tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/corruption-scandal-25790/articlesCorruption scandal – The Conversation2022-05-31T13:32:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1832622022-05-31T13:32:54Z2022-05-31T13:32:54ZPolitical debates in Kenya: are they useful or empty media spectacles?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463922/original/file-20220518-23-xadjx7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eight presidential candidates on stage during Kenya's first presidential debate in 2013.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joan Pereruan/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is a few months to Kenya’s <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/editions/kenya-election-2022/">August 2022 general election</a>. That means it is time for the theatrical, skeleton-revealing spectacle also known as the political debate.</p>
<p>Televised political debates in Kenya started in 2013 and have had a chequered history.</p>
<p>In the first debates, eight presidential aspirants met over two sessions that were broadcast on multiple television and radio stations. The sessions <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/2/26/sparks-fly-in-kenyan-presidential-debate">drew in</a> millions of listeners and viewers. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2013.869929">one study</a> argued that the debates were more a performance that failed to provide the electorate with enough information on which candidate to elect. </p>
<p>In 2017, there was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iCGy5NYkqo">televised</a> debate between the eight candidates for governor of Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi. They traded barbs, accusing each other of corruption, shady business deals, crime and weak leadership. </p>
<p>The live audience loved it, laughing at the particularly potent allegations. </p>
<p>Nairobi voters eventually elected <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/08/07/the-sonkonization-of-nairobi-how-mike-sonko-is-reshaping-city-politics/">Mike Sonko</a>, a controversial, flashy politician whose popularity can partly be traced to his <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-08-13-the-rise-and-fall-of-mike-sonko-nairobis-matatu-king/">public displays of generosity</a>. These include providing free public services, such as garbage collection, that are otherwise the role of local government.</p>
<p>During the televised debate, Sonko was accused of having a criminal record. Over the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56269628">course of his five-year term</a>, he was charged with gross misconduct and faced several corruption allegations. He eventually <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2020/03/sonko-defends-move-to-handover-key-functions-to-national-govt/">handed over</a> the running of key functions in the county to the national government. </p>
<p>Political debates have become part of the election calendar. They are organised, moderated and broadcast mostly by <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/kenyan-media-launches-presidential-debate-2022-n293607">commercial news media</a>. These platforms have played a leading role in proposing, organising and broadcasting them.</p>
<p>Their stated intention is to enable citizens to access comprehensive information that will help them decide whom to elect.</p>
<p>As the 2017 Nairobi gubernatorial race showed, a political debate is helpful in presenting candidates to the citizens, and allows some exposure of their backgrounds, plans, possible strengths and weaknesses. </p>
<p>But, useful as the political debate was in subjecting the Nairobi gubernatorial candidates to citizen scrutiny, it was not enough to change residents’ minds about Sonko potentially being a bad bet. </p>
<p>If a debate is the citizen’s primary source of information about the candidates running for a particular seat, that is too much weight for a two-hour event to carry. </p>
<p>Debates are culminating events, held as an election season comes to an end. They cannot replace the electorate’s need for the granular, mundane, day-to-day information about candidates and what they stand for. </p>
<h2>What can go wrong</h2>
<p>Election cycles around the world are seen as tangible evidence of democracy. They allow citizens to elect leaders whose policies, views and experience will enable accountable and useful representation. </p>
<p>In principle, the political debate is a forum to showcase these aspiring leaders’ visions.</p>
<p>It is a lofty goal, however, given that in every general election, the Kenyan voter elects <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-influence-and-heroism-the-allure-of-political-power-in-kenya-177171">six representatives</a>. These are the president, governor, senator, women’s representative, member of parliament and ward representative.</p>
<p>In 2013, the political debates focused on presidential and deputy presidential candidates. The presidential debate was organised and broadcast by leading commercial media houses. The debate between deputy presidential candidates was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/02/deputy-presidential-debate-thursday-night/">co-organised</a> by a coalition of churches and a private university. </p>
<p>In 2017, more political debates were planned as independent players got involved. </p>
<p>The Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations, for instance, partnered with other organisations to organise a <a href="http://www.kara.or.ke/index.php/2015-01-22-08-51-09/kara-news/261-service-delivery-kara-accredited-as-an-election-observer">series of debates</a> among aspirants for seven county governor seats. </p>
<p>This year, attempts were made to assess the ability of community and local language media to get involved in carrying out debates. The idea was that these forums would focus on bringing together aspiring governors, senators and women’s representatives from more of Kenya’s 47 counties. </p>
<p>Community and local language media platforms tend to provide information for particular geographic or ethno-cultural zones. Their regional reach works for the seats for which they are being assessed. </p>
<p>But the idea has run into trouble, provoking a <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001442764/media-groups-split-on-mucherus-debate-taskforce">spat</a> between sections of Kenya’s mainstream media and the cabinet secretary in charge of information and communication, Joe Mucheru. </p>
<p>The issue revolved around the government’s appointment by <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MjU4MA--/Vol.CXXIV-No.61/">gazette notice</a> of a working group. They were given the job of assessing the ability of community and local language media to hold political debates. </p>
<p>Beyond the differences of opinion over the setting up of the working group, a number of issues arise. </p>
<p>First, who will accommodate the need for information about MP aspirants in Kenya’s 290 constituencies? Or the thousands who will vie for the 1,450 ward representative seats, particularly just months to the elections? </p>
<p>Second, as dramatic and exciting as the debates are, candidates don’t always participate. In 2017, there were <a href="https://hivisasa.com/posts/video-buzeki-speaks-after-mandago-failed-to-show-up-for-gubernatorial-debate">gubernatorial candidates</a> in several counties – among them incumbent holders of the seat – who <a href="https://karakenya.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/omar-shahbal-face-off-in-mombasa-gubernatorial-debate/">didn’t show up</a>. </p>
<p>That same year, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/6/kenyas-uhuru-kenyatta-pulls-out-of-election-debates">incumbent president and his main opponent</a> declined to attend their debates, citing event format concerns. This denied citizens the opportunity to ask questions or hear aspirants’ plans. </p>
<p>Third, debates are usually held at the end of the political campaign season. The number of political candidates and the format of debates don’t usually allow citizens to gain sufficient understanding of each aspirant’s agenda. </p>
<h2>Making it right</h2>
<p>As governance researcher John Ahere <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2020.630684/full">observed</a>, democracy in East Africa is nuanced. The appearance of democracy is not always the same as its lived reality. </p>
<p>Citizens are often treated as bystanders in democratic governance – valuable once every five years when aspiring leaders seek their votes.
