tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/democratic-values-28451/articlesDemocratic values – The Conversation2023-02-07T13:33:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1985782023-02-07T13:33:49Z2023-02-07T13:33:49ZLarge numbers of Americans want a strong, rough, anti-democratic leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507422/original/file-20230131-12-8h4a1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C8%2C2991%2C1985&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Americans, many of them Republicans, seek leaders who would violate basic principles of democracy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TrumpRally/f347757471f444fa94616d07038d354e/photo">AP Photo/Ben Gray</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It might be comforting to think that American democracy has made it past the Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection. But <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722003206">our research</a> shows that a wide range of the American people, of all political stripes, seek leaders who are fundamentally anti-democratic.</p>
<p>It’s true that many who participated in the insurrection are facing consequences, including <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/12/16/jensen-qanon-jan6-attack/">prison time</a>. Many candidates for state office who falsely claimed that Donald Trump won the 2020 presidential election <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2022-election/election-deniers-overwhelmingly-lost-battleground-states-rcna57058">lost their races</a>. And the congressional committee investigating the insurrection <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/19/trump-referrals-jan-6-committee/">voted to refer</a> Trump to the Department of Justice for criminal charges.</p>
<p>But more than 100 members of Congress who <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-the-capitol/2021/01/07/954380156/here-are-the-republicans-who-objected-to-the-electoral-college-count">objected</a> to the results of a free and fair election won their reelection campaigns. And at least seven people who attended the “Stop the Steal” rally on Jan. 6 have been elected to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/03/least-seven-jan-6-rallygoers-won-public-office-election-day/">state legislatures</a> and two have been elected to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/15/derrick-van-orden-jan-6-congress/">Congress</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oTq7_YIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Ndefs_gAAAAJ">interested</a> <a href="https://sites.allegheny.edu/politicalsci/faculty/brian-harward/">in</a> how committed citizens are to democracy, we wanted to measure whether regular Americans want someone who will abide by democratic traditions and practices or dispense with them. </p>
<p>Using a nationally representative sample of 1,500 respondents, we found that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722003206">a large proportion of Americans</a> are willing to support leaders who would violate democratic principles. </p>
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<h2>Support for anti-democratic leaders</h2>
<p>About two decades ago, an important study found that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613722">roughly 1 in 4 Americans</a> supported leaders who are uncompromising and take decisive action. These people said they would also prefer nonelected experts to make decisions. Our study replicates this finding nearly 20 years later but sheds light on a troubling reason for this preference.</p>
<p>At the Allegheny College Center for Political Participation, we, with our former student <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/candaisy-crawford-ab0141112/">Candaisy Crawford</a>, asked people about their willingness to support leaders who promised to protect them by any means necessary, even if that meant violating expected standards of behavior in a democracy, a set of principles often called “democratic norms.” We <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722003206">developed these questions</a> based on existing research about the strategies that leaders with anti-democratic tendencies use to build public support. </p>
<p>In Venezuela, for instance, democratic decline happened gradually. Early on, Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chavez was known for using <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/populism-in-europe-and-the-americas/populism-and-democracy-in-venezuela-under-hugo-chavez/FA3183273C9744A9A70FE4EBF71EB826">nationalist</a> language and calling opponents epithets like “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/dec/17/alexbellos">rancid oligarchs” and “squealing pigs</a>.” Later, he <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/18/decade-under-chavez/political-intolerance-and-lost-opportunities-advancing-human">blacklisted</a> those who sought his removal from office through a democratically conducted referendum. Eventually, he went further, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-amnesty-cases/factbox-jailed-and-exiled-opponents-of-venezuelas-chavez-idUSBRE8B60RU20121207">arresting and exiling</a> his political opponents. </p>
<p>These types of tactics have also been used in <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/">other nations</a>, such as Turkey and Hungary, by leaders who rose to power through democratic elections.</p>
<p>In our study, we asked about behaviors that foreshadow the early stages of democratic decline. For example, we asked citizens whether they thought that “the only way our country can solve its current problems is by supporting tough leaders who will crack down on those who undermine American values.” We also asked about explicit violations of democratic principles, like shutting down news organizations and “bending the rules to get things done.”</p>
<p>By design, some of these questions allow citizens to use their own interpretations of actions like “crackdowns” and “bending the rules.” These types of practices can take a number of different specific forms, as the cases of Venezuela, Turkey and Hungary illustrate. Our aim was to determine whether citizens were inclined toward leaders who seek power by promising retribution toward some groups and benefits for others, because this rhetorical strategy is often a precursor to explicit violations of democratic institutions.</p>
<p>Likewise, the phrasing of our questions is designed to allow respondents to rely on their own ideas about the meaning of “American values,” and “people like you.” Our interest was in what people would enable leaders to do to protect their idea of America and the Americans with whom they identify.</p>
<p>We found that people who want this type of protective but anti-democratic style of leadership were by far the most inclined to want leaders who would take uncompromising, decisive action. These people did not merely want their side to win a political competition for power. They were literally willing to say they would “bend the rules” to do it, a clear violation of the democratic ideal that everyone must follow the same rules.</p>
<p>For each item, we found that at least a third of the people we polled agreed or strongly agreed with these subtle or explicit violations of democratic norms. </p>
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<h2>Across the political spectrum</h2>
<p>Anti-democratic statements are embraced by members of both U.S. parties, but more commonly by Republicans.</p>
<p>For example, around 90% of Republicans would support tough leaders who crack down on groups that “undermine American values” – however the survey respondents define those values. More than half of Democrats take the same position. Perhaps even more notably, nearly half of citizens who strongly support the Republican Party and over a third of those who strongly support the Democratic Party endorse the view that it is acceptable to “bend the rules” for people like themselves to achieve political goals.</p>
<p>This echoes other research that has found Americans, on both sides of the political aisle, are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000052">willing to sacrifice</a> democratic principles and practices if it means their political party wins elections.</p>
<h2>An appetite for protection</h2>
<p>The key to understanding these views, we believe, is <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-securitarian-personality-9780190096489?cc=us&lang=en&">a desire for protection</a>.</p>
<p>Many Americans view those in the other party as existential <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/pp-2014-06-12-polarization-0-02/">threats to the country</a> – and <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/08/09/as-partisan-hostility-grows-signs-of-frustration-with-the-two-party-system/">closed-minded, dishonest, immoral and unintelligent</a> too. All this coexists with growing evidence that more people are willing to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-divided-america-including-the-15-who-are-maga-republicans-splits-on-qanon-racism-and-armed-patrols-at-polling-places-193378">support political violence</a> under <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo163195227.html">certain circumstances</a>.</p>
<p>Many citizens prefer leaders who are willing to undermine democracy if it means protecting people like themselves from groups that threaten their values or status. Although most Americans do not subscribe to these beliefs, a substantial portion of the country does. </p>
<p>Leaders who actively promise anti-democratic action may come and go, but we fear the appetite of many Americans for such actions may always be a persistent threat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tarah Williams receives funding from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) as a Public Fellow.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Bloeser and Brian Harward do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A large proportion of Americans is willing to support leaders who would violate democratic principles.Tarah Williams, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Allegheny CollegeAndrew Bloeser, Associate Professor of Political Science; Director, Center for Political Participation, Allegheny CollegeBrian Harward, Professor of Political Science, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1846242022-06-12T19:36:06Z2022-06-12T19:36:06ZWhy Muslim countries are quick at condemning defamation – but often ignore rights violations against Muslim minorities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468273/original/file-20220610-24020-pgezi3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=172%2C77%2C5578%2C3750&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of a Pakistani religious group burn an effigy depicting the former spokeswoman of India's ruling party, Nupur Sharma, during a demonstration in Karachi, Pakistan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanIndiaIslam/cfcff703192e4cfda0ddc017f7060ad8/photo?Query=nupur%20sharma&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=65&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Fareed Khan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Indian government finds itself in a diplomatic crisis following offensive remarks by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesperson, <a href="https://thewire.in/communalism/after-boycott-india-tweets-in-arab-world-bjp-clarifies-on-insulting-remarks-against-islam">Nupur Sharma</a>, on national television about the Prophet Muhammad and his wife, Aisha. The BJP has suspended Sharma from the position, but that has not been enough to <a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/qatar-summons-indian-envoy-seeks-govts-public-apology-over-bjp-leaders-remarks-on-prophet">quell the crisis</a>. Over a dozen Muslim countries, including Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have condemned the Indian government and asked for a public apology.</p>
<p>This is just another incident of <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/what-the-recent-hate-speech-incidents-will-achieve-7712243/">hate speech against Muslims</a>, which has been rising in India since the Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led BJP government came to power in 2014. The government has been criticized for several <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60225543">lynchings of Muslims by Hindu mobs with police indifference and judicial apathy</a> over the past years. In 2019, the BJP passed a new citizenship law <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/asia/modi-india-citizenship-law.html">that discriminated against Muslims</a>, and its <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/india/">Islamophobic attitudes</a> recently encouraged <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/15/world/asia/india-hijab-ban-schools.html">some schools and colleges</a> to impose a <a href="https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/hijab-controversy-karnataka-the-paradox-of-hijab-quran/article38430996.ece">headscarf ban on students</a>.</p>
<p>These discriminatory policies have a global significance because India has the world’s third-largest Muslim population, after Indonesia and Pakistan. Out of the estimated Indian population of 1.4 billion, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/">about 210 million – 15% – are Muslim</a>. </p>
<p>As a Muslim, I am aware of the deep reverence for Prophet Muhammad, and I understand Muslim individuals’ resentment. The reaction of Muslim governments, however, reflect their political regimes. As my book “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>” explains, most Muslim governments are authoritarian and <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">concentrate on condemning sacrilege against Islam</a> – more than advocating to protect the rights of Muslim minorities abroad.</p>
<h2>Aisha: a powerful woman</h2>
<p>The recent Indian case focused on Aisha’s age when she married the Prophet. <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/politics-gender-and-the-islamic-past/9780231079990">Aisha is one of the most important, vigorous and powerful</a> figures in Islamic history. The favorite wife of the Prophet, she was the daughter of the Prophet’s successor and closest friend, Abu Bakr. She became a leading narrator of hadith – the records of the Prophet’s words and actions – the teacher of many scholars and a military leader in a civil war.</p>
<p>According to a hadith record, <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/paper/understanding-aishas-age-an-interdisciplinary-approach">Aisha was 9 years old</a> when she got married. Some Muslims accept this record and see it normal for a pre-modern marriage, whereas other Muslims believe that Aisha was <a href="https://unity1.store/2021/09/26/the-age-of-aisha-at-marriage/">either 18</a> or <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/hazrat-aisha-was-19-not-9/story-G4kaBHqM0VXoBhLR0eI2oO.html">19 years old</a> by referring to other records. </p>
<p>It is not possible to know the true facts of Aisha’s age. As Islamic scholar <a href="https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/khaled-m-abou-el-fadl">Khaled Abou El Fadl</a> stresses, “<a href="https://www.searchforbeauty.org/2016/06/30/my-good-friend-confronted-me-on-the-issue-of-the-prophet-s-wife-aisha-and-asked-did-muhammad-rape-a-child-i-was-disturbed-and-confounded-and-did-not-answer/">we do not know and will never know</a>” them. Sharma thus used a single narration, while ignoring alternative Muslim explanations, in her remarks.</p>
<h2>Prioritizing blasphemy, not human rights</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that Muslim governments have reacted to defamatory actions against the Prophet. The long list of incidents includes Iran’s Supreme Leader <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/salman-rushdie-satanic-verses-fatwa-iran">Ruhollah Khomeini’s 1989 call on Muslims to kill novelist Salman Rushdie</a> and <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300124729/the-cartoons-that-shook-the-world/">the 2006 boycott of Danish products throughout the Middle East</a> in reaction to a dozen cartoons published in a newspaper.</p>
<p>An interesting pattern is visible in Muslim governments’ attitudes: They are very vocal when it comes to the cases of verbal or artistic attacks on Islamic values, whereas they are generally silent about human rights violations against Muslim individuals.</p>
<p>Muslim individuals in India have complained about the violations of their rights for almost a decade, but <a href="https://time.com/6185355/india-bjp-muslim-world-prophet/">Muslim governments did not show a noteworthy reaction to the BJP</a> until this defamation incident.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men and one woman holding posters with photographs of missing Uyghurs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468274/original/file-20220610-43412-vmhhoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Uyghur protesters, saying they had not heard from their relatives in years, protest near the Chinese Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, in Feb. 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TurkeyChinaUighurs/85e4020b2b5a4241be53a5fe19abf6e8/photo?Query=%20uighurs&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=947&currentItemNo=100">AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici</a></span>
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<p>Another example is China, which has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037">persecuting 12 million Uyghur Muslims</a> for many years. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-world-china-uyghurs/31324045.html">No Muslim government showed any major reaction</a>. Instead, these governments have focused on their material interests and <a href="https://uhrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Transnational-Repression_FINAL_2021-06-24-1.pdf">disregarded how the Chinese state treats its Muslim minority</a>.</p>
<p>This double standard can be explained by the widespread authoritarianism in the Muslim world. Out of 50 Muslim countries, <a href="https://institute.global/policy/ulema-state-alliance-barrier-democracy-and-development-muslim-world">only five are democratic</a>. Most authoritarian governments in the Muslim world have blasphemy laws that <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">punish sacrilegious statements and suppress dissenting voices</a>. That these governments should demand the punishment of blasphemy and defamation from India or other non-Muslim countries follows from these policies. </p>
<p>Another characteristic of authoritarian Muslim governments is their <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/">own violations of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities</a>. In Pakistan, these violations have targeted <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USCIRFAnnualReport2022_ONLINE_FINAL.pdf">the Ahmadiyya, Shia, Hindu and some other religious communities</a>, while in Iran, ethnic minorities, including Azerbaijani Turks, Baluchis and Kurds, faced <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/report-iran/">discrimination in education and employment</a>. A rights-based discourse abroad, therefore, would contradict these governments’ policies at home.</p>
<p>Authoritarianism in the Muslim world has tragic consequences for Muslim minorities in India and elsewhere. Muslim governments’ short-term, emotional reactions to some defamation cases do not help improve the conditions of Muslim minorities, who actually need a more consistent and principled support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Islam writes about how widespread authoritarianism in the Muslim world shapes governments’ foreign policy toward Muslim minorities abroad.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1553772021-02-22T00:38:08Z2021-02-22T00:38:08ZHow China is remaking the world in its vision<p><em>This is an edited extract of an essay in the latest issue of Australian Foreign Affairs, <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/essay/2021/02/the-march-of-autocracy">The March of Autocracy</a>, published today.</em></p>
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<p>It is the year 2049. China is celebrating having reached its second centenary goal – to become a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, civilised and harmonious socialist modernised country” by the 100th anniversary of the people’s republic.</p>
<p>Its economy is three times the size of the United States’, as the International Monetary Fund predicted back in the 2010s. The US remains wealthy and powerful – it has functioning alliances in Europe – but its pacts with Asian allies have fallen into disrepair.</p>
<p>For decades, Hong Kong has been accepted as just another province of China. Few dare to criticise the ongoing human rights abuses there, or in Xinjiang and elsewhere, because of the extraterritorial application of China’s national security laws. Taiwan, if not annexed, is isolated, with no diplomatic partners.</p>
<p>The legacy of Xi Jinping, who led China for more than 30 years, monopolises ideological discourse in China. His successors rule under his shadow.</p>
<p>Outside China, many of the third-wave democracies that transitioned in the second half of the 20th century have become far less liberal. Elections are held, but increasingly authoritarian governments have adopted many of Beijing’s technological and legal tools to manage markets and control politics. The internet is heavily censored.</p>
<p>Mistrust permeates every aspect of China’s relations with the West. International co-operation on climate change and the strong carbon-reduction commitments of the early 2020s have long been abandoned. The focus is on individual adaptation.</p>
<p>Australia remains a liberal democracy and a staunch defender of free markets and human rights. But these are no longer the default standards of global governance – they are minority positions associated mostly with Western traditions. No longer a top-20 economic or military power, Australia’s opportunities to make its mark internationally are few and far between.</p>
<h2>An unsettling but plausible vision</h2>
<p>This vision of a fragmented and decidedly less liberal international order is highly speculative, but also dispiritingly plausible.</p>
<p>It is unsettling to an Australian reader, not just because Australian foreign policy has been centred on a global set of rules and institutions since 1945, but because Australian identity is so enmeshed with the values of liberal democracy.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/pdf/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf">2017 Foreign Policy White Paper</a> states that Canberra is “a determined advocate of liberal institutions, universal values and human rights”, in stark contrast to Beijing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
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<p>All nation states, especially rising powers, desire a favourable global environment in which they can acquire power, prosperity and prestige. The postwar system greatly aided China, and it would be incorrect to claim Beijing wants to dismantle it entirely.</p>
<p>Similarly, it would be disingenuous to overlook the many instances where the US and other liberal democracies have behaved inconsistently. </p>
<p>But the Chinese Communist Party, which leads an authoritarian state, sees the liberal values embedded in the present order as a threat to its rule. Unlike the US, which at times ignores or violates these principles, China needs many of them to be suppressed, even eliminated.</p>
<p>As China seeks to remake the international order, the challenge is to understand where and how Beijing’s efforts will undercut its liberal character, and to identify where it is possible to resist.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385426/original/file-20210221-15-whj46k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese state media lauded Xi Jinping as a ‘champion of the UN ethos’ ahead of the UN General Assembly last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andy Wong/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How China is changing the world</h2>
<p>Rather than upend the existing international system, Beijing’s approach today is to co-opt, ignore and selectively exploit institutions.</p>
<p>Xi has said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforming and improving the current international system do not mean completely replacing it, but rather advancing it in a direction that is more just and reasonable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In late 2019, for instance, the World Trade Organisation’s appellate body <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/09/trump-may-kill-wto-finally-appellate-body-world-trade-organization/">ceased to function</a> after the US – complaining about the organisation’s soft stance on China – blocked the appointment of replacement judges.</p>
<p>In many ways, the WTO’s structure is the epitome of a liberal rules-based system: countries relinquish some sovereignty and are bound by judicial decisions in the interests of resolving trade disputes.</p>
