tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/integration-5476/articles integration – The Conversation2022-07-25T12:07:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1835822022-07-25T12:07:55Z2022-07-25T12:07:55ZAlcohol use more likely among Black youths at racially segregated schools<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467714/original/file-20220608-25-5i4dwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C20%2C4580%2C3400&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could structural racism in U.S. schools lead more young African Americans to drink?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/jet-of-a-bottle-of-cold-beer-of-crystal-on-a-black-royalty-free-image/584320758?adppopup=true">Jose A. Bernat Bacete / Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/research-brief-83231">Research Brief</a> is a short take about interesting academic work.</em></p>
<h2>The big idea</h2>
<p>Black youths who attend racially segregated schools are more likely to have drinking and behavior problems during childhood than Black youths in less segregated schools. This is according to a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2021-055952">new study</a> we conducted using <a href="https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/GettingStarted.aspx">national survey data</a> from 1997 to 2014.</p>
<p>School segregation, defined as the physical separation of students in schools based on their race, was ruled unconstitutional in 1954 as part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/brown-v-board-of-education-of-topeka">Brown v. Board of Education</a> decision. Consequently, about 1,000 districts nationwide were under court orders to desegregate. </p>
<p>However, school segregation <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-return-of-school-segregation-in-eight-charts/">has increased since 1991</a>, when the first of a series of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21649">court decisions</a> allowed districts to be released from court-ordered desegregation. Highly segregated schools – where less than 10% of students are white – <a href="https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-by-race-poverty-and-state/Brown-at-62-final-corrected-2.pdf">increased from 5.7% to 18.6% of all schools</a> – from 1988 to 2013. </p>
<p>Our study is among the first to explore how this recent segregation affects the health of Black children. It examines whether the health of Black children in districts that were released from court-ordered desegregation earlier is different from those in districts released later. </p>
<p>Our research team analyzed data on school segregation levels and health outcomes for about 1,248 Black children ages 5 to 17. We measured school segregation using the dissimilarity index, which indicates the proportion of Black or white students who would need to move to a different school to make all schools in a school district have the same student racial distribution.</p>
<p>We found that the more segregated a school district, the more likely Black students were to have behavioral problems, and the more likely Black students older than 12 years were to drink alcohol. For Black girls, the more segregated the school, the likelihood of having drunk alcohol rose at twice the rate it did for Black boys.</p>
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<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Earlier studies about school desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s found that it led to improvements in Black people’s well-being, such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w16664">higher educational and occupational attainment, better self-rated health</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.12.029">reduced teen pregnancy rates</a>.</p>
<p>Yet some scholars have argued that segregated schools can have certain <a href="https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2021.7.1.10">benefits</a>. For example, school segregation may have protective effects as Black youths in predominantly Black schools may face less interpersonal racism from white students and teachers than if they went to desegregated schools. </p>
<p>On the other hand, school segregation is a manifestation of structural racism, such that highly segregated schools are often <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9780807876770_boger">underfunded, with more crowded classrooms</a>, less experienced teachers and high teacher turnover. Segregated schools also tend to have <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/brown-v-board-students-criminalized-msna324866">harsher school discipline</a>.</p>
<p>These stressful environments can increase mental and emotional challenges for Black youths, making them more likely to develop unhealthy coping behaviors like drinking alcohol. In addition, segregated schools are more likely to be in segregated neighborhoods, which are more often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0277-9536(00)00004-6">targeted for alcohol advertising and have substantially more liquor stores</a>, making it easier for Black youths to obtain alcohol.</p>
<p>The results of our study suggest that the effects of structural racism and low school resources in segregated schools may be greater than the potential for reduced interpersonal racism. </p>
<h2>What still isn’t known</h2>
<p>This study did not examine why well-being was worse among Black youths in more segregated schools. For example, it didn’t examine whether it was because of fewer school counselors, higher stress levels or broader systemic factors. It also did not examine health among other groups like white, Hispanic or Asian children. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>Our team’s next steps are to explore the reasons school segregation affects young people’s well-being, not only for Black youths but also for white youths and other youths of color. Additionally, we plan to examine the long-term impact of school segregation as children transition to adulthood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rita Hamad receives funding from the National Institutes of Health and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guangyi Wang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An analysis shows that Black students at more racially segregated schools have a greater tendency to turn to the bottle.Guangyi Wang, Research Specialist, University of California, San FranciscoRita Hamad, Associate Professor of Family Community Medicine, University of California, San FranciscoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/752012017-05-02T20:09:48Z2017-05-02T20:09:48ZNew to Australia? Good luck! Migrants can no longer afford ‘gateway’ suburbs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163567/original/image-20170403-19423-1at37x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Migrants can no longer afford to live in the 'gateway' suburbs that once helped them to leave the ranks of the 'disadvantaged' and feel at home in their new country. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jack Wright/flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The concentration of disadvantaged people in certain parts of cities is almost always seen as undesirable by urban researchers and policymakers. But is this always the case? </p>
<p><a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0042098017700791">Our research</a> demonstrates that it isn’t. Concentrations of people who are often classified as “disadvantaged” – namely newly arrived humanitarian refugees and their families – can have significant positive outcomes. This is because such “gateway suburbs”, while housing large numbers of disadvantaged people, are not disadvantaged places. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163784/original/image-20170404-21972-77fafk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Auburn is 19km west of the Sydney CBD.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As part of a <a href="https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/research/projects/addressing-concentrations-of-disadvantage/">broader research project</a>, we chose two suburbs that were identified as disadvantaged and characterised by high numbers of immigrants. We spoke with residents and local service providers about their experiences, place changes over time and current settlement opportunities for newly arriving migrants. The suburbs we chose were <a href="https://www.ahuri.edu.au/research/research-papers/addressing-concentrations-of-disadvantageauburn-case-study-report">Auburn</a> in Sydney and <a href="http://www.ahuri.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/12450/AHURI_Research_Paper_Addressing-concentrations-of-disadvantage-Springvale-case-study-report.pdf">Springvale</a> in Melbourne. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163783/original/image-20170404-21972-poqi4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Springvale is 23km south-east of the Melbourne CBD.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/theres-something-about-auburn-sydneys-demographic-hotspot-20150804-gir2sg.html">Auburn</a> and Springvale may have high concentrations of disadvantaged people, as defined by <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/2033.0.55.001">Australian Bureau of Statistics data</a> (in terms of income, employment and language proficiency in particular). But they are not disadvantaged places.</p>
<p>These suburbs are well serviced by public transport and are within reasonable commuting distance of their cities’ CBDs. They have a plethora of social and community services, along with a good selection of shops and services catering to the local community. </p>
<p>Historically, these suburbs have been major hubs for providing resources and support to new and established migrant communities. </p>
<h2>A bottom-up community structure</h2>
<p>In both suburbs, the presence of “first-wave” migrant groups during years of intensive manufacturing after the second world war, and the immigration encouraged to support this, promoted the development of migrant support services. Government subsidised some of these. Many grew more organically through community relationships and support needs. </p>
