before software and delivery). This is a major challenge for those of us working in African countries, as at least 50 devices would be needed to conduct large scale studies like SUNRISE. There is no local manufacturer or distributor of accelerometer devices. Researchers need a legal licence to import or export them. </p>
<p>The SUNRISE study is able to loan devices. But exorbitant customs and shipping charges for moving this equipment to and between African countries makes sharing difficult – even when it’s only for research. This leads to unnecessary costs and delays, which means Africa gets left behind in this scientific field. </p>
<p><strong>Lack of awareness about the benefits of accelerometers</strong></p>
<p>These devices are often novel in African settings. Some parents and caregivers in our study areas have been sceptical about using them. For example, caregivers have asked whether the devices attract lightning, or whether they have some physical effect on the body. This may lead to another challenge in recruiting sufficient participants for the study. And data collection can take a long time when the shortage of devices is added to the time to get local buy-in. </p>
<p><strong>Difficulty in securing funds</strong></p>
<p>SUNRISE study researchers in Africa battle to get funding. They rely on highly competitive international funding, which seldom prioritises movement behaviour research in young children. It costs a lot to attend conferences internationally and to publish research in reputable academic journals. Open access journal fees can even exceed the monthly salary of a research assistant in an African country. </p>
<p><strong>Institutional challenges</strong></p>
<p>Within African research institutions, another challenge is how to build capacity. Few research institutes focus on movement behaviours in Africa. Accelerometer data is often complex to manage, and needs trained staff. High-income countries typically have access to support staff and students who can assist with this. This is not the case in many African countries. So it is difficult to conduct high-quality research and translate it into policy and practice. </p>
<h2>Possible solutions</h2>
<p>A possible solution is to collaborate with local partners and stakeholders to identify the most appropriate devices for each context and population. </p>
<p>All stakeholders, including local government and non-government organisations, ought to remove barriers so that the researchers can focus on the quality of evidence to inform policy and practice that is anchored to the local context. </p>
<p>Establishing some type of research equipment hub in Africa would go some way to help. But even moving equipment within Africa is not easy. Governments should consider waiving import and export charges for research equipment. The development of low-cost devices that can be produced and used efficiently in Africa is the best way forward. </p>
<p>Researchers in Africa could also examine other new data collection methods that are customised to the local context. Qualitative research (interviews and focus groups) can provide valuable insights into the factors that influence movement behaviours in different contexts. These insights are vital for the development of measurement tools and interventions that are culturally appropriate and effective. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>There are many other pressing needs in Africa. But the contribution of movement behaviours to population health and development is significant, particularly as there is growing evidence of the global economic costs of physical <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2822%2900482-X">inactivity</a>. We need local research on these behaviours, starting in the early years, when patterns of behaviour are established. </p>
<p>Without addressing barriers to robust research, researchers in this region will continue to lag behind in this field. </p>
<p>This means that we lose opportunities to learn how to promote movement behaviours that support health and development, thus setting children on the best path for life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Draper receives or has received funding from the British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the South African Medical Research Council, the Jacobs Foundation, and the European Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Okely receives funding from NHMRC, Research Council of Norway, World Health Organization, and UNICEF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoko Oluwayomi receives funding from ISBNPA-PIONEER PROGRAM SCHOLARSHIP 2022</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chalchisa Abdeta receives funding through HDR Scholarship from the University of Wollongong, Australia.</span></em></p>Africa contributes less than 1% of research worldwide on movement behaviours in children. This means that research on movement behaviours has largely excluded over 16% of the world’s population.Catherine Draper, Associate Professor at MRC/Wits Developmental Pathways for Health Research Unit, University of the WitwatersrandAnthony Okely, Distinguished Professor of Public Health, University of WollongongAoko Oluwayomi, PhD Candidate (Exercise Physiology), University of LagosChalchisa Abdeta, PhD candidate, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1675632021-11-04T15:52:37Z2021-11-04T15:52:37ZHow religion helped African migrants during a risky Atlantic crossing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427789/original/file-20211021-16-1jmluxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Migrants often have to brave the sea with just food, water, and life vests.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sabrina Mundi/EyeM/Getty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In April 2018, a catamaran captained by two Brazilian smugglers left São Vicente, Cape Verde, setting its course across the Atlantic Ocean, towards the coast of Brazil. Twenty-five West African men were on board. They were all leaving their home countries, going on this risky journey to take their chances for a better life on a new continent. </p>
<p>Before their departure, the group was briefed that the journey would last for 21 days. They were told to pack enough food, water and supplies to survive. But 18 days into the journey, their boat’s engine developed a fault and they were stuck at sea. By day 27, food stores were exhausted on board, and thirsty passengers were desperately drinking their own urine for hydration. To survive, they found a way to catch fish to eat.</p>
<p>Soon there were new threats. The boat’s hull split and the mast broke. After the migrants had done their best to repair the boat, their fate was out of their hands. Their chances of survival and reaching land would be dictated by the ocean currents. Or perhaps not.</p>
<p>Despite these odds, the migrants survived. After 30 days at sea, they were spotted by a fishing boat which rescued them. When they were later interviewed in São Luis, Brazil, they gave a lot of credit to divine intervention. They all made religious references, suggesting that a higher being fought alongside them. </p>
<p>Their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/african-migrant-brazil-boat-rescue-atlantic-crossing">story</a> made a strong impression, prompting Dr Luisa Feline Freier (Universidad del Pacífico) and I to team up and dig deeper with journalist Walker Dawson. </p>
<p>Over the years, much of my research interest has focused on the cultural dimension of forced displacement. Over the last decade or so, there’s been increasing interest in the mental health aspects of migration. Yet the place of religion in this dimension remains under-explored.</p>
<h2>Religious coping strategies</h2>
<p>For our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13674676.2021.1919069">research</a>, we interviewed three of the 25 migrants: Omar from Sierra Leone, Abeo from Nigeria, and Moussa from Guinea (names altered to preserve confidentiality). All Muslims, these migrants consistently described Allah as benevolent and protective, and particularly so when recounting key crisis points of their journey. In line with other <a href="https://doi.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fa0037652">research</a> showing Muslims’ extensive use of positive religious coping, our findings suggest religion can be a way to deal with stress, anxiety and fear, especially during extreme, high-risk migration journeys.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Security officials at a beach, staring at a man swimming in the sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427791/original/file-20211021-19-c8z13q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">European security arrest migrants trying to cross from Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Antonio Sempere/Europa Press/Getty Image</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We analysed our interview transcripts using the typology of religious coping strategies provided within the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1097-4679(200004)56:4%3C519::AID-JCLP6%3E3.0.CO;2-1">RCOPE framework</a>, a well-established clinical framework used to study and categorise forms of religious and spiritual coping.</p>
<p>According to its authors, there are several ways in which religiousness is a valuable resource when coping with difficult situations. It can be used to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>ascribe meaning to an otherwise incomprehensible phenomenon </p></li>
<li><p>provide a sense of control during turbulent events</p></li>
<li><p>offer comfort when a person is experiencing pain</p></li>
<li><p>build intimacy with one’s faith and with others</p></li>
<li><p>initiate a life transformation following a difficult period. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>With the exception of the last point, all these articulations of religious coping were present in our data. The “meaning-making” function of religious coping showed up the most. Migrants often referred to their journey’s hardship as an act of God or as part of God’s grand plan. </p>
<h2>Risky journeys, religion and mental health</h2>
<p>Migration scholars broadly agree that whether seeking a better life or escaping violence and persecution, people on the move -– and particularly those from the global south –- have faced increasingly restrictive immigration policies since the end of the Cold War. Walls and fences have been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/as-migration-is-rising-so-are-border-barriers/a-58848161">erected</a>, detention <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/detained-us-largest-immigrant-detention-trump">centres</a> built, and sophisticated surveillance <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/news/afghan-crisis-accelerates-automated-controls-at-eu-borders/">technology</a> deployed at the borderlands. To adapt to these changes, old migration routes have been replaced by longer and riskier ones. </p>
<p>While our study case was certainly not the first recorded instance of irregular African migration to Latin America using the Transatlantic Corridor, we are likely to see an uptick in such crossings in the coming years. This is largely due to the increased securitisation and criminalisation of migrants in northern destinations. This has led to the emergence and diversification of south-south and intercontinental migration <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Hope-and-Uncertainty-in-Contemporary-African-Migration/Kleist-Thorsen/p/book/9780367358983">routes</a>. </p>
<p>The elevated risks in these new and increasingly popular migration routes lead to feelings of stress, anxiety and trauma. This is extensively demonstrated in a recent <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7443922/">review</a> and meta-analysis of empirical studies on the relationship between migration and mental health. This makes migrants’ coping mechanisms an increasingly important area of research.</p>
<p>As our research has shown, religiousness is an important adaptive coping mechanism during the migration process. There’s a need for more holistic clinical interventions that include the spiritual aspects of migrants’ mental health.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas Parent receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. Nicolas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Migration can be a matter of life and death, but religion can help people cope.Nicolas Parent, PhD Candidate, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1568952021-03-23T14:55:53Z2021-03-23T14:55:53ZPeople living in African urban settings do a lot of walking: but their cities aren’t walkable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390087/original/file-20210317-13-1vxctq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People walking next to traffic in Abuja, Nigeria's capital city. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Walking remains the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0966692313001634">main mode</a>of transport in many sub-Saharan African cities, especially among low-income residents in informal settlements. Yet, it is well acknowledged that walking conditions in African cities are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311949916_Non-Motorized_Transport_in_African_Cities_Lessons_from_Experience_in_Kenya_and_Tanzania">precarious and unsafe</a>. This is partly due to the prioritisation of local urban design for auto-mobility.</p>
<p>Under the right physical and social conditions of the urban built environment, walking <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S2044-994120170000009004/full/html?utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Transport_and_Sustainability_TrendMD_1">offers</a> major benefits. But in most cities across Africa, poor planning and pedestrian infrastructure makes walking a serious challenge.</p>
<p>Yet, it’s something that most people who live in African cities have to do every day. The majority of Africa’s urban population live in <a href="https://theconversation.com/accras-informal-settlements-are-easing-the-citys-urban-housing-crisis-104266">informal settlements</a>. These are often neglected by state authorities, under-serviced and deprived. They have limited access to basic transport infrastructure and services. As such, many low-income informal residents’ resort to walking and other informal transport systems.</p>
