tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/chinese-media-7449/articlesChinese media – The Conversation2023-10-07T07:07:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143832023-10-07T07:07:55Z2023-10-07T07:07:55Z‘No’ campaign is dominating the Voice debate among Chinese Australians on WeChat: new research<p>Some <a href="https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinese-communities/reports/2023%20Being%20Chinese%20in%20Australia%20Poll%20%E2%80%93%20Lowy%20Institute.pdf">1.4 million</a> Australians are of Chinese ancestry, or about 5.5% of the population. Given the size of the community, it will be an important voting bloc in the upcoming referendum on a Voice to Parliament for First Nations people.</p>
<p>But while the government and the “yes” and “no” campaigns are translating some information into Chinese, it appears very little is gaining traction in the Chinese Australian online community. </p>
<p>According to our research, the Voice referendum has garnered limited attention on WeChat, the popular Chinese messaging app, compared to discussions on other issues, such as immigration, the economy and property prices. </p>
<p>As we draw closer to the referendum, we’ve also seen right-wing political rhetoric and misinformation come to dominate what little online discussion there has been. </p>
<p>Our research found the “no” campaign was resonating much more than “yes” on WeChat, particularly among conservative voices within the community. Among the 339 comments we collected and analysed, the vast majority (about 98.5%) leaned towards voting “no”, while just five comments unequivocally expressed support for the “yes” side.</p>
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<h2>Translated media reports</h2>
<p>Our study used a tool called <a href="https://twitter.com/wecapture_proj">WeCapture</a> to collect and archive public posts and comments on WeChat related to the referendum. </p>
<p>Between February and September, we collected more than 110 public posts, two short videos and 339 public comments in total. None of the posts had more than 20,000 views – showing how little the debate has resonated with Chinese Australians.</p>
<p>We were only able to analyse public WeChat accounts, as opposed to private discussions between individuals or in groups. As a result, commercial media accounts run by Chinese migrants, such as sydtoday, meltoday, AFNDaily, and melvlife, played a pivotal role in shaping these discussions. </p>
<p>Many of these posts were translated news reports on the Voice from the English-language media. These posts covered a broad range of topics, including explanations on the scope of the proposed Voice, analysis of Australian public sentiment about the Voice and reports on “yes” and “no” campaign rallies. </p>
<p>We found these media accounts sometimes <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231186343">editorialised</a> the translated English sources to align with readers’ expectations and the accounts’ business imperatives. For instance, in the screengrab of a WeChat post below, the headline reads: </p>
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<p>Breaking news! After 24 years, Australia has announced: an immediate mandatory nationwide referendum will be held. Everyone must participate. Australia is about to undergo significant changes.</p>
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<p>This translation conveys a sense of emergency and ambiguity to entice WeChat users to click on the link.</p>
<h2>Posts from the official groups</h2>
<p>Other posts came from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), the Victorian Labor Party, the Yes Campaign Alliance and other content producers, also translated into Mandarin. These appeared on influential WeChat media accounts such as sydtoday and Mel_life.</p>
<p>The AEC posted a series of sponsored articles to explain the Voice and the voting procedure (as seen in the post below). The AEC posts were much more formal and official sounding than most public posts on WeChat.</p>
<p>The “yes” campaign has also embedded image banners within WeChat posts, such as the one below, authorised by Dean Parkin, director of the Yes Campaign Alliance. </p>
<p>And in a short video posted the Victorian Labor Party, Carina Garland, the MP for Chisholm, conducted an interview with Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus to explain the Voice referendum and its significance. The video, which features Chinese subtitles and is specifically targeting Chinese Australians, only received 20 likes and was shared just 25 times. It also got no comments from WeChat users. </p>
<h2>Posts from ‘no’ campaigners</h2>
<p>In our research, we found WeChat users who were leaning towards a “no” vote had many concerns, including: </p>
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<li><p>fears the Voice could somehow disempower the Chinese Australian community</p></li>
<li><p>the perception taxes could increase due to Labor’s “leftist politics” </p></li>
<li><p>skepticism towards the Albanese government</p></li>
<li><p>fears the Voice could lead to “racial divide” and “apartheid” in Australia</p></li>
<li><p>and the prevalence of conspiracy theories associated with white supremacy ideologies.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>One account named YamiChew has published a series of “no” campaign videos. The profile says the owner of the account transitioned from a professional career in Beijing to an immigrant life in Melbourne. </p>
<p>The account underwent a notable transformation at the end of September, from posting videos of the family dog to advocating for the “no” campaign. Compared to most WeChat posts about the referendum, YamiChew’s first video gained significant traction on the platform, with over 10,000 reposts, 1,800 likes and more than 300 comments within 24 hours of its release.</p>
<p>The video listed four reasons to vote “no”, which included claims that have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.au/sorting-fact-from-fiction-in-the-voice-to-parliament-referendum/">dismissed</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/04/indigenous-voice-to-parliament-referendum-tom-calma-racism">elsewhere</a> as misinformation, such as concerns over the Voice’s impact on Australia’s “constitutional integrity”, fears of “racial inequality” if the referendum succeeded, and claims it would lead to “Indigenous priviledge”. </p>
<h2>Why countering misinformation matters</h2>
<p>Migrants from diverse socio-cultural backgrounds possess varying levels of literacy regarding Indigenous affairs. </p>
<p>As a result, Australian public institutions need to craft messages that are not only linguistically accessible, but also adapted to the information consumption habits of migrant communities. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-to-do-how-chinese-australians-perceive-coverage-of-themselves-and-china-in-australian-media-211432">More work to do: how Chinese-Australians perceive coverage of themselves and China in Australian media</a>
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<p>The government also needs to take steps to address the amount of misinformation in the Chinese-language media and social media.</p>
<p>The government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-labors-misinformation-bill-could-jeopardise-free-speech-online-213241">bill</a> to curb the online spread of false and misleading information, for instance, does not include non-English-language platforms in its scope.</p>
<p>On WeChat, misinformation that is not directly linked to Beijing’s political interests tends to fall outside the scope of platform regulators. </p>
<p>This means it’s up to public institutions to counter misleading information. They can do this by working with local communities to provide credible information on all matters of public interest, not just during the referendum campaign.</p>
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<p><em>The author would like to acknowledge Robbie Fordyce from Monash University and Luke Heemsbergen from Deakin University for their participation in the research project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214383/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fan Yang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One ‘no’ video was reposted more than 10,000 times by WeChat users, while a ‘yes’ video from the Victorian Labor Party was shared only 25 times.Fan Yang, Research fellow at Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne and the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society., The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1587852021-04-13T02:35:18Z2021-04-13T02:35:18ZWhy China’s attempts to stifle foreign media criticism are likely to fail<p>When China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, summoned journalists to the Chinese embassy last week, this was not an occasion for polite exchanges on a troubled relationship between Beijing and Canberra.</p>
<p>Cheng was intent on <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/china-s-embassy-in-australia-hits-back-at-mounting-global-pressure-over-treatment-of-uighurs-in-xinjiang">communicating a forceful message to Australian reporters</a> that China was intent on fighting back against what it regards as a great wall of unfavourable publicity about its treatment of its Uyghur minority.</p>
<p>In some media reporting of the press conference, the exercise was referred to as a “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/if-we-are-provoked-we-will-respond-china-goes-on-offensive-over-treatment-of-uighurs-20210407-p57h6p.html">charm offensive</a>”. However, a more accurate characterisation would be to describe it as an attempt by China to draw a line under increasingly negative foreign reporting of its activities.</p>
<p>This reporting is having real world consequences for China’s image abroad. It is inviting pushback from an international community that is mobilising against Chinese overreach. Beijing will not be insensitive to the risks of brand damage to China’s reputation, or risks of sanctions.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/biden-administration-considers-co-ordinated-beijing-olympics-boycott-20210407-p57h0t.html">canvassing of a potential boycott</a> of the 2022 Winter Olympics in China will have got Beijing’s attention. If countries, led by the United States, stay away this would represent a significant loss of face.</p>
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<h2>Global campaign against unfavourable reporting</h2>
<p>Senior Chinese officials and Uyghurs appeared via video during Cheng’s embassy briefing to refute media accounts of human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region as “Western lies”, “fabrications” and the work of “anti-China forces”.</p>
<p>In its propaganda offensive, China has <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1865988.shtml">not been averse to using the “fake news” label</a>, popularised by former US President Donald Trump to assail its critics.</p>
<p>Cheng’s press conference was part of a larger, global campaign against unfavorable reporting in which Beijing has resorted to a combination of bluster and in some cases reprisals against journalists who have cut too close to the bone.</p>
<p>Australian citizen <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-must-continue-to-press-for-humane-treatment-of-journalist-cheng-lei-after-her-arrest-in-china-154937">Cheng Lei appears to be a case in point</a>. Cheng, an anchor for state broadcaster China Global Television Network (CGTN), was detained in China last year without explanation, but now stands accused of ill-defined national security breaches.</p>
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<p>In private social media posts, she had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-53980706">criticised China’s initial response to the coronavirus pandemic</a>. It is not clear whether this is the basis of allegations against her, but no other reasonable explanation has been forthcoming to this point.</p>
<p>China appears to have been particularly displeased by the reporting of the BBC. In February, Beijing <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56030340">banned all BBC broadcasting in China</a> in retaliation for British authorities having revoked the license of the Chinese overseas broadcaster, CGTN. This represented a significant escalation in the conflict between the Chinese authorities and Western media.</p>
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<h2>What Chinese propaganda is seeking to achieve</h2>
<p>Cheng’s propaganda exercise should therefore be seen as part of a global campaign to stifle what China regards as unfair and damaging criticism of its policies at home and abroad under paramount leader Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>If this Canberra media event was designed to dampen negative reporting in the Australian media, however, the campaign is unlikely to work for the simple reason there is little, or no, sign of Beijing reversing its antagonistic behaviour towards Western media.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-should-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654">Despite China's denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should be called what it is: cultural genocide</a>
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<p>Scarcely a day passes without criticism of foreign media in Chinese state-controlled outlets. These attacks underscore the gap that exists between Western perceptions of the role of journalists in democratic societies and China’s view that media should serve the interests of the state.</p>
<p>Typical of the sort of criticism levelled at Western media is the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217111.shtml">following contribution to the nationalistic Global Times</a> by a professor of international relations at Shanghai’s Fudan University.</p>
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<p>What some media have done is exaggerate Chinese authorities’ fault in a bid to overthrow the Chinese system. Take the BBC. This British media outlet did not call on the British public to overthrow the British government even if it has miserably failed to effectively curb the spread of COVID-19. This is double standards.</p>
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<p>This level of naivete is hard to credit, but it is revealing nevertheless of the gap that exists between Chinese views of the Western media and vice versa.</p>
<p>China’s bluster against Western media may play to nationalist sentiment at home, but it is hardly likely to be effective in neutralising foreign media criticism.</p>
<p>Australian media will not stop providing a platform for legitimate and widely publicised concerns about China’s mistreatment of its minorities; its disrespect for the “one country, two systems” agreements it signed with the UK to facilitate the handover of Hong Kong; its threatening behaviour towards Taiwan; and its expansion of base facilities in disputed waters of the South China Sea.</p>
<p>Beijing’s <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/01/australias-trade-war-with-china-is-unwinnable-for-both-countries/">trade war against Australia</a> smacks of the sort of overreach that may have become a staple of Chinese propaganda in state-run media, but in reality this is not a campaign that serves China’s own interests.</p>
<p>That is assuming Beijing is concerned about promoting itself as a reasonably constructive citizen in its own Indo-Pacific neighborhood.</p>
<h2>China’s dismal treatment of journalists</h2>
<p>China’s press freedom record leaves a lot to be desired.</p>
<p>In the latest Reporters Without Borders world press freedom index, China <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/china-harassment-foreign-correspondents-intensified-during-covid-19-0">rated 177 out of 180</a>. It is by far the world’s largest captor of journalists with at least 121 detained, some in life-threatening conditions.</p>
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<p>In March, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China reported an intensification of harassment of foreign reporters and increased use of “visa weaponisation”. This had led to the expulsion of 18 foreign correspondents in the first half of 2020. Others, like ABC’s Bill Birtles and the Australian Financial Review’s Michael Smith <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australian-journalists-bill-birtles-mike-smith-forced-out-of-china-20200908-p55tg0.html">left because of concerns about being detained.</a>.</p>
<p>China regards the FCCC as an “illegal” organisation. As Cedric Alviani, Reporters Without Borders’s East Asian bureau head, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/china-harassment-foreign-correspondents-intensified-during-covid-19-0">said</a>,</p>
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<p>In recent years, Chinese regime apparatus has come to consider foreign correspondents as unwanted witnesses and goes to great length to prevent them from collecting information that doesn’t mirror its propaganda.</p>
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<p>In a 2019 survey of the <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2019/09/10-most-censored-eritrea-north-korea-turkmenistan-journalist/">10 “most censored” countries in the world</a> by the Committee to Protect Journalists, China rated fifth behind only Eritrea, North Korea, Turkmenistan and Saudi Arabia. It said,</p>
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<p>China has the world’s most extensive and sophisticated censorship apparatus. […] Since 2017, no website or social media account is allowed to provide a news service on the internet without the Cyberspace Administration of China’s permission. Internet users are blocked from foreign search engines, news websites, and social media platforms by the Great Firewall. […] Foreign social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are banned.</p>
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<p>This is the lived reality for foreign journalists in China in the Xi era, and for Chinese consumers of uncensored news, for that matter.</p>
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Read more:
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<p>At no other stage since China began opening to the outside world in the Deng Xiaoping era of the late 1970s have conditions for foreign correspondents in China been more threatening — or more counterproductive from Beijing’s point of view.</p>
<p>China’s war against the foreign media is at a tangent to its proclaimed ambition to continue opening its economy to foreign investment. The anti-Western media campaign jars with hopes that it would become a <a href="https://www.ncuscr.org/content/robert-zoellicks-responsible-stakeholder-speech#:%7E:text=It%20was%20as%20National%20Committee,interestingly%2C%20had%20significant%20difficulty%20coming">responsible international stakeholder</a>, as well.</p>
<p>If Ambassador Cheng’s press conference marks a new stage in China’s battles with foreign media, this promises to be a long march.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s a sizeable gap between Western perceptions of the role of journalists in democratic societies and China’s view that media should serve the interests of the state.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1341022020-03-25T14:36:29Z2020-03-25T14:36:29ZChina’s expulsion of American journalists a dangerous mistake at a deadly moment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322402/original/file-20200323-112700-1hll6wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C0%2C6223%2C4155&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Journalists wait for a briefing at China's National Bureau of Statistics.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roman Pilipey/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the world wages a difficult battle with the coronavirus pandemic, China is escalating its own diplomatic war with the US – and the media is the casualty.</p>
<p>On March 18, China announced it would expel at least 13 American journalists working <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/mar/18/us-media-accuse-china-of-cold-war-mentality-after-move-to-expel-journalists">with three leading US newspapers</a>: The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post. </p>
<p>China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the journalists to hand back their press cards within ten days. “They will not be allowed to continue working as journalists in the People’s Republic of China, including its Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions,” the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1757162.shtml">announcement read</a>. </p>
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<p>In its <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1757162.shtml">announcement</a>, the government said the expulsions had been made “in the spirit of reciprocity” in response to a US move in late February to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html">designate</a> five Chinese state media agencies operating in the US as “foreign missions”. This imposed a cap on the size of their reporting teams in the country. That same week, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expels-three-wall-street-journal-reporters-11582100355">China had expelled three other reporters</a> from The Wall Street Journal over the controversial title of an opinion piece the paper published which referred to China as “the real sick man of Asia”. </p>
<p>The most recent expulsions came a week after the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/asia/coronavirus-china-xi-jinping.html">made his first visit</a> since the outbreak to Wuhan, the epicentre of the pandemic, signifying China’s propaganda effort to frame the narrative as a victory in containing the virus. </p>
<p>A few days later, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-13/chinese-official-pushes-conspiracy-theory-u-s-army-behind-virus">tweeted a conspiracy theory blaming the US</a> for the outbreak, which was met <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1240243188708839424?s=20">by a rogue tweet</a> from the US president, Donald Trump, calling coronavirus the “Chinese virus”. </p>
<p>While unprecedented in scale and scope, the expulsion of the 13 journalists is just the latest example of the press being attacked amid the escalating tensions between China and the US.</p>
<h2>A tight leash</h2>
<p>China is known for its stringent control over the press, both domestic and foreign. In my book on <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Reporting-China-on-the-Rise-Habitus-and-Prisms-of-China-Correspondents/Zeng/p/book/9781138586413">foreign reporting in China</a>, I detailed how the strong tradition of a media system controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, in which journalism is used as the party’s mouthpiece and to emphasise positive stories, has long been on rocky ground with the foreign press. This is particularly the case with the Western press, who are steeped in liberal media traditions in which public service journalism, an independent media, and professionalism are highly valued.</p>
<p>One of the ways the Chinese government keeps the foreign press corps on a leash is to impose a strict accreditation system, under which foreign journalists need to apply for a press card and a “journalist visa”. Both are reviewed and renewed every year. With this system China can expel journalists deemed not friendly enough. This happened to the Wall Street Journal <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/business/china-wall-street-journal-reporter.html">reporter Chun Han Wong in 2019</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9e866170-abcb-11e5-825b-ff5e0ff4db24">Ursula Gauthier</a> a reporter for French weekly magazine L’Obs, in 2015 and Al Jazeera <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-17986447">journalist Melissa Chan in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>But such a large expulsion of 13 journalists with a clear message of retaliation against another superpower has never been seen before. The ban also covers Hong Kong, the Asian hub for most international news outlets. The semi-autonomous territory, which has its own legal and media system, has been hit by waves of protests and violence in recent months <a href="https://qz.com/1699053/hong-kong-protests-beijing-move-to-deny-democracy/">amid defiance at Chinese</a> influence on its governance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-police-legitimacy-draining-away-amid-spiral-of-rage-and-retaliation-127127">Hong Kong: police legitimacy draining away amid spiral of rage and retaliation</a>
