tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/econometrics-5649/articlesEconometrics – The Conversation2021-06-24T20:09:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1633512021-06-24T20:09:59Z2021-06-24T20:09:59ZVital Signs: how to halve serious injuries and deaths from teenage driving accidents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408091/original/file-20210624-27-afw1ip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C245%2C4000%2C2000&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Teenage drivers are a risky bunch. They are inexperienced and don’t always drive carefully, sometimes with tragic consequences. Various studies indicate <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28707/w28707.pdf">15-30% of teens</a> have an accident in their first year of driving. In many countries driving fatalities are the leading cause of death among teenagers.</p>
<p>The policy question is what to do about it.</p>
<p>One can imagine a number of options, from the light touch (such as information campaigns and advertisements) to the dramatic (such as raising the legal driving age).</p>
<p>Many jurisdictions have introduced laws to restrict the driving privileges of younger drivers. But it’s not always easy to tell if such laws are effective.</p>
<p>One could look at places that have the laws and compare them to accident statistics from places without such laws. But this might be misleading. </p>
<p>It is possible those laws were introduced in places with a bigger problem. Suppose the laws have reduced driving fatalities, but only to the same level as places with less severe problems in the first place. With no difference in the teen driving fatality rate between jurisdictions with or without driving restrictions, it could be incorrectly concluded the restrictions have no effect.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-mad-max-than-max-safety-teenagers-dont-dream-of-safe-cars-47425">More Mad Max than max safety: teenagers don't dream of safe cars</a>
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<h2>The identification problem</h2>
<p>This is an example of what economists call the “identification problem” – figuring out how to identify the true causal effect of a policy intervention. </p>
<p>To identify the causal effect, one needs to know the right counterfactual – that is, what would have happened if the policy had not been introduced. To put it another way, the group affected by the policy needs to be compared with the right control group.</p>
<p>This is a big general issue on which economists have been working for decades. In that time many useful techniques have been developed to address the identification problem across the social sciences.</p>
<p>The development of this set of tools is what MIT economist Joshua Angrist (one of the leading scholars in this endeavour) has called “<a href="https://economics.mit.edu/files/5566">the credibility revolution</a>”.</p>
<p>It’s a revolution because we now have ways to credibly identify the causal effect of different policy interventions. That allows us to provide sensible policy prescriptions based on empirical evidence.</p>
<p>It even permits scholars to understand the size or “magnitude” of the effects and to undertake careful cost-benefit analysis.</p>
<h2>An Australian policy experiment</h2>
<p>Back to those troublesome teenage drivers. </p>
<p>In 2007 New South Wales introduced a law that banned drivers in their first year of a provisional licence from carrying two or more passengers under the age of 21 between 11pm and 5am. </p>
<p>As economists Tim Moore and Todd Morris write in a working paper published by the US National Bureau of Economic Research <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w28707">in April</a>, about 3% of all accidents by first-year drivers occurred while carrying multiple passengers between these hours. But these accidents accounted for about 18% of fatalities.</p>
<p>Moore (an Australian, now at Purdue University in Indiana) and Morris (at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy in Germany) saw the NSW policy as an ideal opportunity to test the effectiveness of teen-driving restrictions. </p>
<p>So how did they make sure they had the right counterfactual? </p>
<p>They used one of the classic techniques from the identification revolution, known as the “<a href="https://dimewiki.worldbank.org/Difference-in-Differences">difference-in-differences</a>” – or DID – method.</p>
<p>This technique was made famous (in academic and policy circles) by a path-breaking <a href="https://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/njmin-aer.pdf">1994 paper</a> by David Card and Alan Krueger (both then economists at Princeton University) on how minimum wage laws affect employment. </p>
<p>To put it at its simplest, rather than comparing one group to another or one group before and after a policy change, the DID method involves comparing the changes over time in one group to the changes over time in another.</p>
<p>Moore and Morris calculated changes in the restricted period (11pm–5am) then compared those to the changes in accidents during the daytime (8am–8pm). This allowed them to control for other factors affecting crash risks. </p>
<p>What they show is striking. The restriction reduced crashes by first-year drivers by 57%, and hospitalisations and fatalities by 58%. </p>
<p>With the restrictions, crashes in the 11pm-5am window dropped from about 18% to 4% of fatalities involving first-year drivers. That’s an effective policy.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/automated-vehicles-may-encourage-a-new-breed-of-distracted-drivers-101178">Automated vehicles may encourage a new breed of distracted drivers</a>
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<h2>Long-run effects</h2>