The rest of the time, citizens have little say over why poverty is widespread, for instance, or why <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/-kenyans-worse-off-under-uhuruto-report--3772824">theft of public resources</a> remains pervasive. </p>
<p>The performance of elected officials, therefore, needs sustained coverage beyond the election. This needs to be done by the media. Once the election is over, there is an opportunity for all media – commercial, community and public – to commit to extensively covering the work of all legislative and executive leaders during their five-year terms of service. </p>
<p>By doing this, news media would be showing its value as an institution within Kenyan democracy, as described by journalism scholar <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/JMCS/article-full-text/343D5DF61867">Mwangi Michael Kamau</a>. </p>
<p>Under this scenario, future political debates could cement the electorate’s knowledge of whom to elect. </p>
<p>This would be based on a grounded understanding that as citizens, they are central actors – rather than peripheral observers – in the evolution of their democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183262/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wambui Wamunyu is affiliated with the Kenya Editors' Guild. </span></em></p>In principle, political debates should showcase an aspiring leader’s vision. It’s a lofty goal given their current format in Kenya.Wambui Wamunyu, Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, Daystar UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1681342021-09-23T14:11:27Z2021-09-23T14:11:27ZWhistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn’t be at their peril<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421871/original/file-20210917-23-dv2093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Numerous corruption scandals have been reported in South Africa in recent times. The extent of corruption in the country has been laid bare at the judicial commission probing allegations of <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> over the past three years. Corruption can impede a country’s economic growth, and undermine democratic principles, stability and trust. </p>
<p>Whistle-blowing is one of the mechanisms used to deter corruption. It plays a role in encouraging accountability, transparency and high standards of governance in both the private sector and public institutions. Whistleblowers help combat criminal conduct and should thus be afforded protection by the state. But South Africa’s system is flawed. </p>
<p>Recently, the country was shocked by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/babita-deokarans-murder-will-deter-whistleblowers-from-speaking-out-says-goodson-20210826">murder</a> of a woman who had exposed corruption in <a href="https://www.unisa.ac.za/static/corporate_web/Content/News%20&%20Media/Articles/Documents/Covid-19%20Personal%20Protective%20Equipment%20(PPE)%20corruption%20scandals.pdf">the procurement</a> of COVID-19 personal protective equipment. </p>
<p>As an academic, I’ve done work on the importance of whistleblowers in general, and on the possibility of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292689589_The_Protected_Disclosures_Act_26_of_2000_the_Companies_Act_71_of_2008_and_the_Competition_Act_89_of_1998_with_regard_to_whistle-blowing_protection_Is_there_a_link">paying incentives to people who blow the whistle on tax evasion</a>.</p>
<p>This is one way in which the role of whistleblowers could be elevated. There are others too, such as harnessing special courts to try cases. For example I support calls for physical security to be provided to whistleblowers and their families. I also believe that whistle-blowing should be made national strategic priority. This would enable the country develop an <a href="http://www.africanplatform.org/fileadmin/Content/PDF/Resources/Publications/HeroesUnderFire.pdf">environment for transparency</a> and accountability. </p>
<h2>Protection of whistleblowers</h2>
<p>South Africa has seen a fair number of whistleblowers raising the alarm on irregularities and corruption. The outcome for the individuals in a lot of the cases point to the fact that they don’t get the protection they deserve.</p>
<p>Notable examples include <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/whistleblower-doctor-claims-victory-387905">Paul Theron</a>, the prison doctor who exposed poor health conditions at Pollsmoor Prison in the Western Cape. </p>
<p>Dr Theron was suspended after he made the disclosures to parliament. He battled to get his case heard in the whistle-blowing process. But he finally ended up in the Labour Court. He was never reinstated.</p>
<p>There’s also the famous case of <a href="http://www.africanplatform.org/fileadmin/Content/PDF/Resources/Publications/HeroesUnderFire.pdf">Mike Tshishonga</a>, a civil servant who made serious allegations to the media about a former Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. He was immediately suspended and subjected to a disciplinary inquiry. </p>
<p>The matter took many years to be resolved ending up in the Labour Appeal Court. </p>
<p>The most notable recent case was the murder of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/babita-deokarans-murder-will-deter-whistleblowers-from-speaking-out-says-goodson-20210826">Babita Deokaran</a>. She had exposed corruption within the Gauteng province’s health department prior to her death. </p>
<p>It is evident from these examples that the South African whistle-blowing environment is failing to encourage people to come forward.</p>
<h2>What’s in place</h2>
<p>South Africa has various pieces of legislation and regulatory policy documents that cover corruption and whistle-blowing. They also provide for the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292689589_The_Protected_Disclosures_Act_26_of_2000_the_Companies_Act_71_of_2008_and_the_Competition_Act_89_of_1998_with_regard_to_whistle-blowing_protection_Is_there_a_link">protection of whistleblowers</a>.</p>
<p>The most important of these is the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/protected-disclosures-amendment-act-5-2017-english-afrikaans-2-aug-2017-0000">Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000</a>. The act aims to encourage whistle-blowing in the workplace. It also seeks to create a culture that makes it easier to disclose information about criminal and other irregular conduct.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>, the <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/za/za091en.pdf">Labour Relations Act</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/companies-act">Companies Act</a> are also part of the whistle-blowing legislative framework. </p>
<p>For its part, the <a href="https://www.compcom.co.za/">South African Competition Commission</a> encourages “authorised whistle-blowing” on cartels involved in, among other things, price fixing and collusive tendering.</p>
<p>In addition, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/prevention-and-combating-corrupt-activities-act-0">Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act</a> seeks to strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption. It places a duty on certain people holding positions of authority to report certain corrupt transactions.</p>
<p>The Protected Disclosures Act lists the <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/AboutUs/TheAuditor-General.aspx">Auditor-General</a> and the <a href="http://www.publicprotector.org/">Public Protector</a> as institutions that whistleblowers can disclose information to. Both are important in achieving the purposes of the Act and are equipped with specialists to deal with corruption and other illegal activities. But they should receive additional funding to do their jobs better.</p>
<p>South Africa’s regulatory framework is one of the best in the world. But there are gaps in the system. </p>
<h2>Steps to strengthen the system</h2>
<p>South Africa should consider setting up an independent whistle-blowing institution. This would help whistleblowers from the time they make disclosures. It could ensure:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the confidentiality of information flow </p></li>
<li><p>the protection of their identities </p></li>
<li><p>mapping the way forward for them.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This would enhance the current system. It would also showcase the important role these <a href="https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-09-29-sa-needs-a-speak-out-culture-and-whistleblowers-are-recognised-as-patriots/">heroes and heroines play</a>. </p>