<p>This has led to the notion that African cities are <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/31388">“walking cities”</a> that are not walkable. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29474106/">research</a> shows the socio-economic benefits of walking in African cities. Yet, there is still little understanding of the walking environment, residents’ everyday walking practices and their impact on walking experiences. </p>
<p>We therefore set out to analyse walking practices in informal settlements. Our <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2210539521000134">pilot study</a> was conducted in Moyiba, an informal settlement in Freetown, Sierra Leone.</p>
<h2>Unwalkable cities</h2>
<p>Walking should be the most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13574800701816896?journalCode=cjud20">equitable</a> mode of transport. But for many African urban residents, walking is forced on them. It is also a manifestation of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275116306023">socio-spatial</a> inequalities. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.routledge.com/Non-Motorized-Transport-Integration-into-Urban-Transport-Planning-in-Africa/Mitullah-Vanderschuren-Khayesi/p/book/9780367219024">Research</a> on African cities show that improvements in non-motorised transport infrastructure is crucial to accrue the physical, social, and psychological benefits of walking. Accordingly, scholars and practitioners have suggested the need to integrate walking into urban transport and development planning in African cities.</p>
<p>Indeed, global agenda such as the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal11">Sustainable Development Goals</a>, <a href="https://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NUA-English.pdf">New Urban Agenda</a>, and African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/goals">Agenda 2063</a> all highlight the importance of walking in building equitable and sustainable African cities. </p>
<p>Sadly, on the continent better planning for and the integration of walking into urban development plans is undermined by socio-spatial features of the urban built environment. Other contributing factors are political and social exclusion of low-income communities. </p>
<p>For example, in some cities such as Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311949916_Non-Motorized_Transport_in_African_Cities_Lessons_from_Experience_in_Kenya_and_Tanzania">studies</a> show a lack of well-defined and dedicated infrastructure for walking. These include walkways, attractive facades or open spaces, and street lights. In <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275116306023">Cape Verde</a>, the differences between neighbourhoods are stark. Poor neighbourhoods are more likely to be located along slopes with limited walking infrastructure.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We used a participatory web-mapping tool, <a href="https://maptionnaire.com/">Maptionnaire</a>, to explore the variety of walking routes and their characteristics. We used the tool also for a qualitative assessment of local walking practices and experiences to shed light on the realities of everyday walking. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2210539521000134">The study</a> showed that walking is the predominant mode of transport within the settlement. Daily commuting patterns combine walking with other informal transport modes such as <em>okada</em> (commercial motorcycle) and <em>poda poda</em> (commercial transit bus). </p>
<p>The study revealed that residents of Moyiba are not walking because it is a sustainable choice. Rather, walking is imposed by exclusionary urban configuration. This includes the steep physical terrain, unplanned physical morphology, limited connectivity and poor infrastructure for motorised transport. </p>
<p>Data from our maptionnaire tool revealed that only 11% of the mapped walking routes were paved. Paved roads were severely damaged or had become dumping grounds for construction materials or solid residue from waste. For residents, walking is the default position because of the poor availability of public transport. Then there is the high cost of transport fares. In addition, walking is faster than other alternatives.</p>
<p>Our study found that walking intersects with everyday social and economic lives. Some respondents walk because “everyone walks”, thus allowing for social interactions. Walking also provides easy access to community or economic facilities, including schools, churches, water stations, and street vendors. These are often located along walking routes. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, our study showed that walking routes were exposed to more than 120 risks. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>steep routes that were a potential for mudslides, </p></li>
<li><p>potholes, </p></li>
<li><p>open electrical wires and </p></li>
<li><p>abandoned construction material along walking routes. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Residents have mitigated these risks, either individually or through collective efforts. Collective efforts include the the provision of street lighting and the use of sandbags along walking routes during the rainy season. They have also carved stairs within the steep terrain using gravels and rocks were common. </p>
<p>The study showed the benefits of walking in a safe, comfortable and aesthetically pleasing environment. Residents rated highly walking routes with street lights provided by the community. Similarly, routes with natural or self-planted trees for shade, and street benches for relaxation educed feelings of comfort and attraction. On the other hand, walking routes marred with dirt and dust, isolation, and lack of nature produced negative feelings among residents. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Our findings point to the issues policy makers should take into account when planning urban transport and building roads. </p>
<p>They should also find ways of enhancing community-led initiatives aimed at making cities walkable. Communities are highly adaptable and innovative in their approaches to mitigating the risks of poor infrastructure. However, their efforts have limits. The long-term and sustainable solution is for urban transport and development planners to integrate the walking experiences and behaviour of local residents into their planning.</p>
<p>They can do this through experimentation and other strategies that build the capacity of communities to mitigate risks. In addition, existing community initiatives should be incorporated into future planning for a comfortable and pleasurable walking environment.</p>
<p>Officials should seek to understand walking from the perspective of residents. This will provide insights on the challenges and opportunities for access to everyday social and economic facilities. This will also inform the upgrading of informal settlements. </p>
<p>The overall public policy objective should be to promote an inclusive city where residents are not captive walkers but walk because it is accessible, safe and pleasurable to do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seth Asare Okyere receives funding from the Osaka University Global Knowledge Partnership Grant (GKP Type A), an international joint research partnership between Osaka University and University College London on exploring the walking environment in informal settlements in Freetown. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Oviedo receives funding from the Osaka University Global Knowledge Partnership Grant (GKP Type A), an international joint research partnership between Osaka University and University College London on exploring the walking environment in informal settlements in Freetown. He also receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund, through the Transitions to Sustainable Urban Mobility (T-SUM) project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariajose Nieto receives funding from the Osaka University Global Knowledge Partnership Grant (GKP Type A), an international joint research partnership between Osaka University and University College London on exploring the walking environment in informal settlements in Freetown. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michihiro Kita receives funding from the global knowledge partnership grant (type A), an international joint research partnership between Osaka University and University College London as the principal investigator.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis Kusi Frimpong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African city planners need to promote inclusive cities where residents are not captive walkers but walk because it is accessible, safe and pleasurable to do so.Seth Asare Okyere, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka UniversityDaniel Oviedo, Assistant Professor, UCLLouis Kusi Frimpong, Lecturer, University of Environment and Sustainable Development Mariajose Nieto, PhD student , UCLMichihiro Kita, Professor, Osaka UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1368632020-04-30T12:25:28Z2020-04-30T12:25:28ZWhy downgrading countries in a time of crisis is an exceptionally bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331371/original/file-20200429-51495-5e3t30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The street market at Mont-Bouët in Libreville, Gabon. The country was one of 10 on the continent downgraded this year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A number of rating agencies have downgraded emerging market economies during the COVID-19 pandemic. Their actions have raised the question: <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-06-fitch-downgrade-pours-more-salt-into-the-gaping-wound-that-is-the-sa-economy/">why</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/a-trio-of-downgrades-spell-default-danger-for-emerging-markets">do so</a> during a crisis? </p>
<p>This is not the first time ratings agencies have adopted a procyclical approach – that is, one in which bad news is simply piled on bad news.</p>
<p>During the 2008 global financial crisis, ratings agencies were accused of aggressively <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/credit-rating-controversy">downgrading countries</a> whose economies were already strained. Reports by the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/external_publishers/ex_pub3_en.htm">European</a> and <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf">US</a> Commissions found evidence that their decisions worsened the financial crisis.</p>
<p>Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has also <a href="https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8QF93PN">accused rating agencies of aggressively downgrading</a> countries during the <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/asian_financial_crisis">1997 East Asian financial crisis</a>. The downgrades were more than what would be justified by the countries’ economic fundamentals. This unduly added to the cost of borrowing and caused the supply of international capital to evaporate.</p>
<p>In addition to the issue of timing, the <a href="https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary_356.pdf">effectiveness</a> and <a href="https://ukdiss.com/examples/problems-of-the-credit-rating-agencies.php">objectivity</a> of the rating methodology continues to be questioned by <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156043/adbi-wp188.pdf">policymakers</a>. Their methodological errors in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349003">times of crisis</a>, together with the unresolved problem of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-credit-rating-agencies-are-still-getting-away-with-bad-behaviour-117549">conflict of interests</a>, leave both issuers and investors vulnerable to losses. </p>
<p>The procyclical nature of ratings needs to be put under check to avoid market panic. The devastating effects they add on economies that are already strained has to be challenged. The coronavirus pandemic is yet another episode to prove this.</p>
<h2>Questionable decisions</h2>
<p>Ten African countries have been downgraded since the COVID-19 pandemic started – Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius and Zambia.</p>
<p>These decisions were based on <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/coronavirus-will-hit-africa-hard-25716">expectations</a> that their fiscal situations would deteriorate and their <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/24952/africa-faces-a-coronavirus-catastrophe/">health systems</a> would be severely strained by the pandemic. </p>
<p>But, in my view, the downgrade decisions reflect monumental bad timing. I would also argue that, in most cases, they were premature and unjustified.</p>
<p>Since international rating agencies have tremendous power to influence market expectations and investors’ portfolio allocation decisions, crisis-induced downgrades undermine macroeconomic fundamentals. Once downgraded, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, even countries with strong macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorate to converge with model-predicted ratings. Investors respond by raising the cost of borrowing or by withdrawing their capital, aggravating a crisis situation.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>South Africa was <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-South-Africas-ratings-to-Ba1-maintains-negative-outlook--PR_420630">stripped</a> of its last investment grade by Moody’s. The rating agency cited a rising debt burden of 62.2%, which was estimated to reach 91% of GDP by fiscal 2023; and structurally weak growth of less than 1%, which was estimated to shrink to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020">-5.8%</a>. It was hoped that Moody’s would <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/South-Africa/could-coronavirus-give-sa-another-breather-from-moodys-junk-status-20200326">delay its rating action</a> to see the impact of the coronavirus onshore and the country’s policy responses. The procyclical effect of the downgrade magnified the impact of the lockdown. Fitch further pushed it <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/islamic-finance/fitch-downgrades-south-africa-to-bb-outlook-negative-03-04-2020">deep into junk</a> a week later. </p></li>
