tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/felix-tshisekedi-58087/articlesFélix Tshisekedi – The Conversation2023-12-06T13:44:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170182023-12-06T13:44:46Z2023-12-06T13:44:46ZDRC elections: three factors that have shaped Tshisekedi’s bumpy first term as president<p>Africa’s second-largest country by land mass, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/27/dr-congos-president-felix-tshisekedi-to-seek-re-election/">scheduled to go to the polls on 20 December 2023</a>. President Felix Tshisekedi will be seeking re-election. However, his first tenure has been decidedly mixed. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s first term has been defined by three major factors: questions over the legitimacy of his 2019 election victory, violence in eastern DRC and the state of the country’s economy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.qmul.ac.uk/history/people//academic-staff/profiles/loffmanreuben.html">researched extensively and taught</a> on contemporary Congolese politics for 15 years. In my view, while Tshisekedi has had some successes, including the DRC’s joining of the East African Community and a modest upturn in economic growth since the pandemic, much work remains to improve the lives of Congolese citizens.</p>
<h2>Legitimacy questions haunt the presidency</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi has been president since January 2019 after an election that one of his then opponents, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/drc-opposition-candidate-threatens-to-boycott-december-vote">Martin Fayulu</a>, claimed was stolen. These claims were supported by a <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/who-really-won-the-congolese-elections/">Congo Research Group</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">Financial Times</a> analysis of voting data that found Fayulu had won the election. The courts, however, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/20/drc-court-confirms-felix-tshisekedi-winner-of-presidential-election">upheld</a> Tshisekedi’s win.</p>
<p>The upcoming election is also mired in controversy. DRC’s electoral commission has promised a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-election-chief-promises-rebrand-amid-concerns-over-december-vote-2023-10-17/">rebrand</a> in an effort to shake off the irregularities of the 2018 poll. It has registered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-registers-around-439-million-voters-december-general-election-2023-05-22/">nearly 44 million voters</a> in the country of 102 million people. </p>
<p>However, Fayulu, as well as the United States, the European Union and other international election observers <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/drc-opposition-candidate-threatens-to-boycott-december-vote">have raised doubts about the accuracy of voter records</a>. Fayulu has threatened to boycott the 2023 elections if the voter lists are not redone and audited.</p>
<p>The electoral commission cleared <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/twenty-four-candidates-sign-up-congolese-presidential-race-december-2023-10-08/">24 candidates</a> to run for president. They include 2018 presidential contender Moïse Katumbi, Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege and Augustin Ponyo, a former prime minister. The campaign period has officially began and already there are plans to <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-katumbi-race-takes-shape-in-drc-presidency-poll-4451764">rally opposition support</a> behind Katumbi.</p>
<p>Given the controversies involved in this election, as well as in his assumption of office in 2019, Tshisekedi will need to work hard both to win the upcoming poll and do so in a way that citizens believe to be credible.</p>
<h2>Violence in eastern DRC</h2>
<p>While eastern DRC was unstable <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691194080/the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name">before</a> Tshisekedi came into power, the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-condemns-latest-attack-eastern-dr-congo-act-horrific-brutality#:%7E:text=Eastern%20DRC%20has%20been%20plagued,among%20the%20top%20three%20globally.">escalation of violence since 2022</a> has made it a defining feature of his presidency.</p>
<p>At least <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-is-driving-violence-eastern-congo-2023-01-31/">120 armed groups are active in the region</a>. One of the most significant of these armed groups is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-is-driving-violence-eastern-congo-2023-01-31/">M23</a>. In March 2023, M23 violence led to the displacement of about 500,000 people. In recent weeks, it has broken a <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/renewed-fighting-breaks-truce-in-congo/7321665.html">months-long truce</a> and resumed attacks in eastern DRC. </p>
<p><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">International</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-the-drc-east-africa-has-deployed-troops-to-combat-m23-rebels-whos-who-in-the-regional-force-204036">regional</a> peacekeepers have been trying to address the conflict in eastern DRC. Yet, their presence points to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">failure</a> of the Congolese government to deal with the violence on its own.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drc-is-president-tshisekedis-state-of-siege-a-cover-up/a-57426558">state of siege</a> announced by Tshisekedi in the eastern region’s provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in 2021 <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/drc-authorities-must-end-state-of-siege/">worsened</a> the human rights situation there. The military took over key state posts from civilian leaders. This despite the Congolese army being <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">linked to violence</a> in the region. </p>
<p>It was meant to last one month, butt the siege was extended many times by Tshisekedi’s government. Two years on, there has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/drc-authorities-must-end-state-of-siege/">no “meaningful public debate” about it</a>. In the run-up to the December elections, Tshisekedi announced he would “<a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/africa/dr-congo-to-end-state-of-siege-in-ituri-north-kivu-15377066">gradually ease</a>” the siege. Such interventions have made it difficult for Congolese people to believe that Tshisekedi’s policies have resulted in a more peaceful Congo.</p>
<h2>Economic growth and prospects</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi has registered some success in managing the Congolese economy. The country’s GDP growth rate went down during the pandemic but has made a modest recovery. It <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/gdp-growth-rate#:%7E:text=Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20gdp%20growth%20rate%20for%202022%20was,a%202.65%25%20decline%20from%202019.">increased to 8.92% in 2022 from 6.20% in 2021</a>, with the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">mining industry</a> being a major driver. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">In 2022</a>, the DRC joined the East African Community as its seventh member. Tshisekedi’s hope was that this move would <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2402-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-joins-eac-as-its-7th-member">promote trading relationships and reduce tensions with the DRC’s neighbours</a>. Entry gives the DRC access to a market of <a href="https://www.eac.int/gender/75-sector/investment-promotion-private-sector-development/162-184-706-market-size-access-trade-policies#:%7E:text=The%20internal%20EAC%20market%20has,population%20of%20over%20460%20million.">146 million consumers</a> and means it can start importing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60901159">more goods from its east African neighbours</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC also signed a mining deal with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/18/uae-signs-deal-to-develop-mines-in-eastern-dr-congo">the United Arab Emirates in July 2023</a>. The deal is worth US$1.9 billion and involves developing at least four mines in Congo’s northeast region. Such deals are important because <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">mining is the main driver of economic growth in the DRC</a>.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi also <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/this-dollar850-million-investment-aims-to-fast-track-congos-copper-exports/y86zk27">broke ground on a new road</a> cutting through Zambia to Tanzania to speed up the movement of Congolese exports. The DRC is landlocked – the new road will cut about 240km from the journey between some of the country’s copper and cobalt mines, and a port in Tanzania. </p>
<p>But Tshisekedi’s economic record isn’t all positive.</p>
<p>The upcoming election is causing financial problems for the state. It’s expected to cost about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-election-chief-promises-rebrand-amid-concerns-over-december-vote-2023-10-17/">US$1.1 billion</a>. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">The World Bank predicts</a> that the election will widen the country’s fiscal deficit in 2023 to -1.3% of GDP. Further, foreign exchange pressures caused by spending on security and pre-election processes have seen the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-12/congo-struggles-to-steady-franc-amid-conflict-election-spending?leadSource=uverify%20wall">Congolese franc slide 20% against the dollar</a>.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s government is looking to increase revenues from a much anticipated re-negotiation of a China-DRC mining deal. The president is under pressure to get more from the deal, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/whether-drc-china-mining-deal-will-be-restructured-remains-uncertain-/7118892.html">which is worth US$6.2 billion</a>. Tshisekedi wants a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/congo-hike-stake-copper-cobalt-venture-with-china-2023-05-24/">70% stake</a> in the Chinese-Congolese firm Sicomines, up from the original 32%. </p>
<p>The Chinese deal is one way in which Tshisekedi’s economic achievements could have impacted the lives of Congolese people given the hoped-for investment in schools, roads and hospitals. However, its unclear how many of these infrastructure projects have been implemented. At the same time, the country’s mining industry has been plagued by allegations of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/window-opportunity-build-critical-mineral-security-africa#:%7E:text=The%20Sino%2DCongolais%20des%20Mines,in%20exchange%20for%20infrastructure%20investments.">human rights abuses</a>. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>In his presidential campaign, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-tshisekedi-kicks-off-re-election-bid-with-vow-consolidate-achievements-2023-11-19/">Tshisekedi has emphasised</a> his administration’s economic and diplomatic achievements rather than the situation in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/opposition-candidates-jostle-for-position-before-drc-election">pushback</a> from opposition candidates on these achievements means Tshisekedi will need to campaign hard to win. An election that is seen as illegitimate will only further damage Tshisekedi’s credibility, especially given the amount of money the Congolese government is spending on it.</p>
<p>One of the best things Tshisekedi could do for his country now would be to run a free and fair election. This would go a long way towards rescuing his troubled term in office so far.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Arts and Humanitaties Research Council, and the Presbyterian Historical Society. He is affiliated with the Labour Party. </span></em></p>Plenty remains to be done to improve the lives of Congolese citizens.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2182822023-11-24T11:26:29Z2023-11-24T11:26:29ZSouthern African troops versus M23 rebels in the DRC: 4 risks this poses<p>The security situation in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate. The region comprises North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces. It’s about seven times the size of neighbouring Rwanda. </p>
<p>The violence in North Kivu has drawn most of the attention of the DRC’s neighbours and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/21/readout-of-director-of-national-intelligence-avril-hainess-travel-to-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-rwanda/">international community</a>. This close attention is aimed at preventing <a href="https://medafricatimes.com/32898-un-fears-direct-confrontation-between-drc-and-rwanda.html">possible confrontation between Rwanda and the DRC</a>. </p>
<p>Since late 2021, North Kivu has been confronted by <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have executed people and forcibly displaced thousands within the province and outside the DRC. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/un-again-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-m23-rebels-4281916">DRC and UN officials have accused</a> Rwanda of supporting M23 rebels. Kigali denies this.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">mid 2022</a>, the East African Community sent <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">a regional force</a> into the DRC to halt the military advancement of M23 in an effort to address rising tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The DRC shares a <a href="https://www.trademarkafrica.com/democratic-republic-of-congo/">2,500km border</a> with five east African countries: Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. </p>
<p>Since this deployment, however, DRC president Felix Tshisekedi and residents of North Kivu have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">criticised the east African force</a>, accusing it of deferring to the M23. The East African Community heads of states <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">recently agreed</a> to withdraw the force starting in December 2023.</p>
<p>The DRC’s leadership is now seeking <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868#:%7E:text=Saturday%20November%2018%202023&text=The%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo,ceremony%20in%20Kinshasa%20on%20Friday.">support</a> from another regional bloc, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/communique-extra-ordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government">has pledged</a> to deploy a military unit to North Kivu <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-announces-deployment-of-sadc-troops/7362075.html">in the coming days</a>. The DRC is a member of SADC, as are its neighbours Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.</p>
<p>The SADC mission will <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/11/19/actualite/securite/la-rdc-signe-laccord-de-deploiement-des-militaires-de-la-sadc-dans">support the Congolese army</a> in its quest to root out M23 and other armed groups operating in eastern Congo. It’s still unclear if these troops will replace the east African force, or cooperate with it. Either way, this deployment comes on the heels of the gradual planned <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">exit of UN peacekeepers from DRC starting in December 2023</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
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<p>As a researcher on micro-level violence, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=4SlemykAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017. In my view, there are four risks to the proposed SADC mission. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>it would primarily target M23 rebels, leaving out the other armed groups in eastern DRC</p></li>
<li><p>it could give Rwanda more room to exploit the M23 rebel force</p></li>
<li><p>it could antagonise the East African Community, which the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">DRC joined in 2022</a></p></li>
<li><p>the SADC force could end up being outnumbered in a vast region. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The focus on M23 rebels</h2>
<p>The primary mission for the SADC force would be to stabilise and contribute towards peacebuilding in eastern DRC. The danger is that this mission, especially if deployed under the banner of the Congolese national army, could end up condoning the army’s perspective. </p>
<p>This perspective tends to concentrate on the danger posed by M23 and disregards the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">armed groups (more than 120)</a> operating in eastern Congo. Further, it tends to accommodate other armed groups that commit atrocities against civilians. In countering M23 attacks, <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/m23-crisis-flares-again-in-north-kivu-context-dynamics-and-risks/">the army has co-opted foreign and local militias</a>, providing them with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/conflict-in-eastern-dr-congo-flares-again/a-67203737">guns and ammunition</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC may end up trapped in the Congolese army’s approach. This would be dangerous for the stability of the region. Some of these local and foreign <a href="https://www.genocidewatchblog.com/post/addressing-the-banyamulenge-s-plight-in-dr-congo-part-1">militias have vowed to wipe out</a> ethnic communities whom they believe are not “real Congolese”. </p>
<p>Any regional force aiming to stabilise eastern Congo should remain neutral in its actions and be alive to the ways the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Congolese army has fanned violence and committed atrocities against civilians</a>.</p>
<h2>Rwanda and the M23</h2>
<p>Efforts to stabilise eastern DRC should dissociate Rwanda’s grievances from those of the M23. </p>
<p>The rebel group claims to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">fighting for the rights of Congolese Tutsis and other ethnic communities</a> in the Kivus. Rwanda, on its part, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">accuses the DRC</a> of working with a rebel force, the FDLR, that seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government and operates out of Congo. In a 2022 report, a group of UN experts on the DRC <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">claimed that Rwanda armed M23 rebels</a> to enable them to go after FDLR combatants. Rwanda has dismissed such allegations.</p>
<p>The M23 cause shouldn’t be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">exploited</a>. Instead, preference should be given to enabling peaceful negotiations between the rebels and the Congolese government to address grievances. </p>
<p>However, the Congolese army and Tshisekedi’s stance <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/m23-rebels-fight-on-in-eastern-drc-despite-truce-/6850531.html">against the M23</a> – particularly ahead of the DRC’s general elections in December 2023 – could push SADC forces to opt for a military solution to the rebel group’s offensive. SADC should be careful not to back a stance that would end up forcing M23 to remain a rebel force that regional countries could manipulate for their own agenda. </p>
<p><strong>DRC and its neighbours</strong></p>
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<h2>Antagonising the East African Community</h2>
<p>The East African Community’s force is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">largely criticised</a> by Kinshasa and residents of North Kivu for failing to attack M23 rebels. The public – under the influence of Congolese political figures – tends to see the threat posed by M23 and disregards other forms of violence in the region. </p>
<p>Kinshasa has demonised the rebel force and its links to Rwanda for political mileage. Calling the east African troops’ efforts to root out M23 a failure after less than two years is premature. Particularly since the UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Monusco</a>, has been in the DRC for more than two decades. </p>
<p>The upside to the East African Community’s intervention is that it <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2660-communique-of-the-consultative-meeting-between-the-chairperson-of-the-summit-and-the-facilitator-of-the-eac-led-eastern-drc-peace-process-on-the-security-situation-in-eastern-drc">combines</a> political consultations and dialogue among different belligerents. It is unclear what will happen to the peace talks initiated by <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-says-drc-peace-restoration-talks-to-resume-4185714">former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta</a> should the SADC mission replace the east African one. </p>
<h2>Limited force strength in a vast area</h2>
<p>Eastern DRC contains at least 120 armed groups, and borders Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. The SADC mission in the DRC will, therefore, be taking on multiple rebel forces in a vast area with complex politics. It runs the risk of having its efforts criticised just like those of the East African Community because of its limited capacity to tackle the [underlying causes of violence <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">in eastern Congo</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC force could choose to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-fighting-idUSBRE97M0WA20130823/">focus on attacking</a> M23 rebels – which is how the group was first rooted out in <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">2012-2013</a>. Or it will get lost in the vast jungles of eastern Congo. Either scenario won’t bring lasting peace. </p>
<p>Many of the drivers of violence in eastern DRC are linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">the state’s absence</a> in the daily life of ordinary Congolese. This is largely driven by the political elites’ focus on their own survival. A purely military approach to addressing the violence would, therefore, be ill-advised.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated to reflect the East African Community’s decision to withdraw its regional force in the DRC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international effort to address three decades of violence in eastern DRC has drawn in the UN, east African troops and now a southern African force.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170012023-11-14T09:00:26Z2023-11-14T09:00:26ZDRC elections: the Kabila family legacy looms large over the country’s polls<p><em>The Democratic Republic of Congo is expected to hold elections on 20 December 2023. The country’s electoral commission has announced President Felix Tshisekedi will be seeking reelection <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/twenty-four-candidates-sign-up-congolese-presidential-race-december-2023-10-08/">alongside 23 other candidates</a>. They include Nobel Peace Prize winner <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231003-nobel-prize-winner-denis-mukwege-unveils-dr-congo-presidential-bid">Denis Mukwege</a> and the runner-up in the 2018 presidential election, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230930-dr-congo-opposition-figure-martin-fayulu-to-stand-in-presidential-election">Martin Fayulu</a>. The courts will confirm the final list of candidates. One key political figure has yet to make his intentions known: Joseph Kabila. He was president for 18 years until Tshisekedi took over in 2019. The DRC’s constitution allows <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/circumvention-of-term-limits-weakens-governance-in-africa/">two five-year terms</a>, but he remained in power by <a href="https://www.africanmedias.com/dr-congo-sets-elections-for-december-2018/?lang=en">delaying elections</a>. He holds substantial political, military and business sway. Jonathan R. Beloff is a <a href="https://jonathanrbeloff.com/publications/">political scholar</a> who researches the politics and security of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. We asked him some questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is the Kabila family’s place in the DRC’s politics?</h2>
<p>Joseph Kabila was the country’s fourth president. He took office after the assassination of his father, Laurent Kabila, who was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/feb/11/theobserver">killed</a> by his bodyguard in 2001. Joseph later won presidential elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/16/congo.chrismcgreal1">2006</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/17/congo-joseph-kabila-election-victory">2011</a>. </p>
<p>The surprise <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">2018 election</a> of Felix Tshisekedi, who took power in January 2019, as president interrupted more than two decades of the Kabila family’s rule. At the time, Joseph was constitutionally barred from running for president – and he had already <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/12/12/will-kabila-go?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e">overshot</a> his second term by more than three years.</p>
<p>The Kabila family became a political powerhouse after gaining control in 1996. With the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3bc5a95e8.pdf">assistance</a> of other countries – such as neighbours Uganda, Angola and Rwanda – the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6ce20.html">overthrew</a> the long-standing Zairian dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. This was during the First Congo War (1996-1997).</p>
<p>Laurent’s tenure was riddled with <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004407824/BP000014.xml?alreadyAuthRedirecting">ineffectiveness and corruption</a>. In less than two years, he had <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship">dismissed</a> his minister of defence, the Rwandan James Kabarebe, and <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Africa_s_World_War.html?id=kp93kUfdhC0C&redir_esc=y">begun arming</a> anti-Rwandan forces. These forces contained actors who participated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. </p>
<p>Laurent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/how-kabila-lost-his-way-performance-laurent-d%C3%A9sir%C3%A9-kabilas-government">claimed</a> his government only backed these forces after Rwanda attempted to overthrow his regime. </p>
<p>The bloody <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Second Congo War (1998-2003)</a> led to at least two million deaths, many of them from disease and extreme poverty rather than warfare itself. While <a href="https://archive.ph/20190515011819/https://mobile.monitor.co.ug/Rwanda-s-Gen-Kabareebe-remembered-Operation-Kitona-/691260-4834546-format-xhtml-ry3w3x/index.html">Kabarebe’s invasion attempt on the capital Kinshasa in 1998 failed</a>, the vast DRC was divided into spheres of influence for different nations and their aligned rebel groups. This status quo only began to break after Laurent’s assassination, which led to the rise of his son Joseph. </p>
<p>Joseph learned military strategy, tactics and politics under Kabarebe. The two worked together after the Second Congo War <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2014/06/rwandan-ponders-own-security-while-fdlr-remains-a-strategic-threat-by-jonathan-beloff/">to flush out many anti-Rwandan forces</a>. This included the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. They also <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2011-11-28/joseph-kabila-and-where-election-congo-went-wrong">campaigned</a> together during the 2011 presidential elections, which Joseph won. </p>
<p>Joseph initially cast himself as a reformer who would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/27/world/kabila-preaches-peace-congo-rebels-skeptical.html">end the Second Congo War</a> and pursue policies to spur political and economic development. However, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/12/jospeh-kabila-kivu-crisis-congo">instability in eastern Congo</a> persisted under his rule, with accusations of <a href="https://jgbc.scholasticahq.com/article/72664-cobalt-and-corruption-the-influence-of-multinational-firms-and-foreign-states-on-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo">massive corruption that undermined the nation’s development</a>. </p>
<h2>How much sway does Joseph Kabila hold today?</h2>
<p>Joseph Kabila remains a <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/kabila-congo/">strong presence</a> within Congo’s political, economic and military institutions. He has strong networks developed over <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/25/drc-what-is-joseph-kabilas-legacy-after-18-years-in-power">18 years in power</a>. He could use this influence to sway the vote towards any of the candidates.</p>
<p>His influence <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/drcs-shady-political-alliance-unravels">stems</a> from favourable business and political alliances he created when he was president. Like Mobutu, Kabila used his vast financial resources to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/11/19/document-leak-shows-kabila-family-associates-looted-drc-funds">secure favourable relationships</a> with Congolese and foreign business leaders. A <a href="https://www.pplaaf.org/2021/11/19/congo-holdup-leak.html">document leak</a> in 2021 revealed that Kabila received over US$138 million from corruption and bribes. </p>
<p>There were claims that the former president originally <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1065149/politique/consultations-nationales-en-rdc-comment-joseph-kabila-prepare-loffensive/">convinced</a> Tshisekedi to accept a power-sharing agreement. Under it, Tshisekedi would be president, while Kabila would control political decisions behind the scenes. The near <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/16/in-protests-hit-drc-a-fierce-power-struggle-deepens">appointment</a> of Ronsard Malonda as the president of the electoral body illustrated Kabila’s political influence. Malonda held senior positions during the country’s 2006, 2011 and 2018 elections. He has been accused of rigging results in favour of Kabila.</p>
<p>Such accusations have benefited <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181123-dr-congo-opposition-elections-tshisekedi-kamerhe-ramazani-kabila">Tshisekedi’s election campaign</a>. He is depicting himself as a candidate not tied to the corruption within DRC. </p>
<p>If Kabila does decide to campaign, political dynamics within much of Congo’s civil society, military and economy will be divided. Government ministers and officials will be forced to choose to support either the incumbent or Kabila’s preferred candidate.</p>
<h2>What was Tshisekedi expected to change after he routed Joseph Kabila?</h2>
<p>There was <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">initial</a> hope that Tshisekedi’s government would foster peace in eastern Congo, establish greater national unity and help solve the nation’s economic woes after decades of corruption and conflict. However, these problems have persisted.</p>
