tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/expropriation-41014/articlesExpropriation – The Conversation2022-06-08T13:58:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844752022-06-08T13:58:18Z2022-06-08T13:58:18ZThe Fourth Industrial Revolution: a seductive idea requiring critical engagement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467151/original/file-20220606-18-vw9r8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technological innovation can indeed be beneficial for the working class.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by JNS/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Narrative frames are fundamental to unifying ideologies. They frame what is possible and impossible, which ideas can be accepted and which must be rejected. In her book, <a href="https://www.perlego.com/book/1990637/digital-democracy-analogue-politics-how-the-internet-era-is-transforming-politics-in-kenya-pdf?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&campaignid=17287656381&adgroupid=134138494702&gclid=Cj0KCQjwnNyUBhCZARIsAI9AYlHhmee4nOr5YnvVZ2kTReK-wWuLVjoCzLrVSMUqsZt9v284egzcFvYaAhsvEALw_wcB">Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics</a>, storyteller and political analyst Nanjala Nyabola examines the framing of the Fourth Industrial Revolution narrative in this light. </p>
<p>She argues that it is being used by global elites to deflect from the drivers of inequality and enable ongoing processes of expropriation, exploitation and exclusion. During a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-iD8rIdbU">policy dialogue</a> on the Future of Work(ers) she commented:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The real seduction of this idea is that it’s apolitical. We can talk about development and progress, without having to grapple with power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Fourth Industrial Revolution’s chief ideologue is <a href="https://www.weforum.org/about/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-by-klaus-schwab">Karl Schwab</a>, chair of the World Economic Forum who published an influential book by the same name. In it he argues that digital innovations are transforming the ways in which people live, work and relate to one other. These include artificial intelligence and robotics, quantum cloud computing and block chain technology.</p>
<p>Compared to previous industrial revolutions, he maintains, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is evolving at an exponential pace, reorganising systems of production, management and governance in unprecedented ways.</p>
<p>But there is growing critique, particularly from the global South, of this capital-friendly framing of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Many are questioning whether it should be considered a revolution at all.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-fourth-industrial-revolution/">available evidence</a> suggests that the proliferation of digital technologies has been highly uneven, driven by an older generation of technological innovation, and used to reproduce rather than transform unequal social relations. </p>
<p>We share the view that there is nothing predetermined or linear about what digital technology is developed, how it is used, and for what end. The challenge is how to harness digital innovations to improve the conditions of work and life, while holding capital accountable. </p>
<h2>Arguments against</h2>
<p>Historian <a href="https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/1297">Ian Moll</a> questions whether the current myriad of digital technological innovations constitute an industrial revolution. After all, revolutions are not characterised by technological changes alone. Rather they’re driven by transformations in the labour process, fundamental changes in workplace relations, shifts in social relations and global socioeconomic restructuring. </p>
<p>The industrial revolution, for example, gave rise to factories that changed how people worked as well as where they lived. The centralisation of workplaces saw growing urbanisation, deepening class divides between the rich and the poor. It also saw the emergence of trade unions. </p>
<p>It is clear that digital technologies are reshaping the structure of the labour market and conditions of work. They are doing this through <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jlso/24/4/article-p525_525.xml">automation</a> and labour replacement, the informalisation or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2020.1773647">Uberization</a> of work, the imposition of <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jlso/24/4/article-p525_525.xml">algorithmic management</a> and commodification of data.</p>
<p>But they seem to be deepening rather than transforming historic patterns of inequality along the lines of class, gender, race, citizenship and geographic location. </p>
<p>As Nyabola put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Data is the new oil … data points which can be extracted for profit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite critiques, the <a href="https://au.int/fr/node/38163">African Union (AU)</a> has embraced the Fourth Industrial Revolution as a “watershed moment for Africa’s development”. The AU describes it as an opportunity to leapfrog into the digital era, increase global competitiveness and generate new sources of employment. </p>
<p>Scholar-activist Trevor Ngwane argues in the edited volume, <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-fourth-industrial-revolution/">the Fourth Industrial Revolution: a Sociological Critique</a>, that technological innovation can indeed be beneficial for the working class. It can reduce drudgery, improve working conditions and free up more time for people to engage in other meaningful activities. </p>
<p>The problem is that the fruits of technological innovation are being monopolised by a globalised capitalist class. Take the example of <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/lang--en/index.htm">digital labour platforms</a>. Financed primarily by venture capital funds in the global North, they have set up businesses in the global South without investing in assets, hiring employees or paying into state coffers. </p>
<p>This process is being buttressed by a framing that portrays the current terms of innovation as inevitable and thus uncontestable. </p>
<p>As Ngwane reflected during the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-iD8rIdbU">policy dialogue</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Who can question something which is moving along the laws of nature, of history, of technology?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Setting parameters</h2>
<p>For community practitioner <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/authors/tessadooms/#google_vignette">Tessa Dooms</a>, there <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-iD8rIdbU">are two potential roads</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We can allow capital to do what it wants. Or we can start imagining a world where we set the parameters for what tech should be.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Dooms agrees that the narrative of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is more aspiration than reality. But it’s precisely because it is aspirational that its terms can be shaped. What is the place of Africans in an increasingly digitised world? How are technologies affecting people’s lives, identities and access to opportunities? How can innovations advance a more just society, where people are freed up to do meaningful work? How can states use regulations and other means to ensure the benefits of technological innovation are more equally shared?</p>
<p><em>The Future of Work(ers) Research Group at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand is hosting <a href="https://wits-za.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_5UislRDVQPW1u4SdbBESHw">a six-part dialogue series</a>. The aim is to generate further debate on the relationship between digital technologies, the changing nature of work(ers) and the implications for inequality.</em></p>
<p><em>Seipati Mokhema, an Associate Researcher with the Future of Work(ers), contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184475/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The narrative of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is more aspiration than reality.Ruth Castel-Branco, Research Manager, University of the WitwatersrandHannah J. Dawson, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1654502021-08-03T15:22:42Z2021-08-03T15:22:42ZHow a land reform agency could break South Africa’s land redistribution deadlock<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414137/original/file-20210802-14-1a1o5qb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The distribution of agricultural land in South Africa remains deeply unequal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by David Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Columnists/CyrilRamaphosa/cyril-ramaphosa-land-reform-process-state-land-to-be-released-soon-to-black-farmers-20201005">conceded</a> that the country’s land reform programme is taking too long to address the challenge of land ownership inequality in South Africa. Bureaucratic delays, patronage and political influence, and opportunism among beneficiaries and landowners are among the challenges that have hindered South Africa’s land reform programme progress.</p>
<p>At the same time, the government’s farmer support programmes haven’t been agile and quick enough to provide the necessary support for beneficiaries.</p>
<p>In 1994 when South Africa became a democracy white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland out of the total surface area of 122 million hectares. The new government set a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">target of redistributing 30% of the 77 million hectares within the first five years in government</a>. This target has been consistently moved over the years, and now the aim is to reach 30% by 2030, in line with the National Development Plan’s <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">agriculture and land reform objectives</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/4653/wp_57_successful_farmland_redistribution_south_africa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Our estimates</a>, which include restitution, redistribution, private transactions and state procurement, suggest that 13.2 million hectares (or 17%) have already been transferred from white landowners to the state. An additional 3.08 million hectares have been transferred to black owners and 10.135 million hectares through private and state supported transactions including land restitution. </p>
<p>Adding 2.339 million hectares of land that was identified for restitution but for which communities elected to receive financial compensation as the means for restitution brings the total area of land rights that were restored since 1994 to 15.56 million hectares. This is equivalent to 20% of formerly white owned land. </p>
