tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/denuclearisation-52778/articlesdenuclearisation – The Conversation2019-07-03T05:05:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1197372019-07-03T05:05:47Z2019-07-03T05:05:47ZTrump and Kim are talking (again). But the leaders have yet to find real common ground<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282420/original/file-20190703-126355-1suxz1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1037%2C6%2C2202%2C1145&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Handshakes and symbolism only go so far – eventually, the US and North Korea will need to work toward something more concrete.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KCNA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/trump-kim-meeting-was-amazing-event-says-north-korean-media">Sunday’s trilateral meeting</a> in the Korean Demilitarized Zone between US President Donald Trump, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and South Korean President Moon Jae In made for compelling viewing, the latest chapter in Korean peninsula summit diplomacy.</p>
<p>Indeed, such a meeting would have been unthinkable only 18 months ago. It was an unprecedented event – the leaders of the US, South Korea and North Korea meeting together, especially in the DMZ. </p>
<p>Critics have argued, however, that the meeting was merely a <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/nice-picture-but-trump-kim-visit-lacks-focus-on-true-challenge-20190701-p522xi.html">heavily manicured photo-op</a>. While heavy on symbolism, it covered nothing substantive and signalled only that the parties are willing to restart the negotiating process.</p>
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<p>A couple of major questions remain unanswered. First, what is the ultimate purpose of negotiations? Are the US, North Korea and South Korea talking about the same thing when they talk about “denuclearisation”? </p>
<p>And is the endgame of negotiations ultimately about denuclearisation, or is it about reaching a permanent peace settlement to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/asia/north-south-korea-baekdusan-paekdu-kim-moon.html">formally end the Korean War</a>?</p>
<h2>Symbolism vs substance</h2>
<p>Given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chasing-the-denuclearisation-fantasy-the-us-north-korea-summit-ends-abruptly-in-hanoi-112397">abrupt failure of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi</a> in February, a symbolic photo-op at the DMZ is an encouraging sign that the parties are still interested in talking.</p>
<p>These kinds of symbolic gestures are the foundation upon which negotiations can move forward, given that all parties are starting from a place of mutual mistrust. Without this kind of patient state-to-state relationship building, the US and North Korea will never reach a stage where more substantive issues can be discussed.</p>
<p>The symbolism is also important in signalling intent to the public in all three countries. For the US and South Korea, building domestic support for engagement is key to the ultimate ratification of any future agreement.</p>
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<h2>Define ‘denuclearisation’</h2>
<p>We also need to place the DMZ meeting in the proper context. There are several parallel games at play in which the US, North Korea and South Korea have diverging interests.</p>
<p>The first of these games revolves around the US demand of <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/bolton-pompeo-trump-and-kim-all-have-different-ideas-about-what-the-d-in-cvid-stands-for.html">“complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation”, or CVID</a>, which has formed the basis of US policy on North Korea for successive administrations since 2002.</p>
<p>North Korea’s nuclear weapons program represents a threat to America’s nuclear weapons supremacy – both in and of itself, and as an example to other countries that might seek to develop their own nuclear weapons capability. A nuclear-armed North Korea also demonstrates the diminished authority of the US as a regional and global power. </p>
<p>We see the CVID game at play in the rhetorical commitment of the US government to denuclearising the DPRK, despite the evidence that CVID has thus far failed, and in the pushback against Trump for his perceived willingness to sacrifice this aim in order to reach a deal with Kim.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-and-south-korea-met-but-what-does-it-really-mean-95755">North Korean interpretation</a> of a nuclear-free Korea, meanwhile, involves the full relinquishment of nuclear weapons by all nuclear powers, including the US. </p>
<p>With this in mind, the Kim government is committing to a negotiating process from which it can obtain sweeteners, not an end goal.</p>
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<p>This leads into the second game at play: Kim’s quest to <a href="http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/890103.html">modernise the North Korean economy</a>, which is important to the legitimacy and longevity of his government. Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program was developed as a security umbrella under which the government can move forward with economic modernisation, while minimising the risk of state collapse.</p>
<p>As such, the North Koreans are likely to seek an easing of economic sanctions and economic assistance to accelerate the development of their economy in negotiations with the US. </p>
<p>One way to achieve these objectives is by stretching the negotiating process out for as long as possible – this allows the North Koreans to secure incentives for small concessions over a longer-term, incremental negotiating process.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282423/original/file-20190703-126360-8eplms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The impromptu trilateral meeting on Sunday played well to audiences in the US, North Korea and South Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yonhap/EPA</span></span>
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<h2>The race to develop the North</h2>
<p>The third game relates to the potential opening of North Korea to foreign investment. Kim’s economic modernisation drive means that extensive opportunities for infrastructure development will emerge for foreign investors when the political climate eventually warms sufficiently.</p>
<p>The contours of a contest to develop North Korea are beginning to coalesce, with South Korean, Chinese and Russian companies jockeying for position to develop this relatively untapped space. </p>
<p>Moon, for one, sees this engagement strategy as <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">part of South Korea’s broader push</a> to integrate northeast Asia through economic and infrastructure linkages, such as gas pipelines, railway connections, seaports, regional electricity grid integration, Arctic shipping routes, shipbuilding, labour exchange, and the development of agriculture and fisheries projects. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">If a US-North Korea summit does happen, we'll have Moon Jae-in to thank for it</a>
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<p>Elements of this emerged in last year’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-27/panmunjom-declaration-for-peace2c-prosperity-and-unification-o/9705794">Panmunjom Declaration</a>, which mentioned the potential opening of railway and road corridors across the DMZ. </p>
<p>A peace settlement, or at least a negotiating process towards that end, is the magic key that could unlock possibilities for infrastructure development in North Korea. This would remove economic sanctions as an obstacle to investment and reduce the political and economic risk for investors.</p>
<h2>Trump’s unique diplomatic style</h2>
<p>Finally, the fourth game relates to Trump himself. His <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/26/donald-trumps-relations-foreign-leaders-can-get-personal/2924963002/">businesslike approach to diplomacy</a> and penchant for policy-by-Twitter are far removed from longstanding US diplomatic practices, in both style and substance.</p>
<p>Trump’s desire to reach an agreement with Kim has brought him to the brink of relinquishing the US demand for “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation” by the North.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-is-firing-missiles-again-does-diplomacy-still-have-a-chance-116956">North Korea is firing missiles again. Does diplomacy still have a chance?</a>
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<p>While one could argue, <a href="https://theconversation.com/chasing-the-denuclearisation-fantasy-the-us-north-korea-summit-ends-abruptly-in-hanoi-112397">as I have</a>, that CVID has long been a fantasy anyway, Trump’s apparent willingness to make concessions on this front puts him at odds with many in his administration and within the broader US foreign policy establishment.</p>
<p>This may explain one notable absentee from Trump’s entourage in South Korea – National Security Advisor John Bolton, who was <a href="https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton/status/1145288948291440642">dispatched to Mongolia</a> instead. Bolton’s hardline stance on North Korea is well known, so his absence was significant. In February, the North Korean media criticised Bolton for <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-20/n-korea-says-bolton-comments-on-third-summit-are-foolish-kcna">trying to be a spoiler</a> in the negotiations in Hanoi.</p>
<h2>More work to be done</h2>
<p>Engagement with the North is <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">hugely preferable</a> to the uneasy status quo on the Korean peninsula that carries with it a heightened risk of conflict escalation. However, for this engagement to continue, the parties need an agreed purpose to keep negotiations moving forward.</p>
<p>The DMZ leaders’ meeting shows just how far apart the interests of the US, South Korea and North Korea are, and how much work needs to be done to build trust and align the parties to a basic common goal. </p>
<p>Handshakes and symbolism only go so far. Eventually, the parties will need to work towards something more concrete for the process to be sustained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un have very different objectives from their on-again, off-again negotiations. More work needs to be done to build trust and align the leaders on a basic common goal.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194612019-07-01T05:50:02Z2019-07-01T05:50:02ZAt the G20, a focus on sideshow diplomacy and photo opps, with limited material gains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281958/original/file-20190701-105200-ljv14n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As always, sideline diplomatic meetings dominated the G20, while multilateral cooperation was fleeting. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What a weekend it’s been: global leadership, diplomacy and theatrics, all at play on the world stage. US President Donald Trump – never one to shy away from the spotlight — has dominated. Significant breakthroughs, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/business/us-china-trump-trade-truce.html">a pause in the escalating China-US trade war</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48814975">resumption of dialogue between the US and North Korea</a>, have been achieved.</p>
<p>One might question the strategy and motivations behind Trump’s latest diplomatic engagements. Known for his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48814975">unorthodox approach</a> to diplomacy, Trump’s latest activities are more likely driven by the prospect of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/30/politics/2020-democrats-donald-trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-cnntv/index.html">a fight in the 2020 US elections</a> than a genuine concern for regional and global stability. Trump’s turn towards dialogue has averted the immediate disaster of a trade war and confrontation with North Korea, but the longer-term implications point to a more significant shake-up in global diplomacy.</p>
<h2>Limited success and blurred optics</h2>
<p>As host of the 2019 G20 summit, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is to be credited for his efforts in bringing global leaders together under what appeared to be difficult circumstances. </p>
<p>It was always going to be a tough meeting. Overshadowed by the US-China trade war, and set against a global backdrop of widening political fault lines, seething populism and fraying institutions, Abe certainly had his work cut out for him.</p>
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<p>Just bringing together the leaders and other officials from <a href="https://g20.org/en/summit/about/">19 of the world’s biggest economies, plus the European Union</a>, for a summit on global economic governance was, in itself, a major achievement. They were joined by a raft of <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002275.html">invited guests</a>, including the leaders of Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, as well as representatives of key international organisations.</p>
<p>The summit delivered expected consensus support for “strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic growth”, alongside renewed commitments to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-summit/japan-says-g20-summit-to-debate-trade-including-wto-reform-idUSKCN1TK07E">reform the World Trade Organisation</a> and agreement on key initiatives on <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/06/28/national/abe-heralds-launch-osaka-track-framework-free-cross-border-data-flow-g20/#.XRl-R9MzZBw">digital innovation and e-commerce</a>, <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/in-historic-first-g20-weighs-ageing-as-global-risk">financial inclusion for ageing populations</a>, and <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/g20-nations-agree-to-reduce-marine-plastic-waste/news-story/de6bad852463b14736f0b9abbcb19236">marine plastics</a>. </p>
<p>More importantly, it provided the much-needed platform for US-China dialogue, bringing the escalating trade war to a halt. </p>
<p>Ultimately, though, the G20 gains were limited. The <a href="https://www.g20.org/pdf/documents/en/FINAL_G20_Osaka_Leaders_Declaration.pdf">final communiqué</a> reflected the deep political tensions globally at the moment and the overriding domestic focus of many leaders. For example, it stopped short of affirming the G20’s customary commitment to anti-protectionist measures and included <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/25/japan-waters-g20-climate-commitment-ahead-leaders-summit/">watered-down language</a> on climate change action.</p>
<p>One might be forgiven for mistaking the leaders’ summit for a glorified photo opportunity. G20 pics – ranging from the <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/world-leaders-gather-family-photo-130122841.html">rambling family photos of leaders and spouses</a> to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/28/asia/theresa-may-vladimir-putin-g20-gbr-intl/index.html">awkward moments on the sidelines</a> — dominated the weekend Twittersphere.</p>
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<p>Of course, optics matter, and the images revealed much about the diversity and dynamics at play within this “premier” economic forum. Trump’s friendly interactions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Saudi Arabia’s <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1517821/saudi-arabia">Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman</a>, for instance, <a href="https://nypost.com/2019/06/28/dems-slam-trump-for-comments-to-putin-about-election-meddling/">raised eyebrows and ire at home</a>.</p>
<p>But it’s not all about the photo opps. The G20 leaders’ summit is the culmination of months of intense negotiations, and most importantly reinforces the underlying habits of cooperation so desperately needed for ongoing global economic stability.</p>