<p>With the decline of manufacturing from the late 1970s and changing immigration policies, government support has retracted in these areas. This has been accompanied by a winding back of government support for housing and a rapidly changing housing market. </p>
<p>The legacy of these areas has meant that both Auburn and Springvale continue to have high degrees of amenity and social and economic infrastructure. This includes a high concentration of grassroots community groups. These provide support to recent immigrants in general and refugees in particular. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162830/original/image-20170328-21238-y69bav.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘There is a fantastic array of support services out there.’ – Auburn interviewee.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These are good places to live. But there are signs this is changing. </p>
<p>Broader changes in urban housing markets and migration policies, and economic and labour market restructuring, are beginning to undermine the benefits for immigrants settling in these areas. Increasingly unaffordable housing, reduced employment opportunities in low-skilled jobs and the erosion of government support for newly arrived immigrants mean migrants are at risk of greater disadvantage than in the past. </p>
<p>In particular, housing costs are increasing rapidly in Auburn and Springvale. While private market housing has successfully housed new migrants in the past, this is no longer the case. Many migrants can no longer afford to live in these areas, except in overcrowded or otherwise unsatisfactory living conditions.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Rental stock is in bad disrepair. Refugees and recent arrivals go into these houses and real estate agents are slow to act on people living in substandard conditions and are reluctant to do anything about it. <strong>– Springvale interviewee</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Today, the choice new migrants face is whether to live in unsatisfactory conditions in these areas, or to move to more affordable areas with fewer facilities and support services. </p>
<p>If similar processes are at play in other migrant gateway suburbs, and we suspect they are, this has important implications for Australia’s ability to continue its role as an immigrant destination country. </p>
<p>In the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/report-marks-australias-shift-from-settler-to-temporary-migrant-nation-34794">recent shifts</a> in Australian immigration policy away from humanitarian and family migrants and towards skilled and student migrants, this is perhaps not a government priority. But it should be. </p>
<h2>Left to fend for yourself</h2>
<p>Far from being something to celebrate, that new “disadvantaged” migrants are finding it increasingly difficult to live together in places like Auburn and Springvale is something we should be worried about. </p>
<p>As they are pushed out into more dispersed areas with more insecure housing, recent arrivals are also pushed away from areas with the services and amenities that might help them leave the ranks of the “disadvantaged” and become the “new Australians” who have, until recently at least, been much celebrated. </p>
<p>We have been replacing housing, employment and migrant settlement policy supports with a fend-for-yourself “good luck!” approach in an unaffordable housing market. </p>
<p>In a market dominated by more than 95% private ownership or rental, this poses new risks for those choosing Australia as their home. It introduces further complexity for organisations trying to support <a href="https://theconversation.com/interculturalism-how-diverse-societies-can-do-better-than-passive-tolerance-72874">successful integration</a> as they work across dispersed locations. </p>
<p>Ultimately, these developments create the risk that Australian society will miss out on the enduring cultural, social and economic contributions made by migrants who choose to call Australia home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Easthope receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, which funded the research discussed in this article, City of Sydney, Strata Community Australia (NSW) and Shelter (NSW). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Stone receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, which funded the research discussed in this article, Lord Mayor's Charitable Foundation (Vic) and Brotherhood of St Laurence (Vic). </span></em></p>With the winding back of government support for housing, ‘gateway’ suburbs that have in the past accepted and supported recent immigrants are becoming increasingly unaffordable.Hazel Easthope, Senior Research Fellow, City Futures Research Centre, UNSW SydneyWendy Stone, Associate Professor; Director, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Swinburne University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640262016-08-31T08:16:14Z2016-08-31T08:16:14ZAfrica stands to benefit from new trade deals and, possibly, from Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135935/original/image-20160830-28235-13br06r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African trade and economic integration is set for growth</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The last few months have seen some significant developments for African trade and integration. These advances come at a crucial time for African countries, which have been particularly <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2016/06/21-africa-brexit-trade-aid-economy-sow-sy">hard hit</a> by the slump in commodity prices, China’s economic downturn, and higher external borrowing costs. This has resulted in slower GDP growth than expected, currency fluctuations and reduced investment – particularly in resource-rich countries.</p>
<p>New dynamics are emerging as a result of two major developments: first, a set of agreements between regional African blocs and the European Union, as well as between African countries themselves. Second, Brexit may change the thrust of African trade with both the EU and Britain. </p>
<p>Combined, they are likely to have some positive economic implications for Africa.</p>
<p>Intra-African trade has <a href="http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/RITD/2015/CRCI-Oct2015/intra-african_trade_and_africa_regional_integration_index.pdf">comprised about 15%</a> of Africa’s total trade over the last decade. This compares with intra-regional trade rates of, for example, 17% in South and Central America, and 62% in Asia. African exports to the EU have <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Africa-EU_-_key_statistical_indicators">increased substantially</a> in recent years, from €85 billion in 2004 to more than €150 billion in 2014.</p>
<p>The recent trade and integration developments should raise economic activity and competitiveness in non-extractive sectors, leading to higher GDP growth and greater economic diversification. They are intended to boost intra-African trade, particularly in goods, and may increase African trade with the EU and Britain. </p>
<h2>Trade to drive economic integration</h2>
<p>In June, African leaders signed the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33076917">Tripartite Free Trade Area agreement</a>. This has created a free-trade zone stretching from Cape Town to Cairo, covering 26 countries and representing almost half of African Union member states. </p>
<p>The agreement unites three existing trade blocs – the Southern African Development Community, the East Africa Community, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/08/26-regional-integration-arrangements-africa-de-melo">At least half</a> of the member states are expected to ratify the tripartite agreement within the coming year, enabling implementation to begin.</p>
<p>The tripartite agreement promises to remove trade barriers within this extended region and increase market size and economic activity. Critically, it will reduce the cost of goods traded within the affected zones. It is a key achievement in the <a href="http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/the-tripartite-free-trade-area-agreement-a-milestone-for-africa%E2%80%99s">rationalisation</a> of Africa’s trade agreement landscape. </p>
<p>Not all member countries will benefit equally from the agreement. Notably, countries with smaller economies and limited goods export capacity, such as Rwanda, may lose out to stronger regional economies where production centres may <a href="http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2266&context=ilj">consolidate</a>, such as South Africa. </p>
<p>Since member states will be required to remove protectionism from domestic industries, infant industries are likely to struggle to compete unprotected in the free trade zone. This may hamper industrialisation efforts in smaller economies.</p>
<p>A notable weakness is that the tripartite agreement does not cover trade in services, such as legal, accounting and IT services. Services represent <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/08/26-regional-integration-arrangements-africa-de-melo">more than 50%</a> of exports in value-added terms and has been the <a href="http:the//www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Global%20Trade%20Slowdown_nocover.pdf">largest contributor</a> to GDP in 35 African countries.</p>
<p>Achieving greater integration through implementation of the tripartite agreement <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/17/c_135443004.htm">will require considerable investments</a> in improving infrastructure and connectivity across member states. </p>
<p>This is essential to reduce <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Internal-Training/Portugal-Perez_Wilson_Trade_Costs_Africa_paper.pdf">transaction costs</a>, which remain disproportionately high across much of Africa. It costs more in time and money to import and export containers of goods in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region. For example, it takes US$2,567 and 37 days to import a container in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to US$1,612 and 19 days in Latin America and the <a href="http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/trade_facilitation_eng.pdf">Caribbean</a>. </p>
