tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/eu-trade-26827/articlesEU trade – The Conversation2023-07-12T05:58:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2095052023-07-12T05:58:22Z2023-07-12T05:58:22ZWhat’s in a name? Quite a lot if it’s prosecco, parmesan or mozzarella<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536972/original/file-20230712-29-bay9u1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=209%2C0%2C7073%2C4627&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/search/lunch-platters?image_type=photo">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prosecco might evoke warm summer evenings while prosciutto conjures scenes of generous platters at a casual weekend lunch. But would “sparkling wine” or “thinly sliced ham” have the same impact?</p>
<p>Australian producers would argue they wouldn’t. They are fighting a push by the European Union to stop them from using these and other terms that indicate the geographical origin of numerous cheeses, wines and other foodstuffs now widely produced in Australia.</p>
<p>This stoush over using European names for locally made products has stalled <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-07-11/european-union-trade-deal-prosecco-feta-geographic-indicators/102583310">this week’s trade talks</a>, with the EU refusing Australia better access to their markets unless Australia agrees to rebrand its products.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/anthony-albaneses-warning-on-australiaeu-trade-talks/news-story/fa15fa19a945311c21ac1326c1675653">Prime Minister Anthony Albanese </a>said Australia was keen to conclude the trade agreement but would not sign a deal that wasn’t in Australia’s interests. He is strongly backed by the National Farmers’ Federation and food producers.</p>
<h2>So why does Europe want to control the use of food names?</h2>
<p>Consumers increasingly want to know their foods’ provenance. They also pay premiums for guarantees about origin and quality. There has been a corresponding rise in so-called geographical indicator registrations, with <a href="https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13128/21">the 3,500th</a> listed earlier this year.</p>
<p>Items included on the EU Geographical Indications register cover different foodstuffs that are either applying for or have been accepted for having their geographic origin related name protected from being used for similar foods produced elsewhere.</p>
<p>Europe has the highest number of registered products, with most relating to wine, agricultural products and foodstuffs, as well as spirits and beers.</p>
<p>Champagne is among those with a widely recognised connection to its place of origin which assures consumers about the regional and cultural values as well as the products’ characteristics and quality.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Unidentified person filling glasses with prosecco." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536984/original/file-20230712-16-3r8z8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sparkling wine doesn’t have the same cache as prosecco or Champagne.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/search/prosecco-bubbles?image_type=photo">www.shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like high value household product brand names (for example, Coca-Cola which has been valued at US $97.88 billion) geographical indication registered names also attract substantial dollar values.</p>
<p>This is because of strong international awareness, familiarity, and appeal among consumers. The geographic indicator name often attracts a price that can easily be double that of a similar but non-registered product. </p>
<p>Registered products can therefore bring in significant revenue to the European Union member countries. They contribute to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jwip.12208">regional development </a>by stimulating tourism and by helping to reverse population decline often experienced in rural areas.</p>
<p>Like household brands, the names which indicate a product’s origins, are recognised as intellectual property. They have consequently become an integral part of international trade agreements. </p>
<h2>What would Australia gain by agreeing to European product names?</h2>
<p>In return for complying with European Union demands, Australian producers would gain access to European markets of [<a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/minister-flies-to-brussels-amid-signs-of-eu-trade-deal-breakthrough-20230708-p5dmre">445 million people</a>] with a GDP of $24 trillion.</p>
<p>The lost opportunity of non-compliance is best illustrated by Brexit. Since Brexit, UK <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/12/29/brexit-draft-deal-first-of-many-hurdles-to-a-smooth-exit">exports to Europe have fallen</a> and UK farmers have faced significant challenges finding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/dec/29/uk-farmers-impact-brexit-trade-deal-losing-common-agricultural-policy">alternative markets</a>.</p>
<p>If Australia agrees to the European Union’s conditions to get a trade deal through then producers will need to rename some of their products.</p>
<p>This would be a large and costly exercise but might give local producers an opportunity to capitalise on the growing consumer demand for locally sourced food and promote Australia’s unique geographical brand values.</p>
<p>Recent research conducted by Charles Darwin University reveals some of the unique brand values of Australian agri-food products, including unique selling points of products from the <a href="https://researchers.cdu.edu.au/en/publications/nt-shelf-stable-food-products-market-opportunity-analysis">Northern Territory</a>.</p>
<p>Selling points included the unique climate, soil and traditional community values as selling points.</p>
<p>Australia’s reputation for quality and ethically produced goods was also important. Such values may lead to Australia developing more of its own geographical indication registration requirements in the future.</p>
<p>Rather than fight the rising tide of European Union registrations, the federal government might embrace the trend, in conjunction with renewed promotion of Australia’s geographical brand benefits.</p>
<p>Should the government choose to comply with Europe’s demands then producers will need support to rebrand some of their products. Government and departments such as CSIRO should be keen to support this as it can only strengthen Australia’s agri-food sector’s international reputation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209505/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The CDU research report mentioned in the article relates to a market opportunity analysis led by Steven Greenland. This is part of the ongoing Government funded Northern Australia Food Technology Innovation (NAFTI) project investigating avenues for developing food manufacturing capability in Northern Australia (<a href="https://www.cdu.edu.au/news/supporting-northern-australia%E2%80%99s-agricultural-and-food-manufacturing-capability">https://www.cdu.edu.au/news/supporting-northern-australia%E2%80%99s-agricultural-and-food-manufacturing-capability</a>)</span></em></p>Australia wants better access to European markets but isn’t prepared to give up using the names of popular products including parmesan and prosecco as part of the latest trade talks.Steven Greenland, Professor in Marketing, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2054832023-05-15T11:47:05Z2023-05-15T11:47:05ZThe UK needs a new industrial strategy or it will lose the global green subsidy race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525653/original/file-20230511-12302-f4puke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C11%2C980%2C652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Making industry greener -- and stronger</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/concept-environmentally-friendly-production-pond-shaped-2044948658">petrmalinak/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>UK businesses have criticised the government for the lack of a clear industrial policy. Industry body Make UK has warned the country “<a href="https://www.makeuk.org/insights/reports/industrial-strategy-a-manufacturing-ambition">risks being squeezed</a>” by US and EU green subsidy packages.</p>
<p>Outside the UK, industrial policy <a href="https://theconversation.com/industrial-policy-is-back-on-the-agenda-and-its-never-been-needed-more-than-it-is-now-119120">is back</a> – and in a big way. Around the world, there has been a noticeable shift towards greater government intervention in the economy. </p>
<p>Recent shocks such as the COVID pandemic and the energy price spike arising from the Ukrainian war, have <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/supply-chain-disruptions/">led to breakdowns in global supply chains</a> and high inflation. In Europe and the US they also exposed fragility and a lack of resilience – especially in key areas such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/energy-price-freezes-and-business-support-are-sticking-plasters-heres-how-to-protect-uk-families-and-companies-from-future-crises-189406">energy security</a> and the supply of <a href="https://www.somatechnology.com/blog/in-the-news/medical-supply-chain-challenges-and-its-effects-on-healthcare-industries/">medical equipment</a>.</p>
<p>These governments seem to recognise the role of industrial policy in supporting domestic manufacturing to safeguard against future crises, reduce reliance upon Chinese imports, and in dealing with the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_emergency_declaration">climate emergency</a>. They are also promoting industrial policies to enhance competitiveness, productivity and economic growth.</p>
<h2>New industrial policies</h2>
<p>The US has been the most prominent flag-bearer for these new industrial policies. President Joe Biden’s 2022 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-62457386">Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)</a> allocates <a href="https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/inflation_reduction_act_one_page_summary.pdf">almost US$700 billion (£555 billion) of federal funding over the next decade</a> to support US industries, particularly healthcare, renewables and clean-tech sectors. </p>
<p>This includes subsidies and tax breaks to US manufacturers and consumers to encourage investment in, and use of, low carbon technologies (such as electric vehicles, heat pumps and carbon capture), as well as semiconductors. There are also new rules to encourage the use of local supplies to support US manufacturing.</p>
<p>The US has also recently enacted the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/">Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal</a> and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d1e5bb5d-da09-488b-8430-a05d8016a95f">Chips and Science Act</a> to boost transport and communication networks, and promote R&D, especially in regional high-tech hubs. Over the next decade, these three packages are expected to total over <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it">US$2 trillion of industrial policy</a> support for US businesses.</p>
<p>Yet, there are concerns that these interventions are protectionist and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/de1ec769-a76c-474a-927c-b7e5aeff7d9e">violate rules set by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)</a> – the global body that oversees trade between countries – on procurement and subsidies by unduly favouring US firms. The EU has spoken out about the possible impact of the IRA on its own clean-tech industries, particularly in terms of harming its exports and diverting investment away from Europe. </p>
<p>The EU has also questioned <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9bfe7e7e-83b7-47f2-8d59-e180215d534a">China’s industrial subsidies</a>, possible infringements of intellectual property rights by Chinese companies, and the difficulties European businesses face in operating in China. </p>
<p>To combat these issues, the EU announced its own €250 billion (£217 billion) <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en">Green Deal Industrial Plan</a> in February. This includes relaxing EU state aid rules to allow member states to fast-track investment in green sectors. The emphasis is on support for skills and supply chains, alongside smarter and simpler regulation. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/commission-president-eu-sovereignty-fund-will-be-proposed-in-summer/">European Sovereignty Fund</a> is also expected to offer subsidies for clean-tech innovation and infrastructure, while net-zero industry academies will train European workers for the green transition.</p>
<h2>What about the UK?</h2>
<p>One argument put forward for Brexit was that EU state aid rules <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/state-aid-after-brexit/">stifle the ability of the UK to support its industries</a>. But, post-Brexit, how has the UK responded? Its <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/news-analysis/industrial-strategy-council-government-b1814698.html">industrial strategy was scrapped</a> under the Johnson government. And so far, there has been no policy response to either the US or EU packages. </p>
<p>Indeed, the UK’s net zero initiatives to date have generally <a href="https://acss.org.uk/levelling-up-an-industrial-strategy-perspective/">lacked sufficient funding</a>. The <a href="https://green-alliance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Getting_the_building_blocks_right.pdf">Green Alliance think tank</a> believes there is a £14.1 billion shortfall in low carbon infrastructure investment in the UK. </p>
<p>The UK’s haphazard approach to net zero has also sometimes conflicted with other policies. For instance, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/30/eu-plans-to-loosen-state-aid-rules-renewables-investment-tax-credits-biden-green-subsidy">windfall tax on North Sea oil and gas firms</a> applies to some wind and solar electricity generators, discouraging investment in renewables. </p>
<p>At the end of March, Jeremy Hunt said he would <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/government-uk-government-budget-climate-jeremy-hunt-b1070844.html">wait and see what the EU will do</a> on its green industrial policy. It seems the UK position has been to watch as the action unfolds elsewhere – for example on attracting investment to build <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-race-for-electric-vehicle-battery-making-is-well-underway-and-the-uk-is-barely-off-the-starting-grid/">battery giga-factories</a>. This is in stark contrast to the US and EU.</p>
<p>The Labour Party has promised to invest £28 billion a year through a dedicated green investment fund and transition programme. This proposal has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/oct/01/climate-experts-give-cautious-welcome-to-labours-green-policies">cautiously welcomed by climate experts</a>. But doubts remain about whether the speed and nature of Labour’s proposals will be sufficient for a successful UK <a href="https://www.wwf.org.uk/green-transition">green transition</a>. </p>
<p>Labour has also discussed a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/business/labour-plan-to-buy-british-not-about-slapping-a-flag-on-procurement-reeves-b1877867.html">“Buy British” procurement</a> policy. But this approach is also likely to fall foul of existing WTO rules and possibly the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en#:%7E:text=The%20EU-UK%20Trade%20and%20Cooperation%20Agreement%20concluded%20between,matters%2C%20thematic%20cooperation%20and%20participation%20in%20Union%20programmes">EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Parcel Boxes with a flag of United Kingdom in a mini shopping cart on a laptop." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525654/original/file-20230511-17-a6vfh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Encouraging British businesses to source parts and services domestically would boost UK industry.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/parcel-boxes-flag-united-kingdom-shopping-1298645047">Fevziie/Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>The green subsidy race</h2>
<p>The UK needs to get serious about its own “<a href="https://neweconomics.org/about/our-missions/green-new-deal">Green New Deal</a>” if it is to meet its net zero commitments, build low-carbon resilience in its energy supply, and compete with the US, EU and China.</p>
<p>Both the US and EU subsidy schemes should help to accelerate a much needed green transition. They will help to reduce barriers to clean-tech investment and innovation, create new jobs and generate greener growth in those regions. At a global level, this should accelerate decarbonisation and the move to net-zero.</p>
<p>They could also create a <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/03/inflation-reduction-act-eu-green-deal-subsidy-race-consequences/">green subsidy race</a> – with UK not yet even at the starting line.