<p>I also think that the country should consider using dedicated specialised courts and units that deal specifically with corruption and whistleblower protection. This would:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>show that government is serious about dealing with criminal and illegal activities that have high social and economic costs</p></li>
<li><p>send a clear message that the full impact of the law will be felt by perpetrators and,</p></li>
<li><p>show a serious commitment to upholding a value-system where whistleblowers are valued and protected.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Employers should have a zero-tolerance policy in dealing with corruption and other irregular activities. Internal procedures sometimes lack a proper commitment to follow up issues raised by whistleblower. Often no feedback is provided or nothing is done. </p>
<p>I support the suggestion by the Open Democracy Advice Centre that the development of a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23258/">“Code of Good Practice”</a> would help. It sets out a full and considered guidance to private and public bodies on interpretations of the law, implementation of whistle-blowing policies, and alternative mechanisms for preventing corruption </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340755929_Whistle-Blowing_for_Reward_-_Friend_or_Foe_Exploring_a_Possible_Tax_Whistle-Blowing_Programme_in_South_Africa">my research</a> I support calls for the remuneration of whistleblowers. For example, they could be eligible for a financial reward based on the amount of tax revenue eventually collected.</p>
<p>Lessons can be learned from the US which has strong whistle-blowing protections. These include the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/civil/false-claims-act">False Claims Act</a> which allows private citizens to file suit on behalf of government when they have evidence of fraud. Such citizens who recover money or assets are entitled to rewards for their efforts.</p>
<p>Another is the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-financial-regulatory-reform-bill.asp">Dodd-Frank Act</a>. It provides for a reward of between 10% and 30% of the amounts collected if an “eligible whistleblower” voluntarily provides original information.</p>
<p>These measures can be easily adopted by South Africa where compensation is wholly inadequate. The compensation cap provided for in the Protected Disclosures Act in line with the limits under the Labour Relations Act is not sufficient. For example, in the case of an unfair labour practice the employee would be entitled to a maximum of 12 months’ compensation and in the case of automatically unfair dismissal to a maximum of 24 months’ compensation. </p>
<p>Another problem is that it only kicks in when the whistle-blowing employee has suffered an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317473911_Minister_for_Justice_and_Constitutional_Development_v_Tshishonga_2009_9_BLLR_862_L">“occupational detriment”</a>. For example, when a employee faces disciplinary action, dismissal, suspension, demotion, harassment, intimidation, or transfer against his or her will.</p>
<p>It is time for business and political leaders as well as civil society organisations to push harder for a system where speaking up is normalised and whistleblowers are adequately protected. And rewarded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monray Marsellus Botha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa has seen a fair number of whistleblowers raising the alarm on irregularities and corruption – the most recent was murdered.Monray Marsellus Botha, Head of Department & Associate Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/745772017-03-29T06:25:10Z2017-03-29T06:25:10ZJustice for all? Spanish lessons on corruption and ‘draining the swamp’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162737/original/image-20170327-3308-1xv15uf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1069%2C2206%2C1202&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A civil guard informs people of an ongoing raid as part of a corruption probe in Torrejon de Ardoz near Madrid, Spain.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/SPAIN-CORRUPTION--D1BETNUTAXAB.html">REUTERS/Andrea Comas</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Corruption has become a major issue in political agendas across the world, from Donald Trump’s promise to “<a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/trump-pledges-to-drain-the-swamp">drain the swamp</a>” to the impeachment of South Korea’s president <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/south-korean-president-impeached-from-office-over-corruption-scandal/2017/03/09/23666a46-0488-11e7-a391-651727e77fc0_story.html?utm_term=.51c65630040c">Park Geun-hye</a> over cronyism claims.</p>
<p>No country gets close to a perfect score in Transparency International’s <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016">2016 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)</a>, which annually ranks nations by their perceived levels of corruption, <a href="http://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/corruption">defined as</a> “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Last year, the global average score was 43, indicating endemic corruption in the public sector of more than half the countries in the world.</p>
<p>Spain is a salient example of this global trend. Over the last decade, the country has been plagued with <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20160128/nine-spanish-corruption-scandals-that-will-take-your-breath-away">high-profile corruption scandals</a> involving money embezzled from regional governments and mismanagement in local-level urban planning and construction.</p>
<p>Clichéd cultural explanations do not sufficiently explain the breadth and depth of this crisis. As early as 1748, Montesquieu described Spaniards in his seminal work, <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol.txt">The Spirit of the Laws</a>, as naturally obedient and generally indolent as a consequence of Catholicism and the mild Mediterranean climate. But this prejudiced view <a href="http://elpais.com/diario/2009/03/27/opinion/1238108412_850215.html">muddles</a> cause and effect, because a culture of corruption is not the ultimate factor that undermines legal and political institutions.</p>
<p>On the contrary, countries develop a culture of distrust and dishonesty between different branches of society as a consequence of high levels of corruption.</p>
<h2>A deceiving accountability</h2>
<p>Spain is a good case study for understanding the institutional causes of corruption. In 2013, the country <a href="http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results">dropped</a> ten places – to 40 out of 177 – in CPI. In other words, at the height of the <a href="http://fortune.com/2015/05/11/spain-economic-recovery/">Spanish financial crisis</a> that destroyed over three million jobs, corruption <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-corruption-transparency-idUSBRE9B204Z20131203">rose faster</a> in Spain than anywhere else in the world except war-torn Syria.</p>
<p>The economic debacle stimulated a debate about corruption, which became fierce amid <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/opinion/krugman-europes-austerity-madness.html">austerity measures</a> imposed by the Partido Popular (PP) government. Two new political parties, the leftist <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-you-ready-for-a-new-kind-of-left-wing-politics-33511">Podemos</a> and the centre-right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/13/ciudadanos-podemos-of-right-political-force-spain-albert-rivera">Ciudadanos</a> made corruption a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c1620496-56db-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2">central issue</a> in their platforms.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162728/original/image-20170327-3276-qy27bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy at a People’s Party (Partido Popular) event.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/Download/Order/MCSrrSLI5yDWC9.UchFuCjbnTxyy2pu3LUvwRZbx@X@j02NKN2372ZKzGYwqCaCMe55393049626">Albert Gea/Reuters</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Spain’s attempts to limit corruption have subsequently intensified, with corruption investigations, arrests and prosecutions on the rise. The high-profile convictions in February 2017 of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c1d87e5e-f500-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608">Iñaki Urdangarin</a> – former Duke of Palma and husband to Princess Cristina, the youngest sister of Spain’s King Felipe VI – and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/25/former-imf-head-rodrigo-rato-on-trial-over-bankers-luxury-sprees">Rodrigo Rato</a> – former deputy prime minister under José María Aznar and former International Monetary Fund director – are seemingly landmarks in Spain’s struggle against corruption.</p>