<p>In response, China joined with the European Union, Australia and other governments to <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6597846/eu-china-aust-agree-to-temporary-wto-fix/">set up</a> a parallel stop-gap legal mechanism.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1220703685963124737"}"></div></p>
<p>This was a reflection of the CCP’s nuanced relationship with the liberal international order. China needs a stable trading system and will agree to binding rules to preserve it. The odd trade dispute does not substantially threaten China’s ideological security.</p>
<p>In the future, Beijing should be expected to exert its influence on the current order. The challenge for states such as Australia is to identify when Beijing’s behaviour exceeds influence and begins to erode the system’s liberal foundations.</p>
<p>China is already skilfully manoeuvring within international institutions to guide their operations, press for reforms and promote the China model.</p>
<p>Chinese nationals run four of the 15 United Nations specialised agencies, including the <a href="http://www.fao.org/director-general/biography/en/#:%7E:text=Qu%20Dongyu%2C%20who%20took%20office,sure%20the%20world%20is%20fed.">Food and Agricultural Organisation</a> and the <a href="https://www.icao.int/secretariat/secretarygeneral/pages/default.aspx#:%7E:text=The%20Council%20of%20ICAO%20first,2015%20to%2031%20July%202018.">International Civil Aviation Organisation</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385430/original/file-20210222-17-5uh7pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Qu Dongyu, the new director general of the Food and Agricultural Organisation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Riccardo Antimiani/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ironically, the democratic nature of international institutions benefits Beijing. Chinese representatives in a variety of forums, such as the World Health Assembly and committees of the UN General Assembly, muster coalitions of the Global South to ensure favourable votes on issues such as <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-seeks-to-deny-Taiwan-seat-at-key-WHO-meeting">Taiwan’s (non)participation</a> or to <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1202794.shtml">counter criticism of its repressive policies in Xinjiang</a>.</p>
<p>China also elevates its government-organised NGOs, presenting an image of independence while drowning out the voices of independent civil society.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/CSHRS/">China Society for Human Rights Studies</a>, for example, has official consultative status at the United Nations as an NGO, but is co-located with Chinese government offices and staffed by Chinese government officials. It has vigorously prosecuted China’s human rights agenda.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-china-us-rivalry-is-not-a-new-cold-war-it-is-way-more-complex-and-could-last-much-longer-144912">The China-US rivalry is not a new Cold War. It is way more complex and could last much longer</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The use of deft diplomacy and inducements to generate voting blocs is unsurprising. But China also seeks to change the system, diluting the liberal elements that threaten the China model and thus the CCP’s rule.</p>
<p>For instance, China has already succeeded in weakening the liberal character of international human rights. In 2017, it <a href="https://www.right-docs.org/doc/a-hrc-res-35-21/">proposed</a> its first-ever resolution to the UN Human Rights Council, headed: “The contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights”.</p>
<p>It prioritised economic development above civil and political rights, and put the primacy of the state above the rights of the individual. Despite objections and nay votes from Western members, the resolution passed. The subsequent report by the council’s advisory committee, a body of 18 experts supposed to maintain independence, referred mainly to Chinese party-state documents.</p>
<p>Chinese diplomats also block human rights resolutions at the UN Security Council, such as a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/5/un-fails-to-take-action-on-order-against-myanmar-on-rohingya">February 2020 resolution</a> on the plight of Myanmar’s ethnic Rohingya.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385424/original/file-20210221-15-12mvgg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi speaks during a UN Security Council briefing in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Evan Vucci/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the US has arguably been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-un-idUSKCN1UJ2ZW">similarly obstructive</a> on resolutions about Palestine, it is for the narrow purpose of protecting an ally, rather than the broader project of weakening the rights themselves.</p>
<p>China has even been able to marshal the international system to defend and commend its behaviour in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.</p>
<p>In 2020, at the 44th session of the UN Human Rights Council, a joint statement <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/43rd-hrc-joint-statement-id-hc-xinjiang-hong-kong.pdf">signed by 27 countries</a>, including Australia, expressed concern at arbitrary detention, widespread surveillance and restrictions in Xinjiang and the national security legislation in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>A competing statement supporting the Hong Kong legislation received support from <a href="https://www.axios.com/countries-supporting-china-hong-kong-law-0ec9bc6c-3aeb-4af0-8031-aa0f01a46a7c.html">53 states</a>, only three of which are considered “free” by the non-governmental organisation Freedom House.</p>
<p>By working within the system to rally a voting bloc, Beijing was able to compromise the world’s peak human rights body. Tactics that have been successful in watering down human rights are now being employed in areas where norms are still being established, such as internet governance.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1279027163988017154"}"></div></p>
<h2>Preparing for the new world disorder</h2>
<p>The history of liberal internationalism is replete with contradictions. Some say that in recent decades it is Washington, not Beijing, that has damaged the order most. </p>
<p>So can China really do more damage to an order already on life support? Liberalism is not just facing an external challenge, but one from within.</p>
<p>The answer requires optimism about liberalism’s capacity to self-correct across the arc of history, and scepticism that illiberalism can do likewise. As much as Donald Trump belittled, criticised and attacked America’s institutions, he also created the conditions for a course correction – Joe Biden’s victory.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-enters-2021-a-stronger-more-influential-power-and-australia-may-feel-the-squeeze-even-more-150943">China enters 2021 a stronger, more influential power — and Australia may feel the squeeze even more</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The CCP is a well-resourced and well-organised political force. It has the potential to be far more effective than any iconoclastic but capricious populist in permanently weakening the liberal foundations of the global order. Much of China’s influence abroad is unavoidable. A rising power with the economic and military strength that China wields is unlikely to be deterred.</p>
<p>On this logic, optimism has no place. But it would also be mistaken to adopt a fatalistic approach. Instead, Australia and its partners must focus their efforts on those elements of the liberal order most worth preserving and most under threat.</p>
<p>The centenary of the people’s republic is still 28 years away.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Kassam is also a director at the Lowy Institute in Sydney.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Darren Lim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese Communist Party sees liberal values as a threat to its rule and needs many of them to be suppressed. Its approach? Co-opt, ignore and selectively exploit global institutions.Natasha Kassam, Fellow, ANU National Security College’s Futures Council, Australian National UniversityDarren Lim, Senior politics lecturer, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438852021-02-12T13:18:29Z2021-02-12T13:18:29ZUS-educated foreign soldiers learn ‘democratic values,’ study shows – though America also trains future dictators<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383898/original/file-20210211-16-4bu91t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C30%2C4103%2C2708&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Foreign military students from the U.S. Navy's Patrol Craft Officer course conduct a field training exercise at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi in 2009. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.defense.gov/observe/photo-gallery/?igphoto=2001152339">Department of Defense</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The leadership of a U.S.-trained special operations officer, Col. Assimi Goita, in Mali’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/mali-coup-leader-was-trained-by-us-special-operations-forces/2020/08/21/33153fbe-e31c-11ea-82d8-5e55d47e90ca_story.html">August 2020 coup</a> has <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint/">reignited an old American debate</a> about whether U.S. military education of foreigners is spreading respect for democracy or empowering future dictators.</p>
<p>Several notorious <a href="https://thegrayzone.com/2019/11/13/bolivian-coup-plotters-school-of-the-americas-fbi-police-programs/">coup plotters</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/18/us-military-usa">human rights violators</a> – among them Argentina’s 1970s-era military junta leader Leopoldo Galtieri and Guatemalan dictator Efraín Ríos Montt – were trained by the United States military. So was the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/ustrained-police-sniper-colonel-gulmurod-khalimov-made-isis-minister-of-war/news-story/5469ea35513f9c8a4eba5cf553d5171c">Islamic State group’s minister of war</a>, Gulmurod Khalimov. </p>
<p>Training foreign military personnel became part of the United States’ global military strategy to <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/lend-lease-act-1">achieve its foreign policy goals during World War II</a>, along with a robust program of weapons and equipment sales. Today, the U.S. Armed Forces run <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FMT_Volume-II_FY2018-2019.pdf">14 programs</a> in over 150 countries, providing education and training for roughly <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FMT_Volume-II_FY2018-2019.pdf">70,000 foreign military personnel</a> of all ranks each year, both in the U.S. and overseas.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/94/hr13680">International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act</a>, passed in 1976 and amended in 1978 and 1991, these programs aim to transmit the U.S. military’s professional values and norms – namely respect of democratic values, human rights and civilian control of the armed forces. They also seek to professionalize and strengthen the armed forces of recipient countries.</p>
<p>Is that what’s really happening?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Goita, a middle-aged Black man, stands at a lectern in fatigues with his hand raised, with a crowd in foreground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383824/original/file-20210211-17-1e61wad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Col. Assimi Goita is sworn in as Mali’s transitional vice president following a military mutiny, Sept. 25, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sept-25-2020-colonel-assimi-goita-is-sworn-in-as-malis-news-photo/1228741241?adppopup=true">Xinhua/Habib Kouyate via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What soldiers learn</h2>
<p>The U.S. military’s underlying assumption seems to be that foreign soldiers learn democratic values in class and further absorb them by living in the United States during training. Graduates are expected to train their peers upon returning home, thus spreading American military values throughout the armed forces of their country.</p>
<p>That’s the theory. </p>
<p>But little research has been done to examine whether this actually happens. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066109344659">Papers examining U.S. foreign military training</a> tend to be theoretical and <a href="http://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2-Atkinson-All-Azimuth-Jul-2015.pdf">limited in scope</a>. Neither the U.S. government nor scholars have demonstrated how, or even whether, this process works.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=etd2020">security studies research</a> attempts to fill that gap. I examined the centerpiece of U.S. military training initiatives: the U.S. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-international-military-education-and-training-program#:%7E:text=The%20International%20Military%20Education%20and%20Training%20%28IMET%29%20program%2C,to%20members%20of%20foreign%20militaries%20to%20take%20class%E2%80%A6">International Military Education and Training program</a>. Each year, this <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585950.pdf">US$900 million government program</a> offers 4,000 courses in the United States, from individual classes on specific skills like radio operation to degree programs at the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/education/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/us-war-colleges">United States’ four war colleges</a>. </p>
<p>To assess what foreign officers actually take away from this experience, I studied one participant country, Hungary, in depth. </p>
<p>I administered a survey to 350 military personnel, 140 of whom had completed a U.S. training program and 210 who had not. Survey respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of democratic values, civilian control of the armed forces and human rights on a <a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale.html">scale of 1 to 10</a>, with 1 meaning “not important at all” and 10 meaning “extremely important.”</p>
<p>The results show that U.S.-trained military officials displayed greater respect for democratic values, rating them an average of 7.8 in importance, compared with the control group’s average rating of 6.1. Human rights were similarly judged more important by U.S.-trained military officials, 7.5 to 6.6. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photo of two soldiers in fatigues, one standing and the other lying in the bushes shooting a weapon" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383900/original/file-20210211-17-1jp4j64.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. soldiers train with Hungarian armed forces on March 3, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Mar/04/2002258876/-1/-1/0/200303-Z-CC612-1079A.JPG">Army Staff Sgt. Noshoba Davis/Department of Defense</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When asked whether “the military should intervene in domestic policy making,” nearly all survey respondents roundly rejected the idea. But U.S.-trained military officials were less inclined, rating military intervention a 2.8 out of 10, compared with 3.5 in the control group.</p>
<p>To ensure the validity of my results, I employed several control measures to correct for potential biases, such as participants’ prior attitudes toward democracy.</p>
<h2>How armies change</h2>
<p>Having established that individual trainees learn the intended practices and values in U.S. military training, I then examined whether they share these lessons more widely within their military. </p>
<p>Statistical analysis of the same 350 surveys provides some initial evidence that they do. </p>
<p>I found military personnel who have served under a U.S.-trained commander to have higher respect for democratic values, human rights and civilian control than those who have never served under a U.S.-trained commander. </p>
<p>This knowledge transfer may explain my next finding, that U.S. military training helps countries keep the peace. </p>
<p>Here I zoomed out from modern-day Hungary to analyze <a href="https://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs/mids">3,558 international military disputes</a> between 1976 and 2007. </p>
<p>I found that countries that had received U.S. training were less likely to have initiated the conflict than other countries. In fact, for every soldier trained in the U.S., the probability of a country instigating an international conflict decreases by about three-quarters of a percent, on average. </p>
<h2>Battling insurgencies</h2>
<p>The benefits of U.S. military training on domestic rule of law are more mixed. </p>
<p>I examined 120 insurgencies between 1976 and 2003 and found that countries with U.S.-trained militaries were more likely to defeat the insurgents. Again, the probability of victory increased proportionally with the number of U.S.-trained soldiers.</p>
<p>This analysis controlled for other kinds of military assistance the U.S. provides to allies, like weapons and operational support. </p>
<p>But when U.S.-trained militaries fight domestic insurgents, I found, the conflicts are usually longer than those in other countries. Uganda’s civil conflict lasted from 1978 to 1991. India’s lasted from 1978 to 2003. Militaries in both countries were receiving substantial American military education and training throughout. </p>
<p>I hypothesize that such prolonged conflicts may result when insurgents recognize the higher capacity of the U.S.-trained government forces they are up against and resort to guerrilla tactics rather than open combat. </p>
<p>In some places, long conflicts have opened the door to decidedly undemocratic practices. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5400%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Half a dozen young men in green military gear and helmets sit nervously and look straight at the camera" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5400%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383871/original/file-20210211-15-ghhzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Salvadoran Army recruits await their turn during a parachute training exercise overseen by the U.S. in 1982, during the Salvadoran Civil War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-salvadoran-army-recruits-await-their-turn-during-a-news-photo/595390475?adppopup=true">Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The El Salvador civil war is a good example. This fight between leftist insurgents and the U.S.-backed right-wing government was fought from 1979 to 1991. Salvadoran government forces committed major <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/03/el-salvador-no-justice-years-un-truth-commission/">human rights violations against civilians</a>, including kidnapping the children of suspected insurgents, burning villages and destroying crops, according to a postwar truth commission. </p>
<p>At least 75,000 people died in the conflict. </p>
<h2>Weighing the evidence</h2>
<p>My research establishes, possibly for the first time, that U.S. military training programs achieve their stated goals: They transmit democratic values to foreign soldiers, who spread them among national armed forces.</p>
<p>However, it does not conclude that American military education is an unmitigated good. Far from it. </p>
<p>U.S. foreign military training has produced more democratic commanders, better-trained warlords and everything in between. My next research project will try to determine which specific conditions create suboptimal, even deadly, results. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143885/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandor Fabian served in the Hungarian armed forces.</span></em></p>The US Armed Forces run 14 programs in over 150 countries, providing education and training for roughly 70,000 foreign military personnel each year. What, if anything, are they learning?Sandor Fabian, Research Fellow, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438392020-08-05T05:13:16Z2020-08-05T05:13:16ZWhy is ‘values’ the new buzzword in Australian foreign policy? (Hint: it has something to do with China)<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351229/original/file-20200805-237-jiskd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In international affairs, words are bullets, according to an old diplomatic saying. If so, Australia in recent years has begun firing new ammunition.</p>
<p>In his address to the Aspen Security Forum today, Prime Minister Scott Morrison <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-05/scott-morrison-urges-the-us-and-china-to-play-by-the-rules/12524448">stressed</a> the importance of Australia’s alliances with fellow liberal democracies, the Five Eyes partnership, our “ever‑closer” ties with Europe and our </p>
<blockquote>
<p>belief in the values and institutions that the United States has championed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In a similar address to the Lowy Institute a year ago, Morrison also <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2019-lowy-lecture-prime-minister-scott-morrison">praised</a> India and Japan as countries with “shared values” to Australia.</p>
<p>And in the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/transcript/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-ausmin">press conference</a> at last week’s AUSMIN talks between the Australian and US foreign and defence ministers, there were 15 references to “democratic values” (on the American side), “shared values” (the preferred Australian formulation) and related phrases (“fundamental values”, “value sets”).</p>
<p>“Values”, a word seldom used in the past, has now assumed a central place in our foreign policy rhetoric. Speeches, press conferences and policy statements vibrate with the V-word.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351230/original/file-20200805-24-1gdep9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The joint statement after the AUSMIN talks stressed the ‘shared security, interests, values, and prosperity’ between the US and Australia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Smialowski/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A counterpoint to China’s value system</h2>
<p>The reason for the return of values to our diplomatic rhetoric is no mystery. China’s emergence as the largest and most powerful autocracy in history, with an economic weight to match, has forced Australia to balance its mercantile and security interests. </p>
<p>Over the past decade, Australia allowed itself to become economically dependent on China, which takes a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-15/china-economy-slowdown-will-affect-australia/10716240">third of all our exports</a> and over 80% of key commodities like <a href="https://minerals.org.au/minerals/ironore">iron ore</a>. </p>
<p>As our economic dependency increased, China also changed, becoming more repressive domestically and more aggressive in the international sphere. </p>
<p>China’s own governance model is based on a different set of values, which prioritise allegiance to the state and party and involve restrictions antithetical to open societies. These include limits on freedom of speech, association, religion and anything else that could enable collective action in opposition to the state.</p>
<p>As it has championed this model around the world, Beijing has increasingly targeted democracies like Australia with local influence operations, political interference and, most recently, its crude “<a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-chinas-newly-aggressive-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-ready-to-fight-back-139028">wolf-warrior diplomacy</a>”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-chinas-newly-aggressive-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-ready-to-fight-back-139028">Behind China's newly aggressive diplomacy: 'wolf warriors' ready to fight back</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Australia’s new embrace of the term “values” has also been accompanied by much more hawkish words on China. </p>
<p>While Australia has declined to join the US in more aggressive freedom of navigation campaigns in the South China Sea, the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2020">AUSMIN joint statement</a> criticised China’s behaviour in the disputed waters, as well as in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Also consistent with democratic values, it backed Taiwan’s membership or observer status in international bodies.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1156087864175677440"}"></div></p>
<h2>The term ‘values’ used to risk push-back</h2>
<p>Until recently, Australian leaders ignored or downplayed the role of values in our foreign policy, preferring to focus on economic issues and engagement with Asia. </p>