There is a risk these subsidy schemes will stifle competition, raise global trade tensions and reduce opportunities for developing economies to grow their own clean-tech sectors. </p>
<p>They will also challenge the existing <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm">WTO framework</a> and its rules to promote fair and free trade. This could lead to a major reset for the WTO. It may need to adopt a wider remit that aligns global co-operation on free and fair trade with that on climate action. Doing so would enhance the prospects of all countries in this race in delivering sustainable, inclusive and green growth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phil Tomlinson receives funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) for Made Smarter Innovation: Centre for People-Led Digitalisation, and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for an Interact project on UK co-working spaces and manufacturing.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Bailey receives funding from the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe programme.</span></em></p>Can UK business compete in an international green subsidy race?Phil Tomlinson, Professor of Industrial Strategy, Co-Director Centre for Governance, Regulation and Industrial Strategy (CGR&IS), University of BathDavid Bailey, Professor of Business Economics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2021962023-04-04T12:15:00Z2023-04-04T12:15:00ZNew EU-UK trade deal has promise for Northern Ireland and US as well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518029/original/file-20230328-518-tnu3a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C0%2C7919%2C5306&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, left, and European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen announce their new trade agreement. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/britains-prime-minister-rishi-sunak-and-european-commission-news-photo/1247535827">Dan Kitwood/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A new trade agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom, which left the EU in 2020, could have finally found a way to safeguard peace in Northern Ireland after Brexit reignited old tensions.</p>
<p>The deal between the EU and the U.K., called the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9736/">Windsor Framework</a>, lays out new rules about how trade will move between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the island that consists of Scotland, Wales and England, the other three provinces of the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>Among other changes, the Windsor Framework creates two categories of items being shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Items intended to stay in Northern Ireland would have free passage, but those destined to cross the border into the Republic of Ireland – which is in the EU – would face stringent screening. </p>
<p>The agreement has been <a href="https://www.irishcentral.com/news/politics/windsor-framework-ratified">ratified by the U.K. Parliament and the European Union</a>. But it remains to be seen whether Northern Ireland’s unionist political parties will accept it and lift their boycott of the provincial government.</p>
<p>Since unionists’ refusal to join the power-sharing assembly began in 2022, elected representatives in Northern Ireland have not been able to tackle a growing backlog of critical issues, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/nov/19/northern-irish-healthcare-in-crisis-amid-political-deadlock">declining quality and availability of health care</a>, the shortage of housing, the <a href="https://viewdigital.org/crushed-by-the-cost-of-living-crisis/">rising cost of energy</a> and <a href="https://www.newsletter.co.uk/business/consumer/cost-of-living/northern-ireland-being-hit-harder-by-cost-of-living-crisis-than-other-parts-of-the-uk-as-more-forced-to-cut-back-on-essentials-which-research-shows-4020648">inflation</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=V4yncf0AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=6nkxNe8AAAAJ">of</a> Northern Irish politics, we see a newly approved trade deal as an opportunity to return Northern Ireland’s political attention to those crucial issues.</p>
<h2>A history of trouble</h2>
<p>In the late 1960s, a period of violence known as “The Troubles” began, pitting nationalists, who want Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland and are mostly Catholic, against unionists, who want it to remain part of the United Kingdom and are mostly Protestant. Over the following three decades, <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html">about 3,500 people were killed</a> and <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#05">another 47,000 were injured</a> in riots, assassinations and other violence. These events were largely in the six counties of Northern Ireland, which are part of the U.K., but also happened in the neighboring nation of Ireland and the remainder of the U.K., on the island of Great Britain. </p>
<p>A 1998 agreement between the U.K. and Irish governments and various political groups in Northern Ireland ended the violence. That deal, called the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-61968177">Good Friday Agreement by nationalists and the Belfast Agreement by unionists</a>, set up a power-sharing provincial government in Northern Ireland, close links between this new government and the Irish government, and various systems for cooperation and coordination between the U.K. and Irish governments. </p>
<p>The agreement also allowed people who lived in Northern Ireland to identify as Irish, British or both and carry passports from both places. These measures made it easier for people with different identities in Northern Ireland to coexist, and in some cases to express complex identities. Today, for example, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/over-one-third-of-north-s-population-hold-irish-passport-1.4814375">more than one-third of Northern Ireland’s population</a> carry an Irish passport.</p>
<p>And the 1998 agreement says that the decision about whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the U.K. or unite with Ireland should be decided only by a majority vote of Northern Ireland’s people.</p>
<p>When the agreement was signed, both the U.K. and Ireland were part of the EU. The EU’s common market allows goods, people and business activities to flow freely between member nations, without customs or passport controls. </p>
<p>Within a few years of the 1998 agreement, trade and people were flowing seamlessly, rendering the border all but invisible – especially after the U.K. removed <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/border/border-violence.htm">military installations and the fortified barriers</a> at the land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large commercial truck stops at a gate with a booth and a person holding a piece of paper." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The port of Belfast is a crucial point in trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/freight-lorries-are-checked-after-disembarking-from-the-p-o-news-photo/1247533288">Paul Faith/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Brexit risks peace</h2>
<p>With the help of a strengthening EU, the peace was stable until 2016. That year, the people of the U.K. voted to leave the EU, though the majority of <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/brexit-northern-ireland-votes-to-remain-in-the-eu-1.2697132">voters in Northern Ireland wanted to remain</a> in the union. </p>
<p>The departure of the U.K. from the EU meant the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland mattered again. It would no longer be a technical, administrative boundary between EU member nations, but rather a point where goods and people would flow into and out of the EU and a non-EU country. </p>
<p>Tensions flared over where to put these checks and the possible new divisions they would create between either Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K.</p>
<p>In 2019 the U.K. and the EU agreed to a deal, called the Northern Ireland Protocol, that established a kind of border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K. It involved burdensome and slow customs checks on all goods arriving at Northern Irish ports and prohibitions on some goods including sausages, medicines, plants and potatoes. </p>
<p>Those problems sparked stiff resistance from unionists, who said it had done what they feared: <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46988529">separated them from their nation</a>.</p>
<p>In 2022, in protest against the Protocol, the Democratic Unionist Party, a key party in Northern Irish politics, <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/no-stormont-return-until-ni-protocol-is-replaced-dup-leader-says/42170991.html">withdrew from the provincial government</a>, effectively shutting it down. </p>
<p>Now, the Windsor Framework keeps key border protections around the EU but eases a lot of the restrictions created in the 2019 agreement.</p>
<h2>A key US role</h2>
<p>There is an element of U.S. foreign policy at work here, too. The U.S. was <a href="https://joewilson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/wilson-resolution-calls-for-full-implementation-of-belfastgood-friday">key to negotiating the 1998 agreement</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/10/why-joe-biden-is-so-invested-in-defending-good-friday-agreement">successive administrations</a> have championed it as the only way to a sustainable peace. </p>
<p>When the U.K. voted to withdraw from the EU, the departure meant the U.K. needed to negotiate a new trade agreement with the U.S. But the U.S. decided to force the U.K. to work out its departure from the EU – in ways consistent with the 1998 agreement – before U.S.-U.K. trade talks could truly begin.</p>
<p>With the Windsor Framework agreed upon, the U.S. will <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/13/politics/biden-northern-ireland-visit/index.html">likely send President Joe Biden</a> to visit both Ireland and Northern Ireland, potentially as soon as April, to mark the 25th anniversary of the 1998 agreement. The new U.S. special envoy to Northern Ireland for economic affairs, Joe Kennedy III, a former Democratic congressman from Massachusetts, is also <a href="https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2023/01/19/news/us_envoy_promises_to_champion_northern_ireland_s_compelling_potential_-3005755/">expected to travel to Northern Ireland soon</a>, with U.S. investors eager to take advantage of <a href="https://www.newsletter.co.uk/business/us-president-joe-bidens-special-envoy-to-northern-ireland-joe-kennedy-hears-call-from-ni-business-for-new-economic-good-friday-agreement-4064604">Northern Ireland’s unique connections</a> with both the EU and the U.K. markets.</p>
<p>All eyes are now on the Democratic Unionist Party. Its members voted against the Windsor Framework in the U.K. Parliament in late March, but the people of Northern Ireland, including many unionists and the business community, want a functioning government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kimberly Cowell-Meyers is affiliated with the Ad-hoc Committee to Protect the Good Friday Agreement but does not represent the group and the views expressed here are her own. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Gallaher is affiliated with the Ad-hoc Committee for the Protection of the Good Friday Agreement. This is an ad-hoc, bi-partisna voluntary group. It is not a lobby and there are no membership fees or responsibilities for members. It also does not have 501c3 status. However, we are not representing this group. The views expressed here are our own. </span></em></p>A newly approved trade deal could be an opportunity to return Northern Ireland’s political attention to pressing issues of health care, housing, energy costs and inflation.Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, American University School of Public AffairsCarolyn Gallaher, Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1715252021-11-10T16:10:31Z2021-11-10T16:10:31ZTrade war looms over article 16: the Northern Ireland protocol safeguard, explained<p>David Frost, the UK Brexit minister, has expressed discontent with the implementation of the Northern Ireland Brexit protocol. This is the trade arrangement at the heart of controversies over trade between the EU, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Frost has threatened to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/anger-tangle-trouble-is-another-brexit-showdown-looming-2021-11-09/">trigger an emergency brake</a> known as article 16, or even to completely renege on the protocol. But triggering it would have wide-reaching consequences.</p>
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<p>Since the beginning of Brexit negotiations, both the EU and UK recognised the need to avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. This was to preserve the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840230/Revised_Protocol_to_the_Withdrawal_Agreement.pdf">Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland</a> was signed precisely for this purpose. Its rules ensure a smooth movement of goods between Ireland and Northern Ireland. But it also introduces checks and controls on goods entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK or any other third country. This way, goods entering Northern Ireland comply with EU regulatory standards and can be exported to Ireland (part of the EU) and then to other EU countries.</p>
<p>The EU and UK were aware that the implementation of the protocol could lead to difficulties and problems. This is why they set up a system of joint committees (UK and EU) to discuss issues arising from the protocol and to provide an opportunity for compromise.</p>
<p>The protocol provides that both the EU and UK can unilaterally take “safeguard measures” if its implementation leads to durable and serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties or to diversion of trade. This safeguard is known today as article 16. </p>
<p>Article 16 does not specify what such safeguard measures are. In international trade, they can refer to temporary tariffs, quotas or other measures designed to avoid a country suffering serious harm. Some considerations are helpful to understand article 16 of the protocol.</p>
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<p>First, while the EU or the UK can unilaterally take safeguard measures, the other party can respond with proportionate measures to remedy any imbalance between rights and obligations created by the safeguard. Effectively, this could lead to a trade war where the other party would also take measures, such as imposing quotas and tariffs. </p>
<p>In any case, it must be stressed that such safeguard measures do not include tearing up the protocol and replacing it, as has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/oct/12/lord-frost-wants-to-replace-northern-ireland-protocol-with-new-brexit-agreement">suggested in the press</a>. In this respect, the protocol makes it clear that the people of Northern Ireland, through a democratic vote, will decide whether the protocol should remain in force in the future.</p>
<p>Secondly, before taking such measures, the EU and UK must attempt to find a common solution. In this case, there is a one month waiting period, starting from the date on which either the EU or the UK advises the other that it intends to take such measures. The protocol also says that any measures taken shall be discussed every three months.</p>
<p>Finally, the protocol is silent on the meaning of “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties” or “diversion of trade” – the conditions under which the UK or the EU can legitimately adopt safeguard measures. The protocol does not offer any quantitative or qualitative criteria to define these difficulties.</p>
<h2>Why the protocol is different</h2>
<p>Safeguard measures are not unknown in international trade, for example, within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) regime. These may be adopted when unforeseeable developments and circumstances connected with trade liberalisation result in an increase of an imported product, causing (or risking) serious injury to domestic producers. </p>
<p>It would be tempting to rely on GATT/WTO case law to define “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties” as mentioned in article 16. After all, they both refer to “safeguard measures”. However, this would be a mistake for two reasons. </p>
<p>First, the problems arising from the protocol are not unforeseeable, as they were <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/frictionless-trade-brexit-august-2017">widely predicted</a> when it was signed. Secondly, unlike GATT/WTO safeguards, article 16 measures do not refer to an injury to domestic producers resulting from an increase of imports. </p>
<p>The reality is that the underpinning goal of the protocol is radically different from an international trade agreement, and lies in the need to preserve the Good Friday Agreement and EU regulatory standards on goods. To be legitimate, any safeguard measure taken under article 16 must take this into account.</p>
<p>The article 16 safeguard measures are new and therefore there are no precedents to rely on to understand how they would work. While there may be different interpretations on the appropriate conditions to take such measures, there is little doubt that they will result in tariffs and quotas. </p>
<p>Invoking article 16 should be done responsibly. An unjustified triggering of article 16 from the EU or UK will bear serious economic consequences, and will be detrimental in terms of international credibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171525/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Petrucci does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UK is threatening to trigger Article 16. What is the Northern Ireland protocol ‘emergency brake’?Carlo Petrucci, Lecturer in Law, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1437752020-09-17T11:56:10Z2020-09-17T11:56:10ZBrexit: Ireland’s land bridge to the continent boosts air pollution in the UK<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358324/original/file-20200916-24-a6i76r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C4500%2C2997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/a1-motorway-berwick-england-uk-november-651439936">Duncan Andison/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A no-deal Brexit could cost up to <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2020/0728/1155985-fishing-industry-brexit/">5,000 jobs</a> in Ireland’s fisheries, but it’s not just access to the UK’s coastal waters that the country is hoping to hold on to in any post-Brexit arrangement. Perhaps more important to Ireland is the UK’s motorway network. </p>
<p>Every year, more than 150,000 trucks transport over 3 million tonnes of <a href="https://www.imdo.ie/Home/sites/default/files/IMDOFiles/972918%2520IMDO%2520The%2520Implications%2520of%2520Brexit%2520on%2520the%2520Use%2520of%2520the%2520Landbridge%2520Report%2520-%2520Digital%2520Final.pdf">freight</a> to and from Ireland to the rest of the single market across the UK “land bridge” – an arrangement that involves Irish trucks using British motorways to reach the continent. One route involves goods being shipped from Dublin to Holyhead by ferry and then by road to Dover before being shipped to Calais.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to overestimate the importance of this land bridge for Ireland. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/cargo-food-production-producers-brexit-burns-irelands-british-bridge-to-eu-markets/">A 2017 study</a> found that 40% of Ireland’s exports to the EU reached the continent via the UK’s roads, with an estimated value of <a href="https://www.imdo.ie/Home/sites/default/files/IMDOFiles/972918https:/www.politico.eu/article/cargo-food-production-producers-brexit-burns-irelands-british-bridge-to-eu-markets/%2520IMDO%2520The%2520Implications%2520of%2520Brexit%2520on%2520the%2520Use%2520of%2520the%2520Landbridge%2520Report%2520-%2520Digital%2520Final.pdf">€18.2 billion</a> (£16.3 billion). Journey times to the EU market are less than 20 hours by the land bridge, but up to 40 to 60 hours by sea. That’s why it’s the preferred route for companies moving food, live animals and other high-value goods, such as heavy machinery and transport equipment.</p>
<p>A no-deal outcome could sever Ireland’s <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/cargo-food-production-producers-brexit-burns-irelands-british-bridge-to-eu-markets/">most important route to EU markets</a>. But what might the loss of Ireland’s land bridge mean for the UK? <a href="https://wm-air.org.uk/">Our research</a> has found that it could entail substantial benefits for air quality and roads throughout the country.</p>
<h2>Irish freight, British pollution</h2>
<p>From January 1 2021, British goods will be treated as third-country freight by the EU, meaning they will be subject to customs and regulatory controls at European ports. These ports aren’t yet able to differentiate between British and Irish freight, but once they are, a two-speed processing system would ensure Irish trucks are fast tracked through the system and UK trucks subject to regulatory delays. The Irish government is keen to ensure that the land bridge isn’t considered a <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2020/0703/1151272-brexit-land-bridge/">major negotiating point</a> in UK-EU trade negotiations.</p>
<p>But for the UK, there is another dimension to the land bridge that has been completely overlooked. All the benefits that come from it accrue to Ireland and the EU, while all the negatives are borne by British citizens and companies.</p>
<p>The 150,000 truck journeys that Ireland’s imports and exports add to the UK’s road network often cause local congestion. Lorries also cause more damage to road surfaces than most other vehicles, with <a href="https://bettertransport.org.uk/blog/better-transport/lorries-cause-more-damage-roads-cars">one study</a> calculating that a six-axle, 44-tonne truck is over 138,000 times more damaging to the foundations of a road than a small, one-tonne car with two axles. These extra costs are covered by the UK taxpayer. </p>
<p>For the UK, the land bridge means that a third country is directly contributing to national air pollution, with all the <a href="https://www.who.int/airpollution/ambient/health-impacts/en/">health consequences</a> that entails. Exposure to nitrogen dioxide pollution can trigger and exacerbate asthma symptoms, and it’s also associated with heart disease and birth complications. Inhaling fine particulate matter (often called “PM2.5”, as these particles are smaller than 2.5 micrometres) is linked to a host of medical conditions, including lung cancer.</p>
<p>We calculated the <a href="https://naei.beis.gov.uk/">quantities</a> of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and PM2.5 produced from 150,000 heavy goods vehicle journeys from Holyhead to Felixstowe (329 miles, or 529 kilometres) and found that it results in an additional 34 tonnes of NOx and 0.7 tonnes of PM2.5 per year being emitted across Wales and England. The PM2.5 calculation is based on exhaust emissions only though, it excludes particulates shed from <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-your-car-sheds-microplastics-into-the-ocean-thousands-of-miles-away-142614">brakes and tyres</a>. Total UK road transport NOx emissions in 2018 were <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/865172/Figure_NOx_sector.csv/preview">258,000 tonnes</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/environment-bill-a-laudable-but-disappointing-attempt-to-rewrite-the-law-after-brexit-110858">Environment Bill: a laudable but disappointing attempt to rewrite the law after Brexit</a>
