tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/end-to-end-encryption-41801/articlesEnd-to-end encryption – The Conversation2024-03-11T12:26:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244772024-03-11T12:26:13Z2024-03-11T12:26:13ZAre private conversations truly private? A cybersecurity expert explains how end-to-end encryption protects you<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580537/original/file-20240307-24-mrho7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1080%2C719&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Several popular messaging apps, including Messenger, Signal, Telegram and WhatsApp, use end-to-end encryption.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/openrightsgroup/50534017012/in/dateposted-public/"> Open Rights Group/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine opening your front door wide and inviting the world to listen in on your most private conversations. Unthinkable, right? Yet, in the digital realm, people inadvertently leave doors ajar, potentially allowing hackers, tech companies, service providers and security agencies to peek into their private communications. </p>
<p>Much depends on the applications you use and the <a href="https://www.passcamp.com/blog/data-encryption-standards-what-you-need-to-know/">encryption standards</a> the apps uphold. <a href="https://www.ibm.com/topics/end-to-end-encryption">End-to-end encryption</a> is a digital safeguard for online interactions. It’s used by many of the more popular messaging apps. Understanding end-to-end encryption is crucial for maintaining privacy in people’s increasingly digital lives. </p>
<p>While end-to-end encryption effectively secures messages, it is not foolproof against all <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories">cyberthreats</a> and requires users to actively manage their privacy settings. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=0ixaP0AAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">cybersecurity researcher</a>, I believe that continuous advancements in encryption are necessary to safeguard private communications as the <a href="https://www.enzuzo.com/blog/digital-privacy-definition">digital privacy</a> landscape evolves.</p>
<h2>How end-to-end encryption works</h2>
<p>When you send a message via an app using end-to-end encryption, your app acts as a cryptographer and encodes your message with a <a href="https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/cryptographic-keys-101-what-they-are-how-they-secure-data/">cryptographic key</a>. This process transforms your message into a <a href="https://www.hypr.com/security-encyclopedia/cipher">cipher</a> – a jumble of seemingly random characters that conceal the true essence of your message. </p>
<p>This ensures that the message remains a private exchange between you and your recipient, safeguarded against unauthorized access, whether from hackers, service providers or surveillance agencies. Should any <a href="https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/eavesdropping">eavesdroppers</a> intercept it, they would see only gibberish and would not be able to decipher the message without the <a href="https://sensorstechforum.com/what-is-decryption-key/">decryption key</a>.</p>
<p>When the message reaches its destination, the recipient’s app uses the corresponding decryption key to unlock the message. This decryption key, securely stored on the recipient’s device, is the only key capable of deciphering the message, translating the encrypted text back into readable format.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A diagram showing three document icons linked left to right by two arrows with key icons above the arrows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580578/original/file-20240307-23-3a9gom.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When you send a message using end-to-end encryption, the app on your phone uses the recipient’s public key to encrypt the message. Only the recipient’s private key, stored on their phone, can decrypt the message.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Asymmetric_encryption_scheme.png">MarcT0K/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This form of encryption is called <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/module/deep-dive-end-end-encryption-how-do-public-key-encryption-systems-work">public key, or asymmetric, cryptography</a>. Each party who communicates using this form of encryption has two encryption keys, one public and one private. You share your public key with whoever wants to communicate securely with you, and they use it to encrypt their messages to you. But that key can’t be used to decrypt their messages. Only your private key, which you do not share with anyone, can do that. </p>
<p>In practice, you don’t have to think about sharing keys. Messaging apps that use end-to-end encryption handle that behind the scenes. You and the party you are communicating securely with just have to use the same app.</p>
<h2>Who has end-to-end encryption</h2>
<p>End-to-end encryption is used by major messaging apps and services to safeguard users’ privacy. </p>
<p>Apple’s <a href="https://www.apple.com/privacy/features/">iMessage</a> integrates end-to-end encryption for messages exchanged between iMessage users, safeguarding them from external access. However, messages sent to or received from non-iMessage users such as SMS texts to or from Android phones do not benefit from this level of encryption.</p>
<p>Google has begun rolling out end-to-end encryption for <a href="https://support.google.com/messages/answer/10262381?hl=en">Google Messages</a>, the default messaging app on many Android devices. The company is aiming to modernize traditional SMS with more advanced features, including better privacy. However, this encryption is currently limited to one-on-one chats.</p>
<p><a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2023/12/default-end-to-end-encryption-on-messenger/">Facebook Messenger</a> also offers end-to-end encryption, but it is not enabled by default. Users need to start a “<a href="https://parentzone.org.uk/article/facebook-secret-conversations">Secret Conversation</a>” to encrypt their messages end to end. End-to-end encrypted chats are currently available only in the Messenger app on iOS and Android, not on Facebook chat or messenger.com.</p>
<p><a href="https://faq.whatsapp.com/490592613091019">WhatsApp</a> stands out for its robust privacy features, implementing end-to-end encryption by default for all forms of communication within the app. </p>
<p><a href="https://signal.org/">Signal</a>, often heralded by cybersecurity experts as the gold standard for secure communication, offers end-to-end encryption across all its messaging and calling features by default. Signal’s commitment to privacy is reinforced by its open-source protocol, which allows independent experts to verify its security. </p>
<p><a href="https://telegram.org/faq">Telegram</a> offers a nuanced approach to privacy. While it provides strong encryption, its standard chats do not use end-to-end encryption. For that, users must initiate “<a href="https://core.telegram.org/blackberry/secretchats">Secret Chats</a>.”</p>
<p>It’s essential to not only understand the privacy features offered by these platforms but also to <a href="https://www.telemessage.com/privacy-settings-in-mobile-messaging-apps-how-to-configure-and-which-app-protects-your-privacy-best/">manage their settings</a> to ensure the highest level of security each app offers. With varying levels of protection across services, the responsibility often falls on the user to choose messaging apps wisely and to opt for those that provide end-to-end encryption by default. </p>
<h2>Is end-to-end encryption effective?</h2>
<p>The effectiveness of end-to-end encryption in safeguarding privacy is a subject of much debate. While it significantly enhances security, no system is entirely foolproof. Skilled hackers with sufficient resources, especially those backed by security agencies, can sometimes find ways around it. </p>