<p>Talk of “democratic values” risked push-back from other nations in the region. Former Malaysia Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir and Singapore’s long-time leader, Lee Kuan Yew, for example, were advocates for the idea of “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2640078?seq=1">Asian values</a>”, which was more culturally specific to their countries.</p>
<p>They <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2018/05/12/lets-not-return-asian-values-debate-heads/">argued</a> that individual freedom was a Western ideal, not compatible with Asian societies.</p>
<p>Successive Australian governments, keen to engage more with the region but still wary of being too close to Asia, largely accepted this. </p>
<p>The Howard government, in particular, was often at pains to frame Australia as a European society that approached Asia as an outsider, as academic <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/how-mateship-made-way-for-freedom-democracy-and-rule-of-law/">John Fitzgerald</a> put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia had one set of values, Asians another, and all parties should respect the values associated with the other’s ethno-cultural traditions by remaining silent on values altogether.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351234/original/file-20200805-24-bumfj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Howard and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew agreed to disagree when it came to their respective value systems.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alan Porritt/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How our diplomatic language has evolved</h2>
<p>The shift in our diplomatic language began a decade ago with the idea of a “<a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australias-rules-based-international-order/">rules-based order</a>”. This term (like values) had hardly been used in official policy before, up to and including the Howard government. </p>
<p>It began to gather a lexical head of steam under the Rudd and Gillard governments, and reached its pinnacle in the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf">2016 Defence White Paper</a>, in which “rules-based global order” appeared no less than 48 times and was identified as one of Australia’s core strategic interests.</p>
<p>The ascent of “values” has followed a similar trajectory. It was mentioned seven times in the 2016 Defence White Paper, including specific references to “shared democratic values” with the US, India, Japan and New Zealand.</p>
<p>“Values” then went mainstream in the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper">2017 Foreign Policy White Paper</a>, with no less than 31 references, including a whole section devoted to “Australia’s values”. </p>
<p>Democracy and multiculturalism were identified as our two core values, staking big claims for Australian exceptionalism: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are one of the oldest democracies and the most successful multicultural society in the world.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351232/original/file-20200805-16-1u314qv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Morrison stressed Australia’s ‘shared values of democracy’ with India following a virtual summit with Narendra Modi in June.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Talk of values must be met with action</h2>
<p>This language provides an obvious connection with the US. And the contrast with China could not be more stark. </p>
<p>With China’s rise under President Xi Jinping, different value systems now underpin different visions of security. By pushing democratic societies to confront this reality, Xi has done us a favour. </p>
<p>Australia has reaffirmed its core belief in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2019.1693503?scroll=top&needAccess=true">a rules-based international order linked to democratic values</a> and strengthened its partnership with other like-minded nations, such as <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/assessing-quad-prospects-and-limitations-quadrilateral-cooperation-advancing-australia">India, Japan and the US</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/payne-and-reynolds-leave-washington-with-key-wins-and-room-to-disagree-with-us-on-china-143612">Payne and Reynolds leave Washington with key 'wins' — and room to disagree with US on China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>However, the language of values also presents challenges to other aspects of our foreign policy. </p>
<p>It is difficult to square the focus on values with our treatment of asylum seekers, selective application of international law and ongoing engagement with autocratic regimes in Asia. (A good example of all three is the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/australia-blames-cambodia-for-unfortnuate-champagne-toast-20171027-gz97fk.html">now-lapsed refugee resettlement deal</a> with Cambodia’s brutal Hun Sen regime, signed with a champagne toast, which Morrison presided over when he was immigration minister.)</p>
<p>If values are now the coin of our foreign policy realm, we will have to start walking the talk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143839/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Reilly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The word ‘values’ was seldom used in Australian diplomacy in recent decades, but has slowly become more prevalent as Canberra has sought to counter China’s influence in the region.Benjamin Reilly, Professor, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1243212019-09-26T18:22:53Z2019-09-26T18:22:53ZWould ousting Trump rebuild the country’s faith in government? Lessons from Latin America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/294391/original/file-20190926-51438-78ag0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Reporters ask Nancy Pelosi about the formal impeachment inquiry against Trump.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Trump-Intelligence-Whistleblower/61c57ac3d4164ebfb32beb42e192331e/56/0">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The House of Representatives has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/25/what-you-need-know-about-impeachment-inquiry-into-trump/">opened an impeachment inquiry</a> against President Donald Trump. But what happens if a president is impeached?</p>
<p>The vice president would take his place, but other parts of the government continue unchanged. Partisan polarization can be magnified in the process. Many Americans already think the government is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2017/04/17/3-views-of-congress/">too divided along partisan lines</a> and that <a href="http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/june_2017/for_sale_congress">corruption</a> has reached <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-and-maryland-to-sue-president-trump-alleging-breach-of-constitutional-oath/2017/06/11/0059e1f0-4f19-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html">the highest levels of government</a>. These beliefs fuel <a href="http://www.npr.org/2015/11/23/457063796/poll-only-1-in-5-americans-say-they-trust-the-government">declines in public trust</a> and <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/208526/adults-name-government-dissatisfaction-important-problem.aspx">dissatisfaction</a> with the government in general.</p>
<p>In my book on the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/achilles-heel-of-democracy/729655118E5C21315EA768CE19291434">rule of law in Central America</a>, I discuss several occasions in which presidents were removed from office before their terms ended. </p>
<p>The current political crisis in the United States shares similarities with political issues in Latin America. We are seeing <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/">radical partisanship</a>, <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/data-trend/political-attitudes/congressional-favorability/">public dissatisfaction</a> and <a href="http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/right_direction_wrong_track_jun26">perceived poor government performance</a>. Since only one U.S. president has left office due to wrongdoing, examples from Latin America can give us some perspective. </p>
<p>Lasting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2015/05/06/40-years-ago-church-committee-investigated-americans-spying-on-americans/">reforms after Watergate</a> came from a <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm">congressional committee’s investigation</a> and recommendations, rather than from the simple resignation of President Nixon. Impeachment is <a href="https://theconversation.com/impeachment-its-political-77528">inherently political</a> and, as I have observed in Latin America, does more to punish enemies than clean up politics. Removing a president who is a “bad apple” may help, but a real cleansing takes more effort.</p>
<h2>After impeachment</h2>
<p>Take Brazil as a case in point.</p>
<p>Former President Dilma Rousseff <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/dilma-rousseff-impeached-president-brazilian-senate-michel-temer">was impeached</a> in 2016 in the midst of an anti-corruption investigation known as “Operation Car Wash.” There were already pending corruption investigations against <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-brazil-impeach-20160328-story.html">37 of 65 members of the congressional impeachment commission</a>, but none of them were forced from office. It is no surprise that Rousseff’s impeachment appeared to many to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/05/in-brazil-women-are-fighting-against-the-sexist-impeachment-of-dilma-rousseff">inspired by sexism</a> rather than just anti-corruption efforts.</p>
<p>Rousseff’s replacement, President Michel Temer, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption-idUSKBN19J2R5">was charged with</a> corruption-related offenses in June 2017. However, Temer’s political party and their allies controlled the majority of the Congress and the president of the Congress was an ally of Temer’s. A formal impeachment never went forward, but Temer <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47658080">was arrested in March 2019</a> after leaving office.</p>
<p>We see a similar failure to pull out the root of corruption in the “Guatemalan Spring” of September 2015. Then Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina was forced to resign in the face of massive popular protests. He was implicated in an investigation into corruption at the national customs agency, for which he was arrested the day after his resignation. He had also been accused of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36060524">taking bribes from a Spanish firm</a> in exchange for granting it a lucrative long-term contract with the government of Guatemala.</p>
<p>An election was held just four days after Pérez Molina’s resignation. Jimmy Morales, a television comedian with no political experience, won the presidency over a former first lady. Morales ran as an outsider with the slogan “not corrupt, not a thief.” After his first year in office, <a href="http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Guatemalan-President-Jimmy-Morales-Marks-Inefficient-1st-Year-20170112-0017.html">which opponents have derided as “inefficient,”</a> Morales <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-corruption-idUSKBN16E2PW">faced a corruption scandal</a> involving accusations that his son and brother had fraudulent dealings with a government agency.</p>
<p>Take an older example, from Honduras. The <a href="http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/us-honduran-coup/">military coup against Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in 2009</a> was authorized by that country’s Supreme Court and was backed by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/world/americas/29honduras.html">the majority of its Congress</a>. The Honduran Supreme Court argued that Zelaya was planning to reform the constitution to give himself more power as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had done. </p>
<p>Some eight years after Zelaya was removed, Honduran political elites continue to <a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/corruption-honduras-result-of-functioning-system-report">participate in widespread corruption</a>, including <a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/honduras-elites-and-organized-crime-introduction">direct ties between some political elites and organized crime</a>. Because so many of the elites are corrupt, none of them <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/30/when-corruption-is-operating-system-case-of-honduras-pub-69999">rock the boat.</a> </p>
<p>Even prosecuting and jailing presidents for corruption doesn’t seem to solve the problems that lead up to these crises. Often the rest of government continues to be overly partisan and even corrupt – and public satisfaction with government drops even lower. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3299289.stm">Nicaragua</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/americas/28fbriefs-EXPRESIDENTF_BRF.html">Costa Rica</a>, for example, former presidents have been jailed on corruption charges, but those convictions were <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/world/americas/16nicaragua.html">ultimately</a> <a href="http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/12/05/appeal-court-acquitts-ex-costa-rica-president-miguel-angel-rodriguez">overturned</a> on appeal. In 2013, Guatemala became the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/10/world/americas/guatemala-genocide-trial/index.html">first country</a> to convict a former head of state of genocide in a national court. Ten days later, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22605022">reversed</a> General Efraín Rios Montt’s conviction over an evidentiary matter – and Rios Montt then <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/01/ex-guatemalan-dictator-efrain-rios-montt-dies-aged-91">died in 2018</a> before a <a href="https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/04/rios-montt-to-face-second-genocide-trial-for-the-dos-erres-massacre/">new trial</a> could occur. The point is, it is extraordinarily difficult to make charges stick against even a former president, especially if he or she still has sizable support in the government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/294392/original/file-20190926-51401-12r53ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Molina spoke at a conference as president of Guatemala in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/SOP-AP-SPANI-SPAN-XUN-SPANUNJD120-GUATEMALA-ENT-/b291e2cfd6894c868678c0922edb4c35/3/0">AP Photo/Jason DeCrow</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Beyond impeachment</h2>
<p>Problems with governance are rarely fixed by going after even an unpopular or corrupt president if fundamental institutional problems are allowed to continue unchecked. Impeachment’s weakness is compounded by its often partisan deployment. </p>
<p>What else can be done to clean up politics? </p>
<p>The hard work of demanding <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2017-04-13/brazil-s-never-ending-corruption-crisis">transparency</a> more generally may help get at the root of the problem. Guatemala’s experience with an <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/5-takeaways-cicig-guatemala-anti-corruption-experiment/">international anti-corruption commission</a> helped local officials shine a light on official wrongdoing at every level of government. However, that commission’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/guatemalas-un-anti-corruption-body-a-victim-of-its-own-success/a-50277624">mandate expired on September 2, 2019</a>, following <a href="https://theconversation.com/guatemala-in-crisis-after-president-bans-corruption-investigation-into-his-government-109864">clashes with the president</a> over an investigation into his own actions.</p>
<p>Ultimately, using <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2017-06-02/brazils-best-shot-against-corruption">legal channels to improve political institutions</a>, rather than focusing on just one bad politician, can enhance the rule of law. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/would-impeaching-trump-restore-the-rule-of-law-lessons-from-latin-america-80127">an article</a> originally published on July 11, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel E. Bowen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the House mounts an impeachment investigation of President Trump, examples from Central and South America show that ousting an executive leader from office doesn’t always have the intended effect.Rachel E. Bowen, Associate Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015102018-08-16T10:36:47Z2018-08-16T10:36:47ZZimbabwe’s coup did not create democracy from dictatorship<p>Many citizens and international observers <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">cautiously hoped</a> that the southern African nation of Zimbabwe would find its way from dictatorship to democracy this year. President Robert Mugabe was militarily removed from office in November 2017 <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">after 37 years in office</a>, opening the door for the country’s first real leadership transition since 1980.</p>
<p>Elections were set for July 30. And, for the first time in many Zimbabweans’ lives, Mugabe was not on the ballot. </p>
<p>Election turnout was high, with over 70 percent of the country’s 16 million eligible voters participating. Zimbabweans waited in <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/zimbabwe-votes-for-first-time-without-mugabe-on-ballot-long-lines-at-some-polling-stations/">long lines</a> to choose between Mugabe’s replacement, the 75-year-old acting President Emmerson Mnangagwa, and a young lawyer named Nelson Chamisa who promised <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election-chamisa-newsmaker/young-contender-chamisa-promises-zimbabwe-break-from-the-past-idUSKBN1KG1R0">economic revival and political change</a>.</p>
<p>“What everyone had hoped for was a turning of the page in Zimbabwe,” observed Michelle Gavin, an Africa specialist at the <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/08/zimbabwe-is-free-from-mugabe-but-that-doesnt-mean-its-a-democracy-yet.html">Council on Foreign Relations</a>.</p>
<h2>A quick crackdown</h2>
<p>Election day was peaceful enough, but the high spirits wouldn’t last long. </p>
<p>After Chamisa’s party <a href="http://time.com/5354721/zimbabwe-election-results/">alleged fraud</a>, the election commission said it would take days to finalize the vote count. When people in the capital of Harare protested the delay, police and soldiers fired, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-holds-funerals-for-victims-of-election-violence/a-44961507">killing seven unarmed citizens</a>. </p>
<p>On Aug. 2, the election commission <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45053412">declared Mnangagwa president</a> with 50.8 percent of the vote – just enough to avoid a run-off. Chamisa’s party rejected the results and, a week later, filed a legal challenge in court.</p>
<p>Mugabe was a violent, repressive ruler. And Mnangagwa – whose nickname is “the Crocodile” – was <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">his vice president and enforcer</a>. In the weeks since the election, the government has ruthlessly cracked down on the opposition. </p>
<p>Police have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">beaten and arrested</a> dozens of Chamisa supporters, and groups of Mnangagwa’s backers have conducted house-to-house searches for opposition leaders. </p>
<p>Tendai Biti, a well-known opposition figure, fled to Zambia, but was turned over by the Zambian government to Zimbabwe’s security forces. Mnangagwa’s government <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/zimbabwe-opposition-tendai-biti-charged-asylum-bid-fails-180809162846974.html">charged him with inciting public violence</a>. He was released on a US $5,000 bond only after a global outcry. </p>
<p>Today, Zimbabwe remains tense as it awaits the results of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-historic-elections-a-case-of-leopards-not-changing-their-spots-100956">court battle over the presidency</a>. Most observers expect Chamisa’s case will fail, and that Mnangagwa will officially be installed as Zimbabwe’s third president since 1963.</p>
<h2>Mnangagwa’s political pantomime</h2>
<p>Having spent considerable time studying Zimbabwe’s politics as a <a href="https://zw.usembassy.gov/senior-state-department-officials-visit-zimbabwe/">U.S. State Department official</a>, I found the contested result and election-day violence saddening but not surprising. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa struck a conciliatory tone in the months leading up to the election. Declaring that Zimbabwe was “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-new-investment-law-to-open-economy-idUSKBN1HP1S6">open for business</a>,” he amended a law requiring local ownership of diamond and platinum mines. He signaled his intent to end farm seizures and vowed to sell off failing state enterprises. </p>
<p>He even wrote a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/opinion/zimbabwe-emmerson-mnangagwa.html">New York Times op-ed</a> calling for democracy and equal rights for all citizens. </p>
<p>But Mnangagwa is tied to numerous human rights abuses, including overseeing a series of government-ordered massacres between 1982 and 1986 known as the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">Gukurahundi</a>.” An estimated 20,000 civilians from Zimbabwe’s Ndebele ethnic group were killed.</p>
<p>And behind his seemingly reasonable rhetoric, there were signs that Mnangagwa would stoop to win Zimbabwe’s election at any cost.</p>
<p>Human rights groups reported <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/zimbabwe/2018-07-25/zimbabwes-upcoming-election-political-charade">widespread voter intimidation</a>, especially in rural areas, where the government deployed plainclothes security forces to “remind” people to vote – for Mnangagwa. Zimbabwe’s state-controlled media relentlessly broadcast pro-Mnangagwa messages. </p>
<p>And, according to civil society groups, the election commission kept the voter registration roll under wraps until it was <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/07/01/battle-lines-drawn-over-voters-roll/">too late</a> for voters who discovered their names were missing to re-register.</p>
<h2>Electoral autocracy</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s recent history mirrors a pattern familiar to other authoritarian countries undergoing a transition.</p>
<p>Research shows that authoritarian leaders almost always contend with <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/politics-authoritarian-rule?format=HB&isbn=9781107024793">two major political pressures</a>: challenges from within their regime, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-american-history-suggests-zimbabwes-military-coup-will-turn-violent-87648">rarely trigger a democratic transition</a>, and popular challenges from outside the system, which might.</p>
<p>Mugabe succumbed to pressure from within his party last year after a succession battle between his wife, Grace, and Mnangagwa’s faction. The military settled this struggle decisively in November 2017, putting Mugabe under house arrest. Grace fled the country, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00040824.html">Mnangagwa was installed as acting president</a>.</p>
<p>Once he assumed office, Mnangagwa worked resolutely to guarantee he could quash the next challenge facing him: popular opposition.</p>
<p>Even as he cited the importance of human rights and invited international observers to monitor Zimbabwe’s presidential election, he was methodically working with allies to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/zimbabwe/2018-07-25/zimbabwes-upcoming-election-political-charade">lay a repressive groundwork</a> that would ensure he stayed in power as the standard-bearer of the ruling ZANU-PF party. </p>
<p>After the electoral commission announced his tenuous victory, Mnangagwa reacted in classic authoritarian fashion: he deployed police and military forces to repress street protests, driving would-be challengers into hiding.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe held an election without Mugabe. Unfortunately, all it got was another despot in Mugabe’s mold.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>It wasn’t crazy to imagine things turning out differently. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political system had actually been getting slightly more democratic in Mugabe’s final years. According to the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf">Varieties of Democracy index</a>, one of the world’s largest social science databases on democracy, Zimbabwe’s electoral system remains squarely in the “illiberal” category. But its score has improved 20 percent since 2007, particularly on freedom of expression. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/">Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index</a> shows Zimbabwe making similar modest progress since 2006.</p>