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<p>The Irish lorry fleet is also quite a lot older than the UK’s. By 2020, 90% of UK lorries were at Euro VI standard and none were Euro III. In comparison, <a href="https://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/airemissions/ghg/nir2019/Ireland%2520NIR%25202019_Final.pdf">the latest data</a> for the Irish fleet reveals that almost 20% is Euro III and only 22% Euro VI. This matters, as Euro III engines emit about 30 times more NOx than Euro VI.</p>
<p>Brexit has made visible a source of UK air pollution that is unrelated to the UK economy. The UK-EU trade negotiations should include air pollution and any agreement should include regulations that prevent highly polluting heavy goods vehicles from using the land bridge.</p>
<p>Perhaps one of the strangest outcomes of a no-deal Brexit may be that, for all the potential economic consequences for both Ireland and the UK, Britain’s air pollution problem might substantially improve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143775/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Bryson receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omid Ghaffarpasand receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Bloss receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).</span></em></p>Irish trade with the EU contributes an additional 34 tonnes of toxic nitrogen oxides to air in the UK each year.John Bryson, Professor of Enterprise and Competitiveness, University of BirminghamOmid Ghaffarpasand, Research Fellow in WM-Air Project, University of BirminghamWilliam Bloss, Professor of Atmospheric Science, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318042020-02-18T15:15:42Z2020-02-18T15:15:42ZCambodia punished by EU over human rights violations – through limits to its trade access<p>The jobs of many hard-working women in Cambodia are at risk after the EU announced its intention to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2020/EN/C-2020-673-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF">partially withdraw free access</a> for Cambodian goods to the EU market due to the country’s “serious and systematic violations of human rights”.</p>
<p>As one in a group of <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html">least-developed countries</a>, Cambodia enjoys the most preferential trade arrangement with the EU under the <a href="https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradehelp/everything-arms">Everything But Arms</a> (EBA) tariff, which offers quota and duty-free access to the EU single market for all goods except arms. Cambodia currently exports more than €5 billion of goods to the EU, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/cambodia/">most from its thriving garment sector</a>. </p>
<p>In order to qualify for the EBA scheme, countries have to <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/637931/EPRS_ATA(2019)637931_EN.pdf">comply with many different</a> UN and International Labour Organisation conventions on human rights.</p>
<p>Standard tariffs <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods_-_tariffs">will now apply</a> for certain products to Cambodia, including low-added-value garments and shoes, travel goods and sugar. But other products are still covered by the EBA, including high-added value clothes and shoes, and bicycles. </p>
<h2>Using tariffs as a lever</h2>
<p>This partial withdrawal of preferences of a country under the EBA tariff is unprecedented. The EU has fully and partially withdrawn trade preferences in the past – for <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1663">Sri Lanka</a> and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/belarus/">Belarus</a> – but these countries were under less beneficial arrangements in the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm">Generalised Scheme of Preferences</a>. </p>
<p>The EU’s decision to only partially withdraw preferences for Cambodia arguably reflects the adverse impact of a full withdrawal on the socio-economic rights of the thousands of people working in the affected sectors. A full withdrawal would arguably also restrict current supply chains into the EU. </p>
<p>The withdrawal is due to occur in August, bar any objection from the EU Council or parliament. The Cambodian government has time to ameliorate the situation, and the withdrawal decision could be reversed should the political space be opened significantly in the next few months. The EU Commission would look for the establishment of active political opposition, removal of restrictions on NGOs and more freedoms of assembly, expression and association.</p>
<p>However, the view of the Cambodia Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is clear: it <a href="https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/63406%20MoFAIC%20feb%202020">called</a> the EU’s decision “unjust” and “politically driven”. The government also refutes the claims of violations of human rights. A spokesperson said the government: “Remains firm in its principled position in rejecting any attempt by external parties in their use of trade and development assistance as pretexts to justify their interference in Cambodia’s internal affairs.”</p>
<p>Such rhetoric is familiar to those in Cambodia. The government has <a href="https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affair-201704-388.pdf">frequently railed against</a> external interference in the internal affairs of the country. It has engaged in discussions with the EU for two years, since “enhanced engagement” was <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4467">initiated</a> after concerns were expressed in <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0497_EN.pdf">the European Parliament</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/636482-un-rights-chief-voices-concern-about-cambodia-election-after-opposition-ban">at the UN</a>. The process to temporarily suspend EBA privileges was <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_882">initiated</a> in February 2019.</p>
<h2>Freedoms curtailed</h2>
<p>Such decisions on trade preferences are not technically sanctions, but they are designed to encourage the state to move into closer alignment with civil, labour and political rights. The EU is particularly concerned about the lack of a credible political opposition party in Cambodia, after the former opposition was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics/cambodias-main-opposition-party-dissolved-by-supreme-court-idUSKBN1DG1BO">dissolved by the Supreme Court in late 2017</a>. The country is now a de facto <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/17/cambodia-becomes-the-worlds-newest-one-party-state-china-democracy-dictators/">one-party state</a>.</p>
<p>The leader of the former opposition, Kem Sokha, is <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50680158/kem-sokhas-treason-trial-begins">currently on trial for treason</a> after he was detained in September 2017. His <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/70204/statement-spokesperson-latest-developments-cambodia_en">release from house arrest</a> in November 2019 was welcomed by the EU but was not enough to assuage concerns. Human rights defenders, especially those working on land issues and <a href="https://seekingjusticeincambodia.com/">civil and political rights</a>, are frequently arrested, followed and have their <a href="https://cambodia.ohchr.org/en/news/end-mission-statement-special-rapporteur-rhona-smith-her-7th-mission-cambodia">activities curtailed</a>, as I’ve detailed in my role as the UN’s special rapporteur for human rights in Cambodia.</p>
<p>There are ongoing violations of <a href="https://cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?url=media/media.php&p=report_detail.php&reid=140&id=5">rights and freedoms</a> in Cambodia, though the country has made much progress made in the <a href="https://cambodia.ohchr.org/en/un-human-right-mechanisms/annual-report-of-special-rapporteur">wake of its tragic past</a>. The EU has <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2020/EN/C-2020-673-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF">acknowledged this progress</a> in several areas.</p>
<h2>Setting a precedent</h2>
<p>The loss of this export market could have a negative impact on the socioeconomic rights of many people working in the textile sectors. Around 800,000 people, mostly women, <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/549413/eba-removal-wont-affect-development-projects-eu/">are employed in factories</a>. </p>
<p>A fifth of Cambodia’s exports to the EU are affected, worth <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_229">almost a billion euros</a>. But the measures taken by the EU against Cambodia are unlikely to have as dramatic an impact as <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50681539/facing-risks-as-eba-decision-looms">some feared</a>. As the EU targeted its withdrawal at lower value items, where more people work, it will affect them, but the higher-skilled sector won’t be affected. Moreover, there are opportunities for Cambodia to conclude trade agreements with China (currently an influential development partner) or indeed with a post-Brexit UK, which has been one of the EU’s largest importers of Cambodian products.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the shockwaves may reverberate further. The EU continues to monitor human rights and labour rights in other EBA beneficiary countries including <a href="http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6418-2018-INIT/en/pdf">Myanmar</a> and <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bangladesh_en/69148/The%20European%20Union%20and%20Bangladesh%20held%20the%209th%20session%20of%20their%20Joint%20Commission">Bangladesh</a>. Either or both could yet have their trade preferences fully or partially withdrawn.</p>
<p>The EU’s decision to partially withdraw preferences appears an attempt to balance its concern over civil and political rights with concerns over the impact a full withdrawal could have on socioeconomic rights of Cambodian workers, and perhaps the EU’s own markets. The Cambodian government <a href="http://en.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/localnews/16597-2020-02-04-05-49-57.html">continues to emphasise</a> its success in securing the peace and dramatic economic progress in the country in the 21st century. The EU decision focuses on justice and freedom but tries to mitigate the impact on development. It is a move that could have implications around the world for countries that do not uphold their human rights commitments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rhona Smith currently serves as the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, an unpaid independent role. This article is written in her academic capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views of the UN or her role as Special Rapporteur.</span></em></p>For the first time, the EU has withdrawn some trade preferences for a developing country on its Everything But Arms tariffs.Rhona Smith, Head of School, Newcastle Law School, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179532019-05-29T15:10:10Z2019-05-29T15:10:10ZWhat Green surge could mean for the new European Parliament<p>European politics has been seriously shaken up by this month’s parliamentary election. The centre-left/centre-right coalition that has dominated European political proceedings can no longer command a majority in the European Parliament. Eurosceptic parties, meanwhile, made smaller gains than expected.</p>
<p>That has opened up an opportunity for Europe’s green parties, which made big gains and now hold 69 seats in the 751 seat chamber.</p>
<p>This historic showing means environmentalist parties could hold the balance of power. Green MEPs sit in a transnational political group called Greens/European Free Alliance, together with MEPs from regionalist parties including the UK’s Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. By far the <a href="http://www.caneurope.org/docman/climate-energy-targets/3476-defenders-delayers-dinosaurs-ranking-of-eu-political-groups-and-national-parties-on-climate-change/file">strongest supporters</a> of climate and environmental action in the last parliament, the alliance will seek to leverage its burgeoning influence on key EU policies. It could also play an important role in choosing the EU’s new personnel – including the successor to European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker.</p>
<h2>A greener president?</h2>
<p>Environmentalists will be thankful that Brexit has been delayed until (at least) October, because it means that UK MEPs will probably still be around to play a part in choosing the new European Commission. The UK Green party delivered a particularly strong result, taking seven seats, along with the Scottish Nationalist Party’s three and one for Plaid Cymru. As a result, the Greens also now have more say over upcoming votes for the European Parliament’s president, 14 <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20170608STO76914/how-parliament-is-run-president-vice-presidents-and-quaestors-infographic">vice-presidents</a> and 22 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/parliamentary-committees.html">committee chairs</a> that lead legislative negotiations on all policy areas.</p>
<p>In the past MEPs have pushed for the Commission presidency to go to the lead candidate of the political group winning the most seats in the election, which would be the right-leaning European People’s Party’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46113924">Manfred Weber</a>. But many EU heads of state (notably Emmanuel Macron in France, Pedro Sanchez in Spain and MArk Rutte in the Netherlands) are unhappy with this approach and would like the Parliament to endorse someone else.</p>
<p>With no candidate able to command a majority by aligning with just one other party, political manoeuvring will be needed, in both the council and the parliament. With backing from the Green group, a strong challenge to Weber could be brought by a broad coalition between the centre-left and the centrist <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e73e734-814d-11e9-9935-ad75bb96c849">Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe</a>. As potential kingmakers, expect the Greens to try to extract environmental promises from leading candidates. Weber has very poor credentials on this front. </p>
<h2>Greener agriculture and trade</h2>
<p>Once the new commission starts work in November, Green MEPs will have the opportunity to shape future EU policy. In the last European Parliament, the grand centre-left, centre-right coalition decided <a href="https://www.votewatch.eu/blog/ep2019-how-meps-made-decisions-during-these-5-years/">74% of votes</a>, leaving smaller groups at the fringes of power. With a more fragmented European Parliament, smaller groups will now be key to establishing a majority, and coalitions will be much more changeable.</p>
<p>Despite the Greens’ rise, they remain a relatively small group. Their influence will depend on their ability to reach compromises with other parties when necessary – and to know when to pick their battles. Based on their past activities and their <a href="https://europeangreens.eu/priorities-2019-what-european-greens-fight">manifesto</a>, two such likely red lines will be reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the EU’s trade policy.</p>
<p>During the last reform in 2013, the European Parliament weakened the CAP by making it <a href="http://capreform.eu/birdlife-cap-reform-is-dead/">easier for farmers to qualify for green subsidies</a> without actually changing their practices. More recently, the agriculture committee has supported a proposal to automatically label 40% of CAP spending as “climate expenditure”, writing what Green MEPs called a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/opinion/why-the-new-cap-will-be-worse-for-the-climate-and-farmers/">“blank cheque” on climate change</a>. Meanwhile, the European Commission <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/28/european-commission-accused-of-deliberately-harming-climate-action?CMP=share_btn_tw">sat on a report</a> highlighting how little the CAP does for the climate for a year, quietly publishing it a day after the recent elections. This time around, we can expect the Green MEPs riding the resurgent climate wave to push for reform that puts delivery on climate change goals much higher up the agenda.</p>
<p>The Greens are also strong critics of EU trade policy. They have long <a href="https://www.greens-efa.eu/trade-policy/index.html">called for</a> more democratic scrutiny and public consultation by the European Parliament to make trade more environmentally sound. They have pushed for a greater emphasis on improved labour conditions and trade deals which do not undermine the EU’s environmental and emissions targets. We can expect Green MEPs to hold other political parties accountable for their climate change pledges – and to influence the environmental requirements in EU trade policy in the future.</p>
<p>Finally, as <a href="https://europeangreens.eu/priorities-2019-what-european-greens-fight">staunch defenders</a> of the rule of law and the right to asylum, the larger Green group will also hope to exert influence on the EU’s long-awaited revision to its <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/opinion/why-are-we-not-reforming-the-dublin-regulation-yet/">asylum system</a>, and on how parliament deals with attacks on the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/interview/ska-keller-manfred-webers-openness-to-the-far-right-is-quite-crazy/">rule of law</a> in Hungary and Poland.</p>
<p>The Greens will be keen to influence affairs as much as they can before the UK leaves the EU – when it will lose nearly 20% of its MEPs. They will also still be reliant on how seriously other parties now take the union’s climate and environmental commitments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Viviane Gravey received funding from the ESRC's 'UK in a Changing Europe for the Brexit & Environment' network.</span></em></p>Green parties across Europe scored an all-time high in the European Parliament elections. Now, they’ll seek key reform on agriculture and trade – and could be kingmakers for Juncker’s replacement.Viviane Gravey, Lecturer in European Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1002832018-07-23T13:22:38Z2018-07-23T13:22:38ZBoth EU and US want to protect competition – so why do they disagree about Google’s €4.32 billion fine?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228826/original/file-20180723-189319-1ox5oat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=94%2C44%2C2661%2C1795&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-january-2018-google-headquarters-offices-792044194?src=Jb-8JYx0athLtiZ7b_prCQ-1-5">Shutterstock.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The European Commission has fined Google €4.34 billion for breaching <strong>EU</strong> antitrust rules – the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/56ae8282-89d7-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340">highest ever fine</a> imposed in the <strong>EU</strong>. The case concerned a part of EU competition law that prohibits a <strong>business</strong> from strengthening its dominance in the market through certain <strong>business</strong> practices. </p>
<p>US President Donald Trump was quick to object to the fine, following on from an earlier interview with CBS, where he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/19/donald-trump-eu-google-fine">called the EU</a> “a foe”. But both EU and US antitrust laws are put in place to foster competition in the market – so why is the fine such a flash point? </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1019932691339399168"}"></div></p>
<p>The first thing to note is that EU law does not prohibit a business from being dominant. The goal of any business is to maximise its profits, and most of the time, a business is successful because consumers buy its products or services. But it is illegal, under EU law, for a company to abuse its dominant position in the market. </p>
<p>This means that a business arrangement may be lawful when a company is not in a dominant position, but unlawful when a company is in a dominant position. Android OS – owned by Google – accounts for 80% of the market share of mobile operating systems in Europe. Since Apple iOS is not available for licensing, other mobile phone manufacturers have little choice but rely on Android – a fact which Google used to promote its own apps. </p>
<p>Google’s business strategy was to strengthen the dominance of its search engine and browser (Google Search and Google Chrome), by putting certain restrictions on the use of Android OS. The <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm">commission ruled</a> that Google broke the law by forcing smartphone manufacturers to pre-install Google Search and Google Chrome, as a condition of licensing the Google Play Store on their devices. </p>
<p>This is called “tying”: where a business uses its dominance in one product or service (Android) to gain or consolidate the dominance of its other products (Google Search and Chrome). If Google was not dominant in the software for mobile operating system, tying would be lawful. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228823/original/file-20180723-189341-1oszkqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smartphone operating systems: the issue in hand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/chiang-mai-thailand-june-262018-man-1120981547?src=OyYpuFbr2JqdfVAARRSGyg-2-66">Shutterstock.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The company also paid some manufacturers and network operators for pre-installing Google Search on their devices, but not other search engines, and made it impossible for manufacturers to sell devices running on alternative versions of Android, which were not approved by Google.</p>
<h2>Not just a value judgement</h2>
<p>Defining which practices are abusive is no easy task, because most of the time it doesn’t depend on the nature of a business deal. Behind the enforcement of the antitrust laws, there is an idea of how the market economy should operate as well as complex factual assessments of the effects of the business practice under investigation. This does not mean that ethical preferences trump any economic considerations. Rather, market regulation reflects intertwined views on values, economic knowledge, social and political factors. </p>
<p>The US takes a minimalist approach when it comes to enforcing the law against “monopolisation” (broadly speaking, this corresponds to the EU’s prohibition of abuse of dominant position). In the US, courts, agencies and scholars have often interpreted the law in a way which results in limited enforcement. </p>
<p>The argument for the US approach goes like this: markets have a tendency to self-correct, whereas public intervention – such as antitrust enforcement – is counterproductive. Most of the time, a business is dominant because it is efficient. So, constraining its economic power creates inefficiencies, and sends the wrong message to businesses that want to enter the market or create new products. </p>