<p>We argue that things can happen much quicker if the arteries of land reform are unblocked.</p>
<p>One proposal is the creation of a Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency. Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address-11-feb-2021-0000">announced</a> the creation of such a body in his state of the nation address in February 2021.</p>
<p>Here, we outline how the proposed agency could accelerate land reform by removing the process from political and bureaucratic control. The state’s only role would be to create an enabling environment. The heavy lifting would be the task of landowners, agribusinesses and large corporates. Their job would be to facilitate equitable and sustainable land reform. </p>
<p>We believe that the model set out below, with the agency as proposed by the president as the starting point, would give South Africa another chance to get a meaningful land reform programme under way. </p>
<p>The model could be the vehicle through which farmland can be returned to the majority of South Africans, with two notable differences to previous efforts. Firstly, it would ensure that beneficiaries weren’t being set up to fail, as has been the case in the past. Secondly, commercial farmers, who benefited from the past injustices, would have an opportunity – in a non-politicised way and with little red tape – to contribute meaningfully to land reform.</p>
<h2>How it would work</h2>
<p>The agency would ideally bring about national coordination, reduce red tape, and become a one-stop shop for issues related to a decentralised redistribution of agricultural land. This would not require additional fiscal outlays. It would, instead, use existing sources of material and other forms of support from the commercial agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The agency idea was developed out of proposals on decentralising land reform first set out in South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a> released in 2012. The ideas in the plan were echoed in <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_0.pdf">a 2019 report</a> by the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture.</p>
<p>The central principle is to locate the responsibility of redistributive land reform with district-level land committees. These would design locally based solutions created on the dominant farming enterprises while considering an area’s community and social dynamics.</p>
<p>The agency would take the job of land acquisition and redistribution out of the government sphere and put the responsibility on the shoulders of those who have benefited from the previous regime. </p>
<p>At the district level, farmers, communities, agribusinesses and other private sector role players would craft local solutions within a framework managed by the agency.</p>
<p>Local District Land and Agricultural Development committees would be established within a particular area. They could comprise ten voting members (all bona fide farmers: five black and five white). This structure could then elect a chairperson and invite six other members (agribusinesses, banks, community and so on) to join. </p>
<p>The local committee would have to consult with all stakeholders in the area and register as a non-profit company with a memorandum of incorporation, a budget, and a board of directors. </p>
<p>The functions of the committee would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the listing of land, </p></li>
<li><p>the identification of potential beneficiaries in terms of objectively agreed criteria, </p></li>
<li><p>funding, training and support programmes, </p></li>
<li><p>monitoring of enterprises, and</p></li>
<li><p>liaison with government departments and the secretariat of the overarching national agency. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The mechanism would not require the state to provide funds for land acquisition since the land would be made available by farmers and transferred to beneficiaries without any funding flows. </p>
<p>What’s being proposed is a form of “self-expropriation without compensation” but on the terms of the existing land owner. This implies that there are no legal processes required to get land for free. It is done automatically by the current landowner and will transfer land to the beneficiary of their choice.</p>
<h2>Success factors</h2>
<p>A number of critical success factors would need to be in place before any transaction was set up. These would include: access to land, ownership or long-term lease, skills, access to markets for inputs and selling products, funding, the exit strategy, and a supportive environment.</p>
<p>Simply put, the new farm enterprise on redistributed land should immediately be linked to commercial value chains.</p>
<p>The district committee would be responsible for coordinating and facilitating implementation in line with the agreed principles. </p>
<p>The national agency would be established by the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform, and Rural Development and supervised by a board of 12 members who would meet quarterly. A small secretariat would have funding and administrative capabilities to liaise with the local committees.</p>
<p>Its main functions would be to create enabling policies and smooth out bureaucratic logjams, set up a land reform fund, prescribe rules for the local committees and record and monitor progress with land transactions.</p>
<h2>Nudges</h2>
<p>To nudge current landowners to make land donations we propose:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Exemption on donation tax for land or finance donated for land reform purposes.</p></li>
<li><p>Exemption on capital gains tax when land is transferred to a beneficiary or new entity.</p></li>
<li><p>Registration of title deeds and the important notarial links on the deed signalling the land reform status of the deed. The speedy transfer of title deeds and tradable long-term leases to beneficiaries, including those who occupy land already procured for land reform purposes, will go a long way to support the land reform process.</p></li>
<li><p>Exemption of transfer fees.</p></li>
<li><p>Some recognition mechanisms to upscale voluntary donations. This could be in the form of water rights and access to a land reform fund at beneficial interest rates. The awarding of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment scores could also be used. These were set up <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/29617s0.pdf">by government</a> to advance economic transformation and <a href="https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/fe87cd48/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment---basic-principles">increase the participation of black South Africans in the economy</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The empowerment recognition could also be provided to individuals or companies donating funds to a land reform fund.</p>
<p>What we are proposing is a way forward that avoids top-heavy, bureaucratic focused processes. The agency would largely operate virtually. It would only report on progress and make sure politicians weren’t hindering the redistribution of land. It would facilitate the process of redistribution of land by ensuring that incentives for donation and transfer of land were in place. </p>
<p>This would ensure limited opportunity for political rent-seeking, jobs for friends, and corruption.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz), and also a member of the South African President's Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agency could accelerate land reform by removing the process from political and bureaucratic control.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Visiting Research Fellow, Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1483792020-11-01T07:57:35Z2020-11-01T07:57:35ZSouth Africa has another go at an expropriation law. What it’s all about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366387/original/file-20201029-17-xy1661.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Sandi Sile on an abandoned structure in Makhanda, South Africa, in 2013. Questions remain about how the new law will treat abandoned land. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Africa officially became a constitutional democracy in South Africa on <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">4 February 1997</a> it heralded profound change in the way the country is governed. Once a racially oppressive pariah state, it became one based on freedom, human rights and the rule of law. </p>
<p>All laws that were not in keeping with the new constitution had to be changed to give effect to the rights enshrined in the new supreme law. One such law is the Expropriation Act, which governs how the government can acquire land owned by private citizens for public purposes such as building roads and railways. </p>
<p>The constitution changed the compensation standard from requiring the government to pay “market value” for such land to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321670076_What_is_just_and_equitable_compensation_for_land_reform">“just and equitable”</a> compensation. The requirement that expropriation be in the public interest (which includes a commitment to land reform and other reforms) was included. The requirement that a fair procedure be followed when expropriating was included in section 33 of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf">bill of rights</a>. </p>
<p>The constitution laid down a framework in which expropriation must happen, but did not provide the details of how. This is the role of legislation. Such legislation is necessary to bring the process in line with the constitution.</p>
<h2>Long, arduous process</h2>
<p>The first attempt at an Expropriation Bill was 12 years ago, in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjk_fL937jsAhWQx4UKHaT3As0QFjAAegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpmg.org.za%2Ffiles%2Fbills%2F080416b16-08.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2E61_FpIKOugF8btpYSAGm">2008</a>, but it was shelved because of the concern that it obscured the role of the courts in expropriation and would therefore be declared unconstitutional. </p>
<p>Another attempt was made in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjiw5Tn37jsAhWBqqQKHXj-A4wQFjAAegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.za%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fgcis_document%2F201409%2F36269gen234.pdf&usg=AOvVaw08hwxR5n2yTB8RbEdyd3gM">2013</a>. The 2013 bill was refined and became the 2015 bill, which made it onto the table of the president the same year, to be signed into law. But it was officially <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26932/">withdrawn</a> in 2018 because the process of amending section 25 of the constitution was still not completed. Communities living on land in terms of customary law also had <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-12-24-draft-expropriation-bill-a-disappointment-for-land-rights-organisation/">reservations</a> about its constitutionality, including the public participation process. </p>