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<p>The move clearly mirrors Xi’s strong-handed governance and diplomatic style. Since coming to power in 2012, he has noticeably tightened the state’s grip over media and civil society at home, and has abandoned the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Reporting-China-on-the-Rise-Habitus-and-Prisms-of-China-Correspondents/Zeng/p/book/9781138586413">“hide and bide” diplomacy strategy</a> of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in favour of an assertive, and increasingly belligerent one. </p>
<h2>Awful timing</h2>
<p>The fast deterioration of the world’s most important bilateral relationship has come at the worst possible time. The world urgently needs a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-defeating-coronavirus-in-one-country-isnt-enough-there-needs-to-be-a-coordinated-global-strategy-134474">joint effort</a> to cope with the unprecedented crisis caused by coronavirus. An independent press is vital to hold power to account and ensure the public are well informed. </p>
<p>Both China and the world are now suffering from China’s lack of transparency. When Dr Li Wenliang, a 34-year-old Chinese ophthalmologist <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-51403795">died from contracting coronavirus</a> in early February, he was hailed as a hero amid calls on social media for freedom of speech. Just a month before his death, Dr Li had been reprimanded by local authorities for “rumour-mongering” after trying to alert the public about the outbreak. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-coronavirus-cover-up-how-censorship-and-propaganda-obstructed-the-truth-133095">China’s coronavirus cover-up: how censorship and propaganda obstructed the truth</a>
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<p>With public opinion and information rigidly policed, anything disliked by the authorities could be labelled as “rumour” in China – and anyone who speaks truths inconsistent with the official narrative could be penalised for “rumour-mongering”. This begs the question of the credibility of the official narrative, which does not welcome scrutiny or challenging.</p>
<p>China’s increasing efforts in muzzling its own press gives the foreign press an even more important role. So much so that internet users in China half-jokingly share a saying: “Learn English language to better understand China” (<em>xue hao ying yu, liao jie zhong guo</em>). </p>
<p>It was the American news magazine, Time, which <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,441615,00.html">first broke the story</a> of the SARS outbreak 17 years ago. Chinese doctor Jiang Yanyong, a brave whistleblower who spoke out about China’s cover-up of the outbreak, failed to get the message out in the Chinese media. The world remained ignorant until Susan Jakes, then China correspondent of Time, picked up the story. Now Time – together with the three US newspapers and Voice of America – have been designated by China as “foreign missions”, <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1757162.shtml">subject to more stringent control</a>.</p>
<p>“A healthy society shouldn’t have just one voice.” That is the legacy <a href="https://china.caixin.com/2020-02-07/101512460.html">Dr Li left behind</a>. By expelling the 13 American journalists, China is moving once against to eradicate voices outside of its official narrative just when they are most needed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yuan Zeng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How mounting diplomatic tensions between China and the US is affecting the media at the worst possible time.Yuan Zeng, Lecturer in Media and Communication, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1315492020-03-02T12:21:22Z2020-03-02T12:21:22ZCoronavirus unites a divided China in fear, grief and anger at government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317424/original/file-20200226-24694-y7p6w4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=221%2C215%2C3772%2C2443&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A train attendant in Nanchang, China, gestures in solidarity with medical staff departing for the city of Wuhan, Feb. 13, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-february-13-2020-shows-a-train-news-photo/1200641673?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The coronavirus known as COVID-19 has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/world/asia/coronavirus-news.html">killed more than 3,000 people</a> and spread into Europe and Latin America, raising fears of a global pandemic. </p>
<p>But in China, where the outbreak began, it took just one death to unleash the grief and fury of a nation. On Feb. 7, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/chinese-doctor-sounded-alarm-wuhan-coronavirus-dies-200207004935274.html">34-year-old Dr. Li Wenliang</a> – one of eight whistle-blowers who first sounded alarms about the new coronavirus in Hubei Province back in December – died from coronavirus. </p>
<p>Public vigils were held across the country. Chinese people angry over the government’s handling of the public health emergency also went online en masse and placed blame for Li’s death squarely at the government’s feet. </p>
<p>Using text, songs, pictures and symbolic imagery to evade censors, they asserted that the Chinese government had both covered up the coronavirus outbreak and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-coronavirus-has-tested-chinas-system-of-information-control">downplayed the seriousness of the disease</a>, causing avoidable deaths. </p>
<p>A song from the musical “Les Misérables,” <a href="https://qz.com/1798862/in-china-using-les-miserables-and-chernobyl-to-mourn-li-wenliang/">“Do you hear the people sing?,”</a> made the rounds on social media. One lyric celebrates “the music of the people/Who will not be slaves again!” – a refrain of resistance that recalls the Chinese national anthem, “Arise, ye who refuse to be slaves!” </p>
<p>One civil rights activist even published an <a href="https://cmcn.org/archives/46079">open letter</a> asking President Xi Jinping to resign. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-chinas-health-crisis-a-fleeting-flicker-of-free-speech/2020/02/06/21e16f8a-4888-11ea-8a1f-de1597be6cbc_story.html">brief blossoming of free speech</a> ended quickly. Within several days of Li’s death, the hashtag #IWantFreedomOfSpeech – which had gone viral on Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter – was deleted. Zhiyong Xu, the activist who demanded Xi’s resignation, was arrested. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317426/original/file-20200226-24659-18fzgc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A memorial to the late Dr. Li Wenliang at Li’s hospital in Wuhan, China, Feb. 7, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/portrait-of-dr-li-wenliang-is-left-at-lis-hospital-in-wuhan-news-photo/1199162702?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>State control versus popular anger</h2>
<p>While short-lived, the popular anger over coronavirus was a significant development in China. Such open dissent would have been unimaginable just a few months ago. </p>
<p>Chinese <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297285781_Understanding_China's_media_system_in_a_world_historical_context">media</a> and the internet have developed along two separate but ultimately repressive paths, my doctoral research on the political economy of the Chinese internet shows. But the government normally maintains strong authority over both. </p>
<p>Online news media, which emerged in the 1990s in China, was immediately integrated into the <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/provisions-on-the-administration-of-internet-news-information-services">traditional state media system</a> and strictly controlled. According to Reporters Without Borders, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/china">China ranks 177 out of 180 countries in press freedom</a>. </p>
<p>For-profit businesses have more freedom to operate on the internet as a means to boost China’s economy – as long as their business operations don’t challenge authority. As a result, Chinese social media platforms like WeChat and Weibo are vibrant and well used, but they are dominated by <a href="https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/f7114033900a8f7ef5afd2c80234d3b388292e468b4c93c35e1fd743ae4fded5/8450511/Fuchs_AsianJnlComm_2015.pdf">entertainment, gossip and other sensational content</a> – not political speech. </p>
<p>During the height of coronavirus fury, the government lost control of both realms of the Chinese internet. On social media, celebrity gossip gave way to discussions of public affairs, social issues and politics. Comments critical of the government, normally deleted quickly, were widely circulated.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/opinion/coronavirus-china-news-journalism.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage">China’s most daring investigative journalists</a> joined the fray. </p>
<p>The day after Dr. Li’s death, on Feb. 8, Yicai Magazine published a timeline showing the spread of the coronavirus in an article titled, “<a href="https://www.yicai.com/news/100495596.html">If there was a possibility to sound the alarm on Wuhan, which day would it be?”</a> Other <a href="https://theinitium.com/article/20200203-opinion-journalism-china-media-politics/">outlets</a> published investigative stories about government disinformation, corruption within aid groups and the scarcity of medical supplies.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317431/original/file-20200226-24694-1tlmozx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Journalists at the first regular in-person press briefing by the Chinese Foreign Ministry since briefings had gone online during the coronavirus outbreak, Feb. 24, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/journalists-in-face-masks-seen-ahead-of-the-first-regular-news-photo/1202945758?adppopup=true">Roman Balandin\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>A gaping class divide</h2>
<p>The public outcry over coronavirus was also unprecedented because in a society that has long been deeply divided, it united Chinese across classes and geography.</p>
<p>Ever since China “opened up” its socialist economy in 1978, partially liberalizing <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-brief-history-of-neoliberalism-9780199283279?cc=gb&lang=en&">markets and reducing the state’s oversight over all economic activity</a>, gross domestic product <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#1">has grown by around 10% annually</a>. More than 850 million Chinese people were lifted out of poverty.</p>
<p>But surging growth has brought <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/111/19/6928">roaring income inequality</a> – among the world’s worst. Chinese society is hugely divided between <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674036321">rural and urban areas</a>, with urban households earning on average more than three times as much as rural households, <a href="http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/5669/China_92s_urban-rural_divide.html">according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</a>. </p>
<p>China’s inequality is geographic, too. While privileged elite and middle classes in coastal cities have access to top-notch education systems, health care and infrastructure, inland residents frequently lack access to these services. Rural unemployment <a href="https://www.nber.org/digest/oct15/w21460.html">is high</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317430/original/file-20200226-24655-1myp00b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Residents do their washing in Guizhou Province, China, Feb. 20, 2014. While China’s cities explode, rural poverty remains entrenched.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-on-february-20-2014-shows-rural-news-photo/476571003?adppopup=true">MARK RALSTON/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Internet access is among China’s unevenly distributed services. According to the <a href="https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201911/P020191112539794960687.pdf">2019 report</a> from the China Internet Network Information Center, 61% of Chinese people can get online at home or on a mobile device, whereas <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/269329/penetration-rate-of-the-internet-by-region/">Northern Europe has the highest online penetration rate of 95% and Western Europe 92%</a>. </p>
<p>The internet has proven to be a <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/working-class-network-society">powerful tool for China’s “have-less” and “have-nots”</a> to connect with each other and with job opportunities. </p>
<p>Unlike in <a href="https://theconversation.com/going-viral-what-social-media-activists-need-to-know-96043">other countries</a> where online activism has triggered mass protests, the internet has not historically enabled Chinese people to come together across economic and social divides to protest their government. </p>
<p>Most social movements in China – both online and offline – gain traction only within similar groups whose interests are clearly aligned. Environmental protests against the construction of chemical plants in the cities of <a href="https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/1626-Xiamen-PX-a-turning-point">Xiamen</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/14/china-protest-against-px-chemical-plant">Dalian</a> in 2007 and 2011, for example, drew students and urbanites. Labor protests for better pay, working conditions and the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/making-of-a-new-working-class-a-study-of-collective-actions-of-migrant-workers-in-south-china/0ACCD9E2633CD0281AD6F0AF78EBFCDD">right to unionize in 2018</a> were confined to China’s working classes. </p>
<h2>Class solidarity</h2>
<p>Coronavirus is different: The threat is universal.</p>
<p>The outbreak affects Chinese across classes and threatens different interest groups within classes. Quarantines of entire villages and communities, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VA9G1VCnOFY">sealed off</a> as the government tries to control the outbreak of the virus, impact the lives of every single resident. </p>
<p>Nor are rural areas exempt from coronavirus. The Chinese migrant workers who live in the outskirts of cities were headed back to their rural hometowns en masse when the virus hit during the Chinese New Year – the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7813267.stm">largest annual human migration in the world</a>, called “Chunyun.” Some of them brought coronavirus with them to places where the <a href="https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_5735718">lack of medical resources</a> is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/world/asia/27china-coronavirus-health.html">severe</a>. </p>
<p>Economically, coronavirus hurts a wide swath of Chinese society, too. <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/news/32022/toyota-tesla-other-automakers-shut-down-factories-over-coronavirus">With factories and offices shuttered</a>, both white-collar and blue-collar workers are facing <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/coronavirus-china-firms-cut-staff-as-xi-vows-no-large-scale-layoffs">potential layoffs</a> or delayed return to work, depriving them of income. Street vendors, shops and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51386575">service industries</a> are all hit hard. </p>
<p>Between the seriousness of the virus and the mass pause of all Chinese society, everyone seems to be questioning systemic problems long disguised or ignored in the Communist Party’s discourse of stability, <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-transformation-of-chinese-socialism">nationalism and economic development</a>. </p>
<p>The lack of government transparency, a censored press, inequality and the shortage of medical resources are longstanding problems in China. Coronavirus brought them to the fore, and, if only for a brief moment, the Chinese people demanded better. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yuqi Na does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Public criticism of the Chinese government’s handling of coronavirus shows that the Chinese people can overcome both strict censorship and a gaping class divide when they get angry enough.Yuqi Na, Course Instructor , Fordham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1311672020-02-10T12:36:50Z2020-02-10T12:36:50ZChinese movie studio upturned its business model due to coronavirus – Western companies take note<p>Imagine that you have spent tens of millions of dollars to make a movie and you find out at the last minute that it cannot be released. This was the situation facing China’s <a href="https://www.huanximedia.com/en">Huanxi Media Group</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/world/asia/china-coronavirus-beijing.html">in January</a>. During Chinese New Year, movie theatres are normally full of families enjoying the additional leisure time available during the holiday. But due to the outbreak of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-does-the-wuhan-coronavirus-cause-severe-illness-130864">Wuhan coronavirus</a>, most movie theatres were empty and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-wuhan-coronavirus-is-impacting-china-movie-business-disney-2020-1?r=US&IR=T">nearly 70,000</a> had to close their doors for fear of spreading the disease.</p>
<p>Huanxi stood to lose millions on its New Year-themed movie <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt11172926/">Lost in Russia</a>. The company had committed to a theatrical minimum guarantee deal and expected billions of renminbi (RMB) in gross box office revenues. But now the theatres were closed, what should they do?</p>
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<p><a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/pioneers-hidden-champions-changemakers-and-underdogs">Studies have shown</a> how Chinese businesses typically respond quickly to crises and with innovative solutions and <a href="http://dialoguereview.com/agility-chinese-style/">agility</a>. Agility is about linking hyper-awareness with decision-making and decision-making with action – <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Digital-Vortex-Leaders-Disruptive-Competitors/dp/1945010010">all at speed</a>.</p>
<p>In a clear demonstration of agility, Huanxi decided to fundamentally change its distribution approach and turned to an unlikely partner: <a href="https://bytedance.com/en">ByteDance</a>. ByteDance is the Chinese company behind the blockbuster app <a href="https://theconversation.com/tiktok-the-worlds-most-valuable-startup-that-youve-never-heard-of-109302">TikTok</a> along with a number of native Chinese apps like <a href="https://www.douyin.com/">Douyin</a>, <a href="https://www.toutiao.com/">Jinri Toutiao</a>, <a href="https://www.ixigua.com">Xigua Video</a> and <a href="https://www.huoshanzhibo.com/">Huoshan Video</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the fact that ByteDance boasted hundreds of millions of daily active users, it was not an obvious partner. The company’s video streaming sites tend to focus on short form, user-generated content. TikTok, for instance, caps videos at 15 seconds. Lost In Russia, by contrast, was over two hours long. Chinese digital giants Alibaba or Tencent might have been more obvious partners, except that both owned competing movie studios.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/are-you-in-danger-of-catching-the-coronavirus-5-questions-answered-130512">Are you in danger of catching the coronavirus? 5 questions answered</a>
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<p>ByteDance, however, proved open to discussions and the two companies started negotiations. ByteDance would get exclusive access to Lost in Russia along with a portfolio of other Huanxi movies and TV shows to livestream across its platforms. In return, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3047558/huanxi-media-shares-skyrocket-douyins-parent-pays-630">it would pay Huanxi</a> RMD630 million (US$91 million) and give Huanxi a share of the advertising revenues. The deal was done in less than 24 hours.</p>
<p>Just two days later, Lost in Russia was released on ByteDance platforms and racked up an astonishing 600 million views. Not only did the movie gain a huge following, it led to a flood of positive sentiment from Chinese citizens who were frustrated about not being able to leave their homes during the <a href="https://www.screendaily.com/news/chinese-streaming-platforms-flourish-during-virus-outbreak/5146713.article">outbreak</a>.</p>
<p>Building on the success, ByteDance has started to release other Huanxi titles on its streaming platforms. This has led to a massive increase in users – a key growth benchmark for digital giants. Not surprisingly, the Chinese film studio and theatre association has <a href="https://de.reuters.com/article/uk-china-health-movies/chinas-theatres-studios-protest-against-deal-to-stream-movie-online-for-free-idINKBN1ZO05O">complained bitterly</a> about the approach, saying it is “destroying China’s cinema industry” by giving away the content for free.</p>
<h2>Seeing, deciding, reacting</h2>
<p>The Wuhan coronavirus has negatively impacted millions of people in China, <a href="https://voice.baidu.com/act/newpneumonia/newpneumonia/?from=osari_pc_3">many more</a> than <a href="https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6">the 40,000+</a> infected so far. The crisis, however, has led to some significant opportunities. By acting quickly and pursuing an unorthodox approach to content distribution, Huanxi covered its development costs and reached a larger audience than it otherwise would have managed. By adapting its operating model, ByteDance managed to significantly increase its userbase, gain additional revenues and entertain users who were otherwise trapped in their homes. </p>
<p>The situation turned out to be a win-win for both companies and a boon to Chinese citizens. It was only possible because of the agile approach taken by Huanxi and ByteDance, both of whom had to challenge deep-seated assumptions about their business models. Huanxi risked alienating its core customers, the movie theatres. ByteDance abandoned its long held point of competitive differentiation (short form, user-generated content). But the situation warranted both moves and they didn’t hesitate. They saw, they decided, they reacted. That’s agility.</p>
<p>It is rumoured that there is already a deal in place for phase two of the collaboration: a new online cinema channel and an agreement to co-invest and co-produce a host of film and TV content.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine two Western companies taking these radical steps in such a short period of time. The Huanxi and ByteDance approach highlights the decisiveness that comes with an agile response to what might seem to be an overwhelming challenge. It was agility in action – and Western organisations should take note.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When cinemas closed down, Huanxi Media Group turned a crisis into an opportunity.Mark Greeven, Professor of Innovation and Strategy, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Michael Wade, Professor of Innovation and Strategy, Cisco Chair in Digital Business Transformation, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1306982020-02-09T19:07:16Z2020-02-09T19:07:16ZThe coronavirus and Chinese social media: finger-pointing in the post-truth era<p>As public health authorities in China and the world fight the novel coronavirus, they face two major communication obstacles: the eroding trust in the media, and misinformation on social media. </p>
<p>As cities, towns, villages and residential compounds have been shut down or implemented curfews, social media have played a central role in crisis communication. </p>
<p>Chinese social media platforms, from WeChat and Weibo, to QQ, Toutiao, Douyin, Zhihu and Tieba, are the lifeline for many isolated and scared people who have been housebound for over two weeks, relying on their mobile phones to access information, socialise, and order food.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314129/original/file-20200207-43128-spk2fd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A meme being shared on WeChat reads: ‘When the epidemic is over, men will understand why women suffer from postnatal depression after one-month confinement upon childbirth.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These platforms constitute the mainstream media in the war on the coronavirus.</p>
<p>I experienced the most extraordinary Chinese New Year with my parents in China and witnessed the power of Chinese social media, especially WeChat, in spreading and controlling information and misinformation. </p>