<p>The EU takes a different approach for historical, political and economic reasons. It places a “special responsibility” on dominant companies not to distort competition. And it holds that a dominant company has the right to compete as long as it does so on merit, by offering products and services that consumers value, rather than putting in place business practices designed to exclude competitors. </p>
<h2>Same aim, different means</h2>
<p>From the European Commission’s perspective, pre-installing Google Search and Chrome created a <em>de facto status quo</em>, which made it difficult for rival search engines to offer their apps – and ultimately served as a disincentive to innovate. So, rather than being a political decision against US businesses – as Trump seems to think – the EU’s fine against Google is also an attempt to protect competition. </p>
<p>At the heart of the issue are two different approaches to protecting competition. Put simply, the US approach is to only enforce antitrust laws when consumers pay more as a result of collusive or abusive practices. But the EU has a more sophisticated answer: to prevent consumers from paying more, but also to create an economic environment where businesses have a chance to compete. </p>
<p>Rather than having a monopolised market and then waiting for new entrants to challenge the dominant player, the EU prefers to enforce its laws to create a balance between the dominant business and existing competitors, while also encouraging new entrants to compete on the market. Consumers, the thinking goes, then benefit from both lower prices and wider choices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Petrucci does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US President Donald Trump thinks the fine is political – but it’s just a different way of doing business.Carlo Petrucci, Lecturer in Law, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/975822018-06-06T10:37:06Z2018-06-06T10:37:06Z4 charts showing why putting tariffs on your friends is a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221857/original/file-20180605-119860-1u2shxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Don't forget your friends.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Europeans, Canadians and Mexicans buy more American goods and services than anyone else in the world. So why would the Trump administration be willing to start a trade war with the United States’ most important trading partners – as well as some of its oldest allies? </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-threat-to-slap-tariffs-on-foreign-steel-is-a-bad-idea-80847">current dispute</a> started back in March, when the White House proposed tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminum on national security grounds. That led to <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/march/tradoc_156648.pdf">threats</a> of retaliation. The administration granted temporary exemptions to several key allies, including Canada, Mexico and the European Union. As of May 31, they’ve all expired, and the U.S. government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/trump-aluminum-steel-tariffs.html">decided</a> not to renew them. </p>
<p>Now the EU, Mexico and Canada are beginning to make good on those threats. </p>
<p>Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2018/05/31/justin-trudeau-says-donald-trumps-tariff-rationale-absurd/660461002/">called the tariffs</a> “totally unacceptable” and “an affront” to Canadian soldiers who have served alongside Americans in numerous conflicts.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=B744wv0AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">economist</a> who studies international trade, I thought it’d be instructive to explore the trade relationships the U.S. has with each partner to show just how important they are – and what would be the consequences of a full-blown trade war. </p>
<h2>Why they’re upset</h2>
<p>The Trump administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/trump-aluminum-steel-tariffs.html">placed</a> a 25 percent tariff on steel and 10 percent tariff on aluminum with the aim of propping up U.S. metals manufacturers. </p>
<p>A tariff is basically a tax on imports that raises the price of foreign company’s products for American consumers, putting imports at a disadvantage to domestic producers. </p>
<p>To see why these three U.S. allies are so upset, one need only look at the biggest suppliers of U.S. metals. Canada dominates, supplying more than a quarter of all U.S. steel, aluminum and iron imports in 2016. More importantly, steel exports to the U.S. make up <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/01/trade-steel-quotas-tariffs-navarro-trump-513565">more than half</a> of total Canadian production. </p>
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<p>The EU came second at 14 percent, while Mexico ranked fifth with 5.4 percent of U.S. imports. Steel exports to the U.S. also make up more than half of Mexican production.</p>
<h2>America’s biggest customers</h2>
<p>The EU is the single biggest market for exported U.S. goods, buying US$270 billion of American products in 2016, followed closely by Canada and Mexico. By comparison, China buys just $116 billion. </p>
<p>On the flip side, Americans purchase more from those countries than they sell, creating bilateral trade deficits that the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/us/politics/trade-deficit-tariffs-economists-trump.html">president hates</a> – even as most economists say they don’t matter. The U.S. imports $417 billion in goods from the EU, $294 billion from Mexico and $278 billion from Canada.</p>
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<p>When the steel tariffs were first proposed in March, the EU, Canada and Mexico all reacted by threatening to retaliate with their own sanctions against some of these products.</p>
<p>So far, only Canada and Mexico have done so. Canada <a href="https://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/cacsap-cmpcaa-eng.asp">announced</a> dollar-for-dollar tariffs on steel and aluminum, as well as sanctions of 15 percent to 25 percent on whiskey, orange juice and other food products. Mexico <a href="https://www.gob.mx/se/articulos/mexico-impondra-medidas-equivalentes-a-diversos-productos-ante-las-medidas-proteccionistas-de-ee-uu-en-acero-y-aluminio-158765?idiom=es">also slapped</a> tariffs on U.S. steel, as well as various farm products, including pork, cheese, apples, whiskey, cranberries, grapes and canned goods.</p>
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<p>While tariffs on these products won’t have much of an impact on the overall U.S. economy, they could be especially painful for particular industries or regions. For example, <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/usa/show/0203/2016/">Mexico is the second-largest consumer</a> of U.S. pig meat, making the industry vulnerable to Mexican tariffs. </p>
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<iframe src="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/embed/tree_map/hs92/export/usa/show/0203/2016/?controls=false" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="400"> </iframe>
<figcaption>Countries that import U.S. pig meat.</figcaption>
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<p>And tariffs like those on Kentucky bourbon and motorcycles seem <a href="https://www.apnews.com/9014f8128c324f77976852b875ef040d">intended</a> to hit key members of Congress where they live – namely, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, the home of Harley-Davidson.</p>
<p>Disruption to U.S.–Canada trade could also affect <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/03/30/how-u-s-states-rely-on-the-nafta-supply-chain/">cross-border supply chains that have grown during the NAFTA era</a>. The automotive industry is particularly vulnerable in this regard.</p>
<p>Although the EU hasn’t pulled the trigger on its own <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/march/tradoc_156648.pdf">tariffs</a> – yet – it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/01/eu-starts-retaliation-against-donald-trumps-steel-and-aluminium-tariffs">recently opened a case</a> at the World Trade Organization, arguing Trump’s tariffs can’t be justified on national security grounds and are no more than “pure protectionism.” A negative judgment at the WTO could result in the U.S. having to compensate aggrieved foreign producers or face broader retaliatory measures. </p>
<h2>American consumers will also feel pain</h2>
<p>While the purpose of Trump’s tariffs is to shift U.S. steel consumption away from foreign producers and towards domestic producers, Americans will share some of the pain as well. </p>
<p>For example, if automakers have to pay more for the steel used in cars, you’ll see that effect when you visit your local dealer. One estimate put it at an additional $175 per vehicle. </p>
<p>And higher prices for things that require steel or aluminum like cars, planes, construction and appliances can slow the rest of the economy. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-threat-to-slap-tariffs-on-foreign-steel-is-a-bad-idea-80847">When President Bush tried a similar tariff in 2001</a>, it was estimated that it cost American consumers $400,000 for each domestic steel job saved. </p>
<p>The reaction of the EU, Canada and Mexico raises the possibility the U.S. is facing down a full-blown trade war – even as it does the same with China. Whether tensions can be turned down before serious harm is done remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Hauk has previously received funding from the Center for International Business Education and Research, which is funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of Education. </span></em></p>The Trump administration recently imposed tariffs of up to 25 percent on foreign steel and aluminum – including from the EU, Canada and Mexico, the three biggest markets for American goods.William Hauk, Associate Professor of Economics, University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794002017-07-20T11:30:28Z2017-07-20T11:30:28ZBrexit lessons from Britain’s 19th-century push for free trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178998/original/file-20170720-4864-1xxx215.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Britain prepares to enter what have been widely described as the most complex negotiations in recent history, politicians and civil servants dealing with Brexit can look to the 19th century for inspiration when it comes to securing the best trade deal for the country. Britain went through a similar process of reshaping its relationship with the world when it repealed the controversial Corn Laws and embraced the idea of free trade in 1846. </p>
<p>It’s a comparison that pro-Brexit economists have been <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-economists-idUKKCN0Y20FG">eager to make</a>, as it greatly benefited the UK economy at the time. But a closer look shows that the pursuit of the principle of global free trade is often tempered by compromise and political pragmatism. </p>
<p>The Corn Laws imposed tariffs and restrictions on grain imports between 1815 and 1846. This favoured domestic producers and kept grain prices (and the cost of living) high for the British public. Many of the leading lights among the <a href="https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/">Economists for Free Trade</a> group (formerly, Economists for Brexit) argue that the EU’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-eu-common-agricultural-policy-56329">Common Agricultural Policy</a> is similar. CAP subsidises agricultural production for EU member states, ensuring artificially high prices. Ending CAP and switching to free trade, it is held, will therefore benefit British people by lowering food prices, ending subsidies and allowing the import of world produce at lower market prices. </p>
<h2>History lessons</h2>
<p>To some extent, this is what happened after 1846, as Britain entered a period of relative affluence for most. But more dramatically, when the UK left the protectionist embrace of the Corn Laws, it set a radically new path by becoming the first major economy to adopt unilateral global free trade. This meant adopting customs duties for revenue only and abandoning any tariffs, which offered reciprocal benefits to individual nations – even to the extent of removing the preference given to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/136800?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">imports of Canadian wheat in 1843</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178997/original/file-20170720-24017-1hxq3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Corn Laws restricted grain imports.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/internetarchivebookimages/14766991442">Internet Archive Book Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In effect, the policy was one of no trade deals. It relied on unconditionally free imports and market advantage, rather than privileged access to ensure the continued prosperity of British exports. Britain vastly simplified its tariffs and by 1860 only a small number of revenue-raising import duties survived. </p>
<p>In pursuit of this unilateral policy, Britain also ended its previous approach to trade negotiations under the politician William Huskisson in the 1820s which had been based on the gradual <a href="http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/transnational-movements-and-organisations/internationalism/gordon-bannerman-free-trade">extension of reciprocity treaties</a>. Britain abandoned policies of imperial preference which had since the 17th century offered economic advantages to the colonies. The <a href="http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/america/unitedstates/1775/causes/navigation.htm">Navigation Acts</a>, which were designed to benefit the British shipping industry, would also go in 1849.</p>
<p>For those most directly concerned in the trade regime – the politicians and officials at the Board of Trade – the appeal of unilateralism lay in ending decades of frustrating negotiations, which had been <a href="http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/history/free-trade-and-the-repeal-of-the-corn-laws/">time-consuming and largely fruitless</a>. This should give today’s negotiators pause for thought as they attempt to secure a trade deal within two years with the remaining 27 EU member states. And for them, the lack of a trade deal would not result in Britain unilaterally adopting free trade, but WTO tariffs as the easiest alternative. This would leave consumers in the UK and EU facing duties ranging <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm">from 4% to 32%</a>. </p>
<h2>Mixed results</h2>
<p>Britain was the world’s foremost trading nation in 1846 so the case for unilateralism was bolstered by the belief that other nations would follow its example and bring about free trade across the globe. And there was some evidence to support this. The <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007818">Walker Tariff of 1846</a>, introduced by US President James Polk, lowered US tariff rates in anticipation of the repeal of the Corn Laws. </p>
<p>But, except in a few smaller nations, the political risks of free trade after the 1848 revolutions (involving disgruntled workers and uncompetitive manufacturers) deterred statesmen from decisive change. Some, schooled in the protectionist thinking of <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Friedrich_List">German economist Friedrich List</a>, believed that “Perfidious Albion” – treacherous Britain – merely propagated free trade in its own self-interest. Therefore, only in the wake of a war scare between Britain and France in 1859 was the French emperor, Napoleon III, persuaded that free trade was a way to bolster peace as well as growth in a sluggish French economy. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178696/original/file-20170718-10331-cu3wn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The House of Commons debates the Treaty of France in 1860.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ALord-Palmerston-Addressing-The-House-Of-Commons-During-The-Debates-On-The-Treaty-Of-France-In-February-1860%2C-1863.jpg">By John Phillip, via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This ultimately led to a return to the negotiating table. In what <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_11jan11_e.pdf">opened the floodgates</a> to commercial treaty-making, the British liberal politician, Richard Cobden set out to negotiate a new trade deal with France, the leading continental economic power, in the autumn of 1859. Much to Cobden’s dismay, what he thought would take a matter of weeks, took over a year. It involved the intimate arrangement of what was by comparison with today a limited range of goods (and no services or non-tariff barriers to deal with). </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1860 proved successful. A slew of bilateral, commercial treaties followed suit in the 1860s between European powers, helping to integrate the European economy and create what has been hailed as <a href="http://eh.net/book_reviews/bargaining-on-europe-britain-and-the-first-common-market-1860-1892/">the “first common market”</a>. Ironically, it was these treaties, rather than unilateral free trade, that brought Britain closest to its ideal of the 1840s – leading a tariff-free Europe and boosting British prosperity by global free trade.</p>
<p>Britain in the 1860s therefore entered the European system of treaties in pursuit of the global free trade ideals her statesmen had outlined in the 1840s. Paradoxically, today it prepares to leave Europe, purportedly in a similar pursuit of global free trade, deal or no deal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79400/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Howe receives funding from
Past funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council for an edition of The Letters of Richard Cobden</span></em></p>Many have compared the UK’s repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 with leaving the European Union.Anthony Howe, Professor of Modern History, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/808472017-07-18T00:26:17Z2017-07-18T00:26:17ZWhy Trump’s threat to slap tariffs on foreign steel is a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178518/original/file-20170717-27512-k7835b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A worker at an auto parts plant in Orion Township, Michigan, lifts coiled steel into place. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Paul Sancya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump attracted a lot of support by <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/there-is-a-huge-hole-in-trumps-promise-to-bring-back-us-manufacturing-jobs-2017-3">promising to restore jobs</a> to the American manufacturing sector. </p>
<p>One sector that has been hit hard by purportedly unfair foreign competition is the U.S. steel industry. It <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=WpuZ0bpoCVoC&lpg=PP1&dq=striking%20steel&pg=PA121#v=onepage&q=steel%20employment&f=false">supported as many as 650,000 American workers in the 1950s</a> yet now employs only <a href="http://www.steel.org/%7E/media/Files/AISI/Reports/2017-AISI-Profile-Book.pdf">about 140,000</a>. </p>
<p>In order to restore <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2235256">American steel’s</a> flagging fortunes, the Trump administration has been exploring <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/12/top-obama-bush-advisers-band-together-to-warn-trump-against-steel-tariffs/?utm_term=.1bf9584c7667">increased tariff or quota restrictions on steel imports</a>, citing national security concerns.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/13/trump-tariffs-quotas-steel-240524">Trump upped the ante</a> this month in an exchange with reporters on Air Force One: </p>
<p>“Steel is a big problem… I mean, they’re dumping steel. Not only China, but others. We’re like a dumping ground, OK? They’re dumping steel and destroying our steel industry. They’ve been doing it for decades, and I’m stopping it. It’ll stop.”</p>
<p>My research focuses on the politics of trade, including the use of restrictions like tariffs. A look back at the last time a president slapped tariffs on steel is illuminating for the current debate.</p>
<h2>The Bush steel tariffs</h2>
<p>Imposing steel tariffs is not a new thing. </p>
<p>In early 2002, then-President George W. Bush <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/general/2002/03/05/bush-steel.htm">imposed steel tariffs</a> of up to 30 percent on imports of steel in an effort to shore up domestic producers against low-cost imports. These tariffs were controversial both at home and abroad because, even as they helped steelmakers, they squeezed steel users, such as the auto industry.</p>
<p>They were also seen as hypocritical at a time when the Republican administration was trying to encourage other countries to liberalize trade policies – and reduce their tariffs – through the (now-foundering) <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm">Doha Round of World Trade Organization</a> talks. </p>
<p>This case is instructive as to why President Trump may have a tough time imposing steel tariffs.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch90/T90-11.php">general economic view</a> of trade protection says that tariffs transfer money from a good’s consumers to its producers. </p>
<p>Let’s say a country slaps a 20 percent tariff on imports of beef. The country’s beef producers will be much better off because now imported meat is as much as 20 percent more expensive, meaning domestic companies will be able to sell more ribeyes and raise their prices. That’s bad news for restaurants and fans of steaks and hamburgers, who will pay those higher prices.</p>
<p>This transfer is usually <a href="http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch90/T90-11.php">economically inefficient</a> because the benefits that domestic producers receive from a tariff will generally be less than the costs to domestic consumers. In the case of the steel industry, <a href="https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb03-1.pdf">two economists found</a> that the Bush policy would cost US$400,000 a year per steel job saved.</p>
<p>Despite the fact that imposing tariffs is economically inefficient, one of the reasons they still happen is that consumers are typically a very large and dispersed group. While they collectively may lose a great deal of money in higher costs from a tariff, the cost to any one individual may not be that great. Therefore, consumers are often <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674537514">less motivated in opposing trade protection</a> than a relatively narrower and more unified group of producers who have a lot to gain.</p>
<p>Steel tariffs, however, don’t follow this pattern. </p>
<p>That’s because far from being broadly dispersed, steel consumers <a href="http://www.steel.org/%7E/media/Files/AISI/Reports/2017-AISI-Profile-Book.pdf">are heavily concentrated</a> in the <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?ind=C">construction</a> and <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=M02">automotive</a> industries – which have very powerful political lobbies of their own. As a result, steel consumers are more likely to balk at the higher prices that would result from tariffs. </p>
