tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/deradicalisation-16337/articlesDeradicalisation – The Conversation2022-01-19T13:28:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1747282022-01-19T13:28:24Z2022-01-19T13:28:24ZNigeria’s Boko Haram reintegration process: weaknesses and how they can be fixed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440735/original/file-20220113-23-zlnau2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The wreckage of a car hit by an attack led by Boko Haram members.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-wreckage-of-a-car-hit-by-an-attack-led-by-boko-haram-news-photo/1231356524?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Nigeria, the advent of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> terrorism and its wanton destruction of lives and properties has led to untold hardship, especially in the country’s north-eastern region. </p>
<p>The devastating impact of Boko Haram activities transcends Nigeria’s borders. The Institute for Economic and Peace Global Terrorism <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-2.pdf">Index Report in 2020</a> highlights that Boko Haram ranks among the world’s top three deadliest terrorist groups. </p>
<p>In 2019 alone, Boko Haram was responsible for the death of 1,245 persons, which amounts to <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-2.pdf">9 per cent</a> of the deaths from terrorism globally. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is also responsible for displacing over <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/nigeria-emergency.html">2 million</a> people in Nigeria and approximately 2.4 million people in neighbouring countries such as those of the Lake Chad Basin. This is why the reintegration of repentant terrorist combatants is a burning issue for residents of the affected region. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304580116_De-Radicalising_Prisoners_in_Nigeria_Developing_a_Basic_Prison_based_De-radicalisation_Programme">Previous studies</a> have focused on government intervention and deradicalisation programmes aimed at reintegrating the repentant combatants. </p>
<p>However, there is a knowledge gap on how communities perceive repentant terrorist combatants in Nigeria and their reintegration into the society. Little has been done to explore these perceptions and how they inform the design of reintegration programmes. </p>
<p><a href="https://research.tees.ac.uk/en/publications/rethinking-reintegration-in-nigeria-community-perceptions-of-form">Our paper</a> sets to fill the gap. We conducted interviews with 24 Christian and Muslim Nigerians who lived in Lagos and the Plateau states in Nigeria. </p>
<p>We found that, overwhelmingly, those we spoke to had little faith in the ability of former Boko Haram combatants to genuinely reform or repent from terrorist acts. </p>
<p>Based on our findings we recommended that efforts should be made to shift the public fear of former Boko Haram combatants to a more positive outlook. Such steps could help people embrace reconciliation which in turn would help the successful reintegration of former terrorist combatants into Nigerian communities.</p>
<h2>Our findings</h2>
<p>Drawing on data from the community members some recurrent themes emerged. </p>
<p><strong>Societal structure:</strong> most felt this was a factor in fuelling the identity of former Boko Haram members. </p>
<p>There were the perceived views that society and poor parenting bred terrorists who later became former combatants. </p>
<p>Societal ‘responsibility’ was construed as playing a central role. As one participant commented: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those that are former Boko Haram members are those that the society failed in their own part to cater for … those (Boko Haram members) that their parents actually did not try to bring up in the right sense of mind.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These perceptions resonated across participants regardless of their identities as Christians or Muslims. </p>
<p>The implication of such perceptions is that repentant combatants are seen as a product of poor societal and familial structures. As such, improving these might potentially reduce the likelihood of being recruited into terrorism.</p>
<p><strong>Indifference towards genuine repentance.</strong> This appeared to stem from the distrust in a change in attitude. This was construed from an ‘us and them’ stance, which positions Boko Haram from a negative perspective and as the ‘them’ group seeking to eradicate the vulnerable population (the ‘us’ group) through its combatants. </p>
<p>As a participant commented: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Boko Haram has already brainwashed (deceived) him (the member). He has not repented …So when bringing him back to society, you are giving him more privilege to harm more people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ideology of Boko Haram geared at Islamisation and the abolishment of western influences appears to influence how those previously affiliated with Boko Haram are perceived. </p>
<p>The implication is that such negative perception could impact positive reintegration even when the combatants have successfully undergone deradicalisation programmes to change their thinking and reintegrate them. </p>
<p><strong>Distrust of the deradicalisation process.</strong> The lack of trust appears partly informed by the perceived inability of the Nigerian deradicalisation programme to change former combatants of Boko Haram effectively. </p>
<p>For instance, a participant questioned: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The issue is the institution that carries out that change. Do they have all the resources? Do they have the resources that are needed to rehabilitate brainwashed people because the meaning of Boko Haram is against modernisation? That is the real essence of Boko Haram. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus, the perceptions raise doubt concerning the capabilities of the Nigerian criminal justice system to successfully carry out deradicalisation and reintegration programmes. </p>
<p>In this case, ‘trust’ in the system appears integral and seems to draw on how the structure has been handled.</p>
<h2>Why insights matter</h2>
<p>Reintegration plays an important role in ensuring that those that have successfully undergone deradicalisation and reintegration programmes do not re-offend. </p>
<p>To achieve successful reintegration, significant attention needs to be given to the social context in which reintegration takes place. For example, the view of the community and how they perceive those to be reintegrated is vital. It could help design reintegration programmes that are reflective of the community social identity. </p>
<p>Also, addressing weak societal structures and poor parenting might yield positive results.</p>
<p>When it comes to concerns about the genuine repentance of former combatants, more needs to be done in relation to public orientation about the deradicalisation programme. </p>
<p>Such an avenue could also include some of the measures in place to ensure that the repentant combatants do not re-offend. That way, it might serve as a way of building community trust.</p>
<p>Finally, as far as the deradicalisation process is concerned, more needs to be done to build confidence by involving the communities in the design of the reintegration programme. </p>
<p>As our study suggests, changes in communal perceptions are important. How the repentant combatants are perceived may shape community attitudes towards them and encourage acceptance of their reintegration into post-conflict societies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tarela Juliet Ike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For a successful reintegration of former Boko Haram combatants into society, public perceptions in Nigeria need to change.Tarela Juliet Ike, Lecturer in Criminology and Policing, Teesside UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1311692020-02-05T14:34:36Z2020-02-05T14:34:36Z‘No evidence to back up emergency terror law change’ – human rights expert<p>In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, when people are frightened and in need of reassurance, it’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/vague-promises-about-seizing-passports-wont-fight-off-the-islamic-state-31149">common for governments to propose a tough response and new laws</a>. </p>
<p>This is what recently happened in the UK after an attack in Streatham, London, by convicted terrorist <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51351885">Sudesh Amman</a>. On Streatham High Road, Amman stabbed two people before being shot dead by police. He had been under police surveillance since his release from prison in January 2020 for terror offences. </p>
<p>Since the attack, the UK government said <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51364047">emergency legislation</a> would be introduced to end the automatic early release from prison of terror offenders after they have served half of their sentence. Instead, they will be required to serve two-thirds of their sentence. </p>
<p>But there is a major issue with this proposal: it’s not at all clear that such a move <a href="https://theconversation.com/london-bridge-attack-why-longer-sentences-for-terrorist-offences-are-not-the-answer-128154">would stop people</a> committing these types of atrocities in the first place. And it also raises significant human rights concerns. </p>
<h2>“Rehabilitation rarely works”</h2>
<p>This latest attack follows another <a href="https://theconversation.com/london-bridge-attack-why-longer-sentences-for-terrorist-offences-are-not-the-answer-128154">recent incident in London</a> where two Cambridge University graduates were stabbed to death and at least three other people were seriously wounded by convicted terrorist Usman Khan.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the Streatham attack, Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2020/feb/03/streatham-attack-sudesh-amman-freed-after-serving-half-his-sentence-live-news?CMP=share_btn_tw&page=with:block-5e37ffc08f08e1332473c0e3#block-5e37ffc08f08e1332473c0e3">boldly stated</a> that rehabilitation for convicted terrorists “rarely works”. So by his own admission, it seems the plan to increase the length of time terrorists will serve by 17% will also fail. </p>
<p>That said, there are no statistics in the UK to either back up or refute the prime minister’s claim. The former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and now member of the House of Lords, Lord Anderson, <a href="https://twitter.com/bricksilk/status/1224247206003298304">recently asked the Ministry of Justice</a> for figures on how many convicted terrorists commit further terror offences when released from prison. It remains to be seen what the answer is.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1224247206003298304"}"></div></p>
<p>There is some evidence from elsewhere that <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/pops.12428">deradicalisation programmes in prisons</a> can work to some extent. But care is needed when comparing different state programmes and different groups labelled as terrorist. </p>
<p><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/pops.12428">Evidence from Sri Lanka</a>, for example, looks at deradicalisation with a group of Tamil Tigers – who sought to secure an independent state of Tamil Eelam. In this instance, the group had a distinct goal that could be identified and engaged with. Likewise, the conflict in Northern Ireland came to an end with the peace settlement of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement">the Good Friday Agreement</a>. It was this, rather than any deradicalisation programme that ended the violence there. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/permanent-states-of-emergency-and-the-rule-of-law-9781509906154/">My research</a>, however, has shown that a key factor to the endless “war on terror” is the idea that Islamic extremist terrorism has no feasible goal – so there is nothing to negotiate with. </p>
<p>This raises the question of whether rehabilitation programmes would work on Islamic extremist terrorists or the ever increasing numbers of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/05/rise-in-rightwing-extremists-held-under-anti-terror-laws-in-uk">far-right extremists</a> in UK prisons. </p>
<h2>Retroactive punishment?</h2>
<p>The proposals to change terrorist sentences also raise enormous human rights concerns. <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_7_ENG.pdf">Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights</a> prohibits retrospective criminal laws. This means a person cannot be punished for something that was not a crime at the time they committed an act and that if the act was already criminalised, they cannot be made to suffer a harsher sentence.</p>
<p>So it may be the government’s proposals to change the automatic release dates will be found by the courts to amount to retrospective punishment. In some cases people will have pleaded guilty on the basis they would be released at the halfway point of their sentences. </p>
<p>Retrospective criminal punishment was a notorious tool used by <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/1962-ps.asp">Nazi Germany</a> to target their enemies. The stigma attached to retrospective criminal laws is so strong, the European Convention on Human Rights does not even allow states to use this during a state of emergency. So it’s inevitable that a challenge to these laws will end up before the courts – and may set the stage for a future clash between the UK government and the European Court of Human Rights.</p>
<h2>Restrictions and relocation</h2>
<p>The UK already has some of the most robust counter-terrorist laws in the world. Indeed, the home secretary, Priti Patel, has the power to place an array of restrictions on a person she suspects is involved in terrorism-related activity.</p>
<p>Known as TPIM (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-act">Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures</a>), this can include electronic tagging, periodic reporting to a police station, house arrest for certain periods of the day, excluding a person from certain areas and restricting their electronic communications. In certain instances, people can even be subjected to forced relocation orders, requiring them to move away from their home address. </p>
<p>Police had been following Sudesh Amman closely since his release, as they believed he posed a high risk of committing an attack. But the home secretary did not make him subject to a TPIM. This seems an oversight given his risk of re-offending was thought to be so high that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/streatham-terror-attack-london-stabbing-shooting-police-met-a9313976.html">police were monitoring him closely</a> in the lead up to the attack. This also raises further questions: when are TPIMs being used and how often?</p>
<h2>Eroding democracy</h2>
<p>Two attacks by recently released offenders would suggest terrorists re-offending is a genuine issue. But without the statistics to show how many convicted terrorists commit further terror offences when released from prison, it’s hard to know the scale of the problem. And going by the available evidence, it’s difficult to say whether such changes in law would make us safer.</p>
<p>Yet with every new attack and the new counter-terrorist laws that follow, what is certain is that human rights are being eroded further still. This is not to take away from the suffering of victims, but governments must think very carefully before sacrificing those very human rights that give the state its identity and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Greene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments must think very carefully before sacrificing the very human rights that give the state its identity and democracy.Alan Greene, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281542019-12-03T13:57:41Z2019-12-03T13:57:41ZLondon Bridge attack: why longer sentences for terrorist offences are not the answer<p>Following the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-on-terrorism-and-rehabilitation-from-the-london-bridge-attack-128108">attack in London</a>, where two Cambridge University graduates were stabbed to death and at least three other people were seriously wounded by convicted terrorist Usman Khan, many questions are now being asked about the UK’s legal system. </p>
<p>The attack has brought to attention the fact that in the UK, people convicted of terror offences (along with other prisoners) can be released after serving half of their sentence. Khan who was shot dead by police officers following the attack, had been released from jail on licence in 2018 – halfway through a sentence for terrorism offences. </p>
<p>Khan was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/nov/30/usman-khan-profile-terrorist-who-wanted-to-bomb-london-stock-exchange">convicted in 2011 of plotting to attack the London Stock Exchange</a> receiving an 18-year sentence. He was given what’s known as an <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/contents">indeterminate public protection sentence</a>(IPP) – in theory, IPP prisoners can stay in prison for the rest of their lives. But Khan’s IPP was quashed by the Court of Appeal in 2013, and replaced with a 16-year fixed-term sentence. Khan was told he should serve at least eight years in prison. And in December 2018 he was released on licence – and ordered to wear a tag. As part of his release conditions, Khan was required to attend the government’s <a href="https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2019/11/05/fact-sheet-desistence-and-disengagement-programme-2/">desistance and disengagement programme</a>, aimed at rehabilitating people who have been involved with terrorism. </p>
<p>Khan was attending an event near London Bridge organised by a University of Cambridge programme he had taken part in while in prison, called <a href="https://www.cctl.cam.ac.uk/tlif/learning-together/details">Learning Together</a>. This brought together students from outside and within prison together “to learn alongside one another”. During this event, Khan, wearing a fake suicide vest, began attacking people with a knife.</p>
<p>An urgent review of the licence conditions of people jailed for terror offences has now been launched by the Ministry of Justice. This has led to the emergency vetting of 74 convicted terrorists released on parole – with one man already <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/12/02/london-bridge-terror-attack-cambridge-university-vice-chancellor/">returned to police custody</a>. </p>
<h2>Why was he released?</h2>
<p>The legislation that facilitated Khan’s release was brought in by the then Labour government which introduced <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/contents">Imprisonment for Public Protection</a> (IPP) – which basically gave prisoners an indeterminate sentence. The idea behind the sentencing was that high-risk criminals would only be released if the parole board felt they were safe to return to the community. </p>
<p>In 2008, Labour removed the review process by parole boards, meaning more offenders were released automatically halfway through sentences. It was thought that reducing the need for the parole board to sign off on every case would help to speed up the number of prisoners being released.</p>
<p>IPPs were abolished in 2012 by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government – and the law was also changed to allow for prisoners to <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/10/enacted">serve half of their sentence</a>. </p>
<p>Austerity cuts have also had an impact on all sections of the criminal justice system. And these cuts have made it more difficult for the <a href="http://speakupforjustice.org/the-attack-on-justice/probation-services-under-attack/">probation service to monitor every prisoner on release</a>. The cuts have also made it harder for the probation service to effectively assess and monitor high-risk terrorist prisoners released on parole.</p>
<p>So, in effect, all three of the main UK political parties had a role in bringing about the situation that allowed Khan to be released. Rightly a review should now be held. </p>
<h2>What to do with terrorists</h2>
<p>Under UK terrorism legislation, the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents">sentences for terrorist-related activity are lengthy</a>. But though it might seem like a straightforward solution, handing out longer sentences for terrorist offences is not the right approach. Indeed, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243718/evidence-reduce-reoffending.pdf">evidence shows</a> that long sentences without effective rehabilitation tend to increase the risk of a prisoner reoffending upon release.</p>
<p>Instead, more focus must be placed on introducing effective assessment of terrorist prisoners to ascertain if they are either a danger to society or if they are suitable and safe to release.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-on-terrorism-and-rehabilitation-from-the-london-bridge-attack-128108">Lessons on terrorism and rehabilitation from the London Bridge attack</a>
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<p>One way forward could be applying the <a href="https://theconversation.com/counter-terrorism-prevent-strategy-receives-a-boost-from-the-courts-and-statistical-evidence-113949">Prevent strategy</a> to terrorist prisoners <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1253941">while still in custody</a>. Prevent is the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">government’s counter-terrorism strategy</a> which aims to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">challenge extremist ideology and disrupt</a> the ability of terrorists to promote it. </p>
<p>As I highlight <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Terrorism-Law-and-Policy-1st-Edition/Lowe/p/book/9781138655317">in my book</a> on terrorism, law and policy, under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, authorities have a statutory duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Prevent is currently being <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/lord-carlile-to-lead-independent-review-of-prevent">reviewed by Lord Carlile</a> with his report due in June 2020 which may assist in a prisons-based approach.</p>
<p>Prevent, however, is considered to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-remains-unfair-on-british-muslims-despite-home-office-efforts-108779">controversial and seen by many as ineffective</a>. This is because of its initial link in 2003 to violent Islamist extremist ideology which made UK Muslims “suspects” and created suspicion as to the real aim of Prevent. </p>
<p>Indeed, despite changes to the strategy to include all forms of extremism – including far-right ideology and dissident Irish republican and loyalist causes – Prevent is still viewed to be an anti-Muslim strategy by many. </p>
<p>This has not been helped by the goverenment’s requirement that universities, schools, prisons, hospitals and local authorities must report any concerns of terrorism under Prevent. This has been seen as a form of spying on people who <a href="http://newjurist.com/prevent-and-resilience-strategies.html">hold views outside the norm</a>.</p>
<p>Senior politicians have been accused of using this attack for political ends. The prime minister, Boris Johnson, claims “leftie legislation” is responsible. The Labour leader, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7743241/Jeremy-Corbyn-blames-Tory-cuts-London-Bridge-attack.html">Jeremy Corbyn, said it was the austerity cuts</a> on the probation service created the problem. This is clearly a complicated situation. But ultimately, both parties must take some responsibility for a system that allows a man recently released from prison for a terrorism offence to kill two people.</p>
<p>Then, of course, there’s also the possibility that whoever wins the general election may consider reintroducing sentences similar to IPPs – making the situation yet again even more complicated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lowe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A terrorism expert explains the legislation that led to the attacker’s release.David Lowe, Senior research Fellow, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281082019-12-02T06:02:54Z2019-12-02T06:02:54ZLessons on terrorism and rehabilitation from the London Bridge attack<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304621/original/file-20191202-79485-dgl11f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In a deeply tragic irony, the two victims who lost their lives to a man who made a mockery of their idealism were assisted by two others who appear to have genuinely benefited from prison rehabilitation programs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Facundo Arrizabalaga </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can prison rehabilitation programs work, and is it sensible to try and rehabilitate seriously radicalised individuals convicted on terrorism charges?</p>
<p>These are questions not just for the UK, in the wake of the second London Bridge attack over the weekend, but for the entire world.</p>
<p>There are no easy answers and no simple options. As the numbers of people detained and eventually released on terrorism charges mount up around the world, so too does the question of what to do with them. Politicians find it easy to speak in terms of “lock them up and throw away the key”. But our legal systems don’t allow this and the results, even if allowed, would almost certainly be worse.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-isnt-taking-the-national-security-threat-from-far-right-extremism-seriously-enough-122717">Australia isn't taking the national security threat from far-right extremism seriously enough</a>
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<p>Some answers, and some difficult questions, can be found in the lives of four participants in the events in London: Jack Merritt, Saskia Jones, Marc Conway and James Ford.</p>
<p>All four were participating in an event organised to reflect on the first five years of the University of Cambridge’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50623646">Learning Together program</a>. Merritt was a young graduate who was helping coordinate the program. Jones was a volunteer in the program. Tragically, their idealism and desire to give back to society saw them lose their lives to a man whom they thought they had been able to help.</p>