<p>The country is having another attempt at passing an expropriation law that is in keeping with the constitution. The 2015 version, with slight amendments and the addition of clauses 12(3) dealing with “nil compensation”, was published again in December 2018.</p>
<p>This new bill, the <a href="https://www.dalrrd.gov.za/docs/media/2020%2010%2011%20JOINT%20STATEMENT%20BY%20IMC%20ON%20LAND%20REFORM%20EXPROPRIATION%20BILL.pdf">2020 Expropriation Bill</a>, was recently published in the government gazette. Importantly, this bill is not a result of the process to amend section 25 of the constitution to enable expropriation at nil compensation.</p>
<h2>Section 25 amendment</h2>
<p>Section 25 sets down the requirements that the state has to comply with if it wants to expropriate property: it must be done in terms of a law of general application; it must be for a public purpose or in the public interest; and lastly, “just and equitable” compensation must be paid. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/29530/">proposed section 25 amendment</a> makes it explicit that it might be “just and equitable” in some instances to pay nil compensation. But the state must still justify why not paying compensation is “just and equitable”. All other requirements must still be complied with. </p>
<p>Section 25 of the constitution provides the framework in which the 2020 Expropriation Bill will operate, once it becomes law. </p>
<h2>Why expropriation?</h2>
<p>Expropriation is a mechanism for the state to acquire property for public projects, such as the building of the railways, mass housing and roads. It is not only used in land reform instances, and is not only restricted to land.</p>
<p>Because expropriation is an administrative action by the government, the procedure must be just and give affected people an avenue for recourse in the case of abuse.</p>
<p>The 2020 Expropriation Bill sets out the procedure that the authorities must follow when expropriating property, how compensation must be calculated and paid, and where and when decisions can be challenged. </p>
<p>It includes a comprehensive mediation process, and guarantees access to the courts as the final form of oversight.</p>
<h2>Some contentious issues</h2>
<p>The bill has gone through consultative processes at the <a href="https://nedlac.org.za/">National Economic Development and Labour Council</a>, which facilitates consensus and cooperation between government, labour, business and the community in dealing with South Africa’s socio-economic challenges.</p>
<p>Still, there are a few unclear provisions that will most probably be focused on during the parliamentary public participation process. These are the definitions of “expropriation”, the provision for nil compensation and expropriating land from communities.</p>
<p><strong>Definition</strong></p>
<p>The definition of “expropriation” provides that an act will only be an expropriation if the state <em>acquires</em> the property. The concern is whether, if the property is expropriated for land reform purposes and transferred to a private beneficiary, it will be deemed an “acquisition by the state”. The bill obscures this a bit in clause 9(1)(a) where it seems to suggest that a private beneficiary can also “acquire” the property.</p>
<p>The legally correct route would be for the state to first acquire the property and then transfer it to the beneficiary. These actions can happen simultaneously in the Deeds Office and should not delay the transfer. The bill must reflect this.</p>
<p><strong>Nil compensation</strong></p>
<p>Clause 12(3) and (4) provides that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>it may be just and equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the public interest, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It then lists the instances where the state possibly foresees nil compensation to be applicable. The bill clarifies that this is, for example, land that is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>not being used and the owner’s main purpose is … to benefit from appreciation of market value. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This might still be vague, but it does give a more precise indication that it is not property earmarked for development.</p>
<p>Similarly, it’s not clear how “abandoned land” will be handled. Will this bear the technical legal meaning that the owner abandoned the land with the intention of no longer being owner? Or will it also include land that the owner left because it was no longer safe to stay on? </p>
<p><strong>Communities</strong></p>
<p>Owners of land earmarked for expropriation have specific time-frames in which they must respond. It seems as if the time-frames in the bill were written with a single owner of land in mind, and not for situations where whole communities living on land in terms of customary law are concerned. </p>
<h2>The next steps</h2>
<p>What is desperately needed in the land reform context for expropriation to be a useful tool is redistribution legislation that authorises the expropriation, and sets out what must happen after the state has acquired the land. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the bill will now go to the committee of the National Assembly that will hopefully start the public participation process. The bill will also have to go to the National Council of Provinces, the house of parliament that ensures that provincial interests are taken into account on the national level. </p>
<p>Considering all that, the bill will probably only be finalised some time next year, if all goes well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elmien du Plessis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The proposed new law has a long history. The country has been trying for almost 12 years now to come up with expropriation legislation that is in line with the constitution.Elmien du Plessis, Associate Professor of Law, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140922019-03-26T14:04:33Z2019-03-26T14:04:33ZLand reform in South Africa is doomed unless freed from political point-scoring<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265616/original/file-20190325-36264-15z7oq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Villagers till their fields in South Africa's North West Province. Access to land for small holder farmers remains unresolved.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Jon Hrusa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Black landlessness has become a convenient weapon for political populists in South Africa. With elections around the corner, the lingering questions about land reform are ever more crucial and timely. But, challenging questions need to be debated if a radical land reform programme is to be realised.</p>
<p>The pace of land reform has been slow since South Africa’s first democratic elections 25 years ago. Recent <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf">findings</a> confirm that the land reform programme has done very little to achieve equitable distribution and access to land for black South Africans. </p>
<p>By 2017 less than 10% (8.13 million ha) of agricultural land had been transferred through land reform. </p>
<p>The latest political wave of calls for land reform has resonance because millions of black South Africans remain landless and poor. This has led to the issue becoming a potent weapon in the hand of populist politicians. </p>
<p>All hopes for radical land reform have been placed on the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-approves-process-amend-section-25-constitution">amendment</a> of Section 25 of the Constitution to allow for expropriation without compensation. This drastic step could be seen as a strategy by the African National Congress (ANC) to take the wind out of the radical Economic Freedom Fighter’s political sails.</p>
<p>In fact the two parties are much more interested in attracting voters than in genuinely addressing longstanding racial inequalities. As a result many vital questions remain poorly explored. And most are lost in the political noise about land expropriation without compensation.</p>
<p>Some of these questions include: how should land for expropriation and redistribution be identified? Who should benefit from land redistribution in rural areas and which institutions should deliver?</p>
<h2>How should land be identified?</h2>
<p>Where should the country look for land for the accelerated redistribution programme? </p>
<p>Some argue that land redistribution should target tax-indebted farmland (or farms that are financially distressed). Others argue that state-owned land should be the primary target for <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">land redistribution</a>.</p>
<p>There’s also a strong argument made by some that the majority of landless people are more interested in relatively smaller pieces of land (0.1 - 1 ha) which they can use for <a href="https://trello.com/c/chLLIO56/2-assessing-the-performance-of-land-reform">household food production</a>. This land could be acquired closer to the large and small urban centres. </p>
<p>But for black commercial farmers to thrive, a distinction has to be made between black small-scale and large-scale farmers. And their different needs must be prioritised when <a href="https://trello.com/c/chLLIO56/2-assessing-the-performance-of-land-reform">land transfers</a> are being considered.</p>
<p>Others propose a more radical approach that promotes the division of large farms into smaller farms and a radical redistribution that will include decongestion of densely populated urban and <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">rural areas</a>. </p>
<p>Buying land from the current owners is just one of many means of land acquisition that could be pursued. Others include expropriation, donations, release of public land, reviews of unjust leases over public land and, in some instances, granting legal recognition to land occupiers where necessary. </p>
<h2>Who should benefit?</h2>
<p>Prof Michael Aliber, an agricultural economist at University of Fort Hare, argues for an approach to land redistribution that acknowledges the wide range of reasons people want land. This approach should cater for:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the relatively small number of people who want large plots on which to pursue large-scale commercial farming;</p></li>
<li><p>the larger number of people who want small-to-medium plots on which to farm as commercial smallholders, and</p></li>
<li><p>the still larger number of people who want small pieces of land for tenure security and food security. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>For most of the past 20 years, the land redistribution programme has sought to cater to only the first of these three groups.</p>
<p>Aliber argues that the overemphasis on large scale farms has significantly slowed the pace of land reform and led to the capture of the redistribution project by well-connected elites. Yet the primary beneficiaries of land reform should be landless black people and other historically marginalised groups. These include evicted farm workers and farm dwellers, unemployed urban and rural people, women and other rural people who live on communal land.</p>