<li><p>Fitch cut Gabon’s sovereign rating to CCC from B on <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/fitch-downgrades-gabon-to-ccc-on-debt-repayment-risks-57907795">3 April 2020</a>. The rationale for the downgrade was that agencies expected the risks to sovereign debt repayment capacity to increase due to liquidity pressure from the fall in oil prices.</p></li>
<li><p>Moody’s revised Mauritius’s sovereign rating outlook from Baa1 stable to negative on <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-changes-the-outlook-on-Mauritiuss-rating-to-negative-from--PR_420034">1 April 2020</a>. Moody’s said the downgrade was driven by the expectation of lower tourist arrivals and earnings due to the coronavirus. Both would have a negative impact on the country’s economic growth.</p></li>
<li><p>Nigeria was downgraded by S&P from B to B- on <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/fitch-downgrades-nigeria-amid-oil-price-slump-pandemic-shock-57921342">26 March 2020</a>. The reason was that COVID-19 had added to the risk of fiscal and external shock resulting from lower oil prices and economic recession. Yet the investment grades of Saudi Arabia and Russia were spared.</p></li>
<li><p>S&P also downgraded Botswana – one of the most <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13040376">stable economies in Africa</a> – which had an A rating. The agency <a href="https://www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=64900&ArticleTitle=Market+Slump+Prompts+Botswana+Downgrade">cited</a> weakening fiscal and external balance sheets due to a drop in demand for commodities and expected economic deceleration because of COVID-19. Botswana’s downgrade came four days after it went into a lockdown and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/botswana-no-covid-19-cases-closes-borders-after-death-zimbabwe">before it had recorded a confirmed</a> case of COVID-19. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These downgrades deep into junk impose a wave of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/a-trio-of-downgrades-spell-default-danger-for-emerging-markets">other problems</a>, worse than COVID-19. They cut sovereign bond value as collateral in central bank funding operations and drive interest rates high. Sovereign bond values are grossly discounted, at the same time escalating the cost of interest repayment instalments, ultimately contributing to a rise in the cost of debt. A wave of corporate downgrades also follows because of the sovereign ceiling concept – a country’s rating generally dictates the highest rating assigned to companies within its borders.</p>
<h2>Solution</h2>
<p>In response to the procyclical COVID-19 induced downgrades, African countries need to implement these four measures. </p>
<p>First, to curb the procyclical nature of rating actions that disrupt markets by triggering market panic, the timing of rating announcements needs to be regulated. Regulators of rating agencies such as the <a href="https://www.fsca.co.za/Pages/Default.aspx">Financial Sector Conduct Authority</a> in South Africa have the power to determine the timing of rating. In times of crisis, rating agencies should defer publishing their rating reviews as markets have their way of discounting risk when fundamentals are conspicuously changing. </p>
<p>Second, the rules of disclosure and transparency should be enhanced during rating reviews. Rating methodologies, descriptions of models and key rating assumptions should be disclosed to enable investors to perform their own due diligence to reach their own conclusions.</p>
<p>Third, in collaboration with other market regulatory bodies in the financial markets, transactions that unfairly benefit from crisis-driven price falls should be restricted. This includes short-selling of securities – a market strategy that allows investors to profit from securities when their value goes down.</p>
<p>Lastly, African countries need to develop the capacity for rigorous engagement with rating agencies during rating reviews and appeals. They need to make sure that the agencies have all the information required to make a fair assessment of their rating profiles.</p>
<p>The African Union and its policy organs need to fast track the adoption of its continental policy framework of mechanisms on rating agencies’ support for countries. This will assist them to manage the practices of rating agencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize consults for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on support to African Union (AU) member states on credit rating agencies.</span></em></p>Downgrades have a devastating effect on economies that are already strained. The decision to downgrade during a crisis like the coronavirus pandemic must be challenged.Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1256792019-11-05T14:30:22Z2019-11-05T14:30:22ZEU targets fragile West African fish stocks, despite protection laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298941/original/file-20191028-113991-6rnb5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Fishing boats in Senegal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fabian Plock/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of the large fishing vessels that operate in West Africa <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf">are from</a> distant water fishing nations – such as countries in the European Union (EU) and China and Russia. To get permission to fish in West African waters they form agreements in exchange for a fee that is payable to the government. </p>
<p>But these agreements have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236227528_Overfishing_in_west_Africa_by_EU_vessels">been criticised</a> for contributing to the over-exploitation of fish stocks in the region. Specifically affected are, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d′Ivoire, Liberia, Cape Verde, Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia.</p>
<p>So far, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-depleting-fish-stocks-may-pose-a-threat-to-regional-security-105168">over half</a> of the fisheries resources in waters off West Africa are already over-fished. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0964569119301620?via%3Dihub">our recent paper</a>, my colleague Dyhia Belhabib and I show that the EU’s agreements with West African countries continue to target fragile fish stocks. This is despite the fact that the EU is bound by policies that are meant to protect fish stocks. </p>
<p>EU activities alone are not to blame for over-fishing in the region. The impact of trawling by other countries, <a href="https://chinadialogueocean.net/5984-foreign-trawling-west-africa/">like China</a>, is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-47698314/is-china-s-fishing-fleet-taking-all-of-west-africa-s-fish">well-documented</a>. But, through its fisheries policies, the EU has a commitment to sustainable fishing. It also continues to enter into fresh agreements with countries, despite evidence of serious population declines in the species of interest.</p>
<p>Marine fisheries play <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms201550">a significant role</a> in the food and economic security of millions of people in West Africa. If stocks are depleted, small-scale fishers that depend on them won’t be able to make a proper income and many people will lose their main source of protein. Competition for depleting resources is already <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf">leading to conflict</a> between fishers and foreign fishing vessels. </p>
<p>It is crucial that these natural resources are better protected. We propose that one way to do that is for countries to renegotiate their naively low royalties with the EU. And there needs to be more investment in marine enforcement.</p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/114/the-common-fisheries-policy-origins-and-development">original objectives</a> of the EU’s <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/114/the-common-fisheries-policy-origins-and-development">Common Fisheries Policy</a> was to preserve fish stocks, protect the marine environment, ensure the economic viability of European fleets and provide consumers with quality food. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569119301620?via%3Dihub">our paper</a> we argue that the policy protects EU waters, but damages the marine environment of third countries to which it has now been extended. </p>
<p>We also argue that subsidies under the policy are a key driver of this over-exploitation of fisheries in third countries. For instance, these subsidies <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/opinion/the-eu-must-bury-the-debate-on-harmful-fisheries-subsidies-once-and-for-all/">incentivise</a> the construction of new vessels to allow boats to go farther and remain active at sea for longer, and even support the fuel costs for these more extensive activities. </p>
<p>And we highlight that abuse by EU vessels undermines local food security and provokes conflict with artisanal fishers. This is because demand in EU countries has led to EU vessels targeting fragile fish species such as the European anchovy, bigeye grunt, sardinellas, bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna and swordfish. </p>
<p>Our study used a review of existing literature and policy documents. This included an analysis of <a href="http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/search">catch data</a> between the EU and countries with whom it has fishing partnership agreements in West Africa, between 2010 and 2014. </p>
<p>We then cross-referenced EU catches with the exploitation status of certain species extracted from the <a href="http://www.fao.org/home/en/">Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)</a> and the <a href="https://www.iccat.int/en/#">International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas</a>. The categories we used were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Fully exploited: this means that there’s no room to catch more of that fish species,</p></li>
<li><p>Over-exploited: this means that too many are being caught and that numbers will decline, and </p></li>
<li><p>Depleted: which means that the number of fish stock are at the lowest they’ve ever been. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>We found that, of the species caught by EU vessels:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Over 20% of the species in Sao-Tome and Principe were over-exploited; 10% of the species caught in Liberia are fully exploited. In Mauritania we found that 41% of the species caught are over-exploited and 5% are fully exploited while in Guinea-Bissau, 7% of the species are over-exploited and 21% are fully exploited.</p></li>
<li><p>In The Gambia, 55% of species caught are over-exploited and in Cape Verde 28% of the species caught are over-exploited. In Côte d'Ivoire, 23% of species caught are over-exploited.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>We also found that the EU selectively applies regulations when it comes to <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32008R1005">preventing</a> illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The EU issues warnings (yellow) or a complete ban in fish trade (red) to countries that are not making their fisheries more sustainable. This is when there are inadequate local provisions, like laws and enforcement measures.</p>
<p>We uncovered a trend. Yellow cards are issued to countries with whom the EU have a high level of trade, and a ban to countries where it has less fishing trade. </p>
<p>Guinea-Bissau, for example, <a href="http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fmars.2018.00079/full">has not</a> received a warning despite evidence of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. Its maritime enforcement agencies <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/892031523024988244/ICR-final-P119380-04302018.docx">aren’t adequately equipped</a> to monitor the activities of vessels operating in its waters.</p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>We recommend that the EU review the implementation of the provisions of its Common Fisheries Policy, including the terms of their subsidies which have been identified as being harmful to sustainable fisheries. West African countries should also do far more to ensure that future and renewed fishing agreements are negotiated more robustly.</p>
<p>It is possible. For instance Guinea-Bissau was firm in its negotiations over a new agreement with the EU when its old one expired in 2017. After a year of negotiations, the EU offered a much better deal than previously proposed. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/press/eu-concludes-sustainable-fishing-partnership-agreement-guinea-bissau_nl">In return</a> for providing five years of access to 50 EU fishing vessels, the EU will pay Guinea Bissau €15.6 million per year. The previous agreement’s rate was €9.2 million. </p>
<p>They were also required to put more investment into effective marine governance and enforcement.</p>
<p><em>Dyhia Belhabib is a Principal Investigator, Fisheries, ECOTRUST CANADA</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood is a Visiting Fellow at The Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College Abuja, Nigeria</span></em></p>The EU continues to enter into fresh agreements with countries, despite evidence of serious population declines in the species of interest.Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Graduate Teaching Assistant, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1198272019-07-05T13:47:49Z2019-07-05T13:47:49ZWhy the African Monetary Fund is a good idea and what can be done to get it going<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282653/original/file-20190704-51284-s1lcmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa has tried for decades to develop robust intra-regional trade. Free trade agreement is the most recent effort </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African Union (AU) leaders will gather in Niger on 7 July for an Extraordinary Summit to discuss the <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>. They will be meeting at a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/taking-the-pulse-of-africas-economy">critical moment</a> for the continent. Many African countries are experiencing uneven growth and rising debt. All face an uncertain global environment and need the boost that closer and more dynamic continental trade relations could deliver.</p>