<p>Urdangarin was <a href="http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2017/02/17/sentencia_caso_noos.pdf">sentenced</a> to more than six years of prison on charges that included fraud and tax evasion. He had been accused of embezzling around 6,000,000 euros in public contracts for conferences and sporting events through <a href="http://www.theolivepress.es/spain-news/2016/02/26/infanta-cristinas-husband-inaki-urdangarin-admits-company-had-ghost-workers/">the Nóos Institute</a>, a non-profit sporting company he ran.</p>
<p>Similarly, Rato was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/imf-boss-rato-sentenced-jail-embezzlement-170223175007508.html">handed</a> a sentence of four-and-a-half years for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/09/former-caja-directors-accused-credit-card-misuse-bankia">misusing corporate credit cards</a> while in charge of savings bank Caja Madrid and its successor, Bankia, from 2010 to 2011.</p>
<h2>The formula of corruption</h2>
<p>The appearance that Spain has achieved a great feat in transparency and accountability is deeply deceiving.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520074088">classic work</a> on corruption, political scientist Robert Klitgaard defines the <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ak8xdW1sY4sC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=monopoly%20%2B%20&f=false">formula</a> that favours the proliferation of illicit behaviour among public agents in the following terms: <em>monopoly + discretion – accountability</em>.</p>
<p>In other words, corruption flourishes whenever agents have monopoly power over clients, because they enjoy discretion and accountability is weak.</p>
<p>Both Rato’s and Urdangarin’s cases fit Klitgaard’s formula. Rato and other Bankia executives used uncontrolled corporate credit cards to rack up around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/23/former-imf-chief-gets-four-years-jail-after-corruption-trial-in-spain">12,000,000 euros</a> in undeclared expenses. This spending spree is particularly outrageous because Bankia was bailed out in 2012 for <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18213848">19 billion euros</a>, the largest corporate loss in Spanish history.</p>
<p>In relation to Urdangarin, the <a href="http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/constitucion.t2.html#t2">Spanish Constitution</a> acknowledges the King (sic) as head of state and broadly defines his functions but issues no norms on <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/espana/el-rey/ley-corona.html">central matters</a> like the King’s budget or which members of his family should be considered constituent elements of the Crown.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162729/original/image-20170327-3268-s1xz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iñaki Urdangarin leaves court after a hearing in Palma de Mallorca, Spain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/SPAIN-PRINCESS--RC12BEDB5D00.html">Reuters/Enrique Calvo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This regulatory gap granted Urdangarin a discretionary power. Exploiting his royal connections, he siphoned off millions in public funds from local governments.</p>
<p>The 2012 scandal triggered calls for the <a href="http://cadenaser.com/ser/2012/02/24/espana/1330044619_850215.html">abolition of the monarchy</a>. King Juan Carlos was not implicated in the investigation, but it was causal in his <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/king-juan-carlos-of-spain-plans-to-abdicate-9469433.html">2014 abdication</a> to make way for his son, Felipe.</p>
<p>The real problem, however, is that neither Urdangarin nor Rato is really facing the consequences of his actions.</p>
<h2>Justice, equal but different for all</h2>
<p>In his 2011 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Vo1A6MzF14">Christmas speech</a>, then-King Juan Carlos addressed Urdangarin’s scandal by promising that “justice” would be “equal for everyone”.</p>
<p>Today, his words amount to an insult for many Spaniards. Urdangarin and Rato have been formally convicted, but the lenient subsequent court proceedings in both cases have been perceived as a cruel mockery of justice.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NMusNLY5yT0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A parody of Urdagarin’s trial by Spanish comedians Los Morancos.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Though Urdangarin’s prosecutors requested that he pay bail of 200,000 euros to avoid going straight to prison, the court <a href="http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/02/23/actualidad/1487853566_315168.html">decided</a> that he should remain free without bail in Switzerland, where he currently lives, as he prepares to appeal his sentence.</p>
<p>Rato was similarly let <a href="http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2017/03/03/actualidad/1488530043_753467.html">free without posting bail</a> because the anti-corruption prosecutor did not ask the courts to take him into custody. Calling Rato’s behaviour during the trial “completely appropriate”, the Audiencia Nacional (National Court) saw “no need for precautionary measures”.</p>
<p>Social media <a href="http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170223/42258936323/condena-valtonyc-injurias-Twitter.html">exploded</a> in outrage after the judgements were published. Pablo Iglesias, the leader of Podemos, angrily contrasted Urdangarin’s and Rato’s impunity with the Spanish courts harshness toward individuals who oppose and resist the current political system, specifically referencing the <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/baleares/2017/02/22/58adc20f268e3e06758b4642.html">plight</a> of rapper Miguel Arenas Beltrán, aka Valtonyc, who was handed three-and-a-half years in prison for songs deemed to have insulted the Crown and to have promoted nationalist Basque terrorism.</p>
<p>“Injustice is different for each of us,” Iglesias <a href="https://Twitter.com/Pablo_Iglesias_/status/834742067897184256?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">tweeted</a> on February 23. “Songs will be written about this sentence and their authors will be condemned.”</p>
<p>“Only poor people go to jail,” <a href="http://www.publico.es/politica/libertad-expresion-rapero-valtonyc-pobres.html">declared</a> 23-year-old Valtonyc to the Spanish online newspaper Público. It will be quite difficult for him to fight the court’s decision. He now works at a grocery store and has spent all his savings in his legal defence.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"834765179434975232"}"></div></p>
<h2>Corruption: the spirit of wild capitalism</h2>
<p>Corruption thrives on impunity, whose roots certainly reach beyond the Mediterranean. They can be traced to the binding forces behind privileged elites of a global capitalist system that increasingly runs wild.</p>
<p>Cultural critic Slavoj Žižek <a href="https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=16+Cardozo+L.+Rev.+925&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=1b2c2beb1fe6ea66491d130f8b5977ba">asserts</a> that societies are bound together by their guilty secrets more strongly than by their public principles. Social acts of transgression “reaffirm the cohesion of the group” as “everybody pretends to know nothing” about them, or even “actively denies” their existence.</p>
<p>Corruption would therefore embody the “spirit” of wild capitalism. It binds us to the basic unwritten law of the system: anything is admissible if it helps you get richer. There are no moral or legal limits to the accumulation of capital. In the <a href="http://nypost.com/2015/05/28/ex-lehman-ceo-dick-fuld-everyone-to-blame-for-collapse-except-me/">words</a> of Richard Fuld, the former CEO of the now defunct Lehman Brothers: “Whatever it is, enjoy the ride. No regrets.”</p>
<p>In his last international trip as US president, Barack Obama <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cdab5192-ab55-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122">warned</a> that populist movements from the left and the right have risen across the world from “a suspicion of globalisation, a desire to rein in its excesses, a suspicion of elites and governing institutions that people feel may not be responsive to their immediate needs.”</p>