<h2>Can the state still be trusted to deliver?</h2>
<p>There’s still a great deal of disagreement about which institutions should drive land reform. The poor performance by the ANC government in addressing the land issue, particularly its inadequate support for black land reform beneficiaries and farmers in communal areas over the past 25 years, has seriously depleted public confidence in the role of state in land reform.</p>
<p>For land reform to work, redistribution should focus beyond land transfer. It should begin to focus on providing adequate support for new farmers. Which institutions can deliver on this crucial undertaking? Is it the state, business, civil society or a collective effort? </p>
<p>Undoubtedly, the mounting scepticism about the capacity and political will of the state to deliver is warranted, given the failures of the ANC-led government. </p>
<p>This points to the fact that private sector support remains crucial in promoting commercial agriculture. But, then again, some are still sceptical about the private sector. For land rights activist <a href="http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/10_Advocate-of-the-New-Left.pdf">Mazibuko Jara</a>, the state and civil society <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">need to play a key role</a>.</p>
<p>A land debate left only to vote-hungry politicians is doomed. For politicians, black landlessness is nothing more than a political tool – hence the landless poor have been voting since 1994 but are still without land.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on debates at a <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">land reform conference</a> hosted by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (University of Western Cape (UWC)), University of Fort Hare and Rhodes University in February at UWC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sonwabile Mnwana receives funding from the Open Society Foundation-South Africa and the Southern Centre for Inequlaity Studies - Wits University. </span></em></p>Land reform programme has done very little to improve access to land for black South Africans.Sonwabile Mnwana, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Fort HareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010442018-08-03T11:06:55Z2018-08-03T11:06:55ZExplainer: what’s involved in changing South Africa’s Constitution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230553/original/file-20180803-41360-jd741k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A member of South Africa's Economic Freedom Fighters party with a copy of the Constitution.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his capacity as leader of the governing African National Congress (ANC), has <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/read-president-cyril-ramaphosas-full-speech-here-20180731">announced</a> that his party will spearhead an amendment to <a href="https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/on-the-right-to-property/">section 25 of the country’s Constitution</a> to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>outline more clearly the conditions under which expropriation of land without compensation can be effected.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He emphasised that the property clause in the Constitution already enables <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-national-assembly-adopts-motion-on-land-expropriation-without-compensation-20180227">expropriation of land</a> without compensation in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/read-president-cyril-ramaphosas-full-speech-here-20180731">public interest</a>. The proposed amendment would be aimed at putting this beyond any doubt. </p>
<p>But what is the process that would have to be followed for such an amendment to be passed?</p>
<p>Like all modern constitutions, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">South African Constitution</a> provides for its own amendment by Parliament and prescribes special procedures to effect them. The Constitution has already been <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">amended 17 times</a> since it came into force in 1996, following this prescribed procedure.</p>
<p>The procedure for amending the Constitution differs from the procedure to pass or amend ordinary legislation. It is more difficult to amend the Constitution than it is to pass or amend ordinary laws. This is because the Constitution is the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">supreme law</a> of the Republic. </p>
<p>Section 74(2) of the Constitution allows Parliament to amend any provision in the Bill of Rights – including section 25. But this cannot be done by a simple majority vote as would be the case for ordinary legislation. A Bill amending any provision of the Bill of Rights must be passed by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, and by the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six of the nine provincial delegations.</p>
<p>This means that at least 266 members of the national assembly must support the amendment. The additional requirement that six of the provincial delegations in the National Council of Provinces must support the Bill in effect means that the party – or parties – wishing to amend the Constitution must control at least six of the nine provincial legislatures. This is because provincial legislatures give each provincial delegation to the National Council of Provinces a mandate on how to vote on constitutional amendments.</p>
<h2>The process</h2>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/expropriation-without-compensation-an-unruly-horse-20180103">commentators</a> have argued that an amendment to section 25 of the Constitution would have to be supported by at least 75% of the members of the National Assembly. </p>
<p>But this is incorrect, and confuses two things. It’s true that the founding values in the Constitution – set out in section 1 – can only be amended with a supporting vote of 75% of the members of the Assembly. But, as long as an amendment doesn’t affect the values in section 1 (specifically the Rule of Law) by allowing the arbitrary expropriation of property, a 75% majority wouldn’t be required.</p>
<p>Apart from the increased majorities required to pass an amendment to section 25, the Constitution also prescribes other procedures that must be followed for an amendment.</p>
<p>A Bill amending the Constitution can’t include provisions other than constitutional amendments and matters connected with the amendments. This means a constitutional amendment may not be included in another Bill dealing with other matters to secure its passage. For example, a constitutional amendment can’t be attached to the budget in the hope that MPs will be forced to pass it in order to pass the budget.</p>
<p>The next step to effect an amendment of section 25 would be for the government to formulate the text of the Bill proposing the amendment. At least 30 days before such a Bill is introduced in Parliament, the government is required to publish in the national Government Gazette details about the proposed amendment for public comment. This would include the text of the amendment and the motivation for it.</p>
<p>At the same time these details must also be submitted to the provincial legislatures to get its views. Only after this 30 day period can the Bill be formally tabled in the National Assembly. When it’s introduced in the assembly, the government must also submit any written comments from the public and the provincial legislatures to the Speaker for tabling in the assembly. These must also be tabled to the chairperson of the National Council of Provinces.</p>
<h2>Public involvement</h2>
<p>Sections 59 and 72 also require the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the National Assembly and its committees. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2006/11.html">Constitutional Court held</a> that this imposed a duty on the assembly and the National Council of Provinces to act reasonably in ensuring the voices of ordinary people are heard before passing legislation. </p>
<p>The more important the Bill, and the greater the public interest, the more onerous the obligation to facilitate public involvement. The <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/house-rules">rules</a> of the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces already provide for this and will therefore have to be followed. </p>
<p>This process could take some time to conclude as it can be time consuming to ensure extensive public involvement in the process.</p>
<p>Section 74(7) also says that a Bill amending the Constitution may only be put to the vote in the National Assembly after at least 30 days have elapsed since its introduction, if the National Assembly is sitting when the Bill is introduced; or after at least 30 days after its tabling if the National Assembly is in recess when the Bill is introduced.</p>
<p>Once the Bill amending the Constitution has been through all these steps, it’s then referred to the President for signing into law.</p>
<h2>Legal challenge</h2>
<p>An important caveat is that an amendment to the Constitution passed in this way can’t be challenged on the basis that the amendment itself is unconstitutional. This was made clear by the Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/21">in 2002</a>, when it stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Amendments to the Constitution passed in accordance with the requirements of section 74 of the Constitution become part of the Constitution. Once part of the Constitution, they cannot be challenged on the grounds of inconsistency with other provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution, as amended, must be read as a whole and its provisions must be interpreted in harmony with one another. It follows that there is little if any scope for challenging the constitutionality of amendments that are passed in accordance with the prescribed procedures and majorities.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre de Vos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s constitution has been amended 17 times already. But, the procedure for doing so is onerous.Pierre de Vos, Claude Leon Foundation Chair in Constitutional Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/939582018-04-04T16:25:35Z2018-04-04T16:25:35ZWhy giving South Africa’s chiefs more power adds to land dispossession<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212153/original/file-20180327-109169-3onbmt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chief Nyalala Pilane of Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela has been accused of corruption regarding mining royalties.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Simphiwe Mbokaz</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Power over rural land has become more and more concentrated in the hands of local chiefs in <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/newsmigration/files/SWOP%20%20WP%20%20Bakgatla%20%20Mnwana%20and%20Capps.pdf">post-apartheid South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>This is particularly so in areas that are earmarked for mining. </p>