<p>Additionally, end-to-end encryption does not protect against threats posed by <a href="https://www.seciron.com/blog/10-signs-that-your-mobile-device-is-compromised/">hacked devices</a> or <a href="https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/preemptive-safety/phishing-prevention-tips">phishing attacks</a>, which can compromise the security of communications.</p>
<p>The coming era of <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-quantum-computers-about-to-break-online-privacy/">quantum computing</a> poses a potential risk to end-to-end encryption, because quantum computers could theoretically break current encryption methods, highlighting the need for continuous advancements in encryption technology. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, for the average user, end-to-end encryption offers a robust defense against most forms of digital eavesdropping and cyberthreats. As you navigate the evolving landscape of digital privacy, the question remains: What steps should you take next to ensure the continued protection of your private conversations in an increasingly interconnected world?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robin Chataut does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>End-to-end encryption provides strong protection for keeping your communications private, but not every messaging app uses it, and even some of the ones that do don’t have it turned on by default.Robin Chataut, Assistant Professor of Cybersecurity and Computer Science, Quinnipiac UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1835122022-06-14T12:30:22Z2022-06-14T12:30:22ZEU law would require Big Tech to do more to combat child sexual abuse, but a key question remains: How?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468135/original/file-20220610-25540-fwy2pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C20%2C4500%2C2970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson announced a set of proposed regulations requiring tech companies to report child sexual abuse material.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BelgiumEUSecurity/d70061f7057045fcad9ac9819e883334/photo">AP Photo/Francisco Seco</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The European Commission <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-laying-down-rules-prevent-and-combat-child-sexual-abuse_en">recently proposed regulations</a> to protect children by requiring tech companies to scan the content in their systems for child sexual abuse material. This is an extraordinarily wide-reaching and ambitious effort that would have broad implications beyond the European Union’s borders, including in the U.S.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the proposed regulations are, for the most part, technologically unfeasible. To the extent that they could work, they require <a href="https://edri.org/our-work/european-commissions-online-csam-proposal-fails-to-find-right-solutions-to-tackle-child-sexual-abuse/">breaking end-to-end encryption</a>, which would make it possible for the technology companies – and potentially the government and hackers – to see private communications.</p>
<p>The regulations, proposed on May 11, 2022, would impose several obligations on tech companies that host content and provide communication services, including social media platforms, texting services and direct messaging apps, to detect certain categories of images and text. </p>
<p>Under the proposal, these companies would be required to detect previously identified child sexual abuse material, new child sexual abuse material, and solicitations of children for sexual purposes. Companies would be required to report detected content to the EU Centre, a centralized coordinating entity that the proposed regulations would establish. </p>
<p>Each of these categories presents its own challenges, which combine to make the proposed regulations impossible to implement as a package. The trade-off between protecting children and protecting user privacy underscores how combating online child sexual abuse is a “<a href="https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/wicked-problem/about/What-is-a-wicked-problem">wicked problem</a>.” This puts technology companies in a difficult position: required to comply with regulations that serve a laudable goal but without the means to do so.</p>
<h2>Digital fingerprints</h2>
<p>Researchers have known how to detect previously identified child sexual abuse material for over a decade. This method, first developed by <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna">Microsoft</a>, assigns a “hash value” – a sort of digital fingerprint – to an image, which can then be compared against a database of previously identified and hashed child sexual abuse material. In the U.S., the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children manages several databases of hash values, and some tech companies maintain their own hash sets. </p>
<p>The hash values for images uploaded or shared using a company’s services are compared with these databases to detect previously identified child sexual abuse material. This method has proved extremely accurate, reliable and fast, which is critical to making any technical solution scalable.</p>
<p>The problem is that many privacy advocates consider it <a href="https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/CDT-Outside-Looking-In-Approaches-to-Content-Moderation-in-End-to-End-Encrypted-Systems-updated-20220113.pdf">incompatible with end-to-end encryption</a>, which, strictly construed, means that only the sender and the intended recipient can view the content. Because the proposed EU regulations mandate that tech companies report any detected child sexual abuse material to the EU Centre, this would violate end-to-end encryption, thus forcing a trade-off between effective detection of the harmful material and user privacy.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4pZhkNmGtCo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Here’s how end-to-end encryption works, and which popular messaging apps use it.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Recognizing new harmful material</h2>
<p>In the case of new content – that is, images and videos not included in hash databases – there is no such tried-and-true technical solution. Top engineers have been working on this issue, building and training AI tools that can accommodate large volumes of data. <a href="https://protectingchildren.google/#tools-to-fight-csam">Google</a> and child safety nongovernmental organization <a href="https://safer.io/about/">Thorn</a> have both had some success using machine-learning classifiers to help companies identify potential new child sexual abuse material. </p>
<p>However, without independently verified data on the tools’ accuracy, it’s not possible to assess their utility. Even if the accuracy and speed are comparable with hash-matching technology, the mandatory reporting will again break end-to-end encryption.</p>
<p>New content also includes livestreams, but the proposed regulations seem to overlook the unique challenges this technology poses. Livestreaming technology became ubiquitous during the pandemic, and the production of child sexual abuse material from livestreamed content has <a href="https://inhope.org/EN/articles/live-streamed-abuse-of-minors-what-can-be-done">dramatically increased</a>. </p>
<p>More and more children are being enticed or coerced into livestreaming sexually explicit acts, which the viewer may record or screen-capture. Child safety organizations have noted that the production of “perceived first-person child sexual abuse material” – that is, child sexual abuse material of apparent selfies – has risen at <a href="https://annualreport2021.iwf.org.uk/Trends/SelfGenerated">exponential rates</a> over the past few years. In addition, traffickers may livestream the sexual abuse of children for offenders who pay to watch. </p>