<p>But in Spain the courts have once again confirmed that powerful individuals have nothing to regret as they pursue wealth. The longer state institutions keep capitalism’s guilty secret, the harder it will be to break free. This Spain has now painfully learned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luis Gómez Romero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Can Spain learn from a decade marked by high-profile political corruption scandals involving money embezzled from regional governments and mismanagement in urban planning and construction?Luis Gómez Romero, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Legal Theory, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/708662017-01-05T17:58:38Z2017-01-05T17:58:38ZRamaphosa has what it takes to fix South Africa’s ailing ANC. But …<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151714/original/image-20170104-18647-21pae9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa celebrates his election as deputy president of South Africa's embattled governing ANC.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s deputy president <a href="http://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/987">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> has confirmed his availability to <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-i-am-available-to-lead-20161215">contest the presidency</a> of the governing <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/splash/index">ANC</a> at its 54th national conference later this year. He has already secured the endorsement of the South African Congress of Trade Unions <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2016-11-24-politics-live-why-cosatus-backing-is-a-big-deal-for-ramaphosa/">(Cosatu)</a>.</p>
<p>He failed in his bid to lead the party once before. Twenty years ago his comrades Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were chosen ahead of him for the top two jobs at the party’s <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-national-conference-1991-2013">1997 Mafikeng Conference</a>. If his dream is going to be realised this time he is going to have to take on a major task of convincing ANC branches of his suitability.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa will need a restoration and renewal narrative to convince them. He’ll need to show he has a plan to rebuild the party, and inspire its cadres sitting on the side-lines to join in his renewal efforts.</p>
<p>If successful, he will need to switch immediately to election campaigning mode. The country goes to the polls in 2019 and he will have to do everything in his powers to salvage the former liberation movement’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/sharp-tongued-south-african-voters-give-ruling-anc-a-stiff-rebuke-63606">declining electoral support</a>.</p>
<p>For South Africans at large, he will need to show how the ANC as a brand can reclaim its sentimental and inspirational traits to warrant their trust.</p>
<p>These tasks seem insurmountable when one considers the extent of damage done to the party since Zuma’s rise to power was solidified at the ANC’s bitterly divisive <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-11-02-polokwane-and-mangaung-shades-of-difference/#.WG36ext97IU">Polokwane conference in 2007</a>. But Ramaphosa has faced seemingly insurmountable tasks of building organisations in challenging times before. He has also served in various international organisations and has been a member of teams appointed to <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/cyril-ramaphosa-anthony-butler">help countries in transition</a>.</p>
<p>He will need to draw on all this experience to succeed.</p>
<h2>A history of organising under difficult conditions</h2>
<p>Born on November 17 1952, Ramaphosa is from a generation I <a href="http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=fwMoyHJCMfM">regard as the agitators</a> in the struggle for South Africa’s liberation. Inspired by <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-bikos-black-consciousness-philosophy-resonates-with-youth-today-46909">Steve Biko</a>, among others, this generation – born in the early 40s to late 60s – injected greater momentum to the fight against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p>As a young person Ramaphosa was an active member of the erstwhile <a href="http://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/ramaphosa-cm.htm">Student Christian Movement</a> (SCM) at Sekano-Ntoane High School in Soweto. His evangelical experience cannot be understated in the task that confronts him now. Much like the biblical character <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Nehemiah+2&version=NKJV&interface=am">Nehemiah</a>, his task is to inspire a dejected and hopeless people with a new vision.</p>
<p>That will not be a new experience for Ramaphosa. As historian Anthony Butler writes, while pursuing standard nine and ten at Mphaphuli High School in his parents’ village of Sibasa in Venda, he built a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/cyril-ramaphosa-anthony-butler">stronger SCM within a short time</a>. This was after he was elected to its leadership in the first year of his arrival.</p>
<p>The same happened when he went to study at the then University of the North (now University of Limpopo). The SCM was weak and seen by some as a tool of domination. Rhamaphosa worked tirelessly with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/frank-chikane">Frank Chikane</a> and others to turn it into a vibrant organisation. It became a vehicle of struggle when the Black Consciousness student movements <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/banning-south-african-students-organisation-saso-and-student-politics-1980s">were banned</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s claim to fame, however, is the work he did in founding the National Mineworkers Union (NUM) in the early 1980s. The NUM operated under the auspices of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/council-unions-south-africa-cusa-formed">Council of Unions of South Africa</a>. Until then, attempts to unite mineworkers and fight for their representation in the mines had <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/cyril-ramaphosa-anthony-butler">failed</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that Ramaphosa was able to build a union in a mining industry fraught with ethnic politics, worker fragmentation and a history of state-sanctioned exploitation attests to his organisation building capabilities. This is especially so considering that he had never worked on the mines himself.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s colourful leadership continued over the next three decades across various settings. He became the ANC’s chief negotiator during the country’s transition from apartheid to democracy, beating ANC president Oliver Tambo’s protégé, Thabo Mbeki, to the position. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa became the secretary general of the ANC at its <a href="http://www.incwajana.com/cyril-ramaphosa/">1991 National Conference in Durban</a> after out-campaigning Zuma. He was succeeded in the position in 1997 by <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/kgalema-petrus-motlanthe">Kgalema Motlanthe</a>, with whom he had worked at the NUM. </p>
<p>As the chief negotiator of the ANC he managed the negotiating committee. He showed great leadership, alongside the National Party’s counterpart Roelf Meyer when the talks broke down.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=752&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=752&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=752&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151726/original/image-20170104-18644-10uzn9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=944&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa holds the newly signed South African Constitution as President Nelson Mandela looks on.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ramaphosa became a member of parliament in 1994 and headed the constitutional assembly which <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/drafting-and-acceptance-constitution">drew up the final constitution</a> of the republic. This was finally approved – to international acclaim – in <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">1996</a>.</p>