<p>Merritt’s father told <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50617991">the media</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Jack lived his principles; he believed in redemption and rehabilitation, not revenge, and he always took the side of the underdog.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In her tribute to her murdered daughter, Jones’s mother said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Saskia had a great passion for providing invaluable support to victims of criminal injustice, which led her to the point of recently applying for the police graduate recruitment programme, wishing to specialise in victim support. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Jones, 23, and Merritt, 25, were both University of Cambridge graduates working at the Learning Together program. They lost their lives to a knife-wielding murderer who does not deserve to have his name remembered. Their 28-year-old assailant had been released from prison 12 months earlier, having <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/01/why-was-the-london-bridge-terrorist-released-from-prison">served but eight years of a 16 year sentence</a>.</p>
<p>In a catastrophic system-failure, his automatic release was processed without his case ever being reviewed by a parole board, despite the sentencing judge identifying him as a serious risk who should only ever be released after careful review. He had gamed the system, presenting himself as repentant and reformed.</p>
<p>In fact, he had never undergone a rehabilitation program in prison and only had cursory processing on his release. Systemic mistakes and the lack of resources to fund sufficient and appropriate rehabilitation programs meant he was one of many whose risk was never adequately assessed.</p>
<p>Conway had formerly served time at a London prison and is now working as a policy officer at the Prison Reform Trust. He witnessed the fatal attack and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.sg/cambridges-prison-rehab-program-learning-together-london-bridge-stabbing-2019-12/">rushed directly towards the attacker</a>, joining others who sought to pin him down.</p>
<p>Another man participating in the offender rehabilitation event was James Ford. He too saw the attack unfolding and immediately confronted the assailant.</p>
<p>In a deeply tragic irony, the two victims who lost their lives to a man who made a mockery of their idealism were assisted by two others who appear to have genuinely benefited from prison rehabilitation programs. But even here, the complexities and ambiguities of this sort of difficult endeavour were played out as clearly as any playwright could ever conceive of scripting. </p>
<p>Ford was a convicted murderer attending the Learning Together conference on day-release. He had brutally killed 21-year-old Amanda Campion, a young women who was particularly vulnerable because of her intellectual disability. In the eyes of Campion’s family, Ford is no hero.</p>
<p>However, Professor of Criminology at Birmingham City University David Wilson, who chairs the Friends of Grendon Prison program, says that Ford underwent extensive rehabilitation initiatives, including an intensive period of psychotherapy. </p>
<p>On this occasion, the convicted murderer did the right thing. Even though this doesn’t make him a hero, it does give some reason for hope. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/01/ex-offender-marc-conway-helped-tackle-london-bridge-attacker">For Wilson</a>, the murderous terrorist and the convicted murderer who rushed to contain him represent a tale of two prisoners:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I know through my work that people do change and they change as a consequence of innovative but challenging regimes such as the one at HMP Grendon.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the wake of the attack, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50618744">said the cases</a> of 74 people released early after being jailed for terror offences will be reviewed. This is certainly sensible and necessary, but much more is required. Indefinite detention is not an option in the majority of cases, and the UK is dealing with hundreds of people convicted of terrorism offences either <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48185759">currently in prison or recently released</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/managing-release-convicted-terrorists">numbers in Australia</a> are only a fraction of this but still run into the high dozens and are growing every year. For Australia’s near neighbours, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368">Indonesia</a>, Malaysia and the Philippines, the numbers, including projected returnees from the Middle East, <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/17/indonesias-prisons-will-soon-start-spawning-even-more-jihadists">run into the thousands</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368">How Indonesia's counter-terrorism force has become a model for the region</a>
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<p>Professor Ian Acheson, who has advised the government on how to handle extremist prisoners, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50618744">told the BBC</a> it was not “a question of an arms race on sentencing toughness”, but about what is done when offenders are in custody. </p>
<p>Acheson said his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47225797">panel’s recommendations</a> had been agreed to but not implemented due to “the merry-go-round of political replacements of secretaries of state”, and the “fairly recalcitrant and unwilling bureaucracy”. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/28/britains-police-chiefs-leader-sara-thornton-says-she-wants-end-to-blame-culture">He also cited</a> “crazy failed and ideological austerity cuts” to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/may/02/criminals-going-unpunished-because-of-cuts-says-police-chief">police, prison and probation services</a>.</p>
<p>Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones were not naïve idealists. They had studied the problem closely and believed rehabilitation programs could make a difference. Their tragic deaths speak to the challenges involved. To give up and do nothing is not merely cynical, but self-defeating. Without adequate resourcing and reforms the problem everywhere will only become much worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128108/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>Prison rehabilitation programs are difficult, but to give up and do nothing would be not merely cynical, but self-defeating.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/932662018-03-28T18:58:29Z2018-03-28T18:58:29ZIslamic State schooled children as soldiers – how can their ‘education’ be undone?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210215/original/file-20180314-131572-15cqm1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a fundamental difference between Islamic State's use of child soldiers and the practice elsewhere.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Al Arabiya/YouTube</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the last few years, the Islamic State (IS) terror group has shocked the world with its gruesome public spectacles. Especially abhorrent to our moral sensibilities is its overt use of children as frontline fighters, suicide bombers and propaganda tools.</p>
<p>From macabre hide-and-seek exercises, in which children <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-uses-young-boys-to-hunt-down-and-kill-prisoners-in-ruined-syrian-castle-for-gory-propaganda-a6761641.html">hunt and kill</a> enemy prisoners in specially constructed mazes, to the mass execution and decapitation of adult soldiers, young people living under IS have been indoctrinated and encouraged to engage in violence.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, IS’s quasi-government instituted an education system explicitly aimed at indoctrinating and weaponising the children living under it. </p>
<p>Mathematics was practised by determining how many more fighters IS has than an opposing force. Chemistry was taught by discussion of methods of gas inhalation. And physical education focused on the correct body positions for firing various weapons. </p>
<p>Their education has been compounded by the retaliatory and sometimes excessive violence of the vast array of forces committed to destroying IS. Through this, children have been exposed to horrific violence on a daily basis – thus generating trauma and, undoubtedly, genuine long-term grievances.</p>
<h2>How IS’s use of child soldiers differs</h2>
<p>There is a fundamental difference between IS’s use of child soldiers and the practice elsewhere. </p>
<p>IS hasn’t just recruited child soldiers. It systematically militarised the education systems of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">captured Iraqi and Syrian territory</a> to turn the region’s children into ideological timebombs.</p>
<p>These children, saturated in IS’s particular brand of violent and uncompromising “religious” instruction from about the age of five, were trained in the use of small arms before their teenage years. They constitute a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/inside-the-school-of-jihad-isis-militants-release-shocking-videos-showing-what-education-means-for-9813525.html">new challenge</a> for the international community. </p>
<p>IS’s state-building efforts appear to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mosul-is-taken-back-but-islamic-state-is-not-finished-yet-80835">have been thwarted</a> for now. But saving the children exposed and potentially indoctrinated in its ideology is key to avoiding further terror attacks in the West, tackling the root causes of regional upheaval, and working toward a future where children play instead of fight, and schools teach instead of drill.</p>
<h2>What children have been taught</h2>
<p>Military activity, superiority based on IS’s interpretation of Islam, and the need to defeat unbelievers are <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus147-Olidort-5.pdf">embedded in its school textbooks</a>. </p>
<p>Various videos, produced both through journalistic investigation and by IS itself, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/11/islamic-state-isil-taliban-afghanistan-151101074041755.html">show</a> the more practical side of education under the group’s rule. Children are taught how to fire small arms and use hand grenades.</p>
<p>Although IS extensively forced children into its ranks, many joined voluntarily – with or without their families’ blessing. But, in the long term, <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/this-is-how-the-islamic-state-manufactures-child-militants">it doesn’t matter</a> whether a child is forcibly recruited or not. And this is the matter of gravest concern.</p>
<p>IS’s primary concern is building and maintaining the children’s loyalty. The phrase “<a href="https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/">cubs of the caliphate</a>” is a microcosm of how it views them. Cubs are unruly, ill-disciplined and dependent on strong (sometimes violent) guidance from their elders. </p>
<p>However, with time, resources and patience they can turn into a generation of fighters and idealists who will foster IS’s ideology even if its <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">current military setbacks</a> prove terminal.</p>
<h2>Programs need to take a new approach</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19362200802285757">Disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programs</a> designed to reintegrate child soldiers into post-conflict society have significantly progressed in recent years. This represents the continued evolution of military-civil partnerships in the quest for a conflict-free world. </p>
<p>But IS’s systematic and meticulous radicalisation of an entire region’s children presents new challenges.</p>
<p>It’s understandable to interpret IS’s rapid retreat as its death knell, and thereby view traditional rehabilitation techniques as an appropriate remedy for yet another region recovering from violence at the hands of a radical armed insurgency. However, this conflict has been highly unusual in its pace, tactics and impacts – both now and potentially in the future.</p>
<p>So, we must revisit the fundamental assumptions of what it means to inspire peace within a society. This starts with the children subjected to the ideological extremism of IS and other armed groups.</p>
<p>If there is to be sustainable peace in the areas liberated from IS control, rehabilitation programs must be viewed as a community-wide process. Even if children did not directly participate in IS activities, the group has moulded their worldview and underpinning life philosophies.</p>
<p>Such philosophies may be especially productive in a region where resentment of perceived foreign – Western – interference and exploitation is long-lasting and multifaceted.</p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>The regular processes of identifying child combatants, disarming and reintegrating them into their communities through rehabilitation (such as by ensuring they are physically and mentally capable of rejoining their communities) and reconciliation (developing peace, trust and justice among children and their communities) are all necessary. But they are vastly insufficient in this instance.</p>
<p>Rarely has there been such systematic youth radicalisation and militarisation. So, the international response must be equally far-reaching and methodical.</p>
<p>Rapid reimplementation and revisiting of pre-IS school curricula is of the highest priority. National and local governments should ensure children are shielded from further recruitment by instituting a curriculum drawn from principles of tolerance and inclusion. </p>
<p>It’s essential to develop locally run initiatives to measure the level of radicalisation among a community’s children and to construct child-friendly spaces for young people to socialise, reconnect with their wider community and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35743577">“unlearn” what they adopted</a> under IS. </p>
<p>Such practices will help to heal the wounds of IS occupation and ensure the potential for cyclical violence is removed. Done right, it will hinder IS’s ability to rise anew.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James S. Morris receives funding from the Research and Training Program grant of the federal Department of Education and Training. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristan Dunning does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State systematically militarised the education systems of captured Iraqi and Syrian territory to turn the region’s children into ideological timebombs.James S. Morris, PhD Student in International Security and Child Rights, The University of QueenslandTristan Dunning, Lecturer in Modern Middle East History, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/924552018-03-06T10:20:56Z2018-03-06T10:20:56ZLessons from history on what to do with foreign fighters returning from Syria<p>News in early February that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/09/beatles-captured-britain-isis-fighters-jihadists">Alexanda Kotey and El Shafee Elsheikh</a>, the two remaining alleged members of the so-called “Beatles” gang of British Islamic State (IS) jihadis, had been captured in Syria reportedly <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-and-us-row-over-fate-of-captured-isis-terrorists-alexanda-kotey-and-el-shafee-elsheikh-mcf38jdnw">created a diplomatic dispute</a> between the US and Britain. Neither country wanted to assume responsibility for their prosecution. </p>
<p>It’s estimated that some 850 British citizens have travelled to fight in Syria and Iraq since the conflict there erupted in 2011. By early 2018, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-01-31/debates/23418C82-1737-4535-8151-FAD2712F1C68/BritishJihadis(IraqAndSyria)">almost half</a> of them had already returned. But what should be done with British fighters who wish to return to the UK after participating in the Syrian conflict?</p>
<p>Hardliners such as Britain’s defence secretary, Gavin Williamson, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/07/british-isis-fighters-should-be-hunted-down-and-killed-says-defence-secretary-gavin-williamson">believe</a> that Britons who fought for Islamic State abroad should be hunted down and killed to ensure they never return to the UK. His US counterpart, secretary of defense James Mattis, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/28/james-mattis-defense-secretary-us-isis-annihilation">expressed</a> similar views. In a <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-01-31/debates/23418C82-1737-4535-8151-FAD2712F1C68/BritishJihadis(IraqAndSyria)">special debate</a> on returning British jihadis at the House of Commons in January, Conservative MP Bob Seely pointed out that it’s easier to kill a British jihadi in Syria than it is to arrest, turn or rehabilitate them.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"962059945616097286"}"></div></p>
<p>It seems that, for a while at least, the US-led coalition against IS took this hardline approach. For example, the notorious executioner Mohammad Emwazi, also known as “Jihadi John”, was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35358101">killed by a drone strike</a> in November 2015. The British government <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-01-31/debates/23418C82-1737-4535-8151-FAD2712F1C68/BritishJihadis(IraqAndSyria)">estimates</a> that 15% of those who had travelled to Syria and Iraq were killed during the conflict. But with the collapse of IS strongholds, the window of opportunity to use drones and other means to target Western militants who had joined the organisation is closing fast. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-caliphate-largely-gone-islamic-state-plots-another-way-forward-87036">Its 'caliphate' largely gone, Islamic State plots another way forward</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>Because Britain is a signatory of the 1961 <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/statelessness/3bbb286d8/convention-reduction-statelessness.html">UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness</a>, the Home Office can only deprive a person of their British citizenship if they have dual citizenship. Such cases are rare. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the International Brigades</h2>
<p>Some historical lessons can be drawn from the way Britain and the US handled the return of their citizens who fought as part of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s. In both countries, the government <a href="https://fraserraeburn.com/2018/03/05/balancing-ideology-with-pragmatism-spain-syria-and-returned-foreign-fighters/">was deeply suspicious</a> of the ideology that took these men and women to Spain. </p>
<p>Most of them were communists, members of a party that was perceived as being bent on revolution and overthrowing the governments in Britain and the US. Yet the British security services were sensible enough to understand that these volunteers were not a monolithic group. Some were not ardent ideologues, others had become disillusioned during the war in Spain. As a result, many veterans of the International Brigades were able to enlist in Britain’s armed services and take part in World War II. </p>
<p>In the US, the Office of Strategic Services enlisted veterans of the International Brigades <a href="https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/164018080">to help train new recruits</a> in guerrilla warfare. Part of the rationale behind the incorporation of these “reds” into the war effort was that it would be easier to keep an eye on them in the military than it would in civilian life. </p>
<h2>A fine line</h2>
<p>There are, of course, clear differences between the situation in Europe in 1939 and today. The risk that today’s returning fighters pose is very tangible. At <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/nov/16/men-who-attacked-paris-profile-terror-cell">least five of the men</a> who carried out the attacks in the Bataclan theatre and elsewhere in Paris in November 2015 had been to Syria and joined the ranks of IS before returning to Europe. However, so far, those Britons who have returned from the conflict in Syria and Iraq have not been involved in terror attacks. Those men were radicalised <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40161333">in other ways</a>. Not all foreign fighters become domestic terrorists and not all terrorists start off as foreign fighters.</p>
<p>Perhaps for that reason, not everyone in the security services or the government is convinced that those who return pose an immediate threat. MI5 director Andrew Parker <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41655488">said</a> that those who have come back from Syria are subject to risk assessment. A minority <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-01-31/debates/23418C82-1737-4535-8151-FAD2712F1C68/BritishJihadis(IraqAndSyria)">were prosecuted</a> in accordance with counter-terrorism legislation, but most weren’t and are, presumably, being monitored.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-authorities-can-prosecute-is-fighters-who-return-to-britain-explained-86101">How the authorities can prosecute IS fighters who return to Britain – explained</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Historically, foreign war volunteers, whether in Spain or in other conflicts, have never been homogeneous in terms of their motivations, commitment and postwar trajectories. Today, a measured approach by the authorities is therefore more likely to help deradicalise those former supporters of IS who have become disillusioned with the cause. Where there is evidence that returning fighters were involved in carrying out crimes while in Syria or that they pose a clear security threat and intend to carry out terrorist attacks after their return, they should certainly be prosecuted. This is certainly the case for the alleged members of the “Beatles” gang. </p>
<p>However, in instances where the security forces don’t see an imminent threat, programmes that aim to reintegrate disillusioned jihadists into society may be more productive in the long run than a heavy-handed approach. This would not only help such individuals escape from a cycle of violence but could also serve as a counter-narrative to the one promoted by extremists. </p>
<p>For instance, there are organisations such as the <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/">Institute for Strategic Dialogue</a> that make use of networks of former extremists and survivors of violence in an attempt to deradicalise people who look as though they are beginning to drift towards dangerous organisations such as IS. This method does not replace law enforcement but could operate alongside it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nir Arielli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What should the UK do with foreign jihadis who return home?Nir Arielli, Associate Professor of International History, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911922018-02-26T11:30:16Z2018-02-26T11:30:16ZAfter the niqab: what life is like for French women who remove the veil<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207135/original/file-20180220-116355-r2sso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saliha (left) and Alexia in 2012. Alexia no longer wears the veil. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Agnès De Feo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Islamic headscarves and veils continue to be the subject of intense debate in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/headscarves-and-muslim-veil-ban-debate-timeline">Europe</a>. Countries’ approaches toward the burqa and niqab, which cover the face, range from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/veil-womans-choice-theresa-may">tolerance in the UK</a> to an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/31/french-muslim-burqa-veil-niqab">outright ban in France</a>. Reactions of Muslim women to restrictions have varied, including protests by some, reluctant acceptance by others and also <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/03/the-right-to-ban-the-veil-is-good-news-for-everybody-including-muslims/">support</a> for bans.</p>
<p>But what happens when a woman who has worn a niqab, sometimes for years, makes the decision to leave it behind?</p>
<p>Hanane and Alexia – whose names are pseudonyms to protect their identity – were both born in France. Hanane grew up in a non-practicing Muslim family, while Alexia converted to Islam at age 22. For five years they both wore a niqab. Hanane began in 2009, just before France banned the full-face veil, while Alexia adopted it later. Once ardent defenders of the right to wear the niqab, both women have now completely abandoned it. But the transition took place gradually and was accompanied by a growing distance from extreme <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafist ideology</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/207938/original/file-20180226-120971-17yc4d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hanane today.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Agnès De Féo</span></span>
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<h2>‘Start living again’</h2>
<p>On January 10, during the New Year’s discount sales in France, Alexia and I met near Paris’ Gare du Nord train station. She wanted to buy clothes and “start living again”. In the first shop she bought four slim pairs of pants and a trim jacket. She then tried out some Nepalese clothes designed for Western tastes, including a colourful jacket and pants with huge bell bottoms.</p>
<p>As she came out of the dressing room, Alexia gauged herself in front of the mirror: “It’s really me, I finally feel like myself again after years of being locked up.” With her hair brushing her face, she looked like a modern woman, fully alive. I was impressed with her metamorphosis: it’s hard to imagine that she wore a niqab for five years and was one of the most radical women I’d ever met.</p>