<p>The tripartite agreement is expected to form the basis of the Continental Free Trade Area negotiations, which are due to be completed by October 2017.</p>
<p>The continental agreement aims to join the 15 countries of Economic Community of West African States to the tripartite free trade area. Africa’s economic powerhouses of Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt recently pledged to <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000213714/kenya-signs-partnership-to-speed-up-intra-africa-trade">consolidate their efforts</a> in pushing for the finalisation of these negotiations. </p>
<h2>Taking advantage of Brexit</h2>
<p>The Southern African Development Community signed a new economic partnership agreement with the EU in June. This is to facilitate trade between some of the region’s member states (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) and the EU. This deal was signed shortly before Britain voted to leave the EU.</p>
<p>The EU agreement with the southern African bloc appeared to <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152818.pdf">yield a fairer deal</a> compared to previous agreements. For example, flexible rules of origin were adopted, allowing for partial processing in more than one of the included southern African countries. This will contribute significantly to strengthening regional value chains.</p>
<p>In addition, for the first time, the Southern African Development Community agreement prohibits the EU from using agricultural export subsidies. This might ease constraints on African farmers’ competitiveness. </p>
<p>While the Common Agricultural Policy has already undergone much reform, removal of the remaining protectionist provisions is likely boost GDP and reduce poverty in Africa, as shown in a <a href="http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2014/Papers/382.pdf">case study on Uganda</a>.</p>
<p>Pressure may be mounting for the EU to extend similar (or better) terms for the East African Community. A broadly similar revised EU agreement has been negotiated recently but its signing was recently <a href="http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-07-18/201812/">delayed</a>. Tanzania demanded a moment of pause citing turmoil in the EU after the Brexit vote. </p>
<p>It is too early to be certain, but this may be the first sign of African countries using Brexit to renegotiate and leverage fairer trade terms with the EU.</p>
<p>When Brexit finally takes effect, Britain will have no valid agreements with either African trade blocs or individual countries. New agreements with Britain will need to be negotiated. This may be a costly exercise for African countries but can be made easier by negotiating as regional blocs. </p>
<p>Britain’s immediate concern will be trade negotiations with the EU and other large trading partners. African trade blocs are therefore unlikely to be addressed for some time, and the uncertainty created by this delay may be damaging to African exporters. This lack of clarity could be mitigated by an early signal from Britain as to its planned stance.</p>
<h2>Brexit will have both positive and negative effects</h2>
<p>On the negative side, British consumer demand for imports from Africa could drop as the pound weakens and the British economy goes into a mild, Brexit-induced <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/19/imf-cuts-uk-growth-forecasts-following-brexit-vote">recession</a>. African countries more integrated into global markets will be most affected, notably South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. </p>
<p>On the positive side, Brexit could possibly result in fairer trade deals for Africa, both with Britain and the EU. </p>
<p>But until Britain’s post-Brexit trade policy is established, it is not possible to assess how progressive it may be. A weakened EU may be <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/01/africa/brexit-africa/">forced to compromise</a> more, enabling African countries to secure fairer deals. </p>
<p>Despite some deficiencies with the trade blocs and agreements, these developments have the potential to significantly expand trade and economic growth in Africa. They may increase competition and strengthen regional value chains. Further gains will also be achieved if the free-trade zones are expanded to cover trade in services.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Logan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African trade and integration spaces are seeing significant improvements and gathering even more momentum in the face of Brexit. Sarah Logan looks at the driving factors.Sarah Logan, Economist, International Growth CentreLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/636782016-08-30T09:04:18Z2016-08-30T09:04:18ZHow not to resettle refugees – lessons from the struggles of the Vietnamese ‘boat people’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133816/original/image-20160811-9203-5muoh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrian refugees rescued off the coast of Greece in 2015.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:20151030_Syrians_and_Iraq_refugees_arrive_at_Skala_Sykamias_Lesvos_Greece_1.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Reports surfaced in July that a refugee living on the island of Bute off the West coast of Scotland had described her new home as “<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3706625/Syrian-refugees-settled-remote-Scottish-island-complain-depressed-area-old-people-people-come-die.html">where people come to die</a>”. Although it is early days for the UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syrian-vulnerable-person-resettlement-programme-fact-sheet">Syrian Vulnerable Person Resettlement Scheme</a>, these initial signs of alienation are troubling.</p>
<p>The two Syrian families quoted in the Daily Mail, who are reportedly struggling in Bute, hardly represent most refugees in the UK. Aside from the fact that the quote may have been lost in translation, Argyll and Bute council stressed that many families have settled in well.</p>
<p>Still, despite <a href="http://www.shropshirestar.com/news/2016/08/04/ten-syrian-families-re-settled-in-shropshire-with-more-on-the-way">the welcome received</a> <a href="http://www.yorkshirecoastradio.com/news/local-news/2058496/first-syrian-refugees-settling-in-to-north-yorkshire">by Syrians</a> <a href="https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/news/islands/976254/syrian-refugees-settle-in-stornoway">across the country</a>, is simply sending refugees to the first areas that accept them the best long-term strategy?</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133979/original/image-20160812-16360-e7y6yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vietnamese ‘boat people’ rescued in 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We have been here before. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/30/thatcher-snub-vietnamese-boat-people">grudgingly agreed</a> that the UK would accept 10,000 Vietnamese refugees following global media attention about their plight. Last summer, equally traumatic images of Syrians escaping their war-torn homeland on rickety crafts prompted <a href="http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/what_we_do/refugee_services/resettlement_programme/refugee_resettlement_the_facts">David Cameron’s pledge</a> to resettle 20,000 people by 2020.</p>
<h2>Settled far and wide</h2>
<p>When it came to resettling Vietnamese refugees in the UK, Whitehall wanted to prevent ghettoes from emerging, and believed that dispersal offered the best chance of integration. But the decision to settle refugees in clusters of ten to 15 families across the UK created a postcode lottery. Families lucky enough to find themselves placed in towns and cities with high immigrant populations and low unemployment could benefit from existing support and opportunities. Those moved to far-flung locations struggled. </p>
<p>For example, 15 Vietnamese families were settled in Craigavon, Northern Ireland, and welcomed by the local community. A group called Craigavon Area Council for Aid to Refugees (CACAR) was established to help settle the newly arrived Vietnamese. Ka Fue Lay, a refugee who arrived in Craigavon in September 1979, <a href="https://vimeo.com/103467067">when interviewed in 2014</a>, remembered “getting a lot of help from the wonderful local people”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe src="https://player.vimeo.com/video/103467067" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" webkitallowfullscreen="" mozallowfullscreen="" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Ka Fue Lay, interviewed by artist Victor Sloan in 2014.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Good news stories suggested that resettlement in Northern Ireland had been successful. By Christmas 1979, the Belfast News Letter declared that Vietnamese families in the province had “found home”. A civil servant also wrote that refugees were “settling in without too much fuss”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133971/original/image-20160812-16372-kyq6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cutting from the <em>Belfast News Letter</em>, 18th December 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Belfast News Letter</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Short-lived success</h2>
<p>In reality, problems were developing. Unemployment rates in the 1970s and 80s in Northern Ireland – troubled by political violence as well as economic uncertainty – were higher than the UK average. According to a member of CACAR, a unit tasked with teaching the Vietnamese English, established at the local secondary school in Craigavon, suffered from “a deplorable lack of co-ordination” and closed after only a year.</p>
<p>The boat people faced several difficulties. Most spoke no English and many suffered mental health problems caused by the traumas of war. None had previously experienced a Western workplace. According to a 1984 memo by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, their unemployment rate remained astronomical, above 80%. Dispersal had left local authorities in a dilemma: while most needed new infrastructure to provide for refugees, the handful of families they had received was not enough to justify investment. Central government refused to provide additional funding.</p>
