tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/car-recall-2320/articlesCar recall – The Conversation2023-12-19T19:40:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199952023-12-19T19:40:04Z2023-12-19T19:40:04ZTesla recalls over two million vehicles, but it needs to address confusing marketing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566150/original/file-20231217-29-ey0s6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4992%2C2986&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Drivers often believe that semi-autonomous systems are more autonomous than they are designed to be.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/tesla-recalls-over-two-million-vehicles-but-it-needs-to-address-confusing-marketing" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>On Dec. 12, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a recall regarding Autosteer, a feature included in Tesla’s semi-autonomous suite Autopilot, because “<a href="https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2023/RCLRPT-23V838-8276.PDF">there may be an increased risk of a collision</a>.”</p>
<p>The recall, which affects over two million vehicles in the United States, is a watershed moment in modern automotive history, as it affects <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/12/16/tesla-autopilot-recall-timeline/">nearly every Tesla on the road in the U.S.</a> </p>
<p><a href="https://recalls-rappels.canada.ca/en/alert-recall/transport-canada-recall-2023657-tesla">Transport Canada</a> extended the recall to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/tesla-major-recall-us-1.7057694">193,000 Tesla vehicles in Canada</a>.</p>
<p>Tesla says <a href="https://www.tesla.com/en_ca/support/vehicle-firmware-prevent-autosteer-misuse">only vehicles in the U.S. and Canada</a> are affected by the recall.</p>
<p>Unlike technologies that can be defined as fully autonomous — like elevators where a user steps in and pushes a button — Autosteer is not an autonomous system, despite what drivers may think.</p>
<p>A 2018 study found that <a href="https://news.thatcham.org/automated-driving-hype-is-dangerously-confusing-drivers-study-reveals/">40 per cent of drivers believed Tesla vehicles are capable of being fully self-driving</a>. A similar study concluded that participants “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1541931218621430">rated [Autopilot] as entailing less responsibility for the human for steering than ‘high automation,’ and it was not different from ‘autonomous’ or ‘self-driving’</a>.”</p>
<p>Instead, Tesla Autopilot falls into the category of <a href="https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_202104/">level 2, or semi-autonomous, systems</a>. These system can handle vehicle steering and accelerating but the human driver must stay vigilant at all times.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RuOwHclH2OY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">PBS covers the safety issues that led to the December recall of Tesla vehicles in the United States and Canada.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Confusing communication</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.uwindsor.ca/kinesiology/human-factors-and-ergonomics">human factors research</a>, believing that a system can do something it can’t is referred to as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1555343417695197"><em>mode confusion</em></a>. Mode confusion not only misleads the user, but also has direct safety implications, as in the <a href="https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/F-GGED">1992 Air Inter Flight 148 plane crash in France</a>. That situation was the direct result of the pilot operating the aircraft system in a mode different from its original design.</p>
<p>Safety researchers have sounded the alarm about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10447318.2018.1561792">risks inherent to semi-autonomous systems</a>. In fully manual and fully autonomous modes, it is clear who’s responsible for driving: the human and the robot driver, respectively. </p>
<p>Semi-autonomous systems represent a grey area. The human driver believes the system is responsible for driving but, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/10/31/tesla-not-guilty-autopilot-crash-trial/">as lawyers representing Tesla have already successfully argued</a>, it is not.</p>
<p>A second important factor is also the role of misleading information. The automotive industry as a whole has, for years, tiptoed around the actual capabilities of autonomous vehicle technology. In 2016, <a href="https://time.com/4431956/mercedes-benz-ad-confusion-self-driving/">Mercedes Benz pulled a TV commercial off the air after criticism that it portrayed unrealistic self-driving capabilities</a>. </p>
<p>More recently, Ashok Elluswamy, director of Autopilot software at Tesla, said <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/01/17/tesla-engineer-testifies-that-2016-video-promoting-self-driving-was-faked/">the 2016 video promoting its self-driving technology was faked</a>. </p>
<h2>False sense of security</h2>
<p>Thinking that a system is fully autonomous creates a false sense of security that drivers may act on by losing vigilance or disengaging from the task of supervising the system’s functioning. Investigations on prior accidents involving Tesla Autopilot showed that <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20200225.aspx">drivers’ overrelience on the semi-autonomous system indeed contributed to some reported crashes</a>.</p>