<p>In 2002, it was pushback from these industries that helped persuade the National Association of Manufacturers to <a href="https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb03-1.pdf">come out against the tariffs</a>. Eventually the World Trade Organization ruled the policy illegal because it violated U.S. trade commitments, which led to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/04/usa.wto1">threat of a trade war</a> with the European Union.</p>
<p>The Bush administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/04/usa.wto">withdrew the tariffs</a> in December 2003, about 21 months after they were imposed, but not without a cost. The Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition found that 200,000 workers in U.S. manufacturing <a href="http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/2002jobstudy.pdf">lost their jobs</a> as a result of the tariffs. </p>
<h2>The politics of trade</h2>
<p>Of course, there are always competing voices lobbying for and against trade protection, and those preferences alone aren’t enough to push a protective measure into law. That depends on how effective an interest group is in working through the governmental process and winning the support of powerful political patrons. </p>
<p>Some of my <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00387.x/full">own research</a> has <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596714000286">focused on this last step</a>. Politicians have an incentive to get elected and reelected to office. Therefore, the differing electoral rules that a country has along with which constituencies are considered pivotal to getting elected will help determine which industry voices get heard when asking for trade protection. </p>
<p>In that vein, the steel industry has several things working in its favor. Trump has said repeatedly that he wants to protect American manufacturing squeezed by foreign competition, and U.S. steel certainly fits that profile. But more importantly, steel production is concentrated in old industrial states in the Midwest, such as Pennsylvania and Ohio. These states have been swing states in recent presidential elections, which gives industries with workers in those regions outsized influence. </p>
<p>The U.S. sugar industry, <a href="http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/us-trade-policy-gouges-american-sugar-consumers">which is very heavily protected</a>, benefits in a similar way from being heavily concentrated in Florida, a <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/politics/election-2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-florida/index.html">frequent swing state</a> in presidential elections.</p>
<p>The flip side is that this opens administrations to <a href="http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1259&context=bjil">accusations of playing politics</a> with U.S. trade, as was the case with the Bush White House in 2002. </p>
<h2>Will Trump roll the dice?</h2>
<p>Despite the <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2235256">political advantages that the steel industry</a> has working in its favor, protective tariffs would still be a large gamble by the Trump administration.</p>
<p>The ostensible justification for the tariffs is <a href="https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2017/04/fact-sheet-section-232-investigations-effect-imports-national-security">Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act</a>. This law authorizes the president to impose tariffs on imports that jeopardize domestic industries deemed to be vital to national security. </p>
<p>While the WTO also allows national security concerns to be used as a justification for extraordinary trade protection, <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm">it seems unlikely</a> that other WTO members will accept this reasoning. The Section 232 justification is probably a stretch in this case. Using the steel industry’s own numbers, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/20/this-generations-idiotic-trade-policy-is-about-to-be-born/?utm_term=.bde9a529f4c1">only about 3 percent</a> of domestically produced steel in the U.S. goes towards defense industries.</p>
<p>The impact of steel tariffs on other domestic manufacturers such as construction and automotive manufacturing is likely to be bad. However, the bigger concern would be that the WTO again rule such tariffs to be in violation of U.S. trade commitments. Such an event would likely touch off a trade war between the U.S. and its major trading partners, particularly the European Union. </p>
<p>That threat would have negative consequences for U.S. consumers and producers alike.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Hauk has previously received funding from the University of South Carolina's Center for International Business Education and Research. </span></em></p>The president has promised to put a stop to foreign companies ‘dumping’ steel on US markets. Former President Bush tried the same thing, and here’s what happened.William Hauk, Associate Professor of Economics, University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/751092017-03-24T09:59:01Z2017-03-24T09:59:01ZAmerica can’t be first without Europe<p>On March 25, European Union leaders celebrate the 60th anniversary of their founding treaty, a central pillar of the structure set up in the aftermath of World War II to solidify peace, prosperity and partnership in Europe.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, the EU (and its predecessors) has served as an essential U.S. partner: for example, by enhancing economic opportunity for U.S. companies in Europe and <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/48475.htm">increasingly supplying vital foreign assistance</a> and diplomatic support to help solve international problems. Indeed, if the EU did not already exist, the United States would be looking to invent something like it to help preserve peace and generate prosperity on a continent that suffered through two devastating world wars.</p>
<p>More recently, however, the EU has faced a variety of existential threats as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/15-economic-milestones-which-have-led-to-the-current-eurozone-crisis-53503">euro crisis</a> rattled its members’ financial well-being, economic growth slowed, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-explains-britains-brexit-shocker-61620">U.K. voters opted</a> to leave the union and “<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-eu-wonderful-european-union-brexit-euroskeptic-560200">euroskeptics</a>” in countries like <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-marine-le-pen-could-become-the-next-french-president-68765">France</a> and the Netherlands use criticism of Brussels to contest elections. And even in the U.S., <a href="http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/06/15/brexit-good-for-the-united-states/">some reacted to Brexit</a> with cheers.</p>
<p>The bottom line – based on our many year of experience as diplomats, policymakers and researchers on transatlantic issues – is that the U.S. needs a strong economic and political partnership with Europe to advance its own economic well-being and address vexing international and regional issues. Such a partnership would be <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/div-classtitlewhat-single-voice-european-institutions-and-euus-trade-negotiationsdiv/13091C901403ADB37A006BA31F51C913">enormously more difficult</a> to maintain without the EU’s single voice, something Washington would be wise to remember.</p>
<h2>Ensuring peace and prosperity</h2>
<p>As it happens, the EU <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Recovery-Europe-Richard-Mayne/dp/B00D1FGXPW">might not even exist</a> today if it wasn’t for the United States and its efforts to rebuild Europe – via the Marshall Plan – and stop the spread of Communism following World War II. </p>
<p>Seventy years ago, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, U.S. President Harry Truman and members of Congress – Republicans and Democrats alike – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/table-of-contents_-the-marshall-plan-and-the-shaping-of-american-strategy.pdf">agreed</a> that the way to ensure peace and prosperity in Europe was for Europeans to develop interdependent, competitive economies. What we now know as the European Union emerged from these American efforts.</p>
<p>And it has worked. The EU – whether through the <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/">European Council</a> of heads of state, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu">European Commission</a> or the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal">European Parliament</a> – has helped underpin prosperity and economic competition among democratic nations on the continent. </p>
<p>The EU’s <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.12175/abstract">single market in particular has led to unprecedented wealth</a>, as it established rules and norms for doing business across the member states. The EU has also served as the vehicle for embracing Central Europe into that market and community of members after the fall of the Iron Curtain and still remains a pole of attraction for others hoping to join the EU. </p>
<p>Since the signing of the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Axy0023">Treaty of Rome</a>, the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/is-europe-outperforming-the-us/">EU has grown</a> from six countries with 186 million citizens to 28 countries with 515 million citizens and a GDP seven times larger than in 1957. The <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/charts-eu-economy-is-bigger-than-the-us-2015-6">combined EU economy</a>, in fact, is larger than that of the United States, making it the <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044">second-biggest</a> in the world behind China.</p>
<h2>The economic ties that bind</h2>
<p>Even from an “<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">America first</a>” perspective, it is important to recognize how much value has been created by the European Union’s single market and other initiatives that have made Europe’s economy more integrated and open to U.S. businesses. </p>
<p>For example, today the transatlantic economy <a href="https://transatlanticrelations.org/publication/transatlantic-economy-2017/">generates US$5.5 trillion</a> in total commercial sales a year and employs up to 15 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. Combined, they represent the largest and wealthiest market in the world, driven by investment in both directions. </p>
<p>Roughly 60 percent of America’s total foreign assets are in Europe. Sales in Europe by EU units of U.S. companies topped $3.1 trillion in 2015, and their assets in the region are valued at an estimated $15.7 trillion. Europe accounted for over 70 percent of the $3.1 trillion invested in the U.S. in 2015, while European assets in the U.S. are estimated to be worth $8.4 trillion. Trade in goods across the Atlantic has almost doubled since 2000, totaling $686 billion in 2016, and 45 states export more to Europe than to China. </p>
<p>With a deeply integrated economic relationship of this size and nature, the U.S. should take steps to increase the ease of mutually beneficial economic activities, and urge the EU to take <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/charting-the-future-now">steps needed to spark economic growth</a>. </p>
<p>If the Trump administration wants to address the U.S. trade deficit with the EU, for example, let’s negotiate a new economic agreement that takes better advantage of the massive transatlantic market place described above. The U.S. and the EU were trying to forge such an agreement via the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ttip-will-live-on-but-not-for-the-eu-61718">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a> before the U.S. elections. While that <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/trumps-pick-for-trade-envoy-open-to-continued-eu-trade-talks/">agreement remains on hold</a>, we believe a strong trade deal between the partners could open up job opportunities for new generations on both sides of the Atlantic.</p>
<h2>Tackling troubles together</h2>
<p>EU is also a partner for the United States in tackling international problems and vital as a source of funds to meet humanitarian and development needs <a href="https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/DevelopmentAtlas.do">in almost every corner of the world</a>. This role is even more important if the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/28/politics/trump-budget-foreign-aid/">U.S. wants to reduce</a> its own aid spending. </p>
<p>The EU and its members <a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm">together provided</a> over $87 billion in official development assistance in 2015. That is 55.7 percent of the global total. The comparable number for the United States is <a href="https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/AidOverview.do">just $31 billion, or 23.6 percent</a>.</p>
<p>On the diplomatic front, it is true, the complicated institutional makeup of the EU often means slow decision-making, and it becomes very hard when competencies and authorities at the EU conflict with those of the member states: for example, in fighting terrorism or dealing with refugees. The EU has taken major strides to improve this, such as by establishing a high representative to speak for members in a range of regional situations. The EU has been <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.12175/abstract">an active partner</a> on Ukraine, Iran, the Middle East and Afghanistan, for example.</p>
<p>Despite the remaining shortcomings, in other words, the EU is <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016">still a much stronger foreign policy partner</a> for the U.S. today than in the past. If the EU were not there to contribute significant resources to help deal with major humanitarian crises, handle the fallout of conflicts and terror and bolster the prospects for peace and stability in countries like Ukraine, a much greater burden would fall on the United States.</p>
<h2>Winning with a strong Europe</h2>
<p>The EU currently <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Charting_the_Future_Now_0316.pdf">faces serious challenges</a>: low economic growth, massive immigration flows, euro-skepticism among its citizens and a complicated structure necessary to fashion decisions among 28 member states. </p>
<p>The U.K. vote to leave the EU in June, which <a href="http://transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TE2017_Chapter1.pdf">will surely leave the British poorer</a> economically, only adds to the aging union’s woes as the two sides negotiate their future relationship. </p>
<p>Russia, meanwhile, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-of-words-how-europe-is-fighting-back-against-russian-disinformation-65444">trying to divide and weaken Europe</a>. And some in the U.S. are likely tempted to leave Europe to the Europeans and to tend to our own concerns.</p>
<p>The United States, however, remains an integral part of the European equation through bilateral ties, NATO and relations with the EU. We have learned, often to our sorrow, that whenever we ignore European problems, we end up paying a higher price later, as was the case when we pulled inward in the decade before World War II.</p>
<p>American interest in a strong EU, then, derives from a steely-eyed appreciation of fundamental U.S. national interests: a Europe that is at peace and open to U.S. goods, ideas and cooperation.</p>
<p>While the U.S. would be wise to let Europeans sort out their political differences and options for integration, America will pay enormously if the process of European cooperation or prosperity goes badly off track. We should be clear-eyed about potential costs and work to deepen transatlantic cooperation.</p>
<p>The U.S. will not be better off with a divided and weak Europe. We win with a strong European partner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75109/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Earl Anthony Wayne advises HSBC's Mexico and Latin American operations on combating illicit finance and is paid for that advisory work. He is a public policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a non-resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a senior non-resident advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel S. Hamilton served for 15 years as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies, has been a consultant to Microsoft, the Business Roundtable and Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and a member of advisory boards and committees for the Robert Bosch Foundation, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the German Institute for International Security Affairs (SWP), and the Körber Foundation. In 2008 he served as the first Robert Bosch Foundation Senior Diplomatic Fellow in the German Foreign Office.</span></em></p>The Treaty of Rome, which eventually led to the European Union, is turning 60 at a time when many inside and outside Europe are questioning the union’s value. For the U.S., much is at stake.Earl Anthony Wayne, Visiting Professor of International Affairs, Hamilton CollegeDaniel S. Hamilton, Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Professor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698142016-12-07T07:51:02Z2016-12-07T07:51:02ZHow the EU could spur African growth, instead of making more bad trade deals<p>Before the election of Donald Trump ripped up the global rulebook on trade, the European Union entered into an old school-style deal with many African countries. </p>
<p>After nearly a decade of negotiations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, signed the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/sadc/index_en.htm">Economic Partnership Agreement</a> (EPA) with the 28 members states of the EU. When the process of ratification is complete, Mozambique is <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/new-african-economic-partnership-enters-into-force-critics-still-unconvinced/">slated to become the sixth member</a> of the agreement. </p>
<p>The EPA is designed to be asymmetrical in the African countries’ favour. The European Commission has <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/new-african-economic-partnership-enters-into-force-critics-still-unconvinced/">insisted</a> that the EU has “never accepted such a degree of asymmetry in a trade deal before”. </p>
<p>But some European and African delegates continue to question the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201607131066.html">fairness of the deal</a>, not least because the African countries already benefit from duty-free access to the European single market through the “<a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150983.pdf">Everything but Arms</a>” initiative of the Commission.</p>
<p>The EU will grant all signatories of the deal 100% free access to its common market, except South Africa, which will have custom duties on <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1555">1.3% of its exports</a>.</p>
<h2>Will it work?</h2>
<p>The granting of free access to the vast EU market is lauded as a coup for the continued economic progress of the developing nations involved. While there is no reason to believe the motivations of the European Union are anything but sincere, whether it will have the intended effect is still unclear. </p>
<p>The rationale of the agreement has been showcased by the EU as a tool to spur economic growth. The argument goes that removing duty on “intermediate goods” – such as automotive parts and electronics that are used in the manufacturing of more specialised consumer goods – can now be imported on the cheap.</p>
<p>The EU claims that the agreement will protect African production activities from liberalisation, allowing domestic industries the time to mature. The textile industry has garnered particular interest where South African labour unions have been very <a href="http://www.industriall-union.org/a-turnaround-for-south-africas-textile-industry">vocal</a> against further trade liberalisation. Countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya – both showing promise of becoming established textile-producing hubs – are also grappling with various hurdles from European customers who are <a href="http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/east-africa-the-next-hub-for-apparel-sourcing">perceived</a> as “more demanding with respect to lead times, order sizes, and quality”.</p>
<p>An influx of cheaper, higher quality products such as textiles from the EU are likely to reduce trade between African nations, prevent manufacturers from making more diverse products, and limit industrialisation. Even South Africa’s inter-regional textile exports, despite boasting a more established and sophisticated industry, represent a <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/Business/textiles-turn-to-exports-20160610">mere</a> 12% to 14% of total exports. </p>
<p>Giving European imports the duty-free treatment will leave African producers struggling: local businesses will be unable to sell their wares at competitive prices, while the agreement will limit the whole continent’s efforts to move up the industrial value chain, and produce a greater quantity of final consumption goods.</p>
<p>As a result, Africa will remain, contrary to the envisaged ambitions of the EPA, a perpetual supplier of raw materials with a poorly diversified economy.</p>
<h2>Divide and conquer</h2>
<p>Signatory countries are also at risk of destabilising their fragile economies by losing the ability to collect duties on imported goods.</p>
<p>Botswana, according to the latest World Bank figures, relies on such tariffs to fill <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.IMPT.ZS?locations=BW">47% of its state coffers</a>, Namibia <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.IMPT.ZS?locations=NA">for 22%</a>, while Lesotho, a landlocked country within a country (South Africa) earns nearly 70% of its total tax revenue at its borders.</p>
<p>The Wilson Center, a US think tank, supports the <a href="http://www.herald.co.zw/why-african-countries-are-refusing-trade-pacts/">criticism flung at the EPA</a>, claiming the agreement is inherently flawed because of EU envoys’ “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EPA%20Article.pdf">divide and conquer</a>” tactics when negotiating with African countries. </p>
<p>As part of this approach, EU negotiators trigger the fear of losing preferential access to the EU market in their counterparts, which forces the African states to the table under the assumption that they are left with <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000224260/kenya-now-at-the-mercy-of-eu-on-trade-deal">no choice</a> but to participate in EPA talks. </p>
<p>This strategy can be seen in the behaviour of the European Commission towards other African nations. Recently, the Commission announced that Kenya, on the cusp of being declared a “middle-income” country, would lose tariff-free access to the EU market if the country <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/east-african-states-delay-signing-of-eu-trade-deal/a-19537689">did not ratify</a> the East Africa EPA.</p>
<p>Tanzania faces a <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=694034453&Country=Uganda&topic=Economy&subtopic=Regional+outlook&subsubtopic=Economic+growth&oid=1021301086&flid=1164413300">similar</a> predicament if <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201608020829.html">its status</a> as a developing nation is reviewed.</p>
<h2>The case of Mozambique</h2>