<p>A small Vietnamese community still exists in Craigavon, and these refugees have been very successful, establishing prosperous businesses. But most gradually drifted away from provincial towns to bigger cities such as London and Manchester, where they had family, friends and jobs. These problems were not unique to the UK. Canada experienced similar difficulties with its resettlement model. But other countries took a different approach. <a href="http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.235511">In Sweden, language and social services were centrally funded</a>, resulting in greater equity. Refugees were also concentrated in areas of high employment.</p>
<h2>Avoid repeating mistakes</h2>
<p>Today’s civil servants would therefore be wise to think carefully before spreading Syrian families thinly across the country. There has been some welcome forward-thinking. Guidance issued in October 2015 warned that, before accepting refugees, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472020/Syrian_Resettlement_Fact_Sheet_gov_uk.pdf">local authorities must carefully consider</a> whether they have the adequate infrastructure and support networks. The government has also been more forthcoming with money, promising full funding for 12 months and additional help in the future.</p>
<p>But early signs are discouraging. By May 2016, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36395400">1,602 refugees had been resettled across 71 different councils</a> in England and Scotland, averaging just 23 in each. Only Coventry has received more than 100 refugees – most places have taken far fewer. Placed in small groups, with little prospect of developing a community of fellow refugees, we may see more of the problems that the Vietnamese faced, such as social isolation and poor employment prospects.</p>
<p>As happened with the Vietnamese boat people, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/09/05/migrant-crisis-refugees-syria-sympathy-help_n_8075878.html">an initial wave of sympathy</a> towards Syrian refugees has dissipated and an undercurrent of resentment is surfacing. The Vietnamese experienced their share of hostility. For example, in 1984 an organisation called GAI North-East wrote to civil servants protesting that “there is no right to take these people into our country”. Recently, among many unfavourable online comments on the Daily Mail article, one branded refugees in Bute “<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/reader-comments/p/comment/link/135262637">ungrateful cowards</a>”, stating that if they don’t like what they’re given, they should be packed off back to Syria. The message: shut up, accept your lot and be thankful that you’re not dead.</p>
<p>But it is not enough simply to offer a safe haven. Refugees must be handed the tools to succeed, which involves opportunities and long-term support. We cannot declare that refugees should integrate, while at the same time separating “us” from “them” by expecting continuous deference.</p>
<p>The Vietnamese dispersal programme in the UK was deemed a “<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/40571741">social failure</a>” a mere decade after it began because the bulk of refugees either left their resettlement area or remained unemployed. If Syrian refugees are similarly treated there should be no surprise if we see the same results.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack Crangle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Syrians are the latest high profile refugees to arrive on British shores – what can history tell us about their prospects?Jack Crangle, PhD candidate, immigration history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/642492016-08-24T08:57:18Z2016-08-24T08:57:18ZFrance’s burkini ban could not come at a worse time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135198/original/image-20160823-30238-1r0g2sp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/javinovo/1477807208/in/photolist-3fA9AC-75nUgs-9cGGcE-eqvBx-c4ksSb-9euhBN-9euhqC-eC13w-euMZFX-ac3M47-5vEFiw-4PjTK-eV9aKu-6JmGp8-6Cxmtj-uaejM-abZUvr-2MGbGX-eBZZm-EWqps-6eSAtp-s6d8h-GA7usk-njkq5j-8SEryW-eBZYk-9XMhuy-3gBRR3-79DQB6-H6Cko-uaewD-2bdov-uae6C-8F4RMb-6A4DT6-4YmBZP-57gtdt-7pNzPt-2bRi8-7dMAj5-nFKRSv-yvQXex-oZSWQG-eBZZM-7ZGRQK-7vVgmz-d5hq3s-7dMuDy-7ZGREx-fJ5cHw">Javier Novo Rodríguez</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of armed police <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-police-make-woman-remove-burkini-on-nice-beach">confronting a woman</a> in Nice, apparently forcing her to remove some of her clothing, have added fuel to the already combustible debate over the prohibition against women wearing burkinis on many beaches around France.</p>
<p>Since mayor of Cannes David Lisnard banned the <a href="https://theconversation.com/banning-the-burkini-reinforces-a-single-story-about-muslim-women-they-need-saving-64180">full-body burkini</a> from his town’s beaches, as many as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/nice-becomes-latest-french-city-to-impose-burkini-ban">15</a> French resorts have followed suit. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"768184264672161793"}"></div></p>
<p>Arguments defending the bans fall into three main categories. First, it is about defending the French state’s secularism (laïcité). Second, that the costume represents a misogynistic doctrine that sees female bodies as shameful. And finally, that the burkini is cited as a threat to public order.</p>
<p>None of these arguments satisfactorily refute the <a href="http://www.alternet.org/grayzone-project/burkini-ban-frightening-new-stage-frances-descent-islamophobia-fanaticism">claims</a> of civil rights activists that the bans are fundamentally Islamophobic.</p>
<h2>The niceties of laïcité</h2>
<p>The Cannes decree explicitly invokes secular values. It prohibits anyone <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/world/europe/cannes-muslims-burkini-ban.html">“not dressed in a fashion respectful of laïcité”</a> from accessing public beaches. However, the French state has only banned “ostentatious” religious symbols <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006524456&dateTexte=20160818">in schools and for government employees</a> as part of laïcité (the strict separation between the state and religious society). And in public spaces, laïcité claims to <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;?idArticle=LEGIARTI000019240997&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071194">respect</a> religious plurality. Indeed, the Laïcité Commission has <a href="https://twitter.com/ObservLaicite/status/763848066319474688">tweeted</a> that the ban, therefore, “cannot be based upon the principle of laïcité”.</p>
<p>While veils covering the entire face such as the burqa or niqab are <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id">illegal</a>, this is not to protect laïcité; it is a security matter. The legal justification is that these clothes make it impossible to identify the person underneath – which is not the case for the burkini.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"763848066319474688"}"></div></p>
<p>By falling back on laïcité to police Muslim women in this way, the Cannes authorities are fuelling the argument that “<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/the-battle-for-the-french-secular-soul-laicite-charlie-hebdo/">fundamentalist secularism</a>” has become a means of excluding Muslims from French society.</p>
<h2>Colonial attitudes</h2>
<p>Others, such as Laurence Rossignol, the minister for women’s rights, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-france-burkini-debate-snap-story.html">hold</a> that the burkini represents a “profoundly archaic view of a woman’s place in society”, disregarding Muslim women who claim to wear their burkini <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/16/se-baigner-en-robe-c-est-pas-pratique-ce-burkini-est-une-liberation_1472853">voluntarily</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A burkini on sale.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/landahlauts/15121655242/in/photolist-6E1MdD-p3frgQ-6QgAHC-6QgBVG-5gBzWm-eQiE8w-8ighQ3-9RCvTK-9xqMhE-eQiDMs-pREb8b-eQiEp9-9VujT7-JVwpZE-LeetYR">Landahlauts</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This typifies an enduring colonial attitude among many non-Muslim French politicians, who feel entitled to dictate to Muslim women what is in their best interests. Rossignol has in the past compared women who wear headscarves through choice to American “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/french-womens-rights-minister-laurence-rossignol-accused-racism-negro">negroes</a>” who supported slavery.</p>
<p>Far from supporting women’s rights, banning the burkini will only leave the women who wear it feeling persecuted. Even those with no choice in the matter are not helped by the ban. This legal measure does nothing to challenge patriarchal authority over female bodies in the home. Instead, it further restricts the lives of veiled women by replacing it with state authority in public. </p>
<h2>Open Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Supporters of the ban have also claimed that, with racial tensions high after recent terrorist attacks, it is provocative to wear this form of Muslim clothing. Such an <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37082637">argument</a> was made by Pierre-Ange Vivoni, mayor of Sisco in Corsica, when he banned the burkini in his commune. Early reports suggested a <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/15/corse-le-maire-ps-de-sisco-prend-un-arrete-anti-burkini-apres-les-violences-de-samedi_1472502">violent clash</a> between local residents and non-locals of Moroccan origin was triggered when strangers photographed a burkini-wearing woman in the latter group, which angered her male companions. Vivoni claimed that banning the costume protected the security of local people, including those of North African descent.</p>
