tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/governent-834/articlesGovernent – The Conversation2018-01-11T10:03:28Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899292018-01-11T10:03:28Z2018-01-11T10:03:28ZThe missing papers at the National Archives may not be a grand conspiracy after all<p>Thousands of government papers have apparently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/dec/26/government-admits-losing-thousands-of-papers-from-national-archives">gone missing from the UK National Archives</a>. Declassified documents covering some of the most controversial episodes from Britain’s past, including the Falklands War, Northern Ireland’s Troubles and the now infamous <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1999/feb/04/uk.politicalnews6">Zinoviev Letter Affair</a> were among the missing files, having been officially “misplaced while on loan” to government departments. Some have claimed this is evidence of a government cover-up, but the truth is probably more mundane.</p>
<p>Others papers returned to government from the archives based at Kew, Surrey, include papers on Britain’s control over the Mandate of Palestine, sensitive records on defence agreements between the UK and Malaya and documents on the 1978 killing of dissident Georgi Markov by Bulgarian spies in central London. The number of missing files ran to “almost 1,000”, according to The Guardian.</p>
<p>The story prompted criticism over government handling of documents released into the public domain and led to questions of a possible cover-up by departments trying to manipulate the past. Labour’s shadow cabinet office minister Jon Trickett <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/labour-demands-investigation-after-controversial-11753682">called for an investigation</a> and said the British public deserved to know “what the government has done in their name”. The Scottish National Party also <a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/15793310.SNP_to_demand_clarity_from_Westminster_over_missing_archive_papers/">demanded an inquiry</a>. </p>
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<p>Amnesty International and Reprieve also expressed concerns about the possible loss of papers dealing with human rights violations, especially by the British state in Northern Ireland. Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty’s Northern Ireland programme director <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/dec/26/uk-government-urged-to-search-for-national-archives-papers">demanded</a> “a government-wide search”.</p>
<h2>History theft</h2>
<p>Journalist Siobhan Fenton linked the controversy to attempts to rewrite Britain’s colonial legacy, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/27/archive-files-britain-colonial-past-government">adding</a>: “Britain has long failed to acknowledge the horrors that its colonialism and imperialism have wrought on the world.”</p>
<p>And The National’s Martin Hannan even claimed that the Zinoviev Letter (a forgery at the heart of a plot to destabilise Britain’s first Labour government in 1924) was “<a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/15793310.SNP_to_demand_clarity_from_Westminster_over_missing_archive_papers/">among the missing documents</a>” – even though copies of the letter can be easily found at Kew. </p>
<p>In fairness, this isn’t the first time that government has been accused of withholding sensitive papers. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) was found to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/18/foreign-office-historic-files-secret-archive">hoarding colonial era records</a> in the so-called “migrated archives” following legal action by Mau Mau veterans tortured by the British authorities in the 1950s. The FCO <a href="http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C12269323">subsequently released</a> this material to the National Archives.</p>
<p>But are the new claims of “almost 1,000” missing files actually accurate? In short, no. Figures from the National Archives suggest the number is far smaller than that put forward by The Guardian’s Ian Cobain. Government departments can request the return of documents sent to Kew <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/ordering-and-return-of-documents-procedures.pdf">for several reasons</a>, including writing official history and exploring departmental precedents.</p>
<p>Both the Public Records Act 1958 and Section 46 “Code of Practice –- records management” under Freedom of Information, asks departments to ensure the “safe-keeping and security of records in their custody”. Departments are encouraged to return files as soon as they have been used. Figures obtained under Freedom of Information show that government departments asked for just over 23,000 files between 2011 and 2014. As of early 2014, <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20141203172845/https://apps.nationalarchives.gov.uk/foi/requisitions-government-departments.htm">2,925 were yet to be returned</a>.</p>
<h2>So how many have been lost?</h2>
<p>The National Archives catalogue shows just 626 records – far fewer than the thousands initially suggested. These contain documents from across government, including the FCO, Home Office, Ministry of Defence, Board of Trade, Treasury, Office of Works and many more (some 63 public bodies).</p>
<p>Another Freedom of Information request reveals that 48 records were lost while on loan from July 2011 to July 2016. The Ministry of Defence (19) and Metropolitan Police (ten) were the worst offenders. The FCO accounted for just three. It is unclear when the other almost 600 files went missing, but these could have been lost over a longer period of time, the figures suggest.</p>