<p>Instead of pursuing unhelpful trade deals, Europe should work to help address the African continent’s deepest structural problems. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.marinemegafauna.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Illegal-Fishing.-The-Case-of-Mozambique.pdf">fishing industry</a> in Mozambique serves as a poignant example. The country, disproportionately reliant on its fisheries for both foreign reserve income and feeding its citizenry, is losing up to <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-18-theres-a-crisis-in-our-oceans-illegal-fishing-dwarfs-ivory-and-rhino-horn-poaching">US$65 million</a> from its economy every year because of illegal fishing.</p>
<p>Through a series of deals in 2013, Mozambique <a href="https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/IPR-Mozambique-Oct2013-Summary.pdf">undertook major investments</a> to upgrade its previously inadequate maritime surveillance powers and <a href="http://www.worldfishing.net/news101/industry-news/mozambique-tackles-illegal-fishing">safeguard</a> the country’s coastlines.</p>
<p>The government bought patrol vessels, and improved monitoring, training and technology capabilities. But it is now facing <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3567677/Britain-gave-84-million-year-Mozambique-set-fishing-fleet-instead-country-bought-military-patrol-boats-France.html">criticism</a> over how the deal was secretly financed and further questioning over why it is <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-18-theres-a-crisis-in-our-oceans-illegal-fishing-dwarfs-ivory-and-rhino-horn-poaching">failing</a> to put the new fleet to good use.</p>
<p>An EPA offers little hope of alleviating the plight of fisheries, especially in light of <a href="http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20121030_fish_en.pdf">research</a> that shows that fisheries agreements conducted between the EU and island nations in the Pacific during the 1990s generated seven times more value for European states than for the <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org.au/blog/fishing-for-a-fair-deal-in-the-pacific-and-why-the-eu-must-change-their-game/">island nations</a>.</p>
<p>But a joint initiative on fishing would instead have the potential to increase export revenue and serve as a catalyst for job generation. A concerted effort between the EU and host nations on the issue of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing alone could add 300,000 jobs and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jun/29/tackling-illegal-fishing-in-western-africa-could-create-300000-jobs">generate</a> US$3.3 billion in revenue. It could also boost income from selling foreign rights by a factor of eight.</p>
<h2>Southern Africa as a dumping ground</h2>
<p>The EU’s incessant pursuit of EPAs are uncreative and may prove inadequate in promoting African economic self-reliance. </p>
<p>The most likely scenario for the agreement signed with the SADC is that the African countries involved will become a dumping site for European goods of superior quality to domestic products. Local consumers will no doubt <a href="https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjdof3Yut3QAhVF0hoKHSbhCsoQFggrMAM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nielsen.com%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Fnielsenglobal%2Fde%2Fdocs%2FNielsen%2520Global%2520Brand-Origin%2520Report%2520-%2520April%25202016.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGyZUXOx5LFMAljFmuX1sWGXW5MLw&bvm=bv.139782543,d.d2s">favour</a> these relatively cheaper goods over locally produced goods. This will have a direct affect on local trade and manufacturing prowess. </p>
<p>Instead of chasing new EPAs, the EU should <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/26/development-delivery-aid-agencies">concentrate</a> on providing the skills and structures to assist host nations, becoming development partners rather than dictators of unfavourable terms.</p>
<p>The EPA is a fruitless attempt to reach a seemingly beneficial agreement, which risks become yet another unpopular global trade policy. The EU would do well to consider helping countries such as Botswana, Mozambique and Lesotho with the problems they actually have, rather than striking deals that are bound to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69814/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Breedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A deal intended to help southern African countries develop could instead turn them into an EU dumping ground for cheap goods.André Breedt, PhD Student Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680062016-11-02T10:03:39Z2016-11-02T10:03:39ZMagufuli’s visit should end the grandstanding between Tanzania and Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144066/original/image-20161101-15814-4xpzqo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (right) and visiting Tanzanian President John Magufuli.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Daniel Irungu</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzanian President John Pombe Magufuli has <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Finally--Magufuli-to-visit-Nairobi/1056-3434674-qjwrsi/">finally made his maiden visit to Kenya</a>, only his third official state visit to a foreign country since he took office a year ago. All his previous visits were short trips to neighbouring countries Rwanda, twice, and Uganda. </p>
<p>That all his engagements have been within the East African Community seems to underline a foreign policy shift re-positioning Tanzania as a leading regional actor. His predecessor, President Jakaya Kikwete, was <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-11-05-analysis-how-did-tanzania-become-the-loneliest-kid-on-the-east-african-bloc/">less enthusiastic</a> about regional integration. Tanzania’s apparent aloofness under Kikwete gave rise to the formation of a so-called <a href="http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Coalition-of-the-willing-emerges-again-in-EAC/1840360-2144030-100yaaz/index.html">“coalition of the willing”</a>. This saw Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda acting together to fast track regional development projects.</p>
<p>Magufuli’s visit to Kenya is therefore being seen as as an attempt to reaffirm Tanzania’s place within the East African Community. Just as importantly, it is also being seen as an attempt to reset bilateral relations with Kenya which, at best, have been lukewarm under his watch. </p>
<p>The talks between Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Magufuli appear designed to put to one side their perceived personal and ideological differences. This will not only have an impact on the two countries but also regional integration efforts. </p>
<h2>Tetchy times</h2>
<p>Relations got off to a rocky start early in Magufuli’s term when he disrupted Kenya’s stewardship role in the “coalition of the willing”. He did so by working with Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni to re-route Uganda’s planned oil pipeline through Tanzania after Kenya <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-31/kenya-may-build-own-oil-pipeline-if-ugandan-plan-falls-through">appeared to have secured it</a>. </p>
<p>The celebrations that followed in Dar es Salaam were matched in their intensity only by the bitterness felt in Nairobi. Many commentators felt that the move undermined Kenya’s economic plans which were partly hinged on the large scale regional infrastructural projects. These also included the expansion of ports and a brand new standard gauge railway.</p>
<p>Diplomatic relations were brought to boiling point during negotiations to finalise a trade deal between the European Union and the East Africa Community. Kenya signed the final agreement but Tanzania flatly refused <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/434750-3323648-uirx9iz/index.html">citing national interest</a>. Many in the Kenyan government and the business sector saw this as an attempt to <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-3213568-6lp071z/index.html">undermine Kenya’s economic growth and development</a> </p>
<h2>“Winner takes all” mentality</h2>
<p>For a start, both countries need to avoid the “winner takes all” mentality that has defined competition between them for regional trade and infrastructure projects. </p>
<p>For instance, after <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/JPM-in-Rwanda-for-maiden-foreign-trip/2558-3148232-13cv0scz/index.html">Magufuli’s visits to Rwanda</a> and <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201605111225.html">Uganda</a>, both countries agreed to drop earlier plans of a joint railway with Kenya connecting them to Mombasa. Instead they agreed to work with Tanzania on a railway line <a href="http://www.eac.int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57:tanzania-rwanda-burundi-in-rail-deal-&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=163">connecting to Tanzania’s port city of Dar as Salaam</a>.</p>
<p>Another project to come out of the “coalition of the willing” was a Uganda oil pipeline that would pass through Kenya to Lamu. After intense diplomatic lobbying by Tanzania, Uganda <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2016-04-23-uganda-chooses-tanzania-for-oil-pipeline-route-leaves-kenya-at-the-altar">opted</a> to pump its crude exports to the small port of Tanga north of Dar es Salaam. </p>
<p>Mistrust between the two countries has also revolved around bilateral and regional trade negotiations and agreements. At the bilateral level, <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000178744/ekwee-ethuro-slams-tanzania-for-stifling-trade-free-movement-in-eac">Kenya has regularly complained about non-tariff barriers</a> on its exports to Tanzania. It has also accused Tanzanian officials of being complicit in <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenyan-tour-firms-accuse-Tanzania-of-mistreatment-/539546-1902532-2tnyke/index.html">the mistreatment of Kenyan business owners</a> through punitive measures such as cancellation of work permits. </p>
<p>In return Kenya has at times reciprocated with debilitating consequences. An example was Nairobi’s decision <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Dar-petitions-Kenya-after-tour-operators-barred-from-airports-/-/2560/2585036/-/plrbq0z/-/index.html">to bar Tanzanian tour vans</a> from accessing Jomo Kenyatta airport.</p>
<h2>Towards a common agenda</h2>
<p>Magufuli’s grand posturing has positioned Tanzania as an alternative regional economic powerhouse. This has been seen by some in Kenya as a <a href="http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/uncategorised/east-africa-tanzania-challenging-kenya/">threat to Kenya’s traditional geostrategic advantage</a> as the gateway to the region. </p>
<p>The result has been Kenya’s attempts to strengthen its trade and diplomatic engagements with its northern neighbours. Just hours before Magufuli’s visit, President Kenyatta was in Sudan on an official trip in what was seen as an effort to <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60698">strengthen bilateral trade agreements</a>. Diplomatic and trade ties have also been stepped up with Ethiopia and South Sudan.</p>
<p>The strained relationship is unproductive and unnecessary given the significant trade relations between the two countries. This is explained by the fact that Tanzania is currently one of Kenya’s <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania-edges-Uganda-as-Kenya-s-biggest-market-/-/2558/2435624/-/3o1uv4/-/index.html">largest export markets</a> within the region. For its part <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania-President-Magufuli-in-Kenya-for-two-day-visit/2558-3435930-kd66gy/index.html">Tanzania relies heavily</a> on Kenyan industries and businesses companies for foreign investments. These provide revenue and employment opportunities as was reiterated by Magufuli during his two day state visit. </p>
<p>In addition to close trade relations, both countries are also partners within the common East Africa Community market, with a set of economic growth and development policies as their priorities. It would therefore be expected that they should jointly try and create a conducive environment for regional and foreign investment. </p>
<p>The two countries should take a common stand in pushing to end the political instability in Burundi and South Sudan. Both are East Africa Community member states. They should also cooperate on strengthening regional trade agreements to ensure sharing of regional public goods. These include the European Union Economic Partnership Agreement with the regional common market countries. </p>
<p>Closer cooperation between Kenya and Tanzania will have two major likely outcomes. The first is bringing to an end divisions among East Africa Community members. The second is to invigorate collective efforts aimed at deepening integration as well as the protection of common interests. </p>
<p>The first example of this is the decision by Tanzania and other regional member states to endorse the candidature of <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-fronts-CS-Amina-Mohamed-for-AU-chair-post/1056-3403372-ubic6x/">Amina Mohamed</a> for the African Union chairperson. </p>
<p>The renewed commitment to speed up a planned joint commission between Kenya and Tanzania is another. This forum is expected to formulate future areas of cooperation between the two states. It would also provide a framework for avoiding diplomatic tensions that have at times characterised relations between the two countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sekou Toure Otondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Magufuli’s visit to Kenya reaffirms Tanzania as a leading regional actor. But it is also clearly designed to reset bilateral relations with Kenya which have been at best lukewarm on his watchSekou Toure Otondi, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655072016-09-20T11:50:39Z2016-09-20T11:50:39ZWhy Britain should play the long game with its Brexit strategy<p>Britain’s Brexit negotiating position – imposing limits on freedom of movement, while simultaneously seeking free single market access in goods and services – is difficult, if not impossible, to square with the four freedoms entrenched in EU treaty law. Freedom of movement for people, goods, services, and capital within the EU single market is an irreducible totem of EU identity. It is all or nothing. Fail to embrace the four freedoms and you must face the EU’s external tariff barriers. </p>
<p>This is the line that EU leaders are sticking to when it comes to negotiating Brexit. They made as much clear <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-summit-britain-idUKKCN11M24A">at the recent EU summit in Bratislava</a>, Slovakia – the first major meeting of EU leaders without the UK present. Meanwhile, for Britain, agreeing to all four freedoms is no longer democratically acceptable. </p>
<p>Squaring this circle – of diametrically opposed red-line issues on each side – appears to be an utterly intractable problem. Yet, with patience and a degree of moral ambivalence, Britain may find that developments within and between the remaining EU states may serve up a more receptive negotiating environment. Europe is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4423223e-0875-11e6-a623-b84d06a39ec2">moving closer to Britain</a>. Not fast enough to have preempted the Brexit referendum – but perhaps fast enough to arrive in time for settling the terms of departure. </p>
<h2>Trade balances</h2>
<p>Both the UK and the remaining EU member states manufacture goods that they would like to sell to each other. <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/abs/annual-business-survey/car-production/sty-car.html">Cars and automotive components are one prominent example</a>. The preconditions are therefore in place for finding a way to ensure low, if not zero, tariffs on these goods. </p>
<p>While the UK runs a trade deficit with the EU in manufactured goods, it runs a (smaller) <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/">trade surplus in services</a>. This surplus is primarily due to financial services and insurance, with smaller net contributions from business services; legal, accounting, management consulting and public relations; architectural, engineering and technical services; and computer and information services. </p>
<p>London has been the primary beneficiary of the EU single market in services and capital, along with the European Commission’s drive to establish integrated banking and capital markets. UK-based financial firms have been undertaking 76% of all “passporting” activity within the single market, <a href="http://newfinancial.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-potential-impact-of-Brexit-on-European-capital-markets-New-Financial-Apr-2016.pdf">and have attracted 78% of the other EU member states’ capital-market activity</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138477/original/image-20160920-11103-7a0qp7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://newfinancial.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-potential-impact-of-Brexit-on-European-capital-markets-New-Financial-Apr-2016.pdf">Kim Kaivanto</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>Yet the UK finance industry’s significance extends beyond its trade surplus and tax revenues. It represents an uncomfortable displacement of the EU’s financial epicentre outside of the eurozone, squarely within the domain of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. </p>
<p>As a result, it wields considerable influence in EU bodies and all aspects of financial regulation. Britain’s EU counterparts therefore have good reason, as well as an intrinsic predisposition, to be less willing to compromise and give way in negotiations over services, especially financial services. </p>
<h2>Shifting consensus</h2>
<p>Then there is the issue of freedom of movement of people. As a defining issue of the Brexit referendum, the UK government will be hard pressed to accept any compromise involving free movement of people. But it may be only a matter of time before the EU’s resolve on free movement of people begins to crack.</p>
<p>The rise of the nationalist right, in its various anti-immigration forms, has the potential to undermine the prevailing consensus, which underpins unconditional and unrestricted freedom of movement. Signs of this are already evident across the EU. </p>
<p>In France and Germany, nationalistic parties have surged forward in prominence and popularity, and increasingly pose a credible electoral threat to existing governments. In Germany, electoral successes have <a href="https://theconversation.com/merkels-party-slumps-in-berlin-election-but-dont-count-her-out-for-2017-65639">already been won</a>, with the decisive test of parliamentary elections due in September 2017. </p>
<p>In France, the presidential election will take place in April and May 2017, while the legislative election will take place that June. Migration is set to be a <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/migration-helps-shape-next-year-elections-in-france-and-germany/3494439.html">key issue in both the French and German elections</a>. Meanwhile, 2017 will also feature elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Liechtenstein, and The Netherlands. </p>
<p>Mild forms of anti-federalism are emerging as opposition to “ever-closer union”. This has already taken place among <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/what-neighbours-think-netherlands-hungary-greecehttps://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/what-neighbours-think-netherlands-hungary-greece">national-level parties</a> in Belgium, France, and Italy, though their respective governments have yet to pay heed. But already in 2013 the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5a973412-da86-11e2-a237-00144feab7de">coalition government</a> of The Netherlands declared that “the time for ‘ever closer union’ in every possible policy area is behind us.” Similar sentiments can be seen in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b113d6c-76a2-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a">Ireland, Sweden and Denmark</a>. </p>
<p>A stronger form of anti-federalism is evident in the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), which have endorsed not only repatriation of some powers to the nation-state level, but also a reconstitution of the EU to support the national cultures of its member states. They want to be able to exclude people who do not conform with the national cultural identity. More pointedly, they want to be able to <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/brexit-or-not-only-a-fool-ignores-the-march-of-europes-new-goose-steppers-djgbw7pml">prevent Muslim immigration</a>. </p>
<p>Prominent politicians in <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2016/07/01/who-do-other-eu-states-think-about-brexit">the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France, and Austria</a> have also either called for Brexit-style referendums, or have threatened to do so. </p>
<p>In EU member states, these ground-moving and visceral popular movements are already beginning to undermine consensus over unconditional freedom of movement. But patience is necessary because they will take time to mature and burst forth. Patience is also necessary because the reality within the European Commission will not instantaneously come to reflect changes at the level of member states. It is the commission, not individual member states, that the UK must formally negotiate with when it comes to leaving the EU. </p>
<p>Europhilia understandably prevails among commission officials. Plus, the commission is constrained to operate within the framework set out in the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12007L%2FTXT">2007 Lisbon Treaty</a>. Crucially, this codifies the four freedoms, establishes EU citizenship, and outlaws discrimination on the basis of nationality. </p>
<p>Once the changes within EU member states become recognised within the EU apparatus, however, the UK will no longer find itself outnumbered 27-to-1. Instead, it will be negotiating with an EU that has realised – perhaps even formally acknowledged – that some limitations on freedom of movement have become necessary.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the price to be paid by the UK is not only in the consequences of prolonged economic and political uncertainty, but also in the moral ambivalence of hitching the nation’s future to this development trajectory. Were it not for June 23, the UK would be actively exposing, deploring and opposing the nascent racism and bigotry which is coming to light. Instead, Brexit is unquestionably fuelling these developments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kim Kaivanto does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With patience and a degree of moral ambivalence, the UK may find an EU that is increasingly open to the idea of free trade without free movement of people.Kim Kaivanto, Lecturer in Economics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/645772016-09-01T20:24:27Z2016-09-01T20:24:27ZDoes TPP’s slow death mean the world is now unsafe for trade deals?<p>It seems that the world has become unsafe for trade agreements. In particular, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/tpp-7972">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP), a major new trade deal among the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim nations, has become a political lightning rod for both the left and the right. </p>