<p>I have spent more than a decade studying the multiple impacts of platinum mining on rural communities in the North West and Limpopo provinces. The <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/news-migration/files/SWOP%20%20WP%20%20Bakgatla%20%20Mnwana%20and%20Capps.pdf">research</a> has revealed widespread grassroots discontent, significant resistance to mining expansion and to local chiefs, and mounting exclusive group claims over the platinum-rich land. </p>
<p>This matters because mining affects the livelihoods of millions of South Africans. That South Africa holds unparalleled reserves of <a href="https://www.projectsiq.co.za/platinum-mining-in-south-africa.htm">platinum group metals reserves</a> is well known. </p>
<p>But platinum hasn’t been an economic saviour for the ordinary residents in the mine villages who face grim living conditions. Most are characterised by extreme poverty, severe inequalities and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X15000866">high unemployment</a>.</p>
<p>This is even though some of these communities have been recipients of substantial mining revenues. But these are controlled and distributed by local traditional authorities, known as chiefs, who have positioned themselves as custodians of rural land and mineral resources. They have done so in collusion with the state and mining companies.</p>
<p>This is not as it should be. Distributive power over land doesn’t rest exclusively with chiefs. There are multiple layers of power that rests in different social units, families (and individuals within them). Most importantly, chiefs have never had powers to alienate land rights from ordinary residents.</p>
<p>African land rights are acquired through membership to a group – a productive and social unit such as a <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1160760.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6b37ecef31c5703ee6705db597e074fb">family or clan</a>.</p>
<p>Once allocated, land rights were passed from one generation to the next. It is at the level of this unit that, by and large, decisions about distribution of such rights were taken in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1160760.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6b37ecef31c5703ee6705db597e074fb">precolonial times</a>.</p>
<h2>The law and chiefs</h2>
<p>The post-1994 African National Congress (ANC) government at first vacillated about defining and codifying the powers and status of chiefs. But it eventually passed legislation that significantly increased the powers of chiefs in rural local governance. </p>
<p>The main piece of legislation that did this was the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework <a href="http://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/TLGFA-Traditional-Leadership-and-Governance-Framework-Act-2003-Act-No-41-of-2003.pdf">Act of 2003</a>. It reenacts traditional (“tribal”) authorities to preside over precisely the same geographic areas that were defined by the apartheid government. But there’s ambiguity around what the powers the act actually gives chiefs. It has been interpreted as giving them and their traditional councils powers over the administration and control of communal land and natural resources, economic development, health, and welfare, and to <a href="https://journals.assaf.org.za/sacq/article/view/1204">administer justice</a>.</p>
<p>In fact the law doesn’t directly grant chiefs power and control over communal land and landed resources. But it’s been interpreted that way. </p>
<p>The case of the chiefs’ control over mining revenues on the platinum belt epitomises the contradiction.</p>
<h2>Chiefs gain the upper hand</h2>
<p>Over the last 30 years a new trend began to evolve. Local chiefs began to enter into deals with mining companies on behalf of rural communities on the platinum belt. Chiefs, as assumed custodians of communal resources, became mediators of mineral-led development and mining deals.</p>
<p>This trend can be traced back to the <a href="http://www.bafokeng.com/past/story">Bafokeng</a> community’s momentous court victory over <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/bafokeng-africas-richest-ethnic-group/2/">mining royalties</a> in the 1999. The Bafokeng chieftaincy secured enormous mineral royalties – ostensibly on behalf of the entire community. </p>
<p>Such a victory ushered this rural community, which some have labelled <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305707032000060598">“the richest tribe in Africa”</a>, into a new era of platinum revenues and corporate assets worth billions of rand. </p>
<p>Several rural communities on platinum rich land in the North West and Limpopo provinces have followed the Bafokeng example.</p>
<p>But these developments haven’t been without problems. The mediation and control of mining revenues by local chiefs has generated significant tensions and conflict in the villages that host vast mining operations. </p>
<p>Lack of transparency and accountability, plus <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-01-stealing-the-crust-how-the-baktatla-ba-kgafela-were-robbed-of-their-inheritance/#.WrSPaHVOLIU">serious allegations of corruption</a> have been levelled against chiefs. For instance, Kgosi (chief) Nyalala Pilane of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community – perhaps even more than any other chief in South Africa – has been the subject of a litany of maladministration and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-01-stealing-the-crust-how-the-baktatla-ba-kgafela-were-robbed-of-their-inheritance/#.WrSPaHVOLIU">corruption allegations</a>. </p>
<p>The combined value of the assets of the largely SeTswana-speaking Bakgatla community, who reside in 32 impoverished villages scattered all over the north eastern foothills of the Pilanesburg Mountains, are estimated at <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-01-stealing-the-crust-how-the-baktatla-ba-kgafela-were-robbed-of-their-inheritance/#.WrkKuy5ubIU">R25 billion </a>. Yet the members of the community have yet to realise the benefits.</p>
<p>Mining expansion has also produced significant resistance to Kgosi Pilane’s control over land. Groups of villagers have made strong claims over some of the mineral rich farms, where some of the largest mining operations are situated. They assert that these farms were bought by their forefathers as private property and so never should have been designated <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/news-migration/files/SWOP%20%20WP%20%20Bakgatla%20%20Mnwana%20and%20Capps.pdf">“tribal” land</a>. </p>
<p>Many of these land disputes have been fought in the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2015/25.html">courts</a>. So far, the chief has been able to hire top lawyers. He has successfully interdicted and pressed charges against activists who have called him to account.</p>
<h2>Resistance</h2>
<p>The assumption that chiefs are custodians of rural land and mineral wealth – and as such can distribute and alienate land rights and sign complex mining deals on behalf of rural residents – has no precolonial precedent. It’s no surprise that ordinary people are resisting chiefly power over their property. </p>
<p>It’s even more crucial to closely examine and understand the character of power over land and landed resources as rural land increasingly becomes a target for large scale resource extraction. What needs attention is how ordinary rural residents articulate what leading land academic Ben Cousins calls the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00147.x">“socially legitimate”</a> and historical <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1160760.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:89d030e2faa25%E2%80%8Bhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1160760.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:89d030e2faa25e132d6b673c005b6d2de132d6b673c005b6d2d">“processes through which power over land is conferred”</a> to different groups and individuals. </p>
<p>There is an urgent need to examine how Africans historically accessed, shared, controlled, distributed and defended their rights to land. These customary processes must be used to guide the recording of land rights, consultation and compensation before mining can begin. </p>
<p>Any attempt to legally empower the rural poor by securing their land rights should begin with a full understanding of these processes. Centralising this power in the hands of chiefs is another form of dispossession.</p>
<p><em>This article is <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/topics/africa-land-reform-38700">part of a series</a> on land reform in Africa.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sonwabile Mnwana receives funding from the Open Society Foundation, South Africa and the Ford Foundation. He is affiliated with the Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the Witwatersrand. </span></em></p>Some communities on South Africa’s Platinum Belt have received substantial mining revenues, but these are controlled by chiefs.Sonwabile Mnwana, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Fort HareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937972018-03-27T13:09:01Z2018-03-27T13:09:01ZRamaphosa has started the clean up job. But can he turn the state around?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211567/original/file-20180322-54875-kjykfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is on a mission to rebuild a battered party and state. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s new President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is presently receiving numerous <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2018-03-03-ramaphosas-cabinet-clean-up-shows-promising-signs-of-what-lies-ahead/">plaudits</a> on how he’s handling the transition from the troubled Jacob Zuma presidency.</p>
<p>Zuma’s generals have been scattered, his underlings fleeing the battlefield. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, against whom Ramaphosa fought for the leadership and under whose wing Zuma thought he would be able to shelter had she won, has been brought into the <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/cyril-ramaphosas-new-cabinet-a-balancing-game-with-key-victories/">cabinet</a> and safely neutralised.</p>
<p>The ousting of Zuma has also had a dramatic impact on the major opposition parties. Both the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have been deprived of their strongest electoral attraction. </p>
<p>The DA is now in a state of major disarray, attempting to resolve its various internal squabbles. For the moment at least – it seems to be heading towards a bloody nose at the 2019 election. </p>