<p>To place this into some context, <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/freedom-of-information/information-requests/public-records-that-have-been-lost/">a total of 372 records</a> went missing for unspecified reasons in the vaults of the National Archives between the summer of 2011 and 2016. Figures obtained by the BBC show this number <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/freedom-of-information/information-requests/missing-or-lost-documents/">could be as high as 402</a>, including files on nuclear collaboration with Israel and correspondence with Winston Churchill. That’s out of nearly 11m records – <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36953199">0.01% of the collection</a>. </p>
<p>Searches of the online catalogue show that one Home Office file on the Zinoviev Letter, three on Britain’s relationship with Malaya and several highlighted by The Guardian have been lost. Claims that “many” of the missing papers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/dec/26/uk-government-urged-to-search-for-national-archives-papers">refer to the Falklands</a> are inaccurate. Just one Treasury file on the development of the Falklands is missing. None refer to Britain’s controversial response to the Mau Mau uprising or the colonial campaigns in Malaya, Cyprus or Aden. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201473/original/file-20180110-48488-1yojz2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">On watch for Mau Mau fighters.</span>
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<p>Given Amnesty’s concern over the loss of papers on Northern Ireland, only one file – a Ministry of Defence assessment in the early 1970s – has been lost. Many of the missing reports on Communist Party infiltration in the 1950s can be found in MI5’s declassified papers or those of the Cabinet Office, already available to researchers elsewhere. </p>
<p>For all the talk of government lies, many of the files relate to more mundane matters. Among the lost papers are records on the Channel Tunnel, Norwich Airport, a map of Princes Risborough, kneepads in coalmines (of interest no doubt to researchers in these areas, but far from the government cover-up suggested by some).</p>
<p>For a historian, the loss of government records is troubling but the claim that government is manipulating history by losing documents is an exaggeration. Historians already have the ability to write on controversial aspects from Britain’s past – Zinoviev, Mau Mau, Cold War surveillance and others – using papers at the National Archives, as seen by the growth of historical research on these subjects and many more. If government is supposedly trying to alter history by “losing” historical papers, it’s not doing a very good job.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89929/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Lomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some journalists have claimed that ‘thousands’ of documents which have gone missing at the National Archives are proof of ‘history theft’. It’s probably just old-fashioned incompetence.Dan Lomas, Programme Leader, MA Intelligence and Security Studies, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/341712014-11-20T10:45:06Z2014-11-20T10:45:06ZWhat are the costs of Detroit’s rise from bankruptcy?<p>Earlier this month, we learned that the biggest municipal bankruptcy in history would also be among the swiftest. </p>
<p>The emergency manager for Detroit filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2013 without a friend in the world. The city’s restructuring plan had no creditor support. The filing was met with hostility from elected city officials and residents. The Michigan and federal governments both ruled out any possibility of financial help. </p>
<p>Fast forward to today: the federal bankruptcy court recently entered an order <a href="https://www.kccllc.net/detroit/document/1353846141112000000000018">officially confirming</a> Detroit’s adjustment plan. Poised to reduce its debt by more than US$7 billion, Detroit’s final plan was supported by nearly all its creditors, including bondholders and retired workers. The state of Michigan ultimately put in money (with significant strings attached), as did an array of third-party sources, such as the Ford Foundation. Participants and observers have used <a href="http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-bankruptcy-decision/18648093/">revelatory words</a> to characterize this outcome: Remarkable! Miraculous! Unprecedented! Creative!</p>
<p>Will the ends justify the means used to get there? History will be the judge, of both ends and means, but here’s a snapshot of how it looks right now. </p>
<h2>The means: short but not sweet</h2>
<p>Detroit’s swift trip through bankruptcy was made possible by the confluence of two factors. First, Michigan’s governor, Rick Snyder, installed an emergency manager under a controversial, and possibly unconstitutional, state takeover statute that <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-michigans-emergency-manager-law-disenfranchise-black-citizens/275639/">affects</a> a large percentage of African Americans who live in Michigan. The emergency manager’s limited term created an incentive for a shorter stay in bankruptcy. By its structure, too, the takeover law allows the emergency manager to make more streamlined decisions, operate more quickly than ordinary operations of city government would likely permit. </p>
<p>These factors could not have produced a confirmed timetable without the federal judges overseeing Detroit’s bankruptcy exercising a level and type of control unprecedented in the history of municipal bankruptcy, potentially beyond the constitutional boundaries of federal courts. Much of the court’s activity happened behind closed doors, increasing the potency of any anti-democratic critique of Detroit’s overhaul. </p>