<p>China is not only waging a war against the coronavirus. It is engaged in a media war against misinformation and “rumour” (as termed by the Chinese authorities and social media platforms). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314125/original/file-20200207-43074-8wxl2z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This banner being shared on WeChat reads: ‘Those who do not come clean when having a fever are class enemies hidden among the people.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Information about the virus suddenly increased from January 21, after the central government publicly acknowledged the outbreak <a href="https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-51382117">the previous day</a> and Zhong Nanshan, China’s leading respiratory expert and anti-SARS hero, declared on the state broadcaster CCTV the virus was transmissible from person to person.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-how-health-and-politics-have-always-been-inextricably-linked-in-china-130720">Coronavirus: how health and politics have always been inextricably linked in China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>On <a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">WeChat</a>, the Chinese all-in-one super app with over 1.15 billion monthly active users, there has been only one dominant topic: the coronavirus.</p>
<h2>Rumour mongers and rumour busters</h2>
<p>In Wired, <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-we-should-deescalate-the-war-on-the-coronavirus/">Robert Dingwall wrote</a> “fear, finger-pointing, and militaristic action against the virus are unproductive”, asking if it is time to adjust to a new normal of outbreaks. </p>
<p>To many Chinese, this new normal of fear and militaristic action is already real in everyday life. </p>
<p>Finger-pointing, however, can be precarious in the era of information control and post-truth.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314126/original/file-20200207-43113-ioqy59.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of many spoof Cultural Revolution posters being shared on social media to warn people of the consequence of not wearing masks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On WeChat and other popular social media platforms, information about the virus from official, semi-official, unofficial and personal sources is abundant in chat groups, “Moments”, WeChat official accounts, and newsfeeds (mostly from <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-tencent-became-the-worlds-most-valuable-social-network-firm-with-barely-any-advertising-90334">Tencent News</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toutiao">Toutiao</a>). </p>
<p>Information includes personal accounts of life under lockdown, <em>duanzi</em> (jokes, parodies, humorous videos), heroism of volunteers, generosity of donations, quack remedies, scaremongering about deaths and price hikes, and the conspiracy theory of the US waging a biological war against China. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qOppwhDqWmE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">TikTok video (shared on WeChat) on the life of a man in isolation at home and his ‘social life’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also veiled <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/technology/china-coronavirus-censorship-social-media.html?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=fe0831f988-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-fe0831f988-396508151">criticism of the government</a> and government officials for mismanagement, bad decisions, despicable behaviours and lack of accountability.</p>
<p>At the same time, the official media and Tencent have stepped up their rumour-busting effort. </p>
<p>They regularly publish rumour-busting pieces. They mobilise the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/the-chinese-government-fakes-nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-year-this-is-why/">“50-cent army”</a> (<em>wumao</em>) and volunteer <em>wumao</em> (<em>ziganwu</em>) as their truth ambassadors. </p>
<p>Tencent has taken on the responsibility to provide “transparent” communication. It opened a new function through its WeChat mini-program Health, providing real-time updates of the epidemic and comprehensive information – including fake news busting. </p>
<p>The government has told people to only post and forward information from official channels and warned of severe consequences for anyone found guilty of disseminating “rumours”, including permanently blocking WeChat groups, blocking social media accounts, and possible jail terms. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314099/original/file-20200206-43102-1x0dmlr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A warning to WeChat users not to spread fake news about the coronavirus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Chinese people, accustomed to having posts deleted, face increased peer pressure in their chat groups to comply with the heightened censorship regime. Amid the panic the general advice is: don’t repost anything. </p>
<p>They are asked to be savvy consumers, able to distinguish fake news, half-truths or rumours, and to trust only one source of truth: the official channels. </p>
<p>But the skills to detect and contain false content are becoming rarer and more difficult to obtain.</p>
<h2>Coronavirus and the post-truth</h2>
<p>We live in the <a href="http://theconversation.com/post-truth-politics-and-why-the-antidote-isnt-simply-fact-checking-and-truth-87364">post-truth era</a>, where every “truth” is driven by subjective, elusive, self-confirming and emotional “facts”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/post-truth-politics-and-why-the-antidote-isnt-simply-fact-checking-and-truth-87364">Post-truth politics and why the antidote isn't simply 'fact-checking' and truth</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Any news source can take you in the wrong direction. </p>
<p>We have seen that in the <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/praise-for-chinese-doctors-who-coronavirus-blew-whistle/news-story/eb47484900dbd409099e20784a9dda96">eight doctors</a> from Wuhan who transformed from being rumourmongers to whistleblowers and heroes within a month. </p>
<p>Dr <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/06/asia/li-wenliang-coronavirus-whistleblower-doctor-dies-intl/index.html">Li Wenliang</a>, the first to warn others of the “SARS-like” virus in December 2019, died from the novel coronavirus in the early hours of February 7 2020. There is an overwhelming sense of loss, mourning and unspoken indignation at his death in various WeChat groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314102/original/file-20200206-43074-643h6t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WeChat users mourning the death of Dr Li Wenliang.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the face of this post-truth era, we must ask the questions: what is “rumour”, who defines “rumour”, and how does “rumour” occur in the first place? </p>
<p>Information overload is accompanied by information pollution. Detecting and contain false information on social media has been a technical, sociological and ideological challenge. </p>
<p>With a state-led campaign to “bust rumours” and “clean the web” in a controlled environment at a time of crisis, these questions are more urgent than ever. </p>
<p>As media scholar <a href="http://newsen.pku.edu.cn/news_events/pointsofview/3550.htm">Yong Hu</a> said in 2011, when “official lies outpace popular rumors” the government and its information control mechanism constitute the greatest obstruction of the truth. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>On the one hand, the government has provided an environment conducive to the spread of rumours, and on the other it sternly lashes out against rumours, placing itself in the midst of an insoluble contradiction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the late Dr Li Wenliang said: “[To me] truth is more important than my case being redressed; a healthy society should not only allow one voice.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314106/original/file-20200207-43108-6a6oza.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screenshot from WeChat quoting Dr Li Wenliang: ‘[To me] truth is more important than my case being redressed; a healthy society should not only allow one voice.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China can lock down its cities, but it cannot lock down rumours on social media. </p>
<p>In fact, the Chinese people are not worried about rumours. They are worried about where to find truth and voice facts: not one single source of truth, but multiple sources of facts that will save lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haiqing Yu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As cities have shut down and residential compounds have issued curfews, social media in China have become more important than ever. But it is a place of rumours and mistruths.Haiqing Yu, Associate Professor, School of Media and Communication, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1199172019-07-15T11:11:49Z2019-07-15T11:11:49ZHong Kong protests: why Chinese media reports focus on Britain’s colonial past<p>Over recent weeks, mass protests against proposed changes to extradition law in Hong Kong have escalated into a major crisis. In the latest round of protests on July 14, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-48979988">tens of thousands took the streets</a>. </p>
<p>In the West, the media has reported this as a struggle for basic rights and freedoms. In China, coverage has been limited as the protests are perceived to be negative. But in what restricted reporting that there has been, the perspective is very different from the West, and reflects deep-seated Chinese views about colonial interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>On July 3, the Chinese ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, held a rare <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXsAOkIh7kg">press conference on Hong Kong’s protests</a>. In reply to a reporter’s question, he remarked that “for some in the UK, Hong Kong is still a colony under the British rule … some politicians live in a colonial fantasy”. The comment resonated strongly in the Chinese media which sees the British response to the protest as the latest episode of post-colonial meddling in Hong Kong’s affairs.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1146444437473464320"}"></div></p>
<p>The fact that protesters stormed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2uM2QnZiLc">Hong Kong’s legislature</a> on July 1, the anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from the UK to China, was crucial to the reaction. The violence on the day, and the British response, were intolerable to China, touching on a history China tries to forget – what’s known as “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tedg-6j2_LQ&t=32s">a century of humiliation</a>” that began in the 1839 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6p9ox_T8LE&list=PLA50AB7N5S7fo34ZzGKfM63BIWAR4uQLT">Opium War</a>.</p>
<p>For the Chinese media, Hong Kong’s protests are viewed largely through this historical lens of colonialism. For many Chinese people, Hong Kong is associated with the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Nanjing">Nanjing Treaty</a>, the first in a series of unequal treaties imposed by Western powers on China which ceded Hong Kong to Britain in 1842. The memory of this is ingrained in the Chinese national psyche through pervasive historiography and school textbooks.</p>
<p>In limited Chinese reports on Hong Kong protests, the ambassador’s response to the British government appears widely. <a href="http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/">Cankao Xiaoxi</a> (Reference News) – China’s largest paper by circulation – ran <a href="http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/china/20190705/2384580.shtml">with the headline</a>: “British politician indulging in bygone colonial fantasy.” This colonial reference framed the current protests in the lens of historical injustice.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/extremist-mobs-how-chinas-propaganda-machine-tried-to-control-the-message-in-the-hong-kong-protests-119646">Extremist mobs? How China's propaganda machine tried to control the message in the Hong Kong protests</a>
</strong>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>Hong Kong’s handover: then and now</h2>
<p>The emotive language echoes the sentiments of Chinese media coverage back at the handover in 1997, something I’ve <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233269289_Journalism_as_Politics_reporting_Hong_Kong's_handover_in_the_Chinese_press">studied in my own research</a>. The headline in China’s <a href="http://en.people.cn/">People Daily</a> stated the handover was a “great event for the Chinese nation that will go down in the annals of history forever; the victory for the universal course of peace and justice”.</p>
<p>If anything is different from 1997, it’s the tone that has become more assertive in 2019. An <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1156905.shtml">editorial in</a> the populist <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/">Huanqiu Shibao</a>, or Global Times, said that the British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, had made a “toothless threat against China”, taunting that “nobody believes the UK will send its only aircraft carrier to China’s coast … this is not the 19th century when the Opium War broke out”.</p>
<p>The current reporting contrasts with the more defensive stance 22 years ago when the Chinese media highlighted the Chinese Communist Party’s triumph in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233269289_Journalism_as_Politics_reporting_Hong_Kong's_handover_in_the_Chinese_press">closing a chapter of colonialism</a> by recovering Hong Kong’s sovereignty. But back in 1997, the media also sought to assure the world of China’s commitment to the “one country, two systems” model and that Hong Kong’s prosperity and lifestyle would be protected. </p>
<p>The current assertiveness reflects China’s growing confidence, and its ascent in power relative to the UK. In 1997, China’s GDP was only 62% of the UK’s, but in 2018 it is almost five times the size of the UK’s.</p>
<h2>Accusation of foreign interference</h2>
<p>The Chinese media blames <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/03/WS5d1ca55ea3105895c2e7b805.html">foreign interference</a> for the escalation of Hong Kong’s protests. The Chinese ambassador is reported to “have made strong representations to the British side” and to “have told them to stop interfering”. China is particularly sensitive to links between domestic unrest and foreign organisations, which are seen as a top security threat to its political stability.</p>
<p>Accusations of interference go hand-in-hand with mentions of British hypocrisy. China’s <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/">Xinhua News Agency</a> quoted the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman saying “there had been no elections nor right to protest under the British rule”. Media reports <a href="http://hm.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0706/c42272-31217866.html">highlighted</a> how Hong Kong’s institutions have evolved into an effective style of government through elections of the chief executive and legislative council. This is often contrasted with how Hong Kong governors were appointed in London under British rule.</p>
<p>Despite the diplomatic row, Anglo-Chinese relations are unlikely to suffer significantly. They have weathered stormy relations in the run up to the 1997 handover and survived subsequent difficulties. Enough political will exists on both sides to maintain productive relations.</p>
<p>Perceptions over Hong Kong will remain wildly different in China and the UK for the foreseeable future. The real test, however, is not the perceptions that dictate the daily media coverage, but the wisdom of political leaders to manage real differences in underlying values, assumptions, and institutions.</p>
<p>These differences will only become more apparent. This is because China’s policy choices are increasingly being informed by its long tradition of centralised power and bureaucratic control. Solutions to these differences won’t be found in words of war amplified by the media, but in a deeper understanding of them amid the rise of China as an alternative world power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Qing Cao does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese media sees the protests very differently to Western media.Qing Cao, Associate Professor in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1198942019-07-07T09:03:35Z2019-07-07T09:03:35ZDonor-funded journalism is on the rise in Africa: why it needs closer scrutiny<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282696/original/file-20190704-51278-17ghca9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some African journalists are concerned that foreign funders may influence what they cover and how. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Jayden Joshua</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An enormous and increasing portion of the foreign development aid coming into Africa annually is for media development. Foreign aid funds diverse projects, ranging from investigative journalism in Nigeria, to stories on Chinese building projects in Kenya, or health reporting in South Africa. </p>
<p>The news media landscape and journalism practices – on the continent as well as globally – have undergone massive change in recent times. This, coupled with the collapse of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-economic-questions-are-key-to-africas-media-freedom-debate-96429">familiar business models</a>, and the limited potential for genuinely independent “watchdog” journalism, the relationship between external influences on local cultures and practices of journalism needs to be reassessed.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cima.ned.org/publication/confronting-the-crisis-in-independent-media/">A report</a> last year, by the American <a href="https://www.cima.ned.org/">Centre for International Media Assistance</a>, concluded that about US$600 million a year is spent on media development in Africa by state and private funders. This may exceed a billion dollars if the opaque amount China spends on media operations and training globally is included. <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2018/04/going-out-china-in-african-media">Much of this is focused on Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But how does this aid influence journalism in Africa? </p>
<p>Our recent international <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23743670.2018.1474121">study</a> examined the impact of foreign development aid on media systems in seven African countries. These were Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, South Africa and Sudan. A <a href="http://www.alaic.org/journal/index.php/jlacr/article/viewFile/315/160">separate report</a> focused on Latin America.</p>
<p>We witnessed parallel and intensifying debates among media workers in developing countries who accept (or depend on) foreign funding. Funders themselves are also increasingly <a href="https://www.peterlang.com/abstract/title/65486?rskey=AIyXje&result=1">reflecting on their objectives</a> and how they measure success. And, the role of foundations in funding journalism is <a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/foundation-funding-journalism.php">coming under increasing scrutiny</a>.</p>
<p>Much of the media aid industry still holds the view that media workers and institutions in the South should emulate their counterparts in the North. But, our study took a different approach. We asked to what extent a flow of foreign money has affected the ability of developing regions to foster a critical and independent media sector. </p>
<h2>Chinese versus Western perspectives</h2>
<p>Journalists who took part in our project worried that the foreign assistance or travel they’ve received may limit the stories they can tell, or influence the way they tell them. On the other hand, they often feared that without foreign financial support, critical journalism in their countries would vanish.</p>
<p>The colonial powers of Britain, France, and Portugal still <a href="https://www.surlejournalisme.com/rev/index.php/slj/article/view/73/25">cast a long shadow over Africa’s media</a>. More recently, however, African media has been shaped by the US and China. Many foreign interventions are small like the funding of a single investigative news story, for example. But some are massive.</p>
<p>Since the end of the Second World War in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/btn-end-of-wwii/index.html">1945</a>, foreign aid has been directed at disseminating a model of journalism practice and education that aligns with the interests of wealthy, Northern donor nations. Chinese involvement in Africa has led to questions being asked about the assumptions underpinning Western media funding and training. </p>
<p>Because Chinese media are based on a very different model, their initiatives have caused anxiety among journalists and <a href="https://rsf.org/en/reports/rsf-report-chinas-pursuit-new-world-media-order">commentators</a> steeped in the liberal-democratic tradition. This tradition emphasises the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-media-should-beware-of-being-the-voice-of-only-some-85911">“watchdog” role of journalism</a>.</p>
<p>Chinese media, on the other hand, adopt a more persuasive and positive tone and favour official perspectives. This, while taking a critical view of the history of Western involvement in Africa. This approach is sometimes called <a href="https://www.journals.uio.no/index.php/TJMI/article/view/2403">“constructive journalism”</a>. It promises to present Africa in a more positive light than the stereotypes that have <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Africas-Media-Image-in-the-21st-Century-From-the-Heart-of-Darkness/Bunce-Franks-Paterson/p/book/9781138962323">historically characterised Western coverage</a>.</p>
<p>The establishment of Chinese media outlets such as <a href="https://www.cgtn.com/">China Global Television Network</a>, the wire service <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/">Xinhua</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/">China Radio International</a> in Africa have been seen as part of China’s strategy to increase its visibility overseas.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23743670.2018.1473271">the cultural diplomacy component of media aid</a> has seen African journalists receive offers for paid travel to Europe, North America, and especially to China. </p>
<p>We know little about how these exchanges – and other forms of foreign investment by corporate or religious institutions – affect African media and the stories they tell.</p>
<p>The fear is that the Chinese model, because of the government’s control over the media, is dangerous to introduce in African countries where press freedom has often come under attack. </p>
<p>But fears about a major shift may be overblown or premature given that <a href="https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/7809">research</a> has shown that the influence of Chinese media on journalists and audiences in Africa remains minimal. </p>
<p>For its part, Western aid has resulted in an <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/glomed_africa/5/1/EJC34950">Anglo-American culture of journalism</a> education which has proved impractical to implement in countries with illiberal political regimes. </p>
<h2>A quandary</h2>
<p>Should under-resourced African journalists accept any foreign funding? </p>
<p>This is a difficult question. There are risks that come from shunning aid. This includes missed opportunities to develop African media or report independently on local power brokers. </p>
<p>On the other hand, aid can be used to coerce journalists to change their norms and practices unduly.</p>
<p>Media producers and users in developing countries need to be more vigilant about foreign media support. And they need to evaluate it. For citizens in countries that provide such aid, the challenge is to scrutinise the efforts made in their name.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119894/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The study upon which this article is based, was an AHRC/DfID funded project: Development Assistance and Independent Journalism in Africa and Latin America: A Cross-National and Multidisciplinary Research Network (AH/P00606X/1). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Audrey Gadzekpo received funding from the AHRC/DfID for this project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Paterson received funding from the AHRC/DfID for this project.