<p>The EFF has played the brief post-Zuma moment more skillfully, most notably by getting the ANC to back its motion in parliament, albeit with amendments, in favour of expropriation of land without compensation. But Ramaphosa has responded in kind by subtly extending an invitation to the EFF to rejoin the ANC, a ploy which will continually compel it to justify its continuing existence, especially if the ruling party continues to steal its policy clothes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ramaphosa continues to bask in the admiration of whites and seems likely to bring disaffected elements of the black middle class back into the ANC. He has brought back hopes of better days for a previously despondent South Africa. </p>
<p>He is master of all the surveys, Mr Action and Mr Clean. </p>
<p>Yet the new president is no fool. He knows that his major challenge, after the depradations of the Zuma years, is to work towards making what he termed in his inauguration speech, a “<a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-16-in-full--read-cyril-ramaphosas-first-state-of-the-nation-address/">capable state</a>”. This revolves around addressing challenges of governance, the party as well as the economy.</p>
<h2>Low hanging fruit</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa has had little option but to first turn to addressing immediate problems within the state. The early steps have been relatively easy. The most straight forward task has been to shuffle the cabinet. By doing so he was able to expel or marginalise ministers known for their loyalty to Zuma or their incompetence, while bringing in replacements of known ability and integrity. </p>
<p>He has also moved swiftly to address crises at major parastatals, notably at the power utility Eskom and South African Airways to prevent them defaulting on their loans to banks and other creditors. With new boards now in place, emergency measures have been taken to prevent financial meltdown. </p>
<p>Likewise, Ramaphosa has given notice that he is determined to restore the South African Revenue Service to its former glory. Getting rid of the top brass, notwithstanding the resistance of Zuma’s point man, the commissioner Tom Moyane, should not be too difficult. But, as within the parastatals, it is the problem of what to do with Zuma cronies at lower levels of management that is likely to be more difficult and more time consuming. </p>
<p>Zuma cronies who have been embedded in state organisations for a long time will have set up procurement linkages that will need to be examined closely. This will provoke resistance, some of it overt, much of it covert, for whatever the cronyistic patterns of procurement, they will have been celebrated as black empowerment. Their disruption will be stigmatised as reactionary. Pravin Gordhan, the new minister of state owned enterprises, will probably have to get tough, and the fights could get nasty. </p>
<h2>ANC politics</h2>
<p>The other set of challenges which Ramaphosa faces have to do with his party, the ANC. His narrow victory at the party’s national conference was only secured because he did a deal with David Mabuza, then Premier of Mpumalanga, now promoted to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/who-is-our-new-deputy-president-elect-david-mabuza-20180226">deputy president</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa will, in time, find that this kind of backing was instrumental. Loyalty will come at a price, and Ramaphosa will have to play his cards carefully. </p>
<p>He may have to make alliances with a lot of party power holders he doesn’t like. This may include ceding control of certain provinces to party barons so that their patronage patterns are left intact. </p>
<p>This is a problem because, as Ramaphosa knows, some provincial governments, such as the Eastern Cape, are grossly inefficient. They are staffed by people who simply lack the capacity to do their jobs – but who have strong connections with local party bosses. Disrupting such networks will take determination and courage, and will meet politically costly pushback. Expect little to be done this side of an election.</p>
<h2>The economy</h2>
<p>Perhaps Ramaphosa’s most formidable challenge is how to kick start economic growth. He has been lauded as the man who, with experience in both the trade union movement and in business, can bring labour and capital together around a new consensus. </p>
<p>It’s a nice idea, and one boosted by Ramaphosa’s smooth talk of convening a summit around the economy. But if it is going to be more than just another talk shop, he is going to have to do an awful lot of arm twisting. Both sides are going to have make concessions. </p>
<p>South Africa’s major corporations have been sitting pretty for years. Despite the horrors of the Zuma years, the stock market has <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/2017/07/31/south-africas-stock-market-defies-recession-scales-record-highs/">boomed</a>. The country became a low investment, high profit economy, characterised by the power of huge <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-badly-skewed-to-the-big-guys-how-it-can-be-changed-92365">cartels</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has to convince them that they have to get out of the comfort zone, warning that if they don’t, levels of inequality and unemployment are such that South Africa may explode. Capitalism is going to hit big trouble if they don’t look beyond the short-term bottom line and commit to serious levels of investment, combining this with major commitments to labour-intensive employment and training. </p>
<p>The president is also going to have the difficult job of convincing the unions that they have a greater responsibility to address unemployment. To date their emphasis has been on securing higher wages for their members (that’s what unions do) and they have succeeded in getting the government to implement a minimum wage. </p>
<p>But these wins have come at a cost. For example, central bargaining has resulted in wage agreements with big firms that have imposed massive costs on small and medium sized businesses. </p>
<p>While no one wants a low wage economy, Ramaphosa would need to convince the unions that something has to give if problems like this are going to be addressed.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s easiest task will be to win the next election. But history will judge him on his ability to do something much bigger: rendering the South Africa state one that is not only capable, but genuinely developmental.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has done well so far but more challenges relating to reigniting the economy lie ahead.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/928622018-03-05T13:52:06Z2018-03-05T13:52:06ZLand debate in South Africa is about dignity and equality - not the constitution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208894/original/file-20180305-65507-nl8b14.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Angry protests for free higher education by South African students forced the country to search for a solution.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you want economic change in South Africa, create a crisis – then stand by to negotiate a way out of it. </p>
<p>The country’s current <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-27-national-assembly-adopts-eff-motion-on-land-expropriation/">debate</a> over land expropriation without compensation, which has now been endorsed by Parliament, is important. Not because, as some fear, it will radically change the constitution. Rather, it tells South Africans how, in the economy and other spheres, the country deals with its minority ruled past: by crisis followed by compromise.</p>
<p>Crises are the only way change happens because, since the 1970s, the goal of the minority which has called the shots in the society for decades has been to ensure that changes alter as little as possible. Which, of course, means clinging to many of the inequalities which existed before all adults were allowed to vote in 1994.</p>
<p>So most businesses – and professional practices and places of learning - do not change until a crisis forces them to look again at what they need to give up to keep things as much the same as possible. Because this means keeping black demands for change at arm’s length, the crises always happen when black people get angry with current arrangements and make demands which force a reaction.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/transition-democracy-timeline-1984-1994">negotiations</a> which produced the 1994 constitution began because the costs of black anger at apartheid were growing. They followed reforms to labour law, which were triggered when angry <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-africa-1970s">strikers in Durban</a> demanded pay increases in 1973, and the end of curbs which kept black people out of the cities, a reaction to the anger of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising">1976 Soweto protests</a> and the refusal of angry migrant workers in the same year to live in single-sex hostels.</p>
<p>Recently, it took angry protests on campuses to trigger discussions at universities on how <a href="https://theconversation.com/feesmustfall-the-poster-child-for-new-forms-of-struggle-in-south-africa-68773">to change to</a> meet the needs of black students. Race is debated seriously only when black people get angry over racial prejudices in advertising or company behaviour or on social media.</p>
<p>The crises always end in compromises because none of the country’s key interests can impose what they want on the others without severely hurting themselves. This is particularly so in the economy: forcing change on the owners of capital will kill investment and growth – ignoring demands for reform will trigger costly resistance.</p>
<h2>The land debate’s message</h2>
<p>The land debate illustrates the point.</p>
<p>Moves to change the constitution are dramatic because they threaten the property rights on which the market economy rests. They are, therefore, the most significant expression of black anger at the survival of pre-1994 inequalities since South Africa became a democracy. </p>
<p>Inevitably, they have prompted a crisis: a public debate which has been fixated on former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-era-lessons-how-democracies-can-be-held-hostage-by-party-machinations-91924">Jacob Zuma</a> is now discussing economic divides. The debate is polarised and heated – but among middle class black people, support for the change seems overwhelming.</p>
<p>Outsiders might be surprised that tensions caused by economic inequalities focus on land – farming has not been South Africa’s key industry for decades. The reason it triggers such heat is that for South Africans, “land” is a symbol of far more than an expanse of soil. For most people, it has nothing to do with agriculture at all. </p>
