tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/civil-society-organisations-13390/articlescivil society organisations – The Conversation2023-12-04T15:04:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178692023-12-04T15:04:09Z2023-12-04T15:04:09ZGetting climate funds to conflict zones – a case for working with armed groups and local communities<p>Conflict-ridden and fragile countries are among the most vulnerable to climate change and least prepared to deal with it. They are largely excluded from climate adaptation programmes and funding. </p>
<p>This is partly because funding is channelled through national governments, which might not be able to work in areas affected by conflict or beyond their control.</p>
<p>Civilians and armed groups alike are increasingly concerned about climate change. The international community, however, is doing little to address its impact in these vulnerable areas. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://gain.nd.edu/">Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative</a> has identified 25 countries as most vulnerable to climate change and least prepared to adapt to its impact. Of these, 15 have been hit hard by conflict. This list includes Somalia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>By their nature, conflict-ridden areas have weak or no government structures. The current approach to climate adaptation does not include non-state actors and local communities, who might work more effectively in these areas. </p>
<p>With the COP28 climate meeting in Dubai, the issue of climate change adaptation in conflict areas has been in the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2023/11/13/exclusive-cop28-declaration-climate-funding-and-conflict">news</a>. A draft declaration by the COP presidency calls for immediate action and urgent funding for these vulnerable communities. The text is not legally binding, but it goes further than any previous COP statements on climate impacts in conflict areas.</p>
<p>I have spent over a decade researching conflict and insurgency. Working with colleagues from the <a href="https://odi.org/en/">Overseas Development Institute</a> and the <a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/">Geneva Graduate Instiute</a>, I’ve investigated the failure of multilateral institutions to include conflict areas in their climate adaptation programmes. </p>
<p>We <a href="https://www.armedgroupscentre.org/reports-and-articles/climate-adaptation-in-no-mans-land">reviewed</a> existing literature on this. We identified gaps in climate adaptation efforts and funding mechanisms that would work in conflict areas. We argue for working with local communities and civil society as well as engaging non-state armed groups. </p>
<h2>The conflict-climate gap</h2>
<p>Conflict-affected countries receive <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/fair-share-of-climate-finance">significantly less</a> climate adaptation funding. They get about one-third of the per capita climate financing compared to conflict-free countries. Adaptation programming and financing mechanisms are not designed for areas experiencing conflict or those beyond state control.</p>
<p>In some areas, non-state armed groups have stepped into the gap. In Myanmar, the <a href="https://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th/publications/conflict-complexity-climate-change/">Karen National Union operates</a> its own departments focusing on land, forestry and wildlife conservation. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has incorporated environmental protection clauses into its internal <a href="https://ceobs.org/environmental-protection-and-non-state-armed-groups-setting-a-place-at-the-table-for-the-elephant-in-the-room/">codes of conduct</a>. And in Somalia, Al Shabaab has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/08/somalia-deforestation-charcoal-farmers-logging-al-shabaab">imposed fines</a> for cutting down trees and even banned plastic bags. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, such as in the Sahel, armed groups exploit the environmental drivers of conflict in <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/sipriinsight2203_ccr_west_africa_0.pdf">propaganda and recruitment</a>. </p>
<p>Armed groups take up the mantle of environmental protection for a complicated mixture of reasons. (They may also contribute to ecological destruction.) For most, it enhances their legitimacy with local populations, who are desperate for relief from the impact of climate change. </p>
<p>Where this is the case, it may present an opening for climate adaptation interventions. Armed groups control significant territories — often rich in natural resources. Their participation can be critical in taking wide-scale climate actions. We also <a href="https://www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2019/11/18/international-law-talk-by-non-state-armed-groups/">know</a> that armed groups seeking statehood or other forms of legitimacy are often willing to comply with international norms to gain positive recognition.</p>
<p>In short, there is untapped potential to save lives and mitigate the impact of climate change in areas under armed group control. </p>
<p>Our research suggests that this engagement can help build peace and reduce violence. Climate change is often <a href="https://climateandsecurity.org/2023/01/briefer-climate-change-as-a-threat-multiplier-history-uses-and-future-of-the-concept/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThreat%20multiplier%E2%80%9D%20has%20become%20a,realm%20and%20climate%2Dsecurity%20literature">portrayed</a> as driving conflict or as a “threat multiplier” with impacts ranging from <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/human-security#:%7E:text=Climate%20change%20is%20often%20called,most%20politically%20and%20economically%20fragile.">resource scarcity</a> to <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/61542ee0a87a394f7bc17b3a/t/61b8e67b32b0eb4c0fbb89a5/1639507580316/working-Paper-9-climate-change-threat-multiplier.pdf#page=11">displacement of people</a>. But engagement with armed actors on the environment and climate change can also serve as a building block for peace. </p>
<p>This is especially true in countries like <a href="https://www.peaceagency.org/colombian-environmental-peacebuilding-process/">Colombia</a>, where environmental factors <a href="https://www.peaceagency.org/colombian-environmental-peacebuilding-process/">contributed</a> to the conflict. Environmental and resource issues are an often neglected aspect of preparing for peace talks. </p>
<p>Climate work in areas beyond state control is fraught with ethical, legal and practical dilemmas. For instance, certain <a href="https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/NP_79_crc_string_FINAL.pdf">laws</a> that prohibit material support to designated terrorist groups can obstruct or complicate aid efforts. </p>
<p>There is always a risk that armed groups may just <a href="https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/16583/files/SSRN-id1569636..pdf">pay</a> lip service to these norms, or that engaging with them could inadvertently further empower or legitimise them. Additionally, unlike government counterparts, armed groups and communities in these areas may lack the technical capacity to understand the ecological complexities involved in climate adaptation.</p>
<h2>Addressing climate impacts beyond state control</h2>
<p>These risks must be navigated carefully. But the urgent need for adaptation outweighs the potential drawbacks. </p>
<p>Climate adaptation actors do not need to engage directly with armed actors. Customary authorities, humanitarians and local peace builders can be intermediaries, ensuring interventions are appropriate and accepted by all. </p>
<p>Climate adaptation in conflict areas requires a different approach. At a minimum, it requires going beyond national governments, and directly engaging with conflict-affected communities. It also, to some extent, means devolving decision-making to communities themselves. </p>
<p>An urgent priority should be increasing climate financing for conflict regions. COP28’s belated interest in conflict affected areas is welcome, but it doesn’t go nearly far enough. This recognition must be followed by concrete policy and funding shifts tailored to the challenges of working in conflict areas and areas beyond state control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashley Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Funding climate adaptation in conflict areas may require engaging local communities and armed groups where national governments are absent.Ashley Jackson, Research Associate, Overseas Development Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052362023-05-10T09:37:47Z2023-05-10T09:37:47ZSudan’s people toppled a dictator – despite the war they’re still working to bring about democratic change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524896/original/file-20230508-251777-o6xtme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Civilians protest in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, in December 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan’s generals</a> have unleashed indiscriminate destruction and occupation on wide swaths of the capital, Khartoum, neighbourhood resistance committees and pro-democracy activists have stepped up to respond to the needs of citizens. </p>
<p>They have risked their lives to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/05/world/africa/sudan-fighting-evacuations-rescue.html">drive people to safety</a> or to working hospitals. They have maintained up-to-the-minute information on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/22/sudan-resistance-activists-mobilise-as-crisis-escalates">where medicine can be found</a> or which roads are safe. </p>
<p>These actions have solidified this decentralised network of youth and civil society groups as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/22/sudan-resistance-activists-mobilise-as-crisis-escalates">most trusted and legitimate</a> organisations in Sudan. Resistance committees are part of a <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sudans-unfinished-democracy/">diverse collection of Sudanese pro-democracy groups</a>. These groups include political parties, university students and staff, professional associations and unions, and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>Together, they helped bring down <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/12-defining-moments-in-sudans-12-month-uprising">long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir</a> in April 2019 after months of protests. Women emerged as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/23/sudans-female-protesters-leading-the-pro-democracy-movement">particularly visible and vocal</a> in these protests, stepping forward after years of being arbitrarily targeted by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/19/sudan-community-squad-morality-policing-fears">Bashir’s morality police</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan’s hopes for democratic change were dashed, however, when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211025-abdel-fattah-al-burhan-the-general-who-leads-sudan">led a coup</a> in October 2021 against the transitional government. </p>
<p>Resistance committees <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59045020">led marches</a> against the military takeover. Their insistence on non-violence maintains their status as citizens and civilians. They are not insurgents, combatants or the enemy.</p>
<p>I have spent nearly two decades <a href="https://elliott.gwu.edu/linda-bishai-0">researching</a> the role of Sudan’s civil society organisations in managing conflict. I have also studied the rise of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228">resistance committees</a> and what keeps them going in the face of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/28/sudan-hundreds-protesters-detained-mistreated">vicious repression</a> by Sudanese security forces. </p>
<p>In my view, these groups’ <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228">consistency of action and messaging</a> has given them a form of political power that Sudan’s traditional elites have struggled to attain. Sudan’s resistance committees provide a model for young people in Africa to participate in politics, even without the approval of established structures.</p>
<h2>The growth of a movement</h2>
<p>Sudan’s resistance committees grew out of youth activist groups that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr540372012en.pdf">formed in 2009-2010</a>. The members were largely aged below 40. The groups coalesced around years of anger at <a href="https://theconversation.com/omar-al-bashir-brutalised-sudan-how-his-30-year-legacy-is-playing-out-today-204391">Bashir’s authoritarian regime</a>, its inability to provide basic services and its divisive politics.</p>
<p>They engaged in a range of political activities, including voter registration and awareness raising around the 2010 general elections. The hope was that they could bring down Bashir’s National Congress Party. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/omar-al-bashir-brutalised-sudan-how-his-30-year-legacy-is-playing-out-today-204391">Omar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Bashir’s reelection only made the groups more determined. They continued to operate in local and decentralised ways. For example, they assisted during disasters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/world/africa/as-floods-ravage-sudan-young-volunteers-revive-a-tradition-of-aid.html">such as floods</a> and other emergencies where the government was absent. </p>
<p>In 2012-2013, the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2012/06/sudan-end-crackdown-protesters-and-journalists/">regime hit back hard</a>. It attacked demonstrators, arrested known activists, and tortured and killed youth leaders. This forced a pause in activities as activists lay low. </p>
<p>In the years that followed, many youth leaders began to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/FHPrecursorsSudan11302022.pdf#page=6">study the techniques of non-violent movements</a> in other countries and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228">shared the lessons</a> with their colleagues. In early 2019, when pro-democracy protests began in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/12-defining-moments-in-sudans-12-month-uprising">regions outside Khartoum</a>, many of these leaders and new youth activists joined in. Drawing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/7/in-sudan-neighbourhoods-mobilised-against-al-bashir">structure and cohesion from their home bases</a>, neighbourhood committees became part of the resistance, too. </p>
<p>These groups augmented the coalition of trade unions, political parties and civil society organisations that brought down al-Bashir. </p>
<p>After the October 2021 coup that ousted prime minister <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/3/profile-abdalla-hamdok-sudans-outgoing-civilian-leader">Abdalla Hamdok</a>, resistance committees <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-resistance-committees-take-centre-stage-fight-against-military-rule-2022-02-02/">took centre stage</a> in the fight against a return to military rule. </p>
<p>Alongside other civilian protest groups, they led <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/anti-junta-marches-of-the-millions-continue-across-sudan">relentless street marches</a> and social media campaigns calling for the coup leaders to step down and make way for legitimate civilian leadership. </p>
<p>Despite a violent clampdown by security forces, resistance committees persisted. They maintained a momentum for protest that kept civilians motivated to march right up until the recent war between Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a>. The committees’ campaign slogan of “<a href="https://www.newframe.com/women-and-three-nos-chart-sudans-future/">the three nos</a>” – no negotiation, no partnership, no legitimacy – affirms their resolve to change Sudanese politics. </p>
<h2>The potential for democracy</h2>
<p>In March 2023, resistance committees set out plans to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/khartoum-resistance-committees-to-form-local-legislative-councils">form a parallel government</a>. This was to be done through local legislative councils based on collectively negotiated charters written and approved by two main clusters of committees. </p>
<p>These local councils didn’t take root, but if they had, they would have represented a serious challenge to the two generals’ claims to the sovereignty of Sudan. While Sudan has <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">collapsed into war</a> and appears to be further than ever from a democratic transition, it would be wrong to disregard the potential of resistance committees to bring change. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan crisis explained: What's behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation's troubled past</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>They continue to act collectively and provide for citizen needs.</p>
<p>During the course of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228?journalCode=fnas20">my research</a> between June 2022 and March 2023, resistance committee leaders explained to me that their commitment stems from a belief that their generation is the one to carry the burden of standing for change. Therefore, they would rather risk paying the ultimate price than stand by and watch their country be looted. </p>
<p>In continuing to provide public safety and services at the local level, resistance committees are actively performing legitimate citizen-centred leadership. </p>