<p>In our view the AU leaders should also use their meeting to reinvigorate their efforts to create an <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-establishment-african-monetary-fund">African Monetary Fund</a>. This would be used to encourage African states to engage more actively in regional trade by offering them financial support for managing the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/09/sub-saharan-africa-regional-integration-arizala.htm">risks</a> associated with closer regional integration and expanded intra-regional trade.</p>
<p>Over the past 10 years, most regions have developed <a href="https://www.bis.org/review/r120203d.pdf">regional arrangements</a> that can supplement the help that the IMF provides to countries facing balance of payments problems. Ten years ago, US$100 billion was available through these regional funds. Today more than <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12464">US$900 billion</a> is available through these arrangements. Africa is currently the most prominent gap in the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692622">evolving global financial safety net</a>. </p>
<p>The African leaders signed a treaty to establish this fund in 2014. Unfortunately, progress to set it up has stalled. So far the treaty has been signed, but not ratified, by eleven AU member countries. Fifteen must sign and ratify the statutes for the fund to become operational. Once operational, it will have a capital subscription of up to US $22.64 billion and the ability to provide member countries with loans equivalent to two times their contributions to the Fund’s capital.</p>
<h2>Managing the ripple effects</h2>
<p>The free trade area offers states new growth and employment opportunities. But by increasing economic linkages between African states, it could also increase the risk that economic problems in one country can spill over and have a strongly negative effect on growth, trade, investment and employment in others. For example, both positive and negative developments in the US economy will have a powerful impact on Canada and Mexico.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135">More work lies ahead to make Africa's new free trade area succeed</a>
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<p>To help mitigate these effects, participants in other regional trade arrangements have established regional financial arrangements. These provide financial support to their members to manage balance of payments crises. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128437">evidence</a> suggests that when states have access to this type of financial support they are less likely to take actions that impede intra-regional trade flows. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2128437">For example</a>, the Latin American Reserve Fund, which provides its members with financial support during balance of payments crises, has helped the recipient countries to maintain their intra-regional trade arrangements. This, in turn, has reduced the risk that the recipient’s problems would cause a crisis in its neighbours.</p>
<p>The failure of an adequate number of states to sign and ratify the African Monetary Fund treaty is an embarrassing challenge to the credibility of the AU’s efforts to promote a more integrated, dynamic, sustainable and equitable African economy. These efforts have been going on for more than 40 years. Steps along the way have included the former Organisation of African Unity’s Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/745620?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents">signed in 1980</a> and the Abuja Treaty <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/3000/Bib-24781.pdf?sequence=3">signed in 1991</a>.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://www.bu.edu/gdp/2019/07/03/july-2019-summit-of-the-african-union-jump-starting-the-african-monetary-fund/">policy brief</a> published by the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria and the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University, we propose three concrete steps to jumpstart the push for the fund. </p>
<h2>Action plan</h2>
<p>First, the creation of the fund must be explicitly linked to the success of the free trade area. The AU leaders can do this by making the case that, just as has happened in other regions, the presence of a regional financial arrangement will support the efforts to boost intra-regional trade in Africa. It will help participating countries mitigate the balance of payments challenges that greater regional integration may cause. </p>
<p>Moreover, the fund, by quickly providing its members with financial support, can offer them more time to negotiate a larger support package with richer institutions, such as the IMF. In this regard, it should be noted that eight of the AU member countries (Cape Verde, Comores, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and Somalia) will be able to borrow more resources from the AMF than the IMF. </p>
<p>Second, one AU member state should become the champion for the fund. This country would become the first country to sign and ratify the fund treaty. It would lobby other AU member countries to ratify the African Monetary Fund. It would advocate for the AU to reconstitute the steering committee created in the treaty and provide it with adequate resources. Since Cameroon is the designated host country for the AMF’s headquarters, it has an incentive to be a champion for the institution.</p>
<p>Finally, the steering committee should develop a plan for overcoming the substantial resource constraints in the region. This will require balancing the fund’s need for sufficient resources to be credible with the limited ability of some states to contribute. This could be addressed by negotiating an arrangement in which richer regional countries and institutions contribute a disproportionate share of their capital contributions up-front. </p>
<p>These additional contributions will be reimbursed as poorer countries make their capital contributions. It’s important to note that the AMF Board of Governors has the authority to extend the period for a country to make its contribution for up to eight years. To further incentivise small to medium sized member countries to contribute capital, they should be allowed to treat their capital contributions as part of their international reserves. Such an arrangement is not unprecedented and was used effectively in South America. These measures would make an implementation plan more feasible.</p>
<p>Africa has tried valiantly for decades to overcome the substantial challenges hindering the development of robust intra-regional trade. The free trade area agreement is the most recent of these efforts. The credibility of the continent’s leaders and institutions will be influenced by its success or failure. The establishment of the African Monetary Fund would demonstrate the continent’s determination to promote intra-regional trade and development.</p>
<p><em>Hadiza Gagara Dagah is a co-author of the policy brief, <a href="http://www.bu.edu/gdp/2019/07/03/july-2019-summit-of-the-african-union-jump-starting-the-african-monetary-fund/">Jump-starting the African Monetary Fund </a>, on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danny Bradlow's SARCHI chair receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>William N Kring is a co-grantee of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for a project on regional financial arrangements and surveillance. The grant covers regional financial arrangements in general, but not the African Monetary Fund specifically. </span></em></p>Now that African countries have signed up for the continental free trade agreement, they must complete the institutional loop by jumpstarting the creation of the African Monetary Fund.Danny Bradlow, SARCHI Professor of International Development Law and African Economic Relations, University of PretoriaWilliam N Kring, Assistant Director, Global Development Policy Center, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1072202018-11-26T13:34:18Z2018-11-26T13:34:18ZLifestyle diseases could scupper Africa’s rising life expectancy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246458/original/file-20181120-161624-r1p1zi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The life expectancy improvements in sub-Saharan Africa vary between men and women.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People in sub-Saharan Africa are now living longer than ever before. A child born in the region today is expected to live up to 64 years on average. This is a remarkable increase of 11 years since the year 2000, when life expectancy at birth was only 53 years in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat2006DefinitionsAndMetadata.pdf">Life expectancy</a> at birth is the average number of years that a newborn is expected to live, if current mortality rates hold steady. Changes in life expectancy can be used to track the impact of population-wide health threats, such as the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. The monitoring of life expectancy can also provide crucial information that’s needed to deploy resources and effective interventions on the ground.</p>
<p>The life expectancy improvements in sub-Saharan Africa vary between men and women, within sub-regions and between countries. </p>
<p>We know all of this, and much more, because of an extensive study we recently published in <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31891-9/fulltext">The Lancet</a>. We drew from the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/gbd">Global Burden of Disease</a> study, which is a systematic effort to gather and analyse a huge amount of data on health loss due to diseases, injuries and risk factors by age, sex and geography over time. This allowed us to look at trends in mortality and life expectancy in the region from 1950 to 2017. It’s the most comprehensive look at these issues that’s ever been published. </p>
<p>Our research shows that the average life expectancy for men in sub-Saharan Africa is 62 years. For women it’s 66 years. </p>
<p>There are regional variations too. For example, men in central Africa will live to 60; those in eastern Africa to 63. Women in central Africa will reach 64 years; in southern Africa the figure is 68 years. The lowest life expectancy among men in sub-Saharan Africa is 49 years in the Central African Republic. The highest – 73 – is in Cape Verde. The corresponding life expectancy for women in those countries is 55 and 79 years.</p>
<p>There has been a huge decrease in mortality among children younger than five in sub-Saharan Africa. As a portion of total deaths, the number of deaths before the age of five has decreased from 45% in 1950 to 10% in 2017. </p>
<p>This is likely linked to a number of interventions such as the scale-up of <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-leaders-step-up-to-the-plate-to-narrow-immunisation-gaps-58237">vaccination programmes</a>, improved water and sanitation, and mass distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets. Mothers’ increased education levels and rising individual incomes have also contributed to the decrease in child deaths. </p>
<p>But caution is necessary. It’s not inevitable that death rates will keep falling. Rising epidemics of high blood pressure, high blood sugar, and obesity in some <a href="https://theconversation.com/people-in-africa-are-living-longer-but-lifestyle-diseases-are-rising-66686">African countries</a> could lead to shifts over time in the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31694-5/fulltext">opposite direction</a>. </p>
<h2>Falling death rates</h2>
<p>Overall, death rates have been dropping in sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the 21st century. There were 702 deaths per 100 000 people in 2017, down from 1366 deaths per 100 000 in 2000.</p>
<p>For all ages, it’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/36/3/484/655065">estimated</a> that one-third of life expectancy improvements are because of rising income per capita, one-third can be attributed to improvements in educational attainment, and one-third are a result of changes that have happened over time. These include technological improvement such as new vaccines. We have also <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32225-6/fulltext">learned more</a> about diseases and how to control them.</p>
<p>There may be additional reasons for the reductions in mortality over time. These would include social factors like availability of job opportunities and good working conditions, existence of social support networks, and safe housing.</p>
<h2>Causes of death</h2>
<p>The five leading causes of death in sub-Saharan Africa for adults between the ages of 15 and 49 years in 2017 were AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, maternal disorders, and road injuries. </p>
<p>The leading causes of death differed when we looked at mortality for each of the sexes over time. There were major changes in the leading causes of death between 1990 and 2017. </p>
<p>Interpersonal violence was the seventh leading cause of death among men in 1990. Now it’s number five. Liver cirrhosis was the eighth leading cause of death; now it’s the sixth. </p>
<p>The main changes in causes of death among women were cervical cancer, which moved from 10th in 1990 to seventh. Breast cancer was the 17th leading cause of death among women – today it is eighth. </p>
<p>For people between the ages of 50 and 69, the three leading causes of death in 2017 were tuberculosis, <a href="https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/heart-attack/about-heart-attacks/silent-ischemia-and-ischemic-heart-disease">heart attacks</a> and stroke among men; and stroke, heart attacks and tuberculosis among women. </p>
<p>This shows that non-communicable diseases are already wreaking havoc in many countries across the continent.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/people-in-africa-are-living-longer-but-lifestyle-diseases-are-rising-66686">People in Africa are living longer but lifestyle diseases are rising</a>