<p>I met Alexia in August 2011 in the context of <a href="https://ehess.academia.edu/Agn%C3%A8sDeFeo">my research on the full-length veil</a> during a demonstration by the Salafist group <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/06/10/forsane-alizza-nous-entendions-creer-une-police-musulmane_1326640">Forsane Alizza</a> (literally Knights of the Pride) in a city near Paris. She was wearing a niqab and presented herself as the wife of one of the group’s leaders.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203250/original/file-20180124-107967-1arfh7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Event of the Salafist group Forsane Alizza in August, 2011. At the centre is its leader, Mohamed Achamlane, who was jailed in 2015 for criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Agnès De Féo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alexia remembers that time:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We considered all Muslim supporters of the French Republic to be unbelievers. We were doing the <em>takfir</em> (excommunication) against those who did not practice like us. We were opposed to the <em>taghout</em> (idolatry in the broad sense), i.e., the state and institutions. We defined ourselves as <em>ghûlat</em>, which means ‘extremists’ in Arabic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Estimates of the number of women who wear the niqab vary widely, from a few hundred to <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2009/09/09/01016-20090909ARTFIG00040-deux-mille-femmes-portent-la-burqa-en-france-.php">several thousand</a>. In terms of even France’s Muslim population the percentage is tiny.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203251/original/file-20180124-107959-1gghw1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hanane, whom I met on the side-lines of a demonstration in front of the French National Assembly, 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Agnès De Féo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘The niqab was protecting me’</h2>
<p>I’ve known Hanane even longer than Alexia. We met during a January 2010 demonstration of women in niqab at the Place de la République in Paris and then in front of the National Assembly. She and others were protesting a proposed measure that would <a href="http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/dissimulation_visage_espace_public.%20asp">outlaw concealing one’s face in public</a>.</p>
<p>At the beginning of 2017, Hanane reached out to ask me to help her write a book about her life. In the book she’d like to write, Hanane doesn’t want to denounce the niqab, but to tell the story of the rapes she says were repeatedly inflicted by her father-in-law. To her, they help explain her involvement in Salafism.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Religion brought a lot that helped me escape from the trauma of rape. I was 19 to 20 years old when I started wearing the niqab, I took it off when I was 25. The further I went, the more I wanted to cover myself. The niqab protected me, I liked hiding from men. I could see them, but they couldn’t see me.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unlike Alexia, who decided on her own to begin wearing a veil, Hanane remembers the influence of her social circle at the time:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We were a bunch of girlfriends and wore niqab almost all at the same time. In our group the earliest was <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-shootings-police-hunting-for-grocery-shop-gunmans-girlfriend-hayat-boumedienne-9969144.html">Ayat Boumédiène</a>, who adopted it more than two years before the law. At first everything was normal with her, and then she started to organise gatherings to encourage us to take up arms. It was her husband, Ahmadi Coulibaly, who turned her head – he was low-key until he went to jail. Ayat wanted to introduce me to a man she said I should marry, she really pushed hard. He was later imprisoned for murder. Thank goodness I didn’t give in – I’d be in Syria today.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On January 9, 2015, Ahmadi Coulibaly attacked the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/09/amedy-coulibaly-paris-kosher-market_n_6444418.html">Hyper Cacher market near Paris</a>. Boumédiène left Paris one week earlier, and was spotted at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/jan/12/hayat-boumeddiene-shown-on-cctv-at-istanbul-airport-video">Istanbul airport</a>. She remains at large. Coulibaly killed five people during his attack and died when the police assaulted the grocery store in which he was holding hostages.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/IJTyWhq_w40?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Trailer of the film <em>Forbidden Veil</em>, directed by Agnès De Féo and produced by Marc Rozenblum, 2017.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘I felt like I was getting out of jail’</h2>
<p>When France banned full-length veils in 2010, some of the women who wore the niqab switched to the jilbab, which covers the whole body except the face, while others <a href="http://www.slate.fr/story/153005/islam-pourquoi-quinquagenaires-virulentes-contre-niqab">gave in to public pressure</a> and ceased wearing it. Both Alexia and Hanane are different: they say they’ve turned the page completely.</p>
<p>Alexia has even become a fierce opponent of the Islamic veil and Salafism. She continues to define herself as a Muslim but reads the texts with a critical eye. Hanane admits that she has become less diligent in her rituals: “I often skip prayers or make them late. Some days I don’t even have time to pray. When I wore the niqab I was a little more regular, even though I was often late.”</p>
<p>Both say they’ve put aside the more radical texts they once favoured, and no longer frequent fundamentalist websites. But this process didn’t happen all at once – it took several months. Alexia says she decided to remove the niqab on the advice of the man who shared her life at the time. A convert to Islam and Salafism, he was a supporter of conservative dress for women, but nonetheless suggested she cease wearing the niqab:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When he saw my physical condition, he asked me to remove the niqab – he feared for my health. I had worn it to please Allah, but because of the lack of sunlight I wasn’t synthesising vitamin D any more – my health was failing. I followed his advice, but it’s been long and hard.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Alexia remembers:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When I took the niqab off, I felt like I was getting out of jail. But that doesn’t mean I was released – I still felt bad. It takes years to get by and I haven’t finished cleaning my head yet.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hanane abandoned her veil after the attacks on the French satirical magazine <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30710883">Charlie Hebdo in 2015</a> because she feared for her safety, facing more and more insults in the street. She said the hardest part has been the exclusion from her social circle:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since I removed my veil, many of my Muslim sisters no longer want to talk to me. I find them stuck-up and unfair, because anyone can choose to take off their veil. A few rare ones talk to me, but it’s not like it used to be.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For a long time Alexia would put her veil back on when returning to her old neighbourhood in northeast Paris where social and religious conservatism is strong in certain communities. Then she finally changed her life entirely.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>My life began to change when I enrolled in a gym, which allowed me to get out of the Salafist social networks that were my only source of socialisation before. Then I got a job and then I finally said goodbye to my past.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And it was at this job that she met the man whom she would marry. He is not Muslim and the civil marriage took place at city hall, an unthinkable choice for this woman who once hated French institutions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202265/original/file-20180117-53328-1oxp5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alexia visits a booth at the annual salon for French Muslims at Le Bourget, north of Paris, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Agnès De Féo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A bitter taste</h2>
<p>In hindsight, neither Alexia nor Hanane spoke of their “exit” from the niqab as a liberation. Instead, the experience has left them with a bitter taste. They say they were convinced at some point in their lives of the importance of wearing a full-length veil: Alexia believed that she was achieving Muslim perfection and giving meaning to her life – she imagined meeting the pious and virtuous man who would save her from her life as a single mother. For Hanane, the goal was to heal the wounds of an adolescence torn apart by family trauma and foster care.</p>
<p>Alexia now feels that this period cost her years of her life and expresses anger at the propaganda coming from Saudi Arabia. She blames the entire system that indoctrinated her, even though she acknowledges it was, in a sense, voluntary. According to her, the Islamic State benefits from the naivety of those who believe they are committed to Salafism for legitimate reasons.</p>
<p>Even if they’ve both renounced the niqab, neither Hanane nor Alexia support the 2010 ban. Hanane told me recently: “The law is counterproductive. The only way out is by yourself. The ban will never convince any woman to take it off.” Alexia has the same reaction, saying that the law that has led some women to cut themselves off from society and that some might adopt it as a rebellious gesture.</p>
<p>Testimonies of those who’ve chosen to “leave the niqab behind” are rare. The number of women who have adopted it is extremely low, and the ones who then choose to renounce it must often sever their old relationships and adopt what is in many ways a new identity – they change their e-mail addresses, phone numbers and move on completely. For them the full-length veil has become something firmly in the past, representative of a transitional stage in their lives.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Translated from the original French by Leighton Walter Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agnès De Féo is co-founder of Sasana Productions and teaches at the journalism school CFPJ.</span></em></p>A number of women who once wore and defended the full Islamic veil known as the niqab later chose to renounce it. Here two of them tell their stories.Agnès De Féo, Sociologue, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/818292017-08-01T06:07:20Z2017-08-01T06:07:20ZSecurity gets $1.2b, community programs to counter violent extremism $40m – that’s a foolish imbalance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180467/original/file-20170801-766-wd8iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police raided several Sydney properties over the weekend in relation to possible terror plots.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Dean Lewins</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/national-security/police-conduct-terror-raids-across-sydney/news-story/43b9e1326594a9b2ed70d334c38f1bbd">arrests and raids</a> in Sydney over the weekend, as well as the 12 so-called “terrorist plots” disrupted by police since September 2014, ought to raise questions over whether Australia’s efforts to counter violent extremism are actually working.</p>
<h2>A spending and policy imbalance</h2>
<p>Australia has <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-budget-1-2-billion-for-counter-terrorism-measures-2015-5">spent more than A$1.2 billion</a> since 2015 on strengthening sharp-end counter-terrorism arrangements such as increasing intelligence and security capabilities. Millions more will be spent when the government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-department-of-home-affairs-is-unnecessary-and-seems-to-be-more-about-politics-than-reform-81161">proposed Department of Home Affairs</a> opens.</p>
<p>Over roughly the same period, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/australias-antiextremism-programs-are-worlds-best-practice/news-story/0b9ec2093ea99bf0c7ad5b3ad62a3f1f">only about $40 million has been spent</a> on countering violent extremism and community cohesion programs.</p>
<p>Of this $40 million, only around $2 million was given out in 2015 to <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3201/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_12.pdf">42 of the 97 applicants</a>. This money was to support grassroots organisations to develop new, innovative services to move people away from violent extremism. This funding round was developed to improve Australia’s capability to deliver localised and tailored intervention services.</p>
<p>So, there is a significant imbalance between sharp-end funding and piecemeal, short-term, community-level grants. The money is clearly not being invested wisely or even reaching the right places, such as those at-risk communities willing to engage and desperately seeking funding. Many more terror-related arrests will follow in the foreseeable future as a result.</p>
<p>All the while, it’s been <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/08/01/sydney-raids-alleged-plane-terror-plot-was-well-along">full steam ahead</a> in relation to security, legislation, corrections, police and intelligence. This has come at the expense of community resilience and building up protective mechanisms within vulnerable youth and communities.</p>
<p>From my research with Muslim communities over the past two years, the government’s approach is verging on being counter-productive. It now risks trampling on the basic rights and freedoms of young Muslims, their families and their communities more broadly.</p>
<p>This approach will actually worsen the many underlying issues – such as discrimination, alienation, marginalisation and rejection – that seem to contribute to offending in the first place.</p>
<p>The safety of all Australians should remain a key government priority. And getting the balance right between security and youth and community welfare is difficult. But the government seems hell-bent on pre-crime arrest, prosecution and punishment, while falling short on providing the necessary long-term support for the young vulnerable people it really needs to protect and prevent from engaging in serious anti-social behaviour. </p>
<p>For those from minority communities in particular, the criminal justice system is a very slippery slope. Once in it, the prospects of positive and meaningful futures are slim.</p>
<h2>Where Australia’s approach is lacking</h2>
<p>As with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/21/government-prevent-strategy-promoting-extremism-maina-kiai">the UK’s Prevent program</a>, Australia’s approach suffers from multiple, mutually reinforcing structural flaws. Its foreseeable consequence is a serious risk to the wellbeing of young Muslims and Australian multiculturalism more broadly.</p>
<p>Much of the centrepiece of the government’s countering violent extremism strategy rests on the theory of radicalisation and the social engineering of radical views and cultures to become more conservative and “Australian”. </p>
<p>However, for the concept of radicalisation alone, there seems to be very little clarity about the term and the tools that measure it. If such tools are used to help determine the destiny of a young Muslim person, whether it be in a school or criminal justice situation, then these must be made more available for wider peer review – rather than held in secrecy within the government.</p>
<p>For those deemed “radicalised” or on the pathway to radicalisation, there are very few community-based secondary-level intervention programs designed to support them. Nor are there programs they are willing to participate in voluntarily. This is largely because most current programs are led by government and police, which seem to lack a crucial understanding about the many cultural, religious and ethnic nuances required for effective intervention.</p>
<p>Without close community partnerships and community-led approaches, programs will never be able to fully understand the highly complex nature of families and communities.</p>
<p>Getting access to vulnerable youth and their families, and then encouraging them to participate in interventions, requires close and trusted community partnerships. To date, partnerships between government and the more conservative community groups have not been fully developed. This is particularly the case with the more hard-to-reach groups, which have many of the young people requiring support or intervention.</p>
<p>Put together, this has limited the government’s capacity to support and fund communities working with the most at-risk or vulnerable youth. </p>
<p>The government’s position on these communities is that they are too risky to work with. In reality, it is too risky not to work with them.</p>
<p>To make us truly safe – not just from terrorism, but from other serious crimes too – the government needs to go back to basics. Australia should invest a lot more in longer-term community partnerships and develop more preventive measures, such as community-led interventions. These interventions must be developed by those outside the government’s national security apparatus.</p>
<p>A major government rethink is required if it is truly going to keep us safe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clarke Jones's team at the ANU received funding from the Attorney General's Department and the Australian Federal Police in the 2015/16 financial year. </span></em></p>The government seems hell-bent on pre-crime arrest, prosecution, and punishment for terror offenders – while falling short in providing the necessary long-term support.Clarke Jones, Research Fellow, Research School of Psychology, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789692017-06-26T08:17:39Z2017-06-26T08:17:39ZHow to deradicalise someone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173327/original/file-20170612-10208-10gyxr2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s hard to talk about deradicalisation in the face of appalling attacks, such as those in London and Manchester: calls for retribution are often louder than those raising the possibility of redemption. But supporting disengagement from extremism is an important part of a long-term response to terrorism. </p>
<p>Prominent voices such as <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/comment/comment/maajid-nawaz-muslims-can-play-a-crucial-role-in-isolating-the-extremists-a3557146.html">Maajid Nawaz</a> and <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ex-fighter-hanif-qadir-i-could-have-prevented-london-terrorist-attacks-39kkkhnr9">Hanif Qadir</a> who condemned the attacks, were themselves once involved in militant Islamist networks. Not only does this show it’s possible to walk away from extremism, it illustrates that former militants can be important in the fight against terrorism. </p>
<p>There is also a pragmatic argument for deradicalisation. Compared with surveillance, incarceration or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/29/paul-nuttall-ukip-internment-terrorism-suspects-islamist-cancer">internment</a>, it is a more cost-effective and long-term solution. Importantly, supporting disengagement also reasserts those liberal democratic values terrorism seeks to undermine, in ways that detention without trial does not.</p>
<h2>How much do we know?</h2>
<p>Historically, research has focused on understanding why people become involved in militancy. This means we know less about disengagement than we do about mobilisation processes. Nevertheless, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Understanding-Deradicalization-Methods-Tools-and-Programs-for-Countering/Koehler-Horgan/p/book/9781138122772">knowledge is growing</a> about why and how people leave extremist groups. </p>
<p>A distinction is often made between <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/32/html">deradicalisation and disengagement</a>. Deradicalisation is generally used to mean a change in attitudes or ideas that supports the move away from extremism, while disengagement refers to behavioural change.</p>
<p>A common assumption is that disengagement leads to deradicalisation. But this is not always the case, in part because the link between attitudes and behaviour is not straightforward. Many more people <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3882153/Disengagement_De-radicalization_and_the_Arc_of_Terrorism_Future_Directions_for_Research">hold “radical” views</a> than actually engage in violence, and some of those involved in violence don’t hold strong ideological beliefs. </p>
<h2>Why do people walk away from extremism?</h2>
<p>The reasons people leave militant groups are varied and each story is different. Some are forced to quit because of arrest, others are supported by formal <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Leaving-Terrorism-Behind-Individual-and-Collective-Disengagement/Bjorgo-Horgan/p/book/9780415776684">intervention programmes</a>, but the majority walk away of their own accord, as one former extremist put it: “I deradicalised myself, really.” </p>
<p>It’s common to talk about <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343314535946">push and pull factors</a> that support disengagement. Push factors can include disillusion with the group, its leaders <a href="https://apnews.com/4697045016914df2961577a82950a529/former-neo-nazis-behind-germanys-successful-far-right-rehab">or ideology</a>, burnout, or a feeling that violence is going too far. Pull factors might involve the desire for a normal life, or positive interactions with those outside the group. Even financial incentives can be influential. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173325/original/file-20170612-10249-4g142d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A return from the far right.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/zweibruecken-germany-march-20-2009-protests-310600439?src=WG0ntY_ZB9lBbAsFp2kRgA-1-9">rkl_foto /Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, there is much to learn about the ways these different factors interact and how they shape long-term outcomes. We also have a relatively limited understanding of when and why interventions bring about positive change. </p>
<h2>What supports disengagement?</h2>
<p>I’ve spent the last decade <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137550187">researching</a> efforts to support disengagement from extremism, and the reality is often more complex than ideas of “push and pull factors” and “deradicalisation and disengagement” imply. Years of talking to those who work with extremists, and those who have been involved in militancy, suggest a different way of thinking about disengagement. </p>
<p>To support the move away from extremism, it’s useful to begin by asking: what did they seek to achieve by being involved? Not just in terms of pursuing political change, but taking into account the full range of <a href="https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf">complex, interacting reasons</a> why people become involved in extremism. From individual factors related to identity and a search for belonging, to a desire to address community experiences of discrimination, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/11/egypt.owenbowcott">or sociopolitical issues</a> like foreign policy and social injustice. </p>
<p>Once there is a better understanding of why someone became involved, it becomes possible to identify ways for them to achieve those same goals in pro-social ways. Instead of starting by trying to “deradicalise” someone by deconstructing their ideological commitments, this involves redirecting their initial motivation to become involved in the first place. </p>
<p>As one intervention provider who works with people convicted of terrorism offences and those considered “at risk of radicalisation” explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There’s a war going on in our own streets, in our own community that we’re addressing; so we’re giving them that negative cause [that led them to extremism], and replacing it with a positive cause, and a justifiable one.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As well as working to redirect someone’s motivation, it is important to try and develop resilience to people or events that might undermine any growing commitment to disengage from extremism. Finding ways for someone <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/deradicalise-isis-fighters-jihadists-denmark-syria">to reintegrate into wider society</a> is also central to supporting positive outcomes. Militant networks often seek to isolate people from friends and family, so finding mechanisms to enable them to develop new networks and a broader social identity is crucial. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173326/original/file-20170612-10202-15s87p2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bristol graffiti: alternative ways of seeing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bristol-aug-31-view-religious-tolerance-243025738?src=CgDVr7n-8f6d5_5CEJwVrQ-1-5">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What works?</h2>
<p>This work is not easy. There is often a gulf of trust between those involved in extremism and those seeking to support their reintegration. Sometimes, this proves impossible to bridge. It’s also extremely difficult to assess whether and why interventions might be effective. Partly because few independent evaluations are publicly available, but also because it’s not clear what “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19434472.2014.1001421?src=recsys&journalCode=rirt20">success</a>” looks like. One probation officer I spoke to summed up this problem:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[Is] stepping somebody back from violent extremism to extremism, is that enough? Do you want them just not offending, is that enough? Do you want them to convert to become a Catholic? How far do you want to go, how far is enough?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What is clear is that there is an urgent need to develop a better understanding of how to support disengagement from extremism. Without underestimating the difficulty of engaging with those committed to political violence, as those who have turned away from extremism can testify, people can and do change. Given the absolutely devastating consequences of terrorism, refining our knowledge about how to influence and assess this process is as important as ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Marsden has previously received funding from the European Union.