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<span class="caption">Theresa May and Vladimir Putin shared one of the weekend’s more cringe-worthy moments.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Metzel/Tass handout/EPA</span></span>
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<h2>Side-show diplomacy</h2>
<p>As with any major summit, the G20 gathering offers the opportunity for leaders to engage in bilateral or minilateral discussions. For many, this is the main event, and for Abe, especially, the stakes on the sidelines at this G20 were high.</p>
<p>Saturday’s bilateral meeting between Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping did not disappoint, with both leaders agreeing to resume trade talks, stalled since the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/05/donald-trump-xi-jinping-trade-buenos-aires">last G20 in Buenos Aires</a>. Notably, Trump announced his suspension of some <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/28/expectations-low-for-xi-trump-g-20-meeting-trade-tariffs-osaka-huawei/">US$300 billion in threatened tariffs</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidphelan/2019/06/29/trump-surprises-g20-with-huawei-concession-u-s-companies-can-sell-to-huawei/#1c02c1fa1e21">eased restrictions</a> on US companies selling components to Chinese telco, Huawei.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-relations-are-certainly-at-a-low-point-but-this-is-not-the-next-cold-war-117509">US-China relations are certainly at a low point, but this is not the next Cold War</a>
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<p>Other G20 sideline events, including Trump’s bilateral with Putin created their own drama, but it was Trump’s Saturday morning tweet suggesting a spontaneous visit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his subsequent trip to Korea, that caught everyone off guard.</p>
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<p>And with that, arrangements fell miraculously into place for Trump to take a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/29/politics/kim-jong-un-donald-trump-dmz-north-korea/index.html">historic first step</a> for a sitting US president into North Korea, and for Kim and Trump to spend an hour in conversation in Freedom House on the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone. </p>
<p>Importantly, the two have now agreed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-dmz.html">further talks</a> intended to advance their ongoing denuclearization negotiations. Spectacle aside, there may well be positives to come from this interaction, but for the moment the endgame just isn’t clear.</p>
<h2>Thumbs up for Morrison</h2>
<p>Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison performed remarkably well at his second G20 leaders’ summit, marking a positive turn from last time round.</p>
<p>To be fair, Morrison attended his first G20 summit in November <a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-morrisons-authority-deficit-on-show-at-home-and-abroad-107813">just three months</a> into his term as prime minister following the Coalition leadership spill. He was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/03/german-chancellor-angela-merkel-uses-cheat-sheet-about-new-australian-prime-minister-scott-morrison-at-g20-summit">unknown</a> and inexperienced at the time.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-his-first-major-foreign-policy-test-morrison-needs-to-stick-to-the-script-106606">In his first major foreign policy test, Morrison needs to stick to the script</a>
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<p>In Japan, Morrison was attending his first G20 as Australia’s elected leader, with decent summitry experience and far more established relationships with his global counterparts in place. His key message – that a US-China trade war was in nobody’s interests – was well-prepared, and it resonated with key G20 counterparts.</p>
<p>Other highlights for Morrison included his dinner on the eve of the summit with <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-28/scott-morrision-meets-with-donald-trump-at-dinner-in-japan/11259746">Trump</a>. While the press pool may have been <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/one-of-our-best-donald-trumps-gushing-words-for-australia-and-scott-morrison/news-story/9e07502465548a2d610efbca411f3c8b">unimpressed</a>, the fact that this was Trump’s first bilateral event of the summit is significant, even if it was, <a href="https://iview.abc.net.au/show/insiders">as some suggest</a> simply to fill a gap in Trump’s program. Trump’s reflection on the US alliance with Australia, and Morrison’s election win with Australia was replete with praise.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281966/original/file-20190701-105176-x17557.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Scott Morrison had plenty of face-time with Donald Trump over the weekend.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
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<p>More importantly, though, Morrison’s win on <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/scott-morrison-secures-g20-deal-to-block-violent-terrorism-on-facebook-and-social-media-20190629-p522kv.html">curbing terrorist activities</a> via social media was an important contribution to the summit outcome. G20 leaders were unanimous in their backing for the proposal that would increase pressure on tech giants like Facebook to block or remove the spread of violent extremism online. </p>
<p>The fact that Morrison <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/social-media-giants-need-to-raise-the-bar-prime-minister-says-ahead-of-crackdown-on-streamed-terror-violence-20190629-p522jg.html">shared news</a> of the outcome with New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern added to the credibility of the concept within the G20 grouping and lifted its profile at home.</p>
<h2>No clear path ahead</h2>
<p>In all, the G20 summit was an important exercise in diplomacy and resulted in a positive outcome for Abe. This sort of cooperation is so desperately needed if the institutions, rules and norms underpinning economic governance are to carry any weight at all. And as Japan hands the G20 reins over to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/saudi-arabia-host-g20-leaders-summit-november-2020-190417175058777.html">2020 host</a>, Saudi Arabia, supporting diplomacy and cooperation will be more important than ever.</p>
<p>Trump’s sideshow-style diplomacy certainly stole the limelight. The resumption of dialogue with both China and North Korea reaffirms the necessary place of diplomacy in the region. But Trump is navigating dangerous territory, and the lack of clear strategy, dubious motivations and self-serving tactics should have everyone – including his allies – on guard.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caitlin Byrne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US President Donald Trump stole the show over the weekend with seeming breakthroughs on the China trade war and North Korea. Disaster has been averted, but for how long?Caitlin Byrne, Director, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1169562019-05-14T01:15:48Z2019-05-14T01:15:48ZNorth Korea is firing missiles again. Does diplomacy still have a chance?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274225/original/file-20190514-60537-1i8ettf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A photo released by the official North Korean Central News Agency showing North Korean leader Kim Jong-un
overseeing weapons tests at an undisclosed location last week.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KCNA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent days, North Korea has upped the ante in its standoff with the United States and South Korea, further highlighting the missed opportunity at February’s Hanoi summit aimed at bringing peace to the Korean peninsula.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48212045?ocid=socialflow_twitter">Reports last Thursday</a> suggest that a “projectile” was launched from the Sino-ri test site on North Korea’s west coast, flying approximately 420 kilometres. A flight path of this distance would suggest the projectile was a Hwasong-6 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), which the North has possessed for some time.</p>
<p>On May 4, North Korea tested a new missile that appeared to be a version of the Russian-made Iskander SRBM. According to <a href="https://www.38north.org/2019/05/melleman050819/">38 North</a>, a North Korea analysis website, the strategic significance of the Iskander missile is its in-flight manoeuvrability and relatively low flight altitude, which allows it to evade most missile defence systems. With a range of approximately 280 kilometres, the Iskander missile is clearly intended for targets in South Korea.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hermit-kingdom-nuclear-nation-if-the-media-keep-calling-north-korea-names-it-will-only-prolong-conflict-112507">Hermit kingdom, nuclear nation ... If the media keep calling North Korea names, it will only prolong conflict</a>
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<p>The latest missile tests are a predictable reaction by the Kim regime to its diplomatic impasse with the United States. Tiny escalations are North Korea’s stock-in-trade response in situations where it is trying to extract concessions in an unfavourable negotiating dynamic.</p>
<p>How the White House responds from here is an open question. Every time North Korea needles the US with another provocation, it represents a loss of face for Trump and makes it harder for him to mobilise the domestic support in the US for a return to the negotiating table. </p>
<h2>A familiar strategy from Kim Jong-un</h2>
<p>The Iskander short-range missile is new to North Korea’s missile arsenal and demonstrates the damage the North could do to South Korea in a war scenario – a veiled threat that is classic North Korean strategic signalling. </p>
<p>The tests were conducted on the heels of <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2019/04/kim-jong-un-open-to-third-summit-with-trump-but-wants-fair-deal-kcna/?c=1555563773303">Kim Jong-un’s speech to the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly</a> on April 12, in which he indicated he will only wait until the end of the year for the US to change its diplomatic approach and return to negotiations for a peace agreement.</p>
<p>In the meantime, it would be unsurprising to see more short-range missile tests of this sort from the North. Short-range missile tests <a href="https://www.38north.org/2019/05/rcarlin050519/">technically fall within Kim’s pledge</a> at his <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-trump-kim-north-korea-summit-updates-htmlstory.html">first summit with Trump in Singapore last year</a> not to conduct any further <em>long-range</em> inter-continental ballistic missiles.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chasing-the-denuclearisation-fantasy-the-us-north-korea-summit-ends-abruptly-in-hanoi-112397">Chasing the denuclearisation fantasy: The US-North Korea summit ends abruptly in Hanoi</a>
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<p>If we get to 2020 without any substantive change in the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea, a reversion to North Korea’s belligerent behaviour of the past is likely: more nuclear tests, more long-range, inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests, ramping up production of fissile material and increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal. </p>
<p>This can be predicted with reasonable confidence, as Kim does not have many other options if he wants to move forward with his <a href="http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/890103.html">economic modernisation agenda</a>.</p>
<p>In short, Kim will likely put a capital ‘N’ and ‘P’ on “nuclear proliferation” if he sees the door slamming shut on the summit process with Trump. </p>
<h2>Trump boxed himself in at Hanoi</h2>
<p>The US responded to Pyongyang’s latest missile launches late last week by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48208686">suspending the program to repatriate America’s war dead</a> from North Korea. However, US President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-downplays-north-korea-missile-tests-amid-stalled-nuclear-talks-n1004611">tried to downplay the tests</a> by saying he didn’t consider it a breach of trust.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1127963520291590144"}"></div></p>
<p>With his all-or-nothing grand bargain gambit in Hanoi, Trump trapped himself in a box. He has <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1124670603179565056">expressed a strong personal desire</a> to secure an agreement with Kim. But if he still wants a deal, he is going to work around their <a href="https://theconversation.com/chasing-the-denuclearisation-fantasy-the-us-north-korea-summit-ends-abruptly-in-hanoi-112397">irreconcilable positions on the meaning of denuclearisation</a>.</p>
<p>What this means is either Trump or Kim will have to blink. At this point, only one of them has room to compromise. Kim cannot afford to dramatically change tack and relinquish his nuclear program, as, from his perspective, the <a href="https://drbenjaminhabib.com/2013/07/04/north-koreas-rational-belligerence/">security and the legitimacy of his regime</a> depends on its possession of “the bomb”.</p>
<p>As a result, the US will inevitably have to make the bulk of the concessions if this process is to move forward. The US is also in the better position to make concessions because of its <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat">overwhelming nuclear superiority</a>, its effective deterrence posture and its status as a global power that is not existentially threatened in the same way that North Korea is. </p>
<p>Previous US administrations have been unwilling to shoulder this burden. Trump has. But every time North Korea tests a missile, it will further undermine Trump’s ability to cut a deal. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-north-korean-prosperity-would-be-the-ruin-of-kim-jong-un-113236">Why North Korean prosperity would be the ruin of Kim Jong Un</a>
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<p>Competing voices within the White House are another complication. Hardliners like National Security Adviser John Bolton are arguing for a “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/06/boltonus-may-ramp-up-north-korea-sanctions-if-it-doesnt-denuclearize.html">maximum pressure</a>” stance against Pyongyang, to squeeze North Korea until Kim makes concessions. To them, any deal with North Korea would represent a <a href="https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/no-time-artificial-peace-korea">sell-out of US interests</a>. North Korea criticised Bolton, in particular, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-20/n-korea-says-bolton-comments-on-third-summit-are-foolish-kcna">for being a potential spoiler</a> in the negotiations in Hanoi.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274231/original/file-20190514-60557-1e6a72j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Just three months ago, Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump seemed to mark another breakthrough in Hanoi. Then came a lull in negotiations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KCNA/EPA</span></span>
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<h2>If negotiations break down, is conflict inevitable?</h2>
<p>The latest tensions have left South Korean leader Moon Jae-in scrambling to save the peace process. His government is urging the US to <a href="http://english1.president.go.kr/President/News/575">stay the course on engagement</a> with the North, in spite of the recent missile provocations. </p>
<p>Moon has spent enormous political capital trying to reconcile with the North and bring lasting peace and security to the Korean peninsula. And the Blue House is well aware that the carefully constructed summit agreements of 2018 are teetering on the brink of collapse. There is no <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/feb/09/winter-olympics-begin-with-powerful-message-of-peace">fortuitously timed Winter Olympics</a> to provide a circuit-breaker to prevent tensions from escalating, either.</p>