<p>Critics usually decry decisions of so-called activist judges made after hard-fought adversarial processes. Less discussed are situations in which the power of the court is enhanced by avoiding litigation and reaching deals, as in this case. As one might expect, the settlement required parties to waive their rights to appeal key issues, such as the treatment of public pensions in bankruptcy. Detroit’s bankruptcy produced a precedent of a different sort: the implementation of judicial oversight that, in ways large and small, affects the timeline for Detroit’s bankruptcy exit and the blueprint for its future. </p>
<h2>The ends: not yet time for a victory lap</h2>
<p>Will people think the result is worth these sacrifices? Detroit’s restructuring helped make Governor Snyder one of Governing Magazine’s <a href="http://www.governing.com/poy/poy-rick-snyder.html">public officials of the year</a>. But what lies ahead is hard to say. </p>
<p>In the corporate context, at least, faster restructuring is associated with a greater likelihood of a <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887523">return to financial distress</a>. A financial expert appointed by the bankruptcy court, Martha Kopacz, found Detroit’s plan feasible, albeit barely so. She suggested that the speed of the case may have <a href="http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Bankruptcy%20Information/M.%20Kopacz%20Expert%20Report%20to%20Judge%20Rhodes%20071814.pdf">undercut feasibility</a> to some extent. </p>
<p>The negotiated cuts are certainly <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/us/detroit-financial-problems.html?_r=0">more modest</a> than the emergency manager’s original proposal circulated before the bankruptcy. Are the savings enough to give the city a fighting chance? Richard Ravitch, a New York politician and businessman <a href="http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/17/richard-ravitch-detroit/19149687/">tapped</a> first to serve as a behind-the-scenes consultant to the bankruptcy court and then to be a senior advisor to the panel that will oversee Detroit’s fiscal decisions, says that its difficulties are much, much worse than New York City’s in the 1970s. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan’s task, says Ravitch, is Sisyphean, like rolling a rock up a hill just to have it roll down again. </p>
<p>Emergence from bankruptcy is a breakthrough but just the beginning of a journey to try to conquer problems <a href="http://www.freep.com/article/20140223/OPINION05/302230041/Sugrue-Trickle-down-urbanism-won-t-work-Detroit">decades in the making</a>. In addition, the emergency manager and his team put the restructuring plan in place, but elected officials will have to implement it, subject to some <a href="http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/10/detroit-financial-review-commission-appointees/18822451/">oversight</a> by a new financial review commission. Although those officials told the court during the confirmation process that they support the plan, it took barely a business day for fractures to emerge publicly. </p>
<p>Mayor Duggan and Detroit’s Corporation Counsel have been arguing in court and the media that the city <a href="http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/12/duggan-bankruptcy-fees/18889949/">cannot afford</a> the professional fees incurred during the bankruptcy if it is to improve services for residents. That argument generates more than a little awkwardness when, just days earlier, the bankruptcy court ruled the city’s plan was feasible. </p>
<p>As for creditor outcomes, no one was immune from sacrifice. Retirees are taking sizable hits, especially to health care. Financial creditors have accepted far less than the face amount of their debt. The creditors getting the lowest return – civil rights claimants, personal injury claimants, lessors and counterparties to contracts the city is breaking – didn’t settle, lacking an organized way to negotiate collectively with the city (an official committee that would have represented their interests was disbanded by the judge in early 2014). These claims are a small fraction of Detroit’s overall debt, but quite substantial from the perspective of the people seeking payment. </p>
<p>It may be years before we know whether Detroit has truly turned the corner. But we can say right now that the methods used to get this far, this fast, were costly in more than money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa B Jacoby does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Earlier this month, we learned that the biggest municipal bankruptcy in history would also be among the swiftest. The emergency manager for Detroit filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2013 without a…Melissa B Jacoby, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/21362011-07-04T20:59:40Z2011-07-04T20:59:40ZWhy Australia’s defence procurement is lacking military precision<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/2085/original/Ausfighterjet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=119%2C63%2C3309%2C2282&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">No magic bullet for Defence's procurement problem AFP/Paul Crock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>There is a certain security in the way Australia handles its national security – you can always expect future failures. It’s never too long before there’s a problem, drawing public attention and justifying further inquiries. </p>
<p>Over recent months, the Australian Defence Organisation has gained a great deal of this kind of attention, culminating in a <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/national/shipbuying-method-haphazard-auditor-20110628-1gp3x.html">report</a> by the government auditor which revealed serious problems in the way that defence buys Navy ships.</p>