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<h2>Impending epidemic</h2>
<p>High blood pressure, high blood sugar, and obesity are the top risk factors for death in women aged between 50 and 69. The top risk factors for men in the same age group are high blood pressure, high blood sugar, and alcohol use (with obesity in sixth position). </p>
<p>These risk factors are warning signs of an impending, widespread epidemic of <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31694-5/fulltext">non-communicable diseases</a> in sub-Saharan Africa. Some non-communicable diseases such as <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/health/2018-10-17-diabetes-to-be-sas-leading-killer-by-2040-study-shows/">diabetes</a>, heart attacks, and stroke are already projected to be <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31694-5/fulltext">major killers</a> in the region soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Shey Wiysonge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The leading causes of death in sub-Saharan Africa for adults 15 to 49 years were AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, maternal disorders, and road injuries.Charles Shey Wiysonge, Director, Cochrane South Africa, South African Medical Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1056112018-10-25T13:42:40Z2018-10-25T13:42:40ZBolsonaro’s victory is likely to see Brazil scale down Africa interests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242100/original/file-20181024-71011-p1gf7n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Brazilian presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro on the campaign trail in Rio.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> FEF-EPA/Marcelo Sayao</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>His first son is a senator for the state of Rio do Janeiro. His second son a municipal councillor in the city of Rio, and his third is a federal deputy for the state of São Paulo. And he himself has served seven terms as deputy and as member of several political parties. </p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/who-is-jair-bolsonaro-brazil-13470717">Jair Bolsonaro</a>, the favourite candidate for Brazil’s upcoming runoff presidential elections, likes to present himself as a new man who operates outside of the “system”. </p>
<p>The rhetoric of a new man, untainted by the culture of corruption that prevails among the political class, is a powerful device. It’s succeeded in folding the interests of disparate social categories into those of seasoned right wing politicians.</p>
<p>Bolsonaro is candidate for the Social Liberty Party. He’s the author of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/24/planet-populists-brazil-jair-bolsonaro-environment">incendiary pronouncements</a>, happily racist, misogynist and homophobic. The former army captain has managed to coalesce eclectic crowds whose commitment to democracy depends on the exclusion of entire sections of Brazilian society. He has colossal support among Brazil’s prolific evangelical communities. These have re-purposed their religious fervour to passionate hate and the <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/08/radicalismo-de-bolsonaro-afasta-parte-dos-evangelicos-afirmam-lideres.shtml">demonising of adversaries</a>.</p>
<p>Bolsonaro assuages the fears of a middle class that feels it’s lost privilege. He also confirms their aversion for Brazil’s internal “others” – namely black Brazilians and various Indian communities. In fact, he promises to keep privilege spaces of university education, residential suburbs and commercial spaces free from poor people. </p>
<p>For Bolsonaro, the choice Brazilians have to make is rather simple: it’s either “prosperity, freedom, family and God” – in other words him, or “the path of Venezuela”. In other words <a href="https://thegoldwater.com/news/39073-Bolsonaro-Prosperity-Freedom-Family-and-God-Or-The-Path-Of-Venezuela">Fernando Haddad’s Workers’ Party</a>.</p>
<p>In the first round of elections, Bolsonaro’s party secured 46% of the total vote. Haddad’s Workers’ party secured 29%. Haddad is routinely the victim of his opponent’s foul mouth. Bolsonaro is a slavery-denialist, who claims that the Portuguese never set foot in Africa and that Africans themselves <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/07/portugueses-nem-pisaram-na-africa-diz-bolsonaro.shtml">“delivered” slaves to Brazil</a>. </p>
<p>Needless to say his views on Africa are narrowly informed by the prism of Brazil’s uneasy, strained and unresolved racial question. As a result, his government can be expected to scale back Brazil’s engagements with the continent.</p>
<h2>The end of Lula’s Africa moment?</h2>
<p>Bolsonaro is expected to turn threats by the current administration to close Brazilian embassies in Africa into policies. Cutbacks on <a href="https://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/mundo/232642/Serra-pode-fechar-embaixadas-na-%C3%81frica-e-no-Caribe.htm">scholarships for African students</a> are also expected.</p>
<p>At home he’s expected to put further restrictions on immigration and to withdraw into national priorities. These include Brazil’s economic doldrums, its fractured society, the high levels of crimes and more crucially the <a href="http://diplomaciacivil.org.br/eleicoes-2018-as-propostas-de-haddad-e-bolsonaro-para-politica-externa-e-educacao/">economic recession</a>.</p>
<p>The only area where a Bolsonaro government policy might intersect with previous policy could be the military cooperation and the trade in military equipment.</p>
<p>If little is known about Bolsonaro’s views on foreign policy in relation to Africa, his running mate, General Hamilton Mourão, has been very clear. During a recent speech he criticised Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff’s South-South diplomacy claiming that it had resulted in costly association with “dirtbag scum” countries (African) that did <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Brazil-Bolsonaros-VP-Running-Mate-Calls-Africans-Dirt-Bag-20180918-0004.html">not yield any “returns</a>.</p>
<p>Africa was the centrepiece of Lula da Silva’s geopolitical aspirations for Brazilian status in an expanded and reformed multilateralism. In eight years of his presidency he visited 27 African countries over 12 trips. </p>
<p>But Brazil’s Africa moment had already began to fade under Rousseff. The election of Bolsonaro is likely to signal the beginning of the end of Africa-Brazil relations as we know them. It could even mean the end of the five country grouping known as <a href="http://www.brics2018.org.za/what-brics">BRICS</a> as he has promised to review Brazil’s <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/brazil-election-where-jair-bolsonaro-and-fernando-haddad-stand-foreign-policy">participation in the coalition</a>.</p>
<p>Brazil’s relations with Africa have been particularly strong with the Lusophone countries of Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe. Angola in particular became a springboard in Brazil’s expansion into the South Atlantic <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/brazil-and-africa-bridge-south-atlantic">beyond the Lusophone world</a>.</p>
<p>Lula da Silva sought to institutionalise the new Global South framework in the form of a biannual Africa South America Summit and also through the <a href="http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/mecanismos-inter-regionais/7495-india-brazil-south-africa-ibsa-dialogue-forum">India, Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum</a>. He doubled Brazil’s diplomatic presence in Africa between 2000 and 2010. By 2010 there were <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292010000300013">39 embassies</a>. Over the same period, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-muggah/what-is-brazil-really-doi_b_6413568.html">18 African embassies </a>opened in Brasilia.</p>
<p>These various initiatives fed a momentum in Brazil’s rise to global prominence. Brazil was for instance able to get José Graziano da Silva elected Director-General of the UN <a href="http://www.fao.org/home/en/">Food and Agriculture Organisation</a> with the strong support of African countries. </p>
<p>Beyond punctual strategies, Brazil’s engagement with Africa served to enhance its global standing and to buttress Brazil’s ambition to become a leading voice of the Global South.</p>
<h2>Economic strategies</h2>
<p>Brazil’s economic strategies took an expansionist pattern similar to that of other emerging powers. They targeted resources-rich and fast growing economies. Main export destinations were Egypt and Nigeria. Imports come mainly from Algeria and Nigeria. </p>
<p>Between 2000 and 2013, trade between Brazil and Africa expanded from $USD4.3 to <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-muggah/what-is-brazil-really-doi_b_6413568.html">USD$28.5 billion</a>. But it dropped by <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/brazil-and-africa-bridge-south-atlantic">USD$12.4 billion</a> in 2016 following economic recession and political upheaval in Brazil. </p>
<p>Brazil’s economic engagement with Africa is not without its problems. For instance, the infrastructure giant Odebrecht is at the heart of Operação Lava-Jato (Operation Car War) which exposed the largest corruption scandal in the history of modern democracy. It involved over 200 leaders across the political and business sectors and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-39194395">over USD$2 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Under Bolsonaro, economic ties can be expected to take a different turn. Institutions such as the <a href="https://www.embrapa.br/en/about-us">Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation</a> can be expected to grow in prominence in Africa as he makes a big push for agro-business expansion. This will come with its own set of problems, notably pollution caused by fertilisers and attendant health risks. That, however, is unlikely to deter him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jair Bolsonaro has very rightwing views likely to put a final nail in the coffin off Brazil’s Africa moment spearheaded by former president Lula da Silva.Amy Niang, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Wist University, Visiting Professor at the University of Sao Paulo, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1025852018-09-13T14:10:05Z2018-09-13T14:10:05ZPeople across Africa have to travel far to get to a hospital. We worked out how far<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234987/original/file-20180905-45135-p8f2jz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small hospital in Wakiso district in the central region of Uganda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nearly half of all deaths and about a third of disabilities in low and middle-income countries could be avoided if people had access to <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(18)30026-3/fulltext">emergency care</a>. In Africa the main causes of emergencies are road accidents, obstetric complications, severe illnesses and non-communicable diseases.</p>
<p>Over the past 18 years the <a href="https://www.afem.info/">African Federation for Emergency Medicine</a>, an advocacy group, has been encouraging the development of emergency care systems on the continent. The gaps it has identified include decent transport and hospital services. </p>
<p>But to address these challenges data is needed on the number of hospitals, their locations as well as the population marginalised. Most countries in Africa don’t have this information. They lack basic inventories of health care service providers, including the number of hospitals. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(17)30488-6/fulltext?utm_campaign=lancet&utm_content=66283296&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook">Our study</a> set out to address this problem by producing the first ever assessment of hospital services in sub-Saharan Africa, and used it to work out peoples’ access to care. </p>
<p>The results – including how long it takes to get to a hospital – show where investment is needed in improving access. Various interventions are necessary. These should include building new hospitals, improving ambulatory care, building new roads and fixing existing ones. </p>
<p>But the most urgent action is that countries must update their hospital lists, including assessment of capacity and capability to provide emergency care and updating of the private sector. Our research goes someway to helping them start this process. We have built a database which can be accessed for <a href="https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/JTL9VY">free</a> and used for assessing service availability at national levels.</p>
<h2>Building the database</h2>
<p>The hospital list covers 48 countries and islands of sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>To develop the list we used numerous sources for the data, including ministries of health, health information systems, national and international organisations from all the countries and islands. In most cases, the sources were available online but we also relied on personal contacts to obtain hospital data in some countries. </p>
<p>Close to 50% of the hospitals on the list didn’t have GPS coordinates that could aid in precisely locating them. To overcome the problem we assigned them unique location attributes using online mapping tools such as Google earth and OpenStreetMaps. </p>
<p>This audit located 4908 public sector hospitals which were precisely assigned location attributes (Figure 1). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234990/original/file-20180905-45178-l6s510.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of public hospitals in Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nigeria, which accounts for close to a fifth of sub-Saharan Africa’s population had the highest number of hospitals at 879. Other countries with significantly high numbers of public hospitals were the Democratic Republic of Congo (435), Kenya (399) and South Africa (337). </p>
<p>The least were in smaller countries such as Cape Verde, Zanzibar, and São Tomé and Príncipe. This information was used as a starting point to calculate the geographic access to the hospital services. </p>
<h2>Timely access</h2>