<p>We have been here before. When tensions last reached a crescendo between the US and North Korea in 2017, threats of war from Washington were successful in <a href="https://www.38north.org/2018/05/jdethomas050918/">cracking open the window for new possibilities</a>. </p>
<p>After the unprecedented diplomatic activity of the last year, however, this strategy would not work again. If the US pursues “maximum pressure” against North Korea now, there is nowhere left to go besides conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Every time North Korea needles the US with another provocation, it makes it harder for Donald Trump to mobilise the domestic support for a return to the negotiating table.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140552019-05-07T11:22:18Z2019-05-07T11:22:18ZWhat geology reveals about North Korea’s nuclear weapons – and what it obscures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272792/original/file-20190506-103057-o9joev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pedestrians in Tokyo pass a television screen broadcasting a report on May 4, 2019 that North Korea has fired several unidentified short-range projectiles into the sea off its eastern coast.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Japan-North-Korea-Missile/1c5b528c87434184abfb8e89886b92c3/15/0">AP Photo/Koji Sasahara</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s leader, Chairman Kim Jong Un, clearly is in no hurry to demilitarize his country. In the wake of two historic yet unproductive summits with President Trump, Kim made a state visit in April to Moscow, where he made clear that his country will not give up its nuclear weapons <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-arrives-in-russian-far-east-ahead-of-first-ever-summit-with-kim-jong-un/2019/04/24/a2d941f8-65c6-11e9-a698-2a8f808c9cfb_story.html?utm_term=.520ded083162">without international security guarantees</a>. North Korea also tested what appeared to be short-range missiles on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-weapons-test.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">April 18</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-fires-several-short-range-projectiles-south-korean-military-says/2019/05/03/511efe92-6e0f-11e9-be3a-33217240a539_story.html?utm_term=.2b75e21a2a13">May 4</a>.</p>
<p>These tests are reminders that North Korea’s military forces, particularly its nuclear arsenal, pose a serious threat to the United States and its Asian allies. This reclusive nation is a high-priority U.S. intelligence target, but there are still large uncertainties about the power of its nuclear weapons. North Korean scientists <a href="https://theoutline.com/post/2944/what-science-is-like-in-north-korea?zd=1&zi=l3tyywxr">work in isolation from the rest of the world</a>, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/us/north-korea-refugees-defectors-usa-utah.html">defectors are far and few between</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/rogersma/">My research</a> focuses on improving techniques for estimating the yield, or size, of underground nuclear explosions by using physics-based simulations. Science and technology give us a lot of tools for assessing the nuclear capabilities of countries like North Korea, but it’s still difficult to track and accurately measure the size and power of their nuclear arsenals. Here’s a look at some of the challenges.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Experts say the US and North Korea are closer to nuclear war than many Americans believe.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>A nation in the dark</h2>
<p>For an isolated nation like North Korea, developing a functional nuclear weapons program is a historic feat. Just eight other sovereign states have accomplished this goal – the five declared nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) plus Israel, India and Pakistan.</p>
<p>North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Paradoxically, in 1985 it also joined the <a href="http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT</a>, under which it pledged not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. But by 2002, U.S. intelligence discovered evidence that North Korea was producing enriched uranium – a technological milestone that can yield explosive material to power nuclear weapons. In response the U.S. suspended fuel oil shipments to North Korea, which prompted the North to leave the NPT in 2003.</p>
<p>Then the North resumed a previously shuttered program to extract plutonium from spent uranium fuel. Plutonium-based nuclear weapons are more energy-dense than uranium-based designs, so they can be smaller and more mobile without sacrificing yield.</p>
<p>North Korea <a href="http://eqinfo.ucsd.edu/special_events/nuclear_tests/north_korea/">conducted its first nuclear test</a> on Oct. 6, 2006. Many experts <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2006/10/north-korean-bomb-may-be-bust-science">considered the test to be unsuccessful</a> because the size of the explosion, as determined from seismograms, was relatively small. However, that conclusion was based on incomplete information. And the test still served as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992">powerful domestic propaganda tool and international display of might.</a></p>
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<h2>More tests, more uncertainty</h2>
<p>Since 2006 North Korea has conducted five more nuclear tests, each one larger than the last. Scientists are still working to measure their yield accurately. This question is important, because it reveals how advanced the North Korean nuclear program is, which has implications for global security.</p>
<p>Estimates of the size of North Korea’s most recent test in September 2017 place it between 70 and 280 kilotons of TNT equivalent. For reference, that’s five to 20 times stronger than the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. In fact, the explosion was so strong that it caused the mountain under which it was detonated to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2018GL077649">collapse by several meters.</a> </p>
<p>We have a variety of tools for gaining knowledge about these events, ranging from satellite imagery to radar and seismograms. These methods give us an idea of North Korea’s capabilities, but they all have drawbacks. One difficulty common to all of them is uncertainty about geological conditions at the test site. Without a good understanding of the geology, it’s difficult to accurately model the explosions and replicate observations. It is even harder to constrain the error associated with those estimates. </p>
<p>Another, less understood phenomenon is the effect of fracture damage at the test site. North Korea has conducted all of its nuclear tests <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punggye-ri_Nuclear_Test_Site">at the same location</a>. Field experiments have shown that such repeat tests dampen the outgoing seismic and infrasound waves, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/0120130206">making the explosion appear weaker than it actually is</a>. This happens because the rock that was fractured by the first explosion is more loosely held together and acts like a giant muffler. These processes are poorly understood and contribute to even more uncertainty.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017AGUFM.S12B..04R">my research</a> and work by <a href="http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017AGUFM.S43H2960S">other scientists</a> have shown that many types of rock enhance the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/0120110204">production of earthquake-like seismic waves</a> by underground explosions. The more energy from an explosion that gets converted into these earthquake-like waves, the more difficult it becomes to estimate the size of the explosion. </p>
<iframe title="Estimated Explosion Yield of North Korean Nuclear Tests" aria-label="Dot Plot" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Mow9V/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="240"></iframe>
<h2>What do we know?</h2>
<p>What U.S. officials do know is that North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program, and any such program poses an existential threat to the United States and the world at large. Intelligence experts in <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-believed-have-60-nuclear-weapons-south-korea-says-n915721">South Korea</a> and nuclear scientists in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-nuclear-study/north-korea-may-have-made-more-nuclear-bombs-but-threat-reduced-study-idUSKCN1Q10EL">United States</a> estimate that North Korea has between 30 and 60 nuclear weapons in reserve, with the ability to produce more in the future. </p>
<p>It’s still unclear how far North Korea can deliver nuclear weapons. However, their ability to produce plutonium enables them to make small, easily transportable nuclear bombs, which increase the threat.</p>
<p>In the face of such developments, one course of action available to the U.S. that would serve our country’s national security interests is to negotiate with North Korea in good faith, but accept nothing less than complete nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula. And any such agreement will have to be verified through disclosures and inspections to ensure that North Korea doesn’t cheat.</p>
<p>That’s impossible if U.S. experts don’t have an accurate accounting of what the North has achieved so far. The more that Americans negotiators know about Pyongyang’s nuclear activities to date, the better prepared they will be to set realistic terms if and when North Korea decides – as other nations have – that its future is brighter without nuclear weapons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marshall Rogers-Martinez has received funding from the Air Force Research Laboratory and Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He previously worked at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the Global Security division.</span></em></p>North Korea is a major military threat to the US and its Asian allies, but exactly how powerful are its nuclear weapons? An earth scientist explains why it’s hard to answer this question.Marshall Rogers-Martinez, PhD Candidate, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1123972019-02-28T10:56:24Z2019-02-28T10:56:24ZChasing the denuclearisation fantasy: The US-North Korea summit ends abruptly in Hanoi<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261406/original/file-20190228-106347-1483acs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As the US-North Korea summit comes to an abrupt end, denuclearisation is a fantasy that is leaving Washington as the odd man out on the Korean Peninsula.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/KCNA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Korea-watchers around the world are scrambling to tease out the meaning of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/trump-kim-vietnam-summit.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">abruptly concluded</a> US-DPRK summit in Hanoi. I want to cast a critical eye on denuclearisation itself as the framing objective of the summit negotiations.</p>
<p>If we step back for a moment to look at the extraordinary developments in Korean Peninsula diplomacy over the past year, we see three parties who want different things. </p>
<p>The Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea remembers all too well the chaos of 2017 that brought Korea to the brink of war, and sees a permanent peace regime as the most important objective of its <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/02/356_264566.html">engagement efforts</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-growth-and-trump-proofing-why-the-latest-inter-korea-summit-matters-103598">Economic growth and 'Trump-proofing' – why the latest inter-Korea summit matters</a>
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<p>For their part, the North Koreans want to neutralise the military threat from the US, see sanctions lifted, and obtain economic assistance to accelerate the development of their economy. The Trump administration, and much of the broader US foreign policy establishment, remains attached to the denuclearisation of North Korea as the end game of this process.</p>
<p>But denuclearisation is a fantasy that is leaving Washington as the odd man out on the Korean Peninsula. The goalposts on the Korean Peninsula are changing as the momentum for inter-Korean engagement grows, while the importance of the US as the indispensable security guarantor is diminishing.</p>
<h2>Who walked out on whom?</h2>
<p>Like everyone else, I will be watching closely over the coming days as details begin to emerge about the sticking points that led to the abrupt conclusion of the summit.</p>
<p>In the lead-up to the Hanoi summit, the Trump administration did signal <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/u-s-drops-demand-full-accounting-n-korea-nuclear-program-n977251">some flexibility</a> on verification measures for full, independent accounting of North Korea’s nuclear program as a condition for further negotiation. </p>
<p>It is ironic that Trump’s apparent willingness to befriend authoritarian leaders has opened the door for negotiations for a permanent peace regime in Korea, which previous US administrations had kept quarantined behind the demand for “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation” (CVID).</p>
<p>However, in his final press conference in Hanoi, the US president indicated that the North Korean delegation <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/02/103_264606.html">asked for too much</a> in requesting the lifting of all economic sanctions in exchange for the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. </p>
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<p>Considering the enormous pressure Trump has come under from domestic quarters not to sell out the denuclearisation agenda, there was no way the US delegation could accept those terms.</p>
<p>But there is another possibility. The Congressional <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-michael-cohens-full-prepared-testimony-on-trumps-russia-plans-wikileaks-email-dump">testimony of Michael Cohen</a> from Washington may have created fresh doubts in the minds of the North Korean delegation about Trump’s ability to deliver on a deal. It is possible that Kim Jong-un presented terms they knew the Americans could not accept, to avoid the possibility of a lame-duck deal negotiated by a compromised president.</p>
<p>It is important to recognise that the US and North Korea run at different political speeds. Since 1945, North Korea’s three Kims have presided through 13 US presidents. US presidents are confined to term limits and captive to the political demands of relatively short election cycles. The now extreme polarisation of American politics ensures that promises made by Trump may not be honoured by an incoming administration.</p>
<p>With a US presidential election looming in 2020 and widespread criticism within the American foreign policy establishment of Trump’s negotiating position, and with recurring allegations of criminality fuelling calls for his impeachment, it is understandable that the North Koreans might be cautious about making concessions. </p>
<p>They will remember the failure of the US Congress to ratify the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578">Agreed Framework</a> when President Bill Clinton was facing impeachment during the 1990s.</p>
<h2>The denuclearisation of North Korea is a fantasy</h2>
<p>Regardless of who blinked first, the failure to reach agreement in Hanoi further demonstrates that North Korea will never willingly denuclearise. This is not a secret. It has been obvious for more than a decade, since the failure of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-tests-and-the-six-party-talks-where-do-we-go-from-here/">Six-Party Talks</a>. Beyond the economic sanctions regime, there is very little the US can do about it.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">bears repeating</a> why this is the case:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>successive US administrations have considered and rejected the use of military force against North Korea on the grounds that it poses an unacceptable risk to its ally in South Korea</p></li>