</span></em></p>More work has been done to understand why people become militant – but here’s what we know about disengaging those who do.Sarah Marsden, Lecturer in Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793092017-06-13T16:22:51Z2017-06-13T16:22:51ZFour things schools can do to help tackle extremism and radicalisation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173590/original/file-20170613-25902-16n9pqx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The terrorist attacks in Manchester and London renewed discussions about how to stop young Muslims being radicalised.</p>
<p>A lot of the ideas focus on <a href="https://www.wired.com/2015/11/facebook-and-twitter-face-tough-choices-as-isis-exploits-social-media/">closing down social media sites</a>, reporting “<a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-terrorism-caused-much-more-just-religion-1344141967">at-risk</a>” individuals or organisations, and educating pupils on the evils of extremism. But while it’s important to be having these types of conversations, most of these suggestions are reactive. In that they are about what to do when the seeds of terrorism have already been planted, meaning there has been little mention of strategies to reduce the chances of young people coming under the influence of violent extremism in the first place. </p>
<p>There is no excuse for terrorism, but if there is any chance of stopping it, there has to be understanding of its roots, along with long-term strategies to undermine the causes. </p>
<p>And as most terrorists are “home-grown” – in that they are often born and raised in the country they then go on to attack – what happens in schools may well be critical. Of course, putting things in place in education is not a cure all, but it may help to keep all of us safe and also ensure that communities are not divided. </p>
<p>The following are strategies that can be used by teachers and schools to help to stop those extremist seeds from being sown. They are not targeted to specific groups but can be of benefit to all pupils. </p>
<h2>1. Foster an inclusive environment</h2>
<p>A sense of belonging is a <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/01/health/enayati-importance-of-belonging/index.html">basic psychological need</a> and the groups to whom we are affiliated shape who we are and who we become. Schools that only value high flyers create “exclusive belonging” where bullying and marginalisation can thrive. </p>
<p>Social exclusion inhibits feelings of belonging, self-esteem, perceptions of control over the environment, and of leading a meaningful existence. It can also lead to powerful, negative, deep-rooted reactions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173591/original/file-20170613-25868-y95i77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Make every pupil feel included.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Research by <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia">The Australian Policy Unit</a> found three shared characteristics of young people who become violent Islamist extremists. They had a sense of injustice or humiliation, had a need for identity and purpose, and a need to belong. </p>
<p>Ultimately, all students need to believe that they matter, their contributions are valued and others care about them. Whether or not this happens will depend on the values and practices that predominate in school culture. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3787245/Inclusive_and_exclusive_belonging_-_the_impact_on_individual_and_community_well-being">inclusive sense of belonging</a> goes beyond wearing a school uniform and includes ways in which schools demonstrate respect for the communities they serve. This could include encouraging teachers to get to know all their students, as well as identifying ways of improving communication with families.</p>
<h2>2. Education beyond the academic</h2>
<p>Education is more than gathering facts and passing exams, it is also about learning how to grow into who you are as a person and <a href="http://en.unesco.org/themes/learning-live-together">learning to live together</a>. </p>
<p>It is not only what young people believe about themselves that matters, it is what they come to believe about others. Where schools adopt a proactive approach to social and emotional learning they encourage young people to find out what they have in common, making it more difficult to dehumanise others. Which leads us onto the next point.</p>
<h2>3. Encourage empathy</h2>
<p>Schools should aim to identify positive values and strengths, and help children to understand the skills that are required to build healthy relationships – including the development of empathy. </p>
<p>When young people are given opportunities to understand more about their emotions, they may come to a better understanding of why they feel what they do, and also find safe ways to express feelings. And they may also begin to appreciate how their emotions may by manipulated by others. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173592/original/file-20170613-25860-5i4zm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Empathy should and must remain a priority in our classrooms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21291449">evidence of its efficacy</a> in attitude and behaviour change, <a href="https://www.edutopia.org/social-emotional-learning">social and emotional learning</a> no longer has a place in most UK schools where higher academic outcomes are the overriding priority, so maybe it is time this is revisited? </p>
<h2>4. Make student’s voices heard</h2>
<p>Young people are often idealistic, want to be heard and want to make a difference. And <a href="http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx">research</a> suggests that young terrorists have a similar motivation – even though this is demonstrated in acts of destruction. </p>
<p>Schools can provide constructive channels that engage pupils positively with their communities in ways that provide them with a sense of being agents of change. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173593/original/file-20170613-25902-rlw7r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Make students feel listened to.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Known as “<a href="https://nylc.org/service-learning/">service learning</a>” this combines active engagement with community projects alongside a reflexive process. It’s about <a href="https://www.edutopia.org/blog/what-heck-service-learning-heather-wolpert-gawron">teaching empathy as well as literacy</a>. It’s about teaching compassion as well as composition. It’s about teaching advocacy as well as algebra. </p>
<p>My own experience of working with challenging young people and engaging them in these types of projects is that it has been transformative – in the way they see themselves, their potential, the communities they are working with and their ability to contribute to something. For the first time they become significant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sue Roffey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It starts with making sure every pupil feels included and listened to.Sue Roffey, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Education, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/783042017-05-26T15:07:15Z2017-05-26T15:07:15ZWhat science can reveal about the psychological profiles of terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171117/original/file-20170526-6380-35q8r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Osama bin Laden and his advisor Ayman al Zawahiri.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hamid_Mir_interviewing_Osama_bin_Laden_and_Ayman_al-Zawahiri_2001.jpg">Hamid Mir/wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>What went though the mind of the suicide bomber Salman Abedi just before he blew himself up in Manchester this week, killing 22 people? We often dismiss terrorists as non-humans, monsters, at first. But when we learn that they were seemingly normal individuals with families and jobs, it’s hard not to wonder about how their minds really work.</p>
<p>The search for a terrorist “personality” or “mindset” dominated psychological research in the 1970s and 1980s and remains a significant area for research today. A new study <a href="http://nature.com/articles/doi:10.1038/s41550-017-0141">published in Nature Human Behaviour</a>, which assessed the cognitive and psychological profiles of 66 Colombian paramilitaries imprisoned for committing terrorist acts, now argues that poor moral reasoning is what defines terrorists. </p>
<p>The idea behind such research is obvious – it’s to identify stable, predictive traits or “markers” of terrorist personalities. If we could do that, we may be able to predict who will become a terrorist – and perhaps prevent it. But this type of research <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Psychology_of_Terrorism.html?id=M7aig1sbeewC&redir_esc=y">is viewed by many psychologists</a>, myself included, with extreme caution. Researchers carrying out such studies typically use a myriad of psychometric measures, personality and IQ tests in various contexts. But there’s no consensus on how useful these tests are. </p>
<p>And even if we did manage to pin down terrorist markers, what would we do with this knowledge? Would we all be tested across our lifespan? What would happen if we had a marker? </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171118/original/file-20170526-6389-151kqph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Appeal case of mass murderer Anders Breivik.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">LISE AASERUD/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The term “terrorist mindset” is also problematic because it fuels the notion that terrorists are abnormal, resulting in knee-jerk endeavours to uncover the abnormality. For psychologists, abnormal suggests presence of a disorder, deficit or illness which makes terrorists “sick” or different. This idea seems plausible because it helps us come to terms with extreme behaviour. </p>
<p>But terrorist atrocities are undoubtedly the end of a chain of events which only achieve significance with the benefit of hindsight. By focusing on the event itself, how the terrorist was behaving at that time or how he/she may have been thinking in the immediate run up, our understanding becomes distorted. This is because the process of becoming a terrorist has been overlooked. </p>
<h2>Study on Colombian paramilitaries</h2>
<p>Of course it’s not easy to get hold of terrorists prior to an attack. Most research therefore concerns terrorists that have been caught or are <em>suspected</em> terrorists. The new study did just this. Imprisoned Columbian paramilitaries completed a battery of social-cognitive tests, creating individual profiles – including assessments of moral cognition, IQ, executive functioning, aggressive behaviour and emotion recognition. They were then compared with 66 non-criminals.</p>
<p>The researchers found terrorists had higher levels of aggression and lower levels of emotion recognition than non-criminals. However, no differences were found between the groups for IQ or executive functioning. The biggest difference between the terrorists and the other group was seen in moral cognition – they found that terrorists are guided by an abnormal over-reliance on outcomes. The authors argue that this distorted moral reasoning – that the ends justify the means – is the “hallmark” of a terrorist mindset. They assessed moral judgement by asking participants to rate various stories according to levels of unjustified aggression.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171120/original/file-20170526-6377-hc2but.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relatives of a victim killed in a Colombian conflict by guerrilla or paramilitaries between 1991 and 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Luis Eduardo Noriega</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The results are intriguing and seem intuitive. But we cannot be sure that this profile wasn’t a result of their incarceration – <a href="https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/64669/98691_1.pdf?sequence=1">we know that prison distorts cognition</a>. If not, was it present from birth or did it develop in the run up to becoming part of a terrorist group? </p>
<p>These questions cannot be answered, yet they are fundamental. Headline statements from high-profile research of this nature can be misleading and counter-productive. Despite its appeal, there is no scientific support for the idea that terrorists are psychopaths or have a personality disorder. Often research is contradictory – some researchers argue that their findings show terrorists to be <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2011.551721">suicidal</a> while others claim they are <a href="https://www.surrey.ac.uk/politics/research/researchareasofstaff/isppsummeracademy/instructors%20/martha_crenshaw_political_psychology_and_terrorism.htm">extrovert, unstable, uninhibited</a>, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559208427160">aggressive, defensive</a> or <a href="http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1570&context=mhlp_facpub">narcissistic</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, psycho-pathological behaviours are more likely to conflict with a terrorist agenda than aid it – it after all relies on commitment, motivation and discipline. </p>
<h2>The psychology of radicalisation</h2>
<p>Many psychologists believe that the events which occur in the years before a terrorist attack, referred to as radicalisation, offer most in terms of trying to answer why a person might turn to political violence. However, the psychology of terrorism is not well advanced. There is little empirical evidence to support existing conceptual models – and they are often limited to particular extremist groups and ideologies. </p>
<p>More and more psychologists are now beginning to believe that a number of key psychological components are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/20/david-cameron-anti-terror-strategy-wrong-expert-says">fundamental to the radicalisation process</a>. These include motivation, group ideologies and social processes that encourage progressive distancing from former friends, for example. Rather than measuring to predict, we might be better off devoting resources to improve understanding of what motivates individuals to join the ranks of violent extremists. Is it the fundamental human need to matter that makes people seek out others who share their reality? Psychological <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24128318">evidence indicates</a> the quest for significance may indeed be an important driver of extremist behaviour.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171122/original/file-20170526-6389-lemc8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The so-called Islamic State (IS).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alibaba2k16/wikipedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, it is clear that a number of complicated factors are directly and indirectly related to radicalisation. Personality and cognitive performance may change over time and therefore seem irrelevant for prediction purposes. But it is important to note that many in society are vulnerable to being <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15228932.2013.817890?src=recsys&journalCode=wfpp20">manipulated and managed by terrorist groups</a> to perform terrorist acts because of a cognitive impairment, disability or mental illness.</p>
<p>Accepting that prediction may never be possible because of the complex, evolving nature of terrorism might improve the nature of research in this domain. Quality psychological research aimed at searching for markers of the radicalisation process, such as changes in dress, behaviour and social circles – which appear to have been present in the case of Abedi and others – may be fruitful. Indeed de-radicalisation schemes are <a href="http://gelfand.umd.edu/KruglanskiGelfand(2014).pdf">increasingly important</a> in the fight against terrorism. </p>
<p>Luckily, the more we find out about terrorists’ quest for significance the better we can understand the identity and social issues that are fundamental to radicalisation. So there’s every reason to be optimistic that psychology can be a powerful tool in the fight against terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Coral Dando does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new study suggests that distorted moral cognition is what set terrorists apart from the rest of us.Coral Dando, Professor of Psychology, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/782432017-05-24T15:23:39Z2017-05-24T15:23:39ZManchester attack: now is the time to properly talk about ‘radicalisation’<p>It can be hard to know what to say at a time like this. In these hours when the same words – terrorism, security, threat, radicalisation – will be repeated over and over again, it can often feel like it’s better to just keep silent.</p>
<p>Even as a researcher, who looks to understand extremism in the context of the <a href="http://www.oapen.org/search?keyword=loud+and+proud">everyday lives of young people</a>, silence seems a compelling option right now. But although we might not know what to say today, in the long term, reaching our goal of creating a more secure society means we have to keep talking. </p>
<p>“Radicalisation” is what, post-9/11, we have come to call the process of becoming a terrorist. And the word itself has become <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306396812454984">politically charged and divisive</a>. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly then, the overwhelming majority of radicalisation researchers work within <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2013.802984">terrorism studies</a>. They produce ever more complex models identifying both the <a href="http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/1256627851.pdf">personal qualities and contextual factors</a> that lead people on a path to violent extremism. </p>
<h2>Anger and alienation</h2>
<p>Yet, even leading researchers in the field conclude that <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716208317539">attempts to profile terrorists have failed</a>. The fact remains that <a href="http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/3/">there is simply no reliable way of identifying</a> who will become a security risk before they do so. </p>
<p>Any search for potential terrorists is likely to identify many more people who will never commit violence with radical view. And where these young people are wrongly categorised as a “security threat”, policies designed to make society safer, in practice simply embed anger and alienation. </p>
<p>Radicalisation discourse in this way can be dangerously counterproductive. For young Muslims in Europe, it may be experienced as a way to label and even criminalise legitimate criticism of state policy – especially foreign policy. </p>
<p>While simultaneously, a perceived “silencing” about radical Islamism – the labelling of criticism of Islam, or of its use for violent political ends, as racism – <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-954X.12269">may fuel radicalisation on the far right</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed it is important to remember that radical views are not confined to any particular community. And in the long term, far right or anti-Islamist radicalisation may, in its ability to sow the seeds of division, be more of a threat to society than Islamist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Rethinking radicalisation</h2>
<p>For some the study of “radicalisation” might offer a research agenda aimed at improving policies on security and social well-being. For others, it is a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306396812454984">government-funded industry</a> in which academics are complicit in stigmatising Muslim populations. So, if we want to understand the challenges of violent extremism for young lives today, do we embrace or reject radicalisation studies?</p>
<p>The DARE – <a href="http://www.manchester.ac.uk/discover/news/major-international-project-to-research-radicalisation--fundamentalism/">Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality</a> – project coordinated by the University of Manchester chooses neither starting point. Instead, it sets out to rethink the radicalisation research agenda. It asks questions about society, not security, about everyday lives, not routes to terrorism. And it seeks answers that can be employed to strengthen dialogue and understanding – not defences and borders.</p>
<p>It also aims to develop a social research agenda on radicalisation that is distinct from terrorism studies and which includes both Islamist and anti-Islamist (extreme right) radicalism. </p>
<p>This approach focuses not on terrorist events or individuals, but on the social environment in which radicalisation messages are encountered. It understands these encounters as part of the everyday and it sees young people not as vulnerable to radicalisation but as reflective individuals facing radicalisation choices.</p>
<h2>Encounters and choices</h2>
<p>By understanding radicalisation not as a pathway to violent extremism but as everyday encounters, researchers are able to engage in open and honest dialogue with young people. We will be able to observe the encounters young people have with those who hold radical ideas and their responses to them. And in so doing, we may be able to understand more about why and how people do and do not become violent extremists. </p>
<p>Perhaps most importantly, this social approach will also allow us to chart pathways to “non-radicalisation” and to, understand and mobilise the everyday strategies young people already use to challenge radicalisation. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the Manchester attack, we face difficult conversations. Just how do we marry the need for our young people to be safe with their right to live freely? How do we prevent violent extremism but avoid labelling and discriminating against communities who share those same aims? The answers are far from obvious. But silence is not an adequate response. It is time to talk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hilary Pilkington is coordinator of the DARE (Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality) project which is funded from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 725349.</span></em></p>In the aftermath, we face difficult conversations about society, but we cannot shy away from them.Hilary Pilkington, Professor of Sociology, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/772012017-05-07T12:41:49Z2017-05-07T12:41:49ZIntegrating radical fighters who return home isn’t easy, but can be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167957/original/file-20170504-20192-zwzt25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisians demonstrate against the return of jihadists fighting for extremist groups abroad </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Zoubeir Souissi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thousands of youths have been recruited by terrorist groups from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia and America. Between 2011 and 2016 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_foreign_fighter_returnees_reintegration_challenge_112016_en.pdf">the number of “foreign fighters”</a> rose to more than 42,000 – among them <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20161011-europe-prisons-jihadists-recruitment-study-islamic-state-group-terrorism">5000 Westerners</a> and close to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil">7000 North Africans</a>. They had travelled to the Middle East to join jihadist organisations such as the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) and the Syrian Fateh al-Sham Front (ex-Al-Nusra), a former al Qaeda affiliate. </p>
<p>By early 2016, almost a third of these foreign fighters had returned to their <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_foreign_fighter_returnees_reintegration_challenge_112016_en.pdf">countries of origin</a>. Now that IS is suffering serious military setbacks, the flow of foreign fighters seems to have dwindled. More returnees can be expected to follow in the near future. </p>
<p>In North Africa, hundreds of men and women who joined IS or Fateh al-Sham Front have returned home with combat experience. They pose a major security threat to the region. At least <a href="http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/02/25/around-400-tunisians-have-returned-from-war-in-syria-interior-minister-says">400</a> Tunisians have, so far, returned to the country. Authorities are concerned they could be coordinating new attacks with terrorist networks.</p>
<p>These fears are not without foundation. Terrorist groups like IS continue to encourage those within Europe and Africa (whether returnees or supporters) <a href="http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-council-ctc-foreign-fighters-returnees-policy-options-14799-16.pdf">to carry out attacks from their home nations</a>.</p>
<p>So how should governments manage these returnees? It’s not an easy question to answer but <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/syria-returnee-seeks-prevent-others-becoming-violent-extremists/">accounts</a> of <a href="https://www.apnews.com/b9b54744173746beb1e07502904ec56f">returnees</a> provide some insights. What’s clear is that there are many facets of radicalised youth – and that there’s no single solution to eradicate this social evil.</p>
<p>What the available evidence suggests is that governments must respond realistically to a complex problem. And they need to accept that opting for the reintegration of (former) terrorists to minimise the possibilities of future violence is not adopting a soft approach. Realistically, it’s the only approach.</p>
<h2>Refugees and migrants are not terrorists</h2>
<p>The fear of further attacks has driven the media to draw a link between anti-terror measures and immigration policy that is “analytically and statistically unfounded, and must change”, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-terrorism-link-migration-un-expert-report-no-evidence-isis-uses-route-human-rights-a7377961.html">according to Ben Emmerson</a>, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights. </p>
<p>The report recommends that countries should realise the vast majority of Syrian refugees and others are victims of terrorism. They must not be regarded as potential suspects. It also calls on states to respect migrants’ fundamental rights and warns that attempts to snub asylum seekers or detain migrants are a violation of human rights and international refugee law. Emmerson warned that operations to stop migration may also increase <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-terrorism-link-migration-un-expert-report-no-evidence-isis-uses-route-human-rights-a7377961.html">the risk of attacks in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>This suggests the vital need for strategies that address issues of migration and refugees, and the risks that returning foreign fighters may pose.</p>
<p>Unlike refugees or migrants, foreign fighters returning from the conflict in Syria and Iraq are a serious security threat at home and internationally. While in the war zone, they joined terrorist networks, adopted techniques like suicide bombings and beheadings, and set up ties with other jihadists around the globe.</p>
<p>Different countries have different mitigating factors that limit the danger. The presence of tough and focused security services is particularly important. Several countries in Africa and Europe have developed an individual risk management and analysis for returnees. These people are categorised according to the duration they spent in the war zone, what they did there and their goal after their return.</p>
<p>Criminal trials are favoured in most European and African countries for dealing with returnees. But trials don’t usually result in convictions; evidence against the returnees is often lacking.</p>
<p>This shows the critical need for a comprehensive approach that gets local authorities and social partners involved. These could include, for example, Child Protection Services, Social Services and the health sector. </p>
<h2>Strategies to combat the risks</h2>
<p>North African nations must decide how to handle returnees.</p>
<p>Tunisia has around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tunisia-breeding-ground-islamic-state-fighters">2,400</a>. The country has <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/2/28/tunisia-returning-jihadists-highlight-desperate-need-for-prison-reform">poor rehabilitation processes and policies in place</a>.
