tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/melbourne-demons-3527/articlesMelbourne Demons – The Conversation2013-06-18T04:51:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/152862013-06-18T04:51:13Z2013-06-18T04:51:13ZWhat big business can learn from football<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/25723/original/qk9qvdbs-1371521717.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The sacking of Melbourne Demons Coach Mark Neeld has parallels to business management.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s often said the AFL has become a big business, increasingly embodying many of the rules of the marketplace. But people rarely look at it the other way - that is, how business is like the AFL.</p>
<p>The sacking of Melbourne Football Club coach Mark Neeld and the club’s crisis management around the event give us five important lessons on what big business can learn from football. In many ways, the AFL is a “microcosm” of the larger dynamics and challenges in leadership and management.</p>
<h2>1. We need better models of change</h2>
<p>Mark Neeld was dumped as Melbourne Demons coach after serving only half of his contract. CEO Peter Jackson <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/sport/afl/mark-neelds-time-at-melbourne-demons-over/story-fnca0u4y-1226664868051">says</a> “this is not about a single person called a senior coach” and is “a rebuild of the football club as a whole”. However, there’s a strong pattern in football of senior staff – especially the head coach – being the fall guys for poor performance.</p>
<p>The pattern was there when Neeld’s predecessor Dean Bailey was sacked in 2011, and again when former Carlton coach, Brett Ratten met the same fate last year.</p>
<p>In his book, “Adapt: Why Success Always Starts With Failure”, the <a href="http://timharford.com/">“undercover economist” Tim Harford</a> provides a powerful critique of the stories we tend to tell about change and problem-solving. “The [perceived] solution to any problem,” he writes, “is a new leader with a new strategy, whether it’s the coach of a football team, the new chief executive of a failing business, or a new president”.</p>
<p>The reality tends to be that expert judgement is flawed, leadership has limits, and problems get “solved” over time through ongoing experimentation and learning. The “new leader” model of change adopts a flawed command-and-control form of planning.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25726/original/8dnbbjqd-1371523397.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inexperienced coaches accelerated to senior positions - like former Carlton mentor Brett Ratten- can become fall guys for poor performance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/David Crosling</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>2. “Big data” has dangers as well as promise</h2>
<p>“Big data” refers to enormous growth in the volume and variety of data, and the speed with which data is created. We see this in modern football, with assistant coaches huddled over laptops and the increasing obsession with statistics and key metrics.</p>
<p>However, as Kenneth Cukier and Viktor Mayer-Schonberger <a href="http://www.technologyreview.com/news/514591/the-dictatorship-of-data/">recently argued</a>, related warnings are not being heeded: “big data also exacerbates a very old problem: relying on the numbers when they are far more fallible than we think”. They add that the risk is “big data” may lure us “to become so fixated on the data, and so obsessed with the power and promise it offers, that we fail to appreciate its inherent ability to mislead”.</p>
<p>Consistent with these observations, during the 2013 AFL season expert commentators often lament that the “key indicators” fail to predict the outcome of matches. Not that this stops ever more data on players movements and indicators being gathered.</p>
<p>Big data is related to the flawed “planners dream” – the desire to rationally calculate the best decisions and future through real-time data and more data rich modelling – and to predictive analytics. For today’s executives the planners dream is a seductive vision.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/25728/original/kngr8g6d-1371524099.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hawthorn looked good on paper to win last year’s AFL Grand Final: but the trouble with Big Data is it can be misleading.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Joe Castro</span></span>
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<h2>3. The past often isn’t a good guide to the future</h2>
<p>Consistent with the last lesson, the key indicators and winning tactics of previous seasons often aren’t so successful in future seasons. Carlton’s new coach, Mick Malthouse, has publicly acknowledged his need to significantly tweak and unlearn approaches that only two seasons ago were seen as the leading strategies and tactics in the league.</p>
<p>It’s hard not to see this issue as playing a role in Melbourne’s current crises. Malthouse’s apprentices - such as Mark Neeld - were seen as the next great coaches, having learnt from the best. But this perspective misses the harsh realities of this lesson.</p>
<h2>4. We need to abandon many traditional strategy and planning models</h2>
<p>Although the basics don’t change (get the ball down your team’s end and kick it through the big sticks), we frequently hear from past players and coaches how quickly footy is changing. This is similar to the remarks made by leaders and managers in business.</p>
<p>A complex, rapidly changing, world has a habit of making a nonsense of plans that look good on paper. And we’re unlikely to get it right the first time. In Tim Harford’s words, it’s often “impossible to know in advance what the correct strategy will be”. However, we’re yet to learn that this challenges the traditional models of planning and strategy.</p>