<li><p>because of the longstanding sanctions regime, the US lacks sufficient economic leverage over the DPRK to bring it to heel, even with the expansive list of goods banned from export to the North, and the expansive powers of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to restrict financial flows in and out of the DPRK</p></li>
<li><p>North Korea is adept at sanctions-busting, in spite of the squeeze being placed on the country by existing measures.</p></li>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-shaky-us-north-korea-summit-is-set-to-begin-the-parties-must-search-for-common-interest-97693">As the shaky US-North Korea summit is set to begin, the parties must search for common interest</a>
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<p>Holding out for denuclearisation as an end game is an exercise in futility. It is bad policy. It unnecessarily backs the US into a corner of weakness where it cannot bring its obvious strategic and economic advantages to bear.</p>
<p>Denuclearisation has been the obstacle that has kept the US and North Korea at the stage of talking about talking, halting progress on other confidence-building measures that could improve the relationship and take some of the heat out of the Korean Peninsula security dilemma.</p>
<h2>Missed opportunity for a peace settlement</h2>
<p>The dominant school of thought in disarmament circles is that states that acquire nuclear weapons are a threat to international peace and security, and so must be prevented from doing so. This is the denuclearisation perspective that has dominated the discourse on North Korea in the US and informed the longstanding CVID policy. </p>
<p>There is an clear logic here that stems from the terrible and awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons, with which few could argue. From this perspective, any negotiations with North Korea that do not result in full nuclear relinquishment will be <a href="https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/no-time-artificial-peace-korea">interpreted as a sell-out</a>.</p>
<p>However, there is also an obvious hypocrisy in this position (and in the nuclear non-proliferation regime more generally) given the size of the US nuclear arsenal and the deliberate ambiguity of its <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF">doctrine around nuclear first-strike</a>. It is this hypocrisy that the DPRK exploits in its official interpretation of denuclearisation as meaning the universal relinquishment of nuclear weapons by all countries.</p>
<p>There is another school of thought that it is not nuclear weapons <em>per se</em> that represent a threat to international peace and security. Rather, it is an international environment teeming with existential threats in which states feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to protect themselves.</p>
<p>From this perspective, a peace declaration could diminish the level of insecurity that feeds the desire for nuclear proliferation. If the perception of imminent threat lessens, then the probability of nuclear weapons use in the event of conflict is also reduced.</p>
<p>There is space within this perspective to work towards nuclear disarmament. But that goal is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-pyongyang-pivot-11551225898">one element of a bigger picture</a>. This is the essence of the South Korean position on inter-Korean summit diplomacy, and the fading shadow of a missed opportunity in Hanoi.</p>
<p>These summits are part of a long-term peace-building process. Clearly, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un are not on the same page in their negotiating objectives.</p>
<p>If US-DPRK bilateral negotiations are to continue, they are going to have to find a lowest common denominator on which they can build. Regardless of how we feel about Kim Jong-un, the political system he presides over, and the abuses of his regime, denuclearisation is never going to be the lowest common denominator upon which the US-DPRK relationship can evolve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112397/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any meaningful breakthrough in the relationship between the US and North Korea is once again stalled by the insistence on denuclearisation.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1094472019-01-08T13:45:18Z2019-01-08T13:45:18ZNorth Korea: what latest defection tells us about hopes for peace on peninsula<p>News broke in early January that North Korea’s acting ambassador to Italy, Jo Song-gil, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/03/north-korean-ambassador-jo-song-gil-seeks-asylum-in-italy">is in hiding</a> and reportedly is seeking asylum in an <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/north-korea-italy-ambassador-latest-hiding-missing-diplomat-seoul-spy-a8708966.html">“unidentified Western country”</a>. The possible high-level defection came as a surprise, especially as US president Donald Trump recently confirmed his desire to have a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46776768">second US-North Korea summit</a>, and South Korean president Moon Jae-in is soon expecting a visit from the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un. At time of writing, the North Korean leader was in China on an unannounced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46789925">visit to see president Xi Jinping</a>.</p>
<p>When <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/kim-jong-reaffirms-commitment-denuclearization-letter-south-korean/story?id=60088151">Kim Jong-un sent handwritten letters</a> to Moon and Trump on New Year’s Eve, he seemed to be promising that the three countries could continue their dialogue over the Korean peninsula’s peace process. But why is Jo Song-gil seeking asylum if Kim Jong-un really is open to change in North Korea? Is he making his escape for personal reasons – or is it an indication that things are as bad as ever in Pyongyang?</p>
<p>Whatever the reason, Jo Song-gil’s defection could impact the ongoing negotiations. He could, for example, share sensitive information with the US and South Korea about the real denuclearisation situation in North Korea – and this could make Kim Jong-un less willing to engage. </p>
<p>And the negotiations are already fragile. Over the past 12 months, there have been repeated promises – and cancellations – made by all sides. It certainly remains to be seen whether the three countries will meet as suggested – and whether it will amount to any more than “gesture politics” if they do. </p>
<p>On one level, things do look different to the past, when little tangible progress was made. South Korea’s Moon Jae-in is a proactive leader, and Kim Jong-un is young, ambitious and eager to make his own mark. Both Kim Jong-un and Trump are also deeply unpredictable, however.</p>
<p>But there are other factors to consider, too, not least North Korea’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/20/north-korean-economy-sees-sharpest-decline-in-20-years-as-sanctions-bite">sharp economic downturn</a>. This has, in fact, given many North Koreans wider access to information from outside the country, partially thanks to a growing number of defectors communicating with those who remain and the outside world. Kim Jong Un’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-test-byungjin-and-the-economic-logic/">“equal emphasis” (Byungjin) policy</a>, which focuses on both military and economic development, has also given impetus to his willingness to talk with Moon and Trump. </p>
<p>But even if the willingness is there, North Korea’s regime cannot upend nearly 70 years of history in a day. It will be a long process.</p>
<h2>Bargaining chip</h2>
<p>Although Kim Jong-un’s current performance on this issue is occasionally more promising than that of his father or grandfather, the truth is that he cannot abandon his nuclear programme until he can see an alternative way of guaranteeing the security of his regime.</p>
<p>After all, North Korea’s nuclear programme has so far worked well as a bargaining chip in international negotiations – although the current UN sanctions are an exception. Indeed, North Korea’s nuclear threats and long-range missiles have strengthened the county’s hand against the US, while without them, North Korea has almost nothing <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/reason-north-korea-needs-nukes-deterrence-vs-expansion-2018-1">to offer as a concession</a>.</p>
<p>Nor should we forget the role the North Korean media plays. By showing images of Kim Jong-un shaking hands with world leaders, it has become part of his survival strategy, bolstering his strongman image among both ordinary North Koreans and his government. Any meeting Kim Jong-un agrees to should, at least partly, be seen in this light.</p>
<p>Ultimately, there have been no significant changes in North Korea’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/north-korea-still-developing-nuclear-weapons-iaea-report-un">nuclear programme</a> (besides demolishing some old or disused facilities). Nor will it be possible to achieve completely irreversible denuclearisation as long as North Korea retains its theoretical nuclear know-how. At the same time, while North Korea tends to highlight its will to halt rather than dismantle its nuclear capability, the US wants more before it invests economically. </p>
<p>So how to move forward? And how can negotiators overcome the current chicken-or-egg dilemma: denuclearisation first or economic support first?</p>
<p>The answer is twofold. First, we need something truly imaginative. Perhaps the US can find a solution by transforming the nuclear sites in North Korea into special industrial clusters and providing some of its military capability in exchange for nuclear disarmament. In this way, North Korea can attract private investment from the US, while easing its security concerns.</p>
<p>In the end, however, foreign policy objectives on the peninsula will need to be realistic. As mentioned before, a truly denuclearised North Korea will never happen as it will retain its theoretical nuclear knowledge. It will be far more practical, then, to find a common ground of mutual interests.</p>
<h2>Accountability</h2>
<p>Second, there needs to be a sense of “mutual accountability”. <a href="http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/1075-2846.23.2.183">The traditional definition of accountability</a> has three stages: responsibility, answerability, and enforceability.</p>
<p>The “responsibility” stage can take the form of policy dialogue and trust building. Plenty of dialogue occurred during the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks">six-party talks</a> held intermittently since 2003 between North Korea, China, the US, South Korea, Japan and Russia – but they appeared to fail to build any meaningful trust. The latest rounds of dialogue between the US and the two Koreas will also fall at this hurdle unless they find a novel way forward.</p>
<p>Consequently, the dialogue must be based on mutual understanding and openness. The rest of the world must understand that North Korea is a fragile state, which cannot overcome the denuclearisation problem on its own – especially given its vulnerable financial situation. After all, it’s not just the US that doesn’t trust North Korea; North Korea doesn’t trust the US either, especially following the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.</p>
<p>But that is just the first step. The “answerability” stage will require much greater information sharing and transparency. The international community is so suspicious of the sincerity of Kim Jong-un’s denuclearisation process because of that country’s poor level of openness and the limited access to solid information from within North Korea. Once North Korea opens its borders, there will be simultaneous achievements in terms of both denuclearisation and economic development.</p>
<p>All parties need measurable and transparent indicators of progress. But if agreements aren’t kept, a move can be made towards “enforceability”, including convening inspection panels or enforcing a compliance review process. Kim Jong-un’s father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, for example, faced international sanctions along with the removal of food aid even during a famine period when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/10/northkorea1">he left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003</a>. </p>
<p>2019 may yet bring a way forward. But unless there is a foundation of mutual understanding, defectors such as Jo Song-gil may offer the only tangible insight into what’s really going on in North Korea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sojin Lim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any meaningful way forward must be based on imagination and mutual understanding.Sojin Lim, Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies, North Korean Studies MA & Asia Pacific Studies MA Courses Leader, Deputy Director of the International Institute of Korean Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015862018-11-13T11:47:01Z2018-11-13T11:47:01ZWill China help Trump denuclearize North Korea?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241266/original/file-20181018-67167-1u663ps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The US is not the only country with a stake in North Korea's denuclearization.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Trump-Kim-Summit/45ec8217a39b46308685b4f17c3b4f22/5/1">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in June <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/world/asia/kim-jong-un-donald-trump-denuclearize.html">pledged</a> to work toward “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” by 2020, the White House hailed the agreement as “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/historic-summit-north-korea-tremendous-moment-world/">a tremendous moment for the world</a>.” </p>
<p>The agreement came after a year of tense negotiations between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump – an undiplomatic diplomatic process that included insults, threats, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/03/politics/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-rhetoric/index.html">name-calling</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/us/politics/pompeo-north-korea-trip.html">canceled diplomatic visits</a>.</p>
<p>“I was really being tough. And so was he,” Trump <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/30/donald-trumps-relationship-kim-jong-unwe-fell-love-beautiful/">later said</a>. “And we’d go back and forth. And then we fell in love. OK?”</p>
<p>With all the bilateral drama, it’s easy to forget that this nuclear showdown does not involve just the U.S. and North Korea. </p>
<h2>The China-Korea connection</h2>
<p>The Korean peninsula has been in a protracted conflict since 1950, when Communist North Korean troops <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/korea/korean-war">invaded</a> South Korea. </p>
<p>North Korea has been considered a <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/">dangerous nuclear power</a> since withdrawing from the international nonproliferation treaty on nuclear weapons in 1985, with neighboring <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/asia/abe-north-korea-comments/index.html">Japan</a> and South Korea most at risk of nuclear attack.</p>
<p>Both are strong U.S. allies who essentially <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-28/rift-grows-between-u-s-allies-over-north-korea-s-nuclear-threat">support Trump’s negotiations with Kim’s regime</a>. </p>
<p>Less certain is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-the-key-to-avoiding-nuclear-fire-and-fury-in-north-korea-82257">position of China</a>, North Korea’s Communist northern neighbor. </p>