<p>But after his crushing defeat by Mbeki to the post of deputy president in 1997 Ramaphosa went into business but maintained some involvement in politics. He was to make a sterling return 15 years later when he was elected ANC deputy president in 2012 at the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/53rd-national-conference-mangaung">53rd National Conference</a> in Mangaung.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa the businessman</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa was among the first beneficiaries of the first wave of <a href="http://www.gov.za/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment-summit">equity-based black economic empowerment deals</a> in 1997. In partnership with medical doctor and anti-apartheid activist <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nthato-harrison-motlana">Nthato Motlana</a> he joined <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=883851">New African Investment Limited</a>. From those early beginnings he was to form <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=25599686">Shanduka Group</a>, an unlisted entity with interests in resources, energy, real estate, banking, insurance and telecommunications. </p>
<p>He also chaired a number of South Africa’s largest companies, such as <a href="http://www.bidvest.com/downloads/pdf/Bidvest_Prod_Bro_Aug2013.pdf">Bidvest Group</a> and <a href="https://www.mtn.co.za/Pages/Home.aspx">MTN</a> and held non-executive board positions of others such as <a href="http://www.standardbank.co.za/standardbank/">Standard Bank</a> and <a href="http://www.ab-inbev.com/">SABMiller</a>.</p>
<p>His most <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-19-00-marikana-shootings-will-always-stalk-ramaphosa">controversial role</a> was as a non-executive member of the mining group Lonmin’s board. Shanduka was a minority shareholder in Lonmin, which owned the mine in Marikana <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-tragedy-must-be-understood-against-the-backdrop-of-structural-violence-in-south-africa-43868">where 34 miners were shot by police in 2012</a>.</p>
<h2>Leadership qualities</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa has the leadership experience to salvage the ANC and become a great president with a wide range of skills. He has the potential to restore hope at the top of the ANC following a period of mediocrity and scandal.</p>
<p>However, while he has a chance in convincing ANC members of his potential, the broader South African public will be even harder to convince. Firstly, as a key player at Lonmin, Ramaphosa is seen as having failed to improve the working conditions of the mineworkers he fought for in the 1980s. </p>
<p>Secondly, his relationship with Zuma, whom he has served as deputy president, has led to some awkward questions. Until last year he appeared to be complacent – or actively defended – Zuma even as the president became more deeply embroiled in alleged corruption scandals. This silence was evident even when Zuma was accused of violating the constitution Ramaphosa was party to creating.</p>
<p>It may be that Ramaphosa has the restoration and renewal narrative – as well as the organisational building skills and tenacity – to turn his own fate and that of the ANC around, but it’s going to be a ‘<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-05-ramaphosa-my-long-walk-has-not-yet-ended/#.WG4S0xt97IU">long walk</a>’ as he put it. Time will tell.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ongama Mtimka chairs the board of Isidima Development Council which seeks to advance socioeconomic transformation in the Eastern Cape. </span></em></p>Cyril Ramaphosa is in pole position to become president of South Africa’s ruling ANC, 20 years after he lost the position by Thabo Mbeki. But, it won’t be easy. Neither will rebuilding the party.Ongama Mtimka, Lecturer and PhD Candidate, Department of Political & Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/580262016-04-20T15:26:31Z2016-04-20T15:26:31ZSouth Africans still committed to national unity despite growing dissatisfaction<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119433/original/image-20160420-25631-me04bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=262">manifesto</a> for South Africa’s first democratic election that ended apartheid in 1994 pledged to deliver</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a democratic society based on equality, nonracialism and nonsexism [and] an economy which grows through providing jobs, housing and education.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But as this year’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/speeches/freedom-day-2016">Freedom Day</a> celebrations approach, the latest survey by a non-partisan research group suggests the country still has a long way to go in fulfilling these promises. Freedom Day is a public holiday marking the day on which the country held its first democratic elections. The survey was conducted in August-September 2015 by <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/events/how-much-progress-has-south-africa-made-1994">Afrobarometer</a>, a research network that conducts public attitude surveys across the continent.</p>
<p>On the positive side, South Africans remain optimistic about overcoming historical racial divisions and promoting social cohesion and national unity.</p>
<h2>Pessimism over economic conditions</h2>
<p>Almost two-thirds (64%) of South Africans say the country is heading in the wrong direction overall. This is up from less than half (46%) in the previous survey in 2011. This reflects growing discontent with the state of the national economy and leadership. </p>
<p>Analysis of the <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad83-despite-decline-in-lived-poverty-south-africans-pessimistic-about-economy">data over time</a> shows that public perceptions of the economy generally mirror objective performance measures. More than half the respondents in the 2015 survey rate the country’s economic conditions as “fairly bad” or “very bad”. This is almost double the negative sentiments during the boom years of 2004 and 2006.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119226/original/image-20160419-13901-1suw0uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Negative ratings of national and personal economic conditions, 2000-2015.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Citizens are also <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad82-post-1994-south-africa-better-than-apartheid-but-few-gains-in-socioeconomic-conditions">more disapproving</a> of the country’s current system of government, although they continue to rate it more highly than the apartheid regime. </p>
<p>Worryingly, optimism about the future has significantly declined since 2011. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=241&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=241&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=241&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119227/original/image-20160419-13910-sbwtjt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Average ratings of political system by race, 2015.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Analysis of this measure <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad82-post-1994-south-africa-better-than-apartheid-but-few-gains-in-socioeconomic-conditions">over time</a> shows that South Africans of all races were increasingly optimistic about the future between 2000 and 2006. This took a plunge following the <a href="http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/feature/2015/06/economic-impact-south-africa%E2%80%99s-energy-crisis">electricity</a> and <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-21-mbeki-resigns-before-the-nation">political crises</a> of 2008, before recovering in 2011.</p>
<h2>Pervasive disappointment</h2>
<p>A majority of respondents say that the country has failed to advance on a range of socioeconomic indicators. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>personal safety;</p></li>
<li><p>economic circumstances; </p></li>
<li><p>employment opportunities; </p></li>
<li><p>racial relations; and</p></li>
<li><p>disparities between rich and poor.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>On average, fewer than four in ten (37%) believe that these conditions are “better” or “much better” than in 1994. Nearly a quarter say they are the same and 38% say that they have deteriorated. The largest proportion (52%) of respondents see an improvement in race relations. Only 17% say that the gap between the rich and poor is “better” or “much better” since 1994.