<p>Initially, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/drc-one-year-since-tshisekedi-took-office-insecurity-and-impunity-still-imperil-human-rights/">Amnesty International praised</a> Tshisekedi for pardoning political prisoners and allowing greater public space for criticisms of the Congolese government. He also began <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-28/congo-reviews-6-2-billion-china-mining-deal-as-criticism-grows">investigations</a> on past mineral deals during the Kabila governments. As the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2021/new-au-chair-drc-president-felix-tshisekedi-sets-ambitious-agenda-2021">African Union chair</a> from 2021 to 2022, he pushed for greater attention to the COVID-19 pandemic and promoted the African Continental Free Trade Area. </p>
<p>Despite initial attempts to foster more significant relations with Rwanda, relations <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/2/analysis-why-are-rwanda-and-drc-having-another-diplomatic-spat">soured</a> in 2022. This was after the Congolese government accused Rwanda of supporting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">resurrected M23 rebels</a>. </p>
<p>Rwanda <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/31/rwanda-denies-supporting-m23-rebel-group-in-eastern-drc//">denied</a> the allegations. It has also accused Tshisekedi’s government of being <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">hostile to the Congolese Tutsi population</a> – the Banyamulenge – who are historically related to Rwandans. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">US Department of State has expressed concern</a> about Tshisekedi’s anti-Banyamulenge rhetoric, as well as democratic transparency in the upcoming election. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s campaign strategy seems to focus on promoting security in eastern DRC by not only defeating the M23, but also attacking Rwanda for interfering in Congolese affairs. The <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/">securitisation</a> of the Banyamulenge and Rwanda – the political manipulation to stir public fear – has helped deflect internal criticisms of the Tshisekedi regime.</p>
<p>Whether the elections take place is another area of concern. There are concerns that Tshisekedi will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-president-says-unrest-east-could-disrupt-elections-2023-02-27/">delay or cancel the election</a> by citing security concerns. If this happens, it might be perceived by domestic and international partners as political interference by the ruling regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217001/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/W001217/1). </span></em></p>Laurent Kabila and his son Joseph were the Democratic Republic of Congo’s third and fourth presidents.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040362023-04-27T12:06:03Z2023-04-27T12:06:03ZPeace in the DRC: East Africa has deployed troops to combat M23 rebels – who’s who in the regional force<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522646/original/file-20230424-14-adtvfi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudanese soldiers prepare for deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Samir Bol/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East Africa Community (EAC) has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">completed the deployment</a> of its regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to oversee the withdrawal of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">rebel group, M23,</a> from the eastern part of the country. </p>
<p>The last contingent was of <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/04/fully-deployed-regional-force-starting-to-impact-eastern-drc/">South Sudanese soldiers</a> who joined troops from Kenya, Burundi and Uganda.</p>
<p>Formed in 2012 as a splinter group of the armed militia <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/cross-border-peacebuilding/congo-rwanda-and-national-congress-defence-people">National Congress for the Defence of the People</a>, the M23 briefly occupied the city of Goma the same year. It was quickly routed by forces operating as part of the UN peacekeeping mission, Monusco.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">M23 re-emerged</a> in 2022, prompting the east African region to send in troops.</p>
<p>While eastern DRC contains over 100 armed groups, the M23 has drawn the region’s attention. This is not only because the conflict could spill across borders, but also because the M23 is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-urges-rwanda-to-stop-supporting-m23-rebels-in-dr-congo-/6899260.html">widely seen</a> as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">backed by Rwanda</a> (<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930">a claim Rwanda denies</a>). Thus, a rise in tension could <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">reignite fighting</a> between Rwanda and DRC, and draw in the broader region.</p>
<p>The EAC’s forces could be important in bringing the threat posed by the M23 under control, given the regional dimensions to this conflict. But their involvement is complicated.</p>
<p>On the one hand, neighbouring countries often have a better understanding of local political and security contexts than international actors. They also have more direct interest in the outcome of conflict, potentially leading to more sustained engagement.</p>
<p>On the other hand, neighbouring countries have their own interests, which means their actions may not always be in the best interests of the country they’re meant to help. Such risks are especially pronounced in the DRC. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">Conflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what's gone wrong</a>
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<p>The country’s history has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">rife with meddling</a> by its neighbours, including some members of the EAC regional force. The two Congo wars – <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">in 1996-1997 and 1998-2003</a> – brought numerous foreign forces to Congolese soil. </p>
<p>While some neighbouring countries came to support the DRC government, others backed the rebels during the two wars, and actors from multiple sides <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/report-exploitation-resources-democratic-republic-congo-challenged-security">have pillaged DRC’s natural resources</a>. <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/version-anglaise-sondage-gec-ebuteli-deuxieme-note-thematique-force-regionale.pdf#page=4">Public distrust</a> in the regional force is, therefore, high.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">lessons learned</a> from previous interventions in the DRC, it’s not clear whether the EAC regional force will help the DRC find peace this time around or contribute, deliberately or otherwise, to its instability.</p>
<p>Here is a short overview of the players in the regional force and their connections to the DRC.</p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya has <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states/kenya">relatively more economic resources</a> than some other EAC members and a less complicated history with the DRC. While Kenya has had troops in the country <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/monuc/facts.shtml">since 1999</a> as part of the UN peacekeeping operation, it has been less tangled in previous conflicts in the DRC. </p>
<p>Kenya deployed its troops as part of the regional force in November 2022 after the the M23 enlarged its territorial hold in Congo’s eastern region. </p>
<p>Kenyan president <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/02/kenya-sends-troops-to-dr-congo-to-fight-rebels//">William Ruto has stated</a> that defeating the M23 is important for the region. Stability in the DRC is also in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-why-we-deployed-our-troops-in-drc-4017620">Kenya’s economic interests</a>. It accelerated investments into the DRC after the latter <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">joined the regional bloc in 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>Burundi</h2>
<p>Burundi has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">tangled history with the DRC</a>. It was involved in the two Congo wars and has been <a href="https://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/DRC%20v%20Burundi,%20Rwanda%20and%20Uganda.pdf#page=1">accused by the DRC</a> of occupying its border provinces and violating human rights and international law during these conflicts.</p>
<p>Burundi formally deployed troops to Goma in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">August 2022</a>. A <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/more-burundi-troops-arrive-in-goma-4161608">second battalion</a> was deployed seven months later. But a Burundian rights group has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/burundi-secretly-sent-troops-to-dr-congo-rights-group-3894150">claimed that Burundi</a> has been conducting secret operations against Burundian opposition groups within DRC for some time. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">The group also expressed concern</a> that Burundi may use its membership of the regional force to continue operations against its opponents. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-africas-peace-mission-in-the-drc-why-its-in-burundis-interest-to-help-203486">East Africa’s peace mission in the DRC: why it’s in Burundi’s interest to help</a>
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<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>Uganda <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-troops-join-eac-force-in-drc-4180430">deployed troops</a> to the force in March 2023. Before this, it conducted <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/1/after-air-raids-uganda-sends-troops-into-drc-to-hunt-adf">joint operations</a> with Congolese national forces against the rebel Allied Democratic Forces, a Uganda-based, Islamic State-allied group that has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230309-more-than-40-killed-in-suspected-eastern-dr-congo-rebel-attacks">particularly violent towards civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Despite their common foe, Uganda and DRC have a history of tension. Uganda’s military intervention in the DRC in the 1990s was found by the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116">International Court of Justice</a> to be “of such magnitude and duration” that it was considered “a grave violation” of the prohibition on the use of force in terms of the UN Charter. The court ordered Uganda to pay US$325 million for its illegal occupation. Uganda made its first payment of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/12/uganda-pays-first-installment-of-325m-war-reparations-to-drc#:%7E:text=Uganda%20has%20paid%20%2465m,Ugandan%20troops%20occupied%20Congolese%20territory.">US$65 million</a> in September 2022. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Ugandan troops have found some early success in their deployment. This includes the area of Bunagana, where they were able to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/congo-drc-rwanda-m23-rebels-uganda-bunagana-58787acda1f5ebc0ee2b3de2cbb12491">regain control</a> of the town that had been held for months by the M23. Nevertheless, Uganda’s involvement in the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2001/sc7057.doc.htm">illegal exploitation of DRC’s natural resources</a> in the 1990s and early 2000s raises concerns about its presence among the local population. </p>
<h2>South Sudan</h2>
<p>South Sudan is the most recent EAC member state to deploy troops to the DRC after some <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277626/east-africa-force-in-drc-kenyas-on-the-ground-so-where-are-the-others/">initial logistical delays</a>. South Sudan’s history with the DRC is less contentious than Uganda’s and Burundi’s. However, its national forces have a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/un-experts-tell-human-rights-council-violence-against-civilians-persists#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20investigations%20undertaken%20in,and%20State%2Dsponsored%20extrajudicial%20killings.">history of human rights abuses</a> against their own population. </p>
<p>Despite South Sudan president Salva Kiir’s instruction that his troops not “<a href="https://jubaecho.com/president-kiir-flags-off-720-troops-headed-for-drc/">go and rape women and girls</a>”, their presence within the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-role-progress-and-challenges-of-the-eac-regional-force-in-the-eastern-drc/">crowded theatre could increase the risk</a> of human rights abuses. </p>
<h2>Risky, but necessary?</h2>
<p>Despite these risks, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">EAC regional force</a> may be the DRC’s best chance of defeating the M23. Monusco <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">has struggled</a> to mitigate the M23 or the numerous other rebel groups operating in the eastern region. </p>
<p>One advantage for the EAC is that it’s leading both the political and military responses to the M23, which were previously led by different actors. The M23 threat requires both a political and military response, and ensuring these two prongs remain closely integrated is essential. </p>
<p>So far, though, the M23 has not respected the timelines for withdrawal set as part of the political process, including the most recent <a href="https://ntrtv.com.tr/no-retreat-by-m23-rebels-from-eastern-drc-on-deadline/">30 March 2022 deadline</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">East African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks</a>
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<p>This lack of progress has led Angolan president João Lourenço – who is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221187/rwanda-and-drc-start-peace-talks-mediated-by-angola/">mediating peace talks</a> between the DRC and Rwanda – to announce the deployment of 500 Angolan troops to the volatile east. Kinshasa said the Angolan troops would be there “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/angola-deploy-troops-congos-rebel-hit-east-2023-03-17/#:%7E:text=LUANDA%2C%20March%2017%20(Reuters),approved%20the%20deployment%20on%20Friday.">not to attack but to help maintain peace</a>”. Sadly, there is not yet much peace to be maintained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research for the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Head of IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations. </span></em></p>The region’s forces are seen as important in addressing the long-running conflict in the DRC – but their involvement is complicated.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010992023-03-13T12:24:32Z2023-03-13T12:24:32ZThe Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513396/original/file-20230303-18-fisnxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Banyamulenge community members at the funeral of one of their own in eastern DRC.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Banyamulenge are a minority ethnic group in South Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In December 2022, the UN adviser on the prevention of genocide raised concerns about attacks against the community based on “<a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">ethnicity or perceived allegiance with neighbouring countries</a>”. The Banyamulenge have <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">long been viewed</a> as not being Congolese. The government, however, has often dismissed claims that the community is facing targeted attacks <a href="https://www.politico.cd/encontinu/2022/11/24/pretendus-discours-de-haine-en-rdc-une-fiction-qui-ressemble-aux-discours-segregationnistes-portes-par-le-rwanda-patrick-muyaya.html/121636/">as fiction</a>. Delphin R Ntanyoma, who has <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">extensively researched</a> the Banyamulenge, explains why they are facing persecution.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Banyamulenge and how has their status changed over time?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge live in eastern DRC in South Kivu province. They are mostly seen as affiliated to the Tutsi of the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">African Great Lakes region</a>, and they speak a language close to Kirundi (Burundi) and Kinyarwanda (Rwanda). The Banyamulenge settled in South Kivu between the 16th and 18th centuries, having come from what are today Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. They are largely cattle keepers. </p>
<p>They mostly occupy the southern part of South Kivu province: the Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira territories. In the 1960s and 1970s, some Banyamulenge moved to Katanga in the DRC’s southern region. The region has rich pastures for cattle herding and is close to the large cities of Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi, providing business opportunities. However, in 1998, nearly 20,000 Banyamulenge were forced to flee Katanga after they were <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_10298.html">attacked for being “foreigners”</a>. </p>
<p>Since 1984, the DRC has not organised a <a href="https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/DRC-census-working-paper-fina-online.pdf">general census</a>. The historian <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/nl/title/banyamulenge-qui-sont-ils-dou-viennent-ils-quel-role-ont-ils-joue-et-pourquoi-dans-le-processus-de-la-liberation-du-zaire/oclc/42719868">Joseph Mutambo</a> estimated the group had around 400,000 people in 1997. There are no clear estimates today, but it’s safe to assume that they have grown in number. </p>
<p>Colonial history in the Great Lakes region has categorised local communities into <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">“native” and “immigrants”</a>. Farmers are seen as native, while cattle herders are largely perceived as immigrants, foreigners and invaders. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">Why history matters in understanding conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo</a>
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<p>Based on these assumptions, the Banyamulenge have been viewed as foreigners and were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Africa-04.htm">denied citizenship in the 1980s</a>. A decade later, the Congolese state <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/drc-banyamulenge-seeking-political-solution-tensions">sought to expel them</a> after a parliamentary resolution to send back all Rwandan and Burundian descendants. </p>
<p>This added to the perception that the Banyamulenge were “invaders”. I have researched the drivers of violence in South and North Kivu for six years, with a focus on the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">Banyamulenge situation</a>. It’s clear that much of the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/14687968211009895">violence targeting them</a> revolves around the misconception that they are <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">strangers in their own country</a>. </p>
<h2>Who’s who on the list of their political adversaries?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge’s political adversaries range from local politicians to armed groups and militias. Most of the politicians who rally their constituents against the Banyamulenge are from neighbouring ethnic communities. These include the Babembe, Bafuliro, Banyindu and Bavira. Members of these ethnic communities consider themselves “native”. Political figures outside South Kivu have also spread the idea that the Banyamulenge are outsiders. </p>
<p>Those who take issue with the Banyamulenge claim to be protecting their country from “invaders”. This has led to armed mobilisations and the use of local militias, like the MaiMai and Biloze-Bishambuke. These militias have vowed to <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-warning-the-vulnerability-of-banyamulenge-invaders">expel the Banyamulenge or eliminate them</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Since 2017, Burundian rebel groups like Red-Tabara and Forces Nationales de Liberation have joined local militias in attacks against the Banyamulenge. The Red-Tabara’s involvement raised questions about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-rwanda-un-idUSKCN0VD04K">Rwanda’s role</a> after UN reports claimed that the country had supported the rebel group with logistical and training skills. </p>
<h2>How are the Banyamulenge targeted?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge have been targeted by Congolese security services and local militias in major attacks <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_brf2287.html">in 1996</a>, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/27798/drc-belgium-pursues-case-against-ex-minister-icj">1998</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">2004</a>. </p>
<p>A new wave of violence against the group <a href="https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/province-sud-kivu-un-champ-de-bataille-multidimensionnel-meconnu">began in 2017</a>, and has since led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and the destruction of <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/rapport-sur-les-attaques-anti-banyamulenge-en-rd-congo">hundreds of villages</a>. That year was marked by <a href="https://theconversation.com/2017-the-year-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-would-like-to-forget-88170">intensifying conflict in the DRC</a> over election delays. </p>
<p>The looting of Banyamulenge-owned cattle has been a constant occurrence <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26309798">since the 1960s</a>. Cattle constitute a major source of income and livelihood, and looting has worked as a strategy to impoverish the community and jeopardise their future. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">Burundi's Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict</a>
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<p>Due to the widespread destruction of villages, the remaining Banyamulenge in South Kivu live in small localities like Minembwe, Murambya/Bijombo, Mikenge and Bibokoboko. They continue to face <a href="https://kivutimes.com/minembwe-attaque-des-mai-mai-biloze-bishambuke-ilunga-et-yakutumba-plusieurs-villages-sous-le-feu-la-societe-civile-alerte-les-autorites/">regular and coordinated attacks</a>, which have prevented the community from accessing pastures and farmland beyond a two-kilometre radius. </p>
<p>Armed militias in South Kivu have <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">prevented and constrained</a> humanitarian organisations from getting aid into Banyamulenge settlements. </p>
<p>Hate speech has played a major role in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">fuelling violence</a> against the community. Twitter, Facebook, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG2YPRq3Uqw">YouTube</a> and other social media platforms have thousands of posts and videos that claim the Banyamulenge are not Congolese citizens and shouldn’t be in the country. </p>
<p>Such dehumanising and hateful speech feeds the minds and hearts of young people, mainly men, who consider attacks against the Banyamulenge a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5253c0784.html">“noble” cause</a>. <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/democratic-republic-of-congo-rising-concern-banyamulenge">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/hate-speech-and-genocide-in-minembwe-d-r-congo">activists</a> have called for greater attention to be paid to these attacks.</p>
<h2>Who’s behind the attacks?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge are targeted because they are viewed as “foreigners”. For decades, local armed groups and militias have mobilised to get rid of those perceived as invaders. This ideology is transmitted across generations. </p>
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<p>In addition, the Congolese national army has played a role in enabling attacks against the Banyamulenge by <a href="https://twitter.com/KivuSecurity/status/1304083139334156289">providing ammunition to militias</a> or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXYdu8U7At0">opening breaches when rebels attack civilians</a>. Huge destruction has taken place in areas where the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/10/28/eastern-Congo-Kivu-conflict-regional-tensions">Congolese army is present</a> but didn’t intervene. </p>
<p>There are three possible reasons for the army’s general inaction. First, some military commanders and soldiers may believe the narrative that the Banyamulenge are not Congolese. Second, some military commanders create chaos and conflict pocket zones to serve one or more protagonists in the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">Great Lakes region</a>. Third, violence allows military commanders to access operational funds – and looted cattle can be turned into money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Banyamulenge have been viewed as strangers in their own country – the violence targeting them revolves around this misconception.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976412023-01-24T14:34:50Z2023-01-24T14:34:50ZFootball and politics in Kinshasa: how DRC’s elite use sport to build their reputations and hold on to power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504456/original/file-20230113-26-o6a4dx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people play football on a street in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Football in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – as in much of the world – is intertwined with politics. </p>
<p>In the central African country, football clubs have long been a way for the regime in power to build political capital. Many politicians involve themselves with clubs to bolster their image. On the other hand, football is also a space for political opposition. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our recent paper</a>, we show how politics and football come together in a number of ways in Kinshasa, the country’s capital city. </p>
<p>Football was particularly important for Joseph Kabila’s regime, from 2001 to 2019. His was a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/01/kabila-must-go-the-congolese-see-this-why-cant-the-west/">contested and repressive regime</a>. Throughout his tenure as president, Kabila and his party members looked for ways to improve their reputation to gain votes. One way was by financially supporting football clubs. This worked because these clubs don’t have structural or sufficient commercial or state support. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study finds</a> that football politics can also work against a regime. During the Kabila years, football stadiums and supporter crowds offered a relatively safe place to protest the repressive regime. Anti-Kabila songs, for example, were often heard at matches. </p>
<h2>Football and power</h2>
<p>Our interviews with supporters, regime figures and others found that during the Kabila years, supporters and club officials made a distinction between regime figures supporting the club, and the regime. A common statement we heard was: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>supporters still appreciated Kabila-associated politicians as long as they were able to provide financial support.</p>
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<p>Gabriel Amisi (commonly known as Tango Four), for example, was a close ally of Kabila’s and currently serves as an <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee/">army general and inspector general of the Congolese army</a>. Amisi has been accused of a wide range of human rights abuses during his time as a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/20/congo-war-crimes-kisangani">rebel commander</a> and an <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres">army commander</a>. One press article describes him as “<a href="https://afridesk.org/whos-who-le-general-amisi-tango-four-le-boucher-du-kivu-jj-wondo/">the butcher of Eastern Congo</a>”. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2020, Amisi was president of the AS Vita Club, one of the biggest clubs in Kinshasa. Before 2007, the team was performing poorly. Under Amisi’s leadership, the team won three national titles and excelled internationally. Players remember his leadership as providing financial stability, with regular and good salaries, and material supplies. </p>
<p>This made him very popular. When Amisi tried to resign in 2012 after AS Vita Club’s elimination from the national league, the team’s management and club supporters didn’t accept his submission. When protests began against the Kabila regime in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKBN14800C">2016</a> in Kinshasa, AS Vita supporters protected Amisi’s house. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">Human Rights Watch</a> has documented how Amisi (and other elite figures) used youth league members of football clubs to infiltrate protests against the Kabila regime “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">and incite protesters to loot and commit violence</a>”. </p>
<p>An association with regime figures gives football clubs advantages, such as protection from prosecution if supporters are caught up in stadium violence. This makes it unattractive for clubs to associate with opposition figures, who generally have less money to invest and less political power. </p>
<p>In this way, Congolese football isn’t very different from football elsewhere in the world. It has been shown how <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=VIlcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA463&lpg=PA463&dq=Armstrong,+G.,+%26+Mitchell,+J.+P.+(2001).+%E2%80%9CPlayers,+patrons,+and+politicians:+oppositional+cultures+in+Maltese+football.%E2%80%9D+Fear+and+loathing+in+world+football,+137-158.&source=bl&ots=6GcJZyJ7BE&sig=ACfU3U3YaJGbpHXEt6nnlRXMeLAYfrrpVw&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiorpSsspz8AhUROewKHQ0BDxAQ6AF6BAgHEAM#v=onepage&q&f=false">worldwide</a> – not only on the <a href="https://polaf.hypotheses.org/5030">African continent</a>, but in a variety of places such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2013.792482">Turkey, Indonesia</a> and <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10117/">Malta</a> – football helps regimes to reproduce their hegemony, particularly by creating political capital. </p>
<h2>Football and protest</h2>