<p>Historically, the demand by black freedom movements for the return of the land meant the return of the country to its people – it was directed not only at ownership of farms but at minority control of the economy and society . This is why expropriation without compensation has become a rallying cry for many who have no interest in farming but who feel that a quarter century of democracy has not ended <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-people-in-south-africa-still-hold-the-lions-share-of-all-forms-of-capital-75510">white privilege</a>. It symbolises a much broader demand for change.</p>
<p>It is also why no-one has paid much attention to arguments about the technical merits of land expropriation and why there is such support for a constitutional change despite the fact that there is no need for it because expropriation without compensation is <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/land-expropriation-without-compensation-what-does-it-mean-20180304-5">possible</a> now. </p>
<p>Property rights are protected by Section 25 of the constitution which stipulates that compensation must be paid. But it also says that this may not be used to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, if the government can show that expropriation redresses race discrimination, it need not pay compensation. </p>
<p>But this has been ignored because the dispute is about dignity and equality, not constitutional clauses.</p>
<h2>Compromises will be made</h2>
<p>Like all South African crises, this one will end in a compromise – its details have been discussed by lawyers and reported by newspapers. It seems likely that Section 25 will be changed to allow for expropriation without compensation. But the clause will specify very clearly that this can only happen in very particular circumstances, which it will carefully define. </p>
<p>If it does this, property rights will be protected because owners will know that they are entitled to compensation unless they act in a way which forfeits their right. It seems likely that investors will not have to do much to retain the right to compensation.</p>
<p>On the surface, this, like all good compromises, will solve the problem by giving both sides some of what they want. Land owners who hold the state to ransom will risk losing compensation; property rights will be protected, making investment safe. But, if that is all that happens, an opportunity will be missed.</p>
<p>The pattern described here – in which the country’s elites are very good at compromising in the face of crisis but just as good at creating the crises which force them to compromise – is hardly the ideal way to build a fairer economy and society. </p>
<h2>Past wrongs need to be addressed</h2>
<p>Crisis drives change because elites have avoided negotiating economic reforms which will redress past wrongs while protecting the assets of investors who play by the rules. This forces black people to get angry if they want to be heard and will create new crises if it is not addressed now. </p>
<p>Since the dispute is really about the economy, the solution lies in negotiating the economic changes which cause the anger in the first place.</p>
<p>The dispute’s importance depends not whether it produces a compromise on land but on whether it begins negotiations on opening the economy to the excluded. This alone will reduce the anger which makes crisis the only mode of change and ensure a less dramatic but more lasting way of addressing economic challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Land expropriation without compensation in South Africa will be resolved by opening up the economy and addressing inequalities.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/898012018-01-09T18:24:15Z2018-01-09T18:24:15ZIs South Africa’s ANC bent on radical policies? Here’s why the answer is no<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201164/original/file-20180108-83571-dbc7aq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates attending the 54th National Conference of the ruling African National Congress in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When media cover a political party conference decision, it is best to report on the entire resolution, not just the exciting bits. This may reduce the audience but will improve accuracy.</p>
<p>The point seems to have been forgotten in reporting on a resolution on land expropriation passed at the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">December conference</a> of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress. </p>
<p>Media announced that the party endorsed changing the constitution to allow the government to expropriate land without compensation. This, with a resolution calling for the “<a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-12-21-anc-tells-state-to-nationalise-reserve-bank/">nationalisation</a>” of the South African Reserve Bank, and one urging the government to speedily implement an announcement by President Jacob Zuma that children of poor families would receive <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/zumas-freeeducation-announcement-an-11th-hour-master-stroke-12631040">free higher education</a>, were widely quoted as evidence that the ANC had embraced economic radicalism.</p>
<p>But a closer look at the details of land resolution and the context of the other two shows that the most radical decision adopted by the conference were not these but one that has been largely ignored – a proposal which would give greater <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-20-anc-resolves-to-take-away-rural-land-custodianship-from-chiefs/">power over land</a> to rural people, not traditional leaders.</p>
<h2>Caveats on land expropriation</h2>
<p>Reporting on the land expropriation decision mentions only half the resolution. The ANC has endorsed the change, but, according to the chair of its economic transformation committee, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-21-ancdecides2017-land-expropriation-without-compensation-makes-grand-entrance/">Enoch Godongwana</a>, only if two conditions are met. It must not threaten food security or impact on the rest of the economy.</p>
<p>This almost certainly means that the resolution means the opposite of what is reported– in effect, it rejected changing the constitution to allow expropriation without compensation.</p>
<p>Whether changing the constitution would damage food security is a matter of opinion. But, since there is no shortage of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/12/22/agrisa-anc-s-land-expropriation-decision-economic-suicide">voices</a> insisting that it would, the condition provides a handy escape hatch for a government which does not want to make the change.</p>
<p>The second condition is the clincher. It is impossible to allow for land expropriation without compensation without affecting the rest of the economy. A measure which alters property rights in one sector sends a message that others may be due for the same fate. Even if only some investors came to this conclusion – and the chances are that just about all will – the economy will be affected. So, to say the change will only be introduced if the economy is unaffected is to say it won’t happen.</p>
<p>Political realities explain why the resolution was phrased in this way. One ANC faction wanted the constitutional change, the other did not. But the sceptics knew of widespread anger inside the ANC (and outside it) at the slow pace of land reform. Insisting that there was no need for a change would not have been credible – it would mean being seen to agree that whites should hold on to most productive land.</p>
<p>The only way out for the opponents was to agree on the principle but to hedge it with conditions which can’t be seen to endorse white privilege. The fact that they succeeded in including the conditions suggests that they are strong enough to prevent the change.</p>
<h2>Reserve Bank changes unlikely any time soon</h2>
<p>Similar realities shaped the decision to endorse “nationalising” the central bank. This would not affect its mandate or independence. It would simply end a quirk – that South Africa’s central bank is owned by private shareholders. The change would be entirely symbolic. </p>
<p>In a climate in which there is widespread unhappiness with continued black economic exclusion, agreeing to a change which would change nothing was an obvious response. This is particularly so since the change is unlikely any time soon. </p>
<p>In private discussions, ANC economic policymakers note that the money needed to buy out the private shareholders of the South African Reserve Bank is not available. And so this may be one of many governing party resolutions – in all democracies – which are never implemented because they pose practical difficulties.</p>
<h2>Free higher education</h2>
<p>The tertiary education change may be implemented, at least for a year. It has proved hugely controversial and may create <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-12-28-where-will-zuma-get-the-money-to-fund-free-education-asks-sacp/">headaches</a> for universities and colleges because it has not been carefully costed and planned. But it is no change to ANC or government policy.</p>
<p>Zuma’s announcement is repeatedly described as an agreement to free higher education but it isn’t. It doesn’t apply to all students – only to those who are “poor and working class” - anyone whose household income is below R350 000 a year.</p>
<p>That students who cannot afford higher education should not pay for it is already government and ANC policy, which is why the conference did not see a need to endorse the announcement – it simply urged that it be implemented quickly. It is also accepted by just about everyone concerned about fairness in education. It is very different to the demand that all higher education be free since those who can afford to pay will still be charged fees. </p>
<p>It is not clear whether practicalities will allow Zuma’s announcement to be implemented in full. But, even if it is, this is no shift to the left.</p>
<p>So the ANC has not emerged from the conference as a more “radical” party. Its economic policy resolutions remain within the framework which has governed its thinking for years. </p>
<p>This does not mean it will leave the economy untouched: there is agreement across the factions that change which includes more people is essential. But it does mean that change will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-bargaining-not-another-magic-plan-will-get-south-africas-economy-growing-82471">negotiated</a> and will respect perceived realities in the marketplace.</p>
<h2>A real radical resolution</h2>
<p>What of the change virtually no-one noticed? Media coverage and debate remains dominated by the middle class and so the concerns of people at the grassroots are almost always ignored. This explains why a proposed change that would limit the power of traditional leaders over land passed largely unnoticed.</p>