<p>The circumstances that lead to recorded and livestreamed child sexual abuse material are very different, but the technology is the same. And there is currently no technical solution that can detect the production of child sexual abuse material as it occurs. Tech safety company <a href="https://safetonet.com/">SafeToNet</a> is developing a <a href="https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2020/08/ai-based-software-could-block-livestreamed-graphic-content/">real-time detection tool</a>, but it is not ready to launch.</p>
<h2>Detecting solicitations</h2>
<p>Detection of the third category, “solicitation language,” is also fraught. The tech industry has made dedicated efforts to pinpoint indicators necessary to identify solicitation and enticement language, but with mixed results. Microsoft spearheaded <a href="https://www.engadget.com/2020-01-09-microsoft-project-artemis-online-child-abuse.html">Project Artemis</a>, which led to the development of the <a href="https://www.thorn.org/blog/what-is-project-artemis-thorn-microsoft-grooming/">Anti-Grooming Tool</a>. The tool is designed to detect enticement and solicitation of a child for sexual purposes. </p>
<p>As the proposed regulations point out, however, the accuracy of this tool is 88%. In 2020, popular messaging app WhatsApp delivered approximately <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/29/whatsapp-is-now-delivering-roughly-100-billion-messages-a-day/">100 billion messages daily</a>. If the tool identifies even 0.01% of the messages as “positive” for solicitation language, human reviewers would be tasked with reading 10 million messages every day to identify the 12% that are false positives, making the tool simply impractical. </p>
<p>As with all the above-mentioned detection methods, this, too, would break end-to-end encryption. But whereas the others may be limited to reviewing a hash value of an image, this tool requires access to all exchanged text. </p>
<h2>No path</h2>
<p>It’s possible that the European Commission is taking such an ambitious approach in hopes of spurring technical innovation that would lead to more accurate and reliable detection methods. However, without existing tools that can accomplish these mandates, the regulations are ineffective. </p>
<p>When there is a mandate to take action but no path to take, I believe the disconnect will simply leave the industry without the clear guidance and direction these regulations are intended to provide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Draper receives funding from Meta and the Silicon Valley Community Foundation for her project on combatting online child sexual abuse and exploitation in end-to-end encrypted environments. </span></em></p>The EU’s proposed regulations don’t align with existing technology. They’re likely to fail – or to break the internet as we know it.Laura Draper, Senior Project Director at the Tech, Law & Security Program, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1363302020-05-01T11:40:29Z2020-05-01T11:40:29ZZoom security: I’ve researched problems with video conferencing for years – here’s what you need to know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331696/original/file-20200430-42918-m9lq5i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Spot the intruder.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/group-corporate-video-conference-computer-monitor-1706921377">Andrey Popov/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The video conferencing app Zoom gained about 2 million new users in the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/26/zoom-has-added-more-users-so-far-this-year-than-in-2019-bernstein.html">first two months</a> of 2020 – and that was before the World Health Organization declared the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic. With so many people now relying on video conferencing for contact with their friends, family and colleagues, it’s no wonder Zoom has seen a significant increase in its company stock price. But the firm has also attracted some <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/the-zoom-app-has-a-lot-of-security-problems.html">negative press</a> recently for issues related to its privacy and security.</p>
<p>I worked in the video conferencing industry for 10 years. During this time, I started a PhD on whether such systems meet the needs of organisations that have to communicate under adversarial circumstances, such as international NGOs and opposition groups under oppressive regimes. My near-finished research shows that Zoom has indeed had plenty of problems, but is far from the only platform with security and privacy issues.</p>
<p>A number of issues with Zoom have attracted public attention, most notably call hijacking or “Zoom-bombing”. Calls that are not set to private or password-protected can be accessed by anyone who inputs the nine- to 11-digit meeting code, and <a href="https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/zoom-meeting-password.html">researchers have shown</a> how valid meeting codes could easily be identified (something Zoom now says it prevents).</p>
<p>Zoom has also recently <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/03/27/zoom-use-of-facebook-sdk-in-ios-client">had to make changes</a> to its iPhone and iPad apps to stop Facebook being able to collect data about users. And last year it was <a href="https://thenextweb.com/security/2019/07/09/zoom-security-flaw-could-let-websites-turn-on-your-macs-webcam-without-permission/">forced to fix</a> a problem that could have allowed websites to turn on Mac users’ cameras without permission.</p>
<p>Another issue, recently <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/03/31/zoom-meeting-encryption/">highlighted by The Intercept</a>, is that Zoom claims its calls can be encrypted, but doesn’t use the kind of end-to-end encryption that many people have come to understand <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-whatsapp-encryption-works-and-why-there-shouldnt-be-a-backdoor-75266">as standard</a> for private communication services. Messages or calls sent with end-to-end encryption are effectively locked with the receiving user’s public key that anyone can access, but can only be unlocked by the user’s private key. This system is used by messaging apps such as WhatsApp to ensure only a message’s recipient can read it – not even the app’s provider has access.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331719/original/file-20200430-42946-11q26w2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">a.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/san-jose-ca-usa-feb-17-1708283947">Tada Images/Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<p><a href="https://zoom.us/docs/doc/Zoom%20Encryption%20Whitepaper.pdf">Zoom instead</a> uses the <a href="https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/what-is-256-bit-encryption/">AES-256 ECB method</a> of encryption, which shares the key used to encrypt calls with Zoom’s servers around the globe. This potentially gives them full access to the audio and video streams, although the company <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/01/facts-around-zoom-encryption-for-meetings-webinars/">has stated</a> no user content is available to its employees or servers once encrypted. </p>
<p>Researchers <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/">have also found</a> that encryption keys even up on Zoom servers based in China (where the company has development sites) even when no Chinese participants are in the call. This opens the possibility that the Chinese government, famed for its control of internet communications in the country, could eavesdrop on calls. Zoom has now <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/13/21219835/zoom-data-center-call-routing-china-security-privacy-encryption">started offering</a> paying customers the ability to opt out of having data routed through China or other regions.</p>