<p>In particular, we need to recognise the many flaws of the dominant “predict-and-plan” model. As the “rules of the game” change over time, in many ways we’re not playing the same game. Unlike the game of chess, where we make confident predictions based on our past experience of an unchanging game, we need more adaptive, learning-oriented models.</p>
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<span class="caption">Players and umpires alike are constantly adapting to the changing rules and dynamics of the game.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Tony McDonough</span></span>
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<h2>5. Sometimes we need buck trends, not follow them</h2>
<p>The AFL is full of trends, fashions and fads such as: <a href="http://www.foxsports.com.au/afl/afl-premiership/afl-coaches-association-chief-danny-frawley-laments-trend-away-from-older-coaches-in-the-afl/story-e6frf3e3-1226118984613#.Ub_OwPZ5hJF">chasing young assistant coaches</a> for senior roles ahead of experienced and successful coaches for instance; and the ever-growing multitude of tacticians and coaching staff scouring statistics and trends.</p>
<p>But the parallels to the world of business are obvious and important. Sometimes it’s a good idea to follow trends, but we shouldn’t unthinkingly follow the fashions of the day. Additionally, truly novel ideas tend to be at the core of great strategy, not trend analysis.</p>
<p>Overall, the AFL can be seen as a “microcosm” of wider key challenges facing leaders and managers in big business as well as politics. These lessons both provide insights for football administrators and suggest larger lessons for management and leadership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/15286/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen McGrail does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s often said the AFL has become a big business, increasingly embodying many of the rules of the marketplace. But people rarely look at it the other way - that is, how business is like the AFL. The sacking…Stephen McGrail, Lecturer, Swinburne University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/123922013-02-25T02:21:52Z2013-02-25T02:21:52ZPlaying to win: how the AFL can prevent tanking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20516/original/28kk4j9j-1361496066.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a way to ensure poor performing teams such as Greater Western Sydney and Melbourne play to win.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The AFL’s <a href="http://www.afl.com.au/news/2013-02-19/afl-full-statement-melbourne-tanking-penalties">recent decision</a> on whether the Melbourne Football Club “tanked” to secure draft picks in 2009 has left many confused. </p>
<p>While ruling that the Demons “did not set out to deliberately lose in any matches” in 2009, the AFL still fined the club $500,000 and has suspended then coach Dean Bailey and football operations manager Chris Connolly.</p>
<p>The system that led to the Demons’ suspected tanking, which awarded teams that won fewer than four games a priority pick in the subsequent draft, has since been <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-21/afl-punts-priority-pick/3842838">abandoned by the AFL</a>.</p>
<p>But the temptation to tank persists in the current draft system. Put simply, the team that finishes at the bottom of the ladder gets the highest draft picks. In the final few weeks of the season, then, there remains an incentive for poor performing teams to lose to ensure they attain (or maintain) the earliest possible selections in the draft.</p>
<p>There has to be a better way to ensure fans of poor performing teams can guarantee they can watch their team at least try to win at the end of the season. In that spirit, I’ve come up with the following proposal to discourage tanking.</p>
<h2>How it works</h2>
<p>This system is based on the premise that all clubs commence the season with the aim of playing finals football and maintain that aim for so long as they are a mathematical chance of making the finals.</p>
<p>For the purpose of draft selection, clubs are ranked in the order that they are eliminated from finals contention, regardless of their position on the ladder at the end of the season.</p>
<p>A club is eliminated from finals contention when, at the end of a completed round, the number of games remaining for that club is fewer than the number of wins or draws required to secure the lowest position on the ladder designated for finals qualification.</p>
<p>Where two or more teams fall from finals contention at the end of the same round (irrespective of the number of games won), the team with the best record in head-to-head games played between the clubs throughout the entire home and away season will secure the higher position in the draft.</p>
<h2>Rationale</h2>
<p>Presuming the original premise holds true, clubs have the incentive to try to win matches while they are still in contention to make the finals.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Number one draft pick in 2008, Jack Watts tackles Matthew Kreuzer, the number one pick from the year before.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Joe Castro</span></span>
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<p>And the disincentive to win matches (particularly late in the season) is removed even after clubs are eliminated from finals contention. In the situation where the club is the only one eliminated from finals contention at the end of a round, their subsequent win-loss record cannot alter their position in the draft. </p>
<p>The tie-breaking procedure will ensure that where two or more clubs are eliminated from finals contention in the same round, those clubs still have the incentive to win matches against each other in order to improve their head-to-head records while their results against all other teams will have no bearing on their ultimate position in the draft.</p>