<p>According to an ANC briefing at the conference, it decided that <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-20-anc-resolves-to-take-away-rural-land-custodianship-from-chiefs/">control over land</a> should rest with communities, not chiefs. In principle, this should enable rural people to stop traditional leaders using land for their own purposes at their expense, which has brought “<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-in-rural-areas-are-saying-no-more-why-it-matters-87028">state capture</a>"to the countryside and has triggered conflict.</p>
<p>The resolution may prove hard to implement because it may be difficult for rural people to hold traditional leaders to account. And, like all conference resolutions, it may never become law because traditional leaders may lobby against it.</p>
<p>But, if it did become law, it may make far more difference to far more people than the "radical” resolutions which have hogged print and broadcast headlines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89801/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A closer look at the resolution of South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC, show that it won’t undertake a radical economic transformation agenda as suggested by media reports.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/808412017-07-25T15:14:00Z2017-07-25T15:14:00ZA 10-point plan to accelerate orderly land reform in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179156/original/file-20170721-14731-14fz5gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Land reform remains a divisive subject 23 years after democracy in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A more than 365 year history of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa">colonialism</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> have indelibly affected land, heritage and human rights in South Africa. </p>
<p>Among the vast array of discriminatory laws was the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/natives-land-act-1913">Land Act of 1913</a> that spatially segregated people through land dispossession. It amplified the vast canyon of inequality, further shattered the social fabric of <a href="http://www.saha.org.za/billofrights/property.htm">communities</a> and radically compromised economic development of the black majority.</p>
<p>It was only after the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">1994 democratic elections</a> that the vast majority of citizens could hope for constitutional restitution of their land.</p>
<p>Significant socio-economic advances have been made <a href="https://www.idc.co.za/reports/IDC%20R&I%20publication%20-%20Overview%20of%20key%20trends%20in%20SA%20economy%20since%201994.pdf">since 1994</a>, but several challenges need to be overcome as indicated by <a href="https://www.idc.co.za/images/2017/IDC_RI_publication_Key-trends-in-SA-economy_31-March-2017.pdf">recent trends</a>. Much more needs to be done. This is particularly true when it comes to land distribution and restitution. </p>
<p>The 2013 state <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Cadastral-Survey-management/Booklet/land%20audit%20booklet.pdf">land audit report</a> illustrates why. By 1994 about 87% of the land was owned by whites and only 13% by black people. By 2012 only 7.95 million hectares had been transferred to black owners through land reform. This represented only 7.5% of <a href="http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/No1%20Fact%20check%20web.pdf">formerly white-owned land</a>. </p>
<p>Land reform was discussed with understandable intensity during the recent <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">National Policy Conference</a> of the governing African National Congress. Debates centred on whether land should be <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/more-drama-at-anc-policy-conference-over-land-20170705">expropriated without compensation</a>. </p>
<p>It’s within this context that a <a href="http://nationalforum.nmmu.ac.za/">National Forum</a> was established for dialogues on land reform. The National Forum is made up of a network of organisations that includes three universities, the <a href="https://www.sahrc.org.za/">South African Human Rights Commission</a> and <a href="https://www.fhr.org.za/">Foundation for Human Rights</a>. </p>
<p>The National Forum focused on whether it was possible to achieve effective land reform through <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#25">Section 25 of the South African Constitution</a>, which deals with property rights. The National Forum also examined the bureaucratic, legal and constitutional constraints that slow down land redistribution and restitution. It also explored the policy and legislative options necessary to address the complex challenges.</p>
<p>The National Forum concluded that South Africa’s constitution doesn’t stand in the way of land reform. However, it’s clear that <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-problems-lie-in-political-negligence-not-its-constitution-80474">political negligence</a> has fuelled undue bureaucracy, mismanagement and corruption, which have severely hampered meaningful land reform. It reached consensus on a 10-point plan for constitutionally accelerated land reform. The hope is that it can help break the long-standing impasse over land, and move the country toward radically inclusive socio-economic growth. </p>
<h2>Accelerating land reform</h2>
<p>Aspects of the 10-point plan include:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>A human rights approach to land redistribution, grounded in the effective implementation of Section 25 of the Constitution. This could still guarantee a life of dignity, equality and freedom for all citizens. </p></li>
<li><p>Existing land reform legislation is not effectively implemented. The <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/339-land-claim/685-re-opening-of-land-claims#.WW-Xr01f34g">Land Claims Commission</a> and <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/">Land Claims Court</a>, which were created through the<a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/docs/1994-022.pdf"> Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994)</a>, have not been effective. Unnecessary bureaucratic bungling, significant corruption and limited expert skills have been exacerbated by cadre deployment. This is the practice of appointing party political loyalists to government positions irrespective of ability. In addition, these institutions have yet to be made more accessible and more representative.</p></li>
<li><p>The possibility of adopting further laws to accelerate land reform is not being used. This is the case even though Section 25(8) of the Constitution specifically indicates that it can be done.</p></li>
<li><p>The possibility of repealing existing legislation that’s inconsistent with or hampering land reform is not being pursued. This should be rectified.</p></li>
<li><p>There is a need for national legislation on expropriation. A bill is before Parliament – the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/b4-2015_150213_edited.pdf">Expropriation Bill</a> – but it’s been introduced late and processed without urgency. The possibility of effecting appropriate amendments to the <a href="http://www.did.gpg.gov.za/Acts/saf9927.pdf">1975 Expropriation Act</a> should also be considered. </p></li>
<li><p>There should be improved communication and coordination between various government departments. Currently, the location of relevant land reform mandates and competencies are spread across several departments. These should be aligned to accelerate the pace of the process.</p></li>
<li><p>A draft bill on cultural and spiritual access to land must be developed to enable citizens’ access to cemeteries and related holy sites where their family members are buried. </p></li>
<li><p>The courts should pronounce on the meaning of “just and equitable” compensation in Section 25 of the Constitution, to provide for better definition and interpretation of this provision within the context of land reform.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/downloads/Factsheet_CPAs_Final_Feb2015.pdf">Communal Property Associations</a>, community and traditional leader tensions must be resolved through meaningful engagement. Communication channels must be open, all role-players included and all relevant information made available to every stakeholder. Furthermore, all affected parties must be able to influence the decisions taken. In addition, skills training for officials dealing with land restitution is necessary, whilst an updated land audit is required. </p></li>
<li><p>There is need for a Land and Economy Convention, similar to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">(CODESA)</a>. This was held to negotiate the country’s peaceful transition to democracy. A role for the new convention would be to address poverty, inequality and unemployment. The aim would be to restore citizens’ dignity, strengthen the economy and advance democracy.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>The National Forum envisions the 10-point plan being effected within the context of the country’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf">National Development Plan’s Vision 2030</a>. The plan was drawn up to provide a roadmap for the country to 2030. Its central aims are to reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality. </p>
<p>If land reform is realised, South Africa could present a more humane, just, peaceful, prosperous and democratic face to the world.</p>
<p><em>Key dialogue leaders at the National Forum were:
Retired Justice <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/judge-albert-louis-albie-sachs">Albie Sachs</a>, <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/president-zuma-appoints-prof-bongani-majola-chairperson-of-human-rights-commission/">Professor Bongani Majola</a>, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/mathole-serofo-motshekga/">Professor Mathole Motshekga</a>, <a href="http://advocatesgroup21.co.za/staff/la-makua-leks/">Advocate Leks Makua</a>, <a href="http://www.derebus.org.za/retirement-ceremony-of-justice-johann-van-der-westhuizen/">Retired Justice Johan van der Westhuizen</a>, <a href="https://eiuc.org/education/global-campus-regional-masters/university-of-pretoria/programme-director.html">Professor Frans Viljoen</a>, <a href="https://za.linkedin.com/in/victor-mavhidula-544236b6">Victor Mavhidula</a>, <a href="https://za.linkedin.com/in/makgatho-motshekga-35689910a">Makgatho Motshekga</a>, <a href="http://democracyworks.org.za/who-we-are/our-people/associates">Koogan Pillay</a>, <a href="http://saintzadvertising.wixsite.com/hkkinc/elson-kgaka">Elson Kgaga</a> and <a href="https://www.fhr.org.za/index.php/about/staff/">Advocate Hanif Vally</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The South African Human Rights Commission and Foundation for Human Rights have provided support for the National Forum Dialogues. </span></em></p>After South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, the previously oppressed and dispossessed black majority hoped for constitutional restitution of their land. This has largely failed.Quinton Johnson, Campus Principal: Strategic Leadership and Management, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.