<p>These small improvements in Zimbabwe’s political system, coupled with Mugabe’s demise, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/we-have-a-new-chance-zimbabwe-gears-up-for-elections-after-mugabe">convinced some diplomats and experts</a> that the July 31 election might open the door for real democratic change rather than a continuation of electoral autocracy.</p>
<p>But recent events have confirmed that Mnangagwa and his allies did not force the ailing Robert Mugabe out of office to transform Zimbabwe’s political system. Rather, they sought to ensure their continued control over the nation. </p>
<p>After 38 years of authoritarian rule, one election simply does not create democracy from dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Feldstein is a nonresident fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</span></em></p>Violence and uncertainty has followed Zimbabwe’s first modern election without Robert Mugabe. That’s not surprising: After 38 years of dictatorship, it takes more than a vote to build democracy.Steven Feldstein, Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs & Associate Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/970752018-05-28T23:17:06Z2018-05-28T23:17:06ZUniversity funding debates should be broadened to reflect their democratic purpose<p>In 2017, Murdoch University successfully applied to the Fair Work Commission <a href="https://www.fwc.gov.au/document/decision/2017fwca4472">to terminate</a> its Enterprise Agreement. From the <a href="https://www.nteu.org.au/">National Tertiary Education Union</a>’s (NTEU) perspective this was an attack on <a href="http://www.nteu.org.au/article/The-Murdoch-Decision%3A-Termination-of-the-Murdoch-Agreement-%28Advocate-24-03%29-20138">staff salaries and conditions</a> and showed industrial relations law was deeply one-sided.</p>
<p>For university management having the agreement terminated was a legitimate industrial strategy, justified by a need for <a href="http://www.murdoch.edu.au/_document/AHEIA_sector_comms_piece.pdf">flexibility and cost containment</a>. The wider trade union movement supported the NTEU perspective. The Murdoch case contributed to the development of a much wider campaign: “<a href="https://changetherules.org.au/">Change the Rules</a>”. Changing the rules of industrial relations for better pay, fairer conditions and job security. Reversing the trend towards high rates of casualisation and low wage growth.</p>
<p>But the rules of the game, as far as universities are concerned, are set in a wider context. The context of what universities are for and what they are intended to achieve. While their economic purpose is reasonably clear, contemporary Australian policy debates focus primarily on <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-18/myefo-university-help-funding-frozen-and-caps-introduced/9268326">how and by whom their teaching is funded</a>. This diminishes understanding of universities’ democratic purpose and wider social mission.</p>
<h2>What is the university for?</h2>
<p>The principal polarising point in the university funding debate is whether <a href="https://campusmorningmail.com.au/birmingham-holds-the-funding-line-while-plibersek-sets-the-price-of-freedom-to-innovate/">demand or central planning</a> should determine the number of people taught. The second is the proportion of the cost that should be met by the state vis-à-vis the student. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-our-university-funding-debate-wouldnt-make-sense-to-germans-33077">Why our university funding debate wouldn't make sense to Germans</a>
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<p>While a proportion of universities’ per student public funding must support research, the funding model’s general assumption is that universities are labour market production lines. Research policy debate is confined to the related ideal of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07294360120108340">“industry” purchasing university research</a> to reduce the contributions government must make to the cost of university research. Universities have an incentive to see research as simply a fund-raising activity. </p>
<p>These rules need to change in the interests of stronger democracy. Higher education’s current policy focus understates the idea of universities as public institutions serving a public good. Universities have important and essential contributions to make to democracy’s better functioning. The idea that <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/files/democracy_final_jeg.pdf">democracy requires an educated population</a> is as old as democracy itself. </p>
<p>Research to support economic prosperity is important, but so is research to support public understanding and capacity to contribute to policy debates. Australia’s research <a href="http://www.arc.gov.au/sites/default/files/filedepot/Public/EI/EI_2018_Framework.pdf">Engagement and Impact</a> evaluation policy understates this by measuring engagement principally in terms of the economic value of relationships with research “end users”.</p>
<h2>Academic freedom</h2>
<p>The university’s most important strength is its intellectual independence, and the academic freedom that assures that independence. Research for government or for industry is not independent. This kind of consultancy work may be legitimate and important, but it ought not compromise the presumption that knowledge cannot fully advance, and the democratic system work as it should, unless research is ideologically independent. It must also be contestable and brought into the public domain for evaluation and debate, and to inform public opinion and decision-making. </p>
<p>There is a public good argument to fund knowledge creation for this democratic purpose, which means academic freedom must be defended at all costs. Yet the University of Melbourne, for example, took steps to weaken that essential characteristic of university research when it <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/university-of-melbourne-staff-to-strike-over-academic-freedom-20180502-p4zctp.html">proposed</a> removing from its Enterprise Agreement the commitment that its academics would “<a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/university-of-melbourne-staff-to-strike-over-academic-freedom-20180502-p4zctp.html">engage in critical enquiry, intellectual discourse and public controversy without fear or favour</a>”. This suggests an institution willing to compromise its democratic mission. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-melbourne-university-staff-strike-over-academic-freedom-its-time-to-take-the-issue-seriously-96116">As Melbourne University staff strike over academic freedom, it's time to take the issue seriously</a>
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<p>Academic freedom is important because evidence and reason matter to the formation of public opinion. They matter to the analysis of “fake news”, to counter-balancing an <a href="https://theconversation.com/mixed-media-how-australias-newspapers-became-locked-in-a-war-of-left-versus-right-79001">increasingly partisan</a> Australian private news media at the same time as financial support for the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-08/budget-2018-abc-funding-frozen-in-$84-million-hit-bottom-line/9740690">national public broadcaster is being reduced</a>. </p>
<p>Research that is not independent, that is conducted <em>with</em> fear and favour, is unscholarly. It compromises intellectual integrity and ensures knowledge cannot be a public and democratic good. Research for public good and research sold for private benefit can co-exist, but the latter cannot override the public mission of a public institution.</p>
<p>Universities play an essential role in the development of vocational and professional skills for both the individual and the common good. But if this is all they do, if they are not independently and objectively discovering and disseminating new knowledge for the public good, a society is presuming ignorance as a substitute for robust democracy.</p>
<h2>Understanding power</h2>
<p>There is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-universities-must-defend-democracy-83481">public good argument</a> for people to graduate from university with a well-developed understanding of power. Where it comes from and why, who has it and why, and how one influences it for society’s betterment. Highly developed critical thinking skills, the ability to write clearly and present well-informed and reasoned arguments are essential to influencing power. They ought not be the skills of an elite who have the money to buy the time to read, think and deliberate. </p>
<p>This is partly an argument for raising the status and availability of a liberal arts education, either on its own or in conjunction with a professional or vocational degree so that the social imperative to ‘be’ something when you grow up is still satisfied: an idea inculcated in children even before they start school. </p>
<p>One may reasonably wish to be a nurse, a teacher or an accountant but one should also expect to be a citizen. A nurse should be able to contribute to health policy debate. A teacher ought to know more than what must be taught this week. An accountant should know the democratic and social context in which business operates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97075/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic O'Sullivan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australian higher education policy debates focus primarily on how and by whom universities are funded. This diminishes understanding of universities’ democratic purpose and wider social mission.Dominic O'Sullivan, Associate Professor of Political Science, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/897212018-02-02T11:49:04Z2018-02-02T11:49:04ZIf you’re not sure why what’s happening in Poland matters so much, here’s what you need to know<p>The Polish government continues to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/20/eu-process-poland-voting-rights">clash</a> with the EU over its attempts to revamp its domestic legal system, most recently bringing in legislation that threatens the independence of the courts. </p>
<p>This is just the latest episode in a wider series of reforms through which the populist right-wing government (the Law and Justice party) has consolidated its powers – including tightening its controls on the civil service, and introducing legislation to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35257105">control the media</a>.</p>
<p>The latest piece of legislation, which was signed off by president <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42420150">Andrzej Duda</a>, is the most controversial yet. It permits the government to play a significant role in shaping the judiciary. Politicians will even be able to choose members of the judiciary council – the body responsible for appointing judges.</p>
<p>At the heart of the disagreement between Poland and the EU is a disagreement about the separation of powers. The separation of powers is a liberal doctrine, which the EU takes very seriously. It was developed initially by political thinkers such as <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/">John Locke</a> and <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montesquieu/">Montesquieu </a>.</p>
<p>The doctrine is concerned with how the state’s power should be distributed. It holds that the three arms of the state – the executive, the judiciary and the legislature – should, to a greater or lesser extent, be kept separate. That way, they are able to hold one another to account. </p>
<p>The legislature creates the law, the executive puts the law into force and the judiciary interprets and applies the law in the courts. For Montesquieu, who presents the most detailed formulation of the separation of powers, this compartmentalisation of state power is essential if governments are to be accountable. And this is important, he believed, because only accountable governments protect the liberty of citizens. </p>
<p>This theory about the separation of state power went on to have a formative effect on the development of modern day democracies. And it’s this vision of the tripartite separation of state power that is essential to the <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm">EU’s argument against the Polish reforms</a>.</p>
<p>If Montesquieu is right that unaccountable governments curtail liberties, then the reforms in Poland should worry us. By allowing the ruling party to reform – and to thereby shape – the judiciary, the separation of powers is not being respected in Poland. Suddenly, the government has a significant say over who applies and enforces the laws they create. Suddenly, the government has discretion over who holds them to account. Suddenly, it looks as though the government is not very accountable to anyone at all.</p>
<p>And yet, we might also think that Montesquieu – and with him the EU – is wrong on this. </p>
<p>We may, for example, worry about how the doctrine sits in relation to democracy. For what the doctrine asks of us is to set limits on the power of democratically elected governments. The doctrine permits unelected judges to stop elected governments from doing the things that a majority of people have elected them to do. As such, the doctrine recommends curtailing the will of the people. The doctrine, in short, is undemocratic. And, indeed, these complaints form the substance of the response to the EU from Poland, and those (like Hungary) who have rallied <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-will-block-punitive-eu-action-on-poland/a-41903647">in support</a>.</p>
<p>The separation of powers looks to be at once an important means to secure liberty from arbitrary rule, while being at the same time a doctrine that is fundamentally undemocratic. At the core of the disagreement between Poland and the EU is this deeper ideological disagreement about the nature and composition of liberal democracy.</p>
<h2>Lessons from history</h2>
<p>I want to briefly give two reasons as to why we should take the doctrine of the separation of powers seriously – and why the Polish reforms are thus so troubling.</p>
<p>The first reason is historical precedent. Our historical experience of governments taking (or granting themselves) control of the judiciary (and thereby violating the separation of powers) is not a happy one. </p>
<p>Take Argentina in the late 1970s. The right-wing junta there engaged in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/19/argentina-human-rights">“forced disappearances”</a>, against communists and other opponents. It arrested them arbitrarily, detained them en masse without trial and submitted them to torture and killing. To implement this policy without challenge, the junta restaffed the judiciary with members who were sympathetic to its aims, and who were forced to swear an oath of loyalty to the regime. It was through violating the separation of powers that the Argentine government was able to act unaccountably, to cement its rule and to license violent and oppressive policies.</p>
<p>The second reason is that the threat of majoritarianism – something which is inherent to democracy – should worry us. Majoritarianism occurs when a majority-supported government legislates in ways that suppress or otherwise harm a minority. The separation of powers is designed to prevent the iniquities of majority rule. And, along with other core, legally institutionalised, liberal measures such as free speech, judicial review, legal representation and fair trial, it forms the sometimes very thin protective layer between the state and the citizen. Without these measures, an untrammelled government, particularly in our populist political climate, becomes a very real, oppressive threat.</p>
<p>History tells us (as it no doubt told Locke and Montiesqueu) that it’s correct to think that unaccountable governments suppress citizens, and worse. And their doctrine of the separation of power gives us a plausible and effective remedy which we know works to restrict state power and protect liberty. Both the lessons of history, and the very real concern we should have about omnipotent, unrestricted majority legislatures, show us that the doctrine – developed through trial and error in the emerging constitutional democracies of 17th and 18th century Europe and America – is still essential to accountable, liberty-respecting governance.</p>
<p>This is a lesson the Polish government should not take lightly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Hancocks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Reforms to the judiciary are a threat to democracy – and that affects us all.Thomas Hancocks, Teaching Fellow/ Consultant in Applied Ethics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/801272017-07-12T00:35:49Z2017-07-12T00:35:49ZWould impeaching Trump restore the rule of law? Lessons from Latin America<p>Some Americans and members of Congress have <a href="http://www.salon.com/2017/07/03/taking-it-to-the-streets-thousands-march-to-impeach-trump/">called for the impeachment</a> of President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>What happens after a president is impeached?</p>
<p>The vice president would take his place, but other parts of the government continue unchanged. That may not be a bad thing. However, partisan polarization can be magnified in the process. Many Americans already think the government is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2017/04/17/3-views-of-congress/">too divided along partisan lines</a> and that <a href="http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/june_2017/for_sale_congress">corruption</a> has reached <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-and-maryland-to-sue-president-trump-alleging-breach-of-constitutional-oath/2017/06/11/0059e1f0-4f19-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html">the highest levels of government</a>. These beliefs fuel <a href="http://www.npr.org/2015/11/23/457063796/poll-only-1-in-5-americans-say-they-trust-the-government">declines in public trust</a> and <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/208526/adults-name-government-dissatisfaction-important-problem.aspx">dissatisfaction</a> with the government in general.</p>
<p>In my book on the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/achilles-heel-of-democracy/729655118E5C21315EA768CE19291434">rule of law in Central America</a>, I discuss several occasions in which presidents were removed from office before their terms ended. The current political crisis in the United States shares similarities with political issues in Latin America. We are seeing <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/">radical partisanship</a>, <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/data-trend/political-attitudes/congressional-favorability/">public dissatisfaction</a> and <a href="http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/right_direction_wrong_track_jun26">perceived poor government performance</a>. Since only one U.S. president has left office due to wrongdoing, examples from Latin America can give us some perspective. </p>
<p>Lasting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2015/05/06/40-years-ago-church-committee-investigated-americans-spying-on-americans/">reforms after Watergate</a> came from a <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm">Congressional committee’s investigation</a> and recommendations, rather than from the simple resignation of President Nixon. Impeachment is <a href="https://theconversation.com/impeachment-its-political-77528">inherently political</a> and, as I have observed in Latin America, does more to punish enemies than clean up politics. Removing a president who is a “bad apple” may help, but a real cleansing takes more effort.</p>
<h2>After impeachment</h2>
<p>Take Brazil as a case in point. Former President Dilma Rousseff <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/dilma-rousseff-impeached-president-brazilian-senate-michel-temer">was impeached</a> in 2016 in the midst of an anti-corruption investigation known as “Operation Car Wash.” There were already pending corruption investigations against <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-brazil-impeach-20160328-story.html">37 of 65 members of the congressional impeachment commission</a>, but none of them were forced from office. It is no surprise that Rousseff’s impeachment appeared to many to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/05/in-brazil-women-are-fighting-against-the-sexist-impeachment-of-dilma-rousseff">inspired by sexism</a> rather than just anti-corruption efforts.</p>
<p>Rousseff’s replacement, President Michel Temer, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption-idUSKBN19J2R5">was charged with</a> corruption-related offenses in June 2017. However, Temer’s political party and their allies control the majority of the Congress and the president of the Congress is an ally of Temer’s. A formal impeachment is unlikely to go forward.</p>
<p>We see a similar failure to pull out the root of corruption in the “Guatemalan Spring” of September 2015. Then Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina was forced to resign in the face of massive popular protests. He was implicated in an investigation into corruption at the national customs agency, for which he was arrested the day after his resignation. He had also been accused of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36060524">taking bribes from a Spanish firm</a> in exchange for granting it a lucrative long-term contract with the government of Guatemala.</p>
<p>An election was held just four days after Pérez Molina’s resignation. Jimmy Morales, a television comedian with no political experience, won the presidency over a former first lady. Morales ran as an outsider with the slogan “not corrupt, not a thief.” After his first year in office, <a href="http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Guatemalan-President-Jimmy-Morales-Marks-Inefficient-1st-Year-20170112-0017.html">which opponents have derided as “inefficient,”</a> Morales is also <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-corruption-idUSKBN16E2PW">facing a corruption scandal</a> involving accusations that his son and brother had fraudulent dealings with a government agency.</p>
<p>Take an older example, from Honduras. The <a href="http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/us-honduran-coup/">military coup against Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in 2009</a> was authorized by that country’s Supreme Court and was backed by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/world/americas/29honduras.html">the majority of its Congress</a>. The Honduran Supreme Court argued that Zelaya was planning to reform the constitution to give himself more power as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had done. </p>
<p>Some eight years after Zelaya was removed, Honduran political elites continue to <a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/corruption-honduras-result-of-functioning-system-report">participate in widespread corruption</a>, including <a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/honduras-elites-and-organized-crime-introduction">direct ties between some political elites and organized crime</a>. Because so many of the elites are corrupt, none of them <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/30/when-corruption-is-operating-system-case-of-honduras-pub-69999">rock the boat.</a> </p>
<p>Even prosecuting and jailing presidents for corruption doesn’t seem to solve the problems that lead up to these crises. Often the rest of government continues to be overly partisan and even corrupt – and public satisfaction with government drops even lower. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3299289.stm">Nicaragua</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/americas/28fbriefs-EXPRESIDENTF_BRF.html">Costa Rica</a>, for example, former presidents have been jailed on corruption charges, but those convictions were <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/world/americas/16nicaragua.html">ultimately</a> <a href="http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/12/05/appeal-court-acquitts-ex-costa-rica-president-miguel-angel-rodriguez">overturned</a> on appeal. In 2013, Guatemala became the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/10/world/americas/guatemala-genocide-trial/index.html">first country</a> to convict a former head of state of genocide in a national court. Ten days later, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22605022">reversed</a> General Efraín Rios Montt’s conviction over an evidentiary matter – although 2017 may yet see a <a href="https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/04/rios-montt-to-face-second-genocide-trial-for-the-dos-erres-massacre/">new trial</a>. The point is, it is extraordinarily difficult to make charges stick against even a former president, especially if he or she still has sizable support in the government.</p>
<h2>Beyond impeachment</h2>
<p>Problems with governance are rarely fixed by going after even an unpopular or corrupt president if fundamental institutional problems are allowed to continue unchecked. Impeachment’s weakness is compounded by its often partisan deployment. </p>
<p>What else can be done to clean up politics? </p>