<p>The recall is a logical, albeit long-awaited, effort by transportation agencies to regulate a problem that researchers have attempted to draw attention to for years.</p>
<p>In her 2016 study, Mica Endsley, a pioneer in the research field on user automation, highlighted some <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720816681350">potential safety risks of these systems</a>. A more recent study published by my research group also shows <a href="https://redcap.uwindsor.ca/surveys/?__file=Qqg7hnv2gVUqdycyHgfRoTPkG2pDFkAVb527vx5C3bgcv3AzkrRRIktdafb9F5MxDremWhRMZThpXGa8QVfeqxTfEpL4CVg9yNcH&_gl=1*1x3mupb*_ga*MjE2ODQ3OTQ3LjE2OTAzODUzMDY.*_ga_TMHVD0679R*MTcwMjY2NDAyMC4zMy4wLjE3MDI2NjQwMjAuNjAuMC4w">the dangers that operating semi-autonomous systems pose to drivers’ attention</a>.</p>
<p>With the recall, Tesla will be releasing <a href="https://www.tesla.com/en_ca/support/vehicle-firmware-prevent-autosteer-misuse">over-the-air software updates</a> that are meant to “further encourage the driver to adhere to their continuous supervisory responsibility whenever Autosteer is engaged.” These may include additional “visual alerts” and other additions to the system to help drivers stay vigilant while Autosteer is engaged. </p>
<p>In all, although this may be the first time regulators strike a direct, concrete blow at Tesla and its marketing, it won’t be the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesco Biondi receives funding from the Ontario Ministry of Transportation. He consults on Human Factors issues of vehicle automation.</span></em></p>Tesla’s recall of over two million vehicles in the U.S. and Canada is meant to address driver overreliance on the semi-autonomous Autopilot feature.Francesco Biondi, Associate Professor, Human Systems Labs, University of WindsorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/464192015-08-20T17:54:04Z2015-08-20T17:54:04ZWhy there must be freedom to publish flaws and security vulnerabilities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92590/original/image-20150820-7225-hyi4um.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It's not just the badge that gets nicked.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tedits/6258719892">tedits</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two academics have been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/18/security-flaw-100-car-models-exposed-scientists-volkswagen-suppressed-paper">given permission to publish</a> their security research which reveals vulnerabilities in a wireless car locking system. It comes two years after Volkswagen, one of the manufacturers using it, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/26/scientist-banned-revealing-codes-cars">won a court injunction</a> banning publication.</p>
<p>Despite a court order in its favour, Volkswagen has now allowed the report to be republished with only minor redactions. However the case reveals the tension between security researchers and software firms, or in this case the software used by car manufacturers. While some firms such as Facebook, Google and Microsoft <a href="https://theconversation.com/auto-industry-must-tackle-its-software-problems-to-stop-hacks-as-cars-go-online-45325">offer financial rewards</a> for those finding bugs, others such as Fiat Chrysler <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-33650491">assert that such activity is criminal</a> or as Volkswagen did, take it to the courts – while failing to address the highlighted problems that expose their customers to risks.</p>
<p>The car industry may feel bullied just now, but Volkswagen’s approach of using the courts to try to keep information about a key flaw under wraps is the equivalent of sticking your fingers in your ears and hoping everything will turn out well. This is a serious issue, one that is too important for the brute force of court rulings. In any case, the internet has little respect for national boundaries or court jurisdictions, and the information was available online regardless of the court’s ruling.</p>
<h2>Knock knock, come in</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92588/original/image-20150820-7202-7t9g8r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Megamos transponder wireless key.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Verdult/Ege/Garcia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The encryption used in the Swiss-made Megamos transponder is so weak that an intruder needs only listen to two messages transmitted from the fob in order to crack the key. The vulnerability relates to the poor, proprietary cryptographic methods used by the device, where the researchers found they could generate the transponder’s 96-bit secret key and start the car in less than half an hour.</p>
<p>This vulnerability has been well known since 2012, and code to exploit the flaw has circulated online since 2009. Yet there has been no product recall of the dozens of models from Audi, Porsche, Bentley and Lamborghini, Nissan and Volvo it affects, and no patches released to fix its problems.</p>
<p>Vulnerable wireless keys are a growing problem. It is reported that <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/technology-science/technology/tech-savvy-thieves-stealing-17-keyless-5103177">42% of all car break-ins in London</a> were related to various wireless key access systems, particularly for high-value cars from BMW and Audi.</p>