<p>Problems providing equipment to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have been a recurrent and significant issue in the management of national defence. It’s not that these problems go unnoticed – attempts to review significant weaknesses and more tightly manage the process go back decades. And considerable effort is now being devoted to improve the management of defence acquisition, with the Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith announcing <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/Smithtpl.cfm?CurrentId=12043">further</a> <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/Smithtpl.cfm?CurrentId=12046">reforms</a> last week. </p>
<p>But despite these efforts, no one has been able to find a formula to prevent blowouts or inefficiencies in all but the most simple or particularly fortunate military equipment program. So why is this the case?</p>
<h2>It’s complicated</h2>
<p>Providing equipment to the ADF is a complicated procedure. Currently, the major problem is that defence cannot spend the money allocated to it because technical problems are significantly delaying the projected schedules of major programs. </p>
<p>Issues to do with the complex technical nature of such equipment are well known. And just as complex, is the environment of the defence organisation, the nature of the industry that provide the equipment and the political pressures brought against defence. </p>
<p>These bring into play forces that are often incompatible, not complementary, and of sufficient strength to suggest that the problems of defence procurement will never be solved without a fundamental re-think on how we equip the ADF.</p>
<h2>It’s all about risk</h2>
<p>Fundamentally, any engineering or construction project is about managing risk, whether it be in Defence or in private companies. Even the smallest misjudgement can be devastating, as Leighton Holdings <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business-old/industry-sectors/leighton-holdings-in-huge-swing-to-427m-loss-plans-to-raise-757m/story-e6frg96x-1226037278119">recently discovered</a> when having to write down its profit projections. </p>
<p>Defence project managers are as aware as their commercial counterparts of the requirements of risk management but defence equipment is built by commercial entities that must put them into effect. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, even when these commercial entities have experience and a good reputation within the defence industry, risk will always play a part. With the now infamous <a href="http://newmatilda.com/2008/03/07/saga-super-seasprites">Super Sea Sprite naval helicopter project</a>, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) wanted to use a flight crew of two instead of the three. </p>
<p>This seemingly small change required the development of a whole new avionics system, undertaken by the well-regarded Litton Systems. But despite its reputation and ability, Litton was unable to deliver and was forced out of the defence systems industry, leaving a project that eventually had to be scrapped.</p>
<p>It is also difficult to quantify risk, particularly as risk does not always increase with the complexity of a project. The automated ship control system for the <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/Collins_Class">Collins class submarines</a> was a vital, innovative and highly complex system that was successfully transferred from its Swedish designer, Saab and developed for the Australian vessel. </p>
<p>In contrast, the design and development of a refuelling boom for the new Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) tanker transport aircraft would seem less complicated. But in fact, problems with the boom have delayed the project by three years and sometimes proved dangerous to aircraft involved in trials.</p>
<h2>It takes time and times change</h2>
<p>Because defence acquisition programs are so complicated they also take a long time. Defence’s <a href="http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/construction-of-12-submarines-in-adelaide-spared-defence-budget-cuts/story-e6frea83-1226060681552">new submarine project</a>, still in its early stages after four years, will continue to deliver vessels into the 2040s. So much will change over this time that the later vessels in the 12 submarine program could well be obsolete. </p>
<p>A theme in the recent Auditor General’s assessment of the purchase of naval equipment was the need to ensure the Navy became a management partner in the acquisition process so that bringing a new ship into service did not become a “<a href="http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/confusion-and-delay-at-heart-of-navy-purchasing-20110628-1gp7e.html">voyage of discovery</a>”. </p>
<p>In other words, having to determine after a period of 10 years or more whether the equipment would meet the needs of current circumstances rather than those envisaged a decade earlier when it was originally designed.</p>
<p>This is not a situation confined to the Navy but to most very long-term projects. Recently, Major General John Caligari, in charge of the Army’s modernisation programs, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence-hold-ups-could-kill/story-fn59niix-1226084470192">criticised</a> procurement for failing to modify equipment so that it met the needs of soldiers when conditions changed in areas such as Afghanistan. He also observed that attempts to rewrite tender conditions to suit fighting conditions, were regarded as “interference” that could “pervert the outcome” of procurement processes. </p>
<p>General Caligari is right to want appropriate equipment for his troops. But there is a strong and justifiable history behind those whose approach is causing his frustration. In earlier projects, the cause of cost increases often lay in successive changes to equipment specifications. These increased complexity, delayed schedules and produced, sometimes spectacularly, cost overruns. </p>