<p>Those reports have transpired to be <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/18/au-tribunal-l-affaire-lamentable-de-sisco-ramenee-aux-faits_1473281">false</a>: none of the women in question were even wearing a burkini at the time of the incident. Nonetheless, the ban has stood in Sisco and elsewhere.</p>
<p>To be “provoked” by the burkini is to be provoked by the visibility of Muslims. Banning it on this basis punishes Muslim women for other people’s prejudice. It also disregards the burkini’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/17/the-surprising-australian-origin-story-of-the-burkini/">potential</a> to promote social cohesion by giving veiled women access to the same spaces as their non-Muslim compatriots.</p>
<p>Appeals to public order have, occasionally, been openly Islamophobic. Thierry Migoule, head of municipal services in Cannes, claimed that the burkini “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/cannes-mayor-bans-burqinis-beachwear-must-respect-secularism">refers to an allegiance to terrorist movements</a>”, conveniently ignoring the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/europe/nice-truck-attack-victims-muslims.html">Muslim victims</a> of recent attacks. Barely a month after Muslims paying their respects to friends and <a href="https://www.ajib.fr/2016/07/hanane-charrihi-mere-a-ete-tuee-a-nice-deux-agressions-lors-de-recueillement/">family</a> killed in Nice were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFGeJ2BKpRg">racially abused</a>, such comments are both distasteful and irresponsible.</p>
<h2>Increased divisions</h2>
<p>Feiza Ben Mohammed, spokesperson for the Federation of Southern Muslims, <a href="http://www.thelocal.fr/20160812/riviera-burqini-ban-absurd-and-a-gift-for-isis-recruiters">fears</a> that stigmatising Muslims in this way will play into the hands of IS recruiters. That fear seems well-founded: researchers cite a <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/daech-r-v-lateur-des-failles-et-crispations-de-la-soci-t-fran-aise-1699605917">sense of exclusion</a> as a factor behind the radicalisation of a minority of French Muslims. Measures like this can only exacerbate that problem. Indeed, provoking repressive measures against European Muslims to cultivate such a sentiment is part of the IS <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12002726/The-grey-zone-How-Isis-wants-to-divide-the-world-into-Muslims-and-crusaders.html">strategy</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the day after the incident in Sisco, riot police were needed in nearby Bastia to prevent a 200-strong crowd chanting “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/corsica-mayor-bans-burkini-violence-beach-protests-sisco-france">this is our home</a>” from entering a neighbourhood with many residents of North African descent. Given the recent warning from France’s head of internal security of the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/were-brink-civil-war-french-security-chiefs-chilling-warning-before-nice-terror-attack-1570820">risk</a> of a confrontation between “the extreme right and the Muslim world”, such scenes are equally concerning.</p>
<p>Now more than ever, France needs unity. Yet more legislation against veiled women can only further divide an already divided nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64249/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fraser McQueen receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council through the Scottish Graduate School of Arts and Humanities, and is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>With tensions already high, telling Muslim women not to dress a certain way at the beach will only make things worse.Fraser McQueen, PhD Candidate, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/636742016-08-23T09:34:59Z2016-08-23T09:34:59ZAfter Brexit, nationals could take a lesson in integration from immigrants<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134955/original/image-20160822-18711-e79iop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">pcruciatti/Shutterstock.com </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hate crimes in England, Wales and Northern Ireland <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36869000">reached a new peak</a> after the UK’s Brexit vote. This was sadly predictable, considering that one of the Leave campaign’s key arguments in favour of exiting the European Union was the prospect of getting tougher on migration and border controls. </p>
<p>Anti-migration sentiment is not a “British only” phenomenon. Alternative for Germany, a nationalist party which recorded the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-local-elections-far-right-groups-merkel-afd-npd-huge-gains-a6917246.html">strongest increase</a> in three federal state elections in 2016, <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/wahlen-2016-die-ergebnisse-der-landtagswahlen-im-ueberblick-a-1082093.html">proclaimed</a> “<em>Einwanderung braucht klare Regeln</em>” – migration requires clear rules. With <a href="http://guardianlv.com/2015/05/donald-trump-wants-to-build-a-wall-between-u-s-and-mexico/">his call for a wall</a> to be built along the US-Mexico border, US Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has taken anti-immigration rhetoric to the centreground of American politics. </p>
<p>The message from these politicians is clear: migration is not only an economic threat but also a cultural one – the more we accept different ways of life in our own neighbourhood, the more our own way of doing things is under existential threat. But <a href="http://ccr.sagepub.com/content/early/recent">our recent research</a> has shown how a zero-sum trade off between national and other cultures does not really reflect the reality. </p>
<h2>Integration goes both ways</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.victoria.ac.nz/cacr/research/mirips/MIRIPSprojectdescription-August-2013.pdf">Psychologists, anthropologists</a>, and <a href="http://www.mipex.eu/">political scientists</a> have studied how migrants can integrate – maintaining the heritage culture of the country where they were born, while simultaneously adapting to a host culture. So a German migrant living in the UK can have German friends, speak German and cheer for the German football team while at the same time be fluent in English, hang out with British friends, and wear a poppy in November. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134952/original/image-20160822-18718-h84y3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The streets around Markazi Jamia Mosque in Bradford.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tjblackwell/7761133946/sizes/l">tj.blackwell/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, migrants who identify with, and participate in both their heritage culture and the host culture <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0022-4537.00225/abstract">have better overall well-being</a> and their children even do better at school. </p>
<p>But what about nationals – non-immigrant people, who live alongside immigrants in their own country? Are they also able to adapt to immigrants without losing their national culture?</p>
<p>In <a href="http://ccr.sagepub.com/content/early/recent">my recent research</a> with colleague Tara Marshall, I tried to answer this question by changing the wording of <a href="http://www.midss.org/content/vancouver-index-acculturation">a questionnaire</a> usually given to migrants. The original questionnaire uses ten questions to ask migrants how much they maintain a link to their birth, or “heritage” culture, and another ten questions on much they have adapted to their new “host” culture. </p>
<p>We adapted this for nationals: asking them ten questions about how much they link to their birth culture – what we call “national culture maintenance” – and another ten about their adaptation to cultures of immigrants, their “multicultural adaptation”. For example, do they have neighbours, friends, colleagues or students who they know who are immigrants, and do they identify with them. </p>
<p>We gave this questionnaire to 837 nationals in two different studies in 2012. First, we asked 218 US nationals to complete our modified questionnaire online. For example, on a scale from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”, we asked them if: “I believe in my American cultural values” and “I believe in diverse cultural values.” </p>
<p>Not only did the data show that American nationals can integrate towards other cultures but also that both maintaining one’s national culture while adapting to cultures of immigrants were significantly and positively linked. When our participants scored high on the ten questions addressing national culture maintenance they were more likely to also score high on the other ten questions addressing multicultural adaptation – and vice versa. This would indicate that building a wall between cultures as Trump advocates might actually diminish America’s own national culture rather than encouraging people to endorse it more.</p>
<h2>Why immigration is good for culture</h2>
<p>In our second study in 2012, 619 participants across the UK, Germany, China, India and the US also answered our questionnaire online. Across all the countries we again found that scoring high on one set of the ten questions had no or a slightly positive impact on how nationals answered the other set of questions. This “slightly positive impact” was found for the American and European nationals who answered our questionnaire whereas the “no impact” was found for the Chinese and Indian participants.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134936/original/image-20160822-18725-v6vka7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Getting ready for Diwali in High Barnet, north London.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/npmeijer/6286671131/sizes/l">npmeijer/flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In other words, those British nationals who engaged in cultural practices from immigrant communities such as Diwali were no less likely to engage in British cultural practices such as Bonfire Night. Nor were they less likely to strongly endorse British values such as <a href="https://geert-hofstede.com/united-kingdom.html">individualism</a> – the preference of the “I” over the “we”. </p>