<p>But the opposite has also been shown. Football has played an important role in contesting power. It has, for example, played a role in decolonising struggles in <a href="https://experts.arizona.edu/en/publications/visualizing-politics-in-african-sport-political-and-cultural-cons">Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/kickin-it-leisure-politics-and-football-in-colonial-zanzibar-1900s1950s/A97494FF2D4FEB7BFA1252B4A11A6309">Zanzibar</a> and <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=N65pbr2hC4wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP12&dq=Martin,+P.+(2002).+%E2%80%9CLeisure+and+society+in+colonial+Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D+Cambridge+University+Pr&ots=2MF69toPoN&sig=6yK6P7RbPAWkvnTOo0XuYu3Tp6U#v=onepage&q=Martin%2C%20P.%20(2002).%20%E2%80%9CLeisure%20and%20society%20in%20colonial%20Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D%20Cambridge%20University%20Pr&f=false">Congo-Brazzaville</a>; and in the <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24122012-pitched-battles-the-role-of-ultra-soccer-fans-in-the-arab-spring-analysis-2/">Arab spring</a> in the 2010s. </p>
<p>These dynamics also played out in Kinshasa, where football supporters participated in decolonisation struggles. On <a href="https://dialectik-football.info/16-juin-1957-lunion-saint-gilloise-au-congo-et-la-premiere-emeute-anti-coloniale/">16 June 1957</a>, a match between Kinshasa’s FC Leopoldville and Belgium’s Union Saint Gilloise de Bruxelles led to the first riots leading up to independence. A year and a half later, AS Vita Club supporters played <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=bF5Vx8cCnrMC&printsec=frontcover&hl=nl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">an important role</a> in decisive riots against colonial authorities. In 1960, the DRC got its independence from Belgium. </p>
<p>In the postcolonial period, football has also played a role in challenging power. During the Kabila regime, as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears">political repression escalated</a> in almost every other space, the football stadium became an important venue for political protest. </p>
<p>In the words of a soccer fan in <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since we’re in the stadium, we won’t be arrested. The police knows this: they won’t try anything because we’re way more numerous than them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lyrics of protest songs and slogans – referred to as “hymns of the oppressed” – included: “God is doing everything so that Kabila dies!” and “Eeeh, we refuse (to be) the voting machine”. </p>
<p>During <a href="https://qz.com/africa/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-to-a-third-term">the “slippage” period</a> from 2015 onwards – when Kabila went beyond the formal limits of his mandate – anti-Kabila slogans became even more popular. </p>
<p>The engagement of regime figures with soccer clubs didn’t overcome hostile feelings about the regime. </p>
<h2>Regime controls</h2>
<p>The impact of these confrontations of regime power was limited, though. </p>
<p>For example, during the Kabila regime, radio and TV stations would cut their broadcasting when political songs were sung during games involving the national team. And in late 2016, the minister of sports <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">temporarily suspended</a> the national football competition. The official reason for this was “<a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">excessive violence in the stadiums</a>”. But it was widely understood as a political measure by the regime, fearing protests by supporters in reaction to the end of Kabila’s official mandate during this period. The former minister confirmed this to us during interviews. </p>
<p>In sum, football in Kinshasa is politics – but primarily regime politics. Even though political opposition can be expressed through football, it is questionable how much potential for change this carries. </p>
<p>During the authoritarian Kabila regime, the protest role of football was confined. It’s similar under the current Felix Tshisekedi regime, which uses football as a political tool. Kinshasa’s main clubs (Daring Club Motema Pembe and AS Vita), for example, have club presidents who are close allies of Tshisekedi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Football provides a way for unpopular elites to build political capital – but also creates space for citizens to voice dissent.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpAlbert Malukisa Nkuku, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913512022-10-02T08:41:52Z2022-10-02T08:41:52ZBurundi’s Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486859/original/file-20220927-18-9tkhfy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Men hold up protest signs in front of the coffins of DRC refugees killed in August 2004 in Gatumba, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in violence. Millions of people have been killed and an <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-the-drc/">estimated 5.6 million</a> others displaced by civil wars, local feuds and cross-border conflicts. The neighbouring countries of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been locked into this ongoing cycle, too.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">The First Congo War</a> began in 1996, with a coalition of the DRC’s neighbours supporting a rebel group that toppled the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Laurent Kabila was installed as head of state in 1997. A year later, however, a bloodier war began amid violent jostling for power and influence.</p>
<p>In December 2002, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/17/congo">peace deal</a> was signed. The DRC got a national army and new constitution. Democratic elections were held in 2006, the country’s first in more than 40 years. </p>
<p>But the violence soon resumed. Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory proved difficult. Since then, the Congo has received tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and hosts one of the largest <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">United Nations peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>Various studies have fronted several reasons for the persistence of war in the Congo. These include <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congos-peace-miracle-or-mirage">flaws</a> in the 2002 peace deal, a Congolese elite that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">benefits from the chaos</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africa/2010-drc-mapping-report">ethnic intolerance</a>. </p>
<p>The events that have shaped the DRC mean different things to different actors. The fact that sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country has over <a href="https://minorityrights.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">250 ethnic groups</a> gives a sense of the complexity of its plight.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chris-Davey-9/research">My research</a> adds to debate on the factors driving the violence. I focused on the narratives of Banyamulenge soldiers. The Banyamulenge are a sub-group of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group, and originally come from the province of South Kivu in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>They are an important constituency to consider because their experiences offer a window into past and current Congolese conflicts. </p>
<p>They illustrate how violence in the Congo multiplies across borders, blurs the lines between victim and perpetrator, and is used to win a place in government rather than to overthrow it. </p>
<p>From my research, I believe that to stop the cycle of violence, the DRC and its regional allies need a new status quo that doesn’t reward rebellion but decreases its appeal. Politics that facilitates peaceful livelihoods is essential.</p>
<h2>Tracing the pattern</h2>
<p>In August 2004, 166 members of the <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">Congolese Banyamulenge community</a> were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">killed in Gatumba</a>, a small town in Burundi near its border with DRC. They were at a UN-protected refugee camp. </p>
<p>The killings were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3564358.stm">perpetrated</a> by a group of armed rebels, many of them from the Forces for National Liberation, a Burundian Hutu militia group. The group claimed their Banyamulenge victims were planning a new war in the Congo.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">spoke to</a> survivors of the 2004 massacre. Most felt that the attack wasn’t a one-off event, but part of a pattern of mobilising anti-Tutsi violence. </p>
<p>This began before Gatumba and persists into the present day. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">archive of Gatumba survivor accounts</a> that I was involved in curating attests to this ongoing persecution and the wider dysfunctions of the region. These include the lack of robust democracy or transparent governance, and high levels of insecurity. </p>
<p>Like most participants in Congolese conflicts, the rebels and refugees involved in the Gatumba massacre regularly crossed the DRC’s border. The Banyamulenge refugees fled to Burundi to escape turmoil in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drcsouth-kivu-jun-2004-situation-report-and-recommendations">South Kivu in 2004</a>. The Forces for National Liberation moved between DRC and Burundi to recruit, fight and cooperate with armed groups in both countries. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">How DRC's colonial legacy forged a nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict</a>
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<p>The DRC’s borders are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/103/412/359/81797?redirectedFrom=fulltext">porous</a>, with the central government too weak to control its eastern region or its boundaries. DRC borders nine countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.</p>
<p>These porous borders have allowed armed groups – like the Ugandan <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2011.542297">Allied Democratic Front</a> and Congolese-Tutsi <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">March 23 Movement</a> – to use the DRC as a base and battlefield, connecting civil conflicts across borders.</p>
<h2>Beyond ethnic conflict</h2>
<p>Gatumba was a border refugee camp. Hutu rebels found an easy target in Banyamulenge refugees, whom they associated with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/11/congo.rorycarroll">Tutsi rebels</a> behind the violence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation deployed religious-flavoured anti-Tutsi rhetoric to motivate their political base. But there’s rarely a straight line between politics and ethnicity. The Hutu rebels <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971605100202">were in political competition</a> against other Hutu-labelled militias and parties. </p>
<p>Contemporary rebel groups, too, act in multiple directions as they destabilise border areas, displacing and killing civilians. </p>
<p>The March 23 Movement, for instance, provides anti-Tutsi fodder for extremist politicians across the DRC. These politicians benefit from promoting <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">discrimination and hate speech</a>, and fuelling <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">protests</a> against the UN mission. The movement’s use of force has <a href="https://chrispdavey.blogspot.com/2022/06/m23-memory-remains.html">hardened lines</a> between Tutsis and other Congolese. </p>
<h2>Illegal violence to legitimate power</h2>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation, like other rebel groups, committed atrocities to improve its bargaining position in peace talks. </p>
<p>By 2004, other Burundian rebels had cut a peace deal with the Burundi government to become politicians and army officers. The Forces for National Liberation was marginalised. It, therefore, stopped trying to overthrow the state and focused on killing civilians, hoping to use the threat of terrorism to negotiate its way into power. It worked. </p>
<p>Agathon Rwasa, the leader of the Forces for National Liberation, signed a deal. He now leads <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-kenya-burundi-agathon-rwasa-b10afc3bb09daf8e4b87782b057fb56d">Burundi’s opposition party</a> in parliament and has not gone to trial for any crimes.</p>
<p>This elevation of a guerrilla into government is not unique to Burundi. </p>
<p>Rebel groups in the DRC typically aren’t looking to overthrow the state. Instead, they’re <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/98/3/873/6581695?redirectedFrom=fulltext">using rebellion</a> to prove themselves a threat. They then sue for <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/recycling-rebels-demobilization-congo">limited peace</a> and an improved position either in DRC or in neighbouring countries like Burundi or Uganda. </p>
<p>As one Gatumba survivor observed:</p>
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<p>the reward for killing people is a promotion in our country. </p>
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<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s been 18 years since the Gatumba massacre. Groups like the <a href="https://www.gatumbasurvivors.org/">Banyamulenge Gatumba Refugee Survivors Foundation</a> are <a href="https://www.wishtv.com/news/hundreds-gather-for-18th-anniversary-of-the-gatumba-massacre/">working internationally</a> to pursue accountability and justice. Yet, addressing their own community’s past and current involvement in DRC’s multi-directional violence is largely taboo. </p>
<p>Until a broader sense of the past is more widely shared among Congolese groups, rebels will flit across borders, civilians will be both victims and perpetrators, and groups will purchase political power with demonstrations of violent disruption.</p>
<p>Interstate collaboration between the DRC and Burundi governments for justice in Gatumba would be a first step towards building a future without impunity.</p>
<p><em>Ezra Schrader, a research assistant at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies with the Gatumba Survivors Project, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey works for Clark University.</span></em></p>Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is used to win a place in government, not to overthrow it. And it keeps working.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884612022-08-09T10:15:59Z2022-08-09T10:15:59ZIs there really a paradigm shift in US/Africa relations? Why the answer seems to be yes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478255/original/file-20220809-22-788vfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Secretary of State Antony Blinken setting out Washington's new Africa strategy at the University of Pretoria.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Andrew Harnik/AP POOL/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/08/blinken-makes-case-for-democracy-at-start-of-sub-saharan-africa-tour">whirlwind visit</a> to three African countries is the second in less than 12 months. </p>
<p>In November 2021 he visited <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-travel-to-kenya-nigeria-and-senegal/">key U.S. regional partners</a> Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria. </p>
<p>In South Africa – the first stop on this trip – Blinken unveiled the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf">U.S Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa</a>, marking a remarkable paradigmatic shift in America’s engagement with Africa.</p>
<p>Why do I call the new strategy a paradigmatic shift? </p>
<p>First, it sets a positive tone for US engagement with Africa. Previous US strategies began from the premise that Africa was not a strategic actor in the broad scheme of American foreign policy. </p>
<p>This strategy is different. It starts from the assumption that Africa is a core priority of US foreign policy. </p>
<p>This guiding assumption frames the fundamental commitment to working together toward common aspirations in the advancement of a shared agenda. </p>
<p>The tone is matched by the emphasis on African agency. And the ability of the continent to lead and participate effectively in decisions when it comes to economic, political and military engagements.</p>
<p>But, first some reflections on Blinken’s three-country visit.</p>
<h2>Significance of three-country stopovers</h2>
<p>The visit to South Africa underscored US interest in re-engaging the South African government within the context of the US-South Africa Strategic Dialogue framework. This was crafted by the Barack Obama administration in 2010 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-secretary-of-state-blinken-in-south-africa-on-africa-tour/2022/08/07/bd50edba-163f-11ed-b998-b2ab68f58468_story.html">to deepen the relationship</a> between the two sides. </p>
<p>The dialogue provides a forum for both partners to review common aspirations and objectives while also addressing persisting disagreements. But it was interrupted by the Donald Trump administration as well as the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. </p>
<p>South Africa is one of the few African countries with this kind of strategic partnership with the US. The forum therefore reinforces South Africa as an African actor that Washington takes seriously. This is despite differences which both partners should manage amicably. </p>
<p>Hopefully, the Blinken delegation may have had the opportunity to cautiously raise concerns about the instability and disarray in the governing African National Congress (ANC) coalition. This has had a detrimental impact on South Africa’s stature in foreign policy. In Africa and globally.</p>
<p>In the DRC and Rwanda, Blinken will <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/secretary-blinken-arrive-congo-rwanda-amid-international-tensions/story?id=88086834">confront the unending conflicts</a> in the region. These have decimated lives and communities, frustrated international and regional stabilisation efforts, and consigned the Great Lakes region to global marginality. This is despite its <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=blinken+in+rwanda&rlz=1C1CHBD_enZA971ZA971&oq=bli&aqs=chrome.1.46i67i131i433j35i39j69i57j35i39j0i131i433i512j69i60l3.4607j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">abundant resources</a>. </p>
<p>Bilateral, regional, and international efforts to resolve the root cause of the problem – the antagonism between the DRC and Rwanda – have failed. They need the injection of US mediation to break the impasse. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
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<p>The government of President Felix Tshisekedi has <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-06-09-rwanda-drc-tensions-complicate-the-nairobi-peace-talks-for-the-great-lakes/">made decisive attempts</a> to mend fences with Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame. But the two are incapable of resolving their problems while conflict persists. </p>
<p>Kagame will not cease his relentless military adventures in the region if the DRC and its supporters cannot eliminate insurgent Hutu rebels implicated in the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>In addition, neither the DRC government nor the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) seem able to marshal the resources to be able to pacify the eastern DRC sufficiently to address <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/08/05/confidential-un-report-provides-solid-evidence-of-rwanda-s-involvement-in-the-east-drc_5992599_4.html">Kagame’s concerns</a>. </p>
<p>It is going to require US diplomatic dexterity and a sustained economic and political re-commitment to resolve this 30-year-old crisis. A start may be a US-led military force composed of new military contingents from various countries. This could be bolstered by a bold US commitment against authoritarian and autocratic regimes in the region. </p>
<p>But Blinken is bound <a href="https://www.aei.org/op-eds/why-blinken-fails-to-understand-rwanda/">to face opposition from some of the key players </a>.</p>
<h2>The paradigm shift</h2>
<p>The strategy outlined by Blinken has four key objectives. These are fostering openness and open societies; delivering democratic and security dividends; advancing pandemic recovery and economic opportunity; and supporting conservation, climate adaptation and just energy transition (pp. 7-10). </p>
<p>An innovative idea is the involvement of the US International Development Agency (USAID) on the education front. What’s been tabled is that US academic institutions and the private sector provide online courses for African students. Subjects could include science, technology, engineering and Maths (STEM) (p.16).</p>
<p>The strategy also emphasises digital democracy, the centrality of cities, and incorporation of African American diaspora in US-Africa relations.</p>
<p>Beyond these, the four objectives capture the continuity of policies that past administrations have articulated. </p>
<p>The change prescribed in the strategy, therefore, is in tone rather than substance.</p>
<p>Third, sensitivities to race play a dominant role in the strategy, reflective of the convergence of Africanists and African Americans in the Biden administration and its Africa policy. </p>
<p>Throughout the document, there is mention of placing people of colour at the heart of US-Africa relations as well as </p>
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<p>recognizing the historical and ongoing connections between addressing racial justice and equality in Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States (p.12).</p>
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<p>Equally germane, the strategy acknowledges past criticisms of US training and support for African militaries that launch coups against civilian regimes and abuse human rights.</p>
<p>Finally, the strategy is cleverly articulated to undercut critics who often invoke US competition with China and Russia in Africa as the main driver of engagement with Africa. The strategy poignantly addresses this issue. It states:</p>
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<p>the United States has an abiding interest in ensuring that the region remains open, and accessible to all, and that governments and publics are able to make their own choices, consistent with international obligations.“ (p.7).</p>
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<p>Instead of being preachy and prescriptive with respect to African relations with other powers, the strategy presents African states with the enticing option of working with the US in the advancement of common values, mutual respect, democracy, and prosperity. </p>
<p>The strategy is a fresh beginning in US-Africa relations. But its outcomes will be judged on two factors. Will the Biden administration be able to negotiate implementation in the fractious US political process? And will African countries be able to seize opportunities that the strategy presents?</p>
<p>The December 2022 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-announces-us-africa-summit-mid-december-2022-07-20/">Africa-US summit in Washington</a> will be an excellent opportunity to gauge responses to this strategy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The strategy outlined by the US Secretary of State marks a fresh beginning in US-Africa relations.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1879322022-07-31T06:47:55Z2022-07-31T06:47:55ZProtests against UN in eastern Congo highlight peace mission’s crisis of legitimacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476697/original/file-20220729-9109-i8ccly.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Congolese soldier in Goma during protests against the UN peacekeeping mission in July 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michel Lunanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2022/7/26/photos-anti-monusco-protests-in-dr-congos-goma-turn-violent">Violent protests</a> erupted in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in late July 2022, resulting in the deaths of at least three peacekeepers and several civilians. </p>
<p>The United Nations mission in the Congo has long suffered a crisis of confidence among local communities. It has been accused of failing to protect civilians and improve security in the region, despite a presence spanning <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">more than two decades</a>. </p>
<p>This is not the first time protests have broken out against UN peacekeepers in eastern Congo. However, these recent events have brought to the surface the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272?scroll=top">persistent problems</a> facing the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco). It has <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/khassim-diagne-monusco-not-responsible-death-demonstrators-who-looted-and-vandalized-its-base-goma%E2%80%9D">faced questions</a> on its operational effectiveness, consent of the host state and whether – or how – it can make a graceful exit from the country. </p>
<p>Heightened tensions in the Congo’s eastern region are the result of what is perceived by many as years of peacekeeping failures, resulting in violence, death and the displacement of millions of Congolese. </p>
<p>A great deal has been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139?casa_token=0oceATTE0UMAAAAA:qoyNM4-ndQKWelRNVo5J4yOKDbd-IxFr_yBy22jB2daPNQJNnrU73cRsDblt0rbUL2m5kA69__Stkg">written</a> about the perils of so-called stabilisation approaches to peacekeeping. These have been pursued in countries like the Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic, and are characterised by efforts to neutralise non-state armed groups and extend state authority. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Both the UN and the African Union increasingly reference stabilisation approaches in policy dialogue and mission mandates. However, such approaches have proven largely ineffective, in part because of their state-centric nature, which fails to take into account local drivers of conflict. </p>
<h2>Crisis of confidence</h2>
<p>When the Force Intervention Brigade was <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm">authorised by the UN Security Council</a> in 2013, it was initially praised for bringing a <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/11/in-drc-one-militia-m23-down-49-more-to-go/">swift halt</a> to the insurrection attempt by the armed group M23. </p>
<p>Yet, since that time, the brigade has struggled to implement its mandate in the face of the continued proliferation of armed groups in the region and high levels of insecurity. In response to these challenges, the brigade recently received <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/quick-reaction-forces-to-the-rescue-in-eastern-drc">additional support</a> from several quick reaction forces.</p>
<p>Yet, the mission has been unable to stem the violence. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">resurgence of the M23</a> in the past few months has been a stark illustration of the brigade’s shortcomings. </p>
<p>At the same time, militarised approaches to peacekeeping in the Congo have come at the expense of <a href="https://nonviolentpeaceforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2021_Course_Manual___Mod_1_pt_2.pdf">non-violent approaches to peacebuilding</a>, like unarmed protection methods, which may be more conducive to building lasting peace.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">The UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence</a>
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<p>The result is that the UN is facing a crisis of legitimacy among the population, despite having invested a good deal of resources trying to manage its reputation. Confidence in the ability of peacekeepers to ensure security is <a href="http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC_Poll19_FinalEnglish.pdf">generally low among communities</a> in eastern Congo, and has decreased over time. It’s also notably lower than confidence in state security forces, despite the latter’s <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unjhro_-_analysis_of_the_human_rights_situation_-_may_2020.pdf">egregious human rights violations</a> and lack of capacity. </p>
<p>This raises questions of consent, including whose voices matter when it comes to maintaining cooperation with the host country. Host state consent, a <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping">principle of UN peacekeeping</a>, is conventionally interpreted as consent of the host government. However, the recent scenes from the Congo suggest that greater attention ought to be paid to the voices of community members. </p>
<p>While the UN recognises the importance of maintaining trust with local communities, it’s not clear how it can – or should – respond should those relationships deteriorate beyond repair, as may now be the case. </p>
<p>Regional dynamics have further complicated this situation, given the cross-border nature of the conflict, and with Kinshasa’s military <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/13/m23-rebels-seize-key-congolese-town-drc-blames-rwanda">accusing Rwanda</a> of using the M23 to invade Congo. Kigali has denied these accusations.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While the UN mission is in a period of drawdown, there is no clear timeline for exit. Withdrawal is instead guided by progress towards a series of agreed-upon <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14374.doc.htm">benchmarks</a>, including a significant reduction in the threat posed by armed groups. </p>
<p>Some experts <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/IPI-E-RPT-The-Case-of-MONUSCO2021PDF.pdf">have argued</a> that the drawdown should not be bound by time. Progress has been slow, and it is not clear the benchmarks will be met in the near future.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the mission and members of the UN Security Council need to grapple with what to do if they cannot bring security conditions under control, or if the state pushes more forcefully for an early exit. </p>
<p>Protests in the region are likely to continue over the coming months, particularly in the run-up to the Congo presidential elections, which are scheduled for late 2023. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">How DRC's colonial legacy forged a nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict</a>
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<p>What is needed at this time is a robust regional security arrangement that would ease some of the pressure on the UN mission and make space for a stronger diplomatic response to regional tensions. </p>
<p>The 22 July 2022 <a href="https://www.eac.int/ncpr/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=27&Itemid=144">agreement</a> by the East African Community Heads of States to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/21/east-africa-leaders-agree-regional-force-for-dr-congo">deploy a regional force</a> to the Congo may be a timely step in the right direction. </p>