<p>If you were sitting in an academic seminar hearing these results, you might ask: “OK, but what happens after the first-year restrictions roll off?” </p>
<p>Remarkably, Moore and Morris also find reductions in nighttime multi-passenger crashes in the second and third years. There are no clear differences in the years that follow, but by then crash rates are down to one-fifth of the first-year level.</p>
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<p><strong>Impacts on nighttime multi-passenger crashes</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Charts showing Immediate and subsequent impacts on night-time multi-passenger crashes, from the paper 'Shaping the Habits of Teen Drivers' by Timothy Moore & Todd Morris." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408086/original/file-20210624-17-1aaaupn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Timothy Moore & Todd Morris, 'Shaping the Habits of Teen Drivers', National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2021.</span></span>
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<p>In other words, these restrictions seem to have a persistent effect even after the policy intervention is no longer in place.</p>
<p>There is a broader lesson in this. Policies can have long-run effects, even after the folks targeted by the policy are no longer “being treated”. This is well known in some <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/fryer/publications/aligning-student-parent-and-teacher-incentives-evidence-houston-public-schools">educational interventions</a>. Experiments with small financial rewards for students and parents, for example, have shown improvements in things like attendance and performance continue even after the incentives are discontinued. It is worth looking out for with policies in other areas.</p>
<p>In any case, NSW – and Australia more generally – seems to have cracked the case on teen driver safety. </p>
<p>Thanks to Moore and Morris, and their NBER working paper, it’s an insight from which the rest of the world can learn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Holden is president-elect of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.</span></em></p>Australia appears to have cracked the case on teen driver safety by restricting late-night passengers.Richard Holden, Professor of Economics, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/719252017-06-16T06:00:02Z2017-06-16T06:00:02ZCan we predict political uprisings?<p>Forecasting political unrest is a challenging task, especially in this era of post-truth and opinion polls.</p>
<p>Several studies by economists such <a href="https://asso-sherpa.org/sherpa-content/docs/programmes/GDH/Campagne_RC/War.pdf">as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in 1998 and 2002</a> describe <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002702046001002">how economic indicators</a>, such as slow income growth and natural resource dependence, can explain political upheaval. More specifically, low per capita income has been <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002702046003001">a significant trigger</a> of civil unrest. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534">Economists James Fearon and David Laitin</a> have also followed this hypothesis, showing how specific factors played an important role in Chad, Sudan and Somalia in outbreaks of political violence. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf">International Country Risk Guide index</a>, the internal political stability of Sudan fell by 15% in 2014, compared to the previous year. This decrease was after a reduction of its <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD">per capita income</a> growth rate from 12% in 2012 to 2% in 2013. </p>
<p>By contrast, when the income per capita growth increased in 1997 compared to 1996, the score for political stability in Sudan increased by more than 100% in 1998. Political stability across any given year seems to be a function of income growth in the previous one.</p>
<h2>When economics lie</h2>
<p>But as the World Bank admitted, “economic indicators <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/Inequality-uprisings-and-conflict-in-the-Arab-World">failed to predict Arab Spring</a>”.</p>
<p>Usual economic performance indicators, such as gross domestic product, trade, foreign direct investment, showed higher economic development and globalisation of <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/Inequality-uprisings-and-conflict-in-the-Arab-World">the Arab Spring countries over a decade</a>. Yet, in 2010, the region witnessed unprecedented uprisings that caused the collapse of regimes <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timeline-arab-spring-20131217114018534352.html">such as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016303470">In our 2016 study </a> we used data for more than 100 countries for the 1984–2012 period. We wanted to look at criteria other than economics to better understand the rise of political upheavals. </p>
<p>We found out and quantified how corruption is a destabilising factor when <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youth-definition/">youth</a> (15-24 years old) exceeds 20% of adult population. </p>
<p>Let’s examine the two main components of the study: demographics and corruption. </p>
<h2>Young and angry</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00416.x/abstract">importance of demographics</a> and its impact on political stability has been studied for years. </p>
<p>In his 1996 book, <a href="http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Clash-of-Civilizations-and-the-Remaking-of-World-Order/Samuel-P-Huntington/9781451628975">The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order</a>, US academic Samuel P. Huntington explained how youth are agents of change. </p>