<h2>Fitting in</h2>
<p>In this second study, we also analysed how nationals’ cultural adaptation to immigrants’ culture in their own country affected their well-being and daily life. Our results showed a clear message – when you adapt to other cultural groups in your own country you feel less stressed about their presence and experience a sense of “fitting in” or being comfortable in multicultural environments. </p>
<p>All this comes back to Brexit. Leave campaigners argued that by exiting the EU, and reducing immigration, British culture would be safeguarded. But our research shows that people’s likeliness to endorse British culture is not at threat – and it can be even higher when they also endorse the cultures of immigrants. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="http://www.ted.com/talks/alexander_betts_why_brexit_happened_and_what_to_do_next?utm_campaign=social&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=t.co&utm_content=talk&utm_term=global-social%20issues">echoes</a> work by Oxford migration expert Alexander Betts, who argues that the vote for Brexit grew out of “a deep, unexamined divide between those that fear globalisation and those that embrace it”. </p>
<p>Integration is not only a task for immigrants. Nationals that integrate towards other cultures around them will thrive more too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katharina Lefringhausen is affiliated with SIETAR Europe. </span></em></p>Research shows how locals thrive from adapting to the heritage cultures of their new neighbours.Katharina Lefringhausen, Lecturer in Psychology, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/639522016-08-17T14:33:42Z2016-08-17T14:33:42ZYes, Muslim women face discrimination – but they’re pushing for change<p>A British parliamentary committee recently discovered what many people in Muslim communities have known for ages – that Muslim women <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37041301">face discrimination</a> on account of their gender, their ethnicity and their religion.</p>
<p>As the most disadvantaged members of the most socially and economically deprived communities in Britain, Muslim women suffer astronomical levels of unemployment and economic inactivity. In 2015 <a href="http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-committee/employment-opportunities-for-muslims-in-the-uk/written/34259.html">ONS figures</a> showed only 35% of Muslim women aged 16 to 64 were employed. That compares with 69% of all British women in the same age range. We also learnt that 58% are economically inactive (not looking for work). That compares with 27% of working age women across the British population.</p>
<p>The committee also concluded that while Muslim women suffered a “triple penalty” on account of their gender, ethnicity and religion, it was the latter that poses the most barriers. Muslims face discrimination in many areas of public life but women are held back further because they are seen as passive, uninformed and uninterested in the world beyond their doorstep.</p>
<p>Muslim women, especially those wearing Islamic dress, represent what is considered a backward faith which disrupts western ways of life. Islam is also regarded as a barrier to their advancement outside the home because it stresses women’s role as care givers and homemakers. It apparently compels them to cover their hair and face and excludes them from Islamic thought and governance.</p>
<p>Large numbers of Muslim women in Britain argue that it is the intersecting effects of Islamophobia, including public stereotyping and male-dominated interpretations of Islam from within Muslim communities or assumptions made by non-Muslims, which constrain them.</p>
<p>For some time, they have been seeking to fight back – particularly in the years following 9/11. Muslim communities have come under heavy surveillance and women have had to play different family roles. Wives, mothers, sisters of men charged with or imprisoned for “terrorist” activity have undertaken traditional male responsibilities. Others have been subjected to surveillance themselves.</p>
<p>They have become rapidly politicised and active in public arenas. They are involved in campaigns <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137480613">to counter Islamophobia and also patriarchal attitudes</a> in their ethnic and religious communities.</p>
<p>The British government also courts Muslim women to act as “bridge-builders” between Muslim communities and majority British society. The <a href="https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf">Preventing Violent Extremism</a> programme, which ran between 2007 and 2010, for instance, encouraged Muslim women to play a greater role in civic life. The idea was to prevent extremism and promote Muslim integration.</p>
<h2>Institutional representation</h2>
<p>In 2010, three women identifying as Muslim were elected to the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/general-election-female-muslim-mps">House of Commons</a>. They were joined by another <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/record-of-13-muslim-mps-elected-8-of-them-women-1-3768726">five in 2015</a>. The number of Muslim women in local councils has also increased in the 9/11 era.</p>
<p>These elections marked the culmination of Muslim women’s involvement in party politics in the 2000s. And while most of these women would stress that they represent all constituents regardless of gender, ethnicity, race or faith, many feel they bear responsibility for <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/general-election-female-muslim-mps">changing the way in which Muslim women are perceived</a>. They also want to show that that they make a valuable contribution to British society. Some have also challenged the <a href="https://bradfordwest.wordpress.com/2015/04/15/naz-shah-labour-party-candidate-bradford-west-facts/">clan-based system</a> within Muslim communities which promotes men as community and political leaders while excluding women.</p>
<p>Far larger numbers of Muslim women also participate in women’s community organisations and NGOs today than 15 years ago. These organisations work not just on issues concerning Muslim women – empowering them to deal with oppressive cultural and religious practices – but also to build capacity among Muslim women. They provide women with the knowledge and skills needed to enter public life and the labour market.</p>
<p>Muslim women have also become active in street politics. In the 2000s, girls and young women were foremost participants in the Stop the War movement and more recently they’ve been involved in support for Syrian refugees.</p>
<p>They are countering male domination within their communities by challenging the way in which mosques are dominated and run in Britain by all-male committees. Some women’s organisations are planning <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/12/muslim-womens-council-mosque-plans-teaching-uk">women-only mosques</a>, while others have called for transparency in mosque governance structures. They are pushing for more women to be involved in making decisions.</p>
<p>So Muslim women are working hard to increase their presence in public arenas and break down stereotypes. That said, it is recognised that too many Muslim women still remain on the margins of society and the economy. State support is crucial in bringing them centre stage.</p>
<p>However, it is important to show that Muslim women are not passive or isolated in the way that media representations suggest. They are subjects in their own right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Khursheed Wadia has received funding from the ESRC. She is on the Board of Trustees of Muslim Women's Network UK. </span></em></p>A parliamentary report found this group suffers severe exclusion from life and work. But things are getting better.Khursheed Wadia, Principal Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Safety and Well-Being, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/626022016-07-19T13:01:33Z2016-07-19T13:01:33ZWhy barriers to a pan-African passport may be insurmountable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131071/original/image-20160719-13837-1i3t983.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Migration across borders is a reality for most people living in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) has launched a pan-African passport. The idea behind the initiative is that the free movement of people will help create jobs and stimulate economic activity. This, in turn, would increase intra-African trade, boosting <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/12/14/deepening-african-integration-intra-africa-trade-for-development-and-poverty-reduction">economic growth</a>. The organisation’s intention is that by 2018 the passport will be distributed to all African citizens. </p>
<p>The AU envisages the issuing of a <a href="http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p9_cons_en.pdf">biometric passport</a>, or electronic passport, which would use contactless smart-card technology. It was chosen instead of a traditional passport because there is a <a href="https://www.entrust.com/3-reasons-to-ditch-your-old-passport-for-an-e-passport/">smaller chance</a> of fraud.</p>
<p>The concept has been strongly backed by a number countries, such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, Senegal and Rwanda. All have eased or lifted visa requirements for people travelling from other African countries. </p>
<p>But a number of insurmountable obstacles stand between the vision of a pan-African passport and it becoming a reality. I believe they are too big to overcome, particularly in the short time-frame the AU has given itself. </p>
<h2>The big obstacles</h2>
<p>The first is that many African countries lack the basic measures to roll out the initiative. For instance, they do not have access to the biometric systems needed to register the passports. Currently only 13 of the 54 AU members offer biometric passports. Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana and Tunisia, for example, <a href="http://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/e-passports-spread-to-half-the-globe/">do not have them</a>. </p>