<p>China accounts for 90 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade and is perhaps the only true <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship">“friend” North Korea has</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241140/original/file-20181017-41150-1xbpkh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and the only real friend North Korea has in the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/The-Week-That-Was-In-Asia-Photo-Gallery/a48f3ab0324a4084af13048378ef2f6e/3/0">AP Photo/Andy Wong, File</a></span>
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<p>It is also an economic behemoth with its own <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/the-world-according-to-china/">ambitions of global dominance</a>. </p>
<p>In recent years China has flexed its foreign policy muscles, paying for major <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-chinese-infrastructure-investment-overseas-and-how-can-we-make-the-most-of-it-98697">infrastructure</a> development in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ties-between-african-countries-and-china-are-complex-understanding-this-matters-104700">Africa</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-china-and-pakistans-coal-romance-wheres-the-love-for-the-climate-74772">Pakistan</a> and the Caribbean. Its diplomacy budget has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/china-races-to-catch-up-on-foreign-affairs-spending/">almost doubled</a> since Xi took office in 2013.</p>
<p>Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1588213.shtml">Lu Kang</a> has assured the United States that China supports “the U.S. and [North Korea] in actively seeking a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue” and is “committed to achieving denuclearization.”</p>
<p>Korea experts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/07/china-is-doing-what-it-has-to-in-north-korea/">have their doubts</a>. </p>
<p>Many believe China fears that a successful Trump negotiation could lead the U.S. to replace China as North Korea’s top ally. Its government “does not want a reunified Korea, indebted to Washington, sitting just across its border,” Richard McGregor, senior fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/18/asia/china-us-north-korea-xi-jinping-intl/index.html">told CNN</a> in May.</p>
<p>So where does China’s government really stand on the U.S.-led denuclearization of North Korea?</p>
<h2>China defends North Korea</h2>
<p>To answer this question, we analyzed one year of Chinese news coverage and commentary on North Korean denuclearatization. </p>
<p>Because journalism in China is <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-scorns-us-media-but-just-try-being-a-journalist-in-north-korea-or-mexico-96393">heavily state-controlled</a>, media analysis can shed light on government positions that may not be public as official policy.</p>
<p>Our project examining China’s view of the U.S-North Korea negotiations is part of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-media-outlets-from-around-the-world-are-reacting-to-the-presidential-campaign-66263">ongoing research</a> into the domestic media coverage of global affairs in Russia and China, two countries that contest America’s dominance in the current world order.</p>
<p>We read China’s position on the Trump-Kim process as delicately balanced between defending its Korean ally while signaling its respect for the international community.</p>
<p>Chinese media makes sure to report North Korea’s side of the argument, tacitly supporting Kim Jong Un’s need for security while questioning American intentions in the Asian region.</p>
<p>For instance, Xinhua <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/08/c_136664812.htm">reported</a> in Oct. 2017 that “Kim justified the development of nuclear and missile programs by [North Korea] as the only way of defense against ‘protracted nuclear threats’ by the United States.” </p>
<p>As an op-ed from the English-language Chinese daily Global Times further argues that the United States uses North Korea “<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1109926.shtml">as a pretext to justify its military presence in Northeast Asia</a>.” </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241279/original/file-20181018-67191-ggvf8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Because China’s government essentially controls the media, the narratives that emerge around certain issues offers insight into what may otherwise be unspoken official policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/China-Party-Congress/91027f65e89a4aada424b91eb8cfd9d8/26/0">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>When Chinese media <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/29/c_136788460.htm">does denounce</a> aggressive North Korean military actions, such as intercontinental missile tests, the articles usually go on to portray the United States’ anti-ballistic missile systems and joint military exercises with Japan and South Korea as far more <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2016-07/09/content_26024911.htm">destabilizing for the Asia region</a>. </p>
<p>China opposes “any strategic military deployment by the U.S. that will cause threats to China’s security under the excuse of dealing <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1001370.shtml">with the peninsula situation</a>,” declared China’s Global Times in 2016.</p>
<h2>Towing the line</h2>
<p>Still, China is careful to uphold international standards when it comes to North Korea.</p>
<p>It advocates for a cooperative and dialogue-based peace process and has <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1511357.shtml">endorsed and implemented all</a> United Nations Security Council sanctions on North Korea. </p>
<p>After North Korea’s nuclear tests in fall 2017, for example, the U.N. unanimously adopted <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/un-us-north-korea-resolution/index.html">severe economic sanctions</a> that further isolated the regime. China criticized U.S. rhetoric about Kim’s regime as overheated, but ultimately signed off on the sanctions.</p>
<p>In Chinese media, such actions – defending North Korean sovereignty while supporting the international community – confirm China’s role as a fair arbiter. China sees itself as perhaps the only nation appropriately balancing North Korea’s economic needs with the world’s security concerns. </p>
<p>For Chinese media, this confirms China’s importance in global diplomacy. When President Trump said that “<a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201805/10/WS5af31c36a3105cdcf651cf9e.html">China has aided efforts with North Korea</a>,” his comment was widely quoted.</p>
<h2>Will China help denuclearize North Korea?</h2>
<p>Ultimately, our analysis finds that China’s global aspirations have not yet led President Xi to openly dispute American leadership in resolving world conflicts. </p>
<p>China is likely to play a supporting role in the gradual denuclearization of North Korea, even as it seeks to shape that process to ensure that Chinese influence and prestige in the region is upheld.</p>
<p>Chinese media has even <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-planning-china-visit-report">praised President Trump’s June 6 summit with Kim</a>, saying it warmed relations between the nations and laid a <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/10/WS5aa2ca66a3106e7dcc140c08.html">foundation for further progress</a> toward peace.</p>
<p>The Chinese government may well work “on both sides towards this goal,” as Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said in a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1517924.shtml">December 2017 press conference</a>.</p>
<p>But in the end, we believe Xi is more of a U.S. partner than foe when it comes to Korea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Randy Kluver has received funding from the Department of Defense to conduct research on global media narratives. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Hinck has received funding from the Department of Defense to conduct research on global media narratives</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Skye Cooley receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security. He is affiliated with Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment group. </span></em></p>With all the drama between Trump and Kim, it’s easy to forget that the US is not the only nation involved in denuclearizing North Korea. China is hugely influential — but it’s not clear quite how.Randy Kluver, Dean, Oklahoma State UniversityRobert Hinck, Assistant Professor, Monmouth CollegeSkye Cooley, Assistant Professor of Communication, Oklahoma State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1002252018-07-25T22:58:08Z2018-07-25T22:58:08ZCasino Diplomacy: The Trump game that everyone loses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229068/original/file-20180724-194149-fkq7mg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. President Donald Trump gives North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a thumbs up during their meeting at a resort on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Jan. 31 this year, I shared a meal with <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/north-korea-defector-jung/496082/">Jung Gwang-Il</a>, a North Korean defector turned activist, in the Canadian city of Halifax.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/north-korea-dalhousie-defector-usb-drives-1.4547574">Jung travelled to Dalhousie University</a> to share his horrific story of imprisonment and escape from a North Korean prison camp. That evening, as <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/30/politics/north-korean-defector-ji-seong-ho-sotu/index.html">the State of the Union address in the United States</a> played on television, Jung’s phone was alight.</p>
<p>It was the White House calling.</p>
<p>Jung was invited, along with seven other North Korean defectors, to meet President Donald Trump on Feb. 2. The others included <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/30/the-incredible-story-of-the-north-korean-escapee-at-the-state-of-the-union/">Ji Seong-ho</a>, praised by Trump in the State of the Union address, and <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/05/01/607375723/north-korean-defector-hopes-to-see-loved-ones-again-but-remains-skeptical">Hyeonseo Lee</a>, whose story became a <em>New York Times</em> bestseller. </p>
<p>As he met with the defectors, Trump said, in his inimitable vernacular, North Korea “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-north-korean-defectors/">is a tough place to live, and people aren’t liking it</a>.” The defectors told their stories of abuse, famine and torture, horrifying narratives that amounted to Orwellian nightmares. But Trump had little to say. He shrunk into <a href="https://share.america.gov/at-white-house-defectors-tell-their-stories/">his famous dismissive slump</a> that screamed of boredom. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229066/original/file-20180724-194155-1pkqbui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Donald Trump is seen during a Feb. 2, 2018 meeting with North Korean defectors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
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<p>Four months later on Sentosa (Peace) Island, formerly called Pulau Blakang Mati (Death From Behind), <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7cfa40d4-6d8f-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914">Trump met with Kim Jong-Un</a>, North Korea’s despotic leader. </p>
<p>Trump smiled at Kim, shook his hand with enthusiasm, patted him on his back, and fawned over him with compliments, concerned with <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-asks-photographers-to-make-him-and-kim-jong-un-look-thin-2018-6">how “thin” he looked</a>. He showed Kim an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxowvUN__2g">utterly bizarre propaganda video</a>, produced with the air of a low-rent public safety video, selling Kim on the benefits of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. </p>
<h2>Dreaming of building hotels?</h2>
<p>After an in-camera meeting, the pair resurfaced, supposedly confident that North Korea’s nuclear program would be a thing of the past. Trump even said how great it would be to build hotels on <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-says-north-korea-beaches-great-place-for-hotels-condos-2018-6">North Korean beaches</a>. But not once did he mention human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Some North Korean defectors <a href="http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=251111">wept seeing Trump chumming up to Kim</a>. Others were devastated that the president went as far as saluting a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/14/documentary-shows-trump-saluting-north-korean-general/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6b9144dcd0a6">North Korean general</a> of a military accused of bone-crushing torture and public executions.</p>
<p>How could someone invite victims of abuse to their home, and later praise their abusers?</p>
<p>The answer lies in the hyper-narcissism that Trump exudes, a dangerous mental disorder that is now shaping U.S. global relations. It can be best described as “Casino Diplomacy.”</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Fire_and_Fury.html?id=E3M-DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Michael Wolff</a>, author of <em>Fire and Fury</em>, when Trump took a billionaire and a fashion model on a tour of his Atlantic City casino, the billionaire “assured the model that there was nothing to recommend in Atlantic City. It was overrun by white trash.”</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229278/original/file-20180725-194137-1mag0ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In this 1990 photo, Donald Trump raises his fist during ceremonies for the opening the Trump Taj Mahal Casino Resort in Atlantic City, N.J.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Charles Rex Arbogast)</span></span>
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<p>The model asked what “white trash” meant. Trump purportedly replied: “They’re people just like me, only they’re poor.” This may be quite revealing.</p>
<h2>Diplomacy as a game of blackjack</h2>
<p>Any punter in a casino knows that the odds are against him. The house always wins. Yet gamblers continue into the labyrinth, at risk of losing it all, but confident that they still have a chance to win it all. </p>
<p>Problem gamblers, those suffering from <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.2165/00023210-200013060-00002">ludomania or pathological gambling</a>, can exhibit various psychological mechanisms, in particular narcissism and impulsiveness, despite harmful consequences.</p>
<p>This is Trump. He is unmoved by high risks and wild odds through a feeling that his sheer cunning will always win, including, now, in the geopolitical sphere — his latest casino. </p>
<p>Trump views opponents like a game of blackjack. Charm the dealer, like Kim, make strong bets like denuclearization, push them as close to a 21 as possible, and hope they bust. </p>
<p>For America’s allies, it’s a crapshoot. And Trump holds the dice. Many people have interests on the table, the odds are high, from four per cent NATO commitments to tariff wars; Trump just rolls the dice. If it all comes up snake eyes? He rolls again. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/very-much-counter-to-the-plan-trump-defies-advisers-in-embrace-of-putin/2018/07/16/b2176bfe-8921-11e8-a345-a1bf7847b375_story.html">Forget what advisers may say</a>, forget the emotional trust of North Korean defectors, forget it all. Go until the house folds.</p>
<h2>‘Hapless punter’</h2>
<p>Difficult as it is to predict the long-term consequences of Trump’s bellicose personality on global stability, be it with NATO or Russia or North Korea, his beloved game of Casino Diplomacy provides insight.</p>
<p>Much like a problem gambler, Trump engages the world stage through narcissistic risk-taking. His opponents understand this. What then can American allies do to mitigate this harmful behaviour? </p>
<p>Problem gamblers often benefit through support that builds confidence for the capacity to change. Is this possible for Trump, or is it simply too late?</p>