<p>Several examples can be found throughout the early 2000s. Young people were particularly active in Yugoslavia’s <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/timeline-the-bulldozer-revolution">Bulldozer Revolution</a>, (2000), <a href="http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/cdw33/publication-32608.pdf">Georgia’s Rose Revolution</a> (2003), the <a href="http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/88778928/youth-as-agent-change-next-generation-ukraine">Ukraine’s Orange Revolution</a> (2004), <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%2051%20Iran%27s%20Youth%20Agents%20of%20Change.pdf">the Iranian Green Movement</a> of the post-2009 presidential election, and finally during <a href="http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/miscellanies/arabspring-41600/17/PDF/17.pdf">the Arab Spring (since 2011)</a>.</p>
<p>But a bulk of population being under 25 years old in a given country does not necessarily lead to revolution. It’s when leaders of such countries deceive and fail their younger citizens through systematic corruption, for instance, that the risk of upheaval is much higher.</p>
<h2>Enter corruption</h2>
<p>Political corruption allows non-democratic leaders to <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-014-9155-1">build political support through networks of dependency</a>, extending the duration of their regimes. </p>
<p>A 2014 study by political scientists Natasha Neudorfer and Ulrike Theuerkauf, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414013516919">suggests the contrastability effects</a> of corruption: the beneficiaries increase their income while a larger portion of the population feels the inequality as economic growth and investment stagnate. It <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-015-9378-8?email.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorContributingOnlineFirs">particularly</a> affects the youth population who are not yet inserted in the system and have <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2011.650916?src=recsys&">fewer economic opportunities</a>.</p>
<p>Autocratic corrupt states also allocate a larger portion of their budget to military and security fores, <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-015-9378-8?email.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorContributingOnlineFirst">under-spending on education and health</a>. This situation might stimulate youth adhesion to anti-establishment movements, including radical ones. </p>
<p>According to NIgerian scholar Freedom C. Onuoha, political corruption is <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf">behind the formation and durability</a> of terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria and Nigeria. These groups succeeded in attracting the marginalised parts of the population that are mainly <a href="http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/tackle_instability_and_terrorism_by_fighting_corruption">from the youth bulge</a>.</p>
<p>But corruption alone, like age, is not creating political unrest. A combination of the right amount of youth within the overall population suffering from corruption is necessary.</p>
<h2>The case of Iran</h2>
<p>A good example is Iran. The country experienced one of the most significant political changes of the 20th century when <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution-of-1978-1979">the 1979 Islamic Revolution</a> ended its monarchy and has been thriving on oil revenues since. </p>
<p>Oil revenue-dependency was less than 1% of total economy from 1970 to 1973. Substantial increase in oil prices from the mid-1970s led to a massive increase in the Iranian economy’s dependency on it – from 0.3% in 1973 to 31% in 1974 according to the <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators">World Bank</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173809/original/file-20170614-21325-uh9ajt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In 2009, youth protested for months in support of the reformist Mousavi, creating the ‘Green Movement’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ahmed Jadallah/Reuters</span></span>
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<p>Based on my calculations of the World Bank’s <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/health-nutrition-and-population-statistics">Health Nutrition and Population Statistics</a>, the share of 15 to 24-year-olds among the overall adult population has been higher than 20% from 1960-2016 (with an exception of 19% in 2016). </p>
<p>For this time period, we observed a continuous increase in the youth bulge in Iran from 33% in 1970 to approximately 36% (one of the highest in Iran’s demographic history) in 1979 (<a href="http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/population-projection-tables">World Bank Population Estimates and Projections, 2017</a>).</p>
<p>With oil income growing along with a diversity of activities linked to its production and circulation, corruption – for which we do not have data before 1985 – <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/corruption-has-become-way-life-iran-1127296548">has emerged as a way of life</a>.</p>
<p>In 1997-98, the share of Iranians aged between 15 and 24 in the adult population reached 36% (<a href="http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/population-projection-tables">World Bank Population Estimates and Projections, 2017</a>). At the same time, Iranian politics experienced a significant change with the presidential election of Mohammad Khatami <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/sep/26/youth-game-changers-elections">whose main support base was the youth</a>.</p>