<p>We measured geographic accessibility by travel time to the nearest public hospital. We did this by calculating how long it would take to travel by road based on the major means of transport in the region. </p>
<p>We assembled road networks from Google earth and OpenStreetMaps, and assigned travel speeds along the roads. We then developed a model that calculates the time it would take for a patient to travel from any 100m by 100m square grid of location to the nearest hospital. </p>
<p>More specifically, a significant proportion of women need access to hospital care when in labour and we additionally determined how long they would take to get to the nearest hospital. </p>
<p>Results reveal that, less than a third (29%) of the total population and 28% of the women of child bearing age, lived more than two hours from the nearest hospitals. The two-hour threshold is a widely used recommendation by the <a href="http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/monitoring/9789241547734/en/">WHO</a> and the <a href="http://www.lancetglobalsurgery.org/">Lancet Commission for global surgery</a> for defining access to emergency obstetric and surgical care respectively. In addition, international benchmarks by the Lancet commission for global surgery recommends having 80% of any given population within two hours as critical in ensuring universal health coverage by 2030.</p>
<p>The most surprising outcome was the huge differences between countries. For example, more than 75% of the population in South Sudan lived outside the two-hour threshold. Other poorly served countries included Central African Republic, Chad and Eritrea. More than half of their populations lived outside the two-hour threshold. </p>
<p>The best served countries were mostly islands like Zanzibar, Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe. More than 95% of their populations were within two hours of a hospital. Large countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria also had good access indices, with more than 90% within the two-hour band. </p>
<p>All 48 countries in our survey have signed up to the sustainable development goal of delivering universal health care by 2030, part of which involves access to hospitals. Our research can help countries work out what they need to do to make this a reality when it comes to emergency care. There’s still a long way to go. Only 16 countries in our survey achieved 80% coverage in access to a hospital within two hours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Ouma receives funding from the Initiative to Develop African Research Leaders as a PhD student (# 107769). The work was also supported by Wellcome Trust Principal Fellowship to Robert W Snow (# 103602) and the Department for International Development (UK) – Project on Strengthening the Use of Data for Malaria Decision Making in Africa (DFID Programme Code # 203155). The authors also acknowledge the support of the Wellcome Trust for the Kenya Major Overseas Programme (# 203077). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emelda Okiro receives funding from the Wellcome Trust as an intermediate research fellow (# 201866). </span></em></p>Only 16 out of 48 African countries and islands have access to hospital services within the WHO’s two-hour time threshold.Paul Ouma, PhD Fellow, Kenya Medical Research InstituteEmelda Okiro, Head, Population Health Unit, KEMRI, Kenya Medical Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/885812017-12-06T13:35:21Z2017-12-06T13:35:21ZEngineering research in Africa is growing but it’s still a patchy picture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197773/original/file-20171205-22967-swwkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Engineering can greatly bolster any country's development and growth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s vast land mass and rich natural and mineral resources make it strategically important and an increasingly significant <a href="https://na.unep.net/atlas/africa/downloads/chapters/Africa_Atlas_English_Intro.pdf">global player</a>. It is also a dynamic young continent: about 60% of its residents are aged <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34188248">below 25</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union is trying to harness this enormous potential through its <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>, which includes elevating Africa through improved education and application of science and technology in development. </p>
<p>Engineering is an important branch of science and technology. It has a significant impact on the overall development of any nation, region or continent. It is, as Professor Calestous Juma <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Engineering-is-the-engine-that-will-power-Africa-s-growth-/440808-2309528-pq151w/index.html">has written</a>, an engine to power growth – especially in Africa.</p>
<p>The World Bank predicts that Africa needs to spend about <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Engineering-is-the-engine-that-will-power-Africa-s-growth-/440808-2309528-pq151w/index.html">USD$93 billion per year</a> in the coming years to improve its infrastructure. Part of this investment must be in world class engineering education and research.</p>
<p>Given the discipline’s importance, I wanted to understand how Africa is performing in terms of engineering research. How much are the continent’s researchers contributing to new ideas and thinking around engineering? To find out, I <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20421338.2017.1341732">searched, downloaded and analysed</a> scholarly publication data from academic publisher Elsevier’s citation and abstracting service, <a href="https://www.scopus.com/">Scopus</a>®. It’s a huge index of articles, covering 22,800 journals belonging to more than 5,000 international publishers across disciplines. </p>
<p>I also examined how many times articles from Africa were being cited, which is crucial to map the relevance and impact of any research. For instance, one of the criteria for winning a <a href="http://www.lindau-nobel.org/blog-on-fundamental-science/">Nobel Prize</a> in science is how frequently a researcher’s work has been cited.</p>
<p>The data I analysed shows that scholarly research output in terms of journal articles, conference papers and so on in engineering fields from Africa has increased over the past two decades. The number remains small in comparison to other, more developed continents and countries. But the continent’s contribution to global thinking and understanding about engineering is growing, and this should be celebrated.</p>
<h2>Analysing data</h2>
<p>My analysis reveals that Africa has recorded a tremendous growth in its output of academic engineering research over the past 20 years. In total, 75,157 scholarly articles about engineering subjects emerged from Africa between 1996 and 2016. About 1,500 of these were published in the first seven years under review. In the past three years, about 9,000 engineering articles from Africa were published annually. That’s a significant percentage increase.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197855/original/file-20171205-23009-1tqh4ia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Africa’s engineering research output over 20 years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php">Scimago</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The problem is that African countries’ outputs are not uniform. South Africa leads the pack, with 22,156 articles over 20 years. This puts it at 41st in the world for output in engineering research. It is followed by Algeria (16,617 articles) and Tunisia (14,805 articles). Some countries have barely contributed to engineering research: Cape Verde produced only nine articles in 20 years; the Central African Republic just seven and Somalia only six.</p>
<p>The continent is also not producing nearly as much engineering research as others and other regions.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197935/original/file-20171206-910-pqurdu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Africa’s engineering research output is still lower than other continents and regions, but its growth over 20 years has been encouraging.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scimago</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also wanted to know how often African researchers’ work was being cited by others. This is a good way to understand the impact a piece of research has, and is called citation analysis. It counts the number of times an author’s article is cited in other scholarly works. And <a href="https://medium.com/@write4research/why-are-citations-important-in-research-writing-97fb6d854b47">citations are important</a> because they reveal that a piece of research is being used by others.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20421338.2017.1341732">The results</a> are encouraging. The average citation for academic engineering papers from Africa is 5.48 per paper. This is almost equal to the performance of papers from Asia, and is well above the average citations received by papers from Eastern Europe. This suggests that African engineering research is influencing others’ thinking and contributing to global knowledge about the discipline.</p>
<p>So how can Africa improve its engineering research output, especially with an eye to meeting the goals of Agenda 2063? Collaboration will be crucial.</p>
<h2>Collaborative work</h2>
<p>South Africa does well with collaboration. Articles from the country tend to involve more than one research organisation or institution. Co-authored articles are common. Its researchers work with others on the continent and with global partners. Countries in North Africa, however, are less active when it comes to collaboration. </p>
<p>Africa-Africa collaboration, involving institutions and individuals across the continent, needs to be strengthened. This is because only African countries can truly understand the continent’s pressing needs, and develop appropriate solutions. Countries like South Africa that perform well collaboratively can offer support and advice to others. </p>
<p>It may also be time to set up an exclusively African citation database. Even Scopus®, the world’s largest indexing and abstracting database, offers very limited coverage of African science. By developing a resource that focuses only on African engineering research, the continent will be able to get a more complete, clear picture of its output and respond accordingly. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa is creating an <a href="http://africancitationindex.org/">African Citation database</a>, but it will be some time before this is a fully fledged searchable database.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Swapan Kumar Patra receives funding from National Research Foundation, Republic of South Africa, Post doctoral research fellowship, through Tshwane University of Technology</span></em></p>Africa has recorded a tremendous growth in its output of academic engineering research over the past 20 years. Greater collaboration can increase this growth even more.Swapan Kumar Patra, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/857592017-11-05T08:57:58Z2017-11-05T08:57:58ZCape Verde’s goal is 100% renewable energy by 2025. Why it may just do it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190625/original/file-20171017-30441-9ow7so.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cape Verde's renewable energy resources account for about 25% of total energy production</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cape Verde, the small island archipelago nation off Africa’s northwest coast, has set itself a very <a href="http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Cabo%20Verde/1/Cabo_Verde_INDC_.pdf">bold</a> renewable energy target. As part of <a href="https://www.se4all-africa.org/se4all-in-africa/country-data/cabo-verde/">its</a> “sustainable energy for all” agenda, it has pledged to obtain 100% of its electricity from renewable resources by 2025. </p>
<p>Cape Verde is made up of 10 islands, nine of which are inhabited, that lie about 600km west of Senegal. <a href="https://www.german-energy-solutions.de/GES/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Praesentationen/2015/2015-07-21-iv-kap-verde-03-mtide.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7">Almost all</a> of the islands’ 550,000 residents have access to electricity, but about one-third still rely on firewood and charcoal for cooking. Cape Verde’s per capita electricity consumption of 727 kWh per person per year is substantially higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC?locations=ZF">488 kWh per person per year</a>. But electricity prices are high. They range from <a href="http://cabeolica.com/site1/docs/Annual%20Report%202015%20-%20website.pdf">US$0.26 - 0.32</a> in recent years compared, for example, to an average of <a href="https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_6_a">US$0.13</a> for residential homes in the US.</p>
<p>Although most of its electricity is produced by generators, which run on imported petroleum products, Cape Verde has started to diversify its energy portfolio. A quarter is now provided by <a href="https://www.german-energy-solutions.de/GES/Redaktion/DE/Audioslidehows/2015/Kap-Verden/Vortrag3/praesentation.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2">renewable sources</a>. This is good news because there are <a href="http://gestoenergy.com/en/project/50-renewable-cape-verde-renewable-action-plan/">estimates</a> that, between 2015 and 2020, Cape Verde will almost double its annual electricity consumption to 670 GWh, up from 360 GWh. </p>
<p>With cutting-edge technologies and innovative business practices, Cape Verde can achieve its 100% renewable energy goal in a way that is cost-effective and equitable. <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544215001656">One research team</a> suggested that a system based on solar, wind and energy storage (as batteries and pumped hydropower) could meet Cape Verde’s goals. It certainly has a wide range of options for increasing its share of renewable energy to achieve this.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.clickenergy.com.au/news-blog/12-countries-leading-the-way-in-renewable-energy/">Some countries</a> obtain almost all of their electricity from renewable sources, but these have substantial hydroelectric resources. Cape Verde, lacking large hydropower resources, would be unique in achieving 100% renewable energy with a diverse resource mix.</p>