Morocco had an estimated <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C46_msb.pdf">1,500</a> citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq as of October 2015. Some returnees have been jailed, but the country still needs to develop an effective strategy to deal with others. </p>
<p>Some decision makers seem to feel that returnees will always be terrorists who present a permanent threat to national security. But a dialogue is necessary with the returnees. They must be retrained and reintegrated into their own societies. </p>
<p>To make reintergration feasible, the government must take an all-inclusive approach. This would entail including returnees’ families, neighbourhoods and local communities in the process. It also requires partnership with government, schools, universities, civil society organisations, and the private sector. </p>
<h2>Deradicalisation and reintegration</h2>
<p>The deradicalisation of (former) terrorists or extremists can be viewed as a process geared at ensuring their reintegration into society in a way that minimises the chances they will resort to terrorism-related activity.</p>
<p>Reintegration plans must therefore be flexible and tailored to an individual’s specific background and motives. </p>
<p>The deradicalisation programme, which combines education with anti-violence training, is an attempt to disentangle the individual’s sense of hatred from his or her political vision of the world and address both the motives behind their hate sentiments. It also aims to reintroduce them to democratic values and peaceful ways of expressing their feelings and viewpoints.</p>
<p>Numerous <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/sr402-returning-foreign-fighters-and-the-reintegration-imperative.pdf">reintegration programmes</a> are already underway in Tunisia, Morocco, and many European countries. Most cover a range of activities such as religious and psychological counselling, vocational skills training, education and recreation.</p>
<p>Reintegration programmes should include both deradicalisation and disengagement-based efforts. Deradicalisation, which emphasises erasing violent ideologies from extremists’ minds, is very crucial. But it should be considered one of many possible options through which to limit the possibilities of recidivism.</p>
<p>In this context information sharing, as well as social media monitoring relevant to conflict zones, is of paramount importance.</p>
<p>More research initiatives should be carried out in close cooperation with policy makers and experts. This will enable the successful reintegration of terrorists and extremists in society.</p>
<p>Finally, there is a need for an optimistic environment to send a clear message of hope to migrants, refugees, youth and communities. Governments should continue building relations with them, gaining their trust – and deriving intelligence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moha Ennaji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trying to reintegrate foreign fighters who return home shouldn’t be considered the soft option. Governments in countries like Morocco and Tunisia need to respond realistically to a complex problem.Moha Ennaji, Professor of Linguistics, Gender, and Cultural Studies, International Institute for Languages and CulturesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/696052016-12-13T16:20:40Z2016-12-13T16:20:40ZFar right threat has slipped under the radar of a counter-extremism strategy targeting Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149643/original/image-20161212-26056-7ljim4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looking the right way?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yorkman/shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late November, Ben Wallace MP, the security minister, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-10-31/debates/D67A3442-5433-4F42-A51D-38618DF4FBC8/OnlineRadicalisation">told British parliamentarians</a> that there had been an increase in the number of people from the far-right being referred to deradicalisation programmes. This followed the conviction of Thomas Mair for the murder in June of the MP Jo Cox, who had been outspoken in her support for her constituency’s ethnic and religious diversity. The judge <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-found-guilty-of-jo-cox-murder">said</a> Mair’s act of “lone-wolf” terrorism was inspired by “an admiration for Nazis and similar anti-democratic white supremacist creeds”. </p>
<p>On December 12, the government <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/national-action-british-neo-nazi-group-to-be-classed-as-terror-organisation-and-banned-first-time-a7468136.html">moved</a> to proscribe a neo-Nazi group called National Action. This is welcome, particularly as in recent years the government’s counter-extremism strategy has been heavily targeting those suspected of “Islamist” extremism, and not doing enough to stop those who espouse anti-Muslim hate and anti-Semitism online. </p>
<h2>Most affected group</h2>
<p>The government has two tools it can use to address the growth of extremism in the UK. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-people-were-referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year">A deradicalisation programme</a> called Channel was piloted in 2007 to deal with those people suspected of being drawn into extremism. Since then, the programme has expanded significantly. In 2015, the government introduced the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf">Prevent</a> duty, a requirement on schools and universities to report those vulnerable to radicalisation. </p>
<p>My <a href="http://faith-matters.org/2016/05/18/numbers-counter-terrorism-powers-disproportionately-affect-ethnic-religious-minorities-britain/">analysis</a>, based on a freedom of information disclosure from the <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/099%2015%20Channel%20Referrals.pdf">National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)</a>, showed that before the Prevent duty was introduced, Muslims were already far more likely to be referred to the Channel programme than non-Muslims. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/069%2016%20Channel%20Referrals.doc">NPCC data</a> demonstrates that counter-extremism powers continue to be used disproportionately on individuals with Muslim backgrounds. For example, the referral of Muslims aged under 18 far outpaces the referral of their counterparts from any other religion. Across England and Wales, Muslims were 50 times as likely as Christians to be referred to Channel between March 2014 and March 2016.</p>
<iframe id="datawrapper-chart-nU3HI" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/nU3HI/2/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>While these calculations are only indicative, the absolute number is more revealing: of the 1,747 under-18s referred to Channel between March 2014 and March 2016, 1,194 of them (68%) were Muslim. To put this in context, just over 8% of under-18s in England and Wales are Muslim, according to the <a href="http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/DC2107EW">2011 Census</a>. </p>
<p>Another <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/043%2016%20NPCC%20response%20att%2001%20of%2001%2014042016.pdf">NPCC disclosure</a> shows that from March 2012 to the end of March 2016, the vast majority of referrals were for “Islamist” extremists. During this period, the number of “Islamists” referred to the Channel deradicalisation programme increased at a much higher rate than referrals for the “far right”, as the graph below shows. </p>
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<p>In 2015-16, the first financial year in which the Prevent duty applied – there was an 82% increase in referrals for “Islamists” and a 74% increase in referrals for the “far right”. While referrals for right-wing extremism have also increased, the increase has not kept pace with referrals for “Islamism”.</p>
<p>Of all people referred to Channel from 2012 to 2016, 40% of them were judged by Channel panels, composed of police officers and officials from the local authority, the NHS, and other safeguarding bodies, not to be in any need of deradicalisation support. The remaining 60% were recommended for <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">deradicalisation programmes</a>.</p>
<h2>An outdated strategy</h2>
<p>Prevent and Channel are optimised for detecting and referring Muslims that might be under the influence of extremism. While there is improvement with regard to referring right-wing extremists, much is going unchallenged. The <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/">Tell MAMA (Monitoring anti-Muslim Attacks)</a> charity, where I am also a senior researcher, records increasing numbers of anti-Muslim incidents and crimes every year. </p>
<p>Part of the problem is the government’s outdated understanding of the dynamics of contemporary right-wing extremism and white supremacy. The current <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf">Counter-Extremism Strategy</a> cites the Stormfront forum, a neo-Nazi site started by a Ku Klux Klan member in the early 1990s. Stormfront is certainly an important site for right-wing extremists to communicate, but they have started to rely more on social media platforms to spread their ideology. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the primary platforms of right-wing radicalisation – just as they are for <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-radical-groups-like-islamic-state-use-social-media-to-attract-recruits-58014">“Islamist” extremism</a>. </p>
<p>Britain First, for example, fashions itself as a group of “patriots” who use a massive Facebook following of over 1.5m to disseminate anti-Muslim memes as well as videos of their “Christian patrols” in Muslim neighbourhoods. Other blogs such as Farenheit 211, recently <a href="http://www.fahrenheit211.net/2016/11/20/have-you-played-pakemon-yet-catch-and-deport-them-all/">advertised</a> a <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/anti-jihadi-frog-account-linked-racist-pokemon-stickers-london/">grossly offensive campaign</a> in which racist stickers were placed on London’s public transport network and which led to an arrest in <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/man-arrested-over-racist-pmon-stickers-found-on-tube-network-a3409901.html">early December</a>.</p>
<p>Twitter took down <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/05/twitter-deletes-isis-accounts-terrorism-online">125,000 pro-ISIS extremist accounts</a> after political pressure between mid-2015 and early 2016. Yet in the past, Tell MAMA <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2895458/Facebook-Twitter-allowing-Islamophobia-spread-refusing-report-offensive-postings.html">struggled</a> to suspend an account that calls for the mass deportation of Muslims. To Twitter’s credit, it has now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/17/alt-right-fake-black-twitter-accounts-hate-speech-ban">started to act</a> on blocking “alt-right” accounts, but this has been too little, too late. </p>
<p>It is time for politicians and social media platforms to take more responsibility for countering right-wing extremist content on social media platforms. Some might object, suggesting that these groups are non-violent, pose no threat to the safety of the public and that religiously-motivated extremists are surely the bigger threat. Yet, <a href="https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-final-report">research has demonstrated</a> that ideological networks can lead to lone-actor terrorism such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 and Mair’s murder of Cox in 2016. Research has also <a href="http://www.springer.com/gb/book/9789400729803">shown</a> that right-wing extremists constitute the largest proportion of lone-actor terrorists and are the most deadly. </p>
<p>In light of the threat, it is imperative that the government understands that right-wing extremism plays a significant threat to the stability of diverse communities across the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bharath Ganesh is a Senior Researcher at Tell MAMA, a project of Faith Matters. His doctoral studies in Geography at University College London, focussing on multiculturalism, race, and tolerance, were funded by The Bonnart Trust (<a href="http://www.fbbtrust.org.uk">www.fbbtrust.org.uk</a>). Views expressed in this article are the author's own do not represent those of Tell MAMA or Faith Matters.</span></em></p>Despite the growing threat from far-right groups, deradicalisation programmes have been largely targeting Muslims.Bharath Ganesh, Researcher in multiculturalism, hate crime, and extremism, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641442016-08-19T13:40:39Z2016-08-19T13:40:39ZHow can Anjem Choudary be stopped from radicalising other prisoners?<p>Anjem Choudary, who <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37098751">has been convicted</a> of inviting support for Islamic State, is not the first Islamist ideologue to spend time in a British prison. He follows in the footsteps of other high-profile preachers such as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11701269">Abu Hamza</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/25/abu-qatada-human-rights-law-secret-justice">Abu Qatada</a>, and like them, he now poses a special challenge for the prison authorities. Can he be de-radicalised? Will he radicalise other prisoners and is he as dangerous in prison as he was outside of it?</p>
<p>Over the past ten years the prison system in England and Wales has completely transformed the way it manages and tries to reform extremist prisoners. Ground-breaking <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Prisons-Terrorism-and-Extremism-Critical-Issues-in-Management-Radicalisation/Silke/p/book/9780415810388">new programmes and systems</a> have been introduced specifically to tackle the problems posed by Islamist extremists. Prison radicalisation is frequently flagged up as a major concern, but terrorist and extremist prisoners actually make up a tiny minority of the prison population. Just 183 prisoners were incarcerated for terrorism-related offences within a prison population of more than 85,000 inmates at the end of 2014. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2014/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-and-searches-quarterly-update-to-31-d">About two thirds</a> of these were connected to extremist Islamist groups, with the remaining third largely composed of far-right extremists. </p>
<h2>Tight security</h2>
<p>The prison system divides terrorist prisoners into three groups: international, domestic and Irish. International terrorists (regardless of nationality) are those connected to a terrorist group that is based outside the UK. This includes all prisoners affiliated to or inspired by groups such as Al Qaeda or Islamic State. It is this category that Choudary will fall under.</p>
<p>In security terms, Choudary will, at least initially, be classified as a Category A prisoner. Category A is applied to those prisoners considered highly dangerous and for whom escape should be made impossible. All terrorism-related prisoners are automatically categorised as Category A on their entry into the system.</p>
<p>Category A prisoners must be held at high-security prisons. There are currently <a href="https://www.justice.gov.uk/contacts/prison-finder/high-security">eight high security prisons</a> in England and Wales and combined they hold more than 3,000 prisoners (but only around half of these inmates are Category A). The last Category A terrorist prisoner escape in England and Wales occurred in 1994 when <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ira-escape-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen-1388101.html">five IRA prisoners escaped from HMP Whitemoor</a>, an incident which prompted a major overhaul in the security surrounding such prisoners.</p>
<h2>Restrictions on prisoners</h2>
<p>One benefit of the tighter security restrictions imposed on Category A prisoners is that it makes it more difficult for them to attempt to radicalise other prisoners. Category A prisoners do not share cells and their interactions with other prisoners are closely monitored. This is particularly the case with extremist prisoners, and an ideologue such as Choudary will be monitored very closely. </p>
<p>But there are significant costs. The enhanced security means that it <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/.../costs-per-place.">costs almost £60,000 a year</a> to hold a Category A prisoner, twice the cost of holding Category B and Category C prisoners. </p>
<p>The rise of Islamist terrorism in the UK in the 2000s brought about further major changes. It was quickly realised the jihadi-inspired terrorists were very different to the IRA prisoners seen in the previous 30 years. There were very few prison staff from Muslim backgrounds and there was a real lack of understanding of the culture and mind-set of the Islamists. There were also real fears that the jihadis would try to radicalise other prisoners and could turn prisons into breeding grounds for violent extremism.</p>
<p>In order to combat this threat, prisons in England and Wales developed one of the best funded and organised prison Imam systems in the world. The prison Imams provide religious support and guidance for all Muslim prisoners and help ensure that extremists cannot takeover the role of religious leader on the wings (something which happened <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-014-9183-x">in French jails</a> in recent years). </p>
<h2>De-radicalisation tools</h2>
<p>The imams play a key role in educating prisoners on the true tenants of mainstream Islam. A religious de-radicalisation programme, Al Furqan, <a href="https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publications/psj/prison-service-journal-203">was also developed</a> in 2011. This targeted the beliefs of extremist prisoners in particular and tried to work with them to embrace a more moderate faith. To the great surprise of many, however, this important programme was scrapped by Michael Gove in 2015 shortly after he <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/justice-committee/news-parliament-20151/radicalisation-in-prisons-evidence-16-17/">assumed control of the Ministry of Justice</a>. </p>
<p>A programme that thankfully survived the Gove era is Healthy Identity Intervention (HII). <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Fa3mAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT105&lpg=PT105&dq=The+Healthy+Identity+Intervention:+The+UK%E2%80%99s+development+of+a+psychologically+informed+intervention+to+address+extremist+offending,&source=bl&ots=A_fsdsDF-O&sig=aTFM7tEhu9lZpTTzOOwRCi9dLTs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOmbbHlMvOAhVJI8AKHcfbBasQ6AEILjAC#v=onepage&q=The%20Healthy%20Identity%20Intervention%3A%20The%20UK%E2%80%99s%20development%20of%20a%20psychologically%20informed%20intervention%20to%20address%20extremist%20offending%2C&f=false">This involves</a> specially trained psychologists or experienced probation staff working one-to-one (or sometimes two-to-one) with an extremist prisoner. Over a series of weekly sessions, which can continue for several months, the programme focuses on helping prisoners to disengage from an extremist group or ideology.</p>
<p>Another important tool developed within prisons is Extremism Risk Guidance 22+. This is the assessment framework used for terrorist and extremist prisoners. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-offender-management-service">National Offender Management Service</a> recognised that the existing risk assessments used for ordinary prisoners were a bad fit for terrorist prisoners. Launched in 2011, <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/tam/2/1/40/">ERG22+ assesses offenders</a> on 22 factors which are theoretically related to extremist offending. Staff use the model to assess an individual’s mindset and capability for terrorism. They will try to interview the prisoner as part of this assessment, and for example, an individual’s progress on the HII can feed into it. </p>
<p>Choudary will certainly be assessed using the ERG framework and in time he will also be given the chance to take part in the HII programme. Whether he accepts that opportunity or not is another matter. A third of extremist prisoners <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Prisons-Terrorism-and-Extremism-Critical-Issues-in-Management-Radicalisation/Silke/p/book/9780415810388">have refused to take part</a> and among the recalcitrants are many senior figures. I suspect that Choudary will follow their example and turn down involvement in HII or similar programmes.</p>
<p>In February 2016, the former prime minister, David Cameron, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prison-reform-prime-ministers-speech">announced</a> that mandatory de-radicalisation programmes would be introduced for extremist prisoners. This was before Britain’s vote to leave the European Union and when Gove was still in charge at the Ministry of Justice. Nothing further about these mandatory programmes has been announced and I wonder if this is really a feasible option anyway. There is general <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Prisons-Terrorism-and-Extremism-Critical-Issues-in-Management-Radicalisation/Silke/p/book/9780415810388">international consensus</a> that prison de-radicalisation programmes do not work with hardline prisoners who are deeply committed to the cause.</p>
<p>Nevertheless this does not mean that Choudary will leave prison unchanged. Prison does provide a time for contemplation. Ultimately, in prison Choudary will be forced to reflect on his life, his priorities, and crucially what will he do after release. As the years pass by, change in some form could come from within or outside of official de-radicalisation programmes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Silke has received funding from the National Offender Management Service. </span></em></p>The Islamist ideologue will be closely monitored, but is unlikely to cooperate with prison de-radicalisation initiatives.Andrew Silke, Head of Criminology and Director of Terrorism Studies, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/631442016-08-17T11:41:15Z2016-08-17T11:41:15ZWe can all be a little radicalised: recognising this will help tackle extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132375/original/image-20160728-12106-q6wo3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zbynek Jirousek/www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/16/anjem-choudary-convicted-of-supporting-islamic-state">conviction</a> of radical Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary for swearing allegiance to Islamic State shows that those breaking the law by inviting support for a terrorist organisation can and will be prosecuted. But it comes at a time when the British government <a href="https://theconversation.com/chorus-of-concern-over-britains-counter-extremism-strategy-grows-louder-62931">is still struggling</a> with definitions of extremism and radicalisation, and how to respond to those who don’t break the law. </p>
<p>Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/105/10502.htm?utm_source=105&utm_medium=fullbullet&utm_campaign=modulereports">recently flagged up new concerns</a> about the government’s counter-extremism strategy but we have had around a decade of these debates. Back in 2008, in the wake of the London 7/7 bombings, then Labour home secretary Jacqui Smith <a href="http://www.ukpol.co.uk/2016/05/23/jacqui-smith-2008-speech-on-preventing-violent-extremism/">spoke of</a> “extremist groups who are careful to avoid promoting violence”. The same year, the Department for Communities and Local Government <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtconren/166/166we40.htm#note64">created a list</a> of British values: “human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all”. Vocal or active opposition to what are now known as <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380595/SMSC_Guidance_Maintained_Schools.pdf">fundamental British values</a> has since been defined as extremism. This marks out certain attitudes as potentially dangerous, even if they do not incite violence. </p>
<p>I say it’s time for a rethink, and that it should be through reclaiming the concept of radicalisation.</p>
<h2>On a journey</h2>
<p>The government has defined and tackled non-violent or “legal” extremism through a strategy known as <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">Prevent</a>. The Prevent duty requires public authorities to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and it also includes the promotion of fundamental British values. Those judged to be at risk of violent radicalisation can be referred to a multi-agency programme called <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">Channel</a>. </p>
<p>Such programmes are founded on the idea that radicalisation is a process. This makes sense: people aren’t born terrorists, nor do they wake up one day with a whole new mindset. Radicalisation is something that starts small and can get bigger. But it can also be reversed – and often is; usually not ending in violence or other illegal behaviour.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Researching_Marginalized_Groups.html?id=HoIFoQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">own ongoing work</a>, I have examined the radicalisation journeys of both radical Islamist and far-right activists, using the term “micro-radicalisations” for the small parts of this journey. In 2009, in the months before the radical Islamist group led by Choudary called al-Muahjiroun and later Islam4UK <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jan/11/islam4uk-al-muhajiroun-ban-laws">was banned</a> as a terrorist group in the UK, I spent nine months of my PhD fieldwork with a local branch of the group.</p>
<p>I interviewed all but one of the six key activists, and spent many, many hours sitting with them at street stalls and attending their public meetings. One of the lead activists reflected on his time in secondary school. He had grown up in a Muslim family, but he was not “practising”, and used fasting as a way to wind up the teacher that eventually, he said, resulted in a physical confrontation and the teacher responding with “get back to your own country”.</p>
<p>Another participant, a British National Party (BNP) activist interviewed for the same study, told me of feeling envious as the Asian children in his class got extra attention due to language difficulties. Others told me of experiences in their later teens and twenties, where they experienced police racism or conflict between ethnically defined gangs. Anger about one thing led to actions that would then be met with an angry response from others, creating a vicious cycle. Any involvement in a far-right or Islamist group ended up with further conflict with the police, other extremist groups or other young men just wanting to start a confrontation with the group, fuelling more anger. After the ban, some of the al-Muhajiroun interviewees went far enough to end up with terrorism-related convictions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132366/original/image-20160728-12106-vx6po9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Where do you draw the line?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">af8images/www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Accusing everybody</h2>
<p>These earlier micro-radicalisations do not need to be justified by a fully thought out ideology either. The teenager’s fasting was a facet of young male rebellion, tinged with an incipient identity politics. Even in groups such as the BNP, English Defence League and al-Muhajiroun, <a href="http://indy100.independent.co.uk/article/this-academic-spent-three-years-studying-the-edl-this-is-what-she-discovered--bkuanfycVZ">many people drift away</a>, for all sorts of political and personal reasons. </p>
<p>Anger and even angry violence was clearly there in the backgrounds of the mainstream political and community activists I interviewed too. I met people who had been uncontrollable as kids and who felt that their activism as adults was them giving something back to their community. Others had discovered that getting involved in the local Labour party was a better way of getting the kinds of change they wanted to see.</p>