<p>While Zoom has developed measures or options to at least partly address all of the issues highlighted – and said it will <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/01/a-message-to-our-users/">freeze the development</a> of new features for 90 days so it can focus on improving security – the litany of problems that have already been identified should provoke serious thought among its users. On top of this, <a href="https://zoom.us/privacy">Zoom’s privacy policy</a> is arguably not user-friendly. By downloading the app, you essentially grant the company permission to do with your personal data whatever they want.</p>
<p>The problem for anyone looking for a more private system is that many of Zoom’s competitors have their own similar security issues. For example, Microsoft’s Skype and Teams services also use forms of encryption that give the company control over the keys.</p>
<h2>Alternatives</h2>
<p>So what are the alternatives? The most secure options are arguably those that use end-to-end encryption and are built with open-source code because it can be publicly reviewed to check it doesn’t have any hidden problems. </p>
<p>Signal is a messaging app that falls into this category and also provides video calling from smartphones, but not desktop video calls or video conferencing with multiple parties. Jitsi is also open source and provides end-to-end encrypted video calls via a web browser, and <a href="https://jitsi.org/blog/e2ee/">is working on</a> doing the same for multi-party video conferencing. </p>
<p>If these options don’t suit you, then there are things you can do when using Zoom or other video calling services that have potential security issues to <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/video-conferencing-services-using-them-securely">maximise your privacy and safety</a>.</p>
<ul>
<li>Enforce encryption by default and makes sure it’s end-to-end if possible</li>
<li>Lock and password-protect meetings</li>
<li>Unauthenticated users should be held in a waiting room so the organiser can check their identity before admitting them to the call</li>
<li>Make sure a meeting host monitors the participants list and ensures no unknown participant joins</li>
<li>Be careful with meeting recordings and get consent from the participants</li>
<li>Be aware that audio-only participants calling via a regular phone dial-in option will “break” the encryption</li>
<li>Be careful with file and screen-sharing capabilities. They could accidentally disclose sensitive information or be used to spread malicious programs.</li>
</ul>
<p>In response to the issues raised in this article, a Zoom spokesperson said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zoom takes user privacy, security, and trust extremely seriously. Zoom was originally developed for enterprise use, and has been confidently selected for complete deployment by a large number of institutions globally, following security reviews of our user, network and datacenter layers. </p>
<p>During the COVID-19 pandemic, we are working around-the-clock to ensure that businesses, schools, and other organizations across the world can stay connected and operational. As more and new kinds of users start using Zoom during this time, Zoom has been proactively engaging to make sure they understand Zoom’s relevant policies, as well as the best ways to use the platform and protect their meetings.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Reisinger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Do you need a new video conferencing provider?Thomas Reisinger, PhD Candidate in Cyber Security, De Montfort UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1287822019-12-16T05:24:02Z2019-12-16T05:24:02ZFacebook’s push for end-to-end encryption is good news for user privacy, as well as terrorists and paedophiles<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307065/original/file-20191216-124004-1zmrcu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C80%2C4270%2C2910&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Facebook's initiative places the company in a complicated situation, as increased user privacy, while positive, could come with potential impunity for offenders. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SHUTTERSTOCK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Facebook is <a href="https://thenextweb.com/facebook/2019/10/31/facebook-is-testing-end-to-end-encryption-for-secret-messenger-calls/">planning end-to-end encryption on all its messaging services</a> to increase privacy levels. </p>
<p>The tech giant started <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/25/18197222/facebook-messenger-instagram-end-to-end-encryption-feature-zuckerberg">experimenting</a> with this <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/">earlier this year</a>. Soon, end-to-end encryption will be standard for every Facebook message. </p>
<p>But Australian, British and United States governments and <a href="https://www.news18.com/news/tech/facebook-wants-to-expand-encryption-across-all-its-platforms-but-lawmakers-are-wary-2376161.html">law makers</a> aren’t <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/encryption-can-t-put-tech-giants-beyond-the-reach-of-the-law-minister-says-20191211-p53ize.html">happy about it</a>. They fear it will make it impossible to recover criminal conversations from Facebook’s platforms, thus offering impunity to offenders. </p>
<p>For instance, this was a major concern following <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/khalid-masood-whatsapp-westminster-london-attack-parliament-message-isis-terror-network-contacts-a7649206.html">the 2017 London terror attacks</a>. Attackers used WhatsApp (Facebook’s end-to-end encrypted platform), and this frustrated police investigations.</p>
<p>But does Facebook’s initiative place the company between a political rock and an ethical hard place?</p>
<h2>What is end-to-end encryption?</h2>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_encryption">End-to-end encryption</a> is a method of communicating more securely, compared to non-encrypted communications. </p>
<p>It involves using encryption (via cryptographic keys) that excludes third parties from accessing content shared between communicating users. </p>
<p>When the sender wants to communicate with the receiver, they share a unique <a href="https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/encryption">algorithmic key to decrypt</a> the message. No one else can access it, not even the service provider.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-and-crime-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-66397">Social media and crime: the good, the bad and the ugly</a>
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<h2>The real incentive</h2>
<p>Facebook’s plan to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/10/06/is-facebooks-new-encryption-fight-hiding-a-ruthless-secret-agenda/#6ec67b3b5699">enact this change is paradoxical</a>, considering the company has a history of <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jmjcila31&div=20&g_sent=1&casa_token=9vXpTPHtJw8AAAAA:B6FRTbg2DmAm5BkVzfidBoBgvSwEM6DcOepLuWUbEM-4ICx8U5kUPS7496BddNrArud0rRPh">harvesting user data</a> and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-you-should-delete-facebook-messenger-2018-4?r=US&IR=T">selling it to third parties</a>. </p>
<p>Now, it supposedly wants to protect the privacy of the same users.</p>
<p>One possible reason Facebook is pushing for this development is because it will solve many of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/10/06/is-facebooks-new-encryption-fight-hiding-a-ruthless-secret-agenda/#6ec67b3b5699">its legal woes</a>. </p>
<p>With end-to-end encryption, the company will no longer have <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)">backdoor</a> access to users’ messages. </p>