<h2>Resource variety</h2>
<p>Like its mainland African neighbours, Cape Verde has a variety of resources and technologies to choose from. It has wind resources like Morocco, the solar potential of the Sahel, geothermal resources like Kenya, and marine energy comparable to many coastal countries.</p>
<p>Cape Verde’s northeasterly trade winds are considered excellent for wind power production. A wind farm typically requires wind speeds of at least <a href="https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-2.pdf">6.4 m/s</a> at 50m above ground. Cape Verde’s average annual wind speeds <a href="http://www.cabeolica.com/site1/about-us/annual-reports/">exceed 9.0 m/s</a> at the wind farm. Already three of the islands, including the two most populated, <a href="http://gestoenergy.com/en/project/50-renewable-cape-verde-renewable-action-plan/">produce about 25%</a> of their electricity from wind turbines. But without energy storage there is little opportunity to expand wind energy on these islands. </p>
<p>Another technology that could be integrated into the electricity generation offering is the country’s desalination systems. Many of Cape Verde’s communities depend partially, or entirely, on <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/cape-verde-desalination-against-aridity/av-39350560">these</a> for drinking water. Desalination systems require electricity and can be run at times when the wind turbines are operating, but electricity demand is low – such as at night. </p>
<p>Additionally, the desalinated freshwater can be pumped into a high-elevation reservoir and used for energy. When demand peaks the water flows back down, spinning hydro turbines and generating electricity in the process. Integrating desalination and energy systems like this could be highly beneficial. For example, on the island of São Vicente it could enable wind turbines to meet <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544215001656">up to 84%</a> of the island’s electricity demand. </p>
<p>Like many African countries, Cape Verde’s tropical location has good potential for solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity. <a href="http://gestoenergy.com/en/project/50-renewable-cape-verde-renewable-action-plan/">One study</a> suggests that the solar PV capacity potential is more than double the currently installed electrical generating capacity. Most of the potential development is on the densely populated island of Santiago. The challenge, as with wind, is integrating irregular flows into the grid.</p>
<p>Cape Verde could also take advantage of an emerging technology called ocean thermal energy conversion. This uses the difference between warm surface water and cold, deep ocean water to produce electricity. <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hawaii-first-to-harness-deep-ocean-temperatures-for-power/">It works best</a> in equatorial latitudes where there is a large difference in temperature between surface water and deep water. <a href="https://www.ocean-energy-systems.org/ocean-energy-in-the-world/gis-map/">Assessments</a> show that the ocean waters around the southernmost tip of Santiago might be suitable for it. </p>
<p>In addition, as a volcanic archipelago Cape Verde has potential for <a href="http://gestoenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PowerGen-Africa2012-Geothermal-resource-assessment-in-volcanic-islands-Fogo.pdf">geothermal energy</a> – which uses heat from the earth. Both geothermal and ocean thermal energy conversion electricity generation have the advantage of running all the time. This provides baseload power, meeting the minimum level of power demand all day. </p>
<h2>Energy technologies</h2>
<p>When it comes to distributing and paying for energy, systems also need a re-think.</p>
<p>Although the centralised grid model of electricity has been effective, technological advancements are making community-based “micro-grids” increasingly attractive. At least three communities in Cape Verde are already using <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261913010428">a solar and wind-based micro-grid</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/how-microgrids-work">microgrid</a> is a local electricity grid. It includes electricity generation, distribution to customers, and, in some cases, energy storage. It’s beneficial because solar- or wind-based microgrids are cleaner than diesel-based systems and have lower life cycle costs. Microgrids are also often connected to the main electricity grid but can disconnect and operate independently, for example, when a storm damages the main grid. </p>
<p>“Pay-as-you-go” energy systems have also revolutionised the delivery of electricity services in Africa. They integrate energy technologies, mobile communications and mobile banking. This allows households to purchase “solar home systems” and pay the cost over time. Kenya and Tanzania have emerged as leaders in this sector and are home to companies such as <a href="http://www.m-kopa.com/">M-KOPA</a>, <a href="http://www.plugintheworld.com/mobisol/">Mobisol</a>, and <a href="http://offgrid-electric.com/">Off-Grid Electric</a>. Pay-as-you-go systems could enable Cape Verde to reach its renewable energy goals without the large capital investments of centralised systems.</p>
<p>Cape Verde has already had tremendous success in integrating wind and solar into its energy system. By adopting cutting-edge technologies and innovative business practices, Cape Verde can achieve its 100% renewable energy goal in a way that is cost-effective and equitable.</p>
<p><em>The following research assistants contributed to this project: Abigail Barrenger, Jessica Crawford, Jacob McLaughlin, and Chad Wilcox. Dr Anildo Costa provided technical assistance and insights into Cape Verde’s energy system.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik Nordman has received funding from the US State Department, US Department of Energy, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Michigan Sea Grant, and the Pan American Development Foundation for energy-related research projects. He has memberships in professional societies including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Society of American Foresters, and American Wind Energy Association.</span></em></p>With cutting-edge technologies and innovative business practices, Cape Verde can achieve its goal in a way that is cost-effective and equitableErik Nordman, Associate Professor, Grand Valley State University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/752682017-04-03T14:29:05Z2017-04-03T14:29:05ZPoorer people in Africa face higher hurdles to access to justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162891/original/image-20170328-30810-iygror.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In Africa a study shows stark differences between perceptions of justice among the rich and poor.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Access to justice for all citizens is a cornerstone of democracy and an increasingly prominent goal on the global agenda. It’s highlighted in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/">Goal 16</a> to “promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.”</p>
<p>One way to assess progress is through the perceptions and experiences of ordinary citizens of the legal systems in their countries.</p>
<p>A new analysis based on <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer’s most recent round of surveys</a> in 36 African countries paints a sobering picture: while some countries can boast significant success in providing access to justice, most still face substantial blockages that are both patently unfair and a breeding ground for discontent. (For a detailed analysis by country, see <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp39-access-to-justice-in-africa">Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 39</a>.)</p>
<p>On the positive side, most Africans (72%) see courts as legitimate, charged with making decisions that all citizens must abide by. But only a slim majority (53%) trust the courts even “somewhat,” and one in three (33%) believe that “most” or “all” judges and magistrates are corrupt.</p>
<p>Citizens report a number of serious barriers to access to justice, including long delays in court cases, high costs, corruption, the complexity of legal processes, lack of legal counsel, and concerns about court fairness.</p>
<p>What’s worse, access is most severely restricted for some of Africa’s most vulnerable citizens – the uneducated, rural residents, and especially people living in poverty.</p>
<h2>Higher hurdles for the poor</h2>
<p>Whether based on experience or word of mouth, poor people (those who most frequently go without enough food, clean water, medical care, cooking fuel, and a cash income) have less faith in the integrity of the courts than their wealthier counterparts. </p>
<p>More than four in 10 (42%) of the poorest respondents say that “most” or “all” judges and magistrates are corrupt, compared to 26% of the wealthiest respondents. The gap is 11 percentage points with respect to trust in the courts (Figure 1).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162882/original/image-20170328-30788-13b1wvs.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When they do engage with the legal system, poorer Africans are much more likely to experience problems (Figure 2). Compared to those with no lived poverty, the poorest are more than twice as likely to find courts too expensive (52% vs. 24%), 16 percentage points more likely to report that judges don’t listen to them, 15 points more likely to find the courts too complex and to suffer from lack of legal counsel, and 10 points more likely to face long delays. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162879/original/image-20170328-21726-1qwb1vt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why poor people don’t go to court</h2>
<p>Only about one in eight Africans (13%) say they had contact with the courts during the past five years. Survey respondents cite a number of reasons that might prevent citizens from taking cases to court, even if they have legitimate complaints.</p>
<p>Here, too, the poor differ from the rich. Court costs are an important deterrent for both groups, but costs for lawyers are a much more significant impediment in the minds of wealthier respondents than among the poorest (cited by 22% vs. 14%). The wealthy identify long wait times as the next-most-important barrier, citing delays twice as frequently as the poor (16% vs 8%). </p>
<p>Poorer respondents are more likely to cite lack of trust in the courts, along with the expectation that they won’t be treated fairly, that the courts will favour the rich and powerful, and that court officials will demand bribes. In short, poor people are significantly less likely to mention time or money concerns and more likely to mention the expectation of inequitable or improper treatment by the courts. Poorer respondents are also much more likely (13% vs. 5%) to prefer informal justice mechanisms such as traditional leaders or local councils.</p>
<h2>Access to justice for all</h2>
<p>Other marginalised groups, too, face particular challenges in access to justice, including the less-educated (Figure 4) and rural residents. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162880/original/image-20170328-21254-1647t41.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But barriers to justice are reported by all groups in all countries, even in relatively high-performing Botswana, Cape Verde, and Lesotho, not to mention dismally low-performing Liberia and Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>In general, less-democratic countries and those affected by conflict struggle the most to ensure access to justice. Across 36 countries, fewer than half (45%) of citizens who had contact with the courts say that obtaining the needed assistance was easy, and 30% report paying bribes to court officials.</p>
<p>Understanding the perspectives and experiences of ordinary citizens can help us identify and ultimately overcome barriers to justice. Evidence that the hurdles are highest for some of the most vulnerable groups – those who may have the greatest needs and least resources to obtain remedies – gives efforts to ensure their access to justice a special urgency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75268/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afrobarometer's survey module on access to justice was supported by funding from the World Bank.</span></em></p>Most Africans see courts as legitimate but only a slim majority trust them while one in three people believe judges are corrupt.Carolyn Logan, Deputy Director of the Afrobarometer & Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and MSU’s African Studies Center, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/665202016-10-05T07:30:32Z2016-10-05T07:30:32ZThere is good as well as bad news about the state of governance in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140347/original/image-20161004-30459-x0auxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's President Paul Kagame is seen as having promoted economic growth at the expense of human rights.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruben Sprich/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Declining safety and deterioration in the rule of law are holding back progress in governance in Africa. This is according to the latest Ibrahim Index of <a href="http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2016/10/01184917/2016-Index-Report.pdf?_ga=1.114147396.230891364.1474620280">African Governance</a>.</p>
<p>The index, started by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation a decade ago, provides an annual assessment of governance in African countries. </p>
<p>This year’s edition shows marginal progress on the continent across all areas. Categories that were measured include human development, political participation and human rights as well as safety and rule of law and sustainable economic governance.</p>
<p>Mauritius emerged as the best performer when the index was started 10 years ago and has retained its top spot. Somalia remained in last position. </p>