<p>As if to highlight that fact once again, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell <a href="http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/mcconnell-comment-tpp-ends-obamas-chance-close-deal">said</a> recently that he would not bring the TPP to a vote until after the new president takes office in January. </p>
<p>That’s bad news for the trade agreement – and for President Barack Obama, who sees its passage as the final plank in his foreign policy legacy and who <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/08/17/obama-tpp-congress-lame-duck-trade/">is pushing hard</a> for a vote during Congress’ post-election lame duck session. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-a-problem-with-the-tpp-that-hillary-clinton-ignores-at-her-peril-62818">controversial Asian pact</a> is not the only trade agreement potentially on the chopping block. Last month, the European Union’s trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-canada-trade-talks-falter-auguring-ill-for-bigger-deals-1472511958?mod=e2tw">decided</a> not to fast-track the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) due to the anti-trade climate prevailing on the continent. </p>
<p>And France’s President François Hollande <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/30/france-demands-end-to-ttip-trade-talks-matthias-fekl">just declared</a> that his country would not support moving forward with the gigantic Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated between the U.S. and the EU. His announcement came on the heels of a statement by Germany’s vice chancellor that <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ttip-trade-deal-agreement-failed-brexit-latest-news-eu-us-germany-vice-chancellor-a7213876.html">TTIP “has failed.”</a></p>
<p>It seems that every time we get closer to the conclusion and ratification of a trade deal, a new barrier emerges to block any progress. What, then, are we to make of the tremendous obstacles confronting these three major agreements? </p>
<h2>The times they are a-changin’</h2>
<p>First and foremost, opposition to trade is a sign of the times. The Great Recession, among other events, has generated strong pushback against globalization and liberal exchange, something that seems to have caught political elites around the world off guard.</p>
<p>The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) had already <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-wto-still-matters-34624">come apart</a> well before the recession. Its failure meant that a multilateral deal, one that would have committed nearly all of the world’s countries to the same trade agenda, was no longer possible. </p>
<p>At the heart of Doha’s collapse were the interests of the newly rising BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – which could not be reconciled with those of the U.S. and the EU. The failure of the WTO, in its turn, gave new impetus to regional agreements such as TTIP and TPP.</p>
<p>Initially, these regional agreements, along with their more modest bilateral cousins (deals between only two nations), were treated with <a href="http://www.cfr.org/world/termites-trading-system/p15840">suspicion</a> by free traders, who feared that they would carve up the global trading system into inefficient blocs. But, in time, such agreements presented themselves as the best, and only, way forward in a more complex, multipolar economic environment. </p>
<p>Still, TTIP and TPP are more than just victims of the general skepticism for globalization that has arisen in the past few years. They are also the collateral damage from political events in the world’s major trading countries. </p>
<h2>Illiberalism on the rise</h2>
<p>First among these is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/brexit-9976">U.K.’s Brexit vote</a>, which is likely to result in the country’s withdrawal from the EU. Brexit, which is itself the fruit of growing illiberalism in England and Wales, has distracted European leaders to such a degree that TTIP and CETA have moved onto the back burner. </p>
<p>Moreover, in the United States, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-free-trade-and-tpp-survive-rise-of-the-new-right-56241">success of Donald Trump</a> in mobilizing the anti-globalization working class has made Republicans in Congress, who typically support trade as good for business, <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-trade-is-once-again-tearing-apart-the-republican-party-57698">wary of trade deals</a>. It has also led Hillary Clinton to distance herself from previous statements supporting TPP made during her tenure at secretary of state.</p>
<p>Another problem facing TPP and TTIP is their <a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-trade-deals-outlook-clouded-by-patent-disputes-elections-as-talks-enter-final-stage-45812">unprecedented scope</a>. Not only do these agreements create free trade blocs that encompass much of the world’s economic output, but <a href="https://ustr.gov/tpp/">they also touch on a variety of issues</a> from internet freedom to generic drug prices to the right of private investors to sue states for compensation. Many of the most controversial elements of the agreements relate to these issues rather than to the traditional components of trade protection.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>What would be the consequences if these agreements fail? </p>
<p>Economically, the U.S. is already tightly linked with both <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/asia-pacific-economic-cooperation-apec/us-apec-trade-facts">Asia</a> and <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union">Europe</a>. The TPP agreement would essentially expand the Pacific trade bloc beyond NAFTA to include nine additional countries, most significantly Japan. Similarly, TTIP would deepen the already significant economic interdependence that traverses the Atlantic.</p>
<p>The loss of these agreements would certainly have negative economic effects on all sides, as least in the aggregate (since some jobs would be saved by the reduced competition). Agreements this large cannot be jettisoned <a href="http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/6642.html">without consequences</a>.</p>
<p>That said, given the deep connections that already exist among Asia, North America and Europe, the purely economic results of killing the agreements are likely to be important, but not enormous. More serious would be the geostrategic implications. </p>
<p>A rejection of TTIP by either side could signal a reduced U.S. presence in Europe, a particular concern in the face of increasing Russian assertiveness. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, an end to TPP could encourage a number of Asian countries, unsure of America’s future in the region, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-will-be-the-winner-if-us-backs-out-of-the-tpp-63328">move into China’s growing sphere of influence</a>. It is no surprise that this last argument is the one <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.d44962edcefc">being made</a> most aggressively by the Obama administration.</p>
<h2>Long live free trade?</h2>
<p>If TTIP and TPP are not likely to be approved any time soon, does this mean that they are already dead?</p>
<p>A President Trump would certainly kill the agreements. If, however, Hillary Clinton becomes the next president, as the <a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html">polls seem to indicate</a>, their future is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-progressives-should-rescue-the-tpp-trade-deal-60304">harder to predict</a>. Clinton seems to be, at heart, a believer in open markets, but the current political situation <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/awkward-trade-fight-coming-hillary-clinton-n637586">makes it hard</a> for her to say so directly. </p>
<p>If elected, Clinton’s statements during the campaign would make it difficult for her to support TPP out of the gate, especially with strong opposition from Bernie Sanders supporters. As envisioned by Cato trade analyst <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-president-hillary-could-reverse-course-tpp-17476">Simon Lester</a>, she may well try to renegotiate a portion of the agreement as political cover and then resubmit it to Congress for approval. </p>
<p>By this point, if Trumpism has been defeated, Republicans may have a greater appetite for foreign trade. The question, of course, is whether the other TPP signatory countries will be willing to reopen portions of the agreement that have already been concluded.</p>
<p>Similarly, in Europe, it seems unlikely that much progress will be made until the Brexit issue is resolved and growth starts to pick up. </p>
<p>Despite all the obstacles, however, I believe that it is important to keep moving forward on free trade. The rejection of these important agreements could risk becoming merely the first step in a gradual erosion of support for the global economic architecture. </p>
<p>This <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/1322.html">architecture</a>, so carefully created and maintained by the United States after 1945, has contributed mightily to international prosperity and peace. Maintaining it is of critical importance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most Western trade agreements – past and present – appear to be in doubt amid an anti-globalization backlash.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/644042016-08-25T11:17:01Z2016-08-25T11:17:01ZWhy the Norway model is a flawed blueprint for Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135383/original/image-20160824-30246-ov9e8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The aftermath of the Brexit referendum has intensified the debate on alternative templates for the UK’s relationship with the European Union. The “Norway option”, an arrangement which allows Norway access to the single market without being a member of the EU, is <a href="http://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/5795e913725e254c7c8afa30/1469442330090/The+Case+for+the+%2528interim%2529+EEA+option+5.pdf">often proposed as a transitional station</a> on the journey towards Brexit’s final destination. If this is the case, and given that transitions often outlast their intended life-span, it is worth examining the context in which Norway operates with the EU.</p>
<p>Norway is a member of the <a href="http://www.efta.int/">European Free Trade Association (EFTA)</a>, a free trade group, along with Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. It is also a member of the <a href="http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement/eea-basic-features">European Economic Area (EEA)</a>, which gives it access to the EU’s single market.</p>
<h2>The question of ‘control’</h2>
<p>The Norway option <a href="http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/what-next-after-uk-vote-to-leave-eu.html">contradicts</a> most claims of “taking back control” made during the referendum campaign. This is because, in order to benefit from membership of the single market, Norway has to accept the free movement of persons, along with goods, services and capital. Free movement within the EEA is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-eus-rules-on-free-movement-allow-all-its-citizens-to-do-62186">package deal</a>.</p>
<p>Even if the UK was able to secure an agreement to join the EEA and introduce limits on free movement of persons (which seems unlikely), the Norway option would still betray the <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html">“control over our laws” promise</a>, as the UK would, <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-britain-sovereignty-is-not-a-licence-to-disregard-international-law-63373">in practice</a>, continue to be bound by a large proportion of EU law.</p>
<p>Leave voters’ key concern that <a href="http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/">“decisions about the UK should be made in the UK”</a> would also not be addressed. Decisions on competition and state aid, which affect businesses and public bodies in the UK, would continue to be taken in Brussels by a supranational body, the <a href="http://www.eftasurv.int/">EFTA surveillance authority</a> which applies (the equivalent of) EU competition law. </p>
<p>During the referendum campaign, the Leave campaign promoted the (<a href="http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-2847">misguided</a>) view that the EU rules on state aid <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/657124/Tata-steel-crisis-Nigel-Farage-Brexit-EU-referendum-David-Cameron">prevented</a> the UK government from intervening in support of the steel industry. The Norway option would not bring about any change in this regard, as those same rules would continue to apply to the UK and would still represent a hurdle for any government that wished to save, say, British steel.</p>
<h2>Trade with the rest of the world?</h2>
<p>Some will object that the Norway model’s <a href="http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/people/aca/erikoer/blog/norway-democratic-deficit.html">democratic deficit</a> is a small price to pay for allowing the UK to, once again, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/14/global-bilateral-trade-deals-bigger-eu-single-market-david-davis">“trade with the rest of the world”</a>, as opposed to being constrained by the EU’s existing trade agreements. And it is true that Norway is not a member of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-the-uk-remain-in-the-eu-customs-union-after-brexit-63179">customs union</a> and is free to sign agreements with whoever it chooses. </p>
<p>But trade patterns suggest that Norway is less engaged than the UK (as an EU member state) in trading with the rest of the world. Its trade is remarkably Eurocentric: 80% of Norway’s exports are to the EU, <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/norway/eu_norway/trade_relation/index_en.htm">while 65% of its imports come from the EU</a>. As for its freedom to enter into agreements with countries outside the EU, this comes in two guises: it may enter into free trade agreements with third countries together with the other EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland); but it can also sign separate bilateral agreements. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135389/original/image-20160824-30249-1vvw9e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The UK’s trade relationships are very different to Norway’s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>A <a href="http://bit.ly/2bDw4cc">comparison</a> between EFTA’s and the EU’s trade agreements shows that EFTA’s are fewer and less comprehensive than the EU’s. What is more, Norway seems in no hurry to sign its own bilateral trade agreements with non-EU countries. So far it has signed only two: one with Greenland, the other with the Faroe Islands. Norway <a href="https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/handel/nfd---innsiktsartikler/frihandelsavtaler/handelsavtaler/id438842/">prefers</a> to negotiate agreements through EFTA, rather than separately, in order to take advantage of its larger negotiating resources and to offer third parties access to a wider market than its own.</p>
<p>There is also a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-unforeseen-cost-of-brexit-customs-62864">downside to not being in the customs union</a>. Exports to the EU are subject to burdensome controls and, in the case of products or inputs from certain non-EU countries, customs duties. This is not so problematic for Norway, since the bulk of its exports are primary (as opposed to manufactured) products, such as oil and gas. These are unaffected by the “<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/introduction/index_en.htm">rules of origin</a>”, the intricate customs rules used to prove the origin of products. But most of the goods exported from the UK are manufactured products, often made with inputs from non-EU countries.</p>
<h2>Farming and fishing</h2>
<p>Norway retains significant control over agriculture and fisheries. But these economic sectors operate in a very different context from that of the UK. Norway uses its freedom from the Common Agricultural Policy to <a href="http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm">subsidise</a> agriculture at a far higher level than the EU currently does, and to erect hefty tariff barriers on agricultural imports. There is a good reason for this: the country’s climate and geography make farming and agriculture extremely challenging.</p>
<p>Norway is also outside of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy. Yet, as the <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/NOR/en">second largest exporter of fish and fish products in the world</a>, it can punch above its weight in international negotiations and in negotiations with the EU (where most of its fish exports end up). Some will see this Norwegian success as a beacon for Brexit. Others may doubt whether leaving the UK’s fishing industry alone to compete against, and negotiate <a href="http://www.fisheries.no/resource_management/setting_quotas/The-regulatory-chain-/#.V6RfFLiU02w">quotas</a> with, formidable rivals such as Norway and the EU was a good idea after all.</p>
<h2>Enduring appeal</h2>
<p>Given that the Norway option seems to make nearly every category worse off than before, why could this solution remain on the table? The answer lies in the structure of the UK’s economy, which is dominated by the services sector. The success of this part of the economy, and its trade surplus, largely <a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8411">depends on the single market</a>. What is more, the EU is the largest export market for UK services. </p>
<p>If the UK was to leave the single market, it would wreak significant damage on its most successful exports. Alternative arrangements, such as a network of trade agreements for different sectors, would take years to negotiate and would have limited coverage. By contrast, EEA membership would offer the chance to contain the damage. Yet, at the same time, it would contradict the stated purpose of Brexit. Herein lies the dilemma.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesco De-Cecco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brexiteers keen to follow Norway’s example face an awkward dilemma.Francesco De-Cecco, Lecturer in Law, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/631792016-07-28T10:58:49Z2016-07-28T10:58:49ZShould the UK remain in the EU customs union after Brexit?<p>The UK government is currently considering what relationship it should seek to negotiate with the EU after Brexit. One option on the table is continued participation in the EU’s customs union, but Liam Fox, the new trade secretary, <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/e87614da-533a-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60">is urging</a> the prime minister, Theresa May, to pull the UK out of it. </p>
<p>When it comes to world trade law, there are clear distinctions between a free trade area and a customs union. Under the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm">law</a> of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a free trade area means that substantially all of the barriers to trade in goods (there is no WTO equivalent for services) between the countries in the area have been abolished. A customs union goes a step further: the countries concerned not only abolish substantially all barriers to trade in goods, they also have the same rules for trading with the outside world. </p>
<h2>Free trade area vs customs union</h2>
<p>As a practical example, Canada, the US and Mexico have a free trade deal, known as <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta">NAFTA</a>. But the US embargoes trade with Cuba, whereas Canada and Mexico trade with that country. Mexico signed a trade deal with the EU years ago; Canada has <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/">just agreed one</a>; and the US is still negotiating one, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ttip">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a>.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the EU is a customs union. This means its members, including the UK, cannot sign separate trade agreements with countries such as India or China. It is, however, possible for the UK to sign a more general type of commercial “trade deal”, such as selling aircraft to India. </p>
<p>Around the world, free trade areas are more popular than customs unions. But states still do sign customs unions, because having common rules on trade with the outside world simplifies the trade between members of the customs union. </p>
<p>For example, in the NAFTA free trade area, when goods are shipped from Canada to the US, American officials must perform a number of checks. They must check to see whether they are actually Canadian goods (which can enter tariff-free), Cuban goods (in principle banned), or goods from any other country (which are subject to a tariff). Whether a good is Canadian or not depends on complex “rules of origin”, which set out how much of a car (and thousands of other products) must be produced in Canada for it to be called Canadian. </p>
<p>On the other hand, if products from China or Brazil are shipped through EU countries, such as from Rotterdam to Harwich, there is no need to carry out such checks. This is because the products would have been treated exactly the same way when they entered any EU country. </p>
<h2>Stay or go?</h2>
<p>When Britain triggers <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">Article 50 of the EU treaty</a> to leave the EU, it does not necessarily have to leave the customs union. The EU has signed customs union agreements with some micro-states such as San Marino, as well as with Turkey. So the UK could ask to retain participation in the European customs union if it wants to.</p>
<p>Leaving would have both pros and cons for the UK. On the one hand, it would mean that the UK could sign free trade deals with more countries – although not everyone sees the appeal of such deals. On the other hand, it would mean <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-unforeseen-cost-of-brexit-customs-62864">extra paperwork</a> for British exporters to the EU to prove that their product is fully “made in Britain”.</p>
<p>There is a particular issue with Northern Ireland, too. If the UK leaves the EU customs union, in principle there would need to be checks at the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, because they would no longer be applying the same law on trade with the outside world. If there weren’t checks, and the UK had a future free trade deal with China that was different to EU-China’s trade relationship, Chinese products could be shipped to Northern Ireland and then cross the border into the EU tariff-free, circumventing the EU rules. </p>
<p>In theory, it’s possible for Northern Ireland alone to remain part of the EU customs union – but that would mean creating economic barriers between its six counties and the rest of the UK. <a href="http://www.eureferendum.com/blogview.aspx?blogno=86001">Another approach</a> is to adapt an agreement that the EU already has with Switzerland (not in the EU, or the EU customs union) which sets out special procedures to facilitate trade despite the different trade rules with the outside world. That would mean the UK continuing to apply some of the EU’s customs law, however. </p>