<p>But, as the UN mission’s difficulties have shown, military operations cannot be effective if they aren’t coupled with a viable political process, which has been lacking in the Congo. The current security situation, alongside contentious regional dynamics, is indicative of this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187932/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is affiliated with the International Peace Institute, an independent, international not-for-profit think tank.</span></em></p>Protests are likely to continue over the coming months, particularly in the run-up to the Congo presidential elections next year.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1878612022-07-28T14:02:57Z2022-07-28T14:02:57ZThe UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476473/original/file-20220728-25-l9hirx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Congolese in Goma protest against the UN peacekeeping mission on 26 July 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michel Lunanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Demonstrators in the volatile eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have called for the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/26/un-peacekeepers-troops-shoot-two-protesters-dead-in-goma-drc">Recent protests</a> in Butembo-Beni, Goma, Bukavu and Uvira turned into deadly attacks against the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). </p>
<p>By 26 July 2022, at least 15 people had died, <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/cp_la_monusco_annonce_la_mort_dun_casque_bleu_et_de_deux_membres_de_la_police_des_nations_unies_26_juillet_2022.pdf">including UN peacekeepers</a>, as demonstrators stormed and burnt the mission’s bases in Goma, Butembo and Uvira. They accused the 22-year-old mission of failing to stop decades of fighting in the country.</p>
<p>The UN mission, however, has long been blamed for what should be the DRC government’s responsibility: de-escalating violence in the country’s eastern region and finding long-term solutions to peace.</p>
<p>Across the entire eastern region, from Ituri to South Kivu, and for roughly three decades now, local populations have suffered daily due to the violence meted out either by armed groups or Congolese security services. </p>
<p>The situation remains volatile despite the presence of the world’s largest UN mission, which was first established and deployed in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/monuc/">1999</a>. Its mandate was expanded in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">2010</a> to include the protection of civilians. As of November 2021, it had more than 16,000 uniformed personnel in the DRC.</p>
<p>Violent reactions against the UN mission are an expression of the local population’s frustrations about the past and the present, but also the uncertainty of their future.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://pure.eur.nl/en/persons/delphin-ntanyoma/?relations=publications">my research</a>, undertaken since 2017 to understand the motivations of individuals, groups and communities in violent conflicts, particularly in eastern DRC, I would argue that the UN mission shouldn’t be held responsible for what the Congolese state should be doing. </p>
<p>In the 22 years since the current UN mission was deployed, the Congolese state, and the country’s elite, bear huge responsibility for failing to form and build an army able to preserve harmony and protect the population. </p>
<h2>The triggers</h2>
<p>The latest attack on the UN mission followed a political meeting held on 15 July 2022 in Goma, the capital city of North Kivu in eastern DRC. While on parliamentary recess, Bahati Lukwebo, the president of the senate, stopped to speak to his supporters in Goma. North Kivu is currently facing diverse forms of armed insurgencies, including from the M23. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">What M23's on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC's precarious search for peace</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnmkWS5i7rw">In his speech</a>, Lukwebo asked the youth to consider joining the Congolese national army, the Forces Armées de la Republique Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). He also blamed the UN mission for failing to stabilise the country. </p>
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<p><em>Pendant 22 ans, ils n’ont pas ramené la paix dans notre pays</em> (For 22 years, they did not bring peace to our country).</p>
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<p>The crowd responded in Swahili, a national language: “<em>Baenda, baende</em> (Let them go, let them go).”</p>
<p>Lukwebo, a long-time politician, asked the crowd to raise their hands if they wanted the UN mission to leave. The hands shot up. He then said the UN peacekeepers should pack their bags, and allow the Congolese to take care of their own peace, security and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>In the country’s fragile socio-security context, these remarks were dangerous. The UN mission has <a href="https://issblog.nl/2020/02/24/whose-responsibility-is-it-anyway-questioning-the-role-of-un-peacekeeping-mission-monusco-in-stabilizing-the-eastern-drc-by-delphin-ntanyoma/">long been accused</a> of failing to protect civilians from rebel groups in the country. </p>
<p>These remarks followed a June 2022 briefing from a top official for the UN mission in the DRC, Bintou Keita. She <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/un-well-armed-m23-rebels-resurgent-in-drc/6638775.html">warned</a> the Security Council that the mission in the DRC “may find itself confronted by a threat that goes beyond its current capabilities” in tackling the resurgence of a highly organised M23. </p>
<p>To <a href="https://twitter.com/luchaRDC/status/1551983126930460674">some Congolese</a>, this sounded like the UN mission would no longer play a role in supporting the national army or protecting civilians. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, Lukwebo’s address fanned the flame of protest. Political manipulation may aim to shift the blame for the DRC’s insecurity from the national army to the UN mission. However, for communities in eastern DRC, their continued exposure to violence is evidence of an unfulfilled promise to keep them safe.</p>
<h2>The blame game</h2>
<p>A few months back, the widely unstable North Kivu province experienced a resurgence of the M23 rebel group. Rwanda has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-m23-problem-kigali-s-headache-and-some-hard-truths-3876884">accused</a> of backing the M23 – Kigali has vehemently denied these allegations. </p>
<p>The rebel group was initially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-rebels-idUSBRE9A30PE20131105">defeated in 2013</a>. But beyond M23, eastern DRC has hundreds of local and foreign armed militia groups. From Ituri to South Kivu provinces, communities witness violence daily. </p>
<p>These armed groups include the jihadist-linked <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests.pdf">Allied Democratic Forces</a> operating in Beni (North Kivu) and Ituri. In Ituri specifically, a militia group known as Coopérative de Développement du Congo has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ethnic-militia-kills-18-in-eastern-dr-congo-3742996">attacking Congolese civilians</a> over their ethnic affiliation. The UN has said these attacks could be characterised as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/01/drc-inter-ethnic-violence-ituri-may-constitute-crimes-against-humanity-un?LangID=E&NewsID=25459">crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>Similar attacks that target individuals due to their ethnic affiliation are committed in South Kivu on the basis that these victims are “not real Congolese”. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-is-endemic-in-eastern-congo-what-drives-it-156039">Violence is endemic in eastern Congo: what drives it</a>
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<p>As insecurity heightens, local communities keep forming defence groups. However, many of these groups eventually turn on those they are supposed to protect. Whether or not these armed groups and rebellions have legitimate claims to exist, their failure to uphold their grievances and their attacks on civilians overshadow why they were formed.</p>
<p>The UN mission has faced <a href="https://issblog.nl/2020/02/24/whose-responsibility-is-it-anyway-questioning-the-role-of-un-peacekeeping-mission-monusco-in-stabilizing-the-eastern-drc-by-delphin-ntanyoma/">various challenges</a> in executing its mandate. This includes its being unfamiliar with local contexts, as well as having to operate in a region that’s mostly inaccessible. In Beni, it has expressed concerns over the national army launching military operations without sufficiently engaging peacekeepers. </p>
<p>These – and other internal and external challenges – call for a redefinition of the mission’s mandate in relation to local contexts. If this doesn’t happen, the UN risks spending another decade trying, but failing to contribute to long-lasting peace in eastern DRC.</p>
<h2>Congo government’s failures</h2>
<p>The Congolese elite have formed a network of predators who have preyed on their constituencies since independence in 1960. The country is among the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">poorest in the world</a> despite its rich mineral and natural resources. The majority of Congolese live in extreme poverty, while the elite are extremely rich. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>On top of this, the national army comprises military officers and generals whose prime concern is to serve their own interests. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-drcs-army-and-police-arent-yet-ready-to-protect-citizens-114326">Embezzlement and corruption</a> have ruined the military to the extent that rank and file soldiers are poorly equipped and sometimes go unpaid, while generals build financial empires. </p>
<p>The UN mission has come to be seen as part and parcel of this situation. Local communities have lost trust in the intervention of government and international security forces, and their capacity to bring change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UN mission is being held responsible for something the Congolese state should be doing.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1865122022-07-27T14:49:00Z2022-07-27T14:49:00ZBelgium is reviewing its colonial past in the DRC: it’s a sensitive but necessary process<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473646/original/file-20220712-22-r756em.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President
Felix Tshisekedi, left, receives a ceremonial mask from Belgium's King Philippe in June 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The year 2022 is shaping up to be a critical period for the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-king-philippe-congo-challenge-dont-do-anything-to-cause-trouble/">troubled relationship</a> between Kinshasa and Brussels. </p>
<p>In June, during a visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Belgian king Philippe <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220608-belgian-king-reiterates-regrets-for-colonial-past-in-dr-congo-stops-short-of-apology">expressed his regret</a> for the wounds of his country’s colonial past. Prime Minister Alexander De Croo then <a href="https://english.news.cn/europe/20220621/64608b85a7b64007a8fd83618d904ea2/c.html">apologised</a> for Belgium’s “moral responsibility” for the 1961 assassination of DRC Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. The country later repatriated his <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-hands-over-lumumba-tooth-family-60-years-after-murder/">remains</a>. </p>
<p>From the outset, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/09/belgium-king-philippe-democratic-republic-congo-colonialism/">said</a> that the challenge for the two nations is to look to the future. He hopes in particular that stronger ties with Belgium will help attract more investments. </p>
<p>But there are those in the DRC who think Belgium hasn’t done enough yet to compensate for its past. Opposition senator Francine Nkanga, for instance, <a href="https://twitter.com/Muyumba/status/1534810273713950720">has said</a>:</p>
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<p>We will never look to the future without an apology and reparations from Belgium.</p>
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<p>So even if both Kinshasa and Brussels want to frame their relationship as one looking into the future, it’s clear that their common past still weighs heavily on their countries. </p>
<p>In July 2020, Belgium set up a parliamentary commission to look into the country’s colonial history and how to best address its consequences. </p>
<p>The commission is expected to come up with <a href="https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/congo/55K1462001.pdf">concrete recommendations</a> later this year. It’s hoped they will provide an idea of how to heal the relationships between Belgians, Congolese, Rwandans and Burundians. </p>
<p>It’s a Herculean task. </p>
<p>The commission’s mission is to shed light on a controversial history. It’s required to critically assess the roles of the state, monarchy, church and corporations during Leopold II’s regime (1885-1908). It will also cover Belgium’s colonial rule (1908-1960), and the country’s history in Rwanda and Burundi (1919-1962). </p>
<p>I interviewed Wouter De Vriendt, the chairperson of the commission, for insights into the team’s work. He said:</p>
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<p>The recommendations could be deployed in many fields: decolonisation of the public space, cultural heritage, fight against racism and xenophobia, academic research, education, and diplomatic and development cooperation relations.</p>
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<p>But some <a href="https://www.lalibre.be/belgique/politique-belge/2022/06/22/lopen-vld-et-la-n-va-renoncent-a-la-mission-parlementaire-en-afrique-centrale-pas-de-plus-value-et-un-cout-trop-important-XHCLG3VGWNF57OBSLHEQYPYB7M/">political parties</a> question this scope. Criticisms have also mounted from people of African descent living in Belgium. </p>
<p>Among other things, they say the commission doesn’t sufficiently include black and mixed-race people, and that their current struggles aren’t taken into account. In their view, the floor is primarily given to academic experts, revealing a persistent <a href="https://blogs.mediapart.fr/plis/blog/100222/pacification-du-passe-colonial-belge-auto-erotisme-et-decentrement-decolonial">coloniality</a> of knowledge. </p>
<p>As a history professor who has <a href="https://uclouvain.be/fr/repertoires/anne-sophie.gijs">examined</a> the influence of the past on current political, economic and cultural relations between Africa and Europe, I’m aware that it’s crucial yet intricate to understand the points of view of people whose experiences we don’t share. </p>
<p>The work of Belgium’s parliamentary commission crystallises some of those challenges societies in Europe face when dealing with their colonial past. It may be on a difficult path, but it’s a necessary one.</p>
<h2>Grappling with the past</h2>
<p>In 2020, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-george-floyd-changed-the-online-conversation-around-black-lives-matter/">George Floyd’s murder</a> in the US and the worldwide Black Lives Matter movement revived long-standing claims from <a href="https://www.memoirecoloniale.be/">diaspora organisations</a> that have denounced the persistence of neo-colonial patterns in Belgium. </p>
<p>These trends still feed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2019.1645422">racism and discrimination</a> in the country today. </p>
<p>In July 2020, Belgium’s parliament <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/117289/parliament-approves-commission-on-belgiums-colonial-past">appointed</a> a commission to investigate the country’s colonial past, document its consequences and propose appropriate responses. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/patrice-lumumbas-tooth-represents-plunder-resilience-and-reparation-186241">Patrice Lumumba’s tooth represents plunder, resilience and reparation</a>
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<p>The first task of the commission – with <a href="https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/comm&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/com.cfm?com=10219">17 members</a> from across Belgium’s political spectrum – was to appoint a multi-disciplinary committee. These 10 experts <a href="https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/55/1462/55K1462002.pdf">released a report</a> in October 2021. </p>
<p>In a bid to broaden and deepen the conclusions of this report, parliamentarians organised hearings with diaspora and civil society. A large panel of international experts also makes presentations every week on the responsibilities of the actors involved in colonisation. </p>
<p>The debate is currently focused on relevant kinds of reparation and reconciliation processes. </p>
<p>The interviewed experts change weekly, but three independent academic specialists are working with parliament permanently. </p>
<h2>A rocky path</h2>
<p>From the onset, the commission faced hurdles. </p>
<p>While public and political attention peaked with the Black Lives Matter movement, priorities shifted following the COVID pandemic in 2020 and the 2022 war in Ukraine, and their economic fallout. </p>
<p>This prompted <a href="https://www.lalibre.be/belgique/politique-belge/2022/06/22/lopen-vld-et-la-n-va-renoncent-a-la-mission-parlementaire-en-afrique-centrale-pas-de-plus-value-et-un-cout-trop-important-XHCLG3VGWNF57OBSLHEQYPYB7M/">certain parties</a> to question the importance of the commission’s exercise. </p>
<p>In particular, establishing historical responsibilities and possible financial reparations triggered <a href="https://www.rtbf.be/article/passe-colonial-l-open-vld-et-la-n-va-renoncent-a-la-mission-parlementaire-en-afrique-centrale-11017385">heated debates</a> between experts and political parties. </p>
<p>For observers, the dire humanitarian and security situation, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61092878">recently aggravated in Eastern Congo</a>, should be higher on the political agenda than the scrutiny of history. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/retracing-belgiums-dark-past-in-the-congo-and-attempts-to-forge-deeper-ties-184903">Retracing Belgium's dark past in the Congo, and attempts to forge deeper ties</a>
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<p>Some also worry about the political gains that lawmakers taking part in the commission may seek to reap.</p>
<p>In response to this, De Vriendt told me: </p>
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<p>The commission represents a broad range of Belgian ideologies and interests, and is synthesising many topics and opinions … This is the first time that diasporas have been included in a parliamentary initiative to such an extent … The three independent academics additionally help to depoliticise and objectify the work and methodology adopted.</p>
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<p>Yet the points of view shared each week can be diametrically opposed. Drawing constructive conclusions for present and future generations will, therefore, be a trying task. </p>
<p>But when I interviewed him, De Vriendt emphasised that the commission’s objective “is not to come to a shared ‘truth’ nor to create consensus around a definitive narrative on history”.</p>
<p>Its aim, he said, was to “demonstrate that Belgium is capable of an open, lucid and thorough reflection on its past and its consequences, and … practical recommendations will follow, paving the way for appeased and improved relations between Belgians, Congolese, Rwandans and Burundians”. </p>
<h2>What reconciliation means</h2>
<p>Among possible reparations, official apologies and financial retribution are most frequently listed. But they are the tip of an iceberg. </p>
<p>To move past the past, Belgium is considering other avenues. These include <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-takes-first-small-step-in-returning-art-to-congo/">restitution of artefacts</a>, joint research between Congolese and Belgians, reformed education, facilitation of visas for people from its former colonies and fighting discrimination faced by African descendants in Belgium. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-drc-reparations-verdict-raises-questions-about-the-price-of-justice-177485">Uganda-DRC reparations verdict raises questions about the price of justice</a>
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<p>The final recommendations could also apply to Belgium’s development policy in central Africa to foster more inclusive and equitable partnerships. </p>
<p>Given the scope of competencies targeted, all layers of the Belgian state will likely be called to action in the final report expected in December 2022. This will include the federal government and local authorities. They, in turn, will have to take inspiration from the proposals, should they choose to do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne-Sophie Gijs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belgium wants to frame its relationship with Congo, Rwanda and Burundi as one looking into the future – but the past weighs heavily.Anne-Sophie Gijs, Professor, Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1793202022-03-23T12:13:45Z2022-03-23T12:13:45ZDRC is set to become 7th member of the east Africa trading bloc: what’s in it for everyone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452234/original/file-20220315-17-1w168gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Felix Tshisekedi waves an official copy of the nation's Constitution during his swearing in on January 24, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/democratic-republic-of-the-congos-newly-inaugurated-news-photo/1087921674">TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Shortly after his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46819303">controversial</a> electoral victory in early 2019, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Felix Tshisekedi sought to get his country admitted into the East African Community. <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2373-democratic-republic-of-congo-inches-closer-to-joining-eac">Recently</a>, the East African Community ministers recommended the DRC’s admission, a decision set to be <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/east-africa/drc-finally-joins-eac-next-week-three-years-after-application-3755792">formalised</a> by the bloc’s presidents when they meet on 29 March. Regional integration expert Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi discusses key points of the decision.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the state of East African Community integration?</h2>
<p>East African Community is one of the most vibrant and best performing blocs in Africa. This is according to the <a href="https://www.integrate-africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ARII2019_technical_report_EN.pdf">African Regional Integration Index</a> which ranks blocs on five aspects of integration - trade, productive, macroeconomic, infrastructural and movement of people.</p>
<p>Currently, it has six members: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. </p>
<p>East Africa’s integration is envisioned under <a href="https://www.eac.int/integration-pillars">four pillars</a>. These are the customs union, the common market, the monetary union, and the political federation. So far, the bloc has been implementing protocols on a customs union and a common market. These have <a href="https://mocu.ac.tz/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/OMUCHESI-JONATHAN-ANGANI_The-Interaction-Between-Intra-regional-Investment.pdf">helped improve</a> trade and investments in the region since 2006 and boosted country relations. </p>
<p>Under the customs union protocol taxes on goods produced within the region have been eliminated. East Africa is also applying a <a href="https://www.eac.int/documents/category/eac-common-external-tariff">common external tariff</a> on imports from outside the region. </p>
<p>In the long run, an operational customs union should open up the regional economy so that small economies are able to gain access to industries that would otherwise be out of their reach. </p>
<p>For its part, the purpose of a common market is to ease cross-border movement of goods, persons and workers. It’s implementation has <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Promise_and_Efficacy_of_E_African_Community1.pdf">seen</a> the east African governments harmonise immigration procedures and order border posts to operate for 24 hours. Some of the governments in the region, <a href="https://www.eac.int/working-in-east-africa">notably</a> Rwanda and Kenya, have also waived the work permit fee for citizens from the region. </p>
<p>The bloc is now preparing the ground for its third pillar, the <a href="https://www.eac.int/monetary-union">monetary union</a>. This began with the adoption and signing of the East African Monetary Union Protocol on 30 November 2013. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/afr1506.pdf">protocol</a> set a timeline of 10 years within which the partner states need to have a common currency. That’s in 2023, a deadline that’s unlikely to be met. There has been mixed progress in the implementation of agreed action on this front. </p>
<h2>How do countries get admitted?</h2>
<p>The criteria for admission into the bloc is provided under Article 3 of the East African Community <a href="https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2487/download">treaty</a> signed in 1999. The regional law provides the following grounds for admission of a new member:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>acceptance of the Community as set out in the East African Community Treaty;</p></li>
<li><p>adherence to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice;</p></li>
<li><p>potential contribution to the strengthening of integration within the East African region;</p></li>
<li><p>geographical proximity to and interdependence between it and the partner states;</p></li>
<li><p>establishment and maintenance of a market driven economy; and</p></li>
<li><p>social and economic policies being compatible with those of the Community.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>So far, the body has had <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-history">three</a> admissions: Rwanda and Burundi in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. The DRC shares borders with Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan. There has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/lawyer-sues-to-block-congo-s-admission-to-eac-bloc-3445788">opposition</a> to its plan to join the East African Community due to its past human rights record. </p>
<h2>What does the East African Community gain?</h2>
<p>The DRC’s admission would give the bloc its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tshisekedi-launches-construction-congos-first-deep-water-port-2022-01-31/">first port</a> on the Atlantic coast. At the moment, the region relies on Indian Ocean-based seaports of Kenya and Tanzania for trade with the rest of the world. The challenge of <a href="https://www.ics-shipping.org/press-release/change-in-piracy-threats-in-indian-ocean-prompts-re-think-of-high-risk-area/">intermittent</a> piracy off the Somalia coast has exposed the need for an alternative trade route. </p>
<p>The DRC is also set to significantly expand the regional trading bloc’s size. The DRC’s geographical area is far much larger than all the six East African states put together. The DRC has a geographical area of 2.4 million sq km while the bloc is about 1.8 million sq km. The additional geographical area - known uniquely for its copper, coltan, cobalt, tin and other minerals - is set to boost East Africa’s profile as an investment destination. </p>
<p>On a world stage, the East African Community gains a bigger clout with the DRC’s huge population (consumer base) of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CD">about</a> 90 million people and an economy of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZG">nearly US$50 billion </a>. It is <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-quick-facts">estimated</a> that the bloc has a population of 177 million people and an economy of US$193.7 billion. </p>
<h2>What’s in it for the DRC?</h2>
<p>The DRC is already doing substantial trade with the East African Community bloc which could <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eac-scorecard-drc-admission-win-trade-rows-slow-business-3669232">benefit</a> from lower or eliminated tariffs. Goods produced in the DRC will no longer be subjected to customs taxes at any of the region’s border points.</p>
<p>It already has established trade relations with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/world-bank-drc-rwandas-most-promising-trade-partner#:%7E:text=By%202019%2C%20Rwanda%20had%20exported,the%20report%20noted%20in%20part.">Rwanda</a>, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/drc-and-burundi-agreements-3472358">Burundi</a> and <a href="https://gltfp.comesa.int/uganda-and-democratic-republic-of-congo-develop-a-simplified-trade-regime-tool-kit/">Uganda</a>. For imports, parts of the DRC rely on the trade corridor that runs from Mombasa port via Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. These connections are set to firm up as national agencies of the East African governments ease tariffs and administrative barriers on the new bloc member.</p>
<h2>Does it matter that this is the third bloc the DRC is joining?</h2>
<p>Generally, membership in more than one customs union is technically impossible. Firstly, one country cannot apply different common external tariffs. Secondly, integration agenda differs from one bloc to the next meaning overlapping membership may lead a country to conflicting obligations. According to the World Trade Organisation, the practice <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm">hurts global trade liberalisation</a>, especially when affected traders have to meet multiple sets of rules.</p>
<p>But <a href="http://repository.eac.int/bitstream/handle/11671/24273/en-epa-overlapping-memberships-2005.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">analysis</a> of the treaties of the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa shows they do not preclude members from maintaining prior trade arrangements or entering into new ones.</p>
<p>The DRC is already a member of the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. But it won’t be the only East African Community country with overlapping membership of regional blocs. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa while Tanzania is a member of Southern African Development Community. </p>
<p>The East African Community, for instance, has not been able to establish a full customs union since it had to allow Tanzania to grant preferences to its southern Africa partners. </p>
<p>The three blocs are currently <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-integration/tripartite-cooperation/">harmonising their agenda and laws</a> with the aim of integrating their economies and markets.