<p>Thus, it won’t be forced to comply with requests from law enforcement agencies to access data. And even if police were able to get hold of the data, they would still need the key required to read the messages. </p>
<p>Only users would have the ability to share the key (or messages) with law enforcement.</p>
<h2>Points in favour</h2>
<p>Implementing end-to-end encryption will positively impact Facebook users’ privacy, as their messages will be protected from eavesdropping. </p>
<p>This means Facebook, law enforcement agencies and hackers will find it harder to intercept any communication done through the platform. </p>
<p>And although end-to-end encryption is arguably not necessary for most everyday conversations, it does have <a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2016/way_2016_paper_vaziripour.pdf">advantages</a>, including: </p>
<p>1) protecting users’ personal and financial information, such as transactions on Facebook Marketplace </p>
<p>2) increasing trust and cooperation between users </p>
<p>3) preventing criminals eavesdropping on individuals to harvest their information, which can render them victim to <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/beware-of-these-11-facebook-scams-1947431">stalking, scamming and romance frauds</a></p>
<p>4) allowing those with sensitive medical, political or sexual information to be able to share it with others online</p>
<p>5) enabling journalists and intelligence agencies to communicate privately with sources.</p>
<h2>Not foolproof</h2>
<p>However, even though end-to-end encryption will increase users’ privacy in certain situations, it may still not be enough to make conversations completely safe.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/end-to-end-encryption-isnt-enough-security-for-real-people-82054">End-to-end encryption isn't enough security for 'real people'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This is because the biggest threat to eavesdropping is the very act of using a device. </p>
<p>End-to-end encryption doesn’t <a href="https://medium.com/@BlackwaveLtd/end-to-end-encryption-is-not-secure-without-proper-authentication-67bfa3c8108">guarantee</a> the people we are talking to online are who they say they are. </p>
<p>Also, while cryptographic algorithms are hard to crack, third parties can still <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/securing-the-weakest-link">obtain the key to open the message</a>. For example, this can be done by using apps to <a href="https://recon.meddle.mobi/papers/panoptispy18pets.pdf">take screenshots</a> of a conversation, and sending them to third parties.</p>
<h2>A benefit for criminals</h2>
<p>When Facebook messages become end-to-end encrypted, it will be <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0150300#pone.0150300.ref009">harder to detect criminals</a>, including people who use the platform to commit <a href="http://milwaukeenns.org/2014/05/21/special-report-diploma-mill-scams-continue-to-plague-milwaukees-adult-students">scams</a> and launch <a href="https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2014/05/27/instant-messaging-trojan-spreads-through-the-uk/">malware</a>.</p>
<p>Others use Facebook <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-cracks-down-on-illegal-racket-on-selling-housemaids-using-app-1.1572855473783">for human</a> or sex trafficking, as well as <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-ednc/pr/jacksonville-man-sentenced-child-pornography-case">child grooming</a> and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/facebook-must-pick-a-side-in-fight-against-online-child-sex-abuse-dutton-20191004-p52xnw.html">exploitation</a>.</p>
<p>Facebook Messenger can also help <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3005872">criminals organise themselves</a>, as well as plan and carry out crimes, including terror attacks and cyber-enabled fraud extortion hacks.</p>
<p>The unfortunate <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/ORRRSA-2">trade-off</a> in <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xpsA2Cq997wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=increasing+privacy+surveillance+internet&ots=nSKCdoaLWu&sig=IIRuxqn5731sXp8A989Vyl9Ef00&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=increasing%20privacy%20surveillance%20internet&f=false">increasing user privacy</a> is reducing the capacity for surveillance and national security efforts. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-photos-on-social-media-lead-to-mistaken-identity-in-court-cases-63887">Can photos on social media lead to mistaken identity in court cases?</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>End-to-end encryption on Facebook would also increase criminals’ feeling of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563217305812">security</a>. </p>
<p>However, although tech companies can’t deny the risk of having their technologies exploited for illegal purposes – they also don’t have a <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/australias-tech-future/cyber-security/what-is-the-government-doing-in-cyber-security">complete duty to keep a particular country’s cyberspace safe</a>. </p>
<h2>What to do?</h2>
<p>A potential solution to the dilemma can be found in various <a href="https://www.computerworld.com/article/3427019/the-snoopers-charter-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-investigatory-powers-act.html">critiques</a> of the <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0066/17066.pdf">UK’s 2016 Investigatory Powers Act</a>. </p>
<p>It proposes that, on certain occasions, a communications service provider may be asked to remove encryption (where possible). </p>
<p>However, this power must come from an authority that <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/25714">can be held accountable</a> in court for its actions, and this should be used as a last resort. </p>
<p>In doing so, encryption will increase user privacy without allowing total privacy, which carries <a href="https://guardtime.com/blog/6-reasons-why-encryption-isnt-working">harmful consequences</a>. </p>
<p>So far, several governments have pushed back against Facebook’s encryption plans, fearing it will place <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/encryption-can-t-put-tech-giants-beyond-the-reach-of-the-law-minister-says-20191211-p53ize.html">the company and its users beyond their reach</a>, and make it more difficult to <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/61-ccblog/8822-encryption-a-godsend-to-all-who-seek-privacy-even-criminals">catch criminals</a>. </p>
<p>End-to-end encryption is perceived as a bulwark for surveillance by third parties and governments, despite <a href="https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/ethics-of-surveillance/tech_wiretapping.html">other ways of intercepting communications</a>.</p>
<p>Many also agree surveillance is not only <a href="https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/119_org_pirate_party_australia.pdf">invasive, but also prone to abuse</a> by governments and third parties. </p>
<p>Freedom from invasive surveillance also <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/CallForSubmission.aspx">facilitates freedom of expression</a>, opinion and privacy, as observed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. </p>
<p>In a world where debate is polarised by social media, Facebook and similar platforms are caught amid the politics of security. </p>
<p>It’s hard to say how a perfect balance can be achieved in such a multifactorial dilemma. </p>