</span></em></p>Western aid has resulted in an Anglo-American culture of journalism education which has proved impractical to implement in African countries with illiberal political regimes.Herman Wasserman, Professor of Media Studies and Director of the Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape TownAudrey Gadzekpo, Professor in the Department of Communication Studies, University of GhanaChris Paterson, Senior Lecturer in International Communication, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1139272019-04-01T01:26:26Z2019-04-01T01:26:26ZWho do Chinese-Australian voters trust for their political news on WeChat?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266283/original/file-20190328-139374-1looncy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WeChat is the preferred social networking platform in China, as well as among the Chinese-speaking diaspora in Australia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/new-york-usa-october-29-2017-752700091">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are currently about 1.2 million people of Chinese origin in Australia. Approximtely half of them were born in China and <a href="https://profile.id.com.au/australia/language">speak Mandarin in the home</a>. For those who have come from a one-party state where electoral voting is a foreign concept, figuring out which party to vote for is part of the process of learning how to be citizens in a democratic society. </p>
<p>Recent state elections <a href="https://johnmenadue.com/wanning-sun-and-haiqing-yu-wechat-the-federal-election-and-the-danger-of-insinuative-journalism/">show</a> that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-australias-mandarin-speakers-get-their-news-106917">widespread adoption</a> of the social media platform WeChat by Chinese-Australians has led to a much higher level of political participation. We’ve also <a href="https://johnmenadue.com/wanning-sun-and-haiqing-yu-mandarin-speaking-voters-in-victoria-wechat-new-influencers-and-some-lessons-for-politicians/">seen</a> that this community is as divided politically as English-speaking Australians. </p>
<p>But whose information and opinions do Mandarin-speaking voters trust? And who is more likely to influence how they vote?</p>
<p>These are among the first set of questions we posed in a longitudinal <a href="https://ozchinamedia.org/">study</a> of the role played by Chinese-language digital media in the political, economic and cultural lives of Mandarin-speaking migrants in Australia. </p>
<p>Since the beginning of the year, we have been closely following a number of WeChat groups based in Melbourne, Sydney and Perth, in addition to a couple national groups. We also conducted a large survey of Mandarin-speaking social media users on Survey Monkey last month.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-social-media-platform-wechat-could-be-a-key-battleground-in-the-federal-election-113925">Chinese social media platform WeChat could be a key battleground in the federal election</a>
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<p>We asked the participants who are citizens (and thus able to vote) to identify their main sources of information about state and federal elections. We then combined our ethnographic and survey results to present the following key findings:</p>
<h2>1. Less politically engaged voters rely on friends</h2>
<p>We found that an important source of information and influence in the Mandarin-speaking community comes from postings on WeChat’s “Moments” feature, which is similar to Facebook’s timeline except the information shared on Moments can only be accessed by a person’s friends and acquaintances, not by others. </p>
<p>Around 26% of citizens surveyed said that postings by friends on Moments was one of their primary sources of information on political news. These people tended not to invest much time in deciding how to vote. They trusted the opinions of friends more than the media, politicians and public commentators. People in this group were also often less educated, less proficient in English or less engaged in politics. </p>
<p>On the days leading up to the recent NSW election, we frequently saw postings such as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Have to vote in the state election this weekend. Any ideas who to vote for?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Replies included: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Best stick with Liberal. They’re better at managing the economy. </p>
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<h2>2. WeChat groups are a growing source of influence</h2>
<p>Most WeChat users are members of several WeChat groups, which are self-formed, private messaging communities that can include up to 500 members. In our survey, around 22% of participants cited information shared in WeChat groups as another important source of electoral information.</p>
<p>Unlike friends on Moments, members of a particular group may be unknown to each other. Groups can based on special interests (parenting, gardening, cooking), place of origin (the Shanghai Migrant Association), or current place of residence (Chisholm in Melbourne). In the period leading up to elections, the topic of discussion in many of these groups tends to pivot towards the pros and cons of the major political parties.</p>
<p>WeChat groups with a more explicit political agenda are usually created and administered by candidates of Chinese heritage, or by friends and supporters of these candidates. Although the partisan nature of some groups is clear, they usually include some members from across the political spectrum. Debates in these groups often becomes very heated, sometimes quite combative.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">Thinking of taking up WeChat? Here's what you need to know</a>
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<h2>3. Gatekeepers mediate news from English-language sources</h2>
<p>As many as 50% of Chinese-Australian voters we surveyed also named mainstream English-language media as a source of information and opinion on politics. But our ethnography suggests that this information is only consumed after it has been processed, curated and framed within a particular editorial stance by bilingual gatekeepers within the Chinese-speaking community.</p>
<p>For example, an active member in a Perth-based WeChat group made three posts in quick succession a couple of weeks ago. The first, in Chinese, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Sydney Morning Herald <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/morrison-sees-votes-in-anti-muslim-strategy-20110216-1awmo.html">reported eight years ago</a> on Scott Morrison’s proposal to use anti-Muslim sentiment to win votes – a claim that Morrison did not deny at that time.</p>
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<p>His second post was a link to News.com.au journalist Malcolm Farr’s <a href="https://www.news.com.au/entertainment/tv/pm-accuses-waleed-aly-of-appalling-lie-over-muslim-comments/news-story/8b09f1f6d4c75c2440877bc5e71a30a1">recent story</a> about Morrison accusing TV presenter Waleed Aly of lying over this issue. The third post quoted a few key paragraphs from Farr’s story.</p>
<p>From the first post, it’s clear the WeChat group member is not a fan of Morrison’s. And this frames the news in a certain way for other members of the group.</p>
<h2>4. Chinese-speaking candidates are more relatable to voters</h2>
<p>Politicians like Morrison and Bill Shorten may have their own WeChat accounts now, but they are not as influential as candidates of Chinese heritage. About 23% of voters in our survey said WeChat messages from Mandarin-speaking political candidates were their primary source of information about elections. Mainstream politicians scored only 13%.</p>
<p>Chisholm Liberal candidate Gladys Liu’s WeChat account illustrates this finding. Her site lists a series of stories – no doubt put together by her supporters – detailing how Liu helped individual members of the Chinese community in need. </p>
<p>These feel-good stories were also widely circulated by Liberal supporters on WeChat. Liu is very active in WeChat groups, and often takes time to respond to messages that challenge her on particular issues.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266287/original/file-20190328-139368-1mwfwpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Liberal candidate for Chisholm Gladys Liu’s WeChat account.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screenshot</span></span>
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<h2>5. The emergence of new opinion leaders</h2>
<p>Chinese-language print magazines and newspapers have long been key influencers of community sentiment, but this status is increasingly under threat. </p>
<p>Similarly, traditional community organisations are no longer as influential as they once may have been. These organisations were mostly established by migrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Cantonese-speaking areas of China before the arrival of large numbers of Mandarin speakers from China in the last couple of decades. They also predated the emergence of social media platforms such as WeChat.</p>
<p>New opinion leaders tend to come from within the ranks of individual WeChat users. Many are able to marshal large followings on their WeChat subscription accounts. They tend to be bilingual (Mandarin and English) and have a constant presence in WeChat group discussion. Their opinions or analyses are informed by their own understanding of Australian party politics. </p>
<p>These opinion leaders often emerge organically through interactions with other WeChat users and their influence usually rises and falls unpredictably.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-australias-mandarin-speakers-get-their-news-106917">How Australia’s Mandarin speakers get their news</a>
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<p>These findings should provide food for thought for Australian politicians wishing to reach out to Chinese communities. </p>
<p>WeChat has shown a promising capacity to facilitate civic engagement and promote democratic dialogue <a href="https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/aK6GCZY1WDcMVK8XujRptv?domain=johnmenadue.com">among Chinese-speaking migrants</a>. But the government and non-Chinese-speaking politicians need to do their homework to figure how to use this platform effectively and make an impact on voters whose trust, at times, has been hard to win over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wanning Sun receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>According to a new study, Mandarin-speaking voters look to their friends and key social media influencers to inform how they should vote in Australian elections.Wanning Sun, Professor of Media and Cultural Studies, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015862018-11-13T11:47:01Z2018-11-13T11:47:01ZWill China help Trump denuclearize North Korea?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241266/original/file-20181018-67167-1u663ps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The US is not the only country with a stake in North Korea's denuclearization.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Trump-Kim-Summit/45ec8217a39b46308685b4f17c3b4f22/5/1">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in June <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/world/asia/kim-jong-un-donald-trump-denuclearize.html">pledged</a> to work toward “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” by 2020, the White House hailed the agreement as “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/historic-summit-north-korea-tremendous-moment-world/">a tremendous moment for the world</a>.” </p>
<p>The agreement came after a year of tense negotiations between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump – an undiplomatic diplomatic process that included insults, threats, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/03/politics/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-rhetoric/index.html">name-calling</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/us/politics/pompeo-north-korea-trip.html">canceled diplomatic visits</a>.</p>
<p>“I was really being tough. And so was he,” Trump <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/30/donald-trumps-relationship-kim-jong-unwe-fell-love-beautiful/">later said</a>. “And we’d go back and forth. And then we fell in love. OK?”</p>
<p>With all the bilateral drama, it’s easy to forget that this nuclear showdown does not involve just the U.S. and North Korea. </p>
<h2>The China-Korea connection</h2>
<p>The Korean peninsula has been in a protracted conflict since 1950, when Communist North Korean troops <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war">invaded</a> South Korea. </p>
<p>North Korea has been considered a <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/">dangerous nuclear power</a> since withdrawing from the international nonproliferation treaty on nuclear weapons in 1985, with neighboring <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/asia/abe-north-korea-comments/index.html">Japan</a> and South Korea most at risk of nuclear attack.</p>
<p>Both are strong U.S. allies who essentially <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-28/rift-grows-between-u-s-allies-over-north-korea-s-nuclear-threat">support Trump’s negotiations with Kim’s regime</a>. </p>
<p>Less certain is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-the-key-to-avoiding-nuclear-fire-and-fury-in-north-korea-82257">position of China</a>, North Korea’s Communist northern neighbor. </p>
<p>China accounts for 90 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade and is perhaps the only true <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship">“friend” North Korea has</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and the only real friend North Korea has in the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/The-Week-That-Was-In-Asia-Photo-Gallery/a48f3ab0324a4084af13048378ef2f6e/3/0">AP Photo/Andy Wong, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is also an economic behemoth with its own <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/the-world-according-to-china/">ambitions of global dominance</a>. </p>
<p>In recent years China has flexed its foreign policy muscles, paying for major <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-chinese-infrastructure-investment-overseas-and-how-can-we-make-the-most-of-it-98697">infrastructure</a> development in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ties-between-african-countries-and-china-are-complex-understanding-this-matters-104700">Africa</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-china-and-pakistans-coal-romance-wheres-the-love-for-the-climate-74772">Pakistan</a> and the Caribbean. Its diplomacy budget has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/china-races-to-catch-up-on-foreign-affairs-spending/">almost doubled</a> since Xi took office in 2013.</p>
<p>Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1588213.shtml">Lu Kang</a> has assured the United States that China supports “the U.S. and [North Korea] in actively seeking a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue” and is “committed to achieving denuclearization.”</p>
<p>Korea experts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/07/china-is-doing-what-it-has-to-in-north-korea/">have their doubts</a>. </p>
<p>Many believe China fears that a successful Trump negotiation could lead the U.S. to replace China as North Korea’s top ally. Its government “does not want a reunified Korea, indebted to Washington, sitting just across its border,” Richard McGregor, senior fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/18/asia/china-us-north-korea-xi-jinping-intl/index.html">told CNN</a> in May.</p>
<p>So where does China’s government really stand on the U.S.-led denuclearization of North Korea?</p>
<h2>China defends North Korea</h2>
<p>To answer this question, we analyzed one year of Chinese news coverage and commentary on North Korean denuclearatization. </p>
<p>Because journalism in China is <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-scorns-us-media-but-just-try-being-a-journalist-in-north-korea-or-mexico-96393">heavily state-controlled</a>, media analysis can shed light on government positions that may not be public as official policy.</p>
<p>Our project examining China’s view of the U.S-North Korea negotiations is part of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-media-outlets-from-around-the-world-are-reacting-to-the-presidential-campaign-66263">ongoing research</a> into the domestic media coverage of global affairs in Russia and China, two countries that contest America’s dominance in the current world order.</p>
<p>We read China’s position on the Trump-Kim process as delicately balanced between defending its Korean ally while signaling its respect for the international community.</p>
<p>Chinese media makes sure to report North Korea’s side of the argument, tacitly supporting Kim Jong Un’s need for security while questioning American intentions in the Asian region.</p>
<p>For instance, Xinhua <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/08/c_136664812.htm">reported</a> in Oct. 2017 that “Kim justified the development of nuclear and missile programs by [North Korea] as the only way of defense against ‘protracted nuclear threats’ by the United States.” </p>
<p>As an op-ed from the English-language Chinese daily Global Times further argues that the United States uses North Korea “<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1109926.shtml">as a pretext to justify its military presence in Northeast Asia</a>.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Because China’s government essentially controls the media, the narratives that emerge around certain issues offers insight into what may otherwise be unspoken official policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/China-Party-Congress/91027f65e89a4aada424b91eb8cfd9d8/26/0">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When Chinese media <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/29/c_136788460.htm">does denounce</a> aggressive North Korean military actions, such as intercontinental missile tests, the articles usually go on to portray the United States’ anti-ballistic missile systems and joint military exercises with Japan and South Korea as far more <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2016-07/09/content_26024911.htm">destabilizing for the Asia region</a>. </p>
<p>China opposes “any strategic military deployment by the U.S. that will cause threats to China’s security under the excuse of dealing <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1001370.shtml">with the peninsula situation</a>,” declared China’s Global Times in 2016.</p>
<h2>Towing the line</h2>
<p>Still, China is careful to uphold international standards when it comes to North Korea.</p>
<p>It advocates for a cooperative and dialogue-based peace process and has <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1511357.shtml">endorsed and implemented all</a> United Nations Security Council sanctions on North Korea. </p>
<p>After North Korea’s nuclear tests in fall 2017, for example, the U.N. unanimously adopted <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/un-us-north-korea-resolution/index.html">severe economic sanctions</a> that further isolated the regime. China criticized U.S. rhetoric about Kim’s regime as overheated, but ultimately signed off on the sanctions.</p>
<p>In Chinese media, such actions – defending North Korean sovereignty while supporting the international community – confirm China’s role as a fair arbiter. China sees itself as perhaps the only nation appropriately balancing North Korea’s economic needs with the world’s security concerns. </p>
<p>For Chinese media, this confirms China’s importance in global diplomacy. When President Trump said that “<a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201805/10/WS5af31c36a3105cdcf651cf9e.html">China has aided efforts with North Korea</a>,” his comment was widely quoted.</p>
<h2>Will China help denuclearize North Korea?</h2>
<p>Ultimately, our analysis finds that China’s global aspirations have not yet led President Xi to openly dispute American leadership in resolving world conflicts. </p>
<p>China is likely to play a supporting role in the gradual denuclearization of North Korea, even as it seeks to shape that process to ensure that Chinese influence and prestige in the region is upheld.</p>
<p>Chinese media has even <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-planning-china-visit-report">praised President Trump’s June 6 summit with Kim</a>, saying it warmed relations between the nations and laid a <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/10/WS5aa2ca66a3106e7dcc140c08.html">foundation for further progress</a> toward peace.</p>
<p>The Chinese government may well work “on both sides towards this goal,” as Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said in a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1517924.shtml">December 2017 press conference</a>.</p>
<p>But in the end, we believe Xi is more of a U.S. partner than foe when it comes to Korea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Randy Kluver has received funding from the Department of Defense to conduct research on global media narratives. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Hinck has received funding from the Department of Defense to conduct research on global media narratives</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Skye Cooley receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security. He is affiliated with Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment group. </span></em></p>With all the drama between Trump and Kim, it’s easy to forget that the US is not the only nation involved in denuclearizing North Korea. China is hugely influential — but it’s not clear quite how.Randy Kluver, Dean, Oklahoma State UniversityRobert Hinck, Assistant Professor, Monmouth CollegeSkye Cooley, Assistant Professor of Communication, Oklahoma State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1013342018-08-24T10:15:47Z2018-08-24T10:15:47ZBritish film has a golden opportunity in Chinese video on demand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233432/original/file-20180824-149481-otc2t0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Home theatre.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/laptop-cinema-home-entertainment-view-video-152078999?src=dI9ZJWp7fnVJ1X6ux16XDQ-4-9">BPTU/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Video on demand (VOD) services are big business across the world. At present, Netflix alone boasts an <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/10311/netflix-subscriptions-usa-international/">international audience of 130m</a>. By 2022, it and other regional and international subscription VOD services alone are expected to net an <a href="https://www.rapidtvnews.com/2018030251121/paying-streaming-households-to-reach-450mn-mark-by-2022.html?utm_campaign=paying-streaming-households-to-reach-450mn-mark-by-2022&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter_1656#axzz58tqdIwPq">audience of 450m worldwide</a>.</p>
<p>Given their popularity, one might expect China – which has the highest population in the world – to contribute the highest number of VOD consumers to the global industry. However, trading with China is never straightforward due to the people’s republic’s various rules aimed at restricting foreign investment. As a result, although China has the highest number of VOD users (<a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-leaders-and-founders/article/2148331/chinese-equivalent-netflix-no-we-want-be-chinas">estimated to reach</a> 527m by the end of 2018) they mainly consume through the country’s <a href="https://www.filmdoo.com/blog/2016/04/09/feature-the-chinese-vod-industry-and-breaking-down-the-great-wall/">own rapidly developing industry</a> – the current top three providers being <a href="https://www.iqiyi.com/">iQiyi</a>, <a href="https://www.youku.com/">Youku</a> and <a href="https://v.qq.com/">Tencent</a> respectively – rather than platforms such as Netflix or Amazon Prime.</p>
<p>International companies have tried to penetrate the Chinese market but with little success so far. Netflix <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/18/technology/netflix-china/">has been working on China</a> since 2016, but for now has settled for <a href="https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/iqiyi-and-netflix-sign-licensing-agreement">licensing some of its most popular content</a>, such as Stranger Things and Black Mirror, to iQiyi. Other companies, including arthouse cinema service MUBI have also made attempts, but <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/20/netflix-alternative-mubi-cancels-plan-to-launch-localized-service-in-china/">likewise have faced difficulties</a>.</p>