<p>For example, the <a href="http://makezine.com/2015/08/11/anatomy-of-the-rolljam-wireless-car-hack/">RollJam device</a> can be bought online for £20 and opens many well-known brands of cars – it “jams” the wireless signal twice when the user uses their key, and then is able to grab the access code for the car. It also opens most garage doors and disables some alarm systems. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92586/original/image-20150820-7235-11mqhfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A universal canopener, the RollJam device opens cars easily.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">RollJam</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Academic freedom vs industry interests</h2>
<p>The researchers who have now been permitted to publish, Roel Verdult and Barıs Ege of Radboud University in the Netherlands and Flavio D Garcia of the University of Birmingham, approached the manufacturer in May 2012, explaining that they intended to <a href="https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/sec15_supplement.pdf">present their findings at the USENIX 2013 conference</a>, giving the manufacturer plenty of time to produce a fix for the problem. Instead Volkswagen used the courts to block publication of the paper, pitting the prevention of the potential insecurity of Volkswagen cars against the freedom of academic publishing.</p>
<p>The scope of the patching required to fix Megamos’ problems would be enormous, as there is no simple update to replace the weak propriety cryptography at the heart of the problem. Clearly this was an incentive for Volkswagen to seek an injunction, but doing so hasn’t made the vehicles any more secure, nor has it prevented the information circulating on the internet.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=770&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=770&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=770&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/92587/original/image-20150820-7231-lty5i3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table of models affected (bold indicates models the researchers tested).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Verdult/Ege/Garcia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other manufacturers have been stung too – <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/07/02/ford_recall_software_bug/">Ford recalled 433,000 Focus, C-MAX and Escape vehicles</a> due to a software bug where drivers could not switch off their engines. And recently a security researcher showed how BMW cars could be breached by sending commands that told the cars to <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/09/18/bmw-stolen-hacking-kit/">open their doors and lower their windows</a>, leading BMW to issue a patch for over 2m BMW, Mini and Rolls-Royce vehicles.</p>
<p>But this case was avoidable: the Megamos vulnerability was one of poor design and implementation – using poor-quality, home-brewed encryption instead of one of the many common standards that would have proved far more impenetrable. This should have been reviewed as part of the due diligence process in evaluating the designs. Were they published, someone in the industry could have pointed out their flaws. Yet it’s this same process of research, publication and evaluation common in academia that Volkswagen tried to prevent.</p>
<p>This a sorry tale of responsible disclosure by academics followed by a gagging order, and ultimately for the problem to go unfixed. Unless the car industry takes this problem seriously, designs and tests systems properly before release then they will be weighed down by the costs of recall and repair and fines from regulators. </p>
<p>While some hunt vulnerabilities for glory, the researchers in this case were responsible and gave the companies involved a good amount of time to deal the problem before the paper was due to be published. While many in cryptography have faced pressures not to publish, such as government efforts <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/when-does-40-quadrillion-years-become-one-day-william-buchanan">to suppress Ron Rivest’s work on public key encryption</a>, academic freedom to publish and review responsibly is a key part of how mistakes are discovered and how knowledge progresses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Buchanan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Poor-quality crypto puts millions of car owners at risk – so why did UK courts help try to cover it up?Bill Buchanan, Head, Centre for Distributed Computing, Networks and Security, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/422882015-05-26T10:06:24Z2015-05-26T10:06:24ZWhy automakers so frequently botch product recalls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82749/original/image-20150522-32555-2q05ms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Faulty airbags led to the biggest auto recall in US history. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Airbag explosion via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been a spate of highly visible recalls in recent years that have given a collective black eye to the automotive industry. </p>