<p>And the lesson for Africa’s youth from Sudan is that when it comes to providing leadership at the local level, they don’t need permission from absent government structures. They can provide civilian-led, citizen-centred governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Linda Bishai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sudan’s civilian protesters have gained a form of political power that traditional elites have struggled to attain.Linda Bishai, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687812021-10-07T14:48:33Z2021-10-07T14:48:33ZCivil society groups can help fix South Africa’s food system if they’re given a seat at the table<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423339/original/file-20210927-27-147r0ma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Food insecurity is a daily reality for millions of South Africans. Community organisations can help.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dino Lloyd/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is a long list of existing global crises made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic, including <a href="https://nicspaull.com/2020/09/30/the-lost-decade-my-fm-article-on-nids-cram-w2/">poverty</a> and inequality. Another is food insecurity.</p>
<p>In South Africa, <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/13.-Van-der-Berg-S.-Patel-L-and-Bridgeman-G.-2021-Food-insecurity-in-South-Africa-%E2%80%93-Evidence-from-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-5.pdf">researchers found that</a>, more than a year into the pandemic, food insecurity was still well above pre-pandemic levels. Simply put, this means more people than before do not have reliable access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food. The figure was already high before COVID-19: <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12135">almost 20%</a> of South African households had inadequate or severely inadequate access to food. In some of Cape Town’s poorer neighbourhoods the figure was <a href="https://hungrycities.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/HCP12.pdf">as high as 54%</a>.</p>
<p>But the pandemic hasn’t just shed light on existing problems. It has also identified those who might help to tackle these problems in the longer term: civil society organisations. In South Africa, these groups did a heroic job during the initial COVID-19 crisis, providing <a href="http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/cssr/pub/wp/455">millions of meals</a> for people in need. In the Western Cape province, for example, organisations provided <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MMCfzruoCFjcQdHSMsv88eH3nHPWsueg/view?usp=sharing">more than half</a> of the food aid distributed in the first few months of the lockdown, reaching <a href="https://wcedp.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Western-Cape-NGO-Government-Food-Relief-Forum-Report-October-2020.pdf">5.2 million people</a>. </p>
<p>Without these organisations there would have been a much larger humanitarian crisis. And their work is ongoing as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-faces-mass-hunger-if-efforts-to-offset-impact-of-covid-19-are-eased-143143">need for emergency food aid</a> continues. That’s because they didn’t just respond to the effects of the global pandemic: they also dealt with the fundamental inequalities of a food system <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2016.1259223">designed</a> to make profits for large corporate retailers and food processing companies rather than to provide safe and nutritious food for the majority of people. </p>
<p>And, as we argue in our <a href="https://foodsecurity.ac.za/publications/engaging-civil-society-organisations-in-food-security-governance-in-the-western-cape-reflections-from-emergency-food-relief-during-covid/">recently published study</a>, these organisations should be drawn more formally into food governance. </p>
<p>There are three main reasons for our argument. First, South African civil society organisations have shown <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-07-27-children-will-not-go-hungry-any-more/">they’re willing and able</a> to hold the government to account. Second, they’re ideally placed to contribute their fine-grained local knowledge. They intimately understand the specific needs of the most vulnerable in their communities. Third, given their role in communities, they can play a huge role in education and information sharing about the food system and nutrition as well as performing agricultural and nutritional training.</p>
<h2>Our research</h2>
<p><a href="https://foodsecurity.ac.za/publications/engaging-civil-society-organisations-in-food-security-governance-in-the-western-cape-reflections-from-emergency-food-relief-during-covid/">Our research</a> sought to understand the new civil society organisation landscape in relation to food security in response to the COVID-19 crisis. We examined the relationship between these organisations and government bodies. We also identified how organisations can be supported to engage in food governance after the COVID-19 crisis has passed.</p>
<p>The research showed that civil society organisations relied heavily on their existing networks and relationships with communities when looking to distribute food. These relationships helped them identify vulnerable people who might otherwise have slipped through the cracks and gone hungry.</p>
<p>Partnership was key. We found that larger organisations often helped to channel resources to smaller, more informal community-based organisations.</p>
<p>But this collaboration largely didn’t extend to civil society organisations’ relationships with government departments. In general, these organisations found working with the government difficult. This came down to a mismatch between the government’s culture of rigid compliance and box ticking and the realities organisations were seeing on the ground. There were a few bright spots: some organisations developed valuable relationships with individuals in the provincial government. </p>
<p>It is clear from our research that civil society organisations already play a vital, varied role in South African society and governance. But it’s important that they be seen as more than service delivery mechanisms. This will allow them to play a bigger role in shaping a better food system. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-should-learn-from-brazil-about-how-to-tackle-hidden-hunger-118613">South Africa should learn from Brazil about how to tackle 'hidden hunger'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There’s international precedent for this approach. In the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte, civil society organisations <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-should-learn-from-brazil-about-how-to-tackle-hidden-hunger-118613">worked closely</a> with government departments to design and implement programmes that lessened hunger.</p>
<p>In the same way, South African civil society organisations need to be given a seat at the decision-making table and empowered to help drive long-term change.</p>
<h2>Setting up systems for collaboration</h2>
<p>There are a few ways this can be achieved. South Africa’s 2017 National Food and Nutrition Security Plan stipulated that a Food and Nutrition Security Council must be created. This process must be accelerated and civil society representatives must be among the members. Similar councils could be set up at both provincial and local government level.</p>
<p>It is also critical that short-term solutions such as emergency feeding be linked with long-term change of the system. This can be achieved by helping stakeholders in the food system – like government officials – “see” and understand the system as a whole. <a href="https://www.agroecologynow.com/community-kitchens-cape-town/">Community kitchens</a> are a valuable way to do this. They bring people together not just to grow, cook and share food, but also to deliberate on how to solve food insecurity as well as recognise how it is <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/issues-in-focus/2017.html">shaped by other forms of inequality</a>. </p>
<p>Civil society organisations must also be connected to the debates that help shape decisions and policies about food and policies that affect food.</p>
<p>Crucially, they should be allowed to operate in an enabling environment. They shouldn’t be controlled through heavy handed regulation or stifled by red tape. There are well-established <a href="https://www.gov.za/red-tape-reduction-unit-resolves-90-queries">government programmes</a> for reducing red tape or increasing the ease of doing business, aimed at the private sector. Similar initiatives would benefit civil society organisations.</p>
<p>There have been <a href="https://wcedp.co.za/western-cape-food-forum-evolves/">examples</a> of effective collaboration between civil society organisations and local and provincial government during the crisis to deliver food aid. This collaborative approach needs to be built on so that it becomes a lasting legacy of the crisis.</p>
<p>But building partnerships and enabling environments takes time and resources. COVID-19 has shown the government needs to invest in developing and strengthening relationships outside times of crisis that it can call upon in times of need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camilla Adelle receives funding from the DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Food Security. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashley Haywood receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>These organisations are ideally placed to contribute their fine-grained local knowledge. They intimately understand the specific needs of the most vulnerable in their communities.Camilla Adelle, Research Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaAshley Haywood, PhD candidate in the School of Government, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1332032020-05-28T14:41:43Z2020-05-28T14:41:43ZSocial ties, not politicians, may drive political participation on Instagram<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338227/original/file-20200528-51471-1qwsnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C40%2C1917%2C1172&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Instagram users may be more influenced politically by their social connections on the platform than they are by political accounts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Dean Moriarty, Pixabay)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Politicians of all stripes use <a href="https://www.martenscentre.eu/publications/political-marketing-use-of-social-media">social media</a> to share their party platforms and connect with voters, including during the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>More than ever, they use video and image-driven platforms, especially <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/737d2428-2fdf-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8">Instagram</a>. </p>
<p>Many major Canadian federal political parties and leaders have <a href="https://www.narcity.com/news/ca/federal-party-leaders-social-media-followings-differ-greatly">large followings</a> on Instagram, and younger voters especially are <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/">regular and active users</a>. Political information related to COVID-19 is regularly shared on the platform by Canadian <a href="https://www.instagram.com/justinpjtrudeau/?hl=en">political</a> and <a href="https://www.instagram.com/andrewjscheer/?hl=en">opposition</a> leaders. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/B34qY1ug91U","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>The number of Instagram users has also increased rapidly in recent years. In February, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/">Statista reported</a> that Instagram had a billion monthly active accounts, up from <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/253577/number-of-monthly-active-instagram-users/">200 million users in March 2014.</a> </p>
<p>Until recently, much attention <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/09/the-man-behind-trumps-facebook-juggernaut">from the media</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23333-3_3">academic researchers</a> has focused on how politicians and citizens use Facebook and Twitter for political engagement. Less coverage and work has examined how voters use Instagram to engage with political information, especially in Canada. </p>
<h2>Users interact with people they know</h2>
<p>A number of Canadian voters sought political information about the 2019 federal election on Instagram. This included posting related content or liking, sharing or commenting on posts made by political parties. </p>
<p>Recent survey research conducted as part of the <a href="https://www.digitalecosystem.ca/about">Digital Ecosystem Research Challenge</a> shows that respondents who used Instagram to engage with political information during the election were more likely to interact with people they knew on the platform rather than professional accounts designed to foster political participation. The results are seen below:</p>
<iframe title="How respondents engaged with political information related to the 2019 federal election on Instagram" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-hBkM9" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/hBkM9/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="509" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>This is an important finding because it suggests that professional communicators, even with all their expertise and resources, were still less effective than respondents’ friends, family members and acquaintances in driving engagement on the platform. </p>
<p>This point is made more salient when we consider <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699018763307">recent research</a> that highlights the strategies behind political candidates’ use of Instagram and other social media accounts.</p>
<p>Some of this work, for instance, examines the role of <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i4.1062">digital storytelling</a> in candidates’ efforts to project and manage their political images.</p>
<h2>Findings and implications</h2>
<p>The survey includes responses from 208 Canadian citizens 18 years and older. Respondents intended to vote and to access political information related to the election on Instagram. The survey was conducted online in French and English, from Oct. 4-13, 2019. The data collected is not nationally representative, but results give useful initial indicators. </p>
<p>Many respondents, more than three-quarters, used Instagram to engage politically on issues related to the election in one or more ways. Yet these Canadians were more likely to interact with users who they knew offline (27 per cent). They were less likely to engage with content posted by professional accounts, such as political candidates (19 per cent) or non-partisan organizations (10 per cent). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5472%2C3350&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338225/original/file-20200528-51445-16t88o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Instagram users are more influenced politically by their social connections on the platform then they are by political accounts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Piqsels)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In particular, respondents were less likely to interact with content posted by groups, including political parties (13 per cent), news outlets (13 per cent) and non-partisan organizations (10 per cent). Rather than these groups, survey participants more readily engaged with accounts run by or representing a single individual, such as a political candidate (19 per cent) or a journalist or other public figure (21 per cent) — though still not nearly as much as they engaged with people they knew offline.</p>
<p>This research suggests that respondents’ offline relationships drove political engagement on the platform more than professional communicators. It also signals the important role that social ties played in respondents’ communications on Instagram around the election. </p>
<p>These findings have spurred some recommendations for civil society groups like unions or non-profits whose work involves political engagement. </p>
<h2>Encourage content sharing</h2>
<p>When sharing nonpartisan political information online, civil society groups should consider how they can most effectively use Instagram to spread that content. Since the study suggests that individual users may be more inclined to engage politically on the platform with people they know offline, these groups should consider strategies that encourage individual users to screenshot or otherwise independently share their content. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338224/original/file-20200528-51509-13tst5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Civil society groups like unions and non-profits should encourage people to share their content.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">{Piqsels)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This could allow civil society groups to better connect with individual Canadians.</p>
<p>Also, civil society groups whose mandates include digital literacy should include discussion of political engagement on Instagram in program materials and initiatives. As young people are more active users of the platform, these efforts should target teenagers and young voters. </p>
<p>These initiatives could address how young people can develop their political knowledge and participation on Instagram.</p>
<p>Further work could show the extent to which these behaviours are reflected nationally, and in relation to political information about COVID-19. </p>
<p>The findings give initial indications that social capital may play a greater role than political, industry or third-sector financial resources in political engagement on Instagram. That’s important given the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i4.1062">expertise and resources</a> behind many of these efforts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work was made possible by an award from the Digital Ecosystem Research Challenge, funded in part by the Government of Canada.