<p>Donald Trump is a hapless punter in over his head, putting all of his chips on the table hoping that the dealer busts. As with any problem gambler, he’s creating a wealth of harm, but on a global stage —from robbing the trust of North Korean defectors to destabilizing the global economy. </p>
<p>Trump’s Casino Diplomacy, therefore, is no game. It’s a serious illness that will continue to profoundly harm people and nations around the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Huish received funding from The Atlantic Council for International Cooperation, and the Social Sciences Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Donald Trump is unmoved by high risks and wild odds, apparently feeling that his sheer cunning will always win, including, now, in geopolitics — his latest casino.Robert Huish, Associate Professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/982372018-06-15T00:50:12Z2018-06-15T00:50:12ZGenuine breakthrough or pause in hostilities? After the summit, the world must again wait and see<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223287/original/file-20180615-32307-7bz7tx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some analysts have seen the summit as a triumph for Trump; others believe he's been played. Both are wrong.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Kim Hee-Chul</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The outcome of the US-DPRK summit this week is being furiously spun. Trump supporters see an <a href="http://insider.foxnews.com/2018/06/13/rush-limbaugh-media-caught-completely-flat-footed-success-trump-kim-summit">historic breakthrough</a> by a strong leader who has stopped North Korea’s nuclear program and shown the way for true peace on the Korean peninsula. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/12/trump-pardons-another-celebrity-criminal-kim-singapore-north-korea/">Critics see a vain</a> and poorly-prepared leader outplayed by the wily North Korean, whose desperation for a ratings hit has sold the US and its allies down the river.</p>
<p>Both are plainly wrong. It is too early to tell what the lasting impact of the summit will be. Yet there are some immediate consequences that are unsettling for the US, its allies and those who have a stake in the American-led regional order.</p>
<p>US President Donald Trump relishes claiming achievements that have been beyond the powers of his predecessors. When offered the chance of a summit, something no one had even considered before, it is not at all surprising he leaped at the opportunity.</p>
<p>That foreign policy elites would have said that he shouldn’t because it would put the leader of one of the world’s truly monstrous governments on the same platform as the US president was grist in the Trumpian mill. And with the prospects of the meeting becoming the top global news story, the reality TV star’s instincts would not be denied.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-north-korea-summit-agreement-is-most-revealing-for-what-it-leaves-out-98094">US-North Korea summit agreement is most revealing for what it leaves out</a>
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<p>Yet, by acceding to the meeting and holding it in a highly visible and orchestrated way, which placed Kim and Trump as equals, the US was giving the North Koreans something they have long craved: prestige and legitimacy. The Kim regime’s <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/how-north-korean-children-are-taught-hate-americans-632334">domestic propaganda</a> is centred around imagery conveying the power of the Kims to protect North Koreans from a hostile world and bend world leaders to their will. </p>
<p>Trump provided an unimaginably valuable propaganda coup as well as tacit recognition of the North as a legitimate nuclear power, the regime’s most important security ambition since the 1980s.</p>
<p>Beyond the optics, the meeting’s most notable feature was a set of <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/full-text-of-the-trump-kim-summit-agreement">reciprocal commitments by each party</a>. North Korea agreed to work towards the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. In return, the US would commit to provide the North with “security guarantees”.</p>
<p>Both promises are vague in the extreme and represent the victory of short term optics over substantive policy agreement. Neither is a real breakthrough.</p>
<p>The DPRK’s promises are similar to promises it made in <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron">1992, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2010 and 2017</a>.</p>
<p>At a famous speech in 2012, then US defence secretary Robert Gates said of North Korean promises: “I’m tired of buying the same horse twice”.</p>
<p>Trump plainly liked the look of this North Korean nag. In return, the US promises to provide guarantees, but there is nothing concrete either in substance or timing.</p>
<p>Some argue this reciprocal trade is to the North’s advantage, with the language of the commitment lacking the verifiable and irreversible qualities that had previously been a non-negotiable aim of the US.</p>
<p>In substance, or more precisely <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-north-korea-summit-agreement-is-most-revealing-for-what-it-leaves-out-98094">the lack of it</a>, neither side gave much away.</p>
<p>But in the <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17452624/trump-kim-summit-transcript-press-conference-full-text">press conference following the meeting</a>, Trump put what appeared to be some substance to the vague promise. He noted the US would no longer be participating in large scale military exercises with South Korea, even hinting at an eventual full scale withdrawal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula. This seemed to confirm the critics’ worst fears — the US had sold out its South Korean allies. </p>
<p>The announcement came as something of a shock in Seoul and caused no shortage of angst in Japan. The issue is not operational — a scaling back or an absence of large scale exercises doesn’t make South Korea or Japan any less secure in the short to medium term.</p>
<p>What worries friends and allies is the thinking behind the announcement. Washington does not appear capable to taking the interests of its allies into its calculations, despite the huge benefits its relations with South Korea and Japan provide. Trump appears to think about the North Korea issue in a narrow, transactional sense and not as part of a larger US strategy. </p>
<p>China and North Korea have long sought division between Washington and its North-east Asian allies. Even if, as seems likely, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-kim-war-games-south-korea-pompeo-military-exercises-latest-ulchi-freedom-guardian-a8396261.html">Secretary of State Mike Pompeo</a> and Secretary of Defense James Mattis are able to walk back what appears to be a president thinking aloud, those allies increasingly feel the security guarantees on which they depend are that bit less reliable.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/summit-on-then-off-now-on-again-the-seemingly-endless-game-playing-of-us-north-korea-relations-96785">Summit on, then off, now on again? The seemingly endless game-playing of US-North Korea relations</a>
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<p>At this stage, one can only judge the atmospherics and optics of the summit. And on that basis, Beijing and Pyongyang have plainly come out ahead. Allies are unnerved by the speed with which the US has embraced Kim Jong-un and the ease with which alliance commitments can be discarded.</p>
<p>This strongly reinforces the growing sense of profound geopolitical change in the region. And while the North hasn’t tested missiles or bombs recently, it is continuing to stockpile fissile material to expand its nuclear arsenal. We remain a long way from Pyongyang giving up its “treasured sword”.</p>
<p>But we should not forget that, for the moment at least, the summit broke the cycle of escalation and acute tension that has beset US-DPRK relations in recent years. Certainly, Trump’s approach to the North had been dangerously super-heated. Some have disparaged Trump for orchestrating a step back from the brink of a war to which he had carelessly dragged us all.</p>
<p>Yet one shouldn’t down play the ongoing provocations of North Korean missile, engine and nuclear tests, to which Trump’s bombast was ultimately a response. A circuit breaker was badly needed, and the summit did achieve that end. </p>
<p>In the Trump presidency, image and TV set-pieces are the policy. Treaties and statements are not worth the paper on which they are written. Events remain extraordinarily fluid, and it is impossible to say with any level of confidence whether the summit makes a decisive pathway to peace or a momentary dip in hostilities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley has received funding from the Australian government in relation to projects on regional security. </span></em></p>At this stage one can only judge the atmospherics and optics of the summit, and on that basis, Beijing and Pyongyang have plainly come out ahead, while Tokyo and Seoul seem to have been overlooked.Nick Bisley, Head of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/981822018-06-12T14:48:07Z2018-06-12T14:48:07ZTrump-Kim summit: North Korean leader emerges a clear winner as Donald Trump reverts to type<p>At first glance, it is easy to call <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-north-korea-summit-three-things-trump-and-kim-need-to-talk-about-97959">the meeting</a> between US president, Donald Trump, and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-un, “historic” and “unprecedented”. It was the first meeting between sitting leaders of the two countries, which are still <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10165796">technically in a state of war</a>.</p>
<p>You could also call it a success – preparations and schedules were respected, the media had ample opportunity to take shots of the two men shaking hands in front of the colourful display of 12 intermingled American and North Korean flags – and they were also privy to comments by the two leaders, including Kim in one of his very rare appearances in front of the foreign press. </p>
<p>The meeting was also a success from a security and optics points of view: smiles were exchanged, in-depth discussions took place between cabinet members, nobody went off script and there were no security breaches, thanks to ironclad preparations by their Singaporean hosts.</p>
<p>Now that both leaders are on their way back to their own countries, we are left with many photos of the bromance du jour, as well as a signed statement – and a plethora of questions. What should we take away from this historic moment? Here are three key points:</p>
<h2>1. Ultimately it was North Korea’s day</h2>
<p>Kim has managed to build upon the work of his father and grandfather and secured the highest form of recognition that there is – a bilateral meeting with the president of the most powerful country on the planet. </p>
<p>And North Korea did not have to pay a cent for it: China <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-10/kim-jong-un-surprises-by-flying-in-to-summit-with-air-china/9855232">furnished a plane</a>, Singapore <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/singapore-footing-us15m-summit-bill-pm/news-story/2978c2e2c7b2a0bb4e84a0c804acd1a6">footed the US$15m-plus bill</a> for the summit, and the media distributed images of the North Korean leader parlaying on equal terms with the US president to the entire world. It’s a resounding success for Kim – and one that is likely to be exploited back home for political purpose. </p>
<h2>2. What is written in the agreement</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/12/full-text-donald-trump-kim-jong-un-statement">joint document</a> signed by both parties shows the craftiness and hardline approach the DPRK has taken to the summit. Though the agreement commits both parties to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula – removing all nuclear weapons from the region, including potential American weapons – the DPRK has only reiterated, in writing, its commitment to “work towards” this aim.</p>
<p>This is certainly not the pledge for the unilateral dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programme that the US has always pushed for. </p>
<h2>3. What is not written in the agreement</h2>
<p>The agreement shows a clear miss from the United States, as there are no mentions of <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/bolton-pompeo-trump-and-kim-all-have-different-ideas-about-what-the-d-in-cvid-stands-for.html">CVID</a> (“complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement”) of North Korean nuclear capabilities – something that was talked about a great deal in the run up to the meeting. </p>
<p>Given that Trump and his secretary of state, <a href="http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/848732.html">Mike Pompeo</a>, and national security adviser, <a href="http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_In_detail.htm?No=136287">John Bolton</a>, have signalled that they would accept nothing short of CVID, this is a giant omission. Essentially, this should be read as a refusal from the DPRK to state that they would denuclearise unilaterally. </p>
<h2>4. Putting words into action</h2>
<p>The agreement provides very vague concepts for a new US-DPRK relationship – one that will without a doubt also change the nature of balance and geopolitics in East Asia and relationships with other regional actors such as South Korea, Russia, China and Japan. </p>
<p>The first concrete action was for the American president to announce he intends to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/trump-us-military-war-games-south-korea-intl/index.html">call a halt to the annual war game exercises</a> organised between the US and South Korea (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-is-war-on-the-cards-again-97216">most recent exercises</a> nearly derailed the inter-Korea summit a few weeks ago). This is an important step toward confidence building for both sides of the summit and one that should be praised. </p>
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<p>But it is important to note that Trump’s rationale was to scrap the war games, not because they offend and worry the DPRK – but, as he himself stated to the media, because they cost a lot of money. And money – especially the way Trump thinks the rest of the world takes advantage of the US – was a theme the US president returned to repeatedly in the <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17452624/trump-kim-summit-transcript-press-conference-full-text">post-summit press conference</a>.</p>
<p>Trump also talked about real estate <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f733b7d4-6e22-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914">development opportunities</a> in the DPRK. In essence, Trump’s money-focused transactional nature took only a few hours to surface after his handshake with Kim. But peace has a cost and, given the current US narrative that seeks to avoid foreign entanglement and is fed up with spending money on international commitments, it will require the United States to manage its shaky alliances if this is to be a realistic prospect. </p>
<p>And as reactions are starting to pour in from world leaders, it is important to remember that the summit has given the DPRK legitimacy on the world stage, while there was little talk of how this legitimacy was acquired: essentially by developing nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Kim is a dictator who has purged a number of rivals while starving and oppressing his own population. Ultimately, Trump has just willingly sat down with a villain and not gained much in the way of concessions in return.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Virginie Grzelczyk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Looking at the agreement, it appears that Kim Jong-un has outmanoeuvred Donald Trump.Virginie Grzelczyk, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/980942018-06-12T12:46:25Z2018-06-12T12:46:25ZUS-North Korea summit agreement is most revealing for what it leaves out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222709/original/file-20180612-182751-1pp797x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump were all smiles today, but a meaningful agreement is still a long way off.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Kevin Lim/The Straits Times/SPH</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-shaky-us-north-korea-summit-is-set-to-begin-the-parties-must-search-for-common-interest-97693">my preview</a> of the historic US-DPRK summit in Singapore, I asked where Trump and Kim might find lowest common denominator points of agreement to potentially unlock a confidence-building pathway. </p>