</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119228/original/image-20160419-13919-1d5e177.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 3: Changes in socioeconomic conditions from 1994-2015.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This dissatisfaction is reflected in negative views of government performance in managing the economy. It is doing “very badly” or “fairly badly”, according to 66% of respondents. Other negative scores are: creating jobs (77%), reducing crime (77%), and narrowing the gaps between rich and poor (78%). On the positive side, six in ten (61%) give the government positive evaluations on uniting all South Africans into one nation.</p>
<h2>Material security still determined by race</h2>
<p>Government development plans have focused on redressing racial inequalities. These aim to improve most South Africans’ socioeconomic conditions. But Afrobarometer data show that access to basic necessities (food, clean water, medical treatment, cooking fuel and a cash income) differs substantially by race, location and education. </p>
<p> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119229/original/image-20160419-13901-9g4mnv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 4: Respondents who ‘never’ went without basic necessities in the previous year, by demographic and social indicators, 2015.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the introduction of social welfare and affirmative action programmes aimed at redressing the apartheid legacy, black South Africans continue to enjoy significantly lower levels of material security than other race groups. Since 2000, on average, only two in ten (23%) black respondents have said they “never” went without basic necessities in the previous year, compared with 47% of coloured, 65% of Indian and 74% of white respondents. In South Africa, the term <a href="http://global.britannica.com/topic/Coloured">“coloured”</a> refers to people of mixed descent, while “Indian” refers to people of South Asian origin.</p>
<p>Public discontent with progress since 1994 is concerning, given national objectives to achieve an inclusive, united society by 2030. </p>
<p>Slightly more than half of South Africans believe that race relations have improved. But the proportion of citizens from minority race groups who believe that the government “always” or “often” discriminates against their ethnic group has <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad84-south-africans-generally-tolerant-but-report-racial-discrimination-by-employers-and-courts">increased considerably</a> since 2011. Furthermore, majorities of all South Africans say the courts and employers regularly discriminate against people based on their race, while more than one-third say the same about landlords.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119230/original/image-20160419-13910-h96qrn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 5: Perceptions of frequent racial discrimination, 2015.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-01-04-twitter-erupts-after-kzn-estate-agent-calls-black-people-monkeys">national furore</a> over a Durban realtor’s Facebook post in early January characterising black beach-goers as “monkeys” was a stark reminder of how far South Africa still has to go before achieving racial harmony. But survey findings on national identity and social cohesion are more encouraging: South Africans of all races identify strongly with being South African and large majorities believe that national unity is both desirable (87%) and possible (83%).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rorisang Lekalake does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As South Africa celebrates 22 years since the end of apartheid this month, a new survey by Afrobarometer suggests the country still has a long way to go in fulfilling the promises of freedom.Rorisang Lekalake, Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR)/Afrobarometer Assistant Project Manager for Southern Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/561892016-03-15T09:34:39Z2016-03-15T09:34:39ZHow Brazil missed its golden South-South co-operation moment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114959/original/image-20160314-11292-13q98zs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Brazilian president Lula da Silva's development aid programme has fizzled out.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Ueslei Marcelino</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Compared to China or India, Brazil is a relatively small player in development aid. Yet it has managed to <a href="http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Policy/Interview-Luiz-Inacio-Lula-da-Silva?ct=true">make a mark</a> in Africa and globally, especially under the leadership of charismatic <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luiz_In%C3%A1cio_Lula_da_Silva">Lula da Silva</a>.</p>
<p>From 2003 to 2010 Lula led an unprecedented <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292010000300013">shift in the country’s foreign policy</a> towards the global South. He also helped elevate Brazil to the status of a global player.</p>
<p>Back in 2010 the outlook was promising yet cautious. Brazil’s aid programme was dubbed a <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/16592455">“global model in waiting”</a>. Its potential was acknowledged but there were some tangible (institutional and operational) issues to address to <a href="http://www.odi.org/comment/4952-brazils-development-cooperation-south-global-model-waiting">fulfil its ambitions</a>. But, six years on, the expectant waiting has turned into tired disillusionment. </p>
<h2>An unrealised dream</h2>
<p>Brazil, it seems, is vanishing from the international development cooperation scene. This is happening before it has proved its South-South promise to be more than rhetorical hype. Many may never have been convinced by the South-South euphoria. Others may regard Brazil’s premature retreat as a missed opportunity. This article sways towards the missed opportunity view.</p>
<p>A comeback is needed. Yet, the omens do not look favourable. For the last couple of years, Brazil has been wrestling with major economic and political turmoil at home. This has severely hampered its engagement abroad. </p>
<p>The country is preparing to host the <a href="http://www.olympic.org/rio-2016-summer-olympics">Olympic Games</a> in a few months <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-construction-petrobras-idUSKCN0Q51LL20150731">amid concerns</a> about overpriced infrastructures and unfitting venues. The <a href="http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/">Zika epidemic</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-petrobras-strike-idUSL1N12Z3V520151105">strikes</a> add further strain.</p>
<p>And then the news of <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/brazil/">Lula’s</a> alleged connections to a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/americas/brazil-raid-luiz-incio-lula-da-silva.html?_r=0">mega corruption scandal</a>. This is a major blow to the image of success that Lula had so skillfully cultivated internationally. This is now on the verge of being irremediably tainted.</p>
<p>The “golden age” of Brazil’s South-South cooperation that marked Lula’s years in power is over, as suggested by researcher Laura Waisbich at a recent <a href="http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ConferenceProgramme-finaldraft.pdf">conference</a> on the rising powers and global development at the <a href="http://www.ids.ac.uk/">Institute of Development Studies</a> in the UK.</p>