Ce projet a été financé par une bourse du Défi de recherche sur l’écosystème numérique, financé en partie par le Gouvernement du Canada. </span></em></p>A survey shows respondents who used Instagram for political information during the 2019 federal election were more likely to interact with people they knew, not political accounts.Sabrina Wilkinson, PhD candidate, Communication, Goldsmiths, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1285342019-12-12T14:15:21Z2019-12-12T14:15:21ZHow Canada’s new election law has silenced political debate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306216/original/file-20191210-95115-d0oxdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2964%2C1841&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People march during a climate strike in Montréal in September 2019. Climate change is a top concern for Canadians, but new Elections Canada rules left civil society organizations fearing they could not speak out on the need for climate action during the election. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s almost 2020, and with a minority government in power, another federal election could be upon Canadians sooner than expected.</p>
<p>So as the dust settles on the 2019 vote, it’s important to examine the data on an issue that clouded the election campaign — the impact of new <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-canadas-environmental-charities-are-afraid-to-talk-about-climate-change-during-the-election-122114">Elections Canada regulations</a> on public debate by civil society organizations.</p>
<p>In June 2019, the federal government amended Canada’s <a href="https://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-2.01.pdf">Elections Act</a>. The rules require third parties, including non-profit groups, to register with Elections Canada if they spend more than $500 on “political advertising.” That includes any spending to promote positions during election campaigns on public policy issues on which political parties have taken a stand, or to support or oppose particular candidates and parties.</p>
<p>The new Elections Act also sets specific spending limits on third-party election advertising. </p>
<p>These changes to the Elections Act are important measures to prevent the type of unlimited spending by political action committees (PACs) that followed the <a href="https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/03/07/citizens-united-8-years-later/">Citizens United</a> decision by the United States Supreme Court in 2010. The court ruled that spending limits on third-party election advertising was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.</p>
<p>Since 2010, what are known as <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?chrt=V&type=C">super-PACs</a> have subsequently become major players in American elections, enabling wealthy individuals to exert enormous political influence. Indeed, wealthy donors spent more than <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/1-4-billion-and-counting-in-spending-by-super-pacs-dark-money-groups/">US$1.4 billion</a> during the 2016 presidential election campaign. </p>
<h2>Silencing voices</h2>
<p>The new <a href="https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&document=index&dir=thi/ec20227&lang=e">Elections Canada regulations</a> impose spending limits on third parties ($1,023,400 in the pre-election period and $511,700 in the election period) and specific regulations against collusion between third parties that would prevent the type of unlimited spending by super-PACs in the United States.</p>
<p>However, the new Elections Canada regulations have also played a role in silencing the voices of many Canadian organizations on a wide range of public policy issues — from climate change to health care to international aid.</p>
<p>This chilling effect came into play most powerfully when Elections Canada indicated in a training session for non-profits that organizations with public policy positions on climate change would need to register and report on their spending, given that right-wing candidate Maxime Bernier had made <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/environment-groups-warned-climate-change-real-partisan-1.5251763">public statements denying climate change</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1112677625619759105"}"></div></p>
<p>The silencing impact may not have been intentional, but it is very real and represents a threat to healthy public debate and democracy in Canada. Elections are important opportunities for Canadians to debate public policy, and it’s crucial that civil society groups are able to contribute to those debates. </p>
<p>On the surface, the new Elections Act appears to strike a balance between free speech and excessive influence by wealthy individuals and corporations. </p>
<p>The Elections Act does not prohibit civil society organizations from spending money to promote public policy positions. However, many organizations saw the requirement to register and report on spending as ominous — especially after the crackdown on charities carried out by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) under <a href="https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2018/08/political-activities-of-charities-a-new-world/">Stephen Harper’s Conservative government</a>. </p>
<h2>Fears of another crackdown</h2>
<p>Justin Trudeau’s government made significant changes to the <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/charities-giving/charities/policies-guidance/public-policy-dialogue-development-activities.html?utm_source=stkhldrs&utm_medium=eml&utm_campaign=PPDDA">CRA regulations</a> in 2019 that allow charities to engage much more freely in public policy debates. But many Canadian civil society groups still worry that the federal government will crack down on organizations that criticize its policies. </p>
<p>The regulations also add bureaucratic headaches and expenses to non-profit organizations, many of which cannot afford to pay additional costs for participation in public policy debates. </p>
<p>Staff with many Canadian civil society groups have reported that their organizations did not speak out on public policy issues during the election campaign for fear they’d be penalized by Elections Canada or the CRA. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-canadas-environmental-charities-are-afraid-to-talk-about-climate-change-during-the-election-122114">Why Canada’s environmental charities are afraid to talk about climate change during the election</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The silencing effect is also clear in data from <a href="https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=fin&document=index&dir=oth/thi/advert/tp43&lang=e">Elections Canada</a>.</p>
<p>There are more than 175,000 registered non-profit and charitable organizations in Canada. Only 147 registered to report election advertising in 2019, only 50 reported spending more than $10,000 (the reporting threshold set by Elections Canada) and only two have charitable status. </p>
<h2>Climate change a key concern</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/news-polls/Four-Weeks-In-Climate-Change-Fastest-Moving-Health-Care-Still-Top-Issue">Climate change</a> was a top concern for Canadians during the 2019 election campaign. However, <a href="https://johndcameron.com/data-on-ngo-advocacy-in-canada/">my analysis</a> of the Elections Canada data shows that only 17 environmental organizations registered, and only seven reported spending more than $10,000 (for a cumulative total of $634,307) during the election period. </p>
<p>Similarly, while Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer made Canada’s international aid an election issue by proposing to cut it by 25 per cent, only five international social justice organizations registered, and none of them reported spending over $10,000. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/news-polls/Four-Weeks-In-Climate-Change-Fastest-Moving-Health-Care-Still-Top-Issue">Health care</a> is always an important issue to Canadians, but just one (the Canadian Medical Association) reported spending over $10,000.</p>
<p>The data suggests the new rules kept conservative groups quiet too. Only one gun rights organization reported any spending ($32,091) and just seven explicitly pro-Conservative organizations registered, spending a total of $690,922. As of Oct. 14, 2019 — a week before the election —the total reported by all organizations was just over $9.4 million. </p>
<p>Canada’s new Elections Act may have prevented the type of mammoth spending seen in the United States via super-PACs, but it’s been at the expense of silencing many Canadian organizations with important positions on public policy issues. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306211/original/file-20191210-95159-1tz8r4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The $500 limit must be reviewed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Elections Canada needs to do more to make sure that the new regulations do not block public policy debates. It should also review the $500 threshold for requiring organizations to register with Elections Canada. </p>
<p>With a minority government in Parliament, Canadians could soon head to the polls again, so there may not be much time to make these changes.</p>
<p><em>This is a corrected version of a story originally published Dec. 12, 2019. This version clarifies details about the amended Elections Act and corrects the number of health-sector organizations that registered with Elections Canada.</em></p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Cameron receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Canada’s new Elections Act may have prevented the type of mammoth election spending seen in the United States via super-PACs, but it’s been at the expense of public debate.John D. Cameron, Associate Professor, Department of International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1172382019-05-30T22:44:30Z2019-05-30T22:44:30ZNGOs need international protection from Hindu nationalism in India<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276603/original/file-20190527-193510-16e4o0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5613%2C3731&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This 13-year-old boy from India’s Bihar state who worked 15 hours a day making bread was rescued by the workers of the Bachpan Bachao Andolan or Save Childhood movement in 2014. India's far-right BJP is taking aim at NGOs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The return to power of Narendra Modi’s right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) creates uncertainty about the future of advocacy in India.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1976-49.pdf">Since 1976</a>, civil society organizations have faced multiple operational challenges as successive governments have tried to undermine their work with accusations of “<a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-to-states-track-ngos-for-anti-national-activities-5430272/">anti-nationalism</a>” and “<a href="https://scroll.in/latest/814225/sedition-laws-being-misused-and-misapplied-prashant-bhushans-ngo-moves-supreme-court">sedition</a>.” </p>
<p>It’s important to examine the role of Hindu nationalism — also BJP’s founding ideology — since <a href="https://www.bjp.org/en/articledetail/2722440/Article-The-Choice-of-Political-Funding-Cheque-Electoral-Bonds-or-Blackmoney-from-Contractors-and-middlemen-by-Hon-ble-Union-Minister-Shri-Arun-Jaitley">it regards</a> NGOs as undemocratic and anti-Indian. But it’s equally critical to remember there are provisions guaranteed under international law to protect NGO activity in India.</p>
<h2>Hindutva politics and NGOs</h2>
<p>BJP’s Hindutva ideology <a href="https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/04/25/bjp-and-its-hindutva-politics-the-slow-saffronisation-of-india.html">is based on</a> the advancement of a Hindu <em>rashtra</em>, or Hindu kingdom. The underlying tenet is to regulate the working of civil society through Hindu religious doctrine that imposes vigilantism, violence and punishment on those who defy order. </p>
<p>Hindu nationalism reinforces the glorification and revivalism of Hinduism, the supremacy of a nation and invokes intolerance towards other non-Hindu groups that seek sociocultural change and justice in society. </p>
<p>The BJP views NGO activists as defiant because they challenge conventional notions of power, social structures and hierarchies that conflict with the idea of Hindu majoritarianism and status quo culture. </p>
<p>For instance, the <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/27/narendra-modi-selectively-targeting-western-christ/">Modi government targeted</a> faith-based organizations in 2017 for their alleged involvement with religious conversions. Compassion International, a foreign-funded Christian charity group, <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-hindu-bjp-and-restrictions-on-faith-based-ngos">was shut down and asked</a> to partner with other religious organizations apart from Christians if it wanted to re-register as a legal enterprise again. </p>
<p>Similarly, several local as well as transnational NGOs <a href="https://amnesty.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ACT3096472019ENGLISH.pdf">seeking justice</a> for Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 were threatened with investigation and bank account closures if they continued their work. </p>
<p>While previous governments have been intolerant towards NGOs in the past, the BJP is taking it further, polarizing civil society with far-right politics. Transnational NGOs <a href="http://www.pratirodh.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/IB-Report-NGO.pdf">have been targeted</a> for “serving as tools for foreign policy interests of western governments,” but local NGOs that don’t fall under the <a href="https://fcraonline.nic.in/home/PDF_Doc/FC-RegulationAct-2010-C.pdf">Foreign Contributions Regulation Act</a> (FCRA) mandate are also experiencing repression and harassment.</p>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/tuticorin-sterlite-protests-protesters-killed-by-shots-to-head-chest-half-from-behind-reveal-autopsies-5505282/">13 activists were killed</a> during the Sterlite protests in Toothukudi, Tamil Nadu. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276606/original/file-20190527-193510-1ft7hqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indian activists hold placards during a protest against Sterlite Industries outside the company’s office in Bangalore in May 2018. Police opened fire on protesters demanding the closure of a south Indian copper plant, killing 13 of them.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Aijaz Rahi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Pune, several lawyers, academics and poets <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pune-police-raid-activists-homes-across-four-states/article24799729.ece">were arrested</a> for their alleged involvement as “[<a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/urban-naxals-its-not-such-a-new-thing/articleshow/65598483.cms">Urban Naxals</a>]” practising unlawful activities last year. Additionally, <a href="http://haryanaforest.gov.in/Portals/0/documents/ifa.pdf">recent amendments</a> to the Forest Rights Act proposes restoring authoritative powers to forest authorities. This will deny land ownership rights of forest dwellers and reduce accessibility to tribal land through force and vandalism. </p>
<h2>Systematic dismantling of NGOs</h2>
<p>The BJP has meticulously orchestrated a systematic dismantling of NGOs (non-governmental, non-profit organizations) that has put the future of Indian advocacy surrounding socioeconomic and environmental issues in jeopardy. </p>
<p>Congressional amendments to the FCRA in 2010 made it clear that there would be stricter oversight and monitoring of foreign-funded NGOs that engage in critical discourse. </p>