<p>The hard work of demanding <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2017-04-13/brazil-s-never-ending-corruption-crisis">transparency</a> more generally may help get at the root of the problem. Progress in Guatemala has been buoyed by an <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/lessons-guatemalas-commission-against-impunity">international anti-corruption commission</a> that has helped local officials shine a light on official wrongdoing at every level of government. </p>
<p>Ultimately, using <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2017-06-02/brazils-best-shot-against-corruption">legal channels to improve political institutions</a>, rather than focusing on just one bad politician, can enhance the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80127/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel E. Bowen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ousting an executive leader from office doesn’t always have the intended effect, as these examples from Central and South America show.Rachel E. Bowen, Associate Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775982017-06-13T02:57:44Z2017-06-13T02:57:44ZIs Trump’s definition of ‘the rule of law’ the same as the US Constitution’s?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173479/original/file-20170612-10249-aikxcu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump speaks at the White House.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Alex Brandon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>News <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ninth-circuit-court-declines-to-reinstate-trump-travel-ban-1497287531">such as the recent federal court decision</a> against President Donald Trump’s proposed travel ban and James Comey’s public Senate testimony serve as occasions for <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/house/336700-dem-rep-trump-administration-showing-incredible-disrespect-for-rule-of-law">outrage</a> among critics about the president’s <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/333263-dan-rather-blasts-trumps-willful-disregard-for-the-rule-of-law">disrespect for “the rule of law</a>.” </p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/05/10/warren-comey-firing-shows-trump-disregard-for-rule-law/DTKu5wXPfNPyVmAOMzFIEL/story.html">prominent lawmakers</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-10/comey-s-firing-is-a-crisis-of-american-rule-of-law">law professors</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/opinion/trumps-madness-invites-mutiny.html">journalists</a>, among others, see the new administration as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/26/all-the-times-trump-personally-attacked-judges-and-why-his-tirades-are-worse-than-wrong/?utm_term=.ca88897a8b75">flouting</a> this cornerstone value of American legal politics.</p>
<p>But what is the rule of law? </p>
<p>As a lawyer and political scientist who <a href="https://mei.nus.edu.sg/index.php/web/publications_TMPL/insight-149-contested-meanings-of-the-rule-of-law-in-qatar-and-the-arab-gul">studies this question</a> in <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/09/11/legalism-sans-fronti-res-u.s.-rule-of-law-aid-in-arab-world-pub-17440">diverse Arab countries and elsewhere</a>, I can affirm that the answer is not obvious. The rule of law <a href="https://mei.nus.edu.sg/index.php/web/publications_TMPL/insight-158-debates-on-the-rule-of-law-and-why-they-matter">means a variety of things within and across countries</a>. And they are not always consistent. </p>
<p>This helps make sense of the fact that Trump and some of his supporters may actually endorse one version of the rule of law. It just happens to be a version more dominant in nondemocratic political systems.</p>
<h2>Meanings of the rule of law</h2>
<p>Like “democracy” or “equality,” the rule of law is a popular ideal, but not always a clear one. For this reason, United Nations officials have tried <a href="https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/">to define it</a>. Prominent organizations like the World Bank have measured it through <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home">basic indices</a>, or <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016">multifaceted criteria</a>, such as civil rights, order and security, constraints on government power and absence of corruption.</p>
<p>Yet using an appealing phrase to describe different social phenomena can have real political consequences. </p>
<p>The “rule of law” has at least two broad definitions that exist in obvious tension. </p>
<p>One is a dominant dogma of American political history, as conveyed by Founding Father <a href="http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/sjc/edu-res-center/jn-adams/mass-constitution-1-gen.html#JohnAdamsandtheRuleofLaw">John Adams’ succinct phrase</a>: “a government of laws, not men.” The idea here is basic. Government leaders, like all citizens, should not be above the law, but bound by it. This means, for example, that a U.S. senator who extorts money is no more immune to being charged with this crime than an ordinary American.</p>
<p>A second possible meaning, in tension with the first one but present in democracies nonetheless, is that law ensures that people obey government.</p>
<h2>Law over leaders</h2>
<p>Let’s first consider the rule of law as John Adams and the U.S. Constitution’s framers defined it.</p>
<p>The U.S. Constitution and courts’ mandate to review specific laws define the rule of law as a value and a set of procedures that provide legal protection to all Americans. The framers of the Constitution stressed in <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/overview-rule-law">Federalist 78</a> the need for judges with autonomy from politics who could defend fundamental citizen rights. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/">Equality under the law</a> was popularized as a foundation of the rule of law in the wider English-speaking world by the 19th century.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173478/original/file-20170612-10208-261yyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A carving reads ‘Equal Justice Under Law’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This has not meant that all Americans, in fact, <a href="https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/equality-under-the-law-investigating-race-and-the-justice-system/">enjoy equal legal resources</a>. Nor has it prevented powerful individuals or groups from using laws to their advantage. Nonetheless, institutions that enforce the idea that legal rules and procedures bind everyone, including leaders, are central to the U.S. and other countries. The expectation that rules will be applied to everyone also <a href="http://prospect.org/article/america%E2%80%99s-interest-global-rule-law">underpins the contemporary global legal system</a>.</p>
<p>The rule of law, understood as laws over leaders, takes on added significance in the U.S. Here, <a href="https://www.clements.com/sites/default/files/resources/The-Most-Litigious-Countries-in-the-World.pdf">a comparatively large proportion of people become lawyers</a>. In turn, <a href="http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_no_longer_dominate_congress_is_commercialization_of_profession_to_b">many lawyers become bureaucrats and politicians</a>. American leaders with legal training are educated to focus on specific rules, procedures and close reading of legal texts. </p>
<p>Because of this, many government officials and members of the private and public-interest law firms who rotate in and out of government care about details of legal rules, procedures and transparency. A leader like Trump, whose tweets denigrate the neutrality of American judges, who <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/politics/trump-taxes-reform/">refuses to submit to the same expectations</a> of his peers or other citizens and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/05/09/comey-firing-reaction-from-members-of-congress-on-fbi-directors-dismissal/">who appears to interfere with an important legal inquiry</a>, <a href="http://billmoyers.com/story/trumps-lawyers-rule-law/">raises the hackles of other lawyers</a> and politicians. </p>
<p>Many Americans who are trained in the importance of the autonomy of laws will mistrust a leader who seems not to respect such autonomy. Thus, it was not surprising that as soon as Trump became president, <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-travel-immigration-ban-muslims-supreme-court-san-francisco-9th-circuit-555203">lawyers</a> <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/01/31/with-u-s-democracy-in-crisis-its-suddenly-thank-god-for-lawyers/#54f3c4cf18f0">mobilized against</a> an executive attitude that <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/does-trump-administration-believe-rule-law">demeans their sense of the rule of law</a>.</p>
<h2>Law and order</h2>
<p>Yet, Trump and some supporters appear to embrace a different understanding of the rule of law. The president has in fact <a href="http://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/01/25/trump-we-are-going-to-restore-the-rule-of-law/">stated his dedication</a> to the rule of law. <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/04/29/rule-law-in-trumps-first-100-days.html">Some argue</a> that his leadership on certain issues, such as <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/20/first-100-days-trump-ushers-new-immigration-enforc/">enforcing immigration law</a>, has confirmed this commitment. This is not merely a case of alternative media. It underscores the importance of multiple meanings for the rule of law.</p>
<p>Trump seems to view the rule of law as deference to political authority and efficient <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/09/donald-trump-criminal-justice/93550162/">law enforcement</a>. This includes institutions that execute laws, which might be summarized as “cops, courts, and clinks” (jails).</p>
<p>Part of candidate Trump’s <a href="http://www.ocregister.com/2016/11/22/anti-illegal-immigration-advocates-thrilled-with-trumps-win/">appeal</a> was his repeated charge that people in the U.S. who broke the law, particularly undocumented immigrants, were policed inadequately. Since taking office, he has stressed <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-sign-executive-order-police-more-authority-murder-shooting-us-president-jeff-sessions-a7572001.html">enhancing police power</a> and <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/04/28/trump-proclaims-may-1-as-loyalty-day.html">loyalty</a> to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/letat-cest-trump/526431/">authority, especially his own</a>. </p>
<p>This is hardly a fringe meaning of the rule of law. Efficient enforcement and state order are critical components of a legal system that also embraces citizens’ rights and protections. Yet these two key facets of the rule of law don’t always sit together well. Strong policing can accompany denial of equal protection to suspected criminals, patterns of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-brutality-of-police-culture-in-baltimore/391158/">brutality</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/us/chicago-police-dept-plagued-by-systemic-racism-task-force-finds.html">racism</a>. Leaders’ natural interest in strong and efficient law enforcement and citizen loyalty can override their legal accountability.</p>
<p>Different political systems strike different balances with this tension. This helps explain Trump’s fondness for presidential immunity from <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/17/15654158/trump-prosecuted-constitution-impeachment-prosecutor">most criminal prosecution</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/11/23/trumps-claim-that-the-president-cant-have-a-conflict-of-interest/?utm_term=.5a52a9d27ff4">some conflict-of-interest standards</a>. This and his <a href="http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/trumps-anti-democratic-war-on-facts-and-free-speech-w462960">impatience with protest and criticism against him</a> appear to show that the new president cares about law as a tool to bolster his authority rather than to enhance ordinary Americans’ rights. The world is certainly <a href="https://qz.com/643497/we-are-witnessing-the-rise-of-global-authoritarianism-on-a-chilling-scale/">seeing a trend</a> toward leaders like Egypt’s President Sisi and Turkey’s President Erdogan who wish to control law, rather than subordinate themselves to it.</p>
<p>Trump, and Americans who consider him a strong leader, likely believe in the rule of law, as they understand it. The controversy among many lawyers is that the level to which the new administration elevates efficiency, enforcement and executive privilege tramples their dominant sense of the rule of law as government by laws, not people.</p>
<p>Growing conflicts between the Trump administration and a range of lawyers, judges and activists stem, in part, from each side invoking real, contestable concepts of the rule of law. </p>
<p>Naturally, even if Trump and some supporters share a genuine belief in the rule of law as enforcement and order, this does not justify acts he may have taken that violate American laws. It should nevertheless serve as a reminder that using complex concepts like the rule of law without context or nuance may make it much harder to understand important and genuine underlying political disagreements.</p>
<p>Indeed, the world may be witnessing less a clear rejection of democracy as a more subtle move by many <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c5e7e8f8-22c4-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16?mhq5j=e1">elected leaders to concentrate power in authoritarian ways</a>. With Trump’s occasional <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/donald-trump-praising-authoritarians-rodrigo-duterte">appreciation of leaders with strong power</a>, it becomes particularly important to clarify what he means by the rule of law. That way, each of us can judge whether his legal values are the same as our own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77598/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rule of law can take on different meanings depending whom you ask and where you are – but in the US it pretty much means one thing.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/781682017-05-23T20:54:36Z2017-05-23T20:54:36ZTrump’s Saudi Arabia speech confirms massive shift in US foreign policy<p>President Donald Trump studiously avoided the phrase “radical Islamic terrorism” in his <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit">speech</a> at the Arab Islamic American Summit in Saudi Arabia on May 21.</p>
<p>He instead accentuated the positive, calling the meeting a “historic and unprecedented gathering of leaders – unique in the history of nations” and stressing mutual respect and a desire to “form closer bonds of friendship, security, culture and commerce.”</p>
<p>He went on to say:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“America is a sovereign nation and our first priority is always the safety and security of our citizens. We are not here to lecture – we are not here to tell other people how to live, what to do, who to be or how to worship. Instead, we are here to offer partnership – based on shared interests and values – to pursue a better future for us all.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This elaboration of Trump’s “America First” approach to the world must have been welcomed by foreign policy realists. Realists would like it because it marks a turn away from the emphasis, or at least lip service, that <a href="http://www.nationalmemo.com/saudi-women-disappointed-trump-no-obama-human-rights/">the Barack Obama</a> and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/06/bush.china.olympics/index.html">George W. Bush administrations</a> paid to things like human rights and democracy.</p>
<p>In my experience as a foreign policy expert and former U.S. ambassador, I have found that realists believe nationalism is still as much the driving force as it has been since the signing of the <a href="http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/treaty-westphalia">Treaty of Westphalia</a> in 1648, which ended the 30 Years War and established a system of international relations based on nation-states. </p>
<p>Under realist theory, every country tries to maximize its power in a zero-sum game because the international system lacks any supervision from any supranational entity. For realists, it’s always anarchy out there. Putting America first is just a recognition that every country puts itself first.</p>
<h2>What the Trump doctrine leaves out</h2>
<p>Trump’s declaration of his America First approach was mirrored by Secretary of State Tillerson’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm">recent remarks</a> to employees of the State Department. Tillerson stressed that the job of State Department employees is to promote American prosperity and security with little regard for the internal issues of other countries that are not related to those two goals. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170662/original/file-20170523-5749-1qbcb1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Secretary of State Rex Tillerson speaking to State Department employees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From these two speeches, it’s clear that our “shared interests and values” do not include things that could be divisive, like respect for human rights and democracy.</p>
<p>The assembled leaders would likely have been pleased to hear that – most of them are autocrats, if not outright dictators. No official list of attendees was readily available, but a careful review of photos from the summit showed that about 55 nations were represented. Looking at where those countries fall on the rankings that the NGO Freedom House every year indicates why the audience was so receptive. </p>
<p>In its annual report, Freedom House assigns a numerical grade to 195 countries and 14 territories based on their score on 25 indicators derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their total grade, which ranges between zero and 100, puts them into one of three broad categories – free, partially free or not free. Nearly half of the countries represented at the summit are rated not free, 40 percent as partially free and only 9 percent free, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf">based on rankings</a> from Freedom House. </p>
<p>Besides the United States, the only other nations at the summit categorized as free were Benin, Guyana, Senegal, Tunisia and Suriname. The U.S. was the most democratic country in the room, according to its Freedom House score of 89. None of the 27 countries in the world that rank higher than that were present.</p>
<p>While considerable progress has been made in recent decades in terms of increasing respect for these rights and liberties, 2016 was not a good year to the Freedom House Report. It registered net declines in these values in 67 countries and improvement in only 36. With the policy Trump described, in my opinion, chances for a better year in 2017 are greatly diminished.</p>
<h2>A receptive audience</h2>
<p>Many in the crowd must have been enthusiastic about Trump’s speech because governments that have little respect for human rights don’t like democracy. In addition, autocrats prefer decision-making to be confined to a small elite since it improves the economic opportunities <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hung-En_Sung/publication/226036499_Democracy_and_Political_Corruption_A_Cross-National_Comparison/links/09e4150bc9b10ce238000000/Democracy-and-Political-Corruption-A-Cross-National-Comparison.pdf">provided by corruption</a>.</p>
<p>They won’t have to worry about American criticism under the Trump doctrine, since all that matters to America now is jobs and fighting terrorism. The fact that democracy and respect for political rights and civil liberties is the <a href="https://psmag.com/news/respect-human-rights-reduce-terrorism-14208">best way to combat terrorism</a> is something that doctrine fails to take into account. </p>
<p>There was one other thing Trump has said repeatedly in the past that he did not say at the summit. He did not call the press “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/26/world/europe/trump-enemy-of-the-people-stalin.html?_r=0">the enemy of the people</a>.” But that was unnecessary, as nearly everyone in the audience probably already believes that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78168/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Jett received funding from a Fulbright senior scholars grant in 2016 to do research and teaching in Israel.</span></em></p>For Trump, putting America first means that being a global leader on human rights may take a back seat.Dennis Jett, Professor of International Relations, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/722692017-02-06T19:13:36Z2017-02-06T19:13:36ZTrump, the wannabe king ruling by ‘twiat’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155395/original/image-20170202-1657-cdeeru.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump's reinvention of the royal fiat as rule-by-tweet, or 'twiat', is anti-democratic and needs to be resisted.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump?lang=en">Twitter</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Just weeks after his inauguration as US president, it is clear that Donald Trump is making a further bold claim on power, one that goes beyond the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-executive-orders-and-what-force-do-they-have-in-us-politics-72088">executive orders</a> that are rightly drawing so much attention. He is reinventing the royal fiat by novel means: the rule-by-tweet, or “twiat”. This move is not an extension of popular democracy, but its enemy, and it needs to be resisted.</p>
<p>We are becoming used to Trump’s new way not just of sustaining a political campaign, but of making policy. We wake up to news of another <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/mexico-president-donald-trump-enrique-pena-nieto-border-wall/">state</a>, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/toyota-12bn-value-plummet-shares-stock-market-donald-trump-tweet-move-mexico-tax-a7512096.html">corporation</a>, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-trump-berkeley-20170202-story.html">institution</a> or <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/01/26/511781106/trump-chelsea-manning-an-ungrateful-traitor-for-criticizing-obama">individual</a> caught in the crossfire of his tweets. Corporations and investors are setting up “Twitter Response Units” and “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/06/app-warns-investors-donald-trump-tweets-companies/">Trump Triggers</a>” in case the next tweet is aimed at them. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"827118012784373760"}"></div></p>
<p>The process is so alien to the ways of making policy that have evolved over decades in complex democracies that it is tempting to dismiss it as just funny or naive. But that would be a huge mistake.</p>
<p>A tweet of Trump’s opinion at any moment on a particular issue is just that: an expression of the temporary opinion of one person, albeit one with his hands on more power-levers than almost any other person in the world. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155108/original/image-20170201-12678-1gpou3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump’s opinions at any moment are subject to change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sasha Kimel/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such expressions matter, for sure, to <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump?lang=en">Trump’s Twitter followers</a>. But, although one might be forgiven for thinking otherwise, they do not (at 23 million) constitute a significant proportion of the world’s population, or even a large proportion of the US population.</p>
<h2>The king holds court</h2>
<p>A Trump tweet only becomes news if it is reported as news. And it only starts to become policy if those who interpret policy, including the media, start to <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/china-weighs-response-to-donald-trumps-tweet-storm-20161205-gt4347">treat this news as policy</a>. Until then, the Trump tweet remains at most a claim on power. </p>
<p>But once key institutions treat it as if were already an enactment of power, it quickly becomes one. Worse, it inaugurates a whole new way of doing power whose compatibility with democracy and global peace is questionable.</p>
<p>Imagine you are a diplomat, trying to schedule a meeting for yourself, or your political master, with Trump in a few weeks’ time. Is it sensible for you to rely on the confidentiality of the meeting? Could a poorly chosen phrase or look – or indeed your most carefully argued reasoning – provoke a tweet that publicly mocks your whole strategy?</p>
<p>How do you deal with a figure who claims the power to broadcast on his own terms his gut reactions to whatever you say or propose? Yes, you can tweet back, but that is already to give up on the quiet space of discussion that was once diplomacy’s refuge.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"827002559122567168"}"></div></p>