<p>So clubs will have no incentive not to win matches in order to improve their draft position. More importantly, no club would ever be perceived to acquire any advantage by “tanking”.</p>
<h2>Applying the proposal to the 2012 Season</h2>
<p>So how would the last football season have played out under these rules for the bottom three teams?</p>
<p>At the end of round 15, Gold Cost was seven games behind eighth-placed St Kilda with eight games left to play, therefore mathematically still in finals contention.</p>
<p>By the end of round 16, Greater Western Sydney and Gold Coast were seven games behind eighth place with seven games to play. But both clubs were out of finals contention because ninth-placed North Melbourne had the same record as St.Kilda (eight wins to seven losses) and these two clubs were to meet later in the season. Either team winning that match (or even if they drew) would ensure Greater Western Sydney and Gold Coast could not make the final eight.</p>
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<span class="caption">Former Melbourne head coach and current Adelaide assistant Dean Bailey, received a 16 week coaching ban for his involvement in the Demons’ tanking scandal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Julian Smith</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Because the two teams were eliminated at the completion of the same round, they would then vie for picks one and two in the draft according to their head-to-head record. They had already met in round seven (Greater Western Sydney winning 94 to 67) and were due to meet again in Round 20, where Greater Western Sydney would take a 27-point advantage into the game. </p>
<p>So both teams would have had the incentive to win, but the Gold Coast would have had to win by 28 points or more to earn the superior draft selection.</p>
<p>At the end of Round 17, Melbourne were seven games behind eighth-placed North Melbourne with six games to play, so were eliminated from finals contention. At that point, Melbourne would secure pick three in the draft regardless of any other results before the end of the season.</p>
<p>The table below shows how the picks would have been distributed among the bottom ten teams under the proposed system, as compared to the current system.</p>
<figure><table><thead><tr><th>Pick</th><th>Current</th><th>Proposed</th><th>Round Secured</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>GWS</td><td>Gold Coast</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Gold Coast</td><td>GWS</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Melbourne</td><td>Melbourne</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Western Bulldogs</td><td>Western Bulldogs</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Port Adelaide</td><td>Port Adelaide</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>Brisbane</td><td>Brisbane</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>Richmond</td><td>Richmond</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>Essendon</td><td>Carlton</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>Carlton</td><td>Essendon</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>St.Kilda</td><td>St.Kilda</td><td>22</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>
<p>The finalists secure their order in the draft according to the order they are eliminated from the finals. Teams eliminated in the same week of the finals are ranked in order according to which of the two was ranked lower on the ladder at the end of the home and away season.</p>
<p>The bottom three teams collectively won five games in the final seven rounds without affecting their draft positions. Significantly, despite the fact the Gold Coast defeated Greater Western Sydney in round 20, this proposal would eliminate any suggestion that had Gold Coast lost the game, it might have done so to ensure they finish below GWS to secure an earlier draft pick.</p>
<p>In Round 21, Melbourne went into its game against Greater Western Sydney just one win ahead and, under the current system, may have had a disincentive to win to secure an earlier draft pick. Under this proposal, both clubs had already locked in their respective draft positions and the disincentive, perceived or otherwise, would be removed.</p>
<h2>Playing to win</h2>
<p>Some may argue tanking does not exist. Others looking at the 2012 example may point out that the final draft positions under the current system do not deviate significantly from that which would be derived from the proposal. But whether it actually occurred in 2012 or not, there is a public perception in some quarters that tanking does exist, and has occurred for a number of years.</p>
<p>My proposal definitively removes incentives, perceived or otherwise, to engage in tanking. It also preserves the integrity of the game. </p>
<p>But most importantly, it ensures that fans of Melbourne, the Gold Coast or Greater Western Sydney, can go to games knowing their teams have nothing to lose by winning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/12392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noel Boys does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The AFL’s recent decision on whether the Melbourne Football Club “tanked” to secure draft picks in 2009 has left many confused. While ruling that the Demons “did not set out to deliberately lose in any…Noel Boys, Teaching Fellow / Lecturer in Financial Accounting, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/86232012-08-04T00:50:16Z2012-08-04T00:50:16ZAFL and tanking: the cure might be worse than the disease<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13848/original/bk5j4wss-1344040868.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Did the Melbourne Demons lose matches deliberately? Or are they simply just not very good at the game of Australian Rules football?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Julian Smith</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sometimes denial is understandable.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise that the Australian Football League maintained for so long the farcical position that “tanking’ (intentionally losing) by clubs was not a problem. It’s their standard response to any issue threatening the League.</p>