<p>These amendments included:</p>
<ol>
<li>Regular registration renewals;</li>
<li>Setting up of separate bank accounts for foreign and domestic contributions;</li>
<li>Prescribing various offences and penalties for defaulters, including suspension and cancellation of registration licences. </li>
</ol>
<p>In effect, the FCRA crippled the NGO sector, subdued critical dialogue and restricted transnational partnerships in civil society deemed crucial for effective policy-making. </p>
<p>However, with the BJP in power, the scope of transnational advocacy has been even further reduced. </p>
<p>Since 2014, local activists have been finding it difficult to obtain financial, technological or capacity-building support from abroad or from local officials because external NGOs and local philanthropic organizations are reluctant to aid rights-based advocacy. While the FCRA curtails foreign funding, philanthropists currently <a href="https://www.bain.com/insights/india-philanthropy-report-2017/">shy away from supporting critical activity</a> for the fear of appearing anti-government. </p>
<p>Activists are now concerned about the prospects for activism in India, and are worried about their day-to-day survival in the state as the BJP continues to penalize dissenters. </p>
<p>In this light, what can international and local organizations do to safeguard the interests of NGOs in the future? </p>
<h2>International intervention is crucial</h2>
<p>In 2016, the United Nations Special Rapporteur <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20112&LangID=E">pointed out</a> that India was placing unreasonable restrictions on transnational advocacy networks by silencing them on obscure grounds. It asked the Indian government to repeal the FCRA, which didn’t happen.</p>
<p>This is because currently, UN regulations aren’t rigorously enforced to prevent governments from dismantling civil society operations in the Global South. If enforced, they could guarantee and promote NGO rights surrounding freedom of assembly and association. Sanctions should also be imposed to keep non-compliant and exploitative governments in check. </p>
<p>A common platform for discussion can help NGOs review government policies and deal with repressive actions. For instance, certain <a href="https://www.sangoco.org.za">South African states</a> allow NGOs to gather once a year to discuss issues of common interest. In India, that doesn’t happen.</p>
<p>There’s also a need for change in the culture of Indian philanthropy to ensure NGOs are supported and not questioned about their credibility. Activists must be treated as equal stakeholders in society so that money is distributed for civic education, legal literacy and accountability-related work.</p>
<p>Amid this cultural ecosystem change is the need for NGOs, in turn, to be fully transparent about their funding and operations. </p>
<p>Now that the BJP has won the election with a majority, it gives the Indian government the legitimacy to act freely and bend laws without being questioned because acquiring an electoral mandate by the state means complete adherence to government policies and structures. </p>
<p>But democracy isn’t just about winning elections. It is about equal participation. Socioeconomic and environmental reforms cannot be left exclusively for the government to manage. The international community must help ensure that civil society and the citizenry are being heard to counter India’s conservative policies and right-wing politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roomana Hukil does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Narendra Modi’s BJP views NGO activists as defiant because they challenge conventional notions of power, social structures and hierarchies that conflict with the idea of Hindu majoritarianism.Roomana Hukil, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130892019-04-02T10:41:30Z2019-04-02T10:41:30ZLaws are chipping away at democracy around the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266141/original/file-20190327-139361-tzvxpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US demonstrators who favor and oppose stricter gun laws, in 2018</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Gun-Control-March/751fa86c6b1145518232b701ccc57bfa/5/0">AP Photo/Steven Senne</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy seemed ascendant after the rivalry between communist and democratic states subsided in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. As <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/11/10/7185945/berlin-wall-anniversary">elected governments</a> replaced many toppled totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the number of <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/democracy">democracies rose</a>.</p>
<p>Yet with rare exceptions, <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/waves-authoritarianism">authoritarian leadership and other undemocratic governments</a> have been the norm throughout human history. So perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising that democracy seems to be <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat">losing ground</a> after its post-1991 surge. The rise of <a href="https://theconversation.com/autocracies-that-look-like-democracies-are-a-threat-across-the-globe-110957">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a> in Turkey, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-viktor-orban-degraded-hungarys-weak-democracy-109046">Viktor Orbán</a> in Hungary, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/jair-bolsonaro-says-brazilians-still-dont-know-what-dictatorship-is">Jair Bolsonaro</a> in Brazil, and Donald Trump in the U.S. are among the most visible examples.</p>
<p>As a human rights attorney <a href="http://chrystieswiney.georgetown.domains/">completing my Ph.D. in international relations</a>, I’m researching why democracy appears to be declining around the globe. In addition to the growing number of far-right, <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/431646-national-security-experts-warn-of-rise-in-authoritarianism-efforts">authoritarian-leaning leaders</a> who certainly bear responsibility, lawmakers in historically strong democracies are proposing and passing legislation that adds new layers of red tape, restricts access to foreign financial support, and makes it <a href="https://www.openglobalrights.org/closing-space-for-civil-society/">harder and riskier to engage in peaceful protests</a>. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-ngos-crackdown/india-uses-foreign-funding-law-to-harass-charities-rights-groups-idUSKBN134056">India</a> to <a href="https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/polish-prime-minister-signs-restrictive-anti-ngo-law">Poland</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/israel-passes-law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding">Israel</a>, legislators are limiting the freedom of independent nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations. <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/what-is-civil-society/">Many of these groups</a> are responsible for holding governments to account, standing up for minority rights and providing services to the indigent, among other critical roles.</p>
<h2>New restrictions</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.openglobalrights.org/undemocratic-civil-society-laws-are-appearing-in-democracies-too/">My research</a> focuses on the spread of undemocratic civil society laws in historically democratic states. These laws include bills that impose new restrictions on forming, operating and funding civil society organizations. They are limiting the activities of charities, watchdog organizations, protest movements and nonprofit service providers, such as <a href="https://rewire.news/article/2019/02/22/trump-administration-releases-final-text-of-domestic-gag-rule-restriction-on-title-x/">health care clinics</a> depended on by people lacking access to affordable health care.</p>
<p>For nearly a decade I’ve tracked and documented the spread of these laws. By my count, at least 58 percent of the world’s strongest democracies have adopted at least one restrictive civil society law since 1990. Counting proposed laws, another 5 percent are in this growing category.</p>
<p>I’m not talking about similar legislation passed in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2014.903854">non-democratic</a> and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngo-law/530121/">weakly democratic</a> states like <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-foreign-agents-law-to-shackle-and-silence-ngos/">Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/02/egypt-new-law-will-crush-civil-society">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/04/turkey-government-crackdown-suffocating-civil-society-through-deliberate-climate-of-fear/">Turkey</a>. These laws are also <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/22/how-state-restrictions-are-reshaping-civic-space-around-world-pub-70049">problematic and troublesome</a> for global civil society, but are not the primary focus of my research.</p>
<p>Consider what happened after <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/daria-skibo/five-years-of-russia-s-foreign-agent-law">Russia enacted a law</a> in 2012 that requires all nonprofits wishing to receive any amount of foreign donations and that are engaged in what the government defines as political activities to register as “foreign agents” – a toxic term in the Russian context.</p>
<p>Since then, elected politicians have passed measures with similar objectives in countries with democratic governments, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/israel-passes-law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/08/india-foreign-funding-law-used-harass-25-groups">India</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/controversial-austrian-islam-law-bans-foreign-funding-islamic-groups-309753">Austria</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngo-law/530121/">Hungary</a> and <a href="https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/polish-prime-minister-signs-restrictive-anti-ngo-law">Poland</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266889/original/file-20190401-177190-1h3vtkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian lawmakers passed a Kremlin-backed law restricting NGOs in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Russia-NGOs/ac06e657ec2242209ba8f4f3605b3d5d/2/0">AP Photo/Misha Japaridze</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>In trouble</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html">Democracy experts</a> like the independent watchdog <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat">Freedom House</a> <a href="https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index">generally agree</a> that <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/en/">democracy is in trouble</a> around the world. They no longer debate whether democracy is imperiled, but by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/03/one-third-of-the-worlds-population-lives-in-a-declining-democracy-that-includes-americans/">how much and whether it’s reversible</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-populist-challenge-to-liberal-democracy/">Democracy scholars</a>, such as <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-populist-challenge-to-liberal-democracy/">William Galston</a> at the Brookings Institution – a centrist think tank, political scientist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/04/shock-system-liberal-democracy-populism">Yascha Mounk</a> and columnists like <a href="https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/nb/chris-reeves/2018/01/10/nyts-kristof-trump-scientifically-proven-threat-democracy">Nicholas Kristof</a> tend to focus on the rise of populist and far-right leaders when explaining global democratic decay.</p>
<p>But in democracies, the law, not the president or prime minister, is critical to maintaining the pillars and foundations upon which democracy rests. That is why I consider an <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/26/austria-law-on-islam_n_6754012.html">Austrian law</a> that curbs access to foreign funding to all Muslim organizations so troubling.</p>
<p>I’m also concerned about a <a href="https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/polish-prime-minister-signs-restrictive-anti-ngo-law">Polish law</a> that consolidates all power over nongovernmental organization funding, whether foreign or domestic, into the hands of a single individual appointed by its prime minister. And I find a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngo-law/530121/">Hungarian law</a>, which requires nongovernmental organizations that get more than $28,000 of their funds from other countries to label themselves as funded from abroad on all of their publications, worrisome.</p>
<p>When laws are passed that undermine democracy’s critical foundations, democracy weakens. Laws restricting the independence and strength of nonprofits are one example of this. </p>
<p><iframe id="zOAf1" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/zOAf1/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>Restrictive laws are even appearing here in the United States, so far only at the state rather than the federal level – aside from a handful of <a href="https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/restricted-access/">obscure measures</a>. These laws are designed to curb what nonprofits and activists can do. </p>
<p>For example, over the past decade, more than half of all states have introduced so-called “<a href="https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-ag-gag-laws">ag-gag laws</a>,” measures designed to silence whistleblowers who reveal animal abuses on industrial farms. However, the U.S. system of checks and balances is slowing and reversing their impact. <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/freedom-press/court-rules-ag-gag-law-criminalizing-undercover-reporting-violates">American courts</a> are finding many of these laws to be in violation of the Constitution.</p>
<p>At the same time, ag-gag laws remain on the books in at least <a href="https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gag-legislation">seven states</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267406/original/file-20190403-177190-w5v3dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Initiatives at the state and federal level since November 2016 that aim to restrict the rights of Americans to protest are all over the map.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/">International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Similarly, since November 2016, legislators in 35 states have considered more than <a href="http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/">91 bills</a> designed to restrict protest activities. For example, a <a href="http://www.icnl.org/news/2018/Global%20Trends%20October%202018%20final.pdf">growing number of states</a>, including Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio and Washington have introduced harsh new criminal penalties for protesters who wear hooded jackets or otherwise disguise their identities while protesting. What’s more, states, including Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina and Texas, have proposed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/18/us/legislation-protects-drivers-injure-protesters/index.html">laws shielding motorists from liability</a> if they end up injuring or killing protesters who block traffic.</p>