<p>The impact of rule-by-tweet is potentially profound: above all, on policy, whether global or domestic, legal or commercial. A new type of power is being claimed and, it seems, recognised: the power, by an individual’s say-so, to make things happen, the twiat. Just the sort of power that <a href="https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-glorious-revolution-of-1688/">revolutions</a> were <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/201524045/The-American-Revolution-and-the-Early-Federal-Republic">fought</a> to abolish.</p>
<p>If Trump is the putative Tweet King, who are his courtiers? Surely they’re the mainstream media institutions that regularly report Trump’s tweets as if they were policy. </p>
<p>If a medieval king’s courtiers refused to pass on his word to the wider world, its impact changed. While courtiers could be replaced overnight, contemporary media corporations cannot (for now at least). So why should the media act as if they were Trump’s courtiers?</p>
<p>We must not underestimate the short-term pressure on media corporations to conform to Trump’s claim on power. For sure, there will be an audience if they report Trump’s tweets, and their financial need to grab audiences wherever they can has never been greater. </p>
<p>But, if news values still mean something, they refer not only to financial imperatives, but to what should count as news. And norms about news must have some relation to what passes for acceptable in a democracy rather than an autocracy.</p>
<h2>Why is the ‘twiat’ anti-democratic?</h2>
<p>Some might say: Trump’s tweets are just the new way of doing democracy, “get with the program” (in the words of Trump’s press secretary, Sean Spicer). But, as the grim history of mid-20th-century Europe shows, authoritarian grabs on power only ever worked because their anti-democratic means were accepted by those around them as a novel way of “doing democracy”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KVVTTFKRzAY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">White House spokesman Sean Spicer says officials must ‘get with the program’ or go.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The “twiat” is anti-democratic for two reasons. First, it claims a power (to name individuals, pronounce policy, and condemn actions) against which there is no redress. Its work is done once uttered from the mouth of the “king”.</p>
<p>Second, and more subtly, allowing such power back into political decision-making undermines the slower, more inclusive forms of discussion and reflection that gives modern political democratic institutions their purpose and purchase in the first place.</p>
<p>Trump’s claim to a new form of charismatic power through Twitter is, in part, the flip-side of the damaged legitimacy of today’s democratic process. But, instead of curing that problem, it closes the door on it. The presidential tweeting ushers us into a new space that is no longer recognisable as democratic: a space where complex policy becomes not just too difficult but unnecessary, although its substitutes can still be tweeted.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/P0sPidpwYCA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Is Trump’s Twitter feed bypassing dishonest media or bypassing the democratic process?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Can anything be done to stop this? A good start would be to stop reporting the tweets of our would-be Twitter king as if they were news, let alone policy. </p>
<p>Let Trump’s tweets have no more claim on democracy’s attention than the changing opinions of any other powerful figure. Refuse the additional claim to power that Trump’s Twitter stream represents. </p>
<p>Fail to refuse that claim, and all of us risk accepting by default a new form of rule that undermines the restraints on power on which both democracy and media freedoms, in the long term, depend.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Couldry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump is reinventing the royal fiat by novel means: the rule-by-tweet, or ‘twiat’. This move is not an extension of popular democracy, but its enemy, and it needs to be resisted.Nick Couldry, Professor of Media, Communications and Social Theory, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/689542016-12-12T03:41:07Z2016-12-12T03:41:07ZTrump trolls, Pirate Parties and the Italian Five Star Movement: The internet meets politics<p>We blame the internet for a lot of things, and now the list has grown to include our politics. In a turbulent year marked by the U.K.’s decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump, some have started to wonder to what extent the recent events have to do with the technology that most defines our age.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of Trump’s victory, commentators accused Facebook of being <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2016/11/17/facebook-with-great-power-comes-great-responsibility/#380f552d6e7d">indirectly responsible</a> for his election. Specifically, they point to the role of social media in spreading virulent political propaganda and fake news. The internet has been increasingly presented as a possible cause for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-post-truth-election-clicks-trump-facts-67274">post-truth culture</a> that allegedly characterizes contemporary democracies.</p>
<p>These reactions are a reminder that new technologies often stimulate <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/13688804.2014.898904">both hopes and fears</a> about their impact on society and culture. The internet has been seen as both the harbinger of political participation and the main culprit for the decline of democracy. The network of networks is now more than a mere vehicle of political communication: It has become a powerful rhetorical symbol people are using to achieve political goals. </p>
<p>This is currently visible in Europe, where movements such as the <a href="http://piratar.is/en/">Pirate Parties</a> and the Italian <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-italys-five-star-movement-69596">Five Star Movement</a>, which we have <a href="http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/36/1/105.abstract">studied</a>, build their political messages around the internet. To them, the internet is a catalyst for radical and democratic change that channels growing dissatisfaction with traditional political parties.</p>
<h2>Web utopias and dystopias</h2>
<p>The emergence of political enthusiasm for the internet owes much to U.S. culture in the 1990s. Internet connectivity was spreading from universities and corporations to an increasingly large portion of the population. During the Clinton administration, Vice President Al Gore made the “<a href="http://www.ibiblio.org/icky/speech2.html">Information Superhighway</a>” a flagship concept. He linked the development of a high-speed digital telecommunication network to a new era of enlightened market democracy. </p>
<p>The enthusiasm for information technology and free-market economics spread from Silicon Valley and was dubbed <a href="http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/2007/04/17/the-californian-ideology-2">Californian Ideology</a>. It inspired a generation of digital entrepreneurs, technologists, politicians and activists in Silicon Valley and beyond. The <a href="http://time.com/3741681/2000-dotcom-stock-bust/">2000 dot-com crash</a> only temporarily curbed the hype.</p>
<p>In the 2000s, the rise of sharing platforms and social media – often labeled as “<a href="http://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html">Web 2.0</a>” – supported the idea of a new era of increased participation of common citizens in the production of cultural content, software development and even political revolutions against authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>The promise of the unrestrained flow of information also engendered deep fears. In 1990s, the web was already seen by critics as a vehicle for poor-quality information, hate speech and extreme pornography. We knew then that the Information Superhighway’s dark side was worryingly <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/15/business/limiting-medium-without-boundaries-you-let-good-fish-through-net-while-blocking.html">difficult to regulate</a>.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, the promise of decentralization has resulted in few massive advertising empires like Facebook and Google, employing sophisticated <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-democracys-new-maxim-surveillance-and-soft-despotism-48879">mass surveillance techniques</a>. Web-based companies like Uber and Airbnb bring new efficient services to millions of customers, but are also seen as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-uber-opens-cities-only-to-close-them-59067">potential monopolists</a> that threaten local economies and squeeze profits out of impoverished communities.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://techliberation.com/2011/01/31/the-case-for-internet-optimism-part-1-saving-the-net-from-its-detractors/">public’s views</a> on digital media are rapidly shifting. In less than 10 years, the stories we tell about the internet have moved from praising its democratic potential to imagining it as a dangerous source of extreme politics, polarized echo chambers and a hive of misogynist and racist trolls.</p>
<h2>Cyber-optimism in Europe</h2>
<p>While cyber-utopian views have lost appeal in the U.S., the idea of the internet as a promise of radical reorganization of society has survived. In fact, it has become a defining element of political movements that thrive in Western Europe.</p>
<p>In Italy, an anti-establishment party know as the Five Star Movement became the second most-voted for party in Italy in the 2013 national elections. According to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-5star-idUSKCN0ZM130">some polls</a>, it might soon even win general elections in Italy.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/36/1/105.abstract">our research</a>, we analyzed how the Italian Five Star Movement uses a mythical idea of the internet as a catalyst for its political message. In the party’s rhetoric, declining and corrupt mainstream parties are allied with newspapers and television. By contrast, the movement claims to harness the power of the web to “kill” old politics and bring about direct democracy, efficiency and transparency in governance.</p>
<p>Similarly in Iceland, the Pirate Party is now poised to lead a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/pirate-party-may-step-in-as-iceland-hits-election-stalemate-a7435971.html">coalition government</a>. Throughout the few last years, other Pirate Parties have emerged and have been at times quite successful in other European countries, including <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/137305/rise-fall-pirate-party">Germany</a> and <a href="http://pol.sagepub.com/content/31/3/121?patientinform-links=yes&legid=sppol;31/3/121">Sweden</a>. While they differ in many ways from the Five Star Movement, their leaders also insist that the internet will help enable new forms of democratic participation. Their success was made possible by the powerful vision of a new direct democracy facilitated by online technologies. </p>
<h2>A vision of change</h2>
<p>Many politicians all over the world run campaigns on the promise of change, communicating a positive message to potential voters. The rise of forces such as the Five Star Movement and the Pirate Parties in Europe is an example of how the rhetoric of political change and the rhetoric of the digital revolution can interact with each other, merging into a unique, coherent discourse.</p>
<p>In thinking about the impact of the internet in politics, we usually consider how social media, websites and other online resources are used as a vehicle of political communication. Yet, its impact as a symbol and a powerful narrative is equally strong.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68954/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the US is reeling from rampant fake online news, political movements in Europe are using the internet as a powerful democratic symbol to win elections. Will cyber-optimism or pessimism win?Andrea Ballatore, Lecturer in Geographic Information Science, Birkbeck, University of LondonSimone Natale, Lecturer in Communication and Media Studies, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/660932016-09-28T00:57:37Z2016-09-28T00:57:37ZWhy America needs the virtues of humility<p>In a recent speech full of allusions to Bible verses and Christian hymns at the <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?414956-1/hillary-clinton-addresses-national-baptist-convention">National Baptist Convention in Kansas City,</a> Hillary Clinton focused on Christian humility. She acknowledged that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Humility is not something you hear much about in politics.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, she said, it should be. Those who truly understand “the awesomeness of power and the frailty of human action” – that is, those who manifest humility – are “our greatest leaders.” </p>
<p>Of course, this speech was smart campaigning. It reminded voters of what she sees as a competitive advantage with her opponent. It was also good <a href="http://www.nationalbaptist.com/about-us/what-we-believe.html">Baptist theology</a>. </p>
<p>But, humility is not merely a Christian virtue. Humility is an essential aspect of every major religion. For that matter, humility is more than just a religious virtue. In my research, I have argued that <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PcBtCQAAQBAJ&dq=inauthor%3A%22Christopher%20Beem%22&source=gbs_book_other_versions">humility is also an essential democratic virtue</a>.</p>
<p>So, why is humility so essential in a democracy? </p>
<h2>Humility, religion and politics</h2>
<p>Like <a href="http://christianity.about.com/od/christiandoctrines/a/basicdoctrines.htm">most Christians</a>, Baptists believe that all people are sinners, that all of us are condemned by God’s righteous judgment and that there is nothing that we ourselves can do to alter that condition. If we are saved, it is because of God’s actions, not ours. Humility is the only appropriate response to these tenets of faith. </p>
<p>What’s more, <a href="http://peopleof.oureverydaylife.com/foot-washing-baptist-beliefs-6969.html">Jesus himself washed</a> the feet of his disciples and <a href="http://biblehub.com/philippians/2-8.htm">humbled himself “even unto death</a>.” So, devout Christians are called to do no less. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139298/original/image-20160926-31840-2o8dnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jesus washing Peter’s feet. Sculpture beside the Prayer Tower, Pittsburg, Texas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jstephenconn/4227168918/in/photolist-86Hbzr-86LjRh-86Lk6j-86Hg3K-86Lqj7-9vHLTG-86HfJZ-86LnaJ-86Hbjg-86H6uH-7rxm3J-86H218-86GZHX-86LrYE-86Jk6f-86LeHq-agSFtd-86H9uB-86Ler5-86LkJm-86HcBp-4kYmwN-9ZU1yY-86LkrE-86H3yK-86Lpu5-86H3Qx-86Henc-86F978-86Hcpr-86LnsC-6dUUSa-86LgjN-agPTee-86Hc7P-dsmDY7-86H7iH-76qqje-9cUWFX-8tt3MU-4nJTab-7WVh5w-5b4cU2-JShm-dQpDY-Bi9zYP-KtYY8h-Ki15Xk-Kn3YFs-o7k4bB">J. Stephen Conn</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, politics and humility just don’t go together. Politics requires ego; you need to present yourself as a better alternative than your opponent. Humility means that you aware of your own failures, and are respectful of those with whom you disagree. Seen in this light, many believe that in our society, humility has become <a href="http://today.uconn.edu/2016/09/humility-politics-event-kicks-off-uconns-public-discourse-research-project/">“counter cultural”</a> and that politics is a leading cause. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.krcresearch.com/how-much-incivility-will-american-voters-tolerate-in-the-race-to-the-white-house/">A 2016 survey</a>, for example, showed that over 70 percent of Americans believe that incivility has reached crisis levels and 64 percent believe that politicians are to blame. The survey describes incivility as “insulting comments” and “personal attacks.” These sorts of behavior do not go together with any understanding of humility. If you are humble, you present your opinions and beliefs with more modesty and less belligerence.</p>
<p>Take for example some of the comments from the presidential candidates. Donald Trump, to be sure, <a href="http://www.thewrap.com/donald-trump-says-he-has-more-humility-than-you-would-think-video/">has said</a> that he has “<a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-trump-says-he-has-much-more-humility-than-people-think-2016-1">much more humility</a> than a lot of people would think.” But his claims that he has “<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/17/donald-trump-i-consult-myself-on-foreign-policy-be/">a very good brain</a>,” that he has the <a href="http://dailycaller.com/2015/12/30/trump-i-know-words-i-have-the-best-words-obama-is-stupid-video/">“best words,”</a> that he knows “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/13/the-remarkably-unappealling-anger-of-donald-trump/">more than the generals</a>” and ceaseless reminders that he is <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-praises-his-own-great-performance-2015-8">“a winner”</a> all reinforce the idea that humility is, to say the least, not something that comes naturally to him.</p>
<p>Clinton, drawing a contrast with her opponent’s campaign, called half of Donald Trump’s supporters <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/politics/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables.html?_r=0">“a basket of deplorables,”</a> for which she <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/09/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-basket-of-deplorables/">later expressed regret</a>. Nonetheless, the comment reinforced the opinion of many that she is arrogant. Writing <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/295588-role-reversal-trump-embraces-humility-as-arrogant">in The Hill</a>, Jewish rabbi Shmuley Boteach argued that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“If defaming millions of American citizens she has never met as ‘racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic’ is not arrogant then the word has no meaning.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Humility enables leaders</h2>
<p>Clinton is correct to argue that throughout our nation’s history, those who manifested humility were among our best leaders – and that goes for politics and religion. </p>
<p>Upon accepting command of the Continental Army, <a href="http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/accepts.html">George Washington said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I…declare with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his second inaugural, hard on the heels of a long and bloody civil war, <a href="http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/abraham-lincoln/second-inaugural-address-1865.php">Abraham Lincoln concluded</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“With firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds.” </p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139307/original/image-20160926-31875-1ixoxsr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Martin Luther King Jr.’s memorial, Washington, D.C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ableman/6096851190/in/photolist-ahKXrY-e2VnKv-7fA6pt-e3245d-cvSFyf-4F891W-qMsb86-9HPVZx-7AT8iL-8xsVo4-9aPE33-agf9Ae-9a46d8-e324eh-8xsVjZ-gcCLpQ-dHXneF-6voQ7g-5VMakA-dNFkG1-qv2xqK-kDoZJJ-dxqbkx-8MmedZ-dJ3PZU-8MmerZ-dCQ5kc-qzsFCA-bqfety-7fA6tP-bqfef7-8RGRUH-qSdReF-bd5RrX-pQF1wp-jnMmnh-qzDBn7-4ne6Qw-dzqoeH-dQej58-qzzRr8-aghTzh-5TGtFZ-98d5b7-bDa9uk-9a44En-5bwN26-qzEsy5-afvWJj-jCALBy">Scott Ableman</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html">letter from Birmingham jail</a>, Martin Luther King Jr. closes with acknowledgment of his limited perspective:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“If I have said anything in this letter that overstates the truth or indicates an unreasonable impatience, I beg you to forgive me.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Bias and humility</h2>
<p>Humility is a virtue that has enabled our best leaders to improve our democracy, and it is good for the rest of us, too. It would help, in other words, if humility were not thought of as merely a Christian or religious virtue. </p>
<p>Far better to see humility as a prudential response to the knowledge of how we human beings really operate. Scientific evidence is overwhelming that all of us are hopelessly and <a href="http://www.mindful.org/beware-biased-brain/">inescapably biased</a>. </p>
<p>When we hear information that runs against our beliefs and values, we find reasons to discount or reject that information. This operation happens before we are even consciously aware of it. And what is more, the part of our brain that begins this process (our amygdala) <a href="http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/BerlinTreatment.pdf">is not accessible by our conscious brain</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://ed.stanford.edu/faculty/glc">Psychologist Geoffrey Cohen</a> tested this hypothesis in a group of people likely to think that their side offered a better vision for the future. He presented Republican and Democratic students who had strong opinions about welfare reform with two proposals: one very conservative and one very liberal.</p>
<p>These students also had fairly strong partisan attachments. That is, they were strong Democrats and Republicans. Cohen found that this partisan identity overwhelmed their assessment of the two proposals. Even when he called the conservative proposal “Democratic” and the liberal one “Republican,” the students still followed their party’s beliefs. </p>
<p>In fact, once the label was attached, the impact of the proposal’s objective content “was reduced to nil.” For these students, their bias in favor of their party was more important than the facts about what they were ostensibly assessing.</p>
<h2>Why humility matters</h2>
<p>With effort, we can learn to mitigate the effects of our biased brain. For example, even when we are most convinced of our own righteousness, we can push ourselves to try to consider alternatives, or even to make the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08913811.2012.711022">argument for the other side</a>. </p>
<p>But we will never be able to fully control these effects, let alone turn them off. </p>
<p>In fact, the scientific account of bias is not at all far from the Christian concept of sin. We all have it (it is universal), we can’t not do it (it is inescapable) and it causes us to fail to live up to being the kinds of people we want to be. </p>
<p>For democratic citizens, this information ought to matter.</p>
<p>Knowing that biases are universal and inescapable ought to make all of us present our opinions with more humility. It ought to make us more circumspect regarding what we believe and more open to the possibility that we might be wrong, and to the near certainty that we are not seeing the whole picture. </p>
<p>Just so, it ought to make us see our opponents as fellow “sinners,” deserving, no less than ourselves, tolerance and generosity. This would make our society a better place, of course, but it would also make our democracy operate better. </p>
<p>If we enter into the rough and tumble of politics knowing that none of us has a hammerlock on the truth, we might be more likely to find it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Beem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At a time when politics is showing its most divisive side, a scholar argues that embracing humility could help us deal with hidden biases.Christopher Beem, Managing Director of the McCourtney Institute of Democracy, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/611512016-08-11T00:40:16Z2016-08-11T00:40:16ZWill Chinese investment sacrifice Ukraine’s dreams of democracy to economic needs?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129628/original/image-20160707-12750-10zts4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some fear that Chinese investment will lead to a painful trade-off between Ukraine's desperate economic needs and its long-standing democratic dream.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/11877887686/">Sasha Maksymenko/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>After years of rapid economic growth, bold policymaking and shrewd business tactics, China has become a global player. With its business interests expanding at every opportunity, China’s power now rivals that of the US. In Eastern Europe, China’s strategic engagement is focused on Ukraine.</p>
<p>Beijing sees Kiev as an attractive partner in the so-called <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1978396/chinas-one-belt-one-road-plan-covers-more-half-population-75">One Belt One Road</a>, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-new-silk-road-chinese-foreign-policy-energy-security-and-ideology-17994">New Silk Road</a>, plan to unite West and East into a Eurasian market. The attraction is mutual. Ukraine’s economy desperately needs foreign investment, but many foreign investors see its highly volatile political situation as an insurmountable liability.</p>