<p>Incidentally we observed that Khatami’s government was one of the most factionalised <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rmeef.2013.9.issue-2/rmeef-2012-0029/rmeef-2012-0029.xml?format=INT">period of politics in Iran</a> with frequent political crisis. In 2004, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20041101facomment_v83n6_molavi.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all&position=&">The New York Times noted that </a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During his tenure, President Khatami complained that ‘a crisis every nine days’ made it hard to get anything accomplished.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This did not lead to a revolution but civil unrest has regularly affected political life including in 2009. World Bank Population Estimates and Projections show that the share of youth in Iran will drop to 11% by 2050, reducing the political risk of demographics in the presence of corruption in the future. </p>
<h2>Additional factors</h2>
<p>Using cases such as the Iranian one, we tried to understand how corruption and youth could lead to crisis. </p>
<p>We also took into account other drivers of conflict such as inequality, economic growth, investment rate, inflation, government spending, military spending, oil rents, trade, education, fertility rate, and democracy.</p>
<p>We controlled for specific differences between the countries we studied, such as geography, geopolitical situation, cultural and historical heritage, and religion. International attention and intervention of external powers were also taken into account. And we included events such as the 2008 global financial <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article">crisis</a> and the 2003 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">Iraq war</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=204&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=204&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=204&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164451/original/image-20170407-31640-o8mz74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table 1 illustrates the marginal effect of corruption on internal stability at different levels of youth bulge.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohammad Reza</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164452/original/image-20170407-29390-1lbg7iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect of corruption on internal stability at different levels of youth bulge.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohammad Reza Farzanegan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Based on our main results, Table 1 and Figure 1 show average marginal effects of corruption on political stability at different levels of youth bulge. We are 90% confident that a youth bulge beyond 20% of adult population, on average, combined with high levels of corruption can significantly destabilise political systems within specific countries when other factors described above also taken into account. We are 99% confident about a youth bulge beyond 30% levels.</p>
<p>Our results can help explain the risk of internal conflict and the possible time window for it happening. They could guide policy makers and international organisations in allocating their anti-corruption budget better, taking into account the demographic structure of societies and the risk of political instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammad Reza Farzanegan is affiliated with CESifo Research Network, Economic Research Forum, and Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics. </span></em></p>A certain combination of demographics and corruption can lead to political upheaval.Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, Professor of Economics of the Middle East, University of MarburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/285612014-06-27T11:35:57Z2014-06-27T11:35:57ZGroup stats show Holland will win the World Cup, but the runners up might surprise you<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/52456/original/hs2f3g3k-1403867215.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Crystal ball view of the tournament to come.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s World Cup crunch time. The group stages are over and it will be knockout games to the final from here on in. From the performances we’ve seen so far, there are numerous contenders for the title. Brazil, the favourites at the start of the tournament, haven’t wowed, and title holders Spain are already out of the running.</p>
<p>If you’re looking to predict how the tournament will progress – and perhaps how your sweepstake will fare if you’re still in it – a good look at the performance data can tell us how things might turn out. This kind of data analysis is the business of analytics, a growth industry described by the <a href="http://hbr.org/2012/10/data-scientist-the-sexiest-job-of-the-21st-century/ar/1">Harvard Business Review</a> as the “sexiest job of the 21st Century”.</p>
<h2>Predictive analytics</h2>
<p>Analytics can be divided into two main areas: explanatory analytics and predictive analytics. The former is backward-looking, a forensic investigation of what has happened and why. The latter, predictive analytics, is forward-looking, forecasting what will happen in the future. </p>
<p>The two are connected. Better understanding of the past can help improve our forecasts of the future. Predictive analytics in one way or another extrapolates from the past into the future. It assumes continuity, but uncertainty always remains because of the myriad chance events that can influence future outcomes.</p>