<p>Few of these anti-protest measures, <a href="http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/">only 11 of 91 considered</a>, have been enacted. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/south-dakota-pipeline-protest-law-worries-native-american-activists-aclu-n989191">Legal challenges</a> could topple many if not all of them. But these measures do, in my view, have the potential to erode American democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chrystie Flournoy Swiney is a consultant for the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, and a doctoral candidate and fellow at Georgetown University. </span></em></p>Legislators in a growing number of democracies are clamping down on civil society. In the United States, it’s happening at the state level.Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, Doctoral Fellow at Georgetown and Human Rights Attorney, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001782018-07-30T13:54:28Z2018-07-30T13:54:28ZThe projects that are helping Zambian women get better access to land<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228199/original/file-20180718-142435-s4bwq6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A female farmer in Zambia tends to her crops.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Margaret W. Nea/Bread for the World/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When a woman has access to and control over land and its revenue streams, she and her family benefit. Multiple studies <a href="https://www.land-links.org/issue-brief/fact-sheet-land-tenure-womens-empowerment/">have shown</a> how women invest their land-based earnings in the health, nutrition and education of family members. </p>
<p>But for this to happen, customs that favour granting land to men must be altered. This requires both structural change, through for example government policies, and socio-cultural change. </p>
<p>The Zambian government has worked with civil society organisations to create a gender equality and land governance framework. Civil society organisations have used their social networks and through capacity building programmes pursue gender equality in the allocation of land in customary tenure systems.</p>
<p>I set out to study some of these programmes. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09614524.2018.1480896">article</a>, I documented how women gain access to land in areas of Zambia where access is governed by traditional leaders and local customs. I was specifically interested in the role that civil society organisations play in strengthening women’s land rights in these areas. </p>
<p>Civil society organisations and their donors engage in five key activities that help women get access to land. They build and maintain regional and national networks; they document customary land rights and they train chiefs about gender equality. They also support men and women to work collectively within the home, and empower women to work together on pieces of land.</p>
<p>These activities show how civil society can support and expand the space for women’s land rights. Working with inter-generational family networks also might expand women’s access to economically-productive resources such as land. </p>
<p>Women’s rights organisations in other countries might draw on the Zambian experience, tailoring it to the local socio-economic and historical context within which they work.</p>
<h2>Customary law</h2>
<p>Zambia has two categories of land, state land and customary land. State land includes land in urban areas and land used for mining or nature conservation.</p>
<p>Customary land is administered by traditional leaders, such as chiefs and headpersons, according to customary law that is unwritten and based on local customs. Customary law is valid under <a href="http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20%28Amendment%29%2C%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf">the Constitution</a>. Any customary practice that contradicts the constitution is illegal. </p>
<p>Women in customary tenure systems have what are called secondary land rights. This is because Zambia’s <a href="http://www.mocta.gov.zm/index.php/house-of-chiefs">288 chiefs</a>, and village headpersons, handle land issues and generally grant occupancy and use rights to men because they’re considered the head of household. A woman tends to get access by asking her husband, or another male relative, to use a portion of the allocated land. </p>
<p>Gender activists are working to increase the prevalence of women as primary land rights holders. Their work is being helped by the fact that Zambia has a supportive policy environment thanks to the <a href="http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20%28Amendment%29%2C%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf">2016 Constitution</a> and the government’s <a href="http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/zam152916.pdf">gender policy</a>.</p>
<p>The policies, together with a network of women and gender-oriented civil society organisations, have created momentum for legal reform and new measures to promote gender equality in the land sector. Chiefs, court officials, and men and women at the grassroots level have access to new tools to reconceptualise how men and women might work, live and develop their communities together. </p>
<h2>Documenting and training</h2>
<p>Changing the land use pattern faces a number of challenges. One of them is that there isn’t proper documentation of boundaries, or even of who has rights to what. </p>
<p>For example customary land in Zambia is neither systematically mapped nor registered. This leaves boundaries between individual plots unclear. </p>
<p>International organisations are working with chiefs and community groups like the <a href="http://www.zla.org.zm/">Zambia Land Alliance</a> to create what are known as Traditional Land Holding Certificates. These recognise land rights at either the individual or household level. Certifications clarify rights, verify claims through boundary demarcation, and end with the issuance of a certificate. The certificates allow a woman’s name to be listed as the land’s “primary” rights holder. </p>
<p>The certificate is designed to reduce property grabbing and the <a href="https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/USAID_Land_Tenure_World_Bank_2016_Zambia_Open_Source.pdf">common practice</a> of expelling a woman from a piece of land after her husband’s death. Establishing a system that registers these certificates and makes rights public would mean that women have a better chance of being protected.</p>
<p>Another major gap is knowledge. Chiefs don’t always know what the country’s policies and laws entail. Civil society organisations routinely hold provincial-level training for chiefs to explain women’s land rights. This isn’t always easy. One chief stated that “men need a bigger area” of land to cultivate than women do. </p>
<p>Gender rights activists try to identify more progressive chiefs who are willing to change local practice and tell men not to deny their partners’ land. </p>
<h2>Collaboration</h2>
<p>Getting men and women to work together when it comes to land is also a valuable intervention.</p>
<p>In many communities, husbands instruct their wives where to plant their crops. And when the cropping season is over, a woman might not be allowed to cultivate that same plot again and the husband will take it for his own cultivation. </p>
<p>One civil society organisation brings husbands and wives together and encourages them to own land and cultivate together. Bringing men and women within the household rather than maintaining separate fields closes the gender gap in land.</p>
<p>Another type of programme works through village-level groups that promote women’s collective access to land. Groups might ask their chief for a piece of land for growing crops or other income generating activities such as pig or goat rearing. If a widow’s relatives grab the property after her husband’s death, group leaders can intervene and help her keep her house and then allow her to cultivate a plot on the group’s land. </p>
<p>Some organisations offer training in financial management, legal awareness, and leadership. Women then use these skills to organise, to obtain and maintain control over land and to be less dependent on men. Access to resources is based on relationships. Sustainable land rights programming and gender-equality initiatives must change not only how women think and behave but men too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cynthia Caron received funding from The Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) and provides technical assistance to USAID on its land tenure programming.</span></em></p>Civil society organisations in Zambia help women get access to land.Cynthia Caron, Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/708842017-01-06T11:24:07Z2017-01-06T11:24:07ZA new law in China is threatening the work of international NGOs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151796/original/image-20170105-29222-13c2cnh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/maywong_photos/4129725929/in/photolist-7hVVDc-mJydR-5GphsG-eCjg7S-pVqk6r-ctj6NA-ceKK7q-4jnA2H-hvbS4v-8vvYZS-986QXF-7PyrJA-7hVTVT-nMWeN-eSUZh5-DPWnp-qL2U3Q-amZAug-cuDLrE-rcdkBd-989BHC-pkvUT2-8vsBLr-8vtyRx-pUTaZT-g18McA-aDrUVx-3P5xwh-cfVGDL-5nU1tF-7mkhEH-dHnPMt-gSpzw6-8EVRmL-4rtinC-8vwbrN-cigN4f-2V2uSq-7rNLdi-rnnGkE-cdVqTh-bXoz5v-6NZfwr-3b4sGz-kX1S3-8vtJRX-8vvZMw-bXoyaF-986CM8-p6vQv5">May Wong, Great Hall of the People, Tian'anmen Square via Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A controversial new law regulating the activities of foreign non-profit organisations (NPOs) in China <a href="https://qz.com/preview/873489/">came into effect</a> on January 1. Under the Overseas NGO Law, foreign NPOs will have to meet very stringent registration and reporting guidelines, which raises concerns about China’s lack of progress towards good governance and the rule of law. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/how-should-global-stakeholders-respond-china-new-ngo-management-law">Critics</a> have taken issue with the fact that the law brings foreign NPOs and their operations under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. This leads to an over-politicisation of the civil society sector in China. Chinese officials seem to consider foreign NPOs and their Chinese partners as potentially undermining the authority of the Chinese Communist Party. </p>
<p>The law is indicative of a global trend of restricting the political space available for civil society in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/aug/26/ngos-face-restrictions-laws-human-rights-generation">countries as disparate</a> as India, Israel, Russia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Cambodia. It radically alters the terms of engagement with China for foreign NPOs and is intended to be a game changer. Even before its introduction, it prompted high-level diplomacy between <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-passes-law-clamping-down-on-foreign-ngos-1461853978">China and the US</a> and between <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1973063/german-chancellor-merkel-raise-eu-fears-over-beijings">China and Germany</a>. </p>
<h2>The problems with the new law</h2>
<p>The Chinese ministry has been tasked with a regulatory role which used to be the remit of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) – and it has no prior experience of engaging with China’s civil society sector. With its emphasis on policing and law enforcement it is now empowered to shut down individual overseas NPOs. </p>
<p>But there is a risk that the law will be applied in a non-transparent and inconsistent way. Foreign NPOs working in the field of civil rights and the rule of law are more likely to be targeted than those working in less politically sensitive areas. </p>
<p>Prior to the enactment of China’s Overseas NGO Law <a href="http://ngochina.blogspot.co.uk/2016/12/the-evolution-and-implication-of-chinas.html">only 29</a> foreign NPOs managed to register with MoCA. They have also been struggling to find political sponsors in China to be able to comply with the new law. </p>
<p>In December 2016, the MPS <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-ngos-idUSKBN1491B5">published a detailed list</a> of government organisations that will be in charge of supervising foreign NPOs. But the list does not include supervisory units for NGOs operating in sensitive areas such as legal reform and rights issues. There are also very few incentives for nominated Chinese supervisory bodies to take over responsibility for the activities of foreign NPOs in less politically sensitive fields. The result could be a situation where a majority of foreign NPOs remain in a legal limbo. </p>
<p>At a round table meeting hosted by The Rights Practice in London in May 2016, I heard NPO representatives discuss the possibility of divesting from China. A few months later at the 23rd UK-China Human Rights Dialogue in October, a Chinese official revealed that the government assumed that between 10-20% of foreign NPOs may leave China if they find complying with the proposed changes too much of a burden. </p>
<p>Some NGOs already have. A prominent example is the <a href="http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_initiative_pulls_out_of_china_amid_uncertainty_caused_by_law_regulating">American Bar Association</a>, which recently closed the Beijing Office of its Rule of Law Initiative and has now relocated to Hong Kong. While the law also applies to <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-law-passed-tightening-control-over-foreign-non-government-organizations/">Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan</a>, the American Bar Association seems to assume that the former British crown colony, with its semi-democratic status under the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, still offers greater legal protection for foreign NGOs. </p>
<p>The new law is also a problem because it carries a high risk and probability of administrative abuse – particularly true regarding cooperation with some kinds of Chinese grassroots NGOs working in politically sensitive areas. Just two days before the law came into effect, the premises of the overseas-funded Migrant Workers Home, a Beijing-based service-delivery and advocacy group for rural migrants, <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/ngo-law-01022017203301.html">were ransacked</a>.</p>
<h2>Working more closely with Chinese partners</h2>
<p>One way forward would be for foreign NPOs to adopt a strategy of “smart indigenisation”. This would mean providing grants to allow Chinese partners to sit in the driving seat of projects and programmes, thereby ensuring Chinese ownership and sustainability of initiatives. Arguably, Chinese problems will need be solved primarily by Chinese people drawing on Chinese resources. </p>
<p>There are now more than 5,000 Chinese private foundations operating within the country. A new, separate Charity law which came into effect in September 2016 aimed at domestic civil society organisations, <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/16/the-good-and-bad-about-chinas-new-charity-law/">provides regulatory clarity</a> for Chinese charities and Chinese foundations. By making it easier to register and raise funds domestically, it should allow China’s homegrown civil society to flourish. </p>
<p>Private Chinese foundations are also keen to expand the scope of what is politically permissable in philanthropy by encouraging public discourse and supporting better dialogue between citizens and cadres. More politically-minded Chinese foundations include the One Foundation, Narada Foundation, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation as well as the SEE Foundation. They <a href="http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/how-foreign-non-profit-organisations-should-respond-to-chinas-new-overseas-ngo-management-law/">could be natural partners</a> for those foreign NPOs which are keen to continue their collaboration with Chinese civil society organisations, albeit in an indirect way.</p>
<h2>Mitigating the crisis of trust</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the new law regulating foreign NPOs requires decisive action by the international community. To mitigate the current crisis of trust, its implementation needs to be monitored and evaluated with transparency in order to document and prevent administrative abuse. </p>