<p>All this means that assuming that any particular microradicalisation is a pathway to terrorism will inevitably create many false positives – people who are accused of being dangerous to wider society but, in the end, are not. </p>
<p>In fact, restrictions on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/25/prevent-strategy-muslims-children-school">free speech</a> as a result of the Prevent strategy could affect many more people than those who would have gone on to violence or other law-breaking activities. These actions are the government’s own radicalisation, moving it towards more conflict. The Prevent programme is one-sided and its bias towards Muslims has led to it being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/04/prevent-hate-muslims-schools-terrorism-teachers-reject">described</a> as “an exercise in Islamophobia”.</p>
<h2>A fairer approach</h2>
<p>One alternative would be to take in all kinds of radicalisation – green, to the left and to the right, anarchists and more. We could restrict everyone’s speech and action, because we cannot predict which might be a threat in the future. But this would lead to real authoritarianism and end Britain’s commitment to free speech. My preferred approach would be to accept that all of us radicalise and de-radicalise at times, and that society and the state <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/27/sageman-interview_n_3342206.html">should not overreact</a>.</p>
<p>Where lines are drawn – especially between legal and illegal activities – they need to be set in neutral terms, and with a commitment to free speech and political debate. More important, however, is the need to make lower-level responses to any real or assumed radicalisation universal and positive, regardless of their origins. This should be based in a presumption of good will as opposed to a culture of suspicion. It should include helping people to engage in politics, even if some of their views are contentious, as a better way of resolving differences. We are not faced with a choice between banning some things and encouraging everything else.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.earlyyearscareers.com/eyc/latest-news/nursery-raised-fears-radicalisation-drawing/">recent case</a> in which a nursery sought advice on radicalisation for a four-year-old who staff thought had said “cooker bomb” did not need to play out the way it did. A less suspicious, positive approach would mean a teacher faced with a child mispronouncing “cucumber” will be more interested in doing education than worrying about security. This will make for a kinder more civilised politics than one that responds with “get back to your own country”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Bailey received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for his doctoral research. </span></em></p>Many of us go through periods of radicalisation – spotting when this is a danger rather than over-reacting is the key.Gavin Bailey, Research Associate, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/626802016-07-22T01:12:07Z2016-07-22T01:12:07ZCalls for deradicalisation programs after Nice attack should be met with caution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131184/original/image-20160720-7903-1fkp838.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are calls for Australia to focus on early intervention strategies to steer young people away from the path to radicalisation in the wake of events like the Nice attack.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Eric Gaillard</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A heated <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4485524.htm">Q&A panel this week</a> managed to agree on one thing: in the wake of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/nice-attack">horrific terrorist attack in Nice</a>, there is a greater need in Australia for early intervention strategies to steer young people away from the path to radicalisation.</p>
<p>Given the serious threat Australia and many other countries face from Islamic-State-inspired terrorism, it is difficult to disagree with the idea that prevention is better than cure. When a 15-year-old radicalised boy can <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/parramatta-shooting-curtis-cheng-was-on-his-way-home-when-shot-dead-20151003-gk0ibk.html">shoot an innocent man</a> in broad daylight on a city street, something clearly needs to be done to ensure vulnerable youth do not become radicalised and commit acts of terrorism.</p>
<p>At the same time, calls for greater investments in deradicalisation programs overlook the significant problems that can be caused by national policy strategies for countering violent extremism.</p>
<p>The UK’s experience with its <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">Prevent strategy</a> over nearly a decade urges caution in how Australia should approach its own efforts to counter the threat of radicalisation.</p>
<h2>What do the programs aim to achieve?</h2>
<p>Countering violent extremism programs became a focus of domestic counter-terrorism strategies after the London bombings in 2005.</p>
<p>They are receiving renewed funding and attention in response to terrorism associated with Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p>These programs supplement coercive counter-terrorism powers by tackling terrorism’s underlying causes. They encompass a variety of policy measures, ranging from community-run projects and cultural activities to more targeted intervention programs aimed at deradicalising young people who show early signs of radicalisation. </p>
<h2>What’s happening in Australia?</h2>
<p>Australia came relatively late to the idea that its coercive counter-terrorism laws should be supplemented with a national program to counter violent extremism.</p>
<p>In the <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2010-11/content/bp2/html/">2010 federal budget</a>, the Rudd government allocated A$9.7 million over four years to such efforts. Much of this supported a community-based grants scheme for “building resilient communities”.</p>
<p>The Abbott government initially dropped this funding, although it later announced <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/08/26/tony-abbott-announces-64-million-combat-home-grown-terrorism">$64 million</a> in response to the ongoing terror threat. Nearly $20 million of this was allocated to <a href="https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2014/ThirdQuarter/26August2014%E2%80%94CounterTerrorismMeasuresForASaferAustralia.aspx">community-based and diversionary approaches</a>, with $1.9 million supporting a <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/LivingSafeTogetherGrantsProgramme.aspx">“Living Safe Together”</a> grants program similar to that introduced by Labor. </p>
<p>Details on deradicalisation programs in Australia are scarce. However, the attorney-general’s department notes they are either <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/Intervention-programmes.aspx">established or being developed</a> across Australia. </p>
<h2>What is the UK’s strategy?</h2>
<p>The UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">Prevent strategy</a> is the key overseas example of such a national program. </p>
<p>It is one of four core strands of the UK’s national strategy for countering terrorism, known as <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest">CONTEST</a>. Prevent was supplemented in late 2015 by a national <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy">Counter-Extremism Strategy</a> that tackles the threat of IS-associated terrorism.</p>
<p>Community-based work under Prevent began in 2007. The strategy has since come under continual criticism for aggravating perceptions of surveillance and discrimination in Britain’s Muslim communities. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf">Recurring concerns</a> with Prevent relate to the strategy’s disproportionate focus on Muslim communities, the heavy role police play in overseeing the strategy’s delivery, and its close association with coercive approaches to counter-terrorism. </p>
<p>A police-led intervention program, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance">Channel</a>, is a major driver of these concerns. Under the program, police collect information and conduct risk assessments to determine whether individuals should be referred to a multi-agency support panel. Teachers, health workers and community members are encouraged to identify individuals who might be at risk of radicalisation and refer them to the program. </p>
<p>More recently, significant concern has been expressed about Prevent’s impact on free speech and <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/opinion/universities-must-not-become-part-of-the-security-apparatus/2017752.article">academic freedom</a>. Teachers in British schools and universities <a href="http://www.ox.ac.uk/staff/working_at_oxford/policies_procedures/prevent-duty">now receive training</a> to help identify signs of radicalisation in their students. <a href="https://theconversation.com/teaching-terror-what-role-for-schools-in-countering-violent-extremism-44080">Similar debates</a> are playing out in Australia.</p>
<p>The Cameron government identified and sought to remedy many of these issues in a 2011 review of Prevent. However, significant concerns remain. </p>
<p>Recently, the UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation called for an independent review of Prevent because it “has become a more <a href="http://togetheragainstprevent.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Written-evidence-submitted-by-David-Anderson-Q.C..pdf">significant source of grievance</a> in affected communities” than the UK’s counter-terrorism laws. </p>
<h2>What next for Australia?</h2>
<p>It seems uncontentious to suggest that coercive counter-terrorism laws should be supplemented with community-based programs to counter violent extremism. </p>
<p>However, the UK’s experience demonstrates that such programs are not unproblematic. They can equally generate perceptions that governments are unfairly targeting Muslim communities.</p>
<p>It is likely that Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull will <a href="https://theconversation.com/placing-the-terror-threat-in-perspective-may-help-provide-a-nuanced-response-44407">develop a more constructive dialogue</a> with Australia’s Muslim communities about the threat of terrorism than his predecessor did. But given the significant ongoing threat, the push for more targeted approaches to deradicalisation in Australia is likely to be strong. </p>
<p>Calls for greater investments in deradicalisation need to be followed by a careful discussion as to how Australia will approach its national efforts to counter violent extremism. </p>
<p>It is important to remember that such programs are not one type of strategy. They can emphasise a community-led approach, or they can emphasise the need for police to identify and deradicalise young people who pose a potential security threat.</p>
<p>The UK’s experience would urge strongly against the latter. What is needed is genuine consultation with Australia’s Muslim communities as to how young individuals at risk can best be provided with the support they need to avoid being radicalised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62680/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keiran Hardy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UK’s experience with its Prevent strategy over nearly a decade urges caution in how Australia should approach its own efforts to counter the threat of radicalisation.Keiran Hardy, Lecturer, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/536522016-02-04T12:11:24Z2016-02-04T12:11:24ZExplainer: what happens to people who are suspected of being ‘radicalised’?<p>Channel – the UK government’s “deradicalisation” programme – is <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/098%2015%20Channel%20Referrals.pdf">growing</a>. More people are being referred for support, including a significant number of <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/more-900-british-children-identified-6080066">under 18-year-olds</a>. Four out of five of these referrals are <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx">dropped</a>. </p>
<p>So why are so many people being referred apparently unnecessarily, and what happens to those who do go on to receive support?</p>
<p><a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/TAM/2012/201210TAMChannelFactsheet.pdf">Channel</a> operates in the “pre-crime” space. Its aim is to prevent people becoming drawn into terrorism by providing tailored support programmes to those deemed at risk. Anyone – including parents – can refer someone. Public sector employees including teachers and social workers are now <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf">statutorily obliged</a> to intervene if they believe an individual is “at risk of radicalisation”. </p>
<p>Identifying people at risk is not easy. <a href="http://ann.sagepub.com/content/618/1/80.abstract">Academic</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1">government</a> research largely agree there is no “terrorist profile”. Even Channel’s <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/TAM/2012/201210TAMChannelFactsheet.pdf">own guidance</a> states: “there is no single way of identifying who is likely to be vulnerable”. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, <a href="http://educateagainsthate.com/">Educate Against Hate</a>, a new website set up by the government to provide information on extremism, sets out a series of <a href="http://www.educateagainsthate.com/teachers/what-are-the-warning-signs-teachers/">warning signs</a>. These include argumentativeness, changes in clothing, spending excessive time online and secretiveness. </p>
<p>Such measures are easy to criticise; after all, many of them are part of normal adolescent development. As a result, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/11/british-muslims-terror-laws-witch-hunt-islam-cage-hizb-ut-tahrir">critics</a> highlight the risk of criminalising normal behaviour and threatens to alienate Muslim communities.</p>
<p>Such criticism shouldn’t overlook the <a href="https://www.tes.com/news/school-news/breaking-views/prevent-strategy-%E2%80%98teachers-aren%E2%80%99t-counter-terroris">experiences</a> of teachers in dealing with safeguarding issues – and the increasing examples of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/jan/12/rules-extremism-teachers-pupils-spy-radicalisation-muslims-p">innovative teaching</a> practices addressing extremism. </p>
<p>That is not to say that potential problems should be ignored. There are legitimate concerns that referral decisions might be influenced by fears of being held responsible if something goes wrong, rather than on the basis of evidence and thoughtful deliberation. </p>
<p>With this, comes the risk of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-32162012">shutting down debate</a> in the classroom and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children">stigmatising</a> young Muslims, which some have argued could be <a href="https://theconversation.com/radicalisation-on-campus-why-new-counter-terror-duties-for-universities-will-not-work-43669">counter-productive. </a></p>
<h2>What happens next</h2>
<p>Once a case has been referred, the first stage of assessment determines if there is a genuine cause for concern, ensuring the case is not “malicious or misinformed”. The second stage involves a risk assessment guided by <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/TAM/2012/201210TAMChannelGuidance.pdf">22 indicators</a> deemed to reflect vulnerability. These range from “spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists”, to “condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others” and “being criminally versatile and using criminal networks to support extremist goals”. </p>
<p>Where the Channel police practitioner and local authority believe a person is “a risk” or “at risk”, the case is referred to a multi-agency panel which determines the most appropriate strategy. A <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf">range of interventions</a> are available, from anger management sessions to education and careers advice, through to theological and ideological mentoring. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CY_jRzvWsAALTOG.jpg">efforts</a> to stress the voluntary, safeguarding nature of the Channel process, more coercive mechanisms are also available to the authorities. If an individual refuses to engage, they may be subject to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06qmpr0">monitoring</a> and surveillance by the police or security services. They can also have their passport seized if the police believe they are likely to try and travel overseas. </p>
<p>Parental consent is required for under 18s to engage with the Channel programme, but if parents refuse the case can be referred to social services if there is believed to be a risk of “significant harm”. Parental consent also seems to be necessary only at the intervention stage, which <a href="https://yahyabirt1.wordpress.com/2015/06/04/safeguarding-little-abdul-prevent-muslim-schoolchildren-and-the-lack-of-parental-consent/">critics</a> argue is too far down the line. </p>
<p>Relatively little research has been carried out on the process and outcome of the Channel process, making it difficult to determine how effective the programme is. The <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19434472.2014.1001421">aims of interventions</a> are not always clear, and there are no publicly accessible evaluations. </p>
<p>Interventions are not always successful. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06qmpr0">One man</a> who was directed to Channel after time in prison for a terrorism offence said he was “entirely suspicious … as far as I was concerned it was a trap, an opportunity to spy on me”. <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/an-interview-with-usman-raja">Where they are</a> effective, mentors based in the community can play a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34073367">positive role</a> in helping to reintegrate people back into society. </p>
<p>In my own <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19434472.2014.1001421">research</a> on community-based work with those convicted of terrorism offences – another population that can fall under Channel’s remit – mentors typically take a holistic approach. Rather than concentrating solely on questions of faith or ideology, they look at the whole range of issues that might be important to the individual. These might include problems with peer groups or family relationships, social exclusion or political grievances. </p>
<p>As one person interviewed for a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2012.666820#.VqdlBlOLSAw">study</a> on mentoring around extremism put it: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This isn’t just about quoting lines from a particular holy book or a particular tradition, it’s about understanding the individual you’re faced with, and what that individual may have gone through may be far more complicated than actually a theological argument. … Theology might be just a way of that individual expressing other issues that may have happened in their lives.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Safeguarding the vulnerable</h2>
<p>It is not unreasonable for the government to try and prevent people becoming involved in terrorism. </p>
<p>The controversy lies in a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/government-terrorism-strategy-criticised-spying-muslims">lack of transparency</a> over how Channel operates, and the challenge of identifying who might be at risk. <a href="http://www.claystone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinking-radicalisation.pdf">Some</a> have argued that it targets young Muslims in the context of wide-ranging legislation which controversially bans “<a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf">non-violent extremism</a>”.</p>
<p>The statutory duty to report those considered “at risk” and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East both help to explain the increase in referrals. This wider social and political context can lead to a more risk-averse approach to referral decisions. It can also make it harder to have those difficult, challenging conversations so vital in developing young people’s <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/preventing-violent-extremism-creating-safe-spaces-negotiating-difference">critical and caring thinking</a>. </p>
<p>What we need is a measured, proportionate response to the genuine challenge posed by militant recruiters and the avenues the conflict in Syria provides for young people to engage in what some come to believe is a glorious new caliphate. There is a great deal at stake.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Marsden has previously received funding from the European Union. </span></em></p>Referrals to the Channel programme are rising. Here’s what happens to people suspected at being at risk.Sarah Marsden, Lecturer in Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/534632016-01-22T11:13:19Z2016-01-22T11:13:19ZWhy English language lessons are not the answer to radicalisation<p>David Cameron used an article in <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4667764.ece">The Times</a> and an interview on Radio 4’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03fthb7">Today</a> show to announce £20m of extra funding to provide English lessons for Muslim women in the UK to prevent them from becoming “second-class citizens”. The prime minister’s announcement has come <a href="https://theconversation.com/david-cameron-should-celebrate-muslim-women-not-strip-them-of-their-identity-53347">in for harsh criticism</a>, particularly <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/2016-01-18/david-cameron-segregation-of-women-in-uk-communities-must-end/">his implication</a> that not speaking English was tied up with a person’s identity and could make someone “more susceptible to the extremist message”. </p>
<p>As a researcher studying the teaching of English as an additional language, my main problem with the proposal is the underlying assumption that if mothers could only speak English fluently then their children would not become radicalised. </p>
<p>This monolingual view of family life ignores the fact that these same mothers will be doubtless trying to raise their children to have sound ethics and morals, ready to make a contribution to society just like any good English-speaking mother – just through another language. </p>
<p>We have no evidence to suggest that there is any link at all between parental level of English and extremism, quite the opposite. Look, for example, at how <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mv2KhkkTfgQ">some of the appeals</a> made by parents of would-be Jihadis who have run off to Syria, are made in entirely fluent Standard English, often with regional accents.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/TelPvR1gxNI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An appeal made by a man whose daughter has gone to Syria.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0105918">2014 study</a> on people’s vulnerability to radicalisation found that migrants not born in the UK, from poorer backgrounds and with strong links to their community were less likely to be radicalised than those from more privileged backgrounds. The English language is not the only form of “social capital” that fights extremism.</p>
<h2>Hypocrisy in a landscape of cuts</h2>
<p>Others have expressed further concerns about the new policy. <a href="https://www.tes.com/news/further-education/breaking-news/camerons-new-english-courses-women-dont-make-ps160m-esol-cuts">Martin Doel</a>, chief executive of the Association of Colleges, pointed out that this new funding, though welcome, “does not make up for a 50% (£160m) reduction in the funds available for teaching ESOL [English for speakers of other languages] courses between 2008 and 2015”. Of this, <a href="https://www.tes.com/news/further-education/breaking-news/esol-funding-cuts-will-have-devastating-impact-thousands">£45m</a> was as recently as July last year. </p>
<p>This recent cut alone was, according to Doel, likely to lead to the closure of as many as 47 colleges offering ESOL classes affecting 17,000 students. While £20m in extra funding may sound a lot, if there actually are some 190,000 Muslim women in need of English tuition – as the <a href="https://fullfact.org/factcheck/immigration/muslim_women_english-50891">prime minister claimed</a> – this would amount to £100 a head. That won’t go far and appears hypocritical in the face of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/adult-education-needs-an-urgent-and-radical-rethink-39391">wider funding squeeze</a> facing adult education.</p>
<p>Others, including the National Association for Teaching English and Community Languages, <a href="http://natecla.org.uk/news/817/ESOL-Funding-for-Muslim-women">have questioned</a> the prioritisation of Muslim women, arguing that to “ensure all migrants integrate successfully into British life … more funding needs to be made available to support both men and women from all religious backgrounds so that they can learn English”. </p>
<p>The main concern over the initiative appears to be suspicions about the government’s motives, with critics alarmed at <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03fthb7">the association</a> the prime minister has made between a lack of English and vulnerability to extremism.</p>
<p>A further concern is over the possibility of deporting mothers if they fail to make sufficient progress in English after two and a half years. “You can’t guarantee you’ll be able to stay if you’re not improving your language,” <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03fthb7">Cameron said</a>.</p>
<p>Any question that <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-says-migrant-families-could-be-broken-up-and-mothers-deported-if-they-fail-new-english-a6818631.html">a spousal visa</a> application could be denied to women who fail an English language test could have extremely serious implications for families. Legal experts <a href="http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-muslim-women-deported-learn-english/22248">have been quick to point out</a> that such deportations could be challenged under the Human Rights Act. </p>
<h2>Security creep into language lessons</h2>
<p>Perhaps the answer to why the government insists with a ramping up of these kind of policies lies in the concept of <a href="http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/13/3/357.short">“securitisation”</a>. This has been explained by language scholar Kamran Khan as the process through which successive UK governments since 9/11 have forged the link between language, immigration and the threat of extremism. </p>
<p>The links are not hard to trace. Back in 2001, speaking in the <a href="http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/westminster_hall/2001/jul/17/urban-communityrelations#S6CV0372P1_20010717_WH_6">House of Commons</a> following local rioting involving Asian youths, Anne Cryer, the Labour MP for Keighley, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We need to examine why those young Asian men were so keen to join in the criminal activity … There is little point in blaming the situation simply on racism and Islamophobia … The main cause is the lack of a good level of English, which stems directly from the established tradition of bringing wives and husbands from the sub-continent who have often had no education and have no English.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2002, the National Immigration and Asylum Act required that immigrants have “sufficient knowledge” of English for citizenship. Three years later the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/life-in-the-uk-test/book-life-in-uk-test">Life in the UK</a> citizenship test was introduced, testing both English and knowledge of British life. A speaking and listening component was added to the test in 2013 – adding on another layer of difficulty to passing the test. </p>
<p>We knew that there would be further incentives and penalties introduced in order to make people learn English, thanks to indications given in a 2015 speech by the home secretary, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values">Theresa May</a>. </p>