<p>This is not intended to put any foreign exporters off the Chinese market – because, in fact, VOD in China presents a golden opportunity for the UK film industry.</p>
<h2>Cultural attitudes</h2>
<p>Exporting film content to the Chinese VOD market is not only important economically, but also as a form of modern cultural diplomacy. While it is still unlikely that foreign digital platforms will be able to enter the Chinese market – at least in the near future – one immediate strategy could be to export film content, as Netflix has done. There is already an appetite for British TV content in China and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/worldwide/2018/migu-china">the BBC is a top exporter</a>. Programmes such as Planet Earth, Blue Planet and Sherlock have proved very popular.</p>
<p>Understandably, many British companies may be put off by the <a href="http://chinafilminsider.com/foreign-films-in-china-how-does-it-work/">import quota</a> that regulates the amount of foreign films entering China each year. This number has increased in recent years – 89 foreign films were <a href="https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/33282593">imported for theatrical release</a> in 2017 – but given the amount of non-Chinese films released each year, it is still a very competitive market with <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/22/WS5a3c5beca31008cf16da2c9e_1.html">mostly Hollywood blockbusters getting through</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233433/original/file-20180824-149466-b3xvty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Choices, choices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/wroclaw-poland-february-02th-2018-man-1040788477?src=dI9ZJWp7fnVJ1X6ux16XDQ-1-44">Daniel Krason/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, looking at Tencent’s VOD service alone, more than 100 of the 500 films added to the service in 2017 were foreign – well over the total import figure for theatrical release during the same year. Evidently, VOD platforms can be more flexible when it comes to foreign content. </p>
<p>At the moment, Hong Kong, the US, Europe, Korea and Japan are the most popular regions/categories for imported content. Due to the small amount of British films available on Chinese VOD sites, the UK is currently grouped under “Europe”. Although this may seem a small practical disadvantage, British Council in China as well as the Department for International Trade could potentially intervene to make British films more visible.</p>
<h2>Chinese ratings</h2>
<p>The lack of a ratings system in China is another unique advantage that could be exploited by UK film makers. China continues to adapt a very vague ethos in its exhibition regulation: as long as the films are suitable for all ages, remain respectful toward Chinese culture and the government, they are quite likely to pass the check. </p>
<p>Given this, most British films currently classified as 15 or below are ideal for exporting. To the Chinese audience, most British films are less ideologically aggressive than their Hollywood counterparts and are actually thought of as more educational in many aspects. </p>
<p>In addition, due to the ongoing US-China trade war, <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/will-hollywood-get-caught-trumps-china-trade-war-crossfire-1126182">Hollywood’s exports to China</a> are expected to fall. By taking advantage of these relatively relaxed rules, British production companies could lease exclusive film rights to Chinese VOD providers – as seen recently in a deal between <a href="http://chinafilminsider.com/iqiyi-to-include-filmnation-content-in-its-lineup/">US company FilmNation and iQiyi</a>. </p>
<p>But British film companies must be careful with their strategy. The BFI attempted to export its <a href="https://www.bfi.org.uk/news-opinion/news-bfi/announcements/bfi-pioneers-unique-partnership-iqiyi-chinas-leading-vod-service">film festival content</a> in 2016, but this deal signed with iQiyi has not necessarily made the movies popular on the platform. This may be partially down to the fact that the BFI did not invest in its own marketing and promotion of the content in China – something which prospective partners must take into account.</p>
<p>China’s various VOD platforms are constantly looking for new content in order to compete with each other, so there is a clear opportunity here. But whatever British production companies decide to do, clearly more transparent market intelligence and policy research are crucial to support their negotiations. While the UK’s VOD industry requires improvement <a href="https://theconversation.com/video-on-demand-and-the-myth-of-endless-choice-100116">in many areas</a>, taking up a new global challenge may potentially contribute to the British film industry’s internal reform, its opening up and continuous diversification at the same time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hiu Man Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Netflix and the like are already big business, but here’s why British film should focus more on Chinese subscription servicesHiu Man Chan, PhD Researcher, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974012018-06-07T14:00:54Z2018-06-07T14:00:54ZHow media and film can help China grow its soft power in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221753/original/file-20180605-119885-1lg2vbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from 'Wolf Warrior 2'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Well Go USA Entertainment</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some observers of China’s global rise conclude that its influence is limited to military and economic capabilities. For example, it’s set to overtake the US as the <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/study-china-will-overtake-the-u-s-as-worlds-largest-economy-before-2030/">world’s largest economy</a> before 2030. There is one area in which China lags behind. That’s the use of <a href="https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-benefits-of-soft-power">“soft power”</a>. It’s a phrase coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye to describe the intangible resources that help a nation achieve its interests by influencing the preferences of others.</p>
<p>Take the popularity of Hollywood films, as a conveyor of American values. They are an unofficial and formidable source of US global influence. But China’s influence could be changing, as suggested by recent developments in media and film, specifically in Africa.</p>
<p>It clearly matters in the highest echelons. China’s President Xi Jinping has recently <a href="http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2017-06/23/content_29858712.htm">encouraged</a> the media to,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>tell China’s story well, spread China’s voice well, let the world know a three-dimensional, colourful China…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>China has since the <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/31-the-rise-of-china-s-state-led-media-dynasty-in-africa/file">1950s</a> assisted African governments with media facilities and organised journalist and technical media exchanges. </p>
<p>However, the drive to promote its own narrative originated from the 2008 financial crisis. Its economic resilience and expanding links abroad were put under the spotlight. Coupled with this, was its hosting of the Beijing Olympics in the same year. Yet, at the time its role in places like Darfur and Zimbabwe was <a href="http://www.miafarrow.org/ed_032807.html">criticised</a> by foreign activists and reported by third party news. </p>
<p>That sparked China’s drive to directly engage with audiences in strategic regions of the world, by establishing broadcast centres in global capitals such as London, Moscow, Nairobi and Washington.</p>
<p>Already since <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/31-the-rise-of-china-s-state-led-media-dynasty-in-africa/file">2012</a> China has been actively reporting to and covering Africa. The main players include China Central Television, which was rebranded as <a href="https://www.cgtn.com/">China Global Television Network</a> in 2016, and China Daily’s <a href="http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/">Africa Edition</a>.</p>
<p>Viewership and readership numbers remain uncertain, as does commercial viability. But these players are adding diverse sources and voices in their reports, including room for African <a href="https://www.cmi.no/file/2922-.pdf">perspectives</a>. There is also increased interaction between Chinese and local African media staff who are working together on a daily basis. </p>
<p>These developments have even stirred <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/05/business/china-africa-cctv-media/index.html">other</a> news media organisations, who have themselves reported on it.</p>
<p>Questions may linger over the true impact of China’s ability to compete and win African hearts and minds. But its role is not static. Chinese media engagement is advancing and includes the provision of telecommunications <a href="https://www.chinaafricaproject.com/china-africa-information-digital-technology-iginio-gagliardone/">hardware</a>, to facilitate greater mobile access, as well as affordable <a href="https://qz.com/470166/a-chinese-media-company-is-taking-over-east-africas-booming-pay-tv-market/">pay-TV</a> service providers. These linkages confirm that China’s image is also, to an extent, built open its constructive commercial and infrastructure role on the continent. </p>
<h2>Deep pockets</h2>
<p>Film is another area that could benefit China’s soft power. It highlights the country’s deep pockets and potential for wider audience appeal. This is demonstrated by the deepening role of Chinese conglomerates in Hollywood. An example is the Beijing Wanda Group’s acquisition (estimated at $3.5 billion) of the film studio, Legendary Pictures, who together co-produced <a href="https://qz.com/866485/matt-damons-the-great-wall-is-a-hit-at-the-chinese-box-office-but-critics-hate-it/">“The Great Wall”</a>, starring Matt Damon.</p>
<p>Similar interest in engaging the South African film market is developing, albeit not yet to the extent of China’s interest in Hollywood. The highest-ranking production (estimated earning USD$852 million) in China for 2017 was <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt7131870/">“Wolf Warrior 2”</a> – it was filmed in parts of South Africa, including in Durban, Soweto and Alexandra. </p>
<p>The action film centres on a war hero who defends medical aid workers in a fictitious African country. At a local movie reception, Ambassador Lin Songtian of the Chinese embassy in South Africa, <a href="http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/sgxw/t1530302.htm">described</a> it as,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>an excellent Chinese film that carries forward patriotic enthusiasm and friendship between China and Africa. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>China’s role in the local film industry could be increasing in other ways.
First is the establishment of shared film festivals, such as the <a href="http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/showbiz/14/20170619/6644.html">China–Africa International Film Festival</a> launched in 2017. South Africa will be hosting the upcoming third BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Film Festival, which coincides with its hosting of the tenth BRICS Summit in July. This is an added opportunity to share best practises and drive investment and consumption in respective film industries. </p>
<p>Second, South African film makers are being awarded scholarships to study in China, for instance at the Beijing Film Academy. This forms part of the surge in <a href="https://qz.com/1017926/china-has-overtaken-the-us-and-uk-as-the-top-destination-for-anglophone-african-students/">Anglophone</a> African students seeking education in China. Last year, China surpassed the US and European Union as the primary destination for these African students. </p>
<p>Finally, films are providing platforms to build new China-Africa narratives. A good example is “Golden Lion and the Red Dragon”. This South African-Chinese co-production, which is still in development, is set against the construction of America’s transcontinental railroad during the 1900s, built by Chinese and African slave labour.</p>
<p>One of the film’s South African producers, Mayenzeke Baza of AAA Entertainment, emphasised in our discussion the development of China-Africa narratives as a “two-way street”. He added that there is a real hunger for foreign content in China.</p>
<p>While there are still quotas on the number of foreign films in the Chinese market, his company stated in another <a href="http://variety.com/2017/film/news/discop-africa-aaa-entertainment-pay-dirt-china-1202600778/">interview </a> that there are gaps for filmmakers targeting China, specifically those with stories of “cultural cohesiveness”. </p>
<h2>Largest film market</h2>
<p>It may still be some years before China’s economy overtakes America’s, but it is already the largest film market as of the first quarter of <a href="http://www.scmp.com/culture/film-tv/article/2140381/china-will-soon-be-worlds-top-film-market-having-overtaken-us-canada">2018</a>. Moreover, it has the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-caa-bona-film-fund-20170525-story.html">funds</a> to finance film productions outside of China. These facts will increasingly matter for emerging film markets – like <a href="http://nfvf.co.za/home/index.php?ipkArticleID=513">South Africa</a> – that could become significant contributors to national incomes.</p>
<p>China is slowly but surely becoming a noteworthy player outside of the financial and military spheres. What remains to be seen is whether its engagement in the film and media space can motivate deeper interaction between Chinese and other societies, expanding its soft power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97401/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu-Shan Wu is affiliated with the Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP), University of the Witwatersrand.</span></em></p>Film could benefit China’s soft power. It highlights the country’s deep pockets and potential for wider audience appeal.Yu-Shan Wu, Foreign policy researcher and doctoral candidate, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/927212018-03-16T10:28:44Z2018-03-16T10:28:44ZXi’s indefinite grasp on power has finally captured the West’s attention – now what?<p>When China’s Congress <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/international/377830-china-abolishes-presidential-term-limits">voted to repeal</a> constitutional limits on the length of time a Chinese president can stay in office, there were only two “no” votes out of the 2,964 cast on March 10.</p>
<p>Leaders and analysts in the West are now stepping forward to acknowledge that they have misunderstood China. As a journalist at <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21737517-it-bet-china-would-head-towards-democracy-and-market-economy-gamble-has-failed-how">The Economist</a> put it, “Decades of optimism about China’s rise have now been discarded.”</p>
<p>As someone who has been <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Chinese-Politics-State-Society-and-the-Market/Gries-Rosen/p/book/9780415564038">teaching and writing</a> on Chinese politics since the 1970s, I know that China’s current president, Xi Jinping, is fundamentally different from his predecessors. The West has held out hope that each leader after Mao Zedong, including Xi, would move in the direction of democracy. Now, constitutional reform has snapped the West back to reality. But can the West fashion a unified, viable strategy to deal with an emerging superpower that refuses to accept Western political values?</p>
<h2>Chinese versus Western media</h2>
<p>The difference in how Western and Chinese media have reacted to China voting to abolish presidential term limits underscores a gap in perception of Xi’s presidency.</p>
<p>Within China, reporting in state-run media has been extremely low-key. There has been little mention of it beyond noting the repeal as one of a number of constitutional changes. The state-run press <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi/chinese-papers-defend-removing-term-presidential-limits-idUSKCN1GO03I">noted that</a> the change was merely an “adjustment” or “a perfecting of the term system for the president.”</p>
<p>By contrast, it has been a major topic on Chinese social media, and censors have been <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17059916/china-censors-social-media-responses-abolish-presidential-terms">hard at work removing</a> the many critical comments that have appeared online. </p>
<p>In the absence of much official Chinese commentary, China’s English-language media has stepped in. The nationalistic Global Times, which the state uses to explain Chinese policies to foreigners, has emphasized the necessity of this constitutional amendment. Its writers <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1090562.shtml">have argued</a> that it will promote stability through centralized and unified leadership. This type of strong leadership, the argument goes, is needed for China to realize Xi’s <a href="http://www.atimes.com/article/xi-outlines-vision-achieve-china-dream-2050/">long-term plan</a> to develop China “into a great modern socialist country” by the middle of the 21st century.</p>
<p>Reporting in the West, meanwhile, has differed significantly. It has focused on the removal of the institutional norms and democratic safeguards. Western analysts <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/xi-jinping-china.html">assert that</a> this indefinite presidential term could make China less stable by substituting one-man rule in place of a broader Communist Party consensus. </p>
<p>Taken aback by the strong Western response, after the approval of the constitutional changes, the <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1092799.shtml">Global Times noted</a> that Western theories and advice on China’s developmental path are irrelevant. </p>
<h2>From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping</h2>
<p>Why has the West’s perception of China been so misguided? The answer is complex, but is likely <a href="http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/miller.pdf">rooted in the reforms</a> led by the late Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the Mao years, Deng created a political system that he hoped would prevent the concentration of absolute power that characterized the era. In 1982, Deng ensured that term limits on the presidency and vice presidency were written into <a href="https://china.usc.edu/constitution-peoples-republic-china-1982">the Constitution</a>. He wanted to prevent the rise to power of a new Mao, who could rule indefinitely, subject to no institutional safeguards. This was part of his ongoing effort to create some separation between the Communist Party and the state. </p>
<p>Then, in 1990, there was a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html">global backlash</a> from the 1989 Chinese military assault on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. Deng sought to pull China out of the limelight and eventually re-engage with the world gradually. This strategy <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm">was enshrined</a> in a series of pithy phrases intended to govern policy: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” </p>
<p>Xi’s assertiveness in foreign policy <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349">has marked</a> a key departure from this approach.</p>
<p>One important reason why Xi has felt less constrained than his predecessors is that he is the first leader post-Deng who was not personally chosen by Deng. Deng’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-is-dead-at-92-architect-of-modern-china.html">death in 1997</a> marked the end of an era. He was the last of the great revolutionary leaders who founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Deng had held such great authority in the Communist Party that <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2012/11/dont-forget-about-hu-jintao/">he handpicked</a> both of the party leaders who came before Xi: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.</p>
<p>Deng was motivated to prevent a new Mao. Xi is motivated by the dangers of a weak leadership. Xi views weak leadership as a primary reason for the 1989 student movement and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In effect, he has sought to resurrect a carefully airbrushed Mao. </p>
<p>Deng was concerned with restoring legitimacy and rebuilding China’s global role after 1989. Xi sees the current <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-steps-up-as-us-steps-back-from-global-leadership-70962">decline of the West</a> as a golden opportunity for China to rise. As far as Xi is concerned, Deng’s policies served their purpose. China today needs new policies to reflect its new global status, while the West, in turn, needs a new strategy to cope with this newly emerging China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stanley Rosen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent changes to China’s constitution signal loud and clear that any hope for a path to democracy must be checked with reality.Stanley Rosen, Professor of Political Science, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/923622018-02-26T13:40:47Z2018-02-26T13:40:47ZChina’s media struggles to overcome stereotypes of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207815/original/file-20180226-140217-309rbs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Spring Festival Gala with some Chinese actors in blackface.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For most Chinese people, the <a href="https://www.travelchinaguide.com/essential/holidays/spring-festival.htm">Spring Festival</a> is a time to honour family ties, friendships and acquaintances. </p>
<p>This is what producers of this year’s Annual Spring Festival Gala on China’s national broadcaster, CCTV, probably had in mind when they agreed to include a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAhaj5sG8fc">comedy skit</a> about the growing ties between China and African countries called “Celebrating Together” (同喜同乐). </p>
<p>In a celebration of Sino-African friendship, what could go wrong? In fact, quite a lot. </p>
<p>The 13-minute long skit opens with dozens of African performers, alongside antelopes and a lion, dancing to the tune of Shakira’s “Waka Waka”, all rejoicing over the opening of the China-built Nairobi to Mombasa Railway. They are joined by a group of Kenyan train attendants and the female lead, a Gabonese actress speaking fluent Mandarin. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/siEPxHafx-4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">CCTV’s 2018 Lunar New Year TV Gala.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And, then, a well-known Chinese actress in full blackface comes on stage wearing a colourful yellow dress, fully equipped with oversized butt pads, carrying a fruit plate on her head and leading a cheerful monkey played by an unidentified African actor. </p>
<p>In less than 12 hours, descriptions of the skit were all over <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43081218">international media</a> – always ready to run a “China, the foe” story. Turning to the Twittersphere, the public opinion thermometer of the 21st century, journalists found a divided audience: many called it racist, others argued it was not.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"964312803573141504"}"></div></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"964149617297248257"}"></div></p>
<p>The skit might not have been ill-intentioned. But it was both culturally and racially insensitive. It also reeked of propaganda and relied on all the stereotypes about Africa that Chinese media claim to be debunking in their public diplomacy activities in the continent.</p>
<h2>Chinese representation of Africa</h2>