<p>Despite continuing economic crisis, corruption and war in Ukraine, Chinese investment has been slowly rising over the past three years. While this has been to Ukraine’s economic advantage, it would be remiss of the nation’s leaders not to consider the potential destabilising effects of investment from authoritarian economic powers on Ukraine’s fragile democracy.</p>
<p>Recent Chinese investments driven by resource-seeking motives in Southern Africa (Zambia, Angola and Mozambique) and Latin America (Brazil and Venezuela) confirm such concerns. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-the-shadow-of-colonialism-still-looming-over-africa-8941">investments in Africa</a> have led to a stream of allegations concerning <a href="http://www.diplomaticourier.com/china-s-dangerous-game-resource-investment-and-the-future-of-africa/">the quality of Chinese infrastructure</a>, <a href="http://www.diplomaticourier.com/2013/01/11/china-s-dangerous-game-resource-investment-and-the-future-of-africa/">labour abuses</a> and human rights violations. </p>
<p>African partners (like many other states in similar circumstances) continue to tolerate <a href="http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf">lower levels of democratic development</a> – equality, human rights and political freedoms – in exchange for economic progress.</p>
<p>China’s latest target in Europe is Greece. Torn by a long economic crisis, Athens <a href="https://www.rt.com/business/338949-greece-china-port-sale/">sold its largest port</a> to Chinese shipping group COSCO for €368.5 million (about $A550 million) in April. </p>
<p>This privatisation gives China a significant stake in Greece’s economy, which relies heavily on shipping. The Chinese-owned port of Piraeus is a gateway to Asia, Eastern Europe and North Africa. Greece will not be the last country to trade its resources and strategically important industrial assets to China for economic survival.</p>
<p>Only a handful of dissenting voices in Ukraine’s political leadership worry about the country’s democratic future. They would prefer to look for economic partners with a less chequered record than China’s. These critics understand that successful businesses must align with their investors in terms of values and cultural choices. </p>
<p>Ukraine must consider carefully at least two concerns before opening up to more Chinese investment. How will China’s growing stake in Ukraine’s economy affect Kiev’s relations with Russia? And will there be a painful trade-off between the country’s desperate economic needs and its long-standing democratic dream?</p>
<h2>Where does Russia fit in?</h2>
<p>China has never been Ukraine’s political ally, nor of any other state that aims for democracy and all that comes with it (freedom of speech, free trade, political pluralism, fair elections and the protection of human rights). </p>
<p>Even in China’s closest <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-winner-of-the-ukraine-crisis-could-be-china-37574">relationship with Russia</a>, elements of distrust and historical suspicion percolate beneath the apparent harmony.</p>
<p>In the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, China has not shown firm support for Ukraine. Diplomacy between Beijing and Moscow has always been primarily led by trade relations, energy resources and military weaponry. Far from condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine, China has called simply for restraint and a negotiated solution based on international law.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s closest relationship with Russia is driven more by trade and resources than shared political goals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">President of Russia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Still, regardless of this fence-sitting, China has supported Ukraine’s weakened economy through investment and trade. This has played a significant role in reviving the once strong agricultural sector. Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the volume of agricultural trade between Ukraine and China <a href="http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/12426.pdf">has increased</a> by 56%.</p>
<p>Evidently, Beijing’s strategy in the post-Soviet region is driven by pragmatism. Chinese leaders are aware of the benefits of balancing trade relations with Russia and Ukraine. Economic co-operation with Ukraine loosens China’s long-standing economic dependence on Russia while compensating for the West’s unwillingness to grant Ukraine large-scale economic assistance.</p>
<p>Given the economic opportunities for co-operation, it is important not to overlook the serious political differences between Beijing and Kiev. As in other developing states, the economy is tightly intertwined with politics. Most of Ukraine’s political elites have vested interests in the path to development. Resulting inconsistencies in economic policy could lead to unforeseen democratic challenges.</p>
<h2>A disconnect between economic needs and political dreams</h2>
<p>We must also consider the different political ideals that drive democracy-thirsty Ukraine and communist China. </p>
<p>Certainly, China’s communism has long departed from Maoist-style authoritarianism. Co-operation with the West proves its ability to adjust and operate very well within the regulatory frameworks of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.</p>
<p>However, as an alternative to Western-style capitalist democracy, China’s politics and economy remain very much driven by communist features such as pragmatism, restrictions on information, a deficit of human rights, Soviet-style five-year state planning and a large and disciplined workforce.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Maidan protesters, concerned about abuses of power and human rights violations, demanded closer European integration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/12159238525/in/album-72157644491995781/">Sasha Maksymenko/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the other hand, the last three years of political development in Ukraine clearly indicate a desire to move towards a Western democratic approach. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ 2015 <a href="http://www.ifes.org/surveys/september-2015-public-opinion-survey-ukraine">public opinion survey</a> in Ukraine found that the 2013-14 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/-sp-ukraine-maidan-protest-kiev">Maidan movement</a> supported liberal sociopolitical values and Ukraine’s decision to shake off a Soviet legacy of paternalism and conformity. </p>
<p>Committed to democratic ideals and the rule of law, Ukraine now looks to the developed West for inspiration. In May 2015, decommunisation laws were passed to remove communist monuments and rename public places to erase communist themes. By December, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Ukraine">Communist Party of Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://goo.gl/J2LkgB">Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed)</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Workers_and_Peasants">Communist Party of Workers and Peasants</a> were banned.</p>
<p>This is an interesting and dangerous dance between Ukraine’s economic needs and political dreams. Many observers see this also in other states receiving Chinese investment. Ukraine can draw lessons from Latin America, South Africa and countries in Europe that are seeking better ways to conduct mutually beneficial relations with China. </p>
<p>Certainly, the vigour and dynamism of Chinese engagement with Ukraine means that, given proper strategic planning, its economy has many possibilities to advance. However, to protect its democracy, Ukraine must also tackle a number of challenges. As the proverb goes, “enter the mill and you will come out floury”. </p>
<p>Before opening Ukraine’s doors, the government will do well to protect the country’s positive but still fledgling transformation from being exploited by foreign authoritarian investors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olga Oleinikova is a founder and co-ordinator of the Ukraine Democracy Initiative.</span></em></p>Ukraine desperately needs Chinese investment but, like many other countries in this position, this is giving rise to concerns about the consequences for its fragile democracy.Olga Oleinikova, Postdoctoral Fellow, Sydney Democracy Network, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/632292016-08-04T13:40:39Z2016-08-04T13:40:39ZAre internet populists ruining democracy for the rest of us?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132976/original/image-20160803-12216-ai66jg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mad as hell and tagging you in the comments. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/themikelowe/13205220824/in/photolist-m7Ud67-9sKpML-aaHBDa-913pBR-b5k5Kr-9sFVW6-EqzzJ-9sKkfQ-dP21FR-9j3Pj5-cLk7Y7-m7SFJD-prGQZ8-awtfJk-gZWwGV-91Wegr-6a8M4i-dSwtHn-9sGbzT-qgvtEf-5W85qS-dAXtoG-9mkFBf-c52Nab-atnP7x-9mhBhz-n195k3-8HhbtL-m7TKpa-dVejv8-9mkFgC-g67dF-3bg1bk-cLk8qd-7xLEjm-91gdGQ-8Z83Ly-7T8ukV-9SbttU-918REk-9sFVfp-91WfjV-aSYhaT-4NWD1J-9tn6He-9g3RX3-dVjT9h-8dPExx-9qA3z3-91Zqdy">Mike Lowe</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The internet has rewired civil society, propelling collective action into a radically new dimension. Democracy is now not only exercised at the ballot box, but lived and experienced online on a day-to-day basis. While this may have positive implications for political participation, it’s also causing problems for leaders. They have been elected through time-honoured democratic systems, but now find themselves vulnerable to the whim of the baying internet mob. </p>
<p>People are encouraged to speak up online about matters they deem to be of public concern, so the internet shows just how diverse public opinion can be. This is particularly visible at times of controversy, when a motivated group of users can be relied upon to speak out. They are capable of applying enormous pressure in these moments. </p>
<p>All over the world, contradictory views are expressed online, and these views can impede the smooth governance of a country. Sometimes that’s a positive step but this is uncharted territory. We have to wonder if we are heading in a dangerous direction.</p>
<h2>Digital people power</h2>
<p>Democratic bodies are typically elected in periods of three to five years, yet citizen opinions seem to fluctuate daily. Sometimes the collective mood can swing on an enormous scale. When thousands of people all start tweeting about the same subject on the same day, you know something’s up.</p>
<p>It would be a grave mistake to discount the voices of the internet altogether, since they are not disconnected from real political situations. Those campaigning for Britain to remain in the EU in the recent referendum, for example, learned this the hard way. The messages being spread online proved far more effective than the official campaign literature. Brexit memes <a href="http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-3534">spread faster</a> than Remain statistics and the Leave campaign eventually triumphed.</p>
<p>But with so many views flying around, how can politicians ever reach a consensus that satisfies everyone? That’s of course a problem as old as democracy itself, only now citizens have the real power to assemble online. The force of their discontent can disrupt governments and threaten the security of representatives even outside electoral cycles. </p>
<p>Sudden, attention-grabbing events, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks have always had the potential to engender passionate public opinion, but if that public opinion is powerful enough to trigger hasty political decisions, instability can ensue. And the institutions that exist today have proven time and time again that they cannot keep up with digital expressions of citizen sentiment.</p>
<p>Iceland’s social media users, for example, were credited with playing a central role in forcing the prime minister, Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/iceland-prime-minister-resigns-over-panama-papers-revelations">resign</a> over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/panama-papers">Panama papers</a> scandal. Similarly, the internet was used to organise the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/02/social-networks-and-social-media-in-ukrainian-euromaidan-protests-2/">Euromaidan protests</a> that caused long-lasting political turmoil in Ukraine.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"535450556199075840"}"></div></p>
<p>And in Britain, Labour MP Emily Thornberry was forced to resign from her shadow cabinet job as a result of the <a href="http://time.com/3599163/uk-politics-tweet/">angry response</a> elicited by one single tweet. </p>
<h2>The populist feed</h2>
<p>The EU referendum was a vivid example of what happens when you combine the power of the internet with a lingering feeling that ordinary people have lost control of the politics that shape their lives. When people feel their democratic representatives do not serve them anymore, they look for others who feel the same. The internet makes that so much easier. There, moans turn into movements.</p>
<p>People who have long entertained populist ideas, but were never confident enough to voice them openly, find themselves in a position to connect to like-minded others online and adopt new group identities. The Leave movement had a very strong online presence and came away victorious. </p>
<p>However, this trend is concerning because <a href="http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/03/21/poq.nfw006.short">we know</a> that increased online contact with people who share our views makes our previously held beliefs more extreme, rather than encouraging us to be flexible.</p>
<p>Diverse opinions are available on social media but that doesn’t mean we are seeing them. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter allow us to surround ourselves with social feeds that only show us things we like. We choose who to follow and who to befriend. The <a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-FWO0puw3nYC&oi=fnd&pg=PT3&dq=filter+bubble&ots=g3NmAsxWTW&sig=XvfoEC7w1KBKBSj9_UiSgTDS8Ec">filter bubbles</a> we create are exacerbated by personalisation algorithms which are based on a our previously expressed ideas.</p>
<p>Instead of creating a <a href="http://www.publicspace.org/en/text-library/eng/1-espacios-publicos-en-la-sociedad-informacional">digitally-mediated agora</a> which encourages broad discussion, the internet has increased ideological segregation. It filters dissent out of our feeds and grants a disproportionate amount of clout to the most extreme opinions due to their greater visibility and accelerated viral cycles. </p>
<p>This is why US presidential hopefuls Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump have come to play such a huge role in the US election. They represent extreme political views, where other candidates had more moderate agendas.</p>
<h2>Prospects for a future-proof democracy</h2>
<p>In political philosophy, the very idea of democracy is based on the principal of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_the_Rights_of_Man_and_of_the_Citizen">general will</a>, which was proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 18th century.</p>
<p>A society needs to be governed by a democratic body which acts according to the will of the people as a whole. However, Rousseau <a href="http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon_04.htm">noted</a> that when contradictory opinions arise the general will ceases to be the will of all. When people reject their governments, the institutions that are meant to represent them lose their representative power.</p>
<p>The internet makes this an almost perpetual problem rather than an occasional obstacle. Only the most passionate, motivated and outspoken people are heard – as happened <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/business/brexit-talk-on-social-media-heavily-favored-the-leave-side.html">during the EU referendum campaign</a>. And politicians run the risk of making important decisions based on popular opinion during an emotional moment in time rather than what is best for the country.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"94920803346419712"}"></div></p>
<p>Of course, the internet can be used to make a positive political contribution. It is a great tool for enabling ordinary people to set the political agenda during political campaigns, for example.</p>
<p>So we’re not ungovernable in the long term. However, our current political institutions are incapable of handling the dynamism and diversity of citizen opinions. They are susceptible to emotional bursts and intimidated by the power of internet users. The critical challenge is, therefore, to distinguish when a seemingly popular movement does actually represent the emerging general will of the majority and when it is merely the echo of a loud, but insignificant minority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vyacheslav Polonski receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). This article does not reflect the views of the research councils.</span></em></p>Pressure from online comments can cause our democratically elected leaders to act in the strangest ways.Vyacheslav Polonski, Network scientist, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/575732016-08-01T20:09:13Z2016-08-01T20:09:13ZReimagining NSW: how good governance strengthens democracy<p><em>This is part of our Reimagining New South Wales (NSW) series. For this series, vice-chancellors across NSW asked a select group of early and mid-career researchers to envisage new ways to tackle old problems and identify emerging opportunities across the state.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Many people are watching the Donald Trump campaign in the US and wondering: how has it come to this? Anti-politics, populist, and some say even authoritarian candidates such as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/">Trump</a> have risen in recent years across established democracies, along with rising polarisation and increasing political instability.</p>
<p>In Australia, federal instability symbolised by the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd and Abbott-Turnbull machinations has left many Australian citizens concerned that leadership spills may now have become a regular feature of Australian politics. And despite NSW Premier Mike Baird’s historically high personal approval rating, NSW has also recently experienced its fair share of political drama. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/nsw-governments-crackdown-on-csg-opponents-bring-out-protesters-20160315-gnjbr3.html">Large-scale</a> <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/keep-sydney-open-thousands-turn-out-in-the-city-to-protest-nsw-governments-lockout-laws/news-story/ee5c6f0cf427af934686e406edc2d719">protests</a> – often centred around lack of consultation – are not <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/its-mabo-its-justice-its-westconnex-protesters-rally-against-mike-bairds-vibe-20160529-gp6ljk.html">uncommon</a> in NSW and are starting to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/nsw-state-election-2015/nsw-state-election-2015-greens-take-ballina-after-27year-nationals-reign-20150328-1ma6kh.html">shift election outcomes</a>. The NSW government has <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/nsw-antiprotest-laws-are-part-of-a-corrosive-national-trend-20160321-gno10h.html">tightened the rules</a> on protest (which has sparked further demonstrations).</p>
<p>The common thread here is governance: the relationship between the state and civil society. Many NSW citizens appear to be indicating they feel disenfranchised, marginalised and silenced when it comes to policymaking. Could doing governance differently make NSW more prosperous?</p>
<h2>Good governance can lead to a stronger NSW</h2>
<p>Governance means different things to different people, but there are some common features. </p>
<p>Governance refers to the processes of public decision-making and the processes by which decisions are implemented. Government, citizens, business, unions, and other civil society organisations are all involved. </p>
<p>The process starts with identifying issues of concern to citizens and ends with evaluating the effects of policy decisions. It involves much more than simply holding periodic elections – it means making and implementing decisions that are participatory, accountable, responsive, transparent, equitable, effective, efficient, and that follow the rule of law.</p>
<p>Most of these principles reflect the core underpinnings for democracy. These principles apply to governance everywhere, from the local school level to national politics. It’s only when these principles are upheld and put into practice that a democracy functions well. </p>
<p>Good governance is the right thing to do, and boosts the legitimacy of decision-making. But if moral chivalry does not appeal to you, here are two more reasons. </p>
<p>Good governance leads to better solutions. Citizens’ capacity to solve problems is greatly undervalued. Better involving citizens in deliberation about how to solve problems may actually result in much better outcomes – socially and economically. We should make better use of the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/democracy-needs-our-help-to-thrive-20160630-gpvvvp">wisdom of the crowd</a>. </p>
<p>Good governance is also cost-efficient. Ensuring support of citizens and other stakeholders may reduce the costs of policy implementation. Involving citizens creates a more legitimate process of decision-making and creates a positive perception of government. Engagement ensures that outcomes of policymaking processes are more widely supported. </p>
<h2>Good governance is happening – but we need more of it</h2>
<p>Good governance as described above can work, and in some cases is already happening in NSW. For example, governments have:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Legislated for engagement: the <a href="http://www.acyp.nsw.gov.au/">Advocate for Children and Young People</a>, in consultation with the relevant minister, is mandated to advise the NSW parliament and monitor progress on policy affecting children and young people. In 2015, it consulted with more than 4,000 children and young people to devise the <a href="http://www.acyp.nsw.gov.au/the-plan">NSW Children and Young People’s Plan</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>Engaged in genuine consultation: in 2014, citizens in the <a href="http://www.metrowater.nsw.gov.au/planning-lower-hunter/2014-lower-hunter-water-plan">Lower Hunter</a> provided fresh solutions to the problem of water supply by coming up with ways to reduce water usage. As a result, the need for expensive desalination plants and complex water treatment schemes was significantly reduced. </p></li>
<li><p>Drawn widely on the experience of the community: a <a href="http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/announcements/panel_of_experts_-_political_donations">panel of experts on political donations</a> established by the Baird government in 2014 used the expertise of Australian researchers working on corruption, money and politics to craft a series of independent recommendations for political finance reform in NSW. </p></li>
<li><p>Invested in platforms for citizen-engaged innovation: in Belgium, the <a href="http://www.g1000.org/en/">G1,000</a> initiative brought citizens together to identify political and social problems and craft policy solutions. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>The challenge is to draw lessons from these positive examples and apply them more broadly. Encouraging engagement between constituents (citizens young and old, organisations, networks and governments) requires enhancing opportunities for citizens to have a voice, as well as fostering a culture of listening among lawmakers. Ongoing commitments beyond one-off events and experiments can cultivate the cultures and skills required for good governance. </p>
<p>One practical step could be the creation of a NSW Citizen’s Forum, tasking a representative sample of NSW citizens with the challenge of imagining an ideal NSW in 2025. Finding out the priorities for the public will give a starting point on what policy changes are needed for implementation. </p>
<p>Creating a specialised agency that facilitates regular citizen engagement in policymaking will also help. The agency may be tasked with engaging citizens in the problem and design stage of policymaking, rather than putting fully developed policy proposals to citizens and asking their response. </p>