<p>But if the government is seriously considering it acceptable to break up families because a mother has failed to make “sufficient progress” in her English, then we should all start to worry about who exactly are the extremists and just where the real threats to our civil society and its values lie.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Monaghan is affiliated with NALDIC (National Association for Language Develoment in the Curriculum), the UK's professional association for people working with EAL in schools.</span></em></p>Beware the security creep into adult education.Frank Monaghan, Senior Lecturer in Education and Language Studies, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/529212016-01-20T13:28:49Z2016-01-20T13:28:49ZWhat philosophy can tell Davos about educating for a better future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108416/original/image-20160118-31807-1ha2rx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C3%2C973%2C659&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Schooling doubt.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/eleaf/2536358399/in/photolist-4S8uZe-8vT9yB-wTgzo-7nxn9-71tSg-6zJVC8-5EMUpb-7vEVHQ-Lzpyo-5zEjFG-59WvCM-6eW5gH-ediLaQ-58vQCQ-8giHbr-72pPYr-h5uim-3pHNnz-BPFGkA-6dsVJK-FEdBM-7m7B7h-8W67ZC-93aPCq-fhRZKU-56eXRT-9YgfFw-c5hru-eAPnji-cRMpS-PmSW-3HEpWd-4bP9Xc-7pweVR-rrtnoF-5xY4fw-aiEhXH-bTQwfx-oqa96H-pW8qre-9UTUaB-9jasn7-bTQwf4-8VcPuq-BmH23n-bP1BNF-7BZHSj-8WCQvB-4LDVPT-cDFsSY">Ethan Lofton</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>How do you create a generation that can think its way out of problems and face the challenges of a rapidly changing world? The Davos meeting this year is all about how we can cope with the immense challenges posed by the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” – an era of rapid and complex technological change, where our role in the world is resting on shifting sands. </p>
<p>The next generation of workers will have to be properly equipped to meet these enormous challenges. I believe that, if well-taught and using high-quality materials, philosophy classes can grant children, in Britain and across the world, extraordinary benefits as that era unfolds.</p>
<p>I will be taking part in several panel discussions at the World Economic Forum 2016 at Davos and as part of this, I will be trying to convince the policy makers and power brokers at the Swiss ski resort that we must insert practical philosophy into the heart of schooling.</p>
<p>Through my roles in the <a href="http://www.bpa.ac.uk/">British Philosophical Association</a> and the <a href="http://philosophyineducationproject.org/">Philosophy in Education project (PEP)</a>, I support the continuation of a philosophy A Level and the introduction of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-there-should-be-a-philosophy-gcse-34497">philosophy GCSE</a>. I would also like to see the introduction of at least a year – ideally many more – of non-examined philosophy classes for all children aged between seven and 14.</p>
<p>The range of ideas and arguments on offer in philosophy classes can show children that there are different ways of thinking and living than those immediately on offer in their own postcode. Philosophy is one of the main subjects which extends a child’s imaginative range of possible lives, and this is true for children from all socio-economic backgrounds. </p>
<p>We are not just products of our genetic inheritance and environment; reason can provide at least a partial way out – but only if reason is properly trained. The challenge is then to avoid circularity: is such a training only possible if one is lucky enough to go to a good school (or, in other words, is the development of reason in fact wholly dependent on one’s immediate environment after all)?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108417/original/image-20160118-31807-cac0tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Opening doors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/klearchos/4761478827/in/photolist-8fKPLx-dojnXv-2chTP-r3gh5D-a4aUPj-AedkG1-55oBAY-7w8g1E-4JuXsm-8Xcuzw-avYLM2-u9mbhM-ekmrK3-7sf9ao-aVhv3-8AarqY-6XNed5-6YacYj-yEWgZu-BpyDoB-4DGxM1-6aipGp-615Wzw-ueGqAq-2tAibW-i95ZRK-qSf4q9-38jDwi-aUgaPB-2k1JSF-gMKfti-rrLHn2-5V3Kdy-eNk6G-92vTPd-d8NyVf-dgg7gd-8ftFVS-ekxJt3-6pJU6-6e7y2V-apsScZ-9ixW2J-aGYGLD-57mrJY-a8e2FA-5zwBi4-EYS12-9iNiqs-2aNgqm">Klearchos Kapoutsis</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is true only up to a point. There are excellent materials widely available, including online. But children do at the very least need to be aware that such materials exist, that there are doors to open. </p>
<h2>Questions of belief</h2>
<p>Crucially, philosophy can provide children with a superb training in how to ask questions, analyse concepts, analyse and construct both inductive and deductive arguments and, in general, consider whether there are any good reasons to believe whatever it is they are being told. It helps them to develop good habits of reasoning and thinking for themselves. </p>
<p>This would suggest that philosophy might give children a better chance of resisting any attempts to brainwash them, whether from political or religious extremists, advertisers, or indeed teachers. It is difficult to find hard data on this as yet, but <a href="http://bit.ly/1TPUomo">research from Britain’s Department for Education</a> does speak of “reported impacts”.</p>
<p>This idea would seem to have informed a recent British Council <a href="http://bit.ly/1m8k5nl">paper on education and extremism</a>. The education department’s own research in 2010 also suggested a link between philosophy teaching materials available from the group Philosophy for Children (P4C) and <a href="http://bit.ly/1TPUomo">protection against indocrination</a>. There is currently a working party exploring whether P4C is useful for the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism">Prevent strategy</a>, but I am not sure whether that specific question is necessarily the right one to be asking.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108418/original/image-20160118-31837-ikkiv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Teaching a way to leave the herd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Michaela Rehle</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Philosophy classes pitched at the right level have the merit of being inclusive, whereas some have criticised the Prevent programme <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bradford-west-yorkshire-33884645">for being divisive</a>. My point is that it is healthy for children to be encouraged to question and think for themselves – and philosophy is one of the subjects that is particularly good at this, irrespective of any particular agenda.</p>
<h2>Rigour and flair</h2>
<p>Philosophy hones both speaking and listening skills – and it fosters the ability to engage in robust yet respectful dialogue. It allows children to understand that you can disagree with someone without coming to blows and it encourages them to separate intellectual criticisms from personal attacks. It may therefore have a role to play in encouraging resilience and strength of character.</p>
<p>Both the clear, rigorous thinking and suppleness and flexibility of mind that philosophy requires and fosters will be key skills in a 21st-century workplace defined by constant innovation.</p>
<p>But, important though this is, philosophy does much more than train pupils for work. I believe that the activity of philosophy can in itself form one of the components of a flourishing life for children, both individually and collectively. This flourishing is not just a goal for their future adult selves, but also something that is important for them throughout their education. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108419/original/image-20160118-31831-jkilxk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Making happy grown-ups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/63114905@N06/20967925084/in/photolist-xWS6BJ-6pyzAt-6pCXAb-6kEFkE-6pyKJx-8cjd4w-BweAj-2B8kyT-6pCr1U-4vkHDm-6pyHJc-6pCQeh-6pyKh4-6pyGha-6pCAPo-6kEFSq-6pCk5A-52xNCD-6pCWEW-6pCGRo-6pyqZV-6pCmEG-6kE6Sd-6pyAmR-6pyfYp-6pyqFP-6kEFws-6kDSjy-6kAcer-62VWmU-riNvKb-6pCxJh-7oBQ1Q-2HbnSi-6kDScC-xxsDvk-6pyohv-6pyGYe-6pCR8m-6pCGLS-6pyChP-6kEFFs-c2FP8J-6pCRrm-6pCLDs-6pyBrZ-6pyhvB-6kEo6N-6kzYMV-atMRE6">Henrik Sandklef</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As schoolchildren mature, philosophy can help them reflect on such issues as flourishing, happiness and pleasure and how they may (or may not) interrelate. Philosophy can thus help children work out their own life goals.</p>
<h2>Encouraging doubt</h2>
<p>Those at Davos who are concerned about how the future of education should look in this age of uncertainty can find solace in philosophy. It can help children understand that ethical decisions have always had to be made in conditions of uncertainty and that technological advances have not changed that (though they may have deceived us into thinking that life is more predictable than it is).</p>
<p>Philosophy can also help children develop conceptions of flourishing which can exist in uncertain times and it can help provide them with the mental agility and adaptability that uncertain times require. It is not excess of doubt that is currently causing so many problems around the world – quite the reverse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52921/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela Hobbs is an Honorary Patron of the Philosophy Foundation, a Patron of the Philosophy in Education Project (PEP) and on the Executive Committee of the British Philosophical Association.</span></em></p>Tackling extremism, building happier adults and delivering a generation that can adapt to rapid change. Putting thinking and thinkers at the heart of the curriculum should be an easy decision.Angie Hobbs, Professor of the Public Understanding of Philosophy, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/436212015-06-30T01:08:18Z2015-06-30T01:08:18ZIs Islamic State evidence we are living in a ‘post-honour’ world?<p>Journalists and commentators these days quickly seek personal reasons for every horrible case of murder, drug or human trafficking, terrorism and so forth. In doing so, they fail to recognise that these are also interrelated sociopolitical events, representing the limitations and failures of the “modern world”.</p>
<p>This was the case recently when three British Muslim mothers and their nine children, aged between three and 15, were believed to have joined Islamic State (IS) in Syria. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/17/one-of-missing-bradford-sisters-has-made-contact-with-family-say-police">Reportedly</a>, the missing Dawood sisters came from an “ultra-conservative” Muslim family and two of them had unhappy marriages. </p>
<p>No reasonable person could easily find a justification for the UK-born-and-bred sisters leaving their husbands and taking their children to a war zone. Nor could one could deny the powerful role of personal motivations and incentives in criminal and unlawful actions.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, as <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Suicide-Study-Sociology-Routledge-Classics/dp/0415278317">first identified</a> by sociologist Emile Durkheim, suicide, and by extension the expression of sympathy and support for groups like IS, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, is the consequence of our disturbed and troubled social order.</p>
<p>As Ahmed Akbar has <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VKliU2mTSXAC&pg=PP20&dq=Global+developments+have+robbed+many+people+of+honor.&hl=en&sa=X&ei=pDeKVcDKBIac8QW94YPoCw&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Global%20developments%20have%20robbed%20many%20people%20of%20honor.&f=false">forcefully argued</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Global developments have robbed many people of honour. Rapid global changes are shaking the structures of traditional societies. Groups are forced to dislocate or live with or by other groups. In the process of dislocation they have little patience with the problems of others. They develop intolerance and express it through anger. No society is immune. Even those societies that economists call ‘developed’ fall back to notions of honour and revenge in times of crisis.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the global total of displaced people has risen to <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html">around 60 million people</a>. Among other things, the rapid dislocations of so many people have led to a crisis of identity and belonging.</p>
<h2>‘Us against them’ reinforces alienation</h2>
<p>In Muslim majority countries, this crisis of identity revealed itself through the “Arab Spring” uprisings against the political failures of state authorities to provide the people with security and meaningful means of economic and social survival. Their plight has been reinforced by <a href="https://theconversation.com/radical-islam-and-the-west-the-moral-panic-behind-the-threat-43113">historical injustices</a> inflicted by the dominant Western powers since the early 19th century.</p>
<p>In repeated <a href="http://static1.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/538c8230e4b0ed28e033150b/1401717296229/Five+Years+After+the+Cairo+Speech+Exec+Summary.pdf">surveys</a>, the majority of the world’s Muslims express unease and negative attitudes towards what they see as unequivocal support by the US for Israel in the Palestine-Israel conflict, and US inconsistency on meaningful democratic reform in the region.</p>
<p>State failures and the crisis of identity have paved the way for the emergence of radical al-Qaeda-affiliated groups like the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31764114">Nusra Front</a> and IS in the Middle East and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-virtual-significance-of-boko-harams-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis-38690">Boko Haram</a> in North Africa.</p>
<p>The Western world offers little recognition of the limitations and failures of modernity. The exclusionary discourse of the righteous “us” against the evil “them” has dominated most media and government responses, particularly since September 11. <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13602004.2015.1046262?journalCode=cjmm20">Underlying this</a> is the anxiety of most governments in the West, including Australia, about the capacity of Muslims to be fully active citizens without betraying their religious obligations. </p>
<p>Rather than addressing the root causes of the problem, many in the West have assumed that Islamic religiosity is a set of beliefs and practices contrary to the underlying rights and obligations of active citizenship. In such a context, it is increasingly becoming a social norm to feel personally and socially unworthy, and to dishonour others by supposedly maintaining your group honour. </p>
<p>Sadly, it seems a thing of the past that protecting and maintaining one’s honour required him/her to pursue noble causes – to condemn cruelty and tyranny, to stand up against inequalities and to achieve justice for people around you.</p>
<p>As Ahmed Akbar <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VKliU2mTSXAC&pg=PP20&dq=Exaggerated+tribal+and+religious+loyalties,+hyper-asabiyya&hl=en&sa=X&ei=MzaKVfKvO4a68gXG7rngDw&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Exaggerated%20tribal%20and%20religious%20loyalties%2C%20hyper-asabiyya&f=false">puts it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What would once have been seen as the deviant appears to be accepted as the norm. Exaggerated tribal and religious loyalties – hyper-asabiyya – disguise acts of violence against the other. But neither tribal custom nor religious ideology requires the senseless violence we witness in our time. The widespread use of honour in this perverted manner suggests we may indeed be living in a world with little honour or no honour or a post-honour world.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What needs to be done?</h2>
<p>No doubt the strategy of most Western countries to work with so-called “community leaders” and members of specific communities can help identify individual suspects and perhaps deter them from joining groups like IS. Monitoring and surveillance might also restrict their activities. </p>
<p>However, these measures do not really tackle the root of the problem and are subject to failure, as shown by the many Australians and Europeans who have joined IS since 2013.</p>
<p>What is needed is a new dialogue to genuinely acknowledge the potentials and failures of the modern world. This approach should encourage inclusion, cultural diversity, inter-faith dialogue and religious tolerance. </p>
<p>In addition, social justice mechanisms and “compassion for all” policies need to replace the exclusionary “us against them” mindset, so as to “reverse the movement that has brought us to the post-honour world”. More precisely, social justice policies should take priority over mere inclusion of “others” at local, national and global levels.</p>
<p>It is also important to broaden our understanding of the motives and practices of radical groups like IS. It is commonly reported that IS is an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria, which rose to power because of the failures of Iraq’s Shi’a authorities to include and accommodate the country’s Sunni tribes. This is a gross simplification. One factor alone – the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709">Sunni-Shi’a divide</a> – regardless of how powerful and relevant it might be cannot explain the motives, beliefs and practices of a movement like IS.</p>
<p>It is true that IS shares some of the ideological positions and motives of al-Qaeda. Both groups reject the ideals of the nation-state and seek an “Islamic Caliphate”. IS members and supporters show sympathy for former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and call him “Sheikh Osama”. However, as Graeme Wood has <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/">shown</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>National and global responses must recognise that IS differs from al-Qaeda in many respects. IS members have a deeper religious devotion. Its leadership also sees the control of territory as essential to achieve the group’s goals.</p>
<p>IS is also more strategic in using social media to spread its propaganda worldwide and has a distinct jihadist culture. A recent <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/08/battle-lines-jihad-creswell-and-haykel">analysis of the group’s poetry</a> has revealed that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… unlike the videos of beheadings and burnings, which are made primarily for foreign consumption, poetry provides a window onto the movement talking to itself. It is in verse that militants most clearly articulate the fantasy life of jihad.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>IS might require a rather different military response, and indeed social, political and economic responses, than groups like the Nusra Front, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11483095">al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</a> and Boko Haram.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read other articles in the Roots of Radicalisation series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/roots-of-radicalisation">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Reza Yunespour is affiliated with indigo foundation Australia and Rotary Club of Hall. </span></em></p>Islamic State is symptomatic of a disturbed and troubled social order. The vast crisis of dislocated people and communities is being expressed in anger, intolerance and perverted notions of honour.Ali Reza Yunespour, PhD Researcher, International and Political Studies, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/404462015-04-19T20:08:33Z2015-04-19T20:08:33ZBrothers, believers and brave mujahideen: how to counter the lure of Islamic State propaganda<p>In an unassuming house in the suburbs, a teenager sits alone in a dark room, his face lit only by the projection of his computer screen. As he watches, the barrage of images tugs at his emotions: dead Syrian infants with ashen faces; orphans left to perish in the bitter cold of the Syrian winter; grown men with hooded faces, forced to take part in humiliating acts as American soldiers pose smiling.</p>
<p>His search for answers takes him to videos produced by Al Hayat, the media arm of the so-called Islamic State. The slick production accompanied by emotive music immediately grabs his attention. He watches intently as the video describes those who are fighting as true believers, dutifully opposing oppression and injustice for the establishment of a pure Islamic state.</p>
<p>He watches video after video, conveniently dismissing those that aim to present a different argument. Some are in Arabic, some have subtitles, many are in English. But the images speak for themselves: brave soldiers, some not much older than he is, prepared to die for their freedom, feeding the poor, helping the weak and feeble and standing up for the rights of Muslims, just like him, everywhere.</p>
<p>In the teenager’s mind, their violence is no less brutal than the atrocities he believes are carried out against Muslims. In his mind, there are no innocent victims. This is Islamic State on the internet.</p>
<p>On Saturday, Australians once again awoke to the news of <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/five-arrested-in-counterterrorism-raids-in-melbournes-southeast-20150418-1mns9h.html">pre-dawn raids</a>, this time resulting in the arrest of five young Muslim men suspected of planning an attack on police and the public in Melbourne on Anzac Day. Since those arrests, <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/five-arrested-in-counterterrorism-raids-in-melbournes-southeast-20150418-1mns9h.html">three of the young men</a> have been released without charge. Two 18-year-olds <a href="http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/anzac-day-terror-raids-alleged-plotters-linked-to-police-attacker-numan-haider/story-fni0fee2-1227311086585">remain in custody</a>.</p>
<p>Police have alleged that Islamic State “<a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-18/five-arrested-in-melbourne-after-a-joint-terrorism-operation/6402810">inspired</a>” the planned attack. Like Melbourne teenager <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/mar/23/jake-bilardi-father-blames-himself-teenagers-death-suicide-bomber">Jake Bilardi</a>, who just a month ago was killed in a suicide mission inside Iraq, at least some of the young men arrested in connection with Saturday’s raids will have likely searched, accessed and engaged with IS propaganda online.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/bsCZzpmbEcs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A VICE News reporter spent three weeks embedded with the Islamic State for this 2014 report.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What makes young Australians turn to IS?</h2>
<p>The raids again raise questions about the lure of IS for young men, many born and raised in Australia. What inspires them to join a bloody war they know little about by travelling abroad or, worse, by perpetrating acts of violence right here in Australia? Again, these questions lead us to the propaganda machine of Islamic State and its ubiquity on the internet.</p>
<p>America’s most senior military official in charge of Special Forces units combating Islamic State, Major General Michael Nagata, last year <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2890266/We-not-understand-movement-Special-Forces-general-confessed-clueless-ISIS-FBI-agent-warns-terror-army-s-youth-recruiting.html#ixzz3VY5SUGKW">declared</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The fact is that we do understand the idea. Much of the research and analysis of terrorists’ use of the internet has focused on IS propaganda and on how to formulate counter narratives that challenge the idea. </p>
<p><a href="https://publicintelligence.net/osc-al-qaeda-master-narratives/">A report by the Open Source Centre</a> identified elements of the violent jihadi narrative that collectively define the problem as an ongoing threat to the survival of Islam, self-sacrifice as the route to victory, and the restoration of the Caliphate as the solution to ending injustice and suffering. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jcrTLkSSAeI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Sydney teenager Abdullah Elmir from western Sydney praising Islamic State’s war against the West in a 2014 YouTube video.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What we don’t understand is how the idea appeals to the real lives of young men like <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/sevdet-besim-leaves-trail-of-islamic-radicalisation-on-social-media-20150419-1mo9on.html">Sevdet Besim</a> and the unnamed 18-year-old still held after the latest raids. Both were <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/muslim-conspiracies-and-the-man-charged-with-anzac-terror-20150418-1mnz4e.html">associates of Numan Haider</a>, who was shot dead in September last year after stabbing police at Endeavour Hills.</p>
<h2>Losing the propaganda war</h2>
<p>The instinctive response to propaganda is to counter it with more propaganda. Such has been the impetus for campaigns such as <a href="http://www.sntt.me/">Say No to Terror</a>, a multimedia communication campaign comprising videos, posters, a website and social media pages. The Arabic-language campaign is specifically aimed at a Muslim audience, underscored by the campaign’s slogan “Terrorism. I am Muslim: I am against it.”</p>
<p>The campaign videos are also posted on YouTube and repeatedly aired as public service announcements on the Pan-Arab Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) and Al-Arabiya channels. The videos are as slick as those produced by IS – but their influence is nowhere near as dramatic.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Terrorism. I am Muslim: I am against it.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My own analysis of Say No to Terror, published in <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/376/html">Perspectives on Terrorism</a>, concluded that its lack of credibility and authenticity undermined its success. </p>
<p>Some evidence of this lies in the fact that Say No to Terror has motivated a popular counter-campaign on YouTube. Inspired by the campaign’s catchphrase, videos entitled or tagged “Jihad. I’m Muslim: I’m with it” and “Occupation. I’m a Muslim; I’m against it” now vastly exceed the number of Say No to Terror videos online.</p>
<p>Say No to Terror is just one example of how attempts to directly counter the ideas and messages carried by IS propaganda have failed to stem the growth of violent extremism. Whatever you want to call this battle – a war of ideas; a war for hearts and minds; a war against terrorism – it is clear that we need to be smarter about what we are doing. </p>
<p>Despite all efforts, we are not getting smarter by design, but by default. Much of what we learn comes from our mistakes, not from our successes.</p>
<h2>Tapping into new ideas from peers</h2>
<p>One way we need to get smarter about countering violent extremism is to understand that countering IS propaganda is not about directly challenging their messages with numbers, facts and equally slick productions. </p>
<p>To use a sporting analogy, we do not play their game on their field with their ball. Instead, we need to make our own playing field and set our own terms. To do this we need to be as innovative, if not more, than they are.</p>
<p>Proactive responses to the spread of IS-inspired violent extremism are a necessary element of a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach. Ideally, the more proactive we are in preventing young people from becoming attracted to IS, the less reactive we have to be with dawn raids and massive deployments of law enforcement personnel. </p>
<p>Being proactive means that we engage young people before they become attracted to IS propaganda. One of the best ways to do this is to get young people involved in developing solutions.</p>