<p>Predicting who will win the World Cup is a good exemplar of the problems faced by predictive analytics. Just look at Spain, reigning European and World champions and one of the pre-tournament favourites but yet on an early flight home after losing to the Netherlands and Chile. And who would have predicted before the World Cup started that <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/10920129/World-Cup-2014-Costa-Rica-have-surprised-many-and-shown-they-are-not-a-team-to-be-taken-lightly.html">Costa Rica would qualify</a> as group winners against three teams ranked in the top ten by FIFA, all previous World Cup winners – England, Italy and Uruguay.</p>
<h2>What the group games tell us</h2>
<p>Exploratory analytics applied to the team performance data from the group games can give us a clearer understanding of current form and which teams are best placed to succeed. Statistical analysis shows that the <a href="http://www.jhse.ua.es/jhse/article/view/361">key performances indicators</a> (KPIs) that are most closely correlated with winning at this World Cup include: completed passes, high activity distance covered, shot accuracy, tackles, clearances and fouls committed. Combining these KPIs with goals scored and conceded, it is possible to produce current form team ratings going into the knockout phases and use these ratings to predict the likely destination of the World Cup.</p>
<p><strong>Current form team rankings after the group stage:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li> The Netherlands<br></li>
<li> Colombia<br></li>
<li> France</li>
<li> Brazil</li>
<li> Germany</li>
<li> Argentina</li>
<li> Costa Rica</li>
<li> Belgium</li>
<li> Chile</li>
<li>Algeria</li>
<li>Switzerland</li>
<li>Mexico</li>
<li>Nigeria</li>
<li>Uruguay</li>
<li>USA</li>
<li>Greece</li>
</ol>
<p>The Netherlands top the ratings which is no surprise after winning all three group games including their comprehensive 5-1 defeat of Spain. Much more surprising is that Colombia rank second, also with a 100% record in the group games. The Netherlands and Colombia are in the opposite halves of the draw so could conceivably meet in the World Cup Final. But to do so would probably require Colombia to beat Brazil in the Quarter Finals and then beat either France or Germany in the Semi-Finals while the Netherlands will most likely need to triumph over Argentina in the Semi-Finals.</p>
<p>Brazil rank fourth and Argentina rank sixth based on their team KPIs, reflecting that the form of both of these teams has been a little patchy so far. Brazil could only draw with Mexico, and Argentina only sneaked past Iran with a late winner in stoppage time. But with Neymar and Messi in their teams Brazil and Argentina have the individual genius to go all the way.</p>
<p>The Last 16 games all look very predictable based on current form and at least on paper all of the group winners should progress. But the Quarter Finals look very hard to call, other than the Netherlands who should beat the winners of the Costa Rica-Greece game. Colombia, as already suggested, should beat Uruguay and could surprise Brazil. If France get past Nigeria and Germany beat Algeria, then a France-Germany Quarter Final might need penalties to separate the teams. And Belgium could push Argentina all the way if both teams as expected win their Last 16 games.</p>
<h2>So, who will win the World Cup?</h2>
<p>Although the ratings put the Netherlands as favourites based on their form in the group games, the main conclusion from the statistical analysis of the games is that this is possibly one of the most open and competitively balanced World Cup tournaments ever, with all of the group winners having some grounds for optimism. </p>
<p>The Netherlands against Colombia in the World Cup Final had long odds before the tournament started but those odds have now shortened considerably. The bookmakers still make Brazil favourites followed by Germany and Argentina. And you cannot discount either France or Belgium. </p>
<p>Predicting the World Cup even after half the teams have been eliminated remains very difficult. Indeed based on the team ratings Croatia would have been predicted to reach the Quarter Finals but the quality of their play did not translate into results. We just do not know who will lift the trophy and it is that uncertainty of outcome that makes this year’s World Cup so interesting. The only certainty over the next two weeks is that football fans around the world are going to be gripped and entertained by some tense and exciting games. And there will probably be some surprises so don’t take the table above as gospel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28561/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Gerrard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s World Cup crunch time. The group stages are over and it will be knockout games to the final from here on in. From the performances we’ve seen so far, there are numerous contenders for the title. Brazil…Bill Gerrard, Professor of Business and Sports Analytics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/144612013-05-24T05:47:00Z2013-05-24T05:47:00ZScience is vital, just not in the way you think<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24282/original/wdgf6wx8-1369233775.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scientists take to the streets, optimistically.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK government’s spending review is coming up and scientists are worried. They fear that there may be cuts to science funding, which they were able to just about avoid in 2010 after a strong campaign that saw scientists take to the streets in protest.</p>
<p>The 2010 spending review nominally protected science with a flat cash settlement, but close examination of the small print quickly revealed an accounting trick separating out capital spending from current spending, allowing the government to significantly cut back on the former. Much of this deficit has been made good with subsequent announcements, but in a highly competitive funding system even modest cuts can cause great uncertainty, driving unwise decisions that may be difficult to reverse. </p>
<p>So the worry this time around is real, and the cry has once more gone out that “<a href="http://scienceisvital.org.uk/">science is vital</a>” to our future economic well-being.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, science funding debates in the UK often generate more heat than light. There is a <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/political-science/2013/feb/27/uk-spend-basic-research">widely held belief</a> that curiosity-driven, basic research is the direct precursor to the technological development that contributes to economic growth. In this view, without a steady supply of fundamental discoveries, the innovation process will necessarily grind to a halt. Sadly, there is <a href="http://www.researchprofessional.com/0/rr/news/uk/views-of-the-uk/2010/7/there-is-no-ideal-measure-of-the-economic-impact-of-research.html">little evidence in favour of this view</a>.</p>
<p>There are broadly three sources of evidence relevant to the question: econometric studies, case histories and surveys of innovating firms. Econometric studies try to uncover the relationship between investments in research and improvements in productivity. They do this by modelling research as a process in which cash is turned into knowledge. </p>
<p>Partly through dissatisfaction with the wildly different estimates of “social return” on research investments that come from these econometric studies, the attention of scholars has progressively turned to empirical case studies and surveys. But the allure of hard numbers provided by econometric studies remains strong, even if those hard numbers may have no meaning. </p>
<p>Nearly 60 years of empirical studies, plus insights from the history of science and technology stretching back much further, tell us that the processes by which research can have economic and societal impacts are complex and non-linear. New knowledge is neither the only output nor necessarily the most important. The knowledge and understanding generated by scientific research is undoubtedly valuable in its own right, and may provide an important background for technological development, but discoveries seem only rarely to play a crucial role in directly driving innovation. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the terminology we use to discuss research and innovation remains founded on the simple linear belief that fundamental research must come before nearer-market research and technological development. Yet scientists select the topics they work on for many reasons, and advances in fundamental understanding can come from research conducted to solve real world problems. And in some fields the distinction between basic and applied may break down completely. </p>
<p>Science and technology are both global activities, so there is absolutely no reason to believe that UK investments in scientific research should lead directly to UK benefits in terms of innovation and new technologies. But the conduct of cutting-edge scientific research <em>does</em> directly drive the development of new research techniques and technologies. And crucially, it creates a stock of very highly skilled researchers. </p>
<p>In this way UK spending on science underpins the creation and maintenance of a base that gives us the ability to evaluate, absorb and use knowledge developed elsewhere. It also attracts the best minds in the world to come and work here (that is <a href="http://sciencecampaign.org.uk/?tag=immigration">assuming they are allowed in</a>). </p>
<p>Since leading scientists value independence in selecting the focus of their research, since new scientific knowledge is rarely a direct input into innovation, and since we can’t predict what knowledge we might need tomorrow, there is clearly an important place for blue-sky science.</p>
<p>So, science <em>is</em> vital – just not in the way most people think. Unfortunately, a belief that science drives innovation can actually be harmful to science. Viewing the science base as a production line for commercial knowledge that is somehow misfiring has driven policymakers to tinker with it in order to “fix” the problem. </p>
<p>But our science base is not broken. Technology generally comes from research directed to developing it, something that both government and industry have neglected for decades. Our world-class science base is a tremendous national asset that needs careful nurturing, not cuts or hasty, poorly-thought-out prioritisation. And if the UK is serious about innovation, it needs to build a world-class technology base to accompany it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Counter</em>: <a href="https://theconversation.com/trust-the-markets-to-fund-science-14230">Trust the markets to fund science</a></p>
<p><em>Infographic</em>: <a href="https://theconversation.com/infographic-how-much-does-the-world-spend-on-science-14069">How much does the world spend on science?</a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/14461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kieron Flanagan receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, and from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS).</span></em></p>The UK government’s spending review is coming up and scientists are worried. They fear that there may be cuts to science funding, which they were able to just about avoid in 2010 after a strong campaign…Kieron Flanagan, Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.