<p>A long-term commitment to such an approach would position NSW as a leading state in good governance and produce better long-term policy for a vibrant NSW now and in the future.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Further reading:</em></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/reimagining-nsw-how-the-care-economy-could-help-unclog-our-cities-62970"><em>Reimagining NSW: how the care economy could help unclog our cities</em></a></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/reimagining-nsw-four-ways-to-boost-community-well-being-and-why-it-matters-63049"><em>Reimagining NSW: four ways to boost community well-being and why it matters</em></a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57573/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolien van Ham receives funding from the Australian Research Council's DECRA funding scheme (project number RG142911, project name DE150101692). The views expressed in this article are the views of the author, based on the author's research, and in no way represent the views of the ARC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anika Gauja receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philippa Collin receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noah Bassil does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Good governance is the right thing to do, and boosts the legitimacy of decision-making. If moral chivalry doesn’t appeal, here are two more reasons: it’s cost-efficient and delivers better solutions.Carolien van Ham, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, UNSW SydneyAnika Gauja, Senior Lecturer, Department of Government and International Relations, University of SydneyNoah Bassil, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Director of the Centre for Middle East and North African Studies, Macquarie UniversityPhilippa Collin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Culture and Society, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/629132016-07-22T15:00:28Z2016-07-22T15:00:28ZFrance, Turkey and human rights: is a state of emergency the new normal?<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has declared a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/turkey-parliament-expected-to-pass-erdogan-emergency-measures">state of emergency</a> in the wake of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">failed coup</a> of July 15. It’s not yet clear how the President intends to interpret the powers awarded to him in this situation but there are ongoing concerns that his government will clamp down on human rights.</p>
<p>Indeed, explaining the decision, deputy prime minister Numan Kurtulmuş <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/turkey-parliament-expected-to-pass-erdogan-emergency-measures">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Turkey will derogate the European convention on human rights insofar as it does not conflict with its international obligations. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kurtulmuş added that Turkey was acting “just like France” in taking this action – referring to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nice-attack-reminds-france-the-state-cant-keep-you-safe-100-of-the-time-62558">extended state of emergency</a> that has followed the terrorist attacks of the past year there.</p>
<p>A situation that was originally meant to last three months following the Paris attacks of November 2015, has been extended to last another six months following the July attack in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nice-attack">Nice</a>.</p>
<p>Both cases raise serious questions about how long a state of emergency is supposed to last in this day and age, and how ordinary people are affected while they are in place.</p>
<h2>What is a state of emergency?</h2>
<p>Under Article 15 of the <a href="http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights</a> (ECHR) a country can declare a state of emergency, “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”. Once an emergency is declared, however, a state is not given free rein to do as it sees fit.</p>
<p>The measures taken must still be “proportionate to the exigencies of the situation”. To protect human rights, Article 15 has a triple lock. To derogate from the convention, an emergency must exist; the measures being proposed must be proportionate; and some rights can never be violated. Torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, for example, are never permissible, no matter how extreme the emergency.</p>
<p>The ECHR is vague about the conditions that constitute an emergency, so in some ways, it’s not clear whether what is happening in Turkey constitutes one. </p>
<p>The European Court of Human Rights has never found that an emergency did not exist in a state that declared one. It has taken a very hands off approach to this issue, deferring instead to each government’s assessment of the situation in their country. A large amount of trust is placed in a state’s government on this question.</p>
<p>Emergencies, however, are not just about the facts on the ground that give rise to an extreme crisis; they also reveal a lot about the person or body declaring a state of emergency and what their motivations are. </p>
<p>While the European Court of Human Rights has never found that a state of emergency did not exist in a country, the now defunct European Commission of Human Rights (a tribunal body that prior to 1998 would make preliminary decisions on a case before the Court heard it) has.</p>
<p>The Commission rejected a 1967 declaration of a state of emergency in Greece by the military dictatorship that governed at the time. The Commission found that no “threat to the life of the nation” existed and that the military dictatorship had fabricated the emergency in order to crack down on the communist opposition.</p>
<p>Unlike the government in the Greek case, Erdoğan was democratically elected. But we have to ask ourselves whether we can simply assume that because a state’s government has been elected, it will protect human rights.</p>
<p>Indeed, faced with an emergency, a government might clamp down on human rights to prove to a fearful public that it is “doing something”, whether that something is effective or not. Emergencies are precisely when human rights are needed most. </p>
<p>Democracy also requires respect for the rule of law. All state power is exercised through the law, and nobody is above the law. An independent and functioning judiciary is fundamental to this. Erdoğan’s purging of the judiciary in Turkey is deeply worrying, to say the least. </p>
<p>Democracy likewise requires free speech and the communication of ideas. While Article 10 of the ECHR, which protects freedom of expression, can be derogated from in an emergency, any infringement must still be proportionate.</p>
<p>The decisions to fire and detain academics, and prevent people from travelling abroad are an unprecedented violation of academic and democratic values in Turkey. And it <a href="http://www.cara.ngo/27-turkish-academics-arrested/">didn’t start</a> with the failed coup. </p>
<h2>How long can this last?</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s declaration of a state of emergency is deeply suspect. Turkey’s emergency has an initial time limit of three months; however, emergencies tend to be perpetuated. France’s experiment with emergency powers – which Turkey is drawing parallels to – is a case in point.</p>
<p>The nature of the terrorist threat facing France makes assessing when it has been defeated incredibly difficult. The terrorist attacks that have caused this situation are not committed by an army in uniform but people only connected in the loosest sense by an ideology. That makes them hard to identify or engage.</p>
<p>In light of the challenges posed by Islamic extremist terrorism, the European Court of Human Rights, in a <a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-2638619-2883392#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22003-2638619-2883392%22%5D%7D">case</a> involving the UK’s declaration of a state of emergency following 9/11, has said that an emergency may be perpetual.</p>
<p>Again, this is reflective of the court’s deferential approach to the existence of a state of emergency. It undermines the entire justification of declaring a state of emergency in the first place, which is to restore the status quo that existed prior to the declaration. </p>
<p>With the introduction of emergency powers comes the temptation for misuse. France’s state of emergency was less than a month old when its emergency powers were used, not in the fight against suspected IS terrorists, but to place climate change protesters under house arrest during the Paris Climate Summit in December. And while the state seems to have made the most of its extended powers in this case, it still wasn’t able to prevent the attack in Nice.</p>
<p>It will take some time before the European Court of Human Rights will get to examine Turkey’s emergency. However, even if the emergency is eventually lifted, it is hard to imagine that “normal life” after the emergency will be the same as “normal life” before it.</p>
<p>States of emergency have a dark history of being used in a transformative sense to usher in tyrannical regimes in the guise of confronting a threat to the life of the nation. It would be wise to recall the warnings of British judge <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/dec/17/terrorism.humanrights3">Lord Hoffmann</a> that the real threat to the life of the nation comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Greene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Emergency laws can sometimes be the biggest threat to a state and its people.Alan Greene, Lecturer in Law, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/610382016-07-06T01:20:20Z2016-07-06T01:20:20ZFacing bumps, but on the right track: Indonesia’s democratic progress<p>Members of Indonesia’s civil society organisations were euphoric when the country elected Joko Widodo, a political outsider, as president. But two years into his presidency, old-style political horse-trading has tempered the initial high expectations of a better way of doing politics in the world’s most-populous Muslim-majority nation. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, among Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia is one of the few countries that shows genuine democratic progress. The Philippines has just elected a president keen on <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-the-philippines-new-strongman-romped-into-office-despite-a-shocking-campaign-58891">using martial law if necessary</a>. The civil society movement to push electoral reform in Malaysia, known as “Bersih Malaysia” or “Clean Malaysia”, is <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/what-you-need-to-know-about-malaysias-bersih-movement">severely curbed by the regime</a>. Singapore’s democracy remains a classic case of <a href="http://theconversation.com/fear-smear-and-the-paradox-of-authoritarian-politics-in-singapore-47763">stubborn authoritarian politics</a>. </p>
<p>A survey I conducted with Norwegian political scientist Olle Törnquist shows Indonesia’s democratic progress through the eyes of civil society activists 15 years after Suharto’s dictatorship. We interviewed nearly 600 activists from across the country. </p>
<p>Indonesian activists see that opportunities for them to enter the state arena and influence policy processes are opening up with Jokowi’s presidency. Many former activists have become close associates of Jokowi. </p>
<p>We recently published our survey <a href="http://folk.uio.no/ollet/files/Reclaiming-the-State.pdf">in a book</a>.</p>
<h2>Progress in Indonesia’s democracy</h2>
<p>We conducted the survey in 2013 and 2014 just before Jokowi took office in July 2014. The results show how optimistic and hopeful Indonesian activists were about the state of Indonesia’s democracy. </p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/tIuIL/1/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Comparing this most recent survey with surveys from ten and seven years ago, Indonesia’s democratic institutions are seemingly becoming stronger.</p>
<p>A whooping 85.4% of respondents said the state respects civil liberties in Indonesia, allowing the freedom to engage in public discourse and to self-organise. This shows an improvement in Indonesian activists’ assessment of how well the government guarantees civil liberties. In 2007, only 62% felt positive about protection of these freedoms. In 2003, less than half of the survey respondents (45%) had this attitude. </p>
<p>Some 61.3% of respondents see Indonesia as having good governance, marked by transparent, impartial and accountable government. In 2007 and 2003, only 53% and 23% respectively held this attitude. </p>
<p>Some 77.2% of respondents view Indonesia as upholding values of representation, which are democratic political representation, citizen participation, institutionalised channels of representation, local democracy and democratic control over instruments of coercion. In 2003, only 37% respondents thought democratic values relating to representation were good. In 2007, the proportion was 57%. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, 71% of our respondents see citizenship, values covering equal citizenship, rule of law, equal rights to justice and universal human rights in a positive light. In 2003 and 2007, only 36% and 55% respectively held this attitude. </p>
<p>Another consistent finding is on democratic control of instruments of coercion – that is, civilian control over the military – which has high scores in the three rounds of surveys. </p>
<h2>Democracy under Jokowi’s presidency</h2>
<p>Jokowi’s win was seen as a hallmark of Indonesia’s democratic progress as he broke the mould of presidents coming from the old political guard. </p>
<p>While some posts in Jokowi’s cabinet are politically motivated appointments, at the same time activists have been invited to be part of the group of actors involved in the policy process. </p>
<p>For example, Jokowi’s chief-of-staff, Teten Masduki, is a former anti-corruption activist. A member of the president’s expert staff, Noer Fauzi Rahman, is an agrarian reformist, and State Secretary Pratikno is the former rector of Universitas Gadjah Mada, where I work.</p>
<p>This is healthy for democracy. The more diverse actors are involved in the policy process the better. It means state actors in Indonesia have become more pluralistic and less monolithic than in the past. </p>
<h2>Setbacks</h2>
<p>There are setbacks, however. The kind of popular movement that resulted in spontaneous volunteer groups banding together to support Jokowi for president has weakened. There has been dwindling interest in acting on important issues such as corruption and resolution of past human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Jokowi has also let suppression of freedom of expression and freedom to self-organise happen under his watch. In recent months, militant religious groups have attacked and harassed public gatherings in Java discussing politically sensitive issues such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-the-indonesian-presidents-troubling-silence-on-lgbt-persecution-56154">LGBT rights</a> or the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-should-indonesia-resolve-atrocities-of-the-1965-66-anti-communist-purge-57885">1965 tragedy</a>. These groups are backed by the police and military. This is a bad development for democratic institution.</p>
<p>However, our survey areas are broader than Java. We carried out the survey in 30 of Indonesia’s 34 provinces. Thus, generally speaking, if there is perceived weakening of civil liberties, we expect it will not be a dramatic one. </p>
<h2>Reclaiming the state</h2>
<p>In post-Suharto Indonesia, democratic institutions are still the only game in town. </p>
<p>However, Indonesia has a lot of homework to do. Democracy does not only involve the presence of democratic values in society, but requires the means to practise those values.</p>
<p>Political parties in Indonesia should be true representations of the Indonesian people. People should come together in a popular movement to hold the government accountable. </p>
<p>Lastly, civil society actors should grab the opportunity to participate in the country’s political life. To balance power among Indonesia’s oligarchy and civil society, there must be more plurality in democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalinda Savirani receives funding from the Norwegian Embassy through Universitas Gadjah Mada to conduct the democracy baseline survey. </span></em></p>Indonesian activists see that opportunities for them to enter the state arena and influence the policy process are opening up with Joko Widodo’s presidency.Amalinda Savirani, Lecturer, Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608272016-06-16T13:08:14Z2016-06-16T13:08:14ZNo need to talk trash: alternatives to the Jerry Springer talk show model<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126723/original/image-20160615-14016-d6j4du.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Talk show host Jerry Springer enters the stage on a motorbike as co-host of the 2008 Miss Universe contest.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Adrees Latif </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In today’s world we learn about many issues through Facebook, Twitter or the media more generally, rather than by direct or personal experience. As such, social and mass media significantly shape and influence our perceptions. One of the more subtle ways in which this happens is through the depiction of the world as “a war” of words and images. </p>
<p>From Facebook posts to news programmes or reality shows, one side frequently battles it out with another. This is epitomised in a great number of (especially American) daytime or “tabloid” talk shows, where human relations are often portrayed as being inherently conflictual. Extreme examples include the “Jerry Springer Show”, with its lurid trysts, while a subtler one would be the “Tyra Banks Show”. Such programmes often focus on drawing out <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08838159709364388#">interpersonal conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Talk shows can be a space to explore all kinds of topics that are of interest. They’ve been key in offering a platform for controversial or marginalised issues and members of society. Parallels can be drawn to print tabloids and “trash journalism”, where Media Studies Professor Herman Wasserman suggests that the tabloid format is in fact more <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02500167.2013.772217?journalCode=rcsa20">democratic</a>. In a similar vein, talk shows can be seen to represent “the people” more accurately than news analysis or political programmes, though often earning them the less charming title of “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/14/us/killing-poses-hard-questions-about-talk-tv.html">trash TV</a>” for overemphasising conflict.</p>
<h2>Denouncing the ‘other’</h2>
<p>Talk shows exemplify one prevalent way that communication pans out, particularly in the West. Often, two or more camps are formed. Each side presents and defends its position while challenging or even denouncing the “other”. </p>
<p>For example, “stay-at-home moms” are pitted against “working moms”, implying an inherent conflict of interest between “equality” versus “child care”, as an episode of the “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZnlCNsxtT_c">Tyra Banks</a>” show once did. This adversarial model of communication is often replicated in other parts of the world, including the <a href="http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002fj$002flpp.2013.9.issue-1$002flpp-2013-0006$002flpp-2013-0006.pdf?t:ac=j$002flpp.2013.9.issue-1$002flpp-2013-0006$002flpp-2013-0006.xml">Middle East</a>.</p>
<p>This type of what journalist and scholar Deborah Tannen calls “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/books/chap1/argumentculture.htm">argument culture</a>” became influential with the ascendancy of Western liberal thought. According to her, it has successfully challenged and confronted oppressive, authoritarian systems but may not be entirely unproblematic.</p>
<h2>Addressing full complexity</h2>
<p>Its agonistic emphasis excludes many less aggressive or argumentative voices. It reduces issues into binaries, failing to address their full complexity. It also obscures facets of discussion where common ground often does exist. For example, in many cases talk show guests do agree and game show contestants suddenly cooperate. This became particularly apparent in the first season of <a href="http://www.endemol.co.za/">Endemol</a>’s “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlNE9s9oGNI&index=1&list=PLn6Y2J9gHGZrOTPhgqNEZKAVvpFdrJOJr">Survivor South Africa</a>”, where contestants took a significantly more collaborative posture towards their tasks than their American counterparts.</p>
<p>It would then be compelling to explore what would happen if we engage in a form of public discourse that deliberately draws out collaboration. What if there were common ground between “stay-at-home moms” and “working moms”? As a mother who spends a lot of quality time with her child and still manages to carve out a meaningful career, I am compelled to investigate the efficacy of such framing.</p>
<p>In many such societies like South Africa, globalisation has involved bringing in Western liberal democratic values and systems. They include discourses on human rights or justice that are at odds with local realities.</p>
<h2>Diverse societies</h2>
<p>So the question becomes what would communication look like if it were to meet the needs of highly diverse and fully interdependent societies?</p>
<p>In the case of South Africa, a collaborative approach already lies at the core of its reconciliatory stance and its transition to democracy – one that could also inform mass-mediated public discourse. The cultural value associated with it is <a href="http://africanhistory.about.com/od/African-History-and-Politics/fl/The-Meaning-of-Ubuntu.htm"><em>ubuntu</em></a>.</p>
<p>Commonly understood as “I am because we are,” <em>ubuntu</em> is collaborative in nature. It has been articulated as one of the <a href="http://www.academia.edu/19802614/An_Assessment_of_the_Public_Interest_and_Ideas_of_the_Public_in_South_Africa_and_the_Adoption_of_Ubuntu_Journalism">key philosophies</a> underpinning South African governance and service delivery. While this does not always successfully translate into practice, probably because it has been forged within and <a href="http://bahai-library.com/pokorny_karlberg_culture_contest">subordinated</a> to an adversarial (Western) cultural context, where a conflictual view of the world is naturalised, it has still prevailed in shaping a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/37984/pdf">reconciliatory South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>As such, <em>ubuntu</em> is relevant for exploring a collaborative model of public discourse. What would a talk show model based on a harmonious, cohesive understanding of power look like? </p>
<h2>Sexy enough?</h2>
<p>Would it be sexy enough to capture the imagination of an audience that has developed a taste for adversarial spectacle through an advertising-financed media that deliberately cultivates a taste for <a href="http://projectcensored.org/media-democracy-in-action-the-importance-of-including-truth-emergency-inside-the-progressive-media-reform-movement/">“junk food” media</a>? Can we (also) cultivate what may be termed “deliberation culture”?</p>
<p>While these questions remain to be explored more fully, elements of such an alternative approach can already be found throughout the media landscape. It characterised a large portion of the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s “<a href="http://www.channel24.co.za/TV/News/Noeleen-speaks-to-us-about-the-end-of-3Talk-20150217">3 Talk with Noeleen</a>”. Noeleen Maholwana-Sangqu’s guests consisted of a participatory panel that explored a rather open-ended approach to framing (for example, “when is the right time to get married?”). It was telling of significantly alternative cultural sensitivities in South Africa.</p>
<p>Such an alternative model engenders a deeply relational process. It would be inspired by the cohesive attitude of <em>ubuntu</em> and the way traditional African democracy operates in the form of a “deliberation”, where every person gets an equal chance to speak up until some kind of cohesion is reached. Geared for an increasingly distracted television audience, this would entail careful planning. Facilitation by an intelligent host would draw out and develop the presented ideas for arriving at a collective conclusion. As Maholwana-Sangqu showed us, at least in part, this is possible in a 40-minute time frame. </p>
<p>In this age of extreme inter-connectivity, a harmonious, cohesive and relational approach may be better suited to facilitate a successful way to communicate. “3 Talk with Noeleen” played a significant part in opening this conversation. In many of its episodes people from vastly different cultural, religious and socioeconomic backgrounds came together. They explored and contributed – and in the process they empowered audience members to make up their own minds about life’s big questions rather than persuade them of what is right and what is wrong.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leyla Tavernaro-Haidarian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Daytime television talk shows are known for their confrontational style. But there is a different model: a harmonious, cohesive and relational approach may offer a better way to communicate.Leyla Tavernaro-Haidarian, PhD Candidate of Journalism, Film & Television, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.