This fits into the broader objective of the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>, of accelerating economic integration of the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The admission of DRC will extend the East African Community bloc’s reach to the Atlantic Ocean.Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi, Lecturer In Governance and Regional Integration, Catholic University of Eastern AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1716682021-11-16T12:30:37Z2021-11-16T12:30:37ZTshisekedi a consolidé l'assise de son pouvoir en RDC: il lui faut maintenant passer à l’action<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431394/original/file-20211110-19-1c8nsfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C926%2C616&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Félix Tshisekedi, Président de la République démocratique du Congo</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/-Hayoung Jeon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Félix Tshisekedi, de l’Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social, est devenu le cinquième président de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) en <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/felix-tshisekedis-improbable-inauguration-leaves-congo-in-a-confused-daze/2019/01/24/36f51a84-1cf1-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html">janvier 2019</a> après l’une des élections les plus attendues de l’histoire du pays.</p>
<p>Les loyalistes du parti ont célébré l’événement. Mais beaucoup d’autres –- tant en RDC qu’à l’étranger –- ont déploré une nouvelle élection volée. Le Financial Times a trouvé des preuves irréfutables que l’élection avait fait l’objet d’une fraude <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">d’une ampleur inouïe</a>. Alors que Martin Fayulu devrait de droit être le président en exercice de la RDC, Tshisekedi occupe le palais présidentiel, ou la « Maison Blanche » comme on l’appelle parfois.</p>
<p>C’était un début peu prometteur. La fragilité de la position de Tshisekedi était aggravée par le fait qu’il avait formé avec l’ancien chef d’État <a href="https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-Fl-Ka/Kabila-Joseph.html">Joseph Kabila</a> une alliance précaire. Les deux n'ont pas fait bon ménage et ont engagé une lutte au coeur de la politique congolaise. </p>
<p>La coalition de Tshisekedi, Cap sur le changement, était minoritaire, tant à l’Assemblée nationale congolaise qu’au Sénat. Les deux branches du parlement congolais étaient dominées par la coalition Front commun pour le Congo, contrôlée par Kabila.</p>
<p>Faute de soutien parlementaire, Tshisekédi était, il faut le reconnaitre, en posision de faisblesse. Il a dû accepter le choix de Kabila pour le poste de premier ministre, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/29/dr-congo-s-prime-minister-sylvestre-ilunga-resigns-after-censure//">Sylvestre Ilunga</a>, en mai 2019. Il lui a fallu attendre cette année pour pouvoir enfin évincer Ilunga, un ancien professeur d’économie.</p>
<p>En avril, Tshisekedi a également <a href="https://chargedaffairs.org/felix-tshisekedis-newly-independent-agenda-for-the-drc-modernizer-or-strongman-2-0/">réussi à écarter du pouvoir de nombreux membres de la coalition Front commun pour le Congo</a>. Il a fermement établi son emprise sur le pouvoir politique à Kinshasa.</p>
<p>Bref, son gouvernement n'a plus l'excuse d'être entravé par l'emprise de l'ancien clan de son prédecesseur. Ayant renforcé sa mainmise sur la présidence, Tshisekedi doit s’atteler à la mise en œuvre d’un programme de changement au service du peuple congolais</p>
<h2>Ce qui a été fait</h2>
<p>En mars 2019, Tshisekedi a lancé un <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/23337/felix-tshisekedi-audits-his-emergency-program-troubles-partners/">programme d’urgence de 100 jours</a> pour donner le coup d'envoi à sa présidence. Le programme a été inauguré par la publication d’un <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">document de 78 pages </a> qui couvrait quelques-unes des priorités les plus importantes du gouvernement actuel à l’époque. Même si de nombreuses questions étaient abordées, comme la promotion de l’industrie et l’énergie, une grande partie de l’argent était réservée aux infrastructures: <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">183,2 millions de dollars</a>. Pourtant, bon nombre de ces projets sont inachevés.</p>
<p>Malgré la nécessité de prendre des mesures supplémentaires en ce qui concerne les projets de construction de routes, le président pourrait inscrire à son actif - fut-il partiellement - la fin de l'épidémie d'Ebola de 2018-2020 dans l’est du Congo. </p>
<p>Bien que les communautés locales et les <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/Ebola-2019-drc-">ONG aient été au cœur</a> des activités de secours, cela s’est produit pendant le mandat de Tshisekedi et il le presentera sans doute comme l'un de ses succès. </p>
<p>Dans le même temps, certains <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51220974">prisonniers politiques</a> ont été libérés, une décision qui permet de distinguer sa présidence de celle de Joseph Kabila.</p>
<p>Même s'il y a eu quelques changements, peu de Congolais ont constaté des améliorations majeures. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drcs-felix-tshisekedi-still-a-president-without-a-cabinet/a-48588554">Il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour améliorer</a> la vie des citoyens de la RDC, et cela est particulièrement vrai en dehors de la capitale.</p>
<h2>Ce qu’il reste à faire</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25506">Tout d’abord, de graves violences se poursuivent</a> dans la province de l’Ituri, dans le nord-est du pays. Après une décennie de paix relative de 2007 à 2017, les violences intercommunautaires entre Lendu et Hema <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/ituri-resurgence-conflict-and-failure-peacebuilding-policy">ont repris ces dernières années</a>. La récente campagne de terreur menée par les <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-allied-democratic-forces">Forces Démocratiques Alliées islamistes </a>a également contribué à accroître la violence dans la région nord-est du pays.</p>
<p>Alors que la violence se poursuit dans l’est de la RDC, la marge de progrès est encore énorme dans le secteur, situé en grande partie dans <a href="https://african.business/2014/01/economy/the-drc-s-katanga-province-return-of-the-copper-king/">la province du Haut-Katanga</a>, où la violence a diminué considérablement. Le gouvernement de Tshisekedi s'est engagé dans un long processus de négociations avec un consortium d’investisseurs miniers chinois basé dans le sud-est du pays.</p>
<p>Ces négociations, quoique lentes, présente quelques avantages pour l’État congolais. Les discussions portent sur <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/14/controversy-over-the-location-of-amazon-african-headquarters-in-cape-town-south-africa//">le montant que les investisseurs chinois donneront à l’État</a> en contrepartie des minéraux qu’ils exploitent.</p>
<p>En mai, le président a déclaré qu’il pensait que les contrats miniers précédents <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">pourraient être revus</a>. Globalement, il a cherché à renégocier le tristement célèbre accord <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2013.762167">« minerais contre infrastructures » </a> de Sicomines, conclu entre un groupe d’investisseurs chinois et le gouvernement congolais en 2008. En août, il a créé une <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">commission chargée d’examiner</a> les contrats miniers en vue d'obtenir des contrats plus avantageux.</p>
<h2>Perspectives</h2>
<p>Si un bon accord minier peut être conclu, la prospérité relative de ce secteur pourrait servir à propulser les plans de Tshisekedi au-delà du vieux programme d’urgence de 100 jours.
Premièrement, cela pourrait aider le secteur des infrastructures en difficulté, qui a connu peu de développement. La plupart des infrastructures sont <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">dans un état de délabrement</a>. Un réseau routier décent aiderait à propulser les entreprises et notamment celles du <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">secteur agricole</a>, si important pour la RDC.</p>
<p>Deuxièmement, des fonds publics plus importants pourraient aider le président à s’attaquer aux problèmes du système éducatif. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/school-children-storm-congo-parliament-over-teacher-strike-2021-10-21/">Une grève très inquiétante des enseignants</a> est en cours en RDC, le manque de salaire étant l’une des raisons de l’arrêt de travail. Voilà un problème qui nécessite une solution urgente.</p>
<p>Troisièmement, <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m2879">le secteur de la santé en RDC a également besoin d’un coup de pouce en termes d’investissements </a>, notamment en raison de la pandémie.</p>
<p>En bref, le gouvernement de Tshisekedi dispose désormais d’un capital politique durement acquis, qui lui permettrait d’opérer quelques-uns des changements qu’il a promis pendant sa campagne. Certains de ces changements pourraient être mis en œuvre par la négociation d’un accord minier décent, et à condition que cet argent soit distribué judicieusement.</p>
<p>Le secteur minier, aussi controversé soit-il, a connu une croissance soutenue depuis <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">le boom des matières premières en 2007</a>. Par ailleurs, la transparence au sein du secteur minier est apparemment <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">en train de</a> s'améliorer. Il est donc temps pour Tshisekedi de conclure un accord avantageux et de résoudre quelques-uns des nombreux problèmes auxquels ses citoyens sont confrontés.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171668/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman a reçu des financements de Arts and Humanities Research Council, de Economic and Social Research Council, de la British Academy, du Spalding Trust et de la Presbyterian Historical Society. Il est affilié au Parti travailliste britannique. </span></em></p>Le gouvernement du président Tshisekedi n’a plus l’excuse d’être entravé par l'emprise du clan de son prédécesseur Joseph Kabila.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1702822021-10-27T13:19:06Z2021-10-27T13:19:06ZDRC’s Tshisekedi has secured his power base: now it’s time to deliver<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428042/original/file-20211022-9474-2jop7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/-Hayoung Jeon </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Félix Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress became the fifth president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/felix-tshisekedis-improbable-inauguration-leaves-congo-in-a-confused-daze/2019/01/24/36f51a84-1cf1-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html">January 2019</a> after one of the most anticipated elections in the country’s history.</p>
<p>Party loyalists celebrated. But many others – both in the DRC and abroad – lamented another stolen election. The Financial Times found incontrovertible proof that the election had been the subject of a fraud on an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">eye-watering scale</a>. While <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/11/runner-up-in-congo-election-says-he-beat-official-winner-by-wide-margin">Martin Fayulu</a> should by rights be the sitting president of the DRC, Tshisekedi is occupying the presidential palace, or the “White House” as it is sometimes called.</p>
<p>It was an inauspicious start. The fragility of Tshisekedi’s position was compounded by the fact that he and the former head of state <a href="https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-Fl-Ka/Kabila-Joseph.html">Joseph Kabila</a> had formed an uneasy alliance. But they made unhappy bedfellows, which meant that a power struggle soon ensued in the very heart of Congolese politics.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s coalition, Heading for Change, was a minority – both in the Congolese National Assembly and in the Senate. The two branches of the Congolese parliament were dominated by the Common Front for Congo coalition that was controlled by Kabila.</p>
<p>With a lack of parliamentary support, Tshisekedi was admittedly in a weak position. He had to accept Kabila’s choice for prime minister, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/29/dr-congo-s-prime-minister-sylvestre-ilunga-resigns-after-censure//">Sylvestre Ilunga</a>, in May 2019. It took him until this year to finally be able to <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/29/dr-congo-s-prime-minister-sylvestre-ilunga-resigns-after-censure//">oust Ilunga</a>, a former economics professor.</p>
<p>In April Tshisekedi also <a href="https://chargedaffairs.org/felix-tshisekedis-newly-independent-agenda-for-the-drc-modernizer-or-strongman-2-0/">succeeded in removing many members of the Common Front for Congo coalition from power</a>. He firmly established his grasp on political power in Kinshasa.</p>
<p>In short, his government no longer has the excuse that it is being hampered by the dead hand of the old Kabila cabal. Having reinforced his grip on the presidency, Tshisekedi needs to set about enacting a programme of change that delivers for the Congolese people. </p>
<h2>What’s been done</h2>
<p>In March 2019, Tshisekedi started a <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/23337/felix-tshisekedi-audits-his-emergency-program-troubles-partners/">100 day emergency programme</a> to kickstart his presidency. The programme was launched by the publication of a <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">78 page document</a> that covered some of the most important priorities of the present government at the time. While many issues were covered, such as industry promotion and energy, much of the money was reserved for infrastructure: <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/article/dr-congo-tshisekedi-pledges-20m-power-wide-ranging-emergency-programme">$183.2 million</a>. Yet, many of these projects are incomplete. </p>
<p>Despite the need for more action with regard to the road-building projects, the president could take some – albeit very limited – credit for the ending of the 2018-2020 Ebola outbreak in eastern Congo. While <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/Ebola-2019-drc-">local communities and NGOs were at the heart of this relief effort</a>, it happened under Tshisekedi’s watch and he will doubtless point to it as an achievement. At the same time, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51220974">some political prisoners have been freed</a> in a move that distinguishes this presidency from that of Joseph Kabila. </p>
<p>While some change has been forthcoming, few Congolese have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drcs-felix-tshisekedi-still-a-president-without-a-cabinet/a-48588554">seen major improvements</a>. There is still much more to be done to make life in the DRC better for its citizens, and this is particularly true outside the capital.</p>
<h2>What’s still to be done</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25506">First, serious violence continues</a> in the Ituri province in the north-east. After a decade of relative peace from 2007 to 2017, inter-communal violence between the Lendu and Hema has <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/ituri-resurgence-conflict-and-failure-peacebuilding-policy">reignited in recent years</a>. The recent campaign of terror by the Islamist <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-allied-democratic-forces">Allied Democratic Forces</a> has also served to increase violence in the country’s north-eastern region.</p>
<p>While violence continues in eastern DRC, there is potentially more progress in the hugely important mining sector located largely in the <a href="https://african.business/2014/01/economy/the-drc-s-katanga-province-return-of-the-copper-king/">Upper Katanga province</a>, where there has been much less violence. Tshisekedi’s government is involved in a long process of negotiations with a consortium of Chinese mining investors based in the south-east of the country.</p>
<p>These negotiations, while slow, may yet yield some benefits for the Congolese state. The talks centre on <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/14/controversy-over-the-location-of-amazon-african-headquarters-in-cape-town-south-africa//">how much money Chinese investors will give the state</a> in return for the minerals they mine. </p>
<p>In May, the president stated that he believed previous mining contracts <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">could be reviewed</a>. In general, he sought to renegotiate the infamous Sicomines “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2013.762167">minerals-for-infrastructure</a>” deal that was struck between a group of Chinese investors and the Congolese government in 2008. In August, he formed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-congo-reviewing-6-bln-mining-deal-with-chinese-investors-finmin-2021-08-27/">commission to examine</a> mining deals with a view to getting better terms in general.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>If a good mining deal can be arrived at, the relative prosperity of this sector could serve to propel Tshisekedi’s plans beyond the old 100 day emergency programme. </p>
<p>First, it could help the ailing infrastructure sector, which has seen little development. Much of it <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">is in a state of disrepair</a>. A decent road network would help to propel business and not least those in the <a href="https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49292/">agricultural sector</a>, which is so important for the DRC. </p>
<p>Secondly, more state funds could help the president tackle the problems in the education system. There is currently a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/school-children-storm-congo-parliament-over-teacher-strike-2021-10-21/">serious teacher strike in the DRC</a>, with lack of pay being one of the reasons for the stoppage. This is a problem in need of an urgent solution. </p>
<p>Third, the DRC’s <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m2879">health sector could also do with a boost in investment</a>, not least because of the pandemic.</p>
<p>In short, Tshisekedi’s government now has some hard-won political capital with which to enact some of the changes that he promised during his campaign. Some of these changes could be delivered if a decent mining deal can be negotiated, and if that money finds its way to the right places. </p>
<p>The mining sector – controversial as it is – has seen sustained growth since the <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">commodity boom in 2007</a>. Transparency within the mining sector is also reportedly <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo">improving</a>. It is, therefore, time for Tshisekedi to secure a good deal and resolve some of the many problems his citizens are experiencing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Economic and Social Research Council, the British Academy, the Spalding Trust and the Presbyterian Historical Society. He is affiliated with Labour Party. </span></em></p>President Tshisekedi’s government no longer has the excuse that it’s being hampered by the dead hand of his predecessor Joseph Kabila’s cabal.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680132021-09-16T14:20:26Z2021-09-16T14:20:26ZWhy the push led by South Africa to revoke Israel’s AU observer status is misguided<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421535/original/file-20210916-21-popyo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, speaks during a briefing in Addis Ababa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The announcement in July that Israel had been formally granted observer status at the African Union drew a sharp reaction from some countries on the continent. These included Algeria and Djibouti as well as South Africa, which said it was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/28/shocking-south-africa-slams-israels-au-observer-status">“appalled”</a>. </p>
<p>Pretoria moved quickly to lobby other Southern African Development Community states <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/sa-appalled-by-israels-african-union-observer-status-20210728">against the decision</a>. </p>
<p>At a meeting of Heads of State and Government in Lilongwe, Malawi, the regional body <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108200204.html">issued a statement</a> objecting to the decision. It said it had been taken unilaterally by the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat. It also expressed its solidarity with the Palestinian people.</p>
<p>Let us consider the regional body’s main objection – unilateralism on the part of Moussa Faki Mahamat. Did Commissioner Faki act outside his mandate in granting Israel observer status? The AU Commission <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-08-07-moussa-faki-defends-move-to-admit-israel-as-au-observer-state/">argues</a> that it acted within its “full sphere of competence”
reading of the <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20DEC%20230%20(VII)%20_E.pdf">AU document</a> setting out the criteria for granting observer status and the system of accreditation. It certainly grants the AU Commission discretion in making such decisions. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that Moussa Faki Mahamat’s decision <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">was supported</a> by the current chairperson of the African Union, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Félix Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-08-07-moussa-faki-defends-move-to-admit-israel-as-au-observer-state/">Faki noted in August 2021</a>, out of the AU’s 55 member states, 46 already enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel. Logically, then, Israel’s entry into the pan-African organisation, is merely an extension of what is happening at bilateral level between member states and Israel.</p>
<p>I have been involved in the subject of Israel’s relationship with the continent from an academic perspective for three decades. Based on this experience I believe that South Africa, and the regional body, are wrong in their approach. A more mature and sophisticated foreign policy that embraces engagement and dialogue is needed. </p>
<p>This is because Israel is becoming more integrated in the international community. The unprecedented close political, economic, trade and security ties between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as African countries like Morocco, Chad, Guinea and Sudan <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/uae-targets-1-trillion-in-economic-relations-with-israel/2365173">speaks to this</a>. This is also the case in <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">East Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, South Africa is out of sync with the views of most African heads of state</p>
<p>In addition, isolating Israel will not work in promoting the well-being of Palestinians. This was tried for decades by Arab countries and has failed.</p>
<p>What is needed is a critical engagement with Israel and concerted efforts to strengthen the pro-peace constitutuency in Israel itself. </p>
<h2>The human rights question</h2>
<p>South Africa, as well as the Southern African Development Community, raised the issue of human rights in relation to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. </p>
<p>I believe the organisation is using this selectively. </p>
<p>The leadership of the regional body did not raise the issue of human rights during the bad behaviour on the part of a number of country leaders. These included the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/life/mugabe-zimbabwe-s-liberator-turned-authoritarian-leader/1575001">worst excesses</a> of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe and the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/subverting-democracy-in-tanzania-and-zambia/">authoritarianism</a> of Edgar Lungu Zambia. It has also been silent about the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17762749">corrupt despotism</a> of Africa’s last feudal monarch King Mswati III. </p>
<p>Neither did human rights considerations feature when Pretoria <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africa/icc-south-africa-sudan-bashir.html">attempted to shield </a> Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir from the International Criminal Court to answer for atrocities in Darfur. </p>
<p>A second objection to the position taken by the Southern African Development Community is that, in my view, granting Israel observer status does not undermine previous AU resolutions expressing solidarity with the Palestinian cause.</p>
<p>Commissioner Faki said as much when he stated that Israel’s formal accreditation did not weaken the </p>
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<p>unflinching commitment of the Pan-African Organisation to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent National State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, within the framework of a global, fair and definitive peace between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">In search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union</a>
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<p>South Africa, Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have formally requested that the decision to accredit Israel should be rescinded at the October 2021 meeting of the AU Executive Council. </p>
<p>Most other countries on the continent, however, have sought closer ties with Isreal. Many, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda have secured Israeli investments and expertise in a wide variety of areas from agriculture to tech start ups. </p>
<p>Such a pragmatic approach follows a more pragmatic Arab approach. This was set in train by the signing of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html">Abraham Accords</a> between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 2020. </p>
<p>Just as Algeria and South Africa could not stop Morocco’s entry into the AU, neither can they stop Israeli accreditation. </p>
<p>In addition, 46 AU Member States already have relations with Israel. And Egypt, which also opposed Israel’s observer status, has since agreed to strengthen bilateral relations following a meeting between President Al-Sisi and Prime Minister Bennett. </p>
<p>In my view South Africa, and those of the same view on the continent, won’t be able to get the accreditation decision reversed. This echoes the failed attempts by Algeria and South Africa to stop Morocco’s entry into the AU.</p>