<h2>The myth behind Brazil’s affinity with Africa</h2>
<p>On <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/02/04-brazil-global-ambitions-trinkunas">President Dilma Rousseff’s</a> watch Brazilian cooperation has, for the last couple of years, gradually receded to the backstage.</p>
<p>It is time to take stock of what happened. Several of the rhetorical claims of Brazilian cooperation need to be challenged. Brazilian actors need to be forced into a more self-critical and less self-centred attitude. </p>
<p>The myth of Brazil-Africa affinities based on common history, culture and racial kinship needs deconstructing. <a href="https://grakov-berlin.academia.edu/SusanneRess">Ethnographic research</a> by Susanne Ress, a postdoctoral researcher at Humboldt University of Berlin’s Center for Comparative and International Education, gives an account of the difficulties of striking the envisioned interaction and integration, not least because of the gap that separates Brazilians’ imaginaries of Africa and contemporary Africa. Afro-Brazilians and Africans are separated by different struggles and interests. </p>
<p>Also, the forthcoming work by Katia Taela, a doctoral researcher at Institute of Development Studies, exposes the myth of ‘sisterhood’ and ‘brotherhood’ by Brazilian aid workers towards their Mozambican counterparts. She also challenges claims of mutual learning.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://contestedagronomy.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/lidia-cabral-session-2.pdf">own research</a> shows that Brazilian researchers working on development projects in Mozambique are able to engage fruitfully with local counterparts more because of an individual’s personal attributes and attitudes than on presumed affinities and South-South credentials.</p>
<h2>Recipes that don’t translate</h2>
<p>There is also the questionable claim that Brazil’s recipes can fit in African contexts.</p>
<p>This is particularly noticeable in agriculture. Landscape-based similarity claims have been a particularly strong feature of <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15301765">Brazil in Mozambique</a>. This has led to parallels being drawn between Brazilian and African countries’ tropical geography which has justified the deployment of <a href="http://www.cnpm.embrapa.br/projetos/mocambique/download/ebook_paralelos/Livro_Paralelos.html">Brazil’s “tropical technology”</a>.</p>
<p>Other parallels have been drawn. For example, the presumed relevance of Brazilian concepts such as family farming and social struggles against agribusiness and modernisation. </p>
<p>Yet when they arrive in Africa, Brazilian imaginaries, technology, policy templates and political struggles land in a different context. They get reinterpreted and often <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15303247">reconfigured</a>.</p>
<p>The impact of Brazilian cooperation on the lives of those it was supposed to benefit has yet to be assessed. In the meantime, its impact on local politics and state-society interactions has already been <a href="http://www.future-agricultures.org/research/cbaa/8052-world-development-special-issue-china-and-brazil-in-african-agriculture">significant</a>. </p>
<p>Natacha Bruna, a researcher from <a href="https://www.facebook.com/OMRMZ.ORG/">Observatório do Meio Rural</a>, a Mozambican NGO, shared a critical view of Brazilian cooperation’s footprint in her country. It shows how <a href="http://www.prosavana.gov.mz/index.php">ProSAVANA</a> – a trilateral initiative between the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique – is regarded as a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/OMRMZ.ORG/photos/a.1481782735473895.1073741833.1417376985247804/1480564182262417/?type=3&theater">threat to local communities</a>.</p>
<h2>But there is still potential</h2>
<p>Yet, there are many exciting elements in the Brazilian development trajectory that deserve being more effectively incorporated into international development cooperation. These include policy interventions that tackle different development challenges in an integrated fashion. Examples include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21638333-developing-countries-have-started-weave-social-safety-nets-heres-how-they-should-do-it">Bolsa Família</a>, a conditional cash-transfers programme that tackles income poverty as well as education and health issues.</p></li>
<li><p>The practice of the “<a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-89102006000400003&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en">industrial-health complex</a>” whereby local health care industries are supported to develop national health systems. </p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="http://portal.mda.gov.br/portal/saf/maisalimentos/">More Food programme</a> that aims to boost the farming machinery industry, while raising family farmers’ productivity, increasing food production, and keeping youth in rural areas. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The problem is that these complex policy experiences have been tremendously simplified into transferable recipes where only <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15301492">certain components get through</a>.</p>
<p>Take agriculture. Agribusiness clusters, family farming mechanisation, peasant farming resistance, agroecological systems are all part of the mix. Yet they don’t arrive with the same weight in Africa. A predisposition towards modernisation and Green Revolution-type of interventions is also a factor. The Africa version of the More Food programme, for example, has largely promoted <a href="http://www.agrale.com.br/en/press/news/detalhes/349">four-wheel tractors</a>, overshadowing alternatives such as small-scale mechanisation solutions. This is an area where Brazil has plenty of <a href="http://www.mdpi.com/2076-3298/2/2/139">experience</a> that has apparently failed to permeate development cooperation.</p>
<p>So, yes, Brazilian cooperation has disappointed in many ways and its brand is under stress. But let’s not prematurely dismiss Brazil from international development cooperation on the basis of its exuberant rhetoric and sloppy performance. Brazilian actors have a meaningful role to play in sharing the country’s rich and complex experiences. </p>
<p>The challenge, of course, is avoiding ready-made recipes, marketed as tropical silver bullets, and focusing more on processes or ways of developing policies that suit local contexts. This approach is less amenable to quick wins and requires the sort of enduring engagement on the ground that Brazil is still far from delivering. And so the waiting continues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56189/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lídia Cabral has done research on Brazilian cooperation under the ‘China and Brazil in African Agriculture’ project (<a href="http://www.future-agricutures.org/research/cbaa">www.future-agricutures.org/research/cbaa</a>), supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (grant: ES/J013420/1) under the Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures programme.</span></em></p>Lula led an unprecedented shift in the country’s foreign policy towards the global South. He also helped elevate Brazil to the status of a global player. But, six years on, disillusionment reigns.Lídia Cabral, Doctoral researcher, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.