<p>Whether or not European NPOs will chose to comply with the new law or decide to divest from China will depend on their guiding values and the vision and mission of their respective organisations. But foreign organisation which are ready to comply with the law will have to subject themselves to control by the Chinese public security apparatus. </p>
<p>This intrusion of the security services into the aid sector puts their frontline project and programme officers in China in harm’s way. And yet foreign non-profit organisations would hardly advance their missions by retreating from the world’s most populous nation. Withdrawing from China would mean that they concede defeat without mounting a credible defence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreas Fulda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new Chinese law giving police powers over foreign NGOs is indicative of a global trend to restrict the political space available for civil society.Andreas Fulda, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/692322016-12-19T07:27:23Z2016-12-19T07:27:23ZJapanese civil society groups are helping support refugee entrepreneurs, despite government reluctance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150528/original/image-20161216-26093-16xp5jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A fundamental challenge in Japan, in particular, is the low visibility of refugees and undocumented migrant workers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/stephangeyer/7124063833/">Stephan Geyer/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Japan is <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/07/japan-and-its-immigration-policies-are-growing-old/">known for its negative attitude</a> to immigration. While the door has been slowly opened to professionals, the Japanese government doesn’t accept low-skilled migrant workers – except on temporary work visas – and has been very <a href="http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/japanese-immigration-policy-responding-conflicting-pressures">reluctant to welcome refugees</a>.</p>
<p>Even 2015’s so-called <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en">refugee crisis</a> didn’t change Japan’s closed-door policy. Whereas countries such as the United States, Canada and Venezuela <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/syrian-refugee-crisis-how-different-countries-have-responded-france-lebanon-uk-a7220616.html">have accepted tens of thousands of asylum seekers</a>, Japan has announced it will take only <a href="http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201609/1219204_11015.html">150 Syrian “students” and their families</a> in five years. Though this is an important step forward for the country, the number is still far too small. </p>
<h2>Contrasting attitude</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/09/japan-takes-no-syrian-refugees-yet-despite-giving-200m-to-help-fight-isis">gap between Japan’s passive attitude</a> towards accepting refugees and providing sufficient support, and its proactive commitment outside its own territory has been much criticised by <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/01/national/helping-refugees-requires-financial-help/">NGOs</a>, the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-role-in-the-refugee-crisis/">media</a> and <a href="http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/3/481.short">academics</a>.</p>
<p>Japan is one of the top donors to the <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/donors.html">UN refugee agency</a> and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced a series of actions, including the provision of US$2.8 billion to refugees and hosting communities, at <a href="http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201609/1219204_11015.html">the Leaders’ Summit</a> in New York in September 2016. Despite this significant financial commitment, the nation’s refugee acceptance rate is very low (less than 1% of total applications in 2015). </p>
<p>Of 3,898 asylum claims processed in Japan last year, only 27 were recognised as refugees. This figure included eight asylum seekers who appealed the government’s decision not to accept their claim in <a href="http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri03_00112.html">previous years</a>. Add to this the 79 people who were granted special status to stay in Japan on <a href="http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri03_00112.html">humanitarian grounds</a>, and the total reaches just over 100. </p>
<p>Refugees are able to work without restriction. But asylum seekers can only work if they sought asylum while staying in Japan legally. </p>
<p>People who seek asylum after their travel documents have expired are taken to an immigration detention centre. Some may be provisionally released or be permitted to stay outside the centre. But they are still <a href="https://www.refugee.or.jp/for_refugees/info/employment_en.shtml">unable to work</a>. </p>
<h2>Civil society steps in</h2>
<p>In light of the institutional constraints facing refugees and asylum seekers, Japanese civil society and businesses are gradually moving to help refugees gain acceptance, by assisting them in setting up their own business. </p>
<p>The Tokyo-based nonprofit organisation, <a href="https://espre.org/en/">Entrepreneurship Support Program for Refugee Empowerment</a> (ESPRE), is the first public interest foundation that the government has authorised to microfinance refugees. In partnership with the <a href="https://www.refugee.or.jp/en/">Japan Association for Refugees</a> and <a href="http://www.svptokyo.org/english/">Social Venture Partners Tokyo</a>, ESPRE loans up to a million yen (about US$8,800) to refugee entrepreneurs and provides additional support with business advice.</p>
<p>The types of projects ESPRE has financed range from food services to trading businesses. For instance, a Burmese former university lecturer, who sought asylum in Japan and has lived in the country for over 20 years, opened a Myanmar restaurant in Tokyo with <a href="https://espre.org/2014/06/swe/">ESPRE’s support</a> in 2012. </p>
<p>And Vietnamese refugee, Minami Masakazu, who left home as a teenager, was similarly helped to open a now popular Vietnamese restaurant <a href="https://espre.org/2014/09/yellowbamboo/">in the city</a>. ESPRE has also helped a Pakistani entrepreneur who runs a trading company to export used Japanese cars. His business <a href="https://espre.org/2013/08/case_a/">began targeting the Mozambican market</a> and has now expanded to other countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150873/original/image-20161220-26712-dy9yvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Minami Masakazu opened a Vietnamese restaurant in Tokyo with ESPRE’s help/</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ESPRE</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Corporations also seem to like the idea of helping refugees through entrepreneurship. Uber Japan, for instance, launched a campaign in 2014 for <a href="https://espre.org/2014/06/uber_release/">its customers to donate to ESPRE</a> and an anonymous tax accountancy provides pro bono services to refugee entrepreneurs, according to ESPRE’s director, Masaru Yoshiyama.</p>
<h2>All kinds of benefits</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/alexander-betts-refugees-are-natural-entrepreneurs">Academics</a> and <a href="http://innovation.unhcr.org/10-refugees-who-will-change-your-perception-of-entrepreneurship/">practitioners working with refugees</a> have pointed out the positive effects of entrepreneurship on both refugees and their host societies. </p>
<p>In the first place, it empowers refugees. It’s easy for people to feel helpless and lose confidence if they have to rely on government allowances. These people can regain their autonomy and confidence by managing a business, earning money and engaging with their host community as a contributor. </p>
<p>Organisations such as ESPRE don’t only help them by financing projects but also by lowering the language barrier, for which Japan is notorious. To this end, ESPRE holds English-language orientation sessions where business consultants and accountants explain how to run a business in the country. </p>
<p>It has also been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/93e3d794-1826-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e">widely recognised that refugees can boost the local economy</a> by creating employment opportunities. The Myanmar restaurant owner in Tokyo, for example, is hiring refugees and students. Though this has not yet happened in Japan, refugee entrepreneurs elsewhere <a href="http://news.trust.org//item/20121218150700-vhrp2/">often employ locals</a>. </p>
<p>What’s more, refugees’ engagement in self-generating economic activities can change the public perception that they’re a “<a href="http://www.fmreview.org/preventing/zetter.html">societal burden</a>”. This lessens negative public sentiment towards refugees. </p>
<h2>Remaining challenges</h2>
<p>Despite these benefits, a number of barriers remain for facilitating refugee entrepreneurship in Japan. </p>
<p>The first is a lack of resources. Unlike countries where the number of refugees is large and the infrastructure to support refugee entrepreneurs (or minority entrepreneurs more broadly) has already been set up, efforts in Japan are still in early stages, and personnel and financial capacity is limited. </p>
<p>ESPRE director Yoshiyama has told me that this has hindered the setting up of a more organised process of assistance, from assessment of business proposals to support for implemented projects.</p>
<p>Institutional inflexibility is also a hurdle. Asylum seekers can only work under strict conditions. And the rules are made under the assumption that they work as an employee rather than as an employer, or being self-employed. This can create unnecessary misunderstanding and add to their administrative burden as officials may not give them approval to set up a new business. </p>
<p>A fundamental challenge in Japan, in particular, is the <a href="http://apjjf.org/-Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/2210/article.html">low visibility of refugees</a> and undocumented migrant workers. Though the recent refugee crisis has drastically raised public awareness, the issue is still perceived in Japan as something happening somewhere outside the country. This perception doesn’t help improve the situation for refugee entrepreneurs. </p>
<p>Last but not least, we should bear in mind that refugee entrepreneurship is not a panacea. Many refugees are minors and vulnerable people, who may not be able to engage in economic activity. Refugee entrepreneurship should rather be regarded as an – excellent – alternative for helping refugees gain autonomy and become integrated in their host country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69232/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Satoko Horii is currently a research fellow at the University of Buckingham. </span></em></p>Despite being one of the top donors to the UN refugee agency, Japan accepts very few asylum seekers, and provides little support for those who do make it.Satoko Horii, Assistant professor, Akita International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/656442016-11-03T07:35:34Z2016-11-03T07:35:34ZUN human rights review is largely toothless – but it’s giving a boost to Asian civil society groups<p>A United Nations initiative reviewing human rights records of countries around the world is indirectly strengthening civil society organisations in Southeast Asia by allowing them to participate in the process. But the groups are still blocked from ensuring human rights are meaningfully protected in their countries. </p>
<p>The UN General Assembly <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx">established its Human Rights Council</a> and introduced the universal periodic review of the human rights situation in member countries in 2006. The ten Southeast Asian countries that make up ASEAN – Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam – have now undergone two cycles of review, while a few remaining nations are <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRSessions.aspx">awaiting the second round</a>. </p>
<p>Under the process, states report to the commission every four-and-a-half years and receive its recommendations. Reviews focus on the evolution of human rights in that state, and its implementation of previous recommendations. The state under review may either “accept” or “note” the suggestions.</p>
<p>Recommendations that states tend to accept are those around improving gender equality, accessibility for those with disabilities, and <a href="http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/5065.pdf">children’s rights</a>, which has gained particular prominence during the review.</p>
<p>Recommendations that aren’t as acceptable tend to involve hard political issues related to civil and political liberties. Unsurprisingly, it’s usually <a href="http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10343.pdf">the latter that are detailed in submissions</a> by civil society organisations.</p>
<h2>A role for civil society</h2>
<p>Civil society participation in the universal periodic review of ASEAN countries has <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx">increased markedly over the two cycles</a>. Some 592 such organisations participated in the first cycle in 2008-2012, with 188 submissions; the second cycle (2012-2016) saw a strong increase, with 811 groups submitting 310 reports (personal, unpublished research).</p>
<p>The rise has put civil society groups at the centre of the UN human rights improvement process. But this isn’t the first time such groups have been at the heart of human rights advocacy in the region.</p>
<p>Civil society groups, such as the coalition known as the <a href="http://www.aseanhrmech.org/">Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism</a>, helped push individual countries to join the 2009 <a href="http://aichr.org/">ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights</a> (AICHR), and the 2012 <a href="http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/other_documents/section1/2012/11/phnom-penh-statement-on-the-adoption-of-the-asean-human-rights-declaration-ahrd-1.html">ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights</a>. </p>
<p>But since the establishment of the AICHR, civil society has disappeared from the process. Instead, the commission follows a secretive peer-review process in which such groups have no formal role.</p>
<p>Although AICHR is supposed to be engaged in human rights promotion and protection work, in reality it is unable to provide any actual protection. It is not mandated to receive complaints on human rights abuses, and does not have the power to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable. In fact, <a href="http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/806/807">the bulk of AICHR activities</a> revolve around meetings, discussions and research that have a consensual approach.</p>
<p>Similarly, national human rights institutions also cannot realistically contribute to the region’s protection arsenal. Research shows that, just like the AICHR, <a href="http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Resources/Paper/16021610_172%20-%20WP%20-%20Dr%20Gomez.pdf">national institutions are not able to perform</a> their protection function effectively.</p>
<p>These weak mechanisms raise the question of whether national human rights institutions in Southeast Asia can fill the protection gap. They also make human rights protection in the region weak, and in dire need of improvement and enhancement. </p>
<p>Given the weakness of AICHR and national human rights institutions, engagement with the universal periodic review is critical to the advancement of human rights in Southeast Asia.</p>