<p>South Africa and Ghana are still in the top ten well-governed states at sixth and seventh place. But they are also in the top ten states which have shown the most governance regression in the past decade. In South Africa’s case the biggest regression has been under safety and rule of law, while in Ghana declining sustainable economic opportunity was the culprit.</p>
<h2>Civil conflict impact</h2>
<p>Côte d’Ivoire showed the most improvement. But because it came off a low base it still only ranked 21st given its emergence from years of civil war. </p>
<p>The three countries with the largest deterioration in governance over the past decade are Libya, Madagascar and Eritrea. All have witnessed civil conflict and insurgencies in the past ten years. </p>
<p>As with any social science project, subjective opinion and perceptions are involved. Quantifying qualitative data to create ratings and rankings then becomes the most difficult and debatable aspect. The index addresses these difficulties through its composite nature, adjusting its methodology annually. This year’s edition uses 95 indicators from 34 independent data sources.</p>
<h2>Good leaders equal good governance</h2>
<p>Acknowledging that leaders play an important role in improving governance, the foundation also awards an annual governance prize. Eligible candidates are democratically elected African leaders. They should have served their terms in office within the limits of their countries’ constitutions and left office in the preceding three years.</p>
<p>The caveat here is that although the council meets to discuss candidates every year, the prize has only been awarded four out of nine times since its inception in 2007. No award was made this year. Previous heads of state to receive it were presidents Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (2007), Festus Mogae of Botswana (2008), Pedro Pires of Cape Verde (2011) and Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia (2014).</p>
<p>South Africa’s former President Nelson Mandela also received an honorary award when the prize was <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2013/in-2007-president-nelson-mandela-was-awarded-an-honorary-ibrahim-prize/">conceived</a>. Laureates receive US$5 million a year for ten years and US$200,000 thereafter annually for the rest of their lives.</p>
<p>The idea behind the Ibrahim Prize was to incentivise leaders to abide by the principles of good governance. As the foundation itself puts it, it is for: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>African leaders who have governed well, respected their constitution and left office with their country in better shape than at their arrival.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, leaders who improved governance and who did not abuse their power during office or engage in corrupt activities, are provided with a generous retirement package.</p>
<p>The foundation defines governance as </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver… </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, the foundation does not prioritise one form of public good over the other. This was exemplified by a statement from the prize selection committee chairman in 2013: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… economic development does not give us a reason to be a little complacent about participation and the human rights of people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is commendable that the foundation has high standards that it refuses to compromise, even when it means not giving the prize for two years in a row. </p>
<h2>Development vs human rights</h2>
<p>It is also important in the current African context where countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda prioritise socioeconomic development at the expense of human rights and personal liberties. In both countries human development (comprising of welfare, education and wealth subcategories) improved but the sub-category of participation decreased.</p>
<p>Interestingly, both countries still achieved an overall improvement in participation and human rights, mostly through significant progress achieved under the gender category.</p>
<p>To improve, countries need to find a balance between political and economic matters. This is where leadership becomes particularly important. But this is currently lacking on the continent.</p>
<p>The Ibrahim Prize laureates achieved a great deal domestically. But they did not command a continental presence. It is also interesting that over the last nine years the prize has been won by leaders of some of Africa’s smaller democracies.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>African leaders unlikely to win the prize because of their penchant to cling to <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-old-mens-club-out-of-touch-with-continents-suave-burgeoning-youth-48618">power</a> include Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni (in power since 1986), Paul Biya of Cameroon (since 1982) and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe (1980). </p>
<p>The increasingly authoritarian <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-in-line-to-stay-in-office-until-2034-53257">Paul Kagame</a>, in power since 2000 and potentially until 2034 following a recent constitutional amendment, is likely to join their ranks. </p>
<p>While overall governance progress on the continent over the past decade has shown a positive trend, capable and accountable leaders are needed to take Africa forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yarik Turianskyi is the Programme Manager of Governance and APRM at the South African Institute of International Affairs. The Programme is currently funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. </span></em></p>To improve, African countries need to find a balance between political and economic matters. This is where leadership becomes particularly important. But this is currently lacking on the continent.Yarik Turianskyi, Yarik Turianskyi is Manager of the Governance and African Peer Review Mechanism Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs and guest lecturer in African Governance and Eastern European Politics, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/658242016-10-03T18:57:08Z2016-10-03T18:57:08ZPress freedom: worrying signs as South Africa slips in global rankings<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140129/original/image-20161003-20230-10of9pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Media freedom activists protest against the draconian Protection of Information Bill in Cape Town, South Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sumaya Hisham/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 19 October 1977, the apartheid government in South Africa banned The World, the Weekend World and arrested the newspapers’ editor Percy Qoboza. <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/remembering-qobozas-sense-of-duty-1594527#.ViI2CX4rLnA">Pro Veritate</a>, an ecumenical newspaper, was also banned.</p>
<p>The day was named <a href="http://www.saha.org.za/news/2011/November/a_black_wednesday_for_apartheid_sa_and_a_black_tuesday_for_democratic_sa.htm">Black Wednesday</a> and is commemorated every year. It serves as an opportunity to take stock of how the country is faring when it comes to press freedom. </p>
<p>Since the end of apartheid South Africa has made great advances when it comes to freedom of the press and freedom of expression in general. The situation today is a far cry from the apartheid era. </p>
<p>Freedom of expression is firmly embedded in the country’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/images/a108-96.pdf">constitution</a> which provides for the “freedom of press and other media”. It also enshrines the right of access to information. </p>
<p>Legislation, such as the Promotion of Access to <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/poatia2000366/">Information Act</a> has been put in place to underpin these constitutional rights. It provides for access to any information held by the State or private person. This <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/21.html">practically means</a> that the Act provides the media with information on how government is run. </p>
<p>This in turn may very well have a bearing on elections and therefore significantly influences a democratic state. As the country’s Constitutional Court has <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/21.html">stated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Access to information is crucial to accurate reporting and thus to imparting accurate information to the public. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Contrary to the secretive apartheid regime, the Promotion of Access to Information Act promotes a culture of responsiveness, transparency and accountability in government.</p>
<p>Impressive as that might be, things do not work as well in practice. South Africa has been dropping in <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/south-africa">press freedom rankings</a>. Reasons for the decline include the fact that access to information for the media has been slow and is often hampered by bureaucracy. And in <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/south-africa">only a few cases</a> have access to information applications resulted in full disclosure of information. </p>
<p>While there’s reason to celebrate the improvement of press freedom in a number of southern African countries, South Africans have reason to worry. The <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016">Freedom of the Press Report</a> lists South Africa as being among the countries with one of the biggest declines in press freedom, dropping four places. It is now being seen as only “partly free”. </p>
<h2>Progress so far</h2>
<p>In the 2015 <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking">World Press Freedom Index</a>, southern Africa was ranked as the second most improved media environment in the world with <a href="https://rsf.org/en/namibia">Namibia</a> being a real success story. </p>
<p>In other parts of Africa <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ghana">Ghana</a> is still faring well (despite dropping in rankings). Countries in <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016">West Africa</a>, such as Burkina Faso, Cȏte d’Ivoire and Togo showed encouraging improvements. </p>
<p>According to another survey, the Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016">Freedom of the Press Report 2015</a>, South Africa ranks at number 39 of 180 countries, and within Africa, it ranks lower than Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mauritius, Ghana and Namibia.</p>
<p>So, while there has been a general improvement in press freedom in the southern part of Africa in 2015, South Africa’s decline in rankings is a cause for concern.</p>
<h2>Free to say what they think?</h2>
<p>In his 2014 Black Wednesday <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=18231">commemoration speech</a> President Jacob Zuma emphasised that the “country is run by a government with leaders who fought for these rights” and because of this they should be trusted to “never deny our people the right to say what they think”.</p>
<p>But, the ANC government proved that merely being the liberation party does not exempt you from violating the rights of others. A study by <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Briefing%20paper/ab_r5_policypaperno3.pdf">Afrobarometer</a> shows that people who indicate that they are free to say what they think also report lower levels of corruption and better government performance.</p>
<p>South Africa has shown that high government corruption can be equated to lower press freedom in attempts to cover-up corruption. One example is the use of <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/nkpa1980224.pdf">legislation</a> from the apartheid era to hinder any critical reporting on the use of public money on President Zuma’s private homestead at <a href="http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/national-key-points-act-laid-bare/">Nkandla</a>. This serves as a clear contradiction of Zuma’s 2014 speech.</p>
<p>The controversial <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/B6F-2010_15Oct2013.pdf">Protection of State Information Bill</a> is also a threat to access to information. Better known as the “Secrecy Bill”, it carries prison terms of up to 25 years for the disclosure of classified state information.</p>
<p>Another punch in the face of freedom of expression is the <a href="http://iabsa.net/assets/FPB_Draft_Online_policy_Submissions.pdf">proposal</a> by the Film and Publications <a href="http://www.fpb.org.za/">Board</a> to regulate online content.</p>
<p>But the most saddening has been the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s open display of bias towards the governing ANC. Examples include its refusal to allow political advertisements of <a href="http://buzzsouthafrica.com/das-election-ads/">opposition parties</a> and directing journalists not to ask Zuma <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-20-hlaudis-kill-bill-the-slippery-slide-towards-manipulating-the-news/#.V-5rr8e9rIU">difficult questions</a>.</p>
<h2>Liberating party loses sight of its roots</h2>
<p>South Africa’s challenge is that the government is slowly crossing the bridge from liberating party to being a threat to democracy.</p>
<p>A mediocre democracy would be happy with being ranked “partly free” for media freedom. But, that is not in keeping with the robust democracy that many fought for South Africa to become. </p>
<p>As the country commemorates Black Wednesday and celebrates press freedom, South African would do well not forget what it took to gain such freedom, and the work that lies ahead to maintain it.</p>
<p>If the South African government continues down the slippery slope of corruption and censorship, it will only be a matter of time before its “partly free” media freedom status degenerates into “not free” – just like it was during apartheid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65824/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgia Alida du Plessis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some African countries have shown an improvement in press freedom and freedom of expression ratings, others, including South Africa, are seeing worrying trends and a drop in rankings.Georgia Alida du Plessis, Research Fellow in Public Law, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.