<p>Since the 1980s, the objective of defence acquisition processes has been to produce a firm understanding of the scope of the project before commencing construction and, based on this, to agree some form of cost controlled contract with the producer. It will be a difficult task to introduce the flexibility needed by those on the ground without reawakening the spectre of past disasters.</p>
<h2>There’s politics too </h2>
<p>Even if you overcome all of these issues of shifting needs, risks and the complexity of long-term projects, reaching a firm contractual agreement with your commercial supplier may not mean you are successful. Commercial entities run to their own demands and these may not continue to coincide with those of defence or the government. </p>
<p>The combat system of the Collins submarines became a notorious failure and had to be replaced. There were several reasons for this but chief among them was the early departure of the company with the most expertise in the field from the consortium contracted to develop the system.</p>
<p>The capacity of the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) was severely reduced when one of the constituent companies was asset stripped after a hostile takeover. Eventually, when the submarine designer and consortium partner, Kokkums, was itself taken over by a rival, the government was forced to acquire ASC. </p>
<p>A long and costly legal battle for intellectual property rights followed and greatly complicated relationships at a time when every effort was needed to overcome the problems then affecting the submarines. Ultimately, it is only the Commonwealth that can be guaranteed to have retained its interest in the success of a project.</p>
<h2>No magic bullets: why off-the-shelf isn’t the answer.</h2>
<p>For all these reasons, the defence equipment horror story is most likely one that will continue to be heard. While this doesn’t mean governments should stop striving to improve defence acquisition, they should realise there’s no magic bullet. </p>
<p>There are expectations that selecting equipment off-the-shelf will overcome many difficulties but it is not that simple. Experience with some projects has been promising, with the acquisition of Super Hornet interim strike fighters and C-17 freighter aircraft having been trouble-free. Yet the progress of the most important military off-the-shelf project for the ADF, the RAAF’s next fighter aircraft (the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) has been amongst the most trouble plagued of all. </p>
<p>In this instance, off-the-shelf doesn’t really mean off-the-shelf, it instead means Australia will buy into a large-scale American production. Although the US shoulders the project risk in developing the F-35, the aircraft incorporates highly advanced technology and none of its purchasers can protect themselves against cost increases, time delays and performance shortfalls that arise from problems with this technology.</p>
<p>This level of risk comes with any equipment intended to be central to Australia’s future defence capabilities, especially those for combat. Off-the-shelf to some may mean safe to buy because of widespread usage, but in fact the ADF is likely to consider such equipment to be inadequate for any crucial combat role. </p>
<p>Acquiring adequate equipment is likely to continue to have risk factors high enough to invite trouble. This means that government cannot do better than ensure access to the means to address any problem with defence equipment when it arises. This involves scientific backup from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, experience in the Defence Materiel Organisation, expertise and training in the services, access to the technological resources of allies and the identification of competent commercial alternatives. </p>
<h2>We Need You: the right skills for the job.</h2>
<p>All of these involve people and their training and employment. This is as much of a troubled area for defence today as equipment acquisition. For decades, Defence has been subject to selective deskilling as efficiency programs have sought to reduce the costs of running defence. Many of the activities that developed the skills needed to rectify problems in equipment performance have been transferred to the private sector, meaning long-held knowledge is often lost. </p>
<p>The Audit report records that in no area does the RAN have more than 70 percent of the marine engineers it needs for current requirements. This is not enough for normal operations, let alone if one of the major projects goes awry.</p>
<p>Yet the basis of the government’s current reforms is more cuts – $20 billion of savings over 10 years. Improving administrative efficiency is a valid objective but could involve false economies if it results in the loss of further personnel needed to rescue future equipment programs gone wrong. </p>
<p>Even though, the government is reducing allocations to the equipment program to help reduce the Budget deficit because defence has been unable to spend the money allocated for equipment. </p>
<p>In an environment subject to so many countervailing pressures, the capacity to deliver successful equipment projects has to be sustained by some very careful thinking about both the projects themselves and the environment needed to sustain their development and entry to service.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/2136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derek Woolner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a certain security in the way Australia handles its national security – you can always expect future failures. It’s never too long before there’s a problem, drawing public attention and justifying…Derek Woolner, Visiting Fellow, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.