<h2>Being clever about it</h2>
<p>Since the establishment of the universal periodic review process, civil society groups in the region have been receiving training, preparing submissions, and even making their way to Geneva. In 2015, for instance, five civil society groups from Singapore <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/5-civil-society-groups-heading-to-geneva-to-share-rights-views">went on a trip to Switzerland</a> to discuss human rights in the city-state. </p>
<p>Civil society groups have become involved in monitoring state recommendations and their implementation, as well as speaking on the review process itself. Many have attracted international donor funding and support for this work. US-based <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/">The Carter Center</a>, for instance, has published a document titled <a href="http://internetrights.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/UPR-Training-Manual-English-Carter-Center-UPR-Info.pdf">Universal Periodic Review: Training Manual for Civil Society</a>.</p>
<p>While states in the region <a href="http://www.ishr.ch/news/increased-collaboration-within-civil-society-highlighted-during-singapores-upr">espouse the rhetoric of engagement</a> with civil society groups over the review process, they are, at the same time, cautious of them. </p>
<p>Governments often only pay lip service to human rights mechanisms and the periodic review is no different. This issue was <a href="http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/laos-prepares-for-upr-01082015153146.html">raised in 2015 by local civil society groups against the Laos government</a>, over the disappearance of activist Sombath Somphone and persecution of Lao Christians. </p>
<p>Overall it seems that states favour the current arrangement because they can use it to control the participation of civil society organisations in the process. They can <a href="http://www.acjps.org/sudanese-human-rights-defenders-prevented-from-travel-to-geneva-upr-meeting/">create legal obstructions</a>, <a href="http://poskod.my/cheat-sheets/why-has-comango-been-banned/">target organisations</a>, place <a href="http://www.edmundriceinternational.org/?p=3390">restrictions on civil society activities</a>, and harass and intimidate activists.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/reports-publications/1779-enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-the-un-universal-periodic-review-a-civil-society-perspective-2">a 2015 report</a>, civil society body <a href="http://www.civicus.org/index.php/who-we-are">CIVICUS</a> discussed cases from Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, in which governments have responded with misinformation, arranged for voluminous submissions by <a href="https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/civicus_enhancing_the_effectiveness_upr_2015.pdf">government-organised NGOs</a>, and conducted consultations only with partisan groups, while refusing to work with civil society groups that are more critical of government policy.</p>
<p>Some have enrolled supportive organisations to speak during sessions at the adoption of the working group report by the commission. While others, <a href="http://www.ishr.ch/news/un-committee-ngos-accredits-129-ngos-defers-130">such as Vietnam</a>, have objected to the granting of consultative status to some NGOs. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, for Southeast Asian civil society groups, the review has been an effective mechanism for putting human rights issues on the agenda and engaging their governments in conversation about critical issues, such as <a href="http://ilga.org/the-universal-periodic-review-and-lgbti-rights-indonesia/">LGBTI rights in Indonesia</a>. </p>
<p>But systemic problems remain for engaging others. These include following up on recommendations and the review’s ability to address difficult political issues, such as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29628191"><em>lese majeste</em> law</a> in Thailand, which forbids citizens from defaming or insulting the kind, and other freedom of expression issues.</p>
<p>To have the review make a real impact, civil society organisations will need to think about what they’ve been doing and develop more strategic approaches for the third cycle, which begins in 2017. They will need to go beyond coalition-building and organising submissions to determining how they can make human rights protections actually enforceable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Gomez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>States report to the UN Human Rights Council every four-and-a-half years and receive its recommendations, which they can either “accept” or “note”.James Gomez, Executive Director, Asia Centre & Pro Vice Chancellor, Canadian University of BangladeshLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/673132016-10-25T16:01:17Z2016-10-25T16:01:17ZWhen politics and academia collide, quality suffers. Just ask Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142750/original/image-20161022-1751-7vjem6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When governments and students collide, university systems wobble.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African universities’ academic year lies in limbo as student protests rage on. The debate about free education won’t end any time soon and students are <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-must-fall-fees-or-the-south-african-state-67389">demanding</a> that “fees must fall”. What many don’t seem to realise is that something else is on the verge of toppling: academic standards.</p>
<p>It’s just a matter of time before universities reach the tipping point into decline. All of the hard work that’s been done to set high standards and establish a good research <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/best-universities-in-africa-2016">reputation</a> on the African continent and further afield could be undone.</p>
<p>This is not hyperbole. It’s backed up by universities’ experiences elsewhere in Africa. Once student protests and the politicisation of academia become the norm, quality suffers. Nigeria offers particularly chilling evidence of this, as I’ll explain in this article.</p>
<p>South Africa must urgently come up with sustainable, reasonable solutions for dealing with student protests before it is too late to save the country’s universities from a quality crisis.</p>
<h2>Students are political animals</h2>
<p>No matter what happens in the coming weeks and months, I can say with certainty that student protests are here to stay. </p>
<p>Students constitute a vibrant part of civil society, a natural element of a democratic society such as South Africa’s. Today, the students’ concern is access to decolonised, free and quality education. Later students may turn their attention to something that doesn’t directly relate to their own welfare but that of society at large.</p>
<p>History tells us that students can topple governments. They can drive regime change. In Indonesia, for example, the student movement played <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=RWrm7tPzs1AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">an instrumental role</a> in Suharto’s political manoeuvres and <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/suharto-takes-full-power-in-indonesia">eventual takeover of power</a> from President Sukarno in the late 1960s. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20080117160839331">The students</a> led protests against Sukarno’s government, even fighting his loyalists on the country’s streets. This eroded public trust in the government, paved the way for impeachment and ushered Suharto into power. Later, students turned on the man they’d supported. Throughout the three decades of his rule, they took Suharto on about corruption and the state of the economy. Eventually students occupied the Indonesian parliament grounds in May 1998 demanding Suharto’s resignation. <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20080117160839331">He resigned a few days later</a>.</p>
<p>This makes sense. Universities are training grounds for future leaders – and that includes political leaders. It’s rather duplicitous to praise students when they demonstrate excellence in science, technology or business that promises a great future, but simultaneously condemn them for political engagement. </p>
<p>It is better to nurture them in the discipline and art of political engagement. They should be groomed for this sort of leadership. Formal classes – at all levels of education, actually – provide an opportunity through which democratic principles and values can be taught. </p>
<p>Other groupings like civil society organisations and political parties could get involved too. They could work with students both in and outside classrooms to impart lessons in political engagement and strategy. These engagements would benefit individuals and society as a whole, grooming a new, disciplined body of leaders.</p>
<h2>The contagious effect of student protests</h2>
<p>This work is urgent.</p>
<p>The longer that student protests remain unresolved, the more intractable their unintended consequences will become. </p>
<p>One looming crisis point is the future of South Africa’s academics. Some, especially those who are internationally competitive, may decide to take their services to countries with less volatile academic environments. </p>
<p>This could have negative consequences for the country in the long term. In fact, <a href="https://www.idrc.ca/en/article/brain-drain-and-capacity-building-africa">statistics and studies</a> show that Africa is experiencing an <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/extent-africa%E2%80%99s-brain-drain-frightening-mbeki">alarming exodus</a> of critical human capital that it needs for technological, scientific, and socioeconomic progress. The current protests and consequent suspension of classes or closures of universities will only exacerbate the situation in already-strained sectors such as health. </p>
<p>The flip side is that some academics see a genuine cause in students’ protests. This group is likely to stick it out and even to echo students’ demands. They risk being accused of fomenting trouble against the state; branded as elements that seek to disturb the peace and even dislodge the governing party from power. </p>
<p>Such a view of academics is not new to Africa. Take Nigeria, for instance. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s struggles</h2>
<p>In the years following its <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/places/nigeria">independence from Britain</a>, Nigeria enacted pieces of legislation that systematically suppressed free and independent thinking. In his first reign over Nigeria between 1983 and 1985 General Muhammadu Buhari <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=V0FYXwY2sc8C&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=National+Association+of+Nigerian+Students+banned+buhari&source=bl&ots=X7gSWg7023&sig=2BTiFnFJWS6m0txz4gHYazSFtlE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJu4nNtu7PAhWhKsAKHY5tB84Q6AEINjAF#v=onepage&q=National%20Association%20of%20Nigerian%20Students%20banned%20buhari&f=false">banned</a> the National Association of Nigerian Students. He oversaw the arrests and detention of university students and sympathetic lecturers after students protested about the removal of subsidies on food and accommodation for students. </p>
<p>Buhari’s government also <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=SsCaOl0eXa4C&pg=PA173&dq=Nigerian+Medical+Association+buhari+dismisses&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjI3vP7tu7PAhUFKsAKHfNyBFEQ6AEIJTAA#v=onepage&q=Nigerian%20Medical%20Association%20buhari%20dismisses&f=false">dismissed</a> many academics in Health Sciences faculties across the country for participating in a strike called by the Nigerian Medical Association. </p>
<p>Institutions of higher learning, often because of anti-government protests, were <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=TbCRKwiUPtAC&pg=PA157&lpg=PA157&dq=Oyebade+nigeria+universities+closures&source=bl&ots=OHiCYnL2wz&sig=1bjFOrOQJTsF5cIN1qFKMykgQQw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU4-Cht-7PAhXpAMAKHcgIBEgQ6AEIMzAE#v=onepage&q=Oyebade%20nigeria%20universities%20closures&f=false">often closed</a> during the 1990s.</p>
<p>The government created the National Universities Commission and tasked it with ensuring Nigerian universities were adequately funded as well as allocating grants from the Federal Government to federally controlled universities. Through a set of decrees passed from 1974 to 1988, the NUC <a href="http://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ773123">ate away</a> at university senates’ autonomy.</p>
<p>Government also appointed “sole administrators” in the place of vice chancellors to oversee public universities. A 1975 decree gave the Federal Government and head of state total power to appoint and remove vice chancellors.</p>
<p>These measures were at least partly based on government suspicions that universities were breeding grounds for secessionist ideas. The government’s interventions robbed Nigerian universities of financial, academic and administrative autonomy. They also contributed to <a href="http://search.proquest.com/openview/21841be9e1e07d88c7fa98f7fcf499b6/1.pdf?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=48673">an exodus</a> of academics from the country’s universities – and from Nigeria itself.</p>
<h2>Politics is dangerous</h2>
<p>The politicisation of academia, then, definitely contributes to a decline in academic standards. This is a situation South Africa must work hard and fast to avoid. Yet, South Africa seems utterly reluctant to look elsewhere on the continent for lessons or learn from others’ experiences.</p>
<p>Two things are needed now: serious engagement and real leadership. Meetings, no matter how heated they get, offer an important space to improve relationships, gain understanding and develop a common approach towards decisively tackling the issue. </p>
<p>The department responsible for higher education must take the lead. Universities, students, the business community, industry and civil society all have a role to play too if South Africa is to find sustainable solutions. After all, this crisis has implications for the whole of society, now and for the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The politicisation of academia definitely contributes to a decline in academic standards. This is a situation South Africa must work hard to avoid. It can learn from others on the continent.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Research Fellow & Deputy Director, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/618762016-07-10T16:45:31Z2016-07-10T16:45:31ZGirls should be in school – not forced into marriage by powerful men<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129700/original/image-20160707-30710-7ak492.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Education can change girls’ lives: an extra year of education can raise a girl’s future wages by between 10% and 20%.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Albert González Farran – Unamid/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Naisiae⁺ is 15 years old. She belongs to Kenya’s Maasai tribe, is the first born in a family of six and her father died in 2012. In 2015, the teenager from Narok County graduated from primary school with slightly below average grades. </p>
<p>Naisiae was awarded a scholarship by a local civil society organisation so that she’d be able to repeat the year at a different school, improve her grades and move on to secondary schooling.</p>
<p>But Oloibon was having none of this. He had decided that Naisiae should be his ninth wife and, because he is the community’s chief priest, he’s allowed to do what he wants. And so Oloibon, who is in his 60s, married the teenager against her and her mother’s will.</p>