<p>Malawi, the country where the 41st SADC Summit took place, is seeking to open an embassy in Jerusalem. Harare is also seeking to improve its bilateral ties with Israel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Solomon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Just as Algeria and South Africa could not stop Morocco’s entry into the AU, neither can they stop Israeli accreditation.Hussein Solomon, Senior Professor and Academic Head of Department: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657732021-08-15T09:03:19Z2021-08-15T09:03:19ZIn search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415852/original/file-20210812-24-z1fep5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's President Paul Kagame meets Israel's then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/35029583353">Paul Kagame/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since its establishment as a <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel#:%7E:text=On%20May%2014%2C%201948%2C%20David,nation%20on%20the%20same%20day.">state in 1948</a>, Israel has placed great importance on foreign policy. This is because it had been under a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/1977-04-01/middle-east-arab-boycott-israel?amp">political and economic boycott</a> by surrounding Arab states. The boycott has been falling apart since the <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/israel-egyptian-peace-agreement-signed">1979 peace treaty with Egypt</a>. But it is still in place with countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Libya. </p>
<p>As a result Israel pursues reliable political allies and trading partners on the periphery of the Arab world – and beyond. </p>
<p>This is true in Africa too. Israel’s strongest relations on the continent are with countries in west, central and east Africa. It now has <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/23/israel-granted-observer-status-at-the-african-union">decision</a> by the African Union to grant Israel observer status has once again raised the profile of Israel’s relations with the continent. </p>
<p>For over half a decade under former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tenure, Israel lobbied hard for this outcome. </p>
<p>Netanyahu visited sub-Saharan Africa in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/africa/israel-africa-netanyahu-uganda-kenya-rwanda.html">July 2016</a>, the first Israeli head of state to visit since Levi Eshkol in 1966. In addition to encouraging further political and economic ties, his mission was to secure the support of African leaders for observer status at the African Union. </p>
<p>He carefully chose Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Ethiopia and Kenya had had close ties with Israel in the past. And they were engaged in security cooperation against the threat of Islamist terrorism and were sympathetic to Israel’s goal of achieving African Union observer status. </p>
<p>Connections with Uganda were developing, while Rwanda’s leader Paul Kagame shared an affinity with Israel given his country’s experience with genocide. </p>
<p>The following year Netanyahu visited Liberia <a href="https://www.africanews.com/amp/2017/06/04/israeli-prime-minister-woos-west-african-leaders-to-join-forces/">to address</a> the 15-member countries of the Economic Community of West African States – the first non-African head of state to do so. He made <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=sFRsPT-OTFY&autoplay=1">an appeal</a> for political support in return for economic aid and technical assistance in sectors such as agriculture, water resources, energy and health.</p>
<p>He also lobbied for African Union observer status. Israeli officials – both in public and private – continued with these efforts in the intervening years.</p>
<p>In recent years, Israel has made inroads in North Africa too. In 2019 it re-established relations with Chad, which had been broken off in 1972 because of Israel’s then-continued occupation of Egypt’s Sinai peninsula since the 1967 War. The current African Union Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, who granted Israel observer status in late July 2021, comes from Chad. Mahamat’s decision was supported by the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s president and current chairman of the African Union, Félix Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>Israel also has normalised relations with Morocco and Sudan through the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>. These were brokered by the US and came into action initially with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signing the agreement in August 2020.</p>
<p>The reasons for wanting observer status are not hard to decipher. Firstly, Palestine <a href="https://egyptindependent.com/au-grants-palestine-observer-status/">had been granted observer status</a> in the African Union in 2013. Secondly, African countries form a large bloc at the United Nations and many vote in a similar fashion. Israeli policymakers felt that the African Union would be an easier place to lobby for their positions in the conflict with the Palestinians. Israel had had observer status in the Organisation of African Unity. But <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-19-years-after-its-ouster-african-union-reinstates-israel-as-an-observer-country-1.10020545">it was denied</a> the status when the African Union replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2002. </p>
<p>Israel hopes to get African countries to support it on issues of political interest at the United Nations, and at the very least to abstain or absent themselves. Beyond that, Israel wants to increase security cooperation and economic ties. This includes the sale of civilian as well as military items. </p>
<p>Observer status at the African Union enables Israel to have closer contacts with African policymakers and to address attendees of the organisation’s meetings. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>During the 1950s, as the Cold War evolved, Israel placed emphasis on ties with the US and countries in Western Europe. </p>
<p>At the same time there was a hope of developing promising relations with the independent states in Asia. The <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf">Bandung Conference of 1954</a> stymied these efforts as Israel was not invited to the gathering. Many of its prominent figures would later establish the <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/">Non-Aligned Movement</a>, which often opposed Israel’s policies, especially towards the Palestinians.</p>
<p>One of the consequences was that when African states began achieving their independence in the 1960s, a number received a great deal of interest from Israeli policymakers. Two factors drove Israeli efforts. One was a desire to counteract diplomatic movements by Egypt. Another was an attempt to portray Israel as a model for development and as an alternative to the former imperial European states as a conveyor of technical assistance. </p>
<p>However, all African countries, except apartheid South Africa, Malawi, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Mauritius, broke off formal relations with Israel around the time of the 1973 War. This was due to the continued occupation of Arab territory <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt9309h7t3/qt9309h7t3.pdf?t=mnipnf">as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War</a>.</p>
<p>Some informal ties through embassies and business relations were maintained until many African countries began re-establishing relations with Israel at the end of the Cold War. This was also a period during which Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation began a process that resulted in normalising ties.</p>
<h2>Opposition</h2>
<p>South Africa <a href="https://m.jpost.com/israel-news/south-africa-downgrade-embassy-in-israel-to-liaison-office-585883/amp">downgraded its representation</a> in Israel in 2019 from an embassy to a liaison office over Israel’s actions in Gaza in 2018. South Africa has been at the forefront of the <a href="https://bdsmovement.net/">Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign</a> against Israel. The organisation’s raison d’etre is that isolating Israel will force it to relinquish Palestinian territory in the West Bank and end its blockade of Gaza. The movement has some appeal among left-wing individuals and groups in the west. But it is largely ignored by other African states.</p>
<p>The strong feelings of the South African government and the ruling African National Congress party are driven by two factors. The first is Israel’s military – and possibly nuclear – cooperation with the apartheid regime. The second is the affinity that many South Africans have with the Palestinian cause for self-determination. </p>
<p>South Africa was the country most strongly opposed to Mahamat’s decision. </p>
<p>However, most African countries have chosen to separate the issue of the Palestinians from economic cooperation with Israel, even though a number still vote against Israel on political issues at international forums such as the United Nations.</p>
<p>Some, like South Africa, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/28/shocking-south-africa-slams-israels-au-observer-status">opposed Israel’s observer status</a> on the grounds of its treatment of the Palestinians and the continued occupation of their territory. They <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/botswana-and-three-other-african-countries-oppose-israels-au-observer-status/dwep03m">included</a> Arab League members Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia as well as Namibia and Botswana.</p>
<p>Just as vocal critics – such as South Africa and Algeria – could do nothing about Morocco’s readmission to the African Union, it remains to be seen what they can do about reversing the decision on Israel. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Israel has an important forum in which to lobby for its interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most countries in Africa have chosen to separate the issue of the Palestinians from economic cooperation with Israel.Michael Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1622572021-07-08T14:57:01Z2021-07-08T14:57:01ZWhy payroll fraud in the DRC’s education sector will be hard to fix<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407644/original/file-20210622-28-9b31dg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pupils wear face masks in their classroom while a teacher writes on the board at a school in Kinshasa on August 10, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The primary and secondary education sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faces massive challenges. These include insufficient budgets, payroll fraud, a lack of infrastructure and teaching material, and poor opportunities for teacher professional development. Educational officials aren’t being held accountable for policy failures.</p>
<p>One of the biggest hurdles has to do with the teacher payroll. In general, the country’s teachers – more than 500,000 – work under dire conditions. In particular, a significant number of school teachers in the DRC have gone <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/teachers-observe-strike-in-dr-congo/2011572">without</a> government pay for several years. Since the early 1990s, parents have been <a href="https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/drc-students-drop-parents-struggle-pay-rising-required-teachers-bonuses/">called upon</a> to step in to support teachers and schools financially by paying substantial school fees. Providing quality education <a href="https://educationanddevelopment.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/cyril-owen-brandt-masterthesis-teachers-struggle-for-income-in-drc1.pdf">isn’t always</a> at the top of teacher priorities as they struggle to supplement their income with other activities. </p>
<p>Two years ago, the government decided to abolish primary school fees. The idea was that the government would pay all teachers. However, drawing on our long engagement with the DRC’s education sector and political system, we believe that this will be a challenge because of political, budgetary and administrative issues. </p>
<p>In April this year, Tony Mwaba, one of the most ferocious critics of corruption in the education sector, was appointed the new minister of education. This followed the <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2021/04/30/actualite/justice/rdc-willy-bakonga-condamne-3-ans-de-servitude-penale">conviction</a> of former education officials, including the former minister of education, for corruption and money laundering. </p>
<p>Is this the start of a serious reform of the battered education sector? </p>
<p>We believe that sustainable change in this system would require a thorough restructuring of the mechanisms of political accountability. In the meantime, we can only expect a realignment of existing patronage networks to the political agenda of the current president.</p>
<h2>Patronage networks</h2>
<p>In November 2020, the DRC’s auditor general published a <a href="https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-79332_secope_l_enquete_de_l_igf_revele_la_dilapidation_de_62_milliards_cdf.htm">report</a> which revealed the depths of the payroll crisis. Masses of teachers remained unpaid while new ones were being added to the payroll. There was also an influx of administrative staff, diverting resources from teacher salaries. The report revealed the embezzlement of 62 billion Congolese francs (about US$30 million) and other forms of payroll fraud.</p>
<p>Payroll fraud <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20210324-la-rdc-recense-ses-fonctionnaires-pour-lutter-contre-les-cumulards-et-emplois-fictifs">permeates</a> the public sector, and this has been a persistent problem in the DRC. The report <a href="https://actualite.cd/2020/11/18/rdc-ligf-decouvert-lexistence-de-faux-arretes-de-recrutement-des-agents-et-de-creation">implicated</a> senior civil servants and staff from the ministries of budget and finance, education and the teachers’ payroll agency. The issue reverberated in the provinces as well. Several officials were <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/02/09/lomami-le-directeur-provincial-du-secope-aux-arrets">placed under</a> arrest.</p>
<p>The boundary between “state” and “society” has become a twilight area in the DRC, whose dynamics are governed by specific social pressures, economic rents and political considerations. For example, relationships with politicians, due to party affiliation or origin, increase a school’s chances of being added to the payroll. Another example is the attempted removal of 1,179 schools from the payroll. As <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2021/04/15/actualite/education/rdc-600-ecoles-conventionnees-catholiques-desactivees-de-la-liste-de">reactions</a> by educational leaders suggest, some of these schools have properly functioned for decades. In the past, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1367920?journalCode=crea20">masses</a> of other schools have obtained their decree via informal processes, void of any educational planning. What is the difference between schools functioning on “false” decrees, and schools functioning on decrees based purely on patronage without any technical preparation and monitoring?</p>
<p>Government actors who benefit from the current structures have few incentives to clean up the payroll. However, teacher union politics also partially explains these continued dynamics. There’s a <a href="https://www.ei-ie.org/fr/item/25128:an-online-union-academy-made-in-dr-congo">lack</a> of strong, independent unions and a lack of trust between teachers and unions. Also the political co-option of union leaders, for example by mobilising them as consultants or by inviting them into party politics, has weakened the unions’ impact. Out of 40 unions, only a handful can be considered to be functioning properly. With a dozen pseudo-unions and a high number of unions which hardly function, Congolese teacher unions have been effectively silenced.</p>
<h2>Possibility of reform?</h2>
<p>Trying to reform human resource and payroll management means taking away a massive resource of patronage and electoral politics from hundreds of bureaucrats and politicians.</p>
<p>Public statements to fight against payroll fraud seem to materialise at strategic moments. In 1979, the former president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Mobutu Sese Seko, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/22/archives/mobutu-says-imf-will-give-zaire-aid-asserts-in-paris-after-talks.html">stated</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We’re going to wipe out the imaginary schools and the fake teachers who exist only on paper. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Mobutu, it was a way to attract World Bank funding. </p>
<p>So, what was the reason for the most recent announcement? The investigations, and Mwaba’s appointment, are nested within Congolese political dynamics, and it is necessary to look beyond the education sector. </p>
<p>For 15 years, according to our sources, the education ministry functioned as a cash cow for long-term ruler Joseph Kabila’s party. When Félix Tshisekedi was elected president in 2019, in what is seen as a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/10/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">rigged election</a>, he formed a coalition with Kabila. The investigations and sentences of high-level educational officials sit within Tshisekedi’s much wider use of “<a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/making-sense-of-dr-congos-stunning-political-turnaround/">judicial harassment</a>” against key persons from Kabila’s camp. </p>
<p>Given that Tshisekedi’s coalition remains unstable and based on members of parliament who will “<a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/making-sense-of-dr-congos-stunning-political-turnaround/">condition their support upon payments or extractive opportunities</a>”, he will need all possible sources to gather funds. This is all the more the case as the DRC looks forward to a new round of elections in 2023.</p>
<p>So this is the situation in which the president finds himself: while the judicial investigations and new appointment indicate that using the payroll for patronage purposes is being addressed, now that he’s completely in power himself, Tshisekedi might be tempted to deviate from the norms through which he won his position. </p>
<p>With an education sector struggling to cope through patronage politics and informal arrangements, and with all of the high level dynamics at play, can the new education minister bring much needed change? We truly hope so, but he would have to swim against a strong tide. </p>
<p><em>For a longer French version of this article, please see <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/blog-invite-fraude-dans-leducation-en-rdc-le-nouveau-ministre-peut-il-changer-la-donne/?lang=fr">here</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stylianos Moshonas receives funding from the FWO (Research Foundation Flanders), through a fundamental research project entitled 'Understanding the political economy of Congo's civil service recruitment and remunerations system', in which he works as a postdoctoral researcher.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cyril Owen Brandt, Gauthier Marchais, Jacques Taty Mwakupemba, and Tom De Herdt do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Public statements against payroll fraud seem to materialise at strategic moments.Cyril Owen Brandt, Associate Researcher, Institute of Development Policy, University of AntwerpGauthier Marchais, Research Fellow, Institute of Development StudiesJacques Taty Mwakupemba, PhD candidate, Université catholique de BukavuStylianos Moshonas, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpTom De Herdt, Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1490062020-11-16T14:59:52Z2020-11-16T14:59:52ZGrowing turbulence in DRC’s ruling coalition points to an early divorce<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369276/original/file-20201113-23-1f96hpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former DRC President Joseph Kabila, left, congratulates his succesor, Felix Tshisekedi, on his inauguration in January 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kinsela Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rickety coalition that has governed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for 20 months, forged by President Félix Tshisekedi and his predecessor Joseph Kabila, appears to be falling apart. </p>
<p>In 2019, for lack of a parliamentary majority, Tshisekedi chose to share power with his former rival, Kabila, in a coalition of their respective political platforms – the Cape for Change and the Common Front for the Congo. The Cape for Change is led by Tshisekedi and opposition figure <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/drc-opposition-figures-tshisekedi-and-kamerhe-form-joint-ticket-20181123">Vital Kamerhe</a>.</p>
<p>Rather than put the country on the path of economic and social recovery as intended, this alliance turned out to be a centre of conflict from early on. The alliance partners have fought over the sharing of ministerial posts. They have also clashed over the control of other state agencies, including the judiciary and the national electoral commission.</p>
<p>The tensions have become more pronounced in the last six months, as shown by, for example, the ousting of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/30182/drc-tshisekedi-loses-an-asset-in-parlia">Jean-Marc Kabund a Kabund</a>, the interim president of Tshisekedi’s party, Union for Democracy and Social Progress, from his post as vice president of the National Assembly. This was at the instigation of Kabila’s platform. The members of the platform in the government have also been refusing to execute orders from Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>In addition, the parliament, which is dominated by Kabila’s platform, has accused Tshisekedi of violating the constitution. He appointed three new judges to the constitutional court <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2020/07/18/actualite/justice/justice-felix-tshisekedi-nomme-trois-nouveaux-membres-la-cour">in July</a> and the Kabila camp considers the appointment to be <a href="https://in.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics/congo-leader-boosts-influence-with-new-constitutional-court-judges-idUSKBN27629F">flawed</a>. They also accuse the president of wanting to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46712/drc-constitutional-court-fight-reveals-kabila-tshisekedi-struggle/">control the country’s judicial institutions</a>.</p>
<p>Members of parliament aligned to Kabila have been boycotting initiatives by Tshisekedi, in both the government and parliament. They refused to take part in the swearing-in of the three recently appointed judges.</p>
<h2>Unworkable marriage</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi became president 20 months ago. Before then, his political party had been the main opposition party for more than 35 years, to the successive regimes of <a href="https://www.lesinrocks.com/2017/04/16/livres/actualite/lascension-et-la-chute-de-mobutu-lhomme-leopard-qui-ravage-le-congo/">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Laurent-Kabila">Laurent Désiré Kabila</a> and his son <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/25/drc-what-is-joseph-kabilas-legacy-after-18-years-in-power">Joseph Kabila</a>. </p>
<p>As his party didn’t get enough MPs to form a government, he got into a coalition with Kabila’s Common Front for Congo, which had more than the required number of MPs. This enabled him to lead the war-weary, unstable country, promising to rebuild it.</p>
<p>But being a president without a loyal parliament made his position precarious.
From early on, the governance of the country was like a vehicle driven by two people at the same time, without any prospect of positive economic outlook.</p>
<p>It didn’t take long for a breakdown to happen.</p>
<p>Major disagreements arose between the coalition partners. They differed over how to share ministerial posts, management of the state-owned companies, diplomacy, the <a href="https://actualite.cd/2020/08/03/rdc-elections-les-trois-principales-reformes-proposees-par-les-12-personnalites">electoral process</a>, appointments of the head of the electoral commission as well as judges of the constitutional court, to mention but a few.</p>
<p>From the onset, many observers dismissed the coalition between Tshisekedi and Kabila as an <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/44907/opinion-la-coalition-tshisekedi-kabila-duo-ou-duel-au-sommet-de-letat-en-rd-congo/">unholy alliance</a> doomed to fail. The experience of the last 20 months supports the sceptics’ view that the coalition was never sincere about working together for the benefit of the Congolese people. </p>
<p>For Kabila, the motivation seems to be the desire to retain power behind the scenes. His platform used its parliamentary majority to get cabinet positions and other positions in stated-owned companies (such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15859686">national railway of the Democratic Republic of Congo</a> and <a href="https://www.gecamines.cd/">Gécamines, the Congolese commodity trading and mining company</a>).</p>
<p>For Tshisekedi, the main goal appears to have been to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the coalition to destroy the system of cronyism and corruption that had become entrenched under Kabila. He relied on popular support and political gamesmanship to tighten his grip on power. </p>
<h2>Looming divorce</h2>
<p>After endless, futile negotiations with the Kabila camp, Tshisekedi appears to have finally recognised the limits of the coalition government, and has lost patience. In a brief address to the nation <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=0ZptIKGTDe0">on 23 October</a>, he denounced the Kabila camp’s obstructive actions. It was thinly veiled rebuke of his coalition partner. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These disagreements between parties involved in this Agreement are hindering the economic take-off of the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He announced a consultation with social, religious and political leaders with a view to bringing about reforms. His aim is to gain a majority in parliament and establish a new government loyal to him. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would not let any political commitment of any kind take precedence over my constitutional prerogatives and over the best interests of Congolese people. I will never compromise the best interests of the nation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The statement underlines the primacy of constitutional order over all kinds of political arrangements, including the governing coalition. The president promised to report back to the nation on the outcome of his consultations. Undoubtedly, this statement spells the end of the ruling coalition. </p>
<p>The Kabila camp was caught by surprise. It came soon after they failed to make good on their threats to impeach the president. This is even more unlikely since he appointed new judges to the constitutional court. </p>
<p>The constitutional court is the institution empowered to proclaim the results of both the presidential and legislative ballots, and to judge the head of state and the prime minister if necessary. Its verdicts are final.