<p>It is not the first time that a Chinese state-sanctioned production has misrepresented Africa and African people in such a grotesque way. Last summer, the movie <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt7131870/">“Wolf Warrior 2”</a>, the highest-grossing Chinese film ever, managed to bring together in a single movie all the clichés of Hollywood’s white-saviour subgenre: an unnamed African country affected by a deadly disease descends into chaos as civil war erupts. That is, until a Chinese mercenary comes to the rescue. </p>
<p>All film scripts in China <a href="http://americanfilmmarket.com/working-in-film-in-china/">must be pre-approved</a> before production starts and they must get a final green light before they’re released. CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala also goes through multiple stages of supervision. Sometimes movies and TV acts are tossed out because a red flag is raised. That clearly didn’t happen this time.</p>
<p>Neither “Wolf Warrior 2” nor the Spring Festival Gala were conceived with global audiences in mind. They are cultural artefacts that speak to domestic audiences and, as such, they are tuned to the so-called <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=FL3RCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA20&lpg=PA20&dq=jiang+zemin+main+melody&source=bl&ots=VQfyj0-OQz&sig=qv0ow-GvWaCvwBAVR2bCDnI9lpI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjejLPgjcPZAhULC8AKHXhcB88Q6AEIQzAI#v=onepage&q=jiang%20zemin%20main%20melody&f=false">“main melody”</a>, a concept often attributed to China’s President in the 1990s, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20038774">Jiang Zemin</a>. Cultural products that dance to the main melody need to be aesthetically attractive to the masses, but remain politically aligned with the doctrine of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>China has a different repertoire for global audiences. As part of its quest to improve its image overseas, Beijing has promoted the expansion of companies like CGTN, Xinhua, China Daily and StarTimes. All have a strong presence in Africa, where they claim to be presenting a different view of the continent and its people.</p>
<p>These efforts are hit hard every time a gaffe, such as the CCTV’s skit, goes on air.</p>
<h2>Savannas and safaris</h2>
<p>Chinese media portray Africa in stereotypes not dissimilar to the rest of the world. The continent is routinely treated as a single unit, erasing its linguistic, racial and cultural diversity. It is often associated with cliched images such as savannas and safaris and its transformations over the last 30 years reduced to a market logic under the tagline “Africa rising”. </p>
<p>While misrepresentations of Africa are not an exclusive problem of Chinese media, two things set China apart.</p>
<p>As the release of <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1825683/">“Black Panther”</a> has shown, many in the US are ready to engage in an open discussion about how the US movie industry has, for decades, failed to address racial biases. </p>
<p>In China, criticism of the CCTV African skit <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/02/sensitive-words-spring-festival-gala-2018/">on social media has been censored</a>. This is not surprising, given that, every year, Chinese censors work hard to erase negative comments of a show that has gone from being a must-watch for many Chinese families to a source of memes and jokes for younger generations.</p>
<p>This suggests that China needs to have a conversation about racial insensitivity, which is too common and too often dismissed as cultural specificity. The cultural specificity argument goes like this: while something might be considered offensive in the “West” (for example, blackface), it is not in China, and, therefore, there is no need to feel offended by it. </p>
<h2>Hard to say sorry</h2>
<p>For a long time Beijing has kept a double narrative going in its media strategy – one for domestic consumption and another one for global audiences. This worked in a pre-Internet era.</p>
<p>If China wants to be viewed as a responsible global actor, it needs to find appropriate ways to prevent controversies such as the one created by the offensive CCTV skit. It could, for example, seek out African specialists at Chinese universities to offer expert advise.</p>
<p>More importantly, when errors are made – and Chinese leaders need to accept that nobody is infallible – Beijing needs to be ready to acknowledge them. </p>
<p>Foreign companies, and sometimes foreign media, are forced to issue an apology when their actions are deemed to hurt Chinese people. Will CCTV be offering one? For now, that seems unlikely. Speaking to the press, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lunar-newyear-china-blackface/china-denies-racism-says-hyping-up-tv-blackface-skit-futile-idUSKCN1G60ZE">dismissed the controversy</a> and taken the usual path: attacking those who brought up the issue.</p>
<p>Next time Beijing may want to change its approach. By apologising, it would show the world that it is becoming an empathetic global power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dani Madrid-Morales does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, like in other parts of the world, Africa is routinely treated as a single unit, erasing its linguistic, racial and cultural diversity.Dani Madrid-Morales, PhD Fellow in Media and Communication, City University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/643642016-08-31T02:24:40Z2016-08-31T02:24:40ZDo moves against Hangzhou G20 ‘rumours’ help show China at its best or worst?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135884/original/image-20160830-28230-7rx77e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese are starting to question government control of the terms of public debate, as conveyed by this propoganda banner in Hangzhou in 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/philiproeland/4770190119/in/album-72157624441284070/">Philip Roeland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While Hangzhou has begun counting down to the arrival of G20 delegates from around the world, #g20blue – a hashtag locals use to post about the smog-free sky – is trending on social media. The beautiful sky that is exciting residents is the result of <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-06/22/content_25797965.htm">the Chinese government’s year-long efforts</a> to clean up air pollution in the vicinity of the city. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135676/original/image-20160827-17851-5tqoxd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pictures on Instagram with the #g20blue hashtag.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Instagram</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China’s “cleaning agenda” for the coming <a href="http://www.g20.org/English/">G20 summit</a> is not restricted to environmental problems, but has recently been expanded to the country’s online space. A search for “G20” on <a href="http://weiboscope.jmsc.hku.hk/">WeiboScope</a>, a censorship monitoring website, reveals a large number of posts criticising the event have been removed from Weibo, China’s Twitter-like microblogging site. </p>
<p>While some Chinese netizens who complain about the G20 have had their posts removed from the system, others may have paid a heavier price for their criticism. On July 15, blogger “Pingzi”, who was later identified as Guo Enping, was <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/996263.shtml">arrested for “spreading rumours”</a> about G20 preparations. </p>
<p>It was Guo’s viral blog post, “Hangzhou, shame on you”, that brought trouble upon this public servant. In his post, Guo criticised local authorities in Hangzhou for over-spending in preparation for the G20 summit and for causing unnecessary inconvenience to residents and businesses. </p>
<p>China has strict laws to <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/949407.shtml">regulate online rumours</a>. Under these laws, Guo was fired and detained for “groundless” claims he made in the post, which included Hangzhou’s budget for the city’s G20 preparations. It isn’t feasible to assess the validity of actual figures in this post, because there is little official information or documentation that can be used to verify or discredit Guo’s claims. </p>
<p>As one online forum user <a href="http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-2268118-1-1.html">argues</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>How do we know what Guo said in the post is wrong? Does the government dare to release its record of spending on this event?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This comment points out an important factor that leads to rumour-mongering: lack of trustworthy information. Little information is available on the local government’s budget for hosting this event. When officials <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1956377/hangzhous-g20-facelift-part-citys-long-term-planning">refuse to reveal</a> information about issues of public concern, rumour emerges to fill the gap. </p>
<p>In the absence of transparency, and to discredit undesirable comments, authorities rely on the assumption that they are the arbiters of “truth”. </p>
<h2>Hangzhou ‘trying too hard’?</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135683/original/image-20160828-17887-1qjfucp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police patrol Hangzhou in preparation for the G20 summit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ding_jia_ming/28717449182/">HDBNorth/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most of Guo’s criticism about Hangzhou “trying too hard” to impress foreign guests is not groundless. Based on information from the Hangzhou government’s <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/video/2016/08/07/content_281475411230703.htm">official website</a>, the city has conducted more than 700 renovation projects and declared a week-long holiday for its residents. Also, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/video/2016/08/07/content_281475411230703.htm">$US1.5 billion</a> has been spent on travel vouchers to encourage citizens to leave the town. </p>
<p>However, not all residents are happy about the bonus holidays. According to a recent report, local business owners <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2009392/hangzhou-residents-prepare-holiday-exodus-courtesy-g20">complained</a>. It is also reported that more than <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-industry-pollution-idUSKCN0Z3145">250 industrial facilities</a> in the region were temporarily shut down and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/22/china-shut-churches-g20-summit-city-hangzhou-hangzhou">religious gatherings</a> may be banned in Hangzhou during the G20 week. </p>
<h2>Response to Guo’s arrest</h2>
<p>In response to official media reporting of Guo’s case on Weibo, a large number of Weibo users expressed sympathy for Guo. </p>
<p>The official report offers no systematic explanation of the “falsity” of Guo’s claims. In order to deny Guo’s criticism, officials simply use another “official” figure: 96.8% of local residents are happy about hosting the G20. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=202&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135679/original/image-20160827-17884-5mlitu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Zhenjiang Communist Youth League‘s official Weibo post about Guo’s case – the same message issued by mainstream media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">weibo.com screen capture</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, this official message has backfired. As shown in the following screen capture, most comments challenge the official survey result. Also, as some of the comments suggest, certain posts criticising the government have already been removed from the system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=109&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=109&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=109&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135872/original/image-20160830-28233-5ehauc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Screen capture of Weibo users’ comments on Guo’s case, with author’s translation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Weibo.com, author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Controlling rumour or suppressing free speech?</h2>
<p>In a post-Snowden era, it is no secret that governments in both democratic and authoritarian states conduct online surveillance. However, as discussed by various scholars, the sociopolitical circumstances of China determine that internet control is driven by a <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9199-0">different motivation</a> and can have detrimental impacts on <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdiaCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=info:GcKULJadKbMJ:scholar.google.com&ots=qvsfSXVjRf&sig=PAmWuasYPonYoWC6A2V-QjaVvV8&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">China’s civil society</a>. </p>
<p>From paid <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/blog/china%E2%80%99s-growing-army-paid-internet-commentators">pro-government commentators</a> on online forums to vigorous content-censoring strategies on social media, the government’s approach to regulating public opinion online is evolving with China’s media dynamics. </p>
<p>Recently, crackdowns on social media “rumour-spreading” have become increasingly frequent. As China has very limited alternative information channels, such anti-rumour policies on social media have raised concern among both <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324807704579082940411106988">commentators</a> and <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10006515&fileId=S2057019815000048">scholars</a> about Chinese people’s freedom of speech.</p>
<p>China is now the world’s second-biggest economy. However, the country’s reputation for suppressing its citizens’ freedom of speech is an obstacle to becoming a real leader on the world stage. Rather than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/06/china-human-rights-activist-convictions-us-criticism">constantly rejecting</a> the widespread condemnation of its approach, perhaps it is time to show the world a more mature China that can take and respond to criticism. </p>
<p>The upcoming G20 summit shines a spotlight on China again. With its rich history and natural beauty, there is no better way for Hangzhou to showcase “beautiful China” than by presenting a <a href="http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html">genuinely harmonious</a> relationship between the government and civil society. </p>
<p>Without this foundation, the blue sky, newly painted houses or seemingly harmonious internet may all be perceived as nothing but an unconvincing facade. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=123&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=123&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=123&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135889/original/image-20160830-28233-1y9w73o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">West Lake, Hangzhou.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/norsez/8688058327/in/album-72157633354866537/">norsez Oh/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64364/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jing Zeng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hangzhou is hosting the G20 summit and China is anxious to present a positive picture of the country to the world, but the official attitude to non-compliant citizens isn’t helping.Jing Zeng, PhD Candidate, Queensland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/633692016-08-11T08:47:02Z2016-08-11T08:47:02ZXi Jinping ramps up his crackdown on the Chinese media – both online and off<p>With almost no notice, any website in China can be shut down on a temporary or permanent basis if it’s deemed to contain “politically incorrect” content. And sure enough, this summer, the <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/english/">Cyberspace Administration of China</a> (CAC) announced a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-36881353">crackdown on online news reporting</a>, targeting some of China’s most popular internet giants – including Sina, NetEase, Sohu, Tencent, and Phoenix. </p>
<p>While China is used to tight controls on the internet and the media, this was nonetheless a remarkably aggressive move. And it speaks of a renewed zeal for an all-encompassing control of information. </p>
<p>The internet portals in question provide news to the majority of China’s <a href="https://www.techinasia.com/more-than-half-of-china-population-is-online">688m internet users</a> on a daily basis, most directly through the popular social networks of Weibo and WeChat. The CAC ordered these companies to shut down or clean up their news portals, saying they were in serious violation of internet regulations by publishing original news reporting.</p>
<p>The CAC isn’t launching a new policy here; it’s simply started enforcing an old one. The <a href="http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/provisions-on-the-administration-of-internet-news-information-services">Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services</a>, issued in 2005, stipulate that commercial websites may reprint news from official traditional media, with sources clearly denoted and content not distorted, but may not produce original news reports. But just as it goes in many grey areas of Chinese state authority, this regulation has not been strictly enforced. </p>
<p>Major news portals have been able to establish journalistic and editorial teams to carry out investigations and report on popular news topics such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-china-must-do-to-fix-its-air-pollution-problem-38399">air pollution</a>, the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7720404.stm">milk safety scandal</a>, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/world/asia/china-police-brutality-gansu.html">police brutality</a>, and even <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/05/29/truth-about-chinese-corruption-pub-60265">local officials’ corruption</a>. They have been competing with traditional media outlets to expand their readership.</p>
<p>The restatement and re-enforcement by CAC certainly echoes other recent moves by Xi Jinping’s leadership to obtain a firmer grip on information control, both in traditional media and the internet. When Xi visited the headquarters of CCTV and People’s Daily earlier this year, he forcefully emphasised that all media in China “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-35915056">bears the party surname</a>”.</p>
<h2>Liberals under pressure</h2>
<p>It wasn’t always this way. For all that press freedom has been restricted across all Chinese media for some time, until 2013, there were two precious exceptions: Yanhuang Chunqiu, a liberal magazine, and Southern Weekly. Both endorsed liberal thought, the rule of law, and market economics.</p>
<p>Earlier this summer, the editorial team of Yanhuang Chunqiu announced they would <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/asia/china-yanhuang-chunqiu-dissolved.html?_r=0">cease publication</a> after the authorities replaced them with a new team who would endorse Xi’s political ideals. </p>
<p>Over the past 25 years, the magazine had been protected in its many run-ins with the state by reformists in the party, particularly academics and some senior retired officials who called for moderate political liberalisation. But under Xi’s drive for all-encompassing control, the magazine suddenly found itself unprotected.</p>
<p>Similarly, back in 2013, Southern Weekly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20911823">got into trouble</a> with the provincial propaganda department, which censored a planned New Year Editorial that called for a constitutional national government. The Southern Weekly Incident, as it’s known, triggered heated online debate over press freedom and attracted citizen protests outside the office buildings of Southern Media – but to no avail. </p>
<p>The protests were suppressed by the authorities, and the three years since the incident have seen more and more party officials appointed to prominent posts at the Southern Media Group, which owns the newspaper, to directly regulate its output. The incident diminished the newspaper’s courage, and greatly undercut its capacity to run hard-hitting reports.</p>
<p>With more journalists being detained for reporting on sensitive issues, many liberal newspapers have in recent years maintained discreet silence during controversial social events. Facing the commercial threat posed by digital media outlets, traditional media have also been struggling to generate a profit, forced to compromise by sticking ever more closely to party regulations.</p>
<p>The result is something of a traditional media brain drain, with a large number of influential and idealistic journalists moving to work for digital companies. It would not have escaped the party’s attention that this mass transition now makes online media outlets more of a threat to the party.</p>
<h2>Online danger</h2>
<p>The problem for the party is that it’s made a priority of promoting online business, and several of the media portals targeted by the CAC are listed on US stock exchanges. These internet portals, which are run for profit, benefit from large-scale discussions of current events, which run contrary to the party’s aim to curb mass contention. </p>
<p>Their operators and editors have patiently learned to promote discussion while controlling the intensity of the debate, thereby complying with the party’s dual goal of promoting internet business at the same time as maintaining tight political control. </p>
<p>But it’s a very tricky balance to strike, and the market has ultimately provided the incentive for original news reporting to grow. Popular news portals have attracted high quality investigative journalists by offering them wages many times higher than those offered by traditional media.</p>
<p>Both the state’s control of the internet and resistance from the commercial interests of internet companies has evolved over time, becoming increasingly sophisticated. Since Xi came to power in 2013, the party has cracked down on high-profile internet celebrities and arrested a great number of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/chinaend-relentless-repression-against-human-rights-lawyers-on-first-anniversary-of-crackdown/">activists and human rights lawyers</a> who spoke out online. Tough new measures have been introduced to stop the spread of what they regard as “irresponsible rumours”.</p>
<p>The recent clampdown may also be an attempt to silence dissidents and opponents ahead of next year’s party congress, since major political occasions always yield tightened regulation of media outlets in China.</p>
<p>But it’s not just a reflex: Xi is unafraid of openly endorsing internet censorship. Speaking at the second World Internet Conference in December 2015, he called for “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-35109453">cyber sovereignty</a>”, forcefully stating that countries should be allowed to set their own rules for governing online spaces of their own. </p>
<p>With the party’s confidence growing and its control getting ever more assertive, there’s no telling just how far Xi will go.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sally Xiaojin Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is used to media being kept on a tight leash, but the party’s latest swoop has an ominous new zeal about it.Sally Xiaojin Chen, Lecturer in Journalism, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/605942016-06-30T09:46:58Z2016-06-30T09:46:58ZHow TV dating shows helped change love and marriage in China forever<p>Today, dating shows are an important ingredient in China’s cultural diet, with popular shows like “If You Are the One” and “One Out of a Hundred” attracting millions of viewers.</p>
<p>For single people, they’re a platform for seeking potential spouses; for fans, they’re the subject of gossip and dissection; for the cultural elites, they’re a topic for derision; and for the government, they’re a target for surveillance. </p>
<p>Compared with Western cultures, China has traditionally had a vastly different value system towards marriages and family. But over the past 30 years, these customs have been upended.</p>