<p>Naisiae’s mother was devastated. She had no power to stop Oloibon from marrying her daughter – how dare she stop the chief priest from performing his “duties” in a society that measures a man’s wealth partially by counting his wives?</p>
<p>The girl’s education is finished. Her dream of going on to university and being able to support her family one day is just a mirage. And her story, sadly, is not unusual among Africa’s pastoralist and semi-pastoralist communities.</p>
<h2>Girls’ education benefits everyone</h2>
<p>African governments and civil society organisations have made huge <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-needs-to-be-done-to-keep-child-marriages-trending-down-43419">gains</a> in ensuring that girls go to school and complete their education.</p>
<p>This, of course, has enormous benefits for both individual girls and societies at large. Programmes like the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/adolescent-girls-initiative">Adolescent Girls Initiative</a>, which evaluates economic outcomes among girls, have proved that education and training empowers girls to venture into non-traditional, non-farm employment. In some cases, their presence has bolstered employment figures outside a country’s farming sector by <a href="http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/11/18/090224b0831c9f8e/2_0/Rendered/PDF/Partnering0for00program0report02015.pdf">more than 14%</a>.</p>
<p>Research has also shown that one extra year of education increases a girl’s <a href="http://www.ungei.org/infobycountry/files/file_GirlsCount.pdf">future wages</a> by between 10% and 20%. And greater investments in girls’ education <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-07/the-economic-benefits-of-educating-women">raises a country’s</a> gross domestic product by close to 0.2% annually.</p>
<p>Sadly, as the story of Naisiae and Oloibon reveals, much remains to be done. In pastoralist communities particularly, girls’ lives are still entangled within a culture whose custodians happen to be men. The traditional cutting of female genitals and early marriage are far more of a priority there than a girl’s education. In Kenya, about <a href="http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/kenya/">one in every five girls</a> is out of school because of forced early marriages that were preceded by genital cutting.</p>
<p>This is not merely a Kenyan nor even just an African problem. Globally, about 60% of girls with no or less education are married by their <a href="http://www.icrw.org/child-marriage-facts-and-figures">18th birthday</a>. That’s <a href="http://www.icrw.org/child-marriage-facts-and-figures">compared with</a> 10% of their peers who’ve completed secondary education. It’s estimated that if the trend isn’t arrested now, more than <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/3/child-marriages-39000-every-day-more-than-140-million-girls-will-marry-between-2011-and-2020">140 million girls</a> will become child brides by 2020.</p>
<p>What can be done to avoid this statistic becoming a reality?</p>
<h2>Time for action</h2>
<p>In Naisiae’s case, the civil society organisation in question noticed that she did not meet the cut-off points for admission to a secondary school of her choice, visited her family and persuaded her to repeat Grade 8 at another primary school. It helped her to get a place at an academy in another faraway county near the Kenyan capital.</p>
<p>She went missing the night before she was due to report to her new school.</p>
<p>Nobody knows who colluded with Oloibon in planning this forced marriage. The civil society organisation has tried to track him down, to no avail – at the beginning of the school term in May 2016 he was apparently on “honeymoon” with his child bride at a coastal resort. The authorities don’t want to pursue the case: Oloibon is, after all, a powerful chief priest.</p>
<p>By telling Naisiae’s story, the African Population and Health Research Centre – where I work – and civil society organisations hope to push those who bear a duty into taking action.</p>
<p>In the short term, it’s time for countries’ laws to be applied. Both Kenyan and international law have declared it <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/highlights-of-the-marriage-act-2014/">illegal</a> to marry someone younger than 18. Those who break the law, as Oloibon has done, must be prosecuted.</p>
<p>Another way to start reversing this terrible trend is through education – the education of men, that is. Men in pastoralist and semi-pastoralist communities need to be taught about how important girls’ education is to everyone in a society. </p>
<p>For now, we wait for news of Naisiae. It’s time for her to come home and return to school. She is a child, not some man’s wife.</p>
<p><em>⁺ Not her real name</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61876/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moses Ngware receives funding from African Population and Health Research Center. He is affiliated with the African Population and Health Research Center.
</span></em></p>Girls’ lives are still entangled in a culture whose custodians happen to be men.Moses Ngware, Senior Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/338692014-11-07T13:24:16Z2014-11-07T13:24:16ZHow activist groups became a force in workplace relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63849/original/xnzwtrzk-1415262918.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Groups like Stonewall have become big players in the workplace</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/paris_corrupted/4806226513/in/photolist-8jHaGn-oXykAz-oFkGip-oFjUaz-oXMYJC-oFkFKR-oVMU5J-oXPScD-oXPMyF-oFkE5M-oXykPR-oFkaib-oXPPze-oXyg8B-oFjVH4-oFkcjL-oXMYWm-oXMZAN-oXMXaq-oXMXVy-oFjYD4-oFkpQq-8fnSHT-oVMWVd-oXMWuN-8dFjam-a3fxL6-a3iz4o-a3iQzu-a3fHCB-dSD8c-2stds-8dC6vx-a3Zbfm-4uEiE2-a3ixKU-a3fy5v-a3fG9Z-a3fHP8-a3izHA-a3iuEq-a3fFwn-a3fGFB-a3fCX6-a3fG24-a3fyMc-a3iy6j-a3itDG-a3iyVE-a3iuAu">Linzi</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A key event in the British employment calendar is the publication of the <a href="http://www.stonewall.org.uk/at_work/stonewall_top_100_employers/default.asp?fontsize=large">Workplace Equality Index</a> each January. It is a ranking of the top-100 “gay-friendly” employers by Stonewall, the UK’s main campaigning organisation for lesbian, gay and bisexual people.</p>
<p>In a similar vein, campaigning by community network Citizens UK has helped bring to prominence the notion of the living wage – a wage calculated to provide a minimum decent standard of living to workers who receive it. The latter’s sister organisation, the Living Wage Foundation, operates a procedure through which more than 1000 employing organisations have been accredited as living wage employers.</p>
<p>Both are examples of civil society organisations’ growing role in employment relations. According to our research, <a href="http://eprints.port.ac.uk/5437/">there are</a> now about 400 such organisations trying to influence domestic employment in the UK. They usually rely on charitable donations and grants and sometimes also contracts with government to provide services to fund their activities. </p>
<p>They include advisory and advocacy organisations such as Citizens Advice; equality organisations such as Age UK, Action On Hearing Loss and Arthritis Care; and campaigning organisations concerned with single issues like safety at work or bullying. </p>
<h2>What they do</h2>
<p>Over the past three decades, British employment relations have become more complex and fragmented. Where once there were just trade unions there are now multiple channels of worker voice. Activist organisations form part of that by providing work-related services to individuals, helping to develop government policy and shaping employment practices beyond the letter of the law. </p>
<p>For workers, they provide information, advice and advocacy (some such as Citizens Advice concentrate on this kind of work). They also help workers find or retain work and build careers. For example Women in Film and Television <a href="http://www.wftv.org.uk/mentoring-scheme">offers</a> training, mentoring, networking and job-placement services. This is a different approach to trade unions, who would typically only support training within the employer organisation. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63851/original/wz4ss2cg-1415267054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The alternative to union advice?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&searchterm=citizens%20advice&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=195347045">Duncan Andison</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In their dealings with the different branches of government, civil society groups sometimes seek to exert pressure through publicising an issue. But more frequently they behave as political insiders, responding to government requests for information and advice, serving on commissions and committees, and often receiving substantial funding to provide services or help implement policy. Much of this is of course equally true of trade unions, with whom these groups sometimes form alliances to secure particular changes to the law. </p>
<p>Stonewall’s Workplace Equality Index is an example of an attempt to influence employment practices beyond the law. Groups try to influence employers in numerous ways – offering corporate membership or developing partnerships to promote particular initiatives. Cancer charity Macmillan has for instance <a href="http://www.macmillan.org.uk/Cancerinformation/Livingwithandaftercancer/Workandcancer/Workandcancer.aspx">worked with</a> the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development to promote good practice around workers with cancer.</p>
<p>Identifying good practice and enshrining it in voluntary codes, advice or standards is another common strategy – and was the most striking finding in our research. Groups offered things like training and consultancy, written guides, audit tools, benchmarking, award schemes and accreditation. </p>
<p>They sell these packages by strongly articulating the business case for diversity – tangible performance benefits, corporate reputation and so forth. And often they appear to have succeeded: employers have broadly embraced diversity management since the 1980s, and many want to develop positive “employer brands” through high-profile policies of corporate social responsibility. </p>
<h2>Why employment?</h2>
<p>There are several reasons why these groups have become more involved in employment issues. Most obviously, there has been an urgent need. Carers UK and Independent Age have, for instance, been drawn into campaigning on work-life balance because their constituents face major problems in combining paid employment with child and eldercare.</p>
<p>The rise of social activism since the 1960s has also played a part in making the likes of older people, GLBTI people, and more latterly faith groups more assertive. Activist groups saw an opportunity to help governments develop relevant policies and then to help employers interpret and implement the laws that emerged. The private voluntary regulation then uses the law as a base from which to further extend.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63852/original/bg3xqysw-1415267333.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The rise of social activism has made such groups an inevitable workplace presence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&search_tracking_id=drz9KGOjMqBHM-tP8C2SAg&searchterm=social%20activism&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=146645084">Kunai Mehta</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19521535">The decline of trade union membership and collective bargaining</a> in recent decades was also an opportunity. This has been particularly relevant to general advocacy groups such as Citizens Advice and groups whose campaign themes draw them to largely non-union sectors like construction – over migrant workers’ rights, for example. </p>
<p>Yet these organisations don’t only thrive where unions are absent. Many are most active in the heavily unionised public sector for precisely the same reasons as unions: the “good employer” tradition renders management receptive. And unions have also adapted to the rise of new social movements themselves, negotiating collective agreements that recognise equality in gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation and so on. Partly for this reason, unions and civil society organisations commonly work jointly and often reinforce rather than replace one another.</p>
<h2>Pros and cons</h2>
<p>So how do civil society organisations fare in employment overall?
When it comes to representing individuals, they have the advantage of being attuned to the distinct needs of their constituents. But their main weakness is that generally they don’t have a presence at the workplace – unlike trade unions – which limits their ability to make decisive interventions. They also often only have modest resources to commit. </p>
<p>In these austerity years the government has been reluctant to introduce further labour market regulation. Many organisations’ dependence on state funding also risks pushing them to a more consensual or less controversial agenda than their constituents may require. </p>
<p>Activist groups’ efforts to develop private voluntary codes with employers are meanwhile susceptible to the same weaknesses as any voluntary regulation: the incentive to comply is <a href="http://www.ippr.org/publications/what-price-a-living-wage-understanding-the-impact-of-a-living-wage-on-firm-level-wage-bills">often</a> highly variable between employers and over time. The same is true with employers’ accreditation systems. Stonewall has developed audit methods to get around this difficulty, but it remains a potential weakness. </p>
<p>Finally there is a downside to how these groups work with trade unions. They commonly told us they had constructive relationships, but that is often where they are jointly lobbying for a policy. In other areas, the relationship <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/community-unionism-jo-mcbride/?K=9780230572508">has sometimes</a> been more fraught. Unions complain about civil society organisations dealing directly with employers “over the heads” of workers and their representatives, while civil society organisations counter that unions are neglecting the needs of their worker constituents. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/63853/original/q7m4xrh2-1415267690.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relations between activists and trade unions could be better.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?safesearch=1&search_type=keyword_search&extra_html=1&lang=en&language=en&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&use_local_boost=1&searchterm=trade%20union&show_color_wheel=1&media_type=images&page=1&sort_method=popular&inline=112197956">1000 Words</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To the extent the two sides can overcome their differences, they can help one another. To address the big problem of civil society organisations’ relative absence from the workplace, there may be scope for more joint work with unions focusing specifically on workplace activity. This could help ensure the activist campaigns, policies and codes are sustained over time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Heery receives funding from Nuffield Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve has received funding from the Nuffield Foundation.
</span></em></p>A key event in the British employment calendar is the publication of the Workplace Equality Index each January. It is a ranking of the top-100 “gay-friendly” employers by Stonewall, the UK’s main campaigning…Edmund Heery, Professor of Employment Relations, Cardiff UniversitySteve Williams, Reader in Employment Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.