<p>Either way, the decision is a political one, and governments - as opposed to tech companies - should ultimately be responsible for such decisions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128782/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roberto Musotto is affiliated with the Cyber Security Research Cooperative Centre (CSCRC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David S. Wall receives funding from the EPSRC (CRiTiCal & EMPHASIS Projects)</span></em></p>Facebook is planning to put end-to-end encryption on all its messaging services soon. But governments aren’t happy about it, as it could make it harder to catch criminals.Roberto Musotto, Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre Postdoctoral Fellow, Edith Cowan UniversityDavid S. Wall, Professor of Criminology, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/842522017-11-01T10:15:38Z2017-11-01T10:15:38ZReal security requires strong encryption – even if investigators get blocked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188031/original/file-20170928-22252-19cxghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What's the best way to keep data secure?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/vintage-encryption-data-security-concept-hands-624395702">Victor Moussa/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice have been <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/353858-deputy-ag-rosenstein-raises-alarm-over-warrant-proof-encryption">fighting against</a> easy, widespread public access to <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-encryption-united-states-naval">encryption technologies</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/04/19/a-brief-history-of-u-s-encryption-policy/">for 25 years</a>. Since the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/03/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-fight-explained.html">bureau’s dispute with Apple in 2016</a> over <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/apple-vs-fbi-25241">access to the encrypted iPhone</a> of one of the two people who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html">shot 14 victims in San Bernardino, California</a>, this battle has become <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-news-poll-americans-split-on-unlocking-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone/">more pitched</a>. </p>
<p>This dispute is not about whether regular people can or should use encryption: The U.S. government is in favor of <a href="https://www.cio.gov/2017/01/19/automatic-https-enforcement-new-executive-branch-gov-domains/">using encryption</a> to secure data. Rather, it’s about the <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603534/the-next-big-encryption-fight/">FBI’s demand</a> that encryption systems include “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/opinions/bellovin-encryption-debate/index.html">exceptional access</a>,” enabling police who get a warrant to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2014/10/16/watch-fbi-director-james-comey-on-technology-law-enforcement-and-going-dark/">circumvent the encryption</a> on a device or on an encrypted call. </p>
<p>Nearly every element of American society is a potential target for sophisticated hackers. That makes the conflict complicated; giving law enforcement officers a way into secure systems makes <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/1/1/69/2367066/Keys-under-doormats-mandating-insecurity-by">breaking in easier for others as well</a>. In 2016, I <a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Landau-Written-Testimony.pdf">testified before Congress</a> in support of Apple and against the FBI position; and as I explain in my forthcoming book, “<a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300227444/listening">Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age</a>,” the FBI’s stance would make people, and society, less secure, not more so.</p>
<h2>A new battle in an old war</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187652/original/file-20170926-10403-1mrrry9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An export-restricted encryption algorithm was printed on a T-shirt as a form of protest in the 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMunitions_T-shirt_(front).jpg">Adam Back</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, the American public is engaged in the second round of what have been called the “<a href="http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/1/worthington.php">encryption wars</a>.” During the 1990s, the U.S. had restrictions on encryption software and algorithms, allowing their use within the country, but preventing them from being exported to other countries. As a result, U.S. software companies faced a choice between creating two versions of every program – a strong system for U.S. customers and a weak system for everyone else – or providing only the weak version. Most chose the latter. That limited the availability of encryption software in the U.S., so export control worked well for both the NSA’s intelligence gatherers and the FBI’s investigators.</p>
<p>But in 2000, the two agencies’ interests split. The <a href="http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/ciodesrefvolone.pdf">Clinger-Cohen Act</a> required the U.S. Department of Defense to buy commercially available communications and computer equipment – and the agency wanted encryption built in. To boost the strength of cryptography in the marketplace, the NSA supported loosening the export controls.</p>
<p>This was a time when NSA itself was facing a new reality. Encrypted communications had become the norm in government work – and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1999/12/06/the-intelligence-gap">not just for technologically sophisticated nations</a>. NSA adapted. Details are shrouded in secrecy, but we know that just like hackers, <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html">NSA takes advantage of unpatched vulnerabilities</a> to break in to targets. NSA also <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/nsa-document-metadata-2016-12">relies heavily on communications metadata</a>, the when, where, how long – and sometimes who – of a communication. And NSA apparently uses stealthy techniques, such as <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/">intercepting communication equipment</a> while being shipped, to install eavesdropping tools. The result? Despite widespread use of encryption by its targets, NSA is largely able to obtain the information it seeks.</p>
<h2>Adapting to an encrypted world</h2>
<p>Today, the FBI is facing a similar situation to the NSA’s two decades ago. Consumer products and apps like WhatsApp <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/07/secret-conversations-end-end-encryption-facebook-messenger-arrived/">regularly use strong encryption</a> to protect communications and devices. And sometimes that prevents investigators from viewing potential evidence – as it did in San Bernardino, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/21/fbi-apple-court-hearing-postpone-unlock-terrorist-iphone">for a time</a>. The bureau can keep fighting the battle to weaken encryption, which it has been losing for decades, or it can <a href="https://theconversation.com/bypassing-encryption-lawful-hacking-is-the-next-frontier-of-law-enforcement-technology-74122">follow the NSA’s lead</a> and adapt.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.chron.com/business/technology/article/FBI-couldn-t-access-nearly-7K-devices-because-of-12297546.php">Police without a back door</a> into encryption systems have several options. Since at least the early 2000s, the FBI has been getting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-years-ago-files-show.html">court orders letting agents hack into criminals’ computer and communication systems</a> to install recording and surveillance software. But that’s not the only possibility for investigators.</p>