<p>From Toyota’s <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat/2012/07/01/toyota-recalls-lexus-vehicles-for-sticking-throttles/">fumbling</a> of the recall concerning its sticky throttles a few years ago, to GM’s more recent mishandling of its <a href="http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2014/03/gm-recall-raises-concerns-about-warning-systems-for-auto-safety/index.htm">ignition-switch problem</a>, major car manufacturers look like they only know how to consistently mismanage the critical activity of recalling dangerous vehicles. </p>
<p>Now it’s Takata’s turn in the unwanted media spotlight, and this time the recall is not just big, it’s huge. The <a href="http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/05/20/368706.htm">most recent count</a> puts the number of vehicles affected by its defective air bags at more than 30 million, marking a new world record for apparent incompetence in managing what many people believe to be any industry’s most important task: protecting public safety. Furthermore, it is going to be a logistical mess that will take years to fix all the affected vehicles</p>
<p>The dismay is widespread. Many members of the car-driving public are now asking one of journalists’ favorite questions: given the level of presumed ineptitude involved, how could these blatantly bad decisions have happened? Beyond that concern, we have an even bigger question: are these decisions criminal? And if they are criminal, who’s to blame? </p>
<p>(On that note, the Justice Department just last week <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/business/gm-inquiry-said-to-find-criminal-wrongdoing.html?_r=0">raised allegations</a> of criminal wrongdoing against GM and some of its executives for failing to disclose its ignition-switch deficiencies in a timely manner.)</p>
<h2>Why recalls are slow</h2>
<p>All these cases come in the wake of Ford’s <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00870550">miserable experience</a> failing to recall the Pinto because of exploding gas tanks during rear-end collisions at low speeds almost 40 years ago, and this question is a latent concern of all current executives. Remember, Ford as a corporate entity – not the individual decision makers within the company – <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fatal-ford-pinto-crash-in-indiana">was charged</a> with a crime. And the crime was not negligence, it was murder (in an accident involving three teenagers who burned to death in a 1978 accident in Indiana). </p>
<p>As a former insider who worked as corporate recall coordinator for Ford during the time of the Pinto problem – and now a management professor at Penn State University who uses the case in his MBA teaching – I might have some insight into the factors that lead companies to make decisions that the engineers and executives see as <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/04/the-engineers-lament">complex and rational</a>, but the public sees as simple and criminal.</p>
<p>Question #1 is: in each of these cases, why did the companies wait so long to acknowledge that there was a problem and initiate a recall? </p>
<p>Frankly, I sympathize with the corporate decision makers on this one. To me, the key issue is one of deciding when to pull the trigger and recommend recall. In my case, I was tracking a myriad of possible problems that might qualify for recall. </p>
<p>To initiate a recall I had to have two things: 1) traceable cause (I had to know that some specific component was breaking), and 2) a demonstrable pattern of failures. In most cases I had one or the other, but not both. In some cases I had neither. </p>
<p>What’s a person to do? Recommend recall when you don’t know what’s failing? Not very likely. Recommend recall when you don’t have convincing evidence of a pattern? I don’t think so. </p>
<p>The academic decision-making literature gives us some help on questions about decisions under risk (uncertainty), but not a lot of help on decisions under complexity and ambiguity (where information is either vague or subject to multiple opinions about the most effective course of action). Yet everybody knows executives are paid to make decisions under both these conditions. </p>
<p>It’s not easy, and everyone and every corporation can be accused of having had prior knowledge of a problem. The real question is how much knowledge is enough knowledge to act?</p>
<h2>Who knows there’s a problem and when</h2>
<p>Which gives rise to Question #2: who knew? </p>
<p>In each of the four cases I’ve cited, some engineers allegedly <a href="http://philosophia.uncg.edu/phi361-metivier/module-2-why-does-business-need-ethics/case-the-ford-pinto/">knew</a> there was a problem. In 1970, a subset of Ford engineers knew the Pinto would not meet a proposed fuel leakage standard because protruding studs would puncture the gas tank (the recall didn’t happen until after the Indiana incident in 1978). </p>
<p>As early as 2004, a <a href="http://www.autonews.com/article/20140627/OEM11/140629876/gm-was-urged-in-2004-report-to-study-cobalts-ignition-airbag-link">small group</a> of GM engineers suspected that there was a problem with Cobalt ignition switches (the recall was in 2014). In 2006, Toyota engineers <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/us/toyota-memo-acceleration-concerns/">became aware</a> of customer complaints about “unintended acceleration” (the recall was initiated in late 2009). Now it has come to light that Takata had reports of shrapnel from its air-bag inflators years before a recall that is only now getting under way.</p>