<p>Time will tell which approach the UK government prefers – and whether the EU will agree to its requests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Peers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The difference between a customs union and a free trade area – explained.Steve Peers, Professor of Law, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608032016-06-10T11:43:19Z2016-06-10T11:43:19ZBritish fishermen want out of the EU – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126130/original/image-20160610-29203-2iy9lq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Of all of the industries affected by Britain’s membership of the EU, fishing is one of the most significant. The <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/index_en.htm">Common Fisheries Policy</a>, which governs where fleets can fish in the EU and sets quotas to conserve fish stocks, is known for being incredibly unpopular. And our recent polling shows that this translates to a near unanimous desire among British fishermen to leave the EU.</p>
<p>To date, most of the evidence of feeling within the fishing industry has been anecdotal. It has been widely known that many in the UK fishing industry, particularly skippers and boat owners, are highly critical of the CFP. And, in May 2016, a campaign group called Fishing for Leave was founded, which <a href="http://ffl.org.uk/mission/">aims</a> to withdraw from the EU to restore national control over fishing within British waters. There is no organised group of fishermen campaigning to remain in the EU.</p>
<p>To understand the extent to which skippers and boat owners favour leaving the EU, we conducted a <a href="https://goo.gl/qYt3QA">survey</a> in May and June 2016 using Fishermen’s Associations and Producer Organisations to contact their members across the UK in the run-up to the country’s referendum on membership of the EU.</p>
<p>With <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/index">current polls</a> showing that there is a fairly even split among the general population between those wishing to remain and leave, we found no such split among fishermen. As many as 92% intend to vote to leave the EU – a uniformity of opinion that is unmatched by any other economic or social group in the UK.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>% response to the question: ‘How do you think you will vote in the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union?’</strong></p>
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<hr>
<p>This view of the EU extends beyond the referendum. We found that while the British public is slightly skewed towards holding a negative image of the EU, fishermen hold an almost entirely negative view of the EU.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>% response to the question: ‘In general, what sort of image does the EU conjure up?’</strong></p>
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<hr>
<p>The vast majority of fishermen we spoke to think that leaving the EU will improve the fortunes of their industry. This would suggest that this is a big factor in their decision to vote leave.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>% response to the question: ‘In your opinion, how would the UK leaving the EU affect the UK fishing industry?’</strong></p>
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<hr>
<p>Indeed, the fact that over three-quarters of fishermen think that leaving the EU would allow them to catch and land more fish is further testament to the belief that not being subject to the CFP would directly benefit them and their industry.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>% response to the question: ‘In your opinion, what impact would the UK leaving the EU have on the amount of fish you and/or your boat are able to catch?’</strong></p>
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<hr>
<h2>Unchartered waters</h2>
<p>It is too simple to equate leaving the EU and not being subject to the CFP, however, with an automatic and straightforward benefit to the UK fishing industry. Britain’s exit from the EU means that its future access to and membership of Europe’s single market is unclear. </p>
<p>This would quite possibly have a significant impact on the <a href="http://www.seafish.org/research-economics/market-insight/market-summary#exports">sale of fish to other EU countries</a> – France, Spain and Ireland bought over 140,000 tonnes of UK fish in 2014-15 and account for 36% of the total tonnage exported to the UK’s top 20 export markets.</p>
<p>Plus, the system for managing fish stocks in both UK territorial waters and those EU areas bordering them would need to be renegotiated – and there’s no intrinsic reason why overall quotas would rise. It is also possible that they believe they could benefit from being allowed to land the entire quota of fish, if outside of the CFP, rather than sharing it with other EU-flagged boats.</p>
<p>Our surveys with fishermen suggest that they are relaxed about the impact that leaving the EU would have on the trade of fish. Three-quarters of fishermen believe that leaving the EU would have no detrimental effect on the trade of fish. Indeed, more believe it would improve trade than would hinder it. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>% response to the question: ‘In your opinion, how would the UK leaving the EU affect the trade of fish to European countries?’</strong></p>
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<hr>
<p>The data does not provide a robust explanation for reasons for this confidence, but anecdotal discussions with UK fishermen tells us that fish and seafood are much more popular in other EU countries than in the UK, especially in France and Spain, so there would be a robust market demand that could not be met solely by EU fishermen. Hence continued trade would be in the interest of all parties involved. </p>
<p>Of course, whether this actually happens is unclear: despite the economic logic of open trade, the issue might get caught up in the broader positions taken by the EU, which might feel that there is no incentive to give any deal that encourages other member states to seek an exit.</p>
<p>What is clear though is the strength of feeling among fishermen against the EU. It is in marked contrast to farmers who have typically expressed much more mixed attitudes to their equivalent EU policy, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-eu-common-agricultural-policy-56329">Common Agricultural Policy</a>. But, while farmers’ problems with the EU have been offset by subsidies, fishermen have not seen the same kind of trade-off. </p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=mXTwpSnrU6QC&dq">widely recognised</a> that the costs of European integration tend to be concentrated, while benefits are diffuse. Seen in this light, fishermen’s antipathy to the EU is not so surprising.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood receives funding from the "UK in a Changing Europe" programme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig McAngus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New surveys show the overwhelming antipathy for the EU among UK fishermen.Craig McAngus, Lecturer in Politics, University of AberdeenSimon Usherwood, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/583742016-05-02T10:28:24Z2016-05-02T10:28:24ZWhat Brexit would mean for relations between India and the UK<p>Much of the debate about Britain’s impending referendum on membership of the European Union so far has focused on external trade and the UK’s standing in the world. President <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/24/leave-campaign-obama-trade-warning-eu-referendum">Barack Obama intervened</a> to say that the UK would not find new trade deals easy to conclude, even with strong allies. While relations with Canada and China have entered the discussion, little has been said about India. </p>
<p>This is surprising, given India’s strong links with the UK and status as the world’s <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/india-surpasses-china-become-fastest-growing-economy-world-1542725">fastest growing economy</a> and world leader for <a href="http://next.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/94351bda-0620-11e6-a70d-4e39ac32c284.html#axzz46lTZRzD4">inward investment</a>. </p>
<p>Since India gained independence in 1947, its relations with the UK have remained strong. But as India’s economic importance has grown, the balance in the relationship has shifted. India’s importance to the economy was demonstrated by the crisis caused by <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-steel-industry-decline-isnt-just-down-to-tata-56964">Tata Steel’s decision to withdraw from steel manufacturing in the UK</a>. India’s was the <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/business/india-emerges-as-third-largest-fdi-source-for-uk/article7347305.ece">third largest source of foreign direct investment</a> (FDI) into the UK in 2014-15, behind the US and France. </p>
<p>Yet the post-colonial context looms large – and this matters in debates about what the UK might do if it leaves the EU. </p>
<p>Leave campaigners have not shied away from mentioning the UK’s imperial past in their arguments. Leading Brexit campaigner and outgoing mayor of London Boris Johnson said: “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/03/16/boris-johnson-exclusive-there-is-only-one-way-to-get-the-change/">We used to run the biggest empire the world has ever seen</a>”. This is a risky rationale. India, and other Commonwealth countries, could interpret this type of rationale as an implication that a Britain outside of the EU would seek to assume a greater leadership role towards its former colonies instead of genuine partnership with them.</p>
<p>Rhetoric on controlling and “cracking down” on migration has been a key theme of recent UK elections, including the EU referendum campaign. Indians are <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/populationbycountryofbirthandnationalityreport/2015-09-27">the largest group of non-UK born citizens in the UK</a> and are <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-can-vote-in-the-eu-referendum-57694">able to vote</a> in the referendum as Commonwealth citizens. But they have felt targeted, leading Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/nri/other-news/indian-professionals-react-to-new-uk-visa-rules/articleshow/51686246.cms">raise the issue</a> with his British counterpart David Cameron.</p>
<h2>Other European friends</h2>
<p>European states and the European Union itself have been actively pursuing deeper relations with India as its economy grows. The EU is <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/news/eu-india_factsheet_en.htm">India’s largest trading partner</a>, ahead of China and the US. </p>
<p>The EU and India agreed a “strategic partnership” in 2004 covering a variety of economic and non-economic matters including cooperation on terrorism. Negotiations for an EU-India Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BITA) began in 2007 but have hit <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/whats-holding-back-the-india-eu-fta/">speed bumps</a> over complex issues including tax, market access and free movement of labour. <a>A recent high-level summit</a> between the EU and India in March 2016 has reinvigorated the process. </p>
<p>Although the EU has the power to conclude trade deals on behalf of all of its members, individual states can promote themselves as destinations for investment and trade. And other member states have made progress in pursuing economic links with India. For example, FDI outflow from India into the Netherlands has been steadily increasing, suggesting a Dutch financial gateway for Indian companies into Europe. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.indianembassy.de/relationpages.php?id=37">Investments are increasing in Germany</a>, which has also strategically increased the number of Indian students in its universities by offering ever <a href="https://www.daad.de/der-daad/ueber-den-daad/portrait/en/32996-from-the-very-beginning/">increasing scholarships and academic partnerships</a>. France, too, has been welcomed to India in <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/french-president-francois-hollandes-threeday-visit-to-india-modi-hollande-address-indiafrance-ceo-summit/article8148071.ece">high-level visits</a> to promote economic cooperation in innovation and high-tech areas, including transportation.</p>
<h2>Not high on India’s agenda</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-press-conference-david-cameron-and-prime-minister-narendra-modi">Modi</a> has called the UK the “entry point for us to the European Union”. This was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11989740/David-Cameron-and-Narendra-Modi-have-big-ambitions-for-UK-India-relations-live.html">interpreted in the British press</a> as an indication that Modi wants the UK to vote to stay in the EU at the referendum. </p>
<p>In spite of Modi’s words, the lack of mention of India in the UK debate is mirrored in India itself, where the referendum has <a href="https://www.google.co.in/trends/explore#cat=0-16&q=UK%20referendum%2C%20%2Fm%2F0nfwhxb&geo=IN&date=today%2012-m&cmpt=q&tz=Etc%2FGMT-1">not (yet) gained significant media traction</a>. </p>
<p>One of the only instances was when the UK’s employment minister Priti Patel, who is of Indian origin, <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/brexit-will-give-massive-boost-to-india-uk-ties-priti-patel/story-GQaiT2qRlpsiqXhp77buOM.html">came out in favour of Brexit</a>. She claimed that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Many members of the Indian diaspora find it deeply unfair that other EU nationals effectively get special treatment. This can and will change if Britain leaves the EU. A vote to leave the EU is a vote to bring back control over immigration policy to the UK. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nevertheless, the EU has no powers over immigration policy towards third countries and the restrictions placed on Indian citizens entering the UK are made by the UK government, not the EU. The press in India reported that Patel’s views were <a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/1160225/jsp/foreign/story_71213.jsp#.Vx39qDY4mi4">flatly contradicted by other public figures</a> in the UK of Indian-origin, including <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/british-indian-mps-rebuff-priti-patel-on-brexit/story-CyreqjOWnKTfrUeETxSF2L.html">members of the House of Commons and House of Lords</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"725001768900395008"}"></div></p>
<h2>Indian business leans towards remain</h2>
<p>The reaction of the Indian business community has generally been cautious, but <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-35915389">leans towards favouring the UK remaining in the EU.</a>. The secretary general of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry stated in a <a href="http://ficci.in/PressRelease/2293/ficci-press-feb24-uk.pdf">press release</a> that a British decision to leave the EU “would create considerable uncertainty for Indian businesses” and would “possibly have an adverse impact on investment and movement of professionals to the UK”. </p>
<p>While <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-35915389">some business leaders see potential opportunities for enhanced India-UK cooperation</a> in the event of a Brexit, many share concerns with other parts of the world about the risks of future instability.</p>
<p>It is uncertain whether a post-Brexit UK would be able to secure greater cooperation with India than it has already. Much would also depend on a future UK-EU agreement which <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-leaving-the-eu-would-really-mean-for-british-trade-deals-56756">might restrict the UK’s options to pursue potentially conflicting deals</a>. It’s likely there would be significant barriers to concluding a new agreement: for example, any change to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34793572">free movement of skilled workers</a> would be politically difficult against the background of the UK’s heated migration debates. So there is no evidence that the UK and India could reach an agreement any more quickly than the current India-EU BITA, currently under discussion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul James Cardwell is Treasurer of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES). He has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council as part of the UK in a Changing Europe initiative. This article does not reflect the views of the research councils.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Navajyoti Samanta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Don’t assume a UK outside of the EU will be able to rewrite its trade deal with India.Paul James Cardwell, Reader in EU External Relations Law, University of SheffieldNavajyoti Samanta, Lecturer in commercial law, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/581692016-04-20T14:34:51Z2016-04-20T14:34:51ZGove’s vision for the UK out of the EU: welcome to Vote Leave’s parallel universe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119451/original/image-20160420-25612-1lzfuwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gove, multiplied. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lewis_bingle/12937286954/sizes/l">El Bingle/flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Vote Leave has finally set out their plan for the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU, in the event of a vote to leave the Union in the forthcoming referendum. Justice secretary Michael Gove <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/voteleave/pages/271/attachments/original/1461057270/MGspeech194VERSION2.pdf?1461057270">claims</a> that Britain can have its cake and eat it: we can enjoy full trading rights with the EU, without being part of the single market – apparently, just like a host of other European countries which together form some vast free trade area stretching from Iceland to Turkey.</p>
<p>This plan is so detached from reality as to be simply breathtaking. It reveals a deep ignorance about the basic institutions, structures and processes of international trade in general and of the single market in particular. Gove’s vast European free trade area is nothing short of a fantasy – as is his belief that the EU would simply open the doors of the single market to any third state without insisting upon a heavy price in return.</p>
<p>Let’s be clear: the EU’s commitment to eliminating obstacles to cross-border trade – particularly non-tariff barriers which arise through differences in national regulation – far surpasses that of any other trade organisation or agreement on earth.</p>
<h2>A single market means working together</h2>
<p>The EU has evolved a unique model to build its single market: limited harmonisation of national rules in order to establish common standards for essential public interests, combined with an obligation upon the member states to accept the free movement of their respective goods and services – a model which presupposes a strong degree of mutual trust and close cooperation between them. The entire system is created and maintained by a finely balanced yet highly sophisticated matrix of legislative, administrative and judicial structures and processes.</p>
<p>As a full member of the EU, the UK enjoys the benefits of that unique degree of market access together with significant political influence over its development. If the UK wanted to secure the same or even a similar degree of market access as a non-member of the EU, there is no doubt that we would have to agree a deal comparable in nature to the <a href="http://www.eu-norway.org/news1/Report-by-the-EEA-Review-Committee-Norways-agreements-with-the-European-Union/#.Vxd4CT-PB3l">European Economic Area agreement</a> which currently applies to Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.</p>
<p>This would be a deal which integrates the UK into the single market – but on the basis that we agree to abide by all of the EU’s existing and future market rules (including the free movement of persons) and other rules such as environmental, consumer and employment legislation. In return, we would enjoy only a very marginal degree of influence over the substantive content of the single market rules. We would also pay a substantial “membership fee” to the EU – just as happens with countries such as <a href="http://www.eu-norway.org/eu/Financial-contribution/#.Vxd7TD-PB3l">Norway</a>. </p>
<p>To argue, as Vote Leave tries to do, that the UK is bigger than and different from Norway, Iceland or Lichtenstein is entirely true, but it also entirely misses the fundamental point. It is the nature of the single market itself that requires such a high degree of integration in order to secure such a privileged degree of participation. Any state that wants to enjoy its benefits needs to sign up to its rules: legislative harmonisation, cross recognition of regulatory standards, mutual trust between domestic authorities, effective judicial enforcement mechanisms, a fair playing field when it comes to social and environmental rules.</p>
<p>For the EU, these are simply not a negotiable commodity – regardless of who comes calling.</p>
<h2>Get used to less access</h2>
<p>If the UK is not willing to subscribe to that sort of far-reaching trade arrangement – or if the EU is simply not willing to offer it – then <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/alternatives-to-membership-possible-models-for-the-united-kingdom-outside-the-european-union">two options remain</a>. </p>
<p>Either we would seek to agree a narrower and shallower trade relationship with the EU (as have a host of other countries, such as Switzerland, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-canada-trade-model-and-could-it-work-for-a-post-brexit-uk-58098">Canada</a> and Mexico). Or we would instead and by default fall back upon the general standards for international trade set out under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation. </p>
<p>In either of those scenarios, our understanding of “market access” would have to be very considerably less ambitious than that which we have grown accustomed to as full members of the EU. In particular, significant parts of the UK economy – not least the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-brexit-would-affect-uk-financial-services-50426">financial services sector</a> – would have to adjust to a much less advantageous trade environment. Goods and services produced and provided in the UK would no longer enjoy automatic “passporting” rights into the single market. </p>
<p>The leave campaign have dismissed as “<a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/646412/Boris-Johnson-Brexit-scaremongering-Downing-Street-Project-Fear-David-Cameron-EU">scaremongering</a>” any and every attempt by defenders of UK membership to highlight the (economic and other) risks to this country of leaving the EU. Now that Vote Leave is finally starting to reveal its alternative vision for the future of the UK outside the EU, it is fast becoming clear that they have no credible case to offer. </p>
<p>Gove’s foolish and half-baked speech should act as a serious warning to anyone tempted to put their faith in Vote Leave: this is a campaign based not upon sound evidence or rational analysis, but rather upon the pursuit of an ideological fixation. “Project Fantasy” is a most fitting label.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Dougan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The single market is a complicated beast. It won’t be that easy for the UK to get the post-Brexit deal it wants.Michael Dougan, Professor of European Law and Jean Monnet Chair in EU Law, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.