<p>Other kinds of nonencrypted data may provide valuable information that can serve as an alternative, and computer systems can be enormously helpful in finding and analyzing that data. In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, investigators had to wade through paper copies of phone company records to discover who talked to whom when, and from there draw connections between members of the bombing conspiracy. Modern software – and digital phone, financial and other records available with a warrant – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nd2fZZhxuzQ">can make that analysis immeasurably faster</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Nd2fZZhxuzQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Former federal prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald explains how technology assists criminal investigators.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The “internet of things” provides another potential treasure trove for investigators: In one instance, for example, the history of a person’s heart rate as measured by his data-collecting pacemaker led to his <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/02/07/pacemaker-arson-charges/">indictment for arson</a> when his story of his actions during the fire didn’t hold up. In another case, a woman’s activity level, as tracked by her Fitbit, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/us/fitbit-womans-death-investigation-trnd/index.html">contradicted her husband’s account</a> of her death – and led to murder charges against him.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-costs-of-cheap-surveillance-67763">Following suspects</a> is a third area where technology really helps police: Using a team of trackers cost approximately US$275 an hour – but tracking a suspect’s phone as it travels <a href="http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/tiny-constables-and-the-cost-of-surveillance-making-cents-out-of-united-states-v-jones">drops the price to $5.21 an hour</a>. </p>
<p>Such technological advances aren’t used as easily by state and local investigators, who conduct <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2016">more than half of law enforcement wiretaps</a> in the U.S. Sometimes state and local police are stymied by relatively simple issues, such as the <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-59_64581.pdf">wide variety of phones, internet providers and data formats</a>. In 2013, the FBI stepped up to help, creating training programs through its <a href="https://ndcac.fbi.gov/">National Domestic Communications Assistance Center</a> to help police gather digital evidence without needing to break encryption.</p>
<p>Even as these varied investigatory techniques will help, sometimes encryption will simply prevent investigators from getting the goods – or getting them quickly enough to prevent a crime. But law enforcement has <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/deputy-attorney-general-rosensteins-responsible-encryption-demand-bad-and-he">always had to deal</a> with <a href="https://gizmodo.com/in-1851-a-man-picked-two-unpickable-locks-and-changed-1698557792">blocks to obtaining evidence</a>; <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusionary_rule">the exclusionary rule</a>, for example, means that <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/367/643.html">evidence collected in violation of a citizen’s constitutional protections is often inadmissible in court</a>. </p>
<h2>Facing new threats</h2>
<p>The importance of strong cryptography in protecting people’s privacy has become clearer in recent years. Attackers are more sophisticated – as shown in the 2015 <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf">Russian hack of the Democratic National Committee</a> emails and the 2017 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html">Equifax data breach</a>, among others. And any groups “viewed as likely to shape future U.S. policies” were <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf">targets of Russian hacking efforts</a>, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. That could include almost any organization – activist groups, church associations, community foundations, professional societies, nongovernmental organizations and more – that forms the underpinning of democratic societies. </p>
<p>This broad threat to fundamental parts of American society poses a serious danger to national security as well as individual privacy. Increasingly, a number of former senior law enforcement and national security officials have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-need-for-ubiquitous-data-encryption/2015/07/28/3d145952-324e-11e5-8353-1215475949f4_story.html">come out strongly in support of end-to-end encryption</a> and strong device protection (much like the kind <a href="https://www.aei.org/publication/gen-michael-hayden-on-apple-the-fbi-and-data-encryption/">Apple has been developing</a>), which can protect against hacking and other data theft incidents.</p>
<p>As technology changes, the jobs of police and intelligence workers must also change; in some ways, it will be harder, in others, easier. But the basic need for security supports the call for wide use of strong encryption – and without modifications that make it easy for Russians, or others, to break in.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Landau has a research grant from Google. In the past she has received funding from NSF.
She participates in a Berkman Center group that periodically publishes whitepapers on security and privacy issues related to the Internet. </span></em></p>The FBI and police officials say they need to decrypt secure communications to fight crime. But they have other options, and modern threats make clear the importance of strong encryption.Susan Landau, Professor of Computer Science, Law and Diplomacy and Cybersecurity, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/820542017-08-14T02:34:20Z2017-08-14T02:34:20ZEnd-to-end encryption isn’t enough security for ‘real people’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181676/original/file-20170810-27691-1mm4rft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The weak spots are at the ends.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/concept-computer-network-security-end-padlock-400442002">ThamKC/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Government officials continue to seek technology companies’ help fighting terrorism and crime. But the most commonly proposed solution would severely limit regular people’s ability to communicate securely online. And it ignores the fact that governments have other ways to <a href="https://theconversation.com/bypassing-encryption-lawful-hacking-is-the-next-frontier-of-law-enforcement-technology-74122">keep an electronic eye on targets</a> of investigations.</p>
<p>In June, government intelligence officials from the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/25/world/uk-us-five-eyes-intelligence-explainer/index.html">Five Eyes Alliance</a> nations held a meeting in Ottawa, Canada, to talk about how to convince tech companies to “<a href="http://www.zdnet.com/article/australia-will-lead-five-eyes-discussions-to-thwart-terrorist-encryption-brandis/">thwart the encryption of terrorist messaging</a>.” In July, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2017-07-14/press-conference-attorney-general-senator-hon-george-brandis-qc-and-acting">called on technology companies</a> to voluntarily ban all systems that totally encrypt messages in transit from sender to recipient, an approach known as “end-to-end encryption.” British Home Secretary Amber Rudd made global headlines with her July 31 <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/home-secretary-amber-rudd-real-people-dont-need-end-to-end-encryption-terrorists-2017-8">newspaper opinion piece</a> arguing that “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/whatsapp-messages-private-amber-rudd-home-secretary-real-people-chat-apps-messaging-encrypted-a7870401.html">real people</a>” don’t need end-to-end encryption. </p>