<p>Second, there is already resistance to migration. This comes in the form of pre-existing visa barriers to other African nationals. For example, Equatorial Guinea, the country with the <a href="http://statisticstimes.com/economy/african-countries-by-gdp-per-capita.php">highest</a> gross domestic product per capita in Africa, requires that citizens from the other 53 sovereign African states acquire a visa when visiting. Other African countries with the same restrictions <a href="http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/visa-restrictions-and-economic-consequences-in-africa-11987/">include</a> the Democratic Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Sudan. These would need to be repealed before a pan-African passport could be adopted.</p>
<p>These countries have already <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/equatorial-guinea-illegal-immigrants-expelled-after-african-football-matches/2636240.html">shown</a> their aversion to the adoption of the African passport, with the clear intent not to open borders to possible indiscriminate migration.</p>
<p>Third, some countries are averse to allowing entry to more migrants due to high unemployment rates. In South Africa there is a widespread perception that foreigners are taking too many local jobs. This has led to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/report-blames-media-xenophobic-panic-africa-160406102827284.html">xenophobic attacks</a>, most recently in 2015 and 2016.</p>
<p>The country may therefore also be reluctant to adopt the passport. This, however, would run counter to national legislation. South Africa’s green paper on international migration, issued by the South African Department of Home Affairs on the adoption of the African passport <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/files/GreenPaper_on_InternationalMigration-%2022062016.pdf">affirms that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>South Africa fully supports the vision of an Africa where its citizens can move more freely across national borders, where intra-Africa trade is encouraged and there is greater integration and development of the African continent. The current status is untenable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fourth, despite sub-regional agreements allowing for the freedom of movement of people, some African countries continue to adopt derogatory policies that make them “less free”, citing security concerns. For <a href="http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Join-single-EA-visa-agreement--Tanzania-and-Burundi-urged/-/1840340/2981690/-/c4gv7cz/-/index.html">example</a>, while Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have agreed to the adoption of a single East African tourist visa, Burundi and Tanzania have bailed out citing reasons of national security. </p>
<p>Domestically, some countries are also strengthening their refugee and migration policies. They have done so on the grounds of security concerns. A well-known example is Kenya’s decision to close <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000208865/closing-dadaab-refugee-camp-now-is-the-right-call">Dadaab</a>, the largest refugee camp in the country. </p>
<h2>Impact on refugees</h2>
<p>What impact would an African passport have on the status of refugees and internally displaced people? </p>
<p>It is still not clear how refugee policies would be affected. At present policies have been mostly at the discretion of domestic institutions. The question will therefore be: how much sovereignty will African states be prepared to surrender to adopt a common refugee policy?</p>
<p>Until now only 19 African countries have implemented an essential legal instrument for the protection of migrants, the <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/international-migration-convention/">International Convention</a> on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. This shows that countries are more inclined to determine their own migration policies. </p>
<p>Added to this is the fact that, theoretically, the phenomenon of refugees would disappear if borders no longer existed. This is because no administrative “foreign border” would be crossed. Instead “refugees” would be replaced by an immense number of internally displaced persons. </p>
<p>If this were to be the case, the 2009 <a href="http://www.au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa">Kampala Convention</a> would need to be revised. This is the AU treaty that establishes state responsibilities for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons. </p>
<h2>Insurmountable challenges</h2>
<p>I believe it would be very difficult to overcome all these challenges because of the very short amount of time the AU has given itself. </p>
<p>Recent history shows that, as a general policy, national sovereignty breaches individual rights in most African countries. This includes the freedom of movement. This is done in the name of keeping the country secure.</p>
<p>The idea of adopting a unique e-passport for Africans is certainly praiseworthy. But, in my opinion, there are presently still too many social, cultural and, above all, economic issues that will make the use of this passport impractical. </p>
<p>Personally, I would rather start to strengthen existing sub-regional agreements. These have the scope to integrate more deeply the different countries that have signed them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The idea of a pan-African passport is praiseworthy, but it’s not going to work – yet.Cristiano d'Orsi, Research Fellow and Lecturer, the International Legal Protection of Asylum-Seekers, Refugees, IDPs and Migrants with a strong focus on Africa, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/435982015-07-01T20:11:31Z2015-07-01T20:11:31ZAustralia should tread cautiously on UK-inspired English language tests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86022/original/image-20150622-17715-1gzp6fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The UK requires that new citizens know English. It formally tests for competency.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Andy Rain</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One reform the Abbott government is <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/tony-abbott-pushes-tighter-tests-for-citizens/story-fnpdbcmu-1227370525087">considering</a> as part of sweeping changes to Australia’s citizenship regime is the introduction of English tests for all new citizens.</p>
<p>Migrants learning English can be crucial to integration, whether in Australia, the UK or any other Western country. But Australia should be cautious in how closely it follows the UK in this reform.</p>
<h2>The UK experience</h2>
<p>Britain has formally required for more than a century that all new citizens know English. The Secretary of State had to be satisfied that new citizens had a satisfactory knowledge of English and “life in the United Kingdom”. </p>
<p>The latter became the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/life-in-the-uk-test/book-life-in-uk-test">“Life in the United Kingdom test”</a> for citizenship. Launched in 2005 by then-prime minister Tony Blair, I have <a href="http://www.thombrooks.info/life-in-the-uk-test/">previously likened</a> the test to a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22892444">bad pub quiz</a> for its long list of errors and omissions.</p>
<p>The UK’s requirement that new citizens know English was not formalised into a test until more recently. New citizens had to pass either the citizenship test or an English for Speakers of Other Languages <a href="http://www.niace.org.uk/projects/esolcitizenship/">(ESOL) with Citizenship</a> course. </p>
<p>The latter course taught English through citizenship lessons, in an odd introduction for anyone coming to study English for the first time. The <a href="http://www.niace.org.uk/projects/esolcitizenship/docs/01_What%20is%20citizenship.pdf">first quiz</a> asks about the Houses of Parliament instead of how to greet a stranger or how to order lunch from a menu.</p>
<p>The UK tightened its policy almost two years ago. The level of satisfactory English all must demonstrate was raised, aimed at making it more difficult to qualify for citizenship. Previously, someone with no English need only improve by one level of competency. Now, all must prove they have conversational English at an intermediate level.</p>
<p>This will be a more challenging hurdle for many to pass. And this will be especially true for people who are illiterate in their native tongue, but must exhibit literacy in a new language. Applicants must normally pay their own way – and a higher standard will mean greater costs for many.</p>
<p>The government claims improving standards will <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/communities-minister-celebrates-english-language-learners-in-bradford">further integration</a>. And maybe they will. But the problem is how the UK government manages this requirement. Australia should learn from the UK’s mistakes if it is to take this leaf out of its book on citizenship reform.</p>
<h2>The problems with exemptions</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-rules-appendix-koll">new English language rules</a> are subject to about a dozen exemptions. Some of these are reasonable for children, persons aged 65 years and above or victims of domestic abuse. Anyone meeting these criteria is exempt from having to prove knowledge of English.</p>
<p>But many other exemptions are not reasonable. One set of exemptions is for nationals from a list of countries. Some of this list are <em>de jure</em> English-speaking countries, like Australia and New Zealand, where English is the official language. Others on the list are <em>de facto</em> English-speaking countries, like the US. </p>
<p>What’s unreasonable about this exemption is two-fold. First, a person’s nationality is no guarantee of English fluency. The US has tens of millions of citizens for whom English is not a first or even second language. The UK’s new rules would deem them sufficiently fluent in a language they might not know well.</p>