It is, therefore, a strategic institution in the control of power. In this context, the frustration of the Kabila camp is understandable. They suspect the newly appointed judges <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46712/drc-constitutional-court-fight-reveals-kabila-tshisekedi-struggle/">belong to Tshisekedi’s movement</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>If successful, the president’s consultation process would end the Kabila faction’s stranglehold on his government. He will be free to set up a new government – through a new parliamentary majority – in line with his own political agenda.</p>
<p>Now, the question is how to get this new parliamentary majority. In the labyrinth of Congolese politics, two possibilities seem to open to Tshisekedi: either to dissolve the parliament and call early parliamentary elections, or to create a new coalition with the participation of new partners from the current parliament. </p>
<p>Calling early elections seems unlikely for want of time and funding. The second option sounds more plausible as Tshisekedi is more likely to be supported by dissidents from the Kabila platform and other opposition leaders, including for example, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9tvaP9Upkc">Bahati Lukwebo</a>, <a href="https://www.financialafrik.com/2020/11/08/moise-katumbi-peu-bavard-apres-avoir-rencontre-felix-tshisekedi/">Moise Katumbi</a> and <a href="https://www.financialafrik.com/2020/11/04/jean-pierre-bemba-a-felix-tshisekedi-je-soutiens-ce-dialogue-entre-congolais/">Jean-Pierre Bemba</a>. The consequence would be that Kabila and his remaining supporters would be a minority in the parliament, and subsequently join the opposition. </p>
<p>If Tshisekedi wins this battle for a new parliamentary majority, he will have achieved a masterstroke. Meanwhile, the Congolese people are holding their collective breath.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Albert Kasanda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After endless, futile negotiations with the Kabila camp, Tshisekedi appears to have finally recognised the limits of the coalition government and has lost patience.Albert Kasanda, Researcher in Political Philosophy and social sciences, Center of Global studies, Institutes of Philosophy, Czech Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1329922020-03-04T11:46:39Z2020-03-04T11:46:39ZThe DRC is on the road to being Ebola free: how it got here<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318648/original/file-20200304-66074-1hnefgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom at an Ebola treatment centre in Itipo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images/ Junior D. Kannah</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>At the beginning of March the authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) announced that the last Ebola patient had been <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/democratic-republic-congos-last-ebola-patient-discharged">discharged</a> from a treatment centre. The country has been in the grip of an Ebola outbreak since <a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-returns-to-the-drc-for-the-10th-time-heres-what-we-know-101048">August 2018</a>. More than <a href="https://www.who.int/csr/don/27-february-2020-ebola-drc/en/">3,300</a> cases were confirmed and 2,264 people died. The last case was reported on February 17th. Now the countdown towards declaring the end of the world’s second largest Ebola outbreak begins. The World Health Organisation has put a time line of 42 days on this. The Conversation Africa’s Ina Skosana spoke to Yap Boum about the latest developments.</em> </p>
<p><strong>The last patient being treated for Ebola in the DRC has been discharged. What does this mean for the outbreak?</strong></p>
<p>The first thing is that it’s evidence of all the work that’s been done by those in the field as well as remotely. This has ranged from tracing patients to raising funds, engaging the communities and testing samples. And it shows that collaboration and coordination are the only ways to handle a complex problem such as the Ebola outbreak. </p>
<p>For the DRC it means that we can now count down the 42 days (two incubation phases of the virus) to declare the country Ebola-free. During that time community engagement and contact tracing will continue to ensure no case is left behind. Treatment centres will remain open but will slowly decrease their staffing based on the evolution of the outbreak. </p>
<p>Teams will be on standby to administer vaccinations if need be. This is because the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-vaccine-is-key-in-ongoing-efforts-to-contain-the-drc-outbreak-110924">rVSV vaccine</a> is only administered to people who are in contact with someone who has been diagnosed. There’s still an ongoing study involving the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uganda-vaccine-trial-how-african-researchers-are-tackling-ebola-121517">JnJ vaccine</a>. This will carry on until the participants have completed the protocol, including the second dose of vaccine. </p>
<p><strong>This outbreak has been raging on for 19 months. What was the turning point?</strong></p>
<p>In my opinion, the turning point was the change in leadership to manage the outbreak response. After the elections in 2018 there was a change of government with <a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedis-victory-in-the-drc-is-historic-but-controversial-109673">President Félix Tshisekedi</a> at the helm. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedi-has-taken-over-the-drcs-ebola-response-how-he-can-make-a-difference-121595">July 2019</a> the president appointed Professor Jean-Jacques Muyembe as the chairman of the response, leading to the resignation of the Minister of Health, Dr Oly Ilunga Kalenga. </p>
<p>These changes signalled a new, more inclusive approach to managing the crisis. As a result communities became more engaged and involved in the response. People from the affected areas became more engaged in managing a disease that was affecting them. </p>
<p>To be honest, we don’t yet know what the secret ingredient was. But by the time we declare the country Ebola-free we hope Professor Muyembe will tell us more about it. We imagine that his long experience with the disease and its management has paid a significant role in coordinating all those who were involved in the response. Not an easy task at all, I can tell you. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedi-has-taken-over-the-drcs-ebola-response-how-he-can-make-a-difference-121595">Tshisekedi has taken over the DRC's Ebola response. How he can make a difference</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>But there were other contributory factors we can list. There was the impressive involvement of the WHO through its teams in the field as well as its Director-General, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, and Dr Michel Yao, who was in charge in the DRC. </p>
<p>On top of this, partners such as Doctors Without Borders, <a href="https://www.alima-ngo.org/en/democratic-republic-of-congo">Alima</a> and others managed to play the roles allocated to them by the coordination team. </p>
<p>A major development was the WHO’s decision in July 2019 <a href="https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/">to declare</a> the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. I must stress this wasn’t the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-declaring-ebola-a-public-health-emergency-isnt-a-silver-bullet-120685">silver bullet</a>. The outbreak of a deadly disease within a conflict zone – and then in a major city – can’t be solved with a technical solution, such as more funding. But the decision gave the DRC’s Ministry of Health more flexibility to ensure response teams reached even the most remote areas. The decision had a critical effect on the response. It provided a second breath to address the new phase of the outbreak, paving the way to the point we’ve arrived at now.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-declaring-ebola-a-public-health-emergency-isnt-a-silver-bullet-120685">Why declaring Ebola a public health emergency isn't a silver bullet</a>
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<p>It is also important to mention that the outbreak was unlikely to last forever. The people and communities were more and more aware of the precautions needed to prevent and manage Ebola. People accepted that certain steps were critical in stopping the outbreak: these included screening people’s temperatures, washing hands and safe burial practices. </p>
<p>But we still have to wait for the 42 days and remain vigilant before we can celebrate.</p>
<p><strong>What are the key breakthroughs to come out of this?</strong></p>
<p>The key lesson from breakthrough to come out of the ending Ebola outbreak is that we don’t solve a complex problem using technical solutions. Implementing an Ebola response requires political and community engagement – globally, at the highest level of the country, and locally. </p>
<p>The ability to listen to all partners, to negotiate based on interest, the capacity to advocate and finally decision-making power all contributed to stopping the outbreak in DRC. </p>
<p>Everything starts and ends with leadership. </p>
<p>Beyond stopping the outbreak it is important to note that Ebola is now a preventable and curable disease. We now have a vaccine <a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-vaccine-is-key-in-ongoing-efforts-to-contain-the-drc-outbreak-110924">(rVSV)</a> that’s proven efficient in a large outbreak. Another is being assessed, while the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02442-6">drugs</a> Mab114 and Regeneron have been found to be effective. </p>
<p>The development of drugs and vaccines is further evidence of the critical impact that research can have on improving health while saving lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yap Boum is the regional representative for Epicenter Africa, the research arm of Médecins sans Frontières. He is involved in the Ebola outbreak and the use of the Ebola vaccine for MSF/Epicenter.</span></em></p>Everything starts and ends with leadership.Yap Boum, Professor in the faculty of Medicine, Mbarara University of Science and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1277292019-11-28T12:39:53Z2019-11-28T12:39:53ZIs the Democratic Republic of Congo ready for peacekeepers to leave by 2022?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303711/original/file-20191126-112539-uva5nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Peacekeeper with the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An independent United Nations (UN) strategic review <a href="https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/11/consultations-on-the-independent-strategic-review-of-monusco.php">has recommended</a> that the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) complete a phased withdrawal by 2022. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Mats Berdal to give his insights into why this is happening and what the implications could be.</em></p>
<p><strong>Why is the peacekeeping operation coming to an end?</strong> </p>
<p>The UN Organisation Mission in the DRC started off as a small observer force in 1999. It was deployed by the UN Security Council to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in August 1999. At the time the hope was that this would mark the end of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/africa/drc.html">Second Congo War</a>. It did not. The war was also known as Africa’s World War because, at one stage, it pitted the government of President Laurent Kabila and allied troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia against the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, fronting for forces supported by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The war officially ended in 2003. </p>
<p>War and profound insecurity in the eastern part of DRC continued to be the norm after 1999, at a horrific cost to civilian populations. By one estimate, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2223004/">more than</a> 5 million people had died as a result of war and violence by 2008. </p>
<p>Continuing instability and violence led to a deepening of the UN’s involvement. The initial observer force grew in size. It’s now the UN’s largest field operation with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-massacre-idUSKBN0F828I20140703">overall strength</a> of about 20 000, including civilian staff. </p>
<p>Over time, it also came to assume a much more ambitious mandate. Changing its name to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC in 2010, the principal mandate of the mission became <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">two-fold</a>: the protection of civilians and the strengthening of state institutions in the DRC.</p>
<p>The Security Council first called for the withdrawal of the mission – or rather a transfer of responsibilities to the government and the UN country team – in 2015. Since then, every mandate renewal (every nine months) has involved calls for plans to be developed for its withdrawal. In March this year, the Security Council ordered an independent review of how exactly a phased, progressive and comprehensive exit strategy could happen. This <a href="https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/11/consultations-on-the-independent-strategic-review-of-monusco.php">was presented</a> to the Council in October.</p>
<p>The argument in favour of a progressive withdrawal has long been that the Congolese government, after years of UN involvement and three presidential elections, must now assume full “national ownership” of the peace and stabilisation process. </p>
<p>But this isn’t the only reason. At US$1.1 billion <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/after-strategic-review-what-should-be-done-monusco">per year</a>, the mission is an expensive peacekeeping operation, and member states have been anxious to cut costs. </p>
<p><strong>After 20 years on the ground, what did the UN mission achieve?</strong></p>
<p>The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission’s record of achievement in the DRC is mixed. </p>
<p>The independent strategic review <a href="https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/11/consultations-on-the-independent-strategic-review-of-monusco.php">noted</a> “significant peace gains” and that after 20 years of UN peacekeeping some two thirds of the country was “stable”. Presidential elections were also finally held in December 2018. After 18 years as president, Joseph Kabila stepped down and Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/23/congos-new-president-felix-tshisekedi-does-not-call-the-shots">was voted in</a> as President. This could mean a new political direction that would allow the country to move forward. </p>
<p>But, while a measure of stability has been brought to parts of country, intercommunal violence and internal displacement <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2019/776">are widespread</a> in Eastern DRC, connected in part to the struggle over control of natural resources. The number of armed groups in North and South Kivu is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-roadblocks-not-just-minerals-fund-rebels-and-conflict-in-the-congo-101124">well over</a> 100. </p>
<p>Human rights violations perpetrated by the Congolese Army also <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-un-reports-hundreds-human-rights-violations-security-situation">continue to be</a> a major problem. This reflects a larger failure, after numerous unsuccessful attempts, on the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC’s watch, to undertake meaningful reforms of the security sector. </p>
<p>The mission’s <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11513.doc.htm">programmes</a> in support of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups and the reform of rule of law institutions have fared little better. Critically, the drivers of conflict – specifically those related to issues of land tenure and the management of mining and natural resources – remain unaddressed. </p>
<p>Finally, although the recent presidential elections were relatively smooth, Tshisekedi’s position is weak. Loyalists of Kabila’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drc-is-president-tshisekedi-a-puppet-of-kabila/a-50171782">are firmly</a> ensconced in networks and positions of power, notably within the security sector.</p>
<p><strong>What could the implications of a withdrawal be?</strong></p>
<p>This all depends on the manner in which the withdrawal is organised and implemented. If it is rushed and doesn’t include a clear political strategy and regional diplomatic engagement, it will result in further instability and a recurring protection crises. </p>
<p>The independent strategic review, now before the Security Council, recognises many of the challenges ahead. But it appears overly sanguine about what can be achieved within a three-year period. Given the profound weakness of the Congolese State, especially the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/security-sector-reform-congo">failure to reform</a> the security sector, this timetable is likely to become an operational straitjacket and a potential source of instability. </p>
<p>While the political pressure with regard to timelines is understandable, transitions must be based on meeting realistic targets, not on calendar dates. Particular account must be taken of the indisputable risks to civilians of a precipitate withdrawal. This will likely increase insecurity and violence, especially in Eastern Congo. </p>
<p>Above all, the UN must intensify, rather than scale down, efforts to engage with the politics of post-election DRC. It should help the government build legitimate political institutions while harnessing regional, donor and diplomatic support for the consolidation of peace. All of this is likely to take more than three years. </p>
<p>Even if the UN peacekeeping presence is substantially reduced by 2022, it will be vital for the UN and the international community to remain engaged, in some form, in helping consolidate peace after the formal closing down of the mission.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127729/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mats Berdal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The independent strategic review, now before the Security Council, recognises many of the challenges ahead. But it appears overly sanguine about what can be achieved within a three-year period.Mats Berdal, Professor and Director of Conflict, Security and Development Research Group, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215952019-08-11T09:14:55Z2019-08-11T09:14:55ZTshisekedi has taken over the DRC’s Ebola response. How he can make a difference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287388/original/file-20190808-144888-5jbhfe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Felix Tshisekedi during the inauguration ceremony. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hugh Kinsella Cunningham/EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The most recent <a href="https://www.who.int/ebola/situation-reports/drc-2018/en/">Ebola outbreak</a> in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) rages on. There’s been a continued increase in the number of new cases for a year since the outbreak was first declared. This is despite the extensive use of an experimental vaccine, new treatments and more rapid response to the outbreak when compared to the West African outbreak. </p>
<p>Until recently the Ebola response was coordinated by the minister of health. But <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/07/drc-health-minister-resigns-over-ebola-response">in July</a>, President Félix Tshisekedi announced that he would take over this function and appointed Ebola pioneer Dr Jean-Jacques Muyembe to lead the efforts. The announcement led to the resignation of health minister <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/07/drc-health-minister-resigns-over-ebola-response">Oly Ilunga Kalenga</a>. </p>
<p>But the decision was strategic and significant and is likely to galvanise national and international support. Ebola has now spread to Goma, a city of two million and a major international transit hub. By some estimates only <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49212116">half of the cases are accounted for</a>. </p>
<p>The outbreak calls for a coordinated response across government ministries. This is because it has major social, cultural, political and economic implications.</p>
<p>There are four issues that, as head of state, Tshisekedi will be able to ensure are tackled. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>shifting from a single ministry leading the response to a multi-agency response with very high level of commitment from ministers,</p></li>
<li><p>raising awareness of the intensity of the threat to the highest international level and securing more robust international support, </p></li>
<li><p>forcing the different international state and non-state actors to coordinate their activities, and </p></li>
<li><p>sending a clear message that the disease is a national threat.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>With the president coordinating the response, ministers will be expected to support the country’s efforts. </p>
<p>This is what happened in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4734504/">Liberia in 2014</a> when then President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took over the running of the country’s Ebola response. This provided government leadership that compelled local and global actors to coordinate their interventions and changed the course of a disease. </p>
<p>While this was true and easy in Liberia, we must admit the complexities of the DRC. Firstly, it is a much larger country. Secondly, there are parts of the country that don’t accept the central political leadership.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Liberia</h2>
<p>When the outbreak started in Liberia in 2014, the response coordination was passed from the ministry of health to internal affairs and then to loosely coordinated task forces headed by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23288604.2016.1222793">different leaders</a>. But the change had little affect, the outbreak continued to spiral out of country. </p>
<p>At this stage the number of cases per month from July to August of 2014, increase from <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/cumulative-cases-graphs.html">249 to 1 048</a>.</p>
<p>This changed when Johnson-Sirleaf took over the coordination of the response under the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4734504/">Presidential Advisory Committee on Ebola</a>. She appointed the then assistant minister of health, Tolbert Nyenswah, to lead the incident management system. Key ministries and partners like the US Centres for Disease Control began to meet weekly with Nyenswah. </p>
<p>The coordinated leadership of the President was critical at this stage given the upward shift in the epidemic curve. The cases had increased by 2080 in September alone and 3077 in October of 2014. These increased number of cases would have threatened the peace and security of the country had the President not taken over the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/cumulative-cases-graphs.html">direct coordination of the response</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this, Johnson-Sirleaf made a passionate plea to the US government and the international community, the military was deployed and massive resources were provided that led to the last push to end the outbreak. Under this new coordinating mechanism the Ebola cases <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/cumulative-cases-graphs.html">started rapidly coming down by November of 2014</a>. </p>
<p>In the early phases of the Ebola response in Liberia the lack of coordination was evident. This lack of coordination has also been cited as a major hindrance to efforts to contain Ebola in the DRC. </p>
<p>On top of this international partners may not be coordinating well due to the lack of clear political will about the direction of the DRC’s response. </p>
<p>But that can change now that Tshisekedi is in charge. He can ensure that all partners involved have a single coordinated plan. There will therefore be a much higher chance that strategies that he formulates will be carried out and supported by the partners. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi’s direct involvement can help the DRC overcome some of the biggest obstacles to ending this outbreak. </p>
<p>First, as the president, he can rally citizens who have previously doubted the reality of the outbreak and mobilise provincial leaders to become active in the response. </p>
<p>Second, he can increase security. The epicentre of the current outbreak is North Kivu, a region marred by ongoing <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-26-kivu-the-forgotten-war">violent conflict</a>. Ebola treatment centres have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/28/arsonists-attack-ebola-clinics-in-drc-as-climate-of-distrust-grows">destroyed</a> and a doctor was <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/19-04-2019-who-ebola-responder-killed-in-attack-on-the-butembo-hospital">killed in April</a> this year. </p>
<p>Third, he can put fresh efforts into global response. Only 50% of financial support needed for the response has been provided. There has already been a shift in the international response since Tshisekedi took over the Ebola response. The World Bank committed <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/07/24/world-bank-mobilizes-us300-million-to-finance-the-ebola-response-in-democratic-republic-of-congo">$300 million</a> just days after the announcement. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi can take advantage of the fact that the World Health Organisation recently declared the outbreak a <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/17-07-2019-ebola-outbreak-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-declared-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern">public health emergency of international concern</a>. This is a defining moment for the DRC and the president, he needs to take the response to the people, use his regional and international political capital to build security and mobilise resources to rapidly end the response.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> Mosoka Fallah consults for MERCK/MSD as an expert from Africa on the process of the Ebola vaccine licensing.</span></em></p>The DRC president’s direct involvement can rally people who have previously doubted the reality of the outbreak.Mosoka Fallah, Part-time lecturer at the Global Health & Social Medicine, Harvard University, and Lecturer at the School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of LiberiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1143262019-04-08T14:08:05Z2019-04-08T14:08:05ZWhy the DRC’s army and police aren’t yet ready to protect citizens<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268069/original/file-20190408-2921-u2xg96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Riot police on the outskirts of Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is trying to find its footing after a <a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedis-victory-in-the-drc-is-historic-but-controversial-109673">contentious</a> presidential election in December 2018. These elections were preceded by months of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-drc-is-still-in-crisis-but-there-is-a-way-out-94585">political upheaval</a> and poll delays. President <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-felix-tshisekedi-dr-congos-new-president/a-47025072">Felix Tshisekedi</a> is now in the driver’s seat of <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html">Africa’s second largest country</a>, which is <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html">home to nearly 86 million people</a>. </p>
<p>Among the legacies he’s inherited is a weak, incoherent and to some extent dysfunctional army, and generally beleaguered security forces. This is an issue that must be urgently addressed – especially because the <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en">United Nations’ Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</a> wants to <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2409.pdf">reduce its presence</a> in the country. This is partly in response to budget cuts for peace missions in general. </p>
<p>Plans for a reduced UN mission presence include increasing transfer of security roles to the DRC government. But, as things stand, the mission’s troops are the main source of protection for ordinary Congolese who must navigate between armed groups and
oppressive and exploitative government forces every day. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">my research</a> has shown, the country’s own security forces just don’t appear ready to step into the gap. There have been significant improvements in terms of operational capacity, but the police, army and other security forces are still widely perceived as unprofessional. </p>
<p>There is an urgent need to improve the training of both the army and the police, and to secure the needed equipment for forces to undertake operations and for logistical support. These are urgent and long overdue issues that need to be addressed. </p>
<h2>Systemic issues</h2>
<p>Congo’s security sector reform programme was initiated in 2003. Fairly or unfairly, the programme has been judged a failure. This is because it hasn’t yet integrated and transformed the non-state armed actors into well functioning national security institutions which <a href="https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/wulf_handbookII.pdf">operate professionally</a>. </p>
<p>But there have been some successes, which aren’t often highlighted. Both the police and the army have been able to extend their presence in the country, and have deployed to most areas of the DRC. However, there is a distinction between being physically present and then being in control. My research shows that often the police and the army operate in collusion with the non-state armed actors, and the relationship is more symbiotic than antagonistic. </p>
<p>My research also shows that the army has pockets of well-functioning units. With donor support, it has managed to establish a network of military schools and colleges. It has implemented a biometric payment system which has significantly improved salary payment to the soldiers. But corruption and misuse of funds is still a challenge – soldiers only get a portion of their pay via this system. </p>
<p>There have also been some <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">policing successes</a>. The legal frameworks for the police and army have been passed by parliament. There’s now a national database of police officers. Training programmes have been launched with the support of international donors.</p>
<p>Still, there are undeniably problems. There are individuals and entire units in the army suspected of war crimes. And corruption and illegal activities are still rampant. The soldiers still need to undertake offensive operations, without having the necessary equipment or even, at times, ammunition. </p>
<p>The police are in many ways in a more dire state. Since the force does not receive the same attention or funding from the government as the army does, it has largely failed to fulfil its functions of providing hands-on security to ordinary Congolese. Corruption, illegal activities and direct taxation – such as bribes payed by traders and motorists – of the people they’re meant to protect are the order of the day in large parts of the country.</p>
<h2>Local ownership</h2>
<p>A range of factors can help to explain the success or failure of any security sector’s reform programme. Apart from prioritising legal and practical frameworks, the programme should have firm civilian oversight. Local ownership should also be a top priority. Local ownership means that the host government take on a leadership role and is the key institution in defining the needs and priorities of a SSR programme. But this is for many reasons <a href="http://www.severineautesserre.com/research/peaceland/">tough to achieve</a>, and has only happened to a limited degree in the DRC.</p>
<p>Donors, too, can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">make or break reform programmes</a>. This is mainly through a focus on their national political agenda and self-interest, bad programming and the imposition of ‘off-the-shelf’ initiatives on the country in question. My research illustrates that donor staff tend to use standardised tools while SSR programmes needs to be tailored to the local needs. </p>
<p>This can result in ill-conceived equipment donations and maintenance contracts, or training programmes that are unfit for the recipient country’s needs. The DRC is a classic example of this.</p>
<h2>Local security realities</h2>
<p>Security reform programmes should take note of the local security realities. In the DRC compromises have often been made that have had a negative effect in the medium to longer term. This was for instance seen in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">fast-tracking of integration of rebel forces</a>. These units were generally not loyal to the government, but to their former commanders. Another example was the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1486719">appointment of insurgent leaders</a> to high-level statutory roles for which they had no formal qualifications. </p>
<p>In the DRC priority was given to the need for stability and reducing risk, rather than to long term reforms of the security sector. This is partly why the country’s security forces just aren’t up to the task of properly protecting citizens.</p>
<p>President Tshisekedi has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-felix-tshisekedi-dr-congos-new-president/a-47025072">a big task in-front of him</a>. He is taking over a country still divided and in conflict with itself. Many ordinary Congolese are daily faced with the reality of armed non-state actors. On the other hand, are unprofessional national police and army in many ways operating like the armed groups. The DRC government needs to get the security reform programme back on track, and take real ownership of the process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Mandrup receives funding from EU Horizon2020.