<p>This year, 10 students from Perth’s Curtin University are participating in a world-first global competition to develop a tool, product or solution to counter violent extremism. US-based EdVenture Partners is running the <a href="https://ece.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/P2PCEOfficalContestRules.pdf">P2P Challenging Extremism</a> competition with support from the US Department of State. </p>
<p>It involves 20 universities from across the United States, Canada, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, all competing to develop the best solution through a semester-long project that involves testing and marketing their idea to a target audience of their peers. As part of that competition, later today (April 20) in Perth, P2P will be launching a new app aimed at young Muslims.</p>
<p>Initiatives like these not only have the potential to generate some innovative ideas, formulated by the very target audience that IS aims to influence, they have the added benefit of involving youth in positive solutions to issues that affect them.</p>
<p>What if Numan Haider, Jake Bilardi and others like them were given the opportunity to create and become part of a global community of educated influencers dedicated to challenging violent extremism? </p>
<p>While we will never know the answer, we do know for sure that <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-13/islamic-state-radicalisation-extremism-young-australian-muslims/6307880">several young lives</a> have already been changed for the better by providing young adults with an alternative that diverts them from the lure of Islamic State – both online and offline.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40446/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Aly receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She leads the Countering online Violent Extremism Research (CoVER) Project at Curtin University, which undertakes research into the role and influence of the internet on radicalisation and extremism. She is also a local advisor to EdVenture in the P2P project and is guiding the Curtin University students involved with the competition, competing against other international teams to present their ideas for countering terrorism at the White House. Anne is the Founding Chair of People against Violent Extremism – a not-for-profit group dedicated to challenging violent extremism. In February 2015, she was the only Australian invited by President Barack Obama to attend and speak at the White House Countering Violent Extremism Summit. </span></em></p>The instinctive response to Islamic State propaganda is to counter it with more propaganda. But my analysis shows that’s not working. We should not play their game on their field with their ball.Anne Aly, Associate Professor, Department of Social Science and International Studies, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/387732015-03-17T03:43:55Z2015-03-17T03:43:55ZCommunity backlash leaves nation exposed in fight against terrorism<p>The majority of Muslims in Australia condemn terrorism and extremism. But they also feel that counter-terrorism policing and laws unfairly target their community. This has generated a community backlash.</p>
<p>This is a key finding of <a href="http://researchers.uq.edu.au/research-project/15027">research</a> we have completed on the impact of counter-terrorism responses on Muslim communities in Australia. Preliminary findings from this research <a href="http://theconversation.com/fairness-and-trust-make-all-the-difference-in-countering-terrorism-32319">were reported</a> in The Conversation. </p>
<p>Now we can report full results. These shine a light on the negative and unintended consequences of counter-terrorism activities on Muslim communities. The findings also show us what authorities can do to minimise these impacts. </p>
<p>The research has involved 14 focus groups, totalling 104 participants, and a survey of 800 Muslims living in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. </p>
<h2>Muslims feel under siege</h2>
<p>Key findings from the focus groups were that the Muslim community feels under siege due to the social and political responses to terrorism. For instance, participants felt under constant attack and scrutiny, both politically and in the media. Respondents believed the media spread misinformation about Islamic principles (for example in relation to sharia, jihad, halal).</p>
<p>Participants stressed that Islamist terrorist groups were not true Muslims and distorted the meaning of Islamic principles. However, they said that they felt reluctant to publicly voice an opinion about Islam, foreign policy issues, terrorism or counter-terrorism activity out of fear they would be labelled extremists. These views were particularly strong among young participants.</p>
<p>A key concern was that police could “do whatever they wanted” when using counter-terrorism laws. When it came to efforts to combat terrorism, participants disliked the use of the term “moderate” Muslim to delineate between what might be regarded as a more acceptable form of Islam, or Muslims who opposed the use of Islam to justify terrorist acts. </p>
<h2>Consultation promotes co-operation</h2>
<p>In the focus groups, participants discussed the merits of different police and legal efforts to combat terrorism or radicalisation. Consultative approaches, such as engagement with Muslim leaders (Imams) and community members, were regarded as more reasonable and effective.</p>
<p>Even here respondents were not unanimous in supporting community engagement efforts. Some stated that it carried risks in being judged as illegitimate by community members (youth in particular) because leaders were seen as “selling out” by “joining forces” with police. This was seen as only further dividing the Muslim community. </p>
<p>Participants said that police needed to learn more about the Islamic religion and needed to engage with Muslims in a way that respected religious practices. One example cited was the need for police to remove their shoes when entering a mosque or a Muslim home.</p>
<p>Results from the survey showed that many Muslims trust the police (88% of the sample) and are proud to be Australian (84% of the sample). More than 50% of the sample reported they had changed certain practices (for example changing the way they dressed in public) as a result of terrorism-related police scrutiny.</p>
<p>The results also show that few Muslims think that police considered the views of their community when it comes to making decisions about how to tackle terrorism or deal with radicalisation. </p>
<h2>War on terror falls into ‘us and them’ trap</h2>
<p>In particular, the survey results highlight the unintended consequences of the “war on terror”. That is, Muslim respondents who reported they felt more under siege (they feel under more scrutiny by police and authorities because of their faith; they fear being accused of terrorists acts because of their faith) were less likely to identify with Australia, less trusting of police and less willing to co-operate with police. </p>
<p>We also found some interesting results across the states surveyed. Sydney Muslims were significantly more likely to feel under siege. They were less trusting of counter-terrorism policing and significantly more likely than Muslims in Brisbane or Melbourne to believe terrorists have valid grievances. </p>
<p>Our analysis also shows that if Muslim respondents felt the police used <a href="http://theconversation.com/fairness-and-trust-make-all-the-difference-in-countering-terrorism-32319">procedural justice</a> (that is, treated Muslims with respect, impartially, in a trustworthy manner and provided an opportunity to have a say) in counter-terrorism policing, they were more likely to trust police, less likely to feel under siege and more willing to co-operate with police. This is important because police do have direct control over how they treat and interact with Muslims.</p>
<p>These findings show that any efforts by authorities to engage Muslim communities will be difficult given the sense of siege they are experiencing. If these feelings are dismissed, ignored or overlooked, then generating community cooperation with counter-terrorism strategies becomes all the more difficult.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Cherney receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristina Murphy receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>The majority of Muslims in Australia condemn terrorism and extremism. But they feel that counter-terrorism policing and laws unfairly target their community, causing a troubling community backlash.Adrian Cherney, Senior Lecturer, Criminology Head of Discipline, The University of QueenslandKristina Murphy, Associate Professor, School of Criminology, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/387692015-03-17T03:38:53Z2015-03-17T03:38:53ZJake Bilardi’s story shows why terrorist intervention must be tailored<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/74919/original/image-20150316-9181-6zo2jr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C15%2C940%2C645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The story of Jake Bilardi (centre) has distorted the characterisation of what most people think of as a radicalised individual.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Twitter</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past year, Australia – like many other countries around the world – has been confronted with a range of supposedly radicalised individuals. These individuals have either left for or returned from Syria and Iraq to fight with terrorist groups like Islamic State (IS), been disrupted by authorities while planning terrorist acts at home, or come to the attention of authorities because of their support for IS.</p>
<p>In all cases, the media has scrambled to profile the individual/s involved and held them up as the typical violent extremist offender that we all should be aware of. There will be many more to come, and we must realise that no two cases will be entirely the same. They will come from all areas of society.</p>
<h2>The Bilardi case</h2>
<p>Australians were confronted last week by another so-called violent extremist, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-13/jake-bilardi-what-we-know-australian-teenager-islamic-state/6314260">Jake Bilardi</a>. The story of Bilardi, who reportedly died in Iraq on a suicide mission, has once again distorted the characterisation of what most people think of as a radicalised individual wanting to join groups like IS.</p>
<p>Bilardi was an 18-year-old student from Melbourne who clearly had commonalities with other extremists. Like Sydney siege perpetrator <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/sydney-siege-ends-who-was-gunman-man-haron-monis-20141215-127w5p">Man Haron Monis</a>, Bilardi was a loner and struggling to make sense of all aspects of his life. He was supposedly bullied at school and vulnerable following the loss of his mother to cancer and a lack of attachment to his father. In a sense, he more easily fitted the profile of a <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/13/asia/australia-isis-bilardi-blog/">school shooter</a> than an Islamic terrorist – but there are differences between the two profiles.</p>
<p>Although Bilardi was not <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-12/australian-believed-involved-in-islamic-state-suicide-bombing/6305304">brainwashed</a> or delusional as some have claimed him to be, he was different in that he was a bright kid from a non-Muslim family and not from a low socioeconomic marginalised community – where most would think a terrorist would originate.</p>
<p>Bilardi’s intellect shone through in how he clearly articulated his path to radicalisation in a <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HIgrSseZuYsJ:https://fromtheeyesofamuhajir.wordpress.com/2015/01/13/from-melbourne-to-ramadi-my-journey/+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au">blog</a> titled:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>From the eyes of a Mujahir: An Australian Mujahir in the land of the Khilafah</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With this blog and his carefully scripted path to martyrdom, Bilardi would finally get the recognition he so dearly sought.</p>
<p>Despite a list of red flags, it is extremely difficult to separate Bilardi from the millions of other disaffected young people who may never seek or join IS. Young people in <a href="http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/criminalising-returning-foreign-fighters-isnt-the-answer-farish-noor-and-ja">transitional stages of their lives</a> – sometimes young immigrants or first- and second-generation kids; sometimes struggling students or those between jobs or unemployed – are among those joining IS.</p>
<p>Some seek new attachment because of the dysfunction within the home they left behind. In many cases, there is no traditional religious education. Therefore, it is not so much the Quran or religious teachings but the excitement or action that promises them glory, recognition or esteem in the eyes of their friends, family or community.</p>
<p>In most cases, there is a long trail of circumstances leading up to some type of trigger event when a line is crossed and an individual is ready to commit an act of violence. However, we should remember that there are a lot of young people for whom many things go wrong but they never think to commit murder or become a terrorist. How we distinguish between the two groups is the challenge ahead.</p>
<h2>Towards an individualised response</h2>
<p>Based on the cases Australia has experienced so far, it will be difficult to capture all of the possibilities surrounding the pathways to radicalisation or the reasons people want to join IS. Given this diversity, what should we learn from the vast range of violent extremist profiles and how should we address them?</p>
<p>If we are to develop long-term intervention strategies to reduce the threat of terrorism – rather than the <a href="https://theconversation.com/abbotts-national-security-changes-are-unlikely-to-make-us-safer-37709">short-term remedies</a> the Australian government has delivered so far – we will need to be equally diverse in our responses. As no two pathways to radicalisation are the same, no two intervention efforts should be the same.</p>
<p>Therefore, we will need to develop ways to reach out to vulnerable young individuals who have been exposed to negative influences and are struggling to find their way in life. Through individual case management – which could involve the expertise of social workers, psychologists or even psychiatrists – we will need to develop strategies to help disaffected people find ways other than violence to deal with their problems and frustrations.</p>
<p>Based on individual needs and interests, the aim of the intervention strategies will then be to connect the at-risk individuals with a range of services – such as mentoring and coaching, education, sport, art and employment support – or any other areas that could help them turn away from terrorism. </p>
<p>In many cases, much of the work will have to be done in close co-operation with families, schools and religious institutions to help young individuals get back on track.</p>
<p>Intervention will be no easy task or soft solution. Just finding at-risk kids will be problematic. Types of referral services will have to be established where at-risk kids can be referred without the fear of prosecution. For those who have broken the law, intervention will have to vary depending on the situation – whether it be in a correctional environment or a diversionary program.</p>
<p>But in all situations, intervention to turn people away from terrorism should be tailored to suit an individual’s characteristics. Matching treatment settings, interventions and services to an individual’s particular problems and needs will be critical to their ultimate success in returning to society as a productive, functioning person.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38769/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clarke Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There will be more Jake Bilardis to come, and Australia must realise that no two cases will be entirely the same. Radicalised individuals will come from all areas of society.Clarke Jones, Visiting Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318422014-09-19T05:01:24Z2014-09-19T05:01:24ZTerrorists can be defeated by fighting fear with co-operation<p>From <a href="http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/topics/anarchy.html">anarchists in the 1920s</a> and <a href="http://factsanddetails.com/world/cat58/sub385/item2372.html">radical leftists in the 1960s</a>, to fringe, extreme-right <a href="http://www.salon.com/2013/08/03/the_10_worst_examples_of_christian_or_far_right_terrorism_partner/">Christian bombers or gunmen</a> in the United States in recent decades, or radical Islamists such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/islamic-state">Islamic State</a> today, terrorist groups have one thing in common. They seek to shock, while simultaneously portraying themselves as victims. While their beliefs can vary wildly, what they all share is the “propaganda of the deed” in their extreme violent activities. </p>
<p>Typically, political violence in the most extreme form – terrorism – usually will see groups <a href="http://m.theage.com.au/comment/seeking-calm-amid-violence-fear-and-outrage-20140918-10iwud.html">fracture in to smaller sub-groups</a>. Once violence is legitimated, it then becomes a way to settle internal disagreements as well. </p>
<p>Given that we have seen a number of terrorist groups come and go over the decades, it bears scrutiny how these various groups were successfully stopped, as well as where governments failed. Buying in to media hype actually helps terrorist organisations to create public suspicion, division among groups and eventual social disorder where terrorism can thrive. </p>
<p>Whether it is in Iraq, Australia, Britain, or Canada, radical groups will try to draw legitimate political authorities into a violent confrontation of some kind.</p>
<p>Public and government reprisals against any defined group is <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-wants-australians-to-attack-muslims-terror-expert-31845">precisely what terrorists want</a>. It legitimates their standing as victims rising up against their oppressors through the use of violence, ever more extreme. </p>
<p>This is at least one reason why launching military raids against Islamic State is so risky. It is also why large-scale invasions of homes – although sometimes necessary – must be managed carefully to avoid creating deeper community divisions, which can inadvertently play into the terrorists’ hands.</p>
<p>And there are lessons from overseas – including from Canada, Northern Ireland, Indonesia and Malaysia – on how we might manage today’s terrorists threats.</p>
<h2>Canada’s handling of violent separatists</h2>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, Canada faced its own “homegrown terror cell”: French-Canadian nationalists <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/front-de-liberation-du-quebec/">the Front de libération du Québec</a> (or FLQ). The FLQ had a history of deadly armed robbery and more than 200 bombings. In October 1970, they kidnapped a British diplomat and demanded the release of 23 prisoners in return for releasing him.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=830&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=830&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=830&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1043&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1043&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1043&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A post box in Montreal graffitied with “FLQ oui” (FLQ yes) in support of the violent extremist group, photographed in 1971.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harryzilber/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s response to what became known as <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/october-crisis/">the October crisis</a> was criticised by some at the time. But it is widely seen now as a political masterstroke. </p>
<p>Showing the force of legislative powers by invoking <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-measures-act/">the War Measures Act</a>, Trudeau sent tanks and soldiers in full battle gear into the streets of Montreal to show that the state was mobilised and ready. However, Trudeau avoided wholesale raids on homes (although some were indeed raided). </p>
<p>At the same time, a clear, sympathetic message was delivered by the government that Quebec’s French-speaking locals were right to be disgruntled about feeling like second-class citizens. Trudeau <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-liberties-suspended/flq-backgrounder.html">reinforced linguistic and cultural recognition</a> of the minority that the FLQ terrorists were trying to appeal to, so the government undermined their legitimacy.</p>
<h2>From the Troubles to Toronto</h2>
<p>Crackdowns on communities rarely work without serious consequences. A good example of the failure of a heavy-handed approach can be seen in how successive British governments tried to “solve” <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/histories/troubles">Northern Ireland’s violent 30-year conflict</a> with military crackdowns, without addressing underlying community concerns. </p>
<p>Ultimately it was patient political negotiation through the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement">Good Friday Agreement</a> that ended decades of bloodshed.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mfn93qqvA8E?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Hustontv looks back on the Good Friday Agreement.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More recently in 2006, Canada faced a terrorist plot similar to what has been alleged here in Australia this week. A group of 18 young men – commonly referred to as the “Toronto 18” – were arrested over ambitious though amateurish plans to carry out a series of armed assaults and truck bombings (using a tonne of ammonium nitrate purchased on one perpetrator’s credit card). There were even discussions about beheading Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and driving a ute up the steps of the parliament in Ottawa. </p>
<p>The local and federal police forces succeeded in tracking and infiltrating the group, partly thanks to cooperation from the local Islamic community. While some of the men got off with only light sentences (and two of the accused are believed to have <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5044560.stm">died fighting in Syria</a>), Canada has since reviewed its terrorism sentencing and brought in <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/03/05/the-defining-case-for-trying-terrorists/">life sentences</a> as a much stronger deterrent.</p>
<h2>Community leadership</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59530/original/s624btx5-1411104275.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Queensland Police Commissioner Ian Stewart at a Logan Mosque open day on Friday September 19, held to bring Muslim and non-Muslim Australians together after this week’s terrorism raids.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">@KathLanders/Twitter</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59537/original/3v2347wx-1411104856.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Queensland Police Commissioner Ian Stewart on Twitter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Crucially, in many of the recent cases of radicalised young men both in Canada and in Australia, members of the Islamic community have often helped to identify the radicals amongst themselves. While many did not agree with the sometimes heavy-handed approach of investigations, they certainly did not want the violence brought to their own communities.</p>
<p>Since the Toronto 18 case, further plots have occurred in Canada but have <a href="http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/04/22/suspects_in_toronto_terror_plot_arrested_sources.html">been quietly thwarted</a>. Last year, two Canadian men were arrested for plotting to derail a passenger train travelling between Toronto and New York – and <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/video-via-train-plot-tip-came-from-religious-leader/article11493030/?from=11492749">it was a tip-off from a prominent Toronto imam</a> (Muslim community leader) concerned about the one of the suspect’s behaviour that sparked the investigation. As local man <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/video-via-train-plot-tip-came-from-religious-leader/article11493030/?from=11492749">Hussan Hamdani explains in this news video</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This was a tip that came from the Muslim community because they had good relations with [the Canadian police], because they had this long-standing bridge-building long before this incident ever took place. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Community cooperation in the UK and Australia has also been vital, as both the former head of international counter-terrorism at New Scotland Yard, <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-wants-australians-to-attack-muslims-terror-expert-31845">Nick O'Brien</a>, and the Global Terrorism Research Centre international director, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-raising-australias-terrorism-alert-to-high-would-mean-for-you-31510">Greg Barton</a>, have said this week. For example, the 2005 arrests of men in Melbourne and Sydney under <a href="http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/operation-pendennis/">Operation Pendennis</a> followed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mosques-muslims-and-myths-overcoming-fear-in-our-suburbs-31822">tip-off from Melbourne’s Muslim community</a>.</p>
<h2>Tracking a radical minority</h2>
<p>Terrorism is not a new problem. If history teaches us anything, it’s that close connections with any self-defined community – especially one that is having a series of internal problems associated with violence – is a key to effective policing. </p>
<p>In Indonesia and Malaysia, counter-terror measures include cataloguing how radical Islamists are speaking in public and what actions they suggest their followers take. </p>
<p>The authorities know where the threat lies, and allowing the preaching to go on takes away the argument that radical Islam is being stifled. In the meantime, Indonesia proceeds along a path of democratisation. That’s certainly not without problems – but for a nation of 250 million people, <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-democratic-masses-brought-victory-to-jokowi-29569">its democratic progress in less than two decades</a> has been extraordinary.</p>
<h2>The good news</h2>
<p>If there any upside to this week’s raids and terrorism allegations, it’s that the plotters in Australia don’t seem to show anywhere near the same levels of organisational competence as other terror cells in war zones such as Iraq and Syria. If the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-18/authorities-thwart-beheading-plot-in-australias-biggest-raid/5754276">police allegation</a> that an order to attack a random Australian citizen was given over the phone is true, that’s hardly a sophisticated way of avoiding detection.</p>
<p>At present, radical Islamic terrorists do not appear to have the capacity to develop well-organised cells in places like Australia or Canada, and will most likely dissipate as previous anarchists and ultra-Marxists did decades ago. </p>
<p>The next big question in all of this is how to de-radicalise. What has worked and what has failed in terms of de-radicalisation efforts by various governments? Hopefully, the government is engaged in a careful consideration of this, and has thought about how other countries have handled the problem of domestic terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Imre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From anarchists in the 1920s and radical leftists in the 1960s, to fringe, extreme-right Christian bombers or gunmen in the United States in recent decades, or radical Islamists such as Islamic State today…Robert Imre, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.