<p>That changed last Monday when Carlton midfielder Brock McLean suggested on TV that he left the Melbourne Demons because the club had not been entirely serious about winning games of football, with the implication it was doing so to get high draft picks.</p>
<p>Now faced with a public relations disaster, the League has promised severe punishment, called for people to speak out, and brazenly pronounced the issue must not be swept under the carpet. But the trouble is the AFL has built incentives to tank into the structure of their competition. And any systematic attempts to deal with the problem might do more harm than good.</p>
<p>For all its corporatisation Australian Rules football remains driven by the passions of fans: it depends on the dreams of barrackers, along with their absurd faith that the team they love is destined to one day win the premiership. At the centre of it all is hope – that the new players, coach or gameplan will bring the glory that has been promised. That eventual triumph is on its way.</p>
<p>The Australian Football League has been alive to this, borrowing "equalisation” measures from their North American counterparts, the NFL, since the 1980s. For the intended outcome of the draft and salary cap is to reinforce the belief that every team will be able to compete equally for the premiership cup.</p>
<p>And despite various obstacles, these equalisation strategies have been remarkably successful. Indeed, while the growth in audiences – and thus revenue – of the AFL has generally been credited to the national expansion of the League, the equalisation strategies have been a key factor. Only five different clubs won a premiership in the two decades before the AFL began to expand its competition in 1988. Since then all bar the two most recent teams have played finals, fourteen have been a game away from the grand final, and ten have won the flag.</p>
<p>Much of this has been due to the national draft which rewards the poorest teams by giving them the first pick of the most promising young footballers in the league. And although it takes place around two months after the season has ended, the national draft has become an increasingly vital occasion in footy’s liturgical calendar. Across the country, alone and in groups, huddled around TV’s, radios and the internet, barrackers hope for the recruitment of a saviour: for the player, or players, who will lead their club to a premiership flag. </p>
<p>History gives these fans due cause for optimism. Early draft picks such as Scott Pendelbury and Dale Thomas (Collingwood), Lance Franklin and Jarryd Roughead (Hawthorn), and Chris Judd (West Coast) have all played key roles in premiership victories during the last decade.</p>
<p>It often makes sense then, for those clubs who cannot make the finals to try and lose rather than do everything possible to win. It’s a disturbing side-effect of equalisation, and something the AFL clearly needs to counter. But how?</p>
<p>The AFL is currently taking the line that it can police tanking, but apart from the most extreme cases, this is unlikely to be effective. Clubs down the bottom of the ladder often send key players off for season-ending surgery when they would still be able to play at a high level if the club was still competing for that year’s premiership. How can this be policed? Is the AFL to insist that it vet every decision to operate on a player?</p>
<p>A more effective solution would be to modify the draft. The AFL has already made one change by lowering the value of the priority picks given to teams who perform horrendously for two years in a row. A further step would be to create a lottery for the picks as the NBA has done in the US whereby the teams who finish lowest have more chance, but no guarantee, of being awarded the first draft pick. Unfortunately the most recent NBA season showed that this could simply lead to multiple teams tanking in order to try and “win” the first pick.</p>
<p>Even more radical is the suggestion of moving to a two-league relegation system. This would make winning of the utmost importance for the bottom teams, and augment the race to the flag with compelling narratives of survival and despair. Nevertheless, a two-tier league would require a huge injection of funds to create the second-tier, the abandonment of the equalisation strategies – or at least the draft – and increase the need for new fans from a relatively small population.</p>
<p>The AFL often seems impregnable. Despite the scandals and angst it marches on. Membership figures, crowd numbers, and television audiences have all increased markedly over the past decade. A key reason for this is that even when supporters become disaffected by the game they still love their club and buy into the dreams of future glory. But these dreams of glory are fragile, and it is the AFL’s need to nurture the hopes of barrackers that explains its reluctance to move firmly against tanking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/8623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Klugman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sometimes denial is understandable. It’s no surprise that the Australian Football League maintained for so long the farcical position that “tanking’ (intentionally losing) by clubs was not a problem. It’s…Matthew Klugman, Australian Research Council DECRA Fellow, Institute of Sport, Exercise and Active Living, Victoria UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.