<p>I’ve studied how traditional Chinese marriage rituals have evolved in response to globalization. In many ways, <a href="http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/06/0163443716648493.abstract">dating shows became a powerful way to facilitate these changes</a>. By looking at the development of Chinese television dating shows, we can see how love and marriage changed from a ritualized system mired in the past to the liberated, Western-style version we see today. </p>
<h2>Serving the man</h2>
<p>Marriage matchmaking has always been an important cultural practice in China. For generations, marriage was arranged by parents who followed the principle of “matching doors and windows,” which meant that people needed to marry those of similar social and economic standing. Marriage was viewed as a contract between two households, and it was for the purpose of procreation, not love. </p>
<p>Thought to contribute to peace and stability, it was the dominant custom into the latter half of the 20th century. </p>
<p>But China’s 1978 “<a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6483525.pdf">Open Door Policy</a>,” which transitioned the country from a rigid, centrally planned economy to a global, market-based economy, exposed the Chinese people to an array of outside cultural influences. Meanwhile, the country’s <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21897930.htm">1980 marriage law</a> codified, for the first time, freedom to marry and gender equality. </p>
<p>However, even in the wake of political change and globalization, many families still held the traditional Chinese belief that women, unlike men, belonged in the home, and that their parents had the final say over whom they could marry. </p>
<p>So when a TV show like “Television Red Bride” (<em>Dianshi hongnixang</em>) came along in 1988, it was a big deal. </p>
<p>Certain traditions still ruled. The show’s purpose was to help rural, poor men find a partner, while its slogan, “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serve_the_People">serve the people</a>” (<em>wei renmin fuwu</em>), came from a 1944 speech by Mao Zedong.</p>
<p>Its emphasis on finding partners for men was a testament to <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/opinion/china-challenges-one-child-brooks/">China’s unbalanced sex ratio</a>, caused by a combination of China’s <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/02/01/465124337/how-chinas-one-child-policy-led-to-forced-abortions-30-million-bachelors">One Child Policy</a> and advances in ultrasound technology in the 1980s that allowed pregnant women to abort millions of baby girls.</p>
<p>The style of the show followed a linear pattern. Male candidates introduced themselves and their family’s background, listed their criteria for a spouse and answered a few questions from the host. It was essentially a singles ad broadcast before audience members, who, if interested, could contact the candidate for a date.</p>
<p>Despite all the limitations, the show was a groundbreaking depiction of courtship. It took decisions about love and marriage from the private home to the very public domain of broadcast TV. For Chinese romance, this was its own “great leap forward.” </p>
<h2>Courtship redefined</h2>
<p>By the early 1990s, Chinese TV networks found themselves in fierce competition with one another. Economic liberalization had loosened restrictions for what could appear on the airwaves, but there was now the added pressure of turning a profit. More than ever before, <a href="https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/5487">networks needed to produce entertaining shows that attracted audiences</a>. </p>
<p>It was during this period that dating shows started to transform, depicting live, on-air matchmaking and dates between single males <em>and</em> females.</p>
<p>For example, Human Satellite TV’s “Red Rose Date” featured 12 single males and females who interacted with one another by performing, playing games, and having roundtable chats. Audiences could also tune into shows imported from overseas, such as “Love Game,” a popular Taiwanese show that matched singles through three rounds of speed dating. </p>
<p>These new shows were ways for singles to get to know each other in a fun, flirty environment. And for those who had little dating experience, it was a model for courtship; soon, the viewing public was able to reconceptualize ideas of love, relationships and marriage. </p>
<p>At the same time, traditional courtship and marriage rituals were evaporating.</p>
<p>For example, in 1970, only 1.8 percent of couples lived together before marriage. By 2000, that number had skyrocketed to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/asia/survey-in-china-shows-wide-income-gap.html">32.6 percent</a>. Meanwhile, divorces in China rose from 170,449 couples in 1978 to <a href="http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat4/sub20/entry-4334.html">3.5 million</a> in 2013, while <a href="http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/02/10/chinese-foreign-marriage-in-mainland-china/">marriages with foreigners</a> increased from less than 8,500 couples in 1979 to over 49,000 couples in 2010.</p>
<h2>‘I’d rather weep in a BMW than laugh on a bike’</h2>
<p>There have been some consequences to this shift: as TV became more commercialized, so, too, did love and marriage.</p>
<p>By the late 2000s, dating shows needed to continue to evolve in order to compete with other programs. Strategies dating shows adopted included hiring polished hosts, borrowing set designs and show formats from Western reality shows, and incorporating technology to better interact with audience members and TV viewers at home. </p>
<p>Some shows started collaborating with online dating websites like baihe.com and jiayuan.com to attract participants and viewers. Others partnered with corporations <a href="http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/06/0163443716648493.abstract">to boost advertising revenues</a>. </p>
<p>Today, it’s not uncommon to see commercial products and brands being hawked on various dating programs or hear hosts casually mention sponsors during an episode. Many sponsors sell products we associate with romance and dating, such as cosmetics, clothing, diet drinks and dating website memberships.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128770/original/image-20160629-15277-1ns22tp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A wedding party poses for pictures in Shanghai.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/C.aspx?VP3=SearchResult&VBID=2C0BXZERP17RP&SMLS=1&RW=1277&RH=699#/SearchResult&VBID=2C0BXZERP17RP&SMLS=1&RW=1277&RH=699&POPUPPN=11&POPUPIID=2C040809KJVQX">Carlos Barria/Reuters</a></span>
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<p>Moments from some shows have gone viral, with many emphasizing materialistic values. In 2010, an unemployed male suitor on “If You Are the One” asked a female contestant if she’d go on a bike ride with him for a date. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_would_rather_cry_in_a_BMW">She responded</a> that she would “rather weep in a BMW” than laugh on a bike.</p>
<p>Other pointed retorts include “I won’t consider you if your monthly salary is under RMB 200,000” (US$33,333) and “If you come from the countryside, you can forget about it.” </p>
<p>Traditionalists have argued that the shows reflect the pervasive materialism, narcissism and discrimination against the poor among China’s younger generations. </p>
<p>Not that arranged marriages could be thought of as “pure love.” But, to some viewers, if there were an ideal of pure love, this certainly wasn’t it. And it was a far cry from a dating show that purported to “serve the people.” </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, widespread outcry only augmented the fame of the shows and their contestants, and <a href="http://www.sarft.gov.cn/">SARFT</a> – China’s State Administration of Radio, Film and Television – eventually took action. </p>
<p>In 2010, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-16405804">SARFT urged</a> domestic TV stations to remember their social responsibilities and promote virtues advocated by the Chinese Communist Party. Since then, some shows have gone off the air while others have rectified their “misconduct.”</p>
<p>The government’s message was clear: while Chinese people needed to be free to love and marry, it couldn’t impinge on socialist values.</p>
<p>In a way, the government’s wariness with dating shows reflects many of the tensions in today’s China. While a free-market economy and state authoritarianism appear contradictory, the authorities will often intervene to try to strike a balance. And so <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/6617400">love and marriage</a> continue to operate within the wobbly framework of a Chinese state that attempts to simultaneously control and profit from an onslaught of global forces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60594/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pan Wang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In only 30 years, a generations-old system of arranged marriages has been completely upended.Pan Wang, Lecturer and Researcher, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/550912016-03-10T11:02:42Z2016-03-10T11:02:42ZGreat firewall of China reinforced as foreign media banned from publishing online<p>A new Chinese <a href="http://qz.com/620076/beijing-is-banning-all-foreign-media-from-publishing-online-in-china/">rule banning all foreign media</a> from publishing online will come into effect on March 10, affecting everything from the press, radio and television to music and computer games. The edict provides legislative backing for the government’s existing control of the internet and will empower the Chinese cyber-police to further assert their <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35109453">“cyber sovereignty”</a> inside the country’s online Great Wall. </p>
<p>Those Chinese media companies already acting as mouthpieces for the communist party now have legal backing that enforces their monopoly over online content. </p>
<p>The new directive, jointly issued by China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, prohibits any foreign media companies from engaging in online publishing in China.</p>
<p>This is not new: foreign media outfits, such as the Financial Times, New York Times and Reuters who have invested in Chinese-language services, are <a href="https://projects.propublica.org/firewall/">frequently blocked in China</a>. </p>
<p>The BBC has also experienced difficulties, despite <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourbeeb/dianjing-li/bbc-in-brave-new-china">establishing different websites aimed at different demographics</a>. The minority of people in China who can speak English have access to the unblocked <a href="http://www.bbc.com/">bbc.com</a>, but the Chinese language <a href="http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp">BBC Chinese Net</a> is blocked. </p>
<h2>Still room to collaborate</h2>
<p>The new law will, however, allow foreign media institutions to cooperate on individual projects with firms that are wholly-owned and based in mainland China, as long as they obtain prior permission from authorities. </p>
<p>This kind of collaboration has been going on for some time. The nature documentary series <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/organgrinder/2008/oct/22/chinathemedia1">Wild China</a>, for example, co-produced in 2008 by the BBC Natural History Unit and China Central Television, was approved by the government. These kind of collaborations have been well received by Chinese audiences, and the BBC now is co-operating with the Chinese film company SGM Pictures to produce the documentary <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourbeeb/dianjing-li/bbc-in-brave-new-china">Earth: One Amazing Day</a>, for release in cinemas in 2017.</p>
<p>There is little new about the thrust of the law and it is the product of increasing Chinese observation and regulation of the internet that began in 2002. A 2005 regulation named <a href="http://www.shnuodi.com/_baike.asp?iid=6223">Opinions on Canvassing Foreign Investment into the Cultural Sector</a> banned foreign investors from establishing and managing news agencies and providing online publishing services in China. </p>
<p>So the new rule will have little impact on the way foreign media currently operate, although it’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/business/media/new-chinese-rules-on-foreign-firms-online-content.html">still unclear</a> how it will impact other foreign tech companies producing online content. And of course, online content by foreign media will still be available to Chinese netizens who use a virtual private network or other tricks to <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/chinas-great-firewall-gets-higher-tools-to-evade-surveillance-and-site-bans-are-blocked-as-chinese-10013537.html">get around the censors</a>.</p>
<h2>Boost to Chinese online business</h2>
<p>But the new legislation is no political platitude. It is a signal that China is hardening its line in the ongoing battle between communist party doctrine, the cyber police, commercialisation, and the consumption habits of sophisticated Chinese netizens.</p>
<p>The Chinese government has paid very close attention to how the internet and social media are changing society. It relies on more than two million <a href="http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/05/150531_china_internet_policing">cyber police</a> to maintain internal security through censorship. </p>
<p>By stopping foreign media from publishing online in China, the new law is aimed at encouraging native Chinese media institutions to develop online publishing services. This fits with a new economic <a href="http://www.usito.org/news/china-pursues-internet-plus-strategy">“Internet Plus” action plan launched in 2015</a> by Chinese premier Li Keqiang. This is aimed at driving economic growth through the integration of internet technologies, manufacturing and business. </p>
<p>Native Chinese internet companies and media institutions have already benefited from the government’s censorship and regional protectionism. For example, the search engine Baidu <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/03/23/china.google.winners/">was one of the biggest beneficiaries</a> after China expelled Google in 2010. </p>
<p>Baidu – also one of the Chinese companies in the new Internet Plus alliance – experienced a <a href="http://www.telecompaper.com/news/baidu-sees-q4-profit-jump-663-revenue-up-33--1130501">33% increase in revenue</a> in the fourth quarter of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. Yet, there are signs that Chinese citizens are wary of increased control of their online habits, and some are <a href="http://qz.com/593120/chinese-citizens-are-boycotting-search-engine-baidu-and-praying-for-google-to-come-back/">boycotting Baidu</a> for its collaborations with censors and unethical commercialisation. </p>
<p>The government’s latest edict cements the Chinese government’s control over the internet. And by fixing the government’s quest for cyber-sovereignty further into law, the Chinese public’s position as consumers has been weakened yet again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55091/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dianjing Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New law is a sign of a more muscular Chinese internet protectionism.Dianjing Li, PhD Candidate on Media and Communication, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/257372014-04-22T04:30:12Z2014-04-22T04:30:12ZLooking behind the screens of the ABC’s China deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/46769/original/cq2nfjjb-1398132974.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chinese TV market is hard to crack.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>ABC International has reasons to be proud of its recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-17/an-abc27s-australia-network-signs-china-content-deal/5396664">“landmark” deal</a> to provide ABC content in China. </p>
<p>The deal, which will see the establishment of an online portal, also seems to make it harder for the government to justify scrapping the Australia Network, funded by DFAT and functioning as an official instrument of Australia’s public diplomacy initiatives.</p>
<p>The benefit of exposing potentially 1.3 billion people to Australian media content is obvious: Australia is competing with many other countries to attract business, resources investment, education and tourism from China; and perceptions matter. </p>
<p>Some may think that doing business with the Shanghai Media Group (SMG), the second-biggest media conglomerate after CCTV (Chinese Central Television), may have the added benefit of teaching the Chinese media a thing or two about what media in a liberal democracy look like. But it’s not that simple.</p>
<h2>Going out and coming in</h2>
<p>From the Australian point of view, it seems that the ABC has managed to penetrate the Chinese market. In reality, it’s a matter of China wanting to set up myriad reciprocal relationships so that it can maximise its own exposure to the world. From the point of view of the Shanghai Media Group, allowing the ABC to have an online portal in China is part and parcel of the Chinese government’s recent “going out and coming in” strategy aimed at increasing China’s soft power.</p>
<p>China has been seeking new ways of pushing its media content globally. It still doesn’t have landing rights in many countries, especially the much-coveted Western countries. As a result, Chinese state media have experimented with diverse, highly pragmatic ways of making inroads into foreign mainstream media institutions. </p>
<p>The ABC deal is part of this approach. The deal will allow China to sell its own media content to the ABC and other media groups.</p>
<p>A few years ago, ABC and SMG signed a deal to broadcast an hour of each other’s content for a week. For the third year, ABC had a week on Shanghai TV this March during Prime Minister Tony Abbot’s visit, featuring mainly culture, travel and documentary programs.</p>
<p>SMG will have its turn in Australia in September. China sees this as a good vehicle to carry its media content to various parts of the world.</p>
<h2>Not exclusive</h2>
<p>But Australia is not the only country SMG has invited to come in. A month ago, the Shanghai Media Group signed a multi-year agreement with Walt Disney to co-develop Disney-branded movies with Chinese elements. </p>
<p>Sharing budget and resource strictly 50/50, the partnership is described in the Chinese media as an equitable “marriage” between SMG and Walt Disney Studios. If this is the case, Australia is but one of the partners in SMG’s polygamous operation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46766/original/cbwqzbdt-1398130977.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The state-owned CCTV is positioning itself for soft diplomacy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JWalsh/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Nor should the deal be read as a triumph of democracy over communism, or as a sign that Chinese media are becoming more liberal. There is no indication that China will let its partners dictate the terms and conditions of collaboration, what type of content local broadcasters will use and on what platforms the content will be made available.</p>
<p>To be sure, more than CCTV, SMG is positioning itself as a more effective instrument of China’s soft power diplomacy, and is encouraged by the government to be at the forefront of the “going out and coming in” initiative. At the same time, SMG has affirmed its commitment to reduce “frivolous” entertainment programs and boost politically sound and serious news content. Given this internal political climate, it remains to be seen to what extent Australia’s media content will be taken up by Chinese outlets, or indeed if and how Australian news, especially news that seems critical of China, will be made accessible to the Chinese-speaking public.</p>
<h2>Who really wins?</h2>
<p>Despite the fact that partnerships such as this are considered to be win-win arrangements, China can be expected to do its own cost-benefit analysis. And there is little evidence to suggest deals such as this will lead to a more open and free news media environment. </p>
<p>In more than one way, it was a coup for a news and current affairs program such as Q&A to broadcast <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s3962636.htm">live from Shanghai</a>. That said, China seems to have gained much more. </p>
<p>First, it was able to show the world and its own people that, contrary to the popular belief about China’s lack of press freedom, China is open, cosmopolitan and willing to engage with global media. This is China’s most important impression-management objective. </p>
<p>Second, there was little risk of the Chinese audience seeing the Chinese government placed in a bad light. While broadcast live to the Australian audience, the show was not live to the Chinese audience except those in the studio. And it was scheduled to be on the English-language channel of Shanghai TV, a channel mostly watched by English-speaking expatriates and Chinese social elites in Shanghai. To these people, little that was said on the Q&A program was new.</p>
<p>Soft power diplomacy is a funny game. Win-win outcomes are always preferable, but who wins more is a matter of perspective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wanning Sun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ABC International has reasons to be proud of its recent “landmark” deal to provide ABC content in China. The deal, which will see the establishment of an online portal, also seems to make it harder for…Wanning Sun, Professor of Chinese Media and Cultural Studies, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/257602014-04-17T09:40:08Z2014-04-17T09:40:08ZThe ABC in China: Australian soft power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Parker Song</span></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/46669/original/7m32jxg6-1397727031.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Parker Song</span></span>
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<p>The news that the ABC is to establish an ‘online portal’ in China that will allow it to ‘represent and sell media content across China’ has been greeted with understandable enthusiasm by the ABC. </p>
<p>The ABC is, after all, well and truly in the firing line as far as the government’s expenditure review committee is concerned. The new role in China could be a way of improving the ABC’s image as well as the country’s.</p>
<p>Unfortunately for the ABC, however, the Coalition regards it as little more than a sheltered workshop for ageing left wingers, and slashing its budget would suit the government’s ideological agenda and save money too. It’s the proverbial win-win situation if ever there was one.</p>
<p>In this context, the Australia Network had looked extremely vulnerable. Many in the Abbott government were unhappy with the way the ABC was awarded the initial contract, and would have much preferred Sky to have provided this potentially vital expression of Australian ‘soft power’. </p>
<p>Despite a good deal of disagreement about exactly what soft power might be, whether it works, or who has it, it’s attracted a surprising amount of attention. Originally developed by Joseph Nye to explain the fact that America exerts a huge cultural and ideational influence even in among countries and peoples that actively dislike its foreign policies, it seemed to be an idea whose time had come.</p>
<p>It has now become commonplace for countries such as South Korea and even China to be described as having soft power. Indeed, there is a veritable cottage industry – especially among Chinese academics – dedicated to explaining and analysing China’s ability to project a more positive image of itself. </p>
<p>Cynics might argue that taking a less belligerent and unilateral attitude toward territorial disputes might have more impact, but the Chinese government continues to pour money into Confucius Institutes in the belief that this will make a difference.</p>
<p>China also has its own English language channel that is widely available worldwide. CCTV’s experience also has some potentially salutary lessons for Australia. CCTV could best be described as earnest, dull and rather uncritical of Chinese policy in particular. It doesn’t make for compulsive viewing. Sadly, much the same can be said of the ABC’s Australia Network.</p>
<p>While I’m personally thrilled to have the opportunity to watch the Dockers fighting out a low scoring encounter in a wet and blustery Melbourne when I’m travelling, I wonder how many Chinese will feel the same way. What will they make of the almost unbroken diet of sport, soap operas, children’s programs and cooking shows? It might actually be better if they don’t watch them, unless we want to project an image of a low-budget, low-brow, national broadcaster catering for lowest common denominator philistines.</p>