Thomas Mandrup is an Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and an Extraordinary Associate Professor at the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University</span></em></p>There is an urgent need to improve the training of both the army and police in the DRC.Thomas Mandrup, Associate Professor, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership In Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1138772019-03-24T09:34:08Z2019-03-24T09:34:08ZCollaboration or coalition? Tshisekedi’s tough choices as leader of the DRC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264900/original/file-20190320-93054-pq07lu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former DRC President Joseph Kabila congratulates President Felix Tshisekedi at his inauguration.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Hugh Kinsella Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been a little over a month since Felix Tshisekedi became the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) <a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedis-victory-in-the-drc-is-historic-but-controversial-109673">head of state</a>. </p>
<p>Protests that followed the presidential election seem to be dwindling. And internationally the African Union and Western countries, including France and Belgium, have <a href="https://africandailyvoice.com/en/2019/01/23/african-union-and-european-union-accepts-tshisekedi-presidency/">recognised his</a> takeover.</p>
<p>But Tshisekedi faces an uphill struggle to establish his legitimacy. The poll was contested by the platform that supported <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/martin-fayulu-drc-opposition-candidate-pick-181111204554772.html">Martin Fayulu</a> in the presidential election. The coalition, called <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/11/12/drc-opposition-coalition-picks-united-candidate-martin-fayulu/">Lamuka</a>, seems to have come round to accepting that it failed to win power. Fayulu is seeking to fit into the current political scheme. But it’s clear that he’s called on his supporters to remain vigilant to make sure Tshisekedi doesn’t renege on promises he’s made.</p>
<p>Other aspirant presidential candidates have also fallen into line. The political parties associated with Fayulu in the <a href="https://africatimes.com/tag/lamuka/">coalition</a> have made it clear that they recognise the current authority of the country. This includes the National Union of Federalists of the Congo party under the leadership of <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2019/03/11/actualite/politique/gabriel-kyungu-candidat-president-de-lassemblee-provinciale-du-haut">Gabriel Kyungu</a>, Mouvement social pour le renouveau under <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/4062/Pierre_Lumbi">Pierre Lumbi</a> and a wide range of members of Ensemble under <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/3488/Moise_Katumbi">Moïse Katumbi</a>. </p>
<p>The Catholic Church, which was first to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/10/drc-opposition-chief-wins-vote-as-rival-church-cry-foul">contest the result</a> of the poll, has also <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/six-drc-bishops-recognize-election-of-tshisekedi-as-president-69414">recognised</a> the new head of state.</p>
<p>All this suggests that the race for the presidential chair is over. The question now is to identify where the real power lies. And what capacity the new president has to run the country. The hard truth is that Tshisekedi can’t set up a government to fulfil his political project unless he takes one of two options - cohabitation or forming a coalition. </p>
<h2>A difficult and complex beginning</h2>
<p>For the first time, a peaceful and civilised handover of power took place in the country, between Joseph Kabila and Tshisekedi. But these stories are quiet about one fact: that the old regime remains firmly in place. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s power is being undermined by the outgoing regime in a number of ways. Firstly, Kabila loyalists were put in key positions to run essential state services. Examples include the army, police and intelligence services.</p>
<p>Secondly, Kabila’s cabal has made sure that it retains power through institutions like the national assembly and provincial governments. This is clear from the fact Tshisekedi has lower representation in the national assembly. </p>
<p>There are already signs of tension. One was Tshisekedi’s recent decision to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics/congo-suspends-seating-of-new-senators-following-disputed-election-idUSKCN1QZ20I?utm_source=Media+Review+for+March+19%2C+2019&utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+March+19%2C+2019&utm_medium=email">suspend</a> the process of installing senators and electing provincial governors, amid allegations of procedural irregularities and corruption. </p>
<p>Kabila’s camp considers these decisions a violation of the country’s laws, while Tshisekedi’s supporters view his decision as part of the president’s duty as the guarantor of the constitution and stability of the republic.</p>
<h2>Difficult choices</h2>
<p>The option of cohabitation would see him poach members of the <a href="https://7sur7.cd/tout-savoir-sur-le-front-commun-pour-le-congo-fcc-ses-membres-et-ses-objectifs/">Common Front for Congo</a>, which has the largest number of parliamentarians.</p>
<p>This approach would be interesting because it would allow him to infiltrate the majority parliamentary group and get it to support his political project as head of state. </p>
<p>If that doesn’t work, he’d be forced to form a coalition with other minority parties to counterbalance the weight of Common Front for Congo. This option is rather complicated because he would have a weak hold on both the parliament and the government. He would be a president without power. In other words a puppet.</p>
<p>Yet another option is to form an alliance with Common Front for Congo. If this happens, some thorny questions will be raised about the control of the parliamentary leadership. For example, who would lead such a coalition – Kabila, who holds the the moral authority of the Front Commun pour le Congo, or Tshisekedi? </p>
<p>Another tricky question would be which political programmes or projects should be given precedence. </p>
<p>And lastly, will it be possible to take the country in a new direction while there’s a continued reliance on people who for almost 18 years plundered the country?</p>
<h2>To eat with the devil, you need a long fork</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi doesn’t seem to have many options to set up his first government as head of state. Initially, he will probably have to deal with the current parliamentary majority which is held by Kabila’s supporters, the Common Front for Congo. </p>
<p>Hopefully, he can reshape it during his term in power. In the meantime, he should not lose sight of the popular wisdom that eating with the devil requires a long fork. Despite the apparent cordiality between himself and Kabila, he should not forget that the former head of state remains a political opponent. </p>
<p>If, following Nelson Mandela’s example after his release from prison, Tshisekedi calls all Congolese to reconcile and to work together for the good of the nation, he must not lose sight of the need for justice (for all) as the basis of the rule of law. </p>
<p>Only then will he be able to claim an alternative rule and new perspectives for the Congolese people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Albert Kasanda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Democratic Republic of Congo’s new leader Felix Tshisekedi is being undermined by the outgoing regime of Joseph Kabila.Albert Kasanda, Researcher in Political Philosophy and social sciences, Czech Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101222019-01-28T13:33:56Z2019-01-28T13:33:56ZDRC musicians, patronage networks and the possibility of change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255105/original/file-20190123-135148-glbkmy.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lexxus Legal is a hip-hop artist and at the forefront of the activist movement in the DRC.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/lexxuslegal/photos/a.10152059106112445/10156225003507445/?type=3&theater">Facebook</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Popular musicians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), like many of their compatriots, have often been forced to depend on political patronage networks for their livelihoods. It dates back to colonial times, but has lived on through the country’s nearly six decades of independence.</p>
<p>The nature of the networks may not change after <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/felix-tshisekedi-is-sworn-in-as-congolese-president-11548356987">the inauguration</a> of Félix Tshisekedi as president. That question depends largely on whether or not Tshisekedi is able to take control of the most strategic appointments in the federal bureaucracy and security services. If he does – and it’s a big if – musicians will be faced with a rare moment in their history: a substantial change in the shape of the DRC’s patronage networks. </p>
<p>There have only been three such changes. The first, from the colonial era under the Belgians to the short period of instability after independence in 1960 marked by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassination</a> of Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Next was to the long period of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ll2z5">Mobutu Sese Seko’s</a> dictatorship from 1965 to 1997. This was followed by the establishment of new networks of patronage by the Kabila family until today.</p>
<p>These latest networks may yet endure if the Kabila family remains in <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/10/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">effective control</a> through a cohabitation arrangement with a Tshisekedi presidency. Either way Congolese musicians are likely to be faced with the same invidious choice: accept the patronage of the powers that be, or face the consequences. </p>
<p>Under the Belgians and Mobutu the choice was stark: toe the line if you want to make a living as a professional musician. Conformity determined access to government controlled media and public space. As Congolese soukous musician <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/kanda-bongo-man-mn0000303409/biography">Kanda Bongo Man</a> told me, in Nigeria <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/fela-kuti-mn0000138833">Fela Kuti</a> might openly protest and survive, but under Mobutu he and his family would be tortured, murdered and thrown from a helicopter into the Congo river. </p>
<p>That control has loosened under the Kabilas. But it has by <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-12-10-anti-govt-rapper-abducted-as-dr-congo-vote-tensions-rise/">no means disappeared</a>.</p>
<h2>The colonial period</h2>
<p>After the Second World War Greek and Jewish entrepreneurs, who were outsiders to the Belgium political establishment, were the first to invest in music. They imported rudimentary recording facilities, public address systems, guitars, drums and brass instruments. </p>
<p>They also used their family networks of shops across Africa to sell records elsewhere on the continent. This partly explains how the beautiful and popular music of Leopoldville (the capital of the Belgian colony of Congo, before it was renamed Kinshasa in 1966) and Brazzaville across the Congo River, spread through the colony as well as the continent.</p>
<p>Tanzanian musician <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/remmy-ongala-mn0000190008">Remmy Ongala</a>, who has been part of the Congolese soukous scene since the 1980s, told me in a 2002 interview that he first heard the popular music of the Congolese capital performed in the third largest city Kisangani during colonial times. </p>
<p>It was the Belgian government that paid the transport and provided the public space for the Greek owned company Ngoma to promote their young stars Wendo and Bowane.</p>
<h2>Mobutu’s way of doing things</h2>
<p>Mobutu introduced the cultural policy of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10464883.2014.937235?mobileUi=0"><em>authenticité</em></a>, which was aimed at combating a colonial mentality denigrating African culture and language and casting it as inferior to Europes. In practice, however, it was harnessed to building Mobutu’s personality cult.</p>
<p>The dominance in cultural life of the <em>Mouvement Populaire de La Révolution</em> the political party <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Political-process#ref467764">he founded</a>, was implemented in ways that mimicked the kind of imposition formerly associated with the colonial authorities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/congolese-musicians-rarely-provide-a-critique-but-continue-to-provide-solace-80201">Congolese musicians rarely provide a critique, but continue to provide solace</a>
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<p>His favoured bands, especially <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/tpok-jazz-mn0000955002">TPOK Jazz</a>, benefited the most, and were given both direct patronage and control of the nationalised record plant as part of “Zaireanisation”. The band’s leader Franco Luambo Makiadi was a member of Mobutu’s party. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_k349KCe0qY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Franco’s song ‘Tailleur’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8300170.stm">King of Rumba</a>, as Franco was known, is also famous for composing metaphorically ambiguous songs. One of the most celebrated is <em>Tailleur</em> that’s about an unnamed tailor and an unnamed owner of his needle that captures the nature of patronage networks:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>How is the tailor going to operate if the owner of the needle takes it away?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>During the Mobutu era Congolese musicians created a musical genre that came to known as Rumba. Very little, if any, “resistance” Rumba was composed. As part of <em>authenticité</em>, Mobutu demanded that popular music turn to indigenous influences and languages for inspiration. </p>
<p>Franco responded enthusiastically deepening his relationship with those sources and composing songs in KiKongo. But Lingala, the language of the capital and of the <em>force publique</em> under the Belgians remained the national language of power, government and the army under Mobutu. Despite the “authenticity” policy Lingala remained the predominant language of popular song even for Franco. </p>
<p>This may help explain why the most outspoken musical critics of the corruption and violence in Congolese politics has still not come from the Lingala speaking capital , with some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/28/political-soundtrack-drc-uneasy-mix-of-music-and-power-elections-congo">notable exceptions</a> such as Lexxus Legal, but from the east of the vast country, and is expressed in Swahili rather than Lingala.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drcs-flawed-election-means-for-emerging-democratic-culture-in-africa-109410">DRC protest music</a> , is mainly expressed in East African <a href="http://afropop.org/audio-programs/congo-goma-music-conflict-and-ngos">versions</a> hip-hop, particularly from Goma. Musically it is more derivative than Rumba, being heavily indebted to US hip-hop. The protest is not against the power of the US culture industries but against violence, and the lies that foster violence.</p>
<h2>Dependent musicians</h2>
<p>The 1990s was a decade of change. Late in the decade there was a general weakening of state institutions in the post-Mobutu era with no sign of a return to secure government sponsorship for musicians or of regular salaries for public servants.</p>
<p>Another dramatic shift was that musicians became more dependent on live performance and transient commercial and political sponsorship with the advent of cheap cassette tapes and even cheaper digital recording technology.</p>
<p>This intertwining of the market, state and society has continued to see itself expressed through music in the DRC. A well-loved dance of 2005, <em>Kisanola</em>, (literally meaning a comb) is associated with the moment when one of the country’s best-known stars, Werrason, shifted commercial allegiance from one beer brand, Skol, to its popular rival Primus, with lucrative consequences for Werrason. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-SJ1kUNx9iE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Werrason’s dancers doing the ‘Kisanola’ dance.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255404/original/file-20190124-135154-ly7too.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Werrason’s election poster.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the <em>Kisanola</em> dance, also involves a movement representing the shaving of one’s hair to the bone – a metaphor for how people in the DRC have had everything taken from them. </p>
<p>In the past commercial imperatives and political censoring have not entirely prevented challenging songs slipping through the net. Remmy Ongala told me how even Wendo in the 1950s, under the patronage of the Belgian colonists, sang songs he and his Congolese audience understood as a call for independence and as a challenge to the colonial regime:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>one fine day this country will change, you will see it yourselves. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is a call that remains tragically resonant today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Salter received funding from the ESRC for his PhD on the spread of Congolese popular music in Africa</span></em></p>The intertwining of the market, state and society has continued to see itself expressed through music in the DRC.Thomas Salter, Musician, Academic, Consultant, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101022019-01-19T08:10:10Z2019-01-19T08:10:10ZMaking sense of the DRC’s struggle for democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254572/original/file-20190119-100295-nkyqg9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Citizens movements are now more powerful than conventional political parties in the DRC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Hugh KinsellaI Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On January 10, amid much controversy, the national electoral commission announced that Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/congo-riot-police-deploy-at-electoral-commission-ahead-of-vote-result-idUSKCN1P30RO?il=0">had won</a> the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) presidential poll. Prior to this, unofficial voting results leaked to diplomats and the press suggested Martin Fayulu had won. </p>
<p>Days later, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">compelling evidence</a> emerged that Fayulu had won by a sound majority. The evidence was based on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">rigorous analysis of voting results</a> provided by the Catholic church’s network of observers and by voter tallies in the electoral commission’s database. This was followed by the country’s Constitutional Court ruling that Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drc-calm-after-court-upholds-election-win-of-tshisekedi-20190120">had won</a>. Fayulu immediately rejected the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/20/fayulu-rejects-court-ruling-declaring-tshisekedi-as-drc-president">court’s judgment</a>.</p>
<p>In our view, confidence in democracy in the country will be built through incremental steps. Understanding the complicated dynamics at work now will solidify the foundation in the future.</p>
<p>One important factor to bear in mind is that <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/in-democratic-republic-of-congo-activists-face-uphill-struggle-1.803860">citizens’ movements</a> in the DRC are now more powerful than conventional political parties. They anticipated political and strategic issues and assisted political parties in raising public awareness in the run up to the elections. </p>
<p>Also, the fact that during the 18-year struggle against outgoing leader Joseph Kabila several opposition leaders were bought by the regime further weakened political parties. Organisations in civil society didn’t fall into this trap. The revival of <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180708-rdc-comite-laic-coordination-actions-mois-aout-ceni-joseph-kabila">civic engagement by the Comité laïc de coordination</a>, a secular structure led by Catholic activists to demand Kabila respect the constitution and organise elections, was a lifeline for struggling political parties.</p>
<p>Civic engagement during the past decade has cultivated a demanding citizenry in the country. This is evident in the extent of the collective rage against any manipulation of the election’s results. This represents a qualitative shift from previous elections. The fact that voting was closely observed, and results reported, represents considerable courage in the face of violence and intimidation.</p>
<h2>Pre-election deal making</h2>
<p>Months before the election, the political opposition was divided and without a clear consensus or strategy. In November 2018 seven opposition members agreed to attend a meeting in Geneva <a href="https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/mediation-and-crisis-resolution/meeting-of-congolese-drc-opposition-leaders-in-geneva-faq/">hosted by the Kofi Annan Foundation</a> to discuss backing a single candidate. They hoped this would ensure the defeat of Kabila’s chosen successor, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3900/Emmanuel_Ramazani_Shadary">Emmanuel Shadary</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254498/original/file-20190118-100279-100c0ew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">DRC President Joseph Kabila’s chosen successor Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stefan Kleinowitz</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Several rounds of voting were necessary <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/665388/politique/rdc-comment-lopposition-a-saborde-laccord-de-geneve-pour-un-candidat-commun/">to reach a fragile agreement</a> over days of fraught deliberations. The agreement was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vl81X1kygCY">contingent</a> on the promise of holding free and fair elections, with a full field of candidates, within two years. Whoever became president under such circumstances would be in debt to the coalition that put him in power and seen as a transitional figure. </p>
<p>The fact that Fayulu, a businessman-turned-politician, was chosen – rather than leaders of the two largest political parties – sowed division among the opposition. Tshisekedi, who leads the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, and Kamerhe, leader of the Union for the Congolese Nation, later withdrew their pledge to support Fayulu. </p>
<p>This was <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/27434/katumbi-bemba-muzito-matungulu-tout-pour-fayulu/">seen by some as a betrayal</a> and by others as a means of escaping from what the local press referred to as <a href="https://congosynthese.com/laccord-mort-ne-de-geneve-un-marche-de-dupes/laccord-mort-ne-de-geneve-un-marche-de-dupes-2/">“un marché de dupes”</a>, or a trap.</p>
<p>Understanding why Fayulu was chosen must include considering who <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/27434/katumbi-bemba-muzito-matungulu-tout-pour-fayulu/">stands to benefit</a> if he does indeed take office. </p>
<p>There are visible business interests and political actors supporting him. But given the complex coalition-building that made him into a national candidate it’s difficult to discern what role other interests may be playing. </p>
<p>The Congolese people and citizens groups are committed to creating the necessary conditions for unfettered democracy, so that Congolese people can benefit from their country’s wealth. This means electing leaders who aren’t beholden to corrupt businessmen, inside or outside the country.</p>
<h2>The top three</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/martin-fayulu-drc-opposition-candidate-pick-181111204554772.html">Fayulu</a> studied in France and the US. He worked for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/martin-fayulu-drc-opposition-candidate-pick-181111204554772.html">ExxonMobil from 1984 to 2003 before becoming a member of parliament</a>. </p>
<p>It’s possible to see Fayulu as a political and strategic place-holder, more than a viable stand-alone candidate for president. He was active in the anti-Kabila opposition movement and a member of parliament. But before Geneva, few would’ve bet on him becoming president. He was an outsider without national popularity or many followers. </p>
<p>In practical terms, he’s the national face of <a href="https://africatimes.com/2018/11/11/congolese-opposition-names-fayulu-as-coalition-candidate/">Lamuka (“wake up” in Lingala and Swahili), the opposition coalition supporting him</a>. This coalition formed a strategic alliance and campaigned across the country.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1017&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1017&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254493/original/file-20190118-100279-rno5jo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1017&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Felix Tshisekedi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stefan Kleinowitz</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3970/F%C3%A9lix_Antoine_Tshisekedi">Tshisekedi</a> is a completely different political persona. The son of <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3522/%C3%89tienne_Tshisekedi_wa_Mulumba">Étienne Tshisekedi, the popular opposition leader</a>, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-tshisekedi-newsmaker/congos-president-elect-steps-out-of-fathers-shadow-but-doubts-persist-idUSKCN1P42AO">took over the leadership of his father’s party</a> the Union for Democracy and Social Progress in 2018 <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180331-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-elu-tete-udps-candidat-presidentielle">after Étienne passed away</a>. </p>
<p>The son was considered a favourite in the presidential election from the outset due to both his party’s struggle for democracy since 1982 and its popularity. But some members of the opposition are disappointed with him and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-tshisekedi-newsmaker/congos-president-elect-steps-out-of-fathers-shadow-but-doubts-persist-idUSKCN1P42AO">feel he doesn’t compare favourably to his father</a>. </p>
<p>Others feel that he belongs to a new generation and has learned from his father’s mistakes. Although he hadn’t collaborated with Kabila’s regime in the past, it has been reported that he likely <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-congos-election-is-headed-for-a-chaotic-outcome/2019/01/10/77014fca-14c3-11e9-ab79-30cd4f7926f2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c1c3b8ca4fff">made a deal with Kabila</a> to assume power. The two key concessions he’s reported to have made were assuring Kabila immunity from prosecution and allowing him to retain extensive power <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12538/Data_leak_exposes_plot_to_steal_presidential_vote">over mining and security</a>.</p>
<p>For his part, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3252/Vital_Kamerhe">Kamerhe</a> isn’t an exception in the Congo. He behaves like many politicians do: an informed opportunist who is always ready to help when needed for some profit in return. </p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The opposition must avoid a stand-off framed as Tshisekedi against Fayulu. This would simply open the way for Kabila to step forward as the steady hand that stays in power to make peace.</p>
<p>Those who support democracy in the DRC should insist the true outcome of the election, regardless of who won, be respected. This includes Tshisekedi and Kamerhe who, in theory, have nothing to hide.</p>
<p><em>Professor Albert Kasanda contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phyllis Taoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Confidence in democracy in the DRC will be built through incremental steps.Phyllis Taoua, Professor of Francophone Studies (Africa, Caribbean), Faculty Affiliate with Africana Studies, World Literature Program and Human Rights Pracice, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.