<p>Who’s at fault here for not pulling the trigger? The corporations? The individuals within the corporation? Well, who is the corporation anyway? </p>
<p>If a subset of people know of a problem, can the corporation be held culpable? Of course it can. But that consequence raises very interesting theoretical questions about organizations as agents in modern society. (It also raises questions about whether Mitt Romney was indeed correct in asserting that “Corporations are people, my friend,” but that is a different essay.)</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KlPQkd_AA6c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">On the campaign trail…</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Organizational learning</h2>
<p>More importantly, perhaps, it raises questions about organizational knowledge and learning. </p>
<p>Question #3, therefore, is: if some people in an organization know something important, but there are not adequate structures and processes in place to inform the key decision makers, how can we even talk about “organizational” learning? </p>
<p>Yet, we must. This is one of the most important academic questions of our time. How do we teach organizations how to learn, such that the entire entity acts like a distributed intelligence system? (I should note that Ford took steps in the ‘90s to make the company display the hallmarks of a learning organization)</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82744/original/image-20150522-32558-1olmjze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GM was in the spotlight earlier last year after fatalities resulting from faulty ignition switches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Dysfunctional cultures</h2>
<p>Lastly, all of these putatively bad actors (automotive corporations) have had questions raised about their dysfunctional cultures. So, Question #4 is another area of longstanding academic interest, and leads to several other related questions. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>did something about Ford’s way of doing business many moons ago lead to an intentional cover-up of information? (No, an internal investigation showed it was just engineers being engineers, testing out some solutions in case they needed to meet a new standard) </p></li>
<li><p>why were Toyota’s engineers acting so much like rational engineers and ignoring the palpable fears of customers (and should we be concerned about professional cultures that lead them to think so very differently from laypeople)? </p></li>
<li><p>what is it about GM’s supposed “cover your ass” culture that would tacitly have people wink at a potentially lethal ignition problem (and should they undergo a wrenching culture change as penance and practice, which they seem to be doing now under Mary Barra)? </p></li>
<li><p>why was Takata so deep in denial that it appeared to stonewall a patently obvious problem concerning flying shrapnel from a system that was intended to save your life? (How morbidly ironic.)</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Overall, academic theory and research can teach us quite a lot about decisions under uncertainty and risk, about who or what should be considered the locus of focus for responsibility, about how cultures influence decisions, etc. </p>
<p>But, in a modern world defined by immediate availability of information, litigiousness and image consciousness, what many corporations’ experiences with recalls really tell us is that we need more research and better theories to explain how and why those corporations and their representatives act as they do. And how we might reasonably teach them to act differently.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Gioia owns shares in Ford Motor Co., where he previously worked as a recall coordinator.
</span></em></p>From Ford’s Pinto problem to Takata’s defective airbags, sometimes it seems auto companies know how to do little more than mismanage product recalls.Dennis A. Gioia, Robert and Judith Auritt Klein Professor of Management, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/358902015-01-14T10:29:29Z2015-01-14T10:29:29ZIt seems little is certain in life but death, taxes and auto recalls<p>The US’s top auto safety agency last week fined Japanese car company Honda Motor a <a href="http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/business/honda-fined-70-million-in-underreporting-safety-issues-to-government.html?referrer=">record US$70 million</a> for failing to report hundreds of fatal accidents and injuries over the last 11 years. The unfiled claims included eight from the scandal over Takata airbags exploding violently when they deploy. Five deaths have been linked to that problem. </p>
<p>At the same time, back in Detroit, General Motors CEO Mary Barra vowed to put the automaker’s own safety crisis – including a record number of recalls in 2014 – behind it. The company had to recall millions of small cars for defective ignitions switches that could shut off the engine and disable airbags. </p>
<p>In 2015 US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration officials say they expect the number of recalls <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-06/auto-recalls-this-year-may-surpass-record-2014-nhtsa-chief-says.html">will surpass last year’s record</a> of more than 60 million vehicles, from GM’s faulty ignitions to Takata’s exploding airbags. </p>