<p>Second, there are no clear criteria for how countries were selected. Not all <em>de jure</em> countries are included (such as India) or <em>de facto</em> countries (like Singapore). If there is to be an exemption on nationality, then there should be some clear rationale for choosing some and not others. But this is not given.</p>
<p>A further problem is that there is a further blanket exemption for individuals who hold a degree taught or researched in English, even if the degree is obtained in a university not on the nationality exemption list. This is even more surprising given the variability of English competence that will be held to satisfy the English language requirement. </p>
<p>With so many degrees awarded in English around the world, this may permit individuals to be exempt from the requirement because of a false assumption about English fluency.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The lesson Australia can draw from this is to introduce a standardised English language test that is subject to fewer restrictions, and show the UK how it should maintain a fairer and more consistent policy.</p>
<p>One way Australia might do this is by not endorsing exemptions based on nationality or for holders of degrees taught in English gained elsewhere. If the goal is to better guarantee more new migrants possess some competency in English language skills, this would be one important step to achieving this goal. </p>
<p>Maybe then the UK could learn lessons from Australia when it sees how this more fair, consistent and strategic approach works much better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43598/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thom Brooks is affiliated with the UK Labour Party.</span></em></p>Australia should learn from the UK’s mistakes if taking a leaf out of its book on citizenship reform.Thom Brooks, Professor of Law and Government, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209822013-12-04T14:32:15Z2013-12-04T14:32:15ZIgnore the scare tactics – Roma integration is hard but worth it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36931/original/fhyxfpbw-1386161452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some migrants are more equal than others.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Steve Parsons/PA Wire</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Those who follow the situation of Europe’s Roma know that there is never a “dull” week in which we don’t hear of accusations, abuse, or even violence against them. Most events do not grab major headlines in the British media; not so the happenings of the past few months. </p>
<p>In mid-October, Greek police <a href="https://theconversation.com/roma-in-the-tabloid-crosshairs-over-blonde-angels-19526">detained</a> a Roma couple on suspicion of abducting a four-year old girl who later turned out to have been informally adopted; in Ireland, authorities <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/world/europe/irish-government-promises-review-of-roma-case-but-rights-groups-protest.html">removed two children</a> for DNA testing who later turned out to be who their parents said they were. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Britain, a <a href="http://www.salford.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/363118/Migrant_Roma_in_the_UK_final_report_October_2013.pdf">report</a> was circulated among Labour politicians which claimed that the number of immigrant Roma in the UK was not around 40,000 as previously accepted, but a confounding 200,000. Former Labour home secretary, Jack Straw, went public ten days later to proclaim that his own party had made a mistake by letting a million eastern European immigrants into the country; his words were echoed by the opposition leader Ed Miliband. That same day, Straw’s predecessor David Blunkett gave a radio <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24909979">interview</a> about the Slovak Roma in his Sheffield constituency.</p>
<p>His words of concern appeared to have got lost in translation; the press went into a frenzy over a misquote, claiming that he had warned of “riots” against Roma. UKIP’s Nigel Farage was quick to express agreement, praising Blunkett for his “courage” yet taking the higher ground and condemning his “use of language”. The government now stood bare in the line of fire: in January, restrictions on work permits for citizens of Romania and Bulgaria are being lifted. In the eyes of the public, “Romania and Bulgaria” is a mere <a href="https://theconversation.com/get-ready-for-more-scare-tactics-on-eu-immigrants-14061">paraphrase</a> for “Roma” – and “Roma” in turn is nothing but a politically correct substitute for “Gypsy”. </p>
<p>Public figures on the left and right were now insinuating that the New Year would bring a tidal wave of workshy, rootless, Gypsy child-kidnappers. Nick Clegg tried to assure the public that it’s not the coalition that’s responsible but the Roma, whose behaviour, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24944572">he said</a>, was “sometimes intimidating, sometimes offensive”. </p>
<p>With public anxieties rising, Downing Street’s options were limited: Britain cannot opt out of an EU-treaty at short notice. So last week, the prime minister, David Cameron, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25114890">announced</a> that he will restrict benefits for EU-migrants and deport “beggars”. The mention of both “benefits” and “begging” is again widely understood as code for “workshy Gypsies”. Experts in constitutional law as well as the EU’s Employment Commissioner said the plans could not be legally implemented – but what counts is the rhetoric. </p>
<h2>‘Hordes at the gates’</h2>
<p>We have been here before. Back in 1997, media and politicians <a href="http://www.errc.org/roma-rights-journal/%E2%80%9Ewish-you-werent-here--the-response-of-the-british-press-to-romani-asylum-seekers/499">ran amok</a> when a group of several hundred Czech and Slovak Roma arrived in Dover and claimed asylum. </p>
<p>At the height of preparations for full the EU accession of the Czech and Slovak republics, the UK <a href="http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/briefingPaper/document/65">posted</a> border control officers at Prague airport, whose task was to ethnically profile Roma and prevent them from bordering planes headed for Britain. In a private <a href="http://www.marston.co.uk/rspp/luprsv013p02a00079.pdf">letter</a> to his Czech counterpart Vladimir Špidla in July 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair described the immigration of Czech Roma to the UK as an “unacceptable situation” and added that “the Roma community need to know that unfounded asylum seekers will be returned immediately”.</p>
<p>But just as today’s Roma panic bears little relation to reality, when restrictions on the immigration of Czech nationals were lifted in 2004, there was no wave of Roma queueing up to claim benefits in Britain. But still the British government and opposition are caught in a spiral of angst and tension, triggering and then reinforcing fantasies and fears that have surrounded the image of “Gypsies” in European societies since the Middle Ages.</p>
<h2>Inclusion is a two-way process</h2>
<p>So what is the real issue facing Roma migrants in the UK? There are two. The first is the perception by outsiders. Roma migrants are visible because they arrive in extended families, often with many children; they tend to be unskilled, and so they are not usually silently absorbed within the workforce of large companies. Instead, they are enterprising, and exploit economic niches – which brings them in view of the wider public and hence makes them more conspicuous. </p>
<p>More than any other ethnic group, they are subject to prejudiced expectations about their collective behaviour, which politicians like Nick Clegg reinforce through their judgemental statements. Unless the UK tackles anti-Roma perceptions and prejudice, the exclusion and marginalisation of Roma will continue to thwart any chance of their integration.</p>
<p>The second issue is at work within the Roma community. Having endured centuries of oppression, they find it hard to trust institutions and to believe that they can enjoy full equality. If their situation is to change, Roma need to learn how to make use of the opportunities that society has to offer in education, employment and careers, not least by actively standing up to defend their human and civil rights. Social inclusion is thus a two-way process. </p>
<p>But that process can be managed. At the University of Manchester, I’ve been teaching a course unit on Romani language and culture since 1996. I have seen generations of students take a genuine interest in Romani customs and history, making this the topic of their essays and then taking it upon themselves to enlighten colleagues and acquaintances about this vulnerable minority once they graduated and took on professional careers. </p>
<p>As a university, we have encouraged local schools and Council agencies to engage with the Roma, and offered background information on Roma culture to teachers, police officers and Council officials. Together with the Big Life Company and Sure Start, we offered training and support to Roma youth. </p>
<p>After all these efforts, Manchester City Council now reports that school attendance rates of Roma are <a href="http://romani.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/migrom/docs/MCCRomaReport2013.pdf">outstripping those of non-Roma</a>. There are no complaints about Roma behaviour, and the police are publicly dismissing any claims of Roma criminality. Young Roma have taken up positions as mediators and classroom assistants; others have gone on to college and university, and some have won prizes for community volunteering. Prejudice has seemingly declined and Roma participation has increased. Manchester has made social inclusion possible for Roma – and other cities in Britain might wish to draw on this experience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yaron Matras receives funding from the ESRC and AHRC.</span></em></p>Those who follow the situation of Europe’s Roma know that there is never a “dull” week in which we don’t hear of accusations, abuse, or even violence against them. Most events do not grab major headlines…Yaron Matras, Professor of Linguistics, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.