<p>That this summit has even taken place at all could be seen as an achievement, given where US-DPRK relations were in 2017. We should therefore be unsurprised that despite Trump’s hype in the lead-up to the event, the common denominators of agreement amounted to promises of a new relationship and <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2018/06/north-korea-to-work-towards-denuclearization-in-exchange-for-security-guarantees/">little else of substance</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is not so much what is in the joint statement as much as what has been left out that is the big story.</p>
<p>To tease this out, let’s consider the four specific points of agreement articulated in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/read-full-text-of-trump-kim-signed-statement/index.html">joint statement</a> released by US President Donald Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un at the conclusion of today’s summit.</p>
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<h2>A new relationship?</h2>
<p>In the first article of the agreement, the two parties committed to establishing a “new US-DPRK relations.” What might a new relationship between the two countries look like? </p>
<p>The leader-to-leader summit between the two countries was <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180611000741">unprecedented</a> and potentially could represent a tentative first step on the road to rapprochement. Symbolism is the obvious place to begin, given the low base the relationship between these two countries is starting from.</p>
<p>If we jump to article four, both parties have committed to the process of recovering the remains of UN forces prisoners of war and soldiers missing-in-action from the Korean War, along with the immediate repatriation of the remains of those already identified.</p>
<p>In a similar way to the family reunion program articulated in the inter-Korean <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-27/panmunjom-declaration-for-peace2c-prosperity-and-unification-o/9705794">Panmunjom Agreement</a>, the repatriation of POW/MIA remains is a relatively easy confidence-building measure on which to base a longer-term pathway of more substantive measures. It is also of great importance as a mark of respect to the families of those military personnel who can find closure with the return of their deceased loved ones.</p>
<p>The second article refers to joint efforts “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” As I’ve <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-shaky-us-north-korea-summit-is-set-to-begin-the-parties-must-search-for-common-interest-97693">argued previously</a>, a settlement to formally conclude the Korean War could be potential common interest around which to develop an engagement pathway.</p>
<p>Prior to the summit, Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-peace/trumps-north-korea-summit-may-bring-peace-declaration-but-at-a-cost-idUSKCN1J121B">hinted that the “signing of a document”</a> to close hostilities was a possibility. The closest the joint statement comes to this is a passage in the second paragraph, which reads:</p>
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<p>President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK.</p>
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<p>It is not immediately clear from the text what these security guarantees might be, but it certainly falls short of any kind of non-aggression pact or peace treaty. Such an outcome was always unlikely at this summit and would be the product of a longer negotiating process should it come to pass.</p>
<h2>The end of ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation’?</h2>
<p>The joint statement gets interesting in article three, in which “the DPRK commits to work toward the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.”</p>
<p>The wording around “complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” reflects the <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-and-south-korea-met-but-what-does-it-really-mean-95755">North Korean interpretation</a> of the concept, which has been well-documented in the lead-up to the summit.</p>
<p>Tellingly, there is no mention of “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation” (CVID) in the statement text, which is a clear departure from long-standing US policy.</p>
<p>There are a couple of ways this could be interpreted. On the one hand, it is possible that Trump lived up to the pre-summit fears of some domestic critics and <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/trump-and-kims-one-on-one-meeting-is-unacceptable-threat-to-us-security-11402092">gave away too much for too little</a> in the negotiation. From this perspective, the master negotiator Trump was played by Kim into signing off on the North Korean position, through which Kim gets international legitimacy and domestic prestige from attending the summit without having to make any concessions.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Trump’s omission of CVID could be a calibrated strategy accompanied by a clearly articulated and wide-ranging engagement strategy, scaffolded around a formal peace treaty. If so, it could prove to be the circuit-breaker that opens the pathway toward the aforementioned “new US-DPRK relations” and the <a href="https://thebulletin.org/how-measure-success-or-failure-trump-kim-summit11893?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Twitter%20Post&utm_campaign=June%2011%20Success%20or%20Failure%20at%20Summit">collective management</a> of North Korea as a nuclear power.</p>
<p>Either way, this will become clearer if and when follow-up negotiations take place. Either way, there are factions of the international political spectrum who will be unhappy with the outcome.</p>
<p>It is significant that article three pays homage to the Panmunjom Agreement, which may be the key to understanding how the US-South Korea-DPRK engagement triangle may unfold.</p>
<p>The Panmunjom Agreement, for all its ambiguity, does have an articulation of economic and security confidence-building measures, based on a shared vision for a permanent Korean Peninsula peace regime.</p>
<p>If we assume a calibrated strategy in deferring to the Panmunjom Agreement, the US-DPRK joint statement may indicate the bulk of the heavy lifting with regard to confidence-building measures will be <a href="http://thehill.com/opinion/international/391373-the-koreas-are-moving-ahead">handled as an inter-Korean affair</a>, with Trump’s apparent non-aggression promise providing space for engagement initiatives to evolve.</p>
<h2>Where to now?</h2>
<p>My take-home message from the omission of CVID from the joint statement is confirmation that North Korea under Kim Jong-un is never going to willingly denuclearise.</p>
<p>In “working toward complete denuclearisation,” North Korea may agree to a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing moratorium, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/24/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test-site-intl/index.html">decommission obsolete nuclear facilities</a>, or even promise to freeze production of new nuclear weapons, without ever having to compromise its nuclear weapons capability.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">If a US-North Korea summit does happen, we'll have Moon Jae-in to thank for it</a>
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<p>We should not be surprised if one or both parties back-pedals from the joint statement at some stage. Seasoned North Korea watchers will be expecting North Korea to backtrack from the joint statement to extract concessions, or add new conditions to their continued commitment to the “new US-DPRK relations,” as we have seen several times previously.</p>
<p>We are also likely to see Trump sustain considerable political heat domestically for his perceived capitulation on CVID and for omitting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000005940613/i-escaped-north-korea-heres-my-message-for-president-trump.html">human rights</a> from the discussion, as well as from the Japanese government for <a href="https://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/asian-allies-must-hope-trump-doesnt-sell-them-out-in-korea-peace-talks-20180611-h117y7">selling out</a> their security interests.</p>
<p>This pressure may be sufficient to prompt a recalibration of the US interpretation of the joint statement. Backpedalling from either side will change the position of the other and blow the whole engagement process out of the water.</p>
<p>The final paragraph of the joint statement commits US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to meet with an as yet unidentified high level North Korean official. It will be at these meetings and beyond where the “new US-DPRK relations” will start to take shape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One noticeable omission was any mention of “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation” - whether this was strategy or capitulation on President Donald Trump’s part remains to be seen.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/976932018-06-10T20:08:10Z2018-06-10T20:08:10ZAs the shaky US-North Korea summit is set to begin, the parties must search for common interest<p>US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un will meet on Tuesday for their highly anticipated summit in Singapore. For the summit to be productive, the negotiations need to converge on a lowest-common-denominator shared interest that both parties can agree on.</p>
<p>We saw this in the inter-Korean summit, where South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un settled on easy-win confidence-building measures as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-and-south-korea-met-but-what-does-it-really-mean-95755">starting point</a> for more substantive negotiations.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/summit-on-then-off-now-on-again-the-seemingly-endless-game-playing-of-us-north-korea-relations-96785">Summit on, then off, now on again? The seemingly endless game-playing of US-North Korea relations</a>
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<p>Given the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/trump-north-korea-negotiations.html">extreme and long-standing trust deficit</a> between the US and DPRK, it is not clear where Trump and Kim might find this lowest common denominator to unlock a confidence-building pathway. Because of that, this summit is shaping as compelling viewing as a spectacle, and perplexing in its ambiguous purpose.</p>
<h2>What do they have to offer each other?</h2>
<p>North Korea is not committed to denuclearisation as the concept has been understood by the Trump administration. The North Korean interpretation of a nuclear-free Korea implies the full simultaneous nuclear weapons relinquishment by all nuclear powers, including the United States.</p>
<p>Here, North Korea can <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-and-south-korean-leaders-meet-to-frankly-discuss-how-to-make-trump-kim-summit-a-success-seoul-says/2018/05/26/37a74e9c-60d7-11e8-9ee3-49d6d4814c4c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.40494a32e528">speak the language of denuclearisation</a> without ever having to commit to “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation” (CVID).</p>
<p>The problem with Trump’s insistence on CVID is that there is no mutually agreeable starting point for a discussion with North Korea on those terms. There is <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992?src=recsys&">no outcome</a> in which the regime willingly relinquishes its nuclear weapons program, because the Kim regime is so heavily invested in nuclear weapons as the foundation of its security strategy, economic development pathway, and domestic political legitimacy.</p>
<p>The only real concession of value that Washington has to offer Kim is a formal treaty to conclude the Korean War. Indeed, Trump has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-peace/trumps-north-korea-summit-may-bring-peace-declaration-but-at-a-cost-idUSKCN1J121B">hinted that the “signing of a document”</a> to close hostilities is a possibility (though he stopped short of offering a formal peace treaty).</p>
<p>What does North Korea have to offer the United States, short of denuclearisation? We have seen gestures of goodwill in the lead-up to the summit. North Korea’s recently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/24/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test-site-intl/index.html">demolished tunnels</a> at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site are a gesture of goodwill to Washington, offering up a now-obsolete facility.</p>
<p>This echoes a similar concession by Pyongyang in 2008, when it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/world/asia/28korea.html">demolished the cooling tower</a> of the obsolete reactor at Yongbyon. Negotiations may settle on a nuclear freeze and/or missile testing moratorium, in addition to other smaller security-related confidence-building measures.</p>
<p>The North <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/pompeo-north-korea-trip-trump/index.html">released three American citizens</a> to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on a recent visit to Pyongyang. The Americans had been detained in the DPRK on accusations of espionage.</p>
<p>And in a test of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-the-golden-arches-theory-of-conflict-prevention/">Thomas Friedman’s tongue-in-cheek theory</a> that no two countries with McDonald’s restaurants would ever go to war, Kim may even <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-north-korea-mcdonalds-20180604-story.html">offer to have a McDonald’s</a> open a restaurant in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>Kim may also court Trump with flattery, as <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/06/05/trumps-north-korean-nuclear-theatrics/">many other world leaders have done</a> to productive effect. </p>
<h2>Who has the negotiating leverage?</h2>
<p>Both parties have strengths and weaknesses in their bargaining positions. North Korea has (or is close enough to) a deployable nuclear weapons capability. Kim appears enthusiastic to talk now with the Americans, because in nuclear weapons his government has the strategic leverage it needs. North Korea wants to negotiate a peace agreement with the United States, but on Pyongyang’s terms.</p>
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<p>While it is highly unlikely that Kim begged Trump to reconvene the summit “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44393295">on hands and knees</a>,” as Rudy Giuliani has suggested, North Korea does have some incentive to make concessions.</p>
<p>Kim’s ambitions of developing the North Korean economy under the <a href="https://www.38north.org/tag/byungjin/">Byungjin</a> model are constrained by the UN Security Council and bilateral American sanctions regimes.</p>
<p>While North Korea has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2015.1095278">demonstrated an ability to persevere in spite of sanctions</a>, and even grow some niche sectors of its economy (such as the mining sector), Kim’s vision for economic development ultimately requires strategic connections with international development partners.</p>
<p>The explicit inclusion of references to transportation infrastructure linkages with South Korea in the <a href="https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/2007_North-South_%20Declaration.pdf">Panmunjom Declaration</a> from April’s inter-Korean summit illustrates this point.</p>