<p>True, there is the news. But with the exception of ‘The World’, it can be parochial and interminable. I don’t watch the Drum and its rather self-absorbed ‘personality’ driven content when I’m in Australia. It’s hard to imagine it being a hit overseas. The reality is that most people I know seem to watch the BBC when travelling, and it’s not hard to see why. </p>
<p>The BBC not only has a hard-won reputation for impartiality, but it has the resources and content to run a dedicated <em>global</em> news service. People watch the BBC news because they know that’s what will be showing, and that the coverage and range of stories will be comprehensive. </p>
<p>Despite the ABC’s apparent superior access to a Chinese audience, it will have a hard job to supplant other content providers if the potential audience can’t be confident of regularly watching something worthwhile.</p>
<p>Clearly the ABC does not have the resources or the network of correspondents that the BBC has. Nevertheless, if the Australia Network is to provide a key window for the rest of the world to get a sense of what this country is about, it needs to think carefully about the material it broadcasts. </p>
<p>The target audience cannot be the handful of people like me who happen to be overseas and like watching the footy. Perhaps Aussie Rules will eventually become the world game that we all think it should be, but in the meantime it might be better to give some thought to the preferences of the potential audience. No doubt many in China will be riveted by Bananas in Pajamas, but if the Australian government is serious about exerting some influence in China and elsewhere, it ought to be putting more money into the effort, not less.</p>
<p>Soft power is difficult to measure and utilise. But if the Australian government is serious about projecting a more positive image of this country and possibly influencing the way other countries not only think about us but – even more importantly in the long run, perhaps – themselves, then it ought to put its money where its mouth is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The news that the ABC is to establish an ‘online portal’ in China that will allow it to ‘represent and sell media content across China’ has been greeted with understandable enthusiasm by the ABC. The ABC…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/248662014-04-10T10:36:31Z2014-04-10T10:36:31ZChinese media coverage of MH370 playing catch-up with diplomatic ambition<p>Chinese media coverage of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-mh370-confirmed-lost-experts-respond-24752">missing flight MH370</a> is acting as a proxy for the country’s positioning as a rising diplomatic power with expansionary ambition in the Asian-Pacific. </p>
<p>Since the flight was announced as lost in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese media have laid the blame on the Malaysian authorities. The <a href="http://m.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/mh370-minister-says-chinese-press-fueled-anger-towards-malaysia">home minister of Malaysia</a> said it was the Chinese language papers and print media’s coverage of the crisis that led to massive criticism and anger from Chinese relatives against Malaysia.</p>
<p>Another Malaysian politician, <a href="http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/bung-mokhtar-censor-internet-to-calm-chinese-anger-on-mh370">Datuk Bung Mokhtar Radin even suggested</a> the Malaysian government must restrict information on the internet to calm down the Chinese.</p>
<p>China’s contribution to the complex search for the missing plane has been confirmed by the fact that it was a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/05/mh370-chinese-patrol-ship-detects-pulse-signal">Chinese ship</a> that picked up a quasi signal that might be consistent with the plane’s black box. This information has been heavily reported by Chinese mainstream media and reposted by millions on Chinese social media like <a href="http://s.weibo.com/weibo/%25E9%25BB%2591%25E5%258C%25A3%25E5%25AD%2590?topnav=1&wvr=5&Refer=top_hot">microblog</a> and Wechat. </p>
<p>After Malaysia’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/mh370-malaysia-police-chief-missing-malaysia-airlines-plane-mystery">police chief warned on 2 April </a> that the plane mystery may never be solved, Chinese state media CCTV <a href="http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-04-02/125829848902.shtml?sinatracker=weibo_onebox_weiboztdatahz_news">broadcast the phone</a> dialogue between Chinese premier Li Keqiang and Australian prime minister Tony Abbott. </p>
<p>Xinhua and People’s Daily have also continuously provided up-to-date reports to emphasise the governments efforts, but emphasising tolerance. “The national emotion release needs to be rationally expressed,” wrote the <a href="http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0403/c1003-24811468.html">People’s Daily on 3 April </a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, the market-oriented newspapers in China, as opposed to those that are state-owned, have urged truth and transparency on MH370 via their front pages. Chinese audiences, especially social media users, have expressed mistrust and impatience against the “confused and contradictory statements” from the Malaysian authorities – insisting that a statement of “ending” without finding the plane itself is nothing but suspense. Even the official microblogs of CCTV and People’s Daily online have appealed for the evidence and truth about the vanished flight to come out.</p>
<h2>Flexing muscles</h2>
<p>The continuous coverage by Chinese media is not only driven by the aims of news outlets to report the truth, but also encouraged by the rescue actions of the Chinese government. Compared with the “cold treatment” of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11055015">Manila hostage crisis</a> that occurred in the Philippines in 2010, the role the Chinese government has played this time is more appreciated by its people. </p>
<p>In the Manila hostage crisis, the Philippine officials’ poor handling of the situation was investigated as the cause of the deaths of eight Hong Kong-Chinese hostages. While the Hong Kong Government issued a “black” travel alert for the Philippines as a result of the unresolved affair, the Chinese government was accused of dereliction of duty as they only put out a muted response, which was criticised in the Chinese media as “weak state diplomacy”. </p>
<p>This time, the demands from the Chinese media for the Malaysian government to release accurate information are relatively confident and powerful. China’s military power has been one of the main focuses of the country’s media since the Chinese Coast Guard 3411 ship was sent to the South China Sea to look for the missing plane. </p>
<p>The search operation for MH370 is the first time China has joined a multinational military search and rescue in foreign waters. This has been <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1651428902/ACVANp4op">warmly greeted</a> by the Chinese population who are impressed at their country’s improving national defence capability and China’s growing international status as a rising power that values its people’s lives. </p>
<p>After the reported data brought by 21 Chinese satellites and more than ten aircrafts and ships, <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1726918143/ACXUAqasF">many netizens’ posts and comments</a> have shown a strong sense of national pride reflecting a shift from the humble mentality of a weak nation to the dignified attitude of a world power.</p>
<h2>Very soft power</h2>
<p>But the soft power exercised by Chinese media outlets has been rather weak if we carefully analyse their performance on reporting MH370. The first Chinese media coverage of the missing aircraft was translated from CNN. In the following days, nearly all the updated online information by Chinese media has been from mainstream Western news agencies, like BBC, CNN, and Reuters. </p>
<p>The reports by Chinese media have been relatively mediocre in quality and hysterical in tone, betraying a lack of resources for foreign stories and inexperience in competing with international media organisations. </p>
<p>What’s more, as Facebook and Twitter are blocked in China, the social media users in China have had to rely on the native Chinese news outlets to obtain convincing information, which makes the whole discussion on MH370 more chaotic and less efficient. For example, <a href="http://www.weibo.com/1087770692/ACB8qp8xp?mod=weibotime">the angry slogan</a> on Chinese media by celebrities calling for boycotts against Malaysia reflects the sentimentality and immaturity of many Chinese netizens.</p>
<p>From Chinese media coverage on MH370, it appears that China’s diplomatic approach has shifted from: “hide our capabilities and bide our time” to “show up”. </p>
<p>However, the competitiveness embodied by this diplomatic shift hasn’t been matched by the Chinese media which has failed to meet the information demands of audiences in China. Both China’s media and its audiences still need a lot of development before they can reflect the rationality and dignity expected in a world power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dianjing Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese media coverage of the missing flight MH370 is acting as a proxy for the country’s positioning as a rising diplomatic power with expansionary ambition in the Asian-Pacific. Since the flight was…Dianjing Li, PHD student in CAMRI, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/203922013-11-19T14:20:34Z2013-11-19T14:20:34ZThird Plenum sets out tentative program for change in China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/35597/original/hrfvmrg8-1384857682.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Out and about: Xi Jinping deploying soft power on a trip to Ireland.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Chinese leadership transition last year, with Hu Jintao handing over to Xi Jinping, finally laid to rest Deng Xiaoping’s long-running maxim that China should “keep a low profile and hide its brightness”. </p>
<p>Evidence to that effect was on full display, for example, in Trinidad and Tobago in June this year, when Xi and the first lady, Peng Liyuan, touched down in the small, oil-rich islands for a state visit. As they strode down the gangway, they seemed somehow ostentatious, Peng’s turquoise attire matching Xi’s tie. Such a look would have been less remarkable had this been any other first couple. </p>
<p>Until now, perhaps due to the memory of Mao Zedong’s feared spouse Jiang Qing, Chinese first ladies have shunned the limelight – and by comparison to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi’s performance on the world stage is remarkably outgoing.</p>
<p>His extrovert manner is increasingly of a piece with foreign policy, as China leverages its influence in parts of the world where it had previously operated more tentatively. The country’s soft power is being felt more widely than ever, as are the knock-on effects of its domestic economic reforms. </p>
<p>Yet despite this outgoing appearance, we still know very little about the aspirations that guide the new leadership of the party; and we still have to glean what clues we can from official announcements – hence the importance of the Third Plenum’s communiqué.</p>
<h2>Nothing to get excited about?</h2>
<p>This announcement had been hotly anticipated for some months. There had been <a href="http://wbponline.com/Articles/View/21846/third-plenum-expected-to-change-china-s-face-like-never-before">speculation</a> that Xi’s sure-footedness at the helm, combined with the reformist credentials of his premier Li Keqiang, would allow the party to take sweeping measures to alleviate social inequalities and break down oligopolies. There were also hopes that Xi and Li would streamline China’s often contradictory foreign policy and better manage the country’s maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam.</p>
<p>The climate of expectation meant that the Third Plenum, which convened just over a week ago, was expected at the very least to set out a bold agenda primarily for domestic change – even if few commentators truly expected it to spell out a coherent vision of China as an emerging superpower. The anticipation of groundbreaking decisions had been building for months, riding a wave of upbeat coverage in China’s state-controlled media. Independent analysts, for their part, argued that Xi would seem hopelessly out-of-touch if he were to under-deliver. </p>
<p>But despite predictions of a “promising” or “unprecedented” announcement, the Third Plenum communiqué has instead been received mostly with <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303460004579193813366832736">disappointment</a> both at home and abroad. Specific measures are usually publicly announced only in the several weeks following plenary party conclaves, and the communiqué itself is sufficiently vague to allow for imminent surprises – but still, there is no truly surprising or dramatic news. </p>
<p>In the absence of major stories, what has subsequently hit the headlines in China is not empowerment for the private sector or better protection for individual property rights, but instead the establishment of a national security council – whose mandate and purpose are far from clear.</p>
<h2>‘Feeling the stones’</h2>
<p>Yet this vagueness and hint-dropping is nothing new. The communiqué’s approach follows exactly the sort of cautious reform rationale that has defined much of the past 30 years in China: policy making by trial and error. </p>
<p>The party’s approach to governing has long been an incremental one, known as “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. Communiqués like the recent one use opaque party jargon to conceal innovations that actually emerge on the ground over the course of a few years, while they are tried, tested and allowed to bed in.</p>
<p>In this spirit, the communiqué hedges considerably about how things will proceed. For example, it sets out to “straighten out the relationship between government and the market” by allowing the market to play a decisive role in allocating resources, whilst at the same time ensuring the party continues to command “all quarters” – hardly a bold statement for change.</p>
<p>More notably, the communiqué pays homage to the “achievements” of the Mao Zedong era at quite great length. Though hardly a surprise in view of Xi’s <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1282772/xi-jinping-turns-mao-zedongs-thoughts-his-efforts-counter-corruption">rhetoric</a> in recent months, this homage to Mao is somewhat absurd. It not only defies the plurality of opinion and extensive programme of research into the complexities of the Mao era, both in China and in the West; it also sits very uncomfortably with what we know of Xi’s personal journey. </p>
<p>Xi, like the other princelings who now run the country, may have experienced a privileged early childhood in the Mao era, but many of his generation’s parents suffered brutal torment at the hands of the state. Yet the party’s nostalgic praise for Mao’s rustic mindset, issued even as rapid urbanisation is transforming China beyond recognition, betrays an ambivalence about the legacy of the reform era.</p>
<h2>China dreaming</h2>
<p>Against the backdrop of sluggish economic growth in the West and the failure of the Arab Spring, the conflation of the reform era with Mao’s legacy has become central to the CCP’s account of China’s relative success and international uniqueness. Running the last 60-odd years together into a coherent history has popular appeal at home, and might confer some patriotic legitimacy on the party in the intermediate term – but it certainly will not endear Xi’s “China Dream” to the developed world.</p>
<p>There is, as has been reported, an upside. The communiqué does hint (albeit broadly) at the gradual phasing out of some of the rigours of the one-child policy, and of “re-education” camps. The Plenum’s full decision hints at other changes besides, concerning judicial, rural-land and household-registration reform – measures that could (and should) make life a little easier for China’s millions of disenfranchised migrant workers, provided they are actually implemented. </p>
<p>State-owned enterprises may similarly be forced to transfer stock to external stake-holders in a bid to make them more accountable and have them pay back the central government their fair share in tax. The idea here is to level the economic playing field, so that less politically-connected private-sector businesses can compete more effectively in the marketplace and more easily protect their intellectual property rights.</p>
<p>But in the absence of specifics, we can only hope that these measures will be fleshed out and followed through before too long – and assess them on the merits of what actually happens, not what is tentatively announced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese leadership transition last year, with Hu Jintao handing over to Xi Jinping, finally laid to rest Deng Xiaoping’s long-running maxim that China should “keep a low profile and hide its brightness…Niv Horesh, Associate Professor and Reader in Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/187282013-11-07T04:01:55Z2013-11-07T04:01:55ZTo block or not to block: do Chinese audiences actually want access to foreign media?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/32474/original/qp38z5z5-1380864421.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Western media often falsely assume Chinese locals are desperate for news from foreign outlets</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>International reporting on China is dominated by stories of the Chinese government’s propensity to block access to a number of foreign online media outlets, search engines and social media forums. </p>
<p>There are two untested assumptions in these stories. Firstly, that Chinese people are desperate for news and views from outside China. Secondly, that many Chinese would automatically identify with the views expressed in the international media.</p>
<h2>Foreign reporting and the Chinese government</h2>
<p>Stories like this are bad news for the Chinese government, given that in recent years it has been pulling out all stops to spruce up its international image as an open and transparent society. Nowadays soft power, public diplomacy and Chinese media ‘going out’ are not just policy buzz words, but also translate into concrete political projects costing billions of dollars.</p>
<p>Ironically, however, while stories of media censorship are clearly to China’s disadvantage, the decision to block or restrict access to certain foreign media may actually be driven more by paranoia than by an accurate understanding of the consequences of doing otherwise. If so, is such paranoia really warranted? And is the risky trade-off it involves – maintaining stability domestically but getting bad press overseas – ultimately profitable politically? </p>
<p>What would happen, for example, if domestic audiences in China were allowed to use YouTube, Twitter and Facebook? While the thought may fill the authorities with dread, there is in fact not much evidence to suggest that things would be drastically different from now – apart from the obvious spectacular reconfiguration of these services that the potentially vast Chinese market would likely require. </p>
<p>As a matter of fact, it has been reported recently that Facebook, Twitter and various other ‘sensitive’ sites will soon be accessible within the Free Trade Zone of Shanghai in order to make foreigners ‘feel at home’.</p>
<h2>Are the locals really missing out?</h2>
<p>While a small percentage of individuals may feel restricted by not having access to these sites, most Chinese locals seem to feel little desire to be exposed to Western information media.</p>
<p>There are a number of reasons why this could be the case. To start, China has developed a profusion of its own media forms, content and practices. These cater to a very wide diversity of audiences, are available across the same range of technological platforms as Western media, and provide a similar volume of choices as media-heavy societies in the West. </p>
<p>Indeed, under the regulatory eye of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, diversity of content is not only desirable but is also – and more importantly – an essential tool in the state’s pursuit of social stability and political legitimacy. A natural consequence of the media fulfilling these multiple roles is that, in most cases, there is something for everyone.</p>
<p>Of course, an important caveat to this diversity argument is that diversity of all kinds is encouraged only so long as it does not challenge the legitimacy of the Party. While ordinary people’s desire to access independent and alternative information is undeniable, particularly when the corruption of senior Chinese political figures is involved, the reality is that the majority of Chinese people seem to feel no urgent need to access political content from foreign sources. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/32476/original/p3j6myfr-1380864621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Chinese have access to their own social networking sites, such as Twitter equivalent, Weibo</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">κύριαsity via Flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like their Western counterparts, they freely use social media to access and share information on matters that are close to their everyday lives – where to eat, what to buy, the latest gossip. </p>
<p>But for these purposes, China’s own leading social networking sites such as renren and douban are more useful than Facebook; Weibo works just as well as Twitter, and the Chinese are more likely to find the videos they want from youku and tudou than from YouTube.</p>
<p>This does not mean that the Chinese lack democratic aspirations, nor that they are parochial in their view of the world. It simply means that people spend more time addressing everyday issues, needs and desires than they spend questioning the fundamentals of the political system they happen to live in. </p>
<p>In this respect, the Chinese are not too different from people anywhere else. So it should not be surprising that they pay more attention to television shows advising how to avoid unsafe food, than they do to issues impinging on China’s prospects for democracy.</p>
<h2>A natural and healthy curiosity</h2>
<p>Finally, it is important to point out that when there is censorship in domestic news (SARS, Wenzhou train crash, etc.), audiences in China are naturally interested in what the foreign media has to say. But it is somewhat naïve to assume that the Chinese are at always at odds with their own government. As China watchers such as Linda Jacobson have observed, although Chinese audiences have a healthy scepticism towards propaganda on domestic issues, they are usually happy to accept the authorities’ interpretations of international affairs. </p>
<p>Additionally, it must be remembered that decades of nationalist education have borne spectacular results. On a wide range of issues, especially those involving China’s sovereignty and territorial issues, domestic audiences’ nationalist sentiments often trump their desire to read dispassionate and disinterested reporting in the foreign media – imagining, for a moment, that such things exist.</p>
<p>To be sure, for both individuals and society as a whole, restricting citizens’ access to information and limiting their freedom of speech and expression has serious and far-reaching implications, no matter where it happens. Just ask Bradley Manning and Julian Assange. One must never lose sight of this important point. </p>
<p>But this should not obscure the great discrepancy between how Chinese people actually relate to foreign media in real life, and how they are imagined to relate to foreign media – both by foreigners, and by the Chinese authorities themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wanning Sun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International reporting on China is dominated by stories of the Chinese government’s propensity to block access to a number of foreign online media outlets, search engines and social media forums. There…Wanning Sun, Professor of Chinese Media and Cultural Studies, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.