<p>At the Detroit Auto Show, which began this week, the top auto safety regulator <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/business/safety-chief-pressures-carmakers-on-recalls.html?_r=0">told carmakers</a> that recalls must be aggressive, pre-emptive and aim to fix every vehicle affected, signaling a renewed vigilance on the part of federal agencies. </p>
<p>This near-constant barrage of auto recalls seems to be almost business as usual and accepted by consumers as just the way things are. Even amid all the recalls and scandals, vehicle sales are rising. Last year sales of cars and light trucks tallied an exceptional 16.4 million vehicles, <a href="http://www.nada.org/Publications/NADADATA/NADA_market_beat/default">the most since 2006</a>, according to the National Automobile Dealers Association. </p>
<p>One would think that the negativity you would expect to be associated with the massive recalls of recent years would slow down vehicle sales, perhaps significantly. But apparently this is not the case. </p>
<p>For sure, 2014 will go down in the automotive annuals as one of the most frustrating and challenging years with regard to the massive recall activity within the industry. Negative publicity and numerous legal cases have resulted from these recalls, hitting in particular General Motors, the world’s third-largest automaker.</p>
<p>Why are we seeing all these recalls?</p>
<p>There probably is no single reason for the numerous recalls, and I suspect it may well vary by manufacturer. One clear reason is the fact that today’s new vehicles are very complex. It may only take one minor electronic malfunction for the vehicle to be placed on a safety recall. </p>
<p>Another probable cause arises simply from the swelling demand. As a result, the manufacturing process has been accelerated to increase output, leading to quality control short-cuts in some cases and potentially to defects.</p>
<p>In other cases – such as with the GM recalls – <a href="http://www.autonews.com/article/20140529/OEM02/140529848/barra-says-recall-crisis-stemmed-from-gms-communication-breakdowns">communications about problems weren’t flowing effectively</a> from the bottom rungs of the manufacturing process. This was perhaps caused by the fact that lower level employees in the organization did not want to send bad news upward for fear of being blamed for the problem. </p>
<p>In the case of General Motors, it took some ten years for the now famous faulty ignition switch problem to surface and be announced to the public. GM’s Barra, who took over just last year, appears to have righted the ship with <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/05/news/companies/gm-recall-probe/">aggressive actions</a>, including the dismissal of some executives and the creation of a safety czar who must report to top management as soon as a problem has been identified. </p>
<p>Federal regulators themselves can’t escape some blame entirely. Some appeared to have been a bit lax in investigating safety problems once they learned about them. With GM, for example, the problem was identified as long ago as 2004 but not disclosed until last year. Had regulators been more actively policing recall activity and in closer conversation with GM – and asking the right questions – it is very likely that this problem would have surfaced much sooner. </p>
<p>Whatever the causes for all these recalls, there is much work to be done to minimize them going forward.</p>
<p>The automakers, first of all, have to step up their game. Top of the list of improvements is more stringent quality control measures in their manufacturing processes to ensure even minor defects make it into a finished vehicle. Quicker and more effective communication between lower- and top-level management, like the kind GM has recently implemented, is essential so that when problems do become apparent, they are dealt with decisively at the highest levels. The culture has to change, and perhaps top management should even recognize and reward those who identify and promptly report potential problems. </p>
<p>Regulators need to be more watchful as they oversee auto companies and better monitor their quality and safety control processes. Of course, they often depend on reporting from the automakers themselves to become aware of accidents resulting from defective auto parts, but they can do more to force this kind of reporting and make their own investigations. They also need to keep better tabs on key suppliers like Takata, which appear to have fallen through the cracks a bit. </p>
<p>And finally consumers themselves have a major role to play. The return of strong auto sales is a sign that they don’t seem to be using their pocketbooks to choose cars from companies with the strongest safety records. In the end, it’s not just about changing the statistics. It’s about keeping our families safe as we navigate our roads and highways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Cook does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US’s top auto safety agency last week fined Japanese car company Honda Motor a record US$70 million for failing to report hundreds of fatal accidents and injuries over the last 11 years. The unfiled…George Cook, Executive Professor of Marketing and Psychology, University of RochesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.