<p>Similarly, there are limitations on American action that <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">constrain its negotiating options</a> – most notably, the strategic vulnerability of Seoul to North Korean bombardment.</p>
<p>The absence of a substantive relationship between the US and North Korea also limits Washington’s economic and diplomatic leverage. Rightly or wrongly, the US has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2015.1095278">dealt itself out of direct influence</a> over North Korea through its various policies of strategic isolation and maximum pressure. It is ironic that US officials have consistently urged China to do more to pressure North Korea and uphold the integrity of the sanctions regime, when it has been economic interactions between the DPRK and China that have had the most demonstrable impact on politics in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>However, the clear power disparity between the US and DPRK is often overlooked. As the more powerful party with overwhelming nuclear superiority and clear capacity to deter any North Korean nuclear threat, the US does have capacity to reset the terms of the relationship by reducing the heat in negotiations.</p>
<p>Trump can do this by changing the focus of the negotiations. If it <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-beyond-all-or-nothing-ultimatum">insists on CVID to the bitter end</a>, the Trump administration will blow an opportunity to meaningfully change the strategic goalposts on the Korean Peninsula by focusing on the wrong prize.</p>
<h2>Who else is playing a role?</h2>
<p>With such ambiguity over potential outcomes from the summit, other regional players are lobbying hard around the edges to represent their interests.</p>
<p>South Korea’s diplomatic efforts in 2018 have been geared to guiding the US into a more conciliatory position with North Korea. This would make it politically safer for Trump to negotiate for an agreement with Pyongyang, knowing there are influential American officials in Trump’s ear counselling for war.</p>
<p>Moon Jae-in has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">busy maintaining the diplomatic momentum</a> generated by the inter-Korean summit, from his tactical ego-stroking comments about Trump deserving the Nobel Peace Prize to visiting Washington to lobby the president directly.</p>
<p>Moon has even flagged that he may <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-meeting-summit-north-korea-south-president-moon-jae-in-singapore-june-a8372596.html">travel to Singapore</a> for the summit, knowing South Korea is best positioned to facilitate confidence-building with the DPRK.</p>
<p>Conversely, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also been engaging in shuttle diplomacy, urging Trump to follow a tougher line. North Korea’s WMD and missile threat to Japan, and resolution of the abductee issue, are <a href="https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/224097">core interests</a> of the Abe administration.</p>
<p>Indeed, an adversarial North Korea better suits Abe’s domestic agenda for Japanese strategic “normalisation”, which would be undercut by rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang.</p>
<p>It is also interesting to see that former NBA star Dennis Rodman may be an attendee at the summit. While Rodman has been lampooned in some quarters for his sports diplomacy and relationship with Kim Jong-un, he nonetheless has a <a href="https://drbenjaminhabib.wordpress.com/2013/03/01/dennis-does-dprk/">level of access to and a unique rapport</a> with the North Korean leader that is largely unmatched by anyone else within the American foreign policy establishment.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://nypost.com/2018/06/05/dennis-rodman-will-be-in-singapore-for-trump-kim-summit/">“ambassador of goodwill”</a>, Rodman could help the parties find that common interest.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">If a US-North Korea summit does happen, we'll have Moon Jae-in to thank for it</a>
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<p>Also significant is the non-invitation of US National Security Advisor John Bolton. His <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/30/asia/north-korea-bolton-libya-intl/index.html">recent comments</a> comparing North Korea to Libya appear to be a <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/it-sure-looks-like-john-bolton-is-trying-to-sabotage-the-north-korea-talks.html">deliberate attempt to undercut</a> the State Department’s groundwork with Pyongyang over the past few months.</p>
<p>American hawks such as Bolton view any kind of engagement with North Korea as a “loss” or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/world/asia/moon-jae-in-trump-kim-jong-un.html">“appeasement”</a> — one of the most juvenile and misapplied terms in the international relations lexicon.</p>
<p>They are well aware of the difficulty of getting any negotiated deal ratified in a Republican-majority Congress (recalling the fate of the <a href="http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/us-dprk-agreed-framework/">Agreed Framework</a>). The irony is a deal is more likely to stick in the US if it is owned by a Republican president.</p>
<h2>What could this summit achieve?</h2>
<p>My view is that North Korea can be deterred as a nuclear power, and a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War represents the best pathway to managing regional security and ensuring the <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">safety of the people who live in the region</a>.</p>
<p>It is under the umbrella of a formalised peace regime that human rights concerns within North Korea are more likely to be addressed, coupled with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/06/07/617804581/will-trump-confront-n-koreas-human-rights-abuses-with-kim-well-see">continued pressure</a> from international human rights advocates.</p>
<p>Engagement and interaction is the best vehicle for this, based on an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09644016.2011.538165">understanding of inter-relationships of complex material, financial and ecological flows and networks</a> that are shaping <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357823.2016.1191427">social change processes</a> within the DPRK.</p>
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<p>Summits are symbols that act as markers in a much broader process of relationship-building. They are based on confidence-building measures and clear, achievable implementation steps. Through such a process, the parties could gradually evolve the level of trust necessary to progress to subsequent steps on the negotiation pathway.</p>
<p>It is unclear in the build-up to this unprecedented summit if the participants will be able to hack away the thicket of decades of mistrust and hostility to identify common interests.</p>
<p>We will find out on Tuesday if Trump and Kim can find that lowest common denominator on which to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The highly awaited summit has the potential to lead to real peace on the peninsula- but only if both countries can find a common interest on which to build an agreement.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/952212018-04-23T20:12:15Z2018-04-23T20:12:15ZAs North Korea builds a season of summits, the stakes on denuclearisation remain high<p>This week’s high-stakes summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un heralds a new period of negotiations in which regional states attempt to manage a northeast Asian security environment that includes a nuclear North Korea. </p>
<p>Several analysts, myself included, have long postulated that a primary objective of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development was to enter a new phase of security negotiations with the United States from a position of increased strength.</p>
<p>Pyongyang’s willingness to engage in a fresh round of summits with Seoul and Washington is a good indicator that it has completed the technical development of its nuclear weapons capability and has a nuclear deterrent ready (or nearly ready) to deploy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-with-north-korea-from-unthinkable-to-unavoidable-92654">War with North Korea: from unthinkable to unavoidable?</a>
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<p>Official statements coming out of Pyongyang indicate as much. In a statement on April 20, <a href="http://textuploader.com/du8in">reported by Korean Central News Agency</a>, Kim Jong-un said North Korea will “discontinue nuclear testing and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire” as “technology for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets has been reliably realised”. </p>
<p>The completion of its nuclear development gambit has implications for the timing and direction of North Korea’s summits with South Korea and the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-23/donald-trump-strikes-cautious-note-on-north-korea-crisis/9686426">United States</a>.</p>
<h2>Concessions and confidence-building</h2>
<p>With denuclearisation in the rear-view mirror, could we see a pathway toward a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-meetings">treaty to formally end the Korean War</a>? That would seem to be an objective for North Korea, but remains a long way off. It would require a long period of mutual confidence-building to establish the trust necessary to make a treaty possible.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has announced an end to the North’s nuclear testing.</span>
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<p>So, what of substance is North Korea willing to concede? Kim’s statement on a nuclear and missile test moratorium, and closing the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, is the most prominent concession made yet.</p>
<p>However, we should be clear that this does not mean North Korea has any interest in denuclearising. Punggye-ri is a superfluous asset if testing is no longer required for technical analysis. The site is also reported to be no longer fit for purpose, having been <a href="https://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/">geologically destabilised</a> by six nuclear tests.</p>
<p>The North will continue to produce fissile material. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.feff21355b73">oft-cited</a> US Defense Intelligence Agency assessment released last year estimates a stockpile of fissile material sufficient for 40-60 nuclear warheads, increasing at a rate of about 12 warheads per year at current estimated rates of production.</p>
<p>North Korea also has a history of circumventing commitments agreed to in the past. This includes its development of a highly enriched uranium program in contravention of the Agreed Framework in the late 1990s, its violation in July 2006 of the 1999 missile testing moratorium, and its 2008 abandonment of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-north-korea-denuclearization-revere-paper.pdf">Six-Party Talks</a>.</p>
<p>Information is the key to international co-operation, reducing the uncertainty that countries have about each other’s actions. It remains unclear what North Korea can offer to assuage American scepticism that it will honour a deal. </p>
<p>On the other side of the table, what is the negotiating goal for the United States? Some analysts worry Trump may be entering negotiations with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-definition-ofdenuclearization-is-very-different-from-trumps/2018/04/09/55bf9c06-3bc8-11e8-912d-16c9e9b37800_story.html?utm_term=.8f73a76a1f3d">unrealistic expectations</a> of a denuclearisation deal. There is a fear he will offer too much to North Korea, or that negotiations will fall in a heap when the reality of the demise of “<a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2018/04/02/0301000000AEN20180402008300315.html">complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation</a>” sinks in.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/north-korea-kim-jong-un-trump-nuclear-summit-weapons-missiles/558620/?utm_source=fbb">hard cap</a> on North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability could be the new negotiating point. Now that the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, constraining the Nort’s nuclear weapons capability is shaping as the most practical goal for the US in terms of its commitments to protecting its regional allies and maintaining the integrity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Trump administration could use the summit as a straw man to mobilise a case for attacking North Korea. The appointment of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/opinion/john-bolton-trump-national-security-adviser.html">ultra-hawkish John Bolton</a> as national security adviser would seem to signal a tough line, given his long record of advocacy for the use of force against the North. </p>
<p>For reasons I outlined at length last year (<a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">here</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-north-korea-military-action-will-be-a-disaster-so-a-more-patient-thoughtful-solution-is-required-76318">here</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-cant-win-the-north-korea-crisis-is-a-lose-lose-proposition-for-the-us-83419">here</a>), war on the Korean Peninsula remains a terrible option.</p>
<h2>The Moon-Kim summit</h2>
<p>Moon Jae-in’s meeting this week with Kim Jong-un is arguably the more important of the two summits. This meeting could help shape the negotiating agenda for the US-North Korea summit later this year.</p>
<p>A successful summit between Moon and Kim will need to produce some substantive points of agreement on key security issues. These include negotiation of a nuclear freeze and/or missile testing moratorium, in addition to smaller confidence-building measures. The summit will allow Moon to “road test” a negotiating agenda, as <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/04/08/the-moon-kim-summit-is-the-main-event/">David Kang has argued</a>, for the later Trump-Kim meeting.</p>
<p>However, a nascent South-North détente emerging from the summit could constrain the US bargaining position. It will be much harder for Trump to play a game of high-stakes brinkmanship with the Kim regime if Kim and Moon have agreed to a clear pathway of confidence-building measures. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-assumptions-we-make-about-north-korea-and-why-theyre-wrong-84771">Five assumptions we make about North Korea – and why they're wrong</a>
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<p>The South Korean government will be keen to railroad the Trump administration into an engagement track with Pyongyang. Some within the South Korean establishment see Trump as a loose cannon and his administration as an unreliable variable in Korean Peninsula security. </p>
<p>Trump’s lack of consultation with South Korea during his escalations of 2017, the continued absence of a permanent US ambassador to South Korea, and the <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/10/trump-kim-jong-un-diplomacy-217342?mc_cid=2a155312d9&mc_eid=6e193a5945">lack of a coherent North Korea policy</a> in Washington are seen as evidence that Seoul needs to be more activist in pursuing its own agenda.</p>
<p>Inter-Korean co-operation on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics earlier this year was <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/19/after-the-olympic-detente-what-next-on-the-korean-peninsula/">successful in dialling down tensions</a> on the Peninsula and closing the window, at least for the time being, on American military action against the North.</p>
<p>The end of denuclearisation politics has opened new possibilities for the direction of the Korean Peninsula. The tensions of 2017 showed us a glimpse of disaster. The summits of 2018 may represent a doorway to a new arrangement for collective management of Korean Peninsula security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The end of denuclearisation politics has opened new possibilities for the direction of the Korean Peninsula, but the tensions of 2017 remind us of the possibility of disaster.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.