<p>These claims completely ignore the <a href="https://theintercept.com/2016/06/22/battle-of-the-secure-messaging-apps-how-signal-beats-whatsapp/">one billion</a> real people who already use secure messaging apps like <a href="https://whispersystems.org/">Signal</a> and <a href="https://www.whatsapp.com/">WhatsApp</a>. And it leaves no room for people who may decide they want that security in the future. Yet some technology companies look like they might be <a href="https://9to5mac.com/2017/07/17/apple-australia-encryption-law/">considering removing end-to-end encryption</a> – and others <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data">installed backdoors</a> for government access years ago. It’s been two decades since the <a href="https://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/">Clipper chip</a> was in the news, but now a revival of the <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/policy-papers/doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-of-the-1990s/">government-business-consumer “crypto-wars” of the 1990s</a> threatens.</p>
<p>One thing is very clear to computer scientists like me: We real people should work on improving security where we are most vulnerable – on our own devices.</p>
<h2>Endpoints are the weakest link</h2>
<p>For the moment at least, we do have good, easy-to-use solutions for secure communication between computers, including <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-end-to-end-encryption/">end-to-end encryption</a> of our messages. End-to-end encryption means that a message is encrypted by the sender, and decrypted by the recipient, and no third party is able to decrypt the message.</p>
<p>End-to-end is important, but security experts have <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/securing-the-weakest-link">warned for years</a> that the most vulnerable place for your data is not during transit from place to place, but rather when it’s stored or displayed at one end or the other – on a screen, on a disk, in memory or on some device in the cloud.</p>
<p>As the <a href="https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/?">WikiLeaks release of CIA hacking tools</a> highlighted, if someone can gain control of a device, they can read the messages <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/the-truth-about-the-wikileaks-cia-cache.html">without needing to decrypt them</a>. And compromising endpoints – both smartphones and personal computers – is <a href="https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/critical-takeaways-wikileaks-vault/">getting easier</a> all the time.</p>
<p>Why are we most vulnerable at the endpoint? Because we don’t like to be inconvenienced, and because adding more protection makes our devices harder to use, the same way putting multiple locks on a door makes it harder to get in, for both the homeowner and the burglar. Inventing new ways to protect our digital endpoints without reducing their usefulness is very challenging, but some new technologies just over the horizon might help.</p>
<h2>Next-generation solutions</h2>
<p>Suppose a criminal organization or bad government, EvilRegime, wants to spy on you and everyone you communicate with. To protect yourself, you’ve installed an end-to-end encryption tool, such as <a href="https://whispersystems.org/">Signal</a>, for messaging. This makes eavesdropping – even with a court’s permission – that much more difficult for EvilRegime.</p>
<p>But what if EvilRegime tricks you into installing spyware on your device? For example, they could swap out a legitimate upgrade of your favorite game, “ClashBirds,” with a compromised version. Or, EvilRegime could use a malware “<a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/topic/network-investigative-techniques">network investigative technique</a>” as a backdoor into your machine. With control of your endpoint, EvilRegime can read your messages as you type them, even before they are encrypted.</p>
<p>To guard against either type of EvilRegime’s trickery, we need to improve our endpoint security game in a few key ways, making sure that:</p>
<ul>
<li>EvilRegime isn’t <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/new-android-threat-prowl-krysanec-malware-masquerades-legitimate-apps-unleashes-remote-access-1462013">masquerading</a> as the company that makes “ClashBirds” when we install our software. </li>
<li>No one has <a href="https://theintercept.com/2015/03/10/ispy-cia-campaign-steal-apples-secrets/">tampered</a> with our “ClashBirds” app before or after installation. </li>
<li>The app doesn’t have any <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/23/nsa-director-defends-backdoors-into-technology-companies">backdoors</a> or <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero-day/">security holes</a> that could be exploited by EvilRegime after we install it. </li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, it would be ideal if <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/03/why_america_s_current_approach_to_cybersecurity_is_so_dangerous.html">users could control their apps’ security themselves</a>, rather than having to rely on <a href="https://www.engadget.com/2016/10/14/secure-apps-in-googles-play-store-are-a-crapshoot/">app store security</a> provided by yet another vulnerable corporation.</p>
<p>Computer security experts are excited about the idea that <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/01/24/a-complete-beginners-guide-to-blockchain/">blockchain technology</a> might be able to help us secure our own endpoints. Blockchain, the technology that underpins Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, creates a <a href="https://theconversation.com/blockchains-focusing-on-bitcoin-misses-the-real-revolution-in-digital-trust-58125">verifiable, unchangeable public record</a> of information.</p>
<p>What this means for endpoint security is that computer scientists might be able to create blockchain-based tools to help us <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/CCGRID.2017.8">verify the origin of our apps</a>. We could also use blockchains to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WICSA.2016.21">confirm our data haven’t been tampered with</a>, and to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2015.27">ensure our privacy</a>. And as long as the source code for these programs is also free for us to inspect – as <a href="https://github.com/whispersystems/">Signal is</a> today – the security community will be able to <a href="https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/1999/0915.html#OpenSourceandSecurity">verify that there are no secret backdoors</a>.</p>
<p>As with any new technology, there is an enormous amount of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5b1a5f2-5030-11e7-bfb8-997009366969">hype and misinformation</a> around blockchain and what it can do. It will take time to sift through all these ideas and develop secure tools that are easy to use. In the meantime, we all need to continue to <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/en">use end-to-end encryption</a> apps whenever possible. We should also stay vigilant about <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-choose-terrible-passwords-and-how-to-fix-them-76619">password hygiene</a> and about what apps we install on our machines. Finally, we must demand that real people always have access to the best security mechanisms available, so we can decide for ourselves how and when to <a href="https://ssd.eff.org/en">resist surveillance</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82054/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Megan Squire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments’ efforts to weaken communications security undermine and distract from the need to protect the real weak points in our online communications.Megan Squire, Professor